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President: Mr. Gaston THORN
(Luxembourg).

AGENDA ITEM 101

**Publications and documentation of the United Nations:
report of the Secretary-General**

REPORT OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE (A/10398)

AGENDA ITEM 104

Personnel questions:

- (a) **Composition of the Secretariat: report of the Secretary-General**
- (b) **Other personnel questions: report of the Secretary-General**

REPORT OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE
(A/10450 and Add.1)

United Nations salary system:

- (a) **Report of the International Civil Service Commission**
- (b) **Report of the Secretary-General**

REPORT OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE (A/10423)

1. Mr. ABOUL GHEIT (Egypt), Rapporteur of the Fifth Committee: On behalf of the Fifth Committee, I have the honour to present three reports containing the Fifth Committee's recommendations for the consideration and approval of the General Assembly.

2. Under agenda item 101, "Publications and documentation of the United Nations", the Fifth Committee recommends to the Assembly for adoption the draft resolution contained in paragraph 13 of the report [A/10398] on the subject of meeting records of United Nations bodies.

3. Under agenda item 104, "Personnel questions", the Fifth Committee recommends to the Assembly for adoption two draft resolutions, I and II, contained in paragraph 37 of the report [A/10450 and Add.1]. Draft resolution I refers to the employment of women in the Secretariat of the United Nations, and draft resolution II refers to the composition of the Secretariat. It will be noted that the document before the Assembly under this agenda item constitutes part I of the report. The conclusion of the Fifth Committee's consideration of this agenda item will be submitted to the Assembly as part II at a later date during the current session.

4. Under agenda item 105, "United Nations salary system", the Fifth Committee has considered the revised estimates for the International Civil Service Commission in respect of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 1976-1977, as well as the Commission's recommendation on the interim changes in the post-adjustment system. The Fifth Committee has decided to recommend to the Assembly for adoption the two draft resolutions on these subjects appearing in paragraph 23 of the report [A/10423].

5. It is my hope that the recommendations of the Fifth Committee will meet with the approval of the Assembly.

Pursuant to rule 66 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the reports of the Fifth Committee.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): There being no explanations of vote, we shall now proceed to vote on the draft resolution recommended by the Fifth Committee in paragraph 13 of its report [A/10398] concerning agenda item 101.

The draft resolution was adopted by 92 votes to none (resolution 3415 (XXX)).

7. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We shall now consider part I of the report of the Fifth Committee on agenda item 104 [A/10450]. There being no explanations of vote, we shall now proceed to vote on the draft resolutions recommended by the Fifth Committee in paragraph 37 of its report.

Draft resolution I was adopted by 101 votes to none (resolution 3416 (XXX)).

Draft resolution II A was adopted by 80 votes to 13, with 10 abstentions (resolution 3417 A (XXX)).

8. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Fifth Committee approved draft resolution II B without objection. May I therefore take it that the General Assembly wishes to do the same?

Draft resolution II B was adopted (resolution 3417 B (XXX)).

9. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We shall now proceed to vote on the two draft resolutions recommended by the Fifth Committee in paragraph 23 of the report [A/10423] on agenda item 105.

10. In the first place, concerning draft resolution A, the Fifth Committee adopted it without objection. May I therefore take it that the General Assembly wishes to do the same?

The draft resolution was adopted (resolution 3418 A (XXX)).

11. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We shall now take a decision on draft resolution B.

The draft resolution was adopted by 97 votes to 9, with 3 abstentions (resolution 3418 B (XXX)).

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa (*continued*):*

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against Apartheid
(b) Report of the Secretary-General

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE (A/10342)

12. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Members will recall that at the 2421st plenary meeting, on 28 November, the General Assembly decided to postpone the vote on one of the draft resolutions, namely draft resolution F, recommended by the Special Political Committee in its report [A/10342]. Amendments to that draft resolution have been submitted in document A/L.784. I call on the representative of Madagascar, who wishes to introduce the amendments.

13. Mr. RASOLONDRALIBE (Madagascar) (*interpretation from French*): On behalf of the delegations of Benin, Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Senegal and Madagascar, I have the honour to submit the amendments to draft resolution F contained in document A/L.784.

14. I should like to take this opportunity, Mr. President, to thank you and, through you, the General Assembly for having postponed the vote on draft resolution F, thus giving us an opportunity to submit these amendments.

15. The document shows our intention very clearly. We are seriously concerned by the direct intervention of South African armed forces in Angola. We condemn that intervention, since it demonstrates the determination of the racist régime of South Africa to continue to strengthen its policy of domination and racial discrimination. We also condemn it because it is further confirmation of what we have been saying for many years at the United Nations, namely, that the existence of the present Pretoria régime is in itself a constant threat to the security of neighbouring African States. We propose that, as an immediate measure, the General Assembly request the withdrawal from Angolan territory of all South African military and paramilitary personnel, including the mercenaries.

16. Before going into the reasons which have led us to submit these amendments, I should like to present briefly the observations of the sponsors concerning some comments made by some representatives about the timeliness of our amendments and their place in draft resolution F. In brief, it has been said that in submitting these amendments we are attempting either too much or not enough. First of all, too much, because South African intervention in Angola goes beyond the scope of agenda item 53.

17. What do we envisage in draft resolution F, which has been termed an omnibus draft resolution? We refer to the internal actions of the racist régime of South Africa, but we also refer to certain forms of assistance or co-operation given by foreign Powers likely to give rise to military, economic or other conditions favourable to the continuation and strengthening of the apartheid régime.

18. The racist régime also wishes to create conditions such as will further that aim by intervening with military and paramilitary personnel in the neighbouring African States, and therefore it seems logical to us to mention that in our draft resolution. In our opinion, the wording of our amendments indicates that we are within the scope of agenda item 53, according to its present title, which is "Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa". Those who accuse us of not doing enough state that our amendments do not take into account the entire situation obtaining in Angola. Those same delegations ask that we condemn all foreign intervention in that country and say that we are being partial in our amendments.

19. On that point, we have no excuses to offer, because our so-called partiality stems in fact from an objective and not a subjective understanding of the matter. We admit that our amendments favour the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola [MPLA], since we have from the beginning been among those who recognized that the racist régime of South Africa, by its nature and policies, was the very antithesis of the aspirations to justice and freedom which move African peoples. That movement, which is now the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, has constantly adhered to a policy well defined by the Organization of African Unity [OAU], according to which no co-operation should be given to and no alliance, even temporary, should be concluded with that régime whose present intervention in the Angolan conflict constitutes a threat not against just one of the parties to the conflict or against the Angolan people alone, but against the whole Coloured population of

* Resumed from the 2421st meeting.

southern Africa. That position seems to us to be a just one and one worthy of support. If the Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola [FNLA] or União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola [UNITA] had adopted that position, we would have supported them. And on the contrary, if MPLA had associated itself with Pretoria, we would have censured it.

