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President: Mr. Mongi SLIM (Tunisia).

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72

*Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (concluded)**

*The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (concluded)**

REPORT OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE (PART IV) (A/4942/ADD.3)

Pursuant to rule 68 of the Rules of Procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the First Committee.

Mr. Enckell (Finland), Rapporteur of the First Committee, presented the report of the Committee and then spoke as follows:

1. Mr. ENCKELL (Finland), Rapporteur of the First Committee: The consideration of the two items under discussion in the First Committee was concluded on 14 November by the adoption of the two draft resolutions reproduced in the present report. [A/4942/Add.3]. During the debate on these draft resolutions the view was expressed by some speakers that their scope, and especially the scope of draft resolution II, was wider than the items under discussion as included in the agenda. The opinion was also voiced that it would have been desirable that draft resolution I be regionally discussed before coming to the Committee. It was, however, very widely felt that the Committee could consider and decide upon these proposals at that stage of its proceedings. Both draft resolutions were adopted: the first one, without opposition; the second one, in its original wording by 60 votes to 16, with 25 abstentions.

2. I have the honour to recommend for adoption by the General Assembly the draft resolutions contained in the report.

3. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I shall now call on the representatives who wish to explain their vote.

4. Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution II presented in the report of the First Committee [A/4942/Add.3] that is, on the draft resolution concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

5. Since this draft resolution was adopted in the First Committee, two significant developments have taken place, both of which affect the attitude of my delegation to it. In the first place, we have received the encouraging news that the negotiations on a nuclear test ban agreement will be resumed in Geneva next Tuesday. Second, we have reason to be hopeful that an agreement will soon be reached concerning the resumption of general disarmament negotiations in an appropriate negotiating forum. My delegation feels that it is of great importance that this Assembly should take no action which might in any way hamper the success of these resumed negotiations.

6. I should like to remind Members that in the First Committee my delegation expressed the sympathy which we felt, and which we continue to feel, for the motives of the sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution.

7. However, we made it very clear that we had serious reservations about the effectiveness of this sort of declaration. We recalled in the First Committee that all declarations prohibiting the use of specific types of weapons had, without exception, been violated in the past in wartime; and it was on this ground that Canada abstained on the draft resolution in the First Committee.

8. Now, in the light of recent developments to which I referred, our doubts about the wisdom of adopting this draft resolution have been reinforced. For example, it appears to my delegation that the convening of a special conference, as envisaged in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, would be ill-advised in present circumstances. Action to assemble a world conference to sign a convention of doubtful utility might very well detract from the effort to negotiate binding disarmament agreements which are the only finally effective means of dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons.

9. Accordingly, my delegation has come to the conclusion that we must oppose draft resolution II, on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, on which the Assembly has been called upon to vote.

10. Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I would like to speak first on draft resolution II contained in the report of the First Committee [A/4942/Add.1]. I have a number of the things to say about this draft resolution.

11. The United States fully recognizes that most of the delegations which voted for this draft resolution

*Resumed from the 1049th meeting.

in the First Committee did so in the sincere belief that they were acting from noble motives and effectively, in an attempt to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in war. With this view everyone can be in sympathy. It is necessary to say frankly and bluntly that in the opinion of the United States delegation—these votes were wasted. I regret to say it but this draft resolution cannot fulfil the wishes of its proponents who, we know, supported it out of their abhorrence of nuclear war. All peoples genuinely interested in peace share that abhorrence.

12. But, as in all these matters, there is a correct way and an incorrect way to make a wish or a desire come true and be carried out. So I am sorry to say that this draft resolution, in the opinion of the United States delegation, will not achieve its objective.

13. I say this carefully because the Soviet Union, as it has indicated in this Assembly, has not the slightest intention of paying any attention to this draft resolution, despite the enthusiastic support which the Soviet Union gave to it in the Committee. How do I know this? We know it from the Soviet representative's own statements in the Committee that the Soviets openly intend to use nuclear weapons at the sole discretion of the Soviet Union, if that country considers their use necessary. The delegation of the United States and other delegations quoted Mr. Khrushchev's statement to this effect. So there can be no doubt of the Soviet intentions in this matter. So, just as in the case of the uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium resolutions on the subject of nuclear testing, the Soviet Union votes for this draft resolution with every intention of violating it, if for its sole purposes it suits it to do so.

14. No, I regret to say that the Soviet Union will not observe this draft resolution. It will continue to rattle its rockets and to threaten other countries with thermo-nuclear destruction.

15. At the same time, the Soviet Union will attack the United States when it votes, as a matter of sincere principle, against this draft resolution. It was the Soviet Union and no one else which broke off the nuclear test ban negotiations at Geneva so the Soviet Union could conduct its own series of tests week after week. The Soviet Union will say that our vote here cast as a matter of sincere principle, proves that the United States desires to wage nuclear war. Now the United States desires no such thing, and the Members of this Assembly know that this charge of the Soviet Union is pure hokum, and nothing but hokum. But the point is, that the Soviet Union has already begun to use this draft resolution as an instrument of propaganda in the cold war, while the Soviet Union continues to prepare to disregard it. Surely this is not the result the sincere supporters of this draft resolution had in mind when they cast their favourable votes.

16. The second reason for the ineffectiveness of this draft resolution is, with all respect, that it goes about the task of ridding the world of atomic war in the wrong way. With the end it seeks we can all agree. However, this draft resolution declares that the use of atomic weapons is a crime. But it sets up no safeguards whatsoever to protect any nation against the assaults of the Soviet Union.

17. States which seek security from war which do not wish to wage war—that is the position of the United States—cannot, I submit, trust their safety to such unsupported declarations; or otherwise we, too, might

receive invitations to visit Mr. Khrushchev on his own territory. Nuclear war will be effectively outlawed when nuclear weapons are reduced and abolished through a disarmament programme carefully formulated, with effective international controls, as the United States has proposed in this Assembly. [See A/4891.] With such effective safeguards, the United States and other countries could destroy their own nuclear weapons without impairing their own security. There is no other effective way to go about this task with assurance and with success.

18. The third basic defect in the draft resolution arises from its own terms. It is simply untrue to say that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the Charter and to international law or to assert that the Charter itself can be amended—for this there are ample provisions—by declarations in the Assembly. That being the case, this draft resolution, I submit, sets a very dangerous precedent. If it is an attempt to try to amend the Charter by resolution, I would like to point out that surely it is ineffective, since this General Assembly has no such power.

19. This Assembly cannot rewrite the Charter in a manner totally foreign to the precise provisions for its amendment. If people wish to amend the Charter, I submit that they should follow the orderly procedure laid down in that regard. But this Assembly is a body of representatives of States. It is essential that they should respect legal processes and procedures, and not flout them. It is essential that the United Nations be preserved as an effective instrument for the preservation of peace. But this Assembly's reputation is bound to suffer if during waves of emotion it casts the Charter provisions to one side and acts capriciously.

