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President: Mr. Edvard HAMBRO (Norway).

AGENDA ITEM 22

The situation in the Middle East (*continued*)

1. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those representatives who have asked to explain their votes after the voting.

2. Mr. RIAD (United Arab Republic): The request made by the United Arab Republic to the General Assembly to consider the present dangerous situation in the Middle East was a request to the world Organization to take an initiative for peace. This initiative has just been taken. It is an initiative worthy of the labour we have all exerted here throughout the past ten days. It is also an initiative worthy of the Organization because it is made on behalf of the Charter.

3. The General Assembly has once again denounced Israel's aggression and the consequences of that aggression. It has deplored Israel's occupation and reaffirmed that the occupied territories must be restored in application of the principle that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible. This declaration is in full harmony with the terms of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The General Assembly has further reaffirmed that no territorial acquisition resulting from the use or threat of force shall be recognized. This is a reminder to all the States of their collective responsibility to resist the aggressor in his attempt to expand by force.

4. The General Assembly has further called for the termination of the state of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area. None of these principles escaped Israel's aggression. Every moment that passes without Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories constitutes in itself a new violation of each and every one of these principles. Ever since Security Council resolution 242 (1967) was adopted on 22 November 1967, all efforts to carry out the resolution in the three years that have elapsed have been resisted by Israel. That was the primary consideration which made it necessary for the United Arab Republic to seek initiatives on the part of the General Assembly. We proceeded from our con-

viction, valid under the Charter, that the entire membership of this Organization is both entitled and in duty bound to assist the Security Council in the fulfilment of its responsibilities and the implementation of its decisions and resolutions.

5. The General Assembly today has shouldered its responsibility by urging the speedy implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its parts. To that end the Assembly has taken practical measures of great importance. It called upon the parties to instruct their representatives to resume contacts with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in order to enable him to carry out at the earliest possible date his mandate for the implementation of the Security Council resolution.

6. The Assembly also recommended to the parties that the cease-fire, which comes to an end tomorrow, be extended for a period of three months in order that they may enter into talks under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with a view to giving effect to Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

7. In response to those two complementary demands I declare here, on behalf of the United Arab Republic, that its permanent representative to the United Nations has been instructed to enter into talks with Ambassador Jarring. We shall further observe a cease-fire period for three months. We thus accept the recommendations of the General Assembly in a further effort to carry out the settlement embodied in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) by peaceful means.

8. The General Assembly has also decided to maintain the dangerous situation in the Middle East under the constant and active attention of the United Nations by requesting the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within a period of two months and to the General Assembly as appropriate on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). This is in fact a most positive step on the part of the Assembly. Three years after the adoption of the resolution by the Security Council it was imperative and legitimate that the United Nations become constantly informed of the progress achieved in the peace efforts through the implementation of its own resolution.

9. The Security Council has the primary responsibility to suppress aggression and to take measures and actions to ensure respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of all States.

10. Israel's occupation of the territories of three Member States for almost three years and a half constitutes a continued act of aggression which should invoke the most serious response on the part of the Security Council. The resolution we have just adopted has rightly pointed out that necessity.

11. The debate in the General Assembly has demonstrated beyond any doubt the general conviction that respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is an indispensable element in the settlement of the Middle East question. The great national struggle in which the Palestinian people are engaged is an honourable struggle. The fulfilment of these rights is imperative, and the United Nations has a historic, moral and legal responsibility towards the people of Palestine. The resolution adopted today has reaffirmed that fact. It was not only a recognition of truth but also an act of realism.

12. Both the discussion and the judgement which took place in this hall have clearly revealed that international public opinion has become aware of the dangers of the policy of expansion. That policy has not been supported by a single voice throughout the debate and, indeed, has generally been denounced. The entire United Nations system as well as its entire membership reject Israel's policy of expansion.

13. Now that the initiative for peace has been taken by the General Assembly in its vote today we have great faith in the inevitable victory of the principles of the Charter and in the inevitable realization of peace in the Middle East. The responsibility of the Security Council and its permanent members is paramount. We sincerely hope that the United States will join in the efforts for peace and resistance to aggression, with the full hope that the United States will desist from supplying Israel with weapons and funds as long as Israel occupies the territories of three States Members of the United Nations.

14. Thus, all forces would be mobilized on behalf of the Charter to bring about peace and justice in the Middle East.

15. The adoption of this resolution today is a victory for the principles for which all peoples from all continents have struggled. I wish to thank particularly all the delegations from Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America that have devoted so much of their time to the consideration of this question. That in itself was a vital contribution to the success of the United Nations today. That success is of the greatest significance to the cause of world peace. It has also revealed that the world Organization can meet the challenge and stand for the defence of the principles of the Charter.

16. Mr. SAYEGH (Kuwait): On behalf of the delegation of Kuwait and at the request of the delegations of Algeria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen, Syria and Yemen, I should like to read the following declaration:

“It was with a heavy heart that we, the delegations of Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Southern

Yemen, Syria and Yemen, decided not to participate in the vote on draft resolution A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1. While some elements and features of this draft resolution make it unthinkable for us to vote against it, other provisions make it impossible for us to vote for it.

“We have always felt bound to the co-sponsors of the draft resolution by bonds of friendship and traditions of mutual co-operation, both wide-ranging in scope and enriching.

