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President: Mr. Gaston THORN
(Luxembourg).

AGENDA ITEM 53

**Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa
(continued):***

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*;
(b) Report of the Secretary-General

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We will continue this morning the consideration of the report of the Special Political Committee on agenda item 53 [A/10342].

2. Members of the General Assembly will recall that at its 2421st meeting on 28 November the Assembly decided to postpone the vote on draft resolution F, recommended by the Committee. Benin and other countries submitted amendments [A/L.784] to that draft resolution. The General Assembly began its consideration of the draft resolution and the amendments thereto at its 2430th meeting, held on 8 December. Subamendments were submitted by Zaire, [A/L.786] at the same meeting. The Assembly then decided to adjourn its debate on the question and, as announced, to resume it today.

3. That, briefly, is the situation and I shall now call on those speakers who wish to speak on the amendments which have been submitted.

4. Mr. LAI (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation has carefully studied the amendments put forward by Zaire to the amendments contained in document A/L.784. In our view, the Zaire amendments are entirely just as they are based on the actual situation prevailing in Angola and are in conformity with the consistent position of the Organization of African Unity [OAU] as well as the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The Chinese delegation firmly supports the Zaire subamendments.

5. As is known to all, the grave situation of civil war obtaining in Angola is entirely the result of the rivalry between the two super-Powers, particularly the undisguised intervention and provocation by the Soviet Union. Serving its needs of seeking world hegemony

in its intense rivalry with the other super-Power over Angola, a place of great strategic importance and abundant natural resources, Soviet social-imperialism has deliberately created division among the three Angolan liberation organizations, one-sidedly supported one organization and attacked the other two and thus single-handedly provoked the civil war in Angola. The other super-Power has not lagged behind and is getting actively involved; it has even incited the South African authorities to direct intervention in Angola.

6. This is the real cause of the present division among the three Angolan liberation organizations and the increasing aggravation of the civil war. Evidently, condemnation and elimination of all foreign intervention in Angola, including South African intervention, are the necessary conditions for promoting the restoration of unity and co-operation among the three Angolan liberation organizations.

7. The Chinese Government and people strongly condemn Soviet social-imperialism for its naked and crude aggression and intervention in Angola and condemn the two super-Powers' rivalry in this region and the South African authorities' intervention in Angola. We firmly support the OAU's solemn position for an immediate end to all foreign intervention so that the Angolan people may solve their own problems by themselves.

8. Basing itself on this position, the Chinese delegation will vote in favour of the Zaire amendments. At the same time, we wish to call upon all countries that uphold justice and oppose foreign intervention and aggression to give active support to these amendments.

9. Mr. ALARCÓN (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation wholeheartedly endorses the amendments submitted by several African countries in document A/L.784 because we believe that they have a direct bearing on a major aspect of the true situation in Angola today.

10. In this statement we should like to explain why our delegation takes this stand and at the same time—since reference has been made to it during the debate—to make absolutely clear what the attitude of our Government and our people is towards the struggle of the Angolan people for their national independence.

11. I shall begin by stating clearly that Cuba has always helped all national liberation movements in Africa, among them the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola [MPLA], which is the only legitimate representative of that people, the sole movement which for many years fought heroically against Portuguese colonialism, the only one which represents the national interests of the Angolan people and has raised the standard of national independence in the face of foreign intervention.

* Resumed from the 2430th meeting.

12. This position of political, moral, diplomatic and material support adopted by Cuba for the national liberation movements of Africa, including MPLA, has been entirely in keeping with the decisions taken by the non-aligned countries, the resolutions adopted by the member States of the OAU and the repeated resolutions that year after year have been adopted by the General Assembly which has always recognized the right of national liberation movements to receive assistance in their just struggle and the duty of Member States to provide such assistance. If other States have limited their support of those resolutions to rhetoric and formal expressions when it came to voting, this was not the case with my own country. And we are very proud of that. If our co-operation with MPLA has had the effect of provoking the anger of the imperialists, our satisfaction is all the greater and so is our pride.

13. As a result of this long struggle of the Angolan people for their liberation and independence from Portuguese colonialism there emerged the Government of the People's Republic of Angola led by comrade Agostinho Neto. For Cuba and for many States Members of the Organization, this is the only legitimate Government of Angola. We believe that to help this Government led by Agostinho Neto—which we and many others consider to be the only legitimate Government of Angola—to combat by all possible means the foreign aggression of which it is at present a victim constitutes an obligation which Cuba has discharged, continues to discharge and will always discharge.

14. The intervention of South African racists against the Angolan people and the intervention of other racists and imperialist forces in Angola is nothing new, and it did not begin only after the proclamation of independence of that country, and I am going to make some reference to this.

15. About three years ago—of course, before the withdrawal of the Portuguese from Angola, even before fascism was overthrown in Portugal—in a widely read article in the international press, the current President of the People's Republic of Angola and President of MPLA, Agostinho Neto, made the following statement:

“The Portuguese are thus enjoying the co-operation of technicians from other countries. We do not know precisely which countries these are, but at least in Cabinda there are United States officers, and we know that recently South Africa has been providing officers and soldiers who are fighting in the south-eastern part of the country against our forces. For the South African racists, the development of the war in Angola and its influence in south-west Africa is a primary concern. On several occasions they have declared that their frontiers should be defended in Angola and Mozambique because they fear that these countries may serve as bases for patriots from South Africa, Rhodesia and south-west Africa. With the Portuguese they have been carrying out bombing and strafing attacks with helicopters. Recently, they have been building a base in Angolan territory near the frontier with south-west Africa, which will be operated by Portuguese and South African troops.”

16. As is obvious, the references in the article from which I have just quoted were subsequently fully

verified and are today recognized by the racist authorities of South Africa and by the authorities of the new Government of Portugal.

17. Just a few days ago, in an attempt to confuse the Assembly, the representative of the United States alleged that proof with regard to the South African intervention against Angola had not been submitted in plenary meeting. On that occasion we referred the Assembly to some newspaper and magazine articles—since the press was the only source on which Mr. Moynihan could draw—which seemed to contradict his point of view.

18. I shall now mention a specific reference which was given to the Assembly on 21 November last by Mr. José Manuel Galvão Teles, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations and we will find in the statement of the representative of Portugal confirmation by the present Portuguese authorities of what was being denounced some years ago by MPLA. I shall read the relevant portion of that statement. He said:

“Meantime the Portuguese Government learned that incidents had taken place at the Ruacana Dam and the village of Calueque in the south of the Territory, near the frontier with Namibia, in which South African troops had entered Angola on the pretext of defending the Dam workmen. Further, my Government received reliable indications that infiltrations of mercenaries and other unidentifiable forces had taken place from the Territory of Namibia.