20. Indeed, the very provisions of the Charter approve, and demand, the exercise of self-defence against armed attack. It is very clear that the Charter says nothing whatever about any particular weapon or method which may be used for self-defence. Those who wrote the Charter expected victims of aggression to react as necessary to protect their territorial integrity and political independence, and they were very careful not to say how self-defence could be carried out. The unforgivable crime under the Charter is not self-defence but aggression, direct or indirect; in other words, the illegal use of force. The General Assembly has recognized that fact many times. I call the attention of representatives in particular to the resolution [380 (V)] on "Peace through deeds" adopted as far back as the fifth session of the Assembly, and I can cite many other examples.

21. The amendments which the Italian delegation introduced and so ably and courageously defended in the First Committee represented an attempt to reconcile the Assembly's desire to prevent the use of nuclear weapons with the clear and definite provisions of the Charter. Had these amendments proposed by Italy been adopted, the United States would then have been glad to vote for the draft resolution, as so amended, for then it would have been a reflection of a humanitarian desire shared by all men of good will. Instead, in its present form, the draft resolution can only mislead dangerously those who put their faith in the acts of this Assembly.

22. My delegation hopes that all those who wish this Assembly to make a real contribution to the outlawing of nuclear weapons, to the attainment of general and

complete disarmament under effective international controls, and to the support and strengthening of the United Nations Charter, will vote against this draft resolution.

23. I would now like very briefly to speak on draft resolution I, the draft resolution which, in substance, provides for a denuclearized Africa. The United States Government and the people of the United States have had a long, close association with Africa. We have had ties of friendship and amity, economic and political ties—some of which go back for more than two hundred years. I can say without any reservation whatsoever that the United States Government and the people of the United States have always looked upon the Continent of Africa, and the peoples of Africa and their problems, with the utmost sympathy and understanding and that we have always sought to be both constructive and helpful in trying to aid them in the solution of these problems.

24. I can also say that there is no lack of understanding on the part of either my delegation or my Government of the frequently expressed anxiety and wish of both the old and the new countries of Africa that the continent of Africa should not become involved in the arms race. The United States delegation understands and fully sympathizes, therefore, with the sponsors of this draft resolution, and with the expressed wish that the Continent of Africa be isolated from the threat of nuclear war, even though—and we say this with regret—we cannot agree with the method chosen by the sponsors of this draft resolution to achieve this goal.

25. In this modern age of science, however much one may wish it were otherwise, we have to look with realism at whatever the scientists have achieved. When nuclear tests take place in the atmosphere, no matter where the tests take place, the fall-out from these tests is whirled about by the winds and in due course may descend upon any continent with the snow and the rain. So we do not believe that the continent of Africa can be effectively isolated from nuclear war or the threat of nuclear war by a mere declaration of this Assembly with no provision for inspection, control or policing. We believe that the African States themselves should join together to make such a decision, if that is their wish.

26. If the African States should adopt such an undertaking, preferably with some means of international verification and inspection to ensure compliance, then, and only then, we submit, should the matter come before the General Assembly for appropriate consideration of the undertaking.

27. On the question of the effective cessation of nuclear weapon tests in Africa, my delegation in past weeks has made its position clear. For three years we have been trying to negotiate a treaty which would outlaw nuclear weapons testing with the Soviet Union and we have submitted to the Soviet Union, together with the United Kingdom, a complete draft of such a treaty. As this assembly knows—although the negotiations were interrupted by the Soviet Union so that it could unilaterally carry out its own tests—those negotiations are reconvening in Geneva on 28 November 1961. Therefore we submit that another uncontrolled, uninspected moratorium is not the means of bringing about such a cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The only answer is an effectively controlled international treaty banning nuclear weapon tests.

28. In this connexion, I would like to call the Assembly's attention to the provisions of the proposed United States-United Kingdom draft treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests [see A/4772], and to the provisions of the United States disarmament programme laid before this Assembly [1013th meeting] by President Kennedy on 25 September 1961. The draft treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, in article 1 states:

"1. Each of the Parties of this Treaty undertakes, subject to the provisions of this Treaty and its Annexes:

"A. to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear weapon test explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control and

"B. to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of nuclear weapon tests explosions anywhere."

29. Let me also direct the attention of this Assembly to the provisions of the United States programme for general and complete disarmament, about which President Kennedy spoke here on 25 September. In state I, section C, paragraph (e) of the United States disarmament programme [A/4891], it is provided:

"States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation the information or material necessary for their manufacture. States not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other States, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture."

30. The previous uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium on nuclear testing [resolutions 1577 (XV) and 1578 (XV)], for which the Soviet Union voted in December 1960 has, I regret to say, proved to be completely ineffective. This moratorium was cynically exploited by the Soviet Union as a cover for the preparation of new nuclear weapons tests. Indeed, it may well be true that as far back as the summer of 1958, before the nuclear test ban negotiations started at Geneva on 31 October 1958, the Soviet Union had laid out its plans for its present series of nuclear tests. Of at least incidental interest to this Assembly might be the fact that the Soviet Union has carried out not some thirty nuclear tests in the current series, starting on 1 September, but instead has carried out approximately fifty—I repeat, fifty—nuclear tests in its recent series in the months of September, October and November. No one of course, except the Soviet Union, because of its secret society, knows precisely how many nuclear tests it has carried out, or in precisely what environments.

31. Now the United States did not vote for this uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium, but it scrupulously observed it. The United States cannot again agree to such a moratorium. We do not believe that this Assembly should again vote for such an uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium, and we say this whether it applies to all of the world or a part of the world. We call the attention of this Assembly to the fact that no uncontrolled moratorium without effective international controls can guarantee the security of any State which desires peace.

32. As President Eisenhower told the General Assembly [868th meeting] on 22 October 1960, the United Nations should be prepared to help the African States maintain their security. But he emphasized that the

African States should seize the initiative in this matter and either use existing regional machinery or establish such machinery in order to avert an arms race in Africa. That is still the position of the Government of the United States. My Government's position is that the African States themselves should arrive at regional arrangements to ensure their own security. At that time it would be appropriate for the United Nations to request its Members to respect, and co-operate in the fulfilment of, such arrangements. But we believe that the initiative in such movements should come from the African States themselves and should not come from the outside, especially in the form of an uncontrolled undertaking, which the Soviet Union has no intention of keeping.

33. My delegation will therefore abstain in the vote on this draft resolution.

34. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): After careful discussion the First Committee has by an overwhelming majority of votes approved two important draft resolutions contained in its report [A/4942/Add.3], which are an important contribution to the cause of peace and to the preparation of conditions which would free humanity from the threat of nuclear war and help to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament. These resolutions have now been submitted for the approval of the General Assembly.

35. The Soviet delegation was very happy to support both the draft resolution of the African States declaring Africa a denuclearized zone and the draft resolution of the African and Asian States concerning adoption of a declaration proclaiming that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, the letter and the aims of the United Nations and is, accordingly, a direct violation of the United Nations Charter.