“As far as the substance of the draft resolution is concerned, we whole-heartedly and without reservation support at the United Nations—as our Governments support, by all the means at their disposal—the demand, which is echoed in the draft resolution, for complete withdrawal by Israel from all Arab territories occupied since June 1967. Fraternal Arab bonds as well as common loyalty to the principles of the Charter render this goal a cornerstone of the policies of our respective Governments and a focal point of our own efforts at the United Nations.

“On the other hand, the following factors have made it impossible for us to countenance giving our support to the draft resolution as a whole:

“(a) The Palestine problem is the core and crux of the situation in the Middle East. Yet the draft resolution makes only a passing reference to that problem;

“(b) The lone paragraph in which the draft resolution refers to the Palestine problem, as reworded in the revised version, is retrogressive. It falls short of the reaffirmation of ‘the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine’ which was formally made by the General Assembly in resolution 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969;

“(c) We lament the fact that the Palestinian people—whose independence was recognized by the organized international community as early as half a century ago—was absent during the current debate on the situation in the Middle East and was therefore denied the opportunity to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on this item. While many delegations can, and do, support the cause of the Palestinian people, none is competent to speak for it save its representatives;

“(d) Our respective Governments cannot and do not accept any solution for the problem of Palestine which the Palestinian people itself rejects. We have been formally notified that the leadership of the Palestinian people rejects the draft resolution under consideration;

“(e) Israel is composed preponderantly of transplanted, alien settlers, who have forcibly dispossessed and subjugated the indigenous Palestinian people and conquered and usurped its homeland. To contend, as the draft resolution does, that the recognition

of the claims of Israel to the attributes and prerogatives of statehood is indispensable for the achievement of a just peace is tantamount to contending that the legitimization of a gross injustice is a prerequisite for the attainment of justice and peace. We reject this thesis as well as the principle on which it is predicated;

“(f) Our respective Governments have categorically rejected, and continue to reject, Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, on which draft resolution A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1 is essentially based.”

17. Mr. PIÑERA (Chile) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Chilean delegation voted this morning in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1 because in our opinion it properly meets the objective that this General Assembly sketched out when, as part of its powers and functions, it participated in the solution of the problem of the Middle East.

18. The item that we have been considering is designed to find effective means for bringing about the urgent application of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts, in all its elements and without devious interpretations.

19. Chile's position in this matter is an expression of its attempt to find a harmonious and just position which will fully take into account the rights of all the countries of the area.

20. Mr. MUNTASER (Libya): I should like to place it on record that my delegation's vote for the draft resolution presented by a number of African, Asian and European countries, which was adopted by this Assembly this morning, does not in any way mean that my Government has changed its position with regard to the question of Palestine and the Palestinians.

21. I should like to emphasize my Government's unequivocal support for the Palestinian people and their inalienable right to freedom and self-determination as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and recognized by international law. The Libyan Arab Republic fully supports the Palestinian struggle aimed at the realization of the national aspiration of the Palestinian people to regain its legitimate rights and restore its homeland. The Palestinians are determined to achieve their legitimate goals and decide their own destiny. No force on earth can prevent them from realizing these goals and no one should be allowed to do it on their behalf.

22. It is very appropriate to end my short statement by reiterating what the Chairman of the Libyan delegation said in this connexion when he addressed the General Assembly on 16 October 1970:

“The United Nations, which has recognized the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, would do well to support fully a realistic solution, which is sponsored by the Palestinian freedom-fighters: a

just and lasting peace for everyone in a democratic, secular State of Moslems, Christians and Jews living in harmony.” [1870th meeting, para. 47.]

23. Mr. TSURUOKA (Japan): In explaining my delegation's vote I should like to quote from my statement on the strengthening of international security on 6 October 1970 in the First Committee:

“Everyone knows that there is no single effective means for the strengthening of international security. Everyone knows also that the formulation of elaborate rules and regulations for the conduct of international affairs or the drafting of solemn declarations containing beautiful words will be merely a futile exercise unless every nation of the world assumes an attitude of genuinely seeking peace and of putting into action what is written on paper.

“It is therefore the will and the determination of each nation to build the peace on which depends the realization of the strengthening of international security. This will and determination of nations to build peace could not be better shown, could not be better reaffirmed in a concerted way, than on this commemorative occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.”¹

24. One unanimous voice has echoed in this hall throughout the discussion of this item. That voice has called for the establishment of peace in the Middle East. The representative and Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Riad, indicated “full readiness to implement the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, to co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and to facilitate his mission” [1884th meeting, para. 48]. The Foreign Minister of Israel stated: “Israel . . . will never renounce the pursuit of peace, be the journey towards it short or long” [1888th meeting, para. 68]. The representatives of Nigeria, the United States of America, Argentina and France all called for the establishment of peace in the Middle East when they introduced draft resolutions or amendments of their own. This is indeed the voice of the whole world and my country is no exception. My delegation believes in the will and determination of those who spoke of peace; my delegation believes in the sincerity of those who spoke of peace. With that in mind, and apart from all the semantics and rhetoric, the various drafts looked equal to my delegation in the lofty cause of peace. In fact, serious and intensive efforts were made by all concerned to bridge the gap between the different views. It is unfortunate that no agreed text acceptable to all was formulated. However, a considerable spirit of accommodation was shown in the course of informal consultations, and as a result it can well be said that the draft texts looked almost equal in essence, all of them seeking a just and lasting peace based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The fact that the latter resolution has been fully respected and the existence of a spirit of accommodation are, we believe, signs that we are

¹See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, First Committee, 1729th meeting.*

all of us seriously hoping to attain a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

25. My delegation therefore voted in favour of both the drafts that were put to the vote. It is the sincere hope of my delegation that our belief in peace in the Middle East will never be betrayed.