“In the face of such events my Government immediately protested to the Pretoria Government, expressing the most serious concern at the gravity of these facts, the effect they could have on the process of decolonization in Angola and the serious risks they entailed as regards peace and security of the Angolan region and in southern Africa in general. At the same time as it was trying to bring the situation under control locally, Portugal informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Executive Secretary of the OAU to the United Nations of its concern.

“More recently, and because of new incidents which were due either to the alleged pursuit on Angolan territory of elements of the South West Africa People's Organization [SWAPO] by South African troops or to the infiltrations of mercenaries into Angola, the Portuguese Government, unable specifically to verify those allegations since it no longer has authorities or troops in the region, nevertheless condemned that type of action in the most energetic terms in its statement at the 2154th meeting of the Fourth Committee during the debate on the question of Namibia.” [2414th meeting, paras. 70-72.]*

19. In other words, the authorities in control of the Angolan territory at the time when the South African intervention was beginning, with all the authority and the relevant information required for the purpose, and in the presence of the representatives of the States Members of the Organization, confirmed at the same plenary meeting during November last, that regular South African troops had occupied part of the territory

* Quoted in French by the speaker.

of Angola and had established military installations there, and that they were engaging in aggressive activities against the Angolan people and against the freedom fighters of Namibia.

20. There are many other reports concerning South African intervention in the affairs of Angola and the co-operation South Africa is receiving in this regard from the Government of the United States and from other imperialist Powers. On 27 November last, the Associated Press—which, as we all know, is not a news agency of any socialist country—published the following dispatch from Pretoria:

“Authoritative governmental sources conceded today that South Africa has troops in Angola and is providing advisers and logistical support to the forces fighting in the former Portuguese colony. The sources said that South African troops were stationed in the Angolan locality of Calueque,”—please note that this is the same locality to which Comrade Agostinho Neto referred three years ago—“about 30 kilometres from the frontier, and that they are ready to penetrate more than 300 kilometres into the interior of the country as part of their strategy of ‘hot pursuit’. The informants added that about 150 South African soldiers were at Calueque with armoured vehicles but they gave no details concerning the number of advisers and other soldiers in that territory.”

21. The source—and I remind you that the Associated Press always refers to authoritative government sources—indicated that “Major Powers of the free world are also fighting in Angola, although they do not admit it.” The Associated Press correspondent then added: “Although he did not go into detail, the phrase is considered to be a reference to France, Great Britain, the United States and perhaps Belgium”.

22. This list of names is not mine; it comes, I repeat, from an Associated Press correspondent in Pretoria. But this is an Associated Press report, and perhaps for that very reason it was somewhat discreet in its revelations concerning South African intervention in Angola. A few days later, a correspondent of another press agency, also not a Communist agency—I refer here to Mr. Ednon Marco of the Agence France-Presse—went to Calueque, the village mentioned both in the statement of MPLA and in the statement today by the Portuguese delegation, as well as by the South African sources cited by the Associated Press, as being the center of activities of the regular South African troops in the south-east part of Angola.

23. Let us see what Mr. Marco observed in Calueque on 5 December last. I shall read out the report from Agence France-Presse:

“The South African army has built, on the frontier between Namibia and Angola, the first elements of a strong line of defence to counter a possible counter-offensive by MPLA. A group of journalists were able to visit today these fortifications near the hydro-electric complex in the Ruacana and Calueque region, in Angola. The visit, which took them as far into Angola as the town of Chitado, controlled by the Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola [FNLA] and occupied by Portuguese refugees, enabled them to verify the fact that the South African military forces are operating in close co-operation

with the FNLA and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola [UNITA]. Calueque itself, within Angolan territory and 30 kilometres from the Ruacana falls, has been occupied since 9 August last by a South African company supported by light tanks and other specialized vehicles, by means of which the soldiers patrol the Angolan territory around the Cunene Dam. The special correspondents were able to observe that the South African military installations are essentially static, with bunkers and dugout positions and heavy automatic weapons. A system of trenches, strongpoints and lookout stations extending into Angolan territory completes the system, while machine-gun emplacements cover the concrete wall of the dam.”

24. This correspondent from a French press agency who, together with other foreign journalists made a tour of a substantial portion of the territory of Angola and was able to verify that troops and officers from South Africa exercise authority and are in control in those areas and even direct the so-called members of FNLA and UNITA, goes on with his description. Here, for instance, is a paragraph from that same report:

“The South African army is in continuing contact with the FNLA forces, whose headquarters are located in Sa Bandeira, through the intermediary of ex-commando officers and Portuguese paratroopers, natives of Angola for the most part, fully equipped and supplied by South Africa. Other defence installations similar to those visited by the journalists already exist or are being built in other areas along the frontier that runs from the Atlantic coast to the eastern part of Caprivi, near Zambia. It is a front 1,000 kilometres long, the most active part of which lies between 18° and 24° of longitude, where approximately 10 South African officers and soldiers recently were killed in an operation against some isolated MPLA guerrillas. The South African Air Force also lost a reconnaissance plane this week, the three occupants of which are considered as having been killed.”

25. One could go on for ever citing proofs and giving evidence with regard to the direct intervention of armed troops from South Africa in Angola. To say the least, it is surprising that in the face of such facts, in the face of the evidence that South Africa and other imperialist Powers have been intervening actively and militarily against the Angolan people, what is happening today in Angola should still be described as a civil war. In Angola there is no civil war. In fact what we are dealing with here is a struggle of the people against imperialist aggression. It is a continuation of the struggle for national independence which for almost two decades was waged by men who today are members of MPLA and who because of this imperialist intervention, have been obliged to continue, in new and more complicated conditions, the struggle for the national independence of their country.

26. The delegation of the United States seems to want to adopt the argument that colonialism in Africa was exclusively of European origin and had practically been eliminated, as if the Members of the Organization were unaware that for so many years Portuguese colonialism and South African and Rhodesian racism could only have survived for so many years and can still only survive today in the case of South Africa and the

racist minority in Rhodesia because of the military, economic, financial, political and diplomatic support which those régimes received and continue to receive from the major imperialist Powers, primarily the United States.

27. This collaboration of yesterday with Portuguese colonialism and of today with South Africa and Rhodesia is certainly not an act of generosity on the part of the imperialists. It is well known that the major beneficiaries of Portuguese colonialism were not the Portuguese themselves but rather the major western consortia which exploited the labour of the African masses who were enslaved or semi-enslaved by colonialism. It was the great consortia which extracted boundless profits from the Portuguese African colonies and which controlled and wish to continue to control their rich iron and copper mines, their oil fields and their agricultural plantations.

