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President: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).

Organization of work

1. The PRESIDENT: Before I call on the first speaker, I should like to announce that, subject to the agreement of the Assembly, I propose to interrupt the discussion on the situation in the Republic of the Congo between 4 p.m. and 4.30 p.m. to take up the question of Algeria. I propose to do so after consultation with the delegations principally concerned. I hope that it might be possible, if we take up this item between 4 p.m. and 4.30 p.m., to conclude this item at this afternoon's meeting; and I am encouraged in that hope by what I understand to be an informal understanding between the delegations principally concerned that, after the Rapporteur's report and the introduction of the amendment proposed by Cyprus, explanations of vote before the vote on this item will be limited to three speakers in favour of one point of view and three speakers in favour of the other point of view. After that, the Assembly will proceed to vote on the proposals before it.

2. If that procedure is agreeable to the Assembly, we will now take up the question of the Congo and interrupt our consideration of that item between 4 p.m. and 4.30 p.m. to take up the question of Algeria.

*It was so decided.*

**AGENDA ITEM 85**

The situation in the Republic of the Congo (continued)

3. Mr. CARDOSO (Congo-Leopoldville) (translated from French): The crisis in the Congo is serving as a pretext for a good many debates. When the debate on colonialism dies down, the question of the Congo is raised in order to give more snap to the proceedings. When the Secretary-General displeases certain ill-intentioned delegations, the Congo question is given a stir. What people fail to realize—or that, at least, is the impression they would like to give—is that the longer the discussion goes on here, the worse the chaos, disorder and anarchy will become and the deeper will grow the dissensions between the various political factions in our country.

4. Instead of spending their time criticizing the Secretary-General and the United Nations, many Member States would be better employed criticizing themselves. After all, what can this Organization be other than a fluctuating reflection of the opinions of the Member States? But, as I have already told the Security Council, many Member nations are only anxious to make a sensation, to get themselves applauded even when they are distorting the best-established and most undeniable facts. We have seen delegations introduce draft resolutions merely in order to secure a negative vote from the other delegations so as to compromise them in the eyes of world public opinion.

5. The United Nations is now no more than a sorry propaganda centre, a high-level centre of discord between nations. We have noticed the game and we cannot any longer be the dupes of the subversive intrigues that are being busily conducted in several parts of the world. We know how to rise above the insults and meanness characteristic of a certain doctrine. The expressions used by certain sister countries here are unworthy of Africans and a betrayal of our continent's ancient tradition of wisdom.

6. We feel indignant when we hear certain countries, following the example of the Soviet Union, call our Head of State a traitor or a fascist. That makes them "agents provocateurs" in the pay of Russian chauvinism. It is useless for them to say afterwards that they are "uncommitted" or "unaligned"; from one day to the next we find them plunged deeper in the monster's lair. We too could label them activists, imperialists, lackeys, puppets or men of straw. It is not worth our while because they would recognize themselves too easily.

7. Let us rather have a look at the programme that is proposed to us by Ghana, India . . . and the whole confounded collection of them. Let us see, more particularly, how it resembles the programme contained in the Declaration by the Government of the Soviet Union. There can be no doubt about the source of inspiration. I must confess it is a very dangerous source of inspiration. This programme constitutes an attempt by these countries to get possession of the three sovereign powers of our State: the legislative, executive and judiciary powers. The United Nations would then be the Trojan horse which they would use in order to interfere in our internal affairs.

8. The declaration of the Government of the Soviet Union does in fact say that it is necessary:

"(a) To liberate at once Patrice Lumumba, the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, Mr. Okito, the President of the Senate, Mr. Kasongo, the President of the Chamber of Representatives, and other Ministers and members of Parliament."  
[A/4618, para. 22.]

One might make a preliminary comment on this text, namely, that Mr. Okito is not the President of the Senate. If you insist on saying that Mr. Okito is President of the Senate, you must, as a consequence, make the logical admission that Mr. Iléo, who, in fact, was President of the Senate and has been appointed Prime Minister, is henceforth Prime Minister. That is the logical conclusion you must come to if you insist on saying that Mr. Okito is President of the Senate.

9. According to this first paragraph of the Soviet Union's declaration, Ghana, India and their acolytes make the urgent request in their draft resolution [A/L.331 and Add.1]:

"Urges the immediate release of all political prisoners under detention, more particularly, members of the Central Government of the Congo and officials of Parliament and others enjoying parliamentary immunity;"

I invite the Assembly to compare these two paragraphs and tell me where is the source of inspiration of this draft resolution.

10. The Soviet Union's declaration then goes on to say that it is necessary:

"(b) To disarm forthwith Mobutu's bands of terrorists, with the help of the forces in the Congo sent to that country by decision of the Security Council." [A/4618, para. 22.]

11. Let us look at paragraph 4 of the draft resolution. It reads thus:

"Urges that measures be undertaken forthwith to prevent armed units and personnel in the Congo from any interference in the political life of the country as well as from obtaining any material or other support from abroad;"

The similarity is patent.

12. Then again the fourth paragraph of the declaration of the Soviet Union can be found in paragraph 6 of the draft resolution:

"Demands that all Belgian military and quasi-military personnel, advisers and technicians be immediately withdrawn in pursuance of the resolutions of the United Nations ...".

The close comparison can be seen.

13. So, without making any further references to these texts which are so compromisingly alike, if you want to make a general comment, you could simply say this: first, if the proposal is to open Parliament, that means usurping the prerogatives of the Head of State; secondly, if what is sought is the release of Patrice Lumumba, that means putting themselves in the place of our courts of law; thirdly, if they want to disarm the Congolese national army, it means they want to deprive us of any means of defending ourselves against some peoples' arbitrary behaviour and imperialism; fourthly, if the intention is to put Lumumba back into power, that means quite simply to encompass the misfortune of the Congolese.

14. It will be objected that Lumumba had the confidence of Parliament. True, he had its confidence when his Government received its investiture. But there is no article in the "Loi fondamentale" which provides that a Government, once revoked, can present itself again to Parliament to get a fresh vote of

confidence. That is an innovation made by the enemies of our people and we shall tell the Congolese who are the enemies of their independence; we shall tell them that these countries want to place the Congo under United Nations trusteeship which, in fact, would be nothing but a trusteeship by Ghana, India and the Soviet Union.

15. How is one to understand the "note verbale" of 16 December 1960, from the representative of Ghana? This note reproduces even the demagogic expressions used by the Soviet Union. Ghana is, decidedly, proving to be an apt pupil of its master. Paragraph (d) of this "note verbale" reads literally as follows:

"To enforce the immediate evacuation of all Belgian military personnel and officials from the Congo" [A/4661],

and paragraph (e) goes on:

"To assume authority, as a temporary measure, for the internal affairs of the Congo, to enable law and order to be restored." [Ibid.]

If we merely replace the word "Congo" by "Ghana", paragraph (d) would then read as follows: "To enforce the immediate evacuation of all English military personnel and officials from Ghana"; and then in paragraph (e): "To assume authority, as a temporary measure, for the internal affairs of Ghana, to enable law and order to be restored". We add the words "and order" because order will certainly be disturbed by the departure of the English officials.

16. Look here, you nationalist-imperialists by the grace of Pan-Africanism. General Alexander, your army's general, is a Britisher; your officers are Britishers; most of the senior posts in your administration are held by Britishers; you are in the sterling zone; your cocoa is marketed chiefly in the Commonwealth and Kwame Nkrumah, liberator of Africa by the grace of his god, can say what he likes, but he cannot escape this control. Congo, on the other hand, is not in the Belgian franc zone; it is not in a Belgian commonwealth; it has no Belgian generals or officers in its regular armies. So then, this neo-colonialism that you talk about—where is it most menacing?

17. To sum it all up, we can say that, whatever the meaning you attach to the word "colonialism", whether it be that of control exercised by the Western Powers or that of the ideological infiltration of communism, the African country that is most threatened is definitely Ghana. To crown everything, this fettered country wants, under the cover of Pan-Africanism, to liberate the others. This is where we might recall the proverb: "Physician, heal thyself." Tomorrow, maybe, the Congo will be coming to the help of Ghana.

18. Meanwhile, however, a certain part of Africa is deserting us, is withdrawing its troops, in order not to have to face up to the demands of peace. They have understood us badly; they have passed by Africa in order to serve new masters who have led them into wrong ways.

19. Thus, we are threatened by the African High Command suggested by President Nkrumah. But before the troops of the African High Command come along and rob us of our sovereignty, we ask you, Mr. President and Mr. Secretary-General, to take their blue helmets from them so that their United Nations immunity may be withdrawn. From then on we are resolved to defend ourselves.

20. Before continuing, I would like to give the distinguished representative of India a few explanations. He has been deploring—and he is quite right—the ill treatment suffered by the Indian personnel made available to the United Nations in the Congo. During the colonial era Indians in the Congo had all the privileges enjoyed by the Belgians. They lived in the European quarter; they had the same advantages at civilian level as the Europeans; they kept small trading concerns and so had a monopoly over a certain amount of capital. These Indians were allowed into hotels and restaurants where the Congolese were simply turned back. You will understand therefore that, in the eyes of the local population, the Indian is a European and arouses the same feeling of xenophobia.

21. In most of the speeches heard there has been little mention made of the secessionist tendency that is manifesting itself in the Oriental Province, the leading figure in it being Gizenga. Obviously, Gizenga has usurped, though quite illegally, the place of Patrice Lumumba. He has already appealed for foreign intervention. The unfortunate thing about it is that little reference has been made in this Assembly to this danger which threatens us from the East. What is really unfortunate is that there has been an attempt to hide the fact that people are biased, they are "committed" or "aligned", whereas they try here to make us believe that they are neutral, that it is a kind of positive neutrality. The moment neutralism becomes negative or positive, it is neutralism no longer. When that happens, you can well understand that the Congolese are quite right to be mistrustful, that thenceforward they can follow their own path to freedom which they have chosen themselves and which they consider is the best one, without any inspiration from abroad.

22. As regards the various draft resolutions which have been introduced, I would like to make a brief comment. Whatever decisions are taken here, the Congolese will not allow themselves to be dictated to. They will never allow anyone else to decide for them. We are definitely independent and sovereign and we have come here to assert this for the second time.

23. Mr. ENCKELL (Finland): When my delegation wholeheartedly supported the resolution [1474 (ES-IV)] which the General Assembly adopted at its fourth emergency special session on 20 September 1960, it did so for several reasons which it considered to be particularly important. One of the essential aspects of that resolution was, in our opinion, the emphasis on conciliation and the offer of appropriate assistance by Asian and African representatives for the purposes of finding a speedy solution by peaceful means of all the internal conflicts of the Congolese people, "for the unity and integrity of the Congo". This offer, which was made in an appeal to "all Congolese" in operative paragraph 3 of that resolution was, in our view, constructive and helpful and we would have liked to see it materialize at an early date. I do not need to recall here the various reasons for which this was not done. I should like, however, to point to the fact that my delegation has consistently held the view that everything which would have rendered conciliation more difficult was to be carefully avoided by the United Nations.

24. With this in mind we felt that we ought to postpone the consideration by the Assembly of the situa-

tion in the Congo when a proposal to that effect came before us on 8 November 1960 and an eloquent appeal was made to us to adjourn the debate the following day [913th meeting].

25. We likewise thought, for the same reasons, that the consideration of the credentials of the delegation of the Congo, a few days later, had been raised at a premature stage, and we acted accordingly in favour of its postponement [923rd meeting].

