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President: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).

AGENDA ITEM 85

**The situation in the Republic of the Congo
(continued)**

1. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (*translated from French*): Since this is my first speech since the death of our colleague the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Bisbé, I wish to take this opportunity to express my sympathy to the Cuban delegation and Government, on behalf of my delegation and my Government.

2. More than eight months have passed since the United Nations went to the Congo, at the request of that country's Central Government, in order to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as might be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces might be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet their tasks fully. The organs of the United Nations were also to take all necessary action to ensure the rapid withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo, including Katanga, to safeguard the territorial integrity and independence of the country and to take measures to enable the Central Government to restore public order, which would contribute effectively to the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. The peoples of the whole world sincerely hoped that the United Nations operation in the Congo would enable the Congo to rid itself of Belgian intervention, and would create a better atmosphere for the restoration of peace in that region, which has suffered so much from colonial exploitation.

4. But what is the position now that the United Nations organs and forces have been in the Congo for eight months? The situation in that country, far from improving, has become much worse. At this very moment, it is unanimously acknowledged that the mercenary bands of Mobutu and other agents in the pay of the Belgian colonialists have spread terror over a large part of Congolese territory, and in particular the Leopoldville region. In Katanga the Tshombé régime, established by the Belgian colonialists, survives only with the help of armed bands commanded by Belgian officers. According to the Conciliation Commission, all the indigenous peoples of Katanga are obviously in a state of terror which contrasts with the calm of the

foreign population, who are mainly Belgians. Political murders have been committed both in Katanga and in South Kasai. Whole villages have been sacked and burned and their inhabitants exterminated in order to bring certain regions under the authority of puppet régimes which they do not want. A large number of deputies and senators have been arbitrarily arrested, tortured and murdered.

5. Although the Congo is very rich in raw materials, and in spite of the enormous possibilities of the rational exploitation of its wealth, the country is now suffering from an unprecedented economic disaster. The disorganization of the public services, of the country's finances and of its whole economic life has had serious consequences for the very life of entire populations in the Congo. At the present time, the Republic of the Congo, an independent and unitary State whose territorial integrity was to have been protected by the action of the United Nations, has been divided by Belgian colonialists and distributed to their agents, so that they can continue to exploit the mineral wealth and the labour of the Congolese people with impunity.

6. What has happened? Why have the organs of the United Nations been prevented from carrying out their tasks? Why is it that the situation in this former Belgian colony, instead of improving after the arrival of the United Nations forces and their technical services, has considerably, and even dangerously, deteriorated?

7. One of the main reasons—I might even say the most important reason—is of course Belgian military intervention in the country. When the attempt to place Kasa-Vubu in the post of Prime Minister of the Congo had been foiled by the unshakable resistance of the Congolese Parliament, the Belgian colonialists undertook military intervention against the country. By force of arms, they began to dismember the Congo and to establish agents in their pay—Tshombé, Kalonji and others—in the southern regions, such as Katanga and South Kasai, which they had been able to separate from the rest of the country. By means of corruption, they ensured the success of the *coup d'état* carried out in Leopoldville by Mobutu, with the consent and support of Kasa-Vubu. After establishing their agents, such as Tshombé, Kalonji, Kasa-Vubu, Mobutu and others, in the various provinces of the country, the Belgian colonialists tried to keep the Congo firmly divided by means of their so-called military advisers and the civilians who pulled the strings of these puppets.

8. But, in order to gain their ends, the Belgian colonialists and their agents were forced in the interior of the country to crush the resistance of the Congolese people, of the Congolese patriots and, in particular, of those leaders who were faithful to the struggle for the independence, territorial integrity and unity of the Congo. In the eyes of the Belgian colonialists, the very existence of these leaders was a serious obstacle to the

fulfilment of their plan to subjugate the country. The Belgian colonialists were convinced that they would not be able to carry out their criminal plan to dismember the Republic of the Congo while these patriots were alive. They decided therefore at once to have a number of influential members of the Central Government murdered, in particular Patrice Lumumba. The only reason why they did not decide to eliminate them at the beginning was because they feared the indignation of world public opinion. At that time such a provocation might have endangered their criminal schemes. The Belgian colonialists and their agents did not decide to act until they had made careful preparations and brought about conditions in which they could carry out their schemes under the protection of the organs of the United Nations.

9. Belgium would not have considered or embarked upon such an undertaking without the consent and support of its powerful allies in NATO, or in particular—we note with regret—without the close and constant co-operation of certain organs of the United Nations. It seems that the Belgians had always considered such co-operation necessary to the fulfilment of the wicked schemes of the colonialists.

10. The United Nations operation in the Congo, undertaken at the request of the Central Government in order to ensure the expulsion of the Belgian troops from the country and to restore order was from the very beginning of assistance to the colonialists—through the various organs of the United Nations and, in particular, through the Secretary-General—in carrying out their evil deeds against the Congolese people. Under the pretext of impartiality, the United Nations Command, on the instructions of the Secretary-General, deprived the Central Government of all means of communication with the people and the outside world. This impartiality between law and illegality naturally led to the paralysis of the Central Government—to which, under the terms of the Security Council resolutions, the United Nations forces were to provide military assistance—and gave a free hand to the rebellious and anti-national separatists in the pay of the Belgian colonialists. This hypocritical impartiality was thus the grossest partiality in favour of the colonialists and the quislings in their service. The rebellion of Mobutu—a most serious act of disorder precisely of the kind which the United Nations forces had been sent to prevent—gave the Secretary-General new opportunities to transform the isolation of the Central Government and of its Head of State into a veritable state of arrest. The murders of the Congolese politicians, indomitable patriots fighting with all their energy to defend the independence of their country, were organized under the protection and with the co-operation of the United Nations organs, which the Belgian colonialists and their agents enjoyed and continue to enjoy in the various provinces of the Congo.

11. One has only to read the report of the Conciliation Commission [A/4711] to see clearly who organized and carried out this policy, although the Commission seems to have done everything possible to avoid hurting the feelings or certain persons.

12. When in last November, in spite of the urgent warnings of many countries, certain delegations succeeded in imposing and passing off on to the General Assembly the group constituted by Kasa-Vubu as the delegation of the Congo it was stated that Kasa-Vubu was the only Congolese leader who was above the

conflict. Now the Conciliation Commission's report shows that Kasa-Vubu played a leading part in organizing the murder of Lumumba and his colleagues. By sending Lumumba to Katanga, in the alleged interests of his safety, Kasa-Vubu took the initiative in organizing the murder. He did everything possible to prevent the Conciliation Commission from visiting Lumumba or any other political prisoner held with him. In January and February, all the Commission's efforts to do so were drawn into a vicious circle of obstacles: Kasa-Vubu, Tshombé, Delvaux and Iléo all blamed one another, in that order and then in the reverse order; the Commission was refused interviews and delayed in every way, and so on.

13. It might well be asked whether all these moves were a matter of mere chance. No, it was not a simple coincidence that Kasa-Vubu allowed the Commission to contact the political prisoners only on 18 January, that is to say immediately after Lumumba and his colleagues had been transferred to Katanga. That was Kasa-Vubu's way of preventing any contact with Lumumba, a way which he must have learnt from his spiritual mentors. It was not a simple coincidence that Kasa-Vubu refused to hold discussions with the Commission between 7 and 14 February, granting it an interview only on 14 February, or immediately after news of the brutal murder of Lumumba and his comrades in arms had arrived. Nor was it by mere chance that the following meeting between the Commission and Kasa-Vubu was fixed in advance for 20 February, or after the execution of Mr. Finant and his colleagues in Bakwanga.

14. So many chances and coincidences would be too much, even in a bad film. In real life, and especially in this particular case, they show only one thing—that the political murders committed in the Congo were the result of a wide organization, involving not only the Belgian colonialists but all their agents in the Congo, such as Tshombé, Kasa-Vubu, Mobutu, Kalonji and others, and that Kasa-Vubu knew the very day and hour on which these murders were to be committed.

15. Throughout this period, Mr. Hammarskjöld turned a deaf ear to the repeated warnings of several Members of the United Nations, who informed him that the lives of Lumumba and his comrades in arms were seriously threatened; he was content merely to write letters and notes, in order to entertain the spectators. Under such conditions how could any person continue to trust a man who has done his utmost to help the colonialists restore their domination in the Congo, although in new forms, and has precipitated the Congolese crisis to a point where it has become a threat to world peace. In any case, such a man can have no place at the head of the executive department of an organization whose principal purposes are the protection of human rights, of international legality and of peace.

16. All these activities of Hammarskjöld and his services in the Congo could not pass unperceived. The Congolese people and the other recently liberated African peoples began to see the United Nations as an instrument of imperialist policy. Inevitably this soon brought shame and disgrace on the Organization itself, and dealt a serious blow to its prestige in the eyes of world public opinion. This is why the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria declared on 17 February 1961 that:

"... in these circumstances to maintain Dag Hammarskjöld in the office of Secretary-General of the United Nations would be incompatible with the most elementary prerequisites for the future normal functioning of the United Nations. The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria has no confidence whatsoever in Dag Hammarskjöld, considers that he can no longer occupy the office of Secretary-General, and declares that in future it will maintain no relations with him."¹

17. Faced with the disastrous results of his policy in the Congo—for he has a policy of his own, not that of the United Nations but that of the colonizers and imperialists whose interests he is defending—Dag Hammarskjöld should draw the obvious conclusion and resign as soon as possible. Here, from this rostrum, the President of Ghana [961st meeting] and other speakers proposed a radical reorganization of the United Nations command in the Congo and of the other bodies responsible for settling the Congolese situation. These are certainly proposals for a peaceful and expeditious solution of the Congo crisis. Nevertheless, one might well ask whether such an initiative would not be doomed to failure again if any bodies thus constituted were to receive instructions and directives for their work from a Secretary-General who has already adopted an attitude and is following a policy distinctly in favour of the colonialists and their allies.