36. In advocating an immediate solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, the most burning and urgent problem of our time, the Soviet Union at the same time warmly supports any constructive proposals aimed at diminishing international tension, strengthening trust between States and thereby facilitating the realization of general and complete disarmament. One such measure which would improve the international atmosphere and lessen the danger of war would be the creation of denuclearized zones and, more especially, a denuclearized zone on the African continent.

37. The idea of creating in various parts of the world zones free of atomic nuclear weapons is a sound and constructive idea and one which meets the wishes of the peoples. It is, therefore, making headway. As we all know, in recent years Governments of various countries have put forward plans for the creation of denuclearized zones for different areas. There is a proposal for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe—the most sensitive area of the world, where the armed forces of the two military groups of States are in direct contact with one another. This proposal is usually called the Rapacki Plan^{1/} after the name of the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, the State which put forward the plan for creating a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. There are also proposals for creating denuclearized zones in Northern Europe, in the Balkan

Peninsula, in the Near and Middle East, in Asia and the Pacific Ocean. This last proposal was put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

38. The approval of the resolution under which the huge African continent would become a denuclearized zone represents the first concrete decision in this important direction. The Soviet Union welcomes this decision.

39. We would like to point out, more especially, that the first concrete decision to create a denuclearized zone relates to Africa, a continent in turmoil, where the old colonial relations based on violence and condemned by history are being speedily shattered and where more and more new independent States, deeply interested in the consolidation of peace are arising under our very eyes. It is on the initiative of these new independent States of Africa that the General Assembly adopted its resolution declaring Africa a denuclearized zone. Nor is this accidental: the African States were not born in order to die in the chasm of nuclear war. They were born for a peaceful life, for prosperity and not for destruction. States in other areas too, all States without exception, have a right to life and the right to live in peaceful conditions. It would, therefore, be only right if denuclearized zones were created in other parts of the world also and if, as the result of general and complete disarmament, there would be no nuclear or hydrogen bombs left at all in the world, and so no one could ever be threatened by nuclear destruction.

40. It is difficult to over-estimate the great positive significance of the second resolution also—a declaration proclaiming that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and as such is a violation of the United Nations Charter—a declaration which proposes that a multilateral international convention should be concluded on this question.

41. The Soviet Union has always favoured and, naturally, continues to favour a ban on nuclear and hydrogen weapons. Of course, the best decision would be a complete ban on nuclear weapons, together with the liquidation of all the stock piles of these deadly weapons. We trust that it will in fact be possible in this way to solve this problem within the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament and thus to eradicate the threat of nuclear war.

42. At the same time, the Soviet Union has for many years past been emphasizing that, even before the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, which would put an end to the very existence of nuclear and hydrogen bombs and the means of delivering them to the target, the States manufacturing nuclear weapons might, as moral preparation for such an agreement, declare their resolve not to use nuclear weapons.

43. The Soviet Union has more than once invited the United States and the other Western Powers to undertake a solemn and unconditional obligation to renounce the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. And were it not for the obstinate objections of our Western partners, this question would have been settled long ago.

44. We are, therefore, happy that, on the proposal of Ethiopia and a number of other African and Asian States, the First Committee has adopted a declaration on banning the use of nuclear weapons and we voice the hope that the General Assembly will confirm this

^{1/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, Plenary Meetings, 697th meeting.

important decision, which is the first step towards the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

45. The Soviet delegation will, of course, vote for both draft resolutions—for declaring Africa a de-nuclearized zone and for prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Only those who do not want peace or who want the United Nations to legalize the inconceivable horrors of thermonuclear warfare can fail to support these resolutions or can vote against them.

46. In this connexion, I cannot refrain from saying at least a few words about the statements made from this platform at the beginning of our discussion today.

47. I would like to say, literally, a couple of words about the speech made by the representative of Canada, who today propounded a rather strange and unintelligible argument in support of his altered position on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In the First Committee the Canadian delegation did not display a very great degree of boldness and did not vote for this resolution. As a member of NATO, Canada did not go all the way on this question, but still it abstained and did not vote against.

48. Today General Burns indicated that the Canadian delegation would now vote against this resolution. Apparently, NATO discipline has prevailed. At the same time, we cannot but point to the completely unfounded assertion that the better the atmosphere gets as favourable symptoms of progress towards disarmament appear, the more strongly one should oppose the very measure which favours the achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament. This however, was the very argument put forward by the representative of Canada today. I am sorry, but it is one I cannot accept, and I feel sure that the Assembly will not agree with it.

49. Mr. Dean, the representative of the United States, made a speech here in which, possibly for the first time in United Nations history, he tried to speak, as it were, on behalf of the Soviet Union. This is a rather unusual situation—to find the United States representative speaking for the Soviet Union, speaking from this rostrum—and with complete assurance—about what the Soviet Union will do and what it will not do.

50. With all due respect to Mr. Dean, the Soviet Government has instructed the Soviet delegation to speak from this rostrum and explain the position of the Soviet Union—it gave no instructions to the United States delegation.

51. I leave aside the question of diplomatic tact which, as we think, has not been entirely observed by the United States delegation in trying to speak here for the Soviet Union. But why worry about the diplomatic tact of United States representatives when their country, the country of Abraham Lincoln, is now supporting a proposal that African Negroes should remain for another ten years the slaves of white masters; when their country, the country of Franklin Roosevelt, is now the mainstay of fascist regimes in different parts of the world, including the Dominican Republic; when their country, the country of Jefferson and Paine, is now preparing a terrible nuclear catastrophe for the peoples in reply to the Soviet proposal to conclude a German peace treaty.

52. Still, we shall leave the question of diplomatic tact on the side. We only want to say that speeches, such as that made today by Mr. Dean, do not in any

way help to create a favourable atmosphere for the negotiations on disarmament which the Soviet Union is approaching with an open mind, with a definite position and with a crystal-clear programme. We would like the United States to help in every way, and not obstruct, the creation of a favourable atmosphere for achieving agreement on the resumption of disarmament negotiations, and for these negotiations themselves.

53. Mr. Dean attempted from this rostrum to cast doubts on the good will of the Soviet Union as regards complying with the General Assembly resolutions on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. May I, not through the mouth of Mr. Dean but through that of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reply to that question.

54. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, the Head of the Government of the Soviet Union, in reply to a letter from Cannon Collins, Chairman of the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, said:

"The question of not being the first to use nuclear weapons which you touch upon in your proposal is certainly of paramount importance. A good solution to that problem would play an important role in the elimination of the threat of war and the solution of the whole problem of disarmament. A simultaneous undertaking by all States possessing nuclear weapons not to be the first to use them would be an important step towards the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war. The position of the Soviet Union is quite clear. We are in favour of an undertaking by all States renouncing the use of nuclear weapons and we are prepared to sign an agreement not to be the first State to use nuclear weapons."