26. We still believe that the solution of the internal problems of the Republic of the Congo can and must be achieved by conciliation, by putting an end to factional and party strife and by following the path leading to national unity. We think we have good reason to hope that the forthcoming visit to the Congo of the representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee will help towards resolving internal conflicts by peaceful and democratic means and to preserve the unity and the integrity of the Congo. We do not think there are any means other than conciliation which could achieve the stability this independent State so well deserves and the progress for which it has such exceptional possibilities in "its enormous natural resources" and in "the talent and labour of the people", to quote the words of Mr. Dayal in his Second Progress Report [A/4557 and Add.1].

27. It has been rightly stressed during this debate that the Security Council, when it decided to authorize the Secretary-General to organize a United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo, did so in consideration of a request addressed to the Secretary-General by the President and the Prime Minister of the Congo. This fact, as well as the provisions of the Charter, seems in the opinion of my delegation to offer a definition of the scope which the United Nations action in the Congo may assume. The United Nations could not be described as intervening in the Congo; the United Nations Force and the technical assistance are there at the request of the Congo.

28. My delegation finds that we cannot expect the Republic of the Congo to accept being treated, because of the present difficulties which are so tragically besetting it at the dawn of its existence as an independent State, with less respect for its sovereignty than we would show to any other Member of our Organization.

29. We would like to appeal to all Congolese to refrain from resorting, in settling their political problems, to any kind of violence, including arbitrary political arrests. We would like to appeal to them to co-operate fully and wholeheartedly with the United Nations in the restoration and in the maintenance of law and order everywhere in their great country. We would like to appeal to them to revert to constitutional life in all its forms, to restore Parliament to its proper position and to reduce the army to its proper constitutional place.

30. But all this has to be achieved by the Congolese themselves; and, what is more, the Congolese themselves, who are and have to be the only masters of their own country, must accordingly take the appropriate decisions. They are of course entitled to get all necessary help and support from the United Nations in these directions, but it seems quite clear to my delegation that the assistance given and to be given by the United Nations ought to remain strictly

within the boundaries of the Security Council resolutions and, basically, of the provisions of the Charter.

31. We are fully aware of the great difficulties which face the Congolese people in their present situation. The United Nations has accepted certain responsibilities which have undoubtedly to be honoured. But by far the greatest responsibility of the United Nations in this respect is certainly the duty of all its Members to refrain, in the words of the previous General Assembly resolution 1474 (ES-IV),

"from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Republic of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of the Congo".

We think that much could indeed be done in the interest of the Republic of the Congo if all Member States, and not least the former Administering Power, conformed their conduct, in the strictest manner, to the requests embodied in operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of that resolution.

32. I think I may say that my delegation is fully aware of the extremely intricate and difficult character of the present situation in the Congo. The very complexity of this situation seems in our opinion to call for very careful consideration in deciding about further action of the United Nations.

33. We are furthermore deeply concerned by the fact that we have two separate draft resolutions before us, both of them covering approximately the same ground. In view of the fact that both have certainly been drafted in order to further the interests of the Congo and of its people, we earnestly hope that it might still be possible to prepare a new draft which could obtain a broad majority or even the unanimous approval of the Assembly. If this could not be done it might even be better, as has been suggested, not to pass any resolution at all at this stage.

34. We consider it to be of paramount importance for the prestige of the United Nations and for the success of its action in the Congo that we could find a way by which we would be able to express our common concern and our common purpose to help the Republic of the Congo to overcome successfully its present grave difficulties.

35. Sir Patrick DEAN (United Kingdom): In his intervention in this debate on 17 December [952nd meeting, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, speaking for the United Kingdom, underlined the great importance which my Government attaches to the continuance and success of the United Nations effort in the Congo. My delegation believes that the great majority of the Governments represented in this Assembly share our anxiety that the United Nations effort should not be allowed to fail and are concerned that the grave and tragic divisions within the Congo should shortly be healed and the country enabled to go forward to prosperity united and truly independent.

36. We in the United Kingdom delegation have carefully studied the draft resolution introduced in the name of Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia [A/L.331 and Add.1]. We recognize that the purpose of this draft resolution is to see that the United Nations effort should be strengthened and that the sponsors of

it are concerned that the potential threat to international peace and security represented by the present situation in the Congo should be removed. In our view, however, the terms of this draft resolution go beyond the provisions of the Charter of our Organization in proposing action by the United Nations which would constitute interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo, and for that reason alone we are unable to accept it.

37. The United Nations is in the Congo to assist the Congolese to surmount their difficulties but not to run their country for them. We believe that the United Nations, many of whose Members have contributed, at substantial cost of men and money, to the United Nations effort to assist the Republic of the Congo in its need, has the right to expect the fullest active cooperation from all those in the Congo who exercise power in any part of the country. But we do not believe that the United Nations has the right to set up any sort of trusteeship over the Congo.

38. The reasons in detail why some of the provisions of the draft resolution of the eight Powers go altogether too far in seeking, on the one hand, to impose unconstitutional and indeed impracticable duties upon the Secretary-General and his staff and, on the other, in interfering excessively in internal Congolese affairs, have been well expressed by several delegations at the last meeting, notably those of Italy, Argentina and Canada. The interventions of the representatives of Ecuador, New Zealand and the Congo (Brazzaville) contained similar warnings. I shall, therefore, not repeat these detailed reasons now and shall rest on the general propositions which I have outlined earlier.

39. The draft resolution presented by the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States [A/L.332] has been prepared with these considerations in mind. My delegation considers that it goes as far as is consistent with the Charter in reaffirming the Secretary-General's mandate to assist the Congolese in the maintenance of law and order, in calling for cooperation with the United Nations by the Republic of the Congo and in pointing the way towards a solution for the situation in the Congo along democratic lines, in accordance with the due processes of law and the accepted attitudes toward human rights and human dignity. More specifically, the draft resolution looks forward to the part to be played by the forthcoming round table conference and the visit which has now begun, for the purposes of conciliation, by certain representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee in helping to resolve internal conflicts by peaceful means and to preserve the unity and integrity of the Congo. We believe that both these initiatives should prove valuable and should be supported.

40. My delegation does not believe that the basis of the United Nations effort in the Congo can or should be altered. We do, however, believe that the situation in the Congo is at a critical stage and that a fresh start is called for. What is required is active cooperation from all concerned, both on the Congolese side and from the contributors to the United Nations effort, to work patiently for a solution which will bring about the restoration of orderly conditions throughout the Congo and provide for the unity and integrity of the whole country.



41. We earnestly trust that those Governments which have spoken of withdrawing their support from the United Nations effort will reconsider and, in so doing, will have in mind the grave dangers to the peace of the world which would ensue if the United Nations effort to help the Congo were allowed to fail. We believe that the draft resolution presented to the Assembly by the United States and United Kingdom delegations provides a proper basis for such a fresh start, and I accordingly recommend it to this Assembly.

## AGENDA ITEM 71

### Question of Algeria

#### REPORT OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE (A/4660)

42. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the procedure which I suggested to the Assembly at the opening of this afternoon's meeting, I would now invite the Assembly to turn its attention to the question of Algeria.

*Mr. Herrarte (Guatemala), Rapporteur of the First Committee, presented the report of that Committee.*

43. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): The amendment [A/L.333] which my delegation has introduced to the draft resolution adopted by the First Committee [A/4660, para. 4] is an amendment which improves the contents of operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution in certain important aspects.

44. First of all, it substitutes the word "recommends" for the word "decides". That meets the objection raised by different delegations in the First Committee, an objection with which we are in agreement, namely that the General Assembly may not decide but only recommend.

45. Secondly, and more important, as to the referendum, instead of the words "organized, controlled and supervised" which appear in operative paragraph 4 and which restrict the whole functioning of the referendum so that it would be carried out in every way by the United Nations, we have the larger term "under the auspices of the United Nations", which simply gives to the United Nations the patronage of the referendum but does not prevent France in any way from playing its role in this matter in co-operation with the United Nations. The sense of the draft resolution is to keep the United Nations in the picture so as to ensure that there is a function for the United Nations which will give it the seal of impartiality and avoid all the conflict which would arise if there were no United Nations function with regard to the referendum.

46. The amendment allows full latitude for the organization of the referendum in every respect. It furthermore follows the pattern which has been adopted by the United Nations in various resolutions, particularly in resolution 637 (VII) adopted on 16 December 1952, with regard to the right of peoples and nations to self-determination, which applies to this case. That resolution speaks about "the wishes of the people being ascertained through plebiscites", preferably under the auspices of the United Nations. Therefore in every respect, juridically and from the point of view of substance our amendment meets all the requirements both of the United Nations procedures and of the United Nations spirit and also allows to France all the possibilities of playing its

own role in this referendum, which is not the case with operative paragraph 4 as it appears in the draft resolution recommended by the Committee.

47. In our submission, it is necessary that we have a constructive resolution giving a "directive" in this issue, because the principle of self-determination is not doubted; it is accepted. It is also accepted by the French Government that it will be an Algerian Algeria, and it is also accepted that there will be a referendum. So the difference is with regard to the general form of the referendum. On this difference, there should be a constructive resolution giving a directive from the United Nations, giving an indication of how that referendum should be held, because, if we simply throw the ball back to the parties to decide about the form of the referendum, we simply do nothing; we do what the previous resolutions did. Whenever there was a question to be decided, such as the Algerian question, and it came to the General Assembly, instead of deciding the issue, it simply threw the ball back to the parties, and the result was nothing. The resolution adopted at the twelfth session on 10 December 1957 states:

*[Mr. Rossides read resolution 1184 (XII)].*

48. This resolution has remained without any result for the last three years. What has prevented it from being followed? Because there was no "directive". It simply asked for "pourparlers". They go to "pourparlers" and they have opposing views; so from the very start there are no "pourparlers". It is the duty of the United Nations to give some "directive" on the actual point of difference, not to give a resolution which says nothing. They know themselves that they will decide their differences if they can, without the help of the United Nations. But it means that they need the help of the United Nations; they do not need the United Nations just to tell them, "Go and discuss the matter and decide it yourselves", but to tell them how and on what basis they could discuss and decide. My delegation's submission is that the resolution should be in a form which would indicate one way or another. If the Assembly decides to indicate another mode of referendum, let it indicate it. But above all, some indication on this issue is always better than no indication, because no indication leads us again to the same position where we were before.

49. What prevented the "pourparlers", recommended in the resolution that was adopted three years ago, from taking place? The main obstacle was the intransigence and the uncompromising attitude—one of the main obstacles—of the extremists among the "colons", difficulties thus placed in the way of President de Gaulle's plan and his imaginative statesmanship which had prevented that policy from producing the desired results. The call for negotiation did not discourage the extremists in their opposition to a solution. Therefore, something more must be done. The genuine intentions of President de Gaulle's Government and their goodwill to carry them out, cannot for a moment be doubted; but the obstacles placed in their way should be discouraged by a resolution of the General Assembly giving some indication of the form of the referendum.

50. Furthermore, the fourth preambular paragraph of the resolution, which was adopted by a two-thirds majority in the First Committee, draws attention to the ineffectiveness of the previous resolution of 1957 which called for "pourparlers". The sense of that

preambular paragraph is that in the operative part there should be a constructive resolution resulting in an effective solution of the problem. Obviously, from that resolution negotiations will follow; they will follow in the ordinary course of events, in arranging how and in which way, this referendum is to be held. But a clear indication will make things effective and possible.