18. I understand why some of the representatives of Western countries are busy defending Hammarskjöld's policy and even his person. In doing so, they are defending their own policy and interests, for the policy followed by Hammarskjöld is based on these interests; as a result the situation in the Congo has become even more embittered, the Belgian colonialists have penetrated more deeply into the country's institutions and their agents have been established in authority in some of the provinces of the Congo. We understand also why Dag Hammarskjöld is busy finding reasons—however futile—to remain in his present post as long as possible. He wants, first of all, to carry out the tasks entrusted to him—or, rather, to execute the orders given to him—by the colonialists and their powerful allies, on which he had set his heart. He is also anxious not to have to leave his post in such tragic and compromising circumstances, which cannot but have a disastrous effect on his personal prestige. It is quite easy to understand these preoccupations, but we do not see why the delegations of those countries that are really concerned and sincerely wish for a settlement of the Congo question in bearing in mind the interests of the people of the Congo and the need to safeguard peace throughout the world refuse to admit that Hammarskjöld must be dismissed immediately from his post as Secretary-General. They should understand that the sooner he goes, the better it will be for the United Nations, for the application of the noble Principles of the United Nations Charter, and for the safeguarding of world peace.

19. They should understand also that the tasks which our Organization must carry out at the present juncture are beyond the strength of one man alone. At the present stage of history one man alone is not able to interpret the decisions and policy of the United Nations. This is perfectly clear, not only to those who have said so from this rostrum but also, and even more, to Hammarskjöld

himself. But he persists in his line of conduct because it is his own interest that he is defending, as well as the interests of the imperialists and colonialists.

20. Suppose for a moment that the functions of the Secretary-General had been carried out by representatives of the three great groups of States which make up our present international community—a representative of the neutral countries, a representative of the socialist countries and a representative of the western countries—instead of by a representative of the western countries only, as is the case at present with Hammarskjöld. The results obtained by the United Nations in the Congo would have been very different, there can be no doubt of that.

21. The first measure envisaged in the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly was the immediate withdrawal or, if necessary, the expulsion of Belgian military and other personnel from the Congo. If there had been a body with three qualified representatives at its head, this task would have been satisfactorily completed long ago. The least that could have been expected in such a case was that such a body would not allow Mobutu's bands of criminals to threaten the peace and stability of the Congo. It would not have countenanced the isolation and arrest of the Prime Minister of the Congo, the chief of the Central Government, which is the only government invested with authority by the Congolese Parliament. The Ghanaian troops that were stationed at Port Francqui when Mr. Lumumba arrived would never have been ordered not to release him, as they wished and intended to do; on the contrary, they would have received an order to snatch him from the clutches of Mobutu's bands of criminals and protect his freedom. Such an organization as I have just described, composed of representatives of the three groups of States, would not have allowed the disgraceful parleys to be held with the secessionists and Belgian puppets in Katanga and elsewhere, for to parley with them is to give them prestige in the eyes of the people they are terrorizing with their armed bands commanded by Belgian Officers; that is to say, encourage them to continue on the path of secession.

22. We shall not waste time on the other questions relating to the Congo which would have been satisfactorily solved if such a body had existed instead of the post wrongly occupied by Hammarskjöld. What we should like to emphasize, however, is that, far from leading to the destruction of the United Nations (as some speakers have tried to make us believe), a body of this kind would strengthen the Organization and ensure that its decisions were carried out after more reflection and in a way that was in accordance with its purposes. This reorganization of the Secretariat is all the more necessary because the conflicts between the reactionary forces of colonialism and the forces of progress within the United Nations have not ceased.

23. The crimes perpetrated by the colonial Powers in the Congo with the complicity or the assistance of the United Nations must never be allowed to recur, either in Africa or elsewhere. The continuing protection granted to the Belgian colonialists by Hammarskjöld—and, on his instructions, by the United Nations—has encouraged them to work openly for the disintegration of the Congo. The Tananarive Conference was the culmination of this policy to divide and dismember the Congo. As there is a Parliament properly elected by the Congolese people, this "Round Table" conference is nothing but a flagrant violation of the elementary principles of demo-

¹ Official Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4720.

crazy and of the fundamental rights of the Congolese people. If someone is to decide the future of the Congo, it is not leaders appointed by no one but Belgian colonialists, but the regularly constituted Parliament of the Congolese people. If the *Loi fondamentale* of the Congo is to be amended or a change is to be made in the system of government, again this may be done only by the elected Parliament and by it alone.

24. What is strange is that the attempt of the Belgian colonialists to perpetuate the dismemberment and division of the Congo seems to have the support of some members of the Commission that was sent to the Congo by the Secretary-General. For instance, in the conclusions of the report of the Conciliation Commission on the situation in the Republic of the Congo, dated 20 March 1961, the following is to be found:

"The Commission, therefore, suggests that a summit meeting of Congolese political leaders be convened in the near future at a neutral place, outside the territory of the Republic if necessary, with a view to achieving national reconciliation and agreement on the formation of a government of national unity and on measures necessary to re-establish normal conditions, and on desired changes in the *Loi fondamentale* concerning the structure of the Congo, more especially in the direction of greater decentralization of the powers of the Central Government . . ." [A/4711, para. 136].

25. You will recall that the Commission went to the Congo with clearly defined terms of reference, which were to study the situation and to direct their efforts "without interference in the internal affairs of the Congo, towards the attainment by the Congolese of solutions . . . which will be conducive to the maintenance and strengthening of the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of the Congo, within the framework of the constitutional and legal structure of the Republic of the Congo . . ." [ibid., para. 2]. These were the Commission's terms of reference: "within the framework of the constitutional and legal structure of the Republic of the Congo". In that case, how is it that, in spite of these clear terms of reference, the Commission is concerned—or at least some of its members are concerned—with changes to be made in the Congolese Constitution and to the country's present system of government? Is it not contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations, to the Commission's terms of reference to advise changes in the Constitution of the Congo and to suggest that "in present conditions a federal form of government can alone preserve the national unity and territorial integrity of the Congolese State" [ibid., para. 134]?

26. The interpretation of the terms "federation" and "confederation" given by the secessionists, or rather by their Belgian advisers, is well known. The conference at Tananarive of those who assassinated Patrice Lumumba and the Congolese patriots and destroyed the constitutional structure of the Congo has thrown light enough on that point. The confederation that they propose for the Congo can lead only to its division and dismemberment. Such a "solution" could only favour the designs of the Belgian colonizers and their allies. If any proof of this was needed, it is to be found in the statement made by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs on 13 March, at the end of the Tananarive Conference:

"The Tananarive Conference, he said, may and should be considered as a decisive political event for the independent Congo . . . (It) reflects a policy that we have patiently followed."

The Belgians have indeed patiently followed such a policy. In these circumstances, it is easy to understand why the responsible leaders of the Congo—the ones who were elected by universal suffrage—refused to participate in the Tananarive Conference. It was because true Congolese patriots could not sit at the same table with traitors and assassins. It was because they could not participate in a Conference which aimed at parcelling out and disintegrating the Republic of the Congo. It was because there are things which cannot be reconciled, even with the best will in the world; patriotism cannot be reconciled with treachery.

27. Moreover, why substitute a conference of leaders for the Parliament elected by universal suffrage? In any event, the Conciliation Commission itself very rightly notes that "the present crisis will not be solved unless Parliament is reconvened without delay" [ibid., para. 139]. That is a recommendation that no one could oppose, except the colonialists and their lackeys. The astonishing thing is that some speakers seem to be quite unaware of this indispensable measure, which was urged by the last resolution of the Security Council.² Instead of that, what they preached from this rostrum—while disclaiming any wish to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo—was that the Congo must be given a federal structure, because, according to them, that would be more in line with the actual situation in Africa. Just imagine that! Do I have to remind you again that the Congolese people alone is entitled to decide the form of government that they wish to have, and they have the right to do so freely and without foreign interference. We are sorry that such ideas have been put forward by representatives of African countries. By doing so, they are supporting the Belgian proposals to dismember the Congo, unintentionally perhaps for we do not wish to cast doubt on their good intentions or their good faith.

28. The question now facing our Organization once again is what decisions must be taken to settle the Congolese question. Many proposals have been put before us. Some suggestions have been made for the peaceful settlement of the situation in accordance with the interests of the Congolese people. Nevertheless, there are some questions which must be settled without delay if our Organization wishes peace to be restored in the Congo and in the whole of Africa.