55. Yes, we, the Soviet Union, are prepared to sign such an undertaking. We are prepared to sign and implement an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. That is the position of the Soviet Union.

56. Unfortunately, to our great regret, the position of the United States is, apparently, the opposite. The United States representative tried to justify this opposite position by referring here to the discussion in the First Committee, where the Italian amendments [A/C.1/L.295] to the Afro-Asian resolution of banning the use of nuclear weapons, were rejected by an overwhelming majority. The United States delegation, you see, cannot, he said, vote for this draft resolution because the Italian amendments were defeated. Yes, there was actually such an incident in the First Committee, one of which it might be better not to remind the Western Powers—the incident of the submission of the Italian amendments, the whole point of which boiled down to the terrible thought that the United Nations Charter sanctions the use of nuclear weapons.

57. No, the United Nations Charter is not a document which can be construed to suit those who want war. The United Nations Charter, of course, does not permit, and cannot permit, the use of nuclear weapons, and the resolution of the African States, which we are now considering, is in full conformity with the United Nations Charter.

58. It is no mere accident that, when the Italian amendments were put to the vote, fewer than a quarter of the United Nations members supported those

amendments. So it was a rather unhappy incident in the First Committee for the Western Powers and it would be better not to remind them of it.

59. Finally, one remark about the position of the United States, and apparently, of the other Western Powers, members of the North Atlantic military bloc, a remark about their position on the first resolution proclaiming the African continent a denuclearized zone.

60. The United States representative expended much energy and many words on trying to justify from this rostrum the unwillingness of the United States to support this noble resolution.

61. He tried to explain this position from various angles but he failed and was unable, to explain one thing: Why after all, is the United States against proclaiming Africa a denuclearized zone? Or does it want, again through France's intermediary, to begin testing nuclear weapons there? Or does it want to transform Africa into a nuclear, not a denuclearized zone, to saturate African States with its nuclear weapons? Is that how the United States understands helping Africa? Is that how the United States understands giving support to the young African States? Is that how the United States understands supporting the initiative of the African States, for it was the initiative of the States of Africa. Mr. Dean said here that the African States must themselves take the initiative in ensuring their security. They did so. They are asking everyone, including the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, not to transform Africa into a nuclear zone. The Soviet Union signifies its agreement. The United States does not give its agreement to this proposal. It does not support it.

62. The Soviet delegation calls upon all delegations to cast their votes today for a just cause—the strengthening of peace and, to this end, invites them to support the resolutions proclaiming the African continent a denuclearized continent and prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

63. Mr. QUAISON-SACKKEY (Ghana): My delegation is intervening briefly in this debate in defence of draft resolution I, which was adopted by the First Committee and is contained in the report of that Committee [A/4942/Add.3]. The operative paragraph of this draft resolution reads:

"Calls upon Member States:

"(a) To refrain from carrying out or continuing to carry out in Africa nuclear tests in any form;

"(b) To refrain from using the territory, territorial waters or air space of Africa in testing, storing or transporting nuclear weapons;

"(c) To consider and respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone."

64. The impression is being conveyed that we who put forward this draft resolution in the First Committee—that is, the majority of African States—want to isolate ourselves from the great issues that are confronting the world today. That is why I feel it my duty to make it clear that Africa does not seek to run away from all efforts which are being made by the world community to bring about peace. On the contrary, all of us have contributed to talks and to ideas which can bring about peace.

65. We support disarmament—complete and general disarmament—and we support negotiations to bring

about the cessation of nuclear tests and a possible treaty ban; this has been made very clear by all African delegations.

66. But we look upon draft resolution I—adopted by the First Committee—as a first necessary step in the whole process of negotiations for the complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests. If I may say so, when the First Committee pronounced on this draft resolution, there was a great sigh of relief all over Africa. Ordinary people—men, women, farmers, workers—were very happy to hear that the First Committee had adopted the draft resolution considering us, and respecting the continent of Africa, as a denuclearized zone. The relief came about due to the fact that two years ago the French tests in the Sahara brought about upheaval among ordinary people in Africa; there were protests in every African capital, so far as we know; ordinary people were opposed to the idea of any Power conducting tests in Africa. And that is why we think that this draft resolution should command the respect, sympathy and support of all Member States.

67. As we indicated in the First Committee [1194th meeting], we have great sympathy for our friends in Latin America and elsewhere who would like their continent to be declared a nuclear-free zone. We have sympathy for them and we want them to have sympathy for us. In our case—as I indicated in the First Committee—it is possible to have this done. The continent is a complete unit and not as yet divided by ideologies, and we feel that this is the time when every effort should be made to preserve the sanctity, the wholeness, of Africa and make it free from all competition in armaments or in nuclear weapons tests.

68. As is made clear in the draft resolution, "the task of economic and social development in the African States requires the uninterrupted attention of these States in order to permit them to fulfil their goals and to contribute fully to the maintenance of international peace and security". I think that on those grounds alone we need sympathy from all and sundry in this Assembly; and that is why we want to appeal to all Member States to support us in this endeavour. It is true that there has not been a consensus as such among Governments, but there is no disagreement whatsoever to this text, and I know that all African peoples and Governments support the idea of having Africa respected as a denuclearized zone.

69. Therefore, I appeal to those who abstained in the First Committee to cast their vote now in support of this draft resolution.

70. Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I should like to make quite a brief intervention here this morning on the vote of my delegation on the second of the two resolutions which we are considering here, namely draft resolution II contained in the report of the First Committee [A/4942/Add.3].

71. Now this is a case in which the sponsors of the draft resolution and those who, as in our own case, have serious hesitations about the wisdom of it in its present form, none the less, I think, both have the same aims. We both want to rid the world of the potential disaster of nuclear and thermonuclear war. We both want the whole of the world to be a denuclearized area, from which the fear of any form of war, including nuclear and thermonuclear war, is banished. That,

I think, is common ground. We differ only as to the best methods of achieving our common end.

72. The sponsors of this draft resolution believe—and I am quite sure they are absolutely sincere in this—that the aim can be attained by a noble declaration which, in its present form, we believe—I am bound to say—is doomed to be ineffectual. Now, we, for our part, are convinced that the same goal must be sought, but it must be sought through general and complete disarmament with effective international verification; and I emphasize those last words.

73. We very much regret that it was not possible in the First Committee to achieve a meeting of minds on the best way to secure what we both want, what indeed, I hope that we all want. This regret does not temper our sympathy with the sponsors and with their objective.

74. Since the discussion of this draft resolution in the First Committee, we have, of course, resumed consideration there of the subject of disarmament; and my own delegation and that of the United States have reaffirmed the urgent need for general and complete disarmament, carried out in balance stages and under effective international control. The joint statement of agreed principles [A/4879], submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union, provides for the elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the cessation of the production of such weapons, carried out in such a way that at no stage of the process could any State or group of States gain military advantage.

75. Under the United States disarmament programme [A/4891], which we support, all nuclear weapons would cease to exist. There would be no nuclear or thermonuclear weapons to use. When all existing nuclear weapons are destroyed, when no more are being made, and when this can be verified internationally, the problem of preventing their use will have solved itself. The aim of this draft resolution and of many other partial proposals will have been achieved. That is what we ourselves favour. For that we are working, and will work, with all our power.

76. But the hard fact remains that so long as States possess nuclear weapons, they will use them in self-defence. Mr. Khrushchev has shown himself a realist on this point. In a recent statement to Mr. Sulzberger, which has already been the subject of discussion in this Assembly, Mr. Khrushchev dealt specifically with the question of undertakings to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet representative in the First Committee sought to show that the point which Mr. Khrushchev was making is, in some way, inapplicable to the draft resolution which is now before us. I would like the Assembly to judge on this. What Mr. Khrushchev said when asked whether the Soviet Union would be the first to employ nuclear weapons in a war was, and I quote his actual words as reported in The New York Times of 8 September 1961:

"Even if either side should in such a war feel it was losing, would it not use nuclear weapons to avoid defeat? It would undoubtedly use its nuclear bombs

"All this goes to show"—and I am still quoting Mr. Khrushchev—"that if atomic weapons are preserved, and if war is unleashed, it will be a thermonuclear war. Therefore, world peace must be assured not by undertaking to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons but by radical solution of the cardinal issues. And the best guarantee to peace is

the destruction of armaments and the elimination of armies, in other words, disarmament."

77. Now those are the words of Mr. Khrushchev. You will notice that in this there is no reference whatever to unilateral declarations, no suggestion that this view, so forthrightly and—if I may say so—so effectively, stated, depended upon the number of States which might declare that they would not use nuclear weapons.

78. The arguments which have been advanced by Soviet representatives in the First Committee seeking to justify their vote in favour of such vague declarations as that envisaged in the draft resolution before us, are specious. The point quite clearly made by Mr. Khrushchev himself—and on this, at least, we are bound to agree with him—is that mere unverifiable undertakings not to use nuclear weapons—in the absence of general and complete disarmament under effective international control—are, in those circumstances, entirely valueless. He has clearly said that the Soviet Union would use nuclear weapons in self-defence if it found itself at a disadvantage in any war, including what is usually called a conventional war. I find it impossible to understand how any representative of Mr. Khrushchev or his Government can then justify casting a vote in favour of a draft resolution which says among other things that " . . . any State using nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is to be considered to violate the Charter of the United Nations" This must surely be taken as a declaration by the Soviet Government of their readiness to violate the Charter. It can mean nothing else.

79. I listened with great care to what the representative of the Soviet Union said to us this morning. He is well aware that I raised this matter on a previous occasion with him in the First Committee [1197th meeting]; indeed, on that occasion, I think he thought the words I used were unnecessarily harsh, but as I reminded him on that occasion, I cannot call other than hypocrisy actions which are, in fact, hypocritical in this way. When we are told that the Soviet Union is supporting this draft resolution, in the light of these remarks of Mr. Khrushchev, then I cannot see any other explanation for that action.

80. I listened carefully this morning to see if we were to receive a further explanation of these words of Mr. Khrushchev; I should have been very interested indeed to hear it. But I do understand that it would be difficult, if not embarrassing, for the representative of the Soviet Union here publicly to disagree with what Mr. Khrushchev said in Moscow. I certainly do not wish the representative any harm and so I do not want to press the point and to embarrass him further on it, but it is a matter in which I think we can all draw our own conclusions; and for myself, even with the greatest respect for the words of the representative here, I prefer the words of Mr. Khrushchev on this occasion as showing what the real intentions of the Soviet Union are.

81. For our own part, since we do agree with Mr. Khrushchev's logic in this matter, we see no alternative, if international honesty and good faith are to be preserved, but to vote against this draft resolution. At the same time, we again pledge ourselves to bend our every effort in the cause of concluding an agreement on general and complete disarmament, with proper provision for effective international control under which there can no longer be any question of using nuclear weapons. This is the way to remove the

threat; and it is for this reason that we feel bound to vote against this particular draft resolution.

82. I think it was significant this morning when the representative of Canada here announced that his delegation would now vote against this draft resolution, and I hope that may encourage others, too, to feel that this is really the correct action to take in regard to this particular draft resolution because of the implications which I have tried to spell out. We all want to achieve real and lasting disarmament, in which nuclear weapons will disappear altogether. But in the light of the arguments I have presented, I believe that it is no help to this Organization for us to blind ourselves to the issues involved here merely by passing resolutions which appear to have the right intention and to think that by so doing we are solving these vital problems.

83. I hope very much that other delegations will think carefully about this. For the reasons stated, my delegation will vote against this draft resolution.

84. Mr. IQBAL (Pakistan): When draft resolution II, contained in the report of the First Committee [A/4942/Add.3] and couched in the form of a declaration, was voted upon in the Committee, we pointed out that it in fact related to the item on disarmament, rather than to that on the banning of nuclear weapons tests. There has been a development since the draft resolution was adopted in the First Committee, because the USSR has declared its intention to resume negotiations on the banning of nuclear weapons tests. As we all hope that this may lead speedily to a treaty on the banning of nuclear weapons tests, we feel that draft resolution II has become unnecessary. We therefore think that, in order to give the fullest chance for these negotiations to result in a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests, we should not proceed with this draft resolution. In any case, if this draft resolution is put to the vote, we shall abstain.

85. Mr. IFEAGWU (Nigeria): We have heard in this forum expressions of sympathy for the aims expressed in draft resolution I, contained in the First Committee's report [A/4942/Add.3] which attempt to declare the continent of Africa a denuclearized zone. What we are pleading for is that these expressions of sympathy should be translated into action in the form of positive votes in favour of this draft resolution.

86. It must be emphasized that the sponsors of this draft resolution are not against a nuclear test ban treaty; in fact, we all without exception voted in favour of the United Kingdom-United States-sponsored resolution [1649 (XVI)] urging the quick resumption of nuclear test ban treaty talks. We have the feeling that, if this universal wish for the banning of nuclear weapon tests should start to be fulfilled in a continent—here it must be noted that there is not a single African country which is a nuclear Power—perhaps we will begin to get somewhere.

87. Besides that, Antarctica was recently the subject of a treaty^{2/} which led to its being declared out of bounds for war purposes. That does not necessarily insulate that particular portion of the world from what is taking place elsewhere; it is only a beginning, to show what can happen, and the fact has not inhibited continuation of disarmament talks. And exactly in the same manner we in Africa, where, as I have stated before, there are no nuclear Powers, would like

this portion of the world to be used as an example, and perhaps from there we could begin to expand. It does not mean we are against the talks which, we are very happy to note, both the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to resume in the course of next week. As I pointed out earlier, we voted in favour of the resolution concerning those talks and we wish them every success.

88. If our friends from Latin America—where again we are happy to note that there are no nuclear Powers as yet—would introduce a similar draft resolution to declare that continent a nuclear-free zone, we shall be very happy; if Western Europe does the same, if Asia wishes to do the same thing, we shall be very happy. But we wish to begin somewhere—at least in a continent where as yet there are no countries involved in the nuclear armaments race. We wish to give encouragement, so that this process may expand to take in everywhere.

89. Once again, may we beg those who have so eloquently expressed sympathy for the aims and objectives to translate their sympathy into positive votes for this draft resolution.

90. Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): I would like briefly to explain the vote of my delegation on the two draft resolutions contained in the report of the First Committee [A/4942/Add.3] now before us.

91. The Polish delegation will support draft resolution I, which calls upon Member States to refrain from carrying out, or continuing to carry out, in Africa, nuclear tests in any form. The Assembly will recall that we have always supported in the past draft resolutions against the French tests in the Sahara.

92. We can only support a call upon Member States to refrain from using the territory, territorial waters or air space of Africa in testing, storing or transporting nuclear weapons, and to consider and respect the Continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone.

93. As the Assembly knows very well, the Polish delegation has always supported initiatives concerned with the creation of denuclearized zones in different parts of the world. We submitted in 1957 a proposal to create a denuclearized zone in Central Europe.^{3/} We have also supported the proposals put forward by other States with the purpose of creating denuclearized zones in other parts of the world.

94. We believe that it is our fundamental duty to respect the wishes of the African States in that respect and we can hardly see any valid reason for opposition with regard to such a draft resolution.

95. We entirely agree with the arguments which were put forward by the representative of Ghana who preceded me at this rostrum a short time ago.

96. The Polish delegation will also support draft resolution II, a declaration banning the use of nuclear weapons. We believe that the adoption of this draft resolution would be a very important contribution of this Assembly to the solution of the general problem of disarmament.

97. The representative of the United Kingdom, who spoke a while ago, tried to enlarge the scope of our debate. It seems to him that the problem, which the authors of this draft resolution are trying to solve,

^{2/} The Antarctic Treaty, signed in Washington on 1 December 1959.

^{3/} See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 697th meeting.

can best be solved by a treaty on general and complete disarmament. I am in full agreement with him on this point, with only one reservation. I cannot see how this declaration can be opposed to our efforts to conclude an agreement on general and complete disarmament. It is certainly not our intention to substitute this declaration for a determined effort to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament. We are looking forward to the resumption of negotiations on general and complete disarmament and we hope that these negotiations will lead to an early conclusion of a comprehensive treaty.

98. We are also in favour of partial measures leading towards general and complete disarmament and we see many merits in the adoption by this Assembly of a declaration which would state in clear terms that the international community is against the use of nuclear weapons.

99. The representative of the United Kingdom has quoted here a statement by Mr. Khrushchev. This has been the subject of debate in the First Committee and has been, I think, clearly and definitely refuted by the representative of the Soviet Union. I wonder why we have here reverted to the custom of some representatives taking the floor to explain their own vote and trying also to explain the votes of other representatives. The representative of the United Kingdom has used rather harsh language.

100. It seems to me that it is not hypocritical to favour disarmament and to vote for a declaration such as this. But one can easily call it hypocrisy when one sees somebody vote against the declaration and pretend, at the same time, to be in favour of general and complete disarmament.

101. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Before calling on the succeeding speakers and in order to facilitate our work somewhat, I intend, before the vote, to call on three speakers who have asked to explain their vote. I shall grant any other requests for an explanation of vote, under Rule 90, after the voting. I call on the first of these three persons, the representative of Thailand.

102. Mr. ANUMAN RAJADHON (Thailand): In the First Committee, the delegation of Thailand voted in favour of draft resolution II contained in the Committee's report [A/4942/Add.3]. The reason for its action was that it has full sympathy with the noble desire and motives of the sponsors of this draft resolution.

103. The genuine desire of my country and my people to see the banishment of all nuclear weapons, as well as to see all areas of the world denuclearized, is well known. That is why my delegation has supported all previous resolutions on nuclear matters adopted by this Assembly.

104. However, now that the two great nuclear Powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, have agreed to return to the conference table at Geneva in order to resume negotiations on a nuclear test ban, my delegation is of the view that no duplicating action should be taken by this Assembly which might prejudice the resumption of these negotiations. A special conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons for war purposes, as envisaged by this draft resolution will, in the view of my delegation, not serve any useful purpose at the present time, for it will certainly clash with the conference at Geneva.

Its work will not only duplicate, but also complicate, the work of the Geneva conference.

105. In the light of these reasons—change of situation and the conviction that all peace-loving people everywhere should welcome the resumed negotiations and should give their wholehearted support to achieving their success—my delegation will abstain in the vote on draft resolution II.

106. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) (translated from Spanish): The Spanish delegation has no comment to make on the first of the draft resolutions on which we are to vote—that concerning atomic explosions on the African continent. We shall cast our vote and pursue our policy on this proposal as we did in the First Committee. On the other hand, our delegation is among those which are changing their votes on the other draft resolution—that concerning the use of nuclear weapons. The two draft resolutions appear in part IV of the report of the First Committee [A/4942/Add.3].

107. Strictly speaking, however, we are not changing our vote; above all, we are not changing our ideas, which we expressed with the utmost firmness in the First Committee. I venture to read what I said there:

"Furthermore, the proposal unintentionally serves to bind hand and foot, in the face of acts of aggression by the country of constant atomic explosions, those countries which obey international law. To deprive those countries of the right to take adequate military counter-measures in the face of the Soviet's untrammelled preparations would be an injustice. These bonds would not be over-strong, for they would lack true moral force, which is what we are in a position to give; If I remember my Swift correctly, they would be rather like Gulliver's bonds, which were of soft silk, and which he threw off with a single movement when he awoke.

"At all events, we must be mindful of the moral consideration we owe to the opinions of the United Nations, and must not be over-hasty in giving expression to them . . ."⁴

108. Our view, then, was wholly unfavourable to the draft resolution. When the vote was taken, we expressed that unfavourable view in the courteous form, increasingly adopted here, of abstention: first, out of respect, friendship and consideration for the sponsoring countries, of whose good intentions and aims we had no doubt, and secondly out of a kind of instinctive respect for the wording; for it is difficult to say "no" to noble and generous words, even if in practice they may serve dangerous ends. This is the strength of drafts which are couched in sublime language but whose outcome may be less sublime and even, perhaps, prejudicial to the smooth progress of international order and external defence. Moreover, we were then unaware of the fortunate agreement to continue negotiations, reached between the countries representing the two main contending schools of thought on this matter of armaments—an agreement which clarifies many problems and calls for clear and well-defined positions on our part also.