20. For all those reasons, we admit that we are biased in favour of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, which we have recognized; but that position is, as I have said, objective and is one that we have adopted in full sovereignty.

21. This said, our position is that the rules of procedure prohibit us from dealing with two situations, that of South Africa and that of Angola, in the same draft resolution or under the same agenda item. Therefore, we insist that the discussion of our amendments be limited to the framework of agenda item 53.

22. To go into the substance: it does not seem to us that the material aspect of South African intervention in Angola has to be proved. The Pretoria régime has itself made that clear in its public statements. We shall only mention that for many months that Government has been trying to justify the presence of its troops on Angolan territory under an agreement that it concluded with the Fascist régime of Caetano. The Portuguese régime was able to give the information required in that regard: no authorization was given by it to South Africa to intervene in Angola.

23. We also recall among the South African statements the recent communication on the loss of a military aircraft over Angola, which implies recognition of the intervention of South African air forces in the conflict.

24. Therefore, the facts are not open to challenge. We shall only stress the significance that we must attach to the military ventures of South African forces in Angola. We must not remain silent with respect to the state of war between the sovereign State of Angola and South Africa, with the latter acting outside the framework of legality, with an arrogance which reflects its usual disdain of world public opinion, of international law and of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

25. We must also note that this is the first time that the racist régime of South Africa has undertaken direct military intervention in an independent African State. Thus, a new step has been taken and a qualitative escalation of violence in southern Africa has taken place. We are certain that member States of the OAU cannot remain indifferent to this, since they are concerned about safeguarding their integrity and security.

26. We should not lose sight of the observations that have been made in the consideration of our proposal. The seriousness of the violence that has been committed and the risks taken can only reflect the importance of the political and economic interests which are at stake. To ensure against possible political contamination of Namibia and South Africa by Angolan progressive elements could be a reasonable objective for Pretoria and could in its eyes justify action aimed at preventing those elements from taking political control in Angola. Hence its crusade against the People's Republic of Angola which is aimed only at dividing the African peoples. We believe that Western

countries are capable of understanding that situation and of refusing to join the holy war which the South African régime complains it is waging alone, or almost alone.

27. Furthermore, the seriousness of the measures adopted in Angola by the South African régime, in our view, bears witness to the fact that, as in the past, the South African racists will not shrink from taking any means to reach their ends. The inhuman measures adopted internally in the country in order to maintain the *apartheid* régime, the strengthening of police repression and the military presence in Namibia, in defiance of United Nations decisions, and the military intervention in Zimbabwe were all, in our view, already very serious. But today violence has been pushed to even further extremes under the guise of direct military intervention in an independent African State. Knowing the blind opposition of Vorster's clique to any true liberation of the Coloured man, knowing his attachment to the privileges and supremacy of the white man, who can assure us that tomorrow South Africa will still be content merely with calling a halt to decolonization and will not launch a new offensive of colonial conquest?

28. Those are the reasons for our concern and the reasons that have led us to propose to the General Assembly the adoption of the draft resolution and our proposed amendment through which it would express its concern and condemnation, and call for immediate measures aimed at the withdrawal of South African military forces.

29. The Liberation Committee of the OAU, on 28 November, made a similar statement condemning South African intervention as flagrant and unjustified aggression. The Special Committee against *Apartheid*, on 4 December, declared itself unanimously against that intervention in terms similar to those in our proposed amendments. We are convinced that the General Assembly will act similarly by adopting this draft proposal.

30. Mr. MUTUALE TSHIKANKIE (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): The tragedy unfolding in Angola is a source of concern to us all. It is extremely grave. It is the countries that are Angola's neighbours that are most affected including, for many reasons, my country, Zaire. We share the longest boundary with Angola—more than 2,600 kilometres—and it was from the national territory of Zaire that the first shot against the Portuguese colonialism of the time was fired.

31. Zaire is happy to have made thousands of sacrifices at that time to help to the limit of its possibilities that country which today is in mourning, divided and afflicted by the atrocities of a fratricidal and useless struggle. During the 14 years of the liberation struggle of Angola, we gladly provided financial, military and moral assistance and support. We rejoice that that aid helped in achieving one of the greatest victories of Africa and the OAU: the liberation of the African continent from the colonial yoke. This assistance and support was meant for all the Angolan people represented by the three liberation movements given equal recognition by the OAU, for Zaire has participated regularly in funding the Liberation Committee of our continental African organization.

32. It was never Zaire's intention to help the brotherly people of Angola only to see it divided today. Long before 10 November 1975, the date on which the Portuguese administration stealthily withdrew from Angola, Zaire sought and supported unity, harmony and reconciliation among the brothers and sisters of Angola.

33. I shall not remind the Assembly of all the initiatives and action personally taken by the President and founder of the Popular Revolutionary Movement, President Mobutu Sese Seko, to achieve this result. A certain segment of the press, undoubtedly unaware of the history of the Angolan liberation movements, tried for a time to tarnish the role that Zaire played in the liberation of Angola and Africa. The outstanding reputation of my country in the anti-imperialist struggle will never be destroyed by this dishonest and false propaganda. Constant in its policy of supporting the national unity and territorial integrity of Angola, Zaire not only subscribes to the recommendation of the Conciliation Committee of the OAU concerning the formation of a government of national union, but also forcefully rejects any and all intervention in the domestic affairs of Angola.

34. The Charter of the United Nations does not condone interventions or lend them legitimacy, nor does it authorize any tolerance or complacency as regards interventionists. Is it possible to justify one intervention and condemn another on the same principle? What could justify intervention of one Member State in the internal affairs of another being regarded as justified and proper while that of others is not? Can we seriously entertain two different and discriminatory attitudes to the violation of so fundamental a principle as that of refraining from interference in the internal affairs of another State?

35. Yes, the Assembly must condemn *apartheid*; the Assembly must condemn South African interference in Angola. But nowhere is it said that only interference by racist régimes is to be considered by the Assembly and condemned by it, while interference by régimes considered to be non-racist is legitimate and is tolerated as not threatening the extension of racism.

36. Since this is the first time that the Assembly has been called upon to take a decision on an aspect of the extremely grave, complex and delicate situation prevailing in Angola, we believe that it must be very mindful of the subtle implications and ramifications of the positions it adopts. The interventionists are on the alert for the slightest pretext on which to justify their undertakings. Forewarned by the experience of the interference of which its members have been the victim, the OAU for its part has already condemned any foreign interference in Angola completely and without any exception. Similarly, at the recent Special Diplomatic Conference at Libreville, held from 16 to 18 November on the initiative of President Bongo, the diplomatic heads of central Africa concluded their work by adopting a resolution on the situation in Angola firmly condemning any aggression against the brother people of Angola and inviting all those who are interfering in the domestic affairs of Angola from now on to refrain from so doing in order to allow the sovereign people of Angola itself to settle its own problems.