26. Mr. CREMIN (Ireland): The Irish delegation has had occasion in the past to set forth its views in detail on the problem of the Middle East. I refer particularly to the statements made on 14 August 1958 [735th meeting] during the third emergency special session and on 27 June 1967 [1538th meeting] during the fifth emergency special session. To summarize very briefly, in 1967 we suggested the speedy negotiation and signature of a permanent treaty of peace by Israel and the neighbouring States, guaranteed by the United Nations. We asked that that treaty should comprise the withdrawal of Israeli forces, a just settlement of the refugee problem, freedom of navigation of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba and certain other arrangements. It seemed to us that those desiderata were essentially met in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), and we consequently welcomed the unanimous adoption of that resolution on 22 November 1967.

27. Our concern at the deadlock persisting two years later was expressed by the Minister of External Affairs of Ireland, Mr. P. J. Hillery, in his address in the general debate at the twenty-fourth session on 26 September 1969, when he said:

“That no substantial progress has been made. . . is most disquieting, bearing in mind the possibility of a recrudescence of major hostilities in the area. In that event there would clearly be a risk of the big Powers being drawn in for various reasons, including the traditional strategic importance of the Middle East. . . . As the Secretary-General has well said, the whole situation in the area creates ‘a crisis of effectiveness for the United Nations and for its Members’. The Irish delegation sincerely hopes that the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Middle East, Ambassador Jarring, will bear fruit worthy of the patient and persistent efforts on which he has been engaged, and that the Big Four, who have been seconding those efforts for the past six months, will enable him to bring his mission to a successful conclusion at a very early date.” [1768th meeting, para. 58.]

28. That was in September 1969. And in the light of the concern we expressed at that time we were heartened by the Secretary-General’s note of 7 August last concerning acceptance of the peace proposal initiated by the Government of the United States.² We deeply regret that, to use the Secretary-General’s description, the welcome first step there outlined has not been followed by others. We note, however, that in this debate very many delegations have stressed the importance of prolonging the cease-fire that was a major feature

of the proposal accepted in August, and each of the three draft resolutions called for its prolongation.

29. In voting this morning my delegation was guided by two main considerations: not to add to or subtract from Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which constitutes a maturely deliberated and carefully balanced whole; and, secondly, to facilitate Ambassador Jarring in the discharge of the very important and delicate mission entrusted to him. My delegation had serious reservations concerning some provisions of the original twenty-two Power draft, including the emphasis placed on some aspects of resolution 242 (1967) to the neglect of others. The amendments proposed by the French delegation and incorporated in document A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1 significantly improve the text. However, it still has features about which we are not happy. We consequently felt obliged to abstain.

30. The draft resolution submitted by twenty-one Latin American States [A/L.604] was, in the opinion of my delegation, a prudent and well-balanced text, well calculated to serve the cause of peace. Indeed *mutatis mutandis* it reminded us in substance and in language of the draft submitted by Latin American States at the fifth emergency special session in June to July 1967.³ We welcomed and voted in favour of that draft, and we consequently voted in favour of the present text.

31. Mr. BORCH (Denmark): On 22 November 1967 Denmark, as a member of the Security Council, voted in favour of resolution 242 (1967). In explaining the vote cast by my delegation I said that that resolution was a compromise in the best sense of the word, that it took into account all the essential interests of the parties involved and that it represented a fair and balanced basis for the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. We stand behind that resolution as firmly now as we did then. It remains for us the only solid basis for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Indeed the Danish Government remains convinced that resolution 242 (1967) and the diplomatic machinery known as the Jarring mission established under it, despite all the old and deep-rooted difficulties and recurring setbacks, still hold out the best hope for the future. It is also well worth noting that acceptance by the parties of the resolution and of the person of the Special Representative strengthens this hope. No less important, the resolution has continued to carry the support and reaffirmation of the four permanent members of the Security Council.

32. When considering our position on the draft resolutions before us, we had three main concerns uppermost in our minds: not to impair but to reaffirm Security Council resolution 242 (1967), to strengthen the possibilities for prompt resumption of the discussions under Mr. Jarring’s auspices and to support the extension of the cease-fire. On all three points, the draft resolution contained in document A/L.604 best met

² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fifth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1970*, document S/9902.

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Emergency Special Session, Annexes*, agenda item 5, document A/L.523/Rev.1.

our wishes. Therefore we supported that draft in our vote this morning and we regretted that it was not adopted.

33. Despite various amendments, the text embodied in document A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1 did not, in our view, meet that test to the same extent. On the contrary, we were inclined to fear that that text attempted so to modify the concept upon which resolution 242 (1967) was built and so to alter the balance in it that its adoption might not facilitate the task of Mr. Jarring in trying to promote agreement and assist in efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of the often mentioned Security Council resolution.

