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**President: Mr. Gaston THORN  
(Luxembourg).**

*In the absence of the President, Mr. Driss (Tunisia),  
Vice-President, took the Chair.*

**AGENDA ITEMS 32 AND 33**

**International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space**

**Preparation of an international convention on principles governing the use by States of artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasting: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space**

**REPORT OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE (A/10304)**

1. Mr. ARTEAGA ACOSTA (Venezuela), Rapporteur of the First Committee (*interpretation from Spanish*): I have the pleasure of presenting to the General Assembly the report of the First Committee on agenda items 32 and 33 [A/10304], which considered the two items simultaneously. The First Committee unanimously adopted a draft resolution on these items, which appears in paragraph 14 of its report. On behalf of the First Committee, I commend that draft resolution to the General Assembly for adoption.

*Pursuant to rule 66 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the First Committee.*

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We shall now take a decision on the draft resolution entitled: "International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space". The report of the Fifth Committee on the administrative and financial implications of that draft resolution is contained in document A/10338.

3. Since the First Committee adopted that draft resolution unanimously, may I consider that the General Assembly also adopts it unanimously?

*The draft resolution was adopted (resolution 3388 (XXX)).*

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Australia, who wishes to make a brief statement to explain his vote.

5. Mr. HARRY (Australia): I have been instructed to make a very short statement in explanation of vote. This statement will apply not only to the draft resolution which has just been adopted by consensus but also to other draft resolutions coming before the General Assembly in the future.

6. As representatives are aware, there has recently been a change of Government in my country. The constitutional situation is that a caretaker Government has been established to hold office pending a general election to be held on 13 December. The Government will not take new initiatives in the foreign policy field during the period before the general election is held. I wish to state briefly the general basis on which the Australian delegation will be acting in the interval.

7. This is that the Australian delegation will, as a general rule, adhere to undertakings given and statements made and will maintain positions already expressed by vote or by announced intention of vote or by co-sponsorship.

8. On other matters, the delegation will continue to follow the broad lines of policy guidance already approved.

9. It is the necessary consequence of the constitutional position to which I have referred, however, that some of the votes which the delegation will be recording may not represent the position which the Government would adopt if it were not a caretaker Government. Specific statements of endorsement may of course be made in some cases.

10. I hope that this will assist representatives to understand my delegation's position and avoid the necessity of a separate explanation of vote on each item during the coming four weeks.

## AGENDA ITEM 49

**Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security: report of the Secretary-General**

## REPORT OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE (A/10308)

11. Mr. ARTEAGA ACOSTA (Venezuela), Rapporteur of the First Committee (*interpretation from Spanish*): I have the honour to present to the General Assembly the report of the First Committee on agenda item 49 [A/10308]. The Committee adopted a draft resolution on this item which is to be found in paragraph 10 of the report. On behalf of the First Committee, I am happy to commend the draft resolution on the question to the General Assembly for adoption.

*Pursuant to rule 66 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the First Committee.*

12. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We shall now proceed to vote on the draft resolution entitled: "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security", which is recommended by the First Committee in paragraph 10 of its report [A/10308]. A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.<sup>1</sup>

*The draft resolution was adopted by 109 votes to none, with 19 abstentions [resolution 3389 (XXX)].<sup>2</sup>*

## AGENDA ITEM 119

**Question of Korea:**

- (a) Creation of favourable conditions for converting the armistice into a durable peace in Korea and accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea;
- (b) Urgent need to implement fully the consensus of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the Korean question and to maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula

## REPORT OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE (A/10327)

13. Mr. ARTEAGA ACOSTA (Venezuela), Rapporteur of the First Committee (*interpretation from Spanish*): I have pleasure in presenting to the General Assembly the report of the First Committee on agenda item 119 [A/10327].

14. At the invitation of the First Committee, a delegation from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and a delegation from the Republic of Korea participated, without the right to vote, in the debate on the question of Korea.

15. A revised draft resolution, A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1, and draft resolution A/C.1/L.709, on the question of Korea, were before the Committee.

16. With reference to draft resolution A/C.1/L.709, the representative of Saudi Arabia submitted a number of amendments which he subsequently withdrew [*ibid.*, paras. 15, 16 and 22], on condition that the text of those amendments would be incorporated in this year's First Committee report. Since no objections to that procedure were raised in the Committee, the text of those amendments appears in the report [*ibid.*, para. 23]—which I bring to the notice of the General Assembly, as well as a statement with regard to those amendments by the representative of Saudi Arabia at the 2071st meeting of the First Committee:

"... the representative of Saudi Arabia hopes that the major Powers, before the thirty-first session begins, will have found a satisfactory solution to which the Korean people as a whole will agree. If they do not come to an arrangement then I will have to resuscitate all those amendments that may be applicable to the situation as it will obtain in the thirty-first session."<sup>3</sup>

17. Draft resolutions A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.709 on the question of Korea, which are to be found in paragraph 26 of the report as draft resolutions A and B, were adopted by the First Committee. On behalf of the Committee, I commend those two draft resolutions for adoption by the General Assembly.

*Pursuant to rule 66 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the First Committee.*

18. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now call on those representatives who have asked to explain their votes before the vote.

19. Mr. HARRY (Australia): Representatives may recall that in my statement at the 2062nd meeting of the First Committee on 22 October last, on the question of Korea, I stated that my Government believed that draft resolution A/C.1/L.709 was silent on matters of fundamental concern to us. I stated at the time that

the Australian Government could not accept the thesis proposed in that draft resolution that it is for the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea alone to negotiate peace in Korea. I said that the Republic of Korea must be recognized as a party principal in any definitive negotiation or agreement. I also said:

“My Government believes, moreover, that any new arrangements and measures must be no less effective in maintaining peace and security in the Korean peninsula than the arrangements which we are now seeking to replace.”<sup>3</sup>

20. I made clear in my statement, however, that the Australian Government had, over several months, worked hard to achieve compromise between both sides and the adoption of a consensus resolution on Korea at this thirtieth session of the General Assembly. Representatives will be aware that we were not alone in espousing the cause of consensus.

21. My delegation abstained in the vote in the First Committee on 29 October in order to further efforts at compromise and consensus. Since that vote, we have worked closely with a number of delegations which, like us, thought it worth while, even at this late stage, to seek ways of avoiding confrontation. When it became clear that there was no possibility of the adoption of a consensus resolution, we and some other delegations considered the desirability of making a joint appeal to the parties to seek ways of reducing tension in Korea and to return to their dialogue. Even our effort to launch this appeal was rebuffed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

22. Our principal goal in this debate has been compromise. Our efforts and the efforts of others towards this goal have proved fruitless. My delegation must therefore, as I said in the First Committee, cast its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.709—that is, resolution B in paragraph 26 of the Committee's report—on the basis of our independent assessment of its merits. My delegation will therefore vote against it.