37. The General Assembly must avoid the risk of confirming, through the amendments that have just been submitted, the imperialist, medieval theory that a distinction can be drawn between just wars and unjust wars. No aim, no alleged intention, no ideology can justify the interference by a State in the domestic affairs of another. Aggression and invasion are crimes, and there is no aim or ideology that can be put forward to give them any validity. Even if South Africa were not carrying out its hateful policy of *apartheid*, its conduct could not but evoke the disapproval of this Assembly. The direct intervention of South African armed forces in Angola must be condemned, not principally because it is a manifestation of South Africa's determination to dominate and to practise racism, but because that intervention violates the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another State. That is the first and foremost reason for the condemnation of that intervention. Of course, the intervention is all the more to be condemned because in the case of South Africa it is also an extension of the detestable policy of *apartheid*. However, the principal reason for condemning South Africa's intervention is that it violates the principle of the duty of States to refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs of other States.

38. The right of a State to independence, to the free exercise of its sovereignty, and the duty not to interfere in the domestic affairs of other States are principles which are valid in themselves; their validity is not to be found in their relation to a policy or the aims of a policy, or an ideology. The admissibility or inadmissibility of intervention in the affairs of an independent State does not depend on the kind of policy practised by or the declared or secret intentions of the intervening State.

39. The colonialist adventurers used a similar argument to justify their undertakings and their occupation of the territory of others. Colonialism always maintained that it was the bearer of the good word or of civilization. The colonialists always acted as if they were philanthropists with the best of intentions, who wanted to protect the indigenous inhabitants against the slave trade.

40. All intervention must be condemned, purely and simply. Whether or not an intervening State practises racism or *apartheid* is not the question; it must be condemned in the same strong terms. The foreign intervention in Angola is becoming a threat. It is heating up civil war, which is already becoming ever more deadly. It is regrettable that we are dealing with such a complex and delicate question within the confines of the discussion of amendments to a draft resolution on *apartheid*.

41. I wish to propose to the General Assembly two amendments [A/L.786] to the amendments that have just been submitted in document A/L.784. The General Assembly must be very cautious. No intervention in Angola can be justified. There cannot be two yardsticks. In the eleventh paragraph of the preamble, I propose that the words "of South African armed forces in Angola" be replaced by the words "of certain foreign Powers, including South Africa, in Angola". In operative paragraph 5, I propose that the words "the direct intervention of South African armed forces in Angola as a", appearing in the first two lines, be

replaced by the words "all foreign intervention in Angola, including the intervention of South African armed forces, the latter being". The rest of the paragraph would remain as it is.

42. These amendments are proposed is an effort to avoid a deadlock and a situation in which the Assembly would take a position that could prove very harmful and prejudicial to the situation in Angola, which is extremely grave and a source of considerable concern. The General Assembly must be as sincere as was the OAU when it fully condemned all foreign intervention in Angola: Africa was completely impartial.

43. Mr. MOYNIHAN (United States of America): The General Assembly is approaching another moment of truth, a test of our capacity to meet the obligations which the Charter imposes upon us, reposes in us; and we shall see, perhaps before this day is out, whether, faced with this moment of truth, the General Assembly settles for a big lie, the big lie that intervention in the country of Angola is that of one nation and one nation only, in the face of the enormous fact that this is not true. And this moment of truth comes at a particularly poignant time for each of us.

44. We have reached a moment long desired, long worked for, when one of the great injustices of modern history was being righted. Step by step and with their own proud and honourable co-operation, the European nations which in the course of the late eighteenth, and then the nineteenth and some earlier centuries, had taken over every inch of the African continent save only the ancient kingdom of Ethiopia, the European colonizers which had come to conquer every square foot of Africa save only Ethiopia, have now left Africa. Most have left in good repute and with good, strong and friendly feelings, and ties that endure with the areas, now nations, which they had come to occupy. And with the departure of Spain from the Sahara on 28 February next there remains but one tiny area of European controlled territory in all of the continent. In effect, the era of colonization has ended. This General Assembly has played an honourable and distinguished role in bringing about that termination.

45. But at just the moment when the European colonizers of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have departed, at just that moment a new European colonizing, colonial, imperial nation appears on the continent of Africa, armed, aggressive, involved in the direct assault upon the land and the people of Africa. The European colonial Power is back, a new colonial Power more mighty than any that ever preceded it. It has come with its arms, with its armies, with its technology, with its ideology, and the recolonization of Africa commences; or, more accurately, the effort now to recolonize Africa commences. The question is whether it will succeed. The enormous and critically important question is whether African nations themselves will allow themselves to be parties to a new European conquest.

46. We are very much aware of the alleged role of the nation of South Africa in some of the goings on right now in Angola. We have not seen evidence presented to this Assembly but no doubt it can be and will, otherwise we could not imagine there would have been the amendment we have before us and which we are discussing. We assume the sponsors of that proposed

resolution will bring evidence before us and we can consider it. And my Government will consider it with no difficulty whatever concerning its view, which is shared by almost all of the members of the Assembly, about the nature of the régime in South Africa. Our detestation for the abominable practice of *apartheid* does not need to be restated.

47. I might just call your attention to the fact that I believe that only a member of the United States delegation to the General Assembly this year was denounced by name by the Prime Minister of South Africa; only an American representative was denounced by South Africa so far in the Assembly, so far as I am aware; there may be others, but there is no question that my good friend, and a great American, Clarence Mitchell, was denounced by name and there is equally no question that, accused by the Prime Minister of South Africa of having stated untruths, Mr. Mitchell, a free American in a free Assembly, came to this podium [*see 2421st meeting*] and in a lawyer-like and detailed way spelled out, named names, cited dates and places and laws, spelled out our profound disagreement with that system and answered the charge that our disagreement was not based upon fact. The facts were presented in this forum by an American representative. We are proud of that representative and proud of his presentation, and we are not unaware of the fact that it was one of the first occasions in the General Assembly in which facts have been brought to this podium.

48. As I say, we have not yet had the facts about the South African intervention. We will welcome such information as it appears before the Assembly. My purpose, however, is to introduce some facts about the whole of the situation.

49. Now it is well known to the Members of the Assembly that the OAU has condemned all intervention in Angola—all intervention. The OAU has done this, and was right to have done it. The United States of America, for one, has condemned all intervention in Angola and we are happy to join OAU in that matter. Which of the great Powers—as they are called—of the world has not condemned all intervention in Angola? You know very well which has not: it is the Soviet Union which has not, the European Power now engaged in colonial expansion on the continent of Africa. In *Pravda* on 4 December there was a commentary by Mr. Capsky on this subject, and the Soviet Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr. Kharlamov, stated here on 26 November [*2419th meeting*] that the Soviet Government, far from condemning intervention, has acknowledged it, saying that it is assisting its friends in Angola and that it would continue to do so.

50. Europeans on the continent of Africa, with European arms, fighting Africans: this is what is happening. Two African Presidents have spoken of illegal Soviet overflights, bringing equipment over their lands to the area. African Angolan freedom fighters have captured some of the invading forces. Photographs have appeared in the press; it is no secret.

