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**President: Mr. Gaston THORN  
(Luxembourg).**

*Statement by the President*

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Following upon representations made to me by colleagues and by a number of delegations, I feel it is my duty to take a stand with regard to certain statements which have been issued in my name and which have given rise to some feeling. I take this opportunity to recall once again, and I hope for the last time, as I did yesterday in a corrective statement that was issued in order to avoid any misunderstanding or erroneous interpretation, that the statements that I made before the vote on racial discrimination, as well as those that I made afterwards, were made solely in my capacity as a Luxembourg politician. I regret that they were, unfortunately, issued as coming from the President of the General Assembly. I take the responsibility for that. I have said so, and I repeat it, for, while I have the courage of my convictions, I have also the courage to admit my mistakes. I regret it and, in so far as it is necessary, I apologize for it.

2. Today I am speaking as President of the General Assembly. I am sure that no one in this hall will contradict me if I say that I have always considered, in this forum and in all the other assemblies over which I have presided, that it was my duty, as President, to conduct the debates in an absolutely impartial manner and to permit them to proceed in the most perfect order. I believe that I have done that so far, and I intend to carry on in exactly the same way in the future. I am, and I shall remain, the servant of the Assembly. You will well understand, my dear colleagues, that, having thus defined my role as President, it could not be possible, and will not be possible, for me to reply, from this rostrum and in my capacity as President, to all that might be said on the subject of the statements that I made, I repeat, solely in my capacity as a politician. We remain, you and I, politicians who accept their responsibilities.

3. I am convinced that all those among you, whether they belong to this majority or to that minority, who

have always wished to be able freely to express their opinions—opinions that I have always respected and shall continue to respect—will afford me also, as a Luxembourg politician, the responsibility and freedom of my opinions.

4. That having been said, I hope that the Assembly will at last be able to resume, with the necessary calm, the study of pending problems, and to do so in the spirit of conciliation and co-operation of which I have been a champion throughout my career, and that we shall now be able to proceed to the consideration of important outstanding issues. For my part, I shall devote myself to that. In doing so, I shall have need of the co-operation of all delegations.

5. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): Mr. President, we have listened to your statement very attentively and very carefully. I believe I speak on behalf of most of my colleagues here, especially those of the non-aligned group of countries, of the African group, and of other Members too, when I say that we take note of the statement you have made, and I would dare say that the matter is closed.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I thank the representative of Mauritius. I now call on the representative of Yemen.

7. Mr. MAKKI (Yemen) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Mr. President, we have just listened to the words you have spoken in which you offered your apologies. We can thus consider the matter closed, and hope that this will be reflected in the verbatim record of this meeting.

8. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I thank the representatives of Mauritius and Yemen. I share their feelings.

**AGENDA ITEM 123**

**Development and international economic co-operation:  
implementation of the decisions adopted by the  
General Assembly at its seventh special session**

**REPORT OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE  
(PART I) (A/10344)**

9. Mr. KARIM (Bangladesh), Rapporteur of the Second Committee: I have the honour to present to the General Assembly part I of the report of the Second Committee on agenda item 123, "Development and international economic co-operation: implementation of the decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its seventh special session", which is contained in document A/10344. In paragraph 6 of that report, the Second Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of a draft resolution entitled "Fifth replenishment of the International Development Association". The draft resolution was adopted in the Committee without a vote.

10. The Second Committee authorized the submission of this partial report on item 123 because the Committee wished that draft resolution to be approved by the General Assembly so that it could be brought to the attention of Governments in time, thus emphasizing the importance of the replenishment of the International Development Association during the forthcoming discussion.

*Pursuant to rule 66 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the Second Committee.*

11. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I believe that the positions of delegations have been made clear in the Second Committee itself in respect of the draft resolution submitted to the Assembly, and those positions are reflected in the relevant summary record of the Second Committee.

12. As no one has asked to speak in explanation of vote, we shall therefore now take a decision on the draft resolution recommended by the Second Committee in paragraph 6 of its report [A/10344]. As there appears to be no objection, may I take it that the General Assembly decides to adopt the draft resolution?

*The draft resolution was adopted (resolution 3387 (XXX)).*

## AGENDA ITEM 125

### Question of Cyprus (*continued*)

13. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): The United Nations has been dealing with the question of Cyprus intermittently for nearly 20 years. It has been closely associated with the long and arduous process of negotiation which led, in 1960, to the creation of an independent State on the island. The General Assembly, its Committees and the Security Council have held innumerable meetings on the subject. The successive Secretaries-General of our Organization have been entrusted with various missions under different circumstances. Last, but not least, the United Nations has maintained, since 1964, a peace-keeping force on the island. In this connexion, I should like to express the gratitude of my Government to those Member States which have contributed to that force. Their contribution to the maintenance of peace on the island has been invaluable.

14. I should also like to pay a tribute to the outgoing Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, for his untiring efforts in the discharge of his mission. I should also like to welcome the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, whose exceptional qualities as an experienced diplomat and whose deep knowledge of the affairs of Cyprus are well known to all. We wish him all success. Above all, I wish to convey the heartfelt gratitude of the Government of Turkey to the Secretary-General, who has spared no effort in the search for a solution to the problem of Cyprus. His dedication to the cause of peace and to the principles of the United Nations, and his outstanding diplomatic qualities, are further assurances on the way to achieving a just and equitable settlement of the issue. Last, but not least, our thanks go to the assistants of the Secretary-General, the Commander of

the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus [UNFICYP] and its rank-and-file members for the competence they have shown in the discharge of their duties.

15. The great majority of the members of the Assembly are well acquainted with the evolution of the problem over the years. I wish, nevertheless, to focus the attention of members on some important stages marking the development of the Cyprus issue up to the present situation in which we are placed today.

16. Cyprus became an independent State in 1960 upon the adoption of a bicomunal Constitution based on the equal partnership of the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities. This was a *sui generis* structure because the reality underlying the relationships between the two national groups composing the population of Cyprus was *sui generis*. In this respect it would be hardly possible indeed to find a similar situation in any country in the third world which gained independence in the same period by the process of decolonization. The differences between the two communities in Cyprus were not only ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic, but went much deeper. For the two communities have strongly identified themselves as parts of the greater neighbouring nations, namely Turkey and Greece. They perceive themselves as indivisible parts of those nations and consider their fate to be linked indissolubly with those nations. Furthermore, Turkey and Greece have had a long history of relationship which found its reflection in the intercommunal relations on the island of Cyprus.

17. The composition of the State of Cyprus, therefore, wisely reflected these facts and envisaged a partnership between the two communities based on their common interest in maintaining a viable State that would enable its peoples to prosper and to develop simultaneously. In order to survive, the Cypriot State required not only the safeguarding of the constitutional equilibrium but also dedication on the part of both communities to the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic.