23. With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1—that is, resolution A in paragraph 26 of the Committee's report—my delegation will vote in favour of it, as we did in the First Committee.

24. Mr. ABAKAR ZAID (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): I should like to explain very briefly my delegation's position before the vote on the two draft resolutions concerning the question of Korea which are now before the General Assembly [A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.709]. The position of my country on the question of Korea was explained by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the Republic of Chad in the general debate on 24 September 1975 [2359th meeting]. Since it is a question of domestic affairs of a country, the Government of Chad has always expressed the sincerest wish to see the two fraternal Korean republics, divided today, united. In this regard, the North-South Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972<sup>4</sup> based on the three principles for reunification in independence at one time met our wishes. Unfortunately, that relevant, realistic declaration was lost sight of and has not been followed up.

25. Chad has supported and will continue to support all efforts at reunification on the basis of the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972. That is the reason why my

delegation, although it abstained in the vote in the First Committee, will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.709, because we believe it truly expresses the national aspirations of the whole Korean people.

26. My delegation welcomes the praiseworthy efforts of the delegations of friendly countries which submitted draft resolution A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1.

27. Both draft resolutions have the same object in view. However, my delegation feels that draft resolution A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1 does not go to the very heart of the Korean problem and would tend to perpetuate the division of Korea. My delegation will therefore abstain in the vote on that draft resolution.

28. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): Unfortunately, as we all know, this Assembly is deeply divided on the issue before us. I regret that this is the fact and, with the Assembly's permission, I should like to review briefly some of the facts and developments which have brought us to this point.

29. As recorded in document A/10142 and Add.1-7,—the document accompanying the submission of the draft resolution that my Government and others sponsored—a number of Member States, including the United States, have sought to implement fully the consensus of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly and to encourage discussions which would lead to the dissolution of the United Nations Command in conjunction with appropriate arrangements to maintain the Armistice Agreement.

30. Thus, on 27 June 1975, those States requested the inclusion on the agenda of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly of an item entitled “Urgent need to implement fully the consensus of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the Korean question and to maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula”. The Member States requesting inclusion of that item urged that it be treated as a matter of high priority and dealt with early in the thirtieth session.

31. Document A/10327 of 3 November 1975 conveyed the report of the First Committee's consideration of the question of Korea to this thirtieth session, which has just been presented. As we take up this report in the plenary meeting, permit me to address myself, in explanation of my vote, to the draft resolution [A/C.1/L.708] co-sponsored by 28 Member States, which was recommended to the General Assembly for adoption as draft resolution A in paragraph 26 of the First Committee's report.

32. That draft resolution, first submitted on 27 June this year [A/10142 and Add.1-7, annex], was later modified by several helpful amendments. It takes note of the letter of 27 June 1975 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Government of the United States of America, offering to terminate the United Nations Command on 1 January 1976 provided that the other parties directly concerned reached agreement on alternative arrangements mutually acceptable to them for maintaining the Armistice Agreement. The draft resolution also takes due note of the statement of 27 June 1975 of the Government of the Republic of Korea affirming its willingness to enter into arrangements for maintaining the Armistice Agreement.

33. Turning to the operative paragraphs of this draft resolution, allow me to underline that each of the four paragraphs stresses dialogue and discussion between the parties directly concerned. Such dialogue and discussion would be directed at new arrangements designed to replace the Armistice Agreement, to dissolve the United Nations Command, to reduce tension and to ensure lasting peace on the Korean peninsula.

34. Let me recall that Secretary Kissinger, in his address to the Assembly on 22 September, called specifically for the convening of a conference of the parties directly concerned: the two Korean Governments, the United States and China. Secretary Kissinger made clear that he was proposing a conference which would not only discuss means for preserving the Armistice Agreement while terminating the United Nations Command, but which also could explore "other measures to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula, including the possibility of a larger conference to negotiate a more fundamental arrangement" [2355th meeting, para. 110].

35. The draft resolution, of which my Government is proud to have been one of the 28 co-sponsors, is one looking objectively and responsibly to the future. It leaves open all avenues to dialogue and discussion. Our side has at all times been prepared for dialogue and discussion. Indeed, it is the objective of the draft resolution which we co-sponsored. It is the other side, I regret to say, which has been unwilling to engage in dialogue and discussion, which has sought to impose its arbitrary will on this Assembly. The contrast between the two sides is clear for all those who are willing to see. In looking toward attainment of the goal of the peaceful reunification of Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of the Korean people, all the Korean people, this draft resolution is based squarely on principles of sovereignty and independence which are fundamental to the Charter of the United Nations.

36. While draft resolution A/C.1/L.709—which appears in paragraph 26 of the First Committee's report as draft resolution B—may appear to have some similar provisions, permit me to repeat here in the plenary meeting that it is not in accord with past resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. It does not encourage discussion by all the parties concerned with peace and security on the peninsula. Indeed, as has been made clear in public statements, it has the intention to exclude one of the principal parties, the Republic of Korea, from any such discussions. How many Members of this General Assembly, I ask you, would support a resolution which denied them the right to participate in the determination of their own future? Since most Members of this body believe firmly in the right of all people, any people, to self-determination—certainly my Government does so—it is surprising that some here are arguing that two-thirds of the population of the Korean peninsula should be denied a say in their own future. I would ask all those who believe in self-determination to ponder this fact and this omission in the other draft resolution.

37. Are we to assume that those who support draft resolution B subscribe to a doctrine of limited sovereignty for the sovereign State of the Republic of Korea? This doctrine of limited sovereignty is,

I believe, not unfamiliar to a number of the Member States which co-sponsored draft resolution B.

38. There is also the question of the United States troops in the Republic of Korea—and a great deal has been made of this—pursuant to a bilateral arrangement between the United States and the Republic of Korea—our mutual defence treaty of 1954.<sup>5</sup> Those troops are there at the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Korea. Many Member States of this body have similar bilateral arrangements between them concerning the stationing of military forces. However, the other draft resolution and the letter which introduced it make clear that it is those United States forces in Korea under a bilateral agreement which are the forces it wants withdrawn from Korea. It seeks to make this a matter of United Nations business by referring to them as forces under the United Nations flag. As my delegation stated in the 2065th and 2071st meetings of the First Committee,<sup>3</sup> the fact is that, with the exception of less than 300 personnel in the United Nations Command, the American troops in Korea are not there under the United Nations flag. Those troops, I repeat, serve in the Republic of Korea under a bilateral agreement.

39. Many of those who co-sponsored the other draft resolution have similar bilateral security arrangements which either permit the stationing of their military forces on the territory of another State or cover the stationing of foreign military forces on their own territory. Are they now saying that such bilateral arrangements are illegal or improper?

40. I re-emphasize that my Government will not place in jeopardy the future stability of the peninsula of Korea by agreeing to actions which would have as their consequence an increase in military tensions and uncertainty. As we stressed in the 2065th meeting of the First Committee,<sup>3</sup> this would be irresponsible and dangerous to the objectives we all espouse. Again may I ask that each Member carefully consider its vote on the Korean item.