51. But let me be more specific and let me share with you information which is known to all the world. It would be well for me to stand here and report what American diplomatic or intelligence services might have gathered in information; many of us could do

more, or at least as well. But that would be in the nature of somewhat arcane information. Let me show you, and let me read to you from the front page of *The New York Times*—certainly one of the world's great newspapers and, I hardly need to remind members of this Assembly, hardly a spokesman for the United States Government. What is on the front page of today's *New York Times*? The article is headed "Cubans"—which are a western hemisphere nation, of course—"with Soviet arms"—that is, a European nation—"said to turn Angola tide". I will read to you the report from Washington by Mr. David Binder, a distinguished American journalist who has covered European affairs as well as American affairs. Mr. Binder writes:

"A Cuban expeditionary force equipped with Soviet armored vehicles and rocket launchers is turning the tide of civil war in favor of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, according to American officials.

"The officials, who are assigned to watching developments in Angola, made this estimate on the basis of information reaching here through intelligence channels as well as from friendly Governments.

"They said Cuban infantry and artillery units had spearheaded columns of the Popular Movement in their advance north of Luanda, the old Portuguese colonial capital,"—you change masters but not capitals, is that it?—"against the National Front for the Liberation of Angola.

"The National Front has set up a coalition government in Huambo—formerly Nova Lisboa—with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Both the National Union, known as UNITA, and the National Front have been fighting the Soviet-armed and Cuban-aided troops of the Popular Movement, which has proclaimed itself sovereign and has its capital in Luanda."

Now listen to this:

"The Popular Movement has pushed more than 50 miles up the coast during the last 10 days, . . . capturing the town of Caxito and moving toward the Atlantic port of Ambriz.

"Cuban infantry and artillery units, the American officials said, have been responsible for advances in the south-central battle area where they are contesting for control of the 896-mile Benguela railroad, which links the countries of Zaire and Zambia to the large Angolan harbor of Lobito."

Understand that the two nations Zambia and Zaire will find, if this movement is successful, that their port of export for their products and import for other matters is controlled by the new colonial Power.

"In that area, the Popular Movement's forces, stiffened by the Cubans, have been fighting sizable numbers of men of the National Union, who are said here to be supplemented by soldiers from South Africa."

Did you read that? There appear to be soldiers from South Africa working with the National Union.

"The Cubans and the Popular Movement are said to have taken the town of Cangumbe, which is on the rail line."

Then it says:

"Correspondents in Angola, however, say they have seen no evidence that South African soldiers are actually fighting there, though the South African Government has admitted giving training and logistical support."

So we have a dispute about how many South Africans there are, if any, but we can get evidence. We have an amendment which is based on evidence.

"'The Cubans are involved everywhere,' an American official observed. A Latin-American official who has just arrived here from Havana said today that Cuban officials had told him that 3,100 soldiers were now serving in Angola. He said Cuban soldiers had also been seen south of Luanda in a third battle region, centered around the rich agricultural belt between Gabela and Quibala."

Well, this story goes on this way, but remember we are now getting stories from American officials, so you can discount them a little bit perhaps.

"Both officials said there was clear evidence that the Soviet Union was continuing large-scale shipments of military supplies directly to Luanda by sea and by air."

And of course *Pravda* has confirmed this. European arms are landing in support of European expeditionary forces in Africa. That is what is happening today.

"The last big Soviet airlift to Luanda occurred last Monday, the officials here said, when several huge AN-22 transports came in".

52. Now that is a summary of news from Washington. *The New York Times* also had this morning a report from Angola itself, from Huambo, an area still not under the Popular Movement control, sent by an American journalist, Michael T. Kaufman. And I wonder if our anti-imperialists would listen to me while I talk about this for a moment; those of us who were so enthusiastic to see imperialism at an end—will they pay a little attention to this new imperialism?

53. From Huambo, dated 4 December:

"As seen from here, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, aided by vast quantities of Soviet arms and by Cuban fighting men, has made sharp military advances on three fronts in recent days".

54. I am not trying to persuade you to take the winning side in this argument. It is not clear which is the winning side. We are talking about what is the right side, what is the claim which every act of the General Assembly in 30 years surely attests, which is that the European colonization of Africa must end. But it says here: "aided by vast quantities of Soviet arms", European arms—"and by Cuban fighting men", there have been great advances—

55. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Madagascar, who is asking to speak on a point of order.

56. Mr. RASOLONDRAIBE (Madagascar) (*interpretation from French*): In my previous statement I did at least indicate that the sponsors are interested in limiting the discussion of our draft to the framework of agenda item 53, "Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa". The representative of the United States is certainly in a position to compare the importance I gave to the Angolan situation in my statement with that he accorded it, when, not content with making his statement, he also read out to us an article from *The New York Times*.

57. I think that the attention of the Assembly is being diverted from the essential item of which it is now seized. Since you were kind enough to allow me to speak, Mr. President, since Mr. Moynihan himself was asking us whether our amendment was based on facts and since he has brought evidence published in a newspaper, I also have some evidence which I have received through the intermediary of our press organ, and with your permission, Sir, I shall now read this—

58. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I am very sorry to interrupt the representative of Madagascar, but this is not a point of order. I understand that he would like to add some explanations of the view he has already expressed, and I shall gladly call on him later in the debate.

59. Mr. MOYNIHAN (United States): I do not wish to encroach extensively on the time of the delegations or of the Assembly, but I simply want to make the point that Holden Roberto, the President of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, a freedom fighter if ever there was one and a distinguished member of his people, had this to say according to *The New York Times* of today: "This is a war of men against weapons; we have the men and they have the weapons."

60. Now, if ever there was a man who appeared in the country of Angola, a leader of the people, it is this very Holden Roberto, and what has he said? He has said: "This is a war of men against weapons, and we have the men and they have the weapons." And who are the men? They are African men. And what are the weapons being used against them? They are European weapons and, if the Assembly will not face up to this fact, then what is the good of the Organization?

61. Now, I think we will. I think there are men and women of courage in this room who will, but, if they do not, think what history will say of us. They will face not only the colonization of south-western Africa, they will perhaps one day even face colonization by the same nation on the north-eastern coast, Somalia, where the International Institute for Strategic Studies has noted that this same European nation has landed 150 T-35 tanks, up to 100 F-54 tanks, 300 armoured personnel carriers, 200 coastal batteries, 50 MIGs, a squadron of Ilyushin-28 bombers, 6 patrol boats, 2 surface-to-surface missile-equipped OSA gunboats, and a batch of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles.