18. Even on the day of independence it was clear that any attempt by either community to pursue a policy oriented towards absorption by their respective motherlands or to tamper with the basics of the Constitution would not only undermine the rationale of an independent Republic of Cyprus but would also result inevitably in violent intercommunal strife, which would in turn involve Turkey and Greece. It also required determination on the part of Turkey and Greece to base their policies towards the young Republic on the same considerations and to encourage in the two communities lasting harmony and co-operation.

19. If we find ourselves today discussing the question of Cyprus, that is due to the evolution of a situation on the island which did not live up to those imperatives. The Republic of Cyprus barely survived three years, only to collapse in 1963. The reason for that tragic outcome is that the leadership of the Greek Cypriot community, convinced that numerical considerations made Cyprus a Greek island, from the outset regarded independence only as an ephemeral phase to be terminated at its earliest convenience in favour of union with Greece. The loyalty of the Greek Cypriot community was channelled not towards the

independence of the island but to the termination of that very independence. Tampering with the Constitution slowly gained momentum and culminated in a massive and sudden onslaught on the Turkish Cypriot community with the goal of depriving it of all its rights and disabling it as an obstacle in the path to *enosis*.

20. When those dangerous policies began to be implemented in Cyprus, it was the moral and contractual obligation of Turkey and Greece to stop them. In this case, as the Greek Cypriot community was the initiator of this dangerous course, it was incumbent upon Greece to call it to reason, to indicate at least that Greece was not for the extermination of the Republic of Cyprus. But, most regrettably, a different wind was blowing in that country in 1964. Fiery speeches by the Prime Minister of Greece advocating union with Greece exacerbated the Greek national passion and pushed Archbishop Makarios to an ever-increasing audacity, until finally the Constitution was discarded and the State was transformed into an instrument of oppression and tyranny against the Turkish Cypriot community. Simultaneously Greece openly violated the independence of Cyprus and dispatched 20,000 troops to the island.

21. The Republic of Cyprus thus virtually collapsing under the joint attempts of Greece and the Greek Cypriot leadership, the island became, for all practical purposes, a military colony of Greece and the goal of *enosis* was half-way met. The plight of the Turkish Cypriot community thereafter was vividly described at the United Nations by the representatives of that community in both the General Assembly and the Security Council. All the representatives who were present at those meetings, and those who have subsequently read the records, have I am sure fully understood the agony, humiliation and suffering of that unhappy community.

22. The year 1967 marked another important turning-point in the recent history of Cyprus when the policy of putting an end to the independence of the Republic was accelerated by an outright military attack on the areas inhabited by the Turkish Cypriots. The order for that outrageous onslaught came directly from Athens and was executed by the notorious General Grivas, who commanded the Greek occupation forces. Turkey had to react strongly. A very grave crisis ensued, at the end of which Greece undertook to withdraw its tactical forces from the island and to remove General Grivas. They were to return later but at that time it was assumed that Greece had finally come to realize that the pursuit of annexation had to be abandoned.

23. That gave way to the hope that the ruined structure of the State could be rebuilt on a new basis and the two communities undertook negotiations to that effect. Those negotiations continued for six years, from 1968 to 1974. The Greeks were unyielding. To the impatience of the Turkish Cypriot community to arrive at a quick solution they stated serenely that there was no rush and that it was impossible to elaborate a new constitution and reach a settlement in a short time. Again and again they counselled patience.

24. Turkish Cypriot patience was taxed to the utmost. They nevertheless continued to negotiate for six years despite the overwhelming military preponderance of the Greeks, despite their inability to make their voices heard in international forums and despite the fact

that during all those years they were denied the slightest participation in governmental functions.

25. What we are facing today is a complete reversal of attitude so far as the pace of the intercommunal talks is concerned. Today the Greek Cypriots lament that there is no progress in the intercommunal talks, that time is pressing and that the international community cannot remain indifferent to this situation. The Greeks of Cyprus seem to have suddenly discovered how precious time can be. We agree with them. We should like to see some definite progress in the intercommunal talks; we should like to see a rapid solution, but we see no justification for this cynical self-righteousness.

26. Time was important during the six years when the Greek Cypriot administration made a mockery of the intercommunal talks, and time is still valuable today. But the allegation that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community are responsible for the present situation is simply untrue.

27. In spreading this allegation, the Greeks are tragically deluding themselves about what happened in Cyprus in 1974. They are casting aside what has been described by the Archbishop—if I may refer to an authoritative source, as he is on this matter—as an outright Greek invasion. What is easily forgotten is that Cyprus was on the verge of losing forever its independence and being condemned to live under the yoke of an abhorred fascist dictatorship. Blinded as they are to the real causes of the tragedy, the Greeks concentrate their efforts on the lawful and the legitimate reaction of Turkey. In doing so, they lose sight of the real issues and substitute rhetoric for the quest of peace.

28. We all know that to arrive at a peaceful settlement is no easy task. The statements of both the Turkish Cypriot representatives and Greek Cypriot representatives have underlined the complexities of the problem we are confronted with. The question of Cyprus is indeed complicated, not only because of the intrinsic difficulties but also because of the several perceptions of it that are misleading.

29. We have seen a typical example of a misconception regarding the Cyprus issue in the statement of the representative of Dahomey. I regret very much that he used offensive language against the country I represent. But this is not the main point I wanted to take up. Neither was I astonished to hear him urge the withdrawal of the Turkish forces even before a settlement. But I was really shocked to hear him advocate forced integration in Cyprus, which, in the light of the recent history of the island, could only end in the almost total elimination of the numerically inferior community. That would not be, I believe, very much of a solution, and it would create a rather unhappy precedent.

30. The representative of Dahomey also put forward the idea of the demilitarization of Cyprus. As I stated yesterday at the 976th meeting of the Special Political Committee, we stand for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus, and for an independent Cyprus where there would be no strategic weapons and no forces capable of carrying out strategic operations. We very much agree with the principle that Cyprus should not con-

stitute a danger for the peace and security of the eastern Mediterranean or for the security of any of the countries in that region. But I wonder how the representative of Dahomey reconciles his idea of demilitarization of Cyprus with the existence on the island of two important military bases. He certainly knows that Archbishop Makarios has rejected all the treaties connected with the creation of Cyprus as an independent State to the exclusion only of the treaty regarding these military bases. Subsequently he also agreed to the establishment of other foreign installations on the territory of the Republic. It has always been puzzling to us to see that such behaviour can be harmonized with a policy of non-alignment.