109. The Spanish delegation, then refusing to be tempted by generous words and good intentions, was opposed to the draft resolution, as I have just said; but when the time came to vote, it took the courteous

⁴ This statement was made at the 1193rd meeting of the First Committee, the official records of which are published only in summary form.

course of abstaining, as the correct and civilized thing to do. At the present grave juncture, faced with new circumstances, and wishing to assume its full responsibilities and avoid the snare of mere words, it announces that it will vote against the draft resolution in question.

110. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): The draft resolutions contained in the report of the First Committee [A/4942/Add.3] and upon which we are about to vote, are historic. We have given birth to both of them—that is to say, we, the Ethiopian delegation. Of course, being the father of two historic children, if I may put it so, we have no preference whatsoever. Yet, since one of them comes before the other—that is, the draft resolution containing the declaration, draft resolution II—the first child should have a little bit of preference, although not very much.

111. The idea of this draft resolution was brought up by my delegation—indeed, by my Minister of State for Foreign Affairs—three years ago. We brought it here during the fourteenth session, but we did not submit a draft resolution. We consulted a number of delegations and, as history now shows, the great majority of the Members were completely in favour of it.

112. During the fifteenth session we presented the draft resolution^{5/} and, for reasons which are now well known, it was not voted upon. So it was that this year again twelve African-Asian countries brought the draft resolution to the First Committee. Now the Ethiopian Government and delegation have already explained in detail the reasons for submitting the draft resolution. We have replied to all criticisms and I am most happy to note that the Committee adopted our resolution not simply by a majority vote, not simply by a two-thirds vote, but by a vote approaching unanimity. A glance at the voting record shows that the amendments which were submitted against our draft resolution—amendments which would have authorized something which the Charter itself never knew and would not dare, even if it did know, to authorize—were rejected by 50 votes to 28, with 22 abstentions. Once that was done, the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 60 to 16 with 25 abstentions.

113. I think the conclusion is clear that the entire human race is for the draft resolution. As a matter of fact, even those who voted against it accepted it—they could not say they wanted to use atomic weapons. They simply said that they wanted to achieve the same end by other means, so that, to my delegation, the occasion is very historic. The world has now accepted that which we brought to its attention, that which grew out of our experience. The world now respects our experience in this matter and is ready to vote on this draft resolution, and thereby take a position on it.

114. I have heard a number of delegations say that there are some developments which must be brought to the attention of the Assembly. What are these developments? One is, that the two great Powers have agreed to further negotiations regarding a nuclear test ban treaty, and so it is argued that this draft resolution now ties our hands. It is said that for this reason it should be defeated.

115. I submit that nothing in our draft resolution prevents anybody from doing anything—in fact, it welcomes negotiations to prepare and define a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Nowhere does the draft resolution say that it is against the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear weapons; it does not say that. In all humility, I am bound to say that those who invoke this fact are not giving a proper interpretation to the situation. The draft resolution in fact, in operative paragraph 2, envisages such a convention, but that is to come in due course.

116. Supposing, however, that there is agreement on nuclear weapons. There is no conflict, because operative paragraph 2 does not say that this cannot be done; it simply requests the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of Member States on the possibility of convening a conference for drawing up a convention. There is no conflict whatsoever. If the countries now engaged in negotiations on a nuclear test ban succeed before the replies come from the various Governments, well and good; we shall be the first to applaud them. If they do not succeed, I submit that they should not prevent other Governments, including themselves as a matter of fact, from making another attempt.

117. Second, the draft resolution in substance is not against the nuclear Powers concluding an agreement on nuclear weapons. Nowhere does it say that it is in fact against it. If they agree, by control and other means, to conclude such an agreement, again, our declaration would be implemented, just as is envisaged in its operative paragraph 2.

118. I also heard an argument to the effect that negotiations on disarmament are being advanced and that therefore this draft resolution is unnecessary. This is really a repetition of the previous argument and I need not deal with it at length. If there is an advance, well and good. If an agreement on disarmament is concluded, this would constitute a part of that historic document. I see no contradiction whatsoever in that.

119. I heard one more argument, which seems to deserve my attention, and that was, that nuclear weapons cannot be done away with by banning them. Well, that is a declaration of the human race and it must be respected. I do not know why it must be concluded: "Do not do this because I am not going to follow it or others are not going to follow it". If we take that line of action then we shall not do anything. If I am told: "Do not do this because I am going to do something against it", then that line of action, I submit, can prevent action everywhere, not only here, but everywhere.

120. I am therefore compelled to beg those delegations that have spoken against the draft resolution to weigh the consequences of their position and at least, if they cannot vote for it, to abstain.

121. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): We shall now vote on the draft resolutions. I shall first put to the vote draft resolution I, recommended by the First Committee in its report [A/4942/Add.3]. A vote by roll-call has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Iceland, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mon-

^{5/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Annexes, agenda items 67, 86, 69 and 73, documents A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1-3.

golia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras.

Draft resolution I was adopted by 55 votes to none, with 44 abstentions.

122. The President (translated from French): We shall now vote on draft resolution II contained in the report [A/4942/Add.3] of the First Committee. A vote in parts has been requested, as well as a roll-call vote on the operative paragraphs and on the draft resolution as a whole. In accordance with this request, we shall first vote on the preamble, paragraph by paragraph.

The first paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 62 votes to none, with 28 abstentions.

The second paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 63 votes to none, with 29 abstentions.

The third paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 63 votes to 1, with 31 abstentions.

The fourth paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 62 votes to none, with 28 abstentions.

The fifth paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 61 votes to 6, with 25 abstentions.

123. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): We shall now vote on the operative part of draft resolution II. A vote in parts has been requested for each of the sub-paragraphs of operative paragraph 1; a roll-call vote has been requested on sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 1, on paragraph 1 as a whole, on paragraph 2 and on the draft resolution as a whole.

The vote was taken by roll-call on sub-paragraph (a) of operative paragraph 1.

Turkey, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal,

Niger, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia.

Against: Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Portugal, South Africa, Spain.

Abstaining: Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand.

Sub-paragraph (a) was adopted by 56 votes to 19, with 26 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (b) was adopted by 59 votes to 17, with 19 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (c) was adopted by 63 votes to 12, with 24 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (d) was adopted by 52 votes to 20, with 23 abstentions.

124. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I shall now put the whole of operative paragraph 1 to the vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Guinea, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Ghana.

Against: Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Greece, Guatemala.

Abstaining: Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland.

Operative paragraph 1 as a whole was adopted by 56 votes to 19, with 26 abstentions.

125. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): We shall now vote on operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution II set forth in the report [A/4942/Add.3] of the First Committee.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The United Kingdom, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian

Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic.

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Costa Rica, France, Greece, Guatemala, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Turkey.

Abstaining: Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand.

Operative paragraph 2 was adopted by 53 votes to 19, with 29 abstentions.

126. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): We shall now vote on draft resolution II as a whole.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Yemen, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta.

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Costa Rica, France, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Draft resolution II as a whole was adopted by 55 votes to 20, with 26 abstentions.

127. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): There are still two speakers on my list who wish to exercise their right of reply, one who wishes to explain his vote after the vote. I call upon the representative of the United States of America, who desires to exercise his right of reply.

128. Mr. DEAN (United States of America): It was not quite clear to our delegation what the representa-

tive of the Soviet Union was complaining about this morning.

129. I used Soviet sources and nothing else to describe the Soviet position. The representative of the United Kingdom has already quoted Mr. Khrushchev's statement in which he said that

"... it would be untimely at present to say that in the event of war atomic weapons would not be employed. Anyone who made such a statement could turn out to be untruthful even though, when making such a pledge, he would be sincere and not be lying ... if either side should in such a war feel it was losing, would it not use nuclear weapons to avoid defeat? It would undoubtedly use its nuclear bombs."

130. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has supported a statement that the use of nuclear weapons, even in self-defence, was a violation of the Charter. In the First Committee, in the meeting of 13 November 1961, the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, said:

"It is quite clear to us—and I think it is just as clear to the representative of Italy—because the draft resolution of the eleven African countries states that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations."

131. I stated that the Soviet Union enthusiastically supported this draft resolution. The next day, in the meeting of 14 November, Mr. Tsarapkin of the Soviet Union said:

"Yesterday, in reply to our criticism of the Italian amendments [A/C.1/L.295], the representative of Italy, being unable to refute that criticism, stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to deal a crushing nuclear blow—I repeat: crushing nuclear blow—to any aggressor. Everybody will understand that that will happen. It is exactly what will happen if war begins. War is war, and it has its own logical sequence of events. In our day any war can immediately become a nuclear war, and since Italy is a member of NATO, and has allowed the United States to establish military bases on its territory, it is clear that, in view of its undertakings under the NATO agreements, it will, whether it wishes or not, be drawn into any such war in the most active manner and, of course, with all due consequences.

"The Italian representative has no doubts concerning the objective of these NATO bases in his country. We have no doubts on that score either. That is why it is within the logic of events that, in the event of war, those bases will be immediately dealt a crushing and devastating blow—and here is Soviet irony—but the responsibility for these consequences will, of course, rest with those who created NATO, who have drawn Italy into NATO and who have established military bases on Italian soil and have thus made that country vulnerable to such blows."

132. I submit that what I said is entirely justified by what Mr. Khrushchev has said and what the repre-

^{6/} This statement was published in *The New York Times* of 8 September 1961.

^{7/} This statement was made at the 1193rd meeting of the First Committee, the official record of which was published only in summary form.

^{8/} This statement was made in the 1194th meeting of the First Committee, the official record of which was published only in summary form.

sentative of the Soviet Union has said in this hall, namely, that although they have voted for a resolution which would outlaw nuclear weapons even in the exercise of self-defence, nevertheless, the Soviet Union does not intend to live up to that resolution.

133. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call upon the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

134. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): At this hour I have no intention of detaining the General Assembly for long, and want to make only two short remarks. The fondness which the United Kingdom and United States delegations have lately shown for quoting from Soviet sources should, in our view, be backed up also by correctness of quotation, since what is the point of quoting, if the quotation is incorrect?

135. As regards the declarations by the Head of the Soviet Government which were quoted by the representatives of Western delegations speaking from this rostrum, I cannot do other than say that they were quoted incorrectly. I read out today a clear and absolutely definite statement by the Head of the Soviet Government about that Government's readiness to sign an undertaking by States to renounce the use of nuclear weapons the very same day that other States also do so.

136. As regards the declarations made by Mr. N. S. Khrushchev in reply to questions put by the United States journalist, Mr. Sulzberger, the Soviet delegation is obliged, for the third time, to draw the attention of the delegations of Western Powers to the fact that the United States observer, Mr. Sulzberger, asked: "Would the Soviet Union agree to declare that it would never be the first to employ nuclear weapons in the event of war?" Mr. Sulzberger went on to say: "It seems to me that, if just one country were to make such a statement, then perhaps the other nuclear Powers also would make similar statements".^{9/} And N. S. Khrushchev, the Head of the Soviet Government, replied: "We shall never be the first to start a war against any country. That is our position: we shall never be the first to start a war against any country". Further, in reply to Mr. Sulzberger's question about the unilateral assumption by the Soviet Union of a commitment not to employ nuclear weapons, Mr. Khrushchev explained why such a commitment could not be accepted unilaterally. And we, today, continue to hope that, after the General Assembly has, by an overwhelming majority of votes, adopted the resolution in favour of concluding a multilateral convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, it will prove possible to conclude such a convention and that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom will not oppose this. On its part, the Soviet Union is prepared to conclude such a convention.

137. Secondly, with reference to Mr. Dean's last speech, the Soviet delegation would like once again

to draw attention to the vitally important necessity of ensuring a healthy and favourable atmosphere for the forthcoming disarmament negotiations. We consider this to be a most important task and we appeal to all delegations, including the United States delegation, to help in creating such an atmosphere.

138. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call upon the representative of the Upper Volta, for an explanation of vote.

139. Mr. GUIRMA (Upper Volta) (translated from French): It may seem strange and contradictory that certain African countries should have abstained in the vote on the resolution [1652 (XVI)] which asks for the denuclearization of Africa, and yet have voted in favour of the resolution [1653 (XVI)] which declares that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

140. Nevertheless, our position is clear. I should like to repeat briefly here the explanations we have already given in the First Committee. During the Committee's discussion on denuclearization and various nuclear problems, we found ourselves witnessing what was virtually a duel between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. This brought it home to us that disarmament was an extremely pressing problem; that the problems had to be placed in order of importance and urgency; that the disarmament problem was, into the bargain indivisible; and that it was necessary to think in terms of general disarmament rather than disarmament by continents. Even if a continent was declared a denuclearized zone, it would not, in the event of nuclear war, necessarily be spared by the atomic bombs, much less by the radio-active fall-out that the nuclear explosions might produce. This prompted us to feel that we should strive for a more general and more comprehensive form of disarmament throughout the world, because it would be idle to think that Africa's destiny could be kept apart from that of the rest of the world.

141. We also felt that this move should come from the various African Heads of State. Faced with the controversy aroused by the various problems of disarmament and denuclearization, the African Heads of State must reach a thorough and unanimous agreement on the steps to be taken to keep Africa safe. It is not our function, here in the United Nations, to take up positions and ask our Heads of State to sanction them; we are here rather in order to secure international sanction for the decisions taken by the supreme authorities of our States. That is why we abstained on the resolution concerning the denuclearization of Africa, yet voted in favour of the resolution submitted by Ethiopia and its friends.

142. I say this in order to dispel any confusion regarding our intentions and to make it clear that there has never been any question of our wishing to protect anyone, or any intention in connexion with the initial testing or storage of atomic weapons in Africa.

^{9/} Published in *The New York Times*, 8 September 1961.

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.