28. To accuse the Soviet Union or Cuba of pursuing an imperialist policy in Africa, or anywhere else, is the height of cynicism, wherever the accusation is made. To substantiate such an accusation it would be necessary to cite the name of at least one mine, the name and whereabouts of at least one factory, the location of at least one banking institution or agricultural plantation in Angola or Mozambique or Guinea or anywhere else in Africa, which is in the hands of Soviet or Cuban interests. It is the imperialists, headed by the United States, which want to hold on to their exploitation of the former African colonies; it is they who yesterday supported the old Portuguese colonialism and want today to convert the national independence of African States into a pretence behind which they will continue to exploit the riches of that continent.

29. However, since reference was made to *The New York Times* last Monday and since I also subscribe to that newspaper and also read the information it gives us almost daily on Angola, I would have a great deal to say here about the intervention not only of South Africa but of the United States in that country. However, I shall not tax the patience of the Assembly by doing so, but, if I may, I simply wish to recommend to anyone who wishes to do so, in particular the professor who leads the United States delegation, that they get hold of that very handy volume issued periodically by that newspaper which contains an index of its publications. I shall just read out a sentence from that index relating to the second half of September, that is, two months before the independence of Angola. Anyone who wishes to do so will find there a very useful reference which will take him back to the front page of the *The New York Times* where he will see new data of interest with regard to the imperialist intervention in Angola. The index for the second half of September this year tells us that on 25 September, in the first column of the front page of the newspaper, there appeared the following report:

“William A. Colby, the director of the [CIA] had notified members of six Congressional subcommittees several months ago”—before the independence of Angola—“of the covert operations in Angola and . . . no serious objections had been raised.”*

According to the index, the information includes a map and some illustrations on Angola.

30. Several months before the independence of Angola, the Director of the CIA had already reported to six congressional subcommittees of the United States on the covert activities of the Agency in Angola. In accordance with North American newspaper practice, I suppose that in 10 years' time *The New York Times* will bring abundant information complete with details, photographs and many anecdotes, regarding the intervention at present being carried out by the CIA against the people of Angola. But the international community should not be so patient as to allow the imperialists all the time they need to act against the Angolan people.

31. I would like to give you another quotation about South African intervention in Angola, since South Africa is using as an operational basis for its attack against that independent African State the international Territory of Namibia, and it should therefore be a matter for additional concern by the Assembly that not only is there intervention and aggression against the Angolan people, but that for this purpose South Africa is daily violating the international status of the Territory of Namibia, and continually disregarding the authority of the United Nations over the Territory of Namibia. That is why, the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, Mr. Sean MacBride, quite rightly stated on 2 December last in Lusaka:

“Intervention by South African troops in Angola and the use by the régime of the Republic of South Africa of the Territory of Namibia which it illegally occupies as a place for storing weapons for aggression creates a dangerous situation for that zone of Africa.”

32. It seems to us that nobody who has the slightest interest in maintaining a clear-cut anti-colonialist attitude or position of forthright support for the African liberation movements can have the slightest hesitation at this time about the course to be followed in the General Assembly. If the Assembly is unable to condemn South African intervention, if it is not prepared to name those who are heading imperialist aggression against the people of Angola, if cannot at this time discharge its most elementary duty, which is to express its solidarity with and support for the people of Angola, which today has to face that imperialist and racist aggression in order to crown its achievement of independence, for which it has fought so hard, then the Assembly will be failing in its most elementary obligations, its most elementary duty under the Charter and in line with the scores of anti-colonialist and anti-racist resolutions we have adopted.

33. My delegation trusts that the anti-colonialist majority present in the Organization will take the only consistent course, which is to support the amendments submitted by several African countries in document A/L.784 and reject any other manoeuvre, any attempt to conceal the origin of the aggression against the Angolan people or to disguise the real nature of the foreign intervention against Angola merely to give intellectual satisfaction to a pseudo-professor who is a tardy defender of colonialism in Africa.

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

34. At this time, many voices have been raised in various parts of the earth, urging us to adopt this course of action. I shall now read only two statements which come from two States with an anti-colonialist position.

35. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of the United States on a point of order.

36. Mr. MITCHELL (United States of America): The representative of Cuba, in delivering his statement, has referred to an eminent, learned and highly respected member of our delegation as a pseudo-professor. I feel that particular remark is an iniquitous personal reference unworthy of the language of this body, and I ask that it be stricken from the record. I hope the representative of Cuba will have the good grace to apologize.

37. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call again on the representative of Cuba who I believe, wishes to conclude his statement.

38. Mr. ALARCÓN (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): That is indeed my intention and I am approaching the end of my statement.

39. I was saying that two States with an undeniable anti-colonialist stance from two different regions of the earth have very clearly stated the attitude we should take and described the real situation that has just now arisen in Angola. On the one hand, I should like to report to the Assembly what was said in New York on 2 December last by an illustrious Caribbean statesman, the man who rightly enjoys the profound respect of the peoples of our region because of his deep-seated anti-colonialist stance and because of his outstanding and brilliant performance in the political life of the Caribbean in promoting genuine independence for the peoples of the region. I am referring to the Prime Minister of Jamaica, Mr. Michael Manley, who, according to a Reuters report published in a Kingston newspaper said "that if it were not for an intervention it seems that the MPLA would be perfectly capable of providing a stable Government for the territory." He is referring, of course, to Angola. The report went on to say:

"Mr. Manley said his Government noted with particular bitterness and resentment that the South Africans had interfered in Angola, and said he was dismayed that any black African would accept South African military aid."*

40. There was also a very recent statement by the Federal Government of Nigeria, when that African State recognized the People's Republic of Angola, in which the following was stated:

"There is now abundant evidence of the direct involvement of racist South African troops in the conflict. The factions fighting against the MPLA are backed not only by South Africa but by other interests which are clearly against Angolan independence and freedom in Africa."*

41. Let no one be deceived. There is no civil war in Angola. There is no internal conflict. What we are witnessing in Angola is the continuation of the long struggle for independence which MPLA has heroically and unswervingly been waging for many years. Today

we are witnessing a dilemma: will that process of emancipation end in victory by ensuring the independence of the People's Republic of Angola, or will the imperialist and racist forces—which but yesterday intervened in Angola through the Portuguese, supporting the Portuguese colonial administration, equipping it militarily, supporting it financially, defending it politically and diplomatically within and outside the United Nations—succeed in keeping the Angolan people in slavery.