31. Some representatives who spoke this morning have urged us not to indulge in acrimonious debates. I am prepared to go along with that suggestion and I will not reply to the slanderous accusations levelled against Turkey by the Greek Cypriot representatives. What was discouraging for us was not the aggressive and abusive rhetoric which they used, but the lack in their statements of a willingness to respond to the Turkish community's desire for continued negotiations. I would be less than candid if I did not voice serious concern in this respect. The representatives who spoke on behalf of the Greek Cypriot community have several times emphasized that the Cyprus conflict is not a conflict between the two communities. It might indeed be said that that is the central theme of their presentation. We have difficulty in understanding the motives behind this attitude. Have the Greek Cypriots decided not to pursue the intercommunal negotiations further? If this is the case, what alternative plans do they have for settling the problem? Or is this attitude the result of their determination to negate the limited yet substantial agreements achieved in the four rounds of talks? Some statements by the representatives of the Greek Cypriots seem to indicate that this last possibility is indeed the case. It is even possible to detect in those pronouncements a serious disagreement among Greek Cypriot factions, with the hardliners seemingly prevailing at this juncture. This has always been a source of difficulty throughout the intercommunal talks since 1968. Turkish Cypriots have been presented with different proposals each time. They have been unable to comprehend the Greek Cypriot positions and have not known whose word to believe.

32. My Government's view has always been, and continues to be, that the only way for a peaceful settlement is through intercommunal talks. We believe that the General Assembly should firmly endorse the necessity for the two communities to persevere in the search for peace. The Assembly should do so in full knowledge of the issues at stake in these negotiations and the progress achieved so far. It has a unique opportunity in this respect. The leader of the Turkish Cypriot community and one of the negotiators in the intercommunal talks, Mr. Rauf Denktas, is in New York and is appealing for a hearing by the Assembly. We believe that an affirmative reaction to that request would facilitate the task of the Assembly in its endeavour to make a constructive contribution to the settlement of Cyprus. Such a positive reaction will fully conform to resolution 3212 (XXIX), which unequivocally indicates that the General Assembly considers

the conflict to be between the two communities and calls upon them to negotiate on an equal footing.

33. We should now try to channel our debate towards a constructive end, benefiting from the insights provided by the delegations which participated in this debate. Such an approach might enable us to depart from rigid positions and move towards a rapprochement of views. It was in this spirit that my delegation was looking forward to the efforts of some non-aligned countries which were ready to undertake such efforts.

34. To our regret, the Greek Cypriots have not chosen that path and are rushing to present a draft resolution [A/L.769] on which I have the following comments to make. Any draft resolution on an issue such as the Cyprus conflict should be evaluated primarily from the point of view of its prospective contribution to the settlement of this issue. We all know that the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly do not by themselves solve the problems we face. They may, however, contribute to a solution, to the extent that they reflect a correct evaluation of a given situation, a realistic and balanced approach, a full understanding of the positions of the parties concerned, a respect for their sensitivities, and a stand based on justice and equity. The draft resolution presented by the Greek Cypriot delegation does not conform to any of those criteria. It is in direct contradiction to all of them. It is a draft resolution the mere presentation of which is bound to have an adverse effect on negotiations. It is a draft resolution presented, to say the least, in a completely negative spirit, a spirit which has contributed so much to the present tragedy of Cyprus.

35. This is, in general, the reaction of my delegation to the Greek Cypriot draft resolution. I should like now to present our detailed views on it.

36. The first preambular paragraph contains the term "Government of the Republic of Cyprus". This is a departure from last year's text, which omitted any such reference. It omitted it not because the Republic is not entitled to exist, but because it is at present unable to express a common view on behalf of its co-founders, the Turkish and the Greek communities.

37. The conflict is between the two communities, and the General Assembly, by its resolution 3212 (XXIX), has recognized it as such. Under these circumstances, as the Greek community has usurped the powers of the State to the complete exclusion of the Turkish community to the point of leaving them stateless, any reference to the "Government of the Republic of Cyprus" in the context of a resolution on the Cyprus question would be tantamount to denying to the Turkish community the right to negotiate on an equal footing. Nobody can expect the Turkish community to negotiate under conditions which, *a priori*, condemn it to a position of inferiority.

38. The second preambular paragraph would have the General Assembly note with regret the non-implementation by Turkey of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and a number of Security Council resolutions. I think the reference to the non-implementation of Security Council resolutions is utterly irrelevant. The Security Council itself has not noted any non-implementation by Turkey of any of its resolutions.

39. As far as General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) is concerned, to hold Turkey responsible for its non-implementation has no justification whatsoever. The only way to implement this resolution is to achieve a settlement through intercommunal negotiations. Turkey has always encouraged these negotiations and taken steps to contribute to an easing of tension and the creation of an atmosphere of dialogue. To try to put the blame on Turkey in this respect is a futile attempt to confuse the issue, to present the problem in a false light in order to justify the refusal to negotiate.

40. Regarding the third preambular paragraph, we certainly agree with the reference to the untiring efforts of the Secretary-General, to whom we are grateful for his perseverance in the search for a peaceful solution. But I think it is not doing justice to his efforts to say that all four rounds of intercommunal talks have proved fruitless, as this paragraph does. We do not accept that no progress has been achieved during those talks. Some important humanitarian problems have been resolved; a channel of communication has been maintained between the two communities; there has been substantial discussion on the basic elements of a future solution; partial steps have even been taken on the basis of a common assumption; and a realistic assessment has been made of the fundamental nature of a solution. Whereas there was no identity of views between the parties on the ultimate nature of the settlement to be found at the beginning of the intercommunal talks, by the end of the third round in Vienna<sup>1</sup> there emerged a complete identity of views that the solution would be a bizonal federation between the two communities, with a central government with agreed limited functions in which the two communities would participate on a basis of equality, provided there was agreement on the zones. This agreement, which reflected the realities of Cyprus and what has happened over the past 12 years, was questioned or rejected by the extremist Greek leaders and EOKA<sup>2</sup> partisans in Cyprus once it was published. The voice of reason was thus suppressed. If at each round of negotiations a new voice is to be raised from the Greek Cypriot side contradicting the previous agreement, how can an early settlement be expected? I find it very hard to understand this persistence in castigating the intercommunal talks. Do the Greek Cypriots really believe that the situation could have been better without these talks? If they do, this is a serious aberration.

41. Because the second and third preambular paragraphs are devoid of any justification, they are unacceptable. So is the fourth preambular paragraph, since it is based on the preceding ones. The fourth paragraph also contains a reference to "unilateral acts". I assume that what that means is the new administrative structure of the Turkish Cypriot community. As we have explained time and again, the Greek Cypriot community cannot object to the internal reorganization of the Turkish community until a new constitution is agreed upon. There is no doubt that at that time the structures of both communities should be in conformity with the constitutional framework. The Turkish community has said that it will act accordingly. To try to present here as a "unilateral act" an internal question of the Turkish community is therefore meaningless and, when taken up as a means of

attack by the side which has deliberately left the Turkish community stateless for 12 years, it is vicious.