51. The situation is such that due regard could not be given to susceptibilities which are otherwise understandable and proper; but these susceptibilities should give way to the urgency of the matter because the situation in Algeria has been deteriorating from year to year. We have reached a point where such deterioration could not be allowed to continue. It could not be allowed to continue because there is a danger of the whole problem being changed in its main aspects. It has now been, in spite of its deterioration, a straightforward question of self-determination; a question between France and the people of Algeria; but dangers looming on the horizon may change the aspects of the whole problem, and we must be alerted by these dangers. We must realize that everything should be done to reach a solution, and in this sense there must be a constructive resolution from this Assembly.

52. We believe that our amendment, while giving that constructive sense, gives ample latitude for each party to play the role that is due to it.

53. Mr. D'ARBOUSSIER (Senegal) (translated from French): In exercising my right of reply in the First Committee, following one of the speeches made by the representative of Tunisia, I confined myself to only one of the points he had raised and reserved the right to reply in the General Assembly to the basic objections that were advanced against the proposal made by the delegations of Senegal and the other States, with whose agreement it had spoken, and who have today joined in sponsoring an amendment [A/L.334]. This proposal, as you will recollect, refers to the necessity for, and possibility of, negotiations with a view to achieving a peaceful solution of the Algerian problem.

54. It is because of this basic position that, after having voted in the First Committee in favour of the preamble and the first three operative paragraphs of the draft resolution before us, we voted against operative paragraph 4 which resolves to entrust the United Nations with the task of organizing, controlling and supervising the referendum on self-determination for the Algerian people.

55. In spite of the change which, as we understand, has occurred in the position of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution after it was adopted by the First Committee, and in spite of the arguments which the representative of Cyprus has put forward in support of his amendment, our position remains unchanged. We are today even more strongly convinced of the need for, and possibility of, negotiations than at the time when we were defending our proposal in the First Committee. As evidence of this I need only refer to the following quotation from a French newspaper which may possibly surprise some people here: "It is futile to hope for the capitulation of a people which is fighting with such courage and self-sacrifice. There has been too much blood spilled; negotiation is not only possible—it is urgently necessary." We

ourselves fully agree with this view expressed by l'Humanité, the principal organ of the French Communist Party. So I must say that, despite the gravity of these discussions, I was rather amused to read, two days after the article from which I have taken the foregoing quotation, the following opinions in the same French newspaper on the vote in the First Committee:

"The ballots that have been taken in the United Nations Political Committee show that the overwhelming majority of international opinion not only disapproves of the continuation of the war but denounces very clearly those responsible for it. Nor will the more or less remotely controlled manoeuvres of a representative of Senegal succeed in restoring the situation. Only an immediate end of the war and negotiations with the Algerian Nationalist Provincial Government [GPRA] would be likely to restore France's authority in the world."

56. Having thus been taken to task once again, the representative of Senegal appreciates the great honour paid him but, truth to tell, fails to understand it. Restore what situation, seeing that he is asking for exactly the same thing that l'Humanité demands: an immediate end to the war and negotiation with the Algerian Nationalist Government? Is the representative of Senegal to understand, then, that l'Humanité is also under remote-control by the Brazzaville conference of Heads of States which has been recently held and whose instructions I, at any rate, am executing, or else by the French Government, whose cause—as people have already tried to insinuate—I am, they say, unjustly supporting, seeing that l'Humanité and I come to the same conclusion? Unless this is a case of curious recurrences of common positions which that newspaper and I formerly defended on colonial problems and peace.

57. But l'Humanité is not the only case in point—I shall spare you superfluous quotations from French newspapers—I would merely point out that, whether it be Combat, Paris-Jour, l'Aurore, le Monde, le Figaro or the weekly l'Express, the whole French Press is now reflecting the powerful movement of French opinion in favour of negotiations to which I already referred in the First Committee and which is even having repercussions in French Government circles. According to the latest Press information in all the policy statements made by the French political parties regarding the forthcoming referendum, as to whether to vote for or against, the same reason is given for their attitude in favour of negotiations. I know, of course, that I shall be told that this is once again a case of manoeuvres designed to get us safely through the Assembly discussions. How can anyone talk of manoeuvres, though, seeing that the problem is to steer events into an irreversible channel and emerge at last in the irresistible atmosphere of peace?

58. It is my serious belief that the moment has come for each of us—and I am saying it just as much on behalf of France, which is absent from our debates, as for all of us who are present here—to divest himself of any feeling of distrust, or even of suspicion, in considering this painful Algerian problem.

59. As I see it, what we should each mistrust is the kind of pleasure that would exist in being, as Jules Lemaitre said, "a handful of people who are right and

know they are". We must, therefore, do our utmost to get the largest possible number of people to share our opinion and our conviction. On the other hand, this very large number should beware of assuming an attitude that is possibly inherent in assemblies like ours, whose powers of execution are not on a par with the powers of decision that would be required of it by events.

60. Our Assembly—and I say this with all the respect that is its due—may thus be tempted to take bolder decisions than it is capable of enforcing, thus escaping the responsibility that devolves on a real executive agent. Several speakers have already stressed the importance of such an attitude. This is not a legal problem but, definitely, a political question, one which will affect the whole future of the United Nations. It is because we are impelled by a sense of the pathetic gravity of this Algerian problem and of the urgent necessity of getting it settled that we are again speaking in this discussion.

61. In the first place, on this—as we see it—fundamental question of negotiation, I am grateful to the representative of Tunisia for having recognized that we have made one of the essential conditions for its success the simultaneousness, not to say, the similarity of the discussion, during the negotiations, of the cease-fire and the other conditions attaching to the implementation of the referendum on self-determination; and I really think that that is the position of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. On 29 February 1960 its President, Mr. Ferhat Abbas, said:

"On 28 September 1959 we accepted recourse to self-determination. In the same declaration we also emphasized that, in order to give this procedure the requisite aspects of sincerity and loyalty, it would have to be discussed; to this end, we asked for talks to begin immediately on the conditions and guarantees for its implementation, for a principle is one thing and its implementation another."

62. On the other hand, we know that the Melun talks bogged down on the preliminary point of negotiating the cease-fire before any discussion began on the conditions for the organization of the referendum. But when we put forward the suggestion of reconciling the opposing points of view, by trying to distinguish between the parties that should participate in the negotiations on these two points, my esteemed opponent thought he had caught me out in a defence of the French viewpoint.

63. After the explanations I have just given, I feel there is no need to press the point but I would like to make it quite clear. In our opinion, the problem of self-determination concerns essentially the Algerian people as a whole, but, to put it frankly, its implementation raises several awkward problems, such as that of the existence of a big Algerian minority of European origin. And here I must say that, in discussing simultaneously the future fate of this minority and the current expression of its wishes about this future fate, a certain confusion is created. So we can distinguish two sides to the problem of the minority of European origin. The thing that concerns us at the moment is the application of the right of self-determination for the whole of the Algerian people. Our own view is that this right can only be applied in accordance with existing concepts of present-day public law, that is, the law of the majority and this is

where the problem of administrative structures assumes its full importance. On this point our view is the following:

(a) We believe that the question of administrative structures and of the political superstructure of the Algerian State cannot be settled without negotiations;

(b) We consider that we could never agree to the right of self-determination being exercised otherwise than for the whole body of the Algerian people and for the whole of Algerian territory;

(c) We consider that the structures of the new Algeria should promote the union of its people, respect the unity of the territory and that any type of structure likely to lead to any kind of partition of the Algerian people or territory must be absolutely rejected.

64. Consequently, the problem of structures is one of the essential points which need to be negotiated. We would say, though, that to mix up the way in which the will of the minority of European origin is expressed with the latter's future in the new Algeria creates a confusing situation. We think it is essential to give frank consideration to this problem which the French Government is putting forward with a sense of responsibility that does it great honour but, in our opinion, in such vague terms as to cast doubt on its intentions.

65. What is the point at issue? Is it a question of how to provide for the protection of the rights of French nationals who will reside in Algeria or of people who, because of circumstances, although they may want to opt for Algerian nationality, are apprehensive as to how the new State, whose citizens they will become, will treat them? In the former case, there can be no doubt that the Algerians who would like to retain their French nationality and citizenship would be subject to the rules of private international law and that respect of their rights might form the subject of a Franco-Algerian settlement convention which might simultaneously regulate the position of Algerian workers in France. For this category there is really no absolute difficulty.

66. On the general plane, after having freely expressed their views on self-determination, they must accept majority rule but they can keep a right of option. The problem is to know whether this right of option can be extended to the Algerians of African origin who have had French nationality and citizenship and would like to retain them.

67. The French Government has on several occasions asserted that it could not abandon those Algerians of African origin who have at a time sided with France and have even fought in her army against their Algerian brethren. In our opinion, this question too must necessarily form the subject of negotiations.

68. Finally, the representative of Tunisia has raised the problem of tendencies. On this point again there should be no misunderstanding. We would not be a party to any measure based on racial, religious or tribal discrimination. From our point of view, there is one problem, the problem of the Algerian people which comprises a strong European element which, by reason of its numbers, its location and a certain tradition, is likely to be transformed into a minority in the international law sense of the term unless political and administrative measures enable it to

move harmoniously from its present status towards a fusion with the Algerian people, the diversity of whose origins is an essential feature of its originality and its human wealth.

69. May I then be allowed to ask two questions. The first I shall put to France: are the special administrative measures, the various kinds of privileges that exist in certain French departments not perfectly compatible with the basic principle of the unity of the French people and the integrity of its territory? The second question I shall put to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic: is it impossible to agree that the sizable minority of European origin, while they are, as Mr. Ferhat Abbas, President of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, says, full-fledged Algerians, might enjoy certain special freedoms and privileges that would in no case constitute privileges falling within the province of Algeria's domestic legislation but the principles of which would have to be specifically negotiated?

70. There are even at the present moment several international precedents in this field. If these various principles could be accepted, then the attempt to achieve conciliation between the positions of the two principal parties concerned, as suggested by us, might perfectly well offer us a solution to this terrible tragedy: simultaneous discussion of the cease-fire and the conditions for organizing the referendum.

71. On the first point, the discussion would be conducted between the representatives of the French Government and those of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. On the second point, we believe the problem is to find ways and means of not debarring from the negotiations any of the interested elements, other than the parties to the dispute and to seek to secure in the preliminary discussions not so much their actual presence in the negotiations, as their participation on the points which should be submitted to negotiation.

72. The essential requirement, to emphasize it once again, is the regularity and the authenticity of the popular consultation in which everybody must be able to express his opinion freely. I think that these explanations will enable the Assembly now to see how far we agree or disagree with the authors of the draft resolution before us. Our concern, our sole concern, is to make it possible for negotiations to begin, for we believe—in our hearts, as well as in our minds—that a continuation of the war is against the interests both of the Algerian people and of the French people, against the interests of the peoples of Africa and of all mankind.

73. For the Algerian people continuation of the war can only, as we sincerely believe, lead to partition; it is not, in our firm belief, the difficulties to be met with in settling the fate of the European minority that can bring about partition, but rather the international implications involved in the state of war that now prevails in Algeria. We have thought earnestly—we have studied the unhappy fate of peoples whose unity had already been achieved and who are today divided by the consequences of the cold war, whether it be in Germany, in Korea or in Viet-Nam.