34. In view of that background, it will be readily understood that we found it impossible to support that text. Moreover, in viewing the text that was before us this morning, we have not been able to avoid taking into consideration our great concern that conflicting calls and recommendations concerning the same matter should go out from the two main organs of this Organization.

35. Finally, it follows from what I have said that my Government attaches the utmost importance to the willingness of the parties to co-operate fully with Mr. Jarring so as to enable him expeditiously to carry out his mandate under Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which remains his guide.

36. Mr. JAKOBSON (Finland): It is to be regretted that at the conclusion of our debate on the situation in the Middle East the General Assembly had to face a parliamentary battle for votes between two rival draft resolutions on a question of such seriousness and urgency as that of the Middle East. In the light of the results of the voting it may seem that the Assembly is sharply divided on the immediate and urgent issues of the situation in the Middle East. However, such an impression is misleading. There is in fact very wide agreement in this Assembly on these issues. There is agreement on the continued validity of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of November 1967 as a comprehensive and concise expression of the will of the international community with respect to the solution of the conflict in the Middle East. There is agreement that this resolution should be carried out in all its parts. The resolution includes a built-in mechanism for its implementation. This is the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring. His mandate is part of the resolution itself; consequently by saying that we support the resolution we say in effect that we support the Jarring mission. There is a nearly unanimous desire among members of the Assembly that contacts between Mr. Jarring and the parties to the conflict should be resumed as soon as possible. There is an equally widely held desire that while talks go on the cease-fire should be observed.

37. Both the Afro-Asian and the Latin American drafts called upon the parties concerned to resume contacts with Mr. Jarring without delay. Both drafts called

for a cease-fire for three months, and both endorsed Security Council resolution 242 (1967) without reservations. It is a pity that this basic unity of purpose could not be expressed in a single resolution capable of commanding the support of the overwhelming majority. Such a result could have made a powerful impact on the efforts to make peace in the Middle East. In the absence of such a united stand, the Finnish Government, mindful of its duties as a neutral State whose services are engaged in the United Nations peace-keeping effort in the area, was unable to lend its support to either of the rival texts.

38. Mr. BENITES (Ecuador) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The explanation of vote given by my delegation this morning is closely related to facts of which I think it is essential to remind the Assembly. The first of these facts is that at the time there were three positions involved: the first being that of a certain number of non-aligned countries which attempted to reflect the opinions of a group of States having their own well-defined attitude towards the question of the Middle East; the second that of the United States, reflecting a different viewpoint which was opposed to that of the first group; the third that of the majority of the Latin American States, which aspired to reach a conciliatory position based on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and on all of the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which is binding on all Member States under Article 25 of the Charter.

39. Before preparing the draft we had listened carefully to both parties to the dispute, and I can assure you that the views considered essential for one balanced resolution were taken into account in the draft by the Latin American majority.

40. A dispassionate comparison of the texts will show how balanced and equitable the Latin American proposal was, for, in reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter and Security Council resolution 242 (1967) as a whole, it contains the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force and consequently the duty to return territories occupied by that means and the reaffirmation of the fact that in order to establish peace it is necessary to respect and recognize the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States of the region.

41. This is literally what the resolution adopted this morning says, and it is the same as operative paragraph 1 of resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, as adopted by the Security Council, the unconditional application of which was called for in the draft resolution prepared by the majority of the Latin American States. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the resolution endorsed this morning are almost the same as paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Latin American draft resolution. This shows the impartiality with which the Latin American group worked in considering the problem and our acceptance of all of the points that were put to us.

42. As far as my Government is concerned, it is essential that any equitable peace should be based on recog-

dition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and in the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory through the threat or use of force, which is stated both in the resolution endorsed this morning in explicit terms and also by implication in the draft resolution prepared by the Latin American majority. Therefore, since we could not vote against such principles my delegation abstained.

43. We hope that the aspirations for a just peace and for peaceful solutions, which were the objective of the Latin American majority, can be achieved through the resolution adopted this morning.

44. Mr. KJARTANSSON (Iceland): For ten days now we have been discussing the tragic situation in the Middle East. I feel sure that we all have the same objective in mind: that we must try to find a solution that all the parties involved could live with and accept. All three of the draft resolutions that were before us this morning had considerable merits and the various sponsors are to be highly commended for their great efforts in trying to find a peaceful solution.

45. All the draft resolutions had the same main elements in them and all underlined the importance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and recommended also the great necessity for a continued cease-fire on the Arab-Israeli frontiers and the resumption of the Jarring talks. We believe that we should have aimed at getting the parties involved to agree to this without getting the great objections from one of the parties, as it turned out, as far as draft resolution A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1 was concerned.

46. It is our belief that all the disputing parties would have been able to live with draft resolution A/L.604 if not happily, yet with the least difficulties. That is why the Icelandic delegation voted against draft resolution A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1 but for draft resolution A/L.604.

47. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): My delegation abstained on both the draft resolutions that were voted on this morning. In my statement in the debate on this item [1893rd meeting], I said that we would not be able to support any resolution of the Assembly which sought to amplify, modify or alter the balance of resolution 242 (1967).

48. All the proposals put before the Assembly attempted to do this in some measure. Accordingly, we abstained. In our view, resolution 242 (1967) stands intact and it is in accordance with that resolution that we shall continue to exert our efforts.