42. The fifth preambular paragraph mentions "the relevant United Nations resolutions". That is a very general term. The United Nations has been dealing with this problem for a long time and has adopted many resolutions. Inevitably some of them, as a consequence of later developments, have no bearing upon the present situation. If the Greek Cypriots should think it useful or advantageous for them to make oblique references to these resolutions, then it really means that they have lost their capacity to come to grips with realities and that they live in a world nurtured by their dreams and complexes.

43. The same goes for the term "the people of Cyprus as a whole". That is the term Greek Cypriots use in the sense that there are not two communities in Cyprus but only the people of Cyprus as a whole—in other words, just a Greek people and an oppressed Turkish minority. Yet, very recently, none other than Archbishop Makarios had this to say: "The Republic of Cyprus is a new State but not a new nation, and it is not the intention of the Cypriot Government to create a Cypriot national feeling." I could not agree more with the Archbishop. Naturally, none of us here in this Assembly who have followed events in Cyprus for the past 12 years could think or believe that the attempts to remove the Turkish obstacle to union with Greece through the eradication of the Turkish Cypriot community has furthered chances for the creation of a Cypriot nation.

44. The sixth preambular paragraph is a most peculiar one. It takes note of communiqués of meetings in which the Turkish community did not participate. Those were meetings at which only the Greek Cypriots had the opportunity to express their views. It is obvious, therefore, that neither the Turkish community nor Turkey can accept that note be taken of those meetings. It should also be remembered that the communiqués of those meetings do not represent the commitment of any of the participating countries to a certain position. We know that this is the case. The Greek Cypriots ought to know it also.

45. I come now to the operative paragraphs. I do not wish to deal at length with operative paragraph 1 because, in the context of the Greek Cypriot draft resolution, the substance of resolution 3212 (XXIX) has been completely distorted, and its reaffirmation here constitutes an absurdity.

46. Operative paragraph 2 is self-contradictory. In it the Assembly would request the immediate and effective implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX) through measures not envisaged in that resolution. The lack of logic is so blatant that I can only deplore the fact that it came from Greeks. But that is not the only drawback of this paragraph. It has no relevance to the realities of the situation existing in Cyprus. It has no relevance to what has already been accepted and implemented by the Greek Cypriots themselves, especially with regard to refugees.

47. The position of my Government on the question of withdrawal of forces is well known. As our Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out during the general debate [2364th meeting], Turkey will withdraw the forces it was obliged to send to Cyprus, in conformity

with its contractual obligations, in order to counter the imminent threat against the independence of the island and the survival of the Turkish Cypriot community, as soon as a settlement of the Cyprus problem is arrived at. Within the limits permitted by the necessity to maintain the security of the Turkish community and that of the force itself, a substantial withdrawal of troops has already taken place. Reference was made the other day to the records of the proceedings of the United States Congress. These records also register that many Congressmen have pointed out the fact that Turkey has already withdrawn more than 10,000 troops from Cyprus. But to request, as in the Greek Cypriot draft resolution, an immediate and unconditional withdrawal is irrational. What will happen under present circumstances the moment the Turkish forces are withdrawn is crystal clear. The Turkish community will remain defenceless and the Greek Cypriot forces, which, incidentally, are still under the command of an officer from Greece appointed by the Government of Greece, will march northwards, accompanied by the notorious private armies and gunmen of Greek Cypriot politicians, and destruction and death will be heaped upon the Turkish community.

48. It is folly to expect that the Turkish Government will ever agree to that. The Turkish forces sent to Cyprus last year will complete their withdrawal only when a settlement safeguarding the security of the Turkish community has been reached. The Turkish Government has no intention of giving a free bonus to the professional murderers who are prone to use their skill not only against the Turkish Cypriots but also against defenceless persons and even against their fellow Greeks as we witnessed last year.

49. Operative paragraph 2 (b) of the Greek Cypriot draft resolution concerns the refugees. The Greek Cypriots discovered the existence of this problem only last year, because in their view refugees are refugees only if they are Greek. The Turks who have been refugees for more than a decade are not considered worthy of compassion.

50. This question of refugees—or displaced persons, to use the correct term—requires some elucidation. As I have just said, the Turks have known that problem for more than a decade, since the end of 1963, when the Greek onslaught against the Turkish community took place. Since then, about 25,000 Turks, fleeing from more than 100 villages and some towns, have become displaced persons and lived for more than five years in tents. But these were not the only suffering Turks: all the Turks of Cyprus, without exception, lived in enclaves, surrounded by Greek armed bands and continuously subjected to threats, harassment, humiliation and economic blockade. Then, last year, after the Greek invasion and the counter-measures that Turkey had to take, a number of Greeks also had to suffer the same fate. We have compassion for them; we are not insensitive to their hardships and their plight. But the Greek Cypriot administration, instead of seeking to alleviate these hardships, is trying to exploit them for its undying and hopeless lust for recovery of the monopoly of power in Cyprus. And with this objective in mind it is claiming that there are 200,000 refugees. But this number is also highly

inflated, and only about 10,000 are deliberately kept in tents.

51. But this is not the whole story. The scope and nature of the problem of displaced persons have undergone a great change since last year. Indeed, since last year, an agreement has been reached in the inter-communal talks on a voluntary exchange of population. As a result of this agreement, all Turkish Cypriots—I repeat, all Turkish Cypriots—who were living in the south of the island under the jurisdiction of the Greek Cypriot administration have moved to the north, the area under the jurisdiction of the Turkish Cypriot administration. The Greeks living in the north were also free to go to the south. Some 60,000 Turks have moved to the north since last year, and their properties and goods have been used in the rehabilitation of the displaced Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot draft resolution totally disregards the important progress achieved at the third round of talks in Vienna on this subject. Are we to reach the conclusion that the Greek Cypriots are trying to destroy the record of their own negotiator?

52. The complete solution of the problem is inevitably linked to the future settlement of the Cyprus issue. Therefore, operative paragraph 2 (b) of the Greek Cypriot draft resolution has no relevance to the realities of the situation prevailing in Cyprus. This paragraph has, rather, propaganda value.

53. The Turkish delegation can have no objection to the substance of operative paragraph 2 (c). We also support negotiations between the two communities. We have recently repeatedly emphasized that we encourage substantial and meaningful negotiations encompassing all the elements of a future solution. So far as paragraph 2 (c) supports this concept, we agree with it. The paragraph refers also to concrete proposals on all aspects of the problem. At first reading this drafting seems innocuous, but at the same time unnecessary because each negotiating process involves at one stage or another concrete proposals on all aspects. But the recent pronouncements of the Greek Cypriot leaders have qualified what is meant by concrete proposals. What is meant is nothing other than pre-conditions by an indication, even before the resumption of negotiations, to the extent of asking for concessions by the Turkish community, as if the whole outcome of the negotiations depended on what the Turkish community has to offer.

54. This attitude is, of course, unacceptable. The Turkish community has indicated that it is willing to discuss the whole range of problems which have to be resolved in order to achieve a settlement. This is a reasonable and constructive approach, and no negotiating party can be asked to agree to anything beyond that. The Greek Cypriot community seriously deludes itself if it thinks that it can dictate pre-conditions and that the Turkish community is summoned to negotiations only to make concessions.

55. In the same operative paragraph 2 (c) the Greek Cypriot draft resolution refers to “a lasting and mutually acceptable solution consistent with the relevant United Nations resolutions and the universally accepted principles of justice and equity”. We have no quarrel, of course, with a lasting and mutually acceptable solution; we shall welcome it and support it.

56. The reference to universally accepted principles of justice and equity is at first sight irreproachable. But we cannot help noticing the difference between this drafting and that of last year's corresponding paragraph. Resolution 3212 (XXIX) in its paragraph 4 referred to a mutually acceptable political settlement based on the fundamental and legitimate rights of the two communities. It is difficult not to be suspicious of the omission of this reference to the fundamental and legitimate rights of the two communities. The question comes to mind whether, according to the interpretation of the Greek Cypriots, the universally accepted principles of justice and equity are not compatible with the fundamental and legitimate rights of the two communities.

57. Operative paragraph 3 of the Greek Cypriot draft resolution should be read in the context of the recent propaganda efforts of the Greek Cypriots on the so-called changes in the demographic structure of Cyprus. This is nothing but an exploitation of the arrival in northern Cyprus of a limited number of Turkish experts and seasonal workers in order to take part in the economic rebuilding of that area. There are also 40,000 Turkish Cypriots, who had emigrated abroad in order to escape from Greek oppression since 1963, who are now returning to the areas under Turkish Cypriot jurisdiction. There is nothing surprising in that, particularly since the Constitution of Cyprus stipulates that Turkish and Greek Cypriots who had emigrated abroad can automatically return and acquire Cypriot citizenship. This paragraph, therefore, is utterly misleading and unnecessary.

58. Operative paragraph 4 again refers to unilateral action, presumably meaning the administrative restructuring of the Turkish Cypriot community. I have already explained our view on that unfounded allegation.

59. Operative paragraphs 5 and 6, which are linked to the implementation of the Greek Cypriot draft resolution, are irrelevant, just as the whole draft is irrelevant. I do not need to elaborate further on that. There is no sense in asking the Security Council to implement a resolution which cannot be implemented because it is out of touch with the realities and because it runs counter to the requisites of a peaceful solution.

60. I have explained the views of my delegation on the Greek Cypriot draft resolution. I wish to repeat that this draft resolution can make no contribution to a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem. On the contrary, it is a biased and unrealistic draft which can only render impossible the continuation of the negotiations between the two communities. It reflects a negative spirit and a blind passion. It is inconceivable that such a draft resolution could be adopted by the General Assembly. But even if it was intended for propaganda and bargaining purposes, it has already done irreparable damage in unveiling the prejudiced mind of those who have submitted it.

61. At the end of my statement I should like to reiterate that my Government will continue to strive tirelessly for a rapid solution of the Cyprus problem and will give active support to the intercommunal negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General.

62. Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Although in the recent period some major steps have been taken in the international arena towards the consolidation of world peace and security and the elimination of sources of tension, that issue remains one of the main tasks confronting the United Nations.

63. Among the potentially eruptive hotbeds is the complex situation in and around Cyprus, which has been engendered by events from outside to violate the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that State, a Member of the United Nations and of the group of non-aligned countries.

64. In the fulfilment of its obligations to preserve world peace and security, the United Nations has from the very moment of the eruption of the Cyprus crisis in the summer of last year been steadily endeavouring to contribute to the settlement of that issue. Both the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session and the Security Council have adopted a number of decisions the implementation of which could lead to a settlement of the critical situation in Cyprus.

65. However, the problem remains unresolved, and resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly have not been implemented; therefore the inclusion in the agenda of the thirtieth session of the Assembly, at the request of the Republic of Cyprus, of the item "Question of Cyprus" is fully justified.

66. There is no need to go into details regarding the events which led to the exacerbation of the situation and the emergence of the conflict in Cyprus in 1974; the reasons for those events are known to all. Their roots lie in the policies of certain North Atlantic Treaty Organization [*NATO*] circles, which have for many years been striving to destroy the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus in order to strengthen the military and strategic positions of NATO in the eastern Mediterranean.

67. The events in Cyprus have brought serious deprivation and suffering to the people of Cyprus. The economic life of the Republic has been disrupted and the economy is having difficulty in getting back on its feet. Tens of thousands of Cypriots have been compelled, as a result of military operations on the island, to leave their homes. We sincerely sympathize with the population of Cyprus.

68. One can hardly fail to mention that the complex situation in Cyprus was made even more tense and involved by the steps unilaterally taken at the beginning of this year by the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community in order to create a separate state-like entity in a part of the territory of Cyprus controlled by Turkish troops.

69. The events of last year are also evidence of the fact that certain circles have not abandoned their intent to impose on the people of Cyprus a decision which is in contradiction to its own genuine national interests and one which would lead to the division of the State of Cyprus. Those circles not only have not abandoned their plans to divide Cyprus but also continue actively to work to that end.

70. Evidence of this is the complications introduced, not without pressure from external forces, into the intercommunal negotiations aimed at achieving a just and mutually acceptable settlement of the question of

the internal organization of the Cypriot State. Four rounds of intercommunal negotiations held with the participation of the Secretary-General have, unfortunately, not yet produced the necessary agreements.

71. Obviously the situation in Cyprus suits some circles, and they seek to delay even further the settlement of the problem, in order, as it were, to freeze the situation in Cyprus, to the detriment of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Cypriot State.

72. Such an approach to the problem of Cyprus is contrary to the true national interests of the Cypriot people. It indicates an intention of bypassing the resolution unanimously adopted by the General Assembly and the binding decisions of the Security Council on this question. The Soviet Union is opposed to such an approach to the Cypriot question and to such a solution.