62. Now let me sum up. We are faced with a situation which is properly the concern of the Assembly. An independent nation has been invaded by foreigners, foreign troops, foreign arms. One group of African countries has brought to our attention the prospect that a nation, South Africa, has been involved. We await their evidence. That evidence will be carefully

considered by my delegation, a delegation which has insistently and in detail stated its abhorrence of the social system in South Africa. And we have other information of invasion by two other countries. Now, are we going to pay attention to those? I think we should pay attention to the words of my colleague and predecessor at this podium, Mr. Mutuale of Zaire, who spoke with pride of his nation's role in the liberation of the African continent from the colonial yoke. Those were his words, and he clearly said his nation did not mean to be a party to the reimposition of that colonial yoke by a great European Power with its armies and its weapons already on the north-east coast and south-west coast of Africa.

63. Mr. Mutuale said that no intervention could be justified in Angola. He said that there could not be two yardsticks for a principle as fundamental in international relations as the obligation of non-interference in the internal affairs of another State. He wondered how this could be tolerated and added that no intervention in Angola could be justified and that you could not have two standards.

64. If the strong and true words of the representative of Zaire are ignored today, do not be surprised if the pronouncements of the General Assembly are ignored by the rest of the world from today on. We face a moment of truth. It is time to tell the truth. If we settle for a big lie, we shall have earned the contempt which the world will heap upon us and which history will record as having been our due.

65. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I wish to tell the representative of Madagascar that if he wants to add anything to his statement he may do so now, but if he wants to listen to other arguments perhaps he would like to wait until the end of this discussion. The representative of Tunisia wishes to speak on a point of order.

66. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, before the representative of Madagascar addresses the Assembly I should like to ask you to clarify the situation. Have we opened the debate on this question we are now discussing? Is the subject of debate now the question of Angola? I should like to obtain an answer from you and, if necessary, I should like to ask you to postpone consideration of this question to another time, so that we may also prepare ourselves to participate in the debate, because we have come here to discuss the item on *apartheid* and to take a decision on a draft resolution. It was understood that the debate should not be reopened, but, since matters are taking another turn, I believe that before we consider this question we should have more time. I will await your answer, Mr. President, before I ask you for a decision or for a ruling, as the case may be.

67. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I understand the concern of the representative of Tunisia, but the President cannot adopt a position for or against.

68. This is the situation. In accordance with our agenda for the current session, we still have to consider agenda item 54. Moreover, concerning the item now under consideration amendments have been proposed by Benin, Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali and Senegal, in which reference was

made to the intervention of armed forces in Angola. These amendments to the draft resolution recommended by the Special Political Committee were not drafted by the President or the representative of Tunisia, but by the various delegations which introduced them. To these amendments Zaire has submitted an amendment regarding the intervention of foreign troops in Angola. The President cannot determine whether, through the introduction of amendments and amendments to amendments, we have deviated from the original item. However, if one delegation believes that the amendments should be voted against, that is its right, and this should be part of the debate. If, on the other hand, a delegation requests that the amendments be withdrawn for the time being or that their consideration be postponed to another time, that would be a procedural motion. However, the President cannot decide that a representative cannot speak on a question. There is a draft resolution, and amendments and amendments to those amendments have been proposed. All this is perfectly appropriate. The Assembly can decide to postpone consideration. However, the President will not propose it.

69. The representative of the Ivory Coast wishes to speak on a point of order.

70. Mr. AKÉ (Ivory Coast) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I thank you for the clarification you have just given in reply to the question raised by the representative of Tunisia. I believe, like him, that some delegations, including my own, are not prepared for statements on the amendments proposed by a group of African countries, which raise a very important problem. I think that some of us would need to discuss among ourselves and establish contacts with our Governments. That is the reason I would like to make an appeal to the sponsors of the draft amendments and to the members of the Assembly that consideration of this agenda item be postponed to this afternoon, if possible, or to tomorrow to allow us to receive the necessary instructions. I do not have the rules of procedure before me, but I think it must be rule 76. Therefore, I ask, Mr. President, that we apply the relevant rule of the rules of procedure and that discussion on this item be continued either this afternoon or tomorrow morning. This is a formal proposal of the delegation of the Ivory Coast.

71. I apologize for not having spoken with the sponsors of the amendments. However, I hope they will heed my appeal and understand the difficulty in which we now find ourselves, in view of the submission of amendments which, after the statements we have heard, appear to us to be extremely important and to require that we receive the necessary instructions. I formally propose that we suspend the discussion. I do not know whether it is a suspension or an adjournment, but what I ask is that we do not continue the debate on this item and that we postpone it until this afternoon or tomorrow. We can look up the relevant rule. I hope that my African colleagues who are sponsoring the amendment will kindly heed this appeal.

72. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): From that statement the President concludes that the representative of the Ivory Coast is requesting adjournment of the debate. It would be under rule 74. Rule 76 refers to an adjournment of the meeting, but this is an adjournment of debate—rule 74. Since the

amendments refer to the situation in Angola, as do the sub-amendments, we need simply to adjourn the debate, if the Assembly so wishes. This is the situation as it now stands, taking into account the request of the Ivory Coast.

73. The President suggests, if the Assembly wishes to adjourn the debate, that it would be preferable to adjourn it until tomorrow morning, since today we still have other items on the agenda and it would give rise to further difficulties if we had to postpone them as well. If the Assembly agrees, in accordance with the arguments advanced by the Ivory Coast, that is, to enable delegations to notify the various Governments in the various capitals, and especially in view of the time differences, we should not adjourn the debate for two or three hours but adjourn it until tomorrow morning—I repeat, if the Assembly shares the view expressed by the representative of the Ivory Coast.

74. I would remind the Assembly that under rule 74 two speakers may speak in favour and two against the motion, after which the motion will be put to a vote.

75. I call on the representative of Tunisia, who wishes to speak on this point.

76. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I should like to ask you to invoke rule 77. Its paragraph (c) refers to the adjournment of "the debate on the item under discussion". This is a very limited form of adjournment. You yourself have proposed continuing the discussion on this item tomorrow, and I should like to support your proposal and to ask you to apply rule 77.

77. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We agree, of course, since rule 74 refers to "Adjournment of debate" and rule 77 refers to "Order of procedural motions". There is only one motion before us, therefore, there is no difficulty.

78. I should like now to make a correction. I had proposed continuing the debate tomorrow morning. The Secretariat points out that, given the meeting schedule, the best time to continue this debate would be tomorrow afternoon or Wednesday morning. I believe that it would not make much difference if the Assembly allowed me to review this matter later on, but at any rate we would not resume the debate before tomorrow afternoon or Wednesday morning.

79. On this motion for adjournment, I call on the representative of the USSR.

80. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Mr. Moynihan need not worry because I am not going to answer him now, since there is apparently a general agreement that this discussion should be postponed until tomorrow. But of course I reserve my right very clearly to reply in detail, objectively and fully to Mr. Moynihan's completely unfounded statements at this rostrum. This is not a club, it is the United Nations, and what can be said in clubs should not be said at the rostrum of the United Nations.

81. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We are now considering a question of procedure. The USSR is in favour of postponement and Tunisia is in favour of postponement. Who is against postponement? Is Mali against the motion of adjournment?