29. First and foremost, it is absolutely necessary to ensure the immediate withdrawal of the Belgian armed forces and military equipment from the Congo whatever the cost, even by force if necessary, and of all the so-called advisers and specialists who were sent there to strengthen the position of the Belgian colonialists. There can be no doubt that as long as the Belgians remain in the Congo, even as advisers of different political factions and their armed bands, there can be neither pacification of the Congo nor any solution of the Congolese problem which is in the interests of the people of this unfortunate country, or of the peoples of Africa or of the whole of Africa.

30. Secondly, it will be absolutely necessary to disarm the bands of mercenaries belonging to Mobutu and the other Belgian puppets in the Congo, for that will enable the Congolese people to live without fear and to breathe freely at last. This is the only way in which we can ensure that it will be possible to convene the Congolese parliament, which can and must carry out its duties to the country. Thus and thus only can we find a peaceful solu-

² Ibid., document S/4741.

tion to the situation. The parliament alone has the right and the power to amend the Constitution and modify the system of government in the Congo, if this is shown to be necessary.

31. Lastly, the assassins of Lumumba and the other Congolese patriots must be brought to justice.

32. As soon as the Belgian colonialists have left the country and the bands of mercenaries have been disarmed, the United Nations should withdraw its forces and its administrative units from the Congo so as to leave the Congolese people free to settle their own affairs.

33. The USSR has proposed a time-limit of two months for carrying out these measures. We are certain that, with application and good will, this will be ample. The tasks and measures specified in the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions since the beginning of the United Nations operation in the Congo could have been carried out with little delay and still can be—we are convinced of that. Now more than ever, it is necessary to carry them out within such a time limit if peace is to be restored in the Congo and throughout Africa, if the United Nations wishes to assist the Congolese people to settle their own affairs. It is not yet too late to carry out these tasks effectively and rapidly, particularly in view of the equipment and forces that the United Nations has sent to the country.

34. But to achieve this, the United Nations bodies must co-operate, not with the Belgian puppets but with the Central Government of the Congo, effectively and continuously. Indeed, the only government that the Congolese Parliament has approved and invested with authority is the government of Patrice Lumumba, which has its headquarters at Stanleyville, under the direction of Antoine Gizenga, the Deputy Prime Minister regularly appointed by Parliament. A large number of countries which are anxious to see the Congo return to normal conditions and the Congolese people become masters within their own borders, have recognized this government as the only legitimate government of the Congo. The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is among those that have recognized the government led by Mr. Antoine Gizenga as the only government of the Congo.

35. Mr. Gizenga's government is not only the legitimate government of the country; it is the only one that has shown itself willing to co-operate in carrying out the tasks of the United Nations in the Congo, which it has done on several occasions, whereas the puppet régimes set up by the Belgian colonialists do nothing but sabotage all the decisions of our Organization. It is this government which is pressing for the Belgian military personnel and so-called specialists to leave the country. It is his government which is calling for the immediate assembly of the Congolese parliament. It is this government, under Mr. Antoine Gizenga, which is struggling to ensure that the Congo will remain an independent, unified and sovereign country. It is obvious, under these conditions, that if the United Nations is determined to enforce these measures, which have been repeatedly adopted and have become an integral part of all the resolutions, it is only in close co-operation with this government that it can rapidly and effectively enforce the decisions adopted and carry out the measures envisaged with regard to the Congo.

36. In conclusion, allow me to quote a passage from the statement of the Bulgarian Government of 17 February:³

"The Bulgarian people is convinced that the heroic struggle of the Congolese people for freedom and independence will be crowned with success, despite all the intrigues and crimes of the colonialists and their allies."

Let me assure the Assembly that the People's Republic of Bulgaria is still firmly convinced of this.

37. Mr. RAKOTOMALALA (Madagascar) (*translated from French*): I would like to join with those who spoke before me and convey to the delegation of Cuba the deepest sympathy of the Malagasy Republic on the death of the distinguished representative of that country, Mr. Bisbé.

38. At this stage of the debate on the Congo, when so many speakers from this rostrum have already analysed the course of events since the last meeting of the Security Council and proposed what steps should, in their opinion, be taken, the delegation of the Malagasy Republic will not take up much of the Assembly's time. It does, however, deem it essential to express its opinion on certain aspects of the situation, and to reaffirm the principles which its Government regards as the only ones which can lead to a lasting solution.

39. The first of these principles is that the United Nations should help the Congo to overcome a difficult situation but should in no way attempt to take the place of the Congolese Government in order to impose any political measures on it from the outside. On that point, most of the speakers who preceded me appear to be in agreement. The Congo is a sovereign State; it is a Member of the United Nations like all other States here present. Nothing in the Charter, which is still our only Constitution and on which our rights are exclusively based, can justify any interference in its internal affairs. Moreover, the relationship between the United Nations and the Congo should be governed by the usages and customs which are normal in international affairs.

40. The Malagasy Government took proper account of the evidence given here showing not only that the United Nations representative in Leopoldville no longer enjoyed the confidence of the local authorities, but had adopted an attitude towards them, and in particular, towards the Chief of State, which had made any co-operation difficult. Whatever views there may be regarding the similarity between the position of the United Nations representative and that of an ambassador, the United Nations representative, like an ambassador, is accredited to the Chief of State. He cannot be regarded—and he should not regard himself—as the all powerful proconsul of a colony, who simply dictates his orders to the local authorities without deigning to consult them, and without even taking the trouble to engage in personal contacts or exchanges of views with the local Chief. Apparently, that is what has happened in recent months and may recur unless there is a drastic change not only in methods, but, if that proves inadequate, in the people concerned. It may be feared that such a change would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. We strongly believe that, on the contrary, the maintenance of this abnormal situation in order not to displease a group of Powers would be a sign of manifest weakness.

41. Since the meetings of the Security Council, an important event has taken place: the meeting, at Tananarive, of the political leaders of the Congo. The meeting was merely the outcome of preparatory talks which began at Brazzaville when twelve African Heads of State assembled there in December 1960 and persuaded

³ *Ibid.*, document S/4720.

a number of Congolese leaders to come and discuss with them the need for a round-table conference at which they would explain their differences and, in a spirit of brotherhood, seek to achieve the reconciliation which was indispensable.

42. I would point out that the Government of the Malagasy Republic heard about the possibility of a decision by the Congolese leaders to meet in Tananarive only through the radio and the press agencies. Mr. Philibert Tsiranana, President of the Malagasy Republic, immediately cabled Mr. Kasa-Vubu to tell him that, if the news was correct, the Malagasy Republic would be happy to receive its African brothers on its soil and would take all necessary steps to make them welcome, house them, ensure their safety and the freedom of their deliberations. Hospitality is one of the qualities which the Africans regard as most sacred. In Madagascar, it assumes its full meaning when relatives or friends in need seek shelter. Thus, I have noted with the deepest appreciation the very friendly congratulations addressed to my Government and the Malagasy people by Mr. Shukairy, the eloquent representative of Saudi Arabia. Those congratulations are only partly deserved because, I would stress this point, the Malagasy Republic did not take the initiative in proposing the Tananarive Conference; its only merit was to offer its hospitality to its Congolese brothers.

43. The Congolese leaders did not begin work immediately because they wanted to give Mr. Gizenga, who was the only one absent from the meeting, every opportunity to join them at the round-table. The deliberations were held at the Palace of the Presidency, at Andafiavaratra. They were closed and the Malagasy Republic took absolutely no part in them.

44. I would recall that the following persons were present: Mr. Kasa-Vubu, Chief of State of the Congo (Leopoldville), Mr. Tshombé (Katanga), Mr. Kalonji (South Kasai), Mr. Mukenge (North Kasai), Mr. Iléo, Prime Minister of the Leopoldville Government, Mr. Kamitatu (Leopoldville Province), Mr. Moana (Central Congo), Mr. Bolikango, Deputy Prime Minister, delegate from Equateur Province, Mr. Bondekye (Oriental Province), Mr. Antoine Kianu (Maniema), Mr. Kabangi (Lomami), Mr. Kulumba, delegate from Kwango and Mr. Ndjoku, delegate from Mango. As you see, all political trends and all provinces were represented. Mr. Gizenga was, unfortunately, the only one not present.

45. After five days of deliberation, a resolution was unanimously adopted, and, while I do not wish to encroach upon the time of the Assembly, I should like to take the liberty of reading a few passages, because I have found that some of the provisions of the agreement have not been made known to the General Assembly, and the Assembly certainly has the right—and, I would add—the duty to know all the facts in order to form an objective opinion.

46. Article 1 says that the whole of the territory of the former Belgian Congo shall constitute a confederation of States; article 2 states that the confederation shall be represented on the international level by the President of the confederation, Mr. Joseph Kasa-Vubu being recognized as the President of the confederation; article 3 specifies that the President of the confederation and the Presidents of the Member States shall constitute the Council of State; article 6 states that the Council of State shall be responsible for deciding the general internal and international policy of the confederation;

lastly, article 7 provides that a co-ordinating organ shall be established to ensure co-ordination between States and that it shall be solely responsible for ensuring the execution of decisions taken by the Council of State.

47. The Malagasy people, which extended a specially warm welcome to its Congolese brothers, has cause to believe that the latter did not fail to notice the calm which prevails in the great island, the atmosphere of peace and serenity which is felt as soon as one arrives in Madagascar. The truth is that the Government, headed by President Philibert Tsiranana, has succeeded in providing a harmonious and friendly settlement for a situation due to the presence in Madagascar of eighteen tribes differing in origin, customs and practices. It is possible that these surroundings helped the Congolese delegates to recognize an elementary truth: within a family, whatever may be the conflicts of interest, the ties of blood cannot be severed.