74. That is why, more than ever, we believe that the course we propose should be followed. But, I repeat, we know what a responsibility we would be shouldering in such a case for, it would be mandatory on us

to succeed. In voicing our opinion, we do not claim to be the only vessels that contain the truth. But we also think that no one has the sole monopoly of sympathy for the Algerian people and our dearest wish is that the solution of the Algerian problem, far from being an occasion for division, should be the major motive for a unity which might take the form of unanimity in our Assembly. It is in that spirit that we have tabled an amendment that takes account of our fundamental position on the need for, and possibility of, negotiations for a peaceful solution of the Algerian problem. We are fully aware of the concessions we are asking both sides to make, the authors of the draft resolution and those who are most stubbornly opposed to certain other provisions in the text that we have approved. But if really both sides, as we have maintained all through this debate, instead of trying to condemn the principle of the policy of self-determination as defined by General de Gaulle and approved by the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, and if this policy, which General de Gaulle is trying to get approved by the French people, is to be backed by us, if we are trying to secure international support for this attitude towards self-determination, that support should be as broadly-based as possible and should even aim at unanimity, a unanimity before which the opponents of this policy will have no alternative but to bow.

75. Why should we dissimulate our idea, however? If we must help General de Gaulle, we are even more conscious that we must do this for the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic; we can help it by signifying our solidarity with its policy of peace and negotiation, a policy which it has constantly proclaimed for the Algerian people's right to freedom—a solidarity which we would also like to see assume the widest possible form. And turning once again to General de Gaulle we beg him—in the same way as he has so high-mindedly rejected the myth, the fiction of a French Algeria in order to face up to the reality of the new Algeria—not to turn down any invitation that may be given by our Assembly.

76. Mr. Masmoudi, the Tunisian Minister of Information, said recently at Lomé: "We think that United Nations intervention will add nothing to the internationalization of the problem; the Algerian problem is already international but it must not degenerate into international war."

77. That is our feeling too for otherwise how could we be taking part in these debates and, as will doubtless be freely recognized, with an ardour that we do not even try to conceal. But, I repeat, like the Congo question, the question of Algeria has within it the potential of a cold war, and possibly to an even more dangerous degree.

78. Reference has frequently been made in this debate, in connexion with our attitude, to the judgement of history and the judgement of the peoples of Africa. As I would be loath to say a single word that might spoil the atmosphere of our discussions, I shall simply say that each of us will be subject to those judgements. As far as we are concerned, we shall face up, humbly, of course, but also serenely and confidently, not only to the judgement of history and of the peoples of Africa but also to that of all the peoples, for we realize that the lack of understanding sometimes shown towards our attitude is merely a passing phase and that we shall all soon find our-



selves reunited again at the rendezvous for peace in Algeria, in France, in Africa and in the world.

79. Turning now also to certain of our friends among the co-sponsors of the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee, we would like to tell them very frankly that, so long as we sit in this Assembly, we shall always claim the right to state our opinion on any problem put before us and that our votes will be given in strict conformity with the convictions and instructions of our Governments, whose recent declaration at Brazzaville sets forth in detail and with remarkable clarity the common policy. For it is our belief that this Assembly is not a popular assembly but an Assembly of nations and peoples; it is not an organization of masses but an organization of independent States whose freedom of speech and vote form an integral part of their sovereignty. It is by keeping these principles constantly in mind that we shall preserve our Assembly and increase its prestige and its influence in the world.

80. It is for all these reasons, which add to and sometimes duplicate those which I had the honour to expound in the First Committee, that we once again make an appeal to our Assembly. As it is the first occasion on which I myself am addressing the Assembly in plenary session, the gravity and solemnity of which cannot but evoke apprehensive reverence, I want to avoid committing the sin of pride; I am much too conscious of all that I still have to learn, but, as I am deeply convinced that all of us here want peace in Algeria, want free self-determination for the Algerian people and the establishment of brotherly relations between the Algerian and French peoples, I have every confidence in submitting our proposal to your vote, which I trust will be unanimous, for by so voting we will enable the Algerian people to enjoy the implementation of one of the undeniable rights of all the peoples, a right that is recognized by our Charter and we will enable the French people to maintain its immense influence in Africa and in the world and enable our Assembly to have contributed to the solution of one of the most delicate problems that today face the human conscience and thus to become the supreme guarantor of peace and brotherhood among the peoples.

*Mr. Sosa Rodriguez (Venezuela), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

81. Mr. TOURA GABA (Chad) (translated from French): I am not in the habit of repeating what everybody knows in all its aspects to the extent of boring my audience. But I have come to this rostrum because the Algerian problem is one that exceptionally interests the country which I have the signal honour to represent here. As it has common frontiers with the United Kingdom of Libya and the Republic of the Sudan—both of them Arab or Arabic-speaking countries—and as it has from time immemorial maintained all kinds of relations with those countries, Chad is, as you see, naturally Arabic-speaking and therefore practises, to a very large degree, the Moslem religion. Accordingly, whatever goes on in Algeria has repercussions of a certain intensity in my country.

82. After this simple statement which does not claim to give you any new information but is merely intended to justify to some small degree the great importance that my delegation attaches to the problem

which we are discussing, I trust that nobody will be surprised to find me supporting here, on behalf of the co-sponsors, the amendment to the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee.

83. My delegation regrets that this amendment could not be accepted by all our partners in the African-Asian group, all the more so that, hitherto, we have worked together in confidence and amity for the defence of the interests of our respective continents, in particular and the interests of all who are weak, in general. After all, though, it has happened, even to twin brothers, not to take the same view of certain problems and to adopt different lines of reasoning.

84. In insisting on submitting this amendment we have had only one aim in view; by giving tactful consideration to the susceptibilities of both sides, to induce the two principal parties concerned to meet round a table to engage in "pourparlers", in order to bring about a cease-fire and a referendum on self-determination. We are, of course, in agreement about international guarantees, which the United Nations could usefully help to arrange. We are seeking effective results and not an easy victory which could be no more than a Pyrrhic victory. Publicity is repugnant to us, more especially when the problem is to find adequate ways and means of extinguishing, without further delay, a conflagration which has done only too much damage and which threatens to spread to the whole of Africa and, as a result, to set the whole world alight.

85. We consider that operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution is only partially in conformity with the United Nations Charter. As it stands, it is absolutely inapplicable and ineffective. That is why we thought it advisable to make it workable by amending it. Is it possible or even imaginable that the United Nations could succeed in imposing its will on the two parties without their consent? Does that mean that we are trying to utter a facile condemnation which would merely gratify our vanity or are we sincerely anxious to help the warring parties to put an end to this useless and stupid bloodshed?

86. Our proposal is not to take sides with one party to the detriment of the other. We do not desire and we have no power to set ourselves up as judges. We want to reconcile the parties in the case and preserve the future, because that is important in this interdependent world.

87. Geographically, Algeria cannot, no matter what happens, ignore France and *vice versa*. That is a truth and an imperative fact against which nothing will avail. We know certain precedents on which comment would be superfluous.

88. Recent happenings in Algeria have greatly helped to clarify the situation. While we deplore numerous casualties suffered by the Algerian nationalists, we note at the same time, not without satisfaction, that those whom we customarily designate as "ultras" have at last been given the punishment they deserved. In their turn they are being pursued, hunted down and haled before the courts. For the first time the feeling of despair has switched sides.

89. This change in the situation shows that General de Gaulle has decided to put an end, once and for all, to this war which the conscience of the world condemns. When one realizes the explosive situation in

which military leaders, powerful political parties and equally powerful groups of business men publicly sided with the protagonists of French Algeria, one cannot but congratulate General de Gaulle on his courageous initiative. No other French leader would even have been brave enough to attempt that.

90. We endorse the preamble of the draft resolution because we think that this war, which has gone on far too long, must necessarily come to a stop. The sooner it does so the better. Like the authors of this draft resolution, we are in favour of serious reciprocal guarantees for the cease-fire and the referendum. In a word, we have been, and we are, in favour of an immediate unconditional peace and of international guarantees.

91. As I said earlier, what we, as disinterested parties, seek is effective action and the avoidance of procedural quibbling with all the risks it involves in due course. The draft resolution submitted to us, on the other hand, runs the risk, by virtue of its intransigent and peremptory character, to indispose the negotiating parties and to give rise to endless discussions of the Panmunjom type. It would be like trying to cut water with a sabre. In order to avoid this difficulty, and since we are trying to reach the same goal—it is only that there are different ways of getting there quickly—my delegation and the co-sponsors of the amendment make a last appeal to the sponsors of the draft resolution which was adopted by the First Committee and ask them to be good enough, in everyone's interest, to accept our amendment.

92. We make the same appeal to the other delegations to vote in support of our amendment so that we can speedily see emerge the conditions for an honourable end of the war in Algeria.

93. The highest degree of courage consists in taking a lucid view of things and accepting one's responsibilities. We have shouldered our responsibilities by quite honestly placing our amendment before the General Assembly.

94. May I, in conclusion, quote this famous sentence of Bossuet: "The greatest disorder of the mind is to believe things because one wants them to be and not because one has seen them as they actually are."

95. Mr. AW (Mali) (translated from French): My delegation is joining in the debate in order to support the amendment which has just been submitted by the delegation of Cyprus [A/L.333], although we ourselves are co-sponsors of the original text of the draft resolution.

96. We support this amendment for the reasons given by the representative of Cyprus and chiefly because during the debate in the Committee it turned out that there are certain delegations which are sincerely anxious to help us to reach a constructive solution and which fully share the anxieties of the Algerians and all their friends and their desire to find a way of putting an end to this terrible war.

97. We found subsequently that those delegations had found operative paragraph 4 a stumbling block as it contained a form of words that, as they said, went beyond what the Charter itself allowed us to do. In order therefore to enable all those delegations, who want to do the whole of their duty, and to act justly by the Algerian people, to do so, we thought it was absolutely essential to make this concession. Drafted as

it is, the amendment will enable us to submit to the Assembly a text which should command the support of everyone, or at least of all the delegations which are not resolutely committed to take sides irrevocably and, probably, I should say, for a priori reasons. In these circumstances my delegation strongly supports the amendment tabled by the delegation of Cyprus.

98. As regards the amendment proposed by eleven African countries [A/L.334], I must say that my delegation objects to it for reasons that are actually very simple. I would like, if I may, to refer simultaneously to both amendments as they offset one another.

99. The amendment of Cyprus, which changes operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, introduces the idea of the General Assembly intervening to ensure that the guarantees demanded by the Algerians might be given during the popular consultation, which is the only method by which the people of Algeria can freely determine their future. Judging by all that I have heard so far about the amendment proposed by the eleven African countries, I have failed to get an answer to one preoccupation on the question of guarantees.

100. It has been said that everyone sincerely desired a solution, that the Algerians had the right to be independent and that it was really from a desire to reach a settlement that this amendment was submitted. It has also been said that negotiations should be opened between all the parties concerned and that that in fact was the only way of reaching a solution. It has also been said that, in order to facilitate contacts, a special international commission should be set up, the membership of which would be determined subsequently and which would be responsible for establishing the necessary contacts.

101. However, there is one idea which seems to us to be of capital importance but which does not appear in these documents. It is the idea of guarantees which gives us concern. Negotiations, certainly; contacts, agreed. But then the one point of concern, which has constantly been mentioned here and which amounts to giving the Algerians guarantees that the popular consultation to be held will be carried out absolutely honestly and above-board, to that point no reply has yet been given. Negotiations are not the sort of thing that can offer such a guarantee.

102. I will grant it to the authors of the amendment that the negotiations should be continued. But I must say that there is nothing new, nothing positive in that. This amendment does not commit the General Assembly to follow a new line. Negotiations were asked for several years ago by the Provisional Government of the Algerian Government. France hesitated for a very long time but finished, all the same, by starting negotiations. They were interrupted at Melun; they will undoubtedly be resumed one of these days. Negotiation, after all, is in the natural order of things.