82. The representative of Mali has asked to speak. I would like to know if he is going to speak against the motion of adjournment.

83. Mr. CISSÉ (Mali) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation is not opposed to adjournment of the debate. I just wanted to respond to the appeal that was addressed to us by the representative of the Ivory Coast and to tell him that the sponsors have consulted and agree to adjourn.

84. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I thank the representative of Mali for his statement, which will facilitate the decision of the Assembly.

85. I must be very strict here: three representatives have spoken in favour of adjournment of the debate; does the representative of Cuba wish to speak against adjournment of the debate?

86. Mr. ALARCÓN (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The rules of procedure authorize two delegations which may so wish to speak against adjournment of the debate. My delegation wishes it to be noted in the record of this meeting that it is categorically opposed to adjournment, and I shall explain why.

87. First of all, those who have suggested it did not have the good fortune to raise their point of order when the representative of Madagascar did so, when he asked that the representative who was speaking at that moment—the representative of the United States—should focus on the item under consideration. In fact, we listened to a lengthy statement which included much reading from today's press, and it was only after the Assembly had wasted its time in that way that it was invited to suspend the debate.

88. The arguments that have been given in favour of that proposal do not seem valid to us. The amendments presented by some African countries were distributed last Friday. We should be very surprised indeed if representatives had not yet had time to consider them. We suspect that the representatives of African States in particular were interested in the topic under consideration and we are certain that they are familiar with the text and have examined it, as have their Governments.

89. On the other hand, it seems to us that as regards the second argument about the advisability of having more time available and proceeding to a vote later, it is not necessary to propose an adjournment of the debate for that reason, since, given the lateness of the hour, it is to be assumed that it would be very difficult for the Assembly, if it continued the consideration of this item, to vote on the amendments and the draft resolution on the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa in the course of this morning. Therefore the very development of our activities this morning makes inevitable what the representative of the Ivory Coast has requested, that is to say, that the voting be postponed until this afternoon.

90. But the only result of acceptance of the proposal would be an interruption of the discussion, which my delegation considers should be developed and should continue in depth, after the representative of the United States had more than sufficient time to abuse our patience by speaking on the item, as well as on what is not in the item, in a statement which despite its length did not include any information on how the United States will vote on the draft resolution on the

policies of *apartheid* of the régime of South Africa. If representatives read the report of the Rapporteur of the Special Political Committee they will realize that the United States vote is and will be negative on that draft resolution, with or without amendments, with or without sub-amendments, since United States policy has always been in favour of the policy of *apartheid*.

91. What would happen if we interrupted this debate? On the one hand, we would be allowing "Professor" Moynihan to leave this Hall after having given his morning lecture to the United Nations students who have gathered here this morning to hear him. If the motion were to suspend until this afternoon, my delegation, in a spirit of compromise, would not object. But if we are threatened with a suspension until tomorrow, thus giving an opportunity to Mr. Moynihan to read out articles from a new edition of *The New York Times* and again to come up here and offer his poor students a mediocre lecture suitable only for a mediocre primary school, my delegation can only categorically oppose our being forced into that childish exercise.

92. If the adjournment is until this afternoon, in a spirit of compromise and co-operation with those who have asked for more time, my delegation will not object formally. But if the postponement is to a later date, after new editions of United States newspapers have been published, and we face the threat of having them read out to us again at this rostrum, then my delegation will formally object to the postponement.

93. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I note that even though four representatives have spoken, not one has directly opposed the motion. I therefore think the time has come to vote, because, after asking to speak against the adjournment, they finally speak in favour of it.

94. I call on the representative of the Ivory Coast, who wishes to speak on a point of order.

95. Mr. AKÉ (Ivory Coast) (*interpretation from French*): I simply wish to appeal to the representative of Cuba not to press for postponement until this afternoon. I also want to tell him that if we did not present this motion for postponement earlier it was simply because we only came to the Assembly Hall when we heard that this problem was being discussed. The motion for postponement has not been made to favour any one delegation. We are simply not in a position at this time to take a decision on this proposed text. I am making this appeal: I am an African and the sponsors of the text are also Africans, and we must have time to hold consultations among ourselves. That is the real reason I felt we could not vote now. It is important for the African delegations to consult among themselves, since another African State has also submitted several amendments to African amendments. Neither *The New York Times* nor any other newspaper has anything to do with this matter. I am making this appeal to the representative of Cuba, and I hope it will be heeded and that consideration of this agenda item can be deferred until tomorrow at a time to be set by you, Mr. President.

96. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I entirely share the view of the representative of the Ivory Coast. I view his position with sympathy, but an appeal to a representative does not really constitute a

point of order; in fact, it reopens the debate. The situation is clear. The adjournment of the debate on the item has been proposed, as the representative of the Ivory Coast has said, in order to allow delegations to hold consultations and to consult their Governments and receive instructions so that the discussion can continue and a vote can be taken in a calm atmosphere and with the utmost seriousness. Members should be aware of the concerns of the presidency. I cannot simply postpone a debate and postpone the whole agenda. Arrangements have to be made with the Committees.

97. That is why I cannot tell the Assembly at this stage when the debate can be resumed, but I will inform representatives this afternoon after discussing the matter with the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, the Chairmen of Committees and the Secretary-General.

98. At any rate, the adjournment of the debate means that this item will not be taken up before the meeting tomorrow afternoon and will be considered at the latest at the meeting on Wednesday morning. I shall give members more details this afternoon. Are we ready to take a decision on the motion for adjournment?

99. I call on the representative of the Soviet Union, who wishes to speak on a point of order.

100. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): When I expressed my agreement to the interruption of the debate I did not know that so simple a question as that of *apartheid* would require several days of consultations with Governments. This question is one which we are certainly entitled to discuss after the suspension this morning. I therefore entirely share the view of the representative of Cuba that it is not necessary to postpone it until tomorrow or Wednesday. I formally propose that the discussion be suspended now, if there is no objection to that, and resumed this afternoon.

101. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Delegations must vote in accordance with their views. Certain delegations have proposed a postponement of the debate and those delegations agree with the interpretation of the President, who must serve the Assembly. The delegations that have requested a postponement of the debate have done so in order to hold consultations. The presidency, taking into account the requirements of the schedule and knowing the difficulties that the Assembly would encounter if consideration of a particular item were not resumed today or tomorrow morning—do not force me to go into further detail—declares that there should be an adjournment until tomorrow, in accordance with the sense of the proposals. One votes for or one votes against. That is all I ask. Therefore I put to the vote the proposal that consideration of this agenda item be postponed until tomorrow afternoon or, at the latest, Wednesday morning.

The motion was adopted by 91 votes to 13, with 22 abstentions.

102. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now call upon the representative of Cuba, who wishes to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

103. Mr. ALARCÓN (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall take a very few minutes of the Assembly's time to reply to this morning's statement by Mr. Moynihan.