48. I am aware that it is considered good form in some circles to underestimate the results of the Tananarive Conference. Of course, they do not represent a miracle cure or a panacea. But for the first time, no one of good faith can deny that the political leaders who hitherto had been stiffening their original positions and treating the others with sarcasm and hatred agreed to talk it over quietly and arrived at solutions. To deny that result is to show bad faith. But to betray scepticism because certain points have to be clarified and to want the situation to change completely overnight is also to commit a serious error of judgement to which the Government of the Malagasy Republic feels compelled to draw the General Assembly's attention.

49. Let nobody come here to browbeat us with solemn and pompous phrases about the indivisibility of the Congo. We proclaim strongly and clearly that it is wholly against the principle of self-determination of peoples to forbid them to establish a confederation if they feel that that is the only form of government which suits them and which can safeguard their dearest possession: peace. Let us take care not to argue on grounds of the political interest of any given country. Let us rather think of the poverty and suffering of the Congolese people and its yearning for tranquillity and peace.

50. There is also another point which the Malagasy delegation would like to make. It considers that an objective examination of events would make short work of the allegations that President Kasa-Vubu and his Congolese leaders who met in Tananarive are resolutely and definitively hostile to the United Nations. If they were not to trample the national honour under foot, they could not very well disregard actions and attitudes which represent a totally unjustified interference, in fact and in law, in the internal sovereignty of their State. A minimum of courtesy and forbearance, a few gestures of consideration for the fact is that the Congo is not a United Nations colony—would have smoothed over differences which the Malagasy Republic, like all members of this Assembly, deeply regrets. But it also wants a peaceful settlement.

51. I promised to be brief. Other speakers, representing States which took part in the Brazzaville Conference, have examined or mentioned other aspects of the problems of the Congo which I did no more than touch on in my statement.

52. In the opinion of the Malagasy Republic, there is one authority which nobody has challenged and which

has been recognized by Mr. Gizenga himself: that of President Kasa-Vubu, whose delegation has been seated here by a clear and definitive decision of the General Assembly. We should leave it to the Congolese themselves to define the type of government they want, and we have not the least cause for opposing the establishment of a confederation. Of course, the Congolese people should subsequently be asked to ratify the decisions of their leaders. But we have absolutely no right to determine the procedure and date of such ratification. The Congolese will have to do so at the appropriate time. There can be no question of disarming the Congolese National Army. There can be no question of barring foreign missions from Leopoldville. It is not the business of the United Nations, in this hapless country, to carry out the particular policies of the Governments which have contributed military contingents, and those contingents should no longer be answerable to those Governments to any extent whatsoever.

53. While the future existence of the Congo is a matter of concern to the whole free world, it is primarily an African issue, and above all a matter strictly for the Congolese. The Malagasy Republic deplors the fact that disunity is being fostered and deems it to be a clear violation of the Charter for any State to recognize a local authority—in this instance, that of Gizenga—in opposition to the Chief of State. We appeal to the General Assembly not to allow itself to be dragged into decisions contrary to the Charter which would be tantamount to an inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State.

54. Those are the principles which my Government has instructed me to uphold from this rostrum. On its behalf, I wish to express the hope that United Nations technical assistance will be continued, under the authority of the Secretary-General to whom my Government expresses its confidence and gratitude. It hopes that, bearing in mind essentially and primarily the distress and suffering of the Congolese people, we shall refrain from using them as pawns in our political warfare. In observance of those principles, the Malagasy Government fervently hopes that peace will be restored to the Congo and that the United Nations will emerge from its painful experience there with greater stature and renewed vigour.

55. The PRESIDENT: The Chair would like to intervene at this stage to refer to the following matter.

56. Representatives may remember that, during the first part of the fifteenth session, the Assembly accorded certain special financial authorizations to the Secretary-General in connexion with the operation in the Congo. The authorizations in question were accorded for a limited period and they expire on 31 March 1961. The Fifth Committee, which has been considering the finances of the Congo operation, decided today that the authorization should be extended for a further limited period. The text of the Fifth Committee's draft resolution on the subject will be circulated as soon as possible.

57. For obvious reasons, the Fifth Committee is very anxious that the General Assembly should deal with the matter without delay. Subject to the permission of the Assembly, therefore, I would propose to ask the Assembly to turn its attention to the resolution recommended by the Fifth Committee at the close of the debate this evening.

58. Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan): It was with great shock that we learned of the sudden demise of

Mr. Manuel Bisbé of Cuba, and I count it my painful duty to express to the delegation of Cuba our profound sympathy in the grievous loss which it has sustained.

59. My country is wholeheartedly in sympathy with the legitimate desires of peoples now under colonial status to shape their own destiny. We are eager to assist them in their efforts ultimately to gain independence, and we do so because in the last analysis they alone can promote their national welfare, freed from any external intervention. My delegation, however, has followed with serious concern the unhappy events in the Republic of the Congo since its independence, which have developed into a dangerous situation. The report of the Conciliation Commission states: "If a political solution to the present crisis is not found urgently, very grave events will occur that will endanger not only the Congo but also Africa and indeed the whole world" [A/4711, para. 115]. Because of the seriousness of this situation, my delegation wishes to clarify at this juncture my country's basic position on this problem.

60. Broadly speaking, we see in the activities of the United Nations in the Congo a significant and important first step towards the future international order; the United Nations, historically speaking, may be ushering in a new era. In this sense my delegation feels that the United Nations operation in the Congo should not be allowed to fail. If it does, we shall have failed in the mission of the Organization. My delegation is, therefore, prepared wholeheartedly to support this endeavour to the extent feasible in our country.

61. My delegation would like, however, to point out that it would be well to bear in mind certain common-sense bases in carrying out the United Nations operation in the Congo.

62. First, even though the Congo is an African problem and, even though for that reason the African continent should have the primary concern and interest in the execution of the operation, we firmly believe, nevertheless, that the basic approach to the problem must be global and universal. The United Nations is involved in the maintenance of peace and security in the Congo as an integral part of world peace and security. It would be unwise to insist that the operation maintain a local or continental character at the sacrifice of the interests of the world as such. The global and the universal must be upheld.

63. Regarding the composition of the United Nations Force, the Secretary-General, in his first report⁴ on the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960, referred to the report in A/3943, which states:

"In order to limit the scope of possible differences of opinion, the United Nations in recent operations has followed two principles: not to include units from any of the permanent members of the Security Council; and not to include units from any country which, because of its geographical position or for other reasons, might be considered as possibly having a special interest in the situation which has called for the operation."

The first principle—that is, not to include units from any of the permanent members of the Security Council—has been applied in the case of the Congo. However, the application of the second principle has been modified in the Congo in the light of African solidarity within

⁴ *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4389.

the framework of the United Nations. I merely wish to point out this fact.

64. The second point which my delegation would like to make in this connexion is the importance of realizing the limitation of this Organization as to its function and power. We must note that the instrument we are working with in this most delicate and difficult situation in the Congo is rather fragile and imperfect. It must be used with care and prudence; otherwise, we may break the instrument itself.

65. The third point which my delegation would like to make is that we should not, in any circumstances, lose the sense of proportion. It is important for the success of the operation that a sense of proportion be kept in its conception, in its undertaking, in its scope, and in its financial backing. If not, the operation may do harm to the very foundations of the United Nations. Having said this, I should like to take up certain basic issues concerning the Congo.

66. The first and most important objective of the United Nations operation in the Congo has been to achieve the elimination of outside interference. However, the report of the Conciliation Commission still points to continuing foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Congo and also states that such interference has compounded the complexity and gravity of the crisis and has largely counteracted the efforts of the United Nations to assist the Congolese to resolve their difficulties.

67. The Security Council, in its resolution adopted on 22 July 1960⁵ requested all States:

“... to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo.”

The General Assembly, in resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960 called upon all States

“... to refrain from the direct and indirect provision of arms or other materials of war and military personnel and other assistance for military purposes in the Congo during the temporary period of military assistance through the United Nations, except upon the request of the United Nations through the Secretary-General for carrying out the purposes of this resolution and of the resolutions of 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960 of the Security Council.”

68. However, since November some of the Congo leaders seem to have done everything possible to strengthen the troops under their command, and have even called upon foreign Powers for technical, financial and military assistance, outside the framework of the United Nations. Such assistance has not always been refused, in spite of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. The various armed groups have been reinforced recently by receiving large quantities of arms and munitions from various sources and by increasing numbers of foreign officers and military advisers. In Katanga it has been observed that a few military planes have arrived and that a foreign legion has been formed. In these circumstances, the Security Council in its resolution of 21 February urged that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all foreign military and

paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command. The said resolution also called upon all States “to take immediate and energetic measures to prevent the departure of such personnel for the Congo from their territories, and for the denial of transfer and other facilities to them.”