103. But this is not a formal, concrete, constructive proposal which promises progress towards an immediate solution of the problem. Ask for negotiations? Agreed. Ask for a commission to be set up to establish contacts and begin negotiations? Agreed. But, after all, will the French Army be the organizer of the popular consultation, if you refuse absolutely to hear of intervention by the United Nations in one form or another. Assuming there is agreement to

inviting the two parties to negotiate and considering what the French stand is at the present moment, who will give the Algerian this guarantee which is what we are concerned about?

104. That is the question I put to the authors of the amendment. They have said many correct things and have expressed, with a frankness that we are perfectly prepared to admit, their desire for a fair and honest solution of the problem. But the question we ask them is: where is the guarantee? Assuming that the United Nations adopts such a proposal, where is the guarantee that the Algerians want?

105. Consequently, the amendment we are offered, containing as it does no reference to a United Nations guarantee, holds out no new prospect for the good reason that the negotiations will go on, whether France likes it or not. It will have to come to negotiations because the National Liberation Army has decided to continue its fight to the end. One way or another there will have to be negotiations. So that is not where the question lies.

106. On the other hand, we fail to understand the formal objection made to the United Nations taking any action which might look as if some kind of pressure was being exerted on General de Gaulle, pressure which would be prejudicial to him. General de Gaulle has announced his decision to apply the principle of self-determination. Assuming that he wants to do so—and we are among those who are prepared to maintain a favourable view on the point—he has to confront a minority in Algeria made up of settlers and a few officers who want a French Algeria. Consequently, if General de Gaulle could get the backing of a decision, a recommendation or some kind of indication of support from world opinion, which would tell France, tell General de Gaulle to give the Algerians the desired guarantee, if in a word the United Nations gave their endorsement to the operation, then General de Gaulle's project would be facilitated. General de Gaulle could put forward such a decision of the United Nations to the "ultras" and the Army as evidence in support of his plan on the assumption that that would be a way of succeeding. Why should General de Gaulle be offended by a decision of the United Nations if world opinion were to say it agreed with him?

107. During the discussions in the First Committee it was quite clear that no delegation made any reflection against General de Gaulle personally. On several occasions tribute was paid to his tireless efforts. Consequently, the United Nations does not in any way condemn the policy of General de Gaulle in Algeria. Thus, in so far as General de Gaulle is sincerely anxious to apply the principle of self-determination, the vote that we are asking you to give will strengthen him against the "ultras", the activists and the fascist officers.

108. Unfortunately, if you continue—and here I am appealing to the co-sponsors of the amendment who actually wish to omit the slightest reference to any kind of United Nations intervention—to believe that this would be a case of pressure that would seem intolerable to General de Gaulle, we shall have to ask ourselves whether the solution envisaged by General de Gaulle is really self-determination in the full sense of the term, that is, to ask the Algerians the following question: "What do you want to be?"

But if that is really General de Gaulle's intention, it would be easy to let the referendum be held, under no matter whose sponsorship or supervision. That would make it unnecessary, for instance, to demand guarantees for the minority. That forms part of the programme of the negotiations, the contacts which would necessarily occur. But would they be, purely and simply, negotiations? To achieve what? I put the question to you.

109. Consequently, on the one hand, we have before us an amendment which mentions negotiations which would be absolutely useless because its content refers to the present situation, a situation which has existed for some years past. On the other hand, we have an amendment which promotes the solution of the problem, without any pressure being exerted on General de Gaulle and which does not in any way run counter to his policy—quite the contrary.

110. In these circumstances I fail to see how, with these two texts before us, anyone can hesitate for a single moment in supporting the amendment submitted by the delegation of Cyprus.

111. Still addressing myself to the co-sponsors of the eleven-Power amendment, I am compelled to point out, as a normal inference from the arguments I have just stated, that the only possible explanation is that there is a desire to prevent absolutely any reference being made in the resolution to sponsorship by the United Nations in one form or another.

112. Whatever the spokesman for the co-sponsors of the amendment may say, we must assert that that is a decision which is rather dated. It is not a decision that has been improvised; it is not the result of the normal sequence of our discussions. We have been able to ascertain that the French delegation is formally opposed to any intervention by the United Nations. In fact, it is even opposed to the debate which is going on at present. Consequently, if someone admits that he is a friend of France—and there is no question of that being made a ground for reproach—when someone makes no concealment of the fact or stresses the point and when, in addition, anyone in this discussion sides with France which refuses to let the United Nations deal with the Algerian problem and when we are offered an amendment which has absolutely no concrete content, contains nothing which would enable progress to be achieved, then we must really admit that this amounts, purely and simply, to taking sides in the discussion. And that is something, we must say, that we noticed quite a long time ago, even before the discussion began. We knew the French position. We knew that France had intimated to its friends that it desired—it made no concealment of the fact—to have no debate. We knew that, if an attempt were made to open the debate, the first concern of France's friends would be to have it adjourned. We knew that, if the adjournment was not secured, it would then have to be so arranged that there would be no condemnation of France in the United Nations.

113. And that is the very point I want to make when I say that, if France is to be championed, she has been championed hitherto—and people have persisted in championing her—by supporting this proposal which, as I said just a moment ago, is not a condemnation. There is not the slightest suggestion of condemnation in this text. I do not think, though, that



we should go so far as to propose deleting the slightest reference to United Nations intervention.

114. The debate now in progress has a political aspect which I would like to stress, speaking as I do still in support of the amendment of Cyprus and against the amendment submitted by the eleven African countries.

115. If you claim to be sincerely anxious to find a solution for this Algerian problem, if you proclaim yourself African and a convinced champion of African solidarity, why do you take up a position in this debate directly opposed to the position of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic? Why do you not only refuse to support that position but even launch an offensive against it? That is the question I ask.

116. Actually, what is the problem at issue? According to the spokesman of the eleven delegations who have signed the amendment, the problem is to help to find a solution. Here we have Algerians who have been fighting for six years past, who have obtained the results we all know of by their courage, their organization, by the sacrifices they have accepted. They have had the experience of making several attempts at negotiation which have led to nothing.

117. Today these Algerians, in their anxiety to find a solution of their problem, have come to the United Nations to ask for its help in finding, within the framework of African solidarity, an honourable and just solution. How does it come about that, as it happens, it is eleven African countries who take up the offensive against this initiative of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic? How is it that eleven African countries are the only co-signatories of this amendment which exactly reflects the view and the desire of the French delegation, reduced to its last shift, in this debate? Why not Belgium; why not Luxembourg? Why not some of France's European friends? That is my question. For that matter, why would it not be the United Kingdom or the United States, seeing that they have not said in this discussion on Algeria that they are in favour of African-Asian solidarity? They have not said that they approved the Algerian point of view. They admitted, they affirmed that they agreed with France, that they stand for France. Why was it not these countries then which took the initiative in proposing an amendment which clearly could not but prejudice the solution of the Algerian problem as conceived by the Algerians.

118. I would like to tell the African delegations which have submitted this amendment that, if they are anxious to find a solution for the Algerian problem, if they are in sympathy with the African cause, I cannot see why they would not trust the Algerian Government in the search for such a solution. How can they imagine that, in their present situation, they are in a better position to propose to the Algerians a solution which is suspect to the Algerians? For what reasons? Do they believe—in the name of heaven knows which principles or which way of looking at the question, that they are better able, in the circumstances in which they are situated, to think out a solution of the Algerian problem? Do they believe that the delegations which are present here are in a bigger hurry than the Algerians to see the end of the war? Why, then, be more of a royalist than the King? I fail to understand. My delegation absolutely fails to

understand how African States which consider themselves supporters of the Algerian cause or in favour of Algerian independence, which say they are sincerely trying to help the Algerians to find a solution, how they can imagine that they are better fitted and better placed to find the solution or point out the quickest way of reaching it. That is the reason why we are compelled to conclude that they are behaving with an irresponsibility that will have extremely serious consequences.

119. I am not talking of the judgement of history. I am not using high faluting speech. I simply ask you to reflect on what I have just said, namely, that in this dispute between Algeria and France, if one is avowedly in agreement with the Algerians about their legitimate aspirations, if one is a supporter of self-determination—real self-determination, not self-determination in the French sense of the term, but in the sense which assumes that, if the Algerians want to be independent and have no links with France, they will manage it—then one must trust the Algerians and not forget that, in the case of people like them, who have taken up arms and have waged war for six years past, if there are any ingenious formulas or any realistic formulas for achieving a solution, they have plenty more of them and have thought out the problem better than all of us here, because they are the people who are getting killed.

120. Consequently, it is impossible in such a debate as this to say: I am in favour of African-Asian solidarity, of the Algerian cause; I support the cause of independent Algeria—and then formally object here to the slightest suggestion likely to be made by the Algerian delegation.

121. I would like to make a brief reference to the responsibility which the United Nations itself shoulders in the Algerian tragedy. I would like to appeal to all the delegations so that, as the representative of Cyprus has just said, a concrete measure may now emerge to show that the United Nations, once and for all, has done everything in its power; even if it did nothing more than adopt this resolution—as to its implementation, we shall see—the United Nations would have taken concrete action.

122. I ask the United Nations to do it because Algeria has been coming here for the last six years. The United Nations has taken no energetic, categorical action because it was doubtful about the real aspirations of the Algerian people. It had heard talk about the Algerian revolution being directed by a handful of fanatics who did not represent the Algerian people. It had listened to long-drawn-out statements by the French Government about Algeria being an integral part of the French Republic. The United Nations has waited five years for evidence that the Algerian revolution really did represent an Algerian popular rising. Five years had to pass. And in those five years what happened in Algeria was that there were thousands and thousands of casualties—a terrible war. If I may be allowed to put it this way; it is a kind of proof by reductio ad absurdum for the United Nations to have waited thus in order to be convinced that the Algerian people really was asking for its independence, asking for justice to be done to it. Now that this has been proved, what more does the United Nations want to make up its mind, to take a decisive step towards settling the Algerian problem?



123. There is nothing to wait for. You cannot put forward again the simple argument that it is General de Gaulle's wish to end the conflict. That is not a convincing argument. The United Nations must, therefore, after having let the Algerian people fight for over five years, shoulder its responsibilities. As this debate comes to a close, a concrete decision must be taken which will enable Algeria to receive at last its freedom and its independence.

124. Consequently, my delegation formally opposes the amendment submitted by the eleven African countries. My closing words will be simply an appeal made to these friends, these African brothers that they themselves should refrain from asking the Assembly to vote on this amendment. I think that is the path of reason, of wisdom and of African solidarity. It cannot follow any other direction. The first way of showing our sympathy for the Algerian people, absorbed as it is by its problem and burdened by the sacrifices it has made for years past, is to offer it a strong helping hand.

125. Mr. GUIRMA (Upper Volta) (translated from French): It is an indisputable fact that the new French-speaking States are, more so than the actual parties concerned, the star performers in this discussion. They were not the people who wanted it. It was "wished" on them. People are waiting to see how they will behave in a conflict in which France, their friend, is opposed to the Algerians, their brothers. There is speculation as to the attitude they will adopt. What people are saying is: these countries are not so independent as they say they are; they are in the French community; they cannot vote against France. And they add: the Algerians are their brothers. How would these African countries dare to vote against colonized peoples which are fighting for their independence? What a terrible conflict of conscience! And the Algerians go one better, for they say: brothers, you must vote for us. We are the people you must help. It is a sacred duty for you. You must forget your problems of conscience and support us unconditionally. If you do so, the whole world will applaud you and cover you with floral tributes. And what do we ourselves say? We say this: things would be so simple, if it were merely a matter of saying "yes" or "no" to a resolution. They would be pleasant, if all one had to do was to come and harvest the flowers and the applause at the United Nations.