104. Cuba's position and its solidarity with national liberation movements of Africa is well known to Members of the United Nations, as is the position of American imperialism as a supporter and beneficiary of Portuguese colonialism. This is to be found in all the information which year after year has been received and examined by the Assembly when it has studied the case of Angola and, in the past, that of the territories under Portuguese administration. Furthermore, that position was very clear from the fact that the United States voted against the draft resolution which the Assembly was considering at this session and consideration of which was postponed. This happened on 4 November in the Special Political Committee before any amendment had been submitted concerning South African intervention in Angola.

105. The representative of the United States spoke as if his Government condemned *apartheid*, as if his Government condemned South African interference in the affairs of other African peoples, as if representatives were so ignorant or so forgetful as not to have examined paragraph 23 of the report of the Rapporteur of the Special Political Committee [A/10342], in which the United States vote is mentioned, a vote which has been consistent for decades.

106. In his statement, Mr. Moynihan also, in a demagogic manner, stated that he did not know of any evidence concerning South African interference in Angola. He presented as proof of his arguments an issue of *The New York Times* and he asked the Assembly whether the sponsors of the amendment were able to present similar evidence concerning the presence of South African troops on Angolan territory.

107. I am going to mention a few publications, almost all of them in the English language, which may perhaps help Mr. Moynihan, when he comes before the Assembly again to give his morning lecture, to complete his argumentation.

108. In the *London Observer* of 16 November there was an article by Mr. Tony Hodges, written in Angola, in which he described the participation of South African regular troops in Angola, and referred to some United States military personnel in that country also engaging in intervention activities and fighting against MPLA.

109. In the *Los Angeles Times* of 16 November, there was an article by Fred Bridgland, a Reuter correspondent, also giving interesting information on South African intervention in Angola.

110. Mr. Moynihan apparently reads *The New York Times* every morning, but he must have forgotten the issue of 15 November. There he will be able to find exact data as to the airlift established by the South African régime to the base on Angolan territory in Sá da Bandeira, through which South African equipment and troops pass to fight against Angolan patriots.

111. In the *Washington Post* of 14 November an article by Mr. David B. Ottaway also refers to South African intervention in Angola.

112. The weekly *Der Spiegel* of West Germany, on 17 November, described the equipment, helicopters, light tanks, mortars and armoured vehicles used by regular troops from South Africa on Angolan territory.

113. *Jornal Novo*, a newspaper published in Angola, also described in its issue of 17 November South African interference in that country.

114. Finally, *Die Transvaaler*, a South African daily newspaper, described on 18 October how South African troops have for a long time been operating in the south of Angola, not only against the Angolan people but also against those who are fighting for the freedom of Namibia, including the South-West Africa People's Organization.

115. Naturally, this account does not exhaust the many, many sources which exist and which confirm South African interference in Angola. Furthermore, Mr. Moynihan would not have to try very hard to find in *The New York Times* and other organs of the press statements by Mr. Botha, the Minister for Defence of the racist régime of Pretoria, admitting South African interventionist activities; and he will also be able to find the request for additional funds by the South African Parliament in order to pursue the war against the Angolan people.

116. We hope that, since the Assembly has decided to give Mr. Moynihan an opportunity to offer us another lecture on the international press, when he comes back to this rostrum, he will include these and other publications in his dissertation.

AGENDA ITEM 54

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (concluded):*

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE (A/10411)

117. Mr. MAUERSBERGER (German Democratic Republic), Rapporteur of the Special Political Committee: I have the honour to present to the General Assembly this morning, on behalf of the Special Political Committee, its report in connexion with agenda item 54, entitled "United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East" [A/10411].

118. During its consideration of this important question, the Special Political Committee was assisted by the information provided by the Commissioner-General of the Agency, Sir John Rennie. During the seven meetings which the Committee devoted to the consideration of the item, the Committee heard approximately 40 speakers in the general debate and adopted, by large majorities or by consensus, four draft resolutions, which are to be found in paragraph 15 of the report now before the Assembly.

119. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [UNRWA] wishes to make a statement, and I now call on him.

120. Sir John RENNIE (Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for

Palestine Refugees in the Near East): Mr. President, thank you for giving me an opportunity to make a brief statement at this stage of consideration of the UNRWA item. I do so in order to acquaint the General Assembly with the financial outlook for UNRWA in 1976, in the light of the pledges announced at the meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and of such other information on probable income as is available at present.

121. I should like first of all, however, to refer to the financial situation for 1975. In my statement to the Special Political Committee, I said that additional contributions had reduced the deficit for 1975 to about \$7.2 million [see A/SPC/SR.974, para. 12]. The present estimate for the deficit is about \$6.6 million and there is no indication of further improvement. It will therefore be necessary to defer the commitment of funds for school building, to forgo the making up of shortages of rations that occurred because of supply difficulties earlier in the year and to carry the balance of the deficit, amounting to about \$2.2 million, on working capital. The result will be to reduce working capital to no more than \$6.4 million, of which \$1.9 million must be reserved to meet a contingent liability arising out of exchange losses on the assets of the UNRWA local staff Provident Fund scheme. The unreserved balance of working capital—\$4.5 million—is far from adequate for an organization with a budget of nearly \$140 million and the need to purchase and pay for large quantities of foodstuffs and other supplies well in advance of utilization because of delivery delays. The margin of safety is much too slender and operations in 1976 will be even more precarious.

122. Pledges at the meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on 26 November, some of which were not specific, can be estimated at \$61.7 million. If contributions that were not pledged but that there is good reason to include in the estimate of income are added and if non-governmental income, contributions from other United Nations organizations and miscellaneous income are also taken into account, the total becomes \$86.6 million. This figure does not include special contributions in 1975 which have not been incorporated in regular contributions for 1976 and concerning which there is no assurance that they will be repeated in 1976. These special contributions amount to \$29 million. Even if these special contributions are all repeated, there will still be a deficit of about \$24 million; and if they are not repeated, and if no new contributions or additional contributions are received, the deficit will be no less than \$53 million.

123. Given the size of working capital and the effect of a deficit in 1975, this is again a most serious situation. I would remind the General Assembly of what I said at the 974th meeting of the Special Political Committee about the position in which UNRWA found itself at the beginning of October this year. At that time the deficit for 1975 was still \$13.2 million and the dire prospect was that operations would have to cease entirely after 30 November because liabilities, including contingent liabilities, would exceed assets and the Agency would be insolvent. The prospect was so catastrophic because services had been maintained in full in the hope that sufficient additional contributions would be received to eliminate the deficit and so avert the painful necessity of making reductions.

* Resumed from the 2373rd meeting.

124. I feel that I must tell the General Assembly that I do not believe it would be prudent to run such a risk again, that is to say, to defer reductions to the point at which there is no alternative to complete cessation of operations if additional contributions are not received. Such a course may demonstrate very convincingly the Agency's desire to avoid reducing its services, but to court disaster twice in this way would be to ignore experience.