42. Yet the dilemma goes beyond Angola because what is being decided in Angola today is the fate of Africa. Angola will decide whether colonialism will really be buried in that continent or whether colonialism will be able to continue to strive to impose its domination, compel the African peoples to accept its tutelage and go on exploiting their natural resources. Accordingly we believe that anyone who, in the future, intends to speak as an anti-colonialist has to prove it today by indicating total repudiation of imperialist intervention against the Angolan people and by clearly expressing here today his solidarity with that fighting people.

43. As far as Cuba is concerned, as I said at the beginning of my statement, our position is consistent with steadfast principles and is fully in accord with the criteria defined for many years by the majority of the members of the international community: complete, firm and total support for MPLA. We shall continue to maintain that position here today when we vote and in the future here, there and everywhere, wherever circumstances require it.

44. Mr. PAQUI (Benin) (*interpretation from French*): This brief statement by the People's Republic of Benin on behalf of the sponsors of the amendments contained in document A/L.784, is being made essentially to provide some clarification to you, Mr. President, and through you, to the General Assembly, after having requested and obtained an adjournment of the voting on draft resolution F. In so doing, the sponsors of the amendments had in mind further developments in the abject policy of *apartheid*, applied by the Vorster gang in South Africa. The leaders of the South African *apartheid* régime no longer merely flout the resolutions of the General Assembly both as regards their internal policy and their presence in Namibia. Like an octopus they intend to spread their tentacles over the entire African continent if the international community fails to react to the renewed South African provocations.

45. It is in this context that we must view armed South African intervention in the internal affairs of the newly independent State of Angola. In calling for a postponement of the consideration of this question, the sponsors of the amendments thought that, with the sister republic which submitted some amendments to ours, a formula could be found to reconcile our points of view by confining our amendments to their specific context namely that the direct intervention of South African armed forces in Angola is but the prolongation of a policy which the entire international community has always disapproved and condemned and at the same time trying to find a proper context for the amendments amended by our sister republic. After lengthy discussions, we are forced to confess that we have not succeeded in convincing each other. We have agreed that the proper place for our amendments as submitted

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

is in the draft resolution on policies of *apartheid* but it was not possible to introduce these amendments as amended under item 53 of the agenda because any reference to Angola is to an independent and sovereign country and no longer to a Territory under colonial administration.

46. The sponsors of the amendments wish it to be clearly understood that if it was not possible to accept the other amendments, that was not because the overwhelming majority of the Group of African States does not condemn all imperialist actions designed to undermine the new independent State of Angola, but simply because those amendments were out of place in the context of the policy of *apartheid* of South Africa. In another place and on another occasion there would be no difficulty in achieving unanimity in the Group of African States.

47. We wish to make this clear, particularly to the impenitent imperialists whose representative, under the pretext of hegemonism or in an attempt at witticism, does not hesitate to use trivial language unworthy of the country he represents and of the Assembly and to engage in public demonstrations, the grotesque and indecent character of which does not require further proof.

48. We regret that the amendments to our amendments have led to an untimely debate on Angola and have enabled the representative of the United States, whose country cannot claim to have clean hands in the matter, to pose as the defender of the independence of Africa. The Group of African States categorically denies that right to the representative of the United States. The insatiable imperialists, as the inveterate liars they are, think that they can deceive world public opinion by concealing their true aims. We denounce the bad faith of international imperialism which makes use of certain bridgeheads to protect its dishonest interests acquired at the expense of the brave African people.

49. The condemnation sought in our amendments is in the same context as our condemnation of South Africa when it arrogated to itself the right to intervene in Rhodesia and even in Zambia in pursuit of the representatives of the South West Africa People's Organization [SWAPO]. The General Assembly vote on the amendments will no doubt show to the Group of African States who are our friends and who are our enemies. The sponsors of the amendments contained in document A/L.784 formally request a roll-call vote both on the amendments and on draft resolution F. We believe that international imperialism will not this time hasten to crow over their victory. If necessary we repeat to them that even if we have not been able to arrive at a satisfactory formulation, the Group of African States, none the less, condemns all imperialist interventions in Angola, especially that of South Africa and of all those who support that régime from near or far, as was specified in the press communiqué of 8 November 1975 published by the Executive Secretary of the OAU.

50. Mr. RASOLONDRABE (Madagascar) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, you will recall that at the 2430th meeting I had started to read a press release on the intervention of South Africa in Angola, when you reminded me of the rules of procedure and requested me to speak at a later stage. It will also be

recalled that it was at the request of Mr. Moynihan that I started to read that press release. I have therefore felt compelled to ask to speak again.

51. Given the development of the debate in the General Assembly, I should like to confirm the statement I made on Monday morning, at the 2430th meeting, to the effect that our position is that the amendments of Zaire are out of context and not receivable in their present form. In this respect I should like to associate myself with the additional explanation just given by the representative of Benin.

52. When we drafted our amendments what we had in mind was to condemn the intervention by South Africa in Angola as a manifestation of the escalation of violence of which the South African régime is capable. We know that the South African régime stops at nothing, at no violence, in order to dominate the Coloured and black populations of South Africa and to strengthen its régime of *apartheid*. We also know that that régime, also by force, not only remains in Namibia but exports to that international Territory its own abominable policy of *apartheid*. Recently we have received information according to which not only has police violence increased in that country, but also South Africa is strengthening its military presence in Namibia. We duly condemned South African intervention in Rhodesia. We knew the purpose of sending military personnel to that country was to strengthen the alliance of the white minority régime in southern Africa. All this in itself was already excessively serious, we said, but it was still within the context of a State which was not independent or in the process of being decolonized.

53. We must emphasize that by its intervention in Angola the South African régime is for once attacking an independent territory, and that for us is of extreme seriousness because, if Angola is the victim today, other independent African States, immediate neighbours of South Africa or a little further away, may be candidates for the exercise by South Africa of its military violence.

54. It is therefore because of this gradually increasing violence, this qualitatively increasing violence of the South African régime, that we have presented our amendments. This alone is what we are concerned with. If we referred to the situation in Angola, that was by accident. It could have been any other country at this time, it could have been another country, not Angola. And had it been another country we would have condemned South African violence in the same manner, whether or not there were other Powers involved in that country. That is why we energetically object to the amendments of the delegation of Zaire, which distort our proposal, to the extent that their concern for the situation in Angola prevails over the primary concern of the sponsors of the amendments.

55. Mr. Moynihan said that we still have to give proof of intervention by South Africa in Angola, and like him, I feel compelled to read extracts from press releases. I do not know whether Mr. Moynihan was speaking seriously when he asked us to bring proof of South African intervention in Angola. But this proved one thing at any rate: either he was ill informed and remains ill informed, or else he wished gratuitously to insult the intelligence of the members of the Assembly. But since he has engaged us in this under-

taking, I now feel bound to read certain passages from the press.

56. The first and most serious, of course, is that from issue No. 777 of the weekly review *Jeune Afrique*. It is a statement by Mr. Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, and it reads:

“One fact must be recognized: there are South African troops in Angola. They are based in the south of the country in accordance with the agreement signed with Portugal on the pretext of protecting the Cunene Dam.”

57. No one knows better than Mr. Savimbi the situation prevailing in southern Angola, and we believe that the statement, on page 32 of issue No. 777 of *Jeune Afrique*, is convincing proof for Mr. Moynihan and the United States delegation of the reality of military intervention by South Africa in Angola.

58. The second extract from the press which I intend to read to you is Reuters communiqué No. 1754, transmitted from Pretoria on 1 December. It reads as follows:

“The Defence Headquarters announces that a South African reconnaissance aircraft disappeared in the course of a mission over Angola. South Africa thereby acknowledges for the first time that its air force is involved in reconnaissance flights over the territory of Angola. The communiqué specifies that the three who were in the plane, a captain and two sub-lieutenants, are presumed dead. As regards the place where the plane disappeared, Defence Headquarters limited itself to saying that it was military zone No. 1, a rather vague denomination which generally means the border region between Namibia and Angola. This brings to 14 the number of South African military personnel killed in that area in a month.”

59. This is an official and direct acknowledgement on the part of the South African authorities themselves. I do not believe that after having heard this statement the American delegation—and in particular Mr. Moynihan—can still have any doubts about the reality of South African intervention in Angola.

60. I have many other press releases before me which refer to South African intervention. To save time I shall only read a few paragraphs. From Agence France-Presse communiqué No. 157 of 1 December, I read the following:

“Regular troops from South Africa are operating in the former Portuguese territory and on Monday the South African Minister for Defence, Mr. Botha, visited the region occupied by the South African invaders accompanied by a group of senior officers.”

61. I did not wish to go beyond the limits of the item we are dealing with, namely, agenda item 53, concerning the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa, but since the American delegation has led us on further, I will simply add that the same communiqué from Agence France-Presse also mentions the following:

“The Pentagon is increasing its aid to the enemies of Angola. A group of military advisers has just joined the pseudo-army of dissidents.”

62. Had we from the beginning wished to go beyond the purpose of our amendment and take account of the entire situation in Angola, we could also have mentioned American intervention in that region. But this was not our purpose, and the American delegation should recognize that it was not at all our intention to embarrass them. Our intention was, above all, not to discuss the problem of Angola. I shall therefore stop at this stage, since I have already spoken at some length, so as to yield to the representative of Senegal who, as one of the sponsors of our amendments, will bring you additional explanations on behalf of our group.

63. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Equatorial Guinea on a point of order.

64. Mr. ECUA MIKO (Equatorial Guinea) (*interpretation from Spanish*): First, I wish to apologize, Mr. President, for having interrupted you when you were about to call on another speaker.

65. My point of order concerns the fact that the accounts we have been given, the press releases that have been read and the arguments that have been made from the very first day that we began to consider the report of the Special Political Committee seem to my delegation to be out of order since they have nothing to do with agenda item 53. If we agree that all the statements we are hearing, and which we may have to go on listening to all day, or even longer, have no bearing on agenda item 53, then, Mr. President, I formally request closure of the debate which will otherwise be endless, because—I repeat—the situation in Angola does not appear on our agenda.

66. The Special Political Committee has submitted its report in respect of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. The draft resolutions that that Committee recommended to us are those which are before us for consideration. I do not believe that the amendments which the delegation of Benin and others have submitted to one of the draft resolutions which the Special Political Committee has submitted to us should be an excuse for the debate we are having this morning. My delegation believes that the amendments are intended to reflect an additional aspect of the intention of the Government of South Africa to expand its policy of *apartheid*. This is the only point we should consider and consequently I do not believe that delegations can justify their statements by saying that the amendments of Benin or Zaire have provided the motive for the long debate in which we are engaged. Therefore I formally move closure of the debate on this item, that the draft resolution submitted by the Special Political Committee be put to the vote, and that we start with the Benin amendments, which fall within the context of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa.

67. I wish it to be clearly understood that my delegation completely agrees that the situation in Angola should be examined elsewhere or in another context, and that the interventions described before should be condemned. But now we are dealing with the policies of *apartheid* and we all know that they are practised by the South African Government.

68. I do not know if I am causing greater confusion. I simply wish to request that the amendments of Benin

and the draft resolution submitted by the Special Political Committee be put to the vote. I hope I have made myself clear, although I am not quite sure under what rule of the rules of procedure this should come.

69. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I do not want to go now into the details of the statement of the representative of Equatorial Guinea: his appeal that an item should not be made to serve two ends, or the question of press releases being read both in and outside meetings. But what is essential is that, on the basis of rule 75, he is asking that the debate be closed and that we proceed to the vote on the amendments that have been submitted. We have therefore a motion for closure of the debate. May I remind the Assembly that under rule 75, two speakers opposing the closure may speak.

70. I must now see if other points of order, raised by Guinea, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau are really points of order and if they should have priority. I call first on the representative of Guinea.

71. Mrs. Cissé (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): I should simply also like to request that we conclude the debate on this matter. The amendments which we presented were meant to fall solely within the framework of the policy of *apartheid* of South Africa. Now we are completely transcending the framework of the idea which led us to submit our amendments. That is why we call for the closure of the debate on this item and we ask that a vote be taken.

72. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): As I have just said, there is already a motion to close the debate, and according to our rules no one else may speak in order to support the motion for closure, but two speakers may speak against. Is there any other speaker on a different point of order? I call on the representative of the Ivory Coast.

73. Mr. Aké (Ivory Coast) (*interpretation from French*): I have asked to speak in order to oppose the motion to close the debate put forward by the delegation of Equatorial Guinea. This debate, which has been going on for more than an hour, has permitted some delegations to express their views; others on the list want to do so too, including my own delegation.

74. I think it would be unfair to say that it is the amendments of Zaire that are the basis of this debate. We have to go back to the source because, if they want to talk about *apartheid*, let the sponsors of the draft amendments in document A/L.784 keep to the draft resolution recommended by the Special Political Committee, and there will be no further discussion. But if they insist on their amendments, Zaire is entitled, like any other delegation, to present subamendments to their text.