126. The representative of Mali, referring to our amendment, asked us a question about the guarantee of the referendum. His question, like the whole of his speech, fully reflects the doubt which weighed on the whole world, the doubt as to France's intentions when she talked pacification and rebellion. Our reply will be that the States signatories of the amendment in question are marching abreast of their time. And the time is the month of December 1960, the time when no one, even in France, really thinks any more of distorting the picture of the Algerian war. Our time is this very moment when, rising above the political arena, the Algerian people comes out of the Kasbah and gives unequivocal expression to its feelings, reminding the whole world around that an end must at last be put to the war.

127. I shall tell the representative of Mali quite simply that the representative of Senegal has carefully analysed the technical part of our amendment and that the representative of Chad has completed the

clarification of our motives. We are no whit less African than the Mali representatives. We intend to prove it just as stoutly as them and to just as great a degree as all the other brethren.

128. The representative of Mali acted wisely and prudently in refusing spontaneously to appeal to the judgement of history. Very well, then, we appeal to the judgement of history. That is why we refuse to take the easy path or play the role of operetta star. We will play the game with a sense of responsibility, as States conscious of having reached our majority. We will play the game better than some people do, for we are completely independent and we defy anyone to prove the contrary without uttering a falsehood or a slander.

129. As far as Upper Volta is concerned, it is not in the former French community; let people realize it. But that does not mean that it thinks that those countries which are in the Community have contracted a shameful disease. The Community is a goodwill effort to secure co-operation between the peoples. Its ideal is fine and should be encouraged. The Algerian war attaches a cancerous growth to this ideal which must be amputated.

130. To the Algerians we shall simply say that we have never needed to be convinced that they were our brothers. God has made us live in the same continent. He has made us share the same fate. We are now free thanks to Him. Why would we not help our brothers free themselves, we who have tasted the bread of freedom and found it good. We want our brothers to taste it also. And it is because they are our brothers that we cannot but wish them well. That is why we shall tell them all the truths also, even those that are painful, for in any case we have to show restraint.

131. The first of these truths is that we cannot adopt an abstentionist attitude in this debate. We would be even more entitled to claim that it is our duty to intervene in the conflict and we shall prove that we are fit to cope with our historic task.

132. The second truth is that we are not prepared to intervene unconditionally in the dispute. The condition which we attach to our intervention is that we are quite clearly and firmly resolved to intervene not as remotely-controlled robots but quite simply as human beings, that is, with our freedom, our intelligence and our heart.

133. When we are told: "We certainly want you to bring us arms but we do not want people to tell us how to use them", as we have been told by our Algerian brethren, our reply is "It is not arms we are bringing you but we offer ourselves with our arms and our abilities. Would you like us to hold the gun while you press the trigger?" A fight carried on in that way cannot be a success.

134. The third truth is that we are prepared and resolved to pay the Algerian people a tribute of sympathy which will contribute to a speedy, prompt and happy peace. But we absolutely refuse, amid its own war, its war of liberation which we admire, to pay it a tribute of hatred as some people do. It would not be fair; it would not be honest. It would not be constructive. Our concern is for justice and honesty, for it is precisely that which constitutes the supreme good towards which all peoples aspire.

135. The fourth truth is that the National Liberation Front (FLN) must admit that this war of resolutions could have, and should have, been avoided. Can they accuse us of not having done our utmost to achieve something resembling unanimity? Up till now the contacts have not been severed. Our goodwill is manifest. Since the debate was opened it has brought the Algerian nationalists more than they could have gained since their revolution. They have simply forgotten to understand that victory is not something you find: it is something that is established as a fact. And what do we find is the fact? We find that, since achieving our independence, the problem has been to know which of our countries would recognize the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA). That even proved to be one of the greatest difficulties, we were told, which caused the break-up of an African Federation. Newspapers in Tunisia and other countries have sharply commented on the declarations of a friend and brother Head of State who described the Algerian problem as one of France's internal problems. When the Heads of State of the Cameroun, Niger and Senegal went to Tunis and met President Ferhat Abbas, people were not slow to interpret this event as de facto recognition of the GPRA. In the United Nations lobbies here FLN Ministers are quite as uninhibited about buttonholing the representatives of African countries as the other diplomatic representatives. In friendly and fraternal fashion they discuss their problems frankly and freely. Can we honestly say today that the problem is merely a matter of de facto or de jure recognition of the GPRA? Can it be convincingly asserted that this way of viewing the situation is not outdated? After the dramatic happenings in Algiers, is it still possible to take refuge behind formulas which smack of legal or political subtleties?

136. As far as we are concerned in any case, the problem now seems to us clear-cut. There must be an end to a war which is poisoning the peace of the world, which presents a risk of a general conflagration. At the same time it must be recognized that a people which is fighting for its freedom has not fought in vain. That is what President Mamadou Dia publicly stated here. The representative of Senegal, his delegate, clearly explained his thinking on the point in the First Committee and I do not believe that any man of goodwill failed to take due note of his declarations.

137. We have not withheld the names of those with whom negotiations must be conducted if a real, lasting peace is to be arrived at. Why, after so many efforts have been made, do people continue to show themselves so distrustful of us and to slander us? Still, we are not discouraged for all that. Anxious to the last to keep in touch and to prove our sincerity, certain countries like Upper Volta, Chad, Cameroun and Dahomey abstained from voting on operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution—the only one on which we are not agreed—so that we could continue to co-operate effectively in deleting everything that reason and commonsense disapprove of as having no operative value. But our endeavour to co-operate has not been reciprocated. Attempts have always been made to deny us the right to express our own individuality.

138. I must say one thing in this connexion. When it was learnt that these States were going to abstain, our Algerian brethren voiced their disappointment, saying that the better way would have been to vote

against that proposal. I myself was bitterly and violently reproached after the vote and my explanation of it. It was a mortifying experience for me, convinced as I was that I was helping everyone to look forward confidently to a successful solution. You can imagine my surprise the following morning to see a statement which acknowledged the positive character of this very abstention by these African States and extolled the virtues of my abstention. What do they take us for? Automatic robots or men? If they think we are robots, let me tell them that they are hugely mistaken. Anxious though we are to help our brethren in their sufferings, we shall yet be firm and resolute. Why should we go to the help of France and take so much trouble? The French Government is absent; that is not our business. Not one of the African countries will get up from his seat to go and occupy that of France.

139. We know, though, that, if the French seat is empty, the French people are there in spirit. And they are the very same people who hurled into the whole world, like a blazing torch, the terrible word "revolution". A revolution to overthrow injustice and tyranny; a revolution to win freedom and to defend the freedom won. It is the same people of France who accepted self-determination, this self-determination which meets with world-wide approval. The French people are the workers in the French Confederation of Christian Workers (CFTC) and General Confederation of Labour (CGT) movements, the working masses who, in sympathy with all those who are suffering in the world, are urging General de Gaulle to negotiate with the FLN. The French people include the French mothers who have no more tears left to shed for their sons who are dying day after day and who are joined together with the Algerian mothers in the same sorrow and the same affliction. This French people relies on one only of its sons to bring it peace: General de Gaulle.

140. If I say nothing about the Algerian people, the reason is that they, at any rate, are unanimous. The paradoxical thing about this war is that one of the parties—the strongest, as it happens—is gravely and deeply divided, a most menacing threat to world peace. But we are also witnessing the drama of a lonely man, whom his enemies do not understand and many of his fellow-countrymen detest. This man by himself is facing the rending blasts of the storm, determined to bring peace and independence to Algeria, as well as civic peace and unity to his own country. We are statesmen here and such a picture cannot but make a vivid impression on us, for courage is one of the virtues that form part of the universal heritage.

141. I admire the heroism of the Algerian people which shed plenty of its blood on 10, 11 and 12 December last and I bow my head in respect before its martyrs. I also admire the heroic courage of General de Gaulle who realizes that he must not fail in his task and who knows better than anyone else that a people's blood is the best guarantee of its freedom.

142. Such are the realities of the Algerian war. The African States who support the amendment of the eleven Powers are only concerned about one thing—to vote for a resolution which will not harm the prestige of the United Nations in case it is not implemented. Everyone knows that General de Gaulle is not an easy man to deal with. That is not to say that

we must adapt ourselves to his haughty, independent character. But I want to point out here that our Heads of State, now meeting in Brazzaville, have expressed their faith in the United Nations and their wish to make it effective. That is why they have also expressed their deep regret that the United Nations has no means of coercion available to it when their decisions are not implemented. This is a dangerous situation and one that offers enormous temptations to the mighty. We do not think that they should be given a chance of setting up undesirable precedents which might, at a future date, paralyse the constructive efforts of the United Nations.

143. If we are here merely to swell still further the number, in the archives of the United Nations, of the decisions that cannot be, and have not been, applied, it would then be better for each of us to go home, back to his country. We feel sure, however, that no one can go home before he has made an effective contribution to the peace of the world and to peace in Algeria. Speaking for ourselves, we are in favour of following this constructive path and we beseech you to help us to achieve this end. Help us to help the Algerians in order that peace may reign in their country and that they may taste the joy and pride of independence.

144. We have expressed our views very simply, very freely, very sincerely, because Upper Volta is a country that is rich, above all, in men and a country of men can only express itself through the heart. We have spoken with the conviction that we have, more particularly, borne witness to what should be our historic role in the Algerian war. If our brethren have understood us, they will vote in favour of our amendment. But, if our amendment is defeated, then, to our most profound regret, we shall be compelled in consternation to vote "No". This "No" will not mean that we refuse to work for peace in Algeria and for the independence of the Algerian people. It will be a "No" uttered in defence of the United Nations and of their prestige in the world, a "No" which will also signify our refusal to be disregarded and misunderstood by our own brethren. And when we go back to our countries, we shall be able to report to our people on what has happened and tell them: "Anyway, our honour is saved". For we remember that our peoples' wisdom has produced the saying: "What is built in spittle, is destroyed by the dew".

145. I entreat you, Gentlemen, vote in favour of the amendment which has been proposed to you. Help us to help all those who are men of goodwill so that peace may reign in Algeria, and so that we may arrive at a really effective solution, a solution devoid of all tension, a solution which can ensure that peace will shortly reign in Algeria.

*Mr. Boland (Ireland), President, resumed the Chair.*

146. Mr. Mongi SLIM (Tunisia) (translated from French): I would like, first of all, in order to maintain the decorum of a debate that is so important and so serious for international peace and world stability, to refrain during this statement from embarking on useless and sterile polemics or advancing considerations that have, in our view, absolutely no connexion with the essential purpose of the debate. I shall confine myself to talking here calmly and dispassionately about the real problem as it confronts us. We have already expounded, exhaustively, objectively and clearly, our point of view during the debate in the

First Committee and we shall not revert to the point, for our essential purpose is not to engage in any polemics but to bring about peace, to have peace on our frontiers, to have tranquillity in Africa and, consequently, to have—at least—stability in the world.

147. While our objective is peace, it cannot be peace in injustice or peace on a defective basis, which might vitiate its consolidation and destroy its fruits. I must then, at this stage of the debate on the Algerian question, review the situation and define our attitude towards the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee, as well as to the two amendments to operative paragraph 4, proposed respectively by the delegation of Cyprus [A/L.333] and by the delegations of eleven sister nations of Africa [A/L.334].