125. After consulting the Secretary-General, what I propose to do, therefore, is to review the financial position in March 1976. If by then sufficient funds have not been pledged to maintain operations in full until the end of the year, reductions in services will have to be made, with effect from 1 April, to the extent necessary to eliminate one half of the outstanding deficit. If enough funds are subsequently received, those services will be restored. The position will be reviewed again in June, and if sufficient funds are still lacking, further reductions will be made on the scale necessary to eliminate the deficit.

126. In this connexion, I should again make the point I made in the Special Political Committee that if reductions are made too late, their scale must be very much greater because they are spread over a few months only and the yield of each item is correspondingly less. How severe the reductions must be will of course depend on the level of the deficit. If—as I hope will not prove to be the case—the deficit were to persist at the higher level of \$53 million I mentioned, that is to say, if 1975 special contributions that have not so far been pledged for 1976 are not eventually pledged, the reductions will be very severe. I need only point out that \$53 million is more than the cost of the general education section of the education programme and more than twice the cost of the flour which UNRWA must purchase for the basic ration to supplement flour donated in kind.

127. I much regret the need to refer to the possibility of reductions in UNRWA's services in 1976 before that year has even begun, but I consider—and the Secretary-General shares this view—that the General Assembly should be left in no doubt about UNRWA's prospects for 1976. I have emphasized very strongly on many occasions the importance that I believe should be attached to the maintenance of UNRWA's services, especially at this critical time, and in doing so I know I have simply been echoing what has been said by many others. I assure the Assembly that every effort will be made to obtain the amount necessary to maintain services in full and that I shall give all possible assistance to the Working Group, renewal of the mandate of which is recommended in a draft resolution before the Assembly. I am bound to add, however, that the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that UNRWA has the funds required to continue its operations must rest, in the final analysis, not with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General but with the States Members of the United Nations, which decided only a year ago, at the twenty-ninth session, to renew the Agency's mandate for a further period of three years. [resolution 3331 A (XXIX)].

Pursuant to rule 66 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the Special Political Committee.

128. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Israel for an explanation of vote.

129. Mr. DORON (Israel): As in previous years, so also this year my delegation made its position abundantly clear on the draft resolutions which were before the Special Political Committee on agenda item 54 when that item was discussed in the Committee [see A/SPC/SR.979 and 981]. Today I should like to explain my delegation's vote on draft resolution C recommended by the Committee in paragraph 15 of its report. [A/10411].

130. This draft resolution follows the pattern of similar resolutions adopted in previous years under this item. It repeats the same falsehoods, distortions, unrealistic demands and unwarranted condemnations. It is thus a completely one-sided and biased draft, which simply ignores the facts and the realities of the situation.

131. In operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 the draft resolution professes to show concern for displaced persons who left the area of hostilities in 1967, and goes on to make various calls on Israel in this connexion. But it ignores the basic fact that the prevailing situation in the area, with the all-pervading enmity displayed by Arab Governments towards Israel, does not permit a large-scale return of these displaced persons. The draft resolution also does not take any notice of the fact that, in spite of all the difficulties, the Government of Israel has during this year, as in previous years, continued to facilitate the return of persons displaced in 1967.

132. The real situation in this matter was set out in a note verbale, dated 8 September 1975, submitted to the Secretary-General by the representative of Israel and reproduced in the report of the Secretary-General of 16 September 1975 [A/10253]. Yet the draft resolution continues to ignore the actual situation and simply repeats allegations which do not correspond to the facts.

133. The same is true of operative paragraph 4. By now everybody concerned knows the truth in respect of the housing situation in the camps in the Gaza Strip and, more particularly, in respect of the security considerations relevant to this matter. Constructive action is being taken by the Israeli authorities to provide proper and decent housing for the refugees concerned, instead of the shelters mentioned in the draft resolution. But again this fact, which is confirmed by UNRWA, is ignored, and unrealistic, unconstructive and propagandistic demands are being made on Israel.

134. Operative paragraph 5 would condemn what it calls "attacks on refugee camps" and would call on Israel "to desist from such attacks". The sponsors of the draft resolution know, as does everybody else, despite false allegations to the contrary, that Israel does not carry out any attacks on refugee camps but is constrained to take defensive action against the bases and installations of the Arab terror organizations which are placed in or near population centres precisely because these organizations seek the protection afforded by this proximity. In fact, the local population has repeatedly demanded that the Lebanese authorities make the terror organizations move away. It is from these bases that the murder squads set out

on their criminal errands against civilian targets in Israel. But, of course, it would be naive to expect the draft resolution to call on those terror organizations to desist from these activities.

135. The fact that Israel directs its action not against the refugee camps but against the installations of the terror organizations has been confirmed over and over again—and even in the last few days—by the spokesmen of those groups and by the Arab press. But the game of pretence and make-believe continues, and the result is a text such as draft resolution C on which the Assembly is now asked to vote.

136. For all those reasons my delegation will vote against draft resolution C and trusts that all fair-minded delegations will oppose it.

137. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We shall now take a decision on the draft resolutions recommended by the Special Political Committee in paragraph 15 of its report.

138. Draft resolution A is entitled "Assistance to persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 hostilities". In view of the discussion and the vote in the Special Political Committee, may I take it that the Assembly adopts draft resolution A?

Draft resolution A was adopted (resolution 3419 A (XXX)).

139. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now put to the vote draft resolution B, entitled "Assistance to Palestine refugees". A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Israel.

Draft resolution B was adopted by 121 votes to none, with 1 abstention (resolution 3419 B (XXX)).¹

140. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now put to the vote draft resolution C, entitled "Population and Refugees displaced since 1967". A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll call.

The Bahamas, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina.

Against: Israel, Nicaragua, United States of America.

Abstaining: Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Germany, Federal Republic of, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Swaziland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Austria.

Draft resolution C was adopted by 97 votes to 3, with 28 abstentions (resolution 3419 C (XXX)).

141. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We now come to draft resolution D, entitled "Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East". The report of the Fifth Committee on the administrative and financial implications of this draft resolution is in document A/10424.

142. The Special Political Committee adopted this draft resolution unanimously. May I take it that the General Assembly wishes to do likewise?

Draft resolution D was adopted (resolution 3419 D (XXX)).

AGENDA ITEM 25

Appointment of the members of the Peace Observation Commission

143. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Peace Observation Commission was established by the General Assembly in resolution 377 A (V)

of 3 November 1950. The present 13 members of the Commission are Czechoslovakia, France, Honduras, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay. The terms of office of all those members will expire on 31 December 1975. One of those 13 members, Iraq, has expressed the desire not to be reappointed to the Commission, but the other 12 members have indicated their willingness to continue to serve as members. I would therefore propose that the General Assembly reappoint those 12 members for the years 1976 and 1977. May

I take it that the General Assembly approves that proposal? If there is no objection, it will be so decided.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

NOTE

¹ The delegations of Iraq and Nigeria subsequently informed the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution.