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*President:* Mr. Gaston THORN  
 (Luxembourg).

AGENDA ITEM 53

**Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (*concluded*):**

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*;  
 (b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The General Assembly is at present discussing the question of the amendment and subamendment to draft resolution F, recommended by the Special Political Committee in paragraph 27 of its report [A/10342], which condemns the *apartheid* policy of the racist régime of South Africa.

2. The amendments submitted by seven African States [A/L.784] quite rightly propose that we condemn the direct intervention of the racist régime of South Africa in Angola—the incursion of South African troops into Angolan territory—and call for the immediate withdrawal of the racist troops from Angola.

3. At the same time, the amendments submitted by Zaire [A/L.786] to the amendments of the seven African States are designed to obscure this clear issue and thus cover up racist South Africa's intervention and the incursion of its troops into Angola in order to fight against the legitimate Government of that country.

4. The representative of the United States, Mr. Moynihan, made a statement, as did the representative of China, with the same purpose of covering up and justifying South Africa's intervention in Angola and

the incursion of its troops into that country. In fact, there was a virtual duet going on here.

5. The delegation of the Soviet Union would like to make one comment in this connexion: we do not view the discussion in the Assembly of the amendments concerning Angola as a discussion of the Angolan problem, for that is an internal affair of the Angolan people. We view it not as the internationalization of the Angolan problem, but as a condemnation of the intervention by South Africa and an attempt by the progressive African States to render moral and political support to a new sovereign State in Africa which has achieved independence after a protracted colonial rule—to the People's Republic of Angola. That is precisely the way we view the current discussion of this question in the Assembly.

6. Two days ago, in the discussion by the plenary Assembly of the draft resolution F [2430th meeting] the lofty rostrum of the United Nations was used in the most unworthy manner, and this was done by none other than the representative of the United States, Mr. Moynihan. I very much regret that he is not here, but I am sure everything I say here on this question will be reported to him.

7. He read out to this lofty gathering a didactic lecture, the vocabulary of which would hardly grace a routine meeting of an amateur political debating society. But the General Assembly is not a debating society or a club at which to listen to repeated exercises in bad faith by Professor Moynihan, who poses sometimes as a lover of the truth and at other times as the only champion of truth and justice, but who, at the same time, does not want to know the truth or anything about verity or justice.

8. So, fact number one: Mr. Moynihan, instead of considering the draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly by one of its Main Committees concerning the policy of *apartheid* pursued by the racist Government of South Africa, and the amendments submitted to that draft, expatiated at some length on the situation in Angola. And how did he do that? By turning all the facts upside-down.

9. As everyone knows, on 11 November 1975 Angola became an independent State: the People's Republic of Angola, already recognized by more than 30 sovereign States. The whole world also knows that the contemptible clique of South African racists took up arms against this young independent State, in league with Portuguese fascists who had earlier fled Angola and all kinds of riff-raff from among the white mercenaries who have become past masters of bloody terror against the peoples of African and Asian countries. They did so with weapons so lavishly supplied to South Africa by certain developed countries of the West, primarily the United States.

10. The South African racists launched an armed intervention against Angola and its legitimate Government. Mr. Moynihan used here data which he had got from *The New York Times* of 8 December. It is striking, of course, that that newspaper is so well informed about everything, including the weapons in the hands of the truly patriotic forces of Angola, headed by the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), and the origin of those weapons, as well as the forces which are fighting on the side of the legitimate Government of Angola. But there is one thing that is very strange in all this, and that is that, if this is indeed the case, then the question arises: where did that paper get all this data which was offered up so tendentiously? Does it really possess a far-flung intelligence network? Well, let all this material be on the conscience of the correspondents of that paper—if indeed they have a conscience.

11. Nor did it do any credit to Mr. Moynihan that, in referring to that newspaper and even waving it from the lofty rostrum of the Assembly, he read out from it only selectively. Apparently he had only read that particular day's issue, but not those of previous months. It so happens that previous issues contained reports of the invasion of South African troops into Angola—that is, armed intervention.

12. Let Mr. Moynihan take a look, for example, at *The New York Times* of 7 November. If he were to look beyond that newspaper and open his eyes he would see the following: Did the Portuguese Government protest against the incursion into Angola of South African troops? Yes, indeed: this is to be found in the press release of the Portuguese Mission to the United Nations, dated 24 November; and it was a protest which they made more than once. Let Mr. Moynihan read that press release. I have sent it to him for his consideration.

13. I wonder whether Mr. Moynihan has read the statement of a hundred British Members of Parliament condemning the armed incursion into Angola by the racist forces of South Africa.

14. And here is another source:

“Foreign troops from Zaire have penetrated into the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda, while in the south of the country detachments of Portuguese colonial troops (that is, the vestiges of the colonial Portuguese Fascist army which had fought in Africa under the Caetano régime) have joined forces with élite units from South Africa to establish a mercenary front fighting to prevent the Angolans from becoming masters in their own house.”

15. Mr. Moynihan will no doubt say that I am quoting the communist press. Not at all. This is from a well-known English publication, the *New Statesman*. Perhaps that is not enough for you. In that case I shall cite a brief extract from the statement of an official organ of the United Nations, the Special Committee against *Apartheid*. That Committee expressed:

“its grave concern at the aggression being committed by South Africa against Angola. It notes that the Defence Sub-Committee of the African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), on 28 November, described the South African intervention as ‘naked aggression whose

magnitude and scope exceed any foreign intervention in Africa’.

“The Special Committee views this act of naked aggression by South Africa as an attempt at further extending and consolidating its racist policies, and posing a serious threat to the security of African countries as a whole. It calls on all Governments and organizations to denounce the aggression by the South African racist régime in Angola, and to take all appropriate steps to secure the immediate withdrawal of all South African military personnel, including mercenaries, from Angola.”

16. As members can see, these are not the words of journalistic hacks in Zionist newspapers. This is the testimony of officially authorized representatives in the United Nations of a large group of African countries. Thus, Mr. Moynihan does not want to see the real threat, the real intervention against Angola. But he should not close his eyes to the facts. After all, everyone can see this and everyone knows it, but Mr. Moynihan states that so far he has no facts in his possession about the armed intrusion of South Africa into Angola. Poor Mr. Moynihan! I am sorry that he was forced to tell an untruth at the rostrum of the Assembly or, to use his own language, to tell the “big lie”. Poor, helpless CIA: after all, it knows everything and sees everything throughout the world, from Chile to South Viet Nam, but it has not noticed so far the military intrusion of the racists of South Africa into Angola. And Mr. Moynihan has been let down by it. He has not noticed this fact either, so far, and he is unfamiliar with it.

17. Mr. Moynihan likes to refer to the press. Let him look at *Time* magazine of 15 December 1975, which came out yesterday—it is hot off the press. In an article on Angola it makes the following statement about the intervention of the United States in the affairs of Angola. It states:

“... it is an open secret that the U.S. has been funneling aid to the FNLA-UNITA forces through Zaire. In Luanda, the MPLA showed off a huge cache of captured weapons and ammunition, the latter mostly American made. Some crates were marked ‘military airlift command, Charleston, S.C.’ and consigned to Ndjili Airport, Kinshasa. Others bore the legend ‘from the United States of America for mutual defense’.”

It is a secret to no one, but to poor Mr. Moynihan these facts are unknown so far. That is Mr. Moynihan's big lie.

18. I come now to fact number two. In his desire not to see the real truth, Mr. Moynihan has invented hypotheses, suppositions and fabrications—everything that he could possibly use if he wanted to lecture to students in a college, particularly when they derive their knowledge of international affairs from the *The New York Times*. But it is certainly not a worthy act to come forward with this kind of material at the rostrum of the General Assembly, before a responsible and well-informed body of representatives of 144 Member States of the United Nations. In these circumstances, we find ourselves confronted with a completely indecent, absurd version spun out of thin air of a certain kind of “colonialism” in Africa on the part of the Soviet Union, and the culprit, according to Mr. Moy-

nihan, is the Soviet Union. Mr. Moynihan, should at least be God-fearing. After all, he is a believer, a religious man, so he should not continue to repeat this absurdity. He would be putting himself in a very ridiculous position, not that there is anything new in that. He simply repeats what he has been able to gather together with a shortage of time and a lack of ingenuity, and with nagging importunity, repeats the anti-Soviet slander by others.

19. Our people are very content with their own country and have no wish to replace it by any other. We have everything we need in order confidently to pursue our course along the path that we chose in 1917, the path of socialism and communism, and we shall continue to follow that path. We do not need anyone else's land because we love our own land more than any other and we shall cherish it, as we say, like the apple of our eye. We do not need the wealth of Africa or its land. We do not need the wealth of Angola or its land. But our country and our people, which have so often experienced the attacks of the imperialists and the colonialists who wanted to divide our own territory and enslave it, plunder its wealth and even completely wipe out our people, remember that there can be no peace on earth while any nation whatsoever is still oppressed. We, the people of the Soviet Union, have been brought up in the spirit of the teachings of the great Lenin, and he taught us that there can be no freedom for peoples that oppress other peoples. We cherish as sacred and follow this teaching of the great Lenin.

20. That is why we give selfless assistance to any people in its sacred struggle for freedom and national independence against the encroachment of the imperialists, colonialists and racists. If to give assistance in a struggle for the freedom of a people is "interference" or "a new form of colonialism", then what in fact do these words mean in the understanding of Professor Moynihan? It is quite clear that Mr. Moynihan is dreaming of turning the clock back in Angola, back to the past of evil memory when Angola was plundered and exploited by colonialist usurpers. Is that what he understands by a return to freedom and democracy?

21. No; we cannot find a common language with Mr. Moynihan on this score. He is in favour of a policy of continuing the plundering by the transnational corporations of his country of the natural resources of Angola and the exploitation of its people. We are in favour of national freedom, independence and the total sovereignty of the Angolan people as proclaimed on 11 November by the people of the People's Republic of Angola. We want that people itself to determine its own fate, to be the master of its own resources and not to allow anyone else to poke his nose into its internal affairs. Every people, particularly every State—and Angola is now a State—must itself fight for its own freedom and independence and forge its own destiny. To help peoples and States in this noble cause is by no means a sin. On the contrary, what is sinful and inadmissible is to intrude, with the help of the armed forces of the racists and the gangster mercenaries, into the territory of Angola and attempt to take from the people of Angola its lawful right to build its own life as it deems fit. What is sinful and inadmissible is to arm and finance pro-imperialist elements

in Angola which are ready to sell their country to foreign capital and to trade off its natural resources wholesale and retail.

22. We now come to fact number three. Mr. Moynihan spoke against the amendments introduced by a group of African delegations to draft resolution F. But intrusion into Angola is a continuation of the internal policy of *apartheid* by other means, military means. What are these amendments of the group of African countries? They condemn the armed intervention of the racists from South Africa into Angola and their military intrusion into its territory and demand the immediate withdrawal of troops and mercenaries from the territory of Angola. It is a good amendment, a just one, and we whole-heartedly support it.

23. In supporting the draft resolution with its amendments, we are supporting a noble cause. We are helping the legitimate Government of the People's Republic of Angola to preserve its independence and territorial integrity, and we are opening up for that people a path to the future. But it is the business of the Angolan people themselves to determine how best to do that. That is our position, Mr. Moynihan. It is extremely clear, just and honourable. We hope that this rostrum will not be used again for absurd and ridiculous suppositions and speculations which are obviously and deliberately anti-Soviet.

24. We cannot support and shall vote against the Zaire amendments, because they are designed to cover up the intervention of the South African racist régime in Angola.

25. Why did Mr. Moynihan use this rostrum to slander the Soviet Union with the big lie? The explanation is very simple. We are aware that in one of his recent public statements Mr. Moynihan spoke of "Soviet colonialism in Africa". On that subject I was asked a question by a *Tass* correspondent, and I answered that question. I shall not take up the Assembly's time by reading out my answer. I think that all, or at least most, representatives here are familiar with it, since a press release containing the answer was circulated to all Missions to the United Nations. I sent Mr. Moynihan that answer and a press release of the Portuguese Mission to the United Nations. Apparently all this aroused Mr. Moynihan's fury, and he decided to use the rostrum of the General Assembly to slander and attack the Soviet Union and to use the big lie against us. The delegation of the Soviet Union has found it necessary to reply to and rebut the slanderous anti-Soviet fabrications of Mr. Moynihan.

26. With regard to the usual anti-Soviet tirade delivered by the representative of China at the preceding meeting, I must say that it could not possibly have surprised anyone. China is a long-time ally and friend of the racist régime of South Africa and the former Fascist régime of Portugal. That was clearly demonstrated by the joint resistance to the adoption at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly of the decision on the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons [*resolution 2936 (XXVII)*]. China, along with South Africa and the Fascist régime of Portugal, voted against that decision. Consequently, they demonstrated, even then, that they support the use of force in international relations and gave their

blessing to the South African régime to intervene and intrude with its armed forces into Angola.

27. Even at that time there was a certain devilish, unholy tripartite alliance against the national liberation movements in Africa and the peoples and nations of the African continent: the alliance of racism, fascism and Maoism. Now there is a fourth member of that alliance, an enemy of Africa: imperialism. The United Nations and world public opinion have every reason now to understand how low the Maoist régime in China has sunk. It has jointed up with the most shameless forces of reaction. The clearest demonstration of the joint criminal actions of that alliance is the events in Angola.

28. During the general debate at this session of the Assembly the Foreign Minister of China, Mr. Chiao, hypocritically stated that China was helping all three movements in Angola. But that is a lie: China is helping only the pro-imperialist, pro-racist forces in Angola. Many papers in Africa have printed photographs showing Chinese military instructors in the camp of the traitor to the Angolan people, Mr. Holden Roberto, leader of the Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA). These photographs show him closely co-operating both with the new colonialists and with the white racists. The FNLA is receiving Chinese weapons, ammunition and financial assistance. The Maoists are not shocked at the fact that, in training soldiers of the FNLA for their shameful role of stiflers of the freedom of the Angolan people, the Chinese military instructors are working side by side with advisers from the CIA of the United States.

29. The Chinese representative called the events in Angola a "civil war". The representative of Cuba, Comrade Alarcón, in his statement [2434th meeting] brilliantly rebutted that demagogic version. He proved that what is taking place in Angola is not a civil war but foreign intervention by means of the intrusion of foreign troops into the territory to combat the Government of the People's Republic of Angola. We Soviet people ourselves experienced, after the October Revolution, all the horrors of foreign intervention, organized by the late Sir Winston Churchill. We therefore have sincere sympathy for the Angolan people, who find themselves the victims of armed intervention by a foreign Power with the support of Maoism, imperialism and fascism.

30. The Chinese representative has slandered the Soviet Union, attributing to it the responsibility for the beginning of a "civil war" in Angola. But that is a rotten invention. What is responsible for the intrusion of foreign troops of South Africa and white gangster mercenaries in Angola is the unholy alliance of racism, fascism, Maoism and imperialism. That alliance prepared the armed intervention and is financing the intrusion of foreign troops and mercenaries for the struggle of pro-imperialist elements against the lawful Government of the People's Republic of Angola.

31. The progressive African countries and their representatives to the United Nations have now come to realize fully on whose side Maoist China is. It is on the side of the racists of South Africa and the pro-imperialist elements in Angola; it is in league with them, as it is in league with the Fascist junta in Chile and the stubborn die-hards in Europe who favour a return to the cold war.

32. China has carried out a tremendous change in its policy towards South Africa. In words Peking condemns the racist régimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. Deputy Prime Minister Li Hsien-nien stated to a very high-level African guest that China approves of the dialogue between the African countries and South Africa and Rhodesia. He stated that that dialogue would make it possible to conclude the process of the liberation of the entire African continent. That is nothing but direct assistance to the white racists of South Africa. Its purpose is to weaken the determination of the peoples of Africa to put an end to racism, *apartheid* and oppression. The policy of Peking is to the advantage of the forces of neo-colonialism and imperialism, with which it is now actively collaborating. That is why the delegation of Peking supports the Zaire amendment designed to divert attention from South Africa's intervention in Angola and to cover up this criminal deed of the racists.

33. In conclusion, I should like to give one more quotation. One of the leaders of MPLA, Lucio Lara, during a visit to Peking in May and June 1975, said frankly to the Chinese, according to the magazine *Afrique-Asie* of 14 July 1975, that the Angolan people do not understand "how China can support those who would bury Angola, how China can give any support whatsoever to the organization created, financed and run by the Central Intelligence Agency, whose real purpose is to suppress the true independence of the Angolan people". He pointed out, "Our duty is to remind that the Chinese leaders are following a false path".

34. The very same day in an article in the Senegalese newspaper *Soleil* it was stated that FNLA is flirting with Peking, and that there can be no doubt that it is a pawn in the African policy of the United States. The article went on to state that the Chinese are helping those forces in Angola which do not have the support of the people.

35. That is the answer of the Soviet delegation to the routine hostile slander of the representative of China against the Soviet Union.

36. Mr. AKÉ (Ivory Coast) (*interpretation from French*): The opposition of the Ivory Coast to all forms of racial discrimination, and particularly to its most abominable form, *apartheid*, is well known. We shall limit ourselves to stressing that we have always denounced and condemned *apartheid* as an insult to human dignity and said that any self-respecting person can only be revolted by that inhuman and infamous doctrine which has served only to enslave 10 million men and women in order to ensure the supremacy of the white racist minority over the vast majority of the population of the country.

37. We unanimously decry and condemn *apartheid* and hope for the rapid elimination of its ignoble and inhuman practices and the creation of an egalitarian and fraternal multinational society so that each citizen of the Republic may be given an equal chance to participate in the conduct of the affairs of State. The differences which may appear among us relate only to the ways and means of bringing to an end *apartheid*, which poisons relations between South Africa and independent African countries.



38. The Ivory Coast, through its head of State, on 28 April 1971 defined its approach to the problem by advocating a policy of dialogue in order to defeat the disdain and the fear which are to be found among the whites of South Africa, to create conditions which would allow for a dialogue inside South Africa itself among the various communities, to spare Africa a confrontation with South Africa, on which undoubtedly it would be the main victim.

39. That policy of dialogue has recently been reaffirmed and confirmed by the National Congress of the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast, held in Abidjan on 15 and 16 October this year. I would recall what was said by the President of the Republic on 16 October 1971:

“The Ivory Coast, despite sarcasm and evil insinuations, will pursue its policy of dialogue, together with its many-sided assistance to the liberation movements. The dialogue which we defend with all our heart and soul, without allowing ourselves to be distracted by anyone, is part of our over-all policy of peace within our country, of peace between our country and brother African States and of peace between our continent and the rest of the world, and it is not a response to any concern for ceremony or material gain. Only man’s happiness in freedom, peace and justice guides us in our actions.”

40. We intend to pursue that policy, whether it pleases or not, since we prefer it to that of force and of war, which does not solve anything in our times. For us, it continues to be the best way, because it is part of the dynamics of peace which is essential to the harmonious development of Africa.

41. Having outlined our position, I come to the draft amendments and subamendments in documents A/L.784 and A/L.786, relating to intervention in the internal affairs of Angola, submitted by a number of African States.

42. First of all, we wish to affirm that the people and the Government of the Ivory Coast have welcomed, as has the international community as a whole, the proclamation of independence of Angola on 11 November 1975. Our joy was overshadowed, however, by the absurd fratricidal war which has pitted against each other the three liberation movements and of which the unfortunate victims are the innocent persons who aspired to a taste of freedom after the long and heroic national liberation struggle waged by the Angolan people under the leadership of their courageous freedom fighters. The continuation of that war concerns us deeply, not only because of the suffering it inflicts on the innocent population and the devastation it causes, but also, and especially, because of the foreign interventions.

43. Angola being an independent and sovereign State, we have no intention of intervening in its internal affairs. My Government and, more specifically, our Head of State, who have maintained extremely close and fraternal contact with the leaders of the three movements claiming power in Angola, have constantly advised moderation and urged them to do everything possible, through dialogue and agreement, to achieve the reconciliation and unity of all Angolans, regardless of their political affiliation, in order to put an end to the

war and re-establish peace in a country which is called upon to play an important role in the development and strengthening of African unity. In their discussions they have not failed to emphasize the greed inspired by the considerable resources of their country, and the danger which the power struggle between the respective movements represents for the peace, security and integrity of the country.

44. It is clear that in this situation the intervention of a major Power at the request of one of those movements would inevitably lead to the other movements’ appealing to other powers, which in turn would lead to the internationalization and Viet-Namization of the conflict. We can see the possibility of that danger, that escalation of violence and those unnatural alliances. That is why the Ivory Coast, which was misunderstood at the beginning, has advocated a policy of peace through neutrality in order to avoid such foreign intervention and to prevent the African continent’s becoming a field of rivalry between the major Powers, which could place us in a situation similar to that in the Middle East.

45. The development of the situation in Angola once again proves us right. As long as Africa does not try to overcome its own difficulties through agreement and dialogue, it runs the serious risk of having others come to settle those difficulties in their own interests and on their own account.

46. The President of the Republic, in his message to the nation of 6 December 1975, denounced the intolerable intrusion of foreign interests in Angolan affairs and, more particularly, the unjust role of the major Powers which, once again, through third-world countries, are settling their ideological and commercial accounts, thus showing how different can be the applications of the policy of détente to which they claim to be profoundly attached when the theaters of operation and confrontation are far from their usual centre of gravity.

47. It is obvious that more than one foreign Power is intervening in various ways in Angola. We need only refer to the communiqués of the international press to realize that. The African group echoed this in its press release of 8 November 1975 when it said:

“The African group strongly condemns the racist régimes of South Africa and Rhodesia for this aggression against the people of Angola. It further condemns all forms of invasion of Angola by forces of any country. The African group also strongly condemns any form of foreign intervention both African and non-African, use of mercenaries, and all arms supplies aimed at disrupting the unity and territorial integrity of the Territory. The African group appeals to all States not to take any action which will frustrate efforts being made with a view to finding a lasting solution to the Angolan problems.”\*

48. If the Assembly wishes to live up to its responsibilities and act in favour of peace and reconciliation in Angola, it must not follow the policy of the ostrich, seeing only the intervention of South African armed forces in Angola and remaining silent about other interventions which are at the very root of the South African intervention.

\* Quoted in English by the speaker.

49. The problem raised in these amendments is not a case against *apartheid* and its manifestations, which we will denounce and condemn each time we are given an opportunity to do so, but is a case against all forms of intervention in Angola, be they African or not. We consider that we are duty-bound to denounce and condemn all those interventions whatever they may be and wherever they may come from, and to ask for their immediate cessation in order that Angola may find peace and settle its problems on its own.

50. We do not have the right to condemn certain interventions on the pretext that the policy of the country which practises them displeases us and give the impression that we encourage others. If we wish to go to the substance of things, we will note that those interventions, illegal though they may be, are designed to counteract the effects of other interventions. That is indeed the case. The disease must be attacked at its roots if we wish to cure it.

51. We understand the motives of the sponsors of the amendments in document A/L.784 which condemn the intervention of South African forces in Angola, but we also share the concerns of Zaire, which asks, in the amendments contained in document A/L.786, that we condemn all foreign interventions, including that of South Africa. Although the interventions in Angola and *apartheid* are entirely different problems in their nature and manifestations, we for our part are willing to support the amendments and subamendments because they complement each other and faithfully reflect the true situation. The delegation of the Ivory Coast, consequently, will vote in favour of the amendments presented by Zaire in document A/L.786. If they are rejected, my delegation will have to withdraw its support of the amendments in document A/L.784.

52. The solution of wisdom, after the acrimonious debate which has been taking place for several days in this Assembly, could have consisted in the withdrawal, purely and simply, of the two draft amendments in order to allow the Assembly to pronounce itself only on the question of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. We do not believe that these amendments contribute anything to our common determination to struggle, each with its own means, against *apartheid*; they only add to the confusion. That is the reason why, on behalf of my delegation, I would like to appeal to the various authors of these amendments not to press them to a vote.

53. Is it not surprising that Angola, which has struggled so hard for its independence, has not as yet found its place in this Assembly? Its absence is deeply felt; should it not give us food for thought? Indeed, it should. Therefore, let us think of what we can do together to allow that brotherly people to find a way out of the situation in which it has been plunged by the rivalries and selfishness of the great, who show little concern for the fate of our peoples. Let us cease playing into their hands our own divisions, and let us have the courage to say no when it is necessary. A vote on these amendments will give us an occasion—even under item 53 of the agenda—to do so, let us not give them an excuse to continue their dirty work, for they are all as guilty as South Africa.

54. It is not up to us to tell the Angolans what form of government they should have, but we believe that in these circumstances the formation of a government of

national union may allow them to overcome their present difficulties and contribute to putting an end to the foreign intervention which has caused so much bloodshed and sorrow.

55. We also wish to associate ourselves with all those who have at heart peace in Africa, and particularly in Angola, by appealing to the three movements to lay down their weapons and once again get together to settle their differences. In order to do this, all forms of intervention in Angolan affairs should cease, all foreign forces that are violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola should withdraw immediately, and the major Powers should put an end to all supplies of weapons to the parties at war and use their influence to restore peace and harmony in Angola.

56. Angola and Angolans wish to have peace. They have a right to live in peace and to decide their own affairs without foreign interference. We are convinced that if left alone they will be able to overcome their differences and their present quarrels and find, in trusting and brotherly dialogue, the path to national reconciliation and unity.

57. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): As President, I wish to put a question to the General Assembly. I have been informed that the sponsors do not insist on a vote on their amendments and subamendments. If this is the case, the Assembly could vote immediately on the resolution, as some have suggested.

58. I should like to consult the Assembly on this, and I call first on the representative of Zaire for his views on the matter.

59. Mr. MUTUALE TSHIKANKIE (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): Before giving you a reply to that question, Mr. President, I should like first to say how surprised I was at the bad faith shown in certain statements.

60. My delegation did not instigate the debate in the General Assembly. The representative of Equatorial Guinea, who in November was President of the African Group, can bear witness to what I am about to say.

61. In November I told the African Group—and I was one of the first to say so forcefully—that it was unwise for the General Assembly to take up the question of Angola.

62. I do not want to become involved in an acrimonious debate. Zaire has submitted amendments to amendments which had injected into the debate some matters relating to Angola. It was not our amendments which did this, but the amendments. What is more, my amendments were simply the spelling out of a fundamental principle of the Charter, one which, incidentally, warrants the condemnation by sponsors of the amendments of the South African intervention in Angola.

63. I do not want to go on any more about the reasons for my amendments, but I would like to rebut the charge of bad intentions against my delegation in proposing my amendments to amendments which in fact raised the problem of the situation of Angola in the General Assembly.

64. There have been insinuations, most unskillfully made, I must say, by the representative of the Soviet

Union. I regret that I speak of this statement at this time, when 48 hours ago the Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Kinshasa was received by President Mobutu at Kisangani. I would have thought there would have been better co-ordination between the Soviet Mission to the United Nations and the Soviet Embassy in Kinshasa. It would have been more correct for the representative of such a great Power as the Soviet Union to be more courteous towards the Zairian delegation, because I assume that the long talks between the Soviet Ambassador in Kinshasa and President Mobutu would have been able to enlighten him.

65. Zaire is not camouflaging anything by its amendments; nothing lies behind them. I know that a request for clarification of the principle raised by the amendments might not suit certain interventionist Powers. They certainly gave themselves away by their uneasiness about my amendments. Zaire does not conceal the fact that it has given assistance, very generous assistance indeed, for over 14 years to the national liberation movements in Angola. We are proud of this; we do not want to make a secret of it. We do not pursue any partisan policy in Zaire. That assistance went to all three liberation movements.

66. In certain quarters it is believed that Zaire is against the MPLA. We are not. The first shot fired against the Portuguese colonial administration did not come from the Soviet Union, but from Zairian national territory. And in the first hours of the MPLA, where was Neto? Is there a desire deliberately to ignore the history of the liberation movements in Angola? Does the Soviet Union really believe itself to be the champion and the saviour of Angola? At a time when the Portuguese colonial administration was rampaging in Angola, where were the armoured cars, the tanks and all the sophisticated weaponry with which the Soviet Union is now flooding Angola? No doubt Soviet bullets could not be seen shedding the blood of Portuguese whites. That is racism, stood on its head. And now they are dividing Angolan brothers, providing them with murderous weapons and helping them to kill each other. They are black, so they can kill each other! But when the white Portuguese were there, no such an airlift was ever directed toward Angola.

67. Whom are they trying to deceive? Why play hide-and-seek? We are not being told here that in the ranks of the MPLA there are 4,000 ex-Katangese policemen, and who does not know what that represents—the most effective instrument that imperialism has ever used to serve its interests in Africa? Who does not know the meaning of the name Tshombe, which became a synonym for treachery? Four thousand Katangese policemen are fighting in the ranks of the MPLA. I am sorry to have to talk about the MPLA. In Zaire we have nothing against the MPLA. The MPLA represents a portion of the Angolan people, just as do the other two movements. But I must mention it because I was prompted to do so by the dishonest insinuations of the representative of the Soviet Union. Do I need to remind you again that those 4,000 Katangese policemen were part of the famous Katangese police force of Tshombe at the time of secession? Shortly before the fall of Tshombe in Katanga, those 4,000 policemen went to Angola, where they were welcomed hospitably and maintained very kindly by Portuguese colonialism with a view to future action

against Katanga. Subsequently, those policemen were integrated into the colonial forces of Portugal. They became the forces of colonialist repression against the Angolan brothers and sisters. They became the vanguard which massacred, raped and slaughtered the Angolan nationalists. Following the fall of the Salazar régime in Portugal and the debacle of the colonialist Portuguese forces in Angola, those 4,000 policemen remained in Angola with the complicity of Coutinho, and then joined the MPLA.

68. This is what should be said here if people really want to speak the truth. It has been suggested that there is no civil war in Angola. I believe that on this problem there is no better authority than the Heads of State of independent Africa; the leaders of our continent have expressed their views on Angola, which is an African territory, and have expressed a clearcut position. If the Soviet Union, that great friend of independent Africa, were really as friendly as all that, it could take into account the decisions of our Heads of State on the African continent. Why fly in the face of the decisions of the leaders of Africa? No doubt out of friendship, out of esteem for our continent! The heads of State of the OAU took a collective decision to recognize all three liberation movements on an equal footing, and very recently, within the framework of the conciliation Committee of the OAU, there was a reaffirmation of this position and it was made clear that all the heads of State of the African continent should do their best to promote the formation of a government of national union.

69. These, then, are the efforts that the Soviet Union could have made to help the people of Angola find harmony and unity, instead of engaging in attempts at balkanization.

70. Certain press clippings have been put on record here. I could do the same thing. Should I also speak about statements? Very well, I will take the statements of UNITA for example. At Lusaka, on 9 December, Savimbi made the following statement:

“The civil war was not launched by South Africa, but by the MPLA. The country that intervened in Angola was the Soviet Union. The first armoured vehicles to appear in the conflict were the Soviet T-54s”.

71. We can put on the record all sorts of statements like that. But I shall stop there. However, I reserve the right to intervene again should I feel it necessary to do so.

72. With regard to your own statement, Mr. President, I should like to say the following. Zaire submitted an amendment to an amendment. Consequently, it is just a matter of logic that, since my amendment is nothing but a clarification of an amendment, then if the sponsors of the amendment find it necessary to withdraw it, I shall have no objection.

73. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): As President I wish to remain scrupulously outside all confrontations of ideas, all differences of opinion that may be expressed on one point or another. My aim is to see that we can get on with our work. But I cannot disregard the fact that at certain points in the debate some have wished to shorten the debate and come to a vote on the draft resolution, to shorten the debate, and to avoid either a discussion or a vote on this or that

amendment. The Assembly has heard the statements of the representative of Zaire and his reply to my question. May I now ask you not to embark on very involved and lengthy statements?

74. Is the President correct in believing that the sponsors of the amendment, like those of the amendments to the amendment, are ready not to insist on a vote? This would allow the Assembly—subject to whatever explanations of vote or statements under the right of reply there may be—to come to an immediate decision on a draft resolution which, I hope, will gain broad support. I would simply request all who disagree with this mode of procedure to so indicate.

75. It seems that there is agreement on this. The President is therefore confirmed in his conclusion that the sponsors of the amendments and subamendments do not insist on putting them to the vote. Thus, we can now go on to vote on the draft resolution. Before calling on those representatives who wish to explain their votes before the vote, I call on the representative of Mauritius on a point of order.

76. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): I see on the list of speakers about eight who wish to speak in explanation of their votes before the vote, and some 11 to explain their votes after the vote. Now that the amendments have been withdrawn, I wish to make an appeal to all those who have inscribed their names to speak in explanation of their votes before the vote to consider whether it would not be appropriate at this time to withdraw their names from the list. I am not trying to muzzle them, but to make it possible for our work to progress more quickly.

77. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Rarely has an appeal, I am sure, met with such unanimous response, as it seems that the representatives who were to explain their votes before the vote agree not to do so.

78. I shall now put to the vote resolution F, recommended by the Special Political Committee in paragraph 27 of document A/10342. A roll-call vote has been requested.

*A vote was taken by roll call.*

*Malawi, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada,

Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar

*Against:* Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg

*Abstaining:* Malawi, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Australia, Central African Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Lesotho

*Draft resolution F was adopted by 101 votes to 15, with 16 abstentions (resolution 3411 G (XXX)).<sup>1</sup>*

79. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes.

80. Mr. DORON (Israel): Without even wishing to enter into the substance of the resolution, my delegation voted against the resolution because in an operative paragraph Israel is singled out for completely unjustified discrimination in pursuance of the one-sided, artificial and cynical discriminatory policy of this Assembly.

81. Mr. LAI (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution.

82. In his speech Mr. Malik tried viciously to sow discord and undermine the militant friendship between the Chinese people and the African people. He even slanderously accused China of colluding with the South African racists and alleged that the Chinese Vice-Premier had been in favour of "dialogue" with South Africa. This is a sheer fabrication. He was brazenly spreading lies before the solemn forum of the United Nations. This shows that Mr. Malik, as the representative of Soviet social-imperialism, has sunk to the depth of having no scruples in trying to cover up Soviet aggression and intervention in Angola.

83. The Chinese Government and people have always firmly supported the Azanian people and other African peoples in their just struggle against the policy of *apartheid* pursued by the South African authorities and their white colonialist rule. On many occasions we have exposed and condemned in the forum of the United Nations the conspiracy of this "dialogue" with the South African authorities. This is a well-known fact. Malik's lies and slanders cannot in the least change the true fact. On the contrary, they can only expose the shameless behaviour of a liar. The Chinese and African peoples have forged a profound militant friendship in their protracted common struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism. Such a friendship can stand the test of time. All Malik's attempts at sabotage and sowing discord are of no avail.

84. Mr. Malik has also viciously attacked the position of China on the question of Angola. We deem it necessary to further elaborate on our position. Malik has slanderously accused China of aligning itself with the South African racists and imperialist forces in interfering in the internal affairs of Angola. This is a typical trick of the thief crying "Catch the thief!"



Who has interfered in the internal affairs of Angola? Who has provoked the civil war in Angola? The leaders of quite a number of African countries, and African just public opinion, have already given a clear-cut reply to these questions. They have penetratingly pointed out that the root cause of the civil war that divides Angola lies in Soviet intervention, and that with its intervention in Angola the Soviet Union has become a monger of death, discord and confusion. The facts have turned out to be exactly so.

85. At today's meeting, the Soviet representative has done his utmost to oppose the entirely just sub-amendments put forward by Zaire condemning all foreign intervention, and brazenly declared his intention to vote against them. The Soviet Union has thus made clearly an unsolicited confession before the world that it is Soviet social-imperialism which has cruelly interfered in the internal affairs of Angola and is the arch criminal who incites Angolans to fight Angolans. This also shows that it is determined to continue its intervention and will never stop at that.

86. It is by no means accidental that Soviet social-imperialism has put in such a big stake for naked intervention and expansion in Angola. It harbours most sinister motives. Angola is abundant in natural resources, and the Soviet Union has long cast a covetous eye on it. Situated in southern Africa and bordering on the South Atlantic . . .

87. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has requested the floor on a point of order.

88. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The representative of China, under the pretext of an explanation of vote, is engaging the attention of the Assembly for what is in effect a right of reply, and I propose that the right of reply be given at the end of our meeting and that he not hold up the General Assembly through various means, such as requesting the floor for an explanation of vote and then embarking on slanders against the Soviet Union. Kindly proceed in that manner, Mr. President.

89. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of China has heard the proposal of the representative of the Soviet Union. I take note of the fact that China is inscribed to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

90. Mr. LAI (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): With regard to the attack of the Soviet representative, the Chinese delegation is fully entitled to explain our position.

91. As I was saying, it is by no means accidental that Soviet social-imperialism has such a big stake in its naked intervention and expansion in Angola. It harbours most sinister motives. Angola is abundant in natural resources, and the Soviet Union has long cast a covetous eye on it. Situated in southern Africa and bordering on the South Atlantic, having a coastline of over 1,000 kilometres, with very good deep-water ports, Angola is a place of great strategic importance.

92. Control of Angola would mean control of the waters of the South Atlantic and of an important sea route to European countries. Evidently Soviet intervention in Angola is aimed primarily at the control of this strategically important place in order to create favourable conditions for its rivalry with the other

super-Power over Europe and for its plan of aggression and expansion in Western Europe. This constitutes an important step in its counter-revolutionary strategy of seeking global hegemony.

93. Moreover, Soviet social-imperialism's intervention in Angola is aimed at sowing discord to split the African countries. Not only has it worked to divide Angola and oppose the Angolan people, but it is doing its utmost to sabotage the militant unity of the African people, undermine OAU and subvert African States in an attempt to fish in troubled waters, incorporate central, western and southern Africa into its spheres of influence, thus strengthening its position of rivalry with the other super-Power for hegemony over the whole of Africa.

94. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the spearhead of the Soviet intervention and expansion in Angola is directed not only against the Angolan people but against the entire African people. However, things turn out contrary to its wish. Its criminal activities have met with increasingly strong condemnation by the people of Africa and the whole world. Its ugly behaviour of a new tsar is being exposed ever more clearly.

95. China's position on the question of Angola has always been open and above board. From the very beginning we have given our support to the national liberation movement in Angola, and we gave military aid to all three Angolan liberation organizations. Being aware of their differences, we have all along urged the three liberation organizations to unite against the enemy. We have always supported OAU in its efforts to eliminate the differences among the three Angolan organizations and promote their unity. After the agreement on independence was reached between the Angolan national liberation movement and Portugal, we stopped giving new military aid to the three Angolan organizations.

96. Upon the independence of Angola, we extended congratulations to all the three organizations. At the same time, we have continued to urge them to take the national interests to heart, root out the super-Power meddling and intervention and unite in the efforts to build a truly independent Angola of national harmony.

97. Such are the facts. Anyone who respects the facts can see that this position of ours takes into account the fundamental interests of the people of Angola and the rest of Africa and can stand the test of the time. Malik's slanderous attacks cannot alter the facts nor can they do the slightest harm to us.

98. The civil war in Angola provoked by the Soviet Union has brought untold sufferings and disasters to the people of Angola and the rest of Africa. This is a bad thing. But it is a good thing as well. It is good precisely because it serves as teaching material by negative example, which can educate the people, raise their political consciousness and open their eyes to see how flagrantly hypocritical Soviet social-imperialism is in impudently chanting its "support for the national liberation movement" and styling itself "a natural ally of the African countries" and how wild its ambitious design is in carrying out aggression, expansion and rivalry for world hegemony. Its expansion everywhere courts defeat.

99. We are deeply convinced that the strength of the Angolan and other African peoples will finally prevail over hegemonism and that unity will finally prevail over division. Angola belongs to the heroic Angolan people, Africa belongs to the great African people, and not to the super-Powers. The super-Power plots of aggression, expansion and division are doomed to failure.

100. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): May I remind members that we no longer have to vote on the amendments, so I think that explanations of vote should only bear on the reasons for a particular vote on the resolution which has just been adopted and not on the amendments. With that in mind, I call on the representative of Cuba.

101. Mr. ALARCÓN (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Thank you for having given me the opportunity to explain my delegation's vote and also for the very useful explanation you have just given us regarding the present position.

102. My delegation wishes briefly to explain its vote in favour of the resolution which the Assembly has just adopted by an overwhelming majority. We understand that this resolution constitutes a clear condemnation of the racist régime of Pretoria, of its policy and practices of *apartheid*, of its violations of the fundamental rights of the South African people and of its violations of the rights of other African peoples, such as those of Namibia and Angola, victims of the aggression of the Pretoria régime.

103. At the same time, the resolution strongly denounces and condemns the support given to the Pretoria régime by other States and foreign economic and other interests, a support making possible the maintenance, existence and development of that Pretoria-directed racist policy that oppresses and threatens the South African people and the African continent as a whole.

104. The adoption of this resolution seems to us to be a genuine expression of the broad majority opinion of Member States, which thus express the common will to continue the struggle against *apartheid*, to persevere in our condemnation of and opposition to the inhuman practices of the Pretoria régime and also to persevere in our consistent support of national liberation movements, striving by every possible means to root out this evil from southern Africa.

105. As someone said at the beginning of this debate, the vote on this resolution would bring the General Assembly closer to the moment of truth. Today, at approximately 4.40 p.m., the moment of truth arrived when the Assembly clearly expressed its opinion on that board: 101 Member States voted in favour of this resolution, while only a handful voted against it. Those who still had any question about the origins of the support for the racist, colonialist and oppressive policy of South Africa, which affects the interests of the people of South Africa, Namibia and Angola, have had, this afternoon, the best possible answer.

106. Only two days ago, the spokesman for the United States Government told us that the vote on this resolution would bring the Assembly closer to the moment of truth. The moment of truth has come, and in the future it will be clear who were, who are and who will continue to be the imperialist, colonialist,

racist minority guilty of innumerable crimes against the people of South Africa, Namibia, Angola and the entire African continent.

107. Mrs. CISSÉ (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): Before making some comments, not as representative of Guinea but as Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, on the occasion of the adoption of the resolution relating to the policy of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa, I should like to express the deep gratitude of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* to the General Assembly for the compliments paid to the Committee for its work, and also to thank the many delegations from all parts of the world for their kind words about the Special Committee in the discussion on this subject.

108. May I assure the General Assembly and all Member States that the Special Committee will continue to do everything in its power, in co-operation with Member States, the specialized agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations, OAU, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and the non-governmental organizations, and in close consultation with the liberation movements of Africa, to discharge its functions and promote the efforts being made at the international level to eliminate *apartheid* and liberate the South African people from racist tyranny.

109. At its thirtieth session, the General Assembly has recognized that it is crucial to intensify international efforts against *apartheid*, and has taken further important decisions to that end. It has unanimously expressed its solidarity with all South Africans fighting against *apartheid* and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. It has proclaimed that the United Nations and the international community bear particular responsibility towards the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements, as well as towards those imprisoned, banished or exiled because of their struggle against *apartheid*. It has reaffirmed the Organization's determination to devote ever-growing attention and all the necessary resources to the pooling of international efforts, in close co-operation with OAU, with a view to the speedy elimination of *apartheid* from South Africa and the liberation of the South African people.

110. We consider these declarations as a solemn commitment on the part of the United Nations and all its Member States. The Special Committee against *Apartheid* is reassured and encouraged by the consensus that has emerged on many decisions at this session, and by the general support its own work programme has received. We are aware that there are serious differences of view with regard to certain aspects of international action against *apartheid*. Some Governments continue to maintain normal relations with the South African régime in spite of United Nations resolutions, and many powerful economic interests in their countries have continued to intensify their activities in South Africa.

111. The Special Committee will continue the dialogue it has begun with those Governments in order to study all possible ways of bringing about concerted international action. We shall try to help to co-ordinate the policies and actions of Governments and organizations in the light of our common commitments. We shall continue to send missions to countries which

have made sacrifices in the struggle against *apartheid* as well as to countries which continue to maintain reservations about sanctions, with a view to holding frank consultations on all aspects of the question. We call on all Member States, therefore, to co-operate with us in our efforts to bring to a successful conclusion the tasks entrusted to the Special Committee against *Apartheid* by the General Assembly.

112. As an African and as Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, I should like to appeal solemnly to the few countries that felt compelled either to vote against or to abstain from voting on certain provisions of the resolutions adopted today and on 28 November. I ask them to make a sincere effort to understand the concern and the opinions of the overwhelming majority of Member States. I ask them to examine this question in the light of the aspirations of the people of South Africa and the best traditions of their own nations, rather than in the distorting mirror of cold-war ideologies or of the selfish motives behind economic interests. May I ask them also to see the basic reality of South Africa and of southern Africa, and not to allow themselves to be led astray by false legalisms or irrelevant analogies.

113. Certain countries have expressed reservations about the question of South Africa's membership and the status of the liberation movements. Is it not more important for us to hear the voices of the vast majority of the people of South Africa, who have been oppressed by racism and are struggling for the principles of the United Nations, here and in all other bodies, rather than to hear the small minority of racists who in that country are resisting the inexorable triumph of human equality and freedom?

114. We have heard representatives stating that certain expressions appearing in the resolution—for example, the reference to self-determination or national freedom—only fit a traditional colonial solution. There is nothing traditional in colonialism, all the manifestations of which should be cast on to the rubbish heap of history, along with all forms of racism.

115. But who can deny that the vast majority of the people of South Africa were not consulted when the administrative system of that country was determined, when even the symbolic right to vote which they had in 1910 was abolished, and that they should have the right to participate on a footing of equality in decisions concerning the destiny of South Africa within the African continent?

116. If anyone has any doubt about our intentions, permit me to remind the Assembly of what Africa has always proclaimed and what the national liberation movements have always declared, namely, that South Africa belongs to all those people who consider themselves Africans and claim no right to superiority or domination.

117. The Special Committee against *Apartheid*, OAU and the liberation movements were the first to express their solidarity with the whites of South Africa who manifested opposition to racism—people such as the late Bram Fisher, Mr. Breytenbach, and many clergymen and students. I would venture to say that it is we who are the true friends of the white minority of South Africa and not the narrow interests which

encourage the Pretoria régime in its march towards suicide.

118. We are particularly distressed that some countries have expressed reservations about the requests for non-recognition of bantustans and their chiefs. I hope that those countries will permit me to remind them of the sorry experience of Africa which, throughout its history, has seen chiefs and other traitors sell millions of Africans to slave traders and into colonial oppression.

119. For 30 years, the United Nations has had before it the question of racism in South Africa. In those 30 years we have reached a consensus in condemnation of *apartheid*. We have taken measures to isolate the racist régime and to help its victims, but we have not succeeded in obtaining the total co-operation of certain great Powers. In the meantime, the situation in South Africa has deteriorated and the threat to international peace has grown. The South African régime has increased its military budget 25 times since the Security Council first began to examine this question in 1960. It has illegally occupied Namibia, and it has intervened in Zimbabwe. Today it is committing aggression against the newly independent people of Angola and is uttering threats against all neighbouring independent States which support the liberation movements.

120. Who can honestly say that this is not a threat to peace? Or does the expression "a threat to peace" have some special meaning when it applies only to the crimes of the South African racists? The concern aroused by the situation prompted the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, at its 314th meeting on 3 December 1975, to make the following statement:

"The Special Committee against *Apartheid* expresses its grave concern at the aggression being committed by South Africa against Angola. It notes that the Defence Sub-Committee of the African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), on 28 November, described the South African intervention as 'naked aggression whose magnitude and scope exceed any foreign intervention in Africa'.

"The Special Committee views this act of naked aggression by South Africa as an attempt at further extending and consolidating its racist policies, and posing a serious threat to the security of southern Africa as a whole.

"It calls on all Governments and organizations to denounce the aggression by the South African racist régime in Angola, and to take all appropriate steps to secure the immediate withdrawal of all South African military personnel, including mercenaries, from Angola.

"It declares that countries that have refused to take energetic measures against the South African régime, which has the regrettable effect of encouraging it to launch new acts of aggression, and which provide it with the necessary means, bear a special responsibility in this regard. It hopes that they allow themselves to be persuaded to cease all co-operation with South Africa and to co-operate in the isolation and punishment of that aggressive racist régime."

121. Thanks to the resolutions adopted on 28 November [resolutions 3411 A (XXI) to 3411 F (XXX)] and that adopted today, the Organization has taken a new step in carrying out the task incumbent on it as a result of the most flagrant challenge to the principles of the Charter. The Special Committee against *Apartheid* expresses the hope that these resolutions will represent a new stage in the action by the United Nations against *apartheid* and the transition from the mere condemnation of racism to decisive action to eliminate it once and for all.

122. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Four delegations have asked to speak in exercise of their right of reply. During the general debate, the General Assembly agreed to grant the right of reply at the end of a meeting. However, in judiciously interpreting rule 115 of the rules of procedure, I must honestly say that that applies in the case of a debate which continues. The debate on this item has ended, and logically I must now call on those representatives who have asked to exercise their right of reply.

123. As President, I should like to remind members that we have a very long agenda, and I appeal urgently to all those who speak in exercise of their right of reply to be as brief as possible.

124. Mr. HUSSEIN (Somalia): The representative of the United States, in a statement that he made on Monday [2430th meeting], mentioned the name of my country and the cordial relations that we have with our friends, which he so maliciously chose to interpret otherwise. Before I come to the gist of my reply to those false and malicious accusations, I should like to follow up slightly on the United States representative's provocative statement. He said:

“at just the moment when the European colonizers of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have departed, at just that moment a new European colonizing, colonial, imperial nation appears on the continent of Africa, armed, aggressive, involved in the direct assault upon the land and the people of Africa. The European colonial Power is back, a new colonial Power more mighty than any that ever preceded it.” [*Ibid.*, para. 45.]

125. For a while, and if I had not known personally that he was the United States Ambassador, I would have honestly thought that he was alluding to the United States as this awesome, powerful nation that has come, as he put it, “with its arms, with its armies, with its technology, with its ideology” so that “the recolonization of Africa commences” [*ibid.*]. For every single word in that paragraph, save perhaps the word “European”, is a more apt description of the United States than of any other nation in this Assembly.

126. Even more surprising is the logic hidden behind the words of the representative of the United States—logic which we believe is much more interesting than the thrust of his statement. In deploring the activities of what he termed a certain European nation, he concluded in effect that, first, any nation that supplies arms to any other nation is a colonial, imperial nation, and the recipient is a colony. So we ask here: Who is the biggest supplier of arms in the world? Is it not the United States of America? Secondly, if a nation maintains a facility or even a base on another nation's soil—and I shall come back to the question of bases

later—then that nation is a colonial, imperialist nation. We ask, again: Which is the nation that maintains the most bases around the world? Is it not, again, the United States? In the Indian Ocean area alone—an area with which we are very much concerned—the United States maintains no fewer than half a dozen military installations.

127. Despite a bit of contorted logic, the representative of the United States has proved beyond doubt the colonialist and imperialist character of his own country. While this is not exactly new to us, it is nevertheless significant that today we have it straight from the horse's mouth, the mouth of the representative of the United States, for the first time in an international forum.

128. The sudden, belated compassion shown by the representative of the United States for the people of Angola and for the nations of Africa is yet another of those sinister moves that are typical of United States arrogance and its utter disdain for those nations that do not agree to be dictated to in the management of their own affairs.

129. The people of Angola have been struggling against a most repressive, Fascist, colonial régime for 14 years. For those 14 years, the United States has been deliberately, and with complete disregard for the relevant United Nations appeals and resolutions, supplying arms to the oppressive colonial, fascist régime, at the expense of the people of Angola, whose only crime has been to demand their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

130. We believe—and we do so with good reason—that this belated display of sympathy and compassion for the people of Angola is not genuine and that the sole purpose of the United States in this intervention was to blur the issue in order to protect its client and unholy ally, the South African minority régime, whose obnoxious policy of *apartheid* is the subject of this debate. It is time that the Government of the United States realized that the people of Angola do not need its sympathy at this stage and that the nations of Africa cannot tolerate being told what is good for them.

131. Somalia is a free and democratic Republic, whose Government pursues policies based upon the wishes of its people. It fosters friendship with all peace-loving nations of the world. Somalia, contrary to the spurious allegations of the representative of the United States, does not condone any infringement, in any form, of its freedom, independence and sovereignty.

132. About six months ago a big, indeed an enormous, lie was deliberately created by the United States Government, which launched a hostile campaign of false accusations directed against the Somali Democratic Republic. Somalia was accused of allowing the establishment of a Soviet military base on its territory and of allowing the deployment there of Soviet missiles.

133. There were three basic objectives for the launching of this groundless propaganda campaign against Somalia. The first objective was to kindle the emotions of Congressmen and arouse American public opinion, to use that allegation as justification for seeking support for the construction of a huge naval base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and, for that matter, to obtain an astronomical appropriation



for the establishment of that base. Secondly, the United States Department of Defense, in an effort to direct the attention of the American public in the way desired and to mislead international opinion, found it expedient to utilize a fabrication, a fairy tale, by alleging that there is a Soviet missile base in Somalia. The third objective of this propaganda campaign was to create a cloud of suspicion and misunderstanding among the neighbouring States situated on the Indian Ocean, as well as the Red Sea. In order to dispel—

134. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I must remind the representative of Somalia that statements in exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes. I must therefore ask him to try to conclude his statement in 30 seconds.

135. Mr. HUSSEIN (Somalia): I shall do my best, Sir. Indeed, if you had not interrupted me, I would have been finished by now.

136. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Somalia had been speaking for 11 minutes before I interrupted him. I ask him to continue his statement.

137. Mr. HUSSEIN (Somalia): In order to dispel such baseless, malicious propaganda, and also to show its sincerity in this matter, the Somali Government, earlier this year, invited anyone—and especially members of the United States Congress—to visit Berbera, the alleged site of the so-called missile base in Somalia. It is unnecessary to point out that we would not have taken that step if we had had anything to hide.

138. I have now concluded my statement, Mr. President. I would only like to remind you that a preceding speaker, who was also making a statement in exercise of the right of reply, was given more time than has been allotted to me. I consider that unfair.

139. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I did not invent the rules. Explanations of vote are not limited in terms of time. Rights of reply, as you will see if you consult your rules, are limited to 10 minutes. I did not invent the rule, but I have to apply it. It may be unfair, and if the representative of Somalia wishes to present a motion to the Assembly, perhaps the Assembly will accept that view. I shall certainly not make any objection to explanations of vote also being limited in time, but the right of reply is already subject to such a limitation by virtue of a sovereign decision of the Assembly.

140. I can only say that I am very sorry, especially because of the friendship he knows I feel towards him.

141. Mr. ADJIBADÉ (Benin) (*interpretation from French*): I confess I regret having to take the floor, since the delegation of Benin is not in the habit of exercising its right of reply. We would not have done so if the delegation of Benin had not been surprised and concerned by the statement made at the preceding meeting by our brother from Senegal, Mr. Fall. We wish to make it clear that the delegation of Benin does not seek, never has sought, never will seek in any way to arrogate to itself the right to speak for others. If the delegation of Benin thought it should speak at the preceding meeting on behalf of certain co-sponsors of the draft amendments in document A/L.784, it was because it had been designated by those co-sponsors to do so, without having requested the privilege of being the spokesman.

142. My delegation has taken due note of the fact that it was not authorized to speak in the name of Senegal, and will make sure to bear this new situation in mind in the future.

143. Although the Benin delegation receives its instructions from the Revolutionary Military Government, it has asked and will ask other delegations to speak on its behalf, especially when defending any just cause, especially an African cause, if the need arises. We wish also to make it clear that all members of the delegation of Benin, at all levels, are entitled to speak on behalf of Benin and to undertake commitments for it.

144. Mr. N'DESSABEKA (Congo) (*interpretation from French*): I shall not take my full 10 minutes, for the simple reason that my delegation was very responsive to the appeal made by a number of African countries in regard to what the representative of Senegal, Mr. Fall, said this morning.

145. In all honesty I would inform Mr. Fall, nevertheless, that what he said this morning has been noted by my Government, and that he will be responsible for the consequences thereof.

146. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): I am exercising my right of reply in order to answer a routine slanderous attack on the part of the Chinese representative, the representative of the social renegades. We do not need to cause a split between China and Africa: the social renegades do that themselves.

147. I was quoting the words of the representative of the MPLA, Mr. Lucio Lara, who told you that the Angolan people did not understand how China could support the grave-diggers of Angola or give any assistance whatsoever to the organization created, financed and run by the Central Intelligence Agency, the true purpose of which is to suppress the genuine independence of the Angolan people. China is helping those who would bury the Angolan people and is becoming one of them.

148. We have had many talks with representatives of African countries, here, those countries which are really concerned about foreign intervention in Angola. They are angry at the position of China. We have no need to divide China and Africa; China is already divided from Africa. It is on the other side of the barricades, the side of the racists, the side of the Fascists, the side of the imperialists, and not on the side of the Angolan patriots. That is the actual state of affairs. The representative of China did not rebut the words of the representative of the MPLA, and that shows the weakness of his position.

149. With regard to the statement of the representative of Zaire, our statements are not insinuations but statements of fact, and he did not rebut a single one of the facts. His position is that he is proud of helping the anti-patriotic forces in Angola, but we are proud that we are helping the legitimate Government of the Angolan People's Republic. He does not understand, or does not want to understand, the qualitative difference between assistance to that side on the one hand, and assistance to the Government, on the other hand. Objectively, in introducing his amendments he is in essence pursuing a course of disarming the lawful government of Angola, taking its arms away from it

so that it would become helpless and unable to defend the freedom and independence of its country from the attacks of the racists, financed and supported from outside. That is what the position of China amounts to, also. It is helping those who are against the interests of the Angolan people, and is not helping, and has not helped, the patriotic forces. That is the difference of principle between our approach and the approach of Zaire and China.

150. We have received information that the United States representative, Mr. Moynihan, has preferred to speak to American journalists in answer to my statement here. He did not dare to come and make his statement in this Assembly to rebut the facts I adduced. He prefers to give an interview to American journalists, who will interpret things, as they write, to his advantage. That is the situation.

151. We are deeply convinced that on the African continent, the overwhelming majority of countries and peoples are on the side of the patriotic forces of Angola. And the Soviet Union has been, is and will continue to be on their side.

152. Mr. LAI (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): As expected, Mr. Malik did not dare to touch on the facts enumerated in the two statements made by the Chinese delegation today. On the contrary, he has again resorted to lies and slanders to cover up his own true features.

153. As one may recall, there was a celebrated saying by Hitler's Information Minister Goebbels to the effect that "Lies repeated a thousand times will become the truth". Apparently, Mr. Malik has become a loyal disciple of Goebbels. He thinks that by endlessly repeating lies, fabrications and slanders, he will succeed in covering up Soviet social-imperialism's aggression and intervention in Angola, in covering up its sabotage of African unity and the African national liberation movement and in covering up the truth about its fierce contention with the other super-Power over Angola and Africa to serve its strategic needs of seeking world hegemony. Lies are after all lies, and facts speak louder than words. Hitler, Goebbels and their like have already been swept into the dustbin of history. Following the beaten track of Hitler today, Brezhnev and his company will come to an even more tragic end. This is the dialectical law of history, which no force on earth can prevent.

154. Mr. REIS (United States of America): I had understood, when the representative of the Soviet Union began to speak, that he was speaking in reply to statements of the representative of China. Suddenly he was directing his heat and what passes for passion against the United States, which had not spoken in right of reply this afternoon. I think, frankly, that in the interests of at least maintaining the present atmosphere, which is already considerably befouled, although through no fault of your own, Mr. President, I should like simply to reserve the right of my delegation to reply at a later stage.

155. Mr. MUTUALE TSHIKANKIE (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): What arrogance to pretend to know better the situation in Angola than the Africans! Which country in the world has the longest frontier with Angola? It is Zaire. We have more than 2,600 kilometres of common border with Angola, that country

whose sons and daughters have for more than 14 consecutive years fought for their liberation. Who then can believe himself authorized to speak with such arrogance and to think that he knows the situation in Angola better than the Africans?

156. The methods of subversion do not pay. The Soviet Union might have remembered that in 1960 it had already tried to divide the people of Zaire—and even succeeded for a while. The 500,000 dead, victims of the civil war that was a result of Soviet activities in my country, should weigh on the conscience of the representative of the Soviet Union.

157. Zaire has a policy of positive neutrality *vis-à-vis* the three liberation movements. It is not a policy which dates from 11 November; already by 1 June, at Kinshasa, Portugal and Zaire had signed important agreements of positive neutrality *vis-à-vis* the three liberation movements. Under those agreements, no supplies of arms could be made to any one of the movements. Could the representative of the Soviet Union be ignorant of these facts? We do not follow a partisan policy in Angola. My amendments were not intended to disarm the MPLA.

158. I understand the concern that emanates from the statements of the Soviet Union. They were bothered at seeing a principle which challenged their policy in Angola. But principles are principles. The Soviet Union, to my knowledge, is still a member of the United Nations. My amendments included a principle of the Charter. Who is against that principle, who but those who may be bothered by the principle of non-interference, and who therefore reveal their real policy in Angola?

159. I have so much to say about the situation in Angola that I sincerely believe that perhaps we could have dealt with this question as a separate item on our agenda, and not in connexion with amendments.

160. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I wish to remind the representatives that right of reply need not be exercised until a general consensus is achieved.

161. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Deep knowledge of the propaganda methods of Goebbels and Hitler in which we have just received instruction from the Chinese representative is the best evidence of whose methods and experience the Chinese delegation is drawing on in United Nations bodies for its constant slander against the Soviet Union. It is all clear now as to whose methods and whose experience are being employed by the Chinese to slander the Soviet Union. I have nothing further to say to the Chinese representative.

162. I would only like to add that Hitler and Goebbels have passed into oblivion, just as all slanderers have throughout the more than 100 years of the history of our country, and so will the social renegades pass into inglorious oblivion, along with their slanders against the Soviet Union.

163. With regard to the comments of the representative of Zaire, I do not want to go into what exactly were the reasons for the death of the 5,000 people in his country. Imperialist aggression, the improper use in that country of the United Nations and its

flag—that was the reason for the death of those people, not the activities of the Soviet Union.

164. This kind of assertion is basically a distortion of history.

#### AGENDA ITEM 51

##### Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations

165. Mr. MAUERSBERGER (German Democratic Republic), Rapporteur of the Special Political Committee: I have the honour to present to the General Assembly the report of the Special Political Committee on agenda item 51 [A/10460]. In considering this item, the Special Political Committee heard 30 statements in general debate.

166. The draft resolution recommended by the Committee was approved by consensus and is contained in paragraph 7 of the report. Among other things, it requests the Committee on Peace-keeping Operations and its Working Group to renew efforts towards the completion of agreed guidelines for carrying out peace-keeping operations in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, and to devote attention also to the consideration of specific questions related to the practical implementation of peace-keeping operations.

167. In submitting to the General Assembly the report of the Special Political Committee, I would like to express the hope that the Assembly will approve the draft resolution which has resulted from the Committee's work.

*Pursuant to rule 66 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the Special Political Committee.*

168. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We shall now take a decision on the draft resolution recommended by the Special Political Committee in paragraph 7 of its report. The Committee adopted this draft resolution without a vote. May I consider that the General Assembly wishes to do the same?

*The draft resolution was adopted (resolution 3457 (XXX)).*

#### AGENDA ITEM 23

##### Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (*continued*)\*

##### REPORT OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE ON TERRITORIES NOT CONSIDERED SEPARATELY (A/10427)

169. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Members will recall that at the 2431st meeting the General Assembly decided to postpone the vote on three of the draft resolutions recommended by the Fourth Committee in paragraph 72 of its report [A/10427],

namely, draft resolutions XI A, XI B and XII. An amendment to draft resolution XII has been submitted in document A/L.785. In addition, amendments to that amendment have been submitted in document A/L.789.

170. I should now like to outline the procedure we shall follow in our consideration of the three draft resolutions.

171. We shall consider draft resolutions XI A and XI B, relating to the question of Spanish Sahara, and in this regard I shall call on those speakers who wish to explain their votes before the vote and then proceed to vote on those two draft resolutions, and hear explanations of vote after the vote on Spanish Sahara. Then we shall consider draft resolution XII on the question of French Somaliland and the amendments and sub-amendments thereto and will follow the same voting procedure, unless, of course, there is debate; that is, explanations of vote before the vote; then vote and explanations of vote after the vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

172. Therefore, at this initial point we shall take up draft resolutions XI A and XI B, dealing with the question of Spanish Sahara. I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote before the vote.

173. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): The Tunisian delegation had an opportunity to explain our Government's position on the question of Western Sahara when that question was being dealt with in the Fourth Committee [2177th and 2182nd meetings].

174. At this juncture, my delegation deems it necessary briefly to recall here the basic elements that serve as the foundation of my country's position with regard to this problem, basic elements without which no really just and viable solution can be reached.

175. As a matter of fact, any mental exercise, any reasoning used in the search of a just solution to a given problem should be guided, in the first instance, by consistent respect for certain principles which we are all under an obligation to respect and see respected, and secondly, that such principles be based on a profound and rigorous analysis of all objective data involved in the problem. It is on this basis only that a valid solution can be found, one that is inspired by the principles and at the same time necessarily takes into account the specific elements of the problem to be solved.

176. The problem of Western Sahara is presented to us in two aspects and in terms which are not necessarily incompatible. The question is first presented as one of self-determination. This is a principle which no one can ignore, least of all Tunisia, whose role in the working-out of that principle and in its implementation is well known to all those who have lived under colonialism.

177. Tunisia dared to defy colonialism at a time in history when colonialism was still considered, in many areas of the globe, as an historic fact and, as such, an inevitable and unalterable fact bound up with the general concept that was held with regard to international relations. It was precisely because Tunisia embarked on its fight for liberation at a time when fatalism and scepticism hindered and delayed the

\* Resumed from the 2431st meeting.

awakening of conscience that it had to appeal to the courage, the determination and generous spirit of sacrifice of its children.

178. For the very reason that it has lived through the colonial tragedy, that it has known oppression and repression, that it struggled in a dramatic and unequal confrontation that lasted at least 30 years, Tunisia is possessed of a particular intuitive ability to understand the profound significance of the principle of self-determination—a principle which on certain occasions Tunisia has been the first, if not the only, one to defend, both here and elsewhere.

179. It is specifically by reason of this understanding that Tunisia, even before establishing its own independence, became involved in active co-operation with the fraternal peoples that were still struggling against colonial domination, and that it spared no effort, no material assistance, no moral support, and even in certain cases no sacrifice, to bring about the triumph of the legitimate struggle that was being waged, and that still is being waged, by the oppressed peoples.

180. It was on the basis of these principles that the Tunisian Government undertook its analysis of the question of the Sahara. Tunisia is of the view that the Assembly should devise, with respect to the Sahara, a solution which, while accelerating the decolonization process envisaged in the Declaration in resolution 1514 (XV), takes into account the specific facts that characterize that Territory and its peoples and that we find amply reflected in the documents available to us.

181. I should like to recall that the International Court of Justice has given a clear response<sup>2</sup> to the two questions contained in General Assembly resolution 3292 (XXIX). The Court confirmed the existence of age-old legal ties between Western Sahara on the one hand, and Morocco and Mauritania on the other, ties which give clear proof of the strength and long-standing existence of the bonds between the Saharan people and their brothers to the north and to the south of the Territory.

182. These bonds have remained all the more vital and effective because of the fact that the colonial domination, even though one of its principles was to divide the peoples and territories the better to restrict efforts to achieve liberation, was never able, with regard to this Territory, to weaken the feeling among those peoples of belonging to the same community as their brothers to the north and the south, nor their allegiance to Moroccan and Mauritanian sovereignty.

183. Proof of the reality of these ties has for centuries been provided by the seasonal movement of the Saharan peoples towards the north and towards the south, convinced as they are that no frontier, colonial or otherwise, can prevent them from going to any country of which they are an integral part.

184. Tunisia considers that these objective facts cannot be disregarded if we wish to achieve a thorough understanding of the situation. This is an essential pre-condition of any attempt to reach a just solution to the problem of Western Sahara.

185. It was precisely by taking all these criteria into account that the Governments of Morocco, Mauritania and Spain, in a praiseworthy effort, achieved

an agreement which would make possible the decolonization of the Territory. Thus the Tunisian Government is highly gratified at the conclusion of the tripartite agreement on 14 November 1975 at Madrid by the Governments of Mauritania, Morocco and Spain<sup>3</sup>, inasmuch as its historic character and its complete conformity with the principles of the United Nations deserve all possible praise. Since it ensures the peaceful decolonization of the Territory, this agreement immediately received spontaneous and massive support from the population of the Sahara.

186. We were able to gauge the strength of this reaction from the declarations of support made by the representatives of the three liberation movements active in the Territory, as well as by the representatives of the only formally constituted body, namely, the Jema'a, who only aspire to liberation from colonial occupation and to a strengthening of those ancestral bonds with their brothers to the north and to the south which colonization never was able to shatter.

187. It is for this reason that the United Nations must take a decision on the basis of a consideration of all the elements and characteristics which are at the origin of the problem. The prerequisites of such a decision exist; they are clearly set forth in draft resolution XI B, recommended by the Fourth Committee.

188. That draft resolution has a twofold merit: on the one hand, it takes into account the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and geophysical situation in the Territory as it is faithfully reflected in the agreement of Madrid; and on the other hand, it specifically ensures the exercise by the people of the Sahara of their inalienable right to self-determination, with the participation of an observer from the United Nations designated by the Secretary-General. Any decision that overlooked one of the two fundamental aspects of the question and did not also take into account all the characteristics of the Territory would run the risk of becoming inoperative and would not contribute to a solution which would guarantee peace and stability in the region.

189. The adoption of a realistic and balanced decision, which would honour and affirm the right of the population of the Sahara to self-determination and would, at the same time, respect the context and the specific features of Western Sahara, represents the only way to disperse feelings of frustration and tension and to reinforce the bonds of fraternity and co-operation which link the peoples of the Great Maghreb.

190. This is the position that Tunisia has adopted with respect to this problem, in the conviction once again that history will recognize that it is right.

191. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Mr. President, I think you made a mistake, as I was told earlier that I was the first speaker before the vote. Nevertheless, you did not call on me before the Tunisian representative. But I do not blame either him or you for this, because we are well aware of Tunisia's position, even in the Fourth Committee, and today it is clearer than ever. I shall be much more brief than he was.

192. When the delegation of the Soviet Union participated in the voting in the Fourth Committee on draft resolutions A/C.4/L.1121 and A/C.4/L.1120/Rev.1 on Western Sahara, we voted differently.



We voted in favour of the first and we abstained from voting on the second.

193. We were prompted to do this by the fact that in both resolutions mention was made, albeit differently, of the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination; in the first—now draft resolution XI A—the right of the people to self-determination was mentioned directly; in the second—now draft resolution XI B—the right of the indigenous population to self-determination was mentioned. Although different interpretations are possible, we made no distinction in our interpretation of the question.

194. Our position of principle is well known to representatives. Our country, the Soviet Union, has always been and still is in favour of the self-determination of peoples. I repeat, although operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution XI B reaffirms the inalienable right to self-determination, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), of all the Saharan populations originating in the Territory, the time that has elapsed between our consideration of this question in the Fourth Committee and this meeting of the General Assembly shows that the granting of the right to self-determination to the people of Western Sahara and respect for that right are not in fact being implemented by the parties to the tripartite agreement of 14 November of this year are not respecting that right. Therefore, it is quite clear that the parties to the agreement are not fulfilling the provisions contained in the draft resolution.

195. On this basis and on the basis of the Soviet Union's position of principle, and guided by what we did in previous years on questions of the self-determination of peoples, the delegation of the Soviet Union this time will support draft resolution XI A and will vote against draft resolution XI B.

196. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): The explanation of my vote will actually not require a lengthy statement, for despite the erudite considerations advanced in the Assembly, the problem of Spanish Sahara remains essentially a problem of the most elementary simplicity.

197. The Spanish Sahara is a Territory under colonial domination. It is a Non-Self-Governing Territory, covered by Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations, the administration of which is at present entrusted to the Spanish Government. It is Spain which continues to be the administering Power, which must report on its administration to the United Nations, and which is bound, by its commitments, to do everything in its power to raise the standard of living of the people of the Sahara and to bring it to the point where it is able to exercise its right to self-determination and independence. All other considerations designed to present the problem in a different light and to introduce other elements and thus to lead us away from reality obviously have the purpose of diverting the Organization from the choice it has to make in respect of steps to decolonize that Territory.

198. The simplicity of the situation would not alone justify my taking the floor for the purpose of explaining my delegation's vote. I felt it was necessary to do so because of the fact that the situation as it is now presented to the General Assembly offers some confusion

which I am in duty bound to point out so that the Assembly will be in a position to reach a decision and take a very clear stand.

199. First of all, today the Assembly has before it two draft resolutions—XI A and XI B—which are contradictory in nature. They are contradictory on several points, and it is my view that all my colleagues here present are sufficiently aware of the elements contained in each of those draft resolutions to be convinced of the fact that it would be impossible to implement the two of them simultaneously. I shall merely say that, in spite of their use of similar language, the aims of the two draft resolutions are different, their practical provisions are contradictory, and their very purpose is contradictory.

200. While both draft resolutions refer to the right to self-determination for the inhabitants of the Sahara, it is clear that in draft resolution A all necessary provisions have been made to enable the population to express itself freely, under United Nations supervision carried out by the Organization itself and by the Secretary-General, the responsibility of the Spanish Government being maintained as that of the administering Power.

201. While draft resolution B reaffirms, in paragraph 2, the inalienable right of the inhabitants of the Sahara to self-determination, it is quickly circumscribed by operative paragraph 4, which entrusts the exercise of that right to an interim administration—consisting in particular of Morocco and Mauritania, two countries with claims on that Territory.

202. However, those are not the only new points on which I must dwell in an attempt to clarify the situation. To all who have closely followed events in that Territory it has become clear that for some time now serious incidents have occurred and that a tragic situation is developing. The international press has already reported the departure of Saharan tribes who leave the Sahara as and when Spanish troops and the Administration withdraw and Moroccan troops take over. In this connexion I should also like to point out that the flight of refugees into Algeria has led the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to pay particular attention to that situation; and I must point out here that a delegation sent by the High Commissioner is to arrive in Algeria tomorrow to study the situation and help the Government of Algeria to provide assistance to the population. That is the first new element in the Saharan situation.

203. The second element—and it is no secret—is the fact that 57 members of the Jema'a—which consists of 104 members, as representatives know—have joined POLISARIO<sup>4</sup>, the liberation movement for the Sahara population, and that these 57 members, more than a majority of that assembly, have declared the assembly dissolved. Among those 57 members of the Jema'a—which, I recall, is the general assembly of Spanish Sahara—are four members of the Cortes, the Spanish Parliament.

204. After the majority of the Jema'a joined up with POLISARIO, the latter decided to establish a national council for Spanish Sahara which rightly claims to be the sole representative of the Saharan people.

205. This new situation is at variance with draft resolution XI B, which refers specifically to what is called

an "agreement" reached by the Governments of Spain, Morocco and Mauritania. I should like to state at the outset that the term "agreement" used in this draft resolution is inappropriate, inasmuch as we are not here dealing with an agreement but with a declaration of principles. Furthermore, I fail to see why the exact title of that document was not reproduced in the draft resolution and why it is referred to as an "agreement" and not a "declaration of principles". I assume that my colleagues here are sufficiently aware of the nuances in this particular case to know that an agreement and a declaration of principles are entirely different things.

206. The most important point, however, is that in that declaration of principles,<sup>3</sup> paragraph 2 deals with the manner in which the Saharan population will be associated with the temporary administration, and paragraph 3 states that the views of the population will be ascertained by that temporary administration through the Jema'a. Now the Jema'a no longer exists. I wonder, therefore, how this declaration of principles can be implemented inasmuch as one of the components, presented to us by the contracting Powers here as one of the basic elements and as proof and evidence of the fact that they were concerned with the right of the people of the Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination, is no longer in existence. Therefore, I feel that that new element vitiates the declaration of principles, which constitutes an essential element in draft resolution XI B, submitted to the General Assembly today for a decision.

207. I believe that all delegations here present are aware of the importance of the problem that we are now discussing. Furthermore, much more is at stake than the question of the Sahara and the right to self-determination of the Saharans. The events that we have witnessed in respect of this problem constitute an extremely dangerous, serious precedent, which has already caused repercussions in other areas of the world.

208. Our countries are very sensitive to this situation, and they should therefore also be extremely vigilant regarding the way in which the Organization envisages exercising its responsibilities towards a colonized people.

209. It is perhaps a coincidence, but I should like nevertheless to underscore the fact that today, 10 December, is the anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It would be particularly tragic for the history of the United Nations if the Saharan people were to be deprived of their rights on this very day of commemoration.

210. Mr. JAIPAL (India): In the Fourth Committee, we voted in favour of draft resolution XI B, sponsored by Tunisia and certain other Member States. We did so because that draft resolution, in its last operative paragraph, contained a provision for the exercise of the right to self-determination by the people through free consultations organized with the assistance of the United Nations. We envisaged that consultation to take place through the representative body called the Jema'a after its democratization.

211. But we have now been informed that the situation in the Territory is very confused. The Jema'a is reported to have split, and several members to have

left the country. Thus, the old basis for popular consultation—namely, the representative body, the Jema'a—seems, in fact, to have disintegrated, and no new means for free consultation have replaced it.

212. In these circumstances, we shall be obliged to take this new factor of confusion into account in determining our vote on draft resolution XI B. This does not in any way detract from the statement of our position made in the general debate in the Fourth Committee [2176th meeting].

213. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): Since the Fourth Committee started considering the question of Western Sahara, many delegations have expressed their views on the problem and have developed their arguments in accordance with the concepts of the procedure to be followed in order to hasten the decolonization of the Territory.

214. Like all other delegations, mine has clearly defined its point of view. It has above all shown that Morocco, which has always worked in the United Nations with great fervour and conviction and has defended the principles of the Charter with determination, could not do and has not done anything not in accordance with the Organization's policy and the guidelines laid down by its bodies.

215. I solemnly state that Morocco and Mauritania reject with indignation any allegation to the effect that my country seeks for Sahara a solution other than one resulting from the strict application of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

216. In the opinion of the Moroccan delegation, draft resolution XI B alone presents balanced recommendations. It takes into consideration all the elements and the components of the question of the Sahara and also opens the way to the peaceful decolonization of the Territory by fully respecting the fundamental principles of the Organization.

217. Draft resolution XI B falls within the guidelines laid down by the United Nations since 1965. Indeed, on the one hand, the General Assembly in resolution 2072 (XX) and the Security Council in resolutions 337 (1975) and 380 (1975) called upon Spain, Mauritania and Morocco to negotiate with a view to arriving at a definitive settlement of their colonial dispute. On the other, the Assembly recalled in other resolutions the right of the Saharan populations to self-determination.

218. Draft resolution XI B strikes a careful balance between these two fundamental aspects of the question of Spanish Sahara. Taking note of the tripartite agreement concluded at Madrid on 14 November 1975, the draft resolution also takes note of the implementation of previous United Nations resolutions. By reaffirming the right to self-determination of the Saharan populations, the draft resolution is in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) which constitutes the charter on decolonization.

219. Draft resolution XI B is the only text among those submitted to us which fully takes into consideration the realities and the specifics of the question of Spanish Sahara. Indeed, as many speakers recalled, the General Assembly has never blindly or uniformly applied the principles of self-determination. No procedure of decolonization is the same as another. The General Assembly has in every case sought to take the

specific issues into consideration when recommending the process of decolonization. This method has permitted the Organization effectively to implement the noble task of decolonization undertaken since the adoption of the Charter.

220. Morocco has supported every initiative aimed at the emancipation of peoples under colonial domination. We are convinced that this policy of the Assembly will allow us once and for all to put an end to colonialism in all its forms. That was the policy pursued by Morocco when it implemented the recommendations of the Organization in order to bring about genuine and effective decolonization of the Territory.

221. The agreement of 14 November 1975 began to be implemented on 19 November.

222. I should like solemnly to inform the Assembly that Morocco, Mauritania and Spain firmly intend to carry out all the commitments which you have required that we make.

223. The tripartite administration now administering the Territory is taking all measures necessary so that the Saharan populations can freely express their aspirations. That is why Morocco supports draft resolution XI B, which is in accordance with the commitments which we do not intend to shirk.

224. Mr. President, I should like to ask you whether I may now exercise the right of reply, after the statements which have just been made.

225. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): When a decision was taken in the Fourth Committee, at its 2181st meeting, on this question of Spanish Sahara—which I prefer to call Western Sahara—our delegation voted in favour of both draft resolutions. I shall of course continue to vote in favour of them—draft resolutions XI A and XI B. However, I shall do so after an explanation.

226. Operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution XI B begins "Takes note of the tripartite agreement concluded at Madrid on 14 November 1975 . . .". My understanding of the words "Takes note" is that we are neither adopting nor rejecting the agreement. It exists, and I see no harm in only taking note of it.

227. Secondly, I should like to make a comment on the word "agreement". My understanding of this word—and this is the basis on which I shall vote—is that this agreement refers to the declaration of principles, and that it is an agreement reached on the declaration of principles.

228. It is the policy of my Government to support this declaration of principles, provided it complies with the Charter of the United Nations and relevant General Assembly resolutions. That is how I understand it. In voting in favour, I shall also take into consideration operative paragraph 4.

229. It is on that understanding that I shall vote in favour of draft resolution XI B.

230. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): There may have been a misunderstanding between the representative of Morocco and the Chair. Did I understand that he wanted to add a few comments?

231. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): As today's meeting is devoted to voting on the various draft resolutions, including the one on the

Western Sahara, it seems that one of the statements that we heard a moment ago was intended to create a certain atmosphere, perhaps even a certain uneasiness . . .

232. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Algeria on a point of order.

233. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I certainly have no objection to the representative of Morocco exercising his right of reply at this juncture, but I should like to be assured that immediately thereafter you will allow me to speak in exercise of my right of reply.

234. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): For the sake of maintaining clarity in this debate, I think it would be best if both of you could air your arguments before we proceed to the vote.

235. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Well, Mr. President, it is you who are presiding over the debate, and we shall abide by your decision.

236. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Morocco may continue his statement.

237. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): I was saying, to create a certain uneasiness, with the sole purpose of disturbing the calm and objectivity of the members of the Assembly.

238. The Moroccan delegation has absolutely no intention of becoming involved in sterile polemics; we wish merely to restore the truth in connexion with what has just been said.

239. I wish most emphatically to disavow the allegations made here for the sole purpose of suggesting the existence of a serious situation in the Territory. Moreover those same allegations, which originated outside the Territory, were denied the day before yesterday by the Spanish radio. They have also been denied by the Moroccan Government.

240. Just today, I telephoned El Aaiún, where the atmosphere is completely calm; indeed, there is even a festive atmosphere there, since the population is completely free to move about from north to south and vice versa. The massive flight from El Aaiún which some have tried to present as an exodus exists only in the imagination of those who would create an unhealthy atmosphere or who would have us believe that such an atmosphere exists. We reject all such malicious allegations against us. We threaten no one; we merely hope to achieve genuine and peaceful decolonization of the Territory, with the support of the United Nations, and in any event without the interference of Powers from outside the region—Powers which are fanning the flames in other parts of Africa and are contemplating a military intervention shortly in this region in pursuit of the same ends.

241. We have been told that the Jema'a had been dissolved, or had dissolved. That is a complete falsehood, quite simply because it was still in session last Friday; and of the 100 members of the Jema'a, 85 were present in El Aaiún. This very day, its officers held a working meeting in El Aaiún for the purpose of studying the organizational set-up of the various provinces.

Suffice it for me to read the message sent from El Aaiún on 10 December:

“Important working meeting of the Standing Committee on the Jema'a in El Aaiún. The Jema'a and its Standing Committee today, in the late afternoon, held a working meeting. This meeting was devoted to the study of the requirements of the province of Sahara and the measures likely to ensure its economic, social and cultural development. Several members of the Jema'a, as well as tribal representatives, took the floor. In their statements the speakers suggested the drawing up of a detailed plan to put an end, as soon as possible, to all aspects of under-development in this province, so that this region may enjoy the benefits of development in such sectors as administration, communications, industry, agriculture and education.”

242. That is information provided today, which invalidates everything that was claimed earlier. In other words, what we were told a moment ago was merely wishful thinking on the part of those who would like to disrupt our calm deliberations and make us believe that Morocco and Mauritania are seeking in the Sahara a solution different from that which would result from a strict application of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly or the Security Council.

243. I solemnly assert that the parties to the tripartite agreement signed at Madrid on 14 November 1975 are firmly committed to implementing, with the support of the Organization and within the framework of the resolution to be adopted, all measures which you may agree upon to advance the Territory towards a just, peaceful and genuine decolonization, with due respect for the free expression of the will of all the peoples of Western Sahara.

244. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): May I be allowed to say that I am surprised, for more than one reason, by the statement just made by my colleague from Morocco.

245. First of all, I noted that he was reading from a written text, which leads us to suppose that either he has some supernatural insight which allowed him to anticipate what I was going to say, or else he is gifted with an exceptional ability to write very quickly and that in a matter of a few minutes he was able to compose a text which took him 10 minutes to read.

246. The second reason for my surprise is that my colleague from Morocco claimed that in my statement I had attempted to confuse the members of this Assembly and that I had made malicious allegations against his country and threatened I do not know whom. In the final analysis, I am content to allow my colleagues here to be their own judge of the moderation and realism with which my colleague from Morocco expressed himself. When I spoke a few minutes ago, I limited myself to communicating to the Assembly the new elements in the situation, knowledge of which was absolutely essential to anyone who wanted to take a responsible decision on this extremely complex problem.

247. I said first of all that today the Assembly is faced with two contradictory draft resolutions. I believe that on this point no one will contradict me, and in saying this I do not have to go any further. To my mind, the General Assembly should not adopt, on a problem of

such importance, which affects so profoundly its essential responsibility in the work of decolonization, a decision open to various interpretations.

248. I said that the situation in the Territory of the Sahara has become dangerous, and I did not prolong my statements by quoting the press. But for all those present who read the international press, the incidents which occur daily in the Sahara are well known. It has just been reported that a truck exploded, that bombs placed in a village where Moroccans were meeting exploded, and that other bombs exploded at El Aaiún. No one in this room expected, any more than I, that our colleague from Morocco would say, “Bombs are exploding in El Aaiún”. I would not carry the joke with him as far as that.

249. When I said that more than half the members of the Jema'a had joined the Frente POLISARIO, I did not base myself on Algerian information. I based myself on information that all my colleagues can find in *Le Monde* of 9 December 1975, which is on sale today in New York. The title of that article in *Le Monde* is: “Western Sahara: The majority of the members of the local Assembly announce at Algiers their support for the POLISARIO Front”. The journalists who wrote that article and other articles in the international press were present.

250. I shall read out the article in *Le Monde*:

“Concerned to take into account United Nations resolutions requesting that the Saharan population be consulted on their future within the framework of the decolonization of Western Sahara, the Governments of Madrid and Rabat have clarified in the agreement which they signed on 14 November that the opinion of the Saharan population, expressed through the Jema'a, will be respected (article 3).

“This text, published on 6 December at Madrid, also states in article 2 that Spain will transfer its powers as administering Power to Morocco and Mauritania in collaboration with Jema'a. The acceptance by a majority of the members of that Assembly of the theory of independence supported by the POLISARIO Front comes as a surprise in that the Jema'a, which includes leading figures chosen by the Spanish Administration, appeared to be a compromise with colonization. The President of that organ, Mr. Khātri Ould Saïd Ould Jamani, arrived at Rabat at the beginning of November and pledged allegiance to King Hassan II (see *Le Monde* of 5 November). Recently Dr. Laraki, Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated in various bodies of the United Nations that the tripartite administration, in co-operation with the Jema'a, would take care that respect is shown for Saharan opinion as it will be expressed through its own structures. The statements made by Mr. Jaime de Piniés, the Spanish representative to the United Nations, were similar in nature. Do the two capitals maintain this position now that the Jema'a is divided, and can one still speak of a tripartite administration when Spain will have evacuated the Territory before the end of the year?”

251. What I have said is contained in the issue of *Le Monde* of 9 December. Therefore I do not know on what grounds the representative of Morocco based himself in saying that I attempted to sow trouble in



the Assembly, when all representatives know perfectly well that I brought to their knowledge elements which have served to clarify the situation before the Assembly takes a decision. Nor do I see how the representative of Morocco can believe that I addressed insults to his country when I did not even mention his country. For the same reason, I could not have threatened his country because, in the first place, that is not my style.

252. Mr. EL HASSEN (Mauritania) (*interpretation from French*): I will be brief. I merely wish to inform the members of the Assembly that the Jema'a referred to so frequently comprises 104 members. Eighty-five of them met last Friday at El Aaiún. Some of them are at present in Mauritania and others are in Morocco. And if we add those 85 members, those who are in Mauritania and Morocco, and those now in Algeria we have a Jema'a of nearly 200 members!

253. I do not want to cast doubt on the information provided by anyone, but I think the fact that 57 out of 104 members of the Jema'a have been won over to the POLISARIO—or to Algeria—should put our Algerian brothers at ease, because the consultation is to be held through the intermediary of the Jema'a, and they will have an overwhelming majority in that Jema'a!

254. That is the only comment I wish to make. The point of view of my country has been amply expressed on several occasions in this Assembly, and I need not repeat it now.

255. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): I warned you, Mr. President, that we would find ourselves in this situation. But I shall not speak at length. I shall follow the example of the representative of Mauritania. The delegation of Algeria is very relaxed; indeed, it has been relaxed throughout this debate. I hope that the delegations of Morocco and Mauritania also are relaxed and will allow the Saharan people to determine its fate in complete freedom, since each of those delegations has assured us that the Saharan people belongs to their country. Well, let us allow that people to decide. That is what the delegation of Algeria has always called for. It feels very relaxed about doing that—all the more because it appears that that position puts the delegations of Morocco and Mauritania at ease too.

256. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I see that the representative of Morocco wishes to speak. I am of course prepared to call on him if he insists, but I wonder if the points of view have not been sufficiently set forth and if we should not now proceed to the vote.

257. Mr. SLAUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): I wish merely to make it clear that draft resolution XI B has four operative paragraphs, of which three relate to self-determination. Hence, we have stated, and we repeat today, that the Saharan people will decide within the framework of whatever is agreed upon here by the General Assembly.

258. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I wish to thank members of the Assembly for the courtesy they have shown during this debate.

259. I now put to the vote draft resolution XI A. A roll-call vote has been requested.

*A vote was taken by roll call.*

*Iraq, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Nicaragua, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, Argentina, Bahrain, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran.

*Draft resolution XI A was adopted by 88 votes to none, with 41 abstentions (resolution 3458 A (XXX)).*

260. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now call on the representatives of Benin and Ghana on a question of procedure.

261. Mr. ADJIBADÉ (Benin) (*interpretation from French*): The principle of the right of self-determination is essential to decolonization, and draft resolution XI B, on which the Assembly is about to vote, is particularly concerned with the principle of self-determination. The right to self-determination has been weakened, watered down, treated with contempt and made inoperable by the developments referred to in this draft resolution. Whatever the date on which the defence of the principle of self-determination is begun, the delegation of Benin believes we should defend that principle in an impartial manner, so that it can be correctly applied in the exclusive interest of the peoples concerned—that is to say, to decolonize. The Madrid agreement referred to in paragraph 1 is the very negation of the principle of self-determination, for the simple reason that that agreement was concluded behind the backs of the Saharan people, without their participation. Paragraph 3 of draft resolution XI B falsifies the basis of responsibilities in the decolonization of the Sahara by introducing conflicting ideas. In fact, knowing the intentions of Morocco and Mauritania, it is frankly impossible to ensure respect for and free expression of the aspirations of the Saharan

populations. Paragraph 4, in the final analysis, envisages a controlled application of the right to self-determination, although paragraph 2 of the same draft resolution describes the right to self-determination as inalienable.

262. Moreover, the draft resolution was conceived on the basis of considerable concessions to the Jema'a, an institution fabricated by the colonizer. The Jema'a should be of little concern to us. Whether it exists or not is not the question. What is important is the Saharan people, and not the representatives to be imposed upon them. The Saharan people should be able to choose their genuine representatives and that is not the aim of draft resolution XI B, which seeks to substitute recolonization for decolonization.

263. For all these reasons, the Assembly should take a responsible decision, either for or against a plot against its own sacred principle of self-determination. To that end, the delegation of Benin very respectfully requests you, Mr. President, in accordance with rule 89 of the rules of procedure, to take a separate vote on operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution XI B and a vote on operative paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 together. My delegation would not object if other delegations requested separate votes on paragraphs 1, 3 and 4.

264. In any case, what we ask for is a vote on the principle which we have always defended here, namely, the principle of self-determination which is mentioned in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution. In order not to waste too much time, we would ask for a vote on operative paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 together, but if other delegations desired separate votes on each of the four operative paragraphs, we would agree to that.

265. Mr. SAM (Ghana): I should like to support the motion made by the representative of Benin to take separate votes on draft resolution XI B. In matters both of a bilateral and of an international character, the Ghana delegation has always supported all efforts aimed at ensuring the peaceful resolution of contentious issues. In matters of fundamental principle, the Ghana delegation adopts the same attitude. In such cases it does so with the conviction that principles are vital for the conduct of international relations, and that the fidelity with which we, especially in the United Nations, observe principles which have already been internationally accepted and sanctioned is the measure by which the world can determine how seriously the United Nations should be taken.

266. My delegation does not seek to take exception to the preambular part of the draft resolution. The operative part, however, is a completely different matter. My delegation is of the opinion that it involves a principle which the United Nations should hesitate to approve. The principle sought to be enunciated here in the draft resolution does not unequivocally conform to Article 73 of the Charter. Also, it is contrary to our understanding of the principles enshrined in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [resolution 1514 (XV)]. The tripartite agreement mentioned in paragraph 1 of the draft resolution was made without the knowledge of the United Nations. Also, it was reached without any known or proven consultation with the very people of the colony of Spanish Sahara whose future it seeks to determine. Indeed, it would even

appear to have been reached without due regard for the interests of the people of the colony. Therefore, if the United Nations approved it, that might give the unfortunate impression that the interests of the people of Spanish Sahara were of little consequence to the United Nations. Whether such a situation would also lead to the peace which we all seek for the people of the area, I would leave to the members of this organization to consider.

267. In addition to the observations I have already made, I should like to point out that as far as my delegation is aware, not a single one of the many regional and other organizations to which the signatories to the agreement belong individually and severally has yet come out in formal or open support of the said agreement. The said agreement applies to the interim administration mentioned in paragraph 4.

268. In these circumstances, my delegation is also of the view that the General Assembly should seize this opportunity to have a closer look at draft resolution XI B. It should indeed hesitate to sanction an agreement to which no other body has as yet felt able to give its open support.

269. The probability is that, since the Fourth Committee considered the said draft resolution, completely new thinking on the question has emerged. For this, and for the other reasons already stated, I support the proposal made by the delegation of Benin that the General Assembly should vote separately on the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution. Since my delegation takes no exception to operative paragraph 2, I should explain that it supports the proposal that the General Assembly should vote on operative paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 together.

270. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall present the problem as it appears following the statements made by the representatives of Benin and Ghana. The Assembly is asked to vote separately on the operative paragraphs of draft resolution XI B—that is to vote on paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 together, and then to vote separately on paragraph 2. Is there any objection to the motion to divide the vote? If there is, I remind the Assembly that in accordance with rule 89 of the rules of procedure, two delegations may speak in favour of the motion and two against.

271. Mr. DIAKITÉ (Mali) (*interpretation from French*): In his statement, the representative of Benin did not exclude the possibility, if requested by certain delegations, of voting separately on the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution. The delegation of Mali requests a separate vote on each paragraph—1, 2, 3 and 4.

272. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The delegation of Mali, expanding the request to divide the vote, has requested a separate vote on each operative paragraph. Is there any objection to this motion? I hear none, therefore the motion of the representative of Mali is accepted.

273. I ask the Assembly to vote first on paragraph 1 of draft resolution XI B. A roll-call vote has been requested.

*A vote was taken by roll call.*

*Sri Lanka, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Sudan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Uruguay, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain.

*Against:* Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Algeria, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Jamaica, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia.

*Abstaining:* Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Zaire, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Ivory Coast, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Singapore.

*Paragraph 1 was adopted by 52 votes to 46, with 34 abstentions.<sup>5</sup>*

274. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We shall now vote on paragraph 2.

275. Mr. HUMAIDAN (United Arab Emirates) (*interpretation from French*): Since we adopted this paragraph by consensus in the Fourth Committee, I appeal through you that the Assembly, in order to save time, should adopt this paragraph by consensus.

276. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Members have just heard this appeal and the reason why this appeal was presented. Does the Assembly share the opinion?

*Operative paragraph 2 was adopted.*

277. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We shall now proceed to vote on paragraph 3. A roll-call vote has been requested.

*A vote was taken by roll call.*

*Poland, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, Sudan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Uruguay, Zaire, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta,

Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines.

*Against:* Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Algeria, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Jamaica, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria.

*Abstaining:* Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Greece, Iceland, India, Israel, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru.

*Paragraph 3 was adopted by 56 votes to 43, with 33 abstentions.<sup>6</sup>*

278. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We shall now vote on paragraph 4. A roll-call vote has been requested.

*A vote was taken by roll call.*

*Maldives, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Uruguay, Zaire, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malaysia.

*Against:* Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Algeria, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Jamaica, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi.

*Abstaining:* Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Greece, Iceland, India, Israel, Ivory Coast.

*Paragraph 4 was adopted by 54 votes to 44, with 34 abstentions.*<sup>6</sup>

279. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The separate operative paragraphs of draft resolution XI B have thus all been adopted. In accordance with rule 89 of the rules of procedure, which stipulates that if the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are approved shall then be put to the vote as a whole, the Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution XI B as a whole, as contained in document A/10427. A roll-call vote has been requested.

*A vote was taken by roll call.*

*Iraq, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, Sudan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Uruguay, Zaire, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran.

*Against:* Jamaica, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Poland, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Algeria, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary.

*Abstaining:* Israel, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea,

Peru, Portugal, Singapore, Somalia, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Greece, Iceland, India.

*Draft resolution XI B was adopted by 56 votes to 42, with 34 abstentions (resolution 3458 B (XXX)).*

280. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Italy to explain his vote.

281. Mr. BENUZZI (Italy): The Italian delegation is again speaking on behalf of the nine members of the European Economic Community. We have voted in favour of draft resolutions XI A and XI B on the clear understanding that both provide equally for the free exercise of the right to self-determination of all the people of the Sahara born in the Territory, and, on the other hand, that they both provide for effective measures to ensure that this right can be exercised fully and freely in consultation with all the parties.

282. We also stress the vital importance of the full involvement of the United Nations through the representative of the Secretary-General. It goes without saying that the principles we have outlined above apply with equal force to the present administration.

*The meeting rose at 8.05 p.m.*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Resolutions 3411 A (XXX) to 3411 F (XXX) were adopted at the 2421st meeting, held on 28 November 1975.

<sup>2</sup> *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975*, p. 12.

<sup>3</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1975*, document S/11880, annex III.

<sup>4</sup> Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro.

<sup>5</sup> The delegation of Indonesia subsequently informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour of the operative paragraph.

<sup>6</sup> The delegation of Poland subsequently informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote against the operative paragraph.