148. Once again the problem for Tunisia, for the world and, above all, for the United Nations, is the problem of a war which, with its train of dead, of wounded, of sufferings, has unhappily been going on for six years past in Algeria between France and the Algerian people battling for a noble cause—the cause of its dignity and its independence. Over these six years all attempts to secure an amicable solution that would safeguard interests that are undoubtedly legitimate and the continuation of such a useful friendship have unfortunately failed.

149. Shall I recall the appeal for a peaceful, democratic and just solution that was issued by our General Assembly as far back as four years ago? Shall I remind you of the offer of good offices made by the President of the Tunisian Republic, Mr. Bourguiba, and by H. M. Mohammed V, King of Morocco, in 1957? Shall I, finally, recall the ardent and unanimous hope that emerged from the debate at our fourteenth session, during the course of which direct talks between the two parties were asked for. All that, alas, has ended in failure. The preliminary meeting at Melun between the representatives of the Algerian Provisional Government and those of the French Government has also, unfortunately, definitively disappointed our hopes. At that meeting it turned out that the French Government was prepared to discuss with the Algerian nationalists only the military terms for the cease-fire, on conditions that are known to you, but deferring until later, if necessary, once the cease-fire had been obtained, the discussion between them and all the other trends of opinion in Algeria regarding the functioning of the referendum that is to enable the Algerian people to decide on their future lot.

150. I have explained more than once that it is unthinkable to ask any party to an armed conflict which does not regard itself as defeated—and six years of struggle seem to show that the Algerians are quite right on this point—to ask it, I say, to discuss a cease-fire without giving it full assurances as to how the political conflict is to be settled.

151. As the principle of allowing the Algerian people to decide freely about their future has obviously been admitted, there remained the essential problem of the guarantees for a real, genuine popular consultation. As the last experience at Melun has, I am very sorry to say, shown that the French Government still wants to avoid conversations on this fundamental subject, there remains only the United Nations, a body that by its very nature is impartial, to guarantee and vouch for the authenticity of a referendum in Algeria,

by organizing it and supervising its operation. That is our conviction, based on an objective and non-partisan study of the situation as it stands, particularly after the declaration made by General de Gaulle on 4 November 1960.

152. In order not to protract the discussion, I shall not recall the serious dangers involved in this declaration, more especially, the danger of the possible partition, that of fictitious bodies which would be set up with a view to seeking out individuals who would be responsible for them, thus prejudging the choice that should be made by the Algerian people as to its future lot. I have abundantly stressed these dangers in the First Committee. All the delegations know them. It will be the duty of each of them to weigh its Government's responsibilities in respect of them.

153. Nevertheless, the operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution tabled by the First Committee seemed to us to offer a concrete and positive method of stopping the war and achieving the real, peaceful, democratic and just solution recommended by the General Assembly at its twelfth session. That is why we have supported it. Amendments, however, have been proposed to this paragraph. I shall take, first, the one which appears in the eleven-Power amendment and try to explain objectively and dispassionately what seems to emerge from this amendment. In its first part we read:

"Invites the parties involved in the conflict to enter immediately into negotiations, without preliminary conditions or restrictions, on a cease-fire and the circumstances for the organization of the referendum on self-determination, including mutual guarantees for the parties concerned, and international guarantees;"

You have probably noticed that I have deliberately stressed the words "invites the parties involved in the conflict" and the words "or restrictions". I must say that this amendment is at least one year behind in the evolution of the discussion of the problem by our General Assembly which has already recommended negotiations or talks. As we have already said, such talks would seem to amount, as the French Government conceives them, solely to surrender. Are we going to go on endlessly recommending negotiations when men are dying day after day, especially with the new and highly dangerous conception embodied in the document I have just quoted. We are not opposed to honest, serious negotiations, conducted with complete good faith and in all fairness, regarding the guarantees for a referendum that will enable the Algerian people to decide its future. Such negotiations cannot honestly be imagined save between the two parties to the conflict—the French Government and the Government of the Algerian Republic. If there are still serious prospects in this connexion, even after the adoption by the Assembly of paragraph 4 of the document, even in the form which it had during the discussion in the First Committee, no one would doubtless raise objections to such negotiations. If agreement could be reached between the two parties, our Organization would welcome it and would refrain from raising any kind of objection.

154. But this amendment is dangerous, as we see it, because of the fact that it calls for negotiations on a general scale. We would, of course, have understood it, when speaking of negotiations on guarantees for

the Algerian referendum, the draft made it clear that they should be held between the two parties to the conflict, that is, the Algerian Provisional Government and the French Government. Unfortunately, the draft does not do so and it introduces a completely new idea.

155. The statement which has just been made so brilliantly by my friend, the distinguished representative of Senegal, regarding the negotiations on the conditions for organizing the referendum on self-determination throws a lot of light both on the danger and the iniquity of such a procedure. A distinction, you see, is made between two kinds of negotiations: those on the cease-fire in which only the Algerian Provisional Government and the French Government should participate and those dealing with the guarantees for a referendum in Algeria, and for which the representative of Senegal considers—and I quote the words he himself has just spoken—"the problem is to find ways and means of not barring from the negotiations any of the interested elements other than the parties to the dispute".

156. Thus, discussions should be continued regarding these guarantees. It should also be borne in mind that, according to this view, the discussions about these guarantees relating to the referendum should be carried on between the French Government, the Europeans in Algeria, the Algerians who are friends of France and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic.

157. I shall, of course, not venture into a discussion of the question of the interests of the French in Algeria or of the guarantees to be extended to them in a free and independent Algeria. Such a problem falls essentially within the purview of France, the unique purview of France, which will have to discuss it, when the proper time comes, with the responsible Algerian quarters and obtain all kinds of guarantees and assurances on the subject. But it will have to do this when the Algerian people have given their views on their future lot. It is, after all, inconceivable that those interests should be defended or that those guarantees should be obtained, both by France and by her nationals.

158. That being the case, I hasten to say that I am not very fond either of the expression "Algerians who are friends of France", first of all, because I do not consider that the Algerian nationalists who are fighting for their freedom and their independence are enemies of France. Secondly, because we consider that the true friends are those who refuse to be associated with an injustice or a mistake committed by their friends and who are not afraid of standing up for right and justice, even against their best friends. It is certainly not, in our opinion, those who approve of everything, the bad as well as the good causes, who are the real friends.

159. That being so, I would like to point out that these pseudo-Algerians who are friends of France are the same people who have been encouraged, impelled—I was going to say "created"—in every way, and certainly against their conscience, to declare themselves, rather timidly though, in favour of formulas they know to be unworkable, if not actually prejudicial, to their country.

160. These are, once again, the people whom it is hoped to implicate in new forms of words which are



set forth in the scheme outlined in the speech made on 4 November 1960, formulas the dangers of which we pointed out during the debate in the First Committee. They are, finally, people who are created out of nothing and behind whom shelter is taken, as it were behind a screen, as, for instance, Bao-Dai in Indo-China, Ben-Arfa in Morocco and Baccouche and M'zali in Tunisia. I have already said that such individuals have never counted, more particularly during the Franco-Moroccan or Franco-Tunisian negotiations which brought about peace, concord and understanding between France, on the one side, and Morocco and Tunisia, on the other.

161. Moreover, the formula as defined by the representative of Senegal is, we consider, iniquitous in that it shows on one side those who are fighting for their independence and their dignity and who are in conflict with France and on the other side at least three partners pitted against them—France, the French in Algeria and the pseudo-Algerians, friends of France.

162. This amendment introduces, further, an element that would cause serious trouble in Algeria for the form of words used, especially as explained by our friend, the representative of Senegal, would substantially strengthen, we consider, the position of all those persons in Algeria who are in reality opposed to the very principles of the self-determination that has been recognized for Algeria. For the General Assembly to endorse that position would, in our opinion, mean using our Organization to undermine the very principle of self-determination, one of the fundamental principles of our Charter. It would also be tantamount to strengthening and encouraging all those "ultras" in Algeria in their opposition to the application of this principle of self-determination which has been recognized by General de Gaulle for the Algerian people. Is that what the General Assembly wishes or desires? Seriously, I do not think so.

163. That being the case, I now turn to paragraph 5 of the same amendment which reads as follows:

**"Recommends**, with a view to facilitating contacts and the progress of the negotiations, the establishment of a special international commission, the composition and members of which shall be determined in agreement with the parties involved in the conflict."

Once again, who are "the parties involved in the conflict"? How many are there of these parties? Everyone will claim to be involved in this Algerian conflict. In that case, though, this paragraph seems to us, from another point of view, to detract from the United Nations responsibility in such a serious conflict, one which has been its constant preoccupation for a long time past, which has been the subject of very serious discussion over five consecutive sessions of our Assembly. It is in clear contradiction to paragraph 3 of the original draft which was adopted in the First Committee by 70 votes to 10.

164. For all these reasons we have no option but to oppose the eleven-Power amendment. We are opposed to it because it is dangerous for peace and it gives encouragement to all those who, in Algeria, are against the actual principle of self-determination offered and accepted by the two parties as the basis for a peaceful, democratic and just settlement.

165. I come now to the draft amendment submitted by the delegation of Cyprus. The changes it makes in the original text of paragraph 4 are important changes. After some hesitation my delegation considers it to be an honest compromise and we accept it. It seems to us to be calculated to allay all the fears which were expressed during the debate in the First Committee. And, besides, it does not in any way close the door to honest, serious negotiations and for that reason we shall back it.

166. I would like to conclude with the following observations which I offer honestly for reflection by the General Assembly.

167. For six years now the war has been continuing in Algeria with its accompaniment of deaths and sacrifices on both sides. All of us here have, in different ways, tried to find a solution for this war by agreement between the two parties. Unhappily, that has proved impossible to achieve. Some of us believe that the fault lies with the Algerian nationalists. Others of us consider that the fault lies with the people holding responsible positions in the various French Governments. Whatever may be our personal opinions on the reasons for the war's continuance, whatever responsibilities the one side lays on the other, the fact still remains that the two parties have failed to reach on their own initiative the peaceful solution we all wish for.

168. Can the United Nations continue to fold its arms, to remain inactive? The issue, it seems to me, is not only that of peace in Algeria, not only of the dignity of a people, the Algerian people, not only of the higher interest of a friendly country like France; the issue at stake is also international peace and security all over the world. What is also, and more particularly, at stake is the very "raison d'être" of our Organization.

169. U THANT (Burma): In view of the fact that we should come to a vote without further delay, I shall be very brief.

170. As one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee, I am very grateful to the delegation of Cyprus for having presented an amendment, [A/L.333], with a view to receiving more support from the Members of this Assembly. The proceedings on this question in the First Committee revealed one fact: while the vast majority of Members are in complete agreement with the main substance of the draft resolution, some objection has been raised to the word "decides" in operative paragraph 4. It has been argued that the United Nations cannot and should not impose any line of action on any Member; it can and should only recommend. That was the argument.

171. The sponsors of the draft resolution are fully mindful of this fact, and it was certainly our intention to recommend to the two parties principally concerned to submit to a United Nations referendum in Algeria.

172. To meet the objections of those delegations, the delegation of Cyprus has come out with an amendment which should dispel any misunderstanding or misconception regarding the implications of this draft resolution. I observe another important change in the amendment of Cyprus. The word "shall" has been dropped. While the original operative paragraph 4

"decides that the referendum shall be conducted", the amendment before us only says that the General Assembly "recommends" that a referendum be held. The absence of this word "shall", I hope, will be welcomed by all delegations. Still another significant change is the elimination of the words "organized, controlled and supervised". Instead, the amendment of Cyprus merely says "under the auspices of", a phrase which has consistently been used in all United Nations resolutions calling for the holding of plebiscites in many territories.

173. In these circumstances, my delegation will vote for the amendment of Cyprus.

174. As regards the eleven-Power amendment [A/L.334], I very much regret that my delegation cannot vote for it. My delegation, however, is grateful to the eleven sponsors for their obvious desire to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Algerian problem; but the means suggested are unreal and unfair.

175. To cite just one instance, both paragraphs which are intended to replace operative paragraph 4, mention the words "the parties involved in the conflict". What does this phrase actually mean? No doubt, there is a conflict in Algeria; but there are only two parties primarily involved in it—the Government of France and the Algerian nationalists. The sponsors of the draft amendment apparently have in mind various factions in Algeria, such as the French settlers, or "colons", as they are called, and maybe some splinter Algerian factions with no backing and with no given policies or lines of action.

176. It is commonplace in all colonial history that when colonies were on the threshold of independence, various mushroom parties cropped up and claimed the right to speak on behalf of all the people. Algeria is no exception to this rule. Perhaps someone with an axe to grind, or an ambitious politician without a spark of patriotism will come out and claim recognition for himself and his followers. But day by day the picture of Algeria is getting clearer. More and more, Algerian people are now rallying round the fighters for national independence, as is evident from the tragic events in Algiers a few days ago. My delegation cannot accept the thesis that all the parties involved in the conflict are entitled to equal status. There are, in fact, only two parties directly involved in the crisis.

177. With these considerations, it will be my delegation's painful duty to vote against the eleven-Power amendment.

178. For the past five years, we have sought to find ways and means of reaching a peaceful solution of the Algerian problem. The right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence has been repeatedly affirmed by the majority of Members of the United Nations. The matter of "pourparlers" has been proposed by the General Assembly on several occasions in the past, but nothing came out of these resolutions and proposals.

179. The problem of Algeria is changing its character from year to year, from month to month, and even from day to day. What was considered proper and appropriate a few years ago, or even a few months ago, is now no longer proper and appropriate.

180. Since all problems of independence movements are not static but dynamic and organic, in the sense

that they are always changing, the solution to those problems also must not be static but must be dynamic and organic. As the disease grows worse the prescription of remedies must also change to suit the new circumstances, to suit the growing disease. In the context of the present happenings in Algeria only the active participation of the United Nations in determining the will of the people can solve the problem. There is no other alternative.

181. I would appeal to the Assembly to give its unanimous support to the amendment of Cyprus and, if it is adopted, to vote for the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee.

182. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the understanding to which I referred at the beginning of the meeting I propose now to invite the General Assembly to proceed to the voting.

183. As the Assembly is aware, there are before it three proposals: the first is the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee [A/4660, para. 6]; the second is an amendment proposed by Cyprus to the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee [A/L.333]; the third is the amendment proposed by Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta [A/L.334].

184. I propose to deal first with the question of the order in which these three proposals should be voted upon. In this connexion the provisions of rule 92 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly are relevant. In accordance with the provisions of that rule, therefore, I shall proceed as follows: I propose to put to the vote first the eleven-Power amendment as being furthest removed in substance from the original proposal and from the amendment submitted by Cyprus. I propose then, depending on the result of that vote, to put to the vote the amendment submitted by Cyprus. Next I propose to put to the vote the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee, amended or unamended as the case may be.

185. If that is acceptable to the Assembly, we shall proceed first to deal with the eleven-Power amendment [A/L.334]. In connexion with that amendment separate votes by roll-call have been asked for on its two paragraphs. We shall vote now on the first paragraph.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Cyprus, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

In favour: Dahomey, Denmark, Gabon, Greece, Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Luxembourg, Madagascar, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Peru, Senegal, Sweden, Thailand, United States of America, Upper Volta, Austria, Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville).

Against: Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria,

Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Cuba.

Abstaining: Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Honduras, Iran, Japan, Laos, Mexico, Netherlands, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Chile, China, Costa Rica.

*The first paragraph of the amendment was rejected by 39 votes to 31, with 25 abstentions.*

186. The PRESIDENT: We shall now vote on the second paragraph of the eleven-Power amendment.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*New Zealand, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

In favour: New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Senegal, Sweden, Thailand, Upper Volta, Austria, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Denmark, Gabon, Iceland, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Madagascar.

Against: Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nepal.

Abstaining: Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands.

*The second paragraph of the amendment was rejected by 39 votes to 22, with 35 abstentions.*

187. The PRESIDENT: I shall now put to the vote the amendment proposed by Cyprus [A/L.333].

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Italy, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

In favour: Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland.

Against: Italy, Ivory Coast, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Cameroun, Canada,

Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Greece, Israel.

Abstaining: Japan, Laos, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti.

*The result of the vote was 52 in favour, 27 against and 17 abstentions.*

*The amendment was not adopted having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority.*

188. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will now proceed to vote on the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee [A/4660, para. 6], as it appears in the Committee's report. A separate vote has been asked for operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution. If there is no objection, we shall proceed first to take a separate vote on operative paragraph 4, before proceeding to vote on the draft resolution as a whole. Once again a roll-call vote has been requested.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Austria, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

In favour: Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania.

Against: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, Gabon, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Argentina, Australia.

Abstaining: Bolivia, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Japan, Laos, Mexico, Panama, Philippines, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela.

*The result of the vote was 40 in favour, 40 against and 16 abstentions.*

*Operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution was not adopted.*

189. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly will now vote on the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee, as amended, that is, without operative paragraph 4. Once again, the vote will be by roll-call.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Turkey, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

In favour: Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bo-

livia, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia.

Against: Union of South Africa, Upper Volta, Cameroun, Chad, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Portugal.

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Leopoldville), Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Paraguay, Senegal, Spain, Thailand.

*The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by 63 votes to 8, with 27 abstentions.*

190. The PRESIDENT: Two delegations have asked to explain their votes, after the voting. I call on the representative of Cameroun.

191. Mr. OWONO (Cameroun) (translated from French): The Cameroun has, with a clear and acute sense of its responsibilities, not only given its full support to the eleven-Power amendment which has been laid before the General Assembly; it has also co-sponsored it.

192. Our anxiety to safeguard peace and friendship in Africa was reflected in the recent journey taken by Mr. Amadou Ahidjo, President of the Republic of Cameroun, to Dakar and Bamako, at the time of the Mali crisis, and, quite recently, to Tunis because of the troubled situation in Algeria. We think it is imperative to work not only for an equitable, but also for a practical, solution. We believe that the amendment which we proposed constituted the only wise path to follow because it achieved a synthesis between the least incompatible opposites and circumvented the irreducible differences between the parties.

193. In particular, we consider that, as the principle of international supervision has been accepted by the parties, its constitution and its function, as defined by the amendment which you have rejected, ensure that the referendum will be equitably organized and carried out. Contrary to the view expressed by the representative of Burma, this solution is, in our opinion, the only one which will enable the basic principle of self-determination to be applied to the case of Algeria under conditions which should be acceptable to the parties concerned.

194. Mr. CABA (Guinea) (translated from French): My delegation supported the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee and the amendment presented by Cyprus because they express the deep feelings and the aspirations of the Algerian people fighting for its independence. The Assembly knows that, the reason why the idea of the United Nations organizing and supervising a referendum in Algeria has not been agreed to, is because certain African countries have supported the French contention against that of the Provisional Government of the

Algerian Republic. If paragraph 4 of the draft resolution was not adopted, the reason is that this hostile vote of the countries of the Community was cast in a mood of deep despair.

195. The delegation of Guinea has always stated and defended its points of view on the various problems raised at the United Nations objectively and dispassionately. In making up our minds we have never taken account of the attitude of any particular delegation. We have never uttered criticisms of any particular Member State, but there are situations which, because of their political significance and historical importance, deserve particular attention and call for the adoption of categorical and unequivocal positions.

196. What is this situation which confronts us in regard to a specifically African problem, the problem of Africa? Some African States have shrunk from their duty and have endorsed a policy of aggression by France by choosing the imperialist camp. In the First Committee and during the debate on the Algerian question, the delegation of the Republic of Guinea made an urgent and fraternal appeal to the African States to take a clear stand in favour of the brotherly people of Algeria. We kept on saying that no African country conscious of its responsibilities could endorse French colonial policy in Algeria.

197. Unfortunately, our brethren in the so-called Community countries have turned their backs on their responsibilities. After affirming that the Algerian people are their brothers and that they are following their noble fight with a great deal of sympathy, the African countries, co-sponsors of the eleven-Power amendment, have openly acted against the interests and the deep aspirations of fighting Algeria, thus endorsing the imperialist policy of France.

198. In so doing, the so-called Community countries have wilfully ignored the fact that for the last six years France has been waging in Algeria a colonial war of extermination and has prevented Algeria from enjoying her most sacred inalienable right. They have deliberately forgotten that for six years past the Algerian people and its leaders have been trying to put an end to the bloodshed by peaceful means.

199. Our so-called Community brethren have wilfully ignored the fact that for six years past France has refused any negotiated solution that would be different from the capitulation, pure and simple, of the Algerian people battling for its independence.

200. The so-called Community States have forgotten that, for six years past and in unilateral fashion, the French Government has been proposing plans for the future of the Algerian people without taking account either of the latter's wishes or their genuine and legitimate hopes.

201. Lastly, our so-called Community brethren have already forgotten that they are largely indebted for their independence to the courage and the sacrifices of the Algerian people.

202. In so acting, these African States have shown, finally, that their independence is still a fiction and purely nominal. It serves chiefly the cause of French imperialism. This independence is utilized against the interests of the African peoples. It is nothing more, we say it again, than a faithful tool of French neo-colonialism. That is why this unanimous vote has operated to delete paragraph 4 of the draft resolution.



203. In so acting, we repeat, the African States of the Community have betrayed the Algerian people. They have betrayed Algeria and, in consequence, the peoples of Africa. By deserting today the Algerian people, the States of the Community are rejecting the real development of all the original values of Africa. By taking a stand against the Algerian people, the States of the Community have chosen the camp of the aggressors against defenceless peoples and so jeopardized peace in Africa and in the world.

204. The international community is coming to realize once again that certain so-called French-speaking African representatives are mere mouthpieces, self-styled independents, with the task of defending in this very Hall, in the United Nations, the interests of colonialism and its privileges which history has condemned. Between their brotherly feelings for Algeria and their friendship for France, these States have chosen the path which history has condemned.

205. We are sure that the peoples of the African States in the Community will take a stand opposed to the attitude of their Governments which they stigmatize, and will go on stigmatizing, as treason. Yes, African public opinion will condemn the docile tools and puppets in Africa which France thought she had

so cleverly moulded of recent years. We are sure that in Africa, and in all the countries of the Community, the trade unions, the youth movements, the women's movements and all grades of society will condemn the Governments of the countries which today have failed to support the cause of the embattled Algerians.

206. Finally, we have said that, as long as the war in Algeria continues with all its horrors, with the Atlantic bloc bringing into play ever more powerful and more murderous weapons, as long as the imperialist Powers continue to aggravate in other quarters the Congo crisis, no African country, whichever it may be and whatever relations of friendship and co-operation it may have with the former colonizer can claim to live in peace and lay the foundations of a viable economic structure.

207. With the Algerian problem confronting it, African solidarity can never, as we have already said, have any other meaning than unreserved support for the Algerian people's cause. Here in the United Nations such support cannot possibly be confined to more or less fraternal declarations on the Algerian question. The peoples of Africa whom we represent here cannot tolerate this kind of solidarity.

*The meeting rose at 7.20 p.m.*