41. As for the United States, we shall vote in favour of draft resolution A and against draft resolution B.

42. Mr. ŠMÍD (Czechoslovakia) (*interpretation from Russian*): From year to year, the situation of having foreign troops stationed in South Korea, even under the flag of the United Nations, has become ever more untenable. This is an anachronism, a remnant of the times of the most acute period of the cold war. International public opinion has become ever more aware of the ill effects of the presence of a foreign army in the territory of South Korea on the general situation in the Far East, and how this state of affairs, which is a manifestation of independent intervention, is an obstacle to the peaceful reunification of the country.

43. At one time, by various machinations, the flag of the United Nations was used to camouflage three years of cruel aggression against the Korean people. I would remind you that at that time when the representative of the USSR had absented himself from the Security Council meeting as a mark of protest at the fact that the People's Republic of China was prevented from exercising the rights of a permanent member of the Security Council, the delegation of the United States of America used what was its mechanical voting majority at the time to create a so-called United Nations Com-

mand and to send what were called United Nations military units to Korea behind the backs of two other permanent members of the Security Council. At that time, in the summer of 1950, advantage was taken unilaterally of the fact that two of the permanent members of the Security Council, the USSR and the People's Republic of China, were not participating in the Security Council, and the Council was forced to take illegal decisions.

44. The year 1975 is not the year 1950. Since that time, a great deal has changed in the world and in the United Nations itself, and the time has really come now when the United Nations should draw the proper conclusions from the fact that its name has been abused. The United Nations should do whatever is in its power to call a halt to imperialist intervention in South Korea. Foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the United Nations flag should be withdrawn from that country; that is an essential prerequisite for the peaceful reunification of Korea. A demand to that effect was stressed by a growing number of representatives of countries in all continents in their statements in the First Committee at this session of the General Assembly.

45. An ever-widening circle of countries considers untenable a situation in which the proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to conclude a peace treaty which would replace the existing Armistice Agreement has been rejected. The adoption at the 2071st meeting of the First Committee on 29 October 1975 of a draft resolution [A/C.1/L.709] on the termination of the armistice in Korea and its transformation into a lasting peace, and on the creation of favourable conditions for accelerating the peaceful reunification of the country, is viewed by my delegation as a very important turning point in the talks on the Korean question at the United Nations forum. This resolution reflects the general trend of the day towards international détente, when a growing number of countries and peoples are advancing on the road to independence, sovereignty and peaceful co-operation. The discussion of the Korean question in the First Committee confirmed the general change that has occurred in the atmosphere in the United Nations and the desire of a growing number of countries to do away with the remnants of the cold war and to change the unjust and illegal measures which the voting mechanism then in force compelled the United Nations to take at that time.

46. I would like to express my conviction that at its thirtieth session the General Assembly will continue on the correct course which it has adopted in the Korean matter, and will adopt, by a majority of votes, draft resolution B which is before us in the report of the First Committee presented by its Rapporteur [see A/10327, para. 26]. The draft resolution provides for the dissolution of the so-called United Nations Command and the withdrawal of all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations. The draft resolution calls upon the real parties to the Armistice Agreement to replace it with a peace treaty as a measure to ease tension and maintain and consolidate peace in Korea and the dissolution of the United Nations Command and the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations. The draft resolution calls upon North

and South Korea to observe the principles of the North-South Joint Communiqué and take practical measures leading to a reduction of the armaments and personnel of both sides to an equal level. This would prevent armed conflicts and the use of force by one side against the other side; it would eliminate the danger of military confrontation and would increase the peaceful development in Korea which would accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of the country.

47. My delegation will vote against draft resolution A [*ibid.*].

48. In July of this year I had the good fortune to be able to acquaint myself personally with the achievements of the talented Korean people and their fierce determination to bring about the peaceful and independent reunification of their country. I also saw the demilitarized zone, an artificial barrier which for more than 22 years has divided the Korean people. I realized once again that the presence of foreign troops in the territory of South Korea was the root cause of the profound tragedy of that peace-loving, industrious and cultured people. I believe that in the present discussion of the important questions affecting the future of Korea and peace and security in the Far East, it will be the forces of reason, forces which are actively striving for the intensification of détente in international relations, that will prevail.

49. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The delegation of the Soviet Union considers it necessary to make the following statement in connexion with the consideration in this plenary meeting of the report of the First Committee on the question of Korea.

50. The report contains a draft resolution, resolution B, adopted by the First Committee on the initiative of 43 co-sponsors, non-aligned and socialist countries, which takes into account the urgent need for normalizing the situation in the Korean peninsula and creating favourable conditions for the independent, peaceful reunification of Korea. The draft resolution was adopted by a substantial majority. The adoption of that draft resolution by the First Committee reflects the growing understanding by the majority of States Members of the United Nations of the real, fundamental interests of the peace-loving Korean people and the increased support in the United Nations for that people's just demand for an end to foreign intervention in its affairs, and that foreign troops be withdrawn and an opportunity be afforded finally to the Koreans independently to determine questions affecting the reunification of their country and other urgent national problems.

51. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea pointed out in its statement of 31 October last [A/10354, annex] that this draft resolution accurately reflected the unanimous desire of the people of Korea and of the peace-loving peoples of the world, the prevailing situation in Korea and the demands of the times, and also clearly indicated the fundamental ways and means for the practical solution of the problem of the reunification of Korea.

52. The draft resolution, adopted in the Committee on the initiative of 43 States, proposes the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the

flag of the United Nations and the dissolution of the so-called United Nations command. It also proposes the replacement of the temporary Armistice Agreement, which has already been overtaken by events, with a peace agreement. The resolution also contains an urgent appeal to North and to South Korea to observe the principles of the North-South Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972<sup>4</sup> and to take all practical measures for removing military confrontation and maintaining a durable peace in Korea.

53. The discussion of the question of Korea in the First Committee has once again convincingly proved that the cessation of interference of outside forces in the internal affairs of Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign troops illegally making use of the United Nations flag are the major and indispensable conditions for the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea. That is the only proper way of eliminating tension and strengthening peace in the Korean peninsula. In the light of the discussion, it has become even more obvious that it is precisely the presence of foreign troops in South Korea that is the major obstacle to the unification of Korea and the establishment of lasting peace there.

54. In a message to the Korean-Soviet Friendship Society dated 11 November, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, said:

“The Soviet people stands squarely behind the Korean people in their just struggle for the cessation of imperialist interference in the internal affairs of Korea and the attainment of the peaceful reunification of that country.”