75. It will be remembered, that at the 2430th meeting I asked for the debate to be adjourned so that we Africans could put our heads together and reach agreement. We tried to do this, but we were not successful and we had to come back to the Assembly. Consequently the debate is going on.

76. In the interest of freedom of expression, I think it would be fair to permit those who want to speak to do so. That is why I oppose the motion to close the debate unless the sponsors of the amendments, for their part, agree to withdraw their text, and then I do not see why Zaire would insist on a vote on its text.

If the sponsors withdraw their proposed amendments, all we have to do is vote on the draft resolution on *apartheid* and we shall have finished.

77. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now call on the representative of Senegal on a point of order.

78. Mr. Fall (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I think you should have called on me before the representative of Ivory Coast. Since he explained why he is against the closure of the debate, I also want to explain why I oppose such closure, but for the time being I am raising a point of order.

79. Just now you summarized the proposal made by the representative of Equatorial Guinea and said that he was asking for the closure of the debate and for a vote on the draft resolution of the Special Political Committee and the two series of amendments. However, if I understood him correctly, the representative of Equatorial Guinea was only asking for a vote on the draft resolution of the Special Political Committee and on the amendments submitted by the six sponsors, not on the amendments submitted by Zaire. If that is the case, I think an interpretation of the rule should be given, because in my opinion all amendments can be further amended. Therefore the representative of Equatorial Guinea cannot ask for a vote exclusively on the amendments and not on the subamendments.

80. I think my point is particularly valid because my delegation is one of the six sponsors of the amendments. I shall ask to speak again, to oppose the closure of the debate.

81. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I understand the representative of Senegal's point. It was precisely because I could not imagine something that was impossible and contrary to our rules and because the representative of Equatorial Guinea said that he did not know on which rule to base his remarks, that I immediately asked him whether in fact it was rule 75 that he was invoking, and if he was referring to a closure of the debate which would encompass votes on the amendments, the amendments to the amendments and the draft resolution, since the Assembly had decided to take into account those various amendments.

82. I call on the representative of Guinea-Bissau on a point of order.

83. Mr. Fernandes (Guinea-Bissau): Mr. President, I am rather confused about your ruling. I thought Equatorial Guinea had asked for priority for these Benin amendments, but that those submitted by Zaire fell outside our discussion. We are talking here about agenda item 53, and to my knowledge that is what he was trying to convey to you, Sir. However, if we are going to follow procedure and vote first on the Zaire amendments, I should like to make an announcement, and to make it quite clearly. When we tried to amend the draft resolution we had very good intentions, but it has been amended and subamended to the point that my delegation, my Government, my country, along with Benin, Congo, Guinea, Madagascar and Mali, will refuse to appear as sponsors of the amendments if the Assembly adopts the amendments to the amendments.

84. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): I have some serious doubts. If we begin discussions on procedure we shall be wasting more time than we would if we allowed the remaining speakers to speak. I have a list of speakers, and there are three delegations on it. I think the best thing would be to allow them to speak, and then to vote.

85. I would request the representative of Equatorial Guinea not to press his motion and to enable the remaining three speakers on the list to speak.

86. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I will call on anyone who wants to speak on a point of order, but, regardless of what the representative of the Soviet Union has just said, I ask representatives not to create more confusion and disorder by raising points of order. Permit me to make my point.

87. We have on our agenda a draft resolution with which everyone is familiar. At the 2430th meeting, on 8 December, amendments were submitted to the Assembly which we were ready to discuss. Then amendments were introduced to those amendments. In accordance with the rules, I consulted the Assembly which agreed to take into consideration and discuss the two series of amendments since delegations may introduce them on any item.

88. The only point at issue was whether we would start the discussion on that day or not. Following a motion for adjournment, the Assembly decided to defer until today discussion of the draft resolution with its two series of amendments, in accordance with the procedure which many of you know longer than I, whereby we vote first on the amendments to the amendments, then on the amendments themselves and then on the draft resolution.

89. As we were reminded by the representative of Senegal, if the Assembly wishes to close the debate, it will close the debate on the amendments of Zaire, then on the amendments of the six countries and finally on the draft resolution. We cannot say now that the Assembly will vote on the draft resolution when, according to the procedure—which I did not invent—we must first decide on the amendments of Zaire, which the Assembly has decided to consider, and then on the amendments of the six countries.

90. I feel, therefore, that the only point at issue now is whether we close the debate or continue it until the list of speakers is exhausted. There are four names on the list of speakers. So if we found ourselves with another 10 procedural motions we should be wasting more time than if we were to listen to those three speakers.

91. I am quite ready to call on the representative of Equatorial Guinea to speak again if he considers that I have not given an adequate account of his position.

92. Mr. ECUA MIKO (Equatorial Guinea) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I apologize for asking to speak again, but I feel it is necessary because of the confused situation that has been created. I asked for the closure of the debate and for the Assembly to proceed to the vote, so that priority would be given to the amendments of the delegation of Benin and other delegations, and we could then vote on the draft resolution since, as my delegation sees it, the amendments proposed by

Zaire do not fall within the context of item 53 of the agenda.

93. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): There is no confusion if everybody will look at the rules. The Assembly knows full well, as the representative of Senegal has recalled, that it has a draft resolution on its agenda; amendments to it were submitted, and then further amendments. The Assembly, in exercise of its sovereignty, has decided to discuss the two series of amendments. That is its decision and there is nothing further to discuss on that point. The debate can be closed, and if the motion for closure is adopted the Assembly will then vote on the amendments of Zaire, and then on the amendments and lastly on the draft resolution. If the Assembly rejects the motion for closure I shall call on the four speakers on my list and then we will proceed in the order I have just indicated. I see no other choice.

94. Two representatives have spoken against closure; we have thus exhausted the possibilities under rule 75 of the rules of procedure, and I would ask all of you to leave the matter there and to be ready to vote on the motion for closure.

95. I call upon the representative of Mauritius on a point of clarification.

96. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): Mr. President, I want to be sure that, whether the Assembly decides to close the debate or not, the delegations will be given the opportunity to explain their votes before the vote.

97. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall certainly not deprive anyone of that opportunity, even though I am aware of the dangers it represents. I shall certainly comply with the rules of procedure.

98. I call on the representative of Nigeria on a point of order.

99. Mr. HARRIMAN (Nigeria): As we understood the proposal of the representative of Equatorial Guinea, it was in two parts: first, that there should be closure of the debate, because the trend of the debate was not relevant to the question of *apartheid*; secondly, regarding the amendments proposed by Zaire, that a vote be formally taken to rule them out of order, as not coming within the context of *apartheid*, which we are discussing here, and to take the amendments proposed by Benin, in three parts. That is how I understood it.

100. The Zaire amendments refer to Angola and South Africa without relation to any of the substance of the draft resolution, and I do not see how they are relevant. I thought the Assembly was going to vote to rule them out of order for discussion by the Assembly.

101. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): It is no longer a question of interpreting anything or speaking on a point of order to explain what another representative has said. I have taken the responsibility on a procedural matter and given my ruling. No further explanations are in order. I would remind you again that the Assembly has decided that the two series of amendments should be considered. The Assembly will now proceed to vote on the motion for closure of the debate.

The motion was rejected by 43 votes to 42, with 43 abstentions.

102. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The motion for closure has been rejected. Therefore we shall continue with the list of speakers, which consists of Senegal, the German Democratic Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Guinea-Bissau, the Ivory Coast and Zaire.

103. Mr. FALL (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation is one of the sponsors of the amendments contained in document A/L.784 and my delegation cannot recall that it authorized the delegation of Benin to speak on its behalf. I want to make it clear, as a sponsor, that I do not associate myself with the statement made by the representative of Benin. That means that the representative of Benin spoke on behalf of his delegation and not on behalf of the sponsors, because one of the sponsors—I do not speak for any others—did not authorize him to speak in its name.

104. My delegation decided to co-sponsor draft amendments condemning the intervention by South Africa in the Angolan affair, because my delegation is convinced that there is indeed intervention by South Africa in the Angolan affair, and it is the consistent policy of my delegation to condemn South Africa whenever it intervenes in the affairs of other African States.

105. My delegation has condemned and continues to condemn the occupation by South Africa of Namibia. My delegation has always condemned the intervention of South Africa in Rhodesia. My delegation condemns most vigorously the intervention of South Africa in Angola. These condemnations do not, however, authorize us to give our blessing to other foreign interference in Angola. We condemn them, possibly not in the same way, but we condemn them equally because we consider that the Angolan people has sufficient maturity to decide its own destiny free from foreign interference.

106. I regret certain polemical and acrimonious asides which have been made in the course of the debate in respect of this affair—

107. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I apologize for interrupting the representative of Senegal but the representative of the Congo wants to speak on a point of order.

108. Mr. N'DESSABEKA (Congo) (*interpretation from French*): I should like, on behalf of the sponsors of these amendments, to recall that the representative of Senegal who is just behind his Ambassador participated in the meeting held in the Indonesian room yesterday when the sponsors authorized Benin and Madagascar to speak on their behalf this morning. If the representative of Senegal says that Benin did not speak on his behalf, I should like to ask the representative sitting behind him what happened yesterday.

109. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the Congo can always ask to speak later in order to reply to the head of the delegation of Senegal. But holding a different opinion is not a point of order.

110. The representative of Senegal may continue.

111. Mr. FALL (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): I should like to remind the representative of the Congo that I am the Permanent Representative

of Senegal to the United Nations. Even if the Congo does not consider that this debate is sufficiently important for it to be represented by its Ambassador, Senegal considers it important enough for its Permanent Representative to take part. Thus I speak on behalf of Senegal—

112. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Could not the representative of the Congo, as is customary in these cases, exercise his right of reply later?

113. Mr. N'DESSABEKA (Congo) (*interpretation from French*): I do not like polemics. I am the deputy Permanent Representative of the Congo to the United Nations and I am speaking on behalf of my Government. I should like the representative of Senegal to know this.

114. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Would the representative of Senegal kindly continue his statement.

115. Mr. FALL (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): I regret such interruptions, which are pointless.

116. I was saying earlier that I regretted the aspersions cast during the last meeting in considering a problem which requires a serious, calm debate since it concerns a question which daily endangers human lives.

117. As I said earlier, my delegation condemns all these interventions in Angola. My delegation condemns them all the more since these interventions do not even have ideological bases because the partisans of all ideologies are involved. My delegation feels that in fact what is at stake is only big-Power rivalries and conflicts of interest, economic as well as strategic. Thus my delegation, while it is one of the sponsors of the amendments which have been submitted concerning the South African intervention in the Angolan affair, also declares that it accepts the amendments submitted by Zaire.

118. It goes without saying that my delegation would have preferred, as stated by our Minister for Foreign Affairs in the course of the general debate, a general and open debate in the Assembly on the Angolan problem. But the Assembly preferred to draw a discreet veil over this important and crucial matter.

119. My Government has decided to set a time-limit in connexion with the problem of Angola. We believe that what is happening in Angola is a repetition of what led to the recent tragedy in Indo-China. This tragedy could go on for 10, 20 or even 30 years more and might have unforeseen tragic consequences for certain neighbouring African States, as did what happened in Viet Nam for the peoples of Laos and Cambodia.

120. My Government would not like it to be said, when our generation is judged by history, that Senegal failed in its duty by joining in the blameworthy conspiracy of silence which seems to prevail at the moment as regards the Angolan problem. This is why I repeat, my delegation, while continuing to support the amendments submitted, of which it is one of the sponsors, also accepts the amendments of Zaire.

121. Mr. NEUGEBAUER (German Democratic Republic): All resolutions adopted by the General

Assembly on the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa during the last few years have made it definitely clear that the *apartheid* policy constitutes a danger to peace and security. This statement induced the Special Political Committee to deal this year in particular with the alarming military armament of the Vorster régime. In this respect—and the Special Committee against *Apartheid* has stressed this again and again as a result of its work—emphatic demands were made which are reflected in the draft resolution which we have before us for voting, demands which call upon those States that support the racist régime with, for instance, arms supplies, to finally stop supporting a régime that threatens peace and security in southern Africa.

122. The Special Political Committee had not yet properly started deliberations on this item at the thirtieth session when the urgency of such demands became obvious. The South African *apartheid* régime is now engaged in open military aggression against Angola, which has just achieved independence.

123. There are no longer any serious news media which would dispute these facts: for instance, *Le Monde* confirmed on 18 November that South African mercenaries marched in the direction of Lobito, getting logistic supplies from South Africa. The British television station ITN confirmed on 13 November that, according to Agence France-Presse [AFP], South African troops fought in Angola and had established a base in Sa De Bandeira, 250 miles north of Namibia. The South African press reported on 9 November, according to AFP, the entry into Angola of 28 armoured tanks coming from Namibia. *The New York Times*, quoted here recently, reported on 3 December on statements by Vorster and the South African Defence Minister on the employment of South African troops in Angola. The Defence Minister of the Vorster régime, Pieter Botha, had the cheek to confirm openly the employment of South African troops in Angola—this was reported by Reuters on 28 November, and published in *The New York Times* of 29 November 1975. After an inspection of the South African deployment base against Angola, Minister Botha and the supreme commander of the so-called Defence Forces of South Africa, H. Biermann, called upon other imperialist States also to launch an open intervention against Angola. And, according to *The New York Times* of 3 December, the employment of South African contingents in Angola was again confirmed by sources in the South African Defence Ministry. The newspaper also pointed out that the radio of the *apartheid* régime had recently broadcast request programmes “for our boys somewhere in the front line”.