69. The report of the Conciliation Commission says in its conclusion,

“All the Congolese leaders interviewed by the Commission referred in forthright terms to the necessity of putting an end to foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Congo . . . The Commission is convinced that no conciliation can be achieved unless foreign interference in all forms is stopped. Consequently, the Commission cannot emphasize too strongly the need for the United Nations to take urgent and effective measures for the immediate enforcement of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions . . . The Commission feels that an appeal should be made to all States to abstain from any kind of interference in the internal affairs of a country and, in particular, to avoid assuming any attitude which might aggravate the opposition between the different tendencies in the Congo and thus make reconciliation more difficult.”

70. My delegation strongly supports the views of the Commission mentioned above. In this connexion, I wish to note the obligations of all Member States under Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council and to afford mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council. My delegation feels that the strengthening of the United Nations authority is necessary and desirable thus to enable it to take strong and effective measures.

71. My delegation recalls, in this connexion, the measures which were taken by the Security Council when it examined the question of Lebanon. It is the view of my delegation that in the case of the Congo, it would be advisable to set up an operation of observation and control similar to the one which was effective in calming the crisis in Lebanon. It seems very appropriate that the Secretary-General should present to the Security Council the report based on observations which would be made by a United Nations organ on the spot, as the United Nations observation group in Lebanon did in the past. These measures would be further strengthened by such steps as the Secretary-General suggested in the Security Council on 15 February [935th meeting] concerning the inspection and investigation of the introduction of arms and funds into the Congo.

72. The second basic issue which my delegation would like to take up concerns the nature of United Nations assistance to the Congo. On 14 July of last year, the Security Council decided to provide the Government of the Republic of the Congo with such military assistance as was necessary in the opinion of the Government to make its national security forces meet their tasks fully. The nature of this assistance is basically technical and it was confirmed in resolution 1474 (ES-IV) adopted on 20 September 1960 of the General Assembly, paragraph 2 of which reads: “Requests the Secretary-General . . . to assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo.” The assistance is given on the basis of

⁵ *Ibid.*, document S/4405.

respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of the Congo and the assistance is also based on another fundamental principle of the Charter, that is, the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. Mr. Joseph Iléo stated in an address on 16 February 1961:

"Everyone is aware of the rash threat of certain countries to place the Congo under trusteeship . . . This threat is nothing but a declaration of war on the Congolese people. Let those who harbour this intention be aware that the Congolese people will reply by every means in its power to such dastardly aggression . . . My Government was called upon to take over the reins of Government in a moment of extreme difficulty. It will, first of all, combat with all its might the threat of trusteeship which is levelled at us. We are not against the United Nations, of which we are Members. The Congo still needs the assistance of the United Nations. Nevertheless, we insist on strict observance of the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of our Republic. Consequently, the assistance given to us by the United Nations cannot in any way imply any encroachment upon or subordination of our national sovereignty, which remains whole and entire, with all the consequences which that implies." [A/4711, annex XV.]

73. In the view of my delegation, it is important to eliminate any fear on the part of the Congolese people of being placed under trusteeship or of any encroachment upon the sovereignty of the Congo Republic.

74. In this connexion my delegation attaches particular importance to the statement contained in the Security Council resolution of 9 August 1960⁶ which says that, "the United Nations Force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise".

75. My delegation also wants to point out that with regard to the interpretation of the resolution of the Security Council of 21 February 1961, we share the views expressed in the statements made by Mr. Adlai Stevenson and Sir Patrick Dean. The statement of Mr. Stevenson with regard to paragraph 1 of part A, especially the phrase "use of force", said:

"The United Nations is there, then, to provide assistance to a Member of the Organization. It is not there, and cannot be there, to take action against that State. Nothing has been done to authorize the taking of measures against it under Article 42 of the Charter, nor has the Security Council made findings necessary under the Charter which would justify such measures."⁷

And Sir Patrick Dean stated that "force will only be used by the United Nations to prevent a clash between hostile Congolese troops" and that "there can be no question of empowering the United Nations to use its forces to impose a political settlement".⁸

76. My delegation shares the views of the United States and the United Kingdom that we should interpret the operative paragraphs of parts A and B in the light of the provisions of these earlier resolutions, which all establish the principles of consultation and impartiality and emphasize that the mission of the United Nations is to assist in the maintenance of law and order and to

safeguard the unity, territorial integrity, and political independence of the Congo.

77. The said resolution of the Security Council stipulates measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, and to reorganize Congolese armed units and personnel, in this way eliminating any possibility of interference by such units and personnel in the political life of the Congo. These measures correspond to the conclusions of the report of the Conciliation Commission. The Commission points out that the proposed reorganization of the Congolese army would be made more difficult without the co-operation of all the Congolese leaders. My delegation regrets that there was some misunderstanding on the part of the Leopoldville authorities about the provisions of the said resolution, and that this misunderstanding introduced the armed conflicts between the United Nations forces and the Congolese troops in Matadi and Banana after the adoption by the Security Council of the resolution of 21 February 1961.

78. It is presumed that the Congolese people interpreted the United Nations actions as intended to disarm the Congolese army by force. It seems to be obvious to my delegation that the United Nations forces could not disarm any army of a sovereign State against its will. In the said resolution of the Security Council there is no provision permitting the use of force to disarm the Congolese army.

79. We fully share the views on this matter which the Secretary-General expressed in the Security Council on 7 December 1960 [913th meeting]:

"The duty of the United Nations could not be anything but to unburden the authorities of the immediate responsibility for the protection of life and security and to eliminate foreign military intervention so as, in those respects, to create a framework within which the people of the Congo could find its way to a stable government, enjoying adequate nationwide authority."

80. The third basic point I would like to take up concerns the solution of the problem by the Congolese themselves. The problem of the Congo cannot be solved unless the Congolese people themselves can establish a workable national structure. It is important that this should be done solely by the Congolese themselves in accordance with their own free will.

81. From this point of view, the General Assembly, in resolution 1474 (ES-IV), adopted on 20 September 1960, appealed to all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation.

82. The Conciliation Commission, which was established by the Advisory Committee under the resolution, studied the situation in the Congo and directed efforts towards assisting the Congolese in the attainment of the objective of the aforementioned resolution.

83. We have received the report of the Commission. My delegation wishes to express its appreciation for the Commission's work. In the conclusions contained in the report the Commission suggests ways and means of solving the Congo problem.

84. The Conciliation Commission reports that many Congolese leaders have expressed the view that the

⁶ *Ibid.*, document S/4426.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Sixteenth Year, 941st meeting.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 942nd meeting.

Loi fondamentale is ill-adapted to conditions in the Congo and that it is largely responsible for the present crisis. Then the report of the Commission states that the amendment or replacement of the *Loi fondamentale* by a new constitution as soon as possible would contribute greatly to a solution of the Congo problem. The Commission also suggests that a summit meeting of Congolese political leaders be convened in the near future at a neutral place, outside the territory of the Republic if necessary, with a view to achieving national reconciliation and agreement on the formation of a government of national unity, on measures necessary to re-establish normal conditions, and on desired changes in the *Loi fondamentale* concerning the structure of the Congo, more especially in the direction of greater decentralization of the powers of the Central Government and an equitable distribution of revenues between the Central and the provincial governments. Furthermore, the Commission recommends in its report the establishment of a provisional government of national unity.

85. To my delegation the conclusion contained in the report of the Conciliation Commission seems to be sound; however, under the terms of the resolution of 20 September 1960, these are matters which in the final analysis only the Congolese people and leaders can settle. The General Assembly is in no position to dictate its own solution to them. The General Assembly has simply appealed to them in its resolution to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts. This fact I wish to point out.

86. We were also informed that the Congolese leaders had assembled at Tananarive. The idea of the Tananarive Conference was suggested, it appears, by the Conciliation Commission. My delegation refrains from commenting on the communiqué issued on 12 March by the Congolese leaders at the Conference because, in my delegation's view, this lies within the domestic jurisdiction of the Congo. My delegation wishes only to congratulate the Congolese leaders for having assembled and discussed their problems jointly.

87. Having studied the various aspects of the question of the Congo, my delegation has arrived at the following conclusions.

88. First, the primordial objective of the United Nations Congo operation should be concentrated on eliminating outside interference. The function and powers of the United Nations could and should be most effective on this matter. The entire United Nations machinery embodied in the Charter could be utilized most effectively for that purpose, and the objective could be achieved through effective and scrupulous application of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly. We are inclined to think that the emphasis on the role of the United Nations on this score—the elimination of outside interference—must be stressed with utmost strength.

89. Secondly, my delegation feels that the United Nations authority should be strengthened to make effective the measures mentioned above. We believe, on the one hand, that any attempt to weaken the authority of the United Nations must be opposed. For that purpose I should like to state that attention should be drawn to the obligations of the Member States under Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter.

90. I would like to point out also that any attempt to weaken the functions of the Secretariat must be rejected. The office of the Secretary-General must be of an inter-

national character, responsible solely to the United Nations as a whole. It would be against the Charter to try to make him represent the interest of any particular State or group of States. The proposal for the reorganization of the Secretariat on the basis of the representation of certain groups would paralyse the functions of the United Nations and would be conducive to its eventual break-down. On the other hand, the United Nations efforts for conciliation among Congolese leaders should be pursued. The Conciliation Commission has accomplished its task. It would be advisable to set up a new machinery to assist the Congolese leaders in their efforts to reach conciliation and to end the political crises. There would be an advantage in having the organ composed of a restricted number of countries selected on a universal basis.