49. Mr. LONGERSTAEY (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): I should like briefly to explain the reasons for my delegation's vote this morning on the draft resolutions submitted by several African-Asian countries and Yugoslavia and also by twenty-one Latin American countries.

50. Belgium was in favour of draft resolution A/L.604 since its operative part contains all that is necessary

for the full implementation of resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council.

51. It was difficult for us to support any recommendation which, with regard to the substance of the problem, diverged, however little, from resolution 242 (1967) by highlighting only some of the factors. This, in our view, is the major shortcoming of the resolution which the General Assembly adopted this morning. As I indicated in my statement of last Monday:

“ . . . the General Assembly should be careful not to place its own construction on resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. It should resist the temptation to rewrite or paraphrase this well-balanced but fragile compromise. It would be a major mistake to isolate one factor and accord priority to it, or even to try to establish some kind of hierarchy. The various paragraphs of the resolution are complementary and interrelated.” [1894th meeting, para. 66.]

52. However, we did not want to oppose the draft resolution submitted by several African and Asian countries and Yugoslavia, as contained in document A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1. My Government considers, indeed, that it did contain two very important factors that could bring about a climate of peace in the Middle East; namely, an extension of the cease-fire for a three-month period and a resumption of the mission entrusted to Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

53. We are, of course, aware of the difficulties involved in the resolution which the General Assembly has just adopted. We would not like to conceal our fears about interpretations incompatible with the operative part of resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council to which it might give rise. We continue to believe that the compromise upon which the Security Council agreed three years ago remains the only possible political basis for a settlement of the conflict.

54. Mr. BEAULNE (Canada) (*interpretation from French*): The Canadian delegation was not able to support draft resolution A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1 because it had serious reservations with regard to the advisability of a debate in the General Assembly at this time and with regard to the possibility of agreement which might be the result of the approach of the sponsors.

55. I do not have to remind the Assembly of the unconditional support of Canada for Security Council resolution 242 (1967). It is a document that seems to us complete and well-balanced. We would not like to weaken it or truncate it. We are convinced, just as is everyone who wishes for peace in the Middle East, that it is the indispensable basis for a settlement.

56. We recognize the excellent intentions of the sponsors of draft resolution A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1. We are grateful to them for having positively improved it by the amendments which were made to the original text in the course of the discussion. But in spite of those efforts there remains a certain imbalance, a certain ambiguity which may compromise the agreement

reached in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). We found on the other hand that the text of draft resolution A/L.604 was balanced and reasonable. We regret that it was not possible to merge the two texts in such a way as to win general support and to promote an equitable solution in the Middle East. However, we hope that nothing will now hinder the resumption of the mission entrusted to Ambassador Jarring, a mission which is an integral part of resolution 242 (1967) and which now offers the best chance for progress.

57. Mr. VINCI (Italy): In taking part in the general debate on item 22, entitled "The situation in the Middle East", during the meeting of 2 November, I made clear the considerations which would inspire the Italian delegation in determining its position on the draft resolutions submitted to the General Assembly. I especially emphasized that:

" . . . this Assembly has one common goal—to assist the parties and all those engaged in the process for reaching a peaceful settlement to overcome the latest obstacles and to reactivate the Jarring mission at the earliest possible date. It seems to me that to perform this essential task the General Assembly should seek a constructive decision that would command the virtually unanimous support of Member States." [1894th meeting, para. 19.]

I added at the end of my statement that we should:

" . . . give to our deliberations the moral weight we need to press the parties to a rapid, constructive resumption of talks for a just and peaceful settlement. We would thus offer them the best opportunity to prove their sincere will for peace. That is why it is the voice of world public opinion as a whole which must resound in this hall; it is the conscience of mankind and its quest for peace which must inspire our conclusions." [Ibid., para. 25.]

58. My delegation was moved in all the consultations it has had with other delegations by this strong conviction and has spared no efforts with other delegations, which shared the same belief, in order to achieve this objective. The same convictions were behind the position we took on the two draft resolutions on which we voted this morning.

59. All this was in line with the statement made by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Aldo Moro, on 22 October during the commemorative session [1879th meeting]. In other words, in our view, a resolution was desirable and required which, being balanced in all its parts, balanced in its wording, in its connotations, would be such as to press the main parties concerned to negotiations.

60. That is why my delegation thought that the Latin American draft, by virtue of its contents and of its authors, which are impartial and objective, offered the best conclusion for our deliberations. In our opinion it would have been preferable if the Latin American draft had been put to the vote first. It could thus have obtained a large majority and would have pressed the

parties to the application of resolution 242 (1967), which is the only United Nations document accepted by the parties mainly concerned.

61. However, since the draft that was put to the vote first was the one which does not appear to us to meet those requirements, we deemed it necessary to clarify our position by abstaining on the draft itself. We thought that we needed something more or something different to pursue those aims which we considered essential. But, on the other hand, we have not rejected it, as we agreed on several points contained in that draft, points that we feel are in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

62. When the Latin American draft resolution was put to the vote, though in a new text which modified the original draft that we liked more and was more in agreement with our own ideas and objectives, we cast an affirmative vote also because we wished to take into account the contribution which the co-sponsors have always provided, with objectivity, in favour of an equitable solution of the conflict. We wanted also, on our part, to give expression to the confidence we place in our Latin American friends, in their dedication to peace, to the use of peaceful means for the settlement of disputes, in one word, to the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations.