55. Many States Members of the United Nations support the just requirement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the United Nations flag, and their number is growing every year. As is well known, the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lima from 25 to 30 August of this year, stated that “all foreign troops that remained stationed in South Korea under the United Nations flag” should “be withdrawn and the present Korean Military Armistice Agreement” should “be replaced with a peace agreement” [see A/10217 and Corr.1, para. 60]. The draft resolution of the 43 States is entirely in keeping with that position of the non-aligned countries.

56. The precarious nature of the armistice in Korea does not guarantee any reliable stabilization of the situation in the Korean peninsula, and the need for the conclusion of a peace treaty is obvious. Replacing the Armistice Agreement by a peace agreement would create a genuine guarantee for the maintenance of peace in Korea.

57. The draft resolution of the 43 States indicates specific, practical measures aimed at creating conditions for strengthening the chances of a lasting peace in the peninsula and hastening the independent, peaceful reunification of Korea. We appeal to the delegations of all States Members of the United Nations, and primarily to those of the non-aligned countries, who cherish the interests of peoples struggling against foreign intervention and for the strengthening of their freedom and national independence and an inde-

pendent and peaceful future to vote in favour of draft resolution B. The proposals in the draft resolution form a good basis for the independent and peaceful solution of the Korean problem by the Korean people themselves. It is the duty of the United Nations to promote the adoption of the measures proposed in the draft resolution. The adoption of the draft resolution would be an important and a useful contribution by the General Assembly to the cause of strengthening peace in Korea and in the Far East as a whole. It would give support to the Korean people in their efforts to solve the question of the reunification of Korea peacefully and by their own decision.

58. The report of the First Committee contains another draft resolution—resolution A—adopted on the initiative of a number of developed capitalist countries and a small number of politically like-minded non-aligned countries. That draft resolution ignores the core part of the Korean problem—the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea—and is aimed at preserving the present unstable and tense situation in the Korean peninsula. For all these reasons, the Soviet delegation will vote against that draft resolution and we call upon other delegations to vote against it. The rejection by the General Assembly of that resolution would, we are firmly convinced, be the only right and just decision and one in keeping with the interests and aspirations of the people of both parts of Korea, North and South.

59. Mr. BUSTAMANTE (Ecuador) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation finds it necessary to explain the vote which, following special instructions from my Government, we are about to cast in connexion with the draft resolutions which the First Committee has submitted for adoption by the Assembly.

60. The results of the votes taken in the Committee, and above all the debates that took place in that Committee, make it clear that the international climate that prevails in connexion with the question of Korea has given rise to a situation on which the Ecuadorian delegation believes it should not remain silent. At the same time, we sincerely hope it will be given the most responsible consideration by all other delegations.

61. Those votes and the discussions that preceded them have shown that there is a clear-cut division among the members of the General Assembly. It has not yet been possible to narrow or eliminate that division through a process of negotiation leading to the necessary compromise or generalized consensus that would be so desirable. On the contrary, the result of the voting in question has placed the Assembly in the disconcerting position of finding it necessary to adopt two draft resolutions whose spirit, meaning and scope—if not the texts themselves—reveal trends which it has not been possible to reconcile, but remain conflicting.

62. We deplore this fact. We should have preferred the General Assembly not to find itself, as it does today, compelled to take a decision in such circumstances. However, since it is faced with this dilemma and since we must, to the extent of our ability, contribute to the decisions of the General Assembly being consistent, so that this body may fulfil its heavy responsibilities, we believe that the fewest problems arise from the text of draft resolution A, provided

—in accordance with the views of Ecuador as put forward by our representative in the First Committee—it is understood that the text may not be used as justification for prolonging indefinitely the presence of foreign troops in Korea, regardless of the flag under which such troops serve and the part of the Korean territory in which they are installed; provided it is understood that this text will not be used to support any kind of interference in the internal affairs of the Korean people and nation; provided also it is understood that the reference in the draft resolution to the “new arrangements designed to replace the Armistice Agreement” refer to the definitive peace treaty that is to replace the Armistice Agreement; and, finally, provided it is made quite clear that the parties directly concerned are, above all, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. On the basis of these understandings, Ecuador will vote in favour of draft resolution A.

63. Similarly, for the reasons given by the delegation of Ecuador in the First Committee, Ecuador will again abstain in the Assembly in the vote on draft resolution B. Although the principles invoked in that text substantiate Ecuador’s international position, my delegation has been unable to support the text because it leaves a disquieting gap between the Armistice Agreement, which, however precarious, is the only thing that supports peace and security in Korea, and a future definitive peace agreement, and because the text presumes to exclude from the negotiation of that treaty the Republic of Korea, which is necessarily one of the main parties concerned, together with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

64. Mr. AKÉ (Ivory Coast) (*interpretation from French*): The consensus adopted on 28 November 1973 in the General Assembly on the question of Korea<sup>6</sup> appears still, in the eyes of the Ivory Coast delegation, to be one of the wisest decisions ever taken by the Assembly in these past few years on this question.

65. In welcoming, in that consensus, the will of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to continue the dialogue in order to achieve the independent and peaceful unification of Korea in accordance with the three principles set forth in their Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972,<sup>4</sup> the Assembly embarked upon a course which aroused our hope that it would use its influence to encourage the Governments of those two countries to pursue and intensify their dialogue in order to overcome the many difficulties which still block the way to the peaceful and independent reunification of their country.

66. For our part we regret that at the twenty-ninth session the General Assembly should have departed from that constructive attitude to fall again into the inertia that has in no way helped the cause of the unification of Korea. We continue to believe that the Assembly should not have abandoned an attitude which was the only one likely to lead the parties to engage in true negotiations instead of using it to ensure that their own views would prevail, for reasons of propaganda or of internal policy.

67. At this session, the First Committee recommends two draft resolutions for adoption by the General Assembly. While they claim to pursue the same objective—in other words to create favourable conditions

for the reunification of Korea—they in fact reflect two fundamentally opposed positions. The weak majority which supported each of these draft resolutions clearly shows that in this Assembly there is no substantial and qualitative majority in favour of imposing a settlement on the parties.

68. The adoption of either draft resolution would not create the conditions for a dialogue between the two Governments, because the victory of one camp will necessarily cause bitterness in the other camp. We believe, therefore, that we should have devoted our efforts to arriving, thanks to the understanding and co-operation of the two parties and of the great Powers which support them, at a compromise draft resolution, or a declaration by the President of the General Assembly, that could be adopted by consensus. Such a consensus would have carried much more moral force and weight than will these two draft resolutions if they should be adopted by the same majorities. We could thus have completed our consideration of the question of Korea in such a way that neither side would have derived an advantage from a vote cast either way, except that we would all have worked for the maintenance of peace and security in the Korean Peninsula by encouraging the Koreans of the North and the South in their efforts to create the necessary conditions for a peaceful and independent reunification of Korea.

69. Since our attempt to reach a consensus has been unsuccessful and we are compelled to take a decision on the two draft resolutions recommended by the First Committee, my delegation now wishes to explain how it will vote on these two draft resolutions.