73. The position of the USSR on the solution to the Cyprus problem is well known. From the very beginning of the events in Cyprus, the Soviet Union has defended the inalienable rights of the Republic of Cyprus. The Soviet Union has decisively demanded the ending of external interference in the affairs of Cyprus and has called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the island and the restoration of constitutional order, and for the Cypriot people, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, to be given the opportunity to exercise their inalienable right to settle their own problems and the fate of their fatherland, the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, in conditions of peace, tranquillity and non-interference. The Soviet Union has made a series of specific proposals aimed at a just solution to the problem of Cyprus. In particular, it has proposed an examination of the problem of Cyprus in a representative forum of States and, to that end, the convening within the framework of the United Nations of an international conference, with the participation of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and of all States members of the Security Council as well as of other States, including the non-aligned countries.<sup>3</sup> It is precisely at such a representative international conference that it would be possible, jointly, with the direct participation of the Republic of Cyprus, to work out solutions which would guarantee the existence of Cyprus as an independent, sovereign and territorially integrated State, in accordance with the interests of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Soviet proposal for the convening of such an international conference has, as is well known, been broadly supported—and, what is particularly important, it has been supported and understood by Cyprus itself.

74. The Soviet Union has also made constructive concrete proposals on the question of international guarantees for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, proposing that States which are permanent members of the Security Council should provide effective guarantees of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.<sup>3</sup> The Soviet Union has been, and is, of the opinion that the interests of the Cypriot people are directly opposed to the idea of a return to the Zurich and London guarantees,<sup>4</sup> which, as events have shown, did not ensure peace and tranquillity but rather threatened the very existence of Cyprus as a sovereign and independent State.

75. What is more, the Soviet Union also proposed dispatching a Security Council mission to Cyprus.<sup>5</sup> This would have made it possible to seek the most effective ways of implementing rapidly certain decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on Cyprus.

76. The development of the situation in Cyprus has confirmed the correctness of those proposals and of precisely this approach to a solution of the Cyprus problem. The Soviet Union, as before, is convinced that the implementation of such proposals would lead to a normalization of the situation in Cyprus, would assist in the settlement of important aspects of the Cyprus crisis, and would create the necessary conditions for the people of Cyprus themselves to decide upon the internal structure of the State without any outside interference. Unfortunately, as a result of opposition from certain permanent members of the Security Council, those Soviet proposals were not implemented.

77. The Soviet Government continues to participate actively in seeking a just and stable settlement of the Cyprus crisis. This problem has been and continues to be the subject of discussions between Soviet leaders and leaders of other countries, including the United States, France, the United Kingdom and others. In a joint communiqué and in statements it has been emphasized that the settlement of the Cyprus crisis must be achieved on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic, and effective implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

78. Such an approach was reflected in particular in the recent Soviet-French declaration signed in Moscow by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid I. Brezhnev, and the President of France, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Such bilateral agreements can and should lead to a just settlement of the Cyprus crisis.

79. In defending the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, whether in the United Nations or in bilateral negotiations or relations, the Soviet Union bases its approach on the principles of its foreign policy, a policy of defending the legitimate rights of all States and peoples, a policy of peace and détente in international relations.

80. On 1 August this year, at a meeting in Helsinki between Leonid Brezhnev and the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union for the support which the USSR has been extending to the people of Cyprus in its struggle for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Mr. Brezhnev wished the President and people of Cyprus success in achieving their high goals, which meet the interest of a stable peace in Europe.

81. The tense situation in and around Cyprus continues to give cause for concern to public opinion in many countries of the world. As is known, the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, devoted great attention to this question. The Conference adopted a decision of full support for the Government and the people of Cyprus, and called for



the immediate implementation of decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the question of Cyprus. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the non-aligned countries called upon all States to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus, and called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island [*See A/10217 and Corr.1, annex*].

82. This same viewpoint was expressed during the general debate at the present session of the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority of delegations.

83. The Soviet Union, other socialist countries and many non-aligned and other countries have been consistent in defending the need to maintain the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. This is fully understandable, inasmuch as the tragedy of the Cypriot people, which has become the victim of foreign intervention, affects equally all other States which are interested in peace, a reduction of world tension and the implementation of the lofty goals of the United Nations Charter.

84. The absence of a settlement in Cyprus is a direct consequence of the failure to implement the decisions of the Security Council and the unanimously adopted resolutions of the General Assembly on the Cyprus question. These decisions by the United Nations should be implemented without further delay.

85. Speaking at the present session of the General Assembly, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, stressed the importance of the resolution of the General Assembly establishing a framework for and ways and means of solving the Cyprus problem. He emphasized that the implementation of the resolution "is a paramount necessity for positive progress towards a just and peaceful solution of the problem" [2378th meeting, para. 39].

86. As representatives are aware, the Governments of Turkey and Greece have expressed their agreement with the appeal to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus contained in the unanimously adopted decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. And at the present session of the Assembly the representatives of those countries have said they favour a solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of the United Nations decisions.

87. The Soviet delegation feels that the United Nations must continue to press for the implementation of the decisions on Cyprus adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council. It is the duty of the United Nations to help the people of Cyprus to defend its independence against imperialist encroachments. The way to achieve this goal is to ensure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory of Cyprus, to secure respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to give the people of Cyprus the possibility of controlling its own affairs.

88. Mr. VINCI (Italy) (*interpretation from French*): It is on behalf of the States members of the European Economic Community [EEC] that I am speaking in this debate devoted to a question to which the nine countries members of EEC attach special importance.

89. The traditional bonds which, throughout history, have united Cyprus and Europe, as well as the close and friendly relations of the nine members of EEC

with the States directly concerned in the question, have always led us to follow the situation on the island most attentively. This, in turn, led our Governments to manifest their anxiety even more directly immediately after the crisis of the summer of 1974.

90. Their position in regard to this question, which was already stated at the twenty-ninth session<sup>6</sup> but to which I must return because, unfortunately, today we are still far from a settlement, comprises three main points which are all equally important, in our opinion.

91. First of all, we remain dedicated to maintaining the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. Then we believe that the agreement of the two communities which constitute that State is essential in the search for a settlement. Finally, we attach particular importance to the distressing question of the refugees, which concerns a major sector of the population of the island.

92. Since the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the nine members of EEC, in their willingness to hold talks with the representatives of all the parties concerned, have felt impelled, because of the circumstances, to meet on several occasions to consider the situation on Cyprus. They have acted to encourage the parties to pursue the negotiations so as to implement United Nations resolutions and, in particular, resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was unanimously adopted by our Assembly.

93. Furthermore, the nine members of EEC supported the resumption of talks between the two communities on the basis of a formula decided on in Security Council resolution 367 (1975). Thus, they have not failed to lend their whole-hearted support to the Secretary-General in the discharge of his mission as defined in that resolution. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to pay a tribute to the praiseworthy efforts of our Secretary-General and his successive special representatives in this complex and delicate matter, and to commend the devotion with which the United Nations Force is fulfilling its mission there.

94. The nine members of EEC regret that there has not been more substantial progress in the first rounds of talks and urge the parties concerned to start a constructive discussion of all the substantive problems, in particular by submitting concrete proposals on both the territorial and the constitutional aspects so that these talks may progress towards a just solution. Obviously, unilateral initiatives would be unacceptable and contrary to United Nations resolutions and would constitute a dangerous obstacle to the achievement of the desired compromise.

95. For the countries members of EEC, the Cypriot crisis jeopardizes the balance and security of a region which is very close to theirs. It also affects countries which are united to them by similar ties as well as by the relations of friendship which they maintain equally with all.

96. How can one in this case not emphasize the feelings of deep anxiety prompted by the present situation on the island and by the uncertainty which looms over the negotiations?

97. We therefore intend to encourage the parties concerned to seek a lasting and equitable solution on the basis of United Nations resolutions, our objec-

tive being that moderation may prevail and that the settlement that is so necessary for the well-being of the entire Cypriot population may be achieved.

98. Mr. JAIPAL (India): The question of Cyprus is yet another of those questions that in recent years have attracted unanimously adopted resolutions, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, thereby giving rise to legitimate expectations of a quick settlement along the lines set out in those resolutions. And yet it seems that unanimously adopted resolutions, to which even the parties directly involved have agreed, do not produce results.

99. The reasons for this curious phenomenon could be that the resolutions themselves are inadequate, or that the parties directly concerned have their own private reservations about the terms of the resolutions, or that the United Nations is being utilized for buying time during which each side tries to improve its own bargaining position.

100. In the case of Cyprus, perhaps all three reasons have been present, and my delegation shares the regret of others that there has been so little progress in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), to the formulation of which my delegation made a limited contribution. We are still of the opinion that resolution 3212 (XXIX) provides the fairest and most balanced basis for an equitable settlement of this complex question. We feel that no new element has emerged that might warrant deviation or departure from the terms of that resolution.

101. Only one year has elapsed since the adoption of that resolution, but considering the long and bitter history of this problem perhaps more time and active encouragement should be given to the parties concerned so that they may persist in the implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX) in all good faith. Above all, it is vital that the parties concerned should not try to bring about unilaterally any changes in the situation which might materially affect the direction of a peaceful and mutually acceptable settlement.

102. What has happened in Cyprus is *sui generis* from the beginning to the present. I am referring to the compromise Cyprus was obliged to make for the attainment of its independence, to the odd system of its Treaty guarantees, to the strange Constitution that it was saddled with, to the untenable position of its minority enclaves and to the curtailment of the normal rights of the majority. All these peculiarities go to the very root of the problem, which was the absence of an equitable *modus vivendi* for the two communities.

103. Despite all this, what is encouraging is that both the communities seem determined to maintain the territorial integrity of Cyprus, its independence and its non-aligned status. With that over-all objective in view, it should be possible for the representatives of the two communities to sit down again to discuss and agree on the terms of their peaceful coexistence within the framework of a new constitution that guarantees the legitimate rights of both communities and their separate cultural identities.

104. The other day the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus stated here in this Assembly:

“It is only through a new approach to this problem in a spirit of understanding, conciliation and co-

operation, with genuine respect for each other's rights, that talks and negotiations could prove constructive and fruitful.” [2401st meeting, para. 37.]

This is indeed a very helpful statement. It seems to me that the same spirit has been echoed in the statements made by the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community.

105. Why then are we in the present stalemate? Is it only because the Turkish troops have not yet withdrawn? Is it also because the refugees have not yet returned to their homes and properties, and will they do so voluntarily before the future is clear? Or is it because the extremists on both sides still have the upper hand? The behaviour of the extremists gives us reason to wonder sometimes whether Cyprus is heading for a double partition. We hope that the moderate elements in both communities will assert themselves and resume the intercommunal negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General.

106. It is clear to us that the future of Cyprus has to be determined freely, peacefully and exclusively by its inhabitants. We feel sure that the two communities take this business seriously and will use the good offices of the Secretary-General. It is regrettable that four rounds of talks have yielded virtually no results. The Secretary-General is a busy man; his plate is more than full and his time should not be wasted. We wish to take this opportunity to congratulate the Secretary-General for his patient, dedicated and persistent efforts to help the parties to reach a mutually acceptable settlement. We wish also to record our appreciation of the magnificent work done by the United Nations Force in Cyprus in keeping the peace under conditions which must try the soul of any honest soldier.

107. Mr. NAÇO (Albania) (*interpretation from French*): Last year in Cyprus a new hotbed of tension was created and, consequently, there arose a new threat to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Balkans.

108. The peace-loving peoples and countries of the world, and particularly those near that area, have watched with particular attention and legitimate concern the development of events on that island. Those events have clearly shown that a tense and threatening situation fraught with disquieting consequences for the surrounding region continues to exist in Cyprus.

109. The island of Cyprus, because of its important strategic position, has always been a magnet for the ambitions of the imperialist Powers, which have always striven to seize control of it so as to use it as a major base for their plans and plots against the sovereign peoples and countries of the Middle East, the Balkans and other regions near the island.

110. The crisis that occurred last year in Cyprus and the acute situation that still prevails in that country are the direct result of the policy of aggression, expansion and hegemony pursued by the two super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Those events are the expression of the rivalry between the two super-Powers to acquire strategic positions in the Mediterranean basin and in the Balkans, and to create more favourable conditions for perpetrating other aggressive acts against the peoples and countries of that region.

111. The United States and the Soviet Union, with the aim of guaranteeing zones of influence for themselves, are trampling underfoot the sovereign rights of peoples, indulging in all sorts of intrigues and hatching plots against the freedom and independence of those peoples, at the same time exerting every possible effort to acquire key strategic positions and create new military bases in the Mediterranean region.

112. It is well known that the United States is behind the bloody events that have taken place on the island, and this in order to carry out their imperialist designs and transform the island into a permanent military base for NATO and make of it a springboard for further aggression. Through overt pressure and various manoeuvres, they are striving to install themselves at all costs on the island, to keep hold of the key to the solution of the problem of Cyprus, to be the sole arbiters in the situation, and to decide, by themselves alone, the destiny of a sovereign people, the people of Cyprus. The American imperialists, pursuing a tactic well known in diplomacy and in behind-the-scenes bargaining, are busily seeking by every means to recommend a solution to the question of Cyprus that best suits their designs.

113. At the same time, the Soviet socio-imperialists are continuing to intensify their activities in Cyprus. The various statements from Moscow concerning events on the island cannot disguise their true aim. The Soviet socio-imperialists, while trying to make us believe that they support the independence of Cyprus, are in fact endeavouring to exploit the tense situation on the island for the purpose of pursuing their policy of penetration and expansion in the Mediterranean area, the Middle East and the Balkan peninsula. For this reason they have been seeking, and are still seeking, to strike bargains and to reach decisions that will serve the imperialist ambitions they cherish with regard to Cyprus and the entire Mediterranean area in general, where for a long time their battle fleet, together with the American fleet, has been moving about like some monster.

114. The promises they make, sometimes to the one party, sometimes to the other, are intended to keep the fires burning in Cyprus so that they may be able to reap their own benefits.

115. From all the foregoing, it is clear that the events in Cyprus are a new proof that the two super-Powers themselves are creating the tensions which arouse one country against another so that they can play the role of arbiter and thus achieve their imperialist goals. All this activity is in keeping with the global strategy of the two super-Powers to dominate peoples. Because of this policy, the situation on the island works against the sovereign interests of the Cypriot people and the interests of peace and security in the Mediterranean area and the Balkans. All the "initiatives" taken by the two super-Powers are nothing but plots and intrigues against the Cypriot people. The United States and the Soviet Union have never been, and are not now, in favour of any genuine solution to the problem of Cyprus. On the contrary, they seek to throw obstacles in the way of the establishment of stability on the island and to keep the disputes and conflicts alive in order that they can act so as to derive the greatest possible profit from these.

116. The interests of the Cypriot people require that the tense situation created by the two super-Powers on the island be ended as soon as possible. Our people and its Government have condemned and still condemn firmly the two super-Powers as being the principal cause of the tragedy of the Cypriot people and of the tense situation in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Balkans. The events in Cyprus make it urgent and indispensable for the peoples of the Mediterranean, the Balkans and the Middle East to increase their vigilance; it is necessary for them resolutely to oppose the hegemonic policy of the two super-Powers and demand the withdrawal of American and Soviet war fleets and the elimination of foreign military bases in the Mediterranean.

117. As was stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country in the General Assembly on 29 September 1975 in the course of the general debate:

"The Albanian people has always borne in mind the welfare of the friendly peoples of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and sincerely hopes that Cyprus will not be a constant victim of the ambitions of the two super-Powers. We condemn any foreign interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus and demand that an end be put to that activity so that the two communities living on Cyprus can themselves, with patience and goodwill and without foreign interference, settle their own affairs in accordance with their own interests and aspirations, in full harmony on the basis of equal rights. The People's Republic of Albania has always favoured the existence of a free and independent State of Cyprus, and respect for its territorial integrity and sovereignty." [2365th meeting, para. 160.]

118. Mr. HOLLAI (Hungary): Since General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) was unanimously adopted in this hall, 12 months have passed, but the situation in Cyprus has not changed and has remained a source of grave concern to all of us.

119. The General Assembly and the Security Council have taken several very promising decisions aimed at a lasting settlement of the situation in the Mediterranean island country of Cyprus. Nevertheless, we cannot but state with regret that the adoption of the resolutions has not been followed by corresponding actions conducive to a solution of the problem. The lack of progress towards that end is due not to interpretations to which these resolutions might be susceptible, but to non-compliance with the resolutions themselves. The Hungarian delegation has more than once had occasion to state its position on the question of Cyprus. In the general debate in the General Assembly this year, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic made it clear that:

"A favourable development in the European situation and the future of the region bordering on Cyprus are overshadowed by the events connected with that island State. The Hungarian People's Republic unswervingly favours the complete independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of . . . Cyprus. We demand the immediate withdrawal of all foreign military forces and we are strongly opposed to any plan to divide the island State into two parts. My Government believes that the time has come for the Security Council to adopt

effective measures for the immediate implementation of its earlier resolutions.

“We should like to see the talks between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus leading to early success through the mediation of the Secretary-General.” [2373rd meeting, paras. 144-145.]

120. We deplore the continued interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus, which is to be condemned all the more strongly since it is attributable to circles which, at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, by the signatures of their representatives, committed themselves to promoting international détente and to renouncing military methods and all kinds of force as a means of settling controversial issues. The continuing interference in the life of the Cypriot people arouses deep indignation in international public opinion. It is time for everybody to awaken to the fact that the use of such methods by certain NATO circles can no longer lead to enduring results, as it could in times long past. It is a present-day reality that the new pattern of international relations based on equality which is evolving rejects all kinds of external intervention.

121. It is no less important for the improvement of international relations to ensure that the Republic of Cyprus can develop in independence and free from foreign interference. The particular significance of this in the Middle East region, fraught as it is with tension, is much too obvious to all. That is why, among other reasons, we welcome the paragraph in the document adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lima, which reads as follows:

“The Foreign Ministers, stressing the importance of resolutions 3212 (XXIX) of the General Assembly and 367 (1975) of the Security Council which recognized the non-aligned status of one of the members of the United Nations and reiterating the Agreements adopted by the Co-ordinating Bureau during its meeting in Havana, with respect to the solution of the Cypriot problem:

“Express their solidarity with and total support for the Government and all of the people of the Republic of Cyprus, and consider that any aggression against Cyprus constitutes a threat to its independence, territorial integrity and its policy of non-alignment, as well as an aggression against all the non-aligned countries;

“Demand the urgent implementation of resolutions 3212 (XXIX), 365 (1974) and 367 (1975) of the General Assembly and of the Security Council of the United Nations, respectively, call upon all countries to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and insist on the necessity of the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island, of the continuation in a

meaningful and constructive manner of the negotiations between the two communities under the personal auspices of the Secretary-General in the shortest time possible and of the immediate return of all refugees to their homes in safety.” [A/10217, and Corr.1, annex, para. 64.]

122. The Hungarian People's Republic is not in any way motivated by selfish interests with regard to Cyprus. We wish that the inhabitants of the island country may live in freedom and peace and enjoy the fruits of their labour, without any foreign intervention, and that the members of the two communities may come to an understanding regarding their common internal affairs. We wish to develop our relations with them just as with the other States of the region, including Greece and Turkey. This is why we take up our stand for a full and just settlement of the Cypriot question in the shortest time possible, and this is why we reject any effort at a so-called military solution.

123. We wish that the representatives of the two communities in Cyprus may at last, under the personal auspices of the Secretary-General, find a solution to the issues under dispute, free from passion and with an eye to the future. I take this opportunity to convey to the Secretary-General our appreciation for the efforts he has made so far to this end.

124. All the participants in the negotiations and all those who can contribute in some measure to the solution of the Cypriot crisis carry a rather large share of responsibility, for the champions of the cold war have not yet given up their plans to stop and reverse the trend towards peaceful coexistence and peaceful co-operation in Europe and all over the world, for they are fanning the flames of war where their glow has not been quenched. We are therefore duty bound firmly to demand anew a speedy, peaceful and just solution to the long-drawn-out crisis in Cyprus.

*The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1975*, document S/11789, annex.

<sup>2</sup> *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1974*, document S/11465.

<sup>4</sup> See *Treaty of Guarantee* (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475).

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1974*, document S/11391.

<sup>6</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 2271st meeting, paras. 62-66.