91. Thirdly, United Nations assistance of any character to the Congo must be given under the scrupulous acceptance of the principle of respect for the sovereignty of the nation concerned and of non-interference in domestic affairs. The United Nations efforts to pave the way for domestic reconciliation in the Congo will have to follow the same principles.

92. Fourthly, the Congo problem must be handled in the light of the fast developing international world situation. We must not keep the hands of the United Nations completely tied in settling the problem of the Congo. The United Nations must be kept flexible and alert so as to be able to cope with any unexpected developments in the international scene. In the real sense, the functions of the United Nations are and must be global and universal. My delegation wants to point out that the mobility of the United Nations machinery and the United Nations resources is essentially important to the defence of peace and security in the world.

Sir Patrick Dean (United Kingdom), Vice-President, took the Chair.

93. Mr. COOPER (Liberia): I should like first to express to the Cuban delegation, on behalf of myself and my delegation, our deepest sympathy on the occasion of the death of Ambassador Bisbé, and I hope these expressions of sympathy will be conveyed to the family of the deceased. It is indeed a great honour to die in harness, and I must recall now the words of that poet who said:

“To every man upon this earth death cometh soon or late;

And how can man die better than facing fearful hours and the ashes of his fathers.”

94. My delegation cannot help but wonder, had the United Nations not gone into the Congo, what would be the situation today? I am sure it could not have been worse. We all know that the crisis in the Congo began with the mutiny of the Force publique which was followed by Belgian military intervention, which compelled the then Congolese Government to turn to the United Nations for military and other assistance in order to restore law and order. On 30 June 1960, conditions in the Congo must have been somewhat normal for we had a request addressed by the Congolese Government to the Secretary-General for admission to the United Nations. Nine months after the Congo's admission to the United Nations, what do we find? Military intervention has not disappeared but rather is on the increase; in place of law and order we have conditions almost bordering on anarchy and chaos. In substantiation of

this, permit me to quote the following from the report of the Conciliation Commission:

"The situation now prevailing in the Republic of the Congo is extremely dangerous. The country is divided between four warring factions. Civil war has indeed already begun in North Katanga and it threatens to spread into other provinces, and lead to direct foreign military interventions. The economic situation is rapidly worsening and the State treasury is nearly empty. Despite the efforts of ONUC, several regions are suffering from famine and threatened with epidemics. It is no exaggeration to say that the country is on the verge of catastrophe. If a political solution to the present crisis is not found urgently, very grave events will occur that will endanger not only the Congo but also Africa and indeed the whole world." [A/4711, para. 115.]

95. We cannot help asking ourselves what has brought about such chaotic conditions. What has transformed a peaceful and normal situation, in June, into confusion and disorder nine months later? We must, for an answer, again turn to the report of the Conciliation Commission, and here I quote the reasons given for such deterioration in the affairs of the Congo:

"(a) Foreign interference by certain States in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo compounded the complexity and gravity of the crisis. This interference largely counteracted the efforts of the United Nations to assist the Congolese to resolve their difficulties.

"(b) The rivalry of Congolese leaders resulting from their personal ambitions and tribal nationalism and their inability to subordinate personal and tribal interests to the interests of the Congo. These rivalries greatly exacerbated the conflict of views in regard to the constitutional and political structure of the newly independent State.

"(c) The persistence of differences among political parties and leaders as to the kind of changes to be made in the *Loi fondamentale*, the provisional constitution of the Republic of the Congo, which had failed to end the mutual antagonisms of those who stood for a unitary state, those who favoured a federation and those who demanded a confederation.

"(d) The distrust of certain political leaders who were suspected of aiming at the establishment of a unitary State under a one-party political system, and at the abrogation of the parliamentary form of government in favour of a presidential one.

"(e) The failure of certain Congolese leaders, while in office, to observe the *Loi fondamentale*." [Ibid., para. 112.]

Instead, where there was once law and order we have confusion, strife and even death. This has resulted in the death of many of the outstanding leaders and sons of the Congo, and particularly the murder of Patrice Lumumba, the first Prime Minister of that country. Never was the world so shocked and horrified as when it heard the news of this man's death. My Government can accept no excuses for such a murder.

96. Political differences of view should never be reasons for political assassination. Though Mr. Lumumba might have held views and expounded theories which perhaps did not suit all of his countrymen and others, I think no one can deny that he was an able, intelligent and patriotic Congolese. It is the hope of my Govern-

ment that the resolutions recently adopted by the Security Council calling for an immediate investigation will be implemented regardless of objections coming from any source.

97. It has been constantly argued from this platform and in resolutions of the United Nations that there should be no interference in the internal affairs of the Congo; yet, not only the Belgians but nearly every State represented in the United Nations, and particularly Asian and African States, have interfered directly or indirectly by giving advice, counsel and direct assistance. Some have argued for a centralized government with a parliament; others have supported a loose federation. There has been no common and agreed policy coming from the Asian and African States.

98. Many have argued that the African States alone should be entrusted with the sole responsibility of settling the Congo affair. Others contended that the African States should have more to say in the affairs of the Congo. I do not think this is the solution to the problem. Our voice, indeed, has been truly loud, but it has not been concerted nor concise, and the constant bickerings among the African States have sown the seeds of confusion and bewilderment in the minds of the Congolese. These divergencies have not assisted the United Nations in its task. Disunited as we are, our differences have hampered the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council. Is it any wonder, therefore, that a rumour persists that the Congolese are asking for the withdrawal of the United Nations forces, military as well as civilian?

99. Nearly every representative has expressed the view that every people has the right to choose the form of government it wishes to live under. This appears in the constitutions of many nations. Yet, when the Congolese attempt to revise a government in a way which they consider suited to their purposes and interests, we do not hesitate to suggest or to point out to them the kind of government that we think should be in the interests of the Congolese. Those who are inclined toward Mr. Kasa-Vubu and General Mobutu and other Congolese leaders favour a loose federation; those who are sympathetic toward Mr. Lumumba and his followers endorse a centralized government. My Government would like, in this instance, to appeal earnestly, especially to the African-Asian countries, to refrain from commenting on either a centralized government or a confederate form of government in the Congo unless and until there is a failure of the efforts of the Congolese leaders to get together to work out a system of government which they consider, regardless of the *Loi fondamentale*, to serve their best interests. Let us therefore encourage their efforts and do nothing that may hamper those undertakings.

100. We cannot preach one thing and do another. This has been the policy of many of the African-Asian States in the Congo. Instead of helping the Congolese to form a stable government and a united people, our interference has fertilized the seeds of discord and disunity which have always been planted in colonial territories. The friendliness, the cordiality and confidence that should exist among the African States are being replaced now by hatred and suspicion arising from the events in the Congo.

101. As long as there are two prevailing points of view, as long as there are two Governments—one

in Leopoldville, recognized by certain countries, and another in Stanleyville, recognized by other African States—it will be impossible for the African-Asian countries to become solely responsible for working out a solution or formulating a plan that will bring to that unhappy country peace, order and a stable government.

102. It is useless now to cast the blame on anybody. Few of us have had clean hands in the Congo, and to attempt now to shift the entire responsibility for our failure on to the shoulders of the Secretary-General is unfair and unjustifiable, considering that in many instances we have failed to support him in the implementation of resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, particularly if such resolutions were contrary to our views or our interests in the Congo.

103. My delegation is of the opinion that the first requirement in the Congo crisis is to establish some form of government that will embrace all factions in the Congo. It is with this in mind that my Government is appealing to the Members of the United Nations to encourage rather than to hamper the efforts of the Congolese leaders in this direction.

104. It is repeatedly suggested that in order to have a Congolese government that will represent the entire Congolese population it is necessary to convene Parliament which would endorse or confirm any such government. Everyone is aware of the constitutional crisis in the Congo in which the President dismissed the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister removed the President, for violation of the *Loi fondamentale*. Therefore, the convening of Parliament under the *Loi fondamentale* seems to present many obstacles and many problems.

105. First, many of the leaders, according to information gathered from the report of the Conciliation Commission, have disappeared, and those who are alive are so frightened and terrified that they would be afraid to attend any meeting of Parliament unless under guarantees of their safety by the United Nations.

106. Secondly, who should convene the Parliament? It would even be embarrassing for President Kasa-Vubu, who has formed a provisional government with Mr. Iléo as Prime Minister, and who has also participated in a round-table conference that called for a confederated Congo State. It would be equally embarrassing and it would be strongly opposed by the Leopoldville Government for the supporters of Mr. Lumumba to convene such a Parliament, when Mr. Lumumba's supporters have argued that the Lumumba government was the sole lawful government and that Parliament should convene only to decide whether the dismissal of that government was lawful. The results, according to that argument, would be the same, since the supporters of Mr. Lumumba enjoyed a parliamentary majority.

107. Thirdly, some have suggested the convening of Parliament under the United Nations. Could this be done without the United Nations having a direct hand in the internal affairs of the Congo? We would endorse such a proposal provided that all parties in the Congo accept an election under the United Nations. If one party refuses, and the United Nations attempts to impose its will, this, in our view, could be construed as direct interference in the internal affairs of the Congo. In this connexion, I should like to quote the Secretary-General's interpretation of the paragraph

in the Security Council resolution of 9 August 1960⁹ which reaffirms

“that the United Nations Force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise”.

The Secretary-General stated that the United Nations could not be a party to any internal disputes, and it would continue to discharge its function of maintaining order and peace in the territory to the best of its ability, and to do that it must be able to count fully on the co-operation of responsible authorities. This policy, despite criticisms levelled against it, has been, in our view, strictly adhered to by the Secretary-General in his handling of the Congo situation.

108. Even if such a Parliament could be convened, it is doubtful whether we could expect representatives from Katanga, a separate State set up and ruled by Mr. Tshombé with the assistance of Belgian officers and officials. I should like here to quote from the report of the Conciliation Commission:

“It seems likely that no real attempt will be made to grapple with this secessionist problem—the most serious of the many facing the Congo—until the dispute between the supporters of President Kasa-Vubu and those of Mr. Lumumba is settled”.
[A/4711, para. 77.]

109. But what does President Kasa-Vubu himself think of the convening of Parliament? In an address of 25 January 1961 to the delegation attending the round-table conference, President Kasa-Vubu said:

“If we wish to create a stable and durable society which will be secure from the overweening ambitions of certain people, we must go to the root of the trouble. We inherited a system of institutions which turned out in practice to be ineffective and inappropriate to the situations to which it was intended to be applied. We must give fresh thought to the *Loi fondamentale* and the institutions derived from it, with a view to adapting them to our ideas and the requirements of a country which is so large in the geographical sense and whose peoples are so diverse”.

On 2 January he said that the existing Parliament no longer represented more than a part of the country; some members of Parliament had died and others were physically prevented from reaching Leopoldville or taking part in that body's work; Parliament was therefore ill-suited to undertake a task which might involve its own reform.

110. It therefore follows that unless there is a *rap-prochement* or understanding between the various factions—as long as each camp, according to the Conciliation Commission report, has an army of its own and upon which it can rely for its own existence and preservation; this is confirmed in the report of the Commission: “that the authority of each group is based upon armed forces”—it is clear no Parliament could convene and operate under such unstable and threatening conditions. We know the forces deployed by these various factions are not negligible. The Congolese National Army under General Mobutu consists of 9,000 men; General Lundula of Stanleyville, 7,000 men; Mr. Tshombé of Katanga, 5,000 men and Mr. Kalonji has 3,000, making a total of 24,000 men and, according to the Conciliation Commission report, equipped with

⁹ *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4426.

modern weapons and led by trained officers, even if these officers are aliens. It therefore follows that the Congolese factions appear to have forces superior to those of the United Nations forces and any attempt to mutiny and rebellion either against their officers or against the Government under which they serve can hinder, if not completely halt, any United Nations activities they consider against their own interest.

111. It is therefore realized that to maintain law and order under such conditions such armies must be neutralized from politics; but, what are the views of the Congolese leaders themselves with regard to these armed forces? I quote the views as contained in the report of the Conciliation Commission:

“Most of those interviewed by the Commission, including Generals Mobutu and Lundula, thought that the army should not be allowed to interfere in politics and that it should be reorganized if normal political life was to be restored; opinions on this subject differed mainly with regard to the particular troops which need reorganization, the tendency being of course to deny the need of reorganization in the case of that part of the army supporting the leader who was expressing this opinion. Nevertheless a number of members of Parliament and other leaders assured the Commission privately that no return to normal life is possible unless steps are taken to reorganize the whole of the army, wherever it might be found, and to restore proper discipline”. [A/4711, para. 75.]

112. It is suggested that the disarming of the Congolese private armies, if we are to avoid bloodshed, should be done voluntarily. But is this possible as long as there is a bitter feud between the various factions, and their respective armed forces must be relied upon to maintain their own authority and their own existence? To attempt to disarm them by force, we know the reaction of the Congolese leaders—that they will repel force with force in any attempt of the United Nations to disarm them by that means. It seems as if the United Nations is caught in a vicious circle. Voluntarily, they will not submit to being disarmed; forcibly they would resist any disarming for without their respective armies their positions as leaders in the Congo would be untenable; further, it was never the intention of the United Nations forces sent to the Congo to be used to enforce the execution or implementation of resolutions that would result in the killing of Congolese for refusing to do what they consider was against their best interests.

113. The stumbling block or the hindrance to any solution in the Congo has been outside interference and in particular the interference of the Belgians. This interference of Belgium gave rise to the appeal of Mr. Lumumba's government for assistance from the United Nations. As early as 9 August 1960, the United Nations called upon Belgium to withdraw immediately its troops from the Congo. Repeated appeals by the Secretary-General to the Belgian Government for the implementation of this part of the resolution of the Security Council has met with lukewarm response. In an addendum to the Secretary-General's Fourth Report, a Belgian *note verbale* dated 10 September 1960,¹⁰ replying to the Secretary-General's communication regarding the cargo of weapons¹¹ said to have been unloaded at Elisabeth-

ville, stated that some light weapons of Belgian origin had reached Katanga. They had been ordered before 30 June but the execution of the order was due to the incompetence of an ill-informed official. Measures had been taken to make certain no action of this kind would recur.

114. I should like to mention a further reply to the Secretary-General's criticism against the Belgian Government for its policies in the Congo. The Belgian Government declared [A/4629] that the report contained inaccurate accusations and quite unacceptable demands. It expressed the conviction that co-operation with United Nations representatives in the Congo could be profitably resumed on the basis of two principles—respect for the sovereignty of the Congo in its entirety and recognition of the fact that Belgium cannot be prevented from helping to restore prosperity in the Congo in the manner desired by the Congolese authorities. These are the flimsy excuses we have received from the representative of Belgium. I think the most recent is that there are no more Belgian soldiers or personnel in the Congo perhaps except a few; that all other Belgians in the Congo are there not at the instance of the Belgian Government but rather at the request of the Congolese authorities and therefore the Belgian Government cannot order them out but can only appeal to them to leave. One cannot understand this attitude of the Belgians unless it is based purely upon selfish and lucrative motives. They have not returned to the Congo with a view to assisting the Congo and the Congolese people but rather to continuing the exploitation of the Congolese wealth which has enriched the coffers of the Belgian Government; and it appears to my delegation that no appeal nor persuasive argument will induce the Belgians to withdraw from the Congo. We know it is the tendency of certain colonial Powers that they do not easily respond to persuasion but rather to force and brute force. It is to be noted that, in keeping with the Security Council resolution, the Secretary-General has dispatched a commission to Brussels for conversations with the Belgian Government for the withdrawal of Belgian personnel from the Congo without any qualification. I am doubtful that the outcome of these conversations will be successful. What then is the United Nations to do? Are we to permit the Belgians to pursue their aims in the Congo only against our protests? I think it is time that something more concrete than appeals or protests should be used with regard to the position of the Belgians in the Congo.

115. Another matter that gives my delegation deep concern is the affair at Matadi and other ports in the Congo. All must admit that the prestige of the United Nations in this regard has been seriously affected. We do not know how far negotiations have succeeded for the return of the United Nations forces to Matadi and other ports. But I do think that the United Nations could not accept the offer by the Kasa-Vubu Government that only civil personnel should be allowed to return to Matadi. Matadi is the main artery for the United Nations existence in the Congo. Considering past experience in which United Nations personnel have not only been threatened but in some cases beaten, we could not expect the Secretary-General to dispatch civil servants to Matadi without the protection of the United Nations military forces. And, further, who shall guarantee the supplies of the United Nations in the port of Matadi?

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, document S/4482/Add.2.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, document S/4482/Add.1.

116. Surely we cannot expect the Congolese army to do this, especially when that army generally rebels against its own officers and Government. It is to be hoped that the Congolese Government will realize this situation, that is, that it will be impossible for the United Nations to remain in the Congo if its lines of supply are in the hands of others. In such conditions it would either have to withdraw or, if it intends to remain, to use force to restore the *status quo*. My Government, although one of the sponsors of the resolution in the Security Council providing for the use of force if necessary as a last alternative, would not like to see this done in the case of Matadi or in any other operation in the Congo.

117. We would like at this time to express our appreciation and gratitude to the Sudanese Government for the heroic action displayed by the Sudanese troops in the defence of the United Nations position at Matadi.

118. My delegation will support any draft resolution based on the suggestion contained in the report of the Conciliation Commission. Should the Congolese leaders be unable to form a government of their own, my delegation would then support the recommendation with regard to the establishment of a provisional government of national unity whose tasks would include the following: (1) to arrange a truce between the different factions in the Congo; (2) to restore law and order, with the assistance of the United Nations; (3) to reorganize the administration and enable it to function; (4) to reorganize the army, in co-operation with the United Nations; (5) to take steps to enable Parliament to adopt a constitution which would provide the Congo with a constitutional structure.

119. We shall also support any draft resolution that confirms or reiterates the Security Council resolution urging the United Nations to "take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort".¹²

120. The Secretary-General has called our attention to the grave financial situation facing the United Nations in the Congo. It appears that the United Nations cannot continue its operation in that country unless funds are provided in the amount of \$120 million. Some countries have flatly refused and others are hesitating to make any contribution for this purpose. It is to be hoped that the African States in particular will not fail to contribute, according to their resources, funds for the United Nations operation in the Congo. Come what may, the Congolese will forever remain our brothers and the Congo will forever be a part of Africa. Therefore, despite our differences and our disagreements, whether storm or peace prevails in the Congo, its people must always be our deepest concern and the Congo our vital interest.

121. As I have said, the Secretary-General has appealed for funds for continuing the United Nations operation in the Congo. You can rest assured that if these operations fail for want of money, we shall not hesitate, as we have done in the past, to saddle him with the responsibility for such a failure. We shall expect him to make bricks without straw. We do not hesitate to adopt resolutions, but how and wherewithal

they are to be implemented seems to be of little concern to us.

122. We have ordered the Secretary-General to put the Belgians out of the Congo, but regardless of their refusal, force should never be used to accomplish this. He must restore law and order in the Congo, but in no circumstances must he interfere in the internal affairs of that country. Even if riots and anarchy prevail, United Nations forces should never be used in the killing of Congolese. On 21 February 1961 the Security Council adopted a resolution ordering an immediate investigation into the death of Mr. Lumumba, and perhaps others, but we failed to say how this should be achieved. In short, we asked the Secretary-General to swim with his feet bound and his hands tied behind his back.

123. The Foreign Minister of Ireland and like-minded representatives have appealed to the African countries to support the Secretary-General in implementing resolutions on the Congo. I hope we will not let this appeal, owing to the strife and bickerings between us, fall upon deaf ears. To the small countries, particularly in Asia and Africa, the United Nations is the only court where we can be heard in defence of our rights. My country speaks from experience. In the old days of the League of Nations we were charged with forced labour, from an investigation of our own choice. Although a Member of the League of Nations, we were not permitted to plead our cause before the highest body of the League, the Council of the League, on the grounds that we were not Members. We sat in the visitors' gallery as mere spectators while our fate was being decided by others. Ethiopia also suffered such a fate.

Mr. Boland (Ireland) resumed the Chair.

124. Mr. VAKIL (Iran): My delegation would like to associate itself with the words of sympathy and condolence which were addressed to the delegation of Cuba on the occasion of the untimely demise of Ambassador Bisbé.

125. For those who have been anxiously watching the gradual development of the United Nations as an institution dedicated to the preservation of peace and security, the involvement of the United Nations in the Congo and the lingering confusion and disorder there present a source of disappointment and concern.

126. Never before has the Organization's prestige been so much at stake as it is today in the Congo. While there have been numerous situations in the past for whose solutions the United Nations cannot claim credit, the Organization has, nevertheless, survived with increasing international respect and effectiveness. The nature and extent of the United Nations operation in the Congo is such that, should the United Nations fail to carry the heavy responsibilities it has assumed, the question of its future as an Organization as we have seen it develop might well be placed in jeopardy.

127. It is true that the United Nations operation did not live up to the high expectations entertained in the early part of its intervention in the Congo. The United Nations has thus far been unable to rid the Congo completely of foreign elements, the main task for which United Nations assistance was solicited. As long as this condition exists in the Congo, it tends to scuttle the United Nations effort there as it has done so far in many different ways.

128. There is, however, a brighter side to the United Nations operation. Despite a host of restraining ele-

¹² *Ibid.*, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4741.

ments, such as functioning within the territory of a sovereign State under a multiplicity of conflicting interests and transient conditions—above all with an inadequate mandate—the United Nations has, until the present, been able to prevent a head-on clash of major Powers in the Congo and has prevented the disorder from reaching wider proportions. Furthermore, it has aroused world-wide sympathy and concern for the plight of the Congolese. Unlike other times when the anxieties and aspirations of oppressed peoples were never heard, today, because of the United Nations, the great misfortune of the Congolese is known to people all over the world.

129. The United Nations operation in the Congo is based on sound and noble principles. Its aims are to establish law and order, to create a congenial atmosphere conducive to the solution of factional and political differences, and to launch an elaborate training programme. Why then has the United Nations operation not been more successful? We feel there are two main reasons for this: first, dissension among the political leaders of the Congo and, second, disagreement among Members of the United Nations. In such circumstances, the United Nations operation cannot be blamed for failing to fulfil its objectives in the Congo.

130. But our inability to agree on a common course of action must not disillusion us: it must not discourage us; certainly it must not make us abandon our operation in that ravaged and unhappy land. If we give up now, if we relinquish our work and our responsibilities, we will open the way for foreign intrusion and encroachment—we will open the way for unilateral action and all the accompanying hazards of conflicting interests. To do this is both dangerous and morally wrong. It is dangerous because it would considerably weaken the effectiveness and prestige of our Organization. It is morally wrong because it would expose the Congo to the danger of losing its hard won independence.

131. If we have not been able to agree among ourselves, if we have not been able to work out an acceptable course, we must take it upon ourselves to try and try again. We must not dissipate our efforts by disparaging and condemning what we have tried to do. Rather, we must re-examine the United Nations operation, correct its shortcomings and, without losing sight of our original principles, work out a new and better approach.

132. At the outset, the United Nations operation may have been adequate. But, as the crisis deepened, it became evident that this operation was no longer effective. Because of the growing dissension among United Nations Members, we were not able to co-ordinate our action in the Congo. As a result the operation became less and less effective. The first part of the current session of the General Assembly failed to remedy the situation, and the Secretary-General, by necessity, had to rely on the previous mandate which was already proven inadequate. A miracle could have happened, but it did not, and the situation steadily deteriorated. It was the brutal execution of Premier Lumumba and the ensuing events that prompted the Security Council emphatically to re-examine the mandate of the United Nations Force in the Congo. The Council's resolution of 21 February 1961 was indeed a positive response to a long awaited expectation. The Council gave a clear and specific mandate to the United Nations regarding the use of force to maintain order

and hence rectified a major shortcoming which hitherto had plagued the effectiveness of the United Nations operation. The Council was also aware of another important factor responsible for the protracted confusion and disorder in the Congo—Congolese armed units.

133. These military units, in contrast to the role normally played by such forces when a nation is born, have thus far proved a divisive element rather than a unifying one. If trained under the supervision of the United Nations, the Congolese Army could evolve as an important element in bringing about unity. If used in conjunction with the true desires of the Congolese people, the Army could help to bring peace to the land and prepare the ground for convocation of Parliament and ultimately the establishment of a strong and viable Congo. It is the task of the United Nations to explain to the Congolese leaders the underlying spirit and ultimate intent of the 21 February resolution, which is designed to bring peace to a situation fraught with dire consequences, without in any way detracting from the sovereignty of the Congo. It is encouraging to note that the authorities in Leopoldville have indicated their general willingness to co-operate with the United Nations in this direction.

134. The Council resolution of 21 February, in essence, is the product of the African-Asian group, and I would like to emphasize here the unreserved support of my delegation as to both the resolution's content and its approach.

135. The recent comprehensive report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo [*A/4711 and Corr.1*] is based on direct observation which has proved instrumental in gaining accurate and varied knowledge regarding the present situation in the Congo. We note with satisfaction that the views expressed and the conclusions drawn in the report of the Conciliation Commission are intended to strengthen and broaden the authority of the United Nations in the Congo. We interpret the Commission's recommendation as a re-affirmation of the Security Council resolution of 21 February, as most of the Commission's recommendations are familiar formulas which have referred to previous resolutions of the Council. In particular, I refer to the stress placed on the United Nations effort to eliminate the lingering foreign influence in the Congo, on the need for the reorganization of the Congolese Army and on the necessity of an early convocation of the Parliament. My delegation is in full sympathy with these considerations. Preference as to the form and character of the future Congolese Government, as underlined in the Commission's recommendation, should not, however, in our view be unduly stressed. Such a specification might unjustifiably influence a future decision of the Congolese people. This consideration is the prerogative of the Congolese and they must express themselves as to the future form of their Government.

136. My delegation hopes that the underlying theme of the Commission's report, and its specific recommendations, as far as they are directed towards the re-affirmation of the previous Council resolutions, gains the general approval of the General Assembly. Similarity between the views of the Conciliation Commission and the basic policy of the United Nations would dispel any qualms about the impropriety of the Organization's mode of operation in the Congo. It follows that what is actually at fault is not the technicality of the operation in the Congo. The United Nations is more than ever

in need of the support of its Members in order to enforce the provisions of the Council resolution of 21 February with greater effectiveness and confidence.

137. It is true that the immediate repercussions of the situation in the Congo most intimately affect the Congolese and the continent of Africa. But the situation in the Congo has reached such dimensions that its repercussions would affect the fate of any State seeking the protection of the United Nations. What is needed to solve this problem is concerted action and the intent to use the United Nations machinery effectively for the purposes for which it was intended.

138. Now the United Nations must make a renewed attempt to tackle the problem with greater vigour and authority. Failure in the Congo is fraught with grave consequences; a triumph of the United Nations in the Congo would be a great achievement for the mainte-

nance of peace through organized and collective action. I hope that in the future we will be able to refer to the Congo in the context of the second alternative.

139. The PRESIDENT: Earlier this afternoon I referred to the draft resolution recommended by the Fifth Committee. Since I spoke, some delegations have pointed out to me that it would be more convenient, and preferable, from their point of view, that the General Assembly should not be asked to deal with that matter this evening. I understand that consideration of the matter can be deferred without major administrative inconvenience and I do not propose to ask the General Assembly to deal with the draft resolution now. It will be scheduled for consideration by the General Assembly at its next meeting, which will be held at 10.30 on Monday morning.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.