70. In the present state of affairs, the first draft resolution, A, has our support because it takes into account fully the true situation prevailing in the region, which calls for adequate measures to be taken to reduce tension in the area where the major Powers are watching one another closely, so as to avoid a situation where, through lack of vigilance, weapons should prevail over dialogue and conversation. Our passion for peace compels us to support any initiative or action conducive to peace or which, at any rate, brings us closer to it, and to oppose anything that takes us further from it.

71. The withdrawal of troops, without prior arrangements for preserving peace and security in the Korean Peninsula, might lead to a confrontation the cost of which would be borne once again by the people of Korea, that people who should remain our main concern.

72. The delegation of the Ivory Coast, therefore, associates itself fully with all those who request that the United Nations put an end to its political and military commitments in Korea, but believes that disengagement cannot be achieved until such time as arrangements are arrived at which ensure peace and security in the Korean Peninsula, in particular the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement, and until, thanks to a dialogue, North Korea and South Korea arrive at an agreement on the independent and peaceful reunification of their country.

73. With reference to the second draft resolution, B, I wish to recall that the delegation of the Ivory Coast abstained in the vote on it, under the symbol A/C.1/

L.709, in the First Committee, because we wanted to see whether the Committee could be so inconsistent as to adopt two mutually exclusive resolutions and whether it would follow the line of thought of both parties concerned. Now, we have a number of objections to draft resolution B.

74. The presence or withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of an independent State is a prerogative of sovereignty to which no exception can be made. Another objection stems from the fact that North Korea, which inspired this draft resolution, will not concede either representativeness or legitimacy to the Government of South Korea. While we have no reason to doubt its readiness to engage in a dialogue, it must recognize that, for a dialogue, there have to be at least two parties, North Korea and South Korea. Not to recognize this is to adopt an attitude that is not in favour of the reunification of the country. North Korea and South Korea are fully aware of the reality of the situation and both know full well the reasons why they insist, one on the immediate withdrawal of troops and the other on the maintenance of those troops.

75. We have serious doubts, for our part, concerning the implications of this draft resolution and concerning the preservation of peace and security in the Korean Peninsula. It is these doubts that will govern our vote on the two draft resolutions.

76. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): It goes without saying that I will explain my negative vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.709, which was defeated in the First Committee. Much as I would have liked to see both parties heed the advice of our colleague from Sweden, I find that the positions have crystallised and that we are still going in circles as we have been doing since 1953.

77. Two years ago, when a consensus was adopted, against my better judgement, I warned the Committee that it would achieve no results because there were external forces pulling strings, each towards his own side. In repetition there is benefit. As we say in Arabic, "It is useful to repeat".

78. The Korean people are the victims of power politics; I do not care what ideology has been adopted by the North or by the South. There exists a Korean people, and sovereignty lies in the peoples, not in their governments. When we dealt with the principle of self-determination, elaborating it into a fully-fledged right, the first axiom was that governments come and go but sovereignty should lie with the people. The people of North and South Korea are treated like sheep—they have no will of their own. Democracy has been ritualized. Sheets of paper have been placed in wooden boxes in order to edify those in power, but still the cleavage remains, pitting brother against brother.

79. And for what purpose but to serve the strategic and economic rights of certain people outside of Korea? I said strategic—I should say and/or other rights, alleged economic rights. Let us examine those economic rights when big Powers have to spend millions in order to bolster one side or the other. The balance sheet would be in the red and they would stand to lose, but power has so blinded those who pull the strings that they always have motivations, telling

their people that they are fighting for democracy, they are fighting for justice. These are slogans that we cannot sell any more to the young generation, who are rebelling in every country regardless of its political persuasion.

80. Here come our friends, the sponsors of resolution A/C.1/L.709, who lost in the First Committee, but not by a large majority. My figures here are 51 votes to 38, with 50 abstentions, whereas the preceding draft resolution [A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1] won by 59 votes to 51, with 29 abstentions. It gives us the impression that the house is divided among itself and that the Korean question is stymied and that next year we will still have the Korean question on our agenda—year in, year out, without any results.

81. I wonder why some disinterested party, like our Swedish colleague, was not listened to. It was because the powers-that-be want to maintain the *status quo*. Here in the Assembly there is a repetition of what took place in the First Committee on the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea. I hold no brief for our American friends—you know how diametrically opposed we are on many issues, including that of the Middle East and Palestine—but we should have the courage to express our views, and not blindly oppose any draft resolution with which one of the major Powers may be associated. Although that major Power cannot be regarded as a saint, the opponents cannot be considered saints either. They make mistakes, but the United States and other States have economic rights in South Korea, and, as I have said time and again, politics revolves around economics. Do you want us to sacrifice our economic rights, some of us who have invested money in South Korea, and subject South Korea to a possible invasion?

82. The United States is 10,000 or 15,000 miles away. What if it withdrew without making sure of reunification or any combination of political instrumentality whereby there would ultimately be one Korean people with one Korean Government—perhaps by confederation, perhaps by federation, or some other form of government? Do you want a confrontation then? Suppose the Americans withdrew their troops, and then found that their economic and strategic interests were threatened. Have you considered the possibility of a confrontation? It is not desirable that everybody should predicate his policy on economic and strategic rights, but we should face the facts of life. We have not had a new approach in international affairs to replace the antiquated policies of spheres of influence and balance of power. Give me another policy and I will ask the United States forthwith what business it has to be in South Korea.

83. Let us face the fact realistically. I will not subscribe to a policy such as that of the United States, but they happen to have rights there. We happen to have rights. Others happen to have rights. Japan, I hear, has rights: not just the vestiges of their past occupation, when North and South Korea were one and Japan dominated the whole peninsula, but rather as a result of what happened after the war when they expanded their trade with the south. So whom do you think we are fooling here? It is a question of conflict of interests, and many of the so-called third-world countries are affected. We also happen to be labelled "third world". I told you from this rostrum that the



country I represent is neither aligned nor non-aligned. We sometimes feel we want to be independent, because belonging to one bloc or the other does not mean being infallible. Who can say that if we belong to the so-called non-aligned bloc we are infallible in everything that we do, and vice versa? Who can say that the West is democratic, when decadence has set in, shattering the social and political fabric, and it awaits the day when a "man of the hour" may save it from the abyss into which it may fall? I am not talking of just one country but of the whole of the West. And what about the so-called communists, who are not the communists of yesteryear or of a half-century ago, but have developed? They are developing détente with the West, and trading. What for? Is it on ideological grounds or to serve their economic interests? Both sides serve their economic interests.

84. Whom are we fooling here, playing that game of chess on the chequered board of the world, which consists mostly of small nations; a game of which we are the victims? If you are not with me, you are against me; if you are not against me, you are with me. No! The United Nations cannot survive on such a premise. That friend of mine who spoke here before me, whom I have known for 28 years and who is a contemporary as regards the Korean question—I mean Mr. Malik—should know better. This is not simply, as one might gather from his speech, a question of troops: let the American troops go and everything will be all right.

85. He has the Warsaw Pact and the Americans and their allies have the NATO pact. Does either side dictate conditions to the other as to what it should do with its pact? It is wrong in the eyes of the small countries, but this is a way of life. We have not chosen it because we small countries do not wield power. It is the big Powers that wield it, but the representatives of the major Powers—I will not say super-Powers like my good friend from China—are not sacrosanct. They are human, they make mistakes. They are apt to make more mistakes because of their wealth and power. Do you mean to say that each one of you has taken a rigid position and is fossilized in it, and that each one of you is right? We see from the voting figures on draft resolutions A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.709 that we are a house divided against itself, and a house divided against itself cannot achieve any constructive results.

86. Sweden has no axe to grind with either north or south. Out of devotion to the United Nations they came forward with ideas that might have bridged the differences, and this was anathema to some parties. They are like horses with blinkers, which cannot see anything but the road in front of them. But there are many pastures full of possibilities on each side of the road. No, they told Sweden and others who made informal approaches to both sides to try to find a bridge.

87. I speak as one not merely representing Saudi Arabia but acting as a servant of this Organization—for we have to identify ourselves with the Organization; otherwise we shall fragment ourselves into petty national States, and it is not becoming in the last quarter of this twentieth century to engage in petty nationalism, after nationalism had plunged the world into war. I repeat, had it not been for the deterrence

of terror we would perhaps have had, God forbid, a third world war.

88. Therefore, I have no choice but to vote against draft resolution A/C.1/L.709, because it does not face up to reality; and although draft resolution A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1 is not the ideal resolution, I have no other choice.

89. The people in the South and the North are brothers, but the North has been conditioned and regimented, and they can have an impact on the South, which has devoted all its energies to trade and industry, and has perhaps become soft, not strong militarily. It is not a question of numbers. How did the British take India and build an empire? Because the people were peaceful. Had it not been for civil disobedience and for Hitler, the Indians might not have won independence. Paradoxically, it took a tyrant to break down the British Empire; he contributed too. Not that we are raising flags for Hitler, yet we must face the facts.

90. So it is not a question of numbers. The people in the South are more numerous than those in the North; but it is not a question of numbers, it is a question of regimentation. Here in the so-called democracies, the new generation has awakened. They will not march into another war. They have become too soft. I do not mean the young, I mean the people who are immersed in luxury. They have become decadent, unfortunately. We know what decadence is. We Arabs had three empires. They extended from Morocco on the Atlantic to the confines of China, and when our people got drunk with power and wealth they became decadent. So do not think I am throwing stones at the British Empire only, or the French for that matter, or the Dutch or the Belgian. I am attacking every empire. Take northern peoples, like the Soviet Union: they will march their men for 24 hours. Why? Because they are regimented.

91. What chance would the South Koreans have if the Americans were to evacuate the country? The whole system is wrong. Détente, where does that get us? We find the cleavage still.

92. Therefore, let it be known that—much as we lament the present situation and although we would like to make a bridge here, at the United Nations, between North and South Korea—the Assembly is deepening the chasm, using slogans of one kind or another. In fairness, both sides are doing it, not just one; I am not favouring one side or the other. Both sides are using such empty words and slogans as have made millions march out to sacrifice their lives. Wake up, you North Koreans and South Koreans. Do not be duped by external forces. If we today are voting for one draft resolution, it is to have pointers towards the future. Let it be known that we staunchly stand for the reunification of Korea with no external forces dominating the scene, no ideology except the ideology of one people; no Government that is eternal, but a people that is sovereign.

93. Long live Korea! Neither South nor North—one Korea! No communism, no capitalism—Koreanism!

94. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Assembly will now take decisions on the two draft resolutions recommended by the First Committee in paragraph 26 of its report [A/10327]. The first vote

will be on draft resolution A. A roll call vote has been requested.

*A vote was taken by roll call.*

*Nicaragua, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Maldives, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand.

*Against:* Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Albania, Algeria, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cape Verde, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iraq, Kuwait, Laos, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique.

*Abstaining:* Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Qatar, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Zaire, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bahrain, Bhutan, Burma, Chad, Cyprus, Fiji, Finland, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal.

*Draft resolution A was adopted by 59 votes to 51, with 29 abstentions (resolution 3390 A (XXX)).<sup>7</sup>*

95. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The General Assembly will now vote on draft resolution B, which appears in paragraph 26 of the First Committee's report [*ibid.*]. A roll-call vote has been requested.

*A vote was taken by roll call.*

*Malta, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Malta, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Panama, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Albania, Algeria, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iraq, Laos, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali.

*Against:* Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Swaziland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi.

*Abstaining:* Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Zaire, Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bhutan, Brazil, Cyprus, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives.

*Draft resolution B was adopted by 54 votes to 43, with 42 abstentions (resolution 3390 B (XXX)).<sup>7</sup>*

96. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now call on those delegations which have asked to speak to explain their votes.

97. Mr. SAITO (Japan): My delegation voted for draft resolution A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1 and against draft resolution A/C.1/L.709. However, the General Assembly at its thirtieth session has just adopted two resolutions on the question of Korea, each of which contains conflicting provisions. It has been confirmed that the majority of the Member States do not wish to implement only one of the resolutions. This means that the Assembly at this session has failed to bring about a solution of the question of Korea, and has even failed to take the first step towards a solution.

98. Confronted with this situation then, how should the Members of the United Nations interpret this result? Some may boast of the victory of their own resolution, simply by counting the number of votes which it received and ignoring the fact that another resolution which contradicts it has also been adopted. Some may merely deplore the equivocal position of a General Assembly that adopts two contradictory resolutions, on the same day, simultaneously.

99. It is the conviction of my delegation, however, that the unusual situation which is before us indicates that confrontation cannot solve such an important problem as the Korean question, and, therefore, the road to conciliation should be sought.

100. This is exactly what I stressed in my statement at the 2060th meeting of the First Committee<sup>3</sup> on 21 October 1975, at the very beginning of the general debate on the question of Korea, when I remarked that a solution of this question "can be found only through dialogue and conciliation".

101. Therefore, it is our hope that, although there have been differences between the two groups of sponsors over the language of the proposals, most of the sponsors of the two resolutions will agree that what is needed for the solution of the Korean problem is conciliation, not confrontation. I should like to appeal to all Member States to put aside the controversy that arose during the discussion in the First

Committee, accept the possibility of a fresh approach and make new efforts to seek the road to conciliation.

102. In the present situation, what sort of action should we take? It may not be easy to find the road to conciliation on such a long-standing and complicated problem as the question of Korea. However, can we not interpret the decisions just taken by the General Assembly as the expression of the common wish of the majority of the Member States to seek peace and the reunification of the Korean peninsula, and agree that the only failure is the disagreement on the measures to be taken and the priority to be assigned to those measures?

103. Indeed, both the resolutions we have now adopted provide valuable clues to a solution. Both seek the reduction of tension in the Korean peninsula, the creation of a situation for terminating the military presence of the United Nations in Korea by proposing an appropriate measure to replace it, and also the promotion of a dialogue aimed at achieving the reunification of South and North Korea. Those objectives have been set forth clearly as a result of the deliberations on the Korean question at this session. It is my firm belief, therefore, that if all the parties directly concerned could reach a preliminary agreement on what they should do now to achieve the goals which I have just mentioned, it would constitute a first step on the road to conciliation. In other words, I am convinced that all the parties directly concerned should now try to agree on what they should do in the present situation to achieve peace, security and the reunification of Korea.

104. My delegation most earnestly hopes that this first, preliminary step will be taken as soon as possible—at the latest before the next session of the General Assembly; and we are ready to do our utmost so that this can be done. At the same time, my delegation would like to invite all Member States and the Secretary-General to do their best to bring about this result.

105. This year the question of Korea has unfortunately brought to the United Nations confrontation and disunity. However, it is my delegation's earnest hope that at the Assembly's session next year the wishes of most of the delegations assembled here which seek conciliation will bear fruit, and that all of us will be able to look back on the confrontation of 1975, this year, as an episode of the old days which will not trouble us any more.

106. Mr. RYDBECK (Sweden): The Swedish delegation deeply regrets that the question of Korea has not been treated in a more positive manner during the present session of the General Assembly. Polemics and confrontation cannot solve the difficult problems involved in the Korean issue, nor can controversial resolutions pressed to the vote and adopted with a number of affirmative votes far below the majority of Member States.

107. Further, in this case two competing and at least partly conflicting resolutions have ultimately been adopted. These resolutions express differing views on such important matters as conditions for the dissolution of the United Nations Command and the replacement of the Korean Military Armistice Agreement by a peace treaty or other arrangements of a more permanent nature. The ensuing situation is anything

but clear. Different interpretation of what the General Assembly actually decided will be made by the parties, and this in turn will certainly be a serious obstacle to implementation.

108. My delegation, like several others, actively sought to promote solutions more conducive to a realistic treatment of the complicated problems involved. Such solutions, involving co-operation and consensus, would have been more compatible with the high responsibilities of the United Nations. They would also have better served the interests of the people of Korea concerning durable peace and security, as well as independent and peaceful reunification. Unfortunately, those efforts met with no success.

109. However, it remains of the highest importance that the United Nations should contribute to the fulfilment of these aspirations of the Korean people. In the course of the year before us, efforts to that purpose must continue. In the meantime, it is necessary that all concerned should exercise restraint, take all possible steps to reduce tension in Korea, facilitate the resumption of the dialogue as envisaged in the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972,<sup>4</sup> and do everything in their power to promote the goal of agreed solutions.

110. Mr. HUANG (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): After a long and serious debate and after overcoming all kinds of disturbances, the General Assembly has finally adopted draft resolution B, which was submitted by Algeria and 42 other countries, by a majority of 54 to 43. This is an important step taken by the United Nations in the right direction towards the settlement of the Korean question. This is a victory of the just struggle of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the entire Korean people, who have long pursued the cause of the independent and peaceful reunification of their fatherland, as well as a common victory of the people of the third-world countries, who support each other and fight in unity. We sincerely rejoice at this.

111. The 43-nation-sponsored draft resolution adopted by the General Assembly has set forth the correct and effective propositions for the settlement of the Korean question. It clearly provides that it is necessary to dissolve the "United Nations Command" and withdraw all the foreign troops stationed in south Korea under the flag of the United Nations and that the real parties to the Armistice Agreement should be called upon to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement; it urges the north and the south of Korea to observe the principles of the North-South Joint Communiqué, and to take practical measures for preventing armed conflicts and guaranteeing against the use of force against the other side. These important measures stipulated in the draft resolution are aimed at terminating foreign interference, removing tension and creating favourable conditions for accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea. This fully conforms to the urgent desire of the Korean people for the independent and peaceful reunification of their country, reflects the current situation in the Korean peninsula and the rest of Asia and the needs of our time and is conducive to the fundamental improvement of the situation in the Korean peninsula and North-east Asia. We maintain that all the above important provisions of the resolu-

tion must be implemented without delay and in a comprehensive way.

112. Draft resolution A—co-sponsored by the United States and others—made no mention whatsoever of the vital issue of the withdrawal of United States troops from South Korea. On the contrary, during the debate the United States representative has gone so far as to declare that fewer than 300 of the United States troops stationed in South Korea belong to the United Nations Command, that the remaining 40,000 and more United States troops are present in South Korea in accordance with the so-called “US-ROK” treaty, and that therefore they are not bound by the resolution. This is a downright sophistry which is completely untenable. As is known to all, all the United States troops have been introduced into South Korea under the United Nations flag. Up till September 1974, the United States representative had declared at the meetings of the Korean Military Armistice Commission that United States troops were stationed in South Korea as United Nations forces. A few days thereafter, the United States side abruptly changed its tune by saying that the 40,000 and more United States troops were stationed in South Korea in accordance with the so-called “US-ROK bilateral defence arrangement”. The United States tries to alter the fact that the United States troops are stationed in South Korea as United Nations forces by means of removing their “helmet”. But how can it succeed? It must be noted that the Armistice Agreement, which the United States has kept on declaring its intention of preserving explicitly, provides for “ceasing the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel” except for the rotation of the United Nations forces then in South Korea “on a man-for-man basis”. One may ask: Do the so-called United States troops not belonging to the United Nations Command fall from heaven? Furthermore, the Korean Armistice Agreement has affirmed the principle of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. The sophistry on the part of the United States precisely shows that it has violated the Armistice Agreement which it declares it wants to preserve and that it has contravened the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States tries to justify the presence of United States troops in South Korea with the above sophistry. This is of course absolutely impermissible.

113. As we have pointed out on many occasions, the prolonged refusal of United States troops to quit South Korea is the root cause of the present tension in the Korean peninsula as well as the main obstacle to the realization of independent and peaceful reunification by the Korean people. The purpose of the draft resolution of the United States and others is none other than to use the dissolution of the United Nations Command as a pretext in exchange for the legalization of the perpetual presence of United States troops in South Korea and the continued creation of “two Koreas”. In fact, the “UN Command” has long become the “US Command” in every sense. Evidently, the dissolution of the so-called United Nations Command must be settled together with the withdrawal of United States troops from South Korea, and the two must not be separated. The use of any pretext to justify the continued presence of United States troops in South Korea is in violation of the principle of the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea

which has been confirmed by the General Assembly. It is only natural that the delegations of many countries firmly oppose such a resolution that openly encourages the United States to forcibly station its troops in South Korea, continue to interfere in Korea's internal affairs, divide the Korean nation and create “two Koreas”. In our view, as the draft resolution submitted by Algeria and 42 other nations has been formally adopted by the General Assembly, the United States draft resolution is certainly of no value and is null and void.