63. Italy has always considered the developments in the Middle East objectively and with deep concern. It has not failed to offer in every forum ideas and initiatives aimed at a peaceful solution safeguarding the vital interests of the parties concerned. We were and we still are convinced that the only way out is offered, in the framework of the United Nations, by the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the resumption of Ambassador Jarring's mission, which all the parties consider indispensable for carrying out such a resolution. The extension of the cease-fire should provide the opportunity to overcome reciprocal conflicting arguments by bearing in mind that beyond those arguments there is the goal of peace to be attained. The advocated cease-fire should be better defined and guaranteed. Italy reiterates its adherence to Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts and expresses the most sincere wish that our deliberations may move the situation out of the present deadlock, having in mind the superior interest of peace.

64. The PRESIDENT: I am in a slightly difficult position. Three representatives who have asked to explain their votes after the voting were sponsors of one of the draft resolutions that was voted upon. According to rule 90 of the rules of procedure: "The President shall not permit the proposer of a proposal or of an amendment to explain his vote on his own proposal or amendment." I wish to draw the attention of those three representatives to that rule and ask them whether they still wish to speak. If so, I shall ask the permission of the General Assembly to allow them to speak. I feel that I cannot give them that permission without consulting the Assembly.

65. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Assembly agrees to waive the application of rule 90 in this case.

It was so decided.

66. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I do not think I shall contravene the rules of procedure because the explanation of vote I wish to give is not on the draft resolution of which Argentina was a sponsor; it is on resolution A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1 which Argentina did not sponsor. Hence, I am not contravening the rules of procedure. None the less I should like to thank the Assembly for having given me the opportunity to speak.

67. From this same rostrum yesterday [*1895th meeting*] I explained the reasons for the presentation of the draft resolution contained in document A/L.604. Although I believe I was sufficiently clear and explicit, I should like to repeat that the Argentine delegation, with all the Latin American countries which sponsored it, wished to contribute in this way to the solution of the Middle East conflict by submitting a text which in our judgement offered the possibility of facilitating negotiations. Our draft was not intended to compete with any other drafts under consideration by the Assembly. We were not inspired, and we are not inspired now, by a spirit of rivalry. For this reason—and this is the explanation of vote—the delegation of Argentina abstained on the vote on the resolution sponsored by a group of Afro-Asian countries.

68. We do not measure the decisions of this Assembly in terms of victory or defeat, but rather in the more constructive terms of efforts for peace. The General Assembly adopted resolution A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1. In spite of our abstention, the Argentine delegation is now confident that the parties directly concerned in the conflict, overcoming the differences in the debate, will take this resolution into account and, by following its recommendations, will make a genuine effort to attain peace by resuming the cease-fire and prolonging it and by co-operating in good faith with the Jarring mission, so that it will be successful.

69. I should like to thank all the delegations which, understanding the reasons of the Latin American countries, have so far supported and promoted our action in the search for a solution to this problem which concerns and alarms everyone equally.

70. Mr. SOLANO LOPEZ (Paraguay) (*interpretation from Spanish*): In expressing my gratitude, Sir, I would stress that I do not wish to break the rule which you mentioned earlier: that is to say, I shall not give an explanation of my vote on the draft resolution sponsored by my delegation, but I wish to refer to the other draft resolution.

71. Before proceeding, I should like to endorse the words of the declaration just made by the representative of the Republic of Argentina.

72. I propose to explain as briefly as possible the negative vote of my delegation on the draft resolution contained in document A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1, submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly this morning.

73. My delegation examined the draft resolution referred to and, in the light of that examination, was in complete agreement with most of its provisions. But because the draft had certain additions which went beyond Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and modifications in certain paragraphs taken from that resolution and omitted certain references and quotations, the result is that in the view of my delegation it lacks the delicate equilibrium and balance which is the vital characteristic of that Security Council resolution adopted on 22 November 1967. Those considerations prompted the reservations which prevented my delegation from supporting the draft. But those reservations were not of such a nature that they alone would have been sufficient reason for us to cast a negative vote. This negative vote today was a result of our objective, based on the most sincere good faith, which was to present the General Assembly with a more balanced alternative, and we believe the last of the proposals presented on item 22 of our agenda offered such an alternative. This is also the reason for the request I made this morning for a decision by the Assembly with regard to that third draft resolution. With these words I have explained the vote of my delegation on the draft resolution—which has now become a resolution—in document A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1.

74. My country, a small developing country, is anxiously watching the tragedy afflicting the Middle East. My country hopes that peace will be restored to this area, a peace which will be genuine, stable and just, and that the present state of insecurity and suffering which torments the area will be succeeded by an era of sincere and genuine co-operation in promoting the happiness of the peoples living in that area. We are optimistic and we believe that these ominous times will be succeeded by an era of tranquility and mutual respect.

75. The United Nations and the 127 States composing it possess a unique instrument, giving us hope for better days. This unique instrument is resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council. We do not want to destroy its delicate equilibrium. On the contrary, we shall all co-operate in seeing that it is applied, as soon as possible, and in all its parts. This is a sincere hope and wish.

76. Mr. BAYÜLKEN (Turkey): I take the floor to explain the vote of my delegation and I shall be very brief.

77. As was stressed in our intervention during the general debate on agenda item 22 [*1886th meeting*], we fully endorse Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which contains the necessary elements for withdrawal and a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

78. Since resolution A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1 was in harmony with that Security Council resolution, we voted for it.

79. As to the draft resolution contained in document A/L.604, we believe that it also is in harmony with the objectives of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). We abstained on that draft resolution because the draft resolution sponsored by twenty-two Afro-Asian countries was tabled prior to draft resolution A/L.604 and is also more comprehensive in its approach to the promotion of agreement for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

80. We are pleased to note that none of the sponsors acted to vindicate one point of view; they joined in the one most urgent and most laudable objective, namely, the attainment of the elimination of the conflict in the region. We fervently hope that the talks will be resumed to promote a just and lasting settlement.

81. Mr. MONTENEGRO MEDRANO (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation wishes to explain the negative vote we cast this morning on the draft resolution contained in document A/L.602/Rev.2 and Add.1. My delegation adopted this position because we were a sponsor of another draft resolution which had the same purpose, namely, to reflect the continuing concern of all members of the international community to ensure peace and security on just and balanced terms in the Middle East. We believe that the explosive situation in the Middle East should be eliminated as soon as possible and that full support and application should be given to resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council. This is our hope and our desire.

82. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Saudi Arabia, who has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

83. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): The representative of Kuwait made a comprehensive statement on behalf of Saudi Arabia and other Arab States in explanation of our non-participation in the vote. I need not elaborate on the statement he made. But I thought it timely to draw your kind attention, Mr. President—rather than merely the attention of the Secretary-General, because, after all, you represent all of us and you are the symbol of the Assembly—to the fact that it is high time the situation was corrected in this host country of the United Nations. There is no genuine freedom of information. The mass information media in the host country frequently resort to three “s’s”: the first “s” is slanting the news to suit themselves or their masters; the second “s” is using scissors to cut off whatever is factual and then dilating the news in the domain of the notional, calling it opinion—whereas anyone who knows anything about news cannot but find it tendentious propaganda—and the third “s”, the most serious one, is complete silence.

84. This City of New York happens to be the capital of the world in that the Headquarters of the United

Nations has unfortunately been established here. But the mass information media are not satisfied with resorting to the use of the afore-mentioned three “s’s”. Quite often they have ridiculed representatives of Member States. If they cannot exercise the elements of courtesy, let us get out of this impolite city. I will substantiate what I have said.

85. Time and again pro-Zionist newspapers have called the representative of a sovereign State “a court jester”. I am the “court jester”. Is that polite? Is this in accordance with the code of ethics of correspondents or their masters? The first to use such an epithet was *The Long Island Star Journal*. Everyone knows that it is a pro-Zionist publication. It has crept in again in *Newsweek*, in the current issue. You may look at it when you have time, Mr. President. I brought here the book by a former United States Secretary of State, none other than Dean Acheson, and very seriously quoted a paragraph from it [*1888th meeting*]. This is how *Newsweek* reports that occurrence. They have my photograph, as if they are doing me an honour by putting it in the company of Mr. Eban’s photograph, and they say: “As this futile spectacle drags on”—and that use of the word “futile” shows the pro-Zionism of this magazine—“Saudi Arabia’s Jamil Baroody, the UN court jester . . .” Do you expect, Sir, as President of the Assembly, that members of a sovereign State should be called “court jesters” by correspondents? They should at least be polite, play the game and not resort to ridicule, in addition to the three “s’s” I have mentioned.

86. In the Fifth Committee I shall have my say about the extension of Headquarters. I shall say that that extension should be arrested and this Organization should be decentralized. We cannot be made the laughing-stock of the masses, who are sheep which feed on what is given to them by the mass information media.

87. In Europe and in my part of the world we are not used to discourtesies. It is too late for you, Sir, and me to get used to such epithets.

88. Having made that statement, which is timely—even perhaps overdue—I now wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply to certain statements that were made in the explanations of vote of some of my colleagues.

89. Mr. Yost—excuse me, Ambassador Yost, the distinguished representative of the United States—said this morning that we should not do anything that would divide us, but rather everything that would bring us together. He referred to the critical time in the Middle East and said that trying to exacerbate matters would not yield any fruit. But my distinguished colleague from the United States should know that his country is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The Soviet Union and the United States are the most powerful States in the world. They are permanent members of the Security Council.

90. Why did the United States accept in 1967 that the situation in the Middle East—or whatever name

you want to call that question—should be transferred to the General Assembly when I, amongst others, warned it that the Assembly has no mandate to act but only to recommend? Why did it suggest or, rather, work towards the transfer of this item to a special session of the General Assembly when it was its duty to resolve the question in the Security Council? And now it takes exception when some States—more specifically the United Arab Republic—point out how the Council was paralysed due to the ill will with which the Arab world was treated. Why did it take exception and begin to say that it is an exercise in futility? How can it compromise between having worked during June 1967, more precisely on 11 June 1967, to transfer the question to the Assembly when I warned it in the Security Council that it wanted to kill the question by referring it to the Assembly—and saying now: Do not do anything; keep the balance of resolution 242 (1967)—which I called the eleventh commandment the other day. God forbid that it should be the eleventh commandment. If we are fundamentalists we know that nobody can add to or subtract from those commandments. But they have been treating that resolution as if it were the eleventh commandment here.

91. I should like to have an answer from the United States representative, whether it be from Mr. Yost or he who occupies Mr. Yost's chair. Why do they take exception to the United Arab Republic bringing the question before the Assembly when they did not take exception to this in 1967, considering that the Council was paralysed and could not act either with dispatch or in any practical manner?

92. Resolution 242 (1967) confronts the Arab world with a *fait accompli*—the recognition of Israel, an extraneous element planted in our midst, in the western gate of Asia. And I should like here to turn to my colleague from Japan, who is noted for his infinite patience. Was he not exhilarated when the United States troops evacuated Okinawa? If I were Japanese I should consider the evacuation of Okinawa a festive occasion. And then he comes here to the rostrum and tells us about the balance of that package deal, as it was referred to—one of those Americanisms which I know but which have no place in any serious discussion of such intricate problems.

93. Did the United States—or Russia for that matter—consider the invasion of Europe by Hitler a *fait accompli*? After all, Hitler was European. Did they consider it a *fait accompli*? Would the European countries at war with Nazi Germany in 1939-1940 have heeded the advice of Asian or African countries—individually or collectively—that perhaps it would be the better part of wisdom to make peace with Hitler and recognize the Third Reich under his domination? I want an answer from the United States. I was here in 1939-1940. If anybody said anything about the Nazis without insulting them or saying what despicable people they were, he would be followed by the FBI. Why do you want us to recognize Israel when you did not recognize Hitler? Is there a double yardstick in the United Nations?

94. Why should the Western European countries—I would say most of them but not all of them—and those aligned with them persist in supporting a State, none other than Israel, which is not Asian by any stretch of the imagination? As I have mentioned time and again, Zionism is an Eastern European movement; it is alien even to the Jews of our area. Many of them have told me that they became the victims of that movement.

95. And here, judiciously, I am going to ask another question. By what yardstick of justice do the Anglo-Saxon countries consider that they have the right to be the arbiters of the destiny of an Asian people, a people that was placed under a Mandate in 1920 at Versailles? By what yardstick of justice do those Anglo-Saxon countries have a right to be the arbiters of our destiny in Asia?

96. We thought colonialism had been liquidated in Asia. And here they establish themselves at the western gate of Asia.

97. What is the answer, my good friends from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and from part of Canada—because there is Quebec which is French, and the French have always been known as the torch-bearers of liberty. Parenthetically, I found out that Mr. Cross is an Irishman: that is why they do not give a damn if he should get killed. And Mr. Laporte was a Frenchman. I have the right to say this when those Anglo-Saxons maltreat us, when they are bigoted, and when they discriminate against us. Why should they be the arbiters of our destiny? Why did they not open up Australia for the persecuted Jews—a persecution we deplore. Why did Mr. Truman not open up the prairies of Kansas and the expanses of Texas? Those displaced Jewish persons pleaded with the United States to let them come here. No, let them go to Palestine at our expense.

98. Whom do the successive Governments of the United States—with the exception of the Government of the late Mr. Eisenhower, may God rest his soul—think they have been fooling? Mr. Eisenhower had a very wise and firm Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, who had been close to Presidents before and after Mr. Eisenhower's tenure of office. You know them, I do not have to tell you who they were. What a shame.

99. Sir, I do not want to tax the patience of my colleagues and act in contravention of your request that statements in exercise of the right of reply should not become a general debate. But States like mine, which do not exercise world power, even in collectivity with our Arab brethren, should, I think, be treated with a little generosity by the President of this session of the Assembly—and of any session for that matter—when there is an array of power that balks justice and treads upon the right of a people to self-determination. For, after all, this Organization will become the laughing-stock of the world, if it has not already done so in part—and I hope only in part.

100. One last word with regard to the mass information media. Channel 31, which usually televises meetings of the United Nations—I do not have a television set so I do not know what is happening in the field of television—saw fit, and not for the first time, to cut off my speech. When I took issue about this with Mrs. Loeb, who is the illustrious representative of the Mayor—she is the City Commissioner for the host country—she wrote me a letter saying that it was only a question of finances, I had spoken after 5.30 p.m. and there was not sufficient money to tape the speech. I shall not bother the Assembly by reading out the letter. If it is a question of finances, I ask you, Sir, as my President, to consult with the Secretary-General and after that consultation to let me know whether we could not initiate radio broadcasts to the host country, because it is kept in the dark.

101. I know that the United Nations has a short-wave programme that goes out to all the world, but it is ironical and paradoxical that the people of the host country are left in the dark because the mass informa-

tion media slant the news, use the scissors and quite often maintain silence. We should decentralize from Headquarters; perhaps we should leave the social, humanitarian and cultural questions here, along with the economic questions because this country loves economics and the dollar. We should leave them here and the political issues should be dealt with in a civilized place like Europe, where people are not discourteous and insulting; they know how to play the game. Forthwith I give warning that—although I may not live long enough to see it—we must decentralize from this city whose Mayor plays politics against us and, together with the Governor of the State, puts a yarmulka on his head in order to beg for votes. How can the United States be objective when their mouths drool for votes? You know what “drool” is. They sell us down the Hudson River—and I need not mention that we were sold down the Potomac River by Mr. Truman.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.