124. The reports of the last few days further state that AFP reported, on 5 December from Dalugue (in southern Angola), that South Africa has established a kind of Bar Lev line on Angolan territory; and *The New York Times* reported on 3 December—and this part was not quoted by Mr. Moynihan—that “The American officials said that . . . the South Africans still hold the Atlantic port of Novo Redondo”. According to the map printed with the article, this port is about 400 miles north of Namibia, deep in the territory of Angola.

125. Numerous Governments have condemned, and thus again confirmed, the violation of the territorial integrity of Angola by troops, paramilitary units and units of mercenaries from South Africa. I want to draw the attention of the General Assembly to the fact that the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations confirmed, here at the 2414th meeting of 21 November, as well as in a press release of 24 November, that South African military contingents had crossed the frontier of Angola, which made the Government of Portugal lodge repeated protests with the Vorster régime.

126. Other examples: the Supreme Military Council of Ghana strongly condemned South Africa for intruding with troops and mercenaries in the Angolan situation, and called this an act of naked aggression and an affront and a threat to all independent African States. The Foreign Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mr. Kaduma, on 4 December accused South Africa “of escalating the civil war in Angola”. The Government of Tanzania on 5 December confirmed the condemnation of South Africa’s armed intervention. On 11 November, Algeria condemned the intervention in Angola of troops and mercenaries of the *apartheid* régime. The Sub-Committee on Defence of the OAU Liberation Committee called the “South African intervention in Angola naked aggression”. I should like to add the statement issued by the Group of African States to the United Nations, in which it underlined, on 7 November that the Group of African States strongly condemns the racist régimes of South Africa and Rhodesia for this aggression against the people of Angola.

127. These are the facts. And also the goal of the military intervention of South Africa in Angola is no secret. The régime of *apartheid* does not even shrink from the use of military force to prevent the development of an independent African State whose people can determine their destiny free from any colonial tutelage. The *apartheid* régime and its supporters should indeed have learned that peoples are no longer willing to accept the establishment of a neo-colonialist régime. The imperialist aggressors can no longer enforce their plans for oppression and exploitation without being punished. Indo-China and the Middle East show that the balance of forces has clearly changed. The open, armed intervention of the *apartheid* régime of South Africa clearly demonstrates the anachronism of this régime.

128. The Special Committee against *Apartheid* stated last week with regard to this subject that:

“The Special Committee views this act of naked aggression as an attempt at further expanding and consolidating its racist policies and posing a serious threat to the security of southern Africa as a whole. It calls on all Governments and organizations to denounce the aggression by the South African racist régime in Angola, and to take all appropriate steps to secure the immediate withdrawal of all South African military personnel, including mercenaries, from Angola.

“The Special Committee declares that those countries which have resisted firm action against the South African régime with the regrettable effect of encouraging and enabling it to embark on this further act of aggression, bear a special respon-

sibility. It hopes that they will be persuaded to cease all collaboration with South Africa, and will co-operate in isolating and punishing the aggressive racist régime."

129. The call to all States is clear. Everybody who advocates the strengthening of peace and security in this area is obliged to condemn the open military aggression of the régime of *apartheid*. Each Member of the United Nations, by acceding to the Organization and by recognizing the Charter, has bound itself, as is known, to advocate peace and security. No one can escape this responsibility. Also, the useless attempts to divert attention from the facts and to separate from their natural allies the peoples and States that are fighting for their national independence and that have shaken off the imperialist yoke of colonial exploitation, cannot change anything.

130. In this connexion I should like to draw attention to the fact that today's *Christian Science Monitor* published a broad survey of United States military bases abroad. Obviously this is considered by some as being quite normal, so it is only understandable if, as this was done on Monday before the Assembly, efforts are made in order to defend the *apartheid* régime of South Africa. The reason for the move becomes visible. New possibilities are being sought for the establishment of military bases.

131. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic is convinced that unanimous and joint action by the African States and of all their real allies will support the Angolan people in their struggle against neo-colonialist and racist oppression, so that the Angolan people will in fact benefit from the fruits of their liberation struggle, which extended over many years and included many sacrifices.

132. We, as the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, share the position of such African States as Nigeria, the Government of which has stated that "the current event in Angola must be seen in its right perspective: not just fighting between factions in Angola, but fighting between racist South Africa and its backers, and the MPLA."

133. The German Democratic Republic is firmly convinced that the People's Republic of Angola will repulse all attacks against the territorial integrity of the country and against the young Republic, and will gain a victory over the South African mercenaries.

134. Proceeding from its political principles, the German Democratic Republic, as a member of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, has always condemned the policies of the *apartheid* régime in South Africa as threatening peace and security, and feels linked in unity with the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic has always rejected attempts to divert attention from the subject and from the real situation. It will also do so in the future.

135. It is for these reasons that the delegation of the German Democratic Republic energetically supports the amendments contained in document A/L.784, submitted by seven African countries, supplementing the present draft resolution on the situation in South Africa. We believe that these amendments are timely, and that any attempt such as that, for instance, by the first speaker in this morning's debate, to divert attention from the real facts and from condemnation of the *apartheid* régime can only play into the hands of that régime and its backers.

136. Mr. FERNANDES (Guinea Bissau) (*interpretation from French*): I know that it is already late and I do not wish to start any debate concerning Angola, since everyone knows what the position of Guinea-Bissau is in that respect. I simply want to clarify one point, and that is that I have been authorized to speak for Guinea—Guinea-Conakry, if you like—the Congo, Benin, Madagascar and Mali, and to announce to the Secretariat that if the amendments proposed by Zaire are adopted, we shall withdraw our names from the list of sponsors. My Government has not authorized me to enter into debate here on Angola. Angola is an independent country with a Government which we recognize and with which we maintain diplomatic relations. I do not wish, therefore, to have any debate concerning Angola.

137. Under agenda item 53 one can easily denounce South Africa, *apartheid*, and all that is happening in Africa; this, however, is not the case in the amendments of Zaire and, if those amendments are adopted, we shall withdraw our names from the list of sponsors of the amendments of the seven African countries.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.