114. The Korean people are the masters of Korea. The Korean question must be settled by the Korean people themselves, free from any outside interference. The prolonged United States military aggression and gross intervention in Korea by illegally usurping the name of the United Nations have evoked the strong opposition of the entire Korean people and the people of the world. The obstinate procrastination of the United States on a settlement of the Korean question will only land itself in a more passive and isolated position. It must be pointed out that all artificially divided countries will eventually realize their national reunification. This is the general trend and popular demand, which no force on earth can frustrate. We are deeply convinced that with the support of the peoples of the world, the entire Korean people will do away with interference by outside force and realize the independent and peaceful reunification of their country. The Chinese people will as always fight shoulder to shoulder with the fraternal Korean people and support them in their just struggle until final victory.

115. U TIN LAT (Burma): My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution B as a whole. However, we should like to state that we have reservations on operative paragraph 2 of that text, because, in the opinion of my delegation, it intends to exclude the Republic of Korea from the possible conclusion of a new peace agreement in Korea. My delegation believes that lasting peace and security in the Korean peninsula and the achievement of national reunification can be attained only with the active participation of both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Had a separate vote been taken on that operative paragraph, my delegation would have abstained.

116. Mr. GROZEV (Bulgaria) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Korean question has been discussed in the United Nations for more than 25 years now. After such a long period of discussion and debate, we have finally adopted draft resolution A/C.1/L.709, which is fully in keeping with the legitimate aspirations of the Korean people for the peaceful and independent reunification of the country without foreign interference. This will help the creation of the appropriate conditions for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of South Korea and the conclusion of a peace treaty. This draft resolution provides for measures and steps which would lead—I should like to stress this—not to a further continuation of the present abnormal situation prevailing in the Korean peninsula, but to a genuine implementation of all measures necessary to create the conditions for the reunification of the country.

117. The adoption of that draft resolution by the General Assembly, without any doubt, is further confirma-

tion of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and is in keeping with the interests and aspirations of the whole Korean people, and the interests of peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world. Obviously, the world Organization no longer wishes to connive at the shameful use of the flag of the United Nations in the service of interests and purposes which contradict the interests of the Korean people and the purposes of the Charter. It is precisely for this reason that the General Assembly clearly and unambiguously expressed its wish for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of South Korea. The sooner those foreign troops are actually withdrawn, the sooner will it be possible to carry out the peaceful and independent reunification of Korea. The adoption of that decision is an act of political wisdom because it is entirely in keeping with the spirit of the times, with the general aspirations of all peoples to international détente, and their desire that as a result of these positive changes it may be possible to extend the benefits of détente throughout all parts of the world.

118. Such a decision is worthy of this session which celebrates the thirtieth anniversary of the United Nations, and thus demonstrates that it is in keeping with the positive trends in the world. It will strengthen confidence of the nations as to the ability of the Organization to make an active contribution to the resolution of contemporary international problems. It is for those reasons that the Bulgarian delegation and many other delegations voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.709 as being most in keeping with the requirements of a just settlement of the Korean problem.

119. Mr. THIOUNN PRASITH (Cambodia) (*interpretation from French*): The General Assembly has just by an overwhelming majority adopted draft resolution A/C.1/L.709, which was sponsored by 43 countries, among them my own country, Kampuchea. The General Assembly has rejected all sophism and all lying and slanderous propaganda against the people of Korea. It has unmasked all dilatory tactics and has spoken out clearly in favour of the dissolution of the so-called United Nations Command and of the complete withdrawal of United States troops from South Korea. With this vote it has expressed its determination to open the way for a dynamic process of independent and peaceful reunification of Korea, in keeping with the deeply-felt and reasonable aspirations of the people of Korea. By the same token, it has expressed its will to put an end to 25 years of usurpation of the United Nations flag to mask the aggression and foreign intervention by the United States in the internal affairs of the Korean people.

120. The adoption of this resolution by the General Assembly is above all a victory for the Korean people, but it reflects clearly the demand of all the peoples of the world engaged in the irreversible movement for independence and national sovereignty. In conformity with the principles of the Charter concerning respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, it has shown our Organization the course to follow to contribute effectively to the elimination of tension in that part of the world and, at the same time, to achieve the consolidation of world peace.

121. The recent painful experience of the Kampuchean people shows that no national independence is possible, no national sovereignty can be envisaged, no national unity can be achieved and, therefore, no lasting peace can be built so long as aggression and intervention in the internal affairs of a State by foreign forces continue—in this case, the intervention of United States imperialism.

122. It is with this conviction that the delegation of Kampuchea was both happy and honoured to express once again its full solidarity with the just struggle of the Korean people and of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to reaffirm the position that it has always held and that is well known to all.

123. The General Assembly has just made a contribution to the struggle made of sacrifice, determination and perseverance of the people of Korea for the peaceful, independent reunification of their fatherland, and to the cessation of the sufferings and evils that have beset the people, which have lasted too long. It has thus participated in the elimination of one of the greatest injustices of our time, and that gesture does it great honour.

124. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The General Assembly has just taken a decision on agenda item 119. The two draft resolutions concerning the question of Korea and reflecting the views expressed by their respective sponsors were adopted by the General Assembly to the satisfaction of the parties concerned. None the less, the question of Korea remains unresolved. Sincere, continued and urgent efforts must be made by all to ensure progress towards solving this problem, which has been before the United Nations for 27 years. It is to be hoped that, thanks to the points of agreement and the common elements in the two resolutions, despite the divergencies in the texts, the adoption of the two resolutions by the Assembly will provide an opportunity to begin true negotiations, for which the parties concerned must now seek adequate and mutually acceptable machinery. The search for such negotiating machinery will make it possible to go beyond the *status quo* and will pave the way for the achievement, in mutual confidence and understanding, of the objective dear to all the Korean people, namely, the peaceful and independent reunification of Korea without outside interference. As can be seen from both resolutions, all the efforts made must reflect the common concern with the need to maintain peace in the Korean peninsula.

125. If the question of Korea arises again at the thirty-first session, the General Assembly may then perhaps be in a position to note considerable progress on the road to peace and to adopt unanimously a decision which will reinforce the rights of the Korean people and consolidate international peace, for which, in accordance with the Charter, the Organization must continue to strive.

*The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.*

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#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The delegation of the United States of America subsequently informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote against the draft resolution.

<sup>2</sup> The delegation of Bangladesh subsequently informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

<sup>4</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27*, annex 1.

<sup>5</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 256, No. 3635, p. 251.

<sup>6</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 41, document A/9341, para. 21.

<sup>7</sup> The delegation of Bangladesh subsequently informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution.