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FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 19 April 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Dávid Meiszter (Hungary)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 458th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues its consideration of the reports of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies, as well as of the special report to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As agreed in the timetable of meetings to be held during this week, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on its improved and effective functioning immediately after this plenary meeting.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States of America, Brazil, the United Kingdom and Mexico. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Radoslav Deyanov, who will introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, contained in document CD/825, on behalf of the Chairman.

Mr. DEYANOV (Bulgaria): On behalf of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, I have the honour to submit today to the Conference the special report of that Committee. This report is contained in document CD/825, which has been distributed today and which you will find before you.

The Ad hoc Committee held eight meetings during the first part of the session this year. In addition to dealing with its special report, the Committee spent several meetings in a general exchange of views on the subject and consideration of the existing proposals on the substance of this matter. The Chairman believes it is timely, in the light of the forthcoming third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to underline the importance that all delegations continue to attach to the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Chairman also believes that it is recognized that the work of the Committee has been at a standstill for several years. It was therefore encouraging that the Committee was able to begin its work early in the session and engage in a substantive discussion.

The Ad hoc Committee took full advantage of the time offered to review the state of affairs in the light of recent developments in the field of disarmament and to continue the consideration of an interesting proposal made last year by one delegation, as well as an alternative option put forward this year by the same delegation. This part of our work remained inconclusive in view of the complex nature of the issues involved. Difficulties still remain as regards the whole question of working out a "common approach" or "common formula" of security assurances, to be included in a legally binding

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

international instrument, and the Ad hoc Committee has had to report this fact in its special report. At the same time, the Committee also underlined the wide support for a continued search for such a "common formula".

The Chairman would like to stress here, on a more positive note, that deliberations this spring on the subject have been held in a business-like manner and in a spirit of co-operation and good will. For that the Chairman would like to express his thanks to all delegations which participated in the work of the Ad hoc Committee during the first part of the session, and which helped prepare what the Chairman feels is a true, if not completely happy, report on the state of negotiations on the item for consideration by the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr. Deyanov, who spoke on behalf of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, for his statement introducing the report of the Committee. I intend to put the report of the Ad hoc Committee before the Conference for adoption at our plenary meeting on Tuesday 26 April.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): We are all under the impression of the gruesome reports on the recent use of chemical weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq. The pictures we have seen of victims of a chemical attack reconfirm the notion that, as Foreign Minister Genscher put it, chemical weapons are not weapons, but devices for destroying man and nature.

Indeed, we cannot remain indifferent in the face of this blatant violation of international law. Rather we should view it - as was suggested in my Government's note of 7 April this year addressed to the States participating in the Conference on Disarmament - as an urgent warning to meet our responsibility in the negotiations on a global ban on chemical weapons. We must intensify our efforts and work towards the conclusion of a convention now. Chemical weapons must not have a future anywhere.

In reconfirming this commitment, to which we attach the highest priority, we can proceed from the basic agreements reached in the course of our negotiations on the main issues relating to an effective and verifiable convention. Substantial progress made in the negotiations during recent years gives rise to optimism and justifies the hope that an early agreement is possible. We have passed the point of no return. There is nothing which should stop mankind from banning chemical weapons once and for all. Therefore we must not jeopardize the important achievements and the basic consensus reached in our negotiations by introducing new concepts or developing old and collectively refused concepts. Rather, we must resolutely follow the road we have taken and try to resolve the remaining issues expeditiously and effectively.

(Mr. von Stulpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

The spring part of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament is now drawing to a close. In the course of it we have continued our intensive negotiations on chemical weapons under the dedicated chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland. Detailed discussions have been conducted on most of the still outstanding issues relating to the CW convention. Despite the strenuous efforts which have been made, not all our expectations have been fulfilled. Rather, we are somewhat disappointed by the lack of progress in many areas where, on the basis of agreements achieved so far, better results should have been reached.

Let me briefly review some of the major issues on the agenda of our negotiations. First I would like to address matters dealt with in Working Group A of the Ad hoc Committee. The issue of non-production and the monitoring of the chemical industry is of crucial importance for a durable and effective convention. The verification mechanism to be established to this end has to be comprehensive, feasible, manageable, consistent and effective. In order to meet these criteria we have to devise a régime which is stringent and at the same time provides for the necessary flexibility.

We should proceed from the basic question: What is realistically verifiable or detectable? We consider the monitoring régimes for schedules [1], [2] and [3] contained in the annex to article VI to be a sound basis for a viable and effective non-production verification system. However, we consider that coverage should not be limited to those facilities which are declared under schedules [1], [2] and [3]. There should also be a verification instrument available for all other chemical industry facilities. To this end, in CD/791 of 25 January 1988 we proposed ad hoc checks, which could be managed on a routine basis. These checks, which would be initiated by the Technical Secretariat, should serve solely to ascertain whether, at the time of the check, substances listed in the annexes to article VI and not reported for the facility in question are being produced. We are convinced that by this complementary instrument for monitoring the chemical industry an optimal degree of additional transparency, and hence of additional confidence in the reliability of all States parties' compliance with the convention, can be achieved. In the course of the past weeks we have had interesting discussions on our proposal. In light of these talks we intend to further elaborate our concept of ad hoc checks. We are looking forward to further exploration of our concept during the summer part of the session.

There were two other subjects which have been extensively dealt with in Working Group A during the previous weeks: schedule [1] of article VI, and the question of super-toxic lethal chemicals not included in schedule [1].

In document CD/CW/WP.192 of 11 March 1988 we proposed a redraft of the annex to article VI [1]. We did so in the hope of bridging the differences which surfaced on this matter during lengthy discussions in the course of the intersessional work of the Ad hoc Committee. However, as consultations during the previous weeks have shown, regrettably it has not yet been possible to reach agreement on the declaration and verification régime for the substances in schedule [1]. We remain convinced that the approach taken in our working

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paper does provide a basis for a compromise solution, as the régime proposed therein builds on existing points of agreement. Thus we hope that the matter will be taken up again in the summer with a view to arriving at an eventual solution acceptable to all. The degree of agreement in principle existing on this question should make this goal attainable.

On the question of the so-called schedule [4], we expressed strong reservations on the approach proposed at last year's session. We drew particular attention to its inconsistency with the other schedules in the annex to article VI. We also argued that it would be impossible to implement schedule [4] in the form envisaged then. Although a number of questions remain as to the purpose of schedule [4] and its relevance to the objectives of the convention, we are prepared to meet the concerns expressed over this question. Thus in an effort to overcome the obstacle posed by this issue, we proposed in CD/792 of 25 January this year an approach which is at the same time effective, practicable and consistent with the régime contained in article VI as a whole. In doing so we have accepted that the régime could be based on the toxicity criterion alone, and that on this basis a list of relevant super-toxic lethal chemicals could be drawn up. We agree with Ambassador Friedersdorf that the problem should be restored to its real dimensions. We continue to be prepared to seek acceptable solutions. However, as experience in this spring session shows, it is necessary, before continuing to draft texts, to clarify what we are trying to achieve through a schedule [4]. Only when we have identified in an unambiguous manner the objectives of and reasons for a régime for super-toxic lethal chemicals will we be able to shape an effective régime tailored to defined requirements.

One of the main open questions to be resolved in the framework of Working Group B is the order of destruction of chemical weapons. The question of maintaining undiminished security for all States during the entire destruction process is of paramount importance in this regard. The preconditions for this - after the entry into force of the convention - are in the view of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany: no research on new chemical weapons; no continued production or modernization of chemical weapons; no exceptions from the general rule of verification of all existing stocks and facilities, i.e. no secret CW stocks; and, lastly, no proliferation.

In an effort to translate principles agreed by the majority of the CD members into reality, and taking account of existing disparities in chemical weapon arsenals, we made a proposal together with Italy in CD/822 of 29 March 1988, which seems to us to present a viable solution. These are the main points of our suggested phased approach to the destruction process:

Proceeding from the basic undertaking that all production of chemical weapons shall cease immediately upon the entry into force of the convention, and that all chemical weapon storage sites as well as production facilities will immediately be subjected to systematic international on-site verification, we suggest that in a first phase the States parties possessing the largest stocks of chemical weapons should proceed with the destruction of their chemical weapon stocks until an agreed level is reached. It is

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envisaged that, after the large stocks have been levelled out at the end of this phase, which we propose to be the first five years of the destruction process, all States parties possessing chemical weapons, regardless of the size of their chemical weapon stocks, will be required to destroy them. During this second phase, the existing stockpile of each State possessing CW would be subdivided into five equal amounts to be destroyed during the remaining five years of the destruction period.

Our proposal also provides for close monitoring of the destruction process. Thus we suggest that during the first phase States parties should submit regular annual reports on the reduction of their stocks. Furthermore, we envisage a review at the end of the first phase, to take stock of the results achieved so far and the experience gained. It should serve two purposes. First, it should establish that the agreed reductions have in fact been implemented in the first phase. Second, it can be used to examine the verification mechanism in the light of experience and to see whether it is adequate or whether improvements are needed. However, it will not be possible to use this review to change the timing of the overall destruction period, to extend the transitional period or to decide on a course for the execution of the convention other than that laid down in the convention.

Another important subject to be dealt with in Working Group B is the question of "abandoned chemical weapon stocks, discovered chemical weapons and old obsolete chemical weapons". After last year's intensive and sometimes controversial discussion on this topic, my delegation is actively involved in the search for a solution which is acceptable to all concerned and in conformity with the objectives and the nature of a multilateral convention.

We welcome the substantial progress we have made on article VIII of the convention since last year. Our thanks are due especially to last year's item co-ordinator for cluster IV, Dr. Krutzsch, who started to restructure this article. With the elaboration of the chapter on the Technical Secretariat at the very beginning of this year's session, we now have concluded a redraft of article VIII. We consider that article VIII is in far better shape than it was only one year ago. Now we have a better picture of the powers and functions of the organs of the treaty organization, as well as the interrelationship between them. The major issue which remains to be resolved in article VIII is the composition of the Executive Council. Admittedly, this will be one of the most intricate and difficult issues. The preliminary discussions indicate that there may be common ground to build on. I am sure that at the end of the summer session we will have an even better picture of the problems involved, and we sincerely hope that by then a solution acceptable to all will not just appear in outline but will be within reach.

Challenge inspection is of crucial importance for the convention. Only an effective solution to this question will provide the necessary confidence in the verification system as a whole. The work done in this field under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus was very encouraging. The paper included in appendix II of document CD/795 in our view provides a basis for successful completion of an acceptable challenge inspection régime. Part I of the paper

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especially is in an advanced stage of elaboration. It should be possible to put the finishing touches to it early in the summer session. The process after the submission of the inspection report and part II of Ambassador Ekéus' paper will require further detailed exploration.

In the evaluation of an inspection we believe that two basic considerations have to be taken into account. It would be unrealistic to assume that the Executive Council will be prevented from discussing the results of a challenge inspection and forming its own opinion on whether or not the requested State is in compliance. The Executive Council, a treaty organ consisting of representatives of a limited number of States parties to the convention and taking decisions by a majority, cannot take any decision or adopt specific measures which would affect the national security of one individual State party.

The role of the Executive Council and the requesting and requested States should therefore be seen from that angle. Thus the requesting State will in any event state its position on the report and the conclusion it draws from it. It will certainly adopt those measures it deems necessary to maintain its national security. On the other hand one can assume that the Executive Council, representing the entire membership, will also assess the situation, in particular when a case of non-compliance seems to have been established.

The Executive Council should in our view be permitted to publicly address a violation of the convention. In the event that the violation of the convention is not unambiguously established, it seems necessary that the result of the challenge inspection should be discussed between the requesting State, the requested State and the Executive Council with a view to clarifying the situation. If this cannot be done, another request for challenge inspection should be submitted.

If a violation is unambiguously established, the question of possible sanctions might be addressed. As international law does not provide for sanctions in the form of "convention penalties", it could be examined whether the system of collective security established by the Charter of the United Nations can provide a basis to enforce a chemical weapon ban. Normally the United Nations Security Council is the body which classifies non-compliance with a convention as threatening peace. Consequently the State party which is violating the convention could be subject to sanctions by the community of nations under Chapter VII of the Charter.

At this point I would like to draw attention to working paper CD/CW/WP.191 of 11 March which we have submitted. In it we address a number of further questions on which additional work needs to be done. We hope that the thoughts offered therein on yet unresolved problems may stimulate the negotiations on the challenge inspection régime and contribute to finding acceptable solutions.

Before concluding my remarks on the current state of our negotiations, I would like to mention briefly two subjects on which there have been intensive

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discussions since December of last year: article X (Assistance) and article XI (Economic and technological development). Quite a bit of valuable work has been done on these two articles. On both articles it has been possible to identify some common ground, which will pave the way for satisfactory solutions. My delegation especially welcomes the submission of working paper CD/802 by Argentina, which has in our view provided a good basis for the discussion on assistance. I think it should be possible to arrive at acceptable solutions for both articles if no unrealistic demands are made and if proposed solutions are in conformity and not at variance with the main objectives of the convention.

I have not been able to deal with all the aspects of our negotiations on a CW ban. For example, I did not make any reference to the very useful discussion we had on the final clauses, a discussion we hope to continue in the summer in order to arrive at agreed formulations for articles XII to XVI. I would, however, before ending my statement, like to thank the chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, as well as the working group chairmen Mr. Cima, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Numata, for their excellent work and their commitment. We are confident that under their guidance we will be able to make substantive progress in the coming summer session. I would also like to add that the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee and the chairmen of the working groups can continue to rely on our active support in their endeavours aimed at the early conclusion of an effective CW convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): At the plenary meeting on 14 April I presented the assessment of the United States delegation of the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons during the spring part of the 1988 session. Today, I would like to look ahead to the summer part of the session.

In some recent plenary statements concern has been expressed that the negotiations have not moved more rapidly. The United States delegation sometimes shares this frustration. However, important work has been accomplished in a number of substantive areas. We hope and expect that even more will be achieved in the remainder of the 1988 session. We must bear in mind that the key to future progress is not in external developments, or artificial deadlines, but in the efforts of individual delegations and of the Conference as a whole to come to grips with the remaining key issues.

There are, in fact, numerous unresolved issues that require detailed negotiation before a convention can be realized. These issues are difficult ones, and solutions are not readily at hand. The United States delegation will continue to address these issues aggressively because of the strong and continuing United States commitment to the negotiation of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Some delegations have taken practical steps to tackle key issues by contributing useful working papers. A few others, unfortunately, have emphasized rhetoric rather than concrete proposals. The United States delegation hopes that in the summer there will be more concrete proposals, and much less empty and unhelpful rhetoric.

We also hope that during the summer the trend toward greater openness about chemical weapon capabilities and industrial capabilities will be reinforced and extended. The United States attaches considerable importance to this. We welcome the statements made by a number of delegations since January. We urge those delegations that have not already done so to indicate during the summer whether or not their countries possess chemical weapons. Accurate declarations can make a major contribution toward building the confidence necessary for conclusion of the negotiations and entry into force of the convention. Inaccurate declarations or silence will inevitably have the opposite effect of diminishing confidence and making completion of a convention more difficult.

Given the unhappy experiences of the past, declarations cannot always be accepted at face value. They should be viewed cautiously and critically, and in conjunction with other claims by the same country. In our view, building confidence requires that a country also satisfy any concerns that arise about the declarations that are made. How follow-up queries are answered will play a large role in determining whether confidence decreases or increases.

Today the United States is taking another major step in demonstrating openness about its chemical weapon capabilities. In the past, most recently on 10 July 1986, detailed information was provided on stockpile locations and plans for destruction in our working paper, CD/711. Earlier this year we indicated that our stockpile is smaller than that of the Soviet Union. Today we are providing to each delegation a document that contains considerable additional information, bearing the designation CD/830. This document identifies each toxic chemical in the United States stockpile and provides extensive information on its properties. Detailed diagrams depict each chemical munition in the United States stockpile, including the binary artillery shell. Specific data is provided about the characteristics of each munition.

In addition to the information on toxic chemicals and munitions, the document contains detailed information on the United States programme for destruction of chemical weapons. Since 1974 the United States has destroyed almost 4,000 agent tons of chemical weapons. In the coming years even larger quantities will be destroyed. The document contains detailed material, including numerous pictures and diagrams, on the technology that the United States has developed and is using for this difficult task. The material in the document was presented to representatives of the Soviet Union during their visit to the Tooele army depot between 18 and 21 November 1987. We are now making it available to all delegations represented in this Conference. We will do our best to respond to any questions delegations may have.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

The United States delegation welcomed the opportunity recently to participate in the Shikhany workshop, and we consider the information gained from that visit a valuable reduction in the secrecy that has long surrounded the Soviet chemical weapons programme. None the less, the visit has given rise to a number of points that we are seeking to clarify with the Soviet Union.

More recently, the Soviet delegation declared that its chemical weapon stocks do not exceed 50,000 tons, and proposed a so-called multilateral data exchange of certain other chemical-weapons-related information. These most recent steps, unfortunately, do not reflect a balanced approach to data exchange. Nor, in our view, do they build confidence or facilitate the negotiations.

The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Soleby, raised questions about the Soviet stockpile figure on 8 March. My delegation has similar questions. The Soviet stockpile declaration is vaguely worded and the figure it contains is impossible to assess as an isolated number. We hope that the Soviet delegation will respond positively to Ambassador Soleby's request, and our own, that it provide more information which might clarify the situation. In our view, such information should specify whether the declaration covers bulk agent as well as filled munitions. Details on the number and location of Soviet chemical weapon production facilities and storage sites are also essential.

We cannot agree with the assertion on 15 March by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin, that the total size of chemical weapon stocks is the most important statistic. We believe that the number and location of facilities is a much more significant and relevant indicator of chemical weapon capability, and is more critical to our negotiations. We are disappointed, too, that the Soviet delegation continues to advocate an approach to data exchange that in our view is unbalanced. This approach would provide the Soviet Union with much more information about United States capabilities than the United States would receive about Soviet capabilities. Much of the information provided by the United States in CD/711 is presented in terms of percentages of the overall stockpile. If we were now to release the figure for our stockpile size, the Soviet Union would know the quantities of stocks at each of the depots listed in CD/711. They would know what quantities of United States stocks were in bulk and in munitions. And they would know what quantity of usable chemical munitions the United States possesses. And, of course, Soviet officials realized that a single number from us would give them this bonanza. It is little wonder that they emphasize this number. The net result would be that the Soviet Union would know almost everything about the United States chemical weapon stockpile, whereas theirs would continue to be largely shrouded in secrecy. We can hardly agree to such a one-sided approach. Exchanges must be reciprocal. To facilitate greater confidence-building, the Soviet Union could respond constructively to questions about its declarations and present balanced proposals for data exchange.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Two recent proposals for data exchange and confidence-building do represent a constructive approach. I am referring to the 14 April proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany for multilateral data exchange and the 18 February proposal by the Soviet Union for testing of verification procedures in the chemical industry.

The Federal Republic of Germany's proposal, for example, is directly connected to the negotiating tasks of the Conference. The data requested could assist negotiators in assessing the number of facilities subject to international verification and identifying which countries would be affected. Assuming that agreement can be reached as to what data should be declared and when these declarations should be made, we must confront the difficult problem of implementing the proposed exchange of data. We also must deal with the fact that the Conference on Disarmament does not include a number of relevant States. Will data elicited from member States - even if reported accurately and comprehensively - be adequate to build confidence or to provide a useful data base? If not, how do we expand this exchange to encompass non-member States? And what are the consequences if participation is less than adequate, or less than truthful? These are issues we must consider in our future deliberations.

We also note with interest the Soviet proposal for a multilateral effort to develop and test inspection methods for commercial facilities. We note that in 1986 the delegations of the Netherlands and Australia reported on trial inspections of commercial facilities in their countries. In 1987 the delegations of the United Kingdom and Finland suggested that countries co-operate in devising verification procedures. The Soviet proposal can be seen as a natural outgrowth of these earlier activities and suggestions.

We believe that a test of verification procedures at commercial facilities would be premature at this stage, since the procedures themselves have not been developed in the CD. The first step must be for each country with facilities subject to inspection to do its homework. United States experts are already actively engaged in developing inspection procedures for commercial facilities. We urge the Soviet Union and other countries to conduct similar work. We would also welcome elaboration from the Soviet delegation of its ideas for the actual implementation of its proposal. How would it actually work?

In looking ahead to the summer part of the 1988 session I have emphasized today attitudes more than specific issues. The attitudes with which delegations approach the work ahead will play a critical role in determining whether significant progress is made. We hope that delegations will return determined to come to grips with the key issues. We hope that they will put aside propaganda and devote their energies to substance. We hope that they will be more open about their military and commercial capabilities, and we hope that they will come with specific proposals, rather than simply reacting to the ideas of others.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

After reviewing the advances made across a broad front during the spring part of the session, I am confident that further advances can and will be made during the summer. The appendices of the draft special report of the Ad hoc Committee prepared in view of the forthcoming third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as the plenary statements made this spring and other documents before the Ad hoc Committee, provide a wealth of material that can serve as a foundation for further progress. Our delegation will be returning to Washington soon to consult with its authorities and to assist in preparations for the summer. We shall look forward to resuming the negotiations in early July.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement. It is my understanding that the secretariat is processing document CD/830 as requested. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador de Azambuja, in his capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21 for agenda item 1, to introduce document CD/829.

Mr. AZAMBUJA (Brazil): Mr. President, I will not address formal words of congratulation to you as I am not speaking in my own national capacity but as the Group of 21 co-ordinator on item 1 of the agenda. It will be my pleasure to do so when I speak to the Conference as the Brazilian representative next week.

We have before us, in document CD/829, a draft mandate for an Ad hoc Committee on item 1 of the agenda of the Conference proposed by the Group of 21. Once again our group is making a considerable effort to get things going, and we again indicate that we are prepared to sacrifice points to which both individually and collectively we attach great importance in order to find a possible common denominator.

The draft mandate is, I think, self-explanatory. I wish, however, to draw the Conference's attention to the footnote, and in particular to its final sentence, where it is indicated that if flexibility similar to that which we are demonstrating is shown by other groups, the draft mandate contained in document CD/520/Rev.2 of 21 March 1986 would be superseded by the text that is now introduced by me and placed before you.

May I just say how appreciative I am of all the good work and good will shown by Group of 21 delegations which have made the presentation of the paper possible. Although thanks are due to many, it would be unfair not to single out the efforts and the commitment of the Mexican delegation and its leader, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles, who have been tireless in the pursuit of progress in our work across the board and in all agenda items, showing the indispensable will to compromise and to negotiate.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): The distinguished Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany on 14 April introduced on behalf of a group of Western countries a paper on provision of data relevant to the chemical weapons convention. The United Kingdom is one of those countries on behalf of whom he spoke.

The paper he tabled mainly concerns the provision of data on a multilateral basis. It also envisages exchange of additional and more detailed data between States on a bilateral basis. I would like to elaborate on our own approach to all this. The United Kingdom has long attached importance to the idea of data exchange. In March 1983 we pointed out, in CD/353, that "in order to demonstrate that the inspection of commercial facilities would not be too burdensome, it would be useful to know how many facilities world-wide produce" chemicals of concern to the convention, and we called upon members of the then Committee on Disarmament to furnish such data in relation to their civil chemical industries. In an annex to that paper we gave the relevant information about our own civil industry, which we subsequently updated on two occasions.

The course of the chemical weapons negotiations since then has, I think, confirmed that data exchange would be useful. Indeed there is a growing consensus that in certain regards it is essential. Early data exchange would serve three purposes:

First, the drafting of certain provisions of the convention, in particular those relating to the destruction timetable, verification, organization and costs. For this purpose multilateral data exchange will be essential before the convention is concluded and should be undertaken as soon as possible;

Secondly, the early effective functioning of the convention. As we pointed out in CD/769, the sooner information is available the sooner we can make arrangements for the smooth functioning of the convention, such as training of key personnel in the Technical Secretariat;

And thirdly, as confidence-building measures to create an atmosphere of trust and assurance which in turn would facilitate our negotiations and help encourage wider adherence. This is also a matter of high priority.

We welcome the statements made here by several distinguished delegates on the status of the chemical weapon capabilities of their countries and on the production of certain toxic chemicals for civil purposes. We hope that other delegates will soon follow suit. I have also just listened with great interest to the statement by the distinguished Ambassador of the United States, in which he announces further information which his delegation is tabling on their own chemical weapon capabilities.

We have also welcomed the memorandum on the multilateral exchange of data presented by the Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Petrovsky, on 18 February. However, we do wonder whether the data exchanges proposed in that memorandum would be sufficient to permit the drafting of an effective convention.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

Indeed, the paper tabled by the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of a group of countries including the United Kingdom sets out what we regard as the minimum data exchange required for drafting purposes. We consider this exchange should be undertaken as soon as possible. It is essential that those States with the largest stocks of chemical weapons should be amongst the first to provide this data. We do not think the absence of agreed definitions for some of the terms used in the list should hold up the exchange of data. We envisage each State making clear what criteria it has used in compiling its data. Similarly we see no need for negotiations about data exchange. Let each of us provide unilaterally as much data as possible and as soon as possible.

I come now to data exchange for confidence-building measures. In my statement of 8 March I emphasized the high importance my authorities attach to this. We need to give each other as much information as we can about our capabilities in the various areas which the convention will cover. Things should be clearly above board, so that all of us can be reassured that our partners are negotiating in good faith. This calls for considerably more detailed data than that needed for purely drafting purposes. It might be helpful if I gave an idea of the sort of information we consider should be provided for this purpose. An exhaustive list is not feasible as the requirements will differ from country to country. However, the following are examples of the information we think should be included:

First, location and capacity of chemical weapon production, storage and destruction facilities;

Secondly, a detailed quantitative breakdown of chemical weapon stockpiles by site and by agent, as well as by munition and agent stored in bulk;

Thirdly, numbers of civil plants producing, processing or consuming chemicals on each of schedules 1, 2 and 3 above the thresholds to be agreed and the names of the chemicals concerned;

Fourthly, locations of research and development facilities producing chemicals on schedule 1 and the location of the permitted single, small-scale production facility;

Fifthly, plans for the destruction of chemical weapon production facilities.

This more detailed information might be provided bilaterally as a confidence-building measure. Alternatively it might be provided publicly so that it could have the added advantage of facilitating the smooth early functioning of the convention. It is up to each State to choose.

Exchange visits to military and civil chemical facilities can also have a useful confidence-building effect. Visits are not of course an alternative to providing the information I have mentioned, but rather one of the possible vehicles for doing so. Several countries have already conducted such visits - the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

Soviet Union for example - and we look forward to the process continuing. The United Kingdom in March 1979 invited members of the Conference on Disarmament to visit our former chemical weapons pilot plant at Nancekuke as well as an organophosphorus chemical facility near Birmingham. We reported this visit together with our experience in destroying the facility at Nancekuke in document CD/15. We have recently arranged an exchange visit with the Soviet Union under which a Soviet team will visit our chemical defence establishment at Porton Down at the end of May and a British team will visit the Soviet military facility at Shikhany in early July. We are also considering sympathetically the proposal made by Deputy Minister Petrovsky on 18 February for an international verification test on civil chemical facilities.

It is sometimes argued that data exchange can diminish rather than expand confidence and we all know examples where this has happened. It is a fact that some initial disclosures of information will give rise to further questions or may not tally with the assessments of others. In these cases we would expect that the process of data exchange will continue until the necessary confidence has been established. In some instances verification of data exchange on a bilateral basis before conclusion of the convention could greatly help to achieve this.

I have recently returned from a meeting of experts organized by the United Nations Secretariat in Dagomys, where we enjoyed not only a most interesting exchange of views but also the generous hospitality of our Soviet hosts. There seemed there to be a general consensus in favour not only of verification, the specific subject of the meeting, but also more widely in favour of greater openness and transparency on military matters. Data exchange during the negotiating process, when conducted in a positive fashion, can contribute in a tangible way to the search for a common agreement. My delegation hope that the type of information set out in the paper presented by the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany as well as in my statement today, will be provided by participants in the chemical weapons negotiations in the very near future. We ourselves will be continuing to play an active part in this exchange.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for her statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, my delegation is pleased to see presiding over our work, and for a period which instead of one month will last for three months, a person of such objectivity and skill as yourself. You can be assured of the total co-operation of my delegation.

The first item on our agenda, adopted unanimously at the inaugural meeting of this year, held on 2 February last was, as will be recalled, that concerning a "nuclear test ban". It has rightly been said that in the area of disarmament there is no other measure that has been the subject of such protracted consideration. The resolutions adopted on this topic by the

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

United Nations General Assembly and many other governmental and non-governmental bodies can be counted in their hundreds. To date, nevertheless, all that has been attained is what has come to be known as a partial test ban, through a variety of treaties, the most significant of which is the one signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963, which entered into force on 10 October of the same year. In order to help change that situation, the delegation of Mexico, along with the delegations of the other 20 countries that comprise the Group of 21, has submitted to the Conference on Disarmament the draft mandate that is to be found in document CD/829, which has been presented to the Conference today by the co-ordinator for that subject in the Group of 21, Ambassador de Azambuja, with his customary eloquence. The two main paragraphs of the document, with which it begins, are worded as follows:

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad hoc Committee on item 1 of its agenda with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

"The Ad hoc Committee will set up two working groups which will deal, respectively, with the following interrelated questions:

"(a) Working group I, - Contents and scope of the treaty;

"(b) Working group II - Compliance and verification."

As can be seen, and contrary to what frequently occurs, the co-sponsors of the draft do not claim to have a monopoly of truth, but recognize in advance that each delegation has the right to maintain the view that it considers appropriate. Through the adoption of the draft, then, the Conference can establish an Ad hoc Committee: "with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty". "With the objective" is a formula that, as I said in the statement I made in the First Committee of the Assembly last October, is open to the widest variety of interpretations. For my delegation this is an immediate objective, but for other delegations, for instance the delegation of the United States, which has said so on several occasions, it is a long-term objective. Therefore, if this draft mandate were to be adopted, the delegation of Mexico could set down in a statement what its interpretation is. The delegation of the United States, or any other delegation, could also indicate its interpretation. In that way the draft in question could be adopted by consensus without any of the delegations of member States of the Conference on Disarmament having to abandon its position. The Ad hoc Committee would set up the two working groups mentioned in the mandate and would commence its work immediately.

Unless there is already a consensus in favour of the adoption of the draft mandate contained in document CD/829, it is not the wish of the co-sponsors that the Conference should take a decision on it until the commencement of the summer session. We trust that by then the sought-for unanimity will be easily obtained.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I recognize the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): In his statement today, the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf, touched upon the important question of the multilateral exchange of data before the convention is signed. The same thing occurred with the statement made by the distinguished representative of Great Britain, Ambassador Solesby. I would like to make some brief comments in connection with these two statements.

To begin with I would like to point out that a multilateral exchange of data before the signing of the convention is, first, an important confidence-building measure, and second, a means which ought to contribute to the elaboration of the convention. At least that is the Soviet Union's approach to the multilateral exchange. Against that background the Soviet Union has declared the size of its chemical weapon stockpile. The representative of the United States devoted a critical part of his statement to this fact. I strongly object to his assertions, which are designed to belittle the importance of this fact.

As an example of why we think that the presentation of such data is important I might refer, for instance, to the recent proposal made by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, which, in a document on the order of destruction of chemical weapon stocks put forward jointly with the delegation of Italy, proposed that the process of destruction should be begun by the States with the largest stocks of chemical weapons. I do not intend now to give an assessment of this proposal, but it seems to me that it would be justified for the States with the largest stocks to begin the destruction process. However, in order to solve this problem we obviously have to know in advance which States have the largest stocks of chemical weapons. And if we take this practical aspect, it will be clear that data concerning the volume of stocks are naturally very important in elaborating the convention.

The distinguished representative of the United States also emphasized strongly that the data submitted by the United States constitute what is necessary for the negotiations. Such an approach will certainly not move us forward in solving this matter. That is precisely why we put forward our proposals this year in the form of a memorandum where we set forth our views on which data States must exchange before the convention is signed - a memorandum which did not apply to the data which the Soviet Union had already submitted. We think that the volume of information which should be exchanged by States should take account of certain objective criteria, and should certainly not be based on the data provided by one State or another. We have, of course, given attention to the proposal made by the Federal Republic of Germany and the proposal made by Great Britain today concerning the content of the information which it is proposed should be exchanged. We will examine these considerations attentively.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

I would also like to note with satisfaction the statement which was made today by the distinguished representative of Great Britain, Ambassador Solesby, to the effect that the English side views favourably the proposal made by Deputy Minister Petrovsky on 18 February concerning an experiment in international verification at commercial chemical enterprises. I would also like to take this opportunity to express appreciation to Ambassador Solesby for her kind words to the Soviet side concerning the organization of a recent meeting of experts in Dagomys.

Allow me to return to the statement made by the representative of the United States. In the statement he made today he opposed carrying out an experiment in verification at commercial enterprises at this stage because, he said, the procedures themselves have not yet been elaborated. I would like to explain once again, although the Soviet delegation has already done so, that the point of the experiment which we propose is, as we see it, that its results will help in elaborating the procedures and will help in the negotiations. We already have some basis for such procedures. Carrying out the experiment should show in practice what we might have left out in these procedures, what should be added to them, how they should be developed and clarified. This is where we see the main point of the experiment, and therefore to wait until we finish elaborating our procedures, and then to carry out this experiment, in my opinion, is of no value whatsoever: what is the point of the experiment if the procedures have already been worked out?

I would like to conclude with the same words as those used by the distinguished Ambassador Friedersdorf in his ending statement. He said: "And we hope that they" - meaning delegations - "will come with specific proposals, rather than simply reacting to the ideas of others." I would like to endorse this call, with a small addition: We hope that they will come with specific proposals, rather than simply reacting to the ideas of others in a negative way.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I recognize the representative of the United States of America.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Our delegation has listened carefully to the statement made today by the distinguished representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azambuja, introducing for the Group of 21 a draft mandate for an Ad hoc Committee under agenda item 1, "nuclear test ban" (CD/829). This mandate was originally introduced in 1987 by eight delegations belonging to that Group. In the Conference's report on its work during 1987 (CD/787), a group of Western countries, including the United States, pointed out that the approach in this draft mandate, as contained in CD/772, was not new. These countries further pointed out that the mandate they had proposed, contained in CD/521, continued to provide a viable framework in which to commence and carry out substantive work on agenda item 1. My delegation continues to be of this view.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

I would like to make one additional point concerning the mandate proposed today by the Group of 21. The distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, has today suggested that the wording of this mandate allows for different interpretations of the formulation "with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty". He has suggested that some would interpret this formulation to mean that multilateral negotiations would begin immediately, and that others would interpret it to mean that the objective remained a long-term objective. For our delegation this is a major liability of the proposed mandate. Mandates, of course, should be clear in their meaning, so that all delegations understand them in the same way. Otherwise, our work could not proceed without confusion and misunderstanding.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? That is not the case. That concludes my list of speakers for today.

I should now like to inform you that informal open-ended consultations on draft substantive paragraphs under agenda items 3, 2 and 1, in this order, will be held tomorrow, Wednesday, at 3 p.m. in conference room I. Also, in the same room, at 4 p.m. this afternoon, informal open-ended consultations will be held on the draft report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The formal open-ended consultations dealing with the questions of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in the context of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament have been rescheduled for 3 p.m. today in the conference room on the 6th floor of the secretariat.

As I announced at the opening of this meeting, I intend now to adjourn the plenary and convene, in five minutes' time an informal meeting of the Conference devoted to the consideration of its improved and effective functioning. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 21 April at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.459
21 April 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 21 April 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Dávid Meiszter (Hungary)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 459th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues its consideration of the reports of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies, as well as of the special report to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member who wishes to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As I mentioned in the plenary meeting on Tuesday, the Conference will hold an informal meeting immediately after this plenary meeting on its improved and effective functioning.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the United Kingdom, Egypt, India, Belgium and Australia. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby, in her capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, who will introduce the report of that subsidiary body contained in document CD/820.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I have asked for the floor today in order to introduce the special report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, which is contained in document CD/820.

I was fortunate to take over the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee from yourself, Mr. President, whose experience of the CD in general and of this subject in particular is well known. Under your guidance in 1987 the Ad hoc Committee decided to establish two contact groups, A and B, to consider respectively the prohibition of radiological weapons in the traditional sense and the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. Each contact group produced a report which reflected in a useful manner the current state of consideration of the issues.

This year the Ad hoc Committee decided to follow the same procedure. Accordingly, contact groups A and B have again been established for the 1988 session, the two meeting in parallel and each chaired by a co-ordinator, Mr. Wayarabi of Indonesia and Mr. Györffy of Hungary. During the spring session, the groups have concentrated on the issues of verification and compliance and other main elements, thus continuing the work undertaken in 1987, and building on earlier work done under these headings. The report you have before you contains the new material produced by them.

In addition to this, the groups were able to devote some time to reviewing the co-ordinators' records attached to last year's report. It was possible in the case of group B to record some change on the part of one delegation which resulted in the deletion of a number of draft alternatives.

Despite intensive efforts by the Ad hoc Committee in both the current and previous sessions, I have to report that different approaches continue to exist with regard to both subjects under discussion.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

The reports on the contact groups are reproduced as annexes I and II to the overall report of the Ad hoc Committee. Both annexes contain as attachments a co-ordinator's record, reflecting views on possible elements on the questions before the Committee. As was the case in 1987, the records are not binding on any delegation, but I feel that they give a clear account of the state of work on the subjects. This clarity will, I hope, be of use to delegations to the special session as well as to our own delegations here both for our summer session of the Conference and beyond.

Although we are only at the mid-point of our work for 1988, I would like before closing to thank most warmly Mr. Wayarabi and Mr. Györfy for their assistance. They have both worked extremely hard in order to accomplish the tasks we set ourselves in the comparatively short time available to us this spring. I am grateful to them both and indeed to all the members of the Ad hoc Committee for their help and co-operation. I look forward to returning to our work in the summer session. Meanwhile I have pleasure in presenting the special report to you, Mr. President, and to the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons for her statement introducing the report of the Committee. I intend to put the report of the Ad hoc Committee before the Conference for adoption at our next plenary meeting on Tuesday 26 April. I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elaraby.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, the presidency of this Conference requires great wisdom as well as vast experience, all of which are qualities to be found in you. Your well-known abilities and your leadership of the friendly delegation of Hungary ensure that you will perform your task in an excellent manner, and in such a way as to further the work of this Conference, not only during your term of office but also throughout the current session. Your presidency of the Conference follows that of Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, a presidency characterized by decisiveness and achievement, which is what we expected from such an able diplomat. We would like to express our gratitude and appreciation to him. I would also like to pay tribute to the important role played by Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic during his presidency of the Conference last February.

Allow me, Mr. President, to thank you as well as all my colleagues who welcomed my participation in this Conference as head of the delegation of Egypt. It gives me pleasure to return once again after an absence of 12 years to this multilateral disarmament forum in its new form to continue participating in the efforts to achieve the purposes and objectives of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. I would like in turn to welcome the new ambassadors, namely Ambassador Sujka of Poland, Ambassador Marchand of Canada, Ambassador Nasser of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom and Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, who have recently joined the Conference, wishing them success in their endeavours.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The current session of the Conference is being held in auspicious circumstances following the recent agreement between the USSR and the USA to eliminate an entire generation of medium-range nuclear weapons. It is an agreement that a statement issued by the Government of Egypt welcomed as a historic step, and an important achievement by the international community as a whole, in the field of disarmament. President Hosni Mubarak expressed his hope, and that of the Egyptian people, that the signing of this agreement would lead to further tangible steps in the field of nuclear and conventional disarmament, and to the elimination of the threat of a new world war that would endanger human civilization.

In a few weeks the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will convene. Like the previous sessions, it will constitute a review conference of disarmament efforts, and of the work of this Conference. Any objective assessment must conclude that little has been achieved in comparison with what was expected and hoped for. The bilateral negotiations and their results to date should not obscure the fact that the nuclear and conventional arms race is being pursued unabated. In fact there is also a persistent effort to extend this arms race from land, sea and air to outer space. These facts compel us to express our concern at the growing trend towards solving problems of arms limitation and disarmament between the two super-Powers on a bilateral level at the expense of the multilateral approach adopted by this Conference on Disarmament.

We do not deny the special responsibility of the two super-Powers in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. In fact we have emphasized this special responsibility on every possible occasion, and stressed the cardinal need for the super-Powers to shoulder it. But at the same time, we have affirmed that bilateral negotiations should not be an alternative to multilateral negotiations through the Conference on Disarmament. Negotiations in the two forums should complement and support one another.

The Conference on Disarmament provides us with a unique framework that makes it possible to deal with questions of disarmament in their entirety, since the Conference includes in its membership all the nuclear-weapon States and enables all States to exercise their legitimate right to participate in disarmament efforts. Consequently, we believe that the framework provided by this Conference deserves our support. It is gratifying to note that 14 Foreign Ministers of member States have addressed this session of the Conference. We hope that this expression of high-level political interest will have a positive bearing on the substantive debate on the various items on our agenda.

It would be appropriate to highlight some of these items, in order to reaffirm the importance we attach to them, and to define Egypt's position in this regard. The Final Document of the 1978 first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, which we rightly regard as a "constitution for disarmament", and as a faithful expression of the world's conscience, affirmed that nuclear weapons constituted the greatest threat to mankind and the survival of civilization, that the nuclear arms race in all its aspects must be stopped and reversed in order to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war, and that our ultimate aim is the complete elimination of nuclear

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

weapons. The Final Document also stressed that the nuclear arms race in no way strengthens the security of nations, but on the contrary weakens it, and increases the danger of nuclear war.

Egypt shares this belief, bearing in mind the tense situation in the Middle East which could induce the countries of the region to acquire nuclear weapons. Egypt is equally aware of the growing nuclear capabilities of a certain State in the region - namely Israel - to the extent that queries no longer remain at the level of whether Israel produces and possesses nuclear weaponry, but revolve around the number of nuclear weapons in its possession, and their delivery systems. With this in mind, Egypt has supported all efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament and at putting an end to the nuclear arms race; Egypt was one of the first countries to sign the non-proliferation Treaty, despite the fact that the situation in the Middle East prevented her from promptly ratifying the Treaty at that time. Eventually Egypt ratified it in 1981, out of her belief in the spirit and objective of the Treaty, and in the necessity of putting an end to vertical and horizontal nuclear weapon proliferation as an important step towards nuclear disarmament.

In the General Assembly in 1974, Egypt took the initiative of calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as a means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and achieving nuclear disarmament. In so doing Egypt aimed to prevent a nuclear arms race from occurring in this volatile region and sought to safeguard the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the obligation of States to promote international peace and security. Egypt has continued to raise the subject at the General Assembly, which has adopted to date 14 resolutions on the matter.

Furthermore, paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament supported the establishment of such a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and called for urgent practical steps to implement the proposal, stating that it would greatly enhance peace and security in the Middle East. The Egyptian initiative was supported by the international community from the start. In 1980, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Egyptian-sponsored resolution by consensus. That reflected agreement by all States in the region, in addition to the five nuclear-weapon States. We therefore consider it imperative to call for consideration of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and to move from the stage of welcome and support to that of actual implementation, in accordance with defined procedures and an agreed time frame with the participation of all the parties directly concerned. We also call for assistance from nuclear-weapon States, as well as all other States, in the establishment of such a zone.

By issuing an important Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the international community has taken a step in the right direction which should be followed by practical measures. Both regions are areas of conflict. It can be said that the establishment of those zones has entered a new phase of success and consolidation of progress through the success of the Treaty of Rarotonga. Thus, Egypt is entitled to ask: What is the international community waiting for, in view of the fact that the

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Middle East is a region fraught with conflicts and a constantly changing situation? Is it not time to translate this initiative into reality, in order to protect this region and the entire world from the dangers of nuclear blackmail? My delegation intends to raise the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as well as the question of the denuclearization of Africa, at the forthcoming third special session devoted to disarmament. We hope that our endeavours will meet with a genuine response.

The Egyptian delegation believes that the time has come for the Conference to move from discussing the item on the prevention of a nuclear arms race and disarmament in informal general meetings, to establishing an ad hoc committee to crystallize the ideas set forth in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. This committee could also submit specific proposals on the best ways and means of starting multilateral negotiations to reach agreement, through appropriate stages, on the necessary verification arrangements for the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms, with a view to their total elimination, in accordance with successive General Assembly resolutions in this regard, the latest being resolution 42/42.

In this connection, I wish to express my delegation's deep regret at the inability of the Conference to adopt the draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" (document CD/819). A nuclear test ban is related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, for there is near-unanimous agreement that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is the real starting-point for the vertical and horizontal prevention of proliferation, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. This fact is not diminished by the persistence of the nuclear Powers in carrying out their nuclear tests, and in giving lame excuses for doing so.

My delegation hopes that the Conference will face up to its responsibility and diligently endeavour to achieve such a nuclear test-ban treaty. We do not see how we can justify the inability of the Conference throughout four sessions to adopt a resolution establishing an ad hoc committee to that end.

We welcome the advanced stage reached in the negotiations on the preparation of a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for their destruction. The progress accomplished is undoubtedly due to the change in the position of many delegations regarding the provisions of this convention, and the flexibility shown in this connection. In this respect, we cannot fail to recognize the prominent role and dedicated efforts of the Swedish delegation, headed by His Excellency Ambassador Ekéus, during his chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee at the last session.

However, in our view, we still have a long way to go before completing the draft convention, especially since some of the remaining differences concern concepts and methodology, and are not confined to drafting details. In our opinion, this convention should be universal in character and acceded to by all States. You may share my opinion that the universality of the

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

convention would be promoted if States felt that their accession to it would not jeopardize their national security, and that they would be secure from the use or threat of use of chemical weapons against them, either by States parties or by other States.

Although my delegation is participating very effectively in the negotiations that are taking place in the Conference on Disarmament, in order to achieve the universality of the proposed convention, Egypt considers that the time has come for consultations on the draft articles of the convention with other concerned non-member States that are not participating in the negotiations. This could be achieved through a framework to be agreed upon by the member States, either officially or informally. Such consultations would be a preparatory step to guarantee wide participation and accession and the desired universality. If we all hope for the codification of an effective international régime with the necessary checks and controls, we must start the preparatory stage forthwith, and listen to the viewpoints of the States not participating in the current negotiations.

The Egyptian delegation thus considers that the convention should provide an umbrella for the States parties, in the form of assistance provided by other States parties to limit the effects of the use or the threat of the use of chemical weapons, and to limit the ability of the other party to continue using or threatening to use chemical weapons. In this context, the idea of a possible Security Council resolution providing positive guarantees for the States parties to the convention could be considered. The same approach was applied in 1968 for the NPT, when the Security Council issued resolution 255 (1968). To eliminate the shortcomings in resolution 255, we propose that these guarantees should be more effective and more credible; this is necessary due to the different nature of the two types of weapons, nuclear and chemical. The reason for this proposal is the need to reactivate the role of the Security Council in the field of disarmament as stipulated by the Charter of the United Nations.

On the other hand, the accession of States to the convention depends to a large extent on the principle of the equality of States parties in regard to rights and obligations. They would be equal partners in all procedures, recommendations and decisions to strengthen the convention and enhance its credibility.

Egypt views with deep concern the use of chemical weapons anywhere, and considers that reports to that effect should give further impetus to the speedy conclusion by the Conference of a convention in this connection. In this respect I would like to refer to an article which appeared in the Journal de Genève on 14 April 1988, concerning a United Nations medical report confirming the use of gases by Israeli armed forces against Arab Palestinian demonstrators in the occupied Arab territories. Egypt is most concerned at this development, calls upon all parties to respect international treaties and conventions and reaffirms the importance of adherence to the main principles contained in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In this connection, I wish to emphasize that Egypt does not produce, develop or stockpile such weapons, which it rightly regards as weapons of mass destruction that should be banned.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Like other countries, Egypt realizes that the exploration of outer space could prove very beneficial for mankind through its peaceful uses, but at the same time it poses an increasing danger of the use of space for military purposes. This danger will not be limited to the major Powers with space technologies, but will extend to the rest of the world as well. One can even say that the third world countries will be even more seriously endangered, since they do not possess the technology and capabilities available to the major Powers to defend themselves against such danger. As soon as the arms race in outer space begins, an increasing number of States will hasten to join in, thereby creating a situation the outcome of which would be difficult to predict. We still maintain the hope that concerted efforts will be made to ensure that outer space is used for peaceful purposes only, and to prevent the extension of the arms race to it.

The Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space has examined and defined all issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the course of three sessions. This year saw intensive deliberations aimed at moving forward with the work of the Committee to a stage consistent with the principles of General Assembly resolution 42/33 adopted on 30 November 1987. The resolution calls upon the Conference on Disarmament "to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1988 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects".

My delegation is disappointed at the inability to develop and improve the mandate of the Committee on the basis of the General Assembly resolution, and the inability to agree on means of improving the programme of work to allow the Committee to achieve the desired results. This inability is due to the rigid position of one delegation.

The deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee also indicated that, in spite of the many positive factors inherent in the legal system governing the use of outer space, this system still has some shortcomings that ought to be remedied, as required through the conclusion of a treaty or treaties to prevent an arms race in outer space. Logically, the Ad hoc Committee should proceed to another stage in its work, by examining the proposals that were submitted to prevent an arms race in outer space. Many of these proposals before the Ad hoc Committee deserve study and evaluation. I am referring, in particular, to the proposal to expand the scope of article IV of the 1967 Treaty on outer space to include the banning of all types of weapons, instead of restricting this prohibition to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The proposal further aims at extending the ban from mere placement of such weapons in outer space to their use as well. This proposal fills a serious gap in the legal system currently governing the use of outer space. In view of the fact that the attempts to broaden the scope of article IV have not been successful over the last 20 years, we consider that the time has come to satisfy this requirement, in the light of the increasing and definite dangers of an arms race in outer space. Not too long ago, this was only a possibility, but the danger now is an actual fact.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

We must realize the seriousness of the situation, and must adopt the necessary steps to face it, knowing that the element of time is not in our favour. Therefore, we urge the Conference to deal objectively with this item, concentrating on the substance and providing the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela, with the powers and freedom of action required to enable him to guide the work of the Ad hoc Committee towards the attainment of that objective.

I would like to deal now with the item on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. It would be appropriate to stress the importance we attach to the completion of the draft Programme. Many sincere efforts have been exerted over a period of 10 years - the age of the conference itself - in the preparation of the Programme. I feel we must all spare no effort to ensure that the Programme achieves the purpose for which it was drawn up by crystallizing the principles contained in the Final Document, instead of using negotiations for the preparation of the draft Programme to cast doubt on the credibility and objective of the Final Document. I take this opportunity to express to Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, our appreciation of his efforts and our conviction that, through his expertise, wisdom and tolerance, the Ad hoc Committee will conclude its task and fulfil its mandate in the best possible manner.

The eyes of the international community and its hopes are directed to the results of the third SSOD, which will convene in New York in the near future. The session will consider the manner in which the Conference on Disarmament has improved its performance and effectiveness during the past decade. A variety of proposals and ideas have been put forward. Egypt is carefully studying these proposals, particularly those concerning the development of our system of work in a manner consistent with events and present reality. Egypt deems it important to preserve the characteristic and limited nature of our Conference, to avoid finding ourselves faced with two deliberating bodies which would turn our Conference into a carbon copy of the First Committee of the General Assembly.

The issues of disarmament in our contemporary world have become urgent and interrelated issues of concern to mankind as a whole, since they affect our present and future lives. For this reason, they require our most diligent attention, utmost effort, and closest co-operation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Teja.

Mr. TEJA (India): In my statement today, I intend to focus on the chemical weapons negotiations. I should, therefore, like to begin by expressing the congratulations of my delegation to Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman for the current year, and also assure him of my delegation's co-operation. We are confident that under his able guidance, we will be able to carry forward our work which was already considerably advanced under the chairmanship of his predecessor Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden.

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Our ultimate goal is a convention that will not only prohibit the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons but also lead to the elimination of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. During our spring session, we have listened with attention to the statements made by a number of foreign ministers. The urgency reflected in these statements is a positive sign. On the opening day of our session, Foreign Minister Chnoupek of Czechoslovakia stated:

"... we consider the most urgent issue to be the completion of the drafting of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons ...".

He went on to add:

"The Conference has come within reach of concluding work on a convention".

At the very next session, we had the privilege of listening to Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany, who stated:

"The early conclusion of a convention for the global prohibition of chemical weapons continues to be a matter of high priority, in our view. In reality, they are not weapons, but devices for destroying man and nature."

The position of the Group of 21 is well known. In a statement on 8 March 1988 it was stated on behalf of the Group of 21:

"... the Group of 21 considers that the Conference on Disarmament must intensify, during the present session, the negotiations on the convention and that it must reinforce further its efforts with a view to the final elaboration of the convention at the earliest possible date."

My Government attaches high priority to these negotiations and fully endorses General Assembly resolution 42/37 A, which was adopted by consensus. Our efforts are now close to fruition and, therefore, as stated by Foreign Minister Andreotti of Italy, it is "necessary to impart a decisive impulse to the negotiations". We cannot but note that an undue prolonging of the negotiations could have adverse repercussions on the early conclusion of a CW convention. It is also a fact that chemical weapons are still being produced in some countries and, what is worse, are being used in some regions. The casualties from chemical weapons are also mounting. With new technical developments, there is a resurgence of interest in this field. The new weapons, which are more lethal than the nerve gases of the past, make the task of verification more difficult. We believe that delay in concluding negotiations on a CW convention would increase the risks of proliferation, and this could adversely affect international security.

I would like to reiterate that India does not possess any chemical weapons, nor does it have any intention of producing or acquiring them in the future. We are committed to the objective of a chemical weapons convention that is comprehensive, universal and effective. A limited or a partial

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approach, in our view, cannot enhance security. To be effective, the convention must improve the security of all nations and, therefore, must be universal.

Within the convention, verification is one of the most complex areas. A considerable amount of work has been done, though some issues still need to be resolved. The scale of the exercise adds to the complexity. Our approach to the verification issue is based upon certain principles. We believe that these provide an effective set of guidelines for tackling the problems relating to non-production, as also those relating to challenge inspection. The principles of universality and non-discrimination are among the most important for any international agreement. If the chemical weapons convention is to succeed in enhancing global security, then it must be based on a "universal multilateralism".

The verification régime must be appropriate and adequate and should not unduly interfere with legitimate activities. The balance between "appropriate" and "adequate" is a delicate one, especially in the activities covered under article VI. With greater interaction with chemical industry, I believe, we can find the right balance, but there must be understanding on the basic principle that certain parts of the civilian chemical industry will need to be monitored.

In developed countries, considerable importance is attached to the fact that the verification activities should not be unduly intrusive or interfere with normal commercial activities, especially the sensitive areas of R & D, and also that the confidentiality of sensitive information should be maintained. We appreciate this. For the developing countries, the natural correlated concern is that verification measures should not in any way jeopardize the development of a peaceful chemical industry which plays an important role in their national planning. Greater openness and transparency can be an important confidence-building measure and a channel leading to increased peaceful co-operation among the developed and developing countries.

The development of a verification system on the basis of these principles can give us a régime which would be acceptable to all. Quite clearly, the régime under article VI has to be a differentiated régime. It must nevertheless be able to fulfil its basic objective, namely, to prevent the misuse of a facility for prohibited purposes. In doing so, it cannot cover only those chemicals which have been used or stockpiled as weapons in the past, but must also make provision for future developments. In other words, the verification process must be workable and judicious, if it is to serve us well.

A similar approach can also help us in furthering our work on challenge inspection. We agree that such a measure is likely to be invoked as a last resort, when all means, bilateral or otherwise, have been tried and found inadequate. The procedure should, therefore, reinforce this conclusion. A challenging State has a far-reaching right, but one curtailed by the obligation that it is not to be abused. The challenged State is obliged to accept such intrusive inspections, but with a right to demonstrate its

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compliance with the convention. In view of the political nature of the exercise, it will be necessary to balance the rights and obligations of both sides. The results of the efforts by the Chairman for 1987 are reflected in an appendix to last year's report, and provide a good basis for further work. The issue of "alternative measures" has yet to be resolved, and this should be done objectively and in the multilateral context. More work is also needed to amplify the procedures in the post-inspection phase. We believe that the principles elaborated earlier can enable us to develop an effective mechanism that will reflect a truly multilateral character.

During the current session, useful work has been done on article VIII, dealing with the organization of the international body which would implement the convention. While new language has appeared regarding the Technical Secretariat, we will soon have to tackle the political issues relating to the composition of the Executive Council and the distribution of work between the different organs. In our view, the universal character of the chemical weapons convention can be best ensured by maintaining the principle of equality of all sovereign States. There seems to be an emerging consensus that the Executive Council should reflect a political balance and equitable geographical distribution. States with large and developed chemical industries could be appropriately represented under the first criterion so as to assist in effective implementation. As the organ responsible for day-to-day implementation, the Executive Council will play a significant role. Unlike the General Conference, which is likely to meet on an annual basis, the Executive Council could remain in session throughout the year. This feature provides the source for the authority of the Executive Council; its powers, though derived from the General Conference, are extensive. At the same time, the General Conference remains the actual repository by virtue of the complete representation of States in it. The papers submitted by the German Democratic Republic (CD/812) and Canada (CD/823) have helped in our work on this article. We are confident that pending problems can be resolved if the above-mentioned elements are kept in mind.

I should also like to comment on two articles which are of considerable importance - articles X and XI. It is a matter of satisfaction that we have commenced serious work on these provisions. Article X deals with assistance. Under ideal conditions, its provisions may never have to be invoked. Guided by this logic, it is necessary that the provisions of article X be adequate. The invoking of assistance under article X by a State party must be seen in the light of the collective security régime that the chemical weapons convention is intended to provide, and not just as a problem of a particular State party.

Article XI deals with economic and technological co-operation for development, and is of special interest to the developing countries, including our own. Recent discussions on it have revealed varying opinions. We believe that security is a broad-based concept, and there can exist non-military threats to security. Article XI, therefore, needs to be seen as a confidence-building measure. Both negative as well as positive assurances need to be included in it. Appropriate wording to this effect would only improve the security-enhancing function of the chemical weapons convention.

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The growing interest in and submission of proposals for voluntary disclosure of information is a welcome development. Not only does it convey a signal of commitment to and confidence in the early conclusion of our task, but it also assists in the practical work relating to article VIII and the annexes to article VI. The chemical-weapon States bear special responsibility in this regard. The proposals made by the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany are encouraging steps and merit a positive response from the chemical-weapon States.

Touching briefly on the discussions held on the final articles of the convention, I should say that the efforts of the Chairman have contributed to development of text on articles XII to XVI. The Chairman's paper will certainly assist in our future deliberations on this subject.

This year, we came up against the issue of the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee. We know that the present mandate stops short of the finish line. As our work proceeds, this issue too will be resolved. But we could assist in the process if parallel efforts are undertaken to transform the "resolved" elements of the "rolling text" into treaty language.

In conclusion, let us acknowledge that we are engaged in a new endeavour and a unique enterprise. While we would all like to be able to produce a perfect convention, we also know that in real life the best is the enemy of the good. We will all conclude our work with perhaps some apprehensions, but on the other hand there will be the sense of achievement of a major disarmament measure. The review process will help to straighten out the odd corners that might remain, as long as we leave open the possibility of improving upon our work. The element of finality is in the objective, not in the means of implementation, which can and must be refined as we gain more experience.

I have dwelt on certain basic principles today because often we need to return to these in order to loosen the technical knots. We are looking for a universal and comprehensive disarmament agreement, for only such an agreement can enhance global security and safeguard the interests of all States. The requirements of universality and comprehensiveness impose their own conditions on the convention, and these must be respected if the convention is to be what we all want - the first multilaterally negotiated disarmament agreement which will eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Clerckx.

Mr. CLERCKX (Belgium) (translated from French): I should like to follow the example of the previous speaker, the distinguished representative of India, Ambassador Teja, and contribute some thoughts concerning the negotiations on chemical weapons. In doing so I shall touch upon a certain problem, certain questions that Ambassador Teja also raised, which clearly shows how vitally important they are in our discussions. But first of all, Mr. President, permit me to congratulate you and to express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you chairing our work during this month of April, and during the period when members of the Conference will be dealing, in other

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places, with other problems related to our activities. Bearing in mind your great experience in the field of disarmament, your balanced approach and your knowledge of the background, I would like to assure you of my delegation's full co-operation, and here I should also like to thank Ambassadors von Stülpnagel and Rose, who set the Conference on its path with vigour and a deep sense of realism which have been very beneficial to us.

The spring session of the Conference is drawing to an end. We will all readily acknowledge that it has taken place in particularly auspicious circumstances. Everybody here has emphasized the importance of the INF agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. The conclusion of this agreement, which some people have described as a revolutionary event has opened up prospects in the field of disarmament and arms control which just a few months ago nobody would have dared to believe in. It has been emphasized that this agreement eliminates a whole category of weapons, so it should be possible for other categories to follow. It includes real verification measures, so such measures can be contemplated in other conventions too. It bears within it the germ of extension to a higher category - a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear arms, so it is a link, a first link in a broader and much more diversified process of disarmament.

Rather paradoxically, it is not in the area where this first disarmament breakthrough has been achieved - the nuclear field - that its impact has been felt most strongly in our Conference. In this area we are still at the stage of grand designs, ideas which are generous but which are difficult to tie down in today's political realities, and to which the INF agreement, and even the prospect of a 50 per cent cut in the strategic weapons of two major Powers, cannot, for reasons which I will not go into here, give real impetus. On the other hand, we have seen vigorous progress in the inter-sessional negotiations for the elimination of another category of fearsome weapon - chemical weapons, we have recently recorded particularly welcome and beneficial flexibility in previously frozen positions among various parties, particularly the USSR, a burgeoning of new ideas, concrete contributions to the negotiated texts, which are doubtless the fruit of a thaw between the USSR and the United States that turns on the INF agreement and its consequences and, as a spin-off, offers a basis for real hopes for the reasonably rapid conclusion of a convention for the elimination of chemical weapons.

However, these successes and advances should not lead us into euphoria. The work in which we are engaged here is quite different. The Conference's task is to negotiate a convention of universal scope on chemical weapons. This is something quite different from bilateral negotiations where agreement is reached between two States, however powerful and influential they may be, for which it is much easier to reach a compromise or agree on a quid pro quo because such concessions bind only themselves and their allies. Nor is it a set of negotiations among a number of developed industrial Powers settling chemical issues on the basis of their own political and economic interests. No, there are 40 countries here negotiating a convention which must be applicable to these 40 countries and, above and beyond that, must be universal, in other words, it must be such as to prompt the spontaneous accession of the whole of the world community.

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The result of this is that our objectives are different, as are our negotiating methods. For a convention to become truly universal, it must meet the fundamental concerns of all the potential signatories, and not just some of them, even the most important. Its provisions, too, both as regards prohibitions and as regards verification and monitoring, must be addressed to and designed for all the potential signatories and not just some of them. It is of less interest to know that countries and alliances far away are accepting a ban on chemical weapons than to be assured that your immediate neighbour is offering the same guarantee. So, in order for the convention to be truly universal, the elimination of chemical weapons must be absolute and free of the smallest exception. Merely stating this principle, though it is an obvious one, already poses a major problem. The world contains nations armed with chemical weapons, fortunately in a minority, and a majority of nations with no chemical weapons. Among the chemical-weapon nations, the degree of armament is, moreover, by no means comparable. How can an absolute ban be imposed in such a wide variety of situations without endangering the security of States or bringing about accelerated proliferation?

Belgium has always maintained that only an appropriate adjustment in the order of destruction of existing stocks, spread over the scheduled 9 or 10 years, can provide a solution to this situation for the chemical-weapon States, in the interests of all the States parties and in the context of a total ban on production. Several practical suggestions in this regard are at present being studied. We have no preconceived ideas about them, and will be happy to help to achieve consensus on one or other of the methods suggested. While an absolute ban on chemical weapons for all the signatory States of the convention is certainly the primary necessary element for the universality of the convention, the extent of the area to which it will apply is another. This area of application must also be universal. There cannot be countries where chemical weapons have been abolished and others where they have not.

We are going to have to start thinking about how best in practice to achieve this universality of the area of application. It is not enough for the terms of the convention which is at present being drawn up to satisfy some or suit a limited number of countries particularly concerned; they must be addressed to the world community as a whole, because this is the very objective being pursued by the Conference. Our working methods, therefore, must be appropriate to this end. And first of all, we have to deal with the question of the expansion of the composition of the Conference. This question has been deadlocked for many years. However, the Conference on Disarmament is the subject of very great interest among the community of nations. Indeed, it is enough to note the number of observers who have been following our work here so actively, whose presence my delegation is pleased to welcome. What is at stake is clearly of capital importance, and the more the community of nations participates in and is directly associated with the work of the Conference, the more impact our work will have.

So Belgium speaks out in favour of a rapid expansion in the composition of the Conference, perhaps even beyond the four-seat expansion at present envisaged. Currently there are no less than 13 countries which are candidates. Any opposition to one candidature, however legitimate it may be, should not block the designation of the others. We think that the expansion

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should take place without any linkage being established between the various candidatures before us, and we appeal urgently for initiatives to be taken to break the deadlock and to ensure that the question is not left pending because the CD itself is impotent.

Second consideration relating to our methods of work: the concerns of each of the members of this Conference, however many there may be, and their own perceptions, must be able to be expressed at every stage of the negotiations. On this point I would like to say that my delegation is not in favour of working methods which, although conceived with the best intentions, result in instituting selections, and consequently exclusions, among the delegations which constitute the Conference: here we are thinking not of the various private consultations which chairmen of committees and working groups may quite legitimately and very wisely hold so that progress may be made in our work, but of the occasional establishment of small working groups or groups of a few representatives selected on the basis of political groups when the characteristic of these formulae is that they violate the fundamental provision contained in our rules of procedure, that is that they should be "open to all member States of the Conference unless the Conference decides otherwise", as stipulated by rule 23 of the rules of procedure, confirmed by rule 24 in respect of subsidiary bodies.

We believe that negotiation is not well served by presenting for discussion purposes in our working bodies texts which have already been pre-drafted, and thus in a way pre-agreed, by a limited group of delegations. The delegations which have not been involved in this pre-work are thereby put at a disadvantage from the outset and placed, deliberately or otherwise, under pressure to accept, or in any case to follow, the basic approach which the group of selected delegations, during their pre-work, has already imprinted on the proposals by the time they reach the negotiating table. This is an unjustifiable handicap for the delegations that have been excluded from these pre-consultations and who wish to express different views, because they are obliged to undo what has already been done and has already been publicly approved by a number of delegations. This is certainly not likely to enable the countries that wish to do so to express their own perceptions and their legitimate concerns in a context of equality and equal effectiveness, nor is it likely to promote the universality without which the convention becomes meaningless.

Well, you will ask me, has Belgium a perception of its own to put forward? Indeed it has, and specifically a historical perception. I believe it is not without value to continue to repeat here that it was on the territory of my country that chemical weapons were used for the first time on a large scale, during the First World War, in 1915 - 22 April 1915, to be more precise. This sad anniversary falls tomorrow. In return for the unhappy privilege of being a battlefield for four years during the First World War, we have for 70 years now been digging up, in the west of the province of Western Flanders in Belgium, tons, yes tons of spent unexploded munitions every year. In most cases these munitions are very difficult to identify. It is sometimes impossible to determine whether they are explosive or chemical munitions. The presumed chemical contents are still unknown, because so far as we know none has ever been extracted, since these remnants of munitions are

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generally in such a state of deterioration that it would be very dangerous to handle them - and there have unfortunately already been many victims during removal and sorting operations - recently four people killed in 1986.

At the present time we dig up some 20 tons of such munitions of all types and various origins per year. When you bear in mind that in the First World War, on the western front alone, between 1.5 billion and 2 billion shells of all calibres were "used", about a third of which - 700 million - did not explode and are scattered and buried, it is impossible at present to predict for how much longer our country will have to dig up old munitions, particularly chemical ones. Up to 1952, these old munitions were dropped into holes and destroyed indiscriminately. As this method of getting rid of them created environmental problems, we tried to locate the old chemical munitions, which from then onwards were covered in concrete and dumped in the open sea. New requirements concerning respect for the environment, particularly the Oslo Convention of 1972 and the 1987 North Sea Conference, mean that use of this method is more complicated. Until the Belgian authorities decide upon a final solution, perhaps in the form of a destruction facility, some 135 tons of these old remnants of unusable and dangerous munitions are at present in storage pending elimination.

It is obvious that this particular situation existing in my country falls, we feel, outside the concerns of the convention. The purpose of the convention is to eradicate chemical weapons and their components. Whatever definition we may decide upon, it is obvious that scattered munitions, spent but unexploded, buried in the soil, buried for more than 70 years now, in a state of advanced deterioration, that may be discovered accidentally today or tomorrow, during agricultural or building work, are not, and in our view could never be, chemical weapons in the sense of militarily usable chemical warfare devices covered by the convention. Thus, as far as the Belgian delegation is concerned, none of the provisions of the convention could reasonably be applied to them, either in theory or in practice.

I have illustrated a specific problem which indicates the particular perception that one country, my own in this case, may have during the negotiation of the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons and the possible effects it may entail for the objective of universality of this multilateral convention. There are others. I am thinking here of verification. The way in which verification is designed will determine to a large extent the degree of universality which the future convention manages to achieve. This convention will not be purely declaratory, thank God, like so many other conventions and undertakings to disarm in the past, whose fate is well known. It will contain verification measures. Fundamentally, verification is intended to ensure that the application of a convention takes place in conformity with its stipulations. As far as disarmament is concerned, a second concern arises, that of how to detect possible clandestine violations and how to safeguard one's security against the consequences of failure to respect commitments entered into.

The future convention has a twofold objective: on the one hand, to eliminate chemical weapons for ever where they exist, by making it obligatory to undertake the destruction of stockpiles and manufacturing facilities - that is, by laying down a specific action for the signatory States to take: on the

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other hand, to prevent the resurgence of chemical weapons by prohibiting the manufacture, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, not only of chemical weapons as such, but also of their components - that is, by laying down that the signatory States must refrain from an action, i.e. by prohibiting that action. That the convention is being applied in conformity with its stipulations may, we feel, be fairly easily checked by the currently planned system of statements, verification by means of on-site inspection, international monitoring and the use of monitoring instruments, as appropriate. On the other hand, this system cannot in our view guarantee to detect clandestine violations of the convention, or offer protection against failure to respect fundamental commitments, even when there is an obligation to do so, because the system for systematic verification of the destruction of stocks and facilities by definition covers only stocks and facilities which have been declared, in other words, which are known; it is powerless to deal with stocks or facilities which have not been declared, in other words, which are unknown.

A fortiori, when it is a question of an undertaking not to do something, to refrain from doing something, a question not only of banning production of chemical weapons, but also of the chemicals which make them up, absolute verification is impossible. It would be futile to submit the entire world chemical industry to an international policing system - clandestine production of illicit products intended for chemical weapons will always remain possible in some part of the world - or of a country. That is why we are not convinced at the outset of the need to submit industry to universal verification measures for the purpose of verifying the absence of production for chemical weapons purposes.

We did not wish to raise obstacles to what other delegations would consider to be progress towards the finalization of the convention, but we remain somewhat sceptical on this subject, except, of course, as I said, regarding plants intended and used for military purposes, which must cease operations as soon as the convention comes into force and be subject to monitoring until they have been totally and radically eliminated. To the extent that the convention fails to submit all present and future plants capable of producing potential chemical warfare agents or their key precursors to effective international verification, the efficacy of the régime for the verification of non-production will, in our view, be limited. In these circumstances is there any justification for trying to increase the present forms of monitoring, to make the convention machinery more cumbersome, to increase the burden it imposes and place it upon the chemical industry, which would ultimately find itself in a veritable strait-jacket?

The example of verification by the inspectors of IAEA in the field of plutonium manufacture shows us that, if the verification of a plutonium plant is to be worth while, the presence of the inspectors is required practically all the time, and for the plant the introduction of this monitoring and verification represents an increase in production costs of something like 15 per cent. This gives us some idea of what would be the burden on private industry if, in order to detect possible abuses in authorized manufacturing of products in schedules 2 and 3, it was necessary to apply an extension or a surrogate of the systematic international on-site verification system applicable to other categories.

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We do not think it is necessary to create a systematic on-site inspection system for schedule 3 products. In fact, assuming it were reasonably feasible, would it be genuinely useful? We must carefully pinpoint the problem. What exactly is involved, or more precisely, what may be involved? In the context of article VI, the only hypothesis to be feared at the inter-State level and in terms of the convention relates to the clandestine manufacture of a militarily significant chemical weapon. Such a decision is not taken by private chemical industry, but by the State. It is the State which is the only user and the only potential customer for chemical weapons. The State alone can decide on that manufacture. Private chemical industry could at most commit the offence of failure to respect the standards for and bans on the manufacture of certain chemical products laid down by the convention. If it does so for reasons which have nothing to do with the interests of the State, it is the State, as the national authority, which must impose punishment, and not some international body, which cannot substitute itself for the State to ensure respect for its laws and regulations within the jurisdiction of the State. Looked at from the point of view of the convention and the ban on the manufacture of chemical weapons, the danger therefore lies not in misconduct by the chemical industry, which can in any case be detected and punished by a State acting in good faith, but in possible misconduct by States, a State acting in bad faith, that is a State which decides to renege on its commitments and embark on the production of chemical weapons.

Now we must start from the conviction that every signatory State subscribes to the convention in good faith. Moreover, the State does so because it is in its own interest to do so. Chemical weapons - and I think that military experts will agree - are not indispensable in the arsenal which serves to guarantee the security of a State, except as a means of reprisals. With the exception of this last case, giving up the possession and use of chemical weapons does not constitute an undue risk for security. That is why we are in a position here today to work multilaterally for their complete disappearance. Otherwise nobody would be here. Consequently, if the possibility of clandestine manufacture of a militarily significant chemical weapon is to be realized, or the possibility of the existence of secret stocks of such weapons is to prove a reality, we necessarily have to suppose a deliberate intention on the part of the leadership of a State party which, renegeing on its commitments, intends to acquire chemical weapons for purposes of armed conflict, or at least for serious political destabilization. Otherwise it is impossible to see why any State party would feel the need to acquire chemical weapons or their components, the precaution of reprisals having become superfluous.

For the same reason, it goes without saying that a State party acting in bad faith would not, in view of the existence of the convention, try to create militarily significant chemical weapons openly and publicly, in other words in installations which are subject to verification, whether these are specific installations which produce schedule 1 and 2 products within authorized limits, or private chemical industry more generally, which is freely manufacturing products on schedule 3, if this industry were effectively subjected to verification and monitoring measures extending throughout the industry. It is quite obvious that a State with such intentions would embark on the manufacture of these weapons in a secret place.

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It follows, in our opinion, that the likelihood of a serious, militarily significant violation of the convention is extremely small, as chemical weapons are not vitally necessary, a clandestine resumption of their manufacture in a world where, under the authority of the convention, they have been eliminated and banned could only result from truly warlike intentions which are, after all, it must be hoped, equally unlikely, and their manufacture is impossible except in secret. It also follows that, from the moment when manufacture must necessarily take place secretly, non-production would seem to a certain extent to be unverifiable, or at all events not always usefully verifiable. It is verifiable for the specific products on schedules 1 and 2 because in these cases verification is limited to a restricted number of products and products which are intended solely for chemical weapons; it is not for the products on schedule 3 because, however broad it may be, it cannot cover the whole of the civilian chemical industry, because it would have to place the industry in a strait-jacket which it would find difficult to bear without seriously hampering its operations, and because it would have to subject the industry to outside interference in the form of monitoring personnel - all this without offering a sufficient guarantee against the non-manufacture of chemical weapons.

Consequently, we do not consider that such supervision of private industry is really justified. The enemy is not private chemical industry, the enemy is the State acting in bad faith. Thus it is here that challenge inspection takes on its true significance: it is the last resort, formal notice at the political level, when there is a suspicion of a serious violation, that is a clandestine violation, and therefore a danger for security. My delegation views this procedure as being the most important instrument for the credibility of the convention, because under it the signatory State acting in bad faith can be backed up against the wall. This is why we have always considered that this procedure should be binding, over and above any concept of national sovereignty and reversing the burden of proof. It must not be trivialized by extending its application to cases other than those which are extremely serious. That is why we consider that challenge inspection should be a measure that can be used as a last resort, only in cases where there is a suspicion of a serious violation, that is a violation of article I - manufacture, possession, transfer of chemical weapons and, of course, use - and that this is a course which should be open to all countries, without any distinction, without any conditions without prior conditions and without the right of refusal.

My delegation is not convinced of the validity of the concept of sensitive military or other installations which have to be protected and consequently could be exempt from challenge inspection. This, we think, would pose the risk of depriving challenge inspection of its significance because if there has been a violation there has been, a priori, deliberate bad faith on the part of the challenged State. For the same reason, my delegation does not see any great merit in the possibility of so-called alternative measures, none of which so far are really satisfactory as valid substitutes for on-site visits. If a requesting State wishes to content itself with alternative measures to be agreed with the challenged State, no obstacle should be put in its way, but in our opinion the option of alternative measures should not as such be an acknowledged right for the challenged State, to be inserted in the Convention.

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The whole procedure of challenge inspection, in the last resort, should be in the hands of the requesting State; it is that State which assumes responsibility for it, it is that State to which the inspectors will hand the factual report that they are to prepare, it is that State which will decide whether or not its fears have been allayed, and it is that State which will opt for retaliatory measures or other consequences to be drawn from the situation, particularly in the light of the threat the situation poses for its security.

The true problem, which arises in the challenge inspection procedure is that of improper (or frivolous) requests. Let us note on this subject that the impropriety of a request may be quite clearly apparent simply in the light of the political context at the time. That is one comment. The second is that, since challenge inspection by its very nature should be reserved for extremely serious suspicions falling under article I, it must oblige the requesting country to indicate precisely the nature of its suspicion (manufacture of chemical weapons, stockpiling, manufacture of chemical products for weapons purposes in quantities which could become militarily significant, etc.), and as far as possible to give all the information needed to uncover the alleged violation, specifying place, time, duration, quantity, etc. The reliability of such information will also help to show whether the request is improper or not, because the verification obligation to which the requested State will submit depends directly on the preciseness of the charge. Lastly, it may be thought that it is ultimately better to tolerate a certain risk of improper requests rather than vitiate the binding nature of challenge inspection which is essential if it is to fulfil its role, through exceptions intended to cover confidential or secret data.

Consequently, in this procedure - which is exceptional - the role of the international body should, in our opinion, remain extremely small. It will receive the request, it will have it carried out immediately by its inspectors - of whom there will be a list agreed upon in advance, from which the challenging State will make its choice - and it will inform all the member States of the initiation of the challenge inspection procedure, with all the necessary information. It will forward immediately to the requesting State, and later to the other States parties, the report of the facts which the inspectors are expected to draw up, and it will receive from the requesting State the judgement and the decisions reached by that State.

I have set out a number of thoughts on fundamental principles which guide us in elaborating a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. They are offered to you in a constructive spirit, in the hope that they may contribute to further delimiting areas which require serious decisions. There are many more questions that have to be dealt with as one moves through the articles. My delegation will have occasion to return to them later.

Very recently, on 3 March last, the heads of State and government of the Atlantic Alliance, in their declaration which was published at the end of the summit, reaffirmed once again that the total elimination of chemical weapons formed part of their global concept of arms control and disarmament. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tindemans, said in this very room on 23 July last year, when he addressed the Conference, that for Belgium the early conclusion of an agreement on the total prohibition of chemical weapons

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was an urgent priority, and he added that "at present this is the main activity and, I would even say, the main responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament". My delegation will do its best to achieve this objective as soon as possible. My country intends to commit itself fully to that end. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs announced to you during his statement on 23 July 1987, Belgium has offered a possible headquarters for the international body which is to administer the convention. This offer was repeated by the Minister in his statement at the forty-second session of the General Assembly, and I have the honour to reconfirm it to you today.

We will resume our work after SSOD-III. My delegation believes that the time is close when we will be able to get down to the texts available to us, article by article, to reach final political agreement on them and to prepare them to be cast in the legal language of a convention, on which there should be no further delay.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): The following statement is made on behalf of a group of Western States members of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the last plenary session of the Conference, held on 19 April, the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil, speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, presented to the Conference, in document CD/829, a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda.

Following that action, at the same plenary meeting, the Conference heard a statement by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, on the same subject. In the latter statement it was indicated that the sponsors of CD/829 would not be pressing it to a decision by the Conference during this present session. Instead, the hope was expressed that consultations in the near future would lead to unanimity of the Conference on CD/829 so that it could be implemented when the Conference resumes its work in the summer of this year.

The group of Western States for which I am now speaking has studied the draft mandate given in CD/829 and listened attentively to the statements made by the distinguished representatives of Brazil and Mexico. Because the group continues to attach importance to item 1 of the agenda and to the earliest possible re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on that item, it felt it important that an immediate and considered response be given.

First, the substance of the draft mandate given in CD/829 is no different from that which was placed before the Conference in July 1987 in document CD/772 and on which the position of a group of Western States has already been made clear.

Second, the statements which accompanied the presentation of CD/829, in the view of the group, do not alter the relevant circumstances. The group recognizes that it is open to any delegation or group of delegations to claim that their approach is one of flexibility, but such a claim should normally be substantiated by textual change.

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Third, the suggestion which was made to the effect that the text of CD/829 could be made the subject of statements of various interpretations of its terms cannot constitute a sound basis for the conduct of work in this Conference. The group believes that to proceed in this way would confuse and possibly defeat any practical work being conducted in an ad hoc committee established on such a basis. It is also concerned about possible precedents which might be established by the Conference seeking to conduct work on the basis of overtly different interpretations of the nature of that work.

For these three main reasons the group will not be able to join consensus on CD/829. The substantive position of the group is that it wants to see an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda re-established without any further delay. It continues to regret, deeply, that this action has not been able to be taken since 1983. To facilitate such action the group has proposed the draft mandate given in document CD/521, which provides for the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee under item 1 of the agenda

"to resume its substantive examination of specific issues relating to a comprehensive test ban, including the issue of scope as well as those of verification and compliance with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject".

It also requests the Conference

"to examine the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network as part of an effective verification system".

The group remains convinced that this draft mandate and the associated suggested programme of work given in document CD/621 would enable all necessary and relevant practical multilateral work on a nuclear test ban to be undertaken in the Conference. The group emphasizes that these proposals remain on the table of this Conference.

For such practical work to be fruitful, it clearly must involve the participation of all States members of the Conference which are willing to take part in such work, including the nuclear-weapon States. The draft mandate in CD/521 holds out this possibility. The same is evidently not true for the draft mandate provided in CD/829, because of its substantive terms, and notwithstanding the interpretation that some have suggested may be put upon those terms.

Under these circumstances the group agrees with the appeal made by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico for further consideration of this issue during the forthcoming period of recess of the Conference, and hopes that an ad hoc committee will be able to be established, during the summer part of the session, under the appropriate mandate and on the basis of the participation of all member States willing to take part in work on a nuclear test ban in the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this moment? I recognize the representative of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Comrade President, I would like very briefly to inform the Conference that the Group of Socialist Countries would be ready to agree on the draft mandate submitted by the Group of 21 in document CD/829 dealing with nuclear test ban. We consider this proposal as a good basis for starting the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference during the coming week. In this connection, I should like to note that there will be an informal meeting of the Conference to start the second reading of the draft special report to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, on Tuesday, 26 April immediately after the plenary meeting. We shall take up then all pending questions. I had expected to hold that informal meeting on Monday, but this is not possible in view of the fact that the informal consultations on agenda items have not yet concluded. I do hope that we will be able to proceed through the second reading without reopening matters of substance which have already been discussed at the Conference, as well as at the informal open-ended consultations held to consider the draft substantive paragraphs of the special report. In this connection, the fact that the informal consultations on items 1, 2 and 3 are still proceeding is delaying the processing of documentation, and consequently, although the timetable provides for the time being that the last plenary meeting will be held on Thursday at 4 p.m., we may now have to postpone the closing date to Friday in order to give the secretariat the time needed for the processing of the draft special report which should be adopted on that date.

The informal open-ended consultations on items 1, 2 and 3 will continue this afternoon, immediately after the meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I hope that work will be concluded today, as otherwise we may need to revise not only our closing date, but also the whole timetable for next week. On that understanding, I would propose that we adopt the timetable. If I see no objection, I will take it that it is adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I suggest that we now adjourn this plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Conference in five minutes' time to continue our consideration of its improved and effective functioning. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 26 April at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12 noon

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.460
26 April 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 26 April 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Dávid Meiszter (Hungary)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 460th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues its consideration of the reports of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies, as well as of the special report to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member who wishes to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As announced at previous plenary meetings, I intend to put before the Conference for adoption, once the list of speakers is exhausted, the reports of the ad hoc committees on radiological weapons and on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which are contained in documents CD/820 and CD/825. As agreed in the timetable for the present week, we shall then suspend the plenary meeting and hold an informal meeting to proceed to the second reading of the technical parts of the special report of the Conference to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, contained in document CD/WP.336. We shall also, on that occasion, discuss the problem of the closing date for the first part of the session, as unfortunately our work on substantive questions has not advanced as had been hoped, and we are facing a problem of time. In the light of our exchange of views on this question, we shall resume the plenary and take the relevant decisions.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Brazil, Mongolia, Pakistan, Poland, Finland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, India and Bulgaria. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azambuja.

Mr. AZAMBUJA (Brazil): Mr. President, may I first of all congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for this and the next two months. Under your very able guidance we have prepared ourselves very thoroughly for the forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. As I am addressing the plenary of the Conference for the first time in a while, may I also take this opportunity to congratulate and thank very warmly your immediate predecessor, Ambassador Harald Rose of the German Democratic Republic, and Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany. I wish to welcome to this forum some recently arrived colleagues, the representatives of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, Canada, Ambassador Montigny Marchand, Iran, Ambassador Nasser, the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby, and lastly Nigeria, Ambassador Azikiwe.

My delegation would like to address today the issue of chemical weapons.

First of all, let me say that the recent and confirmed reports on the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war remind us once more, if we need reminding, that chemical weapons are not spectres of a bygone era, irrelevant in a period when high technology has thoroughly changed methods of warfare. The reports

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stressed the capacity of these weapons to bring destruction, suffering and death in a cruel and massive way, mainly upon civilian populations. The urgency and priority of this item on our agenda was thus underlined in a most regrettable manner.

During its last regular session, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution 42/37 A on the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons, the first single consensus resolution on this matter. In it, the General Assembly again urged the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify negotiations with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date.

The Group of 21, in the statement made on its behalf by Ambassador Ekéus on 8 March, reiterated its commitment to this resolution. At the beginning of the 1988 session, most of us cherished well-founded hopes of speedy progress. Unhappily on the eve of the General Assembly's third special session on disarmament, our feeling is one of disappointment. We certainly made progress, but it was neither so fast nor so far-reaching as expected, nor will it be enough to make us particularly proud when presenting our report on this item to this major forthcoming international conference.

We should not, however, be blamed for idleness, for we completed a significant work-load under the very able guidance of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka of Poland and his dedicated group co-ordinators. Nevertheless, those of us who kept attending the formal meetings now and again had the sensation that negotiations might be taking place elsewhere, thus depriving the collective effort of much of its thrust and meaning. Multilateral and bilateral processes can and should reinforce each other, but they cannot, even temporarily, replace one another.

Signs of protractedness multiply in our day-to-day discussions. Brackets and footnotes seem to increase in number rather than diminish. A scholastic exercise of this sort can go on for ever, if there is no political will to reach a conclusion. The views of delegations with respect to the central points of the future convention are already in our view quite well known. Neither the mere reiteration of these positions, nor the sheer course of time, will solve the outstanding problems. Only a spirit of mutual concession, of real and mature compromise, can overcome the last differences and make us take that final sprint to the finish line, if I may borrow half of the very apt metaphor of the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby. As stated by the Minister of External Relations of Brazil, Dr. Roberto de Abreu Sodré, addressing this forum on 18 February last, "we are prepared to support, be it in substance or in procedure, any practical initiatives that might further intensify the rhythm of our work and the pace of our consultations. We are not in a hurry. We simply refuse to waste time".

Our readiness to accept a universal ban on chemical weapons is easy to understand. Brazil does not possess chemical weapons and does not intend to develop, produce or stockpile any. Brazil has unfailingly recognized and supported the Geneva Protocol of 1925. As such, we think that the first priority of a ban on chemical weapons should be the destruction of all chemical weapon stocks and all chemical weapon production facilities, allowing

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no exceptions for any alleged security reasons. We consider that the slower the pace of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks during the 10-year period, assuming this time-frame is retained in the final text, the more discriminatory the transition régime will be towards those countries that have no chemical weapons.

The paramount goal of the future convention - the complete and universal prohibition of chemical methods of warfare - must be secured without jeopardizing other equally legitimate objectives, namely those related to making the basic achievements in the field of chemistry accessible to all mankind, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis. The prohibition of chemical weapons should not in any way hamper the economic and technological development of the parties to the convention, or curb international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities. Universality and non-discrimination are concepts closely linked. A text which imposes permanently unequal rights and responsibilities on member States will not earn a universal adherence.

We are confronted with the opportunity not only of negotiating one of the most relevant disarmament multilateral agreements ever - one that will free humankind of a fearsome and tragic weapon of mass destruction - we have the occasion to shape a model relationship between the interwoven areas of science, technology, industry, disarmament and development. It has become a truism to say that science and technology are the most wondrous productive factors man ever had to assist him in his struggle for a better life. They help produce more and better, they alleviate physical labour, they inform and teach faster and more precisely. We all know, however, that they can also assist men in killing other men with a speed and range never imagined by our ancestors. Science and technology are, in essence, dual-purpose activities. These two faces of scientific and technological progress are, to some extent, inextricable. We cannot ban or limit science and technology, for we cannot, in the end, ban or limit human intelligence and achievement. We may, however, and ultimately must, ban or limit all types of arms race set in motion by developments in science and technology, and prevent their extension to new areas.

Each welcome regulation of the use of scientific and technological advances for weapons purposes must not result in limitations on the access of developing countries to higher levels of technical capacity and better living conditions for their populations. I think we can strike an acceptable balance between the security concerns we all share and other national interests most of us have, including the free capacity to import and export chemical products not prohibited by the future convention; the right to research, develop, produce and use chemicals for peaceful purposes; and the right to promote and participate in the fullest possible international scientific and technological co-operation in the field of chemistry.

I am confident that the difficulties some delegations have expressed about seeing co-operation-related rights and obligations included in a security agreement will be overcome in the course of our negotiations. Other international disarmament agreements - a denomination we feel is more adequate

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than that of "security agreements" when applied to treaties in this category - have already embodied similar dispositions, most recently the biological weapons Convention.

We welcome, in this context, progress made in the current session on language for article XI. We have put forward our own ideas on this subject in document CD/CW/WP.176. Even if we consider that the wording so far arrived at falls short of what we deem indispensable for the final text of the convention, we feel very encouraged by the exchange of views we have had and consider we have a firm basis for future work. In this context I wish to congratulate Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia for the hard work done in Group A under his chairmanship. May I also thank Ambassador Ekéus, from Sweden, who, as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee for the last session, had already presented to us a very useful paper for discussion on article XI, from which some ideas should still be drawn for our future article on economic and technological development.

Another question of great relevance to Brazil is the matter contained in article X, on assistance, and here again we must welcome the advances made during the present session, under the competent chairmanship of Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico, in Group B. Let me only stress again the point made by many delegations from the Group of 21, that it is only natural and logical that States willing to accept the obligation to renounce the acquisition of chemical weapons for ever should strongly insist on having clearly stated in the convention the symmetrical right to assistance in the event of the use or threat of use of such weapons.

Verification will undoubtedly be the crucial subject of disarmament negotiations, multilateral or bilateral, from now to the end of this century. As with other areas of international relations, as they evolve nowadays, it will bring broad changes to relations between States, between States and international organizations, and to the concept of sovereignty itself. Even if in principle my delegation favours verification mechanisms tailored to each specific treaty, it is arguable that we will be establishing a significant precedent in presenting our convention. We shall therefore be very prudent and careful in dealing with the verification régime and the new ideas that it will introduce.

As a general principle, verification should be efficient, practicable, non-intrusive and cost-effective. Pushed to its logical limits, the verification concept could block progress in any disarmament negotiations, if applied with uncompromising rigidity. Absolute verification being an unattainable goal, we should stress mainly the deterrent effect of the inspection machinery on would-be violators. The cost of future verification procedures in all sectors should stop short of absorbing a large share of the financial resources to be hopefully liberated with the cut in military expenses provided by disarmament agreements and now wasted in the multiple arenas of military competition.

In the case of our convention, Brazil would like to see a verification régime as strict as possible, but with adequate safeguards against excessive intrusiveness and political mis-utilization. We view verification, on the

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other hand, as a two-track process. No one can reasonably equate the threat posed to the convention by chemical weapon stocks and chemical weapon production facilities with the risk allegedly presented by toxic chemicals produced commercially by the civilian chemical industry. The first and utmost priority of the verification system must be to control the former category of threats. May I quote here my distinguished colleague Ambassador Clerckx of Belgium, who, speaking about the risks embodied in supervision of the civilian chemical sector, stressed that "the enemy is not private chemical industry, the enemy is the State acting in bad faith".

Some ideas have been put forward on the need to give the Technical Secretariat the power to decide to carry out ad hoc inspections at short notice, on its own initiative. While sympathizing with the aim of enhancing the verification mechanisms of the convention we consider, in principle, that this proposal would place a very heavy responsibility on the technical skills of the future organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons, allowing for the raising of suspicions about its independence and objectivity and thus possibly endangering the inspectorate's role in other crucial areas, and in particular that of challenge inspections.

Coming to this central and essential feature of our future convention, my delegation holds that it should so be structured that it would preclude misuse or abuse of this right not only by depending on the international opprobrium likely to be brought upon the misuser or abuser, but also by giving a strong role to the Executive Council in one or more of the phases of the challenge inspection procedure. The role of the Technical Secretariat will be crucial in that area too. We can quite understand, in principle, the reasons put forward against filters between the request and the conduct of the inspection: the need for speedy action to prevent a cover-up at the site to be inspected obviously requires automaticity. We favour, however, the establishment of very strict conditions for the receivability of the request - details of the site to be inspected, the matters on which assurance is required, the circumstances and the nature of the suspected non-compliance and the exact provisions thought to have been violated. The Technical Secretariat should make sure that each such request meets these requirements as appropriate.

Coming to the stage of consideration of the report by the inspection team, my delegation is of the opinion that the Executive Council should meet immediately after receiving such a report and establish on a factual basis whether a violation of the convention has taken place or not. The same body should also decide on further steps to be taken if a violation has been confirmed. It would be rather awkward to give the requesting State a party to the controversy, the final say on the report on that controversy. If we have a decision-making procedure based on the need for a two-thirds majority, the Executive Council could settle this kind of issue without allowing any one political or geographical group alone to influence unduly the decisions to be made. The role thus given to the Executive Council would be effective to a very large extent in preventing misuses or abuses of the challenge inspection procedure. A State is likely to weigh carefully the pros and cons of resort to this mechanism once the Executive Council's authority and competence are clearly established.

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Some countries have expressed their misgivings about what they have called the "judicial power" of the Executive Council. My delegation thinks that, while we should allow bilateral controversies to be settled outside the framework of our convention, if a dispute persists once the convention procedures have been set in motion it should be treated multilaterally, according to the rules and procedures established in the convention itself. The fact that we want the Executive Council to play an important role in the verification system makes us even more sensitive to the questions of its composition, procedures and decision-making powers. We would like to see a strong, efficient and representative Executive Council, with a membership in the range between 20 and 30, neither too small to be tempted by visions of oligarchy, nor large enough to be unwieldy and cumbersome.

In the name of efficiency it has been suggested that a few seats should be attributed on a permanent basis. My delegation considers that this would constitute unacceptable discrimination, which would be clearly anachronistic at a moment when we are designing a significant element of the new international order for the next century. Three criteria, in our view, could be merged in the definition of eligibility for the Executive Council: geographical, political and industrial capacity. In a more perfect world we would like to see the pre-eminence or even the exclusiveness of the geographical factor, on the model of the United Nations. For the time being, we are prepared to accept the realistic approach of devising imaginative and balanced ways of combining the three criteria. One of the possible formulations would be to take the CD as a model and repeat approximately the same ratios. This decisive aspect of our future Organization has greatly benefited, if I may say so, from the preliminary discussion presided over by Mr. Numata of Japan, Chairman of Group C, during the current session.

Serious and good work was accomplished in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons last year under the chairmanship of my distinguished friend and colleague Ambassador Rolf Ekéus. Ambassador Sujka has assumed this heavy burden for the present session, and I sincerely congratulate him and wish him further success through the year 1988. Some say, probably with wisdom, but certainly with scepticism, that disarmament measures are only feasible in relation either to weapons on the way to obsolescence or to weapons still in the research and development stage, far from deployment. If this is true, let us strive to have a complete ban on chemical weapons in force before new types of those devices provoke another arms race, bringing unforeseen consequences to all mankind. Let us tackle all unresolved issues with the clear awareness that for every human enterprise there is a right time, and that if procrastination prevails, an historic opportunity can be lost forever.

The Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, has to live up to the expectations of the international community and fulfil the mandate received from the General Assembly. This is a unique chance for multilateralism to prove its effectiveness on disarmament matters, and it is within reach. A positive outcome of our present negotiations on chemical weapons would underwrite our bid for a constructive role in future negotiations on the so-called nuclear items of our agenda, as well as some other significant subjects, like outer space. You can count on the Brazilian delegation, Mr. President, to work in good faith and with diligence towards the attainment of this common goal.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Bayart.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first of all allow me on behalf of my delegation to extend sincere congratulations to you on your occupation of the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. We have a deep feeling of satisfaction at seeing in this post the representative of Hungary, with which my country maintains relations of sincere friendship and co-operation. We are happy to see that at this important time, when the Conference is to prepare a special report to the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, our work is being guided by such a wise and erudite person as yourself, who also possesses great knowledge and experience in questions of disarmament. My delegation wishes to express gratitude to your predecessor in the post of President, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, for his contribution to the work of the Conference.

As everybody recognizes, negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of chemical weapons, which have been under way now for a number of years, have reached a decisive stage. This may be seen from the fact that the special report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/CW/WP.200) has practically taken on the look of a treaty. It is now particularly important to intensify our negotiations, particularly by increasing the amount of time devoted to these negotiations during the year, and to put forward practical and constructive proposals, not new concepts which would complicate work on the convention.

In its statement today, my delegation would like once again to dwell briefly on one of the basic unsolved problems, the question of the order of destruction of chemical weapons, because animated discussions took place on this point during the preparation of the special report. I have already had an opportunity to say that my country does not possess chemical weapons and does not intend to develop, produce or acquire them. In participating in the negotiations on chemical weapons my delegation has been guided by a desire to contribute, as its capabilities allow, to the rapid finalization of the future convention. The working papers submitted by our delegation have been the result of precisely this kind of activity.

We realize that the question of the order of destruction of chemical weapons is not only important from the point of view of military strategy, but also has very obvious political and moral aspects. Careful drafting of the provisions of the convention on this subject and scrupulous implementation by the parties after its entry into force will to a large extent determine the viability of the future convention. It is encouraging that the basic approaches to this question are now moving together, and we hope that it will soon be possible to turn them into agreements, because the solution of this problem will be of substantial importance for the rapid conclusion of the convention. A significant amount of work has already been done on the basis of principles already agreed, such as the principle of undiminished security for all States during the entire destruction stage, confidence-building in the

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early part of the destruction stage, the gradual acquisition of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapon stocks and the applicability of this order of destruction irrespective of the actual composition and size of the stockpiles and the method chosen for the destruction of the chemical weapons.

There is general agreement that all stockpiles should be destroyed by the end of the tenth year after the convention enters into force. We are happy to see that definite progress has been registered at the negotiations on this question in recent months. An example is the agreement reached that the process of destruction of chemical weapons in category 3 must be completed not later than five years after the convention enters into force. Taking into account the positions of the various delegations, the Mongolian delegation put forward in its working paper CD/CW/WP.182 the principle of levelling-out, whereby States possessing chemical weapons would be left, by the end of the eighth year of application of the convention, with approximately equal quantities of such weapons, to be destroyed by the end of the tenth year after the entry into force of the convention. And this principle is now recognized by the participants in the negotiations. As to the level of the remaining stockpiles and the period over which this levelling-out will be possible, these questions await further discussion. Of course, on this question too the socialist countries are prepared to co-operate constructively with all interested delegations.

We are in favour of a simple, practical, effective order of destruction of chemical weapons. As we have repeatedly emphasized, this order of destruction should provide for the complete destruction of all stockpiles, the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and, above all, the immediate cessation of production, the declaration of the precise size and location of all chemical weapon stockpiles by all those possessing them not later than 30 days after the convention enters into force, verification of the trustworthiness of such declarations, and the institution of international monitoring of stockpiles.

Allow me to comment briefly on the working paper submitted by the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy (CD/CW/WP.197). We have studied with interest the ideas put forward in this document, and our preliminary comments may be summarized as follows. We do not quite understand why such an early deadline (five years) has been set for levelling-out, as it will almost automatically lead to the establishment of a high threshold of chemical weapon stocks in the hands of the "States parties with large stocks". What we would like - and this will be closely connected with the fundamental aim of the convention - is for all of the States parties to the convention which possess chemical weapons, without any exceptions, and whatever the size of the stocks they possess, to start destroying them simultaneously. Obviously the rates of destruction will vary from one chemical-weapon State to another, and remain to be determined. One can think of various levels to be aimed at by the States parties which possess these weapons, depending on the size of their stocks.

Since the course and process of destruction of chemical weapon stocks is a very important problem for the fate of the convention, we consider that this question should be included in the agenda of each regular session of the

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General Conference of the future Organization. Meanwhile a provision concerning the convening of special sessions, whatever the issues that may be discussed at them, will be set out clearly in article VIII of the convention.

The question of the order of destruction is also broached in document CD/CW/WP.199. We have outlined our attitude to it in previous statements. Our delegation shares the view of many other delegations that the position reflected in this document is in no way conducive to progress in the elaboration of the convention and the rapid destruction of chemical weapons in order that they should never reappear under any pretext. There is no doubt that the early declaration of possession of chemical weapons by States which have not yet made such a declaration, as well as of the level of their stockpiles of these weapons, would effectively promote finalization of work on the order of destruction during the summer part of the 1988 session.

In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about the urgent need to deal with the question of irritants. The use of weapons containing harmful chemicals against developing countries which do not possess a proper level of protection may constitute an extremely serious blow to their security. The principal victims will be the civilian population and peaceful activities in these countries. The use of herbicides for military purposes is another problem which requires solution. The time has now come to incorporate appropriate provisions on this subject in the "rolling text".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Ahmad.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. President, may I begin by expressing our happiness at seeing you in the Chair, the representative of a country which has always played an active role in this forum and made a useful contribution to its work. Earlier in this session, we were honoured by the presence in our midst of your Foreign Minister, His Excellency Dr. Péter Várkonyi. The important statement delivered by him testifies to the interest taken by your country in multilateral disarmament efforts. Our deliberations this month have been of particular importance in view of the special report that the Conference will be submitting to the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We are confident that, given your diplomatic skill and experience, you will be able to bring our work to a successful conclusion. I would also like to take this opportunity to express the sincere appreciation of my delegation for the efficient and able stewardship of the Conference last month by Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, and in February by Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic.

I should also like to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues who have joined us since I last took the floor - Ambassador Marchand of Canada, Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt, Ambassador Nasser of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, Ambassador Sujka of Poland and Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom - and to wish those of our colleagues who have recently left Geneva every success in their new assignments.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Ten years ago at SSOD-I the Committee on Disarmament was established with its present composition and working methods. When the General Assembly meets next month at its third special session devoted to disarmament, it will also take a look at the work done by us during the last decade. None of us can claim that the achievements of the Conference during this period have come up to the expectations of the international community, nor has its potential as the single multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament been fully realized. Our session this year, however, commenced on a more auspicious note than for several previous years. The signature in December last of the United States-Soviet Treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles created a favourable atmosphere for our work here. The Treaty demonstrates that the nuclear arms race can be stopped and indeed reversed, and that nuclear disarmament is a realistic objective. The figure of two and a half thousand or so missiles that the super-Powers have agreed to eliminate is not large, but the significance of the agreement goes beyond these numbers. It is the first disarmament agreement which envisages the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons, rather than limiting numbers. The detailed and intrusive verification provisions and the principle of asymmetrical reductions that the Treaty embodies are important precedents which will be of relevance in the negotiation of future disarmament agreements, not only between the super-Powers or at the global level but also in a regional context. It shows that mandatory on-site inspections are desirable and feasible and can be carried out without compromising sovereignty and national security. The Treaty also reinforces the principle that in any disarmament agreement he who possesses superiority must also reduce by a larger number.

Of course the INF Treaty will be a true watershed only if it is the precursor of further disarmament measures. The international community expects that it will be followed by agreements on a drastic reduction in strategic offensive weapons as well as tactical weapons, leading to their complete elimination, and by agreements for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. On the other hand, the significance of the Treaty will be greatly reduced if the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear weapons comes to be offset by a build-up, whether quantitative or qualitative, of other nuclear weapons.

Non-proliferation is an integral part of the nuclear disarmament process. States which have voluntarily renounced the nuclear weapon option did so in the larger interest of contributing to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, and in the expectation that the nuclear-weapon States would also come to abjure them. This understanding is enshrined in the non-proliferation Treaty. To deny the non-nuclear-weapon States the right to participate in the elaboration of measures for nuclear disarmament and for the prevention of nuclear war would therefore be morally indefensible as well as legally incorrect. It would also be a short-sighted policy, for the viability of any measures in an area which impinges so profoundly on the security and survival of every State depends on such measures being in accord with the security interests of all.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating forum in this field, cannot, therefore, be denied its due role in the negotiation of nuclear disarmament measures. It is thus a matter of regret that, because of the opposition of the Western group of countries, it was not possible for the Conference to adopt the draft mandate on item 2 of our agenda (CD/819) submitted by the Group of 21 earlier in the session for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to elaborate upon paragraph 50 of the Final Document and identify substantive issues for multilateral negotiations. We must similarly express our deep disappointment over the fact that, because of the position taken by the Western group, the Conference has been unable to address in a meaningful way the question of prevention of nuclear war since its inclusion in our agenda in 1984, and that this year once again the draft mandate introduced by the Group of 21 (CD/515/Rev.4) for consideration of all relevant proposals in an ad hoc committee has not been accepted.

I would now like to turn to the question of a nuclear test ban, an item of the highest priority on the multilateral disarmament agenda. Twenty-five years ago, the parties to the partial test-ban Treaty pledged themselves to seek to achieve the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground. Five years later, in the non-proliferation Treaty, this determination was reiterated together with the commitment to take effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. The urgency of a nuclear test ban has been repeatedly emphasized by the United Nations General Assembly, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Heads of State or Government of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation, most recently in the Kathmandu Declaration of November 1987.

For a long time, negotiations on a test ban apparently foundered on the question of verification. However, it is now clear that a test ban would not be acceptable to some nuclear-weapon States even with an absolutely foolproof verification system. In these circumstances, my delegation finds little comfort in the commencement of full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear testing. We evaluate these talks in the light of the criteria indicated in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of SSOD-I, which stated that the cessation of nuclear weapon testing would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons, and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are aimed in the first place at improved verification measures for the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty, which provide for a 150-kiloton yield threshold. These restrictions have not, however, placed any real restraints on the nuclear weapon development programme of either signatory. An agreement to verify these thresholds would not, therefore, interfere with the development of new weapon designs or end the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, as envisaged by the Final Document. What the world expects is not that the existing high thresholds be verified, but rather that such tests not be carried out at all. Intermediate limits on the number and yield of nuclear tests will be

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

meaningful only if they serve to curb the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and are adopted in the context of a legally binding commitment to a comprehensive ban within a short and predetermined time-limit.

The objective of prohibiting all nuclear explosions in all environments by all States for all time cannot be achieved by bilateral talks. A multilateral approach to the question of a nuclear test ban is, therefore, indispensable. Negotiations on this subject in the Conference on Disarmament should not be delayed any further. It is regrettable that because of a lack of agreement on an adequate mandate for an ad hoc committee, the Conference has not been able to undertake any substantive work on a test ban for the last five years. Earlier this month, the Group of 21, in a spirit of compromise and in a further demonstration of its flexibility, introduced a draft mandate (CD/829) for the establishment of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. We hope that this proposal will come to be adopted, and would urge those countries which regard a test ban as a long-term objective to consider carefully the effects that any further delay in the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would have on efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional States.

I should also like to inform the Conference in this context of the proposal made last year by the Prime Minister of Pakistan to the Prime Minister of India that the two countries should conclude a bilateral nuclear test-ban treaty. We are looking forward to a positive response to this proposal. We believe that the conclusion of such a bilateral agreement between Pakistan and India would serve to assure the two countries and the world that neither has any intention of pursuing the nuclear weapon option.

My delegation has always attached particular importance to item 6 of our agenda, relating to negative security assurances. We are gratified that an Ad hoc Committee on this item was established at the commencement of the session, and would like to express our appreciation for the determined manner in which Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria has been presiding over this body. Once again negotiations on this subject, which the Conference on Disarmament has been dealing with for 10 years, have made little headway. The legitimate demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States that their renunciation of the nuclear weapon option should be reciprocated by the nuclear-weapon States by an assurance in an international instrument with binding legal effect not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those who do not possess these weapons has not been heeded. Such an attitude on the part of the concerned nuclear-weapon States regrettably can only weaken the non-proliferation régime.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another subject of urgent priority for our Conference. We welcome the fact that the Ad hoc Committee on this item commenced its substantive work last month, though somewhat belatedly, and would like to assure Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela of our full co-operation in the accomplishment of his difficult task. Since its establishment in 1985, the Ad hoc Committee has carried out a detailed examination of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and of existing agreements. We must now focus our attention on

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

the third item of its programme of work, relating to existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to reaching agreement on concrete measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We hope that the Committee will be enabled to address this task meaningfully this year.

It cannot be seriously disputed that the current legal régime governing the activities of States in outer space, comprising customary law, the Charter of the United Nations and several international agreements pertaining specifically to outer space, is not adequate to the task of preventing an arms race in this environment. Several shortcomings in the existing law have been identified in the course of discussions in the Ad hoc Committee. It has already been overtaken by technological developments not foreseen by those who drew up the existing treaties. The rapid pace at which space technology is advancing threatens to make the existing space law a tenuous fabric.

A wide variety of military activities is already taking place in space, and space support systems have become an important part of the military machine of space Powers. However, present military activities do not involve the use of weapons in space or of weapons directed against objects in space. It is still not too late to adopt measures that would permanently preclude an expensive and highly dangerous arms race in space. A comprehensive new international régime which ensures that our last frontier does not become an arena of armed conflict is urgently needed. There should be a strict and universal ban on the development, testing, production and deployment of any weapons in outer space. This régime should, in addition, aim at making the beneficial and stabilizing uses of outer space available to all nations on a basis of equality.

Greater transparency in the military activities of space Powers in outer space would serve an important confidence-building function. We therefore invite countries engaged in the research, development and testing of space weapons to inform the Conference on Disarmament of these activities in an open and detailed manner, pending a complete ban on such weapons. The proposal for strengthening the registration Convention has been supported by many delegations. Information on the general function of space objects at present given under article IV of the convention is not provided in a timely manner, is not sufficient to give a clear picture of the military activities of space Powers, and is not subject to verification. To overcome these shortcomings, it would be necessary to amend the registration Convention or to conclude a new agreement providing for the furnishing, before launch, of detailed information, inter alia on the precise function of the space vehicle, and for the verification of this information at the launching site by an international agency. In this connection, I should like to refer to the proposal made by the Soviet Union for the establishment of an international inspectorate to verify the non-deployment of weapons in space. We feel that, as a first step, such an institution could be set up for the purpose of verifying data concerning the function of space objects with a view to providing the international community with reliable information on activities in space, especially those of a military nature.

My delegation has on previous occasions voiced its support for the proposal for the establishment of an international space monitoring agency.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Such an organization would provide the international community with the means of verifying compliance with disarmament agreements on the basis of the remote sensing and surveillance techniques now available to only a few. It would contribute to confidence-building and transparency and thus strengthen international peace and security. We view with concern the large-scale programmes currently under way in a few countries aimed at developing space-based ballistic missile defences. We believe that the deployment of such systems, if technically feasible, would lead to unending competition in strategic defences, a host of countermeasures that can be arrayed against them, and the deployment of more numerous and more sophisticated offensive weapons. Such an arms race, affecting the Earth as well as outer space, would be futile, costly and highly destabilizing.

The dangerous consequences of a competition in ballistic missile defences have been appreciated since the 1960s. Strict limits were therefore placed on such systems in the 1972 ABM Treaty. The philosophy underlying the Treaty, that limits on offensive nuclear weapons are possible only if strict constraints are placed on anti-missile systems, remains valid and is of universal application. There is therefore a need to supplement and reinforce this bilateral treaty through the conclusion of a multilateral agreement of unlimited duration. I would like to recall in this connection a proposal to this effect made by my delegation in 1986.

The importance of a ban on ASAT weapons is widely recognized. Needless to say, such a ban should give protection only to satellites performing peaceful functions, and not those which threaten the security of other States. An ASAT ban, therefore, presupposes an agreed definition of peaceful functions and a verification system aimed at determining whether objects launched into space fulfil this criterion. These are issues which must be addressed urgently. Effective verification is an indispensable element of any international disarmament agreement. This is true also for agreements concerning outer space. The difficulties associated with verifying compliance with outer space agreements, in view of the vast extent of this environment, are sometimes exaggerated. Perfect verification cannot be achieved and should not be aimed at. All space objects are launched from the ground and are not unlimited in number. The location of launching sites is known, and satellites can easily be inspected before launch. Moreover, outer space itself is open to inspection, as considerations of national sovereignty do not apply.

Full compliance with the existing legal régime governing outer space, insufficient and incomplete as it is, is of fundamental importance. The ABM Treaty is one of its essential components. It should be strictly observed and its provisions maintained and further strengthened. My delegation welcomes the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers on space matters, and urges the two parties to bring them to an early conclusion which would also be in keeping with the wider interests of the international community.

I have addressed items 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of our agenda in my statement this morning. I hope to take up items 4, 7 and 8 in a later intervention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair, and especially to my country. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka, who will introduce the report of the Committee, contained in document CD/831.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Comrade President, let me begin by extending my warm congratulations to you on presiding over our Conference for the month of April. You have been performing your duties with great skill and high efficiency over a difficult period involving reporting to SSOD-III. I also wish to take this opportunity to thank those distinguished Ambassadors who have addressed words of welcome to me.

The report I am introducing today, contained in document CD/831, was adopted in its entirety by the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on 20 April. It reflects the results of the negotiations since SSOD-II, including those achieved during the spring session. In keeping with the requirements for SSOD-III, it reflects the present stage of elaboration of a convention on a chemical weapons ban.

The document now before us follows, in general, the well-established pattern of previous years. It consists of three parts: the so-called technical part, which briefly recalls the history of the negotiations within this body and its subsidiary organ, appendix I and appendix II.

Let me briefly comment on their contents. Appendix I, which contains the current version of the "rolling text" of the draft convention, is a fundamental part of the report. Appendix II contains texts of papers which reflect the result of work undertaken to date on relevant issues. These papers are part of the report, as it has been agreed that they are to serve as a basis for further work. For the time being, they are not developed enough to be included in appendix I.

The report as presented reflects a further step forward in our process of negotiations. It encompasses the results achieved during the spring part of the session. The time we had at our disposal was shorter than usual during the spring session. This time was, however, used very intensively in a business-like manner. Nevertheless, I would share the opinion that the results seem to have fallen short of generally expressed hopes and expectations. However, we have before us the summer part of the session, which could bring us much closer to the common goals.

Briefly taking stock of the present state of affairs as reflected in appendices I and II, I would say that in some areas we were able to develop existing texts towards mutually acceptable solutions. In others we have worked out a common basis for future work. We have also had, however, to register a clearer picture of differences of position on some fundamental issues. I hope this will bring us closer to overcoming these divergences in the future.

I would like to draw the attention of the delegations to a very important aspect of the Committee's work which I consider very helpful for the

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

negotiating process. I have in mind the increased openness and confidence among delegations, demonstrated by numerous declarations made by the participating States on Chemical Weapons and related matters, as well as various visits to military chemical facilities, and the exchange of data both on a bilateral and on a multilateral basis.

At the first meeting of the Ad hoc Committee it was agreed that the Committee should deal with all the articles of the draft convention while focusing its attention, in the first instance, on articles III, IV, V and X (dealt with in working group B), articles VI and XI (dealt with in group A) and articles VII, VIII and IX (dealt with in group C). Accordingly the Committee concentrated its work on these areas. In addition I have held a number of open-ended consultations on articles XII to XVI of the draft convention - which have not, so far, been subject to full-scale negotiations. We did not succeed, however, in making substantial progress with articles I and II, though they too have been updated so as to reflect the current state of affairs.

To sum up, I would like to say that the present report is a fair and detailed reflection of what has been done and what still remains to be negotiated and agreed upon. It shows that the process of working out a convention has reached a very advanced stage. The existing point of departure for dealing with outstanding issues gives ground for optimism, especially if delegations would use the coming recess to prepare thoroughly for the summer session so that our work can be intensified.

I should like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the chairmen of the working groups, namely Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Numata of Japan, as well as the Secretary of the Committee Mr. Bensmail, and his assistant Miss Darby.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for introducing the report of that Committee, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. In accordance with a decision taken by the Conference at its 436th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Finland, Ambassador Mennander.

Mr. MENNANDER (Finland): Mr. President, may I begin by expressing my satisfaction at seeing you as President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. Your diplomatic skills are well known and much appreciated by my delegation.

I am taking the floor today to draw the attention of the Conference to a note verbale circulated by Finland to all delegations participating in the Conference on Disarmament, whether members or non-members. The note, which was placed in delegations' pigeon-holes next to room III on Monday, sets out the views of the Government of Finland concerning the question of the expansion of the membership of this Conference. We are gratified to note that there is again growing interest in this question, as evinced by the number of comments in the plenary in the course of the spring session of the Conference. Just last Thursday, the distinguished representative of Belgium, Ambassador Clerckx, pointed out that the question of membership has been

(Mr. Mennander, Finland)

deadlocked for many years, and expressed Belgium's support for a rapid enlargement of the Conference, perhaps by more than four new members. He went on to address an urgent appeal for initiatives to break the present deadlock on this issue. We for our part, find his remarks most appropriate.

Following up on the remarks by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Mr. Kalevi Sorsa, to this Conference on 18 February, the Finnish note reiterates our interest in becoming a member of this Conference at the earliest opportunity. It also points out that the forthcoming third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament provides a timely opportunity to take a fresh look at the membership issue in its entirety so as to assist the Conference in bringing its consultations on the subject to a successful conclusion at an early date.

In our view, looking at the question of membership afresh should involve consideration of all options conducive to an early agreement on expansion. We believe that a step-by-step but limited expansion over time is one option which merits serious consideration. We are convinced that, if approached in the spirit of good will and compromise, the successful resolution of the question of membership at an early date cannot remain beyond reach. We are ready to engage in consultations on this issue with all interested delegations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): At their meeting in Moscow on 21 and 22 April, E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George Shultz, United States Secretary of State, reviewed among other important issues the status of bilateral and multilateral negotiations in Geneva towards a comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons ban encompassing all chemical-weapon-capable States. The joint statement by the Ministers says that they "instructed their delegations to undertake further constructive work, including in such areas as confidence-building, openness, verification and the security of States parties, to contribute to the elaboration of a multilateral convention banning chemical weapons." The Ministers also recorded their concern over the growing problem of the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.

Today I would like to touch upon the issues of confidence-building and openness. On 18 February this year the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V.F. Petrovsky, submitted for consideration by the Conference a memorandum on multilateral data exchange in connection with the elaboration of a convention on the complete and general prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The memorandum set out our ideas regarding the purpose of such an exchange and the volume of information which, in our view, it would be appropriate to exchange. On 15 March the Soviet delegation provided some additional clarification concerning the memorandum, and also presented information falling within the scope of the first stage of data exchange that we propose.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The statement of 18 February also contained a proposal for the voluntary designation of one facility per country where a specially established international group of experts could test the procedures being worked out at the negotiations for systematic international verification of the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. These two proposals have, we understand, generated a certain interest. Comments, ideas and requests for clarification have been made. It seems to us appropriate, now that the spring part of the 1988 session is drawing to an end, to sum up the preliminary results of both the data exchange, which has in fact already begun, and the exchange of views which has taken place on our proposals. Let me turn to this issue.

We note with satisfaction that important steps have recently been made towards greater openness in the field of chemical weapons. More than 20 States have declared that they do not possess chemical weapons, and we have heard similar statements at today's meeting. The distinguished representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azambuja, has made such a statement, and he was followed by the distinguished representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Bayart. A number of countries have provided data showing that they produce chemicals covered by the Convention. The practice of visiting chemical-weapons-related facilities is becoming more widespread. We hope that this practice of confidence-building will continue. In particular we consider that those possessing chemical weapons should provide information on the size of their stockpiles. The provision of such information not only dispels suspicions and builds trust, but is also necessary from the point of view of practical requirements for the elaboration of the convention, particularly of the order of destruction of chemical weapon stocks. As you know, the Soviet Union has already provided such data.

There was, however, particularly in the United States delegation's statement, a shadow of mistrust regarding the figure we declared, although it was not substantiated by any arguments. It seems that on similar grounds, following the "logic of mistrust" and nothing more, we too might question the reliability of the information provided by the United States regarding its chemical arsenal. However, we will not do so, because we do not want data exchange and openness to lead in a direction which would diminish confidence. Furthermore, the statement made on 19 April by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador M. Friedersdorf, contained a reproach that the Soviet Union is allegedly seeking to learn "almost everything" about American chemical weapons, by inviting the United States to declare the overall size of its stockpile, while Soviet stocks would "continue to be largely shrouded in secrecy". The United States delegation asserts that data on the number and location of chemical weapon production and storage facilities are "much more significant". Such data are certainly important. But what for? Obviously, for verification, which will take place after the convention has entered into force. Then, of course, the locations of all storage facilities will have to be declared, including those on foreign territory. Yet I do not know where American chemical weapons are located, for example, in the Federal Republic of Germany. Since it is not proposed to conduct checks in respect of the multilateral exchange of data before the signature of the convention, it is not clear what use data on the location of facilities can be at this stage.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The volume of stocks is another matter, as I have already said earlier. The United States does not want to provide that figure, saying that in combination with the data it has previously declared, including those on the percentage breakdown of the overall stockpile, it will reveal, as Ambassador Friedersdorf put it, "almost everything about the United States chemical weapon stockpile". But one can look at this from the other angle as well. If, in addition to the figure it has declared regarding the size of its stockpile, the Soviet Union provides the data the United States has published, we will find ourselves in the same situation that the United States is trying to avoid. Is there a way out of this situation? We believe one can be found if we take as a starting-point the fact that certain data are needed for the preparation of the convention, rather than asking which data have already been made public at one time or another, for reasons unrelated to the negotiations. This is a matter for each individual State.

The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby, said on 19 April, apparently referring to her statement of 8 March this year, that "some initial disclosures of information will give rise to further questions or may not tally with the assessments of others". On 8 March she had expressed doubts concerning both the figure we had declared for our stockpile and the completeness of the presentation of our arsenal at Shikhany. I have already said earlier that anything can be questioned. The monstrously overstated assessments of our chemical weapon stockpile which are published in the West can only be left to the consciences of their authors. We cannot understand why we should have to prove the truthfulness of our declaration for the sole reason that someone in the West has had wild fantasies regarding the size of our stockpile. Proof of the truthfulness of our declaration will be provided no later than 30 days after the convention enters into force. For the moment I wish to recall our statement that chemical weapon stocks in the Soviet Union do not exceed 50,000 tons of CW agents. Under chemical weapons, we include both chemical munitions and CW agents in containers. As for the presentation at Shikhany, as the command of the Soviet chemical forces stated at the press conference following the presentation, it included all the Soviet Union's CW agents and standard munitions.

I think that on the whole we can state that substantial headway has been made at this part of the session on the issue of the multilateral exchange of data on chemical weapons prior to the signing of the convention. We look forward to further progress on this matter at the summer part of the session.

Now I should like to turn to another issue, which to a certain extent is linked to the first. I refer to the proposal made at the Conference by the delegation of the Soviet Union on 18 February regarding an experiment to test the procedures being worked out at the negotiations for systematic international verification of the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. We are encouraged by the interest that many delegations have shown in this idea. Some initial assessments of our proposal have already been made. Taking into account the discussion that has taken place, we would like today to provide the following additional clarifications as regards our understanding of its organizational aspects.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

First, we believe that the experiment should include the measures envisaged in the draft convention for the types of enterprises from which facilities for the experiment will be selected, including the relevant declarations. Secondly, the experiment may be carried out in stages. In the first stage, a national experiment (conducted by inspectors of that State) would be carried out at the designated enterprise. The Government would submit a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the results of the experiment, containing conclusions and possibly suggestions as regards the international verification procedures being worked out at the negotiations. Thirdly, a specially established group of experts from the States hosting the experiment would analyse the reports and draw general conclusions from them. In the second stage the group would also test the systematic verification procedures at the enterprises designated by the States. Additional procedures which the experts consider desirable might be tested during these international inspections (with the agreement of the host States). The international group of experts will submit its conclusions and recommendations to the Conference on Disarmament. Fourthly, the costs of the experiment, including the costs of inviting the experts, would be borne by the national Government. These are our additional observations. We await with interest the reactions of other delegations.

In conclusion, permit me to express the hope that the forthcoming summer break will be used by all delegations to think over the results of the session now ending, and to study the possibility of further progress in elaborating the draft convention. Allow me also to thank you for your successful and wise guidance of the work of the Conference in the past month, during which it had the important task of preparing the Conference's report to the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament.

I should now like to touch upon a sad circumstance. Today's meeting is the last at which our colleague Ambassador Konstantin Tellalov, the representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, will be present. He is leaving Geneva on completing his mission here, having done so with great skill and dignity. We will miss his sharp wit, his great political and diplomatic experience, his great personal charm. I am sure that Konstantin Tellalov's remarkable qualities will be used in future for the good of his country. On behalf of the Soviet delegation and on my own behalf, I would like to extend to Konstantin Tellalov and his wife Youlia my warmest wishes for happiness, good health and success.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Teja.

Mr. TEJA (India): Mr. President, at the beginning of this month, my delegation expressed its satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair during the crucial month of April. Today, as we approach the end of our work in the spring session of this year, I would like to compliment you on the effective and capable manner in which you have guided our work, especially with regard to the finalization of the special report of the Conference on Disarmament for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Teja, India)

Between now and the resumption of our work in the summer session, a major disarmament event will have occurred. SSOD-III is scheduled to take place in New York from 30 May to 25 June 1988. Whatever the exact nature of the relationship between the CD and the United Nations, it will undoubtedly have immense significance for our work. In my statement today, I would like to focus on some of the issues related to SSOD-III.

The forthcoming special session presents us with a unique opportunity to revive and strengthen multilateralism in disarmament. The options are before us, and it is up to us to take advantage of the unique circumstances and engage in constructive and peaceful dialogue. We believe that SSOD-III should neither be a mere replay of earlier sessions nor should it try to change or redraft what has already been agreed upon. An attempt to undermine or weaken the authority or validity of the Final Document, to which all of us were parties a decade ago and which we all reaffirmed unanimously and categorically in 1982, would only lead us astray and direct our efforts into futile debates. We should, therefore, try to make the special session forward-looking and pragmatic in order to build upon what has already been agreed to and strive towards our general objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

We are all committed to making SSOD-III a successful session. The differences arise because of the varying interpretations of what constitutes a success. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, was an event of historic significance. It was convened in response to growing concern among the peoples of the world that the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, represented an increasing threat to humanity and to the survival of mankind. At that session, the international community of nations achieved, for the first time in the history of disarmament negotiations, a consensus on an international disarmament strategy. The immediate goal of the strategy was the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race. The final objective was to achieve, as I mentioned earlier, general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The conviction that all people had a legitimate right to participate in disarmament and a vital interest in its success led to the United Nations being given a central role and primary responsibility in this field. The success embodied in the Final Document of SSOD-I was founded on a common awareness. A similar common awareness has to be developed to make SSOD-III a landmark in multilateral disarmament efforts. The consensus text arising out of SSOD-III should, in our opinion, be a meaningful and positive one. It should also be relatively brief and address itself to major problems of common concern. It would be desirable not to burden it with issues that can be discussed elsewhere. We visualize it as a concise document, concrete in its contents, future-oriented and yet realistic. It should take stock of where we stand at the moment, develop the principles already accepted by the international community and chart a path for multilateral disarmament efforts to follow. It should indicate in what areas and by what means multilateral disarmament efforts are likely to command wider support. In short, it should be balanced in nature and constructive in its approach. This does not mean that genuine differences of principles and approach cannot be reflected in such a document, or that consensus should be turned into the power of veto.

(Mr. Teja, India)

We perceive a general feeling of optimism, which is understandable, as SSOD-III is taking place in a propitious international climate. In the bilateral sphere, the recent conclusion of the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union is a positive development. It broke new ground in nuclear disarmament. It is even more significant for the new avenues that it has opened up for a 50 per cent cut in the strategic weapons of the two most significant military States. In the regional context, the successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures in Europe is also an encouraging sign. At the multilateral level, we have the increasing pace of CW negotiations. All these reflect new attitudes and new policies. These need to be reflected in our concept of security. In the nuclear age, only with coexistence can there be existence; and only with collective security can there be security. Security is not viable unless perceived to be valid for all countries and all peoples. It is true that different countries in the world are at different stages of economic, social and cultural development; some countries are much more powerful than others, yet the international community has to develop an understanding of security in the present age, for it can no longer be tackled in terms of military power alone. Common security has to be based on a sense of common destiny for all peoples. Allowing for existing differences in the level of development, the concept must contain a common awareness of the goal of ridding the world of the threat of a nuclear holocaust and the use of other weapons of mass destruction.

Security is an overriding priority for all nations. A broader understanding of security, which would include not just the military dimension but also the political, economic, social and humanitarian dimensions, would imply that a unilateralist search for security on the basis of sheer accumulation of more and better weapons is a self-defeating exercise. The enhancement of global security needs progress in the interrelated fields of disarmament, development, multilateral organizations for resolution of conflicts and greater movement towards an equitable world order. A multilateralist approach can on the one hand create conditions conducive to disarmament and on the other provide the confidence for successful pursuit of development. The development process, by overcoming non-military factors which undermine security and contributing to a more suitable and sustainable international system, can enhance security and further promote disarmament. Disarmament would enhance security both directly and indirectly. A process of disarmament that provides for undiminished security at progressively lower levels of armaments could allow additional resources to be devoted to addressing non-military challenges to security, and thus result in enhanced overall security.

In the field of disarmament, we have the organizational resources of multilateral machinery: we have the Conference on Disarmament, which is the sole multilateral negotiating body; we have the globally multilateral Disarmament Commission, a deliberative body, and in the General Assembly we have the First Committee. The CD is unique in that all five nuclear-weapon States are members. Its rules of procedure are fundamentally sound, and flexible enough to accommodate a certain degree of variation in the approaches to issues. Suggestions have already been made about a realistic disarmament agenda. While we would welcome a constructive approach, the established

(Mr. Teja, India)

priorities cannot be overturned in the name of realism. The criterion for inclusion of items on the agenda of a multilateral body is not merely feasibility or the ease with which progress can be made, but whether an issue touches the very survival of mankind. Even if progress is not possible in the short term on such a subject, it is necessary that it be included and kept alive on the agenda of a multilateral body and that we persist in our efforts to resolve it in the most widely acceptable fashion. This criterion justifies the priority accorded to the issue of nuclear disarmament.

Modern science-based technology has done more than anything else to bring about the present shape of the world. While technology has provided us with a number of benefits, it has also made our problems more complex by globalizing them. No longer can we deal with problems of poverty, development, disarmament, security, pollution and ecology in isolation. Growing interdependence among nations, interrelations among global issues, mutuality of interests, all demand a collective approach and a multilateral framework within which these issues can be explored and resolved. In the previous decades our attempts were primarily focused on the quantitative aspects of the arms race. Efforts have been made to try and control numbers while technological developments have continued, leading to the designing of more lethal and accurate weapon systems. It is now clear that the dynamics of the arms race have been led by technological innovation. The emergence of military R and D as the major stimulant of the arms race is a relatively recent phenomenon, primarily due to the increasingly dominant role of science and technology in our lives. It is estimated that 90 per cent of all scientists who ever lived are alive today, and if measured by the volume of research publications, our knowledge doubles every 15 years. About 1.5 million scientists, engineers and technical experts devote their efforts to designing, developing and testing new weapon systems. Regrettably, the growth of military R and D has been even sharper, and it has come to occupy the predominant position in global R and D. Today, the world spends approximately \$100 billion annually on military R and D, accounting for a third of all world spending on science and technology R and D.

Today we stand on the threshold of a new arms race, which seeks to combine the most recent developments in the field of electronics with those of nuclear explosive powers. Significant improvements have taken place in delivery systems with the development of precision guidance systems just as weapon systems have become more compact and versatile. While similar warheads can be used on more than one launch system, missiles can now be fitted with conventional and/or nuclear warheads. These developments also threaten to extend the dimensions of the existing arms race into outer space. Increasing computerization and sophistication in weapon systems can only create an illusion of stability. Increased decentralization and reduced time for decision-making, a blurring of the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, between tactical and strategic weapons, erodes the thresholds. These technological developments are affecting not only nuclear weapon systems but also conventional weapons. For both these areas, the issue needs to be looked at in a global framework.

Technology by itself is neutral. Its applications could, however, contribute to increasing stability or stabilize existing balances. Our

(Mr. Teja, India)

efforts should enable us to look at this problem and analyse it in all its implications, so that the technological developments can be channelled into a stabilizing mode. Such an analysis would require considerable technical inputs. A number of these technologies also have significant applications in arms limitation and disarmament. Before the arms race can be reversed it has to be halted, and before it is halted it has to be slowed down. In the past technology has been used to escalate the pace of competition and create uncertainty; today we need to dampen the pace and create confidence. SSOD-III should give us the means with which to keep this subject under continuous monitoring so that periodic assessments can be made. Channelling technological developments into areas of verification and confidence-building would also help in slowing down the arms race with a view to halting it and eventually reversing it. The solution is a long-term one, but a beginning has to be made. SSOD-III provides us with an opportunity to take a first step in this direction.

Verification of compliance with disarmament agreements is an issue of concern to all nations. We all want to be certain that agreements to destroy weapons or to refrain from their development are strictly complied with. Inadequacy of verification measures has been used in the past as a justification for lack of progress in disarmament. For this reason, the Stockholm Declaration issued by the leaders of the Six-nation Initiative strongly emphasized "the need for the establishment of an integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations, as an integral part of a strengthened multilateral framework required to ensure peace and security during the process of disarmament as well as in a nuclear-weapon-free world".

SSOD-III is a time for reflection and deliberation. It is an opportunity for setting out a common agenda for multilateral disarmament which will stand us in good stead till the turn of the century. It is a time for building upon the foundations laid down by the Final Document in 1978. It is a time to ensure that existing negotiations, particularly on a chemical weapons convention, are accelerated and concluded at the earliest. It is my conviction that an awareness of our common goals, tempered with a sense of realism, will hold the key to a successful SSOD-III.

Before I conclude my statement, let me say how sad we are to see our long-term colleague Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria leaving us. I would like to convey to him our best wishes; his contributions have been numerous, and he will certainly be missed by all of us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): It is not without emotion that I take the floor today. A little more than six years ago I started my work in the Conference on Disarmament - in this same corner of the chamber, actually in the chair on the right. Today my delegation is to be found in the same place. In other words, I have had the opportunity to sit on all 40 chairs around this table and observe and participate in the work of the Conference from every possible

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

angle, including the high post which you, comrade President, now have the honour of holding. Nevertheless, I do not intend today to analyse and assess the activities of the Conference during the past six years. It is not necessary for me to remind you of the position of my country, which I have stated and defended in the Conference on Disarmament; my Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke here only 12 days ago. Allow me to say only a few words.

When I began my work in the Conference on Disarmament in 1982, cold winds blew in international relations. The atmosphere was not very favourable for fruitful work. The records registered a lot of sharp statements and retorts in exercising the right of reply. We used to blame each other and shift the responsibility for the arms race from one to another. Stated desires to achieve real steps towards disarmament were not matched by political will and practical work. Some years later, the sun's rays began to find their way into this chamber as well. Close to our negotiating body, here in Geneva, the first Gorbachev-Reagan summit took place, and for the first time the world heard the joint statement of the two super-Powers that "nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". There followed a second summit, a third, and we are on the eve of a fourth Gorbachev-Reagan summit. The first real disarmament agreement was signed, a second one is on the way, and for us here the chemical weapons negotiations have gained solid momentum, with a view to agreeing on the text of a future convention banning chemical weapons.

One way or another, however, I leave my post without having the personal satisfaction that one could derive from a task accomplished - the achievement of at least one multilateral agreement on disarmament. That is why I sincerely wish success to all my colleagues in their future efforts, which I hope will be stimulated by the decisions of the third special session on disarmament.

In terms of personal experience I would like to assure you that I will preserve the best of memories of all the colleagues I worked with in the Conference. Some of them, like Ambassador Kőmíves of Hungary, Ambassador Lowitz of the United States of America and Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, have left us for ever. Others have retired. Still others have taken up important new assignments. I am really pleased that such veterans as Ambassador García Robles of Mexico and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, continue to perform their duties in the interest of the noble cause of disarmament as energetically as when I met them in 1982.

I should like to express my gratitude and thanks to all of you, dear colleagues, for your co-operation and friendship. I would also like to convey warm words of gratitude to all members of the secretariat, and personally to the Secretary-General, Ambassador Komatina, who is a good friend of mine, to the interpreters, who have tried to translate my bad English into other languages - in other words to all those without whom it is difficult to imagine the functioning of this Conference.

It is a mere chance, comrade President, that I am winding up my duties in this Conference at a time when you, with your inherent diplomatic skill, are presiding over its work. But every chance gives rise to a possibility of some

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

kind, and I would not like to miss it. I cannot conclude without noting the excellent co-operation which has existed between you and me, not only in the Conference, but also in our general activities as permanent representatives, co-operation which is worthy of the fraternal relations between our two countries.

I would like to assure you, dear friends, that wherever I may be I will keep alive my interest in the work of the Conference and that I shall be particularly happy if, as soon as possible, your efforts are crowned with concrete results. I wish to all of you good health, a lot of happiness and success in your work hereafter.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov, for his statement, and especially for the kind words he addressed to me in my capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament, and as a colleague. Ambassador Tellalov is one of the most experienced representatives in the Conference, as he has been with us since January 1982. He has played an important role in the work of the Conference, of which he was President during the month of June 1986. Under his presidency, he developed organizational arrangements to deal with agenda item 2, relating to the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. He also acted as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances during the first part of this session. I am sure that we all appreciate his contribution to our work, which was possible due to his friendly personality and professional competence. May I for a moment drop my somewhat rigid presidential stand and add to this appreciation my personal one? I was privileged to follow Ambassador Tellalov's performance not only in the field of disarmament but in very different areas, in the Conference on Disarmament as well as in his role as Permanent Representative, and I found it to be a very remarkable performance characterized by a deep feeling of responsibility and sense of co-operation. May I, on behalf of you all, wish him and also his family the very best, and a successful continuation of his activity in the field of international relations.

That brings us to the end of my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I recognize the representative of Mongolia, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Our great friend, Ambassador Konstantin Tellalov, the representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the Conference on Disarmament, has completed his work in that post and will soon be leaving Geneva. In expressing the feelings of my colleagues in the Group of Socialist States and my own personal feelings, I would like to emphasize that Ambassador Konstantin Tellalov, who headed the Bulgarian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament for a long time, has just told us that he has completed a big circle round this very prestigious negotiating table, and has made an outstanding contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Leaving aside the personal charm of Ambassador Tellalov, whom it has been extremely pleasant to associate with, his customary calm together with his wisdom, his perceptiveness and his benevolent attention to the views of others, his business-like and constructive approach to the problems being examined at the Conference, his firm conviction of the need for and

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

possibility of reaching solutions for the good of all States and peoples, all these have won him deserved authority here. We will miss him very much, this fine person and friend, who could always be depended on; we will miss his great knowledge and experience. We wish Ambassador Tellalov every success in his further activities, we wish him good health, we wish happiness and success to his wife, Youlia, and his children. In taking our leave of him, we wish to say au revoir, until we meet again.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America.

Mr. GRANGER (United States of America): The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin, has apprised the Conference of the instructions our two delegations have received from their Governments as a result of the recent ministerials in Moscow. The United States delegation will, of course, comply with those instructions, and indeed we have already begun to do so. You will note, if you review the statements of Ambassador Friedersdorf on 14 and 19 April, that the issues mentioned in the joint statement that Ambassador Nazarkin mentioned today, that is, confidence-building, openness, verification and security, are precisely issues my delegation considered important and considered further work is needed on. There are, of course, others that we also discussed in those two statements, and we are prepared for constructive work in all these areas. We will return during the next session when we convene again in the summer and discuss the joint statement further because, of course, it covered many areas other than chemical weapons.

Regarding multilateral data exchange, my delegation has noted with interest the Soviet proposal, and we are considering it carefully, along with other proposals such as the one recently submitted by several Western States. Our preliminary assessment is that the latter proposal offers more prospects for progress in our negotiations, because it seems to call for more useful information to be presented when it would be most valuable. The Soviet proposal appears to us to be unbalanced. We have an open mind, however, as to the approach the CD should take, and we look forward to consideration of all options, as well any others that we may have in addition to those two when we resume in the summer. As for the reservations my delegation and others have expressed regarding some of the recent Soviet revelations, Ambassador Friedersdorf stated last week that, given the unhappy experiences of the past, declarations cannot always be accepted at face value. You all know about these unhappy experiences, and I do not intend to go into them again here today. We have discussed them before in our statements over the past two or three years. I will only say now that these unhappy experiences are not wild fantasies. These past unhappy experiences, however, have not dampened our enthusiasm for multilateral data exchange. Indeed, to the contrary, these experiences make it clear that such an exercise is very important to our efforts.

Regarding the Soviet proposal for multilateral efforts to develop and test inspection methods for commercial facilities, we have welcomed that proposal in the past. We do not think it unreasonable, however, to do our

(Mr. Granger, United States)

homework before we begin such an experiment. First, of course, as Ambassador Friedersdorf mentioned last week, we needed to know more precisely what the Soviet Union had in mind, and in that regard we certainly appreciate the clarification that the Soviet Ambassador has given with regard to the Soviet proposal, and particularly his remark that national development of verification procedures must be the first step of development of this experiment. That was the proposal we made last week. As the Soviet proposal itself recognizes, the inspectors would use procedures being worked out here in the CD. Our reservation expressed last week simply recognized that we should better develop those procedures before we take our chemical experts away from their negotiations for the time-consuming, albeit valuable, task of touring these facilities. We look forward to our summer session, where these and other important issues can be addressed again and, hopefully, resolved. My delegation would add its regrets to those expressed by other delegations, that we will soon lose the valuable services of an able diplomat, Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): In the report of the mission despatched by the Secretary-General to investigate the use of chemical weapons, as documented in S/18852 of 8 May 1987, the specialists, while saying chemical weapons had again been used against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces, also causing injuries to civilians in the Islamic Republic of Iran, concluded:

"We all firmly believe that, at the specialist level, we have done all that we can to identify the types of chemicals and chemical weapons being used in Iran-Iraq conflict ... In our view, only concerted efforts at the political level can be effective in ensuring that all the signatories of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 abide by their obligations".

The specialists warned the international community of their forebodings for the future, saying that indifference "may lead, in the future, to the world facing the spectre of the threat of biological weapons". It is unfortunate that not only has this strongly recommended concerted effort at the political level not materialized, but on the contrary we have been witnesses to a degree of acquiescence to such crimes.

We are now faced with an unprecedented escalation of the use of chemical weapons against civilians, which was highlighted in the Halabja holocaust. Ironically, our request for the dispatch of a team took more than two weeks to meet, and yet the team was incomplete and - worse - the scene of the crime was not visited. What we have to bear in mind is that when the genie is out, nobody will be able to put it back in the bottle. When chemical weapons become a warfare agent in every conflict in the world and the negative effects on the environment come to the threshold of many countries, then it may be too late even to feel sorry for this self-inflicted state. Now the lack of response to the Security Council has made use of chemical weapons by Iraq a fait accompli, which has become normal practice in every operation in a war started by Iraq on 22 September 1980. On 21 April 1988 the township of

(Mr. Mashhadi, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Darkhovein as well as the surroundings of Susangerd in the southern Iranian province of Khugistan were subject to extensive chemical bombardment by Iraqi forces. This deployment, like the previous one in Halabja, was directed against unprotected civilians, leaving a number of casualties. The Islamic Republic of Iran, through its Permanent Mission in New York, immediately submitted a request to the United Nations Secretary-General for the dispatch of an investigation team to the area to once again verify the established facts.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement. Are there any other delegations wishing to take the floor at this moment? I see none.

I shall now turn to another question. As I announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, I intend now to put before the Conference for adoption the reports of the ad hoc committees on radiological weapons and on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as contained in documents CD/820 and CD/825.

I now take up the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report contained in document CD/820.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should like to extend to Ambassador Tessa Solesby of the United Kingdom our congratulations for the successful conclusion of the work of the Ad hoc Committee. I should like now to deal with the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, contained in document CD/825. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should also like to extend to Ambassador Konstantin Tellalov of Bulgaria our congratulations for the successful outcome of the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons.

I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and to convene, in five minutes' time, an informal meeting of the Conference to proceed to the second reading of the special report to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The meeting was suspended at 12.25 p.m. and resumed at 12.40 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 460th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

(The President)

In the light of the exchange of views we had at the informal meeting, I suggest that the Conference should agree to close the first part of the 1988 session at a plenary meeting to be held on Friday 29 April at 5 p.m. The Conference will also hold its regular plenary meeting on Thursday 28 April at 10 a.m., which will be followed by an informal meeting to conclude consideration of the draft substantive paragraphs under various agenda items. If I see no objections, it is so decided.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.461/Corr.1

3 June 1988

ENGLISH only

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 28 April 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Dávid Meiszter (Hungary)

Corrigendum

On the cover page please replace SIXTH-FIRST by SIXTY-FIRST

On pages 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 top right hand corner, please replace
(The President) by Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan).

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.461
28 April 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTH-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 28 April 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Dávid Meiszter (Hungary)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 461st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of the reports of the subsidiary bodies, as well as of the special report to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As announced at our plenary meeting on Tuesday, the Conference will hold today an informal meeting immediately after this plenary, in order to take up the second reading of the draft substantive paragraphs of the special report to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Pakistan, Zaire, Venezuela (who will speak as Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space) and Mexico (who will speak on behalf of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament). I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Ahmad.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): In my statement today, I propose to address items 4, 7 and 8 of our agenda as well as the question of improved and effective functioning of the Conference.

Our negotiations on a chemical weapons ban are the most promising area of our work. This is reflected in the intensity of our discussions on this question. These negotiations have now reached an advanced stage where an end is in sight but not yet quite within our grasp. The work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was brought forward considerably during the last session and during the inter-sessional period under the leadership of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, ably assisted by his team of item co-ordinators. This year we are again fortunate in having as the Chairman of the Committee Ambassador Sujka of Poland who, six years ago, skilfully guided the deliberations of the Working Group on this item of our agenda.

We have been discussing the question of a chemical weapons ban for 20 years in this multilateral negotiating forum. The distance we have covered in the last 6 years is evident from the special report which was submitted to the Conference at our last meeting. For the first time, the report contains either agreed language or suggested formulations on all the articles of the draft convention. The progress made cannot, however, be measured simply by the bulk of our report. There is still a lot of hard work to be done before we reach our goal.

Several delegations have stressed the need for speeding up the pace at which our work is proceeding. We share this view. United Nations General Assembly resolution 42/37 A, adopted last year without a vote, called for the intensification of our negotiations. This call should be heeded.

(The President)

The urgency of concluding a convention to ban chemical weapons can hardly be over-emphasized at a time when reports of their use continue to multiply, when existing stocks are being built up, when these weapons are being produced by more and more nations and when scientific and technological developments threaten to trigger the development of new and more lethal types of chemical weapons. News about the renewed use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war has caused deep anguish to the Government and people of Pakistan. We reiterate our strong condemnation of all actions in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and urge both parties to the conflict to abide by the norms of international humanitarian law, particularly the provisions relating to armed conflict.

The situation in which we find ourselves should impel us to redouble our efforts. Our negotiations are at a crucial stage. If the political will exists, a real breakthrough is possible. The convention we are negotiating would be the first multilateral disarmament agreement providing for the establishment of international machinery to supervise the implementation of its provisions and to monitor an important branch of the civil industry. It would give a significant boost to the Conference on Disarmament and reinvigorate the multilateral disarmament process. We must seize this opportunity.

As stated by Ambassador Ekéus on 8 March on behalf of the Group of 21, the non-aligned and neutral countries want the early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, comprehensive, verifiable, effective and truly global convention banning all chemical weapons. They will work resolutely towards this objective and will not agree to partial measures or limited arrangements. My delegation believes that the question of proliferation should be approached in the context of a global convention.

Differences on some of the outstanding issues were reduced during the spring part of the current session. However, a number of difficult problems still await solution, such as the order of destruction, monitoring of the civil industry, the institutional structure and challenge inspection. Evidently, a lot of arduous work lies before us in the summer and beyond. We would urge all delegations to approach these questions with a sense of urgency and in a constructive spirit.

Some further convergence has taken place on the question of the order of destruction, on which considerable common ground was identified last year. We feel that the concerns that have been voiced about security during the period of destruction could be addressed by appropriate adjustments in the order of destruction. Several useful suggestions have been made to provide for a levelling out of stocks. On the other hand, maintenance of secret stocks or continued production during the destruction period would raise more problems than it would solve.

We welcome the understanding reached by the Soviet Union and the United States, the two largest chemical-weapon States, on the definition of a chemical weapon production facility and on the principle that these facilities should be completely destroyed. This understanding should facilitate concrete work on article V in the Ad hoc Committee during the summer.

(The President)

Article VI will be one of the most important parts of the convention. Unlike the provisions concerning destruction, which will apply only to chemical-weapon States and hopefully become obsolete after a transitional period during which stocks and production facilities would be eliminated, the monitoring régime for chemical industry will be of unlimited duration and of direct interest to a considerably larger number of countries. This régime should be as non-intrusive as possible. It should also be cost-effective. At the same time, it must be effective in producing confidence in compliance with the convention.

The proposal made by the Federal Republic of Germany for ad hoc checks (CD/791) has made a useful contribution to our discussions. It has drawn attention to a real problem, that of the risk of clandestine production in facilities normally devoted to peaceful purposes but which could be converted to the production of chemicals posing a risk to the objectives of the convention. Our delegation would, however, be wary of any procedures which smack of a challenge inspection by the Technical Secretariat, as they could compromise its non-political character.

Work on article VIII of the convention has made concrete progress, and the outlines of the institutional structure are becoming more and more clear. The Executive Council has been described as the "most powerful" organ. We do not see the issues in this light. Our aim should be to establish an organization which is democratically constituted and is effective in overseeing implementation of the convention and compliance with its provisions. The General Conference, as the supreme body comprising all States parties on the basis of equality, should delegate to the Executive Council day-to-day functions of a routine character while retaining a supervisory authority over it.

The composition of the Executive Council continues to be a tricky question, and we are glad that it is now being addressed in the appropriate working group of the Committee. My delegation believes that the Executive Council should not be so large in size as to weaken its capacity to take quick decisions, nor should it be so small as to deprive it of a truly representative character. Its precise composition should be based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and of political balance. We are not convinced that a case has been made out for any further criteria to be taken into consideration in this connection.

As several delegations have pointed out, there is an interrelationship between the composition of the Executive Council and its decision-making procedures. Equally, we feel that there is a linkage between these two questions on the one hand and the respective powers and functions of the General Conference and the Executive Council on the other.

The procedures for challenge inspection will have a crucial place in an effective verification régime - to deter violation as well as to create confidence in compliance. There is general recognition that these procedures should be mandatory, without a right of refusal. The consultations carried out by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee for the 1987 session resulted in

(The President)

tangible progress, as reflected in appendix II of the report. A wide measure of agreement exists on the procedures for the initiation of the inspection, in particular that there should be no political "filter" before this process is set in motion.

As regards the actual conduct of the inspection, procedures still need to be evolved that will reconcile the demands of an effective inspection with the legitimate right of States to protect sensitive information not related to chemical weapons. Moreover, the whole range of issues connected with follow-up to the submission of the inspection report still need in-depth examination. These are questions on which the two political organs to be established under the convention, the Executive Council and the General Conference, would have to be involved in a meaningful way. Once doubts have been raised publicly about compliance with the convention, the matter can no longer be regarded as one of concern only to the requesting and requested States, to be resolved by them bilaterally. Every party to the convention has an interest in seeing to it that the inspection is carried out in an effective manner and that, as far as possible, a clear-cut finding is arrived at on compliance or otherwise. These are matters which could appropriately be decided upon by the Executive Council. In cases of breaches of the convention which are not immediately rectified and of violations of a serious nature the Executive Council should, in our view, refer the matter to the General Conference for further action, including possible measures to restore credibility in the convention.

We have taken a particular interest in articles X and XI of the convention, dealing respectively with assistance and economic and technological development. We fully support the proposal submitted by Argentina on article X (CD/809). Some delegations continue to approach these matters from a rather narrow angle and see them as another North-South issue. Effective provisions on these two articles need to be viewed, however, in a broader perspective as means of promoting the objective of universality of the convention and of strengthening its viability. A State which faces a chemical weapon threat has at present no choice but to acquire a deterrent capability of its own. Such a State will not, therefore, become a party to the convention, or, having become one, will withdraw from it, unless it can count on assurances of assistance from States parties in meeting this threat. These assurances should be given through provisions in the convention for mandatory assistance to the threatened State in protective measures. The existence of such provisions in the convention would by itself serve as a deterrent to anyone contemplating the use of chemical weapons.

In our view, article XI of the convention should contain undertakings for the promotion of international scientific and technological co-operation in the application of chemistry for peaceful purposes. There would be nothing novel in such a commitment, as similar clauses exist in two other multilateral disarmament agreements, namely the non-proliferation Treaty and the biological weapons convention. The case for meaningful provisions on co-operation in article XI is all the greater in view of the generally recognized interrelationship between disarmament and development and the increased confidence that compliance with the convention would generate.

(The President)

Before I turn to other items of the agenda, I would like to express my appreciation to the Soviet delegation for having arranged the visit to the Shikhany military facility last October and for the information on Soviet chemical weapon stocks. We also welcome the various proposals for a multilateral exchange of information on chemical weapon stocks and production facilities and other relevant data. This information would give us a better idea of the magnitude of the task that the inspectorate would be expected to perform, and thus facilitate our work in drafting the relevant parts of the convention.

Under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom, the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons was able to complete its report to SSOD-III with great speed. The co-ordinators' records on both tracks now include possible formulations on verification and compliance and other main elements - both the question of radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense as well as the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. On neither of the two issues have differences been narrowed. However, now that we have clearly identified the problems, a realistic assessment can be made of future prospects.

Pakistan has taken a keen interest in the question of attacks on nuclear facilities. We continue to believe that this Conference is the appropriate forum to address this subject. Our position on the substantive issues has been stated in the Conference on previous occasions, and I will not repeat why we are unable to accept the mass destruction criterion favoured by some.

The Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament continued its work under the wise guidance of Ambassador García Robles on the basis of the heavily bracketed text which emerged from last year's exercise. We have noted the progress made in drafting agreed language in several paragraphs this spring. It goes without saying that the Programme has to be seen as an integral whole. Wide differences remain on a number of crucial issues - the primary importance to be attached to nuclear disarmament, to name just one. The new text on principles which was presented to the Committee at its last meeting will need careful scrutiny. On this section, as on others, our foremost consideration will be that the CPD should not detract from the priorities and principles established in the Final Document, and should take due account of developments since then.

Our discussions on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference have been timely in view of the upcoming SSOD-III, whose agenda includes a review of the United Nations role in disarmament matters. The reports of the Group of Seven which has been meeting since last year under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Fan of China have provided us with a wealth of ideas and suggestions in this regard.

My delegation believes that the present structure and procedures of the Conference are essentially sound. The lack of progress on specific items of our agenda is not due to any flaws in our methods of work but to a lack of political will. We do not believe in change for the sake of change, but would

(The President)

be prepared to support it if the need is clearly established. We do however welcome the present debate on this question as we feel that review of our working methods, like that of any other organization, should be a continual process.

Proposals for increasing the duration of the session reflect a desire to speed up the work of the CD on items on which negotiations are in progress. The existing rules of procedure which provide for special sessions and for subsidiary bodies to meet between sessions already possess the necessary flexibility. The inter-sessional meetings of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons are a case in point. The suggestion of holding 5 five-week sessions spread out over the year would have the advantage of giving us intervals for preparing positions and proposals, but would this gain not be largely neutralized by the repeated interruptions caused in our work by frequent recesses? We also have to bear in mind that our sessions have to be dovetailed with those of the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee in New York.

We support the early expansion of the CD by four members as was decided in 1983. However, nothing should be done to disturb the delicate political balance which is one of the essential prerequisites for the effective functioning of our Conference.

Proposals have been made by several delegations for a review of our agenda in the light of new developments. We welcome the suggestions for an expanded agenda, and at the appropriate time would like to place before the Conference our own ideas on the additions that could be made. The agenda has already been expanded by three items since 1979. Further insertions will no doubt be made as more items suitable for multilateral negotiation are identified. We would not, however, favour the deletion of an item simply on the ground that little or no progress has taken place on it. If this criterion were to be applied, the first item to be dropped would be the nuclear test ban - something that I believe none of us would want.

Let me conclude by saying that our present procedures have served us well. They are not in need of any radical restructuring, and they have the requisite measure of flexibility to cope with the demands of our tasks.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Zaire, Mr. Monshemvula Omvuane.

Mr. MONSHEMVULA (Zaire) (translated from French): Mr. President, since I am taking the floor for the first time at this session of the Conference, allow me on behalf of my delegation and on my own behalf to extend to you my gratitude for the way in which you have guided our work with authority and skill during this month which has practically ended. Allow me also to congratulate your predecessors in the Chair for the months of February and March. Their Excellencies Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic and Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, who placed all their experience and ability at the service of the Conference.

(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

I would also like to take this opportunity to extend the congratulations of the delegation of Zaire to his Excellency Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to His Excellency Ambassador Berasategui, his deputy, for their very difficult and inspiring task in the Conference. It is also a pleasure for me to welcome the newly arrived Ambassadors to the Conference, particularly Ambassadors Solesby of the United Kingdom, Marchand of Canada, Azikiwe of Nigeria, Elaraby of Egypt, de Azambuja of Brazil, Sujka of Poland and Nasser of Iran.

Finally I would like to pay tribute to the memory of Ambassador Cromartie, whose death has been sorely felt by the members of the Conference, who remember him as a model diplomat who worked in the conference with skill, eloquence and devotion.

At the time when the work of the spring session of our Conference is coming to an end and on the eve of the third special session of the United Nations, the delegation of the Republic of Zaire wishes to associate itself with previous speakers in expressing its views on the various items on the agenda of the Conference and contributing to the search for solutions to the problems of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Among the tasks entrusted to the Conference, nuclear issues hold the highest priority in the view of my delegation, and indeed that of all the members of the conference. It is disappointing to see that in the 10 years since the adoption of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, a document which was quite rightly called a charter for world disarmament, no ad hoc committee, that is to say no agreement has been reached under the three questions on the agenda concerning nuclear issues, whether it be the nuclear test ban, the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament or prevention of the nuclear arms race, including all related matters. My delegation considers that all the groups should reach agreement on the establishment of ad hoc committees with negotiating mandates with a view to achieving agreements accompanied by effective verification measures throughout the world. These issues, which are of vital importance and pose a real threat to the very survival of the whole of mankind, should be given priority treatment in the work of the Conference. The tendency for one group to subordinate them to the negotiations between the two major Powers only holds up our work.

Of course we welcomed with great satisfaction the progress made in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR, which some describe as "constructive parallelism", but nevertheless, in the view of most of the members of the Conference, these negotiations should be interlinked with those we are conducting in this Conference, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, as laid down in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. Today, we are absolutely certain in view of the existence of nuclear weapons that the question of strengthening peace and security is a matter for all nations taken together; true security thus becomes universal;

(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

it is no longer a matter for the nuclear Powers, but a matter for all nations large and small. In this area we must learn the lessons of the Chernobyl accident. Since that accident the world has become more aware of the danger threatening it, because even if there is no nuclear war an accident can wipe out a part of mankind through human weakness.

My delegation is in favour of setting up an international seismological verification and monitoring system in connection with a complete ban on nuclear tests. The signing in Washington last December between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan of the INF Treaty, incorporating a verification régime, opens up a new era in eliminating nuclear weapons. This very historic and unprecedented event should lead the Governments of the nuclear weapon States to give specific instructions to their respective delegations participating in our work to work more positively.

In our work the Conference, which is the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, should take account of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations giving the Conference certain specific tasks. It is true that the Conference works independently and takes its decisions by consensus, but the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly with an overwhelming majority in most cases reflect the major concern of the international community. We demand the cessation of nuclear tests, as in fact United Nations General Assembly resolution 42/26, adopted last year, recommends.

We also express the hope that the prospect of a treaty between the two super-Powers on reducing strategic arsenals by as much as 50 per cent will soon come about. The same is true for the continuation of negotiations on space weapons.

To build confidence, we encourage joint efforts at the regional level, such as the creation of zones of peace, denuclearized zones, the results of the Stockholm Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Vienna conference on the reduction of conventional weapons. With respect to my own continent, Africa, as long as the international community as a whole does not implement the resolutions on the denuclearization of Africa as well as the resolution concerning the nuclear capability of South Africa, this continent will remain in perpetual danger. We therefore appeal to the nuclear-weapon States which are helping South Africa to arm itself with nuclear weapons to stop doing so in order to save the continent from the possibility of a nuclear war whose disastrous consequences might reach other horizons. In other words, we are seeking the application by those States of the provisions of United Nations General Assembly resolutions 42/34 A and B.

All the nuclear Powers without exception should adopt a firm commitment not to use nuclear weapons and not to facilitate their proliferation.

On item 5 of the agenda, my delegation is of the opinion that outer space, which is the common heritage of mankind, should be reserved for exploration and exploitation for peaceful purposes alone. The legal régime at present governing space activities should be adapted, taking into account the

(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

astonishing progress in space technology. It would be highly desirable for the 1966 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, to be amended by an additional protocol.

In this sphere of outer space it is necessary to arrive at a ban on anti-satellite weapons, the declaration of a moratorium concerning these arms, the adoption of a code of conduct governing the placing of space objects, the strengthening of the Convention on the registration of space objects and an exchange of information on space activities.

As to the convention on chemical weapons, work on which is far advanced in the Conference, we would like the States which possess chemical weapons to show sufficient political will to settle the no less important questions still pending, for example the questions covered by article VI of the draft convention, to enable the Conference to present this draft to the United Nations General Assembly.

The violation of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 through the increasingly intensive use of chemical weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq is a further argument in favour of concluding the convention on chemical weapons, which will complement the provisions of the Protocol, as soon as possible. Several Ministers for Foreign Affairs who have taken the floor before our Conference have expressed their concern on this subject. The Conference would be taking a great step forward in its work if it succeeded this year in submitting the draft convention on chemical weapons and the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

For the first time in its history, the Conference has been honoured by the presence of an impressive number of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, who have come to speak about disarmament; this testifies to the importance they attach to our work and the importance of the special reports which are to be presented to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The third special session will take stock of our work on the basis of the list of 10 points to be examined by the Conference. In 10 years the Conference has not yet concluded any agreement, and has not even been able to exhaust its 10-point agenda. The third special session will have to take stock and decide on new directions through innovating measures. It will also focus its attention on strengthening the effective functioning of the work of the Conference. Among the questions not examined by the Conference which will be discussed during the third special session, my delegation would like to lay particular stress on the relationship between disarmament and development. We believe that these questions are closely linked. Thousands and thousands of scientists throughout the world are wasting their energy in the service of the arms build-up, billions of American dollars spent every year on weapons research whereas mankind needs this money for its economic, cultural, humanitarian, social and scientific advancement. Hence the disarmament/development formula should be linked with the new international economic order, the problem of third world debt, the problem of the interdependence of peoples in the age of the technological miracle.

(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

The world exists in order to provide the living and future generations with happiness and well-being, and not to disappear for ever under the impact of sophisticated weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Zaire for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela, who will introduce the report of that Committee contained in document CD/833.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, first of all, I would like to convey the satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you preside over the work of our Conference for this month and for the inter-sessional period. We wish you every success and assure you of our full co-operation.

I am taking the floor on this occasion in order to introduce to the Conference the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, which I have the honour of chairing at this session. This report has been circulated in document CD/833 and is in the hands of delegations.

The report of the Committee, which will form part of the report that the Conference will submit to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament, covers the work of the Committee from its creation in 1985 to the present. During this time the Committee has worked actively, and at this point I must mention and pay tribute to its former chairmen for the excellent work accomplished by my predecessors as Chairman of the Committee, Ambassadors Alfarargi of Egypt, Bayart of Mongolia and Pugliese of Italy.

In the three and a half years of its existence, the Committee, in carrying out the tasks set out in its mandate, has devoted itself to consideration of the following subjects: issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space; existing agreements; and existing proposals and future initiatives.

The substantive part of the report gives an account of the consideration of these subjects and sets out the different positions of the delegations in this regard. The deliberations were lively, and ideas and proposals were put forward by various delegations which contributed thereby to thorough examination of item 5 on the agenda of the Conference. They were also useful in highlighting the difficulties posed by the problems related to prevention of an arms race in outer space.

I believe it is appropriate to point out that one of the innovations before this special Assembly will be this very report. As you will recall, the substantive work of the Conference on the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space began in 1985, that is to say after the second special Assembly devoted to disarmament. For the first time, therefore, the Assembly will receive an input from the Conference on this crucial issue.

(Mr. Taylhardat, (Venezuela))

If account is taken of the relatively short time the Conference has spent on examining the subject, it must be concluded that although concrete results have not as yet been reached, the balance of the discussions and deliberations of the Conference is clearly positive.

There is no doubt that significant progress has been made in the multilateral consideration of the subject. In this connection it should be emphasized that the conclusion of the report reflects the consensus attained on important points. There is general recognition of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space, and a desire to contribute to achieving that common objective. It is also stated that the work carried out by the Committee since its establishment has helped make progress towards the accomplishment of its task. The Committee advanced and developed further the examination and identification of the various issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The discussions contributed to better understanding of the problems and the various positions. It was recognized that the legal régime applicable to outer space does not by itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There was recognition of the significant role that the legal régime applicable to outer space plays in the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the need to consolidate and reinforce it and enhance its effectiveness, and of the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral.

In the course of the deliberations, the common interest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes was acknowledged. In this context emphasis was placed on the importance of paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which provided that "in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies." Lastly, the report states that preliminary consideration was given to a number of proposals and initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and ensuring that its exploration and use will be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes in the common interest and for the benefit of all mankind.

I would not wish to conclude the presentation of the report without expressing my appreciation to all the delegations for the valuable contributions they have made and for the flexibility and spirit of co-operation they have showed and for the support they gave me in efforts to overcome differences of opinion with regard to certain points, enabling us to reach the present results, which will now be presented to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament. In particular, it is my duty to express my gratitude to the group co-ordinators for the extensive support they offered me at all times. I would also like to express my thanks to the Secretary of the Committee, Mrs. Aida Levin, as well as her colleagues and all the Conference officials who, directly or indirectly, participated in the work of the Ad hoc Committee and who contributed to its activities.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for introducing the report of the Committee, and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Mrs González, who will introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, as contained in document CD/832, on behalf of its Chairman.

Mrs. GONZALEZ (Mexico) (translated from Spanish):
Ambassador García Robles, who had to leave Geneva because he is the Chairman to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies that is now meeting in New York, has asked me to make this statement, the purpose of which is to introduce to the Conference on Disarmament the special report that the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has prepared for transmittal to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament, in accordance with the recommendation made by the Preparatory Committee for the session.

The first three pages of the report contain a compact summary of the negotiations on this issue that have taken place since the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which, as you know, was held in 1982. Although progress has been made towards harmonizing positions, points of disagreement nevertheless remain on numerous questions, as is reflected in the draft annexed to the report.

Obviously this absence of the total agreement that was being sought cannot be attributed to a lack of hard work or ability on the part of the members of the Committee. The same may be said of the secretariat, whose members, both visible and invisible, made a valuable contribution, with Miss Aida Levin, who acted as our Secretary, playing a particularly outstanding role. Finally I wish to place on record the names of those who served as the co-ordinators of the contact groups - Mr. Fernando Moura Fagundes of Brazil, Mr. Hubert Reniéx of France, Mr. Johan Molander of Sweden, Mr. Rakesh Sood of India, Mrs. Zadalinda González of Mexico, Mr. Adorni Braccési of Italy, Mr. Lkhagvajav of Mongolia, Miss Martine Letts of Australia, Mr. Radoslav Deyanov of Bulgaria and Mr. Sten Lundbo of Norway.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for her statement.

As agreed at our last plenary meeting, I intend to put before the Conference for adoption the report of both the ad hoc committees, as well as that of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, at our plenary meeting tomorrow, before the adoption of the special report of the Conference to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

I have no other speakers on the list for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

Before turning to other business on our agenda, I would like to take a few moments of your time and discharge my pleasant duty to welcome in our midst Ambassador Wisber Loeis, Permanent Representative and representative to the Conference on Disarmament of Indonesia.

(The President)

I should now like to put before the Conference for decision the opening date for the second part of the 1988 session. After consultations with the co-ordinators, it is proposed that we resume work on Thursday 7 July 1988 with our regular plenary meeting, on the understanding that on Wednesday, 6 July there will be group consultations in the morning and that, in the afternoon, the incoming President will hold his first meeting with group co-ordinators and that there will be informal consultations of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In that connection, the secretariat has circulated today a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference during that week. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference agrees to this timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As there is no other business for this plenary meeting, I intend to adjourn it now and to convene, in five minutes' time, an informal meeting of the Conference to proceed to the second reading of the substantive paragraphs of the draft special report to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Friday 29 April at 5 p.m.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.462
29 April 1988

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 29 April 1988, at 5 p.m.

President: Mr. Dávid Meiszter (Hungary)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 462nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference is to consider and adopt today the reports of subsidiary bodies, as well as the special report to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any other subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As announced at our plenary meeting yesterday, the Conference will take up first for adoption the reports of the ad hoc committees on chemical weapons, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

I now turn to document CD/831, containing the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In that connection, I should like to note that on page 104, in the section entitled "Principles and order of the destruction of chemical weapons", in paragraph 1, penultimate line, the words "or size" have been omitted between the words "composition" and "of the stockpiles". The last two lines should read as follows:

"... and applicability irrespective of the actual composition or size of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the destruction of the chemical weapons."

The secretariat will issue an appropriate corrigendum in the various languages in which this omission occurred. On this understanding and with the addition that I have just read, I suggest that the Conference adopt the report of the Ad hoc Committee, as contained in CD/831.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now turn to document CD/832, containing the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next document is CD/833, containing the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: May I extend to the chairmen of the ad hoc committees, Ambassadors Bogumil Sujka of Poland, Alfonso García Robles of Mexico and Adolfo Taylhardat of Venezuela, our congratulations on the successful conclusion of the reports of their subsidiary bodies, which will become,

(The President)

together with the reports of the other ad hoc committees, an integral part of the special report to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Before we proceed further, I should like to ask whether any member wishes to make a statement in connection with the reports of the ad hoc committees which we have just adopted. I see none.

I should like now to turn to the draft special report of the Conference to the third special session, as contained in document CD/WP.336/Rev.1. The document circulated by the secretariat contains the technical parts of the special report, as well as the substantive paragraphs under those agenda items on which no subsidiary bodies were established. The reports of the ad hoc committees will be included in the text once it is adopted by the Conference and issued as an official document.

Before we proceed to the adoption of document CD/WP.336/Rev.1, I should like to ask whether any member wishes to make a statement. If there are no speakers, I shall now put before the Conference for adoption the special report of the Conference to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as appearing in document CD/WP.336/Rev.1. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the special report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should like now to offer the floor to any member wishing to speak after the adoption of the special report. I see none.

As there is no other business for this plenary meeting, may I now make my concluding statement as President of the Conference?

The first part of the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament is drawing to its close. This may be the moment for me to take stock. The month of April 1988 - in terms of the Conference on Disarmament - happens to be a special one in the series of Aprils due to the forthcoming third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I happened to assume the presidency in this very month due to the established rule of rotation of this office, but I found myself in the privileged position of presiding over the proceedings of this body when the work of the years which have elapsed since the second special session was to be summed up. On this occasion I feel it appropriate to express the gratitude of the Conference to all those who have contributed in good faith to the work of this body either in their capacity as presiding officers or as government representatives.

As I look back on my own term, I take satisfaction in reflecting that it has been eventful, indeed interesting and instructive for me. I have tried my best to facilitate progress on priority items of our agenda such as the nuclear test ban, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and prevention of nuclear war including all related matters. Much to my

(The President)

regret, differences of position still prevailing on these issues have again made it impossible to set up the appropriate subsidiary bodies and start laying the foundation for substantive work in the future.

The Conference on Disarmament, however, has successfully accomplished its task of preparing and adopting its special report to the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In the course of this plenary meeting we have just concluded that process.

The special report carries our assessment of the work done since 1982, the results achieved, the tasks yet to be carried out as well as the differences still prevailing. This applies in various degrees to all subjects appearing in the report: to the substantive paragraphs on the nuclear items and the reports of the subsidiary bodies alike. The long and occasionally constructive debate on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament has brought to the surface forward-looking ideas and suggestions concerning several aspects of its functioning.

The third special session will look into the special report and analyse our achievements and failures, most probably with a measure of criticism on several points. I do hope, however, that the special session will make use of the practical experience gained in a decade of functioning of the Conference on Disarmament during the past years, in both substantive and also procedural aspects. That may be instrumental when drawing the necessary conclusions and establishing appropriate guidelines for our future, hopefully more fruitful work.

Before I come to the end of my remarks, I wish to assure all the participants around the table that I am carrying with me pleasant memories of my term as President for the month. The genuine good will and earnest co-operation displayed by every one of you made my task easier. This has been a month the memory of which I will long cherish. Permit me to conclude my closing remarks with the expression of my sincere gratitude to all of you for the help and advice, the spirit of assistance and co-operation that you all have shown towards me.

I would like, also on behalf of all the participants of the Conference, to express our gratitude to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, to the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, to all members of the secretariat, to the team of interpreters, translators and other conference services staff for their dedicated help, patience and understanding that we greatly needed on several occasions. Finally, I would like to wish bon voyage to those who will soon leave Geneva for New York or for their respective capitals, and hope to see all of you when we resume our work in July.

That concludes my statement. I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting and the first part of the 1988 session of the Conference.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.463
7 July 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 7 July 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Jaskaran Singh Teja (India)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 463rd plenary meeting and the second part of the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I should like to extend, on your behalf, a warm welcome to the new Ambassadors of Indonesia, Bulgaria, Kenya and Peru, Their Excellencies Wisber Loeis, Dimitar Kostov, Samuel S. Ruoro and Oswaldo de Rivero, and wish them successful work in the Conference. I would like also to assure them of the co-operation of the delegation of India.

I should especially like to welcome the presence in this Conference today of the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Jan Martenson, whom I have the pleasure and privilege of knowing for many years in the past.

In addition, I would like to extend best wishes to Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan and Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma, who are leaving for new assignments. Both Ambassador Ahmad and Ambassador Tin Tun have represented their countries, Pakistan and Burma, with dignity and efficiency and have enormously contributed to the work of the Conference. I am sure that every one of you has greatly appreciated the personal relations that both of them were able to establish with all members of the Conference.

On a personal note, since both Ambassadors happen to be from countries which are in the neighbourhood of India, I personally will be sorry to see both of them leave. With Ambassador Mansur Ahmad I have developed especially close working relations, both through membership of the Preparatory Committee for the special session on disarmament and through the fact that both of us come from the same part of the sub-continent, where we speak a language which is one of the most ancient languages of the sub-continent, so that we were able to converse with each other in complete confidence and privacy.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of Sweden. Before calling upon her, I should like to make a statement on my own behalf.

In assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July, I would first like to welcome you back to the Council Chamber after a gap of two months. I feel honoured to have the opportunity to preside over the work of this august body. It is only natural that in this capacity I will rely on the co-operation and assistance of every delegation in order to accomplish the task before us.

At the outset, let me express my appreciation to the distinguished representative of Hungary, Ambassador Dávid Meiszter, for the effective manner in which he has performed the duties of the presidency during the last three months. I shall try my best to build upon the achievements of Ambassador Meiszter, and also of his distinguished predecessors, Ambassador Joachim von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany and Ambassador Harald Rose of the German Democratic Republic.

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I look forward with pleasure to working closely with Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, his colleague Ambassador Berasategui and members of the staff.

As this is the first meeting of the month of July, I would like to take this opportunity to make a brief statement.

We are approaching the final decade of the present century - a time span that has been most dramatic in human history. The twentieth century has enriched human life with unprecedented progress in science, technology, health, education and the means of communication. It has also suffered the scourge of two world wars. But most important, it has led us into the nuclear age with all its perils for destruction as well as potential for peaceful exploitation. We came to terms long ago with the individual mortality of man; now we are faced with self-inflicted collective mortality of mankind. This dilemma can be resolved only through maturity, wisdom and a new vision of co-operative action.

Scientific and technological developments have brought out one incontrovertible fact - the interdependent nature of life on this planet. Not only has the world shrunk to a global village but the multi-dimensional nature of peace, prosperity and security has become more evident. This reality must be accepted. Only then can we develop a new thinking.

Last month the General Assembly concluded its third special session devoted to disarmament. The session was convened as a response to the growing desire that more had to be done in the sphere of multilateral disarmament since the first SSOD, especially against the background of improved East-West relations. All of us would no doubt make our own assessment of the outcome of SSOD-III. But it can be said as a reflection of a broadly-shared assessment that this special event in disarmament efforts went some way in registering the concerns of the international community on the burning issues of the day. Many of us would have liked to see more concrete results, especially when there was such a wide area of agreement on the common objectives, as reflected in the public statements in the General Assembly.

Without going into any detailed analysis, it needs to be said that the special session on disarmament was neither a failure nor a setback for multilateralism. There were no winners and losers; perhaps a temporary stand-off. And yet, despite the lack of a document, certain positive aspects of the session are noteworthy. First, the very fact that the session was held as planned shows that multilateralism is very much alive; it cannot be otherwise in an increasingly interdependent world. Second, a genuine effort was made to reach compromises; there were no confrontations. Third, the mood at the session was forward-looking but not unmindful of the enormous difficulties that still remain. Fourth, there was broad recognition that the Final Document of 1978 signified a historic consensus. Fifth, the presence of world leaders - 23 Heads of State or Government, 7 Vice-Presidents or Deputy Prime Ministers and 61 Foreign Ministers - was a testimony to the seriousness

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of purpose with which the international community approaches the problems of armament and disarmament. Finally, one should look at disarmament - nuclear, chemical, conventional and collateral measures as an integrated and continuing process in which nations attempt to tackle the most serious problems of global security and development through collective measures.

Our task as negotiators, therefore, boils down to bridging the gap in our different, if deeply-held, convictions. Admittedly, the slow but by no means insignificant progress achieved in disarmament since the founding of the United Nations is a constant reminder that our task is too important to be left to the whims and fancies of the passing moment, even when the going gets rough. I do believe that a new window of opportunity is opening before us as a result of the new developments and trends and new thinking. It is now up to us to seize this occasion by developing new ideas for tackling old problems.

Many ideas were suggested at the special session. My country submitted an Action Plan for a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world. It calls upon the international community to negotiate a binding commitment to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Plan covers not only nuclear weapons, but also other weapons of mass destruction. My country suggested steps to take the qualitative edge off the arms race, through greater openness and co-operation. With leaders of five other countries, we have projected the need for a single integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations framework. In our Plan, we have looked at it not as a bilateral issue, restricted only to the United States of America and the USSR, or even as a regional issue. We have looked at it in global terms and tried to evolve a multilateral strategy.

Today, there is new hope for peace. The ratification of the INF Treaty between the United States and the USSR has been welcomed as the first important step in the right direction. We hope that there will soon be an agreement between these two countries to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals by 50 per cent. These are positive developments, but their impact can be greatly multiplied when translated into the multilateral field. Bilateralism and multilateralism should be seen as mutually supportive and reinforcing.

India has been a member of this august multilateral body since 1962, when the ENDC came into being. Our commitment to disarmament arises out of our faith in "ahimsa" or non-violence, which guided our struggle for independence. As the sole international body for multilateral disarmament negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament enjoys a unique position. Successful negotiations require a spirit of mutual accommodation, and mutual accommodation, in turn, requires better understanding. We have to develop a clear perspective, for only then can we reflect our commitment to the goal of collective security in our day-to-day negotiations within this Conference.

Subsidiary bodies set up on particular items of our agenda are in the process of accomplishing their task. It is of paramount importance that the Ad hoc Committees on such items achieve progress in their substantive work. In at least two of these, viz. Chemical Weapons and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, there has been a very clear commitment to bring the

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negotiations to an early successful conclusion. I would also like to state that I will continue to make efforts on the priority issues relating to nuclear disarmament. Consultations will also be intensified in order to find an appropriate organizational framework to deal with substantive work relating to nuclear test ban, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war.

I feel confident that in laying the foundations for substantive and structured work during the summer session, I will be able to count on your goodwill and co-operation.

Before giving the floor to the representative of Sweden, I should like to welcome again among us Mrs. Maj Britt Theorin. You have the floor, Madam.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): May I welcome you, Ambassador Teja, to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Aware of the difficult task lying ahead for the President this first month after the conclusion of the third special session on disarmament, we are confident that your well-known diplomatic skills and long experience will help you to give the Conference the necessary direction and momentum to do its work. I would also like to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary, for his good work as President of the Conference during the month of April, and I would also like to direct a heartfelt welcome to Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Ruoro of Kenya and Ambassador de Rivero of Peru. As this is the last session of the Conference in which the delegation of Pakistan will be led by Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, I take this opportunity to thank him most warmly for his distinguished service in the cause of disarmament and wish him all the best for his future assignment. And as I have just now heard that Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma is leaving Geneva, my delegation thanks him for his good co-operation and wishes him all success in his future task.

Better to light one candle than curse the darkness, old wisdom says. Let us approach our task in this spirit.

As we gather here in Geneva for the 1988 summer session of the Conference on Disarmament, the outcome of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is inevitably foremost in our minds. Less than two weeks ago, the special session ended without reaching consensus on a concluding document. How are we to assess this situation?

At this historical juncture, when the super-Powers had just ratified a bilateral treaty on the elimination of all their land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles and pledged to negotiate a 50 per cent reduction of their strategic nuclear weapons, there was a unique opportunity for the world community to articulate and to endorse a multilateral programme of disarmament for the years to come.

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In my delegation's view, an agreement at the special session was within reach. It would therefore have been natural to allot enough time to try to resolve the few issues that stood in the way of consensus, which of course also presupposed a genuine political will on the part of all concerned. It was therefore disconcerting that the United States chose not to agree to a reasonable extension of the time available for seeking to resolve a few issues standing in the way of consensus. I have, however, come to the conclusion that the political will to grant the international community a decisive influence on future disarmament efforts was missing. But the international community must not allow itself to be set aside in matters of crucial importance to all peoples and all States.

I venture to say that world opinion expected, and had every reason to expect, more. More determination, more endurance. World opinion will find it difficult to comprehend, and may not quietly accept, the fact that in the end we were not granted the opportunity to do our utmost to settle the outstanding issues.

There was no final consensus at the special session. But, this is not to say that there was no progress. In the context of elaborating a consensus document, tacit consent to any draft language is always conditional: nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. With this caveat, however, we may all be entitled to make tentative interpretations on the basis of emerging consensus language.

First of all, it has to be recognized that agreement was reached on a number of significant issues. Also, agreement was under way on several of the few remaining points. In the interest of arriving at consensus, important concessions were made. Many delegations manifested determination to reach agreement - and a readiness to pay a price for it by transcending national positions.

Let me first mention one question of particular importance to my Government, namely, verification and the role of the United Nations. A consensus emerged to request the Secretary-General to undertake an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. It is to be hoped that this will serve as a basis for pursuing the matter further in the General Assembly.

Let me continue by focusing on those positive developments at the special session which are of immediate importance to the Conference on Disarmament. Thus, it was reiterated that the Conference on Disarmament remains an indispensable forum and recommendations were made that the Conference intensify its work on various substantive items on its agenda. Significantly, in the proposals for a draft text, it was stressed that nuclear disarmament remains a priority objective and represents a central task of the international community. Also, in this context the importance of a cessation of nuclear testing was reaffirmed and the Conference on Disarmament was requested to intensify its consideration of this matter. In the process of consultations a consensus was emerging to the effect that the Conference on Disarmament be invited to continue to work towards solutions to the question

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of the prohibition of radiological weapons and of the prohibition of military attacks against nuclear facilities. Further, there was a tentative consensus to encourage all efforts on the part of all States, especially nuclear-weapon States, including those efforts aimed at further strengthening the non-proliferation régime and other measures to halt and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. An agreement was under way regarding the prevention of an arms race in outer space and on urging the Conference on Disarmament to continue its efforts in this area. Furthermore, it was urged at the special session that the Conference on Disarmament as a matter of continuing urgency should pursue its efforts to conclude a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

All this is encouraging. The work of the Conference on Disarmament received solid endorsement. However, as this judgement is entirely predicated upon the acceptance of a draft text which never materialized, I will not dwell on it further. But what conclusion do we now draw? Where do we go from here?

The answer is: On with our work. Let us waste no time on lament and apologetic oratory. It is imperative that we pursue vigorously our work in both the many areas of convergence as manifested during consultations at the special session and in the few, although in some cases difficult, other fields where such a consensus appeared to be more distant. I am reminded of a statement by Danilo Dolci, the Italian community organizer:

"There are moments when things go well and one feels encouraged. There are difficult moments and one feels overwhelmed. But it's senseless to speak of optimism or pessimism. The only important thing is to know that words don't move mountains. Work, exacting work, moves mountains."

The INF Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States, which eliminates all their land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles, is a breakthrough for nuclear disarmament. It raises great hopes and expectations. A little more than a month ago, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev exchanged the instruments of ratification of the treaty. The elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons has started. This ultimate confirmation of the treaty signed at the Washington summit last year was the climax of the fourth summit, in Moscow, between the leaders of the two super-Powers.

The United States and the Soviet Union are continuing their negotiations on a 50 per cent reduction of their strategic nuclear weapons. We know that these negotiations are technically difficult. We understand that a treaty must be carefully elaborated in order to facilitate ratification and avoid problems of implementation and compliance. Nevertheless, we urge the Soviet Union and the United States to accelerate these negotiations.

I am hopeful that these talks will result in an agreement in a relatively short period of time. Particularly encouraging in this regard I find the affirmation by Secretary of State George Shultz before the special session that this is the United States' top arms-limitation priority and his assurance

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that the two super-Powers will make their best efforts to conclude such a treaty this year. A treaty on a 50 per cent reduction of United States and Soviet strategic nuclear arms would be a highly significant disarmament measure. It would also confirm that a major political change had taken place in international relations. By concluding such a treaty, the two super-Powers would show the world that they have started to look for co-operative ways of building security rather than competing in an incessant arms race.

The Palme Commission coined the concept of common security, stating that a doctrine of common security must replace the present expedient of deterrence through armaments. International peace must rest on a commitment to common survival rather than on the threat of mutual destruction. In an era when humankind is threatened by total extinction through nuclear weapons, the idea of a war as a continuation of failed policies is no longer an option. The concept of common security provides a viable doctrine as an expression of the common dedication to survival amongst differing ideologies. The INF Treaty may be seen as a building-block towards common security. A treaty on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons would consolidate an emerging system of security through co-operation and disarmament.

While there has been reason for a certain optimism in some fields of disarmament, or at least a sense of growing expectations around ongoing or upcoming negotiations - such as START, chemical weapons and conventional disarmament in Europe - no such optimism or expectations mark the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban today. One of the most crucial tasks of disarmament has reached an impasse. And yet this is the most compelling task for the disarmament work. The need to arrive at a nuclear test ban is as urgent as ever. By the end of last year more than 1,600 nuclear test explosions had been carried out. And the testing continues. Last year all five of the nuclear-weapon States carried out such tests in spite of the long-standing opprobrium of the international community and in defiance of vigorous protests by neighbouring States. A variety of technical reasons and political excuses - reliability, safety, etc. - have been given by the nuclear-weapon States to justify the unjustifiable. But it is clear that nuclear testing is carried out for the main purpose of developing ever more efficient weapon designs. At the same time, the rest of the world - mortally threatened by these weapons - is being told that nuclear weapons are there only to deter, that they are never to be used. Still, they apparently need to be continuously refined, to be given ever more effective war-fighting capabilities. And so the qualitative arms race goes on - to no one's advantage.

It bears repeating that bilateral negotiations that only aim at regulating continued testing fail to meet the demands and expectations of virtually all States outside the nuclear club. Our demand is not that the nuclear-weapon States be able to verify each other's continued nuclear tests but that the international community be able to verify that no nuclear tests are conducted. It has been argued, by the present United States Administration, that a test ban would have to be subordinated to other, more

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urgent priorities, such as negotiating substantial reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals. Now that such substantial reductions, according to pronouncements by both sides, seem to be drawing closer, a test ban seems nevertheless to be as distant as ever.

It is imperative that multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban be accorded the highest priority. This is all the more necessary considering that, just as bilateral negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons certainly require time and care, a comprehensive test-ban treaty would call for extensive preparations as well.

A global network of seismic stations should be set up; it should be operationally tested and functioning, in preparation for a test-ban treaty. The Group of Scientific Experts has done valuable work in this field, but some additional work is required in order to have an international verification system operationally ready and functioning when a treaty enters into force.

It is essential to profit from collateral scientific and political breakthroughs in the area of verification. A construction exchange of views took place at the Six-Nation Initiative Conference on nuclear-test-ban monitoring in Linköping, Sweden, in May this year. At this Conference the necessity of adequate verification was stressed, and various methods, such as seismological monitoring, satellite verification and on-site inspection were discussed.

It is sad to have to conclude that the ongoing bilateral talks on nuclear testing cannot help advance the test-ban issue, except possibly by assisting the two parties in clarifying some of their verification concerns. However, the focus is apparently on verifying ongoing tests and their compliance with thresholds of limited significance to disarmament.

But it is not enough to agree on the ratification of a couple of rather meaningless threshold treaties. It is not acceptable to disregard calls for a multilateral test-ban treaty. It is dangerous to disregard the risks of a proliferation of nuclear weapons. The bilateral talks on nuclear testing must, if they are to become of real interest to the world community, aim at agreements to limit the yields and numbers of nuclear tests to a level of real military significance. And such agreements should constitute steps towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty at an early and specified date.

Let me here interject that the question of non-proliferation was focused upon last week, when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons celebrated its twentieth anniversary. In a joint statement issued on this anniversary, the Nordic Foreign Ministers called to mind the Treaty's significant contribution to international stability and security. It is a vital instrument to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and remains the most important arms-limitation agreement reached multilaterally so far.

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The work in the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons and on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities should continue towards a solution of the two issues under consideration. A military attack on a nuclear facility would lead to mass destruction and remains the only way to wage radiological warfare. It should be in the interests of all States to ban such attacks. We appeal to all participating States to do their utmost to make way for such an agreement, which would be of the greatest importance for the security of all States, those with nuclear installations as well as those without.

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has now been functioning since 1985. During this period the committee has regrettably reached only limited results. The discussions so far have contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions. Firstly, it has been generally recognized that activities in the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. Secondly, there has been a growing awareness of the need to consolidate and reinforce the existing legal régime for outer space. Thirdly, it has been confirmed by most delegations, including my own, that the overall objective of the work of the CD in this field should be the long-term goal of a complete prohibition of the development, testing, production and deployment of space weapons.

Pending the realization of that comprehensive objective, Sweden, as well as several other delegations, has stated that a most urgent partial measure could be a ban on anti-satellite weapons. In order to make further progress in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee there is an urgent need for some technical groundwork to be done. I want to take this opportunity to reiterate the Swedish proposal to organize within the Conference a governmental experts' meeting of limited duration to address, for example, definitions and verification techniques relevant to our common efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space.

The Conference on Disarmament has devoted a lot of time and made considerable joint effort towards concluding a convention on chemical weapons. We have cause for grave concern. At present chemical weapons are actually being used. Only last week the Secretary-General sent another mission of three experts to investigate the most recent allegations of the use of chemical weapons, a mission including as members, Ambassador Berasategui and Spanish and Swedish experts. The conclusions of the group are not yet known, but results of earlier investigations do not leave room for optimism. Sweden condemns the repeated use of chemical weapons, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. Tragedies like the one in Halabja must never be repeated.

Furthermore, there are indications that these weapons are spreading to additional national arsenals. And, as if this were not enough, it seems that chemical-weapon technology and chemical-warfare agents are being further developed and refined. These alarming indications underscore why we should all be guided by a sense of utmost urgency in our further negotiating

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efforts. These developments also show, with ample clarity, that a convention is not only urgent but that it needs to be universal and comprehensive in character. Partial or interim measures could seriously delay or hamper the conclusion of an all-encompassing convention. There are firm commitments by both the United States and the Soviet Union, inter alia at the latest summit meeting, to a global ban on chemical weapons. However, I have to state that there is, in these pronouncements at the highest level, an unfortunate absence of any firm wording that would help to speed up these negotiations and conclude them within a specified time. Experience of various multilateral negotiations has shown that such "deadlines" can be useful. They help to avoid diverting attention to detail in a way which could become more obstructive than constructive, and they invigorate the political process necessary for effective decisions.

In this connection, I wish to recall and express agreement with what was said a month ago by the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Genscher, who challenged the special session to bring its political weight fully to bear "so that the convention can be concluded before the end of the year". During the special session it transpired that there exists a general will to pursue negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban with urgency and determination. The Conference on Disarmament will have to continue its work in that spirit. My delegation is of course aware that a number of complicated drafting problems remain to be solved, and we have no reason whatever to belittle them. Sweden has, as you know, always paid particular attention to various aspects of verification. Having said this, I do insist that these remaining problems can be resolved if the goodwill persists.

One of these issues, that of the principles and order of destruction of chemical weapons, is unquestionably a serious one. I am, however, convinced that this issue can be solved along the lines already being elaborated in consultations with some of the delegations most directly concerned. Nor do I see any major problems which might prevent agreement on a sufficiently elaborated system to safeguard future non-production, or a mechanism for mandatory challenge inspections, or for that matter on an international organization to monitor the implementation of the convention.

Let us all combine our efforts to conclude this work as soon as possible. It would not just be an important disarmament agreement, which should improve security for all. It would also be a much-needed triumph for multilateral disarmament diplomacy, for this negotiating body and for the delegations participating here.

Time is not on our side, neither in the case of chemical weapons, nor indeed of any other issue I have dwelt upon here. The Conference on Disarmament has to push on with its work. As was remarked by Danilo Dolci: Words don't move mountains. Work, exacting work, moves mountains.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the President. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor?

I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your recognition. I take the floor to voice an objection to and a rejection of the premise of the distinguished Ambassador from Sweden with her criticism of the United States, and her attacks on the United States, regarding the recently completed SSOD-III. I do not believe anyone attending the final days and hours of the session in New York can fault the United States for its dedication to trying to seek consensus on a document. As those of you who are here today and were in New York will recall, the United States had at the highest level during the final hours of the session, Ambassador Hansen from Washington, and our United Nations Ambassador, Vernon Walters, was on hand throughout the night in an effort to try to reach a consensus. And I think you will all recall that the United States agreed, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ahmad, to stop the clock at midnight and continue an overtime session, which we participated in as intensely as possible. As you know, we worked throughout the night. The Swedish Ambassador made no mention whatsoever of the serious problems other delegations had with the final document, including wording that was objectionable to some delegations involving the naming of a certain Middle Eastern country and a South African country. She made no mention whatsoever of the problems other delegations had with the proliferation issue and the conventional arms section. She chose to single out the United States as the provocateur and the reason for all its failure. As General Walters said in the final Committee of the Whole session, there were severe obstacles involving national security and policy that could not be compromised and would not be compromised. But to accuse the United States of blame for failure of SSOD-III, with 159 nations involved with varying perspectives bearing on regional and national interests and concerns, is not only inaccurate, it is highly offensive and deeply insulting to my delegation for the effort my Government made at SSOD-III. The United States record on disarmament is very clear. We have worked very hard these past two years to conclude an INF treaty with the Soviet Union, which has been signed. We are working diligently on a START pact, and also here in Geneva on test-ban verification and chemical weapons, and we simply cannot accept the criticism by the Ambassador from Sweden of the United States record in the area of disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I give the floor to the representative of Sweden.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): I listened with great attention to the statement by the Ambassador of the United States, and my only comment on what was said by my distinguished colleague should perhaps be that the facts as presented in my statement speak for themselves. During this historic event, when it was clear that there was hard work going on in the last hours, as it usually does in international conferences - it is always in the last hours that you solve

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the problems, and I would say everyone had done their utmost up till then - it would then have been natural to allot enough time. My experience from the conference in Stockholm, where we stopped the clocks, was that we could have made it up with some more hours to help us. May I just repeat myself? It would have been natural to allot enough time to try to resolve the few issues that stood in the way of consensus, which of course, also presupposed a general political will on the part of all concerned, and the reason why I was disconcerted was, of course, that the United States chose not to agree to a reasonable extension of the time available for seeking to resolve a few issues. Another thing is how to interpret the facts, and there I can only note that there is a difference between me and Ambassador Friedersdorf. I hope, however, that we will agree on the rest of my speech, that it is now time for us to go on and all together work hard to solve the problems which this Conference has to solve.

The PRESIDENT: I now call upon the distinguished representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. President, it is a matter of particular pleasure for me to see you in the Chair. As you said, you and I come from the same region - and I might add, the best region in that part of the world - and I say so without fear of contradiction, because both your aide and mine also come from that region.

You, Mr. President, represent a country which is a great neighbour of Pakistan, and you have been a good friend and a most helpful colleague. I have no doubt that you will conduct the work of this Conference during this month with great distinction. May I also welcome our new colleagues in the Conference - I have already had the pleasure and the privilege of working closely with them, and I am sure that they will make their mark on the work in the Conference.

This is my last appearance in the Conference, and I have been very greatly touched by the very kind things that my colleagues have said here and in New York about me. I can only attribute them to their unlimited generosity and to the feelings of friendship that they have for me. As I leave Geneva, I would also like to place on record my own feelings of gratitude and great appreciation for the friendship and the help that I have received from my colleagues here, and I say this because the last few months of my association with the CD have been very intensive, and they have produced the kind of co-operation that perhaps in other multilateral forums has probably not been seen. May I also place on record my debt of gratitude to Mr. Komatina, our Secretary-General, who has been a guide and a friend, and I have always benefited from my conversations with him, and his advice on important issues has always been timely and constructive, and I extend to him my very grateful thanks, and also to his very able team.

I leave Geneva after a stay of seven and a half years. In addition to my other responsibilities here, this is also the period during which I was associated with the Conference on Disarmament, and for me this period has been one of learning, of developing greater understanding of disarmament issues,

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which, we all know, are highly complex. It has also been a period during which I have made many many friends, and I have no doubt that these friendships, which made work in the CD so very pleasant, will endure. I also have no doubt that given the nature of our careers, our paths will cross again, to which I certainly will look forward with much pleasure.

Not many who have worked in the CD have had the honour of rotating around this rectangular table fully. In fact, when I started in January 1981 I was four seats there to my left. But this has enabled me to admire this Chamber from all aspects, and I have looked at and pondered over José Maria Sert's depiction of the invention of the first machine, the evolution of slavery, scientific progress, and the result of war - death and destruction for both the victors and the vanquished - and finally, his hope for a world without war. I have reason to believe that these thoughts will continue to inspire this Conference.

Reference has been made to SSOD-III. I cannot hide my feelings of disappointment at our inability to produce a concluding document for the session, but I am quite certain that the very sincere and very determined efforts that were made by all delegations will not have been in vain. As Ambassador Theorin pointed out in her speech, SSOD-III produced a greater degree of convergence on a wide variety of important issues than one could have anticipated. And I am convinced that these convergences, which are both of conception and of approach, will have a salutary influence on the disarmament process. And may I take this opportunity to place on record once again my gratitude and appreciation for the ungrudging co-operation and unfailing courtesy which was extended to me by everyone during SSOD-III. I thank you, Mr. President, and all my colleagues once again for your friendship, which I will always treasure.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Mansur Ahmad for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. If there are no other speakers, I would like to make a brief statement.

I would like to inform you that I have requested the Secretariat to circulate today working paper CD/WP.343 containing the draft programme of work, which we might be able to discuss again on Thursday, 14 July, at an informal meeting, in accordance with rule 28 of the rules of procedure, and hope to adopt at a resumed plenary the same day.

As you will see, the text does not need any detailed explanation. The allocation of time for items on the agenda follows closely those agreed upon at previous sessions and the order for the consideration of items is the same as for the first part of the annual session. I had, of course, to take into consideration the shorter duration of the session in establishing the necessary balance. You will note, for example, that all substantive items have one week, except for Negative security assurances and Radiological weapons, which have one week between them. This programme of work assumes that the closing date will be 15 September, with one day in reserve in case of difficulties with the report writing. The relatively short period after the

(The President)

special report to the special session will lead us, I suppose, to a shorter report for the second part of the session. In this context it might be advisable to take together the question of the precise closing date.

The target date for the conclusion of work of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies has been set for 5 September, although in some cases we can expect work to continue in the event that there are possibilities for further progress on specific issues. As the United Nations is still confronting a financial emergency, every effort should be made to conclude the work of the subsidiary bodies by the specified date.

I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 12 July.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose, at 11.10 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.464

12 July 1988
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 12 July 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Jaskaran Singh Teja (India)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 464th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Today we are circulating a message from the External Affairs Minister of India, Mr. Narasimha Rao, on the occasion of India's assumption of the presidency of the CD for the month of July.

"On the occasion of India's assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, an honour for my country, I send my greetings and good wishes to this distinguished body.

"As the sole international body for multilateral disarmament negotiations, the importance of the work of the Conference on Disarmament cannot be over-emphasized. The items on the agenda of this unique forum encompass some of the most vital issues in the field of disarmament. As such, they are of concern to all nations and people all over the world. It is, therefore, incumbent upon this august body to show results in the discharge of its heavy responsibilities.

"The third special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament was convened in response to the growing concern in the international community that not enough had been done to realize the farsighted vision embodied in the Final Document of the first special session of 1978. Despite the fact that there was a historic consensus at that special session on the goals as well as the course of action to be followed, implementation of its Programme of Action remains tardy. Like so many other countries, we too are disappointed at the lack of concrete results at the third special session. All the same, we value the exchange of opinions that took place. The fact that a large number of leaders from all over the globe chose to personally participate in it clearly shows that disarmament is of global concern. The active involvement of more than 500 non-governmental organizations further underlined the concern of people all over the world.

"At the special session, India submitted an action plan for a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order. The plan calls for negotiations towards a binding commitment for elimination of all nuclear weapons by 2010 A.D. It covers not only nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction but also conventional arms, space weapon systems and various collateral measures which can facilitate the process of nuclear disarmament. It includes steps to take the qualitative edge off the arms race through greater openness and co-operation. Together with leaders of five other countries, we have projected the need for an integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations framework. The action plan provides for this as part of a comprehensive global security system required to manage and sustain a nuclear-weapon-free world. The plan is not intended to be the last word on the subject. It has been offered as a basis for negotiations. We hope that the Conference on Disarmament would consider it so.

(The President)

"We are approaching the final decade of the present century. Political thinking has not been able to keep pace with the technological changes in the military field in our times. A return to basics is perhaps called for if we are to break out of the stranglehold of previously-held positions. The mandate of the Conference on Disarmament symbolizes the yearnings of people all over the globe. It is imperative for it to accelerate the pace of advance. I would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm India's commitment to that end.

"In this spirit, I wish the participants in the Conference success in their endeavours".

I have on the list of speakers for today the distinguished representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I give the floor to the first speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador Pierre Morel.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): I should first of all like to express my delegation's satisfaction on seeing you take over the presidency of this Conference on Disarmament for the month of July, at a time when we have to quickly resume our work and set it on as concrete a course as possible. Your experience, your authority and your determination will be necessary to us. My delegation will give you its full support and will, of course, read with attention and interest the message from Mr. Rao, the Minister for External Affairs of India.

I should also like to welcome Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Ruoro of Kenya and Ambassador de Rivero of Peru. At the same time, I should like to say a word of farewell to Ambassador Ahmad from Pakistan, our second most senior member, if I may put it like that, and Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma. Both brought a personal touch to the work of the Conference.

Furthermore, how could we not pay tribute on this occasion to the outstanding work done by Ambassador Ahmad as Chairman of the Plenary Committee at the third special session on disarmament in the United Nations.

Today, as we start our work, I should like to take stock after the both stimulating and disappointing experience which we had at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Personally, I have two points to make which might help us with our work in Geneva: first, although the lesson was a hard one, it will no doubt prove salutary; and second, the absence of any final result did not wipe out the progress which was made and which will be very useful for further work on disarmament.

The lesson was certainly a hard one for the United Nations and for multilateral disarmament. This is not, of course, the moment to waste time on regrets, even though each of us comes back from New York with the feeling of

(Mr. Morel, France)

having missed an opportunity. Life goes on, and here in Geneva we have a specific agenda, so we should devote ourselves to useful discussion with a view to organizing the future better.

We should start by comparing the results of the last two sessions, which both were much below the results of the first session, to say the least.

The relative failure of the second special session in 1982 was due to specific causes, which in retrospect can explain the fact that the international community took the blow without too much damage. The political situation was unfavourable, and we were probably over-ambitious, barely four years after the opening session in 1978, which in any case could not be repeated exactly. This set-back was not truly a surprise, and the image of the United Nations did not really suffer.

The outlook this year was much more favourable: the satisfaction with the Washington Treaty, to which most speakers in the general debate referred, the consequent expectation of new opportunities for multilateral disarmament, the emergence of new themes to mobilize opinion, the spirit of openness and moderation which was perceptible in the approach of most delegations - everything, or almost everything, seemed to be leading to a balanced document which would set the seal on the achievements of the past ten years.

But the atmosphere cannot do everything. The undeniable improvement in the international situation, and in particular in Soviet-United States relations, does not necessarily guarantee success at the United Nations. We have had occasion to warn people against believing in some sort of automatic parallel between the bilateral and the multilateral. The relationship is more complex, and still more so today than ten years ago, or even five years ago.

We can see, then, that the propitious elements I have just briefly mentioned are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the success of a global effort such as that undertaken at the special session on disarmament. Nevertheless, let us not react too quickly and blame the timing or even the shortcomings in the United Nations system. The true lesson is not quite as obvious as that. It lies rather in drawing certain conclusions which are more disturbing but salutary, namely, that any multilateral disarmament exercise which is based on a consensus rule is a very delicate matter, because it means accumulating a large number of difficulties without the participants having at the same time the necessary means to resolve them, or even to reduce them. Some of these difficulties are permanent, others can be overcome by a special effort. But when all subjects have to be covered, the risk of not succeeding is inherent in the exercise, and the absence of an agreed conclusion should not, therefore, be taken too tragically.

If we have perhaps learned in this way to be wary of holding repeated special sessions, we should not for that reason feel that we are impotent. Going from one extreme to the other would be absurd and quite at odds with what actually happened. The draft final document very often went much further than what we expected from this session, but the process of finalizing it brought up a handful of very sensitive questions, and it is not possible to

(Mr. Morel, France)

say with certainty that just a few hours or a few days would have sufficed to settle them. The intensity of the substantive work which has been going on for several weeks, together with the considerable efforts that were being made up to the very last minute, led one to think that an agreement was not out of reach. At the same time the unfinished text represents quite an accurate record of the openings, the limits and the difficulties - a record in which we can recognize our own work. This document is in a way more true than the one with which we could have or should have concluded.

This is why I should now like to stress that the absence of a final result has not wiped out the progress that was made during the session, progress which will be very useful in the continuation of our work.

We should of course start by stressing the general recognition of the importance of that session, the smooth way the debates and proceedings went off and the efforts made by all delegations. But it seems to me that we can try to go further. This meeting was rewarding enough for us to be able to discern a few practical pointers which will guide us effectively in this new phase we are now beginning.

First of all, we come back from New York with a confirmation of considerable interest on the part of the international community in further efforts towards multilateral disarmament, even if the interests, the approaches and the priorities of each of us are obviously different or even opposed. All of these differences in fact confirm the close relationship which exists between State security, the maintenance of peace and international security, and disarmament. This confirmation is essential for the continuation of our work. A common interest does exist, but progress in multilateral disarmament must go hand in hand with progress in security, in other words, in the strengthening of State security, in a reduction of international tension and, finally, as the last moments of the session showed, in the settlement of regional conflicts.

Secondly, the divergences which we see on some basic concepts of multilateral disarmament are not new. It is not a matter of a confrontation between two camps, but rather a multitude of divisions which have to be accepted. These multiple but changing points of difference confirm that the debate has to be resumed and carried further in a constant process which presupposes respect for each other's point of view. We have had practical experience during the third session that such mutual consideration makes it possible to work. The exercise is difficult, but it is essential, and in the end it is fruitful.

Thirdly, priority should not be given to nuclear disarmament in splendid isolation, nor should it rule out other possibilities. A certain amount of diversification in the fields of application of multilateral disarmament is recognized by all as something desirable, without meaning that we have to abandon an overall view. This trend is already reflected in the actual multilateral and regional negotiations which are under way, and it should become more marked in the next few years, whether we are referring to conventional, chemical, biological or space disarmament. We should not be

(Mr. Morel, France)

setting up a series of watertight compartments, but rather promoting a pragmatic approach combining a variety of fields and different negotiations.

Fourthly, at times we see very rapid development of a number of horizontal themes, such as verification, confidence-building measures, assistance, openness, investigation procedures or the development of new technologies and efforts to strike a balance between the peaceful applications of sensitive technologies and the prevention of their uncontrolled dissemination. These horizontal subjects do not fall within a well-defined category, they are not covered by one institution or one treaty in particular, and today they call for a considerable intellectual, political and technical investment. They are, as it were, the tools of disarmament. In many cases, they arouse an interest and even a degree of activity which would not have been suspected just a few years ago.

Fifthly, and finally, as regards the institutional machinery for multilateral disarmament, everyone agrees today that it is relatively well suited for the purpose and therefore does not call for any major change. One might still desire an adjustment here and there - for example a reasonable expansion of the Conference on Disarmament. But this basic agreement on the main lines of the present system should make it easier to seek practical improvements and concentrate on matters of substance.

In putting forward these few thoughts I have attempted to stand back a little from my own country's positions, which are well known to all. That is what we all did in June in New York, and I believe that we can continue this effort, going over the questions which are of concern to us point by point.

The disappointment exists, we cannot ignore it, but it allows us to return to reality and a genuine mutual acceptance of the diversity of our points of view. These are essential pre-conditions for any serious progress in the field of multilateral disarmament.

We have perhaps a better understanding of the fact that disarmament cannot be an ideology imposed outright through confrontation. Even if it did not finish its business, the third special session showed clearly enough that we can go beyond symbols, preconceived formulas and stereotypes, and it was precisely at that point that negotiations began - the only negotiations that are really worthwhile.

Of course, not everything has changed overnight, and the persistence of some rigidities hindered the emergence of a conception of multilateral disarmament that would be both realistic and demanding and would satisfy the requirements of today's world, which is ever more interdependent, more complex and more technical. But that process of renewal is now under way and it is up to us to consolidate it here in Geneva as we did in New York.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Morel for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

(The President)

I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, let me first of all congratulate you warmly on assuming the presidency of the Conference: it is a great pleasure to my delegation to see you preside over our work for the opening month of our summer session. I also want to thank Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary for the effective manner in which he handled the Conference during the month of April. A less pleasant duty is to note with regret the departure of Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma, as well as of Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan, who, as we all know, has had a particularly responsible and distinguished role over the last few months. I wish also to welcome the Ambassadors of Indonesia, Kenya, Peru and Bulgaria: I look forward very much to working with them.

I requested the floor today in order briefly to introduce document CD/837, which contains the text of a statement made by my Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

I have asked for the statement to be circulated as a mark of the very great importance my Government attaches to this Treaty. It has played a vital role in the history of recent decades by helping to contain the spread of nuclear weapons while at the same time encouraging the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It will be just as essential in the decades to come. The Treaty represents a crucial safeguard for all of us.

I should like to draw special attention to one particular part of my Foreign Secretary's statement, namely, his appeal to all countries who have not yet signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty to do so. The recent decisions by Spain, Trinidad and Tobago and Saudi Arabia to accede set an example we hope others will follow.

Completion of the text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty represented a significant achievement of the multilateral process. So did the Third Review Conference of the Treaty here in Geneva in 1985. This year's United Nations General Assembly will see the start of the process of organizing the Fourth Review Conference in 1990 and its preliminary preparatory meetings next year. We trust this will provide further opportunity to reaffirm the cardinal importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for international peace and security.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Solesby for her statement and for the kind remarks she has addressed to the Chair.

I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all, may I say that the Soviet delegation is glad to see you, the representative of the friendly State of India, as President of the

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Conference for July. I should like to wish you every success in this post and assure you of the Soviet Union's unswerving readiness to work actively together with you. At the same time I should once again like to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Meiszter, who guided the work of the Conference effectively during a period heavy with responsibility when we were preparing the Conference's report for the third special session.

We are glad to welcome our new colleagues who have taken up their posts as representatives of their countries in the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Wisber Loeis of Indonesia, Ambassador Samuel Ruoro of Kenya, and Ambassador Oswaldo de Rivero of Peru.

We have learnt with regret that Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan has to leave us and we wish him every success in his future activities.

Today our delegation has taken the floor to make a brief statement introducing document CD/838, which contains the answers given by Mr. N.I. Ryzhkov, Head of the Soviet Government, to questions from a TASS correspondent on the twentieth anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

His replies express the Soviet Government's view on the results of the Treaty over the past 20 years, its place in today's system of international relations and its future role in the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security.

Mr. Ryzhkov stresses in his answers, in particular, that the Soviet Union will come out firmly in support of the treaty, which should remain in force until a non-nuclear and non-violent peace becomes a reality on Earth. The only thing that can replace it is a comprehensive international treaty on the non-resurrection of nuclear weapons after their complete and final elimination.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Nazarkin for his statement and for the kind words he has addressed to the Chair.

This concludes the list of speakers for today.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? There is none.

At this point, I should like to address the question of the Programme of Work of the Conference for the second part of the 1988 session. A draft Programme of Work was circulated last week in Working Paper CD/WP.343. As I indicated at our last plenary meeting, it would be my intention to discuss the draft Programme of Work at an informal meeting next Thursday, 14 July, with a view to having the draft Programme adopted at a resumed plenary meeting, which would be held immediately after the informal meeting.

Another question I should like to raise concerns the requests for participation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, which were circulated to delegations last week. The corresponding draft decisions of the Conference will be distributed in all languages in the

(The President)

delegation boxes tomorrow, Wednesday. Thus, the Conference would be in a position to consider these requests for participation at the informal meeting to be held next Thursday morning and adopt the relevant decisions at the resumed plenary meeting.

Finally, I should like to draw the attention of the Conference to the question of the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The Committee was re-established at the beginning of this year's session with a mandate calling for the submission of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament. Under the circumstances, it is now necessary to take a decision concerning the Committee's re-establishment. As I noted in my opening statement last week, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is one of the two subjects, the other being chemical weapons, where "there is a very clear commitment to bring the negotiations to an early, successful conclusion". I am in the process of holding consultations on the Committee's re-establishment on the basis of a text which was under consideration in New York for inclusion in the concluding document that was to be adopted at the third special session. Since no objections were raised concerning that text, I would hope that agreement may be reached at this Conference, so as to enable the Committee to resume its work without delay.

The Secretariat has circulated at my request a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during this week. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference agrees to the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: If no other delegation wishes to take the floor, I shall adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting will be held on Thursday, 14 July at 10.00 a.m.

This meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.40 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.465
14 July 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 14 July 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Jaskaran Singh Teja (India)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 465th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. I have on the list of speakers for today the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cámpora. I now give him the floor.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I have great pleasure in extending the Argentine delegation's congratulations to you as your country takes over the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July. We take this opportunity to tell you that my delegation is most eager to co-operate with you in the performance of your duties. We also wish Ambassadors Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan and Tin Tun of Burma every success in their new positions. We should like to welcome Ambassadors Ruoro of Kenya, Loeis of Indonesia, Kostov of Bulgaria and de Rivero of Peru to this Conference on Disarmament.

With regard to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the delegation of Argentina has proposed that space Powers declare that they have not deployed weapons in outer space on a permanent basis.

This initiative has been prompted by the example of different delegations that have pressed for unilateral declarations aimed at creating a climate of confidence. It is well known, for example, that various delegations - some of them members of military alliances - have urged States to declare unilaterally whether they possess chemical weapons and to state what stocks of such weapons they possess if they do. In keeping with this idea, many countries, among them the Argentine Republic, have declared that they do not possess chemical weapons.

Of course, these unilateral statements have no value except in so far as people wish to trust them, as they are not subject to any verification procedure until the Convention banning chemical weapons enters into force.

Moreover, in the strategic arms negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, there have been some exchanges of information about numbers, types of systems, deployment, etc. These are also unilateral declarations, which are made with a view to creating a climate of confidence in the negotiations despite the unverifiability of the information.

Similarly, in the Vienna talks on reductions of military forces and conventional weapons, an exchange of information on quantities and types of such weapons has also been proposed without any kind of verification procedure being required.

Another example from the bilateral strategic arms negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States is the proposed exchange of information on sea-launched cruise missiles in view of the difficulties posed by verification of this category of weapons. Such a unilateral, good-faith declaration would also be unverifiable.

It is worth noting that in the field of multilateral disarmament agreements, the principle of the validity of unilateral declarations has been recognized by the international community. Let us take the case of the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. It welcomed with satisfaction declarations by States to the effect that they do not possess any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention. The Conference considered that such declarations increased confidence in the Convention.

We have cited all these precedents bearing in mind that one of the objections made to the Argentine proposal was the unverifiability of a declaration by a space Power stating it had not placed weapons in outer space on a permanent basis.

Verification does not play any role in this sort of declaration, whose merit lies solely in the mere fact that it is made and in the credibility of the State making it. Unilateral declarations have nevertheless been recognized as helping to create a climate of confidence along the lines of the confidence-building measures successfully dealt with by the Disarmament Commission at its 1988 session.

It is our belief that countries and delegations that advocate unilateral, non-verifiable declarations in different fields, such as chemical weapons, strategic arms both land -and sea-based, and conventional weapons, should also acknowledge the benefits of unilateral declarations by which space Powers would state that they had not deployed weapons in space.

Another objection that has been made to this Argentine proposal is the lack of a universally acceptable definition of a space weapon.

We should like to draw attention to the fact that our proposal does not refer to space weapons, but simply to weapons, as we assume it is known what weapons or arms are. Otherwise the Conference on Disarmament would not be about anything at all.

It has also been argued that any object in space could be used as a weapon; for example, if it were placed on a collision course with another space object. This argument is in our view obviously superficial. By analogy we should conclude that a bus driven so as to cause a collision is technically a land weapon.

We take this opportunity to repeat our request to the Conference on Disarmament to analyse this initiative, whose contribution to the creation of a climate of confidence in the prevention of an arms race in outer space is obvious.

It is quite clear that any space Power that declares that it has not placed weapons in outer space on a permanent basis assumes a commitment before international public opinion which will remain in force until it announces that the declaration is no longer valid.

A declaration of this nature constitutes a basic condition, I would even say an essential condition, if an arms race in outer space is to be prevented.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

We consider, and we have said so on various occasions, that the promotion of confidence-building measures is a valid and appropriate alternative at the present pre-negotiating stage in which the Conference on Disarmament finds itself concerning outer space.

The proposal we are putting forward clearly fits into this category.

We also think it is important to stress that the recommendations adopted by the Disarmament Commission on confidence-building measures recognized the fact that one of the main purposes of such measures was to reduce or even eliminate the sources of mistrust, fear, misunderstanding or miscalculation with regard to States' military activities.

Unilateral measures of a voluntary character like the ones we are suggesting were also recognized as valid means that could in due course be developed further into effective international agreements.

For the time being, our objective is of a more modest nature. It is simply to put together collateral measures that could prepare the ground for future and more specific agreements if that were the wish of members of this Conference.

Document CD/716 of 16 July 1986 submitted by the Canadian delegation on "Terminology relevant to arms control and outer space" stated on page 5 the following: "To the best knowledge of the international community, weapons have not yet been placed in orbit on a permanent or semi-permanent basis although it is generally assumed that anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) have been inserted into full or partial orbit for testing purposes on more than one occasion in the past."

Since it seems that weapons have not yet been deployed in space on a permanent basis a declaration by the space Powers such as we propose would help to freeze the situation, thus sending a message of reassurance to the international community. Silence, on the contrary, would arouse the greatest suspicion and at the same time create the fear that the space Powers were trying to keep absolute freedom of action for themselves in order to turn outer space into a theatre of activities to be conducted at their discretion.

We hope that delegations of the countries regarded as space Powers will express their views on this initiative in this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Cámpora for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

If this is not the case, as I announced at our last plenary meeting on Tuesday, I shall now convene an informal meeting to consider the Programme of Work of the Conference for the second part of the session and requests for participation by two States not members of the Conference, namely, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, with a view to the adoption of appropriate decisions at a resumed plenary meeting, to be held immediately after the informal meeting.

(The President)

If I hear no objection, I shall suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting in five minutes.

The meeting was suspended at 10.35 a.m. and resumed at 10.45 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 465th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As a result of the exchange of views at the informal plenary meeting, I believe the Conference is in a position to adopt formal decisions on the organizational questions I referred to when I suspended the plenary meeting.

Let me first turn to the Programme of Work of the Conference for the second part of the 1988 session. The draft Programme of Work appears in CD/WP.343. In this connection, there is agreement that the closing date of the session should be 15 September. May I take it therefore that the Conference adopts the Programme of Work contained in CD/WP.343 with this modification regarding the closing date, it being understood that the session could continue one day longer, that is 16 September, in case the preparation of the Conference's annual report to the General Assembly so requires?

It was so decided.

We now turn to the draft decisions concerning the requests for participation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea contained in documents CD/WP.344 and CD/WP.345 respectively.

Since no objections were raised when the communications from these two non-members were circulated and consensus emerged at the informal meeting, may I take it that the Conference adopts the draft decisions?

It was so decided.

As I informed the Conference at our last plenary meeting, I have been conducting consultations on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament on the basis of the text that was under consideration in New York for inclusion in the concluding document that was to be adopted at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

I am now happy to announce that there is agreement that the Committee be re-established on that basis. The Conference, therefore, will be in a position to adopt a formal decision next Tuesday when the text of the draft mandate will be available in all the official languages.

Finally, I should like to refer to the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. In the course of consultations there has emerged a general feeling that it would be appropriate to discuss all aspects of this question in informal meetings. This would include the work carried out by the Group of Seven, as reflected in its two reports,

(The President)

documents CD/WP.286, dated 24 July 1987 and CD/WP.341 dated 12 April 1988, as well as the future consideration of this question. If this is agreeable to the Conference, the Secretariat would make arrangements to schedule two such meetings in the latter part of this month.

It was so decided.

The Secretariat has circulated at my request a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during next week. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference agrees to the timetable.

It was so decided.

If no other delegation wishes to take the floor, I shall adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting will be held on Tuesday, 19 July at 10 a.m.

This meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV. 466
19 July 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 19 July 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Jaskaran Singh Teja (India)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 466th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. I take this opportunity to welcome the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, who is visiting us in Geneva. I should also like to welcome the Disarmament Fellows to our plenary session. I am sure that they will find the exchange interesting and useful.

I have on the list of speakers for today the distinguished representatives of the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, China, Hungary, Indonesia and the German Democratic Republic. I now give the floor to the first speaker on the list, the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Van Schaik.

Mr. VAN SCHAIK (Netherlands): Let me first of all congratulate you and your delegation on your assumption of the presidency for the month of July. We are happy, both from a professional and from a personal point of view, to see you in the Chair and we have great confidence in you to steer the debate with a firm hand and even-handedly. I also wish to thank our previous President, Ambassador Meiszter, for the excellent and balanced manner in which he has presided over our sessions in April and guided us in the months of May and June. Let me also extend a very warm welcome to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Akashi, a good friend to us, and we are happy that he will attend our meeting this morning. Let me extend a warm welcome to those Ambassadors who have arrived recently, and I refer in particular to Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Ruoro of Kenya and Ambassador de Rivero of Peru. A welcome also to the Disarmament Fellows. At the same time, we note with regret that colleagues have left or will in the near future leave Geneva, in particular, our good friends Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma and, if I am not mistaken, also my very good friend Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary.

Permit me to make a brief statement, in the wake of SSOD-III, at the beginning of this summer session. I wish first of all to express my appreciation for your opening statement, which, I am sure, has set the tone. As you said, the session was neither a failure nor a set-back for multilateralism. There were neither winners nor losers, neither sinners nor saints. Of course, we should all have much preferred a written outcome reflected in a concluding document. But we should not become the slaves of words as such. Establishing a final document is not a goal in itself. We should include in our assessment of SSOD-III our appreciation of the dialogue, the ambiance in which it was conducted and the many constructive ideas and proposals that were submitted and discussed.

The session also demonstrated that on some points differences prevented a consensus from being reached. But these differences did not lead to confrontations. As for my delegation, we are happy that, where compromises were not possible, delegations showed the wisdom of restraint: preventing a war of words, preventing also a last-minute effort for a written outcome, perhaps full of verbal virtuosity, but one that would not have helped us in our further deliberations, here or elsewhere.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

As my Minister Van den Broek stated when he addressed SSOD-III on 1 June 1988: "We have to keep in mind that arms control is not an aim in itself, but should serve our security. Arms control and legitimate defence efforts are not contradictory, but complementary". Indeed, SSOD-III should in our view be placed in a wider context.

The Final Document of SSOD-I of 1978 contains a phrase saying that the special session did not mark "the end but rather the beginning of a new phase of the efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament". My Government is of the opinion that the same could be said about the special session that was concluded last month, albeit without accepting a final document.

It is now up to the negotiators in various forums, in particular of course the CD, to draw their own conclusions, stimulated by the discussions we had in New York. We here in the CD should accept that challenge. Surely, we will all make an effort to build upon the understandings reached in New York, which, though not enjoying an official status, may serve as a source of inspiration. I also refer to the beginning of consensus on priority issues, such as chemical weapons and the alleged use thereof, on verification and on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Last week Ambassador Morel of France offered an interesting and lucid analysis of the third special session on disarmament and made an interesting attempt to draw conclusions of a more general order. On the whole my delegation would concur with the conclusions he reached. I would like to comment in particular on two of the observations he made. First, on the diversification of the areas of concern, second on the so-called horizontal themes, such as verification, which demand increasing attention. Both trends require in our view further reflection.

In New York we could observe a trend towards recognition of the great diversity of the subjects that should be considered, this also in the light of varying legitimate security concerns. It also finds its reflection in the increasing number of forums in which work is undertaken, both on the global and on the bilateral and regional levels. Of course, in spite of this diversity of subjects and approach, there continues to be a need for an overall vision and overall guidelines. New concepts have to be developed. But diversity also points in the direction of a pragmatic, realistic approach that can only get limited support from and inspiration by broad orientations on a global level. That in itself places a ceiling on the expectations one may have of special sessions as such. It also raises the question whether further special sessions to be held in the future with comprehensive, ambitious agendas - also burdened with extraneous issues - can operate effectively and really advance our objectives.

Diversification may also have implications for our own agenda. In the months ahead we shall mainly live under the old régime as it was established at the beginning of this year. But we do hope that, once countries have made their assessment of the special session, delegations will also reflect on the implications of the trend in the dialogue in SSOD-III for next year's agenda and working programme in the CD.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

As regards the increasing interest in horizontal themes, to which Ambassador Morel referred, I wish to make a few remarks on verification in particular. I think it is generally recognized that effective verification plays a key role in any disarmament agreement. In the negotiations on chemical weapons it represents the major issue on which a successful outcome of the negotiations depends. Its importance as such for disarmament efforts has promoted it to a horizontal theme. The guidelines, as adopted by the Disarmament Commission in May, represent a useful policy framework in this context. On the other hand, the special session also brought to light the diversity of the technical problems involved, depending among other things on the category of armaments concerned. In practice there are limits to the horizontal dimension of the theme.

This brings me to the overall role the United Nations could and in our view should play in this area. Canada and the Netherlands have submitted a document explaining the possibilities of, as well as the limitations upon such a role, and it was proposed at the special session that a group of government experts be established to assist the Secretary-General to present a report on it. Other countries have shown willingness to join this approach. This is not the place to enter into the subject itself. But it is an illustration of what I said before: the dialogue conducted in SSOD-III will be continued. In the case of verification, undoubtedly, in particular, in the First Committee of the General Assembly this autumn, and subsequently at the upcoming session of UNDC next spring.

These are our preliminary reflections on the outcome of SSOD-III. At this stage I will refrain from commenting on various items on the agenda for this summer session of the CD. However, let me make two observations which are relevant for our immediate work in the weeks to come.

One concerns chemical weapons. The argument has been made that the negotiations on chemical weapons would need a further political impetus in specific terms, leading to an early agreement on the convention on which we have been working already for such a long time. My delegation shares the underlying concern of this reasoning, taking into account the urgency of reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. Alarming reports on the continued use of these weapons and increasing concern about their proliferation confirm the necessity of making a maximum intensive effort. The appeal made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans Dietrich Genscher, on 6 July 1988 has the full support of my Government. However, we feel that still a lot of complex technical work, in particular in the field of verification, must be undertaken.

We are encouraged by the increasing number of useful documents that are now under consideration in this field. My delegation intends to introduce a working paper shortly, as a contribution to the process of multilateral data exchange, in which we will provide data on the number of Dutch producers and consumers of chemical substances, appearing on schedules 1, 2 and 3 of document CD/831. We hope that the informal discussions that at the end of this week will be held with experts from chemical industries will also help us in finding our way through the thorny path towards a comprehensive, effectively verifiable convention.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

We remain convinced that, with the political will and patience required, these complex problems can be solved. And, let it be said again, an entirely and perfectly verifiable agreement is not what is needed. We need a convention with the capacity of verification required to inspire confidence in its implementation by all parties.

My second observation is related to organizational issues, to the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. We do agree with those who argued in April that the Conference does not need a major overhaul. But on certain points practical improvements can be made enabling the Conference to work more effectively and to streamline its procedures. In my speech of 31 March of this year, I made a few suggestions to that effect. To take only one example, we are still convinced that there are major advantages to a change in the time schedule of the Conference by spreading the sessions over a greater part of the year and, on the other hand, allowing more intervals for reflection and preparation of positions, both in capitals and here in bilateral and group discussions.

But what I would like to underline at this moment is not so much the advantage of one improvement or another in our procedures. Rather I would wish to submit that the Conference should address these issues in a more systematic way, on the basis of the two reports of the Group of Seven, in the first instance in informal sessions perhaps next week and the week after. In April and previous months interesting comments were made by one delegation or another. What we now need is a discussion permitting the Conference to reach conclusions even if they are of a preliminary nature. Only in the light of such conclusions can the Conference pass a judgement on the usefulness of special procedures to deal with these issues further.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Van Schaik for his statement and the kind remarks he has addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Kosin.

Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, at the outset, I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference. The more so, as you represent a country Yugoslavia cherishes a long-standing friendship for and co-operation with in the Non-Aligned Movement. This friendship and mutual understanding were confirmed once more during last week's visit of your Prime Minister to Yugoslavia. You will successfully accomplish this responsible task, I am sure, with your well-known competence, experience and determination.

My appreciation for skilful steering of the Conference also goes to your distinguished predecessors, Ambassadors Meiszter of Hungary and Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany. I am very sorry to hear that Ambassador Meiszter is leaving us. We will miss him in this Conference. My warm welcome to our good friend Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Akashi. We are always happy to have him here with us.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

May I also avail myself of this opportunity to welcome the distinguished representatives of Indonesia, Ambassador Loeis, of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Ambassador Kostov, of Kenya, Ambassador Ruoro and of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero, and assure them of my delegation's full co-operation. I also welcome the Disarmament Fellows. To our dear colleagues, Ambassadors Telalov of Bulgaria, Ahmad of Pakistan and Tin Tun of Burma who are leaving Geneva and whose co-operation we appreciate, I wish the best of success in their new duties.

Our Conference concluded the first part of its annual session two-and-a-half months ago with more than one reason for optimism, because of realistic expectations that we were entering a new stage in the long efforts of the international community to achieve tangible results in disarmament.

The first reason was that the disarmament process had been accelerated through negotiations unprecedented both in depth and in extent resulting in the first ever nuclear disarmament agreement, ratified in the meantime by the two Powers, and in the convergence of views on a number of collateral measures leading to confidence-building and transparency. This paved the way for implementation of the INF Agreement but also for a commitment in principle to halve nuclear strategic arsenals.

The second reason was that the INF Agreement and the convergence of views on important aspects of disarmament and security were treated as an integral part of a much broader dialogue heading towards the improvement of international and particularly East-West relations, and the promising initiation of gradual solutions to hotbeds of crisis.

And last but not least, it was encouraging to see the commitment of the international community in support of the positive evolution in the major Powers' relations and, of course, of faster progress in disarmament. We expected these positive developments in the world and awareness of the need for joint efforts in the entire international community to have been reflected at the recently held SSOD-III.

Although it is too early to assess the causes and consequences of the inability of SSOD-III to agree on a concluding document, and that at a time when we were closer to substantive disarmament measures than ever, we cannot avoid noting the fact that this large international gathering neither met our expectations nor exhausted all its possibilities. The existing degree of agreement on many disarmament aspects provided, in our view, a solid ground for substantive consensus on the concluding document, reflecting a convergence of both views and concepts, a convergence which is in steady evolution. Yet the outcome of SSOD-III, being what it is, proves that there are major differences as to the ways to achieve disarmament, differences of approach to security concepts, that we cannot ignore. But it also reflected the real difficulty of encapsulating this complex sphere of international relations, with all its specific elements and controversial tendencies, in a single document.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

It is up to each and every one of us to analyse and learn the lesson from unnecessary rigidities, excessive ambition and a simplified view of the interrelationship between multilateral and bilateral negotiations wherever they exist and to focus on our immediate tasks. Since, in spite of what happened, the fact remains that the international community voiced at its largest gathering at a very high political level an unwavering commitment to halt the arms race and address disarmament in global terms and as an integrated process. Participation of statesmen from over 90 countries in the third special session, who expressed their concern and advanced significant proposals and suggestions along the lines of vital interest to the entire international community, unequivocally testified that the multilateral character of practically all the issues and problems is a fact of life. It resists simplification, but it cannot be denied. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, said at the opening of the SSOD-III, "all major questions of security and disarmament have bilateral, regional and global dimensions". The multilateral component is not there because of the existence of international institutions and organizations, of our joint creation. It is independent of the functioning of this or that body. It is fundamentally an expression of collective responsibility for world peace and international security, an expression of the globality of the danger, the diversity of threats to peace and security, as well as of increasing interdependence in the world. Multilateralism, either as a process or as a mode of negotiation, has never conflicted with bilateral or regional negotiations, either in theory or in practice, let alone attempted to take their place. It has integrated itself naturally into every dialogue as its complementary, parallel, but always constructive and reinforcing element.

The debate and overall performance at SSOD-III nevertheless demonstrated that in spite of differences, we were moving towards a higher measure of co-ordination in our search for solutions to the problems of international peace and security, as it also registered a large degree of convergence of views that disarmament and the strategic equation need to be comprehensively treated, including all their aspects - nuclear, conventional, space and others, while taking into account specific security situations.

Concerning comprehensive treatment of the disarmament issue, allow me to add that my delegation has always called for conventional disarmament to be accorded proper attention and addressed more decisively in all negotiating forums. This is not a matter of equalization of conventional and nuclear disarmament, but of the fact that conventional weapons are in daily use, that their destructive power and offensive potential are growing. It hardly seems realistic to expect, in the long run, a breakthrough in nuclear while maintaining a deadlock in conventional disarmament. New opportunities emerge, at least on European soil, of reducing conventional arms and redressing new or old asymmetries and disparities. This would certainly give an incentive to further progress in nuclear disarmament.

The absence of a concluding document of SSOD-III should not and must not produce stagnation in our endeavours in CD, as the single multilateral negotiating body. Present differences are not insurmountable obstacles in tracing our common interest, which does exist. Therefore, we see no reason for demoralization, let alone for helplessness or nihilism. We should rather

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

turn, with no hesitation, to a wide range of issues on our agenda in an attempt to accomplish our tasks, mindful of the evolving challenges and the need to respond by our positive action.

To start with the nuclear complex. Decisions on nuclear disarmament, needless to say, rest with those who possess nuclear weapons, primarily with the two most heavily armed powers. However, SSOD-III, and this is the case with other forums, too, voiced renewed and justified concern over horizontal nuclear proliferation, while often neglecting the danger of the vertical kind. What we want to stress here is that the non-proliferation régime has a multilateral character par excellence, encompassing countries which have explicitly renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons and those which de facto adhere to the régime. The best way to prevent proliferation is nuclear disarmament, where CD must play an adequate role, relying as a matter of course on the achievements in Soviet-United States talks, primarily their Washington Agreement. There is no real reason for the Conference not to play its role in contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament, since halting of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament were unanimously included as items on its agenda. Should such an approach be disregarded, the whole non-proliferation régime, subject of one of the most important multilateral agreements, could be seriously endangered. And all that at a time marking the first steps towards nuclear disarmament and when we are recalling the NTP anniversary. CD could help accelerate and widen the nuclear disarmament process, by substantive discussions of its agenda in its entirety and in line with its role as the single multilateral negotiating body. Every effort is worth it. Passivity is the worst of all.

In this context nuclear-test-ban activity is of particular importance. I would like to recall the proposal of the Group of 21, advanced during the first part of this year's session, for the mandate of an ad hoc committee, identical to the one submitted at last year's session by several members of the Group and based on a broadly-endorsed United Nations resolution. In our view it contains an item of broad common interest in the NTB issue, which has been among the top priorities on the agenda for more than three decades. Last year, here in the plenary, the proposal was qualified by a delegation from the Western Group as acceptable to the majority of delegations, and we expect it to be taken into consideration. Should it be so, and possibly accompanied by a complete NT moratorium as of 5 August, to coincide with the 25th anniversary of the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty, as suggested by Yugoslavia at SSOD-III, CD would get the necessary impetus towards progress. My delegation is ready to consider any proposal which would enable the Conference to deal with this item in a substantive way.

It is ever more clear, concerning the question of effective international arrangements to secure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, that the existing unilateral statements are no adequate solution. Therefore we should proceed to negotiations on a multilaterally binding instrument. It seems that suggestions to start elaborating such a document, provided it reflects specific approaches signify a possibility of reaching a common solution.

As a matter of course, other items on the agenda are not to be neglected.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

Thus, not only because of its high place on the agenda, but because of its real significance regrettably emphasized in recent months, we come to the convention on a comprehensive ban on the production, stock-piling and use of chemical weapons. This is a credibility test for the Conference and the ability of other multilateral organs to successfully complete a task promising to open a new phase in multilateral negotiations in general. It is quite clear that the urgent drafting and adoption of a complete, verifiable, non-discriminatory and therefore acceptable convention is of priority to all of us.

We do not ignore the existence of other outstanding complex issues, both technically and politically, but we are sure that the existing measure of agreement points to a successful outcome. As it is generally held that CW are not weapons but means of destruction of man and nature, security problems relating to the order of stock destruction are resolvable. The future convention, to be a genuine multilateral instrument, should be universally acceptable. It should contribute to the consolidation and stability of the régime it is going to inaugurate. It is on these grounds that we believe that convening a United Nations-sponsored Conference for the signing of the Convention, proposed for next year by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister at SSOD-III, would be a timely and powerful incentive for our work and for universal acceptability of the Convention itself. Attempts should be made to adapt its international verification mechanism to the real needs and to rationality and to prevent as far as possible any misuse, particularly against developing countries. The United Nations mechanism should also play its proper role in this field. The issue of international co-operation and technological development should, in our view, find a place in the Convention, in one form or another.

The danger of the transfer of the arms race into outer space adds a new dimension to the arms race in general. Therefore, prevention of its extension into outer space is a precondition for preservation of space for peaceful uses and co-operation. Countries that own space technology cannot reserve it for themselves, because all countries that use space to a larger or smaller extent have a legitimate interest in negotiating, as a point of departure, a system of legal measures for the prevention of additional militarization, regardless of whether space weapons be located in space or on earth. We expect all delegations to show understanding for such an orientation in the proceedings of the Ad hoc Committee.

A complete ban on radiological weapons should be another area of possible understanding. The achievements of the first part of the session raised our hopes that deliberations would be intensified during the second. As to the other component of the same issue - prohibition of attacks on nuclear plants, we believe that the Chernobyl accident was enough to warn us of the necessity of preventing any possibility of turning nuclear power plants into mass destruction weapons.

In the era of speedy development of technology, we should not for a moment forget that all types of weapons are permanently being made more sophisticated and new systems created that the resources devoured by military research are acquiring alarming dimensions. Otherwise, the arms race can get

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

out of control. It is imperative to immediately undertake a complex study of all implications of militarization of research and development, make them more transparent, define technological criteria in disarmament negotiations, synchronize, co-ordinate and reinforce international instruments, and primarily the non-proliferation régime. We must know better and co-operate closely, otherwise we shall continue creating "virile arms and sterile people".

The question of the improvement and efficiency of functioning of our Conference has attracted considerable attention recently. The performance of the Conference is of course primarily the problems of substance and real political convergence of views, which should be encouraged, but it is also a matter of our capability to set aside technical and procedural considerations which delay or hamper our own dynamics. My deep appreciation goes to the exercise of the Seven Ambassadors under the able guidance of Ambassador Fan. The Conference, should, in my opinion, turn again to the consideration of their proposals and to other aspects dealing with this problem.

In conclusion, I should like to say that the outcome of SSOD-III does not diminish but underscores the importance of the role of our Conference as the single negotiating forum of the international community. In spite of disagreement on how to reflect the evolving changes in international relations in a concluding document, we should increase our activity and respond realistically and innovatively. Since, in the final instance, what is going on today in the fields of disarmament and political relations, in terms of both action and ways of thinking, was laid down long ago in United Nations resolutions and Non-Aligned documents, as a primary demand by the international community. Our recognition goes of course to those who finally met that demand and made the first steps in nuclear disarmament. This however does not give them the right to ask only those who were long ago converted to adjust. We are all bound to change and adjust if we are to firmly take the road leading to concrete results, the road which is by definition difficult.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Kosin for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China, Ambassador Fan.

Mr. FAN Guoxiang (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, permit me at the outset to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for this month. Both China and India are big Asian countries, with the largest populations in the world. China sincerely hopes to develop friendly and good-neighbourly relations with India on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence. The Chinese delegation will support you and actively co-operate with you in your work as President. I am confident that your able talents and experience will ensure the smooth proceeding of the Conference. At the same time, I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express my appreciation and gratitude to your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary, for the excellent manner in which he conducted the work during the last month of the spring session and the intersessional period. I would also like to thank the Assistant Secretary-General, who is participating in our meeting today.

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

I would also like to welcome our new colleagues who are taking part in our Conference today - the new Disarmament Fellows. It is to be regretted that Ambassador Meiszter, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan and Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma have either just left or are leaving the Conference. Their positive contributions to the work of the Conference are well known to all. I wish them even greater success in their new assignments. In addition, I would like to welcome warmly Ambassador Wisber Loeis of Indonesia, Ambasssador Dimitar Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Samuel S. Ruoro of Kenya and Ambassador Oswaldo de Rivero of Peru, who have recently joined us. I look forward to working with them.

Since the beginning of the summer session, some delegates have taken the floor to comment on the recently concluded third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament that had attracted worldwide attention. I also wish to take this opportunity to express some ideas of the Chinese delegation.

The special session was convened against the background of some relaxation in the international situation, of certain improvements in East-West relations and of some progress in the Soviet-United States bilateral negotiations on disarmament. The international community generally expected that the session could achieve tangible results in the multilateral efforts for disarmament. Many countries made earnest efforts and carried out intensive consultations in order that the session might adopt a concluding document on the future objectives and tasks in disarmament based on the previous documents and resolutions. China, like many other countries, participated in the special session with a forward-looking, realistic and constructive approach. We submitted a series of reasonable proposals and suggestions and made our effort to ensure a positive outcome to the session.

It is regrettable that the session was not able to reach a consensus on the concluding document. Disarmament issues are of course arduous and complicated, as they are related to world peace and the security of all States. However, it should be pointed out that one important cause for the lack of concrete results by the session is the tendency to concentrate too much on bilateral relations between the super-Powers and to give inadequate attention to the multilateral efforts in disarmament, and in particular to adopt the rigid position of having one's own way while ignoring the reasonable demands of the great majority. Nevertheless, the Chinese delegation does not consider it a failure on the part of the international community in its efforts for disarmament. It will not dispel or weaken the commitment and determination of the Governments and peoples all over the world to maintain world peace and to strive for disarmament.

Although no concluding document was adopted at the special session, the substantial work done during the session was not in vain. Views were exchanged in earnest during the consultations. Consensus was close on many issues. In our opinion, the following aspects of the special session merit attention.

First, the special session was a grand gathering by the international community to demonstrate its will to maintain international peace and

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security, oppose the arms race and strive for disarmament. Governments and peoples throughout the world attached great importance to and actively participated in the session. Statements were made by many heads of State, prime ministers and ministers for foreign affairs, who expounded their positions on disarmament issues. Quite a few suggestions of significance were proposed. Numerous non-governmental organizations and personages from the five continents also actively participated in the relevant activities and made their contributions. All this attests to the strong desire and determination of the international community to safeguard peace and strive for disarmament. This great moral force of public opinion constitutes a far-reaching and significant constraint for the arms race.

Secondly, a large number of countries made an objective evaluation of the international and disarmament situation. They rightly pointed out that although there had been a certain improvement in East-West relations and some progress on the bilateral disarmament negotiations between the super-Powers which had signed and ratified the Treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, the arms race between them had not come to a halt; instead, there had emerged a new trend marked by their quantitative reduction of nuclear weapons and their accelerated application of sophisticated scientific and technological achievements in the research and development of a new generation of conventional and nuclear weapons as well as space weapons. The expansion of the arms race into outer space and other high-technology fields cannot but arouse the grave concern of the international community.

Thirdly, many countries put forward reasonable and practical proposals on the future goals and tasks of disarmament, covering areas such as nuclear disarmament, conventional disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space, a ban on chemical weapons, naval arms and disarmament, confidence-building measures, verification, and the relationship between disarmament and development. It is particularly noteworthy that all the participants further affirmed that the super-Powers possessing the largest and most sophisticated arsenals bore special responsibility for disarmament. They should take the lead in substantially reducing their nuclear and conventional weapons and in halting the space arms race. This represents the effective and unavoidable way for the realization of a genuine disarmament.

It is to be noted that during the session, there emerged an assertion of playing up or even exaggerating the increase in the military expenditures of the developing countries and the rate of their accumulation of armaments, as if they should bear the main responsibility for the arms race. Such an argument obviously runs counter to the facts. China has always been of the view that developing countries should make the best use of their limited resources for their economic construction and social development and that disputes among the developing countries should be settled by peaceful means rather than by force. However, in many cases, the developing countries are not in a position to make a free choice. Even today, their security is still endangered by certain military threats of aggression, which are imposed on them from outside. Therefore we cannot agree with this misleading argument in apportioning responsibility for disarmament.

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

Fourthly, it was generally recognized by the countries participating in the session that disarmament involves the security of all countries. While bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers are necessary, multilateral efforts are also indispensable. The United States and the Soviet Union signed the INF treaty, which was welcomed by the international community. In the meantime, at the special session, all of the countries have urged the United States and the Soviet Union to engage in serious negotiations on issues such as the drastic reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and the cessation of the arms race in outer space. The two countries were called upon to negotiate earnestly with the object of reaching and putting into practice agreements truly conducive to the further relaxation of international tension, to the achievement of genuine disarmament without prejudice to the interests of other countries.

In their disarmament negotiations, the two super-Powers are very much concerned about the balance between them and equal security. However, their equal security alone cannot make a peaceful world. There now exists a very great imbalance between the military capabilities of the two countries and those of other countries, which makes most countries feel very insecure. Consequently, they should take the lead in drastically reducing their enormous arsenals and heed seriously the reasonable proposals and suggestions of the international community so as to strengthen the common security of the world. As disarmament involves the security of all countries, every country, big or small, strong or weak, should have an equal say in the matter.

The progress that has been made in recent years in the field of disarmament is attributable to the joint efforts made by Governments and peoples all over the world. There had been bilateral efforts, multilateral efforts, as well as unilateral efforts. It would not serve the process of disarmament to give only certain countries the credit for the achievements in disarmament and neglect, belittle or weaken multilateral efforts. Bilateral and multilateral efforts should be complementary. In multilateral efforts the United Nations should and can play an important role.

The SSOD III has once again demonstrated that disarmament is a highly complex and long-term undertaking. By adopting a serious and realistic attitude, various parties have done a considerable amount of work. There is a Chinese saying to the effect that "without persistence you cannot break even a piece of rotten wood, while with persistence and determination you can engrave on granite or even diamond". It is in the spirit of perseverance that China will join other countries in an unremitting effort to work for halting the arms race, for disarmament and for the maintenance of world peace and security.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Fan for his statement and for the kind words he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Meiszter.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Mr. President, before turning to the subject of my today's statement let me welcome you on your accession to the presidency for the month of July and wish you success in discharging your responsible duties. Judging by my experience of having worked with you closely for quite

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some time I am confident that you will accomplish your term in an efficient and skilful manner. My delegation will co-operate with you in every possible way for that end.

I feel privileged to have in our midst and welcome the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Akashi. I also warmly welcome the Disarmament Fellows present here.

I have asked for the floor today to introduce the Declaration of 28 June 1988 adopted by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of the Hungarian People's Republic in observance of the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The document has been circulated by the Secretariat under symbol CD/841.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons opened for signature 20 years ago may rightly be called one of the most significant instruments on disarmament. In spite of its shortcomings the operation of the Treaty has proved beyond doubt the effectiveness and efficiency of the efforts of the international community to block the way of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Declaration unequivocally reiterates the continued commitment of Hungary to the objectives, obligations and measures set forth in the Treaty. During the 20 years of its operation the non-proliferation régime has continuously gained strength and has become an international multilateral instrument with the widest adherence. The Hungarian People's Republic in various international forums has repeatedly called upon all States which for whatever reason have not yet signed the Treaty to accede to it without delay. Therefore we cannot but welcome the recent accession of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago and Saudi Arabia to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and look forward to still further States doing the same.

The declaration by the Foreign Affairs Committee attaches great significance to the comprehensive implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is why it welcomes the agreement reached by the USSR and the USA on the elimination of their medium- and shorter-range missiles as a bold step on the way to nuclear disarmament. The successful completion of the ongoing talks on the 50 per cent reduction of their strategic offensive armaments would be a development of the utmost importance also in the implementation of article VI of the NPT.

The Declaration lays special emphasis on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and on international co-operation in this field. May I draw your attention to the point contained in the Declaration where in the context of the security of peaceful nuclear activities, the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear power stations and other nuclear facilities is urged. The Foreign Affairs Committee stresses that the Conference on Disarmament is an appropriate forum for bringing the ongoing negotiations on this issue to an early successful end.

The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has recently concluded its work. Although I was prevented by circumstances

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

from participating in its proceedings I did follow its work closely. Being aware of the activities of our delegation in the special session I would like to share with you a few preliminary ideas on the assessment of the outcome of the special session. The session took place at a time which can rightly be called a turning point in the history of international relations. It has provided a good opportunity for Members of the United Nations to review and evaluate the present stage of disarmament efforts, a vital segment of international security. Even in the absence of a formal substantive final document the session has its merits and significance.

The constructive, forward-looking exchange of views revealed a considerable degree of convergence on important items of disarmament negotiations, especially in relation to those on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Although different delegations may interpret this convergence in their own way, the main directions in which efforts should be aimed can be seen more or less precisely. Different aspects of the question of nuclear disarmament, including the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, have remained in the centre of attention. The need for measures to further strengthen the non-proliferation régime was recognized. The Conference on Disarmament has been called upon to proceed with the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention expeditiously since the chances of its early conclusion are fairly good.

The consultations and the documents that were under consideration during the session clearly indicated an agreement that the Conference on Disarmament should continue to seek solutions to such issues as the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the prohibition of radiological weapons, including the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, and to continue efforts for the elaboration of the CPD. The question of conventional disarmament in a global and regional sense was also approached in a new way. These are but a few instances where the third special session in my view gave clear direction for the work of the Conference and a basis for what we hope will be successful negotiations. It is important in my view that the Conference pursue its substantive work in areas where consensus or something near to it seemed to be at hand. Other new and useful ideas or suggestions may be the subject of further consultations with a view to narrowing the differences.

Before concluding my short statement, may I welcome our colleagues who have recently joined us, the representatives of Indonesia, Ambassador Loeis, of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Ambassador Kostov, of Kenya, Ambassador Ruoro, and of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero. I wish them a pleasant stay in Geneva and successful work in the Conference.

I would like to bid farewell to two of our esteemed friends, Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma and Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, who have left or are leaving the Conference on Disarmament like myself. This may well be the last statement I have the honour to make to this forum, since, as you may be aware, I will be leaving soon Geneva having completed my term. On this occasion I would like to express my gratitude for the friendship and co-operation I have been accorded by all of my colleagues who are sitting in this room now or have been round this table throughout my stay. As a way of saying goodbye to my esteemed friends and colleagues I would like to state

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

that in spite of the frequent feeling of personal dissatisfaction or frustration over the lack of progress I firmly believe that the work of this body is indispensable and I hope my colleagues, if and when their turn comes, will leave this auspicious room with more successes behind them than I do.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Meiszter for his statement and for the kind words he has addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Loeis.

Mr. LOEIS (Indonesia): Allow me, first of all, to express the pleasure of my delegation at seeing you, Sir, a representative of a fraternal non-aligned country, occupying the highest office of the Conference and to pledge its support in the discharge of your duties. Since this is the first time I am taking the floor, I would like also to convey my gratitude to you and, through you, to the distinguished colleagues who have extended a warm welcome to me in their earlier statements and to assure them of the co-operation of my delegation in pursuing the goals of the Conference.

I should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey our sincere appreciation to your immediate predecessor, Ambassador David Meiszter, for his able stewardship in guiding the Conference last April.

Let me also associate myself with others in wishing all the best to Ambassador Mansur Ahmad in his future assignment as well as to Ambassador Meiszter and Ambassador U Tin Tun, who I learned will be leaving us also very soon. To our new colleagues who joined us after my arrival, I wish to extend my delegation's warm welcome and to assure them of our full co-operation. Allow me also, to welcome Under-Secretary-General Akashi's presence in our midst this morning.

Although the third SSOD was unable to come up with a consensus concluding document, nevertheless, the session was successful in demonstrating the continuing importance attached by the international community to implementing disarmament measures. From the session we have gained several new ideas, initiatives, expectations and renewed determination as expressed in various statements delivered by the heads of State and Government and other representatives as well as by a sizeable number of non-governmental organizations. A better picture and understanding have also emerged during the session of the positions and interests of the participants, including the complexities of the problems involved in the field of disarmament.

Furthermore, the session has also strengthened the conviction that disarmament is not a one-time affair but a continuing process, and that SSOD is one of the means in that process and not an end in itself. In other words, the principles, purposes and aims that have been agreed and attained by consensus in the past could not and should not be set aside. One could imagine what would happen to future disarmament efforts, or for that matter any other effort, if we did not strive to entrench and build upon the principles, purposes and aims which we have agreed in the past, and this is especially true for the Final Document of SSOD I, when we know that they remained largely unimplemented not because they are unclear or obsolete, but because of a lack of political will and adverse international events which created an uncondusive climate during the past decade.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

All of this together with the compromises which were reached during the session could serve as valuable new inputs to the process of charting out and embarking upon future efforts in bilateral, regional and multilateral forums.

Thus it cannot be considered that SSOD III is a total failure and that it will adversely affect multilateral disarmament efforts. It is of course true that the developments in SSOD III have a bearing on the Conference on Disarmament. But then if we look back a few years, its tasks have never been easy. For example, during the course of the negotiations on chemical weapons, we had a breakthrough on one of the toughest issues faced by the Committee, namely, the question of on-site challenge inspection. That breakthrough, unfortunately, did not materialize as an opportunity to speed up the negotiation.

Nevertheless, and regardless of what has happened, when we came here in the first place we made several commitments, among them to conclude the Chemical Weapons Convention as a matter of urgency. We are all obliged to realize that commitment. In this connection it has often been argued that States should contribute to the early conclusion of the Convention by providing information relevant to a future chemical weapon convention. During the third SSOD there was also a paragraph on this point that was accepted by consensus, or at least which was not put aside and does not need to be renegotiated. Having this in mind, our Foreign Minister has informed the Conference that Indonesia does not possess chemical weapons. In the same spirit, I wish to add that at the moment we do not produce "Schedule [1] and [2] chemicals" and that we are in the process of determining how many "Schedule [3] chemicals" are being produced or processed in Indonesia.

Speaking about future efforts and on the need to fulfil the obligations and commitments we have made in the past, it may be recalled that on 1 July 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into being and that it entered into force on 5 March 1970. The NPT is now being adhered to by nearly all countries, including Indonesia, and it is considered to be one of the important disarmament treaties to date. The aims of the Treaty, as we all know, are not only to prevent the emergence of additional nuclear-weapon States, but also to oblige the existing nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear weapons. We believe that every effort should be made to preserve those aims since they are still relevant today as they were 20 years ago.

I hardly need to overemphasize the concern of my delegation at the revival of the debate over the interpretation of paragraph 2 of Article X, particularly at a time when Indonesia, together with other countries, is working to strengthen the non-proliferation régime by promoting South-East Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Our deep concern is not without reason since, regardless of who is right or wrong in that controversy, the NPT has worked only in preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. There are other obligations as well, and one of the utmost importance at present is to conclude a comprehensive treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear explosives, which is viewed by many non-nuclear-weapon States as a sine qua non not only to prevent the emergence of additional nuclear-weapon States, but also to preserve the NPT régime itself.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

It goes without saying that the best way to preserve a treaty is the full implementation of all its provision by all States parties. It is now a quarter of a century since the entry into force of the partial test-ban Treaty and 20 years since the NPT was opened for signature, whereas the year 1995 for the implementation of paragraph 2 of article X of the NPT is less than seven years away and is approaching rapidly.

As we are all aware, through its preamble, the NPT reminded the Parties to the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty of the need to seek the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons and to continue negotiations to this end. Considering that seven years is a relatively short time in which to achieve a disarmament treaty, my delegation wonders whether we still can afford to keep preventing the Conference on Disarmament, where all nuclear-weapon States are represented, or other appropriate forums, from negotiating and concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty in a direct manner and as a matter of urgency.

With regard to the reduction and the elimination of nuclear weapons, the need to implement the treaty obligations set forth in article VI of the NPT too should and must be given the highest priority. Despite the measures that have been taken in accordance with the SALT agreements or that will be taken pursuant to the INF Treaty, the accumulation of nuclear weapons will still be at a much higher level than at the time when those treaty obligations were undertaken in 1968. In this connection, the early conclusion of the treaty to reduce the strategic nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union by 50 per cent, the Chemical Weapons Convention as well as the reduction and redressing of the asymmetrical balance of conventional weapons by those military pacts possessing the largest arsenals will be regarded as a firm indication of good faith to implement the obligation assumed under article VI of the NPT.

Lastly, but certainly not least, it would be very helpful also if the States parties to the NPT encouraged any initiative by any group of countries to conclude a regional treaty, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their respective territories. Such an initiative is their treaty right as stipulated in article VII of the NPT.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words he has addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, first of all, my delegation should like to congratulate you very warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the month of July. You represent a country with which the German Democratic Republic has always maintained friendly relations and which plays a significant part in the quest for peace, security and disarmament. This can be gathered from the plan to rid the world of nuclear weapons and violence which was submitted by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to SSOD III. I am convinced that with your great experience and diplomatic skill you will efficiently guide the Conference in the first month of the summer session.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

At the same time, I would like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Meiszter, for the competent and excellent manner in which he fulfilled his responsible functions as President of the Conference and I would like to take this opportunity to bid farewell to my good friend and colleague, Ambassador Meiszter. I thank him for our friendly co-operation and wish him all the best in his further endeavours and in his personal life. We will all miss him here in Geneva.

I would also like to express our happiness to see with us again Under-Secretary-General Akashi and I join previous speakers in welcoming the Disarmament Fellows in our midst.

We should also like to bid farewell to Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan and to Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma.

May I also take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to the new representatives of Bulgaria, Ambassador Kostov, of Indonesia, Ambassador Loeis, of Kenya, Ambassador Ruoro, and of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Our Conference is resuming its work against the background of significant developments in international relations. Convincing proof of this is given by the Treaty on the Elimination of Medium- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Missiles, which entered into force during the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Moscow. All necessary prerequisites have been created for the physical destruction of these weapons.

What matters now is to make rapid headway on the road embarked upon. We hope that the bilateral negotiations on cutting by half the Soviet and United States strategic offensive weapons, while observing the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, will soon record a successful outcome and that further areas will be included in the disarmament process that must develop on a bilateral, regional and global scale.

Manifold and energetic efforts have been undertaken all over the world to consolidate the positive trends in the development of international relations and to strengthen them by taking further measures designed to accelerate the process of arms limitation and disarmament.

The Warsaw Treaty leaders, at their meeting in Warsaw a few days ago, reaffirmed their determination to spare no effort to keep positive processes going and to make them irreversible. They emphasized the priority task in the field of disarmament and put forward concrete and substantive proposals for a considerable reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe with the expectation that the other side would respond constructively.

The third United Nations special session assumes special significance in this context. It was marked by a wide-ranging exchange of views conducted in a businesslike, non-confrontational atmosphere, and it delivered a clear message: in today's interdependent world national security can only be achieved through co-operation by all States. The awareness of the universal character of security and disarmament has gained ground. Consequently, it was

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also one of the crucial demands at the session to ensure what is called a constructive parallelism between the bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations and multilateral efforts, while simultaneously increasing the role of the United Nations. The third special session has, in our view, improved the political conditions for coming to terms on such a comprehensive approach. However, nobody can ignore the substantial differences that need to be overcome. The proceedings of SSOD III not only confirmed agreed priorities in disarmament, but also brought forth new proposals, which will play a significant role in the future.

Deplorably, these constructive endeavours could not be reflected in a unanimously adopted concluding document. This proves that although we are on the right path, the harmonization of different approaches towards disarmament calls for sustained efforts and that political resolve is required to this effect. That is why we should make fuller use of our Conference to pursue more vigorously the discussions and negotiations on the items on our agenda so that practical results will be produced.

What forms part of the positive record of SSOD III is the unanimous desire to conclude the Convention on the prohibition of all chemical weapons as soon as possible. In this context, the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin, in her speech on 7 July 1988, warned of serious dangers which would arise from further delays. We fully share this concern. A situation where chemical weapons are further produced and modernized or their production is prepared, where chemical weapons are employed and the acute danger of their proliferation is growing, such a situation considerably increases the security risk. This should not be acceptable to any State.

Further work has to be accomplished this year concerning different parts of the text, e.g. with regard to the order of destruction of chemical weapons, the conduct of challenge inspections, assistance, economic and technological development and final clauses. We consider clarification of the problems pertaining to the non-production of chemical weapons to be one of the priority tasks. It directly concerns most States. With this in mind, we deem it urgent to advance and complete the work on article VI and the annex thereto.

In so doing, it will be possible to make clear the content of obligations to be undertaken, to arouse the interest of all States and to lay foundations for universal accession to the Convention.

At this juncture, I should like to recall the proposal made by the German Democratic Republic and Poland to the effect that the forthcoming regular session of the United Nations General Assembly should be used for the purpose of information and dialogue with countries outside the Geneva Conference.

An encouraging development, in our view, is the growing amount of information relevant to the future CW Convention which has been provided by various delegations. This, undoubtedly, enhances confidence and directly serves the negotiating process. Just like many other members of the Conference on Disarmament, the German Democratic Republic has already announced in a statement that it does not possess any chemical weapons. The Soviet Union gave details about the amount of its chemical-weapon stocks. We are convinced that during the summer session further States will participate in the endeavours to build confidence.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

In view of this, we believe that a sustained multilateral data exchange in the field of non-production of chemical weapons, and also trial inspections, could be conducive to gathering experience and making the verification régimes practicable.

We hold that it is indispensable to considerably increase the intensity of negotiations, and will support the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, in his activities.

And let me add here the following idea. Taking advantage of the experience gained in the bilateral process and bearing in mind the importance of the issue, we would deem it appropriate to convene in due time a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the States participating in the Conference.

The improved political conditions for the disarmament process should enable the Conference to overcome the standstill with regard to the nuclear items included in our agenda. We, for our part, come out in favour of tackling immediately those tasks which allow us to get down to practical work. At the same time, we advocate intensifying the dialogue with the aim of laying the political foundation for further negotiations. Even if the concrete objectives of bilateral negotiations and of multilateral processes differ from each other, it is, however, indisputable that they can and must be parallel affairs complementing each other in an appropriate way in order to achieve the common goal of a world free from nuclear weapons.

This is especially true of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The initiation of bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States in connection with the ratification of the so-called threshold treaties of 1974 and 1976 is a positive step in the right direction. But it cannot replace the work of the Conference in terms of a comprehensive test ban. At SSOD III, a great majority of States voiced their particular interest in dealing with this task. It is for this reason that the Conference should undertake new efforts at its summer session to set up a committee on agenda item 1 whose mandate would be acceptable to all parties. In our opinion, it is possible to reach a compromise, taking into consideration the proposals on hand. At this juncture, let me draw your attention to the text which was presented by the then President, Ambassador Vejvoda, during the informal consultations in April last year. It would constitute, in our view, a sound basis for understanding. As to the programme of work for a committee, we do not see any irreconcilable differences in the ideas put forward to this end. My delegation would consider it possible to start with the verification issue.

The Conference should also address the proposal submitted by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Eduard Shevardnadze, in August last year. It is about the setting-up of a special group of experts which would be expected to elaborate recommendations on the structure and functions of a verification system for a possible agreement providing for the cessation of nuclear weapon testing.

We are in favour of discussing the contribution which the Conference on Disarmament could make with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament under agenda item 2. Nobody intends to disturb the

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bilateral negotiations. On the contrary. The most essential thing is that all sides adopt a constructive approach with a view to identifying those subjects which could and should be dealt with at our Conference. We think that this forum is especially suited to tackle conceptual problems on the basis of the results achieved in the bilateral process, and to identify issues going beyond it, e.g. the development of new security structures, such as the non-nuclear defensive capability. In this context, the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament should constitute an interesting subject for consideration.

A constituent part of the conceptual work could also be to find out what experience from the INF Treaty would be generally useful for nuclear disarmament. When calling for systematic multilateral activity, in parallel to bilateral negotiations, we always have in mind that the question is not only to reduce and destroy existing arsenals, but also to prevent compensation and modernization. Therefore, multilateral activities are indispensable. They become even more and more pressing.

It would be best to hold these discussions within a special organ of the Conference. It would, however, also be possible to start with informal meetings of the plenary and to set up a working group later on. What needs to be done is to take the first step, to set things going at the Conference and to move towards the objective - nuclear disarmament and prevention of a nuclear war.

The spilling over of the arms race into outer space must be prevented, if the aim to end it on earth is to be achieved. The negotiations to cut the Soviet and United States offensive strategic nuclear missiles by half are inevitably bound up with the overall question of observing the ABM Treaty.

In its work on agenda item 5, the Committee should primarily see to it that the discussion is even more focused on global measures designed to prevent an arms race in outer space. We can note with satisfaction that a number of proposals are already on the table. In this regard, we should like to remind you of the working paper of the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia on "Main Provisions of a Treaty on the Prohibition of Anti-Satellite Weapons and on Ways to Ensure the Immunity of Space Objects" (CD/777). We are well aware of the complicated technical issues which do exist in this field. For this reason, we endorse the idea that a group of scientists working on a temporary basis should be set up.

Growing commitment was demonstrated at SSOD III to adopt regional measures on arms limitation and disarmament in the interest of increased international security.

The International Meeting for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held in Berlin from 20 to 22 June 1988, also manifested this significant phenomenon. Starting from the realization that a nuclear-weapon-free world cannot be achieved overnight, participants from 113 countries, representing Governments, non-governmental organizations and research institutes, demonstrated in a comprehensive and businesslike dialogue the viability of the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace. In his concluding

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

remarks, the host of the Meeting, Erich Honecker, Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, emphasized inter alia that such zones strengthened the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, created confidence and stability and were calculated to free ever larger areas from the horrible nuclear means of warfare.

We will provide interested delegations with the material of the Meeting, as soon as it is available.

The German Democratic Republic, together with Czechoslovakia, has taken the initiative in creating guarantees for security in Europe, precisely where the greatest destructive potentials confront each other eyeball to eyeball. It is in favour of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free corridor along the dividing line between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty and advocates a chemical-weapon-free zone. These proposals are in keeping with the endeavour to free Europe from weapons of mass destruction and to considerably reduce troops and conventional weapons.

All sides hold that it is through more openness and verification that disarmament and arms limitation should be advanced and stabilized also in the regional framework. That is why the proposals only recently submitted by the Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic and the Social Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Germany for a zone of confidence and security in Central Europe deserve great attention and a positive response.

The underlying motive of this move is to convince both sides that, despite the still existing military capacities, there is no intention to carry out a surprise attack. It includes the following measures:

Arrangements going beyond the 1986 Stockholm Document regarding the holding of military manoeuvres in terms of numbers, strength, mandatory notification, etc.;

The setting-up of permanent centres to promote confidence-building;

Permanent mixed observer posts occupied by military experts of both sides and established at strategically important points;

The setting-up of joint European satellite surveillance; and

The installation of so-called hotlines between Central European States.

This initiative will underpin and promote both the Jaruzelski and the Jakes plan.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Rose for his statement and for the kind remarks he has addressed to the Chair.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

(The President)

If no other delegation wishes to take the floor, I shall turn to the question of the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. You will recall that at our last plenary meeting I announced that agreement had been reached on the re-establishment of this Committee on the basis of a text that had been considered for inclusion in the concluding document that was to have been adopted at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Accordingly, a draft decision, contained in working paper CD/WP.346, was circulated in all languages in the delegation boxes on Friday afternoon.

May I take it that the Conference adopts this draft decision?

It was so decided.

I understand that the Conference wishes to appoint Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles of Mexico as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee and that he has kindly agreed to serve in that capacity.

It was so decided.

If no other delegation wishes to take the floor, I shall adjourn this meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 21 July, at 10 a.m.

The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.467
21 July 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 21 July 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Jaskaran Singh Teja (India)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 467th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues this week its consideration of agenda items 1, Nuclear test ban, and 2, Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. However, as provided for in rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Sri Lanka. I give the floor to the first speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, let me start by congratulating you, the representative of friendly India, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the month of July. We are convinced that in discharging your duties you will make full use of your personal qualities and the rich experience from your previous work in this body. Allow me to express our readiness to co-operate in your efforts to advance the Conference's work. At the same time, I should like to express our appreciation to your predecessor and my friend, Ambassador Dávid Meiszter of Hungary, for his work as President of the Conference in April, May and June. He concluded his stay in Geneva in an elegant manner, and I am sad that we have to bid him farewell. Ambassador Meiszter was an excellent representative of his country. I would also like to mention his participation in the Group of Seven, where he introduced several interesting ideas on the possibilities of increasing the effectiveness of our work. We also want to bid farewell to Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan and Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma. It is our pleasant duty to welcome our new colleagues Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia, Ambassador Ruoro of Kenya and Ambassador de Rivero of Peru.

Allow me, first of all, to make a few remarks - on a purely personal note - on SSOD-III. First of all, I would like to state that I do consider SSOD-III a useful and worthy exercise, even if it was not crowned by a document which we should and could have had if a few delegations had shown more readiness for a mutually profitable compromise. What we witnessed was a very small minority trying to the very last moment to push their national policy dogmas through into the final paper, which - of course - was not possible.

The session as a whole showed overwhelming support for the goals of disarmament, the interest of the world community in negotiation, not confrontation, and the attention which is being paid by even the highest echelon of world politics to disarmament. Many interesting and new ideas were expressed in the general debate and reflected in the working papers. We were able to gain inspiration and material for our further thinking and the formulation of draft proposals and decisions. We could see which matters were really negotiable. I was met by surprisingly great interest when I was trying to put together a compromise text on test-ban negotiation. Even if I failed, I do not regret the effort. And as I shall state later, my delegation is ready to continue in this effort here and add what it can to our urgent goal of establishing an ad hoc committee on a comprehensive test ban.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

But it seemed to me at SSOD-III that, while in some places we were making progress, in others we were going backwards. I still remember the period in disarmament negotiations many years ago when some delegations expressed dislike for the expression "disarmament" as if they wanted to express their disbelief that elimination of arms was possible. We witnessed some similar signs at the special session. Some delegations claimed that they were pursuing a so-called policy of firmness, which they falsely depicted as a road to disarmament. But should so-called firmness and refusal to take into account the interests of others really be considered a road to disarmament? There must be only one firmness, and that is to try to reach disarmament on an equal basis for all. And finally I got the feeling that to some delegations SSOD-III seemed only another kind of First Committee of the General Assembly, where positions are put into draft resolutions and prepared for voting. But at sessions where consensus is a procedural necessity, this is the wrong way to achieve positive results.

On the other hand, many delegations showed extreme dedication to disarmament, extreme understanding of the possible ways of reaching tangible results. I shall never forget the unceasing efforts of some - mostly heads of delegations to this body - to find compromises during the last minutes of our night meeting.

Delegations of the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries issued a memorandum in which our principal positions were introduced. However, during negotiations we were trying to help to achieve a common understanding on all problems, and for the sake of consensus we were extremely flexible. The lack of consensus is definitely not a tragedy - let us not cry over spilt milk - but rather it is the reflection of the situation which, in spite of recent progress in some areas, is still far from satisfactory in results, thinking and approaches to our common goal - disarmament. In that connection I would like to quote the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Yasushi Akashi, who said at the national convention of the United Nations Association of the United States of America, and I fully subscribe to this:

"It would be a great pity if short-term calculations of national security interest were to prevail over long-term interests in such vital areas with global dimensions as nuclear non-proliferation, the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, strengthening of the Secretary-General's hand in investigating the use of chemical weapons and preventing the arms race in outer space and constraining it in maritime areas."

This month, on 1 July, we celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic - a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty from the very beginning - regards this treaty as a supporting pillar of the existing régime of non-proliferation. In the field of limiting nuclear armaments it is, with its 136 participants, the most representative international treaty which plays an important role in the strengthening of peace and security in the world. It effectively contributes to the stabilization of relations and confidence among all States. Therefore, in celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

opening for signature of the Treaty, it is only appropriate to appeal to all countries which have not yet acceded to this important and significant international document to do so as soon as possible. Today, at a time when the first tangible steps are being made in the field of nuclear disarmament, all States, both large and small, nuclear as well as non-nuclear ones, should contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation. And it will be high time at the next General Assembly to start the preparatory work for the next Review Conference of the NPT.

It is our firm belief, and we have proof, that the NPT has in no way hampered the development of international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy on a multilateral as well as a bilateral basis. We hope that, in the coming years, the NPT will be upheld and strengthened further through the participation of a greater number of States. Such a course of action would undoubtedly strengthen security and would create favourable conditions for the process of deep and irreversible nuclear disarmament. That would be in full accordance with all the obligations assumed under article VI, which we regard as an important provision of the Treaty.

The signature and ratification of the Soviet-United States INF Treaty is rightly regarded as a first and important step on this path. It is now vital for the credibility of the historical breakthrough achieved in Washington and Moscow that the Soviet Union and the United States should conclude an agreement on 50 per cent cuts in their strategic weapons in the near future, with strict observance of the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972 and on condition of non-withdrawal from this Treaty for an agreed period. That would represent another extremely important and far-reaching step towards nuclear disarmament on Earth, provided that the vital security interests of all States are not directly threatened by new military machinery placed in outer space.

In view of the rapid development of space technology, we hope that in a few years from now we will not have to deal with the cessation of an arms race in outer space instead of prevention. We would very much prefer to avoid such a modification of one of our priority items.

As I have already stated, we maintain that SSOD-III gave us encouragement for more active work in various fields. In our opinion this Conference is the body best suited for follow-up work in this regard. Today I would like to touch briefly on one of the tasks, the validity and timeliness of which was reconfirmed by the debate at the special session, namely, the question of a nuclear test ban.

It was my hope that already in New York we would be in a position to find a framework which would allow us to start practical work on an NTB in the CD this summer. Some consultations I held with that aim in mind seemed to be encouraging. However, as all open problems were treated in the concluding stage of the special session under heavy time pressure, we lacked sufficient time and a calm and minimally constructive atmosphere for dealing with an NTB in a conclusive way, even if a compromise text had been reached.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

In supporting the goal of specific work to be undertaken on the NTB, my delegation proceeds from the assumption that what we should aim at is the general and complete cessation of nuclear tests. For reasons I need not describe, however, the CD is not in a position to start full-fledged negotiations in this direction now. We can, however, discuss some rather important aspects of the future test ban. Such discussion, if carried out purposefully, could help us clarify all problems standing in the way of the achievement of an NTB and identify ways and means for either the solution or the reappraisal of these problems.

With that in mind I put forward in April 1987, in my capacity as President of the CD, an informal paper containing a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of our agenda, Nuclear test ban. Since that paper was not circulated officially, let me, for the benefit of those who might not have seen it, read the second and third paragraphs of my informal proposal:

"The Conference requests the Ad hoc Committee to initiate, as a first step towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification and compliance.

"Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, it will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations."

Let me draw your attention to what I consider a very important part of that proposal, namely the expression "to initiate, as a first step towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty". I want to stress that my delegation has never regarded any work which might be undertaken by this body on item 1 separately from the final goal, which remains the general and complete cessation of nuclear testing. We therefore welcome all activities which could bring us closer to the achievement of that objective. One such step could be the ratification of the Soviet-United States threshold treaties of 1974 and 1976 on peaceful nuclear explosions; another could be consideration of all aspects relevant to the verification of the NTB with the active participation of technical experts. But much more should be done in this regard, and I continue to believe that our Conference, through its appropriate subsidiary body, could contribute a lot to make the journey towards the NTB as short and as smooth as possible.

Our Conference has an extended agenda. I will address some of the other items on future occasions. Now, to conclude my statement today, I should like to emphasize again the opinion of my delegation that in the remaining weeks of this summer session we should act actively on all of them. Our efforts must continue both here and at the upcoming regular forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly so that we move beyond the point at which we had to stop at SSOD-III.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Vejvoda for his statement and the kind remarks he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rodrigo.

Mr. RODRIGO (Sri Lanka): At the outset let me express the Sri Lanka delegation's satisfaction at seeing you, the representative of neighbouring India, steering our work this month as President of the Conference on Disarmament. Sri Lanka and India have age-old ties that have endured through all the vicissitudes of history. Your own personal qualities and wide rich experience in disarmament matters and multilateral diplomacy are too well known to need repetition by me. We have no doubt that the CD's work will benefit greatly by your stewardship.

My delegation would also like to express its gratitude for the excellent manner in which your predecessor in office, Ambassador Dávid Meiszter of Hungary, conducted the CD's work in an important period. We convey our warmest good wishes to him in his future assignment. We will miss him, as we do Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma, and Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, who played a major role at the SSOD-III. My delegation would also like to welcome Ambassador Rivero of Peru, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Ruoro of Kenya and an old and dear friend, Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia.

1 July 1988 marked the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the historic Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to that Treaty, including Sri Lanka, subscribed to it in the firm belief that the Treaty would contribute to international peace and security. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka stated on the occasion of the celebration of the twentieth anniversary, we also expected the Treaty to be a first step towards nuclear disarmament. The essentially multilateral nature of NPT obligations makes it evident that the revitalization of the multilateral disarmament process in key areas of concern to all countries would contribute greatly to the success of the important NPT review that will eventually come up in 1995.

It has been almost four weeks since the final gavel came down on the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Assessments of that session continue, attesting both to its complex nature as well as to the tremendous interest generated, and still being generated, on future prospects for the multilateral process in disarmament, a process exemplified by the United Nations. The comment I wish to make could serve partly as an epilogue to the third SSOD, and partly as a preface to future special sessions. Happily, hardly anyone treats the continuing analysis of SSOD-III as a post-mortem: multilateral debate and negotiations in disarmament are very much alive, and the lack of a final consensus document in New York signifies primarily that time ran out and that the process needs to continue.

The Conference of Disarmament has its own independent negotiating dynamic governed by its own procedures. Nevertheless, there is an important nexus between the special session and this body. In a purely formal sense, of course, this is quite obvious, in that it was from the first SSOD that the CD evolved in its present representative format and composition. Beyond that, the high political level and the near-universal participation at the session were such that its pulse, or its sense, is one which must definitely be taken into account by the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

The dramatic developments of the last 12 months or so, particularly the INF Treaty, the Moscow summit, improved relations between the two major Powers and, most important, their growing realization now that international peace and security, can better be promoted through disarmament rather than armament. All this deeply influenced the special session. Opinions might differ, of course, on whether the appropriate metaphor to describe this influence should speak of casting shadows or of shedding light. What is important, however, is that the special session took deep cognizance of the prevailing international circumstances in disarmament. Indeed, at the session, the potential and promise of the recent bilateral developments in disarmament virtually took centre stage. Nevertheless, it was clear to many participants that while these recent positive trends offered hope, there remained still much cause for concern. The danger of a totally destructive nuclear war had not been averted, and nuclear testing continued; the arms race was proceeding with technological inputs and qualitative escalation substantially transforming the nature and the lethality of non-nuclear weapons; political, economic and other non-military threats to international and regional security were not being adequately addressed.

At the same time, I believe, one absolute was self-evident and was happily reflected in language acceptable to all in the Committee of the Whole:

"Given the interdependent nature of life on this planet, multilateral co-operation in the solution of international problems is imperative."

Coming to grips with the total reality of the international situation and reaching agreed conclusions on future directions in disarmament negotiations, on the proper areas for multilateral negotiations as well as on the pace and scope of these negotiations, were ultimately the daunting challenges to which the third special session, as successor to the first, needed to respond. The success or failure of that response should not be judged solely on the lack of an agreed final document. Proceeding from the historic consensus of the Final Document of SSOD-I, the discussions at the third special session branched out in several directions. Deliberations continued on disarmament issues covered in the Final Document of SSOD-I. New trends were identified, and many new proposals were put forward.

The draft paper presented by Chairman Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan to the Committee of the Whole, thanks to his skill, balance and judgement, was considered a reasonable distillation of what was described as the "middle-ground" of deliberations in the three working groups as well as of views which did not find reflection in the reports of the chairmen of those working groups. Reference, for example, to zones of peace in different parts of the world, including the Indian Ocean, which had been left out of the paper of the Chairman of Working Group II, found expression in Ambassador Ahmad's paper. Accordingly, the paper became the de facto basis on which the myriad negotiating encounters of the special session took place.

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

While it is true that work proceeded on the basis that nothing was agreed until everything was agreed, we should nevertheless not entirely lose the benefit of the very tentative understandings reached on individual issues in the course of these negotiating encounters.

The negotiating encounters that took place during the session are basically of four kinds. The negotiating encounters of the first kind were those that culminated in tentatively agreed texts on such issues as verification, chemical weapons, non-proliferation, new technologies, confidence-building measures and so on. Similarly understandings were also reached on aspects of disarmament machinery relating to the General Assembly and the First Committee, the CD, the Disarmament Commission and other subsidiary bodies and institutions. These understandings embody important conclusions reached in serious negotiating encounters, from which we should not slide back.

The negotiating encounters of the second kind were those on which serious exchanges took place in the open-ended forums of the session, as well as in numerous informal bilateral and other discussions and on which agreements could conceivably have been reached given more time and an additional spurt of political courage. My delegation believes that the sections on zones of peace and various specific initiatives are examples of negotiating encounters of the second kind.

Then there are the negotiating encounters of the third kind, which in a sense were really non-encounters, in that some issues were not aired in the Committee of the Whole because of time and other constraints. Examples are provided by the paragraphs in Ambassador Ahmad's paper relating to the issue of the nuclear capabilities of Israel and South Africa.

Finally, there are the negotiating encounters of the fourth kind, which were marked unfortunately by inflexible attitudes, and where the attainment of consensus seemed impossible. Thus there was no consensus for the inclusion of certain subjects like the naval arms race. It is particularly in respect of these controversial areas that a full exposure of views should be encouraged in the future in order to seek points of possible convergence and to identify points of divergence.

The diverse negotiating encounters that took place during the session point to the complexity of the issues concerned. They gave evidence also of firmly held national positions that would not yield to international prompting. At the same time, in their concern to reach consensus, some delegations made quite considerable compromises in respect of very strongly felt, long-held positions. Some clearly made greater sacrifices than others to appease the great god Consensus. Even in such cases where the course of discussions led only to frustrating dead-ends, the process nevertheless offered valuable indications not only of individual positions, but also of the considerable weight of international opinion pressing for negotiated multilateral action, on, for example, such issues as outer space, where much had happened since the last SSOD. The contrary pulls between deeply perceived national security interests on one hand and what others saw as broader, more valid global imperatives on the other hand were not always reconciled.

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

Above all, the negotiating encounters pointed to the conviction shared, I believe, by all delegations, that the disarmament process is one which concerns the entire international community. Regrettably, however, the logical corollary was not fully activated that multilateral approaches should be consistently applied to all those questions of disarmament in which were bound up the interests, and indeed the survival, of all humankind.

That the special session was a disappointing and even frustrating exercise in many ways cannot be denied, particularly if the yardstick of measurement was SSOD-I, the Final Document of which remains, to my delegation's mind, the most complete expression of the international community's commitment to the systematic attainment of the goals of general and complete disarmament. That document was described by a cynic in the corridors of the United Nations in New York last month as "idealistic", the implication or even the aspersion being that the end result of SSOD-III, as an exercise in multilateral disarmament, was of the real world and the Final Document of 1978 was not. Mr. Brian Urquhart, the former Under-Secretary-General whose career spanned 40 years in the United Nations from its inception, and who remained nevertheless undeterred by that long experience in multilateralism, wrote that "idealism which is the distillation of human experience is far more realistic than cynicism or defeatism".

A co-operative approach which is predicated on the sober acceptance of global interdependence and pursued in a manner which acknowledges, in a real sense, the sovereign equality of all States is the most realistic approach to be followed in our search for peace and security. Such an approach was advocated by the Non-aligned as far back as 1961 at their very first summit in Belgrade. This approach, linked to a refusal to join either of the mutually antagonistic military pacts, was long considered utopian, impractical and even immoral. Time, however, has vindicated the basic position of the Non-aligned that international peace cannot be enduringly founded on military might, whether projected unilaterally or through pacts.

The word "multilateralism" has acquired a certain "loaded" connotation in disarmament and United Nations parlance, and is unfortunately seen sometimes as antonymous with "bilateral". This is unfortunate because it tends to mask the fact that multilateralism is really synonymous with international co-operation. There is no conflict between multilateral and bilateral approaches unless bilateral measures are blindly pursued in total indifference to the imperatives of global interdependence, and multilateral diplomacy refuses to take hard-headed cognizance of international realities.

At SSOD-III the two approaches may not have always been perfectly synchronized, but nor, I believe, were they in confrontation. The two approaches were perhaps seriously seeking to come to terms with each other. This healthy encounter needs to go on. SSOD-III has, therefore, served a useful function.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Rodrigo for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

The secretariat has circulated today an informal paper containing the timetable of meetings for the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable is merely indicative and subject to change. I should like to note that in accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its plenary meeting last Thursday, provision has been made for the holding of two informal meetings, following the plenary meetings on Tuesday and Thursday, to discuss all aspects of the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. It is understood that if in the time available next Tuesday we can exhaust the subject, the meeting scheduled for Thursday will be cancelled. I should also like to note that this is intended as a first round of discussion and that further consideration of the subject will continue later in August.

If I see no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As there is no other business for today, I intend now to adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 26 July, at 10 a.m. Before I adjourn the meeting I have an announcement to make. The Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will meet immediately after the plenary. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.468
26 July 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 26 July 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Jaskaran Singh Teja (India)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 468th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues this week with its consideration of agenda items 1, Nuclear test ban, and 2, Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. However, as provided for in rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Canada and Peru. I give the floor to the first speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of Canada, but before I do that, I would like on behalf of all of you to extend a cordial welcome to the parliamentarians of the Western European Union whose presence at our meeting testifies to keen interest in the work of this Conference. I now give the floor to Ambassador Marchand of Canada.

Mr. MARCHAND (Canada) (translated from French): In my statement today, I will address item 5 on the agenda of the Conference, Prevention of an arms race in outer space. In subsequent statements later in the session, I intend to take up two other major areas of priority for Canada: chemical weapons and a nuclear test ban.

Speaking for the first time in plenary since the third special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, I cannot hide my disappointment that the session ended without agreement on a substantive final document. However, like many of those who spoke before me on this subject, rather than pin blame on one participant or another, I believe we must, in this Conference, build on the common ground which emerged during the deliberations at that session and continue the dialogue in those areas where divergencies continue to exist.

The emerging consensus at the third session confirmed the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space. Accordingly, the participants urged the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts in this area. The draft document also referred to the significant contribution that success in the American-Soviet negotiations would make to our common objective of preventing an arms race. The Government of Canada concurs fully with this analysis, which recognizes the significance of the task before us and gives proper weight to the importance of the bilateral dimension.

Notwithstanding this latter point, it is clear that the multilateral dimension of arms control in outer space is gaining increasing importance and will continue to do so. This is, as it should be, a point that is implicitly recognized in the draft document of the special session where all States are called upon to contribute actively to work towards the objective of the peaceful uses of outer space. Given the potential for an arms race in outer space, the increase in the number of countries with significant interests and capabilities in space and the continuing growth in space activities, the Canadian Government believes that it is appropriate that this dimension should be expected to take on, and should actually take on, increasing significance.

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

Having said this, it is clear that if the multilateral dimension is to take on greater importance, the Conference on Disarmament will have to play a more substantive role in preventing an arms race in outer space. To achieve this objective we must start from four important considerations. Firstly, we must take very great care to enhance stability and not detract from it, secondly our negotiations must compliment, in the strictest sense of the word, the negotiations between the two major space Powers. Thirdly, we must recognize that a very considerable measure of prohibition and protection already exists in outer space and that we must base our efforts on that foundation, fourthly, we must not confuse or lose sight of the very useful and practical division of labour between the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer space.

Establishing a starting-point is relatively easy. What comes next is a lot harder. Prevention of an arms race in outer space clearly involves a significant effort both in defining space weapons and in defining legitimate space activities. Each of us recognizes the bewildering complexity of the problems regarding the emplacement of weapons in space and the deployment on Earth of weapons capable of attacking objects in space. We are all also aware of the difficulty of defining the kinds of military activities that might or might not be legitimately conducted in space.

The fact that the task is difficult and complex does not dictate that we should eschew it, but rather that we should perhaps focus more on measures that could provide a starting-point in the establishment of an appropriate international régime.

One might confine oneself to asserting that these questions require a comprehensive solution and not piecemeal or partial treatment. We could agree to incremental measures provided that they were fully compatible with the existing and future régime, and that compliance with the legal obligations thus created could be effectively verified.

We also believe, as the Australian delegation noted last year, that these goals will be finally attained only in so far as States give all due transparency to their space activities. We must all face the fact that unless we can make significant steps in the direction of greater transparency in these areas, our chances of negotiating a comprehensive régime for the prevention of an arms race in outer space will be pretty slim.

One area which might permit practical progress in increasing transparency would be multilateral exchanges of data on the military functions of space objects. The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space offers clear potential for improving our collective behaviour, provided that we decide to improve compliance with the provisions, and especially the spirit of the Convention. In particular, article IV, paragraph 1 (e) stipulates that each State shall furnish to the Secretary-General information on the general functions of space objects carried on its registry.

It should be noted at the outset that the Registration Convention is not primarily an arms control agreement or a disarmament treaty, it should further be noted that the Outer Space Treaty, which was also negotiated in the

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, is in part incontestably an arms control measure. Clearly it is the terms of an agreement and not its provenance which should reflect its purpose and functions.

As noted, article IV of the 1975 Convention requires, inter alia, that each State furnish information concerning the general function of a space object before launching it or procuring its launching. In the past, descriptions furnished to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under this heading have been extremely vague. In fact, as the United Kingdom and Canada pointed out to the Conference in 1985, not one of the space objects whose launching has been registered has ever been described as having a military function, despite the fact that, at a conservative estimate, over half of all space launches were primarily for military purposes. We accept the fact that the extent and timeliness of information given concerning military activities may, by necessity, be limited by considerations of national security (although even this point might deserve some examination), but we do not believe that this should extend to a refusal to describe space objects as having military functions. Here again it is a question of using elements of the existing legal régime in outer space to strengthen confidence and effectively promote greater transparency.

What we are suggesting, therefore, is that States parties to the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space should take their reporting responsibilities more seriously and go beyond the requirement to disclose the general function of space objects to provide more detailed and timely information concerning the function of a satellite, including whether the satellite is fulfilling a civilian or military mission or both. What we are in fact suggesting is the strengthening of the application of the Convention for arms control purposes.

Assuming that States parties to the Convention reach an understanding and agree in the future to provide information on the military or civilian nature of space objects systematically, at the time of registration, the space Powers that are not parties to the Convention will then be able to accept General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI) of 1961, which calls on all States to provide information on their space objects.

It is perhaps appropriate at this point to appeal to members of the Conference that have launched space objects and are not parties to the Convention, or are parties to the Convention but either do not register their space objects or have delayed several years before doing so, to become parties to the Convention or better observe the spirit of its provisions, as the case may be.

Clearly this would be a very small step towards more transparency and openness. How to go about it would also be a matter for study. Perhaps we should take up a proposal made by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1987, which suggested combining our efforts with those of other forums with the necessary legal expertise.

Strengthening the application of the Registration Convention might even pave the way for the preparation of a code of conduct for outer space, as advocated by France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany in

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

the Conference on Disarmament in 1985. It could also help to make progress with suggestions concerning the legal immunity of satellites. In this connection we have noted with great interest that Foreign Minister Dumas of France, at the third special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, urged that the Conference on Disarmament should give close examination to various issues, including the strengthening of the system of notification under the 1975 Convention, and the framing of a code of good conduct for outer space. The important point, we believe, is to understand clearly that if this Conference continues to work in the hope that it can, in one fell swoop, put in place a comprehensive agreement for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, then it will never achieve anything. However, we must start somewhere. The elaboration of confidence-building measures, even modest ones, would surely constitute a useful beginning.

On the another subject, the distribution of compendiums to this Conference cannot be regarded as a confidence-building measure. However, we have been encouraged over the years by the reactions of other delegations around this table to believe that the compendium put out by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Canadian Department of External Affairs has been most useful to this Committee and the Conference in general. We have asked the secretariat to circulate the compendiums for 1986 and 1987. They were dispatched to delegations under the symbol CD/OS/WP.23 on 23 May 1988. I hope that they will contribute in some way, however small, in advancing the work of this Committee.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Marchand for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I consider it a happy coincidence that I should be speaking for the first time in the plenary Conference on Disarmament when you are in the Chair. Those of us who have had a chance to get to know you are sure that we shall benefit from your talent and experience in searching for new opportunities for the cause of disarmament.

My delegation would also like to join in the cordial expressions of appreciation to the distinguished ambassadors of Burma, Hungary and Pakistan, whose departure will leave a noticeable gap in this single multilateral negotiating forum, but will also leave us with warm memories of the work they have done.

While extending a warm welcome to the distinguished ambassadors of Bulgaria, Indonesia and Kenya, I should like to thank the distinguished ambassadors who have spoken before me most sincerely for the generous greetings and to stress that I am always ready to co-operate to the best of my ability in fulfilling our task.

I should like to focus my first remarks on the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. At the outset, of course, there were great expectations and undeniable optimism in some quarters, despite the fact that we were all aware that the third special session had not been properly prepared for and that insufficient time had been allowed to ensure its success. Either people were overconfident, or they thought that it was possible to achieve a great deal in a short time with little preparation.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

Reality, stark reality, put an end to this wishful thinking: the third special session did not achieve its objectives. We can call this failure, lack of consensus, or yet another setback. What is certain is that it did not come to a successful conclusion.

There is no point in our getting bogged down in sterile reproaches or inappropriate lamentations. My delegation believes that even though our expectations were not fulfilled, we are all left with the lesson that disarmament has to be achieved through realism and persistence. It is an immense and difficult task. It involves nothing less than convincing the great Powers that in the nuclear age they must abandon the policy of the big stride and embrace a policy of co-operation and interdependence. That is to say, they must move on from bilateralism to multilateralism in the disarmament process and in the approach to international security.

After the depression and pessimism that paralysed disarmament discussions because of the ideological and political confrontation between the super-Powers in the past, the recent detente, the promising atmosphere at the summit meetings and the entry into force of the INF Treaty led many over-optimistic enthusiasts to imagine that these recent events were creating enough political room to arouse hopes of a successful outcome to the special session. That was not the case. Unfortunately, the special session was a sterile exercise as far as the achievement of concrete results in the multilateral disarmament process was concerned.

To sum up, we seem to find ourselves with a paradox. In recent years the confrontation between the blocs has not been conducive to the adoption of specific new disarmament measures in the United Nations, and nor, it would seem, is the beginning of detente between them. Faced with this situation, we might perhaps apply an old African proverb which says that when elephants fight they destroy the grass and when they make love they destroy it too.

At all events, the results of the third special session have highlighted the fact that bilateral and multilateral negotiations move on different levels and at different speeds. They ought in fact to be convergent and they should be convergent and complementary, and at a given point they should influence each other. They are, however, two processes which each evolve in their own way. Hence our interest in preventing the bilateral negotiations from either smothering or setting the course for multilateral efforts to promote general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Pessimistic voices have been raised by those who believe they see in the unhappy outcome of the third special session one more episode, and perhaps a dramatic one, in the crisis of multilateralism. Even if they may be right as regards the greater complexity of harmonizing the different viewpoints of sovereign States, it seems an overstatement to conclude that all is lost or about to be lost. Reality, as usual, offers us a less pessimistic prospect, and one might even say a hopeful one. Disarmament will not be the result of an altruistic decision, nor will it be achieved in a day. It will have to be arrived at by stages, and not every step taken will always be in a forward direction. Of course, the fiasco of the third special session has meant that the international community has lost an opportunity - that is true. That is

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

to say, nothing has been gained, and something has indeed been lost. Nevertheless, this loss is not irreparable, just as nobody expected a final overwhelming victory over the arms race.

Perhaps the great moral of the third special session, if we want to look at this lost opportunity from the positive side, may be that we have to learn to moderate our expectations and regulate our objectives better and prepare ourselves better. Anyway, it is up to us to continue these efforts and give ourselves another opportunity to show ourselves that nothing is lost if the will to change this state of affairs exists.

This is a year of anniversaries. On 1 July it was 20 years since the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and on 5 August it will be 25 years since the opening for signature of the partial test-ban Treaty. While they have different objectives, there is an indissoluble link between them because of their unquestionable impact in curbing the arms race.

There have been many criticisms of the NPT, but one fact remains beyond question: it is the first multilateral instrument to enjoy wide international support. Furthermore, in so far as article VI can be implemented to the full, the NPT will be inextricably linked with nuclear disarmament and a point of reference for the disarmament process in general. The fourth review conference is to be held within two years. My country plans to play an active part in it, and accordingly has decided to co-sponsor the United States proposal that an item on the implementation of the conclusions of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT and the establishment of a preparatory committee for the fourth review conference should be included in the provisional agenda of the forty-third session of the General Assembly.

The 1963 Treaty, too, is a multilateral instrument which has not been fully applied inasmuch as the multilateral negotiations on the total cessation of tests referred to in article I, paragraph 1 (b) have not taken place. However, the last word has not yet been said, and there can be no doubt that if the Conference on Disarmament finds itself unable to set up the appropriate ad hoc committee with a mandate to negotiate, there still remains the amendment option offered by the 1963 Treaty, which the Depositary States cannot avoid if they are to comply with the stated requirements.

One of the priority tasks of the Conference on Disarmament is to move resolutely forward to arrive at an agreement on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. In this connection my delegation noted with satisfaction the proposal put forward by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia at the third special session, and repeated last week in the Conference on Disarmament by the distinguished representative of that country, for the convening of a special United Nations conference to approve the convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction. To a large extent this approach coincides with the one set out by my delegation on 6 August last year, and is calculated to consolidate the efforts that have been made in this forum over many years.

The doctrine of arms control cannot go on producing advantages for the super-Powers or the major military blocs. The convention being negotiated

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons must be symmetrical, non-discriminatory and compensatory. The renunciation of chemical weapons by States that do not have them or possess them cannot be a blank cheque if the States that do possess them reserve certain rights for themselves which later on can legitimize their present situation. Hence the need for all States in the international community to participate on a basis of solidarity in order to guarantee the full implementation of a genuine disarmament agreement.

Finally, Mr. President, I wish to inform you that the Government of Peru has firmly identified itself with the cause of disarmament, and in keeping with my country's historic mission to promote peace and international co-operation, has decided to appoint a special delegation to play an active part in the work of this single multilateral negotiating forum. You may be sure that the contribution of the special delegation of Peru will be a constructive one, with no other aim than to promote further progress towards disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador de Rivero for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If not I shall adjourn this meeting, but before doing that I should like to note that following the plenary meeting, as agreed, there will be an informal meeting to discuss all aspects of the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 28 July at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.45 a.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 28 July 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Jaskaran Singh Teja (India)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 469th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues this week its consideration of agenda items 1, "Nuclear test ban", and 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, as provided for in rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on the list of speakers for today the distinguished representatives of the United States of America, Poland, Mongolia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I now give the floor to the first speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, as this is the first opportunity that I have had to make a prepared statement this month, permit me to begin by congratulating you and the delegation of India for your outstanding stewardship of the Conference during the month of July.

Our delegation also extends its best wishes to those other representatives who are leaving us or have recently departed: Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan, who worked so long and patiently here in Geneva and during the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament; Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria; Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma; Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary, who did such a fine job as our President in April; and Ambassador Tarmidzi of Indonesia, and we welcome and pledge our co-operation to those new representatives to this body: Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia, Ambassador Ruoro of Kenya and Ambassador de Rivero of Peru.

I would like to begin today by introducing document CD/839, which contains the texts of a statement by President Reagan and of a statement by the Assistant to the President for Press Relations at the White House on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. These two statements attest to the great importance the United States attaches to strengthening international peace and stability through the prevention of any further spread of nuclear weapons. As President Reagan notes in his statement, "the non-proliferation Treaty is one of the international community's most vital instruments" for doing just this.

The United States has been making concerted efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war and to meet the objectives of the non-proliferation Treaty, in particular under article VI, through its negotiation of the INF Treaty, now successfully concluded, and on a 50 per cent reduction in the strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States calls on all other nations to do their part, by adhering to the NPT Treaty if they have not yet done so, and, if they are already parties, by rededication to achieving the objectives of the Treaty.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

I also want to introduce, in parallel with the delegation of the Soviet Union, two additional documents important for our work here in this Conference. The first is a "Joint statement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics", Issued Following the Summit Meeting of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow, 29 May-1 June 1988, which has been issued as document CD/846. This joint statement deals at length with arms control issues, including the nuclear and space talks, and chemical weapons issues, about which I shall have more to say shortly. The statement also records the exchange of instrument of ratification of the INF Treaty, an event of great historical significance for all of us, as it marks the first time that real nuclear disarmament, involving the elimination of an entire class of United States and Soviet nuclear arms, is taking place. The far-reaching inspection provisions of that Treaty are now being implemented.

The second document, CD/847, is the Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles, signed at Moscow on 31 May 1988. This Agreement is the latest step taken by the two Governments designed to reduce the risk of initiation of nuclear war by miscalculation, misinterpretation or accident. I hope to have more to say at a later point this summer about a number of the arms control issues addressed in the joint statement, and about the launch notification agreement.

At the close of the spring part of the CD session, I devoted two plenary statements to the status of the chemical weapons negotiations. On 14 April, I commented on what had been achieved so far during the 1988 session. My statement on 19 April looked ahead to the summer part of this year's session. Today I would like to return to the important subject of the prohibition of chemical weapons. A lot has happened since I last addressed the Conference on this subject.

On several occasions during the last few months, a ban on chemical weapons has been addressed at a high level bilaterally by the United States and the Soviet Union. As I have already noted, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union have held important and wide-ranging discussions of arms control issues, including the prohibition of chemical weapons. Furthermore, several meetings have been held at the ministerial level.

At the Moscow Summit President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed the importance of efforts to address, as a matter of continuing urgency, the unique challenges of a chemical weapons ban and to achieve an effective convention. They noted the progress already achieved in the talks, as well as the difficult problems remaining with regard to effective monitoring of the global prohibition of chemical weapons and the non-use of dual-capable chemicals for chemical weapons purposes. Furthermore, the leaders underlined problems of ensuring effective verification and undiminished security for all convention participants.

Both sides also agreed on the vital importance of greater openness by all States as a way to build confidence and strengthen the foundation for an

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

effective convention. The leaders also emphasized the necessity of close co-ordination on a multilateral basis in order to ensure the participation of all CW-possessing and CW-capable States in the convention.

I believe this is the prevailing view in the international community as well. On the multilateral level, a text expressing the continuing urgency of prohibition of chemical weapons achieved broad support during SSOD-III, including the support of the United States delegation.

All these positions are reflected in the instructions to our delegation. If this commitment is reflected in the instructions to other delegations as well, then I believe that the prospects for further progress are good.

Let me now turn to the substance of the negotiations. Today I intend to address three key issues referred to in the United States-Soviet joint statement: the vital importance of greater openness; the difficult problem of effective monitoring of the chemical industry; and ensuring participation in the convention of all CW-possessing and CW-capable States.

Increasingly, participants in the negotiations have recognized the vital importance of greater openness by all States about their chemical weapons capabilities and their chemical industries. The United States delegation itself has made major contributions in this regard. For example, in CD/711, presented in July 1986, the United States provided detailed information on its chemical weapons stockpile, including storage locations. Furthermore, in document CD/830, tabled last April, we presented further detailed information on the chemical weapons themselves.

Today the United States delegation is taking another major step toward greater openness. We are declaring the location of each of our chemical weapons production facilities. A map showing the locations is contained in the working paper being introduced today, which is entitled "Destruction of chemical weapons production facilities". It is our hope that this paper will contribute both to greater confidence and to the negotiation of related provisions of the convention.

The declaration we are making today is unprecedented. No other member of the Conference has provided information on its chemical weapons production facilities. We urge other countries that possess chemical weapons production facilities to declare the locations of their facilities and to outline how the facilities would be destroyed.

In recent months the Conference has made significant progress in resolving long-standing issues related to chemical weapons production facilities. An agreed definition is within reach. It has been agreed that all such facilities must be destroyed. Corresponding changes are already being made in the draft text of the future convention.

While there is agreement that chemical weapons production facilities must be destroyed, little information is available to the Conference on how this would be done. This issue has already arisen in Working Group B this summer.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

To assist the negotiations, our working paper describes in general terms how the United States would go about the task of destroying its production facilities.

Openness, of course, has not been a monopoly of a few delegations. We are encouraged that the concept of multilateral data exchange has taken firm hold over the last year or two. Many delegations have provided relevant information in plenary statements or working papers. Undoubtedly, additional information will be forthcoming in the remaining weeks of this session.

Our records show that approximately a dozen members of the Conference have not yet indicated whether or not they possess chemical weapons. We urge them to do so this summer.

Before leaving the subject of openness, I would like to sound a quiet note of caution. Information presented to the Conference can only facilitate the negotiations if it is accurate. On the other hand, inaccurate declarations will decrease confidence and complicate efforts to ban chemical weapons. Unfortunately, we believe statements regarding non-possession of chemical weapons have already been made that are likely to have such an effect. Serious as the effects might be even now, the result of inaccurate declarations after entry into force might well be a series of challenge inspections, with the attendant political consequences. Truthful declarations are essential to the entire process of banning chemical weapons.

The Conference has been wrestling with the difficult problem of effective monitoring of the chemical industry for some time. The report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons at the end of April, document CD/831, clearly shows that substantial progress has been made. The report, however, also makes clear that complicated and thorny issues remain. Resolving these issues will require not only creative approaches, but also a thorough understanding of conditions in the civil chemical industry.

Our delegation believes that representatives of the chemical industry can make an important contribution to the negotiations. This conviction has grown out of the close and long-standing contacts between our negotiators and policy-makers on the one hand, and representatives of the American chemical industry on the other. We have found that industry shares our objective of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons. Permit me to cite a recent official statement made by Mr. Robert Roland, President of the American Chemical Manufacturers Association. This industry organization, which is called CMA for short, represents companies comprising more than 95 per cent of the United States chemical production capacity.

In his statement on 28 April 1988, Mr. Roland called for a "strong, effective international treaty" to ban chemical weapons. He said American, Canadian, Japanese and European chemical industry representatives have been working for several months on a set of recommendations that the CMA believes can facilitate agreement on a chemical weapons ban. When the recommendations are agreed to, Mr. Roland said, "they will be sent to our negotiators along with our industries' pledge to do whatever we can to make such a treaty effective".

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

I also want to point out that the CMA's Board of Directors recently declared its strong support for a chemical weapons treaty and urged that the chemical industries of all nations work toward consensus on the technical issues.

Our conviction that industry is eager to facilitate the negotiations was reinforced by the informal discussions with industry representatives that were held last week here in Geneva. We are encouraged by the serious and constructive exchanges between negotiators and experts from industry. These exchanges made clear the need to devote greater attention to provisions for protection of confidential business information. They also highlighted the need to specify clearly what types of information should be considered confidential. We express our thanks to the industry representatives who came to Geneva and to those who organized these discussions. Their technical expertise and practical experience are of great value in resolving the many commonly recognized issues taken up in the discussions.

Another positive development is the proposal for a multilateral effort to develop and test procedures for conducting inspections of chemical industry facilities. Initially, my delegation reserved its position on that proposal until it was more fully developed. In light of refinements provided by the Soviet delegation, the United States endorses the concept of such a multilateral experiment and is willing to participate.

For the experiment to be successful, broad participation by States possessing commercial facilities that would be subject to routine inspection under the convention is essential. Participation by others is also highly desirable, in our view, it is important for participants in the negotiations to declare not only whether or not they have chemical weapons, but also to declare soon whether or not they have civil chemical facilities that would be inspected. The United States, of course, does have such facilities.

We agree with the suggestion, made on 26 April, that the experiment should proceed in a multi-step fashion. Before procedures can be developed and tested internationally, individual States need to conduct their own national experiments and provide the results to the CD. The United States Government is already working with the Chemical Manufacturers Association to develop and test inspection procedures. We urge the Soviet Union and others to indicate what actions they are taking.

Much discussion and planning must take place in the CD to make the experiment a reality. The concept is a good one, but it needs to be fleshed out. Many questions remain to be answered about how to proceed. For example, how can sensitive commercial information be protected under circumstances where legally binding rules of confidentiality may be lacking? We look to the Soviet delegation to take the lead in developing answers.

Finally, I want to stress the need for a truly global prohibition of chemical weapons. Much attention has been devoted to security in Europe. But events of the past few years make clear that the greatest risk of the use of chemical weapons lies outside Europe - as demonstrated in the Middle East. We share the view, expressed by the distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elaraby, at the plenary on 26 April, that the convention should be

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

universal in character. A convention that does not deal effectively with the dreadful reality that chemical weapons capabilities are very widespread cannot be considered successful.

Our objective is a very challenging one - to secure the participation in the convention of all CW-possessing and CW-capable States. Pessimists argue that this is impossible and that therefore States should set their aspirations much lower. We cannot agree. Rather, we support the constructive and creative proposal by the Egyptian delegation that ways be found to consult key States that are not now participating in the negotiations. Similar ideas have been expressed by Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom and Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic. We share the view that consultations would help to promote the desired universality. We pledge our co-operation with the delegation of Egypt and other concerned States to bring this proposal to fruition.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Max Friedersdorf for his statement and the kind remarks he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. President, permit me first of all to express my pleasure at seeing you preside over our work during this month. I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate you on the efficient and skilful manner in which you are performing your duties as President. Let me also express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary, for his valuable contribution in a difficult period of preparations for SSOD-III. I regret very much that Ambassador Meiszter is about to leave Geneva. His departure will certainly be a loss to the Conference. I wish him all the best. In addition, I would like to express my warm welcome to our new colleagues, Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Ruoro of Kenya and my neighbour Ambassador Oswaldo de Rivero of Peru, who have joined the Conference recently. I look forward to working with them, and I wish to assure them of my delegation's full co-operation

On 15 and 16 July, a session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty was held in Warsaw, at which the leaders of these countries adopted significant documents of direct concern and great relevance to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. These documents - the communiqué of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, a statement by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty on negotiations on reductions in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, and a paper on the implications of the arms race for the environment and other aspects of ecological security - are now available in document CD/842, dated 22 July this year, as yet in the official language of the meeting only, but I am sure that these documents will be available in other languages very soon.

These documents contain a programme of concrete activities aimed at the prevention of war, détente, disarmament and the development of broad and mutually advantageous co-operation in Europe and in the world.

In the communiqué the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty Organization gave their assessment of the present development of the international situation,

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

and reaffirmed that the States represented at the meeting will continue to do their best to strengthen and promote the favourable processes in the international arena so as to make them irreversible. They also designated priorities in the area of international security in all its aspects, i.e. political, military, economic, ecological and humanitarian.

I do not intend to go into a detailed analysis of the statement on negotiations on reductions in armed forces, and conventional arms in Europe. Its content is self-explanatory and speaks for itself. I wish, however, to point out a more general aspect of this document - its conciliatory character, its focus on the search for compromise. It really meets halfway many Western concerns and suggestions, as well as those of neutral and non-aligned countries. It is fully based on a fundamental premise of our philosophy of international relations - equal security for all at a radically lower level of armaments, retaining only forces and means necessary for defence, but not sufficient to launch a surprise attack and conduct offensive operations. We believe that this approach, which is born out of the conviction that the present situation in Europe, a place with the heaviest concentration of the most modern armaments, has a negative bearing on the possibilities for expanded co-operation in all fields, would strengthen politico-military stability and security and would facilitate confidence-building among nations and reduce the threat of war.

The third document, on the implications of the arms race for ecological security, is a sort of warning to all of us. The motivation of this document stems from a growing uneasiness among world public opinion about further degradation of the natural environment, also as a result of military activities. Nuclear testing can be mentioned as just one example, but a most convincing one, especially for this forum, which, I hope, will finally prove its ability to start concrete work on a nuclear test ban.

The document contains a set of concrete proposals for working out and implementing a conception of international ecological security on the basis of the broadest possible and most open international co-operation.

The documents of the Warsaw meeting have been drawn up at a particularly significant time. Firstly, efforts by progressive and realistic forces over many years towards mapping out an area for concrete disarmament agreements have borne fruit. The first agreement in this field, concluded between the USSR and the United States, has come into force. Secondly, the process of lessening confrontation has been initiated, and contacts between East and West have increased, thus creating a favourable basis for curbing the arms race, reducing military spending and peacefully solving regional conflicts. Recent examples are very well known. Thirdly, there has been a decisive increase in interest by all States in achieving disarmament. Fourthly, the process of transforming philosophical attitudes of mind on international relations has started; militaristic ones are now yielding more and more to humanitarian ones. This process is influenced by the increase in mankind's global problems, the solution of which goes beyond the capabilities of single States or groups of States.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

These positive developments are, however, still not totally satisfactory. As the communiqué states:

"Nevertheless, no fundamental breakthrough has occurred. The situation in the world remains complex and contradictory."

Reasoning in these terms the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty agreed on their priorities. They also assessed SSOD-III, and in this context declared themselves in favour of a greater role for the United Nations and more effective mechanisms and processes in disarmament negotiations. These co-ordinated views will serve as guidelines for delegations of member States, including those to the Conference on Disarmament.

Four priority tasks were agreed upon:

Conclusion of a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in Soviet and United States strategic offensive weapons, in strict compliance with the ABM Treaty;

Adoption of a complete and universal ban on nuclear weapon testing and, as steps towards that goal, conclusion of agreements on effective verification measures, so as to facilitate the earliest possible ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties between the USSR and the United States, and conclusion of agreements on further reducing the yield and number of nuclear explosions in both countries;

Conclusion of a convention on the complete elimination of chemical weapons and destruction of stockpiles of such weapons;

Reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe and corresponding cuts in military spending.

With regard to the assessment of SSOD-III, what deserves attention is that the States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization viewed it not in relation to the fact that it was not possible to adopt a final document, and not even from the point of view of the benefits it brought in the form of an occasion to demonstrate determination to stop the arms race and proceed with disarmament in all fields, but in relation to the aspects to be followed up. The communiqué states that "it is important that the many constructive proposals made during the session should be used in disarmament negotiations." In other words, it neither "cries over spilt milk" nor looks for those responsible for spilling it. Instead, it attempts to make constructive use of favourable elements emerging in this interesting debate.

As one of the participants in this debate, I would like to express the conviction that all participants learned a lot from it. If we are consequently to take the path towards disarmament, and I am sure that there is no alternative, we should all learn how to combine caring about the security interests of one's country with not diminishing the security of others. Security can be universal only if it is indivisible, that is, equal and mutual, obviously in due overall proportion to each country's size and power. SSOD-III taught us all the art of compromise. It is not true that where a State's security interests are at stake there can be no compromise.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Compromise is a notion unfamiliar only to commanders or parties fighting on the battlefield - though even they are able to reach cease-fire agreements.

The documents just introduced from the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, the session of which took place in the capital of my country, are the result of and proof of an endeavour to arrive at a sound compromise, based on mutual trust, in the proposed attempt to take up problems ripe for settlement in Europe, and not only Europe.

The offer is concrete, the objectives are clear, the intentions are durable. It is an offer for discussion, and not for take-it-or-leave-it. Such is my understanding of many of the reactions to that event we have witnessed so far.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Sujka for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the next speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Bayart.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia): Mr. President, it is indeed a great pleasure for me to see you presiding over the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament during this month. Your personal commitment to our common cause, your experience and diplomatic skills, will enable the Conference to gain the necessary momentum for substantial work during its summer session. I am happy to note that India and Mongolia enjoy deep-rooted historical and cultural ties and traditional friendship which were further cemented by the recent official visit of the President of your great country to Mongolia. We all know and highly value India's peaceful foreign policy which makes a weighty contribution to the lofty goals of ensuring peace and security in Asia and the world over.

I would like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary, for the efficient manner in which he guided the work of the Conference on Disarmament on the eve of SSOD-III. I would like to thank him, as well as Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan and Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma, for their outstanding contributions to the work of the CD, and wish them all the best for their future assignments. I also wholeheartedly join the previous speakers in welcoming most warmly Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Ruoro of Kenya, and Ambassador de Rivero of Peru, and look forward to close co-operation with them.

Since the beginning of the second part of the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament, the discussions at the plenary meetings have focused on the recently concluded third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This is quite natural, for the special session is itself a significant event. This is an event which takes place once every few years with the agreement of all United Nations Member States and in accordance with the decision taken by them.

Despite all expectations, the third special session did not succeed in adopting a concluding document, which cannot but be a source of deep regret. This obviously shows that old ways of thinking and stereotypes still persist.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

It should be underlined that some major States took a very rigid position at the session and refused to respect the legitimate interests of the overwhelming majority of other States. With great disappointment we observed how they tried to back away even from positions which had been agreed upon previously, and which were clearly spelled out in a range of joint documents adopted by consensus.

However, it is not my intention to analyse extensively the reasons why the special session was not crowned with success. In spite of everything, as I have pointed out already, the special session was a significant event in contemporary international life. It represented an important stage in the development of a constructive dialogue on a wide spectrum of issues relating to security and disarmament, and enabled States to gain considerable experience in interaction and co-operation in the joint search for ways and means of attaining the aims of disarmament and strengthening international security.

In our opinion the special session strikingly showed that States are conscious as never before of the need to search continually for political solutions to the key problems of world development, as opposed to military and strong-arm methods, and that they are increasingly determined to make real contributions to this end. It is clear that these trends account for the large number of important proposals, valuable ideas and opinions put forward during the session with a view to ensuring uninterrupted, consistent progress in the disarmament process.

In the opinion of my delegation, one of the merits of the special session lies in the fact that it again refined both the fields of common understanding and the questions on which States' positions differ. One can assume that this clarification of the situation will help us considerably to consolidate what is positive from our achievements in the past and to focus our main efforts on outstanding issues.

The fact that the special session was not able to work out a concluding document, i.e. to come to concrete agreements on disarmament questions, will prompt our Conference to work hard to find practical solutions to the problems to be tackled, without wasting any time. Such problems are numerous.

The majority of States recognize that nuclear weapons are not a means of warfare but rather a means of annihilation, and that therefore the stockpiling of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to the very existence of mankind. For this very reason, the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles during the Moscow summit between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, and the President of the United States, R.W. Reagan, i.e. the entry into force of the Treaty, has truly historic significance. The Moscow summit gave fresh impetus to the elaboration of an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms and a separate agreement concerning the ABM Treaty. Mongolia hopes that the two sides will exert all their efforts to sign these agreements this year, as called for by the world community.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

There is a close interconnection and interdependence between efforts to enhance the nuclear disarmament process and work to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is our conviction that for the preservation and strengthening of the NPT, which was opened for signature 20 years ago, it is particularly important now to make efforts and negotiate in all disarmament fields in parallel, and to embark on practical work within the Conference on Disarmament on dealing with the first three items on the agenda. In this connection, it is essential to underline the necessity to break the deadlock over the problem of a nuclear test ban, which, unless it is resolved, will make it impossible to prevent either the horizontal or the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In their recent statements, the distinguished representatives of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia drew the attention of the Conference to the informal text of a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1, formulated by Ambassador M. Vejvoda in his capacity as President of the Conference in April a year ago, as a possible way out of the existing situation. The draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21 contained in document CD/829 could in our view also serve the same purpose.

Here I would like to make a few remarks concerning the results of the recently held meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka has just introduced to the Conference on Disarmament. My country welcomes and notes with satisfaction the major constructive initiatives set forth in the documents adopted at that meeting, aimed at resolving the important and urgent problems of reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, curbing the arms race and ensuring ecological security. The appeal made by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty to intensify efforts with the purpose of rapidly concluding important agreements on the reduction of armaments and armed forces, to strengthen security and stability and to refrain from any actions which could create obstacles to progress in these directions, is in conformity with present-day needs.

Mongolia is convinced that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and that its exploration and use should be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes in the interests of the scientific, economic and social development of all States. The extension of the arms race into outer space would not only make its peaceful exploration and use impossible, but could also jeopardize the ongoing process of limiting the arms race and bringing about disarmament. It is in this context that we note the pressing need to prevent an arms race in outer space, as well as the great responsibility borne by our Conference as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body in this field.

The Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space is continuing its work under the able leadership of Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela. We would like to stress once again that the time has come to scrutinize all the proposals and initiatives placed before the Ad hoc Committee, including those submitted by the delegations of the socialist countries. These initiatives include, first of all, the Soviet proposal (CD/817) on the establishment of a system of international verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space, which envisages the

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

creation of an international space inspectorate; the "Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and ways to ensure the immunity of space objects" (CD/777) presented jointly by the German Democratic Republic delegation and my own; the German Democratic Republic's proposal for a structured discussion of item 3 of the Ad hoc Committee's programme of work (CD/OS/WP.18); and the compilation of definitions of space weapons, containing definitions proposed by Bulgaria, Hungary and the USSR (CD/OS/WP.14). It goes without saying that we stand ready in a constructive spirit to consider the valuable initiatives advanced by other delegations participating in the work of the Ad hoc Committee.

In order to analyse the existing initiatives and proposals as well as to identify specific measures on this basis so as to prevent the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space, the creation of a governmental expert group as suggested by the Swedish delegation could prove to be instrumental. We believe that the work of the Ad hoc Committee has already reached the point where the creation of such a group with a clear-cut mandate could be highly useful and contribute to goal-oriented and fruitful work within the Ad hoc Committee, and also facilitate the refining of a truly multilateral approach to the question of preventing an arms race in outer space.

The completion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons continues to be one of the most important tasks of our Conference. Unfortunately, the present pace of negotiations in this domain is far from being commensurate with the urgency and imperativeness of the objectives to be attained. A great amount of work remains to be done if we are to find the key to the still unresolved, mainly technical questions. One might add that among them there are some problems which have certain political implications. In short, I wish to emphasize that we have a great deal of work to cope with as expeditiously as possible so as to achieve substantial progress before the current session of the Conference winds up.

The members of the Conference are aware of the fact that my delegation has in the past offered concrete proposals and ideas on the order of destruction of chemical weapons, and perhaps they may recall that at the end of the spring session I dwelt on them at some length. This time I would simply like to put forward the idea of considering the order of destruction of chemical weapons in possible interrelationship with the destruction of chemical weapon production facilities.

In conclusion, I wish to express my delegation's satisfaction at the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament under the guidance of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico. While assuring him of the full support and co-operation of my delegation, I sincerely wish him success in the discharge of these difficult, but indispensable and essential functions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Bayart for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to my country and to the Chair. I give the floor to the next speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today the Soviet delegation, in parallel with the United States delegation, is introducing as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament a joint statement issued at the Moscow summit (CD/844) and the Agreement between the USSR and the United States on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (CD/845)

The Moscow summit meeting was a major event in international life. Its chief result was a further development of the political dialogue between the USSR and the United States, which now covers all key problems in bilateral relations and world politics. Laying a constructive foundation for the long-term development of relations between the two countries, the Soviet-American dialogue is helping to guide those relations into a normal, healthy channel and to make them more stable and predictable.

The joint statement at the summit is an important political document signalling an entire new phase in Soviet-American relations. At the same time the statement confirms a sort of agenda for the future Soviet-American dialogue. The most significant parts of the statement are those which relate to the importance of continuing and building upon the political dialogue between the two countries and intensifying negotiations.

The Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles signed between the USSR and the United States at the Moscow meeting is a new practical step forward, reflecting the desire of the parties to reduce the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation or accident.

In connection with the statement made today by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf, I should like to state the following. We will, of course, carefully study this interesting statement. However, I should like at this stage to welcome the United States agreement to participate in the experiment we propose on testing procedures to verify the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. We consider that practical steps are now required to organize this multilateral undertaking. I can inform you that the Soviet delegation will take appropriate steps in this regard, and in particular will conduct consultations with the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka of Poland.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Nazarkin for his statement. Are there any other delegations wishing to take the floor? That not being the case, I should like to note that the secretariat has circulated today an informal paper containing the timetable of meetings for the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable is merely indicative and subject to change. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should also like to note that, as agreed, following the plenary meeting there will be an informal meeting to continue the discussion of all aspects of the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. I should now like to read my concluding statement as President of the Conference for the month of July.

The first month of the summer session is drawing to a close. We resumed our work here three weeks ago, under the shadow of the recently concluded third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We were all aware that in New York we had not been able to reach agreement on a concluding statement. It was a sobering realization. Nevertheless, I believe that in this Conference, this fact has made us more conscious of our responsibility. It has also made us value all the more the consensus that we have forged, fragile though it may be at times, on the different items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

The smooth start to our work in the summer session is due primarily to the understanding demonstrated by delegations in their shared commitment to universally accepted goals. I am particularly encouraged by the fact that, while a number of distinguished representatives have put forward their assessments of SSOD-III, nobody has labelled it a failure. On the contrary, almost all delegations have found some positive elements in the negotiating encounters of the third special session. The degree of unanimity on some of the following points is indeed noteworthy.

First, at SSOD-III, the international community demonstrated its will to maintain international peace and security and bring an end to the arms race. The large number of statements made by the world leaders, and active participation by the numerous non-governmental organizations, bear ample testimony to this fact. There is also general agreement that SSOD-III provided an opportunity for an objective evaluation of the international situation. It took note of the new trends, both in bilateralism and multilateralism, as also of developments in the field of technology with its concomitant implications for global security. Finally, and most important, all delegates have, in their analyses, emphasized that SSOD-III reaffirmed the right and responsibility of every State to contribute fully and effectively to efforts in multilateral disarmament.

This month has also seen the coming together of experts from the chemical industry from all over the world, to discuss, appreciate better and contribute to our efforts in the field of verification of non-production. We are all aware of the complexities of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention. These complexities do not exist merely at the stage of negotiations, but will also be present at the stage of implementation. The importance of co-operation from industry for the effective implementation of a CW convention, therefore, cannot be over-emphasized.

We have also resumed work in the Ad hoc Committees on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, and Radiological Weapons. The Ad hoc Committee on the CPD has been re-established under the able chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of

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Mexico and will commence its work this afternoon. Additional intensive efforts are still required to arrive at organizational arrangements on agenda items 1 to 3. I have also carried out informal consultations on other pending subjects, and these too need to be continued - especially on the expansion of the membership of the Conference.

We resumed discussion on the improved and effective functioning of the CD. The two reports of the Group of Seven have served as valuable inputs in catalyzing our discussions on this subject.

Before I come to the end of my remarks, I wish to thank all delegations for the assistance they have extended to me during my presidency. I am especially grateful to the co-ordinators, Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma and his deputy Mr. Mya Than, Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Sujka of Poland and Ambassador Fan of China, who have helped in resolving some of the above-mentioned issues. Let me also express my gratitude to my predecessor, Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary. I wish my successor Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia success, and I would like to assure him of my delegation's full support and co-operation. On behalf of the members of the CD, I would like to take this opportunity to convey our best wishes to Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary, who is leaving us soon.

On behalf of all participants in the Conference, I would like to convey my sincere thanks to the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament, Mr. Akashi, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Komatina, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, and other members of the secretariat, as well as the Conference Services, the interpreters, the translators and others, for their contribution to the success of our efforts.

May I now end this statement on a personal note? As this will be the last time I attend this Conference on Disarmament as the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations and leader of the Indian delegation to the CD, I wish to thank most sincerely all my colleagues of the Conference on Disarmament for their friendship and co-operation. I have enjoyed working with all of you at different stages and different phases of our work, and I leave these portals with a feeling of deep satisfaction that we have covered some important and useful ground in the two years that I have had the privilege of representing my country here. This task, I believe, is still unfinished, but it is too important to be left to chance or to any feeling of despondency. Indeed, the significance of our agenda for the good of humanity, for war and peace, for the well-being of mankind, demands that we redouble our efforts in our work while remaining conscious of the need for thorough preparation and a purposeful, pragmatic and forward-looking approach.

I should also like to offer my best wishes to the younger members of the CD delegations and the observer delegations, including my own, who have put in an enormous amount of work, and without whose efforts, I am sure, we as heads of our delegations would not have been able to play the kind of role which we have. I should also like to express my thanks and gratitude to the various

(The President)

representatives of the NGOs, the members of the media, and all others who, perhaps unseen but very active, have taken part in the deliberations, and we can depend on their continued interest in order to reach a larger public which, I am sure, continues to remain interested in the proceedings.

This, distinguished delegates, concludes my statement.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday 2 August at 10. a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.470
2 August 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 2 August 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Wisber Loeis (Indonesia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 470th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I should like to read a message addressed to the Conference by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, His Excellency Soeharto.

"During the month of August Indonesia has the honour for the second time to assume the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. It is particularly significant for Indonesia as on 17 August the Indonesian people will celebrate the 43rd anniversary of national independence.

"The Republic of Indonesia was born in the midst of the suffering resulting from the Second World War, a war which inflicted incalculable material damage as well as the loss of great number of human lives. Conscious of these tragic consequences, the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia requires its people to play an active part to prevent another tragedy of this magnitude from recurring by establishing an international world order and promoting the well-being of mankind based on independence, eternal peace and social justice.

"In order to fulfil this constitutional obligation, the People's Consultative Assembly, the supreme state organ and repository of the people's sovereignty, gave me the mandate to conduct a foreign policy aimed at increasing Indonesia's role in helping to solve international problems which endanger international peace and order and which are against justice and humanity, such as the arms race.

"The arms race, in particular as regards nuclear weapons, has reached a stage seriously threatening international peace and security. The international community is very much concerned over that situation, as it can be a cause of frightful war gravely endangering the survival of mankind and its civilization.

"The conclusion of the INF Treaty between United States of America and the USSR could be considered as a first step towards further efforts in achieving general and complete disarmament. Thus, it is hoped that this first step will be followed by further agreements leading towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

"History has testified that great strides achieved in science and technology have brought further improvement to the quality of mankind's life. This advancement undeniably has another aspect that could endanger the survival of mankind and its civilization, as it could be utilized not only to serve development efforts and peace but also for military purposes, especially for the production of weapons of mass destruction. If this situation is allowed to continue, it will result in intensifying the arms race and further exacerbate international security. Furthermore, the arms race continues to absorb the world's finite funds and resources, which are in fact more urgently needed by countries all over the world for their economic and social development.

(The President)

"In overcoming these problems, together we should immediately exert our common endeavour to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Accordingly, I would appeal to the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament to enhance its role and fulfil the obligations and duties entrusted to it by the international community to produce concrete results in all fields of negotiation.

"In conclusion, I extend my best wishes to all delegates in your undertakings, and may God speed and guide you towards the achievement of these lofty goals."

This concludes the message from the President of the Republic of Indonesia.

As President of the Conference for the month of August, I should like to thank Ambassador Teja of India for the effective manner in which he conducted our deliberations during July. His diplomatic skills led the second part of the 1988 session to a good start, sorting out a number of procedural issues which are sometimes not easy to settle. Ambassador Teja reviewed, in his closing statement, all pending organizational questions facing us. He did it so ably that I do not need to list them again. Whilst I do not underestimate the difficulties involved, I shall make every effort to deal with them, of course in close contact with the co-ordinators and every one of you. As always, I am sure that I can count on your co-operation to discharge my responsibilities as presiding officer to the best of my ability. I am convinced that I can also fully rely on the assistance of Ambassador Komatina, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Berasategui, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, and their staff.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have listed to address the Conference today the representative of New Zealand, and in accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 436th plenary meeting, I give the floor to Ambassador Fortune.

Mr. FORTUNE (New Zealand): Mr. President, it is a pleasure to be the first to greet you in your capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament for this month. You represent a country with which New Zealand has historically close ties in many areas of our bilateral relationship. We have the fullest confidence in your ability to guide our work to good purpose this month.

New Zealand wishes to make known its views on a number of issues of importance to the CD this session. It has already been a long year for the multilateral disarmament process, and with a hot summer in Geneva a feeling of exhaustion in the Conference is natural. We hope that this will be a passing

(Mr. Fortune)

phase. It must not be allowed to affect the pace and direction of the CD's work. The issues are too important for that. Now is the time to demonstrate the common and deep commitment to global peace and progress in disarmament which we declared at the special session, and subsequently.

The special session has come and gone, and the world of disarmament remains largely unaffected. The recent substantial progress in the bilaterals was noted and warmly endorsed. Like others, we hope it will continue on its present constructive course. But in the multilateral area, nothing has changed. Work continues, to positive end, in negotiations banning chemical weapons. But for the critical nuclear issues, progress remains impeded by two cross-fissures in the international terrain. First, progress in promoting global stability at lower levels of nuclear weaponry remains inhibited by conflicting judgements between the two major Powers over what should constitute the basis of strategic stability in the future. Secondly, in the area of horizontal non-proliferation, progress is stalled by continuing differences of perception over the merits, and role, of the NPT. In the area of disarmament machinery, nothing has changed. The judgement has been made that, notwithstanding the lack of progress recorded over the past decade in multilateral disarmament, the machine is well designed and constructed, and running smoothly enough. New Zealand does not share that view. It is a view which must come as a surprise to an international public concerned with the continuing threat posed to its own survival by nuclear weapons.

I have to confess that New Zealand is not of the school of thought which sees the special session as even a modest success. If the special session has bequeathed any lesson at all, it is that in the world of common security, we must not be deaf to the words of others. In the aftermath of the special session, the CD remains there to be used. If global security is ever to be fully realized, it is in the CD that the critical multilateral steps must be taken. It remains open to members and other interested States to use it to good and constructive effect. This remains the perennial challenge, and it will not go away.

New Zealand wants to play a full and constructive part in that process, but, as members will know, we continue to feel inhibited about this under the CD's current rules. At the special session, New Zealand together with Denmark and Ireland advanced some suggestions on how the CD could facilitate further participation by observer States. The ideas raised drew inspiration from the report of the Group of Seven submitted to the CD in April. We endorse the recent suggestions that the CD take up the Group's report and seek to reach agreement on at least some of its proposals. We hope that the participation of observers will feature in those proposals. My delegation would certainly be happy to elaborate on the issue in informal discussion.

Mr. President, much comment has been advanced over the years, not least at the special session last month, over what is called the autonomy of the Conference on Disarmament. New Zealand would like to make its views on this quite clear. It is true that the Conference, in its various previous incarnations, was conceived and created as a separate organ, independent of the United Nations system. Nor has any formal change to that heritage been instituted. But the CD must not be seen to operate as an autonomous body. To do so implies that the body, with its 40 member States, has interests that are

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sovereign from the international community as a whole. Whatever its history, the Conference on Disarmament negotiates today on behalf of the entire international community. Nobody denies that a collapse of the international security system today would bring consequences on a global scale. That being so, the CD must be seen, not as an autonomous sovereign body, but as accountable to the United Nations membership as whole.

I wish now to turn to the most important items on the CD's agenda. It is four years since a committee was last established to deal with the nuclear test ban item. This is an admission of failure on the part of the Conference. Those who are committed to an early comprehensive test ban prefer immediate negotiations. Those who see a CTB as a long-term goal prefer substantive work in the Committee which falls short of negotiations. No common ground has been found, and no work commences as a result.

Let us take a lesson from the special session and seek the common ground. Let discussion commence in the Committee on a mandate which includes, as a first item in the work programme, the role of a test ban in the disarmament process, including the timing of such a ban within that process. That will enable those who see good reason for deferring a CTB to explain to the Conference the reasons why it should be deferred. It will enable those who see merit in the urgent conclusion of a CTB, including New Zealand, to explain why testing should cease now. This can only serve to air the issue afresh and hopefully allow a better understanding to be gained. If nothing else, that much would represent progress.

In the chemical weapons committee work continues toward the conclusion of a global and comprehensive convention banning all chemical weapons. New Zealand recognizes the technical difficulties that lie in the path of a successful convention. We do not believe, however, that the conclusion of a convention before long is beyond our reach. Complex technical obstacles can be overcome with impressive rapidity, as the successful INF negotiations demonstrated. That achievement should serve as an inspiration for the negotiations before us. With due regard to the complexities of multilateral negotiations, the same applies in the area of chemical weapons. In the meantime, and in order to expedite the conclusion of the convention, further measures of transparency will be important. In this regard, as the most recent such measure, we especially welcome the initiative taken last week by the Government of the United States in making a declaration relating to its chemical weapon production facilities.

The outer space committee deals with one of the most important issues before the international community today. In New Zealand's view, there is considerable scope for work to be expedited within the Committee. The most effective way of preventing an arms race in outer space is to ensure that no weaponry is ever deployed there. For four decades the world has sustained what has been described as global stability without weapons in outer space. The further strengthening of global stability should proceed within that same constraint. The Charter of the United Nations of itself, will not prove sufficient to prevent an arms race in outer space, any more than it has proven sufficient to contain a nuclear arms race on Earth. The Charter has been supplemented by nuclear arms control agreements such as the partial test ban Treaty and the NPT. It has also been supplemented by the outer space Treaty -

(Mr. Fortune)

not undermined or made redundant by these treaties, but supplemented and strengthened by them. Nuclear weapons are deployed on Earth in the name of the self-defence provisions of the Charter. The same logic could allow nuclear weapons to be deployed in outer space. But the international community has banned this in the outer space Treaty. It is clear, therefore, that the right to deploy nuclear weapons in the name of self-defence is not irrevocable, but may be, and has been, forfeited in certain circumstances in the common interest. The same logic can apply to all weaponry in outer space. Technical problems such as definitions and verification are not insoluble.

The NSA committee has received some interesting proposals in recent sessions, and a new sense of purpose appears to be developing. New Zealand follows this issue with close attention, since extending and consolidating negative security assurances, consistent with the imperative of strategic stability, should be seen as one of the cardinal objectives in the move towards an alternative and safer international security system. In New Zealand's view, the security of non-nuclear-weapon States will not be enhanced merely by listing the current unilateral assurances in the non-binding General Assembly resolution. We would prefer to see the new assurances reduced to an agreed formula, preferably in a formal international instrument. In our view there is, in fact, less that divides the five NSA formulae than meets the eye. It is New Zealand's hope that the new atmosphere that has characterized the bilateral relationship in arms control in the past year can be brought to bear on the critical issue of negative security assurances. A breakthrough in these negotiations could yet be found.

These are, in my Government's view, the most important issues before the CD at present - nuclear testing, chemical weapons, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances. At present, progress is discernible in only one of them. In two others, progress could be expedited towards the common goal if the constructive approach displayed in the bilateral negotiations can only be brought to bear on the multilateral machinery. The same spirit, if transferred from the bilaterals to the multilaterals, would get an NTB committee going. This transference of spirit, of course, was the aspiration of the third special session. It is an aspiration left unfulfilled. But it is not beyond the imagination and capability of the Conference to fulfil it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement as well as for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Does any other Member wish to take the floor at this stage?

As I have no other business for today, I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 4 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.471
4 August 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 4 August 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Wisber Loeis (Indonesia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 471st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues its consideration of agenda item 5 entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Austria, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Canada, Venezuela and Bulgaria. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 436th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Austria, Ambassador Ceska.

Mr. CESKA (Austria): Mr. President, it is a privilege for me that my first intervention before the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament should take place under your chairmanship. May I join those who have congratulated you on assuming this responsibility for the month of August 1988, and offer you my best wishes for success?

In thanking you for having given me the floor I wish to concentrate my intervention on aspects of a possible ban on chemical weapons. This matter having been on the agenda of the CD and the CCD for almost 20 years, the history of negotiations on chemical weapons here in Geneva is a long one, with its ups and downs, with long periods when nobody really believed that an agreement was possible, given the complexity of the matter. And yet those who continued patiently to seek solutions and did not give up before the enormity of the task were right. Today there is a general belief that a multilateral convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has real chances of coming into being, even though the optimistic assessments made towards the end of 1987, holding that an agreement in the course of 1988 was not impossible, have to be revised.

Among the factors which give us hope that negotiations will culminate in agreement in the not too distant future, I wish to point out the following. Since the beginning of negotiations on a chemical weapon ban, everybody has been aware of the enormous difficulties involved in adequately verifying such an agreement. Now we have reached the stage of thorough examination and negotiation at a very technical level and agreement-oriented work partly in close co-operation with the civil chemical industries in our countries. It is a relatively new phenomenon that hopefully marks the beginning of the final run. At the same time we should not forget that a multilateral convention of similar significance, where effective monitoring posed enormous technical problems, was realized here in Geneva in 1972 - the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. The prospects of biological warfare are as frightening as the use of chemical substances, with their ability to destroy or cripple lives on a massive scale and at low cost. And the fact that biological substances, such as toxins, have effectively been banned, has encouraged those who for decades have tried to achieve a ban on chemical weapons.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

Though there is no need for me to tell this forum of the enormous political and technological difficulties which still have to be surmounted before a comprehensive ban can be achieved, may I nevertheless raise a few points? Politically, answers will have to be found for a number of basic questions. Will all countries which possess chemical weapons admit this fact? Will all countries with the capacity to produce chemical weapons renounce that capacity? Will all the countries which have chemical weapons be ready to destroy their stocks under adequate international verification and renounce future production or acquisition? In other words, will all the countries whose participation is essential for the success and effectiveness of such a ban be ready to accede to the convention banning chemical weapons? In this context we welcome the comprehensive information submitted by Ambassador Friedersdorf in his statement to the Conference on Disarmament on 28 July 1988 on the United States chemical weapon production facilities.

The technological difficulties are, of course, related to adequate verification. The planned concepts of verification, including challenge inspection, will hopefully prove adequate to ensure compliance with the convention. To meet this goal, we have, inter alia, to take into account the production of civil industries and the phenomenon of binary weapons. Although we are looking for the strictest monitoring possible, we have to admit that 100 per cent verification is not feasible. As a consequence challenge inspection should be conceived in such a way as to provide a sufficiently high risk for potential violators of the treaty to effectively deter them from doing so.

Of course, many problems remain to be solved. Inter alia, financial arrangements concerning the verification régime will have to be worked out. Given the scope of the task, the question of financing verification procedures will not be a negligible one, and fair solutions will have to be found.

An important prerequisite for a meaningful agreement is the readiness of the chemical industries in all countries to fully co-operate. In this context, my country attaches great importance to the chemical experts meeting we witnessed last week. An Austrian expert took part in its work. As in other countries, it was not not easy at the beginning to persuade the Austrian chemical industry to co-operate. The industry's major concerns relate to confidential information on production techniques and on clients, and should be taken duly into account. With the help of a process of information and explanation, chemical industry representatives have become prepared to make their own contribution to the future convention.

I take this opportunity to add that Austria has decided to establish, and is at present examining the legislative requirements for establishing, transfer and export controls on eight highly toxic chemical substances, five of which belong to the category of "key precursors", so that the necessary regulations can come into force as soon as possible. I further wish to confirm what the Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria, Mr. Mock, indicated at the Conference on Disarmament on 14 April 1988, namely, that on the basis of the "matrix version" submitted under CD/CW/WP.193, comprehensive country-wide research on data concerning production facilities and chemicals listed in schedules 2 and 3 of the annex to article VI of the convention is under way.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

After the horrifying experiences in Europe during the First World War, when poison gas was used on a large scale and caused death and invalidity to thousands of soldiers, chemical weapons have not been used on such a scale for nearly 60 years. The horror of this experience led to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. This Protocol, though incomplete, since it did not forbid the production or stockpiling of such substances and did not set out any verification procedures, was respected even during the most devastating moments of the Second World War.

Recently, however, chemical weapons have been massively used in the Gulf War. The world has become the horrified witness of those events with the help of modern mass media. Public opinion throughout the world has become more aware of the fact that the use of deadly chemical substances in armed conflicts is, towards the end of the twentieth century, not just a bad dream but a dreadful reality. The repeated use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War is indeed a fact, and I see a certain danger that mankind will get used to the idea of chemical arms being considered as standard weapons and chemical warfare becoming routine. It is therefore imperative to alert the international community in order to avoid a general state of mind which might finally tolerate the routine commission of such violations of international law. If, through a convention banning chemical weapons, we succeed in removing such weapons from the arsenals of all countries, we will not only do away with the threat of their use during a military conflict. It will also mean that such categories of weapons cannot be used as an instrument of political pressure outside a military confrontation.

Chemical warfare, for many years more an item in the history of warfare than a means of combat in actual use, has come back during the last few years as a cruel reality, victimizing both soldiers and the civilian population - old people, women, children, innocents, blind fate striking out against the unaware in a truly inhumane disruption of everyday life. In this regard, having read the two reports issued by the Security Council (S/20060 of 10 July 1988 and S/20063 of 25 July 1988), we cannot but be shocked by the now confirmed use of chemical weapons in the recent past in the Iran/Iraq conflict. We have had occasion in Austria to treat victims of this type of warfare. We have tried to find new means of medical care to treat and rehabilitate victims and develop new protective and first aid material. We consider that this is one specific way in which a permanently neutral country can contribute to stemming the tide of suffering brought about by chemical weapons. But this is not enough.

Austria feels deeply committed to full co-operation in the fight against chemical weapons being waged by the international community, and particularly the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, as the trustee of the international community as a whole. Austria does not possess or produce chemical weapons, and has no facilities to produce such weapons. The Austrian Government intends to take the necessary steps to be among the first group of States to sign the convention on the complete and general prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. We sincerely hope that, in spite of many questions still to be solved, such a convention will soon be finalized.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

At present we are facing favourable political parameters we have not witnessed for a very long time. East-West relations in general, and relations between the two major Powers in particular, reflect a will to come to mutually beneficial understandings. Regional conflicts which for many years have put a heavy strain on international relations seem to be on their way to solution. Developments in Afghanistan, in the Gulf War, around Kampuchea and Angola give rise to hope for a future of lessened international tension. These favourable conditions should make it possible to create the political will needed to ban the spectre of chemical warfare. Let this "window of opportunity" not pass by!

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Austria for his statement and for the kind words which he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Permit me first of all, Sir, to express my satisfaction at the beginning of your presidency, and to wish you success in this post. It is also a pleasure for us to see beside you your predecessor in the post of representative of Indonesia to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Tarmidzi.

The question of the interrelationship between multilateral and bilateral efforts in the field of disarmament negotiations has been raised frequently in the United Nations and in other international forums, particularly here at the Conference on Disarmament. As the discussion has shown, a general view has taken shape that the bilateral and multilateral processes should go in parallel, each supplementing and enriching the other. One of the means of ensuring this mutual enrichment, in our view, is the provision of information to the participants in multilateral forums concerning the course of the bilateral negotiations.

The practice of informing the participants in multilateral forums of progress in bilateral talks is already fairly well developed. Here I might mention the parallel presentation by the Soviet and American delegations to the Conference on Disarmament of the documents of the Washington summit, including the INF Treaty, the Soviet-American Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres together with its two protocols, a joint statement at the Moscow summit and the Agreement between the USSR and the United States on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles. By this means the Soviet Union and the United States were responding to a call by the United Nations General Assembly, which in resolution 42/38 A of 30 November 1987 invited the two Governments "to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in those negotiations".

We have also carefully studied the proposals made during the spring session of the Conference regarding the need for the Conference to be informed systematically of progress in the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations, and also regarding the problems and difficulties that arise. We agree with the view that the provision of such information can act as a stimulus to progress in the consideration of the problems on the agenda of the Conference. For instance, the Conference can gain experience which would be of value for work

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on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons from the verification provisions developed for the INF Treaty. In addition, the goals towards which we are working under items 2 and 5 of the agenda of the Conference are related to the topic of the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

At the same time, we consider that the multilateral discussions can in turn stimulate the bilateral negotiations. Today the Soviet Union, pursuing its approach of principle concerning internationalization of disarmament efforts and the provision of information to the international community on progress in our bilateral talks with the United States on the complex of arms limitation and reduction issues, is taking a new step in that direction. Allow me to introduce to you the head of the Soviet delegation to the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space arms, Ambassador A. Oboukhov, who will inform the Conference of progress at those negotiations. With your permission, Mr. President, I would now like to hand over to Ambassador A. Oboukhov.

Mr. OBOUKHOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all I would like to express my appreciation at being given an opportunity to speak at a plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, and to inform its participants about the Soviet assessment of the state of affairs at the Soviet-United States negotiations on nuclear and space arms taking place in Geneva.

First, a few words about the history of the negotiations. As you know, in accordance with an agreement reached at foreign minister level between the USSR and the United States, the talks on nuclear and space arms started in the spring of 1985. From the very outset of the negotiations, at which each side is represented by a single delegation, three groups were set up, on space arms, strategic offensive arms and also intermediate-range nuclear systems. Nine rounds have been held. On 12 July this year work began at the tenth round of the negotiations. Those are the statistics.

Now what are the concrete results of the delegations' work over the last three and a half years? As of today, the most important result is the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The historic significance of that agreement, signed during the Soviet-United States summit in Washington last December, is that for the first time it eliminates an entire class of Soviet and American nuclear arms and sets new standards for arms control. In all approximately 2,500 missiles are to be eliminated. The parties have undertaken not to produce in the future land-based ballistic or cruise missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometres and not to flight-test them. Thus a practical start has been made on building a world without nuclear arms. The INF Treaty has entered into force - a protocol on the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the Treaty was signed at the Soviet-American summit in Moscow in May/June this year. Since then a number of activities related to the inspection functions provided for in the Treaty have been carried out. The strictly monitored process of elimination of intermediate-range and short-range missiles has begun. The INF Treaty is a concrete expression of new thinking in politics, now that mankind is facing in all its magnitude the problem of ensuring its survival and preventing a nuclear catastrophe.

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It should be stressed that the programme of nuclear disarmament proposed by M.S. Gorbachev on 15 January 1986 has been of fundamental importance in developing the Soviet approach to negotiations on nuclear and space arms in general and the issue of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in particular. That programme, building on the realities of the current international situation and the practical possibilities arising from it, sets out conceptual and at the same time concrete aspects of the struggle to achieve a nuclear-free world by the year 2000. Thereby Soviet diplomacy has been provided with clear guidelines for active efforts aimed at reaching that goal.

The Soviet-American summits in Geneva in October 1985 and in Reykjavik in November 1986 were of paramount importance in moving the two sides towards the INF Treaty. Thus the mutual understanding reached at the Geneva summit to the effect that the USSR and the United States will continue to be guided by the conviction that a nuclear war must never be fought and cannot be won has been of great importance for constructive progress at the negotiations. At that time the two sides stated that they were firmly resolved to prevent any war, nuclear or conventional, between the USSR and the United States and that neither would seek military superiority over the other. That declaration made at Geneva was reaffirmed by the two sides at the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Washington.

There is every reason to say that the INF Treaty embodies that declaration in the specific area it covers. When difficulties which seemed insurmountable arose at the negotiations, the creative search continued for the most appropriate solutions. The initiatives put forward in that connection during 1987 by M.S. Gorbachev offer striking examples of a wise balance, flexibility, an ability to take all factors into account in the search for solutions that serve the interests of the USSR and the United States, their allies, as well as other countries. It is also necessary to emphasize the role played by Soviet-American meetings at the foreign minister level in the elaboration of the INF Treaty. Five such meetings were held between April and November 1987, that is, during the period of the most active and substantive work on the Treaty. Soviet Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and United States Secretary of State G. Shultz resolved many issues of fundamental importance which were blocking the way towards agreement. As a result - with active support from public opinion and many States - a document was drawn up which embodies a balance between the two sides' interests and reliably serves to strengthen universal security.

The Soviet Union, faithful to the ideals of nuclear disarmament, views the INF Treaty as a first practical step along this difficult but perfectly feasible path. All the more reason to be disturbed by the current talk in some NATO circles of measures to "compensate" for the American missiles being eliminated in Western Europe. Clearly this would run counter to the growing trend towards the reduction of nuclear arms and the lessening of the nuclear danger.

The INF Treaty must not remain an isolated event in the struggle to eliminate nuclear arms. The conclusion of the INF Treaty signifies that the entire international community has gained invaluable practical experience

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enabling it to proceed further without losing momentum. In the process of disarmament delay is unacceptable. The Soviet side would like to see progress in all areas of disarmament without any pre-conditions or linkages.

The INF Treaty is innovative both for its objective - the complete elimination of an entire class of Soviet and United States nuclear arms - and for the novelty and scope of its verification provisions. The system of measures to verify compliance with the obligations assumed by the two sides under the Treaty is truly unprecedented both in scope and in depth. We consider that, since what is involved here is the elimination of an entire class of Soviet and United States nuclear missiles, issues of verification are of particular importance too. In these circumstances certainty that the Treaty will be strictly observed becomes not only a question of confidence-building but also a question of meeting legitimate security interests. For this very reason the Soviet side advocated from the outset that agreement should be sought on an effective and stringent verification system within the framework of the INF Treaty, based on the use of national technical means of verification in conjunction with on-site inspections.

I would like briefly to address the basic parameters of the verification system established under the INF Treaty. The provision of baseline data by the parties, within the framework of a Memorandum of Understanding which is an integral part of the Treaty, facilitates the implementation of verification procedures. These data include both numerical indicators and certain qualitative characteristics of arms to be eliminated. The level of detail and the volume of data are unprecedented. In order to ensure strict verification and achievement of the agreed goals, the parties agreed to put documentation on the negotiating table including photographs of arms and site diagrams of missile operating bases and missile support facilities, among them production facilities, which used to be kept in secret safes, sealed as we say, with seven seals. This is a striking manifestation of glasnost in the new phase of the struggle for nuclear disarmament which has been initiated by the INF Treaty.

One of the Treaty's distinguishing features is that it provides not only for the complete elimination of all deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, but also for cessation of their production. At the same time, proper verification of compliance with this obligation is provided for. In particular, it has been agreed that continuous monitoring of production will be instituted at the exits from a plant in Votkinsk in the USSR and an American plant in Magna, Utah. This will provide an assurance that the Soviet side has stopped production of "SS-20" missiles and that "Pershing-2" missiles are no longer produced in the United States. Periodic inspections will help in verifying the non-production of launchers of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles of the relevant range. A list of facilities subject to such inspections is contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. On-site inspections are provided for both on the territory of the USSR and the United States and on the territories of countries where missiles to be eliminated are deployed: the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia on the one hand, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands on the other. Inspections within an established quota may be conducted throughout the entire period of elimination of missiles and during the subsequent 10 years. The USSR and the United States

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have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per year during the first three years after the entry into force of the Treaty, 15 in the next five years and 10 in the five years after that.

In addition to continuous monitoring at the exits from manufacturing plants and inspections within established quotas to verify that ballistic and cruise missile launchers are not being produced, the following inspections are provided for: baseline inspections, inspections to confirm that missile operating bases and missile support facilities (with the exception of missile production facilities) have been eliminated, and inspections of the elimination process with respect to intermediate-range and short-range missiles. Also provided for are inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated under the Treaty, with the exception of former missile production facilities.

Agreement was reached on the common obligations of the parties relating to the procedure for providing notifications of an intention to conduct an inspection, the obligations of the inspected and the inspecting parties with regard to such notifications, procedures for arrival and accommodation of inspectors and transport to the inspection site, including procedures for the use of measuring equipment, general rules for conducting inspections, privileges and immunities of inspectors and air crew members, etc. The procedure for conducting inspections on the territories of basing countries is governed by agreements with them which are based on the relevant provisions of the INF Treaty.

Of particular value was the Soviet-American agreement on nuclear risk reduction centres which was signed in Washington in September 1987 at the foreign minister level. The facsimile communication line between these centres is used to transmit notifications and other relevant information in connection with the INF Treaty. The parties have agreed to establish a Special Verification Commission to consider and resolve questions relating to compliance with the Treaty. All this provides a reliable system to verify that the obligations assumed are strictly and unswervingly complied with. The verification system provided for in the INF Treaty is already demonstrating its potentialities. Thus, in the process of preparing the Treaty for ratification, the two sides, using the Treaty provisions as a basis, managed to find mutually acceptable solutions to a number of issues connected with the implementation of verification measures. This testifies to the fact that, when there is good will on both sides and a common desire to build up confidence and remove concern, it is possible to resolve the most complex problems of verification in a satisfactory manner. This was clearly demonstrated by the experience gained in the conclusion of the INF Treaty and the first steps in its implementation. I consider that this experience should not be limited to this Treaty alone. It can and must be used - taking into account the specific characteristics of each issue, of course - in working out other bilateral or multilateral agreements in the area of arms control and disarmament.

It must be said that the USSR and the United States have decided to use this experience in a creative way in the process of reaching agreement on verification provisions in the draft treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons. As a result a number of provisions of vital

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importance in this area have already been agreed. We think that the spirit of innovation inherent in the verification mechanism which was created under the INF Treaty, as well as some of the specific approaches and solutions contained in it, can be successfully used in tackling problems arising in the complete destruction of chemical weapons and cessation of production and preparing a draft convention on the subject.

The conclusion of the INF Treaty has dramatically demonstrated that verification, no matter how complex some of its aspects may be, need not be an obstacle to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. Disarmament is a global problem, and it must be approached in such a way that the gains achieved in one area serve as an incentive and a nutrient for a good harvest to be reaped in other areas.

After the INF Treaty had been concluded, the negotiations on nuclear and space arms were somewhat reorganized. Of the original three groups in the negotiations, two now remain, one on strategic offensive arms and the other on space arms. At present, therefore, work at these negotiations is focusing on the two principal goals - the preparation of a draft treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms, and a separate agreement on issues relating to the ABM Treaty.

Negotiations on nuclear and space arms are part of the process of positive changes now under way in the world. The foremost result of these changes is that the risk of nuclear war has been diminished. Following the major agreements that have been reached, the emphasis in international affairs is shifting from confrontation to co-operation, mutual understanding, negotiations with the prospect of concrete results, primarily in the area of weapons of mass destruction. Soviet-American relations have improved. The pan-European process has become more vigorous, both at the international level and particularly in terms of public participation. The Geneva agreements have been concluded, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan has begun.

It is the wish of the Soviet side that the negotiations on nuclear and space arms, and the agreements that may be reached there, should serve as a solid contribution towards further normalization of the international situation. This is all the more necessary since the situation in the world is still complex and contradictory. No radical change for the better has yet taken place. The danger that human civilization, life itself will be annihilated, still remains. Hence the need for new vigorous efforts aimed at reducing military expenditure, diminishing and ultimately eliminating the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. The USSR and its allies are united in their desire to achieve these goals. This is demonstrated by the results of the recent meeting in Warsaw of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty. Analysing the situation in Europe and the world at large, as well as the burning issues of today - the prevention of war, the halting of the arms race and a decisive turn towards disarmament - the meeting of the Committee outlined priorities in this field. Amongst them is the conclusion of a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms, subject to compliance with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972 and non-withdrawal from it for an agreed period.

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What, in concrete terms, is the situation now at the negotiations? As you know, major decisions on the entire range of nuclear and space arms issues were taken as early as December 1987 at the Washington summit. Agreement was reached on a number of conceptual problems relating to the negotiations, and both delegations were instructed to work vigorously towards the completion of a joint draft of the future treaty. Moreover, a formula was found concerning compliance with and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Since the Washington summit both sides have done a great deal towards reaching an agreement on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons. In that process a special role has again been played by the Soviet-American meetings held regularly - virtually every month - at the foreign minister level, where the most important problems in the current negotiations are discussed. As a result, the joint drafts of four documents have been prepared: the draft treaty itself on 50 per cent reductions in offensive arms, as well as drafts of a memorandum of understanding, a protocol on inspections and a protocol on conversion or elimination.

The joint draft treaty reflects the earlier understanding on establishing ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic delivery systems and 6,000 warheads, as well as agreement on subceilings of 4,900 in the aggregate of ICBM and SLBM warheads and 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles. The draft treaty also records agreement between the parties that, as a result of the reductions, the aggregate throw weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be brought down to approximately 50 per cent of the existing level, and that this level will not be exceeded. Understanding has also been reached that in future work on the treaty the parties will act on the understanding that on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types the counting rule will include the number of warheads referred to in the joint statement of 10 December 1987, and the number of warheads that will be attributed to each new type of ballistic missile, which is subject to negotiation. Agreement has also been reached on a rule that heavy bombers equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and short-range missiles will count as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and one warhead against the 6,000 limit. Of course, this counting rule, which was agreed back in Reykjavik, will apply if the 600-kilometre threshold, also agreed before, is used to divide air-to-surface missiles into long-range and shorter-range missiles.

The drafts of the protocol on inspections, the protocol on conversion or elimination and the memorandum of understanding, which are integral parts of the treaty, build on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, extending and refining them as necessary to meet the more demanding requirements of the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The verification measures will include as a minimum the exchange and updating of data, baseline inspections, on-site observation of elimination of relevant systems, continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production facilities to confirm the output of weapons to be limited, etc.

Unfortunately it must be noted that we failed to reach complete agreement on the draft texts of the above documents by the time of the Moscow summit. The difficulties that arose here were largely objective in nature. They are caused by the highly complicated nature of the problems under discussion - what is involved, after all, is radical reductions in armaments of various kinds and types. It is necessary to find agreed approaches to every one of

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them, both in terms of methods of effectively limiting them and in terms of reliable verification of compliance with the obligations to be assumed. And this is not an easy task.

The Soviet-American summit in Moscow gave new, important impetus to the work of the delegations at the Geneva talks. Thus the discussions in Moscow led to a substantial broadening of common ground on such important matters as verification of mobile ICBM launchers, and also limitations on long-range ALCMs and heavy bombers. The additional common ground has been recorded in documents exchanged by the two sides. The delegations are to place these understandings on record in the joint draft text of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons. But of course, it is necessary to go further and seek to resolve the above issues completely.

It is also of great significance for the positive development of the negotiations that the joint statement adopted at the end of the Moscow meeting reaffirmed the language on ABM Treaty issues agreed at the Washington summit in December 1987. The Soviet and United States leaders directed their representatives at the negotiations to prepare a joint draft of a separate agreement and continue work on its associated protocol. As a result of the Moscow meeting the parties expressed their shared conviction that the extensive work done provides the basis for concluding a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms which will promote strategic stability and strengthen security not only for the Soviet and American peoples, but for the whole of mankind. The parties have agreed to continue their efforts in this area energetically and purposefully. They have also reached an understanding in principle that, once the remaining problems have been solved and the treaty and its associated documents agreed, they will be signed without delay. Thus the Moscow summit gives both negotiating teams a joint mandate, drawing on the progress already achieved, to seek the early preparation of the treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons in strict compliance with the ABM Treaty.

It is with these intentions that the Soviet delegation came back to Geneva for the current round of negotiations. Following instructions from its leadership, the Soviet delegation has taken the course of accelerating the negotiation process from the very beginning of the round. For the past three weeks we have been introducing an entire range of proposals to ensure further progress. They include the Soviet draft protocol regarding the aggregate throw weight of ICBMs and SLBMs, tabled as early as the first plenary meeting of this round. This Soviet move, which takes into account the considerations put forward by the United States delegation, allows us to resolve the issue of throw weight on a mutually acceptable compromise basis. The Soviet side has put forward constructive proposals concerning the section of the future treaty on conversion or elimination to be implemented for the purpose of achieving and maintaining radically reduced aggregate limits established for relevant systems under the treaty. The Soviet approach makes it possible to reach complete agreement on this section of the future treaty. The USSR delegation has also pursued a dynamic course with respect to the materialization of new areas of agreement on issues relating to verification of mobile ICBM launchers, and also restrictions on long-range ALCMs and heavy bombers. We have tabled a series of formulations to this effect for inclusion in the documents being elaborated. We look forward to a constructive response from the American side to this and other Soviet proposals.

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It should be noted that the very first weeks of the current negotiating round have already seen a degree of progress in some areas. But we have to be self-critical - this progress is very modest. We are convinced that it could have been much more significant. There is a great amount of work that has yet to be done to resolve outstanding issues. For this work to be accomplished, good will and readiness to search for solutions, backed up by specific and constructive steps at the negotiations, are needed on both sides.

It should be noted that progress at the negotiations is largely dependent on the resolution of such issues as compliance with and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and also limitations on the deployment of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles.

Why is it these questions that have now come to the fore in the negotiations? Let us take outer space issues. The point is that there is a deep and organic interrelationship between radical reductions in strategic offensive arms and the reaching of an agreement which would confirm the obligations of the USSR and the United States as regards compliance with the ABM Treaty for the next 9 or 10 years. Indeed, an extension of the arms race to outer space would be fraught with the danger of a very serious destabilization of the world situation in its entirety. M.S. Gorbachev stresses: "Normal logic cannot grasp the idea of curbing strategic offensive arms on Earth while building a bridge to extend the arms race into outer space". Clearly these two processes would be incompatible.

What in concrete terms is the Soviet approach to the issues related to the ABM Treaty? We would like the agreement reached in Washington on 10 December 1987 to be reflected precisely and fully in appropriate legal language in the provisions of a separate agreement to this effect. To put it differently, the agreement being elaborated should incorporate the obligation to comply with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, not to withdraw from the Treaty for an agreed period, and to hold intensive discussions on strategic stability not later than three years before the end of the period of non-withdrawal.

The conclusion of an agreement on compliance with and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period is a necessary prerequisite for radical reductions in strategic offensive arms. Without it such reductions would be impossible. In this connection we believe that the obligation not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty must be clear and unambiguous. It must be an absolute obligation. Only then would it play a stabilizing role in the context of deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons. This approach flows directly from the essence of the Washington agreement. This agreement also clearly stipulates that the ABM Treaty must be complied with as signed in 1972. Thus, the language agreed in Washington reaffirms the limitations imposed on the parties by the ABM Treaty, and cannot be considered as permitting the so-called "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. It would also run counter to the spirit and letter of the Washington agreement if the right of the parties to deploy a large-scale ABM system, including a space-based system, immediately after the period of non-withdrawal, was laid down now. Such an approach would be tantamount to an attempt to predetermine the outcome of future negotiations on strategic stability. Thus we favour reaching agreement on compliance with

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and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period, and not on a joint shift to deployment of the ABM systems which are prohibited under the ABM Treaty.

In the course of the previous negotiating round the parties succeeded in preparing a joint draft of a protocol to the ABM Treaty. However, the many brackets that remain in the draft require further serious work to remove differences in the parties' approaches. The Soviet side proceeds from the view that the verification, confidence-building and predictability measures reflected in the protocol should also be aimed at providing the parties with a firm assurance that the ABM Treaty will be strictly complied with. To this end we propose that the following measures should be carried out. First, an exchange of data on ABM-related work, meetings of experts, reciprocal visits to test ranges where work in this area is carried out. Second, exchange of information to prevent uncertainty as regards compliance with the obligations assumed by the parties. Third, verification of compliance with the obligations assumed, by means of measures including inspections of facilities with respect to which the parties feel concern. Fourth, consultations to examine situations which one of the parties considers as jeopardizing its supreme interests. During the consultations the parties would use all available means to resolve the situations on a mutually acceptable basis. Thus these Soviet proposals too serve as a good basis for agreement.

The Soviet delegation at the talks is resolved to do everything necessary to carry out the instructions given by the leaders of the USSR and the United States as a result of their meeting in Moscow, i.e. to prepare the joint draft of a separate agreement which would clearly and fully reflect the Washington formula on ABM Treaty issues, and to finalize the protocol to the Treaty.

The limitation of long-range SLCMs poses another problem of utmost importance for the future treaty on strategic offensive arms. This new and dangerous kind of strategic offensive weapon must be limited in a way that can be relied on. This is indispensable to ensure the effectiveness and permanence of the future treaty, to guarantee that it will not be circumvented. As we understand it, both sides recognize the importance of this matter. This can be seen from the mutual obligation assumed under the Washington joint statement to establish ceilings on long-range SLCMs with effective verification. In the course of the negotiations the Soviet side, in keeping with that obligation, has put forward and substantiated a comprehensive programme of far-reaching measures in this area, including a proposal for specific numerical limits on the deployment of long-range SLCMs. I would like to address the issues of verification in more detail because, as our negotiating partners have noted, it is these questions that pose the greatest difficulty.

The Soviet side has proposed that the entire life cycle, as it were, of long-range SLCMs should be subject to strict verification. Verification would start with the establishment of continuous perimeter and portal monitoring at the production facilities for such missiles. In this way each SLCM produced would immediately be counted. Continuous verification would also be established at designated arming stations where SLCMs are equipped with nuclear warheads, following which they are loaded on submarines and surface

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ships of the agreed types. We propose that the number of such arming stations should be limited, and that the loading of SLCMs on submarines and surface vessels elsewhere, including in the open sea, should be prohibited. If at the time of the entry into force of the treaty on strategic offensive arms either party has submarines or surface ships already equipped with long-range SLCMs, that party will have to display each such missile for counting purposes. The Soviet side also favours the extensive use of national technical means of verification. The American side has received a proposal for a joint experiment involving the use of remote verification equipment to determine the presence of nuclear weapons on board ships.

Should concern arise in the process of verification using such means, inspections could be conducted directly on board a submarine or surface vessel which was undergoing such verification. This would remove any possible misunderstandings. Much importance is attached to inspections in general in the Soviet approach to the issues of verification of long-range SLCMs. For instance, we propose that short-notice inspections should be conducted at locations where either side considers covert deployment of long-range SLCMs is occurring. This means that any warship on either side would if necessary be subject to inspection on a reciprocal basis. I believe that such a radical verification measure speaks for itself. Obviously all the provisions of the treaty under which the limitations laid down may be verified would be applied to SLCMs and other kinds of strategic offensive arms. These include the exchange of relevant data, the provision of notifications and the conduct of inspections to check the accuracy of the baseline data that the sides would exchange upon the entry into force of the treaty, as well as verification of elimination procedures, etc. The reliability of the verification would also be assured by the Soviet proposal to limit the number of types of surface vessels and submarines on which long-range SLCMs may be located. Taken together, all these forms and methods of verification would offer the parties an assurance that the obligations assumed were being strictly adhered to. In short, the problem of limiting the numbers of long-range SLCMs with proper verification can and must be resolved. Failing this, the treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms would be ineffective.

In the course of the negotiations we will be trying to persuade the United States to accept the effective and far-reaching methods for verifying long-range SLCMs that we have proposed. Once again I would like to stress that the Soviet side attaches particular importance to questions of the strict verification of compliance with the limitations to be established. This approach of principle was reaffirmed by M.S. Gorbachev in his report to the recent nineteenth All-Union Party Conference. The Soviet delegation intends, as in the past, to pursue this approach consistently in the practical work at the negotiations. We are convinced that effective verification measures should apply equally to all strategic offensive weapons covered by the future treaty, including ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers and long-range ALCMs and SLCMs. Any discrimination, any selective approach is inadmissible here. We are looking forward to constructive co-operation with the American side in devising a reliable verification system suited to the goals and purposes of the future treaty.

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Substantial progress has already been made towards a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons. In accordance with the instructions given to the delegations by the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States at their meeting in Moscow, the Soviet side is ready to work actively and productively in both groups, on space arms and on strategic offensive arms. We do not wish to lose momentum, but to pursue the speedy finalization of the joint drafts of the documents in question, in co-operation with the United States representatives at the negotiations. The future treaty can only be the fruit of joint efforts on both sides. All countries, all peoples, cherish the hope that the Soviet-American treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons in the context of compliance with the ABM Treaty will soon become a reality. The interests of overall security and prevention of the threat of war demand it.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank the leader of the Soviet delegation to the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms, Ambassador Oboukhov, for the information that he has just conveyed to us. I should also like to express my appreciation to him for having come to the Conference to present the views of his Government on matters of vital importance for this single multilateral negotiating forum. In addition I would like to thank Ambassador Nazarkin for his introductory statement. I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative of Canada, Ambassador Marchand.

Mr. MARCHAND (Canada): Mr. President, may I begin by officially extending my warmest welcome to you and congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency for this month? As a relatively new arrival myself, I can well appreciate the position in which you must find yourself in assuming this important responsibility so soon after your arrival in Geneva; and I pledge the full co-operation of my delegation and myself in assisting you in your work. I should also like to express my delegation's appreciation of the outstanding work of your immediate predecessor, Ambassador Teja, and his delegation, during his presidency for the month of July. Further, on both my behalf and that of my delegation, I offer a warm welcome to the other new representatives to the Conference, and I extend to Ambassador Tarmidzi and other departing colleagues our best wishes for continued success.

Last week I offered some observations on the results of SSOD-III and the implications Canada saw for our future work on outer space. This week, I should like to comment briefly on our current negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons, and specifically on the issues we are addressing during this summer session. In focusing on some of the issues that raise particular concerns for Canada, my observations will by no means be exhaustive or categorical.

There is a gratifying degree of consensus, noticeable at SSOD-III, on the importance and urgency of realizing the proposed convention on CW. We should build upon this during the remainder of the 1988 session. Already, even though we are only some four weeks into the summer session, we are pleased to note the serious, business-like approach that negotiators are taking in their examination of the outstanding issues. As I said last spring, my Government favours such a measured pace, without artificial deadlines. But the Canadian Government also recognizes that there are compelling reasons for pressing ahead as hard as we can in our negotiations. Not only is our goal more

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clearly in sight, but the recent repeated use of chemical weapons raises the increasing danger of chemical weapons appearing to be effective as weapons of war. My Government therefore shares the sense of urgency to suppress or choke off their temptation. My Government is convinced that this is one genie that we can and must put back into the bottle - and quickly.

In offering some observations on the issues currently being discussed in the Ad hoc Committee and its working groups, I should emphasize again that, overall, we are pleased with the workmanlike, unpolemical approach delegations are pursuing. We see several encouraging developments. We also see some that perhaps are not so encouraging. We welcome the promising signs of progress on substantial, even critical, issues in articles VIII and IX and in the final articles. We are hopeful for similar signs in our discussions on articles X and XI, although I am obliged to note that some proposals put forward this week on article X seem to be regressive rather than progressive, in terms of the consensus that appeared to be emerging during our spring discussions.

We are rather more concerned about the article VI discussions, however, where the exchange of views seems rather circular. I refer specially to the recently concluded examination of schedule [1] and schedule [4], where there are few signs of real progress since last January's discussions. We ought to remind ourselves that the issues being discussed under these sections constitute one of the most critical areas remaining to be confronted. We believe a number of our problems here may be traced back to our lack of clearly understood definitions, especially what constitutes a chemical weapon. If this situation continues, and if our discussions in Working Group B do not significantly advance our common understanding of the definitions, perhaps we should consider earmarking article II as the priority issue for more detailed discussions during next winter's inter-sessionals.

Concerning Group B's discussions on article V, I had hoped to comment favourably on its progress in reviewing the proposals of the United States and USSR on chemical weapons production facilities. Like many other delegations, however, my delegation was concerned to learn last week that Mr. Macedo's efforts to introduce elements of these proposals into the text of article V have run into difficulties. We strongly support Mr. Macedo's call for the early resolution of these - hopefully minor - problems, so that we can proceed with the appropriate amendment of the text of article V.

Concerning the rest of Group B's current agenda, I should like to address a specific comment to article IV and the general question of the order of destruction. In developing an agreed régime for the phased destruction of chemical weapons, my Government agrees that one of the primary concerns is to ensure that this process does not cause any diminution of the national security of any State party during the very sensitive 10-year destruction phase. I must again state, however, that my Government cannot support proposals intended to address these legitimate concerns about security that have the net effect of permitting the production and proliferation of chemical weapons during this crucial phase. Given the central purpose of the convention - the complete elimination of chemical weapons for all time - it seems fundamentally illogical to have the convention sanction any production of CW after it has come into effect.

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

Turning to article VIII, we are impressed with the solid progress achieved by Working Group C under Mr. Numata's able chairmanship. We look forward to that Group realizing substantial further progress on the remaining substantive political issues, particularly on the question of the composition, procedure and decision-making of the Executive Council. I should like to note here that my Government is continuing to focus a major part of its own research efforts in the area of the international inspectorate - and the somewhat related area of the national authority (article VII) - and hopes to submit the results of our research for the Committee's consideration early in next year's session. (In this respect, I might also note for the record that we are distributing the latest addenda to our compendium of chemical weapons documentation.)

Similarly, we have been gratified to note the productive discussions in Group C on challenge inspections (article IX). Like others, we endorse Mr. Numata's view that the differences may be more apparent than real, and we think the open-ended discussions Mr. Numata has been conducting demonstrate the validity of this view. We recognize that a primary purpose of challenge inspection is to resolve the concerns of the requesting State. But we also endorse the argument that such events are of equal concern for the convention as a whole and, thus, for all States party. Our thinking, in this regard, reflects Canada's long-standing belief in and commitment to genuine multilateralism, and our firm view that the convention being negotiated here, if it is to retain its authority and legitimacy for all States party, must be an effective multilateral treaty.

Our delegation has been following with great interest the discussions on the final articles of the convention, and we very much appreciate Ambassador Sujka's skilful tacking through the shoals of these relatively uncharted waters. My Government has considered carefully arguments recently put forward in the exchange of views on article XII concerning the convention's relationship to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We were particularly struck by the arguments of Ambassador von Stülpnagel and the Belgian representative. On reflection, my authorities are of the view that, from a strict, legal point of view, article XII may not in fact be necessary. In the light of the clear prohibitions found in article I (especially paragraphs 1 and 3), and of the provisions of article 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it may be that article XII is redundant and could be eliminated.

More generally, I should like to comment on another legal issue that is relevant to a number of provisions in the convention - the question of the use of the terms "jurisdiction and control". Canada has particular difficulties with one aspect of these commonly used, but not commonly understood, terms: and that concerns the question of the responsibilities of States party for the activities outside their territory of foreign-incorporated subsidiaries of private corporations incorporated under their own laws.

For reasons that I will not detail here, it has been a long-standing policy of Canadian Governments not to accept that one State can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over enterprises incorporated under the laws of another State, even if they are subsidiaries owned or controlled by its nationals. It is our Government's firm view that the State under whose laws

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the subsidiary is incorporated has exclusive jurisdiction for activities of this separate legal entity within its own territory. This fundamental policy underlies our Government's approach to a wide range of issues arising in the international arena. While we can well understand the concerns of those who advocate extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction under the chemical weapons convention, I must put on record that my Government has not yet heard any compelling arguments that would cause it to alter its fundamental policy on this matter to achieve the purposes of this convention. Moreover, we believe that the purposes of this convention can be achieved without resort to provisions encompassing extraterritorial reach. We are not convinced of the need for any references to jurisdictional issues in the convention.

Ambassador Friedersdorf, in a recent intervention, discussed two other issues, on which I should like to comment briefly. The first concerns the Soviet proposal for a multilateral trial exercise to develop and test procedures for inspections of chemical industry facilities. One major consideration for Canada is that preliminary surveys of our industry indicate that, depending upon the thresholds eventually to be agreed, Canada may not possess commercial facilities that would be subject to routine inspection under the convention. Notwithstanding this possibility, however, we consider that the Soviet proposal merits our support in principle and our close consideration. The results of any such multilateral exercise, providing that it can be properly structured and organized, would be extremely relevant for our further work on article VIII and the organization of the international inspectorate.

The second issue concerns the protection of confidential commercial information. This issue figured large in our consultations with industrial representatives two weeks ago, and is a subject of particular concern to our delegation as well as several others around this table. Clearly, for us negotiators, the primary consideration is to ensure that the information necessary for the effective implementation of the convention is provided by industry. But we must also be prepared to take due account of industry's legitimate concern that commercially sensitive data is adequately protected. Ambassador Friedersdorf emphasized inter alia the need for industry to specify what types of information are truly confidential. I agree that this is an essential requirement. But I would also argue that a priority focus for us here is to examine more closely actual ways in which such information can be protected, perhaps - as others have suggested - by drawing upon precedents available from other international organizations and from our own national procedures. My authorities have been considering approaches to this issue of protecting confidentiality and hope to present our further views in future discussions.

I think it is evident from the number of issues I have raised that our negotiations are addressing substantial concerns in a serious manner. I find this encouraging, and I believe that, if we can maintain the momentum and continue to search for practical solutions to our problems, the 1988 session may well prove to be one of our most productive yet.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. On behalf of the Indonesian delegation, may I also thank Ambassador Marchand for his kind words to Ambassador Tarmidzi? I now give the floor to the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhardat.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Thank you, Mr. President. Before starting my statement I would like to say how pleased we are to see you presiding over our work during this month of August. We would like to offer you our full co-operation and wish you every success in carrying out your very delicate task. I should also like to stress our gratitude to your predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador Teja of India, for his very wise and intelligent guiding of the work of the Conference during July.

During this summer session a number of colleagues have left their posts as representatives of their countries at the Conference. We will miss all of them and would like to wish them personal happiness as well as success in their future tasks. Also during this summer session we have been joined in the Conference by new representatives, including yourself, Sir, and also Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Ruoro of Kenya and Ambassador de Rivero of Peru. We would like to extend our most cordial welcome to all of them and offer them our co-operation.

Like other speakers who have taken the floor during this summer session of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to devote the first part of my statement to making my own comments on the recently concluded special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. When the time for the beginning of the Assembly approached, a question was in the air around the conference: what is a successful special session? The most often heard and least optimistic reply was that a successful third special session would be one where the Final Document of 1978 was strengthened and where that instrument would be built on by the consolidation of its aims and revitalization of the international community's efforts for disarmament.

Man's endeavours are measured by their results. The same can be said of the endeavours of governments and States. This leads us to say that the third special session was a failure because it produced no concrete results. We must be honest with ourselves and recognize reality, and call a spade a spade. There is no purpose in trying to conceal the failure by bringing out aspects that, while important, do not hide the truth. It has been said that one result of the third special session was the participation of a considerable number of heads of State and foreign ministers and other eminent figures. The same is said in connection with the presence of large numbers of non-governmental organizations during the Assembly. Although we recognize the importance of these facts, none of them constitutes an achievement in itself. The successful effort to mobilize international public opinion in connection with the third special session, which culminated in this large-scale participation by non-governmental organizations and figures, did not produce the effect that was sought, which was to create conditions that would contribute to the success of the meeting and the reaching of the result sought. It has also been said that the third special session made it possible to exchange opinions and points of view, and served as a forum for the discussion of important issues relating to disarmament. Here once again we

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think that the terms of the equation are being reversed. This exchange of ideas and opinions and these discussions, which we too think were extremely useful, do not constitute an achievement, but should be the means for achieving the result sought.

It must be recognized, however, that the statements heard in the plenary of the Assembly lead us to believe that today there is deeper and more widespread concern over the arms race. It would seem that the cause of disarmament has been steadily gaining supporters, even in the militarily important developed countries.

It has also been said that third special session made possible a broad convergence of views on many important issues, and that consensus was about to be reached. It was also said that in New York near-consensus was reached on the majority of issues considered. In our view the concept of consensus is an absolute one. Either there is consensus or there isn't. One cannot speak of semi-consensus. We have said this on other occasions; it is particularly valid in the field of disarmament, where a decision or measure that does not enjoy consensus has little or no value.

From the wreckage of the third special session it is just possible to extract two specific results that need to be preserved at all costs. First, the Final Document of the first special session remained intact, and the validity of this document as the basic tool available to us to guide international action for disarmament has not only not been diminished, but has been consolidated. Second, the confidence of the international community in the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral forum for negotiations on disarmament has been strengthened. Thus we, its member States, now have on our shoulders an even graver responsibility to contribute to ensuring that the work of the Conference measures up to the expectations of the international community.

We share the view of those who hold that there is no point in trying to attribute blame for the failure of the third special session. We also believe that instead of lamenting this mishap we should draw lessons from it that will enable us to continue our effort in favour of disarmament with renewed vigour. But this does not prevent us from making an effort to explain to ourselves what happened in New York and trying to identify the cause of the failure.

In our view the reason for the failure of the third special session is that there are two different concepts, two diametrically opposed approaches to the role that should be played by multilateral efforts in the disarmament field. The first, which we could call universalist, holds that disarmament is an issue of general interest in which the organized international community is called upon to play a decisive role through the adoption, by the multilateral bodies that it has itself established, of specific and effective measures intended to halt and reverse the arms race. The starting-point for this approach is recognition of the central role that should be played by the United Nations, without diminishing the importance of other forums of a more restricted nature or ignoring the essential role played by bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers. This approach is faithfully reflected in paragraph 5 of the Final Document of SSOD-I, which says:

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"The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal."

The other approach, which could be called marginalist, although it also recognizes that the question of disarmament is a matter of general interest, perhaps with the sole exception of chemical weapons, does not accept that the United Nations should play a decisive role in efforts to halt the arms race. The supporters of this approach view the work of the United Nations or its competent bodies as a marginal activity that should be limited to carrying out a task that is more academic in nature, consisting of the consideration of general issues and the identification of abstract issues, with concrete action going no further than the adoption and implementation of ancillary measures, as I think they are called in English, which are intended to deal with marginal aspects of disarmament, such as measures intended to help with confidence-building, increasing openness or transparency, consolidating security, establishing machinery for the exchange of information or the publication of data on military expenditure, etc. This approach even rejects the possibility that the United Nations could play any significant role in the field of verification. It claims, in contrast, that the international community is always ready to be called in when there is a need to bless or applaud agreements reached in bilateral negotiations or more restricted forums. I repeat that we are aware that, at least in the case of chemical weapons, progress is being made on work aimed at effectively banning such weapons.

The confrontation between these two concepts of the role of multilateral efforts in disarmament became clear at the beginning of the third session. It is true that on many points of the draft final document it was possible to reach agreement. But the agreement was reached at the expense of those who uphold the universalist approach. The fact that it was not possible to reach agreement on the draft final document as a whole was due to too many concessions having been made to the marginalist concept. To go any further would have meant restricting to an unacceptable degree the role of the organized international community in disarmament matters.

This difference of approach to disarmament efforts finds its specific expression in the problem of complementarity between multilateral and bilateral action. Those of us who back the universalist approach are aware that it is the super-Powers who have the nuclear weapons in their arsenals and have the most advanced military and space technology, and that their concerns and interests in security matters raise delicate problems that require special attention. So we not only recognize their special responsibility in everything to do with disarmament, we demand it. That is why we stress that there is an intimate interdependence and complementarity between the efforts being made at various levels and in various forums, bilateral, regional multilateral and universal multilateral. No one claims that the multilateral bodies can impose any specific disarmament measures on the super-Powers. But it is legitimate to require that in negotiations on those measures,

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particularly when they are to be of universal effect and scope, the organized international community should be granted recognition of the role that it should be playing.

The lesson we should draw from the experience of the third special session may be summed up as the need to set out in the clearest possible terms the interrelationship that should exist between the various bodies where disarmament problems are aired, and what role each of them is called upon to play so as to ensure achievement of the common objective we are all pursuing, which is to bring about general and complete disarmament under effective control, while at the same time strengthening the role and responsibility of the United Nations in the area of disarmament, particularly through this multilateral forum in which we are working as representatives of the rest of the international community.

These are the thoughts on the third special session devoted to disarmament which I wanted to share with the other members of the Conference. And now I would like to refer particularly to agenda item 5, Prevention of an arms race in outer space, which is at present being considered in the plenary of the Conference.

There is serious and legitimate concern in the international community over the prospect that outer space could be turned into the scene of a continuation of the arms race that we are currently witnessing on Earth. This concern deepens as progress in space science and technology brings man to the point where he will be able to develop and produce space weapons. That is why the overwhelming majority of countries insist that the few countries that have the capacity to deploy arms in space should renounce the possibility of doing so. Through various instruments the international community has clearly expressed its unequivocal determination to preserve space from the military rivalry that prevails on Earth, and its intention of reserving the use of this environment exclusively for peaceful uses. This wish has been followed in practice so far.

It is true that many activities carried out in space have military significance. We know that approximately three quarters of the man-made objects that are currently spinning around the Earth are performing military functions. But as has been said repeatedly, in many cases these functions have a stabilizing effect or also play a beneficial role from the civilian point of view. However, this does not detract from the assertion that the nature of space as a "province of mankind", dedicated primarily to the common interest of peoples through its peaceful use, has in practice been preserved up to now. There is no doubt that this has been possible thanks to the existence of an international legal order that has so far been able to prevent space being used for the deployment of weapons. But this legal order has proved inadequate in the face of the headlong progress of space science, which is bringing us ever closer to the moment when an arms race in outer space could be unleashed.

When we talk of preventing an arms race in outer space we are referring to something that has not happened yet, but could happen. To prevent means to forestall, anticipate and avert the occurrence of something that has not yet happened. As far as we know, no one has yet deployed weapons in space, and it

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could even be said that true space weapons do not yet exist. So we still have time to prevent it, we can still stop it happening. We have to avoid a situation where the Powers that have the technological capacity to do so get locked in competition in space weapons. In our view, the most effective way to achieve this objective is to establish a general and complete ban on space weapons, covering the development, testing, production, deployment and stockpiling and use of space weapons.

The outer space Treaty has already established a partial ban on space weapons by prohibiting the deployment of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in space. What is needed now is an extension of this ban to any other kind of weapon that could be conceived for use in space, from space or into space. In our opinion this could be done by modifying article IV of the outer space Treaty. This instrument clearly contains a gap, a loophole that must be closed. To do this it would be sufficient to have an amendment to add a provision whereby the States parties would also undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth, or deploy in their territories or in any other place under their jurisdiction, any kind of space weapon or system of such space weapons. The amendment must also stipulate the obligation of States parties to abstain from developing, producing, testing, stockpiling or using such weapons in any form.

It may be argued that this idea is too ingenuous or too naive to be viable. On this matter it is interesting to point out that on this very day, 4 August 1988, on the eve of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty, a group of six States parties to that instrument, including my own country, have approached the Governments of the three depositary States of the partial test-ban Treaty requesting the convening of a conference intended to introduce into the partial test-ban Treaty the necessary modifications to convert it into a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. This is an idea which no one so far has described as ingenuous or naive. On the contrary, it has been building up steadily to the point that the last resolution of the General Assembly on this question was approved by an overwhelming majority, with the only votes cast against being those of France, the United States and the United Kingdom. If we bear in mind that the procedure for amendment provided for in the outer space Treaty is much simpler than that laid down in the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty, the initiative intended to extend the scope of the latter should not cause any insurmountable difficulties.

It can also be said that a comprehensive ban of this kind requires very efficient and reliable verification machinery. In our view verification is absolutely essential to any disarmament measure. But the design of appropriate verification arrangements for a ban on space weaponry should not cause insuperable difficulties. We understand that the most difficult problems in the verification of a ban on space weaponry would arise in relation to Earth-based weapons. These problems are similar in many ways to those that arise in monitoring compliance with the Treaty on intermediate nuclear forces and the agreement on strategic arms which is currently being negotiated. The two super-Powers have already displayed imagination and creativity in designing the monitoring and verification measures which will be applied to the INF Treaty. Ambassador Oboukhov, the head of the Soviet delegation to the bilateral negotiations, has provided us this morning with

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complete, detailed and very interesting information on the verification arrangements agreed for the INF Treaty, and also the problems posed by verification of the START treaty. A similar effort could be made for space weapons, which in addition could benefit from the techniques and methods applicable to long-range and intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Coming to arms deployed in space proper, the problem as we understand it is less complex. As far as we know, given the present state of the art, it is impossible to hide anything in space. Any space object can be detected and identified and its functions interpreted with almost total accuracy. A few years back this was said to be possible with any object the size of an orange situated in space. The development of space technology since then has certainly made it possible to do the same thing today with an even smaller object.

It must also be borne in mind that there are treaties in force that have operated without verification. The partial ban embodied in the outer space Treaty has been in force for more than 20 years without a real system of verification, and no one has said that the operation of this instrument has been affected thereby. There are other examples of comprehensive treaties that have operated without verification: the 1963 partial nuclear test-ban Treaty, the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, the 1972 Treaty on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons, the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, the 1979 Treaty governing the activities of States on the moon and other celestial bodies. None of these agreements have required developed or sophisticated verification machinery.

As we know, it is impossible to design and develop verification arrangements which may be considered 100 per cent secure. This problem can be presented by means of the following question: How much verification is needed? - or how much verification is enough? On this point it is worth mentioning that the outer space Treaty does contain rudimentary elements of verification machinery. Article IX provides that a State party which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State party in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in peaceful exploration and use may request consultations concerning the activity or experiment. Article X provides that a State party may request an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by another State. Article XI places an obligation on States parties to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the nature, conduct, location and results of their space activities. The same article also provides that the Secretary-General must disseminate that information effectively. Article XII provides that all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies should be open to representatives of other States. These provisions could be supplemented by an appropriate instrument to make them compatible with a treaty completely banning space weapons.

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The conversion of the outer space Treaty into a treaty completely banning space weapons logically requires that we should have a clear and accurate idea of what is meant by space weapons. So the amendments to be introduced in this instrument must provide for the inclusion of a definition of space weapons in the Treaty. As we know, during the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament on item 5 of the agenda, various proposed definitions have been put forward. They all have elements in common, which leads one to think that it should not be difficult to work out a definition that would properly cover the various conceivable types of space weaponry.

As everyone knows, my country has been taking a special interest in the question of preventing an arms race in outer space. This interest has been demonstrated by our participation in the discussions, the presentation of proposals and most recently my own performance of the functions of Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee dealing with this topic. My delegation would now like to make an additional contribution by presenting a working paper containing a proposed amendment to the outer space Treaty. This document has been distributed today under the symbol CD/851. This document, which is based on the ideas that we have put forward on a number of occasions, and which I have further developed in my statement today, is intended to serve as a basis for focusing discussion on a global and comprehensive solution to the problem raised by space weaponry.

We are aware that some countries prefer the marginalist approach to this topic. Some countries would like the Conference on Disarmament to confine itself to ancillary measures, such as the preparation of a "highway code for space objects" and the like. It has even been said that "if this Conference continues to work in the hope that it can, in one fell swoop, put in place a comprehensive agreement for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, then it will never achieve anything". The same opinion, holds that what we should do is "start somewhere", and for that purpose "the elaboration of confidence-building measures, even modest ones, would surely constitute a useful beginning". We respect that opinion, but we hold the view that if there is political will it will always be possible to achieve a global and comprehensive solution, as has been done in the case of chemical weapons.

Our document, consistent with this position, is founded, as is logical, on our universalist approach to disarmament efforts and is motivated by the profound concern that we feel over the prospect that in a short time an arms race may be unleashed in outer space whose dimensions - in terms of the human, material and financial resources that it would absorb - are incalculable and morally totally unjustifiable, even if efforts are made to present it as a means of putting an end to the nuclear danger.

We trust that delegations will examine our proposal with the attention it merits, and for our part we will receive and analyse with interest any comments or observations made.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Venezuela for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Kostov.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, speaking for the first time in this chamber, it is a great pleasure to greet you as President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August. My delegation is happy to work under your skilful guidance, as the distinguished representative of Indonesia, with which Bulgaria by tradition maintains very friendly relations. I would also like to express my appreciation of the competent manner in which your predecessor, Ambassador Teja of India, guided the Conference's work during the first month of its summer session. We shall miss his experience and wisdom, as he has left the Conference to assume other important duties. The delegation of Bulgaria will continue to co-operate with the distinguished Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Milan Komatina, and his Deputy, Ambassador Berasategui, as well as with members of their staff.

May I use this opportunity to thank all colleagues who have expressed words of welcome upon my appointment as head of the delegation of Bulgaria to the Conference on Disarmament? I shall be honoured to work together with all representatives, and pledge the full co-operation of my delegation. I wish every success to our departing colleagues, Ambassador Dávid Meizster of Hungary, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan and Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma.

The Conference is honoured today by the presence of the distinguished head of the Soviet delegation to the bilateral USSR/United States negotiations on space and nuclear weapons, Ambassador Aleksei Oboukhov. My delegation is grateful for the very interesting and detailed information he offered us today on the state of the negotiations. We would like to wish Ambassador Oboukhov new successes at the bilateral talks, whose basic role in disarmament is difficult to overstate.

Mr. President, one month after the third special session, the Conference on Disarmament continues its work deeply influenced by hopes and frustrations generated at the session in New York. It has repeatedly been pointed out in this chamber that although the special session did a remarkable job in considering a number of important proposals, it did not manage to complete its work with an agreed concluding document. This unfortunate event is a matter of concern not only to those who meet in the Conference on Disarmament. It is being analysed in depth by Governments, political movements and peace organizations in many countries all over the world.

A few days ago the Commission on Foreign Affairs of the Bulgarian Parliament organized a series of hearings where officials from the Foreign Ministry testified on the outcome of the special session. A major point made at those meetings was that, rather than become involved in a prolonged debate on missed opportunities, the international community should face the present situation with new sense of resolve, drawing the necessary conclusions and continuing its quest for disarmament.

It is in this spirit that the delegation of Bulgaria endorses the idea of the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden, Mrs. Theorin, expressed in her plenary statement on 7 July, that we may all be entitled to make tentative interpretations on the basis of emerging consensus language and use it as a starting-point for further joint actions in disarmament. The positive developments at the special session are encouraging indeed. They must be

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preserved and reinforced. The indispensable role of the Conference on Disarmament was also reiterated. This forum should redouble its efforts to make substantive progress on such items as nuclear disarmament, a nuclear test ban, prevention of an arms race in outer space and a chemical weapons convention.

Bulgaria values the contributions made by many delegations to the consideration of priority disarmament issues at the special session. An extensive exchange was held on such newly emerging concepts as non-military threats to peace and security, non-provocative defence, reasonable sufficiency and non-offensive military postures. I should like to refer to the proposals advanced by Soviet Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze on naval confidence-building measures, an international monitoring and verification agency under the United Nations, and an international space monitoring agency. Similar in nature is the Six Nations' new initiative for the establishment of a United Nations integrated multilateral verification system and the preparation of an expert study outlining its functions. Equally important are the proposals put forward by a number of countries from the Non-aligned Movement to ban the use of scientific and technological achievements for the development and production of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of conventional arms. The action plan submitted by Prime Minister R. Gandhi of India aims at achieving general and complete disarmament by the year 2010. A number of other proposals to which I will not refer here for lack of time, including proposals by the socialist countries, may offer fresh opportunities for early progress in disarmament.

Like any human undertaking, the special session has taught us some lessons which may be extremely important for the future. May I briefly discuss some of them?

My delegation, together with other delegations, mentioned at the preparatory stage the possibility of confining the deliberations at the special session to a few specific questions on the disarmament agenda. With the historic Final Document at hand, States may choose, on similar future occasions, to take up only a few specific proposals. If such a process is started early enough during the preparation for a special session, possible consensus language could eventually be included in documents focusing on such proposals rather than attempting to rewrite fundamental international instruments such as the Final Document.

We do recognize that disarmament issues are interrelated. This is duly reflected in the Final Document, which preserves its validity today, though some of its provisions may have become somewhat obsolete. A certain analogy could be drawn with the Charter of the United Nations, with the risk of being slightly incorrect. The Charter also contains provisions which may now look a bit old, without rendering the whole legal framework completely useless. On the contrary, the Charter serves as a universally recognized basis of all international efforts to achieve the principal goals of the United Nations.

The Final Document of 1978 plays a similar role in the field of disarmament. The strategy set out therein should be reviewed and further developed regularly in a dynamic manner. The existing interrelationship between disarmament issues has to be respected. But progress should not be

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held hostage to agreement on disarmament strategy as a whole. Otherwise, we might find ourselves in an absurd situation when even modest steps may be impossible unless general consensus is reached on all disarmament items - be they important or secondary, global or regional. Striving for comprehensiveness might become an obstacle to progress on issues ripe for solution.

Secondly, we may need to define the exact role of consensus. This method is, no doubt, extremely important in dealing with security issues. Consensus decisions acquire additional moral and political authority and stand greater chances for implementation. The rule of consensus should not be viewed, however, only as a right of veto. It also implies an obligation on States to consider constructive proposals co-operatively, taking into account the legitimate security interests of other States. It should further mean making genuine efforts to meet the concerns expressed at least half-way and actively search for common denominators which could ensure progress in the interests of all. Such an observation may be valid both for United Nations special sessions and for the Conference on Disarmament.

The INF Treaty has initiated a real process of nuclear disarmament. The beginning is encouraging and gives rise to great expectations for the future. This is a breakthrough which will hopefully make possible further steps to widen and deepen areas of agreement. Any attempt to "compensate" for the weapons being destroyed runs the risk of negating the value of the Treaty itself. Little security and stability can be achieved if disarmament measures in one area are used as a pretext to initiate an arms race in another. The international community also expects an early Soviet-United States agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic arsenals. The two major nuclear-weapon States have made an important political commitment to achieve that goal. Today Ambassador Oboukhov of the USSR has reaffirmed his country's determination to fulfil the stated objective. There is no doubt that such a result would become another breakthrough in nuclear disarmament, strengthening strategic stability and further improving the international climate.

Bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament are obviously insufficient. The existence of nuclear weapons threatens the survival of all nations. Hence the need for multilateral efforts to reduce the nuclear danger by building upon bilateral successes. A multilateral approach is also required because there are more than two nuclear-weapon States in the world. Bilateral and multilateral efforts do not exclude each other and should be viewed as mutually complementary.

The membership of the Conference on Disarmament facilitates the initiation of such a multilateral process, which could be channelled through an appropriate subsidiary body. A beginning has been made with the holding of informal plenary meetings on item 2, which should be followed by the establishment of an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate. Participation by all nuclear-weapon States in the nuclear disarmament process is indispensable. The delegation of Bulgaria has on several occasions suggested that the CD should set up a sub-committee composed of the five nuclear-weapon States, having a negotiating mandate, with a view to contributing to multilateral consideration of item 2 by the Conference itself. Such a body

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could start with the elaboration of the specific prerequisite for all nuclear-weapon States to join the nuclear reduction process. This could mark the beginning of a second stage of nuclear disarmament.

In recent years the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to move beyond general plenary consideration of the item on a nuclear test ban. Many States expressed their genuine concern about this situation at the special session. Continued testing of new designs of nuclear weapons means that the nuclear-weapon States are projecting the nuclear threat into the future of mankind. It is our belief that the main reason for the present lack of progress is that some nuclear-weapon States continue to rely on "counterforce" versions of nuclear deterrence. The destabilizing impact of such military concepts on international relations is widely recognized by Governments, the public and scientific communities. States always relate disarmament to security. This might be an important reason why countries represented in the CD should attach greater significance to doctrinal aspects of a nuclear test ban, which could help identify elements giving rise to serious security concern on the part of other States and hampering progress.

The international community marks this year the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty, the importance of which has further increased with the beginning of a real process of nuclear disarmament. Tomorrow, we are going to celebrate the 25th anniversary of another fundamental multilateral instrument - the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. This is yet another occasion to underline the role of an NTB in the disarmament process as a whole. The Moscow Treaty contains an obligation, reaffirmed in the non-proliferation Treaty, that all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, will seek to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and "continue negotiations to this end". The NTB item should remain on the CD's agenda as an issue having the highest priority.

Bulgaria welcomes the initial progress made at the full-scale, step-by-step Soviet-United States negotiations on the issues related to nuclear testing. We very much hope that these bilateral talks will lead in the foreseeable future to the ultimate goal - a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Conference on Disarmament is the most appropriate forum for the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The situation is intolerable when the Conference is lagging behind bilateral efforts, even in terms of verification only. The CD's membership also includes other nuclear-weapon States and a number of non-nuclear-weapon States. They ought to be involved in the negotiating process, if we are to arrive at a treaty with universal application. These negotiations should cover all interrelated aspects of a CTB. An interesting proposal to this end has recently been reintroduced by the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda, providing for a more flexible framework to begin practical work on a nuclear test ban. Accepting this proposal would not prevent the CD from following a step-by-step approach, which could start with consideration of issues related to verification of and compliance with the future treaty. The Bulgarian delegation believes that the Conference should also benefit from the proposal of the Soviet delegation for

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the setting up of a group of scientific experts to work out recommendations on the structure and functions of a verification system for any possible agreement on a NTB.

Bulgaria attaches great importance to negative security assurances extended to non-nuclear-weapon States. Implementation of the INF Treaty will significantly improve the security of many States. Various kinds of nuclear weapons, however, remain deployed all over the world, thus threatening the survival of non-nuclear-weapon States. Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the security of such States, which are not in a position to become the source of a nuclear threat, should be uniformly and unconditionally guaranteed in a legally binding form against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Negotiations to that end have been under way for 10 years now. As Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov of Bulgaria pointed out to the Conference on Disarmament last April:

"We are convinced that the time has come for bolder approaches which would shift the negotiations out of stalemate. The United Nations General Assembly has urged us to do so. There are already interesting proposals on this subject. Positive movement in this direction would have significant impact on the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime."

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is also an issue of universal concern. This is an objective agreed upon by consensus, both bilaterally and multilaterally in the Conference on Disarmament. The Ad hoc Committee on item 5 offers an opportunity for all member States to contribute to the achievement of that common objective.

The delegation of Bulgaria believes that work in that Committee should focus on the existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to agreeing on appropriate measures to ban the introduction of any kind of weapons in outer space. An interesting paper on a possible approach to this issue has been submitted today by our distinguished colleague Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela. My delegation will study it with care. There are various other proposals which have been submitted in the Ad hoc Committee, and we believe that the time is ripe now to start with an ASAT ban. The existing legal régime for outer space does not exclude the possibility of developing conventional types of such weapons. The current virtual moratorium on testing of ASAT systems, honoured by both the Soviet Union and the United States, facilitates a beginning of concrete negotiations on such a ban. The working paper on "Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and ways to ensure the immunity of space objects" (CD/777) submitted by the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia could serve as a useful basis for such work. Various elements of the Soviet idea for the establishment of an international system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space could also be successfully used for the purposes of an ASAT ban.

There are a number of complicated issues of definition and technical issues which will have to be addressed in dealing with an ASAT ban. Such problems should be considered by an appropriate group of governmental experts

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to provide technical expertise and guidance to the Ad hoc Committee in overcoming possible difficulties. The Bulgarian delegation has advanced specific proposals aimed at making progress on this issue in the Committee.

We learned with keen interest of the proposal made by the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cámpora, that members of the CD should make solemn unilateral declarations that none of them has deployed weapons in outer space on a permanent basis. Implementation of this proposal could become an important confidence-building measure, introducing more openness and transparency into outer space activities related to military matters. Because of their confidence-building nature, such unilateral steps require no verification, and would be a good starting-point for more specific partial measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

The prohibition of chemical weapons is another important issue which I intend to discuss in more detail on some further occasions. My delegation regrets the fact that for a number of years now the Conference on Disarmament has not been making much progress in its substantive work on several items. It seems that the Conference is slowly moving away from discharging its responsibilities as a negotiating body. We feel that this tendency should be halted. The delegation of Bulgaria believes that it is time for the CD to undertake concrete action on all priority items on its agenda, and is determined to make its contribution towards this end.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. I should like to know whether any other member wishes to take the floor at this stage.

The representative of Switzerland has asked for the floor. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 436th plenary meeting, I give him the floor.

Mr. OCHSNER (Switzerland): Thank you, Mr. President. With our very best wishes for a successful chairmanship, we would like to draw your attention briefly and in all due modesty to a problem of a rather administrative nature, but not without a certain significance for our country. Last Monday the Swiss Confederation celebrated its 697th anniversary. 1 August is considered throughout the country as our national day. It was absolutely no formal obstacle indeed for United Nations Headquarters and the Conference on Disarmament to ignore this day. The question comes up whether it would not be possible, as an expression of international courtesy perhaps to respect the afternoon, I repeat, the afternoon of 1 August in future. Could you think of an international conference meeting even under United Nations status on Independence Day in the United States of America, on 7 November in the Soviet Union or on 14 July in Paris?

We really do not want to make it a State affair. At a glance it might even appear that the people of Geneva, as far as they are Swiss, do not pay great attention to this day either, but this is not really true and it is very definitely not the case in the surrounding communes and in the remaining 3,000 towns and villages all over the country. As to Monday afternoon's

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meeting of Working Group B of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we hope that by silently accepting the facts we made a very small contribution to the acceleration of the negotiations on the pertinent subject.

So far, a mental footnote to the problem just for consideration in 1989, à prendre ou à laisser, to which we do not expect any formal reply.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Switzerland for his statement and for the wishes he addressed to me. In connection with his statement, I should like to assure him that the Conference fully appreciates the hospitality of the Geneva and Swiss authorities, and the fact that our work continued during the anniversary of the Swiss Confederation should not, in any respect, be construed as meaning that such an important event was being forgotten.

The secretariat has circulated today an informal paper containing a list of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the timetable contained therein is merely indicative and therefore subject to change, if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As there is no other business for today, I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Tuesday, 9 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV. 472
9 August 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 9 August 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Wisber Loeis (Indonesia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 472nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference starts today consideration of agenda 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mexico, Peru and Pakistan. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, my delegation is pleased to see you presiding over our discussions during this month, which each year is undoubtedly one of the most important months for the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference will no doubt benefit from the experience and knowledge of the subject we know you possess. As far as my delegation is concerned you may count on our unreserved co-operation. My congratulations also go to the distinguished representative of India, who served as President during the previous month, as well as all the representatives participating in the work of this forum for the first time.

The meeting being held today by the Conference on Disarmament is the first to take place since last Friday, 5 August 1988, on which date 25 years had passed since the signing in Moscow of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. The Governments of the five countries - Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and Mexico - which, through their representatives to the Conference on Disarmament, submitted on that day a joint proposal for amendment of the Treaty to which I have referred, which is to be found in document CD/852, for consideration in a conference of the parties to the Treaty in conformity with the provisions of article II, are convinced that nothing could be more appropriate for the celebration of such a happy anniversary.

It is for that reason that, as early as 1963, they proclaimed in the preamble of the Treaty their determination to endeavour to bring about an end to all, and I underline the word "all", nuclear weapon test explosions, and to continue negotiations to that end. Five years later, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was signed in 1968, and whose preamble makes reference to the determination expressed by the parties to the Moscow Treaty, to which I have just referred, included in article VI an undertaking to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament". The United Nations Secretary-General, at the inaugural meeting of the 1972 session, made the following statement:

"No other question in the field of disarmament has been the subject of so much study and discussion as the question of stopping nuclear weapon tests. I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement."

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its final declaration, which was adopted by consensus on 21 September 1985, "deeply regretted that a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test-ban treaty banning all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time had not been concluded" and called on all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament. The six heads of State or government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania, who since 1985 have been meeting and making joint declarations to further peace and disarmament, have from the very outset referred expressly to the need to put an end to all nuclear weapon tests. In the Delhi Declaration adopted in the Indian capital on 28 January 1985, they stated:

"We further urge the nuclear-weapon States to immediately halt the testing of all kinds of nuclear weapons, and to conclude, at an early date, a treaty on a nuclear weapon test ban. Such a treaty would be a major step towards ending the continuous modernization of nuclear arsenals."

In the Mexico Declaration adopted in the city of Ixtapa on 7 August 1986, they stated:

"We remain convinced that no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing to an end all nuclear tests. Both the qualitative and the quantitative development of nuclear weapons exacerbate the arms race, and both would be inhibited by the complete abolition of nuclear weapons testing.

"Furthermore, it is clear that continued development of nuclear weapons by those who already possess them is detrimental to the efforts to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other States which have until now refrained from acquiring them. We must recognise that, just as a drug addict cannot be cured by injecting him with more and more drugs neither can an arms-addicted world be saved from war by an infinite accumulation of weapons. The time to stop is now."

In the declaration that bears the name of the capital of Sweden, where it was adopted on 21 February this year, they stated:

"Agreements to reduce existing nuclear arsenals must be backed up by decisive measures to check the unbridled development of new generations of ever more dreadful and sophisticated nuclear weapons. The single most effective measure would be to end all nuclear weapon tests by all States. Such a step would be of crucial importance not only for achieving this objective, but also for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which have so far refrained from acquiring them.

"The United States of America and the Soviet Union have started bilateral negotiations on gradually establishing lower limits on nuclear tests. Any agreement that leaves room for continued testing would not be

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acceptable. We stress once again that a comprehensive test ban is already long overdue. Pending that, we reiterate our call for an immediate suspension of all nuclear testing, by all States."

In connection with this matter, the General Assembly, in three resolutions adopted successively in 1985, 1986 and 1987, made recommendations that culminated, in the last of those resolutions, with a request addressed to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Moscow Treaty to "formally submit an amendment proposal to the depositary Governments with a view to convening a conference at the earliest possible date to consider amendments to the Treaty that would convert it into a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty."

It is in order to ensure that this request or recommendation is followed up that the five representatives I referred to at the beginning have submitted on behalf of their respective Governments the proposal for amendment of the Moscow Treaty that should be considered by a conference of the parties to the Treaty convened for that purpose, as soon as a third or more of them so request, a requirement that we hope will be fulfilled this very year.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement, as well as for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you presiding over our work during this month. We have no doubt that your wealth of experience and your great tact will make a significant contribution to the joint effort which brings us together in this negotiating forum.

The serious difficulties facing the Conference on Disarmament in fulfilling its mandate under agenda item 1, "Total cessation of nuclear tests", offer eloquent proof of the persistence of positions encountered among those who are supposed to have assumed a commitment to negotiate multilateral disarmament measures in this forum. But they also indicate clearly the inherent limitations of the Conference on Disarmament in heeding and better reflecting the collective call of the peoples of the world for the final cessation of nuclear testing in all environments. If all Governments were to decide to organize a world referendum to sound out the feelings of mankind, there is no doubt that the overwhelming response of the citizens of all countries would be in favour of an immediate moratorium on testing, followed by a ban. The fact that the Conference on Disarmament systematically sidesteps this urgent need to a certain extent means that it is turning its back on reality and ignoring the call of the international community, countering it with an uncompromising conception of national security based on power politics and not on an egalitarian and all-round form of security stemming from a democratic approach to international relations.

In this matter the Group of 21 has demonstrated great flexibility and openness, to the extent that it has made concessions and recently adopted positions far removed from its original stance. Indeed, there is a great deal of difference between what was put forward by the Group of 21 in document CD/492 of March 1984, which demanded the immediate beginning of

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multilateral negotiations, and their position of April this year, reflected in document CD/829, requesting the establishment of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out multilateral negotiations, with no reference to their being immediate.

It is important for the peoples of the world to know that it is not the intransigence of the Group of 21 or its lack of realism which are causing the Conference on Disarmament to shirk its responsibilities in respect of the total cessation of nuclear testing, but rather the obstinacy of those who, with nuclear weapons in their arsenals, persist in complicated stances based on theoretical constructs, thereby rendering the worst possible disservice to the régime of nuclear non-proliferation. Peru believes that the draft mandate appearing in the document of the Group of 21 (CD/829) is totally neutral and is best suited to the specific positions that States represented in this forum may have. Though we acknowledge that it contains a commitment to multilateral negotiations in the future, it does not make them inevitable immediately, nor does it determine their pace. In other words, it strikes a balance between individual interests and the interests of international community as a whole. In this context, any delay or digging in to intransigent positions will be incomprehensible and illogical in the eyes of international public opinion, and over time will of course diminish the role played by this forum in the disarmament process.

Largely as a result of the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has been repeatedly thwarted in its efforts to establish an ad hoc committee on the total cessation of nuclear testing, Peru has since 1985 been working with Indonesia, Mexico, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia to promote the convening of a conference to amend the 1963 partial nuclear test-ban Treaty. It is as a consequence of that gradual and considered process, led by a tireless fighter for disarmament, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles, that the representatives of these five countries last week conveyed to the depositary States an amendment proposal together with a request for the convening of a conference of the parties to consider the proposal. The Government of Venezuela has also subscribed this initiative. This morning the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Mr. Yuri Nazarkin, informed the co-sponsors of the steps taken by his country as a depositary State to set in motion the machinery under article II of that Treaty. We hope that similar actions will be taken by the two other depositary States. This approach to the amendment is no emotional response to the stubborn opposition of one super-Power but an action stemming from one of the provisions of the 1963 Treaty stipulating the conclusion of an agreement on the matter. Consequently, it is to be hoped that the depositary States will live up to their obligations and will clear the way for the holding of this review conference.

The Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is continuing its work in a seemingly normal manner; but we have the impression that it has slowed down, or, at all events, that the chemical-weapon States which are represented at the Conference so far lack sufficient political will to overcome the differences which still exist in certain crucial areas. As a contribution to confidence-building, and in full accordance with the openness in the area of military activities advocated by Peru, I am pleased to state today before this

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forum that my country does not possess or produce chemical weapons. Consequently, when we say that the future convention must include compensatory machinery, we mean that it must contain clauses for use in the event that it becomes invalid. That is to say that its provisions should in no way give States parties possessing chemical weapons grounds for increasing their arsenals during the destruction period, which is scheduled to cover 10 years. Moreover, they should not develop, produce or test new types of chemical weapons. And if, after the 10-year period, one or more States parties still have chemical weapons in their arsenals, then the Convention will become invalid because it will have lost its *raison d'être*, so that the obligations entered into by all States will lapse.

Last week the distinguished Ambassador of Canada set out his country's position on jurisdiction and control. In this regard my delegation views these comments as very appropriate. In connection with a subsidiary operating on territory belonging to a State party or under its administration or international responsibility, it is obviously for that State to apply its legislation in force. However, this can be supplemented by establishing two channels of co-operation in order to block indirect ways of getting round the convention. We are specifically referring to bilateral co-operation between the State party and the State in which the main company has its headquarters, whether the latter is party to the convention or not, and to multilateral co-operation through the future international organization if the bilateral channel proves impractical or inadequate. What is important is that there should be no excuse for a State party hosting in any way a company involved in the chemical industry to be exempted from its obligations in respect of that company.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space has become a priority item on our agenda. Despite that, tackling this topic remains complex because of the diversity of interests at stake and because of the existence of a legal framework which, though imperfect, involves an appreciable number of States. Many proposals have been made to avert what the press has called "star wars", but leaving aside the excessively dramatic reactions to the risk that this threat will become a reality, the fact is that matters are fortunately manageable and, at the same time, negotiations are continuing between the super-Powers to establish a modus vivendi which will banish the immediate danger.

When the Treaty on principles governing the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, was adopted in 1967, the conviction very probably prevailed that military competition in outer space was thereby being ruled out. Unfortunately, this has not been so, and now science and technology are presenting us with a new challenge. The 1967 Treaty is a testimony to the relativity of agreements which fall under the doctrine of arms control. It is not a bad multilateral instrument, still less does it leave the essentials out. The fact is that it is a treaty valid for its time and consistent with the dynamics always imposed by scientific and technological development. This is the reason why in this very forum in August 1987, Peru raised the need to amend the Treaty. Now we also have a draft from Venezuela. When last year Peru raised the question of amending the 1967 Treaty, it stressed on that occasion the need to prohibit the deployment in orbit of any device bearing any type of weapon. This approach is more

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pragmatic, expeditious and practical; it does not attempt to define space weapons, as this would be as difficult as to try and find a definition of land-based weapons generally accepted by all. What is important in a weapon is not so much the space or area in which it operates as its function and effect which characterize it as such, in addition to an always hostile intent. Hence, whether a device bearing any type of weapon in space is permanently or semi-permanently present is of no interest. Nor is its principle of operation. Now, to the extent that it is not only by deploying a weapon in orbit that a given effect can be produced in space, it is necessary, as my delegation has previously pointed out, to "multilateralize" the basic obligations under the ABM Treaty in order to rule out any possibility of sidestepping the spirit of the 1967 Treaty which reserves outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes.

Verification is the expression of mutual trust and is called upon to generate greater trust. Verification is not a police type of activity; its main function is deterrence. It does not point to the future intentions of States, it confines itself to detecting non-compliance by commission and by omission. This aside is valid in respect of item 5 of our agenda. Verification in outer space may be carried out using national means of verification and through multilateral action. The 1967 Treaty was essentially based on the former. It is obvious that, if this international instrument is to be amended, priority will have to be given to multilateral verification. From this standpoint the amendments to the 1967 Treaty, in addition to improving the existing verification machinery, should include express provisions relating to review conferences so that States parties are in a position to carry out endogenous reforms to adapt the verification machinery to the imperatives of science and technology. The important experience acquired in 1986 on the occasion of the Second Review Conference of the parties to the 1972 biological and toxin weapons Treaty is a highly stimulating and very instructive example of what can be done when States parties have the necessary political will.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Mr. Ezdi.

Mr. ASIF EZDI (Pakistan): Mr. President, I should like to begin my statement by congratulating you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the month of August. As two brotherly Asian countries linked together by the ties of a common faith, Pakistan and Indonesia have a record of close co-operation in international forums. We would like to assure you of our full support in the performance of your important duties. Knowing your diplomatic skills and experience, we are confident that the work of the Conference during the month will be guided in a most efficient manner.

I should also like to express appreciation for the able stewardship of the Conference last month by your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Teja of India. With his departure and that of Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma and Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary, the Conference has been deprived of the skills of three of its most distinguished heads of delegation, each of whom made important contributions to our work. We offer them our best wishes in their future assignments and careers.

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

Last Friday marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the partial test-ban treaty. The signing of the Treaty on 5 August a quarter-century ago to ban nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was a historic event. It was widely acclaimed for having removed the threat of radioactive fall-out to human health and survival.

The PTBT was welcomed equally for the promise it held out of further steps on the road to nuclear disarmament. It was the expectation of the international community that further measures would be taken to remove the shadow of nuclear catastrophe hanging over the whole world. U Thant, United Nations Secretary-General at that time, voiced this sentiment when he expressed the hope that steps would be taken for the discontinuation of all nuclear test explosions for all time, prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and the creation of denuclearized zones in different geographical areas of the world.

At the time of signing the PTBT, the Government of Pakistan expressed its strong hope that the Treaty would be followed soon by agreements to cease underground tests also, and to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Unless these and other measures of nuclear disarmament were taken, Pakistan pointed out, the partial test-ban Treaty, although welcome in itself, might turn out to be of only illusory value in dissipating the fear of nuclear war.

When we look at the developments of the last quarter-century, we cannot escape the conclusion that most of the expectations raised at the time of the signature of the PTBT have not been fulfilled. The goal of a comprehensive test ban still seems to be beyond reach. Nuclear testing has not slackened since the signing of the PTBT, but on the contrary has been carried out more vigorously than before. The nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States are today much larger than they were in 1963. In this otherwise cheerless picture, the entry into force of the INF Treaty for the elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons is a ray of hope. The world now awaits the early conclusion of an agreement between the super-Powers for the promised 50 per cent reduction in their strategic offensive weapons. The effect of any such quantitative cuts would, however, be negated if the arms race were carried into outer space or efforts were made to offset these reductions by qualitative improvements in nuclear weaponry.

The nuclear arms race today derives its momentum, in very large measure, from efforts aimed at the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, which in turn depends on a continuation of nuclear tests. If nuclear testing is halted, a key link in the nuclear arms race will have been broken. A comprehensive test ban would thus be the most important step from the point of view of halting the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. It would also serve as a most effective check on the horizontal proliferation of these weapons. For both these reasons, firstly by slowing down the race for new and more sophisticated types of nuclear weapons and secondly by strengthening the non-proliferation régime, a comprehensive test ban would constitute a major step towards nuclear disarmament.

A CTBT is an indispensable measure for slowing, halting and reversing the arms race. It is also a realistic possibility, if the political will exists.

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

There are today no longer any technical obstacles to a CTBT. Verification issues can no longer be used to postpone these negotiations. In the opinion of experts, nuclear explosions can be identified and detected down to a yield of 1 kiloton. This would exclude the continuation of clandestine militarily significant tests required for the development of new weapon designs, new generations of nuclear weapons and exotic weapons, which today is the main aim of nuclear testing.

My delegation has little reason to believe that the ongoing step-by-step negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear testing will bring the goal of a comprehensive test ban any nearer. On the contrary, these talks could delay a test ban even further. The 150-kiloton yield threshold laid down in the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty is high enough to permit almost all the tests needed for the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. New techniques are fully adequate to verify tests of much lower yield. The ratification of these treaties, therefore, which is to be achieved in the first stage of the bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations, will have no significant impact in restricting the nuclear weapon programmes of the parties, and will not meet the expectations of the international community. Similarly, a reduction in the number and yield of underground nuclear tests which does not curb the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and is not concluded in the context of a comprehensive test ban within a short period would be seen as an attempt to legitimize nuclear testing for a long time to come rather than as a meaningful step towards a comprehensive ban.

Any further delay in the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban would be harmful to the cause of disarmament, and is fraught with the danger of weakening the non-proliferation régime. Multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty must commence without delay in this Conference. Last April, the Group of 21 made a constructive proposal contained in document CD/829 for the mandate of an ad hoc committee to be established under item 1. This proposal remains on the table. It reflects a spirit of give-and-take and is further proof of the flexibility of our Group in this matter. Unfortunately, this spirit has not been reciprocated so far by the Western Group.

Last month, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty, several delegations emphasized its importance. Pakistan's commitment to non-proliferation is of long standing. It has been firm and unwavering. In his address to the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1962, the then President of Pakistan warned of the "clear and present danger of the spread of nuclear weapons" and underlined that unless the United Nations took effective and urgent action against the dissemination of nuclear weapons, the race in nuclear arms was bound to overtake other parts of the world in the immediate future. This imminent peril, he said, demanded that the General Assembly give urgent consideration to the conclusion of a treaty to outlaw the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Despite the fact that the non-proliferation Treaty is unequal and discriminatory, we voted in favour of the 1968 General Assembly resolution commending it. We have fully endorsed its objectives. We have observed the

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central obligation of the Treaty, contained in article II. We are convinced that the spread of nuclear weapons to more than the present five nuclear-weapon States will make our world even more insecure. We would therefore like to see the present non-proliferation régime preserved and strengthened. The credibility of the non-proliferation Treaty would be increased if the nuclear-weapon States faithfully lived up to the commitments made by them in the Treaty regarding a comprehensive test ban, nuclear disarmament and co-operation with the non-nuclear-weapon States in the peaceful applications of nuclear technology.

The NPT is, however, only one component of an effective non-proliferation régime. A viable, durable and comprehensive non-proliferation régime requires other measures, at the global and regional level, to allay the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States, and assurances that impediments will not be placed in the path of their peaceful nuclear energy programmes. In his statement to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly in 1968, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan said:

"It has been obvious - and the point has been acknowledged by the prime authors of the instrument - that the Treaty is but the first step towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. By itself, its strength and durability will be reduced if it is not supplemented by other measures which are equally integral to the process of achieving a non-proliferation régime."

Pakistan has been consistent in its endeavours to achieve the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime by additional measures, such as the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world, assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and promotion of co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

We welcome the steps taken by countries of Latin America and the South Pacific for keeping their regions free of nuclear weapons, and hope that the nuclear-weapon States concerned will at an early date undertake the legal commitments necessary for respecting the nuclear-weapon-free status of those regions. We also warmly commend the steps taken by Argentina and Brazil bilaterally to protect their region from the risk of the introduction of nuclear weapons and promote an atmosphere of growing mutual trust in the nuclear field. They have set an example which deserves to be emulated in other parts of the world.

In South Asia, Pakistan has been making unremitting efforts to keep the region free of nuclear weapons and promote mutual confidence among the countries of the area about each other's nuclear programmes. Nuclear proliferation concerns in South Asia are born of a history of regional tensions and conflict. They feed upon mutual suspicions about nuclear programmes. Only a regional approach can therefore effectively address this problem. Pakistan has adopted this approach.

All the States of South Asia have at the highest level declared their intention not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons. What is now required is to convert these unilateral declarations into binding legal obligations. We

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have made a number of proposals in this regard. We remain ready to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty simultaneously with India; to accept full-scope safeguards on our nuclear programme simultaneously with India; to conclude a bilateral agreement with India for the mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities; to make a joint declaration with India renouncing nuclear weapons; and to enter into a bilateral nuclear test-ban treaty with India.

We are prepared to accept any equitable and non-discriminatory agreement, with effective verification arrangements, that would commit the countries of the region in a legally binding manner not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons. Last year, we proposed that in order to explore the possibility of such an agreement, a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia should be convened under United Nations auspices with the participation of States in the region and other interested States.

In 1974, following the Indian nuclear explosion, Pakistan took the initiative of proposing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. This proposal has received the endorsement in principle of the United Nations General Assembly in each of its annual sessions held since then, and enjoys the ever-increasing support of the Member States of the United Nations. South Asia constitutes a distinct region in geopolitical and historical terms, and States situated in the area have declared unilaterally that they will not produce or acquire nuclear weapons. The necessary conditions exist, therefore, for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

We welcome the growing recognition of the regional dimensions of the nuclear problem in South Asia and the increased support that the idea of a regional solution has found recently. Meanwhile, our proposals for keeping the area free from nuclear weapons remain on the table.

An effective non-proliferation régime requires furthermore that the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States be allayed. The present unilateral declarations made by four of the five nuclear-weapon States on refraining from the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States are riddled with conditions, qualifications and exceptions and are hardly calculated to enhance the sense of security of States which have voluntarily and unconditionally renounced the nuclear weapon option. The impasse that the Conference on Disarmament has reached on this issue can only be regretted.

Less than two months ago, the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament came to a close. For four weeks, the nations of the world deliberated upon issues affecting not only their individual security and survival but also the threat of nuclear annihilation that hangs over the entire planet. Delegation after delegation underlined the close relationship between disarmament, development and security and urged a reinvigoration of the multilateral disarmament process. The Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating forum of the international community, must heed this call. We must address our agenda with renewed resolve and a heightened sense of urgency. Given the political will and a constructive approach on the part of all its members, there is no reason why the Conference cannot fulfil the role that is expected of it.

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The inability of SSOD-III to adopt a concluding document must naturally be a matter of disappointment. Yet the prolonged debate and intensive negotiations which took place on the draft presented by the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole were not in vain. While bringing to the fore the divergences on certain vital questions, these discussions also revealed the existence of agreement on many important issues and an emerging consensus on others.

These gains, however unspectacular, were real. It is for us now to preserve these gains and build upon them. Already in this Conference references have been made to the tacit consensus embodied in parts of the draft concluding document. It would like in particular to mention the statement of Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria last week, in which he noted that the emerging consensus language of the document could be used as a starting-point for further action in disarmament.

The Conference itself acted on the basis of this language when it decided to re-establish the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament on 19 July. As the President of the Conference for the month of July, Ambassador Teja of India, noted in his statements on 12, 14 and 19 July, the mandate of the Committee reproduces language contained in the draft concluding document. We will no doubt hear more about the document in the weeks and months to come, especially at the forthcoming regular session of the United Nations General Assembly, when the follow-up to SSOD-III will be taken in hand.

SSOD-III also indicated a growing convergence on an expanded multilateral disarmament agenda for the coming years and on the need for a multidimensional approach to these issues, with simultaneous movement on a broad front, including collateral steps. We are confident that these trends will have a positive effect on the disarmament process.

The question of the application of new technologies to the development of new weapons and weapons systems will figure increasingly in disarmament work. Last month, a combination of high-technology weaponry and miscalculation had tragic results for the innocent passengers on a civilian airliner. It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which the consequences of human error, miscalculation or accident in the use of high-technology equipment could be catastrophic for the whole world. The placing of restraints on research and development directed at the development of new weapons is already overdue, and should be seriously addressed.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Is there any other member who would like to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the distinguished Ambassador of Venezuela.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): As you know, Venezuela is one of the countries which, together with Mexico, Peru, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka, has been promoting an initiative for amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty in order to convert it into a

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comprehensive test-ban treaty. Accordingly, Venezuela and the other countries I have mentioned have sponsored in the United Nations General Assembly the various draft resolutions which the Assembly has considered, and which have been receiving ever-growing support, with the result that the most recent, resolution 42/26, was adopted with only the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union voting against. Venezuela continues to be part of this initiative, and supports and shares in it fully.

The members of the Conference on Disarmament will no doubt have noticed that Venezuela is not among the countries which signed the letter appearing in document CD/852, which was distributed this morning, and which was referred to expressly this morning by the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles. The reason for which my signature does not appear together with those of the other distinguished representatives, namely the representatives of Mexico, Peru, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka, has nothing to do with the substance of the initiative, which, as I have said, has Venezuela's enthusiastic support. The fact that Venezuela has not signed the letter originates instead in matters of form, since the Government of Venezuela, in view of the importance and implications of this issue, and bearing in mind the rank of the addressees, felt that the Minister for Foreign Affairs himself should sign and send the letter to the Foreign Ministers of the three depositary States. Accordingly, on 4 August, the eve of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the partial nuclear test ban Treaty, Dr. Germán Nava Carrillo, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, sent the following letter to the Foreign Ministers, that is to say the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"Sir,

"In my capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs of a State party to the Treaty partially banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, I am addressing the present communication to you in your capacity as Secretary of State of one of the depositary Governments of the Treaty. Identical communications have been sent to the other depositary Governments.

"In accordance with article II of the Treaty and resolution 42/26 B of the United Nations General Assembly I formally submit the amendment proposal on behalf of my Government for consideration at a conference of the States parties to the Treaty convened for that purpose. In that regard, I would be grateful if, in accordance with article II of the Treaty, you would circulate copies of the proposed amendment to all the parties and make the necessary arrangements to convene the conference as soon as a third of the States parties so request.

"I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

"(Signed)

Germán Nava Carrillo
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Venezuela"

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The text of this communication corresponds in substance to that appearing in document CD/852, and differs only in the matters of form to which I referred.

I considered it necessary to make this clarification in order to place on record the fact that the Government of Venezuela remains identified with the proposal for conversion of the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, and through him his Government, as the representative of Peru has done, for its prompt and effective response to the Six Nations' initiative. We trust that the other two depositary countries will also take up the proposal in the same speedy and efficient way as the Government of the Soviet Union.

We would also like to take this opportunity to express our hope that a growing number of countries will endorse this initiative, so as to gather together as quickly as possible the two thirds of the parties to the Treaty required in order to proceed to convening the conference.

It is due course my delegation will forward to the Secretary-General of the Conference the text of the communication sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela to the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom so that it too can be reproduced as an official document of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Venezuela for his statement. I recognize the Ambassador of the Soviet Union.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all I would like to thank the distinguished representatives of Peru and Venezuela for the appreciation they expressed to the Soviet Government in connection with the actions it has taken as depositary of the Moscow Treaty. I would also like to draw attention to the fact that it was stated in the interpretation of the statement by the distinguished representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhardat, that the Soviet Union voted against resolution 42/26 B. This, of course, must be a technical error: the Soviet Union voted in favour of the resolution.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Ambassador of the Soviet Union for his statement and I give the floor to the Ambassador of Venezuela.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): I apologize to the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union. I believe that as a result of a mental slip I referred to the Soviet Union. The other country that voted against was France. My apologies again to the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union.

The PRESIDENT: Is there any other member who would like to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the Ambassador of Australia.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, I congratulate you for the way in which you are conducting the Conference in this month of your presidency. I have the intention of making a statement on another occasion on the issue of nuclear testing, but I have to take the floor this morning to note that a couple of speeches have suggested that this Conference is confronted with Western intransigence on the issue of item 1 of our agenda. Australia is a Western State, and I must reject that charge. My delegation has supported the mandate given in document CD/521 since June 1984, and it has always stood ready to discuss that mandate with others. This charge of intransigence is not in accord with the known facts, and in any case it is an empty charge, by definition, in a Conference which must work on the basis of consensus.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Ambassador of Australia for his statement and his congratulations to the Chair.

As agreed by the Conference, we shall hold, on Thursday next, immediately after the plenary meeting, an informal meeting of the Conference devoted to the consideration of all aspects of its improved and effective functioning, including the two reports submitted by the Group of Seven in documents CD/WP.286 and CD/WP.341, as well as the future consideration of this subject by the Conference.

Since there is no other business for today, I now intend adjourning this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Thursday 11 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.473
11 August 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 11 August 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Wisber Loeis (Indonesia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 473rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work the Conference continues today with its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any issue relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Italy, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Nigeria. I now give the floor to my first speaker for today, the representative of Italy, Ambassador Pugliese.

Mr. PUGLIESE (Italy): Mr. President, speaking for the first time since the beginning of our summer session, I wish to associate myself with the warm congratulations and good wishes that have been extended to you by the previous speakers on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the month of August. We have the fullest confidence in your personal ability to guide our work, and I wish to assure you of the full co-operation of the Italian delegation during this month. I wish also to express my appreciation to your distinguished predecessors, Ambassador Teja of India and Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary.

May I also take this opportunity to welcome other colleagues who have recently joined us? - Ambassadors Kostov of Bulgaria, Ruoro of Kenya, de Rivero of Peru. To our colleagues who are leaving or have recently left Geneva and whose co-operation we highly appreciated, I wish all success in their new duties.

The summer session of the Conference on Disarmament resumed within an international political framework which continues to be characterized by sustained negotiating dynamics - both bilateral and multilateral - on disarmament issues. Two major events, in particular, were recorded in the field of arms control: the Moscow summit and the third United Nations special session devoted to disarmament.

The first event fully confirmed the positive trend of East-West relations. Indeed, the political significance of the fourth summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev marks - in our view - a further stabilization in the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union and a broader understanding between the two super-Powers on disarmament issues. Within the framework of these encouraging prospects, we think that the convergences reached in Moscow on limiting nuclear explosions and banning chemical weapons are particularly significant, and likely to have a positive impact on the progress of our work.

The Moscow agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on joint verification experiments, and the will reiterated by the leaders of these two countries to reach a prompt conclusion on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, constitute a major contribution towards achieving further progress on such items in this forum.

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The third special session devoted to disarmament was held in New York in the context of the promising trend in relations between the two super-Powers. As Minister Andreotti stressed in his speech, the Italian Government expected the session to provide an opportunity for imparting new momentum to the pursuit of disarmament objectives, by preventing a stalemate in multilateral negotiations, which would be in contrast with the dynamism existing at the bilateral level. In order to impart momentum to multilateral negotiations, we think that it is necessary, in particular, to seek, with imagination and realism - as stated also by the United Nations Secretary-General in his opening speech at SSOD-III - the way to reconcile the diverse legitimate security concerns of all States.

Despite the fact that the draft of the final document was not accepted by consensus and approved, we believe that SSOD-III did not entirely fall short of the goals indicated by the United Nations Secretary-General. In our view, the third special session did offer an important opportunity for reflection; at least it contributed to a more precise identification of existing difficulties and of the technical and political options for solving them, within the context of a reiterated general commitment to dialogue and compromise - which failed to persist only during the last stage of our work.

If it is correct to draw this lesson from the special session, we none the less believe that there is a need to establish a useful pattern of cross-fertilization between bilateral and multilateral negotiations. A second element for consideration stemming from SSOD-III seems to us the confirmation that regional conflicts substantially hinder the achievement of more significant progress along the path towards disarmament. Without a lessening of the tensions generated by those conflicts, it is difficult to hope that the multilateral disarmament process might progress at a stable pace. We therefore deem it appropriate to consider solutions capable of preventing the use of force, since they are propitious to arms control, as well as disarmament.

On the issue of nuclear tests, SSOD-III recorded a certain convergence of views on the reaffirmation of the goal of their cessation, within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process. A common trend was also registered on the role that the Conference on Disarmament must play in this field, side by side with the role which the United States and the Soviet Union are already playing in their bilateral negotiations.

On the occasion of the Moscow summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, it was possible to note some interesting progress in the United States-USSR negotiations on the reduction of their strategic nuclear arsenals. It is a good foundation for further progress in the nuclear disarmament field between the two super-Powers in a context of undiminished security. But what matters most is that in Moscow the United States and the Soviet Union concluded a detailed agreement on joint verification experiments. This is bound to pave the way - within the framework of agreed and effective verification measures - to the ratification of the threshold test-ban Treaty of 1974 and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty of 1976, and to subsequent negotiation on further limitations on tests, in yield and in

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number. We consider such a gradual and pragmatic approach to be most appropriate for the safeguarding of general security requirements, and therefore likely to allow step-by-step achievement of the goal of the cessation of all nuclear tests.

These developments lead us to hope for a genuine resumption by the Conference on Disarmament of its work on this issue. The starting-point should be discussion on substantive aspects of the future ban - such as its scope and the verification régime - in line with the proposals on the mandate and the working programme submitted by the Western Group. Only by starting from a pragmatic approach, based on the thorough examination of concrete issues, do we think it is possible to lay down the indispensable premises for future multilateral negotiations on matters with such broad strategic and security implications. We are convinced that the contribution which the Group of Scientific Experts can give to defining a general and effective verification régime will be of primary importance. Adequate verification measures, capable of ensuring respect for the relevant agreements by all parties, represent a central element of a step-by-step process towards the conclusion of a comprehensive ban on nuclear experiments.

On the occasion of his speech at SSOD-III, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs recalled the deep-rooted conviction of the Italian Government that - within the context of general and complete disarmament - outer space must be exclusively devoted to peaceful uses. On that occasion, Minister Andreotti expressed, in particular, the hope that the Conference on Disarmament may achieve some progress in this field, despite the undeniable political, strategic and technological difficulties involved.

During the work of the special session we were able to note a convergence of views both on the fact that the Conference on Disarmament must intensify its efforts in this area, and on the responsibility that falls on all States in reaching the goal of the peaceful use of space. An important - if not altogether decisive - contribution to the progress of the debate in this forum might derive from the positive development of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and we whole-heartedly hope that a common approach will be agreed upon in the bilateral talks at present under way in Geneva, also with respect to the offence-defence relationship.

Regarding the possibility that in this sector of disarmament too a rapprochement between the American and Soviet positions may soon occur, the new initiative in the field of space co-operation for civil purposes agreed upon at the recent Moscow summit seems to us to justify some optimism. While awaiting these desirable negotiating developments, it remains important for the Conference on Disarmament, through its subsidiary body, to pursue the work done so far. On the one hand, it should specify in greater detail the various aspects of the legal régime which applies to arms control in outer space, and, on the other, it should examine some of the activities at present being pursued in space.

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As regards the legal régime, we consider that in-depth consideration is still necessary to define some technological aspects unambiguously, and to reach a more precise understanding of the real scope and objectives of future rules in the field of arms control in outer space. In this context, however, we would like to underscore the major contribution to the strengthening of the existing legal régime which would derive from stricter compliance with the bilateral and multilateral agreements which form this régime, as well as broader adhesion to them. In addition to the legal topics, we believe that some progress should also be made in the field of verification and modalities for ensuring compliance with the agreements.

In conclusion, we wish to stress that - in line with a realistic approach and a renewed spirit of co-operation - our common reflection on outer space should not lose sight of the developments which are shaping up at the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, while encouraging their positive conclusion.

Another item in the Conference on Disarmament's agenda upon which significant convergences emerged during the third special session on disarmament is that of a global ban on chemical weapons. Already last spring's session of the Conference on Disarmament seems to us to have made further advancement in analysing important matters yet unsolved, thus showing that we now have a concrete opportunity to eliminate once and for all the serious threat to peace and the well-being of mankind represented by this category of particularly hideous armaments.

Recent dramatic regional events indicate the extent of the risk of proliferation of chemical weapons. They further prove that such weapons not only constitute a potential threat, but are easily used with devastating effects on civilian populations as well. We therefore believe that the ongoing efforts must be intensified so as to impart greater momentum to the negotiating process. Only the conclusion of our effort in the shortest possible time required for the co-operative solution of the major negotiating difficulties can offer an adequate response to the preoccupations of so many governments and the anxious questions of the public.

It remains to define some aspects of the ban, mainly those requiring further political and legal work. I would mention, in the first instance, the order of destruction of chemical weapons, as well as the various issues involved in the aspects of jurisdiction and control of the future ban. Other aspects, such as verification of the destruction of arsenals and control of permitted industrial activities subject to the prohibition régime, are widely accepted as to their basic principles. However, a number of technical implications are also involved which still require adequate in-depth consideration and final definition.

In our view, this area allows of innovative and pragmatic solutions as well. Agreement on them will depend in large part upon the concrete and exhaustive nature of the premises on which they are founded. In particular, I refer to the need for a timely and adequate assessment of the impact which technological developments may have on those chemical compounds that are on

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the borderline between toxic chemicals and chemicals whose purpose is not prohibited; the proper definition of the characteristics of production facilities which can operate on the margin between legal production and activities banned under the convention; identification of the procedures, techniques and equipment (especially the most innovative ones) which can be used for verification and monitoring of industrial production; and modalities for the protection of industrial patents and any confidential information related to production when a plant is subject to inspection or controls.

The detailed identification of the numerous technical questions inherent in these problems can benefit from wider co-operation in their analysis amongst scientists and experts from all countries concerned. The need to extend such co-operation was recognized by the scientists gathered in a forum held in Rome last May by Centro Ettore Majorana, a well-known Italian scientific association devoted to the promotion of international academic relations.

Because of its short duration, this meeting did not aim at providing exclusive solutions to the numerous problems mentioned above. Its objective was that of singling out some methodological guidelines capable of improving the effectiveness of international co-operation on a number of crucial aspects inherent in the ban of chemical weapons. A report on this work is being published, and we intend to submit it in due course to the Conference. In the meantime, it might be useful to provide some indications of the conclusions reached by the international scientists who participated in the forum. They pointed to the priority need to accelerate the definition of verification and control procedures; the urgency of initiating wider co-operation amongst scientists and experts from all countries concerned with a view to solving the problems cited; within such a framework, the usefulness of concentrating research on the possible standardization of analytical methods, instruments and verification procedures; the advisability of envisaging measures for control of the future research and development of toxic chemical agents to prevent the development of new chemical weapons, as well as to study the formulation of an open list of chemical agents which may potentially pose risks to the stability and effectiveness of the ban being negotiated; and lastly, the usefulness of the contribution which may be rendered by systematically resorting to an experimental method for assessing the procedures under article VI of the present draft convention (in particular as regards the crucial list of key precursors) with the assistance of international experts.

We think that - in view of the authority and independence of the sources from which they derive, which also represent a wide spectrum of opinions - these indications merit close attention and deserve to be considered from a practical and concrete viewpoint. Italy is therefore investigating a possible national contribution in that direction. We invite the member States of the Conference to draw from the above indications an encouragement to continue with increased determination along the path towards the solution of the technical difficulties still preventing us from finalizing the draft treaty for a global ban on chemical weapons. This will really be possible if we agree to be guided by a genuinely co-operative spirit.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, it falls to you to occupy the Chair in a month which plays a special role in the history of the nuclear age. On 6 August 1945 Hiroshima was subjected to atomic bombardment, followed by Nagasaki on 9 August. Soviet people, together with mankind as a whole, mourn the losses suffered by the Japanese people as a result of the use of nuclear arms by the United States. The tragedy of these two Japanese cities confronted the whole world with the grim reality that mankind had entered the nuclear era. It is a monstrous paradox that the greatest achievement of science, the splitting of the atom's nucleus, was used to create weapons of mass destruction and became a threat to the very existence of mankind.

At the same time, the month of August marks events of a completely different nature that inspire hope and optimism. On 5 August 1963 the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water was concluded, while on 6 August 1985, the day of the 40th anniversary of the tragedy of Hiroshima, the Soviet Union declared its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, which it strictly observed for 18 months. And finally, the historic date of 1 August 1988. At noon Moscow time, on a test range to the north-west of the town of Saryozek, a cluster of four OTR-22 missiles, the first of 2,400 Soviet and United States nuclear missiles scheduled to be eliminated under the INF Treaty, was destroyed. It took humanity 33 years to get from the first use of nuclear weapons to the beginning of their destruction.

The following words are inscribed on the cenotaph in Hiroshima: "Rest in peace; the mistake shall never be repeated". An earnest in this direction is the INF Treaty, under which, according to calculations by experts, the total nuclear equivalent of 32,000 Hiroshimas will be removed from the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States over a period of three years. This constitutes in all just 4 per cent of the nuclear weapon stockpiles of the two parties. But it is only a start. The conclusion of the INF Treaty is a concrete, tangible result of changes in our position on disarmament issues which have taken place in the past two to three years as part of a profound, comprehensive restructuring in our country. The changes in the foreign policy area result from the internal changes that are occurring in our lives. In other words, the major changes in our own home have called for new approaches to international affairs as well.

In response to the nuclear challenge that we and the entire socialist world faced, it was necessary to achieve strategic parity with the United States. And this was accomplished. But while concentrating vast resources and attention on the military aspect, we did not always make use of the political opportunities opened up by the fundamental changes in the world to assure State security, scale down tension and achieve mutual understanding between nations. As a result we allowed ourselves to be drawn into an arms race, which could not but affect the country's socio-economic development and its international situation. Meanwhile the arms race was approaching a

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critical point. If we had not overturned the logic of this course of events we could actually have found ourselves on the brink of military confrontation. This served as a starting-point for what we now call new political thinking.

As we analysed the contemporary world, we realized more clearly that international relations, without losing their class character, are increasingly taking the form of relations between nations. We noted the enhanced role of peoples, nations and emerging new national entities in world affairs. And this implies that there is no ignoring the diversity of interests in international affairs. From the standpoint of the present day, with its mounting nuclear menace, the heightening of other global problems and the progressive internationalization of all the processes in the world, which is ever more integrated and interdependent for all its contradictions, we have sought a deeper understanding of the interrelationship between classes and the interests of humanity as a whole. This led us to the conclusion that common human values have primacy in our age. In fact, the very survival of civilization has now become the principal universal problem.

In our assessment, certain favourable tendencies can be observed at present in international life. This is manifested in the nascent decline in confrontation, the growing contacts between the States of East and West, the creation of favourable prerequisites for curbing the arms race and settling regional conflicts. At the same time there has not yet been a radical change for the better. The situation in the world remains complicated and contradictory. Great numbers of nuclear arms remain, nuclear tests continue, new types of weapon are being produced and the danger that mankind, life itself on our planet, will be annihilated, has not been removed. That is why the fundamental issue of our time is the prevention of war, the cessation of the arms race and a decisive move to disarmament, first and foremost nuclear disarmament.

The nineteenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union approved the approach of the Soviet leadership to the problem of eliminating the danger of war through frank, constructive dialogue and disarmament, which opened the way to the conclusion of the INF Treaty and a shift to the practical plane in the negotiations on nuclear, chemical and conventional arms.

Turning to issues related to the activities of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to start with the situation at the negotiations on a chemical weapon ban. During the recession preceding the resumption of the negotiations, important events took place - most importantly, the Soviet-American summit meeting and the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament. The issues involved in banning chemical weapons occupied a prominent place at both the meeting of the top leaders of the USSR and the United States and the special session. The joint statement on the Soviet-American meeting in Moscow underlined the continuing urgency of concluding an effective convention on a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons encompassing all chemical-weapons-capable States.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

There is no doubt that the participants in the Conference take into account the considerable interest shown towards the negotiations on chemical weapons at the third special session. There was hardly a delegation there that did not address the issue of their prohibition. Thus the negotiations have resumed in very favourable political conditions. What is important now is to achieve results, to translate these conditions into the language of specific agreements on the issues which still remain unresolved. Among such unresolved issues I would mention first of all the problem of the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. It is complicated if only because it is necessary to establish a régime that would be effective from the point of view of non-production of chemical weapons and at the same time would not impede the normal development of chemistry for peaceful purposes. One of the aspects of this problem is ensuring the confidentiality of the information on facilities which is to be submitted to the technical secretariat. We share the view expressed by the distinguished representative of Canada, Ambassador Marchand, that it is necessary to consider studying practical ways of protecting such information, naturally without prejudice to the effective implementation of the future convention. A positive contribution to the consideration of this issue was made by the meeting of chemical industry representatives which was held in July.

It is also extremely important that in solving the problem of non-production we have to deal with different forms of ownership, private and public. In other words, differences in the social systems of States are of direct relevance in this issue. Obviously, this element is bound up first and foremost with the complex nature of the search for a mutually acceptable solution regarding schedule [1] chemicals. As you know, we have proposed that all the permitted production of such chemicals should be concentrated at a single specialized small-scale facility for each party.

We proceed from the premise that the convention should not only ensure the destruction of today's chemical weapons, but should also prevent the emergence tomorrow of new and more dangerous types of such weapons, which would in addition be still more difficult to verify. The convention should contain guarantees against a re-emergence of this means of mass destruction. The Soviet delegation intends to continue its active participation in the search for a mutually acceptable solution to this problem.

A useful role in finalizing an agreement on the régimes for verification of non-production of chemical weapons can be played by the experiment at chemical plants proposed by the Soviet delegation. We note with satisfaction that interest in such an experiment is growing and that preparations for it are entering a practical phase. The order of destruction of chemical weapon stocks and production facilities remains unsettled. While developing the order of destruction it is important to observe with care the principle that the security of States should be undiminished. We consider that the next step should be the completion of work on incorporating organically in the appropriate parts of the "rolling text" the Soviet-American document on chemical weapon production facilities presented in April this year.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Regrettably, we have not yet advanced on article X, concerning the provision of assistance to States parties to the convention in the area of protection against chemical weapons. This is an important problem associated with the security of parties to the convention, and deserves serious examination. As our position on the content of article X is flexible, we could support the development of provisions on collective measures by States parties to the convention to resist the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, including the establishment within the framework of the convention of multilateral machinery for mutual assistance among States parties in this area. In our opinion one of the ways to solve this problem could be the conclusion of special agreements between States parties and the technical secretariat specifying the forms, types and order of provision of assistance in conformity with decisions of the Executive Council.

The Soviet delegation is also prepared to agree to inclusion in the convention of provisions on co-operation among States parties to the convention in the area of defence against chemical weapons on the basis of voluntary bilateral and multilateral agreements. Furthermore, we believe that the reaching of agreement on banning military attacks against States parties' chemical weapon storages, destruction facilities and other facilities declared in and covered by the convention would contribute to strengthening the security of the States parties to the convention and to the effective operation of the Convention.

The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction the progress made in developing the provisions of the convention concerning the designation of inspectors for challenge inspections, as well as examination of the reports presented by inspection groups carrying out such inspections. We hope that in the very near future this progress will make it possible to move on to consideration of the key problems in article IX which are still preventing its adoption. I have in mind first and foremost the need to include in the convention provisions that would ensure compulsory challenge inspection without the right of refusal at the request of any State party to the convention at any point and at any facility of another party. We also proceed from the understanding that challenge inspection procedures should be totally without prejudice to the principle of compulsory and effective verification.

To our mind it is time to come to grips with the issues connected with the composition of the Executive Council and other aspects of the establishment and activities of the bodies responsible for the implementation of the future convention, including financial issues. In particular, we consider that the idea of a possible division of the future organization's budget into two parts, administrative and operational expenses, is a useful one. The first part would cover expenses on personnel, current administrative activities, the holding of meetings of various bodies and the like. The second would cover practical activities to ensure systematic international verification of compliance with the convention. States' contributions for administrative expenses would be assessed on the basis of the United Nations funding rules and practices. A given State's contribution to cover operational expenses would be approximately equal to the level of expenses required for systematic international verification on the territory of that State party.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Under the direct guidance of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, work on the final clauses of the convention is moving forward. Thus, in our view, we can count on definite progress in the negotiations by the end of the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament. And yet the pace of the negotiations cannot be considered as satisfactory. The Soviet delegation believes that it is also important to put the inter-sessional period to maximum use for negotiating purposes. We consider that for this purpose we could use at least four weeks in November and December this year, after the completion of the First Committee's work in New York, and also practically the whole month of January 1989. If the preparations for the inter-sessional work are to be more purposeful, it is necessary to define in advance the issues to be concentrated on in the inter-sessional period.

Progress towards a convention banning chemical weapons at the negotiating table must, we feel, be complemented and supported by co-ordinated efforts on a broader international scale as well. One of the areas where such efforts could be made is that of measures to ensure confidence-building and openness. To promote the solution of this problem, the Soviet delegation introduced on 18 February 1988 a memorandum on multilateral data exchange in connection with the convention now being negotiated. It provoked considerable interest and wide reaction. Interesting counter-proposals have been put forward, in particular by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany in document CD/828. We would be prepared to agree to modification of the volume and order of the multilateral data exchange we propose, taking into consideration other existing proposals, in particular within the framework of the scheme set out in the proposal I referred to from the Federal Republic of Germany, which provided for declarations of the presence of chemical weapons on national and foreign territories, the aggregate number of all facilities which are proposed to be covered by the future convention in that State, (CW production facilities, CW storage facilities, plants for production of schedule [1], [2] and [3], chemicals, etc.), and also the names of chemicals produced for CW purposes, types of munitions and chemical warfare agents, the names of schedule [2] and [3] chemicals produced in commercial industry, and plans and methods for CW destruction. However, it seems to us important as a matter of principle that the multilateral data exchange should include the declaration of volumes of CW stocks, which is particularly important both as a confidence-building measure and as a point of departure for negotiating a number of specific provisions of the convention, including those on the order of destruction of stockpiles.

The information provided within the framework of the multilateral data exchange must certainly be exact and truthful. In this respect we are in complete agreement with the point of view expressed by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf, in his statement of 28 July 1988. As regards the information recently presented by the United States on its CW production facilities, we are now examining the American document.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Another important area of efforts outside the negotiations could be described as moral and political preparation for the convention's entry into force. We welcome the statement by the distinguished representative of Austria, made at the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 4 August 1988, that his Government "intends to take the necessary steps to be among the first group of States to sign the convention". It would be useful if other States also spelled out their position in this regard.

The proliferation of chemical weapons, which has already led to tragic results, has recently prompted greater and greater concern throughout the world. Concern on this subject has been expressed in particular in the statement by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr. Hayden, which was distributed today. Many representatives at the Conference on Disarmament have expressed alarm and condemnation in connection with the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. The Soviet delegation agrees with them. We are deeply convinced that the only correct conclusion to be drawn is that it is necessary to speed up by every possible means the conclusion of a convention on a comprehensive and global ban on chemical weapons as the most reliable guarantee of their non-proliferation and non-use. We call all the participants in the negotiations to this task. We note with satisfaction that the same conclusion was reached today by the distinguished representative of Italy, Mr. Pugliese.

"Nuclear test ban" appears as the first item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. This item was included in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament in 1962, and was then transferred to the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. All in all this item has been on the agenda of the multilateral disarmament negotiating body for more than 25 years. However, we must note with deep regret that over a quarter of a century we have never managed to start negotiations on this agenda item, despite the fact that it is exactly what is required by the very status of the Conference. Why is it not possible to get work moving on a multilateral nuclear test ban? For a long time we were told that the major obstacle was the complexity of verification. Let us have a look at the state of affairs in this area.

The Group of Seismic Experts has been functioning under the auspices of the Conference since 1976, and recently completed its twenty-sixth regular session. The Group has been conducting useful work in the area of developing an international seismic data exchange system, including preparations for the experiment on level II data exchange. There is no doubt that such an exchange of seismic data can play an important role in the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. However, we must not overlook other existing methods. On 7 July of this year the representative of Sweden, Maj Britt Theorin, very properly reminded us of this fact, referring to a constructive exchange of views at a conference held in Linköping, Sweden, in May this year. "At this Conference", said M. B. Theorin, "the necessity of adequate verification was stressed, and various methods, such as seismological monitoring, satellite verification and on-site inspection were discussed." In this connection, I would like to remind you of our proposal put forward last year for the establishment of a special group of scientific experts to prepare practical proposals for a system for verification of the non-conduct of

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nuclear tests, as well as the establishment of an international system of global radiation safety monitoring using space communication links. The group would consist of experts in the fields of geophysics, radiochemistry, close-range seismology, atmospheric radioactivity, and the like. We believe that the effectiveness of verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban should not only be judged by the potential of each of these methods taken separately, but taken as a whole.

The 25th anniversary of the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty was recently celebrated. When it was being concluded, it proved impossible to agree on verification of an underground test ban. At that time the USSR, the United States and Great Britain were taking different approaches to the issue of verification. It was extremely difficult to find a common denominator, a balance of interests in this area. The Soviet Union now actively favours diversified verification, both national and international with on-site inspections. So verification is no longer an obstacle to a comprehensive test ban. The delegation of the USSR is seeking the establishment of a special auxiliary body that could conduct negotiations on the question of a nuclear test ban. At the same time we are taking into consideration the real difficulties encountered by the Conference on Disarmament in discussing this issue. Therefore we consider it necessary to reach a judicious compromise taking into account the existing proposals in this regard. I would like to lend support to the proposal made by the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Vejvoda. (He initially made this proposal in an unofficial way in his capacity as President of the Conference in April 1987, and reaffirmed it in his statement in plenary on 21 July this year.) In our view this proposal takes into account the concerns of the different groups of States and opens up the possibility of a compromise solution on the establishment of a working body under agenda item 1.

We have been and remain advocates of a radical solution - an immediate and comprehensive nuclear test ban. But we do not take a maximalist approach - all or nothing. Taking into account the realities and the degree of preparedness of the other nuclear Powers, primarily the United States, we favour the gradual and stage-by-stage settlement of this important problem, through such intermediate solutions as limitations on the number and yield of nuclear tests. That is why we are holding bilateral negotiations on this issue with the United States of America. Once understandings have been reached on improved measures to verify the 1974 and 1976 treaties, there will be an opportunity to drastically lower the ceilings and the number of nuclear explosions per year. The sooner that happens, the better. In any case we shall not be found wanting. But this should not be an aim in itself. We consider it necessary to advance towards the conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive and general nuclear weapon test ban at an accelerated pace. The Soviet Union, realizing the importance and urgency of this problem, is prepared to make use of any opportunity to attain that goal. We favour the holding of parallel multilateral and Soviet-American bilateral talks on nuclear testing. After all, bilateral negotiations can lead only to bilateral measures. Testing is also conducted by some other States. Besides, a multilateral nuclear test ban would constitute an effective means to counter the proliferation of nuclear arms, complementing the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

We view with understanding the proposal by Mexico, Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia, and also Venezuela, for amending the 1963 partial nuclear test-ban Treaty. The Soviet Union has already stated that in principle it supports the idea of broadening the scope of the Moscow Treaty by incorporating into it a ban on underground tests. This approach of ours was also reflected during the last United Nations General Assembly session in our support for resolution 42/26 B on this issue.

Little more than a month is left till the end of the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament. What results will we carry to the United Nations General Assembly? What successes in developing disarmament measures shall we report to the world community? Soon we shall have to sum up the results on this account. In the time left till the end of the session, the Soviet delegation intends to do everything in its power to make the results of the current session as substantive as possible.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Azikiwe.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): Mr. President, as this is the first time I am taking the floor since your appointment as the representative of your country to the Conference on Disarmament, I should like first of all to join preceding speakers in welcoming you, on behalf of the Nigerian delegation, to the Conference on Disarmament. The Nigerian delegation is particularly pleased at seeing you, the distinguished representative of Indonesia, a country with which Nigeria enjoys the most cordial relations, presiding over the work of this Conference during the month of August. With your diplomatic skill and wealth of experience, we are confident that you will be able to guide the work of the Conference in the most effective manner. I would like to assure you of the full co-operation and support of my delegation in the discharge of your responsibilities.

May I also take this opportunity to express my delegation's gratitude for the effective manner in which your predecessor, Ambassador Teja of India, conducted the work of the Conference in the month of July? We regret that Ambassador Teja as well as other distinguished colleagues - Ambassadors Meizster of Hungary, Ahmad of Pakistan and Tin Tun of Burma - have been reassigned from the Conference on Disarmament by their Governments. We wish them greater success in their new assignments. The Nigeria delegation would also like to welcome Ambassadors Kostov of Bulgaria, Ruoro of Kenya and de Rivero of Peru, who have recently been appointed by their Governments to the Conference on Disarmament. We look forward to working with them.

Before examining the items on the agenda of this Conference, I should like to comment briefly on the recently concluded third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. As we can all testify, the session took place in a highly propitious international climate and at a most opportune period in the history of the disarmament process. Relations between the two major super-Powers, which had often remained sour and had constantly impeded progress in disarmament efforts, had improved tremendously, resulting

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in the successful conclusion of the historic INF Treaty between the major nuclear-weapon States, which put into motion the actual process of nuclear disarmament. Efforts are also being intensified for an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in the strategic nuclear weapons of the super-Powers.

Nigeria, and I believe several other countries too, had hoped that the momentum generated by these significant developments preceding the third special session would be reflected in the proceedings of the session, thus ensuring its successful conclusion. It is therefore regrettable that the session failed to adopt a consensus document, which would have given much needed impetus to the multilateral disarmament process, thereby strengthening and complementing the achievements in the bilateral process. Much as we cannot disguise our disappointment over the inability of the session to adopt a concluding document, it would, however, be erroneous and misleading for anyone to conclude that the session was a failure. Indeed, it would be unrealistic to overlook the tremendous progress achieved during the special session simply because a few paragraphs out of the 67-paragraph draft document of the session presented by the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan, had not been agreed when time ran out.

The participation of very high-level dignitaries testifies to the importance which the international community attached to the session and to the multilateral disarmament process. The general debate also revealed that the international community was more concerned than ever before with the preservation of humanity and of civilization. Verification was given a prominent place during the session, and consensus emerged to request the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. In his contribution to the general debate at SSOD-III, my Foreign Minister underlined the importance of verification in disarmament agreements. He expressed the view, however, that verification cannot replace the will of States to reach agreement, or to fulfil, in good faith, their undertakings in such agreements.

My delegation has always felt that the burden of monitoring compliance with the terms of any disarmament agreement will rest primarily with the parties. However, even in bilateral disarmament agreements that touch on nuclear weapons, the universal fear engendered by the existence and possible use of this category of weapon makes it essential to insist on a role for a multilateral verification mechanism under the United Nations. Provision for verification by challenge, which features in the INF Treaty, is likely to recur in many subsequent agreements. This is an appropriate area for the United Nations to play a role. Obviously, resort to challenge will not be had lightly by either party to the agreement. However, if this case does arise, the presence of a third party inspector drawn from the United Nations mechanism will be reassuring. This does not demand an expensive apparatus in the United Nations, particularly at this initial stage of nuclear disarmament. But it does require recognition by both super-Powers that the United Nations embodies international interests in nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

You will recall that during the session also, consensus emerged that the Conference on Disarmament, the multilateral negotiating body of the international community, remains an indispensable forum in the field of disarmament, and the Conference was urged to intensify its work on various substantive items on its agenda. The international community expects swift and positive results from this Conference. We should therefore rededicate ourselves to the noble objectives for which this Conference was created, and undertake to work in concert to meet the profound aspirations of mankind - the attainment of peace and security.

1 July and 8 August 1988 marked the 10th and the 25th anniversaries of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty, respectively. Nigeria is a party to both treaties, and indeed was the very first among the 40 members of the Conference on Disarmament to ratify the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nigeria hoped that both treaties would help to create a safer world by discouraging further testing of nuclear weapons, thereby ending proliferation, whether vertical or horizontal. The two treaties imposed concrete obligations on their depositary Governments, which, *inter alia*, enjoin the two major nuclear-weapon States to "... seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end".

Ever since the two treaties came into force, nuclear weapon testing, especially by the super-Powers, has continued unabated, resulting in the colossal accumulation of nuclear weapons and their perfection to an unprecedented degree of precision and lethality, thereby placing mankind on the brink of catastrophe.

Much as it has been said that no new nuclear-weapon States has emerged since the entry into force of the NPT, it would amount to cold comfort to imagine that all is well with the non-proliferation régime. The constant reports one hears about the nuclear weapon programme of South Africa can no longer be ignored. Nigeria is particularly concerned about the balance of security in the African region, where the unrestrained nuclear programme of the South African régime has continued unabated.

If further proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be prevented, then we should immediately commence urgent negotiations on a nuclear test ban. It is incontestable that a nuclear test ban will dismantle the machinery for prosecuting the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new systems, and will thus create the much needed confidence for progress in disarmament.

The Nigerian delegation is aware that bilateral negotiations are already under way between the two major nuclear-weapon States on the question of a nuclear test ban. The step-by-step approach adopted by them, which would permit testing at agreed yields and at defined intervals of time, unfortunately has the effect of licensing nuclear testing, and would not necessarily prevent the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. The question at issue is the global prohibition of nuclear testing. Since the

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subject concerns the vital security interests of all nations, it falls more appropriately within the purview of this Conference. There should therefore be no further delay in the establishment of a subsidiary body to commence effective negotiations on a nuclear test ban. My delegation believes that a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty must be accorded the utmost priority, as it will reinforce mutual trust not only between the super-Powers but in all regions.

Chemical weapons are weapons of mass destruction which are next to nuclear weapons in their lethality. The use of these dreadful weapons has been prohibited under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and a convention has been under negotiation for the past two decades. Although much progress has been achieved in the elaboration of the convention in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and its conclusion is now in sight, the confirmed reports of the continued use of chemical weapons in warfare underlines in a most regrettable manner the urgent need for a faster pace of work to ensure the early conclusion of a convention on this item. We hope that the Ad hoc Committee will intensify its efforts to conclude outstanding work on the convention at the earliest possible time. The spirit of mutual concession and more mature compromise is required at this stage to overcome the outstanding differences.

I would now like to turn your attention and that of our colleagues to the question of radiological weapons. Nigeria attaches great importance to the question of the clandestine and hostile dumping of radioactive waste in the African region. Africa needs the support of the international community in maintaining its stand against the perils of materials it did not produce and is not technologically equipped to handle. My delegation notes with satisfaction that during SSOD-III consensus was reached on the danger of radiation arising from clandestine dumping of nuclear wastes.

As we are all aware, the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons has been working on a convention that will not only prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, but, more importantly, will prohibit all methods of conducting radiological warfare. I say "more importantly" here purely because radiological weapons as such do not yet exist, whereas two known methods of conducting radiological warfare have been identified. One such method involves attacks against nuclear facilities. The prohibition of attacks against such facilities is currently being negotiated in the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons under Contact Group B.

The lethal effect of radiation that will result from the hostile dumping of radioactive wastes makes the hostile dumping of such wastes or their use in armed conflicts an effective means of conducting radiological warfare. The dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes is a matter of serious concern to Nigeria, and we believe many other countries share this concern. We therefore consider it essential for this issue to be addressed in a clear and unambiguous manner in the radiological weapons convention being considered by Contact Group A. Nigeria believes that it should be essential for each

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

State party to the treaty to undertake never, under any circumstances, to dump radioactive wastes for hostile purposes or in an armed conflict in the territory of another State.

The issue of outer space can no longer be swept under the carpet or be shrouded in rhetoric. We can no longer deny the fact that the legal régime governing the activities of States in outer space is grossly inadequate to the task of preventing an arms race there. The legal régime has been overtaken by rapid developments in science and technology which were not foreseen when the treaties were drawn up. Although the military activities currently taking place in space do not as yet involve the use of weapons, it would be timely at this stage to adopt necessary measures to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space. Such a race would be extremely expensive and highly destabilizing. Outer space is the common heritage of mankind and must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of mankind. The last frontier of mankind should never be permitted to become an arena for the arms race. We hope that the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space will soon be given the appropriate mandate to give serious consideration to this matter.

The Nigerian delegation is pleased to note that active work is currently going on in the Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances to break the impasse which has been affecting the item for the past decade. As you are no doubt aware, the Nigerian delegation submitted a proposal during the 1987 session (CD/768) categorizing non-nuclear-weapon States according to the diversity of their security situations, and proposing undertakings to be assumed by the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. The proposal took into consideration the various conditions imposed by the nuclear-weapon States in their various unilateral declarations, and was aimed at breaking the stalemate on the question. During the spring session this year, the Nigerian delegation once more put forward an alternative option to the effect that nuclear-weapon States should set aside their various unilateral declarations to facilitate effective negotiations on, and the adoption of, a convention on the basis of a common formula. Under this option the nuclear-weapon States would have the right to make reservations while ratifying the convention. It is our hope that the international community will eventually develop effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In ending this statement, let me re-emphasize that, coming from a country traditionally dedicated to the cause of international peace, we shall continue to exert our best endeavours to ensure constructive participation in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. The representative of India has asked for the floor. I give him the floor.

Mr. SOOD (India): Mr. President, permit me to take this opportunity to extend to you the felicitations of my delegation on your accession to the presidency of the Conference for the month of August. We are indeed happy to see the distinguished representative of Indonesia, a country with which India enjoys close bilateral ties of friendship and co-operation, preside over our deliberations. I would like to assure you of my delegation's full co-operation in the discharge of your responsibilities. May I also take this opportunity to thank delegations for their kind words addressed to Ambassador Teja, which have been duly conveyed to him?

The distinguished representative of Pakistan has thought it proper to raise, in this essentially multilateral forum, matters that are strictly of a bilateral character between India and Pakistan. These are matters that concern Indo-Pakistan relations, which have a history that is unique by virtue of specific factors attending the partition of the subcontinent. These are also matters that are deeper and far wider in scope than just the nuclear programmes undertaken by the two countries.

As far as I am aware, India and Pakistan have been engaged for some years in the difficult task of establishing a sound, lasting and all-round basis for improvements in their bilateral relations. The task is not made any easier by choosing, as the representative of Pakistan has done, this forum for airing its views on matters that are currently receiving bilateral attention. I do not propose to follow the example of the distinguished representative of Pakistan. I shall therefore confine myself to exercising my right of reply and in doing so, as briefly as possible, limit myself to explaining the essentials of India's policy.

First, every Prime Minister of India since our independence has stated on the floor of our Parliament that India's nuclear activities are intended solely for peaceful purposes. This policy is fully understood by most Governments. Experts are aware that India's nuclear energy programme is not a recent development but an integral element of India's development strategy. The programme for nuclear energy development up to the year 2000 has been debated in our Parliament. Further, it is administered by a civilian ministry. These aspects give our nuclear energy development programme an open character, in sharp distinction to that of Pakistan.

Secondly, it does not seem a valid reason for India to try to allay the self-inspired doubts of Pakistan by accepting its proposals to join a nuclear-weapon-free zone, or sign the NPT, or agree to full-scope safeguards, or accept mutual inspections, or a regional nuclear test ban. India's principled opposition to the NPT has been consistent, and is based on the tenets of non-discrimination and equal treatment. India's stand with respect to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is consistent with the provisions of the Final Document adopted by consensus in 1978 at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Our positions on these and other related aspects have already been made known in other forums, and I do not intend to repeat them here.

(Mr. Sood, India)

However, it would be a grave mistake to imagine that the improvement of Indo-Pakistan relations is dependent on the nuclear question alone. There are many other questions that have a bearing on our bilateral relations. Regionalizing or multilateralizing such questions will certainly not improve bilateral relations, which, on the contrary, may become more complicated.

My delegation would like to revert to this matter at a subsequent date, if necessary.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

The secretariat has circulated today an informal paper containing the list of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during next week. As usual, this timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if need be. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As I mentioned at our plenary meeting on Tuesday of this week, we shall now hold, immediately after I adjourn this plenary meeting, an informal meeting devoted to the consideration of all aspects of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, including the two reports which were submitted by the Group of Seven (CD/WP.286 and CD/WP.341), as well as the future consideration of this subject by the Conference.

The Co-ordinator of the Western Group has suggested that the next informal meeting on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, scheduled for Tuesday 16 August, should be held instead on Thursday 18 August. As we all know, our schedule of meetings is only indicative and subject to change as appropriate. May I take it that the Conference agrees to reschedule the next informal meeting on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament as suggested above?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 16 August, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.474
16 August 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 16 August 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Wisber Loeis (Indonesia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 474th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference begins this week its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". However, as provided for in rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. I give the floor to the first speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, as I am taking the floor for the first time under your stewardship, I first wish to congratulate you and your delegation on your assumption of the presidency for the month of August. My colleagues and I are happy, from a professional and from a personal point of view, to see you in the Chair presiding over the debates of our Conference. I also wish to thank our previous President, Ambassador Teja, whom we will be missing very much, for the excellent manner in which he presided over our sessions in the month of July. Let me extend a warm welcome to those ambassadors who have arrived recently, and I refer in particular to you, Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Ruoro of Kenya and Ambassador de Rivero of Peru. I would also like to welcome the Disarmament Fellows who watch over the proceedings of our Conference before they travel to the various countries that have invited them.

My colleagues and I note with regret that some of us have left Geneva or are to leave it in the near future, in particular my good friend Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, whose excellence and diplomatic skills I will always remember, Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma, Ambassador Teja of India, to whom I already have referred, and Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary, who in an excellent and balanced manner presided over our Conference in April and guided us in the months of May and June.

On 14 April 1988 I had the honour to introduce on behalf of a group of Western countries a working paper on the provision of data relevant to the convention banning chemical weapons. In presenting the paper I stressed that the multilateral exchange of data prior to the signing of a convention is not only a confidence-building measure but also a necessary prerequisite for drafting an effective convention and ensuring its early functioning. Since the submission of the paper some welcome steps have been taken. I would like to draw attention in this regard to the Netherlands working paper CD/CW/WP.203 of 19 July 1988, which provided detailed information according to the format proposed in CD/828; the declaration of the location of chemical weapons production facilities in the United States by Ambassador Friedersdorf on 28 July 1988; and the detailed presentation by the United Kingdom on the production of schedule [2] and [3] chemicals in CD/CW/WP.206 of 10 August 1988.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

By taking these steps Western States have once again demonstrated their commitment to more openness and transparency - concepts we consider to be essential in all fields of arms control and disarmament.

Today I would like to present the data for the Federal Republic of Germany according to the proposed format in CD/828. These data are contained in a working paper which has just been distributed. I would first like to reiterate a statement my Government has made on a number of occasions in this forum and elsewhere: the Federal Republic of Germany does not possess chemical weapons. Nor are chemicals contained in schedule [1] of article VI being produced in my country.

According to information provided on a voluntary basis by companies in the chemical industry, four compounds on schedule [2] and, with the exception of chlorpicrin, all compounds on schedule [3] are currently being produced, processed or consumed in the Federal Republic of Germany. On the basis of the thresholds for declaration proposed in working paper CD/802 of 5 February 1988, these 15 compounds are produced, processed or consumed in 52 facilities. The data reflect the situation at the beginning of 1988, and are subject to change depending on market conditions and developments in the state of technology.

I hope that in our negotiations we are only at the beginning of a process, at the end of which all States members of the Conference on Disarmament will have submitted data on their chemical industries and their chemical weapon capabilities. The provision of data is not only a necessary contribution to the negotiation and effective implementation of the provisions of a chemical weapons convention. It will also give all participants the reassurance that the negotiations are being carried out in good faith. In this context, we regret that - despite the noticeable increased recognition of the importance of greater openness - a number of members of the Conference on Disarmament have not yet indicated as a first step whether or not they possess chemical weapons. I would therefore like to reiterate my call to all participants to provide as soon as possible data relevant to the chemical weapons convention.

On the occasion of the presentation of CD/828 I expressed my conviction that a multilateral exchange of data would have a positive effect on the course of our negotiations. Reviewing the current state of our negotiations, I cannot conceal my disappointment over what we have been able to achieve so far this summer. Although pleased by the business-like atmosphere prevailing in our negotiations - and here I fully share the view expressed by Ambassador Marchand in his speech on 4 August 1988 - I continue to be concerned about the lack of progress on a number of issues. Let me briefly review the state of affairs during this summer session and our assessment of it.

The Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, and the chairmen of the working groups, Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Numata of Japan, have made strenuous efforts to move the negotiations forward. We are very grateful to them for their commitment, energy and excellent work.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

In Working Group A under the chairmanship of Mr. Cima a number of important issues concerning the non-production of chemical weapons have been addressed. The discussions on some of the long-standing problems have certainly contributed to clarifying the positions. We deplore, however, the fact that the discussions have not yet resulted in the elaboration of solutions which are not only acceptable to all but would meet the criteria for the establishment of an effective verification mechanism. In this regard I am thinking particularly of the deliberations on the régime for schedule [1] and the so-called STLC problem, where regrettably demands continue to be made which ignore the need to arrive at feasible and effective solutions that take account of the basic question of what is realistically verifiable.

In Working Group A we have also had a very interesting discussion on the concept of ad hoc checks, which was originally proposed by us in working paper CD/791. I do not wish to elaborate here on our thinking on this issue. We have done that on a number of occasions in the past weeks. We will reflect on the interesting comments which have been made, and intend to present more specific ideas on a régime for ad hoc checks in the framework of article VI soon.

On 22 July 1988 we had an interesting meeting with industrial experts. I hope that this meeting was only the start of a more intensive dialogue with representatives of the chemical industry. I am convinced that such a dialogue can contribute to better mutual understanding between negotiators here in Geneva and the chemical industry, which will necessarily be subjected to stringent and effective monitoring to ensure the non-production of chemical weapons. I am likewise convinced that it will be very fruitful for our task to elaborate a comprehensive, effective and at the same time manageable article VI. As the discussion on 22 July 1988 clearly showed, more detailed exchanges with representatives of the chemical industry on such issues as the protection of confidential information are needed. I am gratified to say that the chemical industry of the Federal Republic of Germany, with which we have close and long-standing contacts, shares without reservation our priority objective of achieving a comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

Let me make a brief comment also on the question of trial inspections in the chemical industry. We welcomed the proposal made to that effect on 18 February of this year by Mr. Petrovsky, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Such inspections, carried out on a multilateral basis, will provide us with information and insights which will certainly turn out to be most helpful and possibly indispensable for working out procedures for conducting inspections in facilities of the chemical industry. We are willing to participate in such a multilateral experiment. At the moment the issue is being closely examined by my Government, and preparations for a possible national experiment are under way. We endorse the emerging consensus on a step-by-step approach to the issue. We would welcome the establishment of an informal group which could prepare for multilateral trial inspections. In such a group experience acquired in the course of efforts undertaken nationally could be exchanged, and as a result a standardized approach for the multilateral experiment could be elaborated.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

Let me now briefly turn to the work in groups B and C. We had hoped that during the summer session it would be possible, in an effort to finalize article V, to introduce elements of the joint proposal by the United States of America and the Soviet Union on chemical weapon production facilities into the "rolling text". We understand, however, that efforts made to this end have run into difficulties. We strongly support the Chairman of Working Group B, Mr. Macedo, in his intensive endeavours to resolve the difficulties so that the appropriate amendment to the text of article V can be made in the course of this summer session.

With regard to article X, another subject on the agenda of Working Group B, we note with regret that the negotiations have somewhat retrogressed. The discussion paper on this article now contains a number of brackets and footnotes that point to positions which, it seems, are difficult to reconcile. We urge continuation of the work on that article in a spirit of compromise, and also with a sense of perspective. We should never lose sight of the main goals of the convention we are negotiating, and what can realistically be undertaken to achieve these goals.

With quite some interest we have followed the work undertaken in Group C under the chairmanship of Mr. Numata. We consider the paper which resulted from the discussion on the process after the submission of the report on challenge inspections to be a good basis for solving the issue or coming close to it. We hope that it will be reflected in the report of the Ad hoc Committee to the Conference on Disarmament.

With regard to the sometimes rather protracted and detailed discussions on the guidelines on the international inspectorate, I am convinced that we have to undergo such an exercise, which has proved to be useful and has also brought to the surface some detailed problems we have to come to terms with. I would like to encourage Mr. Numata to pursue the sometimes difficult and very time-consuming consultations on the subject. They will contribute substantially to better understanding of inspection procedures, and will also help to resolve the remaining issues with regard to on-site challenge inspections.

Finally, I would like to thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, for actively working on the final clauses of the convention. We welcome the revised discussion paper he put forward last week, which, we hope, will provide a basis for making progress on articles XII to XVI. The past discussions on these articles have clearly shown that some very important issues are involved which deserve our particular attention, as a solution of these issues will have a direct bearing on the viability and effectiveness of the convention. In this regard I would only like to mention the question of reservations and amendments, on which a lot of the discussions in the open-ended informal consultations conducted by Ambassador Sujka have focused, bringing out the differences.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

In conclusion I would like to call upon all participants to make the best use of the remaining time available this summer to achieve concrete progress in our negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. We should make every effort to set the stage and create the best conditions for a promising continuation of our work in any inter-sessionals we may decide to hold starting toward the end of this year.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador von Stülpnagel for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby.

Ms. SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, may I first congratulate you on your accession to the presidency? It seems not a very long time ago that I had the pleasure of welcoming you as a newcomer. But you have taken over the reins of power with the confidence and sure touch of an old-timer, if I may say so. It is a particular pleasure to have the distinguished Ambassador of Indonesia in the presidency, a country with which my own has long-standing close and friendly relations. May I also repeat my earlier expressions of warm appreciation for the leadership given us during July by Ambassador Teja of India?

We are now approaching the last phase of the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament. In the aftermath of the third special session of the General Assembly there has been a general determination to build upon its positive aspect, especially the convergence of views on a wide number of issues. The mood has been: let us get on with the business in hand. And we have done so.

I would like this morning to speak about one aspect of that "business in hand", namely the negotiations for a convention banning chemical weapons. The conclusion of a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention is one of the highest priorities in the arms control and disarmament programme of the British Government as of our NATO allies. We want a convention as soon as practicable. But it must be a good convention, in which we can have confidence. A number of difficult and complex problems remain to be resolved, and this morning I would like to consider two of them: verification and data exchange.

The need for a reliable system of verification lies at the heart of our negotiations. It is the key to a convention. We have made a lot of progress. We can say with some satisfaction that, whatever fine tuning may be required, our "rolling text" provides the basis for a credible procedure for verifying declared activities relating to schedules [1] and [2]. So a good deal is already accomplished.

One reservation has to be made, however, as regards these schedules. The chemical agents so far listed under schedule [1] and indeed schedule [3] are for the main part the traditional chemical agents familiar in the First and Second World Wars and developed further in the 1950s. One or two comparative newcomers such as saxitoxin have also been proposed, but the lists need at

(Ms. Solesby, United Kingdom)

some stage to be reviewed to make sure they are complete. We also have to provide adequate procedures for modifying the schedules in order to keep pace with technological advances.

Outside schedules [1] and [2] the gaps in verification procedures are also wide. At present for example there is no provision for routine on-site inspection in relation to schedule [3]. Nor so far has provision been made for non-confrontational inspection of undeclared facilities. The valuable proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany for ad hoc checks has pointed in the direction of a possible solution. However, the concomitant idea of national registers still leaves us with the problem of facilities wholly undeclared for the purposes of a convention - in other words, facilities which should be declared in accordance with the annexes to article VI or included in any national registers but which are not. Ad hoc checks as conceived at present are clearly not the whole answer. All this calls for further hard thinking. My delegation hopes in due course to table some detailed ideas of our own.

A major achievement in the negotiations has been the convergence of views in support of a system of challenge inspection. The main framework is in place. However, as we have long argued, challenge inspection is the essential safety net for the convention. It cannot by its nature replace the need for a comprehensive and resilient routine régime.

I have so far been speaking about verification mechanisms. There is also the question of conduct of on-site inspections which remains to be tackled in a good deal greater depth than has been done so far. Inspections have to be as intrusive as necessary in order to fulfil their purpose effectively. On the other hand we must recognize legitimate concerns about confidentiality. How can these criteria be reconciled? Here again we have to bear in mind not only the well-known classical chemical weapon agents but any possible newcomers. A lot more innovative thought is required. And private industry has a contribution to make. We are in close and regular contact with our own industry who show a good understanding for the requirements of the convention. Part of the solution may lie in verification instrumentation. Interesting advances are being made through both private and official research. More needs to be done. What is clear, however, is that verification technology in the foreseeable future is not going to replace the need for on-site inspection. We will need a two-legged instrument for a long time.

If what I have said is anywhere near the truth, there are a number of vital questions where we are still groping for answers. Is there anything more we can do that is not yet being done to bring us to the point where we can provide those answers? I think there is. It is my belief - and that of my authorities - that the Conference has reached the phase in its work where our concepts need to be put to the test, as realistically as possible, to see how far they work and to attempt to identify improvements. We need to move from theory to experimentation. We have to test major links in the verification chain, especially those which seem the weakest, in order to establish whether they can take the weight of what we require of them and whether they can be strengthened.

(Ms. Solesby, United Kingdom)

My own authorities have for some time been considering the possibilities of practice inspections of relevant facilities. We see the initial phase of these practice inspections as being undertaken at a national level. Procedures will first have to be carefully prepared if the experiments are to be worth while. Inspections may have to be both of a "walk-through" nature with a co-operative facility management, and in a scenario where the management is doing its best to conceal and misguide.

We would hope that national practice inspections in the civil industry would be followed by multilateral inspections, and we have already welcomed the proposal made by the Soviet Union in this regard. This will require close contact and co-operation among the members of this Conference. I am pleased that the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is already consulting about suitable machinery for this. My own delegation will be happy to participate fully.

The INF Treaty has established an important precedent for intrusive verification measures. We look for progress in the nuclear area from the joint verification experiment now under preparation by Washington and Moscow. Let us apply that experience to our own efforts to ban chemical weapons.

The second aspect of the negotiations for a convention on which I should like to comment is data exchange. I think it is now widely accepted that provision of accurate data is essential, particularly on the part of those who hold the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons. We need additional data to enable us to draft a sensible convention. Equally important, credible data is essential in order to build up the necessary level of confidence in each other's intentions if a convention is to attract widespread support.

For our part we have just conducted what I believe has been an extremely significant experiment. The British Government in 1986 proposed an exchange of visits between Porton Down Chemical Defence Establishment in the United Kingdom and the Shikhany military facility in the Soviet Union. This has just taken place. We were pleased to welcome the Soviet team to Porton Down in May, and a British team was received at Shikhany in early July. Porton Down is engaged solely in research and development for protection against chemical weapons. We aimed at the maximum openness during the visit there. Our visitors were able to go anywhere they chose and they expressed their satisfaction at the end of the visit. At Shikhany we were shown more than during the shorter visit by Conference on Disarmament delegates last October. However, we were made aware of the different attitudes towards the degree of secrecy appropriate in this area. My authorities are still assessing the exchange which was intended as a confidence-building exercise. Much more progress is required towards the sort of openness which our negotiations need. Many questions and concerns remain.

Of course the provision of data does not just depend on visits. We would hope each country, especially the possessors of chemical weapons, would provide the maximum amount of data to its negotiating partners as quickly as possible. The Soviet Union proposed a list of types of data in CD/808 and the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of a number of Western countries

(Ms. Solesby, United Kingdom)

including the United Kingdom tabled a much more comprehensive list in CD/828. My authorities have already provided this data but we are ready to repeat and update the information.

The following are our responses to the data requested in CD/828. First, as is well known, the United Kingdom abandoned its own offensive chemical weapons capability in the 1950s. Delegates from this Conference were invited to see the destruction of our disused pilot nerve agent facility at Nancekuke in Cornwall in 1979. We described in CD/15 some of the problems that had needed to be overcome then.

Against that background our responses to the questions concerning chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents are as follows. Firstly, the United Kingdom does not possess chemical weapons either within its own territory or within the territory of any other State. There are no chemical weapons possessed by any other State within the territory of the United Kingdom. Secondly, the United Kingdom possesses no facilities for the production or storage of chemical weapons. Thirdly, limited quantities of chemicals itemized in the provisional list of chemical warfare agents in schedule [1] to article VI can be prepared at the United Kingdom's Chemical Defence Establishment at Porton Down for research and development for protection equipment. The quantity of each such chemical present at CDE Porton Down at any one time is small. Fourthly, old munitions or agent discovered within the United Kingdom are removed to CDE Porton Down for destruction at a small-scale destruction facility there. It has a capacity to destroy about 35 kg of toxic agent at any one time.

CD/828 also requested information on a number of facilities in the civil chemical industry that might be relevant to the convention. Legislation does not exist in the United Kingdom to compel private industry to provide this information to government. However, the United Kingdom Chemical Industries Association has provided information on its member companies which produce schedule [1], [2] and [3] chemicals. This information may be summarized as follows. Firstly, there is one company producing schedule [1] chemicals (small amounts of nitrogen mustard for medical use). Secondly, there are four companies producing schedule [2] chemicals. Thirdly, there are five companies producing schedule [3] chemicals. More detailed information is set out in CD/CW/WP.206, which is being circulated to distinguished delegates.

As a further demonstration of our commitment to openness in this area we have compiled an account of production in the United Kingdom of chemical weapon toxic agents during the Second World War and in the years afterwards up until 1956 when we gave up our chemical weapons capability. This account sets out the type and amounts of agents produced and location of the then production facilities. It also describes our experience in dismantling production facilities. I have pleasure in circulating this information to distinguished delegates as CD/856.

(Ms. Solesby, United Kingdom)

Until the convention we are negotiating has come into force and has been, as we hope, universally ratified, the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons remains an instrument of considerable importance. My Government has been dismayed by recent instances in which chemical weapons have been used. The reaction of the international community has, in our view, been quite inadequate. In the last few days media reports have alleged still further grave use of chemical weapons.

My Foreign Secretary during the third special session of the General Assembly made a number of proposals to strengthen the effectiveness of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. His first proposal was that any Government not yet a State party of the Geneva Protocol should seriously consider acceding. It is worth my repeating this point here as some members of the Conference on Disarmament have still to become States parties. His second proposal concerned the investigation by the United Nations Secretary-General of allegations by Member States of chemical weapons' use. Sir Geoffrey Howe proposed that the Secretary-General should elaborate without delay "procedures for investigating automatically allegations of chemical weapons' use". He added that such investigations should be "undertaken as a matter of routine and without getting entangled by political considerations". We much hope that the group of experts now meeting in this same building will agree on procedures for an automatic United Nations investigatory procedure. My Government has submitted for the attention of the group a paper setting out our views.

Important as it is to reinforce the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the best way of preventing the use of chemical weapons lies in the efforts of this Conference to negotiate a comprehensive, global and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. I hope that what I have said underlines the determination of my Government to press ahead energetically with these negotiations. Such a ban is a prize for which the world has long striven. It is worth a very considerable effort.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Solesby for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? The representative of Pakistan has asked for the floor. I give him the floor.

Mr. ASIF EZDI (Pakistan): On 9 August I informed the members of the Conference of Pakistan's firm and abiding commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and outlined the proposals made by Pakistan to India for keeping the South Asian region free of nuclear weapons. In a statment on 11 August, the distinguished representative of India, exercising the right of reply, questioned the appropriateness of this forum for raising these issues, which he said were of a strictly bilateral character. Distinguished delegates to this Conference will be familiar with this argument, though in a different context. They will recall that this kind of logic has also been used by some members of the CD belonging to a different group to deny this Conference its due role as the single multilateral negotiating forum of the international community. We are disappointed that the delegation of India too should now be resorting to the same reasoning.

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

Nuclear proliferation is a matter of universal concern, as noted in the Final Document adopted by consensus in 1978 at the first special session devoted to disarmament. Last month several delegations took the floor to make statements on the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty. A few others have officially circulated documents on this subject. Concern about nuclear proliferation in South Asia has been expressed in several quarters. The members of the Conference on Disarmament therefore have a legitimate interest in this question. Pakistan's proposals in this regard will, we hope, make it clear that we are sincere about keeping our region free of nuclear weapons.

It should also be evident from the statements made by my delegation and by the distinguished representative of India that mutual suspicions do exist about the nuclear programme of the other country. These suspicions can only be made worse by allegations and counter-allegations. We did not, therefore, make any such accusation about India's nuclear programme. On the contrary, we only mentioned proposals made by Pakistan in a constructive spirit with the aim of dispelling these doubts and suspicions.

It would be odd to link the nuclear problem between Pakistan and India, as the distinguished representative of India attempted to do, to "specific factors attending the partition of the subcontinent". The origin of this particular problem can be traced to 1974, when India carried out its nuclear explosion. There are indeed other problems which arose on partition. We will not, however, raise these problems here, as appropriate multilateral forums exist for doing so.

The distinguished Indian representative referred to the "open character" of its nuclear programme, "in sharp distinction to that of Pakistan". Such an assertion will carry little conviction in view of the secrecy surrounding the Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 and India's adamant refusal to accept full-scope safeguards on its nuclear programme, to mention two points only. If India's nuclear programme is indeed of an open character, as the distinguished Indian representative stated, India should have no hesitation in accepting our proposals for simultaneous acceptance by the two countries of full-scope safeguards or for mutual inspections of each other's nuclear facilities.

We would agree that the improvement of Pakistan-India relations is not dependent on the nuclear question alone. Unhappily, it is true that there are several other issues as well. We will continue to avail ourselves of every appropriate multilateral and bilateral forum in our efforts to resolve these issues.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

As there is no other business for today, I shall adjourn this meeting, but before doing so I should like to recall that on Thursday, following the plenary, there will be an informal meeting to discuss all aspects of the

(The President)

question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. I should also like to note that I have been informed that as of Wednesday 17 August, and until further notice, the Council Chamber and the adjoining rooms, rooms I and C.108, will be needed in connection with the direct talks relating to Iran and Iraq. Room VII will be set up in a negotiating format to accommodate the Conference on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies, and rooms A.206 and A.302 will be made available to the Conference upon request for informal consultations to replace rooms I and C.108. Room III will continue to be available to the Conference as in the past. Accordingly, the plenary meeting of the Conference scheduled for Thursday 18 August, as well as the meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, will take place in conference room VII, on the third floor. I have also been requested to announce that there will be a meeting of the contact group of the CPD on nuclear-weapon-free zones today after the plenary meeting in room C.108.

The meeting rose at 11. a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.475/Corr.1
16 September 1988

ENGLISH ONLY

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 18 August 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Wisber Loeis (Indonesia)

Corrigendum

On pages 13 and 14 top right hand corner, please substitute
(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany) with (Mr. Sood, India).

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
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Corrigendum

Page 4, second paragraph

Mr. ASLAM KHAN (Pakistan): lines 5 and 6

For families of the bereaved read bereaved families.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.475
18 August 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 18 August 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Wisber Loeis (Indonesia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 475th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Before we commence this morning's proceedings, I wish on behalf of the Conference to express to the delegation of Pakistan, and through it to the Government and people of Pakistan, our deepest sympathy and sincere condolences on the tragic passing away of His Excellency General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan. Speaking as the leader of the Indonesian delegation, I am deeply distressed by his untimely death given the special relationship which exists between our two countries. Not only was General Zia President of a fellow Asian country with a large Muslim population, but both Indonesia and Pakistan attach crucial importance to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and the quest for world peace. I should like to invite delegates to stand and observe one minute's silence in memory of His Excellency General Zia.

* * *

I would also like to express to the United States delegation my deepest sympathy and condolences on the tragic death of Ambassador Arnold Raphel of the United States of America.

I would now like to give the floor to delegates who wish to offer condolences on behalf of the various Groups. I give the floor to the Ambassador of the United States of America.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): On behalf of the Group of Western States, I want to express our profound shock, regret, and deepest condolences to the delegation of Pakistan, and through that delegation to the Pakistani people, on the untimely and tragic death of their President, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. The loss of a national leader is never an easy thing; but the circumstances of President Zia's death are especially saddening. We mourn as well the death, in the same airplane explosion, of the United States Ambassador to Pakistan, Arnold Raphel, and Brigadier-General Herbert Wasson.

I would ask the delegation of Pakistan to convey our condolences to his Government, and to the families of those who were lost in this tragedy. Speaking for my own delegation, I would add that President Zia was a long-time friend and ally of the United States, a supporter of freedom in his part of the world, and a staunch opponent of armed aggression. He will be sorely missed by America and freedom-loving peoples around the world.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Permit me on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries to express condolences to the delegation of Pakistan on the tragic death of President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan. I would ask the delegation of Pakistan to transmit our condolences to the Government and people of Pakistan, and our sincere sympathy to the family of the late President Zia-ul-Haq. I should also like to express our condolences to the delegation of the United States on the death of United States Ambassador Raphel in the disaster.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): The Chinese Government and people were greatly shocked and saddened by the untimely death of His Excellency President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan. I wish to express, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, our deep condolences to the delegation of Pakistan and through it to the Government and people of Pakistan.

China and Pakistan are linked by shared mountains and rivers, and the two peoples enjoy a long-standing friendship. President Zia-ul-Haq made important contributions to the friendly relations between the two Governments and the two peoples, which are characterized by mutual trust and mutual support. The Chinese people highly treasure this friendship. China will, as always, work for the continued development of friendly relations and co-operation between China and Pakistan.

Under the leadership of President Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan has been playing a remarkable role in maintaining peace and stability in Asia and other parts of the world. China has tremendous admiration for the unremitting efforts made by the Government of Pakistan in adhering to principles, upholding justice and searching for a just solution to regional problems. The passing away of His Excellency President Zia-ul-Haq has deprived Pakistan of an outstanding leader and China of a respected old friend. We shall cherish his memory for ever.

I also wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, our condolences to the United States delegation on the tragic death of the United States Ambassador to Pakistan. Please convey our sympathy to the bereaved family.

Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): We were very shocked by the tragic incident which led to the untimely death of President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan. The Group of 21 expresses its deep condolences to the people and Government of Pakistan, as well as to the Pakistan delegation to the Conference on Disarmament. Our group, the Non-Aligned movement, the Islamic Conference, have lost a great leader and we deeply regret this tragedy. As a neighbour of Pakistan we have lost a leader who always led his country in brotherly relations and good-neighbourliness with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran has lost a good brother and a great leader, and the people of my country will always keep his memory. The Group of 21 also expresses its deep condolences to the families of all who lost their lives in the plane crash.

The PRESIDENT: In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". However, in conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

First of all, on behalf of the members of the Conference on Disarmament, I wish to take this opportunity to welcome the newly appointed head of the delegation of Hungary, Ambassador Istvan Varga. I am certain we can all count on him to make a valuable contribution to the work of the Conference.

(The President)

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany and India. Before giving the floor to the speakers on my list, I would like to give the floor to the representative of Pakistan.

Mr. ASLAM KHAN (Pakistan): Mr. President, on behalf of the Government and people of Pakistan and the Pakistan delegation and on my own behalf, I thank yourself and all distinguished delegations who have expressed very kind sympathies with us on this very sad occasion. Your kind sentiments will be conveyed to the people and to the Government of Pakistan and to the families of the bereaved.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan): May I extend to you, Sir, a very warm welcome to the Conference on Disarmament and say how happy I am to see you presiding over us for the month of August? You represent a great nation in Asia with which Japan enjoys the most cordial and friendly relations. My delegation will offer unlimited co-operation to you in your exercise of the important duties in the Conference.

I wish to take this opportunity to convey to the delegation of Pakistan how shocked we were to learn of the tragic demise of President Zia-ul-Haq. Pakistan has just lost a great leader. The Japanese people join Pakistani friends in mourning the untimely passing away of their President. May I also offer to the United States delegation my sincere condolences on the loss of Ambassador Arnold Raphel and Brigadier-General Wasson?

I would like to start my statement today with an assessment of the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In the early hours of 26 June, just before the closure of the session, I said in the plenary:

"My delegation deeply regrets the fact that the many hours of very hard work we all put in did not enable us to produce a concluding document based on consensus. However, my delegation feels that the intensive search for consensus has been a very valuable process. We were able to identify areas of convergence on many of the major disarmament issues which we should be tackling in the years to come. We were indeed very close to agreement. We should not take this as failure.

"I note in particular that on the two issues to which the Government of Japan attaches high priority - the nuclear test ban and nuclear non-proliferation - we found a large body of the international community sharing our belief on the direction in which we should be proceeding.

"It is also encouraging that we reached an extensive measure of consensus on the issues related to the machinery that would be of particular relevance as we continue our multilateral disarmament efforts. We should not let those significant agreements drift away. We should continue to exert utmost efforts in these and other areas. In doing so, we should make the best possible use of consensus, or the seeds of consensus identified during the past four weeks.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

"The Government of Japan pledges its full commitment to the task ahead of us."

I wanted to allow myself a fairly long period before speaking on the subject in the Conference on Disarmament in order to listen to others and pass objective judgement on my assessment. Since the beginning of the summer portion of this session, a number of speakers have voiced their assessments of the special session, and I am very encouraged to know that many of you share my assessment which I quoted. I wish to echo in particular the sentiments expressed by two of my distinguished colleagues. On 19 July, Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands said: "We should include in our assessment of SSOD-III our appreciation of the dialogue, the ambiance in which it was conducted and the many constructive ideas and proposals that were submitted and discussed." On the same day, Mr. President, you stated in your capacity as the representative of Indonesia: "the session has also strengthened the conviction that disarmament is not a one-time affair but a continuing process, and that SSOD is one of the means in that process and not an end in itself." I agree fully with these two statements.

The failure or success of SSOD-III depends on what we do from now on. The paper presented by our dear departed colleague, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, on the very last day of the special session, and subsequent discussions based upon the paper, were a valuable reflection of the status of convergences emerging out of the session. If we should refuse to recognize these convergences or consign them to oblivion, the special session would certainly be a failure. But if we instead use the paper and the discussions on it as a basis on which to build as we engage ourselves in the process of relentless search for progress in multilateral disarmament, we could still make the special session a success. How can we ensure such success? First of all, we must intensify our work in the Conference on Disarmament, particularly on nuclear testing and chemical weapons. At the forthcoming session of the General Assembly in New York, we must broaden the areas of consensus on disarmament items. And for the fourth review conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, preparatory work for which is to start next year, we must search for a truly world-wide nuclear non-proliferation régime.

It is in this light that I wish today to address two of the priority items on our agenda, namely, Nuclear test ban and Chemical weapons.

My Prime Minister, Mr. Noboru Takeshita, expressed in his statement at the third special session on 1 June his appreciation for the intensive negotiations under way between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear testing, as well as his strong hope that these two countries would further step up their negotiations and ratify the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty of 1976 and the threshold test-ban Treaty of 1974 at the earliest possible date, so that they can proceed to the next phase of limiting nuclear tests. He also stressed that the momentum of the positive developments between the United States and the Soviet Union should be fully taken advantage of to promote multilateral efforts toward a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

We were encouraged to note the emerging consensus in the subsequent deliberations in the special session to focus on the need for the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of a nuclear test ban and, at the same time, to invite the United States and the Soviet Union to take into account in their negotiations the views of the Member States of the United Nations, including the importance they attach to the cessation of nuclear testing within the framework of an effective disarmament process.

Another encouraging development is that the historic joint verification experiments between the United States and the Soviet Union are taking place this month and next month, clearing the way for the two countries to complete the first phase of their stage-by-stage negotiations, namely, the ratification of the two treaties I mentioned above.

I believe that the spade-work is steadily under way for constructive parallelism in bilateral and multilateral efforts to blossom and bear fruit, if not overnight then over time. We should take care not to nip it in the bud but to nurture it carefully. The process can best be started through the commencement by the Conference on Disarmament of substantive work on a nuclear test ban.

How can we begin the substantive work of which the Conference on Disarmament has been deprived for the last four years? I still believe, as I said in August last year, that the political realities are such that none of the various draft mandates officially tabled before us as they now stand enjoy consensus support. In April last year, the then President, Ambassador Vejvoda, put forward a valuable initiative. A group of Western countries expressed their readiness to consider that informal proposal as a basis for developing a consensus. Ambassador Vejvoda recently revived his proposal, and members of the Socialist Group also came forward in supporting it. We have yet to hear from the members of the Group of 21 on the proposal. Let us show flexibility and open-mindedness and extricate ourselves from the deadlock of the past four years. Let us build on the convergences at SSOD-III.

The other day, Ambassador García Robles, Ambassador de Rivero and Ambassador Taylhardat informed us of the action taken by six Governments which sponsored General Assembly resolution 42/26 B, calling for a conference to amend the partial test-ban Treaty to convert it into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The parties to the partial test-ban Treaty solemnly undertook to seek "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and "to continue negotiations to this end". I understand the frustration felt by many over non-progress on a comprehensive test ban in multilateral forums, which may have caused them to resort to the amendment procedure. However, Japan abstained in the vote on General Assembly resolution 42/26 B because we are firmly convinced that the Conference on Disarmament is the place where we could and should conduct the most meaningful work for a comprehensive test ban. We have serious reservations over a course of action which may be taken as a profession of the failure of the Conference on Disarmament on the nuclear testing issue and may result in undermining our serious efforts to tackle it within the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts, which held its twenty-sixth session two weeks ago, has undertaken the valuable task of studying the verification aspect of a nuclear test ban. But it has become increasingly apparent that the Group needs proper political guidance from the CD if it is to continue to perform useful and relevant work on a nuclear test ban. In this context, I would like to recall the announcement made by my Prime Minister on the occasion of the special session that Japan will host a conference to share the fruits of experience in verifying nuclear testing by seismological means, and to inform the Conference on Disarmament that consultations are now taking place with the United Nations Secretariat to convene a United Nations sponsored meeting some time next spring.

In searching for progress on a nuclear test ban, we should also bear in mind another crucial area related to nuclear weapons, namely, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is not an agenda item of the Conference on Disarmament, but constitutes an important element of the overall context in which we should approach nuclear issues in the coming years.

As we approach the fourth review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1990, and the fifth review conference in 1995, which will determine the future of this treaty of vital importance, I believe it will become increasingly necessary for us to address the three main nuclear issues - nuclear disarmament, nuclear test ban and nuclear non-proliferation - in their interrelationship and to devise a coherent multilateral strategy which will ensure peace and security for us all.

It is for this reason that Japan attaches particular importance to the recognition widely shared at SSOD-III of the need for efforts on the part of all States to further strengthen the non-proliferation régime, and for other measures to halt and reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We wish to work actively together with others to see that this emerging recognition is translated into concrete and meaningful actions.

There was unanimous recognition at SSOD-III of the importance of the early completion of the chemical weapons convention. Backing this recognition was the widely shared concern at the reported use of chemical weapons and the dangerous spread of these heinous weapons. Among the agenda items of our Conference, we have been making steady headway in our negotiations on this item. I wish to express my deep appreciation to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Bogumil Sujka of Poland, for his untiring leadership, and to Mr. Andrej Cima of Czechoslovakia and Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico for their devotion and contributions to the progress of our work. I consider it an honour and a privilege that my deputy is being entrusted with the work of chairing Group C.

I believe that the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban are now in a final crucial phase. By this I do not mean the process of dotting the Is or crossing the Ts or of going through the whole text of the convention with a legal fine-tooth comb. There will be considerably more work to be done before we reach that stage. We are at a crucial stage where we must make sure that the convention is truly global, effective, verifiable and workable. And we can only do this through working on the nitty-gritty.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

Let me, with your indulgence, step back for a moment from the jargon of the negotiators and think about how an uninitiated layman would look at the convention. I say this only because, in the final analysis, the convention will have to be accepted by the public at large, the international as well as the domestic public, to be truly viable. The layman would probably like to be assured that the convention would really ban chemical weapons, that is, in the first instance, get rid of all existing chemical weapons as well as their storage and production facilities within 10 years. It would also be important to him that his security should not be threatened during the destruction period. But he would feel extremely wary if production of chemical weapons were to start or continue in that period for reasons of security.

He would also like to be sure that there would be no more development, production, etc. of chemical weapons undertaken covertly or overtly by industries in the future. He would see the need for certain sacrifices in this regard. But he would hate to forgo the benefits he derives in his daily life from the products of peaceful chemical activities. He would like to see the convention binding everybody, not allowing some to get away with possessing or producing these dangerous weapons. He would, above all, like to have confidence that the convention and its machinery did the job of banning and verifying with dispatch and efficiency, instead of falling of its own dead weight.

At the risk of over-simplification, these seem to be the necessary ingredients for the widest possible public acceptance of the convention. If that is the case, we must make sure that we have these ingredients in the convention. The question is how.

Let me first touch on universality or globality. We should give thought to whom, besides those now negotiating, we may need to involve in the process, and at what stage. This would entail a realistic consideration of what range of participation would ensure confidence that the convention is globally viable. We also need to demonstrate to a great number of States that it serves their interests, and the interest of the international community as a whole, to be "in" rather than "out". One important question to address in this context is how the system of rights and obligations under the convention may be underpinned by its mechanism concerning non-compliance or violations. We will have to answer this question by the end of the negotiations.

Secondly, the confidence which the international community places in the convention will be largely contingent upon how its verification mechanisms actually work. I feel it is important in this context that the burden of verification should be shared equitably among States parties in a manner commensurate with the risks they pose to the objectives of the convention. In the first 10 years, this burden would probably fall heavily on chemical weapons possessors, which would seem only natural because their chemical weapons and production facilities pose the most obvious and direct risk. As from the eleventh year, it would be the civil chemical industries which would have to bear the primary burden, and that would be in perpetuity. The non-production verification régime would have to be cost-effective in order to

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

be durable. I recall in this connection the very pertinent reminder by Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands on 19 July. He said: "an entirely and perfectly verifiable agreement is not what is needed. We need a convention with the capacity of verification required to inspire confidence in its implementation by all parties."

We should first have a firm and clear grasp of what we are up against in terms of exactly what sort of and how many facilities, military and civil, will be subject to verification, and try to work out a proper mix of data reporting, instrumental monitoring, routine and challenge on-site inspections and other possible means. We should seek the optimum balance between verification requirements and available resources. This requires more down-to-earth practical thinking than theorizing. I welcome the recent initiatives by some countries to come to grips with the realities, including those related to non-production, in the process of multilateral data exchange.

My own Government is intensively conducting a survey of our chemical industries to compile the relevant data. This is proving by no means an easy task. But our very preliminary findings seem to indicate that the aggregate number of Japanese producers, consumers and processors of chemical substances on schedules 2 and 3 of article VI, including those under the heading "to be discussed further", could be in the order of approximately 700 - I repeat, 700 - if counted without applying specific thresholds. What is also emerging is that many of these firms or plants, especially consumers and processors, are not powerful corporate giants or oligarchs but disparate small and medium-sized industries. Perhaps the Japanese economic structure is peculiar compared to those of the West and centrally planned States. We have a large sector containing many small and medium-sized cottage industries. But this is the structure you find in much of the developing world. This is the magnitude of the problem we are going to face. We need to examine whether verification régimes or procedures designed primarily with huge industrial complexes in mind may be effectively applied to those smaller firms or plants.

The protection of confidential commercial information is also an area in which we need to move the discussion from generalities to practicalities. I would hope to see the relevant elements built up on the basis not of a priori assumptions but of an objective assessment of verification requirements and real concerns of industry. A useful focus in this regard may be provided by looking more closely into the question of facility attachments.

As I look to how we may put these various elements together into a viable convention, we recognize the merit of trying to see in practice how the verification provisions may work. My delegation feels that a useful practical approach would be to proceed step by step, that is, first to conduct national experiments and then to pool the experience together to see what can be tried multilaterally.

I have dwelt in some detail on the chemical weapons negotiations precisely because I feel a balanced sense of perspective will in the end provide us with a short cut to the goal we all share, that is, the earliest possible conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. We may not as easily

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

find short cuts to other important items on our agenda, including the nuclear test ban. But I do believe, as you do, Mr. President, that disarmament is a continuing process, and I am confident that we can make it work with determined and persistent efforts.

Before concluding my statement, may I extend a warm welcome to the representatives who have joined our Conference since my last intervention in the plenary? I look forward to working closely with Ambassador Ruoro of Kenya, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador de Rivero of Peru and Ambassador Varga of Hungary.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): I associate myself with the condolences Ambassador Friedersdorf presented on behalf of the Western Group on the occasion of the untimely death of President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and the United States Ambassador to Pakistan. I congratulate the new representative of Hungary to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Varga, on his assumption of his new function in our midst.

Today I would like to offer some brief comments on topics related to item 1 on our agenda, "Nuclear test ban". For the first time ever, the United States and the Soviet Union yesterday conducted a nuclear test with teams from both countries present to verify the data. By this the two countries are following the protocols governing the joint verification experiment, which consists of two nuclear tests. The first took place yesterday at the Nevada test site at 1712 GMT; the second test, at the Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk, is scheduled for 17 September 1988. We consider the experiment to be a major advance in the relations between the two countries taking part, as for the first time each side can validate the other's data directly at source. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has repeatedly expressed its interest in a step-by-step approach ultimately leading to the complete cessation of nuclear tests, and thus hopes that a resolution of the verification problems which have hindered ratification of the 1974 threshold test-ban Treaty and the 1976 peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty will mark an important step on the way to this final objective.

Immediately after the seismic signals from the first experiment were recorded by the 13 array stations at Gräfenberg in the Federal Republic, a set of seismograms was telefaxed to us in Geneva; these data are being distributed. The magnitude of the event was estimated to be mb = 5.5; according to our current knowledge this corresponds to a yield of about 75 kT in wet hard rock. Taking into account actual geological conditions at the test site, the actual yield should be above 100 kT. The data before you could also have been retrieved via public telecommunication links from our open seismic station at the Gräfenberg array operated by the seismological observatory in Erlangen, Bavaria. In fact, we have been informed that a number of countries have already accessed our open array system and have recovered the data from the first explosion for their own purposes.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

This leads me to another important point concerning the Conference's work on an NTB. The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events terminated its summer session just two weeks ago. My delegation has repeatedly set forth its views on the valuable work being performed by the Ad hoc Group under the able chairmanship of Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden. We have in particular voiced our support for an important principle, namely, that the international data centres should be open facilities for participating States, providing free and easy access to any data and results of analysis. Today's demonstration of the capabilities of our "open seismic station" concept serves to underline our point of view on this issue. This "open system" approach provided immediate and unhindered access to the recorded seismic wave-form data without requiring expensive and sophisticated technology. The advantage of immediate availability of seismic data has also been recognized by other countries that have opened their seismometer stations and arrays for direct access, or have announced their intention to do so in the future.

As far as the design of the future global system is concerned, the "open station" concept would facilitate the procedures for wave-form data exchange and, moreover, contribute to the solution of various problems that have been addressed by the GSE during previous meetings. This refers, in particular, to the question of communication between national data centres and international data centres. The possibility of direct access to participating stations makes any restrictive communication procedure, such as a "regional principle", i.e. a regional association of national data centres with a specific international centre, technically obsolete. However one might assess the merits of such a principle for the impending global data exchange experiment, we would like to propose that a future global monitoring seismic network should be technologically designed in a dynamic manner, so as to be able to integrate state-of-the-art technologies at the time it comes into existence.

One year ago, the advantages of the "open station" concept were successfully demonstrated at a technical presentation to CD participants in the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany here in Geneva. Contact was established by commercial telephone lines to the data recording system of the seismological observatory in Gräfenberg, and various segments of wave-form data were displayed on-line on our screen. If the joint verification experiment had been conducted on the day of that demonstration, the seismic signals from this nuclear explosion would have been directly transmitted and the results would have been the same as those in the figures which have been distributed. Concerning the ongoing debate on the relative merits of seismic verification of a future comprehensive test ban, the employment of different techniques of measurement or a mix of a number of verification methods, I would like to remark that when the yields of the experiment and the 10 selected previous nuclear explosions of the two nuclear Powers become publicly available, estimation of magnitude-yield relations for the two test sites should be considerably improved. This would then allow the experts to make a better assessment of the accuracy of different measurement approaches, and would also enlarge the basis for an educated discussion about which mix of verification techniques would eventually be needed to verify a global comprehensive test-ban treaty.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

What we have done today with the first of the verification experiments, we will also do with the test explosion planned at the Soviet nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk. The immediate data exchange on the Nevada test explosion between various open seismic facilities has, in our view, again demonstrated the usefulness of the underlying concept, and has confirmed that the exchange of seismic data on the basis of open stations has become an efficient standard feature. Therefore, we strongly recommend that this concept should be incorporated into the design of a future global seismic monitoring system.

Mr. SOOD (India): On behalf of the Indian delegation I would like to convey to the delegation of Pakistan and, through it, to its people, our sincere condolences on the tragic and untimely death of President Zia-ul-Haq. Our sympathies go to the members of the bereaved families. May I also convey our condolences to the delegation of the United States on its tragic loss? I also extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Varga of Hungary; my delegation looks forward to working closely with him.

I have taken the floor today to introduce document CD/859, entitled "Action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order". The action plan was submitted to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Introducing it, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi stated:

"India believes it is possible for the human race to survive the second millennium. India believes it is also possible to ensure peace, security and survival into the third millennium and beyond. The way lies through concerted action. We urge the international community immediately to undertake negotiations with a view to adopting a time-bound action plan to usher in a world order free of nuclear weapons and rooted in non-violence."

The action plan introduced by India calls upon the international community to negotiate a binding commitment to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The attainment of peace and security has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. In the past, States have sought to enhance their security through the acquisition and possession of arms. This is no longer valid in the nuclear age. Security can no longer be visualized as a zero-sum-game relationship in an adversarial mode. Today, the accumulation of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to the future of mankind rather than a measure of protection. Security, therefore, has to be sought in disarmament through mutually co-operative efforts. The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency.

The action plan is divided into three stages, and presents a programme for the elimination of all nuclear weapons over a period of 22 years. While nuclear disarmament forms the central element of the plan, other measures are also included at each stage to further the process in a comprehensive manner. These cover weapons of mass destruction, conventional force reductions,

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

systems of space weapons, controlling the qualitative arms race, collateral measures in terms of confidence-building, other declarations; all intended to provide the means for achieving the common objective of general and complete disarmament. Equally, emphasis is placed on the need for the establishment of an integrated multilateral verification system under the aegis of the United Nations, as an integral part of a strengthened multilateral framework required to ensure peace and security during the process of disarmament, as well as in a nuclear-weapon-free world.

There are four fundamental features of the action plan. Briefly, these are: first, a binding commitment by all nations to the elimination of nuclear weapons in stages by the year 2010; second, participation of all nuclear-weapon States in the process of nuclear disarmament; third, building up of required confidence at each stage to ensure tangible progress; and fourth, changes in security doctrines and institutional mechanisms to sustain a world free of nuclear weapons. Each stage calls for simultaneous negotiations on a series of measures, which bear an integral relationship. The first stage calls for an agreement on a 50 per cent cut in Soviet and United States strategic arsenals. This is coupled with cessation of production of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissionable material by all States. In parallel, the first stage also calls for a moratorium on nuclear weapon testing, to be followed by commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Collateral measures at this stage include the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending complete nuclear disarmament, undertakings by non-nuclear-weapon States not to cross the nuclear threshold, and initiation of multilateral negotiations for a new treaty which could eventually replace the discriminatory non-proliferation Treaty. Negotiations on treaties banning chemical weapons and radiological weapons must also be completed during the first stage.

A moratorium on the testing and deployment of systems of space weapons is expected to provide an appropriate framework for future agreements to ban their testing, development and deployment. Despite its complexity, it cannot be denied that preventing an arms race in outer space is easier than the much more difficult task of halting an arms race in outer space, which we might be faced with. The first stage also visualizes the need for assessment of new technologies which may have negative implications for international security, and subsequent negotiations to curtail their military applications.

In subsequent stages, it is visualized that negotiations for the establishment of a comprehensive global security system would be undertaken to sustain a world without nuclear weapons. This would include institutional steps to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, arrangements for the release of resources through disarmament for development purposes, and elimination of non-military threats to security. At the same time, the integrated multilateral verification system under the United Nations would be negotiated and come into being during the third and final stage. There has been unprecedented militarization of international relations during the last four decades. To end this

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

militarization, a new structure of international relations needs to be created. The source for this lies in the growing awareness of an interdependent world.

It is difficult to believe that human ingenuity is to be measured in terms of accumulated megatonnage, or in devising security doctrines that lead to mutual annihilation. In the words of the celebrated poet Gabriel García Márquez:

"Three hundred and eighty million years were necessary, after the appearance of visible life on Earth, that a butterfly should learn to fly; another 180 million years, to devise a rose with no other duty than to be beautiful; and four geological eras that human beings, in contrast to our Pithecanthropus forebears, should be able to outstrip the birds and die for love. In the golden age of science, it does no honour to the talents of mankind to have conceived the means by which a multimillennarian process, so beautiful and colossal, should return to nothingness from whence it came, through the simple act of pushing a button".

In sum, this is the reason that we are present here today.

A comprehensive approach to disarmament has its roots in Article II of the Charter of the United Nations, which empowers the General Assembly to consider principles governing disarmament and regulation of armaments. In 1969, the General Assembly requested the then CCD to work out a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The efforts were given added impetus in 1978 by the Final Document of SSOD-I. Paragraph 109 of the Final Document mandated the Committee on Disarmament to undertake the elaboration of such a comprehensive programme. The United Nations Disarmament Commission contributed by developing the elements of such a programme, which also included sections on objectives, measures, machinery and procedures. Since then, a subsidiary body - first the Ad hoc Working Group in the Committee on Disarmament, and subsequently the Ad hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament - has been negotiating on a draft programme to fulfil its mandate. The Indian delegation has contributed in a positive manner to this work.

My delegation believes that document CD/859 will assist the Conference on Disarmament in fulfilling its long-standing mandate to negotiate a comprehensive programme to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the United States.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): First of all I would like to thank you, Mr. President, and all the other delegations who expressed their condolences today upon the untimely death of Ambassador Raphel, the United States Ambassador to Pakistan.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

A number of delegations have spoken recently about the proposal by five parties to the limited test-ban Treaty of 1963 that the depositaries convene a conference to consider amending that Treaty. The acknowledged intention of that proposed amendment is to "convert the Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty".

United States policy with respect to a comprehensive test ban is well known. In particular, a comprehensive test ban remains a long-term objective - one that must be viewed in the context of a time when we no longer need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability; and when we have achieved broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions, a more stable balance in East-West conventional forces, expanded confidence-building measures, and substantially improved verification capabilities.

That policy is both reasoned and reasonable. And in that regard, it can be expected to be enduring. Although we are not in favour of amending what has been a very effective treaty in the absence of the conditions which must precede our consideration of a comprehensive test ban, there should be no doubt that the United States will carry out its legal responsibilities as a depositary Government of the limited test-ban Treaty. Toward that end, we are taking steps to ensure prompt circulation of the proposed amendment to all parties. That will be accomplished in the near term. At the same time, it is appropriate to recall that we and the Soviet Union are engaged in a process that may lead to real progress in the area of nuclear testing. I refer, of course, to the step-by-step negotiations on nuclear testing now under way.

At the Washington summit last December, both sides agreed that the first step in such negotiations must be an agreement on effective verification measures for the 1974 threshold test-ban Treaty and the 1976 peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. An integral part of that step is the unprecedented agreement that we and the Soviet Union conduct a joint verification experiment at each other's nuclear test site. Yesterday, as others have already mentioned, of course, the United States carried out an underground nuclear explosion at its Nevada test site at which about 45 Soviet scientists, technicians and observers - together with their equipment - were present in order to measure the yield of the explosion. Preliminary reports are that events went there as planned.

A month from now, another joint verification experiment underground explosion is scheduled to take place - this time at the Soviet nuclear test site near Semipalatinsk. American scientists and technicians will measure its yield, as they did yesterday in Nevada, using our preferred measuring technique known as CORRTEX. That technique is the most accurate one known to us for determining the yields of nuclear explosions without revealing sensitive information.

Following completion of the joint verification experiment, we hope to conclude work on the verification protocols for the threshold test-ban and peaceful nuclear explosion Treaties - indeed, we are already close to agreement on a verification protocol for the latter. After that, we would expect that the two Treaties will be ratified by each party. And, immediately after that, the United States expects to enter negotiations on ways to

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

implement a step-by-step programme of limiting, and ultimately ending, nuclear testing, in association with a parallel programme to reduce, and ultimately eliminate, all nuclear arms.

As all can see, several nuclear testing initiatives are on track at this moment. The step-by-step approach recognizes that the issues are complex and that the negotiations will, therefore, be challenging. Unlike the proposal to amend the limited test-ban Treaty, it does not attempt to short-circuit the detailed negotiations and preconditions which might allow a comprehensive test ban to emerge. Rather than addressing complex problems in simplistic terms, and proposing back-door approaches to their solutions, I urge those States desirous of nuclear testing limitations that contribute to international stability and security to support the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union in our step-by-step approach.

In parallel with that effort, let us seek an appropriately mandated ad hoc committee in this Conference where constructive, practical, multilateral work on such issues as scope, verification and compliance can be carried out. I assure you my delegation will continue to work for such a committee.

Finally, I also want to note the outstanding work being carried out by the Conference's Group of Scientific Experts under agenda item 1. We shall shortly have an opportunity to study their progress report for their most recent meeting. We are pleased that experimental work is beginning in pursuance of the second global test of seismic data exchange - this time using more modern techniques and incorporating full wave-form data. We congratulate the Group for its hard work, and wish it continued success.

The PRESIDENT: Does any other member wish to take the floor? I see none.

The secretariat has circulated here today an informal paper containing the list of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during next week. As usual this is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As you will recall, immediately following this plenary, we will hold an informal meeting to continue the discussion on the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. As there is no other business for today, I now intend to adjourn this meeting. Before doing so, I wish to inform you, at the request of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka, that an informal meeting of the Ad hoc Committee will be held today at 4.30 p.m. in room III. The meeting will be followed by open-ended consultations on trial inspections in the chemical industry in order to test procedures for systematic verification of the non-production of chemical weapons.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 23 August, here in room VII, at 10 a.m. as usual.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.476
23 August 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 23 August 1988, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. Wisber Loeis

(Indonesia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 476th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work the Conference starts today its consideration of items 6 and 7, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". In conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Canada. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 465th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ambassador Ri Tcheul.

Mr. RI (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I would like to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for this month, and on your savoir-faire and rich experience with which you are guiding our work. I should also like to express my profound gratitude to the distinguished representatives for having shown support for the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which wishes to contribute to general and complete disarmament, so that it could participate in this august Assembly.

Since its territory and people have been divided for over 40 years, and it has still not been able to eliminate the danger of war, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea aspires no less ardently than anyone to the reduction of tension in the international situation as a whole and is keenly interested in disarmament. The solution of the crucial problem of disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, depends entirely on the position taken by the nuclear-weapon States. The appearance of nuclear armaments and the history of their development also show that it is difficult to expect nuclear disarmament without more active efforts from the non-nuclear-weapon States. As far as nuclear disarmament is concerned, in the light of the present global international situation, which is showing indications of détente, there is no justification for the continued existence of nuclear weapons deployed against States that do not possess them, or against regions demanding the creation of denuclearized zones. No complex questions, no need for a long period to dismantle nuclear weapons aimed at those who have none.

My Government long ago proclaimed the North above the demarcation line in the Korean peninsula as a nuclearized zone. More than 1,000 nuclear weapons currently deployed in South Korea and directed against us are a basic source of the threat of a nuclear war breaking out in that region. The presence of American troops in South Korea, more than 40,000 of them, a number which is continuously increasing instead of falling off, the joint South Korean-United States large-scale military manoeuvres which are taking place constantly, involving an enormous amount of weaponry and several hundreds of thousands of soldiers, threaten us and worry us constantly. Confrontation and armed conflict in the Korean peninsula will profit no one.

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

If a new conflagration breaks out in Korea, we will have nothing to gain, the United States will not be safe and sound and South Korea will not feel at ease either. We must choose the route that enables all of us to avoid being victims. My Government considers that our side and the United States, which are responsible respectively for détente and peace in Korea, must sit down at the same table as soon as possible. In this regard, the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of my country proposed on 20 July the initiation of parliamentary talks between the Supreme People's Assembly and the American Congress.

Some people say that the presence of nuclear weapons in the south of Korea is intended to prevent what they call the threat from the north, but we think that they are fully aware that we will not do as they say we would. Our people does not want another war to break out, our territory to be reduced to ashes and our nation afflicted by horrors. We have proposed that these inter-parliamentary talks should be held in New York, in Pyongyang or in a third country, which would make it possible to understand each other better, to make an effective contribution to détente in the Korean peninsula and to promote dialogue between the north and the south of Korea for reunification. We would like to say to the Americans that the war of yesterday against each other does not prevent them from sitting down today at the same table, and that there is no reason why the current hostile relations cannot be improved tomorrow. Is it not true that in the 1950s, we had the experience of stopping the flames of war through negotiations?

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has taken on itself the duty of converting the Korean peninsula into a denuclearized zone of peace and trying actively to extend it throughout north-east Asia, and is taking realistic measures. In order to create a climate that is favourable to the abolition of nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of foreign forces, we have presented a proposal for stage-by-stage reciprocal reductions in armed forces, and have taken the initiative of holding multinational disarmament negotiations for its application. Following the proposal, which was put forward last year, my Government unilaterally reduced its troops by 100,000 men. This year, we have proposed the holding of a joint North-South conference, and in particular, on 20 July, the Supreme People's Assembly of my country took the initiative of meeting in joint conference with its South Korean counterpart, considering it necessary to find a solution to the problem of non-aggression between the North and the South, because of the tension that prevails on Korean soil. The draft joint declaration on non-aggression between North and South states: first, in no case shall either of the two parties resort to force of arms against the other. Second, the two parties shall resolve the differences and disputes between them through dialogue and negotiation. Third, neither of the two parties shall participate in aggression or acts of foreign armed intervention against the other party. Fourth, the non-aggression line shall be the current military demarcation line. Fifth, the two parties shall effect a phased reduction of their armed forces and simultaneously take measures to withdraw stage by stage foreign troops and their nuclear arms based within the Korean peninsula. Sixth, they shall make the present demilitarized zone a buffer zone, shall endeavour to avoid armed conflicts and disputes in that zone and, by way of a guarantee, shall have a neutral-nation inspection force stationed there, etc. However, there has been no response yet to all our efforts, as there should have been, and consequently the situation has not

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

changed at all. Unilateral measures, by their nature, are not sufficient to produce peace, security and disarmament. We feel that the necessary attention should be drawn to the fact that the United States is continuing to aggravate tension in the Korean peninsula while pursuing détente in other parts of the world.

The third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and this Conference, prove that disarmament is in no case a problem of method but one of principle, and that it concerns the political will of each country. Today, when the third special session has not produced results, everyone is focusing on the negotiations in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and hoping that remarkable success will be made in the field of general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. My delegation, which greatly appreciates various peace and nuclear disarmament initiatives taken by the socialist countries and the non-aligned countries, would like to see the earliest possible conclusion of the agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic arms as a follow-up to the ratification of the INF Treaty, which has been welcomed as the first step forward towards nuclear disarmament.

The anti-nuclear struggle of the non-nuclear-weapon States to bring about general and complete disarmament may be seen in the movement to create zones of peace and denuclearized zones, which is gaining ground internationally every day. In these circumstances, my delegation feels that it is necessary to take measures to promote and co-ordinate in a unified fashion the process of creating denuclearized zones throughout the world. In particular, primary attention should be given to the denuclearization of regions of front-line deployment of those nuclear forces which present the greatest risk of causing a nuclear war, such as tactical and battlefield nuclear weapons. International measures should be taken to put a stop to the stationing of the armed forces of the nuclear-weapon States, the installation of nuclear bases and the delivery of all kinds of nuclear weapons in countries that have no nuclear weapons.

The Governments and peoples of all countries want to see the convention banning chemical weapons, which has been the subject of discussion for several years in the Conference on Disarmament, concluded this year. Our people, which was the first victim of chemical weapons in the world after the Second World War, regards the conclusion of the convention as a problem that is ripe for solution, and impatiently expects from this Conference a legal instrument that will make it possible to put an end once and for all to the horror of chemical warfare on Earth.

The tasks to be carried out by the Conference on Disarmament, such as the reduction of conventional weapons, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the drafting of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, etc., are both important and responsible tasks. My delegation will make every effort and co-operate to ensure that the Conference makes real progress.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Marchand.

Mr. MARCHAND (Canada) (translated from French): My statement today will deal primarily with the first item on the Conference's agenda, the fundamental question of the prohibition of nuclear tests, and in particular the work of the Group of Scientific Experts on the seismic monitoring of a future treaty. Before turning to the main subject of my statement, I would like on behalf of my Government to introduce as an official document of the Conference the text of a recent statement made by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Clark, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which Canada was one of the first countries to accede. As Mr. Clark stated, the non-proliferation Treaty "is an instrument of major importance in that it provides for legally binding commitments to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and facilitates international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It also sets out a guiding framework for the negotiated reduction of nuclear arsenals". Canada attaches particular importance to the need for all States to become full parties to this instrument. Mr. Clark also expressed his satisfaction at the noteworthy progress recorded in the American-Soviet negotiations on nuclear arms reduction, in conformity with the objectives set out in the disarmament provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty.

I have already had occasion to stress the importance that Canada attaches to a nuclear test ban. This fundamental goal was reiterated by Mr. Clark in his statement on 13 June at the third special session on disarmament. The convergence of views around that goal during the last few days of the session gave rise to the hope that there would soon be a consensus that work should begin in an ad hoc committee of the Conference. It is therefore all the more disappointing that, back in Geneva, we have not yet managed to agree on the mandate for such a committee. It is not too late for us to unite our efforts to that end. We have by no means exhausted the possibilities of reaching agreement on a mandate. In the view of my delegation, the compromise proposed by Ambassador Vejvoda, which has just been retabled, provides an excellent starting-point.

The Government of Canada has taken due note of the recent initiative taken by five countries aimed at converting the Treaty limiting nuclear tests into a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests in all environments. As it subscribes fully to the goal of achieving a comprehensive test ban as soon as possible, the Government of Canada well understands the motives underlying this initiative. It seems to us undeniable, however, that there is very little chance that this initiative will achieve the desired result. Canada continues to hold the opinion that direct negotiations are the only practical means of achieving a complete and genuinely verifiable ban on nuclear tests.

Despite the fact that we are still seeking ways and means of setting up a subsidiary body for our work on a nuclear test ban, there are some glimmers of hope. The negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of nuclear tests are moving forward. The first stage in these negotiations on the improvement of verification techniques should shortly lead to the ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. The second phase of the negotiations will then focus on limitations relating to the yield and number of tests. This is admittedly insufficient. But it would be a mistake to deny the importance of these negotiations. The

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

forthcoming ratification of the two treaties just mentioned represents a useful first step forward towards the widely shared goal of a nuclear test-ban treaty.

It is also encouraging to note from the latest report on the work of the Group of Scientific Experts, presented by its Chairman, Mr. Dahlman, that progress, slow and painful, perhaps, but none the less real and tangible progress, has been achieved towards the objective of a global network of seismic stations for the verification of a future treaty prohibiting nuclear tests. At its last meeting, the Group of Scientific Experts elaborated on the conceptual model of a modern international system of seismic data exchange and reached general agreement on the operating standards for a global system. The Canadian experts have indicated to us, however, that a number of problems still remain unresolved as to the technical measures required to institute these norms. The group has decided to conduct preparatory experiments in order to test some of the proposed functions for the data centres, so that the large-scale level II data exchange experiment is now under way. The results of these preparatory experiments will enable the Group to refine the design of the seismic data exchange system which is to be negotiated and set up under a treaty. Canada attaches great importance to this work, and lends its full encouragement to it. The Group has asked Mr. Peter Basham of Canada to act as principal co-ordinator for the planning and conduct of the large-scale experiment, and the Canadian authorities are ready to lend him every support in the performance of this important task.

It is a pleasure for me to announce that, as an additional contribution to this exercise, Canada is to host a technical workshop on seismic data exchange for the verification of a nuclear test ban. This workshop, which is primarily intended for experts, will be held at Yellowknife in the Canadian Far North in September 1989. The workshop will mark the official opening of the Yellowknife modernized seismic centre, and will give participants an opportunity to assess this facility as a prototype of the kind of modern station envisaged for the future seismic verification network. The workshop will also offer the participants an opportunity to evaluate the progress achieved and discuss the problems to be resolved, midway through the large-scale experiment on data exchange. Further details on the dates, the workshop programme and the administrative arrangements will be provided in due course.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): We are all familiar with the recent history of the Korean peninsula regarding the naked aggression and military attacks on South Korea by communist North Korea, and the United Nations response involving the assistance of the United States. The attack on the United States today by the communist North Korea representative is highly offensive and repugnant to my delegation. The United States will continue to support its allies around the world when threatened by aggressors. The United States presence on the Korean peninsula is a result of the Korean war provoked by North Korea.

The PRESIDENT: The representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has asked for the floor. I give him the floor.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): With the permission of my Ambassador, his deputy is speaking. Our statement was not intended to attack anybody. We just noted the urgency and importance of this moment in our peninsula, in our region and the world. We just referred to the realities of the peninsula. Now I have heard some history about the Korean peninsula. I have many things to say, but I will refrain this time because this is not the forum to make clear who is responsible for the region's problems. But history and time will decide.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I see none.

I should like to draw members' attention to a request for participation from a non-member State of the Conference, namely Senegal. The relevant letter was distributed in the delegations' boxes last Friday afternoon. The representative of Senegal has expressed the wish to speak at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, 25 August. If no objection is raised with the secretariat before that meeting, I propose to take up this matter for decision at the beginning of the plenary meeting so that the representative of Senegal may address the Conference on that date.

Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I have two short announcements to make. The Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will hold its next meeting, originally scheduled for Friday afternoon, immediately after our next plenary meeting on Thursday, 25 August. The Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons has scheduled a meeting for Friday, 26 August to be held in room VII at 3 p.m.

I have no other business for today, and I now intend to adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 25 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.477
25 August 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 25 August 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Wisber Loeis (Indonesia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 477th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today with its consideration of items 6 and 7, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". However, in conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As announced at our last plenary meeting on Tuesday of this week, the secretariat has received a letter from a non-member State, namely Senegal, concerning its participation in the work of the Conference. That letter was distributed in delegations' boxes last Friday. Since there has been no objection received by the secretariat in response to that request, and in view of the wish expressed by the representative of Senegal to take the floor at this plenary meeting, I suggest that, as agreed at our last plenary meeting, we now take up for action the draft decision circulated by the secretariat in document CD/WP.347.

If I see no objection, I shall take it that the Conference agrees to the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Senegal, Kenya, Romania and Mongolia. In addition, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Ola Dahlman, will introduce the progress report on the twenty-sixth session of that Group, contained in document CD/853. I now give the floor to the first speaker, the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, let me congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference for the month of August as well as your effective discharge of your task. In view of the fact that we are going to have only one more official meeting of the plenary of the CD this month, I believe we may already conclude that your guidance has been skilful and that you have done all in your power to advance the work of the Conference and enhance the effectiveness of its procedures. Let me also thank Ambassador Teja of India for his efforts as President of the Conference in July. I wish Ambassador Teja, who has already left us, success in his future tasks.

Sitting in the Chair you are occupying now, Mr. President, is definitely not an easy task. Operating on the basis of consensus - the only realistic modus operandi of a body of this nature - our Conference is working its way towards common approaches in an painstaking and complex manner. Some 60 presidents who have served it since 1978, when it was given its present composition, can all testify to that. I had that privilege and honour in April of 1987. One of the items on which I focused my attention was the establishment of an ad hoc committee on item 1 of our agenda, nuclear test

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ban. Long and detailed consultations had been under way on this item, and by the end of the spring session it was quite obvious that none of the standing proposals could command consensus.

In the middle of April 1987 I therefore ventured to draft a proposal which, in my opinion, was of a compromise nature and took into account basic elements of all existing draft mandates. Because of a lack of time and persisting divergences in approaches to item 1 of our agenda it was impossible to finalize consultations on my proposal, which I circulated as an informal paper. Almost a year and a half has passed since then. A series of consultations on a nuclear test ban have been held during that time, and the course of these consultations, and especially the lack of results, have reinforced my sentiment that our Conference needs a compromise approach to item 1 of its agenda which would allow it to start practical work aimed at achieving the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

At present, a number of activities related to that final goal are under way. We support the relevant Soviet-American bilateral negotiations which, a couple of days ago, entered the stage of practical experiments designed to improve procedures for measuring the yield of nuclear explosions. Some countries have offered assistance in the verification of an NTB, which we welcome. Recently, ideas were advanced on the possibility of amending the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, which is known as the Moscow Treaty. Needless to say, my country would be in favour of amending the Moscow Treaty and extending its application to underground explosions. We view efforts in this direction as compatible with and complementary to what our Conference could do for the achievement of an NTB.

On the fringes of our Conference the Group of Scientific experts has been working for years evolving procedures for the exchange of seismic data, which should constitute a part of the verification procedures for a future NTB. But the CD could and should do much more in this regard. For the last five years we have been dealing with an NTB only at plenary meetings, which does not allow for a substantive debate on basic aspects of the cessation of nuclear testing.

My delegation considers that the CD should establish a subsidiary organ on item 1 of our agenda. We still believe that a compromise approach to the mandate for such an organ is needed. In view of the fact that my proposal of April 1987 met with interest and a positive response from a number of delegations, I am issuing it today as an official document of the CD. Let me emphasize again that the proposal is not a preference of Czechoslovakia - it is an attempt at compromise, which could establish a basis for further consultations. In deciding to issue it officially I have also taken into account suggestions by a number of delegations from all regional groups that the formalization of the proposal could facilitate further discussion on it. The wording of the proposed mandate is quite familiar to the delegations around this table. Let me just recall that in our opinion the ad hoc committee should initiate substantive work on specific and interrelated test ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification and compliance. All this work should be seen as a first step towards achieving a nuclear test-ban treaty. I am confident that if our Conference starts active deliberations in this regard, it could help us explore ways and means of progressing towards the cessation of nuclear testing.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Undoubtedly one of the long-standing priority items on our agenda is the ban on chemical weapons. An impressive amount of the time and energy of delegations has gone into discussing and drafting a CW convention which would do away with existing CW and ensure that none are produced in the future. Also this year, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, and the three co-ordinators of the working groups have spared no effort in their striving to further advance the elaboration of the CW convention. I am personally very happy that one of the three co-ordinators is a member of my delegation.

The closure of this year's session is not far away, and one might attempt some evaluation of what has happened in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. However, right from the beginning it is obvious that this evaluation will not be an easy task. Some positive as well as negative tendencies have emerged during this year's negotiations on the CW convention, and it is difficult to foresee which of them will have a greater effect on the future course of negotiations.

Let me start with what we see as negative, since I would prefer to close this statement on as optimistic a tone as possible. In the more distant as well as the quite recent past, there seemed to be consensus that the convention should quite unambiguously ban all chemical weapons and ensure, in a most effective way, the immediate cessation of their production and their complete destruction. Furthermore, there seemed to be general agreement that effective measures were needed in order to prevent the creation of chemical weapons under the guise of peaceful, civilian chemistry. Do we still have consensus on these basic goals and objectives of the CW convention? We would like to believe so, but some doubts have appeared too.

Firstly, some proposals advanced recently create the impression that we are negotiating a convention which might, in the long run, lead to the elimination of chemical weapons, but that in the mean time States parties could improve their existing chemical weapon stockpiles and continue their production, and that those States which do not possess chemical weapons could, upon their adherence to the convention, decide to start building their own chemical weapon potential. We consider this approach to be contrary to the elementary logic and purpose of the convention we have been negotiating for years, if not decades. There is no place in it for provisions permitting the production, further qualitative improvement and proliferation of CW. There is no guarantee that during the destruction period, before all CW stockpiles are eliminated, States parties that profited from such benevolent provisions might not, for a variety of reasons, decide to withdraw from the convention. Such developments could have adverse effects on international security and on the confidence of States parties in the convention. During the process of gradual destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, security must be assured by agreed measures of an obligatory nature, rather than by individual and unpredictable decisions of States parties to have or not to have chemical weapons, to continue production or to cease it, to modernize chemical weapons or to refrain from doing so.

For years we have heard about the need for stringent verification of the chemical weapons convention. One would therefore presume that when it comes to the elaboration of specific verification measures for specific provisions

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

of the convention, there will be general eagerness to look for such measures and to make them as effective as possible. Unfortunately, this eagerness is, to say the least, not general. One of the fundamental obligations under the convention will be the obligation not to develop chemical weapons. For the time being nothing in the present "rolling text" tells us how compliance with this fundamental obligation will be verified. We consider that this represents a loophole which should be remedied. Occasionally arguments are raised that some kinds of activities are not verifiable, and hence no verification can be applied to them. If such reasoning is also used with regard to fundamental obligations, then we consider this a methodological drawback. By verification we understand a comprehensive process starting with data reporting, proceeding to data assessment and finally to the choice of an appropriate inspection régime. If the right balance of monitoring and verification procedures is established, one can expect a certain effect from verification even in facilities where it is unlikely that a flask full of a schedule [1] chemical will be unexpectedly discovered. A realistic view seems to prevail that we cannot expect 100 per cent reliable verification, especially with regard to such a complicated matter as the verification of non-production of chemical weapons. Indeed, in all régimes of monitoring and verification both confidence-building and deterrence are present together with the inspection process itself. We therefore fail to understand the categorical rejection of any monitoring and verification in some cases based on mere assertion that inspections at some facilities cannot always bring immediate results.

To complete the list of negative aspects of our work in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, let me mention briefly that in our opinion we are faced with excessively detailed discussion on many questions. Perhaps it would be useful to bear in mind that before the convention enters into force a preparatory organ will be functioning which may settle a number of technical and organizational aspects with a much better overview of likely initial participation in the convention and the conditions of its entry into force than we have now. Besides, the organization to be set up under the chemical weapons convention and its individual bodies, especially the Technical Secretariat, will be continuously solving a number of technical problems which, it seems to us, need not be discussed exhaustively before the final drafting of the convention.

Although the negative tendencies I have mentioned above slow down the progress of our work, we are satisfied that there are also some positive developments contributing to its advancement. The principal of such development is a tendency towards greater openness in military affairs, not least with regard to chemical weapons. A number of seminars and workshops organized in recent years, and international visits to important military facilities in some countries, have given us a better understanding of the problems we are confronted with. Some practical knowledge and experience is of great importance. We therefore welcomed the initiative of the Soviet Union for the organization of trial inspections of chemical industry facilities at both the national and the international level. Czechoslovakia is interested in this experiment and intends to participate in it. We followed with attention the first preparatory consultations on the experiment under the guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. We agree that the drawing up of check-lists as well as a format for reporting might be useful. At the same

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time we do not think that we shall try to be too ambitious in standardizing the ways in which individual trial inspections take place. Some common features for the upcoming experiments will certainly be necessary so that reports can be compared and general conclusions drawn. But we should not completely disregard the creative approach which, especially during inspections at the national level, can also contribute innovative and unexpected approaches, which may well happen when an unexplored field is dealt with in practical terms for the first time. We had no problems with the time schedule originally proposed by Ambassador Ekéus. If some slight readjustments are considered necessary by some, this could be taken into account. But if a substantial expansion of the time schedule is proposed we would consider it regrettable. A number of questions we are trying to find answers to now will more easily be resolved after the trial inspections have been conducted and evaluated. The sooner we can have these practical contributions at hand the better.

I would also like to mention among the positive aspects of this year's session progress achieved on the definition of chemical weapons production facilities. For quite some time this has been one of the missing bricks in the rising wall of the convention. Now, finally, it is going to be inserted into its place. Deliberations on the conduct of on-site challenge inspections and the role of inspectors therein are also progressing in the right direction. Work on the further development of article XI and the final clauses is also encouraging. It is the hope of my delegation that the positive tendencies I have just mentioned will prevail over the negative ones and that, in accordance with the practice of recent years, the time available between the end of this session and February 1989 will be used for further work on the CW convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement, and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. In accordance with the decision taken at the opening of this plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Senegal, Ambassador Sene.

Mr. SENE (Senegal) (translated from French): My first words go to congratulate you, Sir, on your designation as President of the Conference on Disarmament at this crucial time, alive with hope and promise as regards prospects for disarmament. These good omens we perceive strengthen our conviction that our distinguished colleagues here, representing the member States of this prestigious Conference, are making invaluable contributions to the history of international relations in modern times by attempting to build a stable system of collective security based on the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Incontestably, nothing in the world is more fascinating than such work, where multilateral diplomacy bears most closely on the heavy but stimulating responsibility posed by the very challenge of mankind's survival and development. Allow me to pay tribute to His Excellency Mr. Miljan Komatina, Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, whose extensive experience of international matters and wealth of culture wisely and with vision enlighten our approach to the philosophy of disarmament. As far as I am concerned he has always been a valued adviser to guide me in the reading of the most up-to-date documents in the area of disarmament. Finally, I should like to greet the experts, diplomats,

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disarmament Fellows and all those who help us along this path fraught with pitfalls. To all of them I say that even when the night is dark we must be capable of raising our eyes to the sky, following the steadfast gaze of our distinguished colleague and Nobel Peace Prize winner, Ambassador García Robles, who for years has been one of the high priests in this temple of disarmament.

In addressing this august assembly today I should like above all to stress that, on the eve of the third millennium, the United Nations truly stands at an unprecedented turning point in its history. Undoubtedly it is now drawing on the richest displays of the skill and talent of its brilliant Secretary-General, His Excellency Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, who this morning is opening the peace negotiations between Iraq and Iran. We welcome the cease-fire and the silence of arms marking the end of this deadly war, and hope that the two belligerents will find in Geneva the path towards a lasting peace. Within that context it is clear that disarmament, which constitutes a fundamental objective in order to reach the paramount goal of the United Nations, the maintenance of international peace and security, assumes its full importance. Moreover, the only path which is worthy of our future is that of ensuring that the next century is not like the one now ending, the witness of wars and rivalries, fear and distrust, but truly a century of brotherhood and peace in worthy and civilized international co-operation.

It is no secret to anyone that our world is a world which is undergoing a veritable mutation. The tremendous progress made in science and technology since the last century has certainly improved the quality of life, but its application for military purposes, particularly in the area of weapons of mass destruction, also constitutes a danger to international peace and security. In a statement I made here on 23 April 1985 I had occasion to share with you the thinking of my delegation on all the issues on the agenda of this important forum entrusted with multilateral negotiations in the area of disarmament. At that time I stressed from the outset the problem of the arms race, and most particularly the nuclear arms race, which continues to absorb colossal resources which countries urgently need for development. Thus ours is the era of the most intensive militarization in the history of mankind, and the nuclear arms race remains a matter of deep concern. Hence at all costs we must make it impossible for a nuclear war to break out as a result of a surprise attack, a mistake, a failure in communication, an accident or a false alarm.

We know that the arsenals of the two major alliances are capable of devastating the planet, causing total disaster, eliminating all human life on Earth and annihilating the legacy of civilizations built up over thousands of years. This means that in the nuclear era the need for disarmament has never been so deeply felt, so acutely felt as a vital necessity for the maintenance of universal peace and also as an essential lever for economic and social development. In April 1985 we greeted with cautious optimism the announcement made by the United States and the Soviet Union that they had agreed to resume the bilateral disarmament negotiations which had been suspended. Since then developments have occurred and optimism is beginning to bear the fruits of its promise. The two super-Powers have signed and ratified a bilateral treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear weapons and have committed themselves to negotiating a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic nuclear

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arms. Undeniably something has changed, because a major political development has occurred in international relations. In concluding such a treaty, the two super-Powers have grasped that given the complexity of an increasingly interdependent and multipolar world, the process of disarmament is the best way to seek to resolve the international problems of peace and security, co-operation and development.

In the face of the threat of nuclear conflagration, the idea of war can no longer be considered as an extension of a policy advocating a ruinous arms race in order to build up military power, whether it is deployed unilaterally or within alliances. In other words, international peace should be based not on the policy of force but on commitment to the common survival of the human species beyond ideological blocs and antagonisms. Because even if interests, priorities and approaches differ, there is undoubtedly a close and complex link between the security of States and the maintenance of peace, international security and disarmament. More specifically, the common aspiration to peace is shared by all.

There is no doubt that progress in multilateral disarmament should contribute to strengthening the security of States, the elimination of international tensions and the settlement of regional conflicts. Indeed, it is in this context that we should analyse the outcome of the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament to single out the key ideas and major themes, the outlines, proposals and recommendations put forward. I know that eminent speakers have already made their comments here on this third special session on disarmament, indicating that it was either a failure, or a half-failure, or, as was stressed by Ambassador Morel - if I may borrow his words - an exercise which was both stimulating and disappointing. Undoubtedly all these assertions can be explained depending on one's own standpoint. For my part I consider that this third special session could not be the culmination of our progress, nor the point of departure, but only a stage in the persistent and patient search for consensus. In any event disarmament is not, as some have said, a dogma with immutable rules, nor a branch of metaphysics, nor an ideology, but a discipline of the mind that is rooted in strategic depths and which today imposes itself on the human conscience in view of the military applications of scientific and technological discoveries and their capacity for destroying the future and the historical continuity of mankind and its environment.

Obviously, concepts evolve in the light of changes and transformations in the world which give disarmament today its multiple dimensions, and over and above individual positions and the requirements of collective responsibility, disarmament poses the fundamental question of the existential destiny of man himself on Earth today. Hence despite the absence of a final document at the third special session on disarmament, the deliberations in that forum have the value of a symbol and mark the profound attachment of the international community to the cause of disarmament. Firstly, the high level of political representation with the presence of 23 heads of State or government, 7 vice-presidents or deputy prime ministers, 61 foreign ministers, not to mention the NGOs and distinguished personalities from the five continents - all this illustrates the serious approach of the international community to disarmament problems. Moreover, the wide-ranging debate made it possible to identify new concepts, to grasp the diversity of technical problems, to devise

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approaches - all food for thought which shows the participants' redoubled determination and belief in the objectives, principles and purposes already approved by the historic concensus achieved at the first special session on disarmament.

In the context of this forum we believe that disarmament should be viewed simultaneously in nuclear, chemical and conventional terms, including horizontal themes such as confidence-building measures, verification, transparency, fact-finding procedures, the development of new technologies and their peaceful applications, as well as the prevention of their uncontrolled dissemination. So disarmament can be perceived as an integrated and continuous process within which States attempt with realism and perseverance, under a multilateral approach, to settle the most serious security issues in the light of the global imperatives of development.

Incontestably, it was possible to believe that, at the time when the two super-Powers ratified the Treaty on the elimination of their medium-range and shorter-range missiles, the international community was faced with an unprecedented opportunity, at the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, to draw up and adopt a multilateral disarmament programme over the medium and long term. However, nothing was less certain in view of the complexity of the interests at stake in the multilateral disarmament negotiations and the difficulty of formulating ideas in language acceptable to all which could lead to concensus. Indeed, at the third special session on disarmament, it appears that the great Powers understood that disarmament and strategic balance should be considered globally and in all their aspects - nuclear, biological, space, conventional and others - while bearing in mind specific situations in the area of security.

No one can be unaware that conventional weapons are used every day in wars which ravage the third world, and that their destructive power and offensive potential are constantly growing. Moreover, signing a treaty to eliminate one class of nuclear weapons does not mean the end of the arms race, even if it marks a trend towards the quantitative reduction of nuclear weapons. This does not detract in the slightest from the stepped-up application of scientific and technological progress to develop a new generation of nuclear, conventional or space weapons. Thus in the course of the third special session, participants often reaffirmed that the super-Powers which possess the most sizeable and most sophisticated arsenals bore particular responsibility in the area of disarmament. They should therefore set an example by significantly reducing their nuclear and conventional arsenals and halting the arms race. This is the best way to buttress the positive trends in the development of current international relations and to strengthen them by means of new measures designed to speed up the process of arms limitation with a view to better tapping the potentialities and possibilities of disarmament. In this connection, constructive parallelism between the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations and the multilateral disarmament efforts under the auspices of the United Nations would strengthen the Conference on Disarmament as the sole negotiating forum of the international community in this field.

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In a word, the work of the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament will make it possible not only to confirm the priorities already recognized in the area of disarmament, but to bring out new useful proposals to give a dynamic impetus to the continuation of negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament.

Among the urgent pending problems which were emphasized at the third special session, there is first of all the need to draw up a convention containing a universal and global ban on chemical weapons. Consequently, one of the Conference on Disarmament's priority tasks is to advance resolutely towards an agreement for the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. Particularly since alarming reports on the use of chemical weapons and their proliferation have now confirmed the urgent need for maximum possible efforts in this field in order to finalize the draft convention. Hence discussions should be continued on the various parts of the convention text, tackling in turn, for instance, the question of the destruction of chemical weapons, challenge inspections, multilateral assistance, economic and technological development as well as the final clauses. However, clarification of the problem of non-production and the multilateral exchange of data on that subject, along with trial inspections, could make it possible to put in place operational procedures for the verification régimes. In other words, we must agree on a sufficiently well-developed system to ensure the non-production of chemical weapons in future by elaborating mandatory inspection machinery backed up by challenge inspections. If necessary we could even contemplate setting up an international body to monitor the provisions of the convention so as to increase its transparency - but these are all just working hypotheses.

In the mean time chemical weapons continue to be manufactured and, moreover, it appears that techniques and chemical warfare agents are more and more sophisticated, with the risk that they will be used, though as we know their proliferation presents mankind with an ever greater threat. Hence the need to ensure the participation and solidarity of all States in the international community to ensure the full application of a convention on chemical weapons. In this way it will be possible to make the substance of the commitments that are to be entered into more acceptable and to awaken the interest of all States in order to prepare the ground for universal accession to the convention. In this connection my delegation supports the Yugoslav proposal for a special United Nations conference in due course to adopt the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The conclusion of such a convention would assuredly be an undoubted triumph for multilateral diplomacy in the area of disarmament, and specifically for our negotiating body and all the delegations participating in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Secondly, the participants in the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament also recalled that, in connection with the Final Document of the Second Review Conference of Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, States have made statements that they do not possess any of the toxic agents, weapons, equipment or means of delivery listed in their article I of the Convention. Of course, even if as a matter of principle the validity of

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unilateral declarations is recognized in the field of disarmament as a confidence-building factor, none the less it cannot replace obligations stemming from the binding force of a convention.

Thirdly, in the course of the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, stress was also laid on the importance of banning nuclear tests, and in this connection we should first of all clarify the problems that constitute a hurdle to the drawing up of even a mandate - still more a global treaty - by identifying ways and means of reassessing them or resolving them in the light of experience acquired within successive negotiating bodies. In this context I noted with interest the proposal just made by the speaker who took the floor before me, the distinguished Ambassador of Czechoslovakia, regarding the mandate which might be given to a negotiating group to deal with this question. Certainly the opening of bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union in connection with the ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests or on a ban based on a threshold for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is in itself a positive step in the right direction. However, whatever the importance of these bilateral negotiations the work of the Conference on Disarmament relating to the prohibition of nuclear tests must not be underrated.

Over 1,600 test explosions took place last year, and we know that nuclear tests are continuing. A variety of technical grounds such as reliability and security are often cited by States to justify the explosions, whereas we know that their essential purpose is to develop types of weapons which have more effective and enhanced capacity, thus extending the qualitative arms race. Another point which should be considered in depth within the Conference on Disarmament: the aspects of the verification of a nuclear test ban, which my colleague referred to a while ago. In this field the establishment of a global network of seismic stations should be developed along with other monitoring methods such as satellite verification and on-site inspection, which could ensure the monitoring of nuclear tests within the context of a test-ban treaty. There are those who feel that the talks on nuclear testing should, in order to be of real interest for the international community, initially be directed towards agreements limiting the yield and number of tests to a militarily significant level, on the understanding that this phase, which would be only transitional, should lead to the conclusion of a test-ban treaty on the basis of a precise and reasonable timetable.

Fourthly, in the area of nuclear arms limitation, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which 136 States are parties, which was signed on 1 July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970, constitutes a point of reference in the general disarmament process. This Treaty is inseparable from nuclear disarmament, and as such remains an essential international instrument for world security and trust among States. I take this opportunity to welcome the recent accession of Spain and Trinidad and Tobago and the intention of Saudi Arabia to become a party to this Treaty, with the hope that others will follow. In concrete terms the non-proliferation régime is par excellence multilateral and brings together countries that have expressly renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the countries which have become parties de facto. But at a time when progress

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is being made towards nuclear disarmament, all States large and small whether they possess nuclear weapons or not, should contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation.

In other words, nuclear disarmament is the best way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, because otherwise it is the non-proliferation régime as a whole, the subject of one of the main multilateral treaties, which might be seriously jeopardized at a time when we are celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the conclusion of the NPT. Because ultimately the goal of the NPT is not only to prevent the emergence of new nuclear States, but also to force the States which currently possess nuclear weapons to eliminate them, as stipulated in article VI. This situation of inequality leads some to say that in the final analysis the NPT has served only to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons among States which do not possess them and which are parties to the Treaty. This means that one of the most important obligations remains the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear test explosions. This is a sine qua non not only for preventing the emergence of new nuclear States but also for preserving the régime of the NPT itself. Moreover, according to the same school of thought, States parties to the NPT should also support the initiatives of groups of States wishing to conclude regional treaties on the basis of arrangements freely entered into to ensure the complete absence of nuclear weapons in their territories in the spirit of article VII of the treaty. In the mean time, States without nuclear weapons demand negative collective security guarantees formulated in an international instrument in good and due form, because our conviction is that we are all collectively responsible for world peace and international security.

Last, we were able to note at the third special session that participants also frequently indicated that the NPT refers in its preamble to the 1963 partial nuclear test-ban Treaty, which mentions the need to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons and to continue negotiations on that subject within the Conference on Disarmament. In assessing the situation on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the conclusion of the NPT, we must recognize that despite the measures that have been taken under the SALT agreements or will be taken in pursuance of the Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, the build-up of nuclear arsenals is on a much greater scale today than in 1968. Obviously, the signature and ratification of the Treaty on intermediate-range weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the negotiations under way for a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic arms while respecting the ABM Treaty signed in 1972, are steps in the right direction.

I would add that the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons as well as the achievement of balance between the arsenals of conventional weapons of the two major alliances would offer irrefutable proof of good faith vis-à-vis the obligations entered into under the provisions of article VI of the NPT. Undoubtedly, such a development would have great impact on nuclear disarmament on Earth, it being understood that we should prevent the vital interests of the security of all States from being threatened by new military devices deployed in space. Which brings me to my last point, the prevention of an arms race in space. The multilateral dimension of the peaceful use of space requires that all States should actively participate in preventing an

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arms race in this field. It is true that space is already the subject of measures of protection which should be borne in mind in drawing up an appropriate international instrument. Because activities pertaining to the exploration and use of space should be carried out in conformity with the principles of international law, including the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. More specifically, we should consolidate and strengthen the legal régime in force applicable to space and draw useful lessons from the work of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

For its part, the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space stipulates in article IV that each State should provide the Secretary-General with information on the functions of each space object, specifying first and foremost whether it is designed for military or other purposes. However, it seems that to date no space object whose launch has been recorded has been described as having a military function. Yet, this problem was raised in 1985 by several member States of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly in respect of satellites which are known sometimes to carry out civilian or military missions or both. But in fact even if it cannot be shown that a weapon has already been placed permanently in orbit it may be supposed that anti-satellite weapon tests have been carried out. In any event, the space Powers must be prevented from arrogating to themselves the freedom to turn space into an area of activities within their sole discretion. For space, like the sea-bed, should form part of the common heritage of mankind. So here there is a need to ensure the application of the existing legal régime for arms control to strengthen confidence and increase transparency. Wisdom would also have us bear in mind the principles set out in General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI) of 1961, which calls on all States to furnish information on objects they launch into space. The long-term objective should be to completely prohibit the development, testing, manufacture and deployment of space weapons. Meanwhile we should at least prohibit anti-satellite weapons and address ourselves to definitions and verification techniques designed to prevent an arms race in space.

These, then, are the thoughts inspired by the current developments, bringing about changes which, whether we like it or not, are taking place before our eyes through the disarmament initiatives between the two super-Powers and within this Conference on Disarmament, and their possible impact on general disarmament. Bilateral negotiations and agreement between the super-Powers are definitely necessary to undertake any form of disarmament, but multilateral efforts are essential to sustain the process because disarmament commits all countries. Bilateral and multilateral efforts should therefore complement and reinforce one another. The Conference on Disarmament should broaden and deepen the basis for debate on all the items on its agenda, bearing priorities in mind within the context of its negotiating machinery, its procedures and its methods of work.

Drawing on the current climate of détente, we should call on the political will of the Powers that bear particular responsibilities in the maintenance of peace and international security and all Member States of the United Nations to take urgent action to deal with the arms race, do away with the risks of war, curb the use of force, prevent interventions, in order to increase confidence among all with a view to general and complete

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disarmament. This is the way to reduce, indeed eliminate the causes of distrust and fear, misunderstanding or miscalculation in relation to States' military activities and the search for a negotiated settlement of major international issues, particularly the numerous regional conflicts in the world.

In one word, the facts show us every day that the world has entered the era of institutionalized negotiation, which cannot be avoided if we are to resolve problems with realism and effectiveness, with a spirit of compromise and respect for principles. Yet within this negotiating forum on world disarmament, the paramount concern to prevent a nuclear holocaust should not make us lose sight of the inescapable need to prevent war in general by developing mutual understanding among States thanks to political relations, economic co-operation, trade and cultural exchanges, respect for humanitarian law and particularly the promotion of human rights. We should also help at the regional level in the adoption of measures on arms limitation, the conclusion of disarmament treaties, the setting up of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace which can increase confidence and stability among States in order to improve the international political situation. Moreover, in the new problem area of security structures the concept of non-nuclear defensive capacity acquires importance and raises the question of the relationship between nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament. In any event no international body is more appropriate than the Conference on Disarmament to assume responsibility for negotiations on security and disarmament on the world scale in order to conclude lasting agreements thanks to greater transparency in verification in the areas I have just mentioned.

In truth the Conference on Disarmament as an institutional framework for multilateral disarmament requires no major changes as far as we are concerned. However, my delegation would like to recall its interest in the implementation of the decision taken as long ago as 1983 for a balanced expansion of the membership of the Conference to strengthen the dynamics of the negotiating machinery. Finally, Senegal once again will spare no effort to contribute to the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament so as to define better, in the light of new developments, goals and priorities, the timetable for future stages and the rules for their implementation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Senegal for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list for today, the representative of Kenya, Ambassador Ruoro.

Mr. RUORO (Kenya): Mr. President, as this is the first time that my delegation is speaking in the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament for the summer session, allow me to congratulate you and your delegation most warmly on assuming the presidency of this body for the month of August. I would also like to formally welcome you to the Conference as the leader of your delegation. You represent a country with which Kenya has very good relations, and in the discharge of your duties, which we are convinced you will perform with distinction, you can be assured of the co-operation of my delegation.

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May I also take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Teja and the delegation of India for the very qualified manner in which he guided the work of the Conference during the month of July. Since that was the end of his term as head of the delegation of India to this Conference, we would like to bid him farewell and wish him success for the future. My delegation would also like to bid farewell to Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma, Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary as well as Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan, and to wish them all a prosperous future. I would also like to welcome the new heads of delegations, who, like myself, have recently joined this Conference: Ambassador Dimitar Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Oswaldo de Rivero of Peru and Ambassador Istvan Varga of Hungary. I can assure them of the co-operation of my delegation in the work of the Conference. My gratitude goes to the distinguished representatives who have extended kind words of welcome to me while speaking in this Conference. I pledge to them the readiness of my delegation to co-operate with them in efforts to achieve the objectives of this body.

The conclusion of the third special session on disarmament was contrary to the expectations of the majority of participants. Important disarmament issues were considered and some agreed upon, but these important discussions and agreements cannot be permanently referred to as there was no concluding document to record the outcome of the issues under consideration during SSOD-III. Consensus was possible on many of the issues, while on a few issues it was impossible to achieve within the limited time at the disposal of the participants. While it is to be regretted that the lack of consensus on all the issues on the agenda of SSOD-III prevented the adoption of a concluding document, the international community must not allow itself to be discouraged by this outcome. More efforts must be exerted to ensure that disarmament is an attainable goal, whether it is considered in bilateral, regional or multilateral forums.

The less than satisfactory results of SSOD-III reconfirmed the fact that disarmament is a complex process, and positive results in one forum of disarmament negotiations should not always be expected to manifest themselves in another forum. Here we have in mind the positive results attained in the bilateral United States-USSR negotiations prior to the convening of the United Nations third special session on disarmament. When all has been said about the third special session on disarmament, it will certainly be clear to all that the principles and objectives agreed to in the past on all disarmament issues must be maintained if multilateral disarmament efforts are to be successful. This is a task which must be shared by all countries, big and small alike, as in the present world of interdependence, international peace and security is of prime concern to all countries.

The bilateral Treaty that was signed and recently ratified by both the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate medium-range and shorter-range nuclear weapons from Europe (the INF Treaty) has been hailed as the first nuclear disarmament treaty to eliminate a category of nuclear weapons. The destructive power of nuclear weapons and the serious consequences of a nuclear war are documented facts, and it is commendable that after many years of nuclear weapons accumulation by the United States and the Soviet Union, the two countries have taken the lead to decrease the number of nuclear warheads.

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The number of nuclear weapons to be eliminated is minimal compared to the still existing number of nuclear warheads, but of importance is the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have embarked on a policy of nuclear disarmament. The INF Treaty contains unprecedented verification procedures which are calculated to ascertain the compliance of both parties with the provisions of the Treaty and could serve as a prototype for verification procedures in other disarmament agreements. The successful negotiation of the INF Treaty has perhaps opened the door to further agreements aimed at eliminating other categories of nuclear weapons. My delegation hopes that the demonstration of the elimination of Soviet missiles which we have been invited to witness at Volgograd in the USSR will be followed by the genuine destruction of these missiles by the two super-Powers in conformity with the INF Treaty.

The possibility exists now that a second treaty reducing strategic nuclear weapons by 50 per cent might be concluded in the near future between the United States and the Soviet Union. If this second treaty is signed, then a new era in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union will be unfolding, leading to the strengthening of international peace and security through a gradual nuclear disarmament process between the two countries.

Nuclear disarmament is a priority matter for all States, and the sooner measures are undertaken to realize this goal the safer the world will be for us all and for future generations. If we accept that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons are more than sufficient to destroy life on Earth, then all States should concentrate their efforts to ensure that such a conflict does not occur. The obsession with nuclear weapons need not be an omnipresent factor in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies. Mutual suspicion, political and ideological competition should not be the basis on which to conduct international affairs among States. We accept that differences which have their roots in history have contributed to the nuclear-arms race, but we know also that no State can gain any advantage by engaging in a nuclear conflict. We recall the joint statement issued by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev after their Summit Meeting in Geneva in 1985 in which they truthfully proclaimed that "a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought".

Our interpretation of this joint statement was that it signalled a turning-point in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, especially with regard to their policies on the use of nuclear weapons. It was a clear admission that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would stand to gain from a nuclear conflict, and that they would undertake concerted efforts to prevent such a conflict from occurring. We view the historic INF Treaty as the first step towards fulfilling the implications of that significant joint statement.

Nuclear disarmament issues are high on the agenda of this Conference, and if a comparison is made between the achievements of this Conference and the numerous efforts that have been made towards nuclear disarmament, it becomes apparent that the Conference has still a long way to go in addressing nuclear issues on its agenda effectively. Efforts to reach agreement on questions relating to nuclear issues have for well-known reasons been stalled in this Conference. There has been little progress in efforts to achieve a

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nuclear-test ban, which is a matter of great concern to the international community. Nuclear tests continue to facilitate the development of more modern nuclear weapons, thereby increasing the pace of the nuclear-arms race.

Within this Conference there are differing opinions on the mandate for a subsidiary body to deal with the issue of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, but there is general agreement that sooner or later the Conference will have to address itself to this issue in its entirety. To continue delaying work on this issue contributes to the perfection of new and more lethal nuclear weapons, and also the likelihood that some other States will acquire a nuclear weapon capability. Furthermore, a nuclear-test ban would be in conformity with the commitment undertaken by the States parties, among which are some nuclear-weapon States, to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water when they pledged their intent "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and "to continue negotiations to this end". 5 August 1988 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, and we cannot fail to note the proposal submitted by a number of countries, among which are Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, to amend this Treaty so that it would also include the banning of underground nuclear tests. This proposal, like other proposals on this issue, deserves serious consideration by all States.

The Group of 21 in this Conference has pronounced itself very clearly on the nuclear-test ban issue on several occasions. It has demonstrated flexibility which it expects to be reciprocated. It is very clear that a consensus on the mandate of a subsidiary body to discuss this issue is very necessary, and efforts should be directed towards achieving it. The Conference should be enabled to establish the framework for initiating multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The Group of 21's draft mandate contained in document CD/829, which was presented in April 1988, is precisely directed at achieving the necessary consensus as it accommodates the positions of the other groups on this issue. This proposal is still on the table and we hope the other groups will consider it favourably.

The negotiations on a convention to ban chemical weapons have demonstrated what this Conference can achieve if political will is manifested by all States on all the issues on the agenda of this Conference. Even though there still remain certain important issues which have to be thoroughly addressed in the draft chemical weapons convention, the pace of negotiations is encouraging as there is a determination on the part of all States involved in these negotiations to solve the remaining problems. The promise exists that the Conference will be able to conclude a chemical weapons ban convention in good time. In view of the reported use of chemical weapons in the hopefully concluded tragic Iran-Iraq war, we appeal to all States to remain committed to the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of such weapons. The international community must remain committed to eliminating such weapons and to ensuring that they are never again used as weapons of war.

Efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space should be increased, and this Conference should continue its valuable discussions on this issue. We are of the firm opinion that outer space should be preserved exclusively for

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peaceful purposes to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all nations. The transfer of the arms race into outer space would pose serious complications for international peace and security. All efforts must be undertaken to prevent the installation of weapon systems in space or the development of any space-to-space, space-to-Earth or Earth-to-space weapon systems. The international community should conclude a multilateral agreement on permitted and conceptually defined and agreed peaceful military activities in outer space.

The issue of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States - like my own and many others - against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is important to all non-nuclear-weapon States. It should be remembered that a great majority of States in this category have, by acceding to the 1968 non-proliferation Treaty, whose twentieth anniversary was observed on 1 July this year, given up their right to acquire nuclear weapons. These States expect that as parties to the NPT they should be given unconditional guarantees in a legally binding international treaty assuring them that they will not be subjected to or threatened with the use of nuclear weapons. Guarantees given to the non-nuclear-weapon States at present consist of the unilateral declarations issued by each of the nuclear-weapon States, which are not of a legally binding character and can be revoked at any time. My delegation would therefore like to state that unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States, however well-meaning, are unsatisfactory just as unilateral declarations by non-nuclear-weapon States on the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons would be. Various proposals have been made in the Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances, and we would favour the consideration of a formula that addresses the concerns of the nuclear-weapon States as well as those of the non-nuclear-weapon States on this issue.

The Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons has been considering for some time now a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. Two issues have been isolated for consideration in the Ad hoc Committee: one is the prohibition of radiological weapons, which do not exist as yet, and the second is the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, which is a distinct reality. An issue which we also feel could be discussed in the work of the contact group on the prohibition of radiological weapons is the hostile dumping of radioactive waste. The proposal made by Ambassador Azikiwe of the delegation of Nigeria in his statement to the plenary of the Conference on 11 August has our fullest support. The hostile dumping or use in armed conflict of radioactive waste is a potential means of conducting radiological warfare, and States should commit themselves never, under any circumstances, to dump radioactive wastes for hostile purposes or in armed conflict in the territory of another State.

Recent reported incidents of the clandestine dumping of radioactive and industrial wastes in certain African States are deplorable. Such nefarious activities have grave consequences for the health of the population, their agriculture and their general environment, and those responsible should halt such activities forthwith. African countries, like all other countries, require benefits derived from nuclear technology and not radioactive or other wastes. The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity,

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meeting in its forty-eighth ordinary session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 9 to 23 May this year, adopted a resolution calling for, among other things, a halt to the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa. We hope that all those involved in this sinister activity will comply with the contents of that resolution.

Disarmament is an attainable goal if all States demonstrate political will, whether in bilateral or multilateral negotiating forums. If the Conference on Disarmament is to achieve the required results, then all member States should demonstrate the political will necessary to enable it to fulfil its negotiating mandate on all the issues on its agenda, with priority given to nuclear disarmament issues.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Dolgu.

Mr. DOLGU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I should like to associate my delegation with all those before me that have expressed their satisfaction at seeing you preside over the work of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August, at a time when we are called upon to intensify our efforts and give them as specific an orientation as possible. We greet you as the representative of a country, Indonesia, with which Romania has maintained and developed relations of friendship and co-operation in all fields. I should also like to pay tribute to Ambassador Teja of India for the effective manner in which he guided our work in the month of July. I also wish to welcome our new colleagues, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Ruoro of Kenya, Ambassador de Rivero of Peru and Ambassador Varga of Hungary. To our colleagues who have completed their work here and are leaving Geneva I should like to express our best wishes for success in their new posts and their future careers.

Our colleague from Senegal has reminded us of the wide variety of expressions used to describe the outcome of the recent special session held in New York. The delegation of Romania shares the feeling of frustration of those who regret that the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament was not able to produce a consensus final document. From whatever viewpoint this outcome may be viewed, it must be acknowledged to have been a failure. A failure that should not be dramatized, because in the final analysis the session was merely one episode in a vast long-term process, but one which is all the more regrettable in that it reflects a continued inability to provide the multilateral negotiations with an appropriate role in overall disarmament efforts. Romania is among the countries that are of the view that such a role is indispensable, and that multilateral efforts, first and foremost, within the United Nations, should play a decisive role in the disarmament processes. In our view, bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations should be complementary and strengthen each other, for the purpose of achieving progress in this process at as rapid a rate as possible.

Having said this, I should like to underscore, like other speakers before us that the outcome of the third special session should not lead us into apathy. On the contrary, this outcome should prompt redoubled efforts, above

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

all in this body, which is the sole multilateral negotiating forum available to the United Nations in the disarmament field. That is why we endorse the views expressed concerning the positive elements that have come out of the dialogue that took place during the session, particularly concerning the need to retain and broaden the areas of rapprochement that emerged, to work to bring viewpoints together in those areas where consensus could not be achieved. We should study seriously the lessons that can be drawn from the New York dialogue, both positive and negative, in order to enrich our approach to problems and facilitate their solution within the Conference.

It is encouraging that both at the special session and in the statements made before the plenary of our Conference, the role and the purpose of the Conference on Disarmament have not been challenged. On the contrary, a salient feature of all statements has been a call to pursue and intensify the work of this multilateral negotiating forum. But for these statements to remain credible, it is necessary to shift into action, to ensure that statements are followed up by deeds, concrete disarmament agreements. The stakes are extremely high, since what is involved is peace and security, ultimately the survival of mankind. It is true that the Soviet-American dialogue has already produced or is in the process of producing tangible results, and even certain breakthroughs. The fact still remains that the arms race continues, both quantitatively as well as qualitatively. The international situation remains complex and contradictory, and the threat of a nuclear war continues to hang over mankind, with the same dark prospect - the annihilation of civilization and of life on the planet. For the reductions stipulated in the INF Treaty are not such as to substantially affect the existing destructive potential. Moreover, the process of developing new types and systems of weapons continues relentlessly, through the use of the most recent achievements of science and technology. This is true not only for nuclear weapons, but also for chemical weapons and for conventional weapons. Consequently, if we take into account the refinement of various types and systems of weapons, we must acknowledge that despite the planned reductions, the effective destructive capacity of military arsenals is growing constantly. As we have already emphasized, there are no grounds for indulging in euphoria. The Soviet Union and the United States of America have a special responsibility in the field of disarmament. That is why these two major Powers should be encouraged to forge ahead in their bilateral efforts to cut nuclear arms. These efforts and their consequences are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a real, sustained and comprehensive disarmament process. They must not and cannot take the place of the multilateral efforts undertaken by the member States of the Conference on Disarmament, by the international community as a whole. We must redouble our efforts to take concrete steps aimed at significant reductions in all fields, above all in nuclear disarmament.

The fact that nuclear tests continue arouses particular concern. As the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin, emphasized, it is really absurd to continue to refine weapons, nuclear weapons in this instance, whose express purpose is that they should never be used except for deterrence, and which, under the current negotiations, are destined to be completely eliminated. Moreover, continuing such testing means damaging the environment irreversibly in ways that cannot be foreseen. That is probably why the debates in the third special session once again highlighted very forcefully

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

the urgent need for a treaty placing a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests, as well as the need for measures to put an end to any nuclear weapon modernization exercise. That is why our Government learned with great interest of, and supports, the initiative of the six non-aligned countries designed to broaden the scope of the Moscow Treaty so that it covers underground tests as well. As regards the corresponding item on the agenda of the Conference, "Nuclear-test ban", we would have preferred, like most other delegations, to have joined in a consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the basis of the Group of 21's proposal contained in document CD/829. At the same time we concur with the view that in-depth consideration of this issue must begin as soon as possible. That is why we support the compromise proposal that has just been presented by our colleague and friend, the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Milos Vejvoda.

A number of speakers have referred to the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed 20 years ago. We take this opportunity to recall, as we have also done in the past, that the best way to consolidate the non-proliferation régime consists in concrete, significant and vigorous measures of nuclear disarmament in conformity with the appropriate provisions of the Treaty. Only new steps taken by States possessing nuclear weapons, first and foremost the USSR and the United States, towards the sustained reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons can help to make the Treaty universal and strengthen its validity. I take this opportunity to reiterate our support for the proposal that a comprehensive programme of nuclear disarmament should be elaborated as soon as possible with the goal of the phased reduction and complete elimination of these weapons by the year 2000.

I cannot conclude on this extremely important subject relating to nuclear disarmament without addressing our thanks to the delegation of the Soviet Union for the information presented by Ambassador Aleksei Oboukhov on the state of progress in the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space arms. It was with great interest that we followed his presentation which was a response to a request from a number of delegations, including my own, to the participants in the bilateral negotiations in Geneva on nuclear and space arms.

As regards outer space, we are in favour of any measure to prohibit the design, development and deployment of any system of space arms, and strict respect for all existing rules in this field. The prevention of the spread of the arms race to outer space, and the halting of the arms race, should go hand in hand with the establishment of a régime which ensures that outer space is used for exclusively peaceful purposes as the common heritage of mankind.

In order to ensure conditions of stability and security for all States, reduce the danger of war and achieve disarmament, it is necessary to proceed in close relation with practical measures for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, and the elimination of all chemical weapons. We reiterate our position in favour of the intensification of negotiations for the drafting of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. In this context I should like to make several comments.

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

First of all, pending the conclusion and entry into force of the convention, States should reaffirm the validity of the Geneva Protocol and undertake never under any circumstances to resort to these weapons. Secondly, the convention should ensure balance, a necessary balance between rights and duties, notably between countries that possess chemical weapons and those that do not. This involves the peaceful, unimpeded development of the chemical industry in each country, the broadening of international co-operation and exchanges among States in fields related to the application of the convention, the development of the scientific potential of each country and its use exclusively for economic and social progress. Our delegation commends and welcomes the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee of the Conference whose task is to finalize the comprehensive programme of disarmament, and wishes to underscore the importance of such an instrument for defining the main avenues to be followed to ensure the dynamism of future disarmament negotiations. We express the hope that under the very skilful chairmanship of our eminent colleague, Ambassador García Robles, and as a result of sustained and unflagging efforts to arrive at generally acceptable solutions, it will be possible to submit the draft comprehensive programme as soon as possible for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Such a programme, with well-defined timetables and phases, would offer clear prospects and contribute to the strengthening and enhancement of the paramount role that the United Nations is called upon to play in the disarmament process.

As regards the problem of improving the functioning and increasing the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament, we feel that the ongoing exercise - and here we should like to pay tribute to the Group of Seven and its Chairman, our colleague and friend Ambassador Fan of the People's Republic of China - is not without importance. There are of course untapped opportunities to avoid wasting our time and make better use of our skills and the expertise of our Governments. But like other delegations, we consider that the absence of tangible progress, the unsatisfactory pace of the negotiations, are not linked primarily to inadequate organization of work or procedures. In point of fact, what is lacking is political will on the part of all member States of the Conference. What is involved is the general position, the position of principle, as regards the role of multilateralism, in as much as the Conference is in fact no more than the most appropriate forum for a multilateral approach to disarmament problems. Let me conclude by using words oddly similar to those used by my predecessor. Because if we want the first strides in the direction of disarmament to be followed up by other measures making up an irreversible and vigorous process, such political will is an indispensable ingredient.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Bayart.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia): Mr. President, before I proceed with my statement, may I first congratulate you on holding the important office of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August? You represent a great Asian country, Indonesia, with which Mongolia maintains relations of friendship and co-operation. May I also express my delegation's

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appreciation for the very skilful and business-like manner in which you have been guiding our proceedings, and for the efforts made in order to promote the work of the Conference.

I would like to convey our gratitude to Ambassador Teja of India for his wise guidance of our work in his capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament in July, and wish him all the best. I would also like to take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Varga of Hungary. My delegation will be happy to maintain the same close co-operation and friendship as with his predecessor, my good friend Ambassador Dávid Meiszter.

Mr. President, in my statement today, I would like to deal with item 4 of our agenda, that is, chemical weapons. Mongolia remains a staunch supporter of the early conclusion of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. My country has already declared that it has no chemical weapons and does not intend to develop, produce or acquire any. We have done so proceeding, in particular, from our firm conviction that the convention will be concluded in the very near future, for ever putting an end to the chemical weapons threat. With this same conviction, I wish today to state that the Government of my country intends to be among the first to sign the convention as soon as it is ready for signature.

Since the resumption of negotiations on chemical weapons in July this year, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, as well as the chairmen of the three working groups, have made significant efforts to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions to the outstanding problems. Yet the course of negotiations on the text of a draft convention leaves much to be desired. There is an imperative need for active efforts to resolve a number of key problems relating to the convention, political will and readiness on the part of all participants to come to an agreement. My delegation would like to make a few observations on some provisions of the draft convention which, in our opinion, have special significance.

In the course of this session, Group A has continued intensive work on article VI. In doing so, the participants in the negotiations have concentrated their attention mainly on schedules [1] chemicals and the activities connected with them. This is quite natural, since these chemicals pose the greatest risk for the implementation of the future convention. As is well known, the "rolling text" of the draft convention embodies unanimous agreement with respect to the production of these chemicals exclusively at a single small-scale facility, the capacity of which shall not exceed one metric ton per year. However, it is likely that as a special exception in the convention, the production of nitrogen mustard will be allowed outside the small-scale facility, provided that the production facilities are made subject to the same stringent verification régime as that envisaged for the small-scale facility.

Super-toxic lethal chemicals not included in schedule [1], in other words schedule [4] chemicals, as well as the corresponding production facilities, could also represent a significant danger to the purposes of the convention. All participants share this anxiety. We are of the opinion that the convention should have provisions that would preclude such a danger. We have

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no ready recipes to solve this issue. Nevertheless, we are convinced that unless this problem is resolved in one form or another, the convention will not be effective. During the negotiations on schedule [4] the opinion was expressed that it is impossible to verify the chemicals that are to be included in this schedule. We disagree with this, and share the view expressed in document CD/792, presented by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany that "a coherent system of controls could be created for super-toxic lethal chemicals, too, as is largely the case for the substances listed in annexes 1, 2 and 3".

The attention of participants in the negotiations has so far been focused on the question of proper handling of confidential information in the chemical industry. This was dictated by the need to move forward in negotiations to elaborate the régimes for non-production of chemical weapons. In spite of all the inherent difficulties and complexities, we believe that this problem is surmountable. In this context, we found the idea put forward by the representative of the Netherlands at the meeting of industrial experts, for the classification of information which States parties have to provide to the Technical Secretariat in connection with the provisions of the future convention, interesting.

We welcome the consultations begun under the guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden on an experiment to test the procedures being worked out at the negotiations for systematic international monitoring of the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. We are confident that this experiment will make a practical contribution to the solution of concrete problems, as well as to the cause of strengthening confidence and improving the atmosphere at the negotiations as a whole. At the same time, we consider that the preparatory work and the conduct of the experiment itself should be carried out in the shortest possible time span so that the results of the experiment can be used to speed up the ongoing negotiations.

Mongolia considers that the time is now ripe for solving the question of herbicides and pesticides. According to United Nations estimates, pesticide poisoning due solely to improper handling mainly in developing countries, could total as many as 2 million cases a year, with 40,000 deaths. These horrifying figures once again highlight the need to include in the convention provisions prohibiting the use of these chemicals as a method of warfare.

While actively striving for the rapid completion of negotiations on chemical weapons and the conclusion of a convention, Mongolia stands resolutely and consistently for strict compliance with and strengthening of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In this regard, I wish to recall that in response to United Nations General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV), which was initiated by my country, 14 States acceded to the Protocol in 1970 alone. Violation of the purposes and principles of the Protocol is incompatible with efforts aimed at the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of the industrial base for their production. We, therefore, support the United Kingdom initiative concerning the devising of procedures for automatically investigating allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

Last but not least, my country attaches great importance to the provisions of the convention pertaining to assistance and economic and

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

technological co-operation, under which States parties to the convention will assume an obligation to promote the peaceful development of the chemical industry.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize the need to continue negotiations on chemical weapons during the inter-sessional period. Such inter-sessional work, which has been undertaken by the Conference as an almost regular feature during the last few years, has proved to be highly productive.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the last speaker on my list for today, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Ola Dahlman.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): Mr. President, it is a pleasure to report to you on the recent meeting of the Group and to introduce its progress report, contained in document CD/853.

The Group held its twenty-sixth formal session from 25 July to 5 August, and experts and representatives from 24 countries attended. The Group enjoyed throughout its meeting excellent services provided by the secretariat.

The Group agreed two years ago to modernize considerably the global system originally described in the Group's first report (CCD/558) and tested in a large-scale test in 1984 (CD/720). This new system is based on the expeditious exchange of wave-form and parameter data and the processing of such data at international data centres.

You may ask in what way such a new system, utilizing available modern technology for the exchange and processing of large volumes of data, would improve the possibilities of monitoring a nuclear test ban. In many regards, the new system goes far beyond what is available today on a global scale for scientific applications. It would not only provide significantly more data but also, and more important, data of considerably higher quality. The use at international data centres of wave-form data from many stations would dramatically improve the quality of the information on seismic events, in particular by improving the precision of the source parameters. It would further reduce the number of signals observed at individual stations which cannot be associated with a particular seismic event. It is important to reduce the number of such unassociated signals as far as possible, as they may create uncertainty and even suspicion.

The new system would also make high-quality wave-form data readily available for subsequent detailed analysis by individual participating States. The use of data from such a modern system would thus improve the possibility for all parties to a treaty to conduct verification on an equal footing. Would the introduction of modern technology and new methods of seismological analysis also improve the capability of the system to observe and identify smaller events?

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

In its first report (CCD/558), the Group made an assessment of the expected capabilities of some tentative global networks containing around 50 seismological stations. These estimates, and similar calculations made by individual scientists, showed that in general the detection capability in the northern hemisphere corresponds to events of about magnitude 4 and, further, that events occurring in the southern hemisphere have to be at least half a magnitude larger to be detected with the same probability. A magnitude 4 event corresponds to a fully coupled explosion in hard rock with a yield of the order of 1 Kt.

The Group has not made any capability estimates since then, and the issue has been only briefly discussed. A number of national contributions giving capabilities observed at individual stations or national networks have, however, been presented to the Group. To give some idea on how the detection capabilities of a network may be affected if recent technological development is included in the new system design, I will offer a few personal remarks.

The sensitivity of an individual modern seismological station is primarily controlled by the ever-present ground noise. This varies considerably from one site to another, and is generally lower at remote locations inside large continents. The noise can be suppressed by array stations having a number of sensors placed in a suitable pattern to form an antenna. The noise reduction is roughly proportional to the square root of the number of sensors; 10 sensors would reduce the noise by a factor of 3,25 sensors by a factor of 5, etc. Even if modern technology may not substantially improve the detection capabilities of single stations, digital recording and signal processing will facilitate the further interpretation of observed signals. Modern technology also makes it easier to establish high-sensitivity array stations.

The size of the event that can be detected depends on the distance between the event and the station. National investigations have shown that underwater explosions of the order of 100 kg have been detected at distances of some 100 kilometres, and that underground explosions with yields of a couple of tons have been observed beyond 1,000 km. At teleseismic distances, between 2,000 and 10,000 km, the detection capability is less dependent on the actual distance and is generally considered to correspond to magnitude 4 for well-located stations.

The detection capability of a given network is thus largely controlled by the density of the stations, and by whether the stations are array stations or single stations. A network of 500 stations, for example, would thus have a significantly lower detection threshold than the network of some 50 stations so far discussed by the Group. A network of 5,000 stations would have an even lower threshold, and would generate correspondingly more data that have to be analysed and exchanged.

The recent dramatic development of communication facilities makes it possible to transmit large volumes of data from one part of the globe to another. Modern computer technology has made it possible to handle and analyse data volumes that we were unable to handle a few years ago. There is therefore no technical limitation in principle as to the number of stations that could be included in the global network. Technical developments thus

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

offer us the possibility of building a global system with high capabilities. It is a political decision to establish what capabilities we should aim at.

The Group was made aware of the Joint Verification Experiment undertaken by the United States and the Soviet Union. The experiment consists of the conduct and close-in recording of two nuclear explosions, one at the Nevada test site, conducted on 17 August, and one at Semipalatinsk, scheduled for 14 September this year. The general availability of source data, including yield, depth of burial and geological conditions, for these two explosions and the 10 selected previous nuclear explosions conducted by the two countries, would in my view, together with observations obtained at seismological stations around the world, provide a very important data base for the further development of methods of seismological analysis and for assessment of the capabilities of global networks.

The present tasks of the Ad hoc Group can be described in the following three phases: to provide a fifth report giving the functional requirements of the new modern system and an initial concept of the design of such a system; to conduct a large-scale experiment to test most of the key elements of such a system and the interrelations between these elements; and, finally, to reassess the initial design of the system in the light of the results of the experiment.

At its recent session, the Group discussed in detail a draft of its fifth report compiled by the Group's scientific secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdal of Norway, containing the functional requirements and an initial design of a modern international system. The report and its appendices, still to be compiled, present the system in four main components: a global network of highly sensitive modern seismological stations; national data centres in each participating country; international data centres to collect and analyse available data; and telecommunication channels for the expeditious exchange of information within the system.

The Group is in agreement on the functional requirements of the system, and is close to agreement also on an initial design of the system. Some remaining questions, especially on how to organize the telecommunication channels, need further consideration. The Group however, envisages submitting its fifth report to the Conference on Disarmament following the Group's next session.

As to the planning of the large-scale experiment, the Group made most significant progress, guided by material compiled by the co-ordinator of the experiment, Dr. Peter Basham of Canada. The Group decided to name the large-scale experiment the "Group of Scientific Experts Second Technical Test", in short GSETT-2. Based on the earlier agreed stage-by-stage approach to the experiment, the Group identified three phases. A first, start-up phase contains a number of experiments to be conducted on a national or co-operative basis. A number of such experiments have already started or will start soon. As can be seen from the summary of the plans for these start-up tests annexed to the progress report, these experiments, which are related to all components of the system, are quite extensive and will involve many scientific institutions and scientists around the world. The results of these start-up activities will be reviewed at the Group's next two sessions.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The second phase of GSETT-2 is a preparatory or "warm-up" phase to pave the way for the full-scale test, which will constitute the third and last phase. It is now anticipated that, if all of the appropriate facilities and procedures can be put in place through national and co-operative efforts, the second, warm-up phase will begin in late 1989 and the third, full-scale phase will be conducted in 1990. It is an extensive and concerted scientific effort that now has commenced.

The Ad hoc Group suggests that, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, its next session should be convened in Geneva from 6 to 7 March 1989.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events for his statement introducing the report contained in document CD/853. As we all know, we need to adopt the recommendation contained in paragraph 10 of the report, relating to the dates for the next session of the Ad hoc Group. We shall do so at our plenary meeting on Tuesday, 30 August.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Is there any other member wishing to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

As usual, the secretariat has circulated today an informal paper containing the list of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during next week. As you know, this is merely indicative and subject to change if need be. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to inform members that the secretariat will start circulating next week the technical parts of the draft annual report, as well as draft substantive paragraphs on those agenda items on which subsidiary bodies were not established. At an appropriate stage next week, I will propose dates for their consideration. As usual, we shall hold an informal meeting for a first reading of the technical parts, while the draft substantive paragraphs will be discussed at informal consultations.

I intend to discuss today with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies the deadlines for adoption of the reports of the ad hoc committees, as time constraints are already pressing. We have only 14 working days before the Conference adjourns, and we still have much to accomplish.

As I announced at our plenary meeting on Tuesday of this week, immediately after we adjourn this meeting today, the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will hold its next

(The President)

meeting, instead of tomorrow afternoon. I should like to recall also that the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons has scheduled its next meeting for tomorrow, 26 August in this room at 3 p.m.

I have no other business for today, and so I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 30 August at 10 a.m. in this room.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.478
30 August 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 30 August 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Wisber Loeis (Indonesia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 478th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I should like to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference, to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States of America, His Excellency Mr. William Burns, who will be addressing the Conference today. I wish to thank him for the interest he shows in the work of the Conference, and I am sure that members will follow his statement with particular interest.

The Conference commences today, in accordance with its programme of work, consideration of agenda item 8, "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". However, in conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member who wishes to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today, the representatives of the United States of America, the Republic of Korea and Bulgaria. I now give the floor to the first speaker today, the representative of the United States of America, His Excellency Mr. William Burns, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Mr. BURNS (United States of America): It is a pleasure for me to be here today with the United States delegation to address the Conference on Disarmament. I have spent a great deal of time in Geneva working on disarmament issues. My efforts, however, have been primarily devoted to bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the nuclear and space talks, and, this week, in the third review conference of the United States-Soviet anti-ballistic missile Treaty. As Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, I follow the work of this Conference closely, and I see around the conference room today many friends and colleagues with whom I share common goals. I welcome this opportunity to speak before this respected audience and to participate directly in your efforts.

Let me begin by congratulating you, Mr. President, on behalf of the United States delegation, for your capable handling of the duties of President of this Conference for the month of August. Indonesia is a long-time friend of the United States, and the participation of your delegation in the work of this body alongside ours reflects our mutual dedication to seeking ways to strengthen international security through the mechanism of arms limitations and disarmament agreements. I also want to say farewell to Ambassador Teja of India, with whom our delegation enjoyed an excellent working relationship during his tenure as head of the Indian delegation. We wish him well. The United States delegation also extends a warm welcome to Ambassador Istvan Varga of Hungary, and our delegation looks forward to working closely with him and his colleagues.

A great deal has happened in the field of arms control and disarmament since I took office as Director some five months ago. There has been activity on bilateral, on regional, and on multilateral levels. I am happy to say that, overall, this activity has been of a positive character. In our view, an impartial observer would have to conclude that events have furthered our fundamental objective of a more secure and more stable future for the global

(Mr. Burns, United States of America)

community. These various advances did not, of course, happen overnight. And the record is not entirely positive. Much work remains to be done. The world is confronted daily with actual and potential armed conflicts, and with the prospect of nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation; we note the spread of dangerous and destabilizing nuclear and ballistic missile technologies, and we have seen the repeated use of chemical weapons in defiance of one of the oldest norms of international law. And so, while we are encouraged by the progress that we have witnessed recently, the tasks that remain are too pressing to allow time for self-congratulation, for we must get on with our work. My Government recognizes this, and we are not resting on past successes.

In the bilateral arms control area, the United States and the Soviet Union brought into force on 1 June of this year the Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces, banning, for the first time in history, an entire category of nuclear arms, and providing for rigorous verification of the destruction of these arms. The INF Treaty, together with its protocols and memorandum of understanding, was made available to this Conference by my delegation, and by the delegation of the Soviet Union, earlier this year, as documents CD/798 and CD/800.

I am pleased to report to you that the inspection provisions of this historic Treaty are now being successfully implemented by our two countries. As many of you witnessed very recently, INF missiles are being destroyed. INF-related facilities are being monitored to ensure that treaty provisions are being honoured. I served as a member of the United States delegation to the INF negotiations, and it is gratifying to see that the long, hard work of the negotiators, and the patient efforts of other United States and Soviet Government officials, as well as those of the respective alliances, are finally paying off.

It is true that the quantitative reductions mandated in the INF Treaty constitute a small percentage of the parties' nuclear arms. It is not true, however, that the reductions are therefore of little significance. Quite the contrary. The Treaty marks the beginning of a nuclear arms reduction process that will contribute to further reductions, increased security, and greater mutual confidence. Further, and of immediate importance to other arms control and disarmament efforts, and more specifically of immediate importance to our chemical weapons negotiations, the INF Treaty contains a stringent verification régime that will prove a useful precedent to draw upon in structuring verification provisions for other disarmament agreements. No one should doubt, then, that the INF Treaty is an important document representing a milestone in the long and difficult process of disarmament.

In the same period of five months since I entered my present position, the United States and the Soviet Union also signed an agreement providing for advance notification of ballistic missile launches. This agreement, as well, has been made available to you as CD/847 and CD/845. It is an agreement designed to reduce the risk of nuclear war through accident, miscalculation or misinterpretation. It is, we believe, a measure lending greater stability to our relationship with the Soviet Union. Stability and predictability help create an environment in which disarmament negotiations can progress. This agreement, therefore, is closely related to our efforts to achieve a truly substantial, equitable and verifiable reduction in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two sides.

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On 12 July, the tenth round of the nuclear and space talks began here in Geneva. As President Reagan noted in a statement released on that occasion, the two sides have made considerable progress in over six years of negotiations.

In the strategic arms reduction talks, there is agreement in principle to reduce strategic forces by 50 per cent; to impose a ceiling of 6,000 warheads on 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; and to create subceilings of 4,900 ballistic missile warheads, and 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles. The sides have also agreed to a 50 per cent reduction in the throw weight of Soviet missiles. In addition, agreement has been reached on a counting rule for the armaments borne by heavy bombers. Agreement exists on certain verification measures including several kinds of on-site inspection, data exchange, and measures to reduce the possibility of cheating. This progress has been recorded in joint draft treaty text, which, of course, also sets out the remaining areas of disagreement.

At the Moscow summit, some common ground was identified with respect to concepts for verification of mobile missiles - should they be permitted in a strategic arms reduction treaty - and on dealing with air-launched cruise missiles.

In the forum dealing with defence and space issues, our objective is to seek agreement on how we can, jointly with the Soviet Union, manage a stable transition to increased reliance on effective defences that threaten no one. A separate agreement on these issues is being worked on, which reflects the principles which President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev outlined in December at the Washington summit. In addition, work is continuing on a draft protocol designed to improve predictability as research is carried out in the strategic defence area and preparations made for a possible transition to greater reliance on defences. Few persons expected, at the outset of these talks, that we could go so far.

It is our view that the United States Strategic Defence Initiative has provided an important incentive for serious negotiations in the defence and space area. In President Reagan's words, it is "our best hope for a safer world". The programme of research, development and testing in which the United States is engaged is in full compliance with the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty. And, as we have made clear, the Strategic Defence Initiative is not something that we will bargain away or modify with crippling provisions. We will research it, test it, and, if it works, deploy it!

I realize that many around this table would pose the question: After six years of negotiations, when can we expect a completed START treaty, and a completed agreement on defence and space issues? I can answer that the United States seeks sound agreements, and that the United States is not negotiating against arbitrary deadlines. I can also say that, when it comes to vital issues of international security, the United States believes that we are better off with no agreement than with a bad agreement. So we will continue to work hard, but as we do so, we will be patient.

Let me briefly discuss remaining issues. First, the United States continues to seek a ban on mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles unless

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effective verification provisions can be found for limitations on them, in which case we could consider some retention. As I noted, some elements of a possible verification régime were identified in the Moscow joint statement (CD/846), but other important aspects remain to be addressed.

Second, the United States seeks a sublimit of 3,000 on the number of warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles to ensure that a strategic arms reduction agreement will strengthen stability through deep reductions in these most threatening weapon systems.

Third, the United States continues to have serious concerns about whether limits on nuclear-armed versions of sea-launched cruise missiles could be effectively verified. The United States agreed with the USSR at the Washington summit to seek a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. The two sides have not yet found a solution.

And fourth, with regard to air-launched cruise missiles, the two sides agreed at the Moscow summit on some rules for distinguishing between categories of heavy bombers with different armaments, for converting bombers from one category to another, and for counting bombers and warheads. However, important issues remain to be resolved, including the number of warheads to be attributed to heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear air-launched cruise missiles, how to treat bombers capable of carrying conventional arms only, and the allowable range for air-launched cruise missiles.

As I noted at the beginning of my statement, my present duties in Geneva include serving as head of the United States delegation to the third review of the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty. As that review is presently under way, I am not in a position to go into any detail on this subject. I would note, however, that the United States believes the existence of the large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk in the Soviet Union is a significant violation of a central element of this Treaty, and that measures must be taken to resolve this serious problem.

Turning the focus to a somewhat broader scale, let me briefly address what I see as a serious problem for international security: the threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, the proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities, and the proliferation of chemical weapons. The spread of none of these is in our collective interest, nor in the interest of international stability. It can only make more complicated the task of preventing the outbreak of conflict at the local, regional, or even global level. It can only make more complicated the task of resolving such conflicts once they have begun - as the sad events in the Gulf region bear witness.

It is indeed ironic that just when the two major nuclear-weapon States have agreed to destroy their intermediate-range nuclear forces, similar weapons systems appear to be spreading to other regions of the world. The United States strongly urges all other States to examine this unsettling development carefully, and to work for measures to remove the destabilizing presence of these missiles.

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During his address to the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament two months ago, Secretary of State Shultz called special attention to the problem posed by the proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities. I want to underline those remarks today, in particular his statement that the United States views this problem as the most important one facing the international community in the security field. Preparations are already beginning for the fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty in 1990. The United States seeks a successful review of the NPT, and a strengthening of that Treaty, and other measures that promote the global non-proliferation régime. The United States is opposed to any plan that would have the effect of terminating the NPT, as we are convinced that this would be a serious blow to global security. Elimination of the constraints embodied in the NPT would have a dramatic, destabilizing effect. The further spread of nuclear weapons will solve no security problems; it will only create new ones, and make more difficult our present tasks of resolving the underlying causes of regional tensions and conflicts. The United States continues to believe strongly that all States would benefit from universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty.

With regard to the proliferation of chemical weapons, this is a matter of direct relevance to this Conference and to the negotiation of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons. The repeated use of chemical weapons in contravention of the 1925 Geneva Protocol against chemical warfare has eroded the force of that instrument, and blurred an international norm that, for over half a century, successfully inhibited States from systematically using chemical weapons as weapons of war. The international norm is further weakened when such repeated violation of the 1925 Protocol fails to evoke immediate, forceful and universal condemnation.

The United States is committed to strengthening the international norm against chemical weapons, and we are convinced that the most effective way to achieve that goal is through the negotiation of a comprehensive, verifiable and truly global chemical weapons ban - a subject to which I will turn momentarily. In your negotiation of that convention, however, I would urge you to remember the lessons learned from the experience of the Gulf war.

Pending completion of a ban, we will also work closely with others to prevent the dangerous spread and illegal use of chemical weapons. This should include political pressure brought to bear as appropriate, carefully targeted export controls on certain chemicals, and support for investigation by the United Nations of all cases of alleged use. We urge others to join us to ensure that the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which establishes a binding norm against CW use, is not further eroded.

I would now like to turn from our proliferation concerns to the important matter of negotiating a chemical weapons ban. Ambassador Friedersdorf, in his statement before this Conference on 28 July, presented detailed United States views on current issues in the negotiations. I do not propose to cover the same ground today. Rather, I would like to outline briefly the general United States approach to the negotiations. Simply put, the United States is committed to negotiation of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons, thus, encompassing all chemical weapons-capable States. Toward this end the United States submitted to this body in 1984 a draft convention, CD/500, which remains the basis of the United States position.

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At the same time we do not underestimate the difficulty and complexity of the task. Despite the considerable progress that has been made, difficult problems remain in developing effective means of verification, in providing undiminished security for all States during the transition period, and in ensuring that the ban is truly global. In our view, it is important to address these problems as a matter of continuing urgency.

The kind of convention we are seeking can be achieved only through multilateral negotiations. This Conference must be the focus of efforts to achieve a ban. On specific issues, bilateral discussions can facilitate the resolution of issues in the multilateral negotiations. Therefore, in addition to our continuing active participation in multilateral work we periodically discuss key issues with the Soviet Union, and with others, in an effort to find mutually acceptable solutions. In our view, both multilateral and bilateral efforts are essential. Moreover, evidence of the spread of chemical weapons has led to increased awareness on our part of the need to consult States who are not participating in the work of the Conference.

As you know, the United States has long sought to deter chemical attack through a capability to retaliate in kind. We will continue to maintain this capability until the threat of chemical attack is removed through an effective, verifiable, truly global chemical weapons ban.

As everyone knows, the presidential election campaign in the United States is now in full swing. Alternative policies on many issues are being rigorously debated. But on the prohibition of chemical weapons there is no debate. The United States commitment to a chemical weapons ban is an enduring, bipartisan commitment. For its part, the Reagan Administration will continue earnestly to pursue this goal until the new Administration comes into office in January. We will work hard with all delegations to resolve the difficult questions that remain.

I would add only one or two cautionary notes. As you progress toward the completion of your work on a CW ban, resist the temptation to rush to signature by passing over the details. It is unrealistic to believe that a preparatory committee or some governing body can solve problems that have eluded your experienced experts for the past several years. The time to resolve differences is before a treaty enters into force. The second observation I would make is that practice inspections can be quite useful in uncovering potential areas of controversy while you still have time to resolve them - before a treaty goes into effect.

I mentioned the third special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. The United States shares the disappointment expressed by many States that it was not possible to reach consensus on a concluding document to that session. But we do not judge the session to have been a failure. As other speakers in this body have noted, the exchanges of views that took place, and the work carried out in attempting to achieve a consensus on the concluding document, point to a deepened understanding of the real issues involved in our mutual search for a more peaceful world. And realism in our work is never a bad idea.

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The United States remains committed to multilateral approaches to arms limitation and disarmament, where appropriate, as my presence here today testifies. At the same time, the United States is committed to making use of any approach - including bilateral and regional approaches - which it believes offers prospects for increasing security. I would note in this context the continuing encouraging implementation of the Stockholm agreement, with its mandatory on-site verification procedures for monitoring compliance of certain military activities, and the two sets of talks in Vienna aimed at reaching agreements on two autonomous negotiations that would deal with further CSBMs and conventional armaments, respectively, in Europe.

The field of arms limitation and disarmament is a large one. There are other issues of importance to this body, such as nuclear testing and outer space, that I have not taken up today in the interests of time. With regard to nuclear testing, Ambassador Friedersdorf summarized on 18 August the views of the United States regarding various approaches for achieving an effective, verifiable nuclear test ban. In addition, he provided this Conference with a preliminary report on the first phase of the joint verification experiment that took place on 17 August at the Nevada test site. With regard to outer space, the United States has not yet identified any additional practical outer space arms control measures that can be dealt with in a multilateral environment. However, we remain interested in and willing to continue examining issues associated with space arms control at the Conference on Disarmament.

In conclusion, let me repeat that I am honoured to have had the opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament. I follow your work with attention from Washington, and I wish the Conference every success in dealing with its agenda on multilateral issues.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his important statement, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Sang Ock Lee.

Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea): Allow me, first of all, to express my appreciation on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Korea for the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to invite the representative of the Republic of Korea to participate in the second part of its 1988 session and address plenary meetings of the Conference.

I should like to extend my heartfelt congratulations to you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the month of August. I also wish to take this opportunity to express my special thanks to Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference, and his staff for their devoted efforts to make all the necessary arrangements and thorough preparations for the Conference.

At the outset, I wish to make a few observations on the recently concluded third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The special session received particular attention and anticipation, as it was held against the background of positive developments in disarmament and signs of improvement in East-West relations. The

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United States and the Soviet Union signed and ratified the INF Treaty, the first agreement ever concluded for the elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons. Significant progress has also been registered in the negotiations here at the Conference on Disarmament towards the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons. It is especially encouraging to note that such positive developments reflect a broadening consensus in the international community that genuine world peace and security cannot be ensured through the arms race and the ever-growing accumulation of weapons.

The participation of more than 90 national leaders and over 200 non-governmental organizations at the session clearly showed the high hopes the international community placed in SSOD-III. There were candid exchanges of views on assessments of the current international situation and future directions for disarmament. A great number of countries put forward constructive and practical proposals for arms control and disarmament.

It is indeed regrettable that SSOD-III was unable to produce a concluding document, in spite of the strenuous efforts of many participants to work out a common approach towards the goal of lasting peace and security. However, my delegation does not view the special session as a failure. We believe the session was timely and useful, in that it helped to bring together different positions on disarmament held by various countries or groups of countries at the current stage, and to make clear the areas of convergence and divergence. Thus it should be regarded as a necessary part of a long process of multilateral disarmament negotiations.

The experience achieved at the session, though there were no tangible results, can serve as a solid foundation for charting a sound and realistic future course for arms control and disarmament efforts on the part of the international community. Based upon this, concerted and determined actions should be taken to find a universal approach to many matters in the field of disarmament, building upon and expanding the areas of convergence of views.

My delegation believes that one of the important areas where we can expect real achievements is the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime. We celebrated on 1 July the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The non-proliferation régime established by the NPT has been by and large successful in limiting the proliferation of nuclear arsenals among the non-nuclear States. Although it is open to the criticism that it could not do much about prevention of the nuclear arms race among the nuclear Powers, the strengthening of the régime will contribute to realizing overall nuclear disarmament. One of the main reasons for such candid optimism is that the régime is based upon exceptional international support, with more than 130 States parties to the NPT. The Republic of Korea has faithfully observed the provisions of the NPT since its accession in 1975, and will continue to honour its original commitment to non-proliferation. My delegation urges all those States which have not yet acceded to the NPT to do so at an early date.

This August also marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. The partial test-ban Treaty, together with the NPT, is viewed as one of the most important achievements in the history of multilateral

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disarmament negotiations. It has made a significant contribution to slowing down the nuclear arms race and checking the spread of nuclear weapons. However, it was unable to stop altogether the continued development of nuclear weapons both in quality and quantity. The destructive power of nuclear weapons is becoming increasingly devastating and their potential ever more dreadful. My delegation considers that the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons should be halted through the elaboration of a more thorough test-ban treaty, and nuclear disarmament based on a step-by-step approach. In this regard, we welcome the agreement in principle between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their strategic offensive arms by 50 per cent. We hope the negotiations under way between them will bring about positive results in the near future.

Nuclear disarmament is certainly of high importance to this Conference, but it is not the only concern. The international community is facing many other challenges such as the proliferation of chemical weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

We are happy to note that the Conference on Disarmament has made good progress in elaborating a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, although some more work still remains to be done before its conclusion.

The conclusion of a multilateral agreement on chemical weapons is a matter of top priority to the international community, particularly because these are weapons of mass destruction easy to manufacture at low cost. Every avenue should be explored so as to ensure the participation of all States with a capability to produce chemical weapons. Together they should work out effective means of on-site and challenge inspection. We hope that this Conference will come up with an effective and verifiable convention on chemical weapons at an early date. As we all know, giving the final touches to a few outstanding issues will be the most difficult yet important part.

While opinion is divided as to the concept of security, a common objective of States is national security. The principle of undiminished security for all States should be respected at multilateral disarmament negotiations. Disarmament measures should not be taken at the expense of the security concerns of independent States, nuclear or non-nuclear, strong or weak, large or small. In this regard, my delegation attaches particular importance to verification as a collateral measure for the success of disarmament efforts. Adequate and effective verification measures are a sine qua non for compliance with any agreements on arms control and disarmament.

We welcome and support the principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission at its first substantive session of 1988. It is our hope that the international community will further elaborate proper guidelines relating to verification which should meet the legitimate concerns of each State and embrace the requirements of each agreement.

In recent years, there has been renewed awareness of the importance of confidence-building measures for the enhancement of international peace and

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security. Support is increasing for greater openness, transparency and predictability in military matters, which I believe is conducive to the removal of obstacles to disarmament efforts, namely mistrust and fear. We should further promote constructive dialogue and develop confidence-building measures, so as to facilitate the creation of a more favourable environment for the attainment of the goal of general and complete disarmament.

Today, the world has entered an age of reconciliation and co-operation transcending ideologies and political systems. Many countries are adjusting themselves to meet demands for change and reform both internally and externally. Several perennial regional conflicts have lately shown signs of settlement.

For all these positive developments, the tense situation in the Korean peninsula remains unmitigated. Hostility and mistrust still prevail in the relations between the two parts of Korea, even now 35 years after the Korean War. No substantial contacts and exchanges are taking place between the two sides.

Under the circumstances, President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea enunciated a six-point set of policy guidelines for reconciliation and co-operation with North Korea in a special declaration of 7 July 1988. This new initiative was designed to bring to an end counter-productive diplomacy characterized by competition and confrontation between the South and the North, with a view to realizing lasting peace and unification on the Korean peninsula. We hope that this new policy, coupled with the world trend of reconciliation and co-operation, will provide fresh momentum to promote dialogue and negotiation between the two parts of Korea and to expedite eventual peaceful reunification.

I now wish to touch briefly upon the question of disarmament on the Korean peninsula. My Government is of the view that the primary requirement for disarmament negotiations between the two parts of Korea is the removal of deep-rooted mistrust and restoration of mutual confidence. The importance of confidence-building was stressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea in his address to the third special session on 10 June. Taking into account the reality of inter-Korean relations and the complexity of factors involved in disarmament, he put forward a three-stage approach towards disarmament on the Korean peninsula as follows. Firstly, the two sides should build mutual confidence through a resumption of dialogue and expansion of contacts. Secondly, a non-aggression pact should be concluded as an institutional arrangement for preventing the recurrence of hostilities. Lastly, the two sides should enter into negotiations on concrete measures to achieve the goals of disarmament on the peninsula.

When mutual confidence is restored between the South and the North and the necessary institutional arrangements for security have been made, the two sides will be able to take more concrete steps to negotiate disarmament such as exchanges of military information and the holding of meetings of military experts. At the same time, both sides will consider the establishment of a direct communication link between the military authorities and arrangements for advance notification of major military activities and observation of large-scale military training exercises. These measures will enhance the

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scope for the two sides to produce substantive results at the disarmament negotiating table by giving each of them a clearer picture of the pattern of the other side's military activities and thus allowing them to detect anomalies more easily and quickly.

In view of the difficulty in reaching consensus in multilateral disarmament efforts, as shown at SSOD-III, the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum in the field of arms control and disarmament, assumes more significance and greater responsibility than ever in formulating future directions for arms control and disarmament. In closing, I wish to reaffirm my Government's firm support for multilateral disarmament efforts, particularly in the framework of the United Nations. We are very happy to participate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Our co-operation will not be spared to assist the Conference in discharging its important task.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement, and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Kostov.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): At the very outset, I would like to welcome in our midst our new colleagues, Ambassador Varga of Hungary and Ambassador Aung Thant of Burma. I wish them much success in the Conference's activities. It is a pleasure for me to assure them of my eagerness to continue the existing co-operation between our delegations.

During recent plenary meetings most of the speakers have paid special - I might even say exceptional - attention to the negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. That is quite natural. The end of the summer session is at hand; that calls for an assessment of one more annual session of the Conference, whose work has concentrated to a great degree on the negotiations for a chemical weapons ban. That is why my delegation would like to set out its attitude by dwelling upon some major problems of these negotiations.

As a whole the negotiations have proceeded in a favourable political climate. No one questions the need to finalize the convention as soon as possible. This was made explicitly clear in the statements of all foreign ministers who spoke in the Conference during its spring session. The joint Soviet-United States summit statement in Moscow confirmed "the importance of efforts to address, as a matter of continuing urgency, the unique challenges of a chemical weapons ban and to achieve an effective convention". A wide consensus was reached at the third special session that the elaboration of a convention on a chemical weapons ban is a particularly important and urgent task for the Conference on Disarmament. The Warsaw communiqué of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty again pointed out that one of the priority goals in the field of disarmament is to conclude a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction.

The urgent character of the task of eliminating for ever a whole category of weapons of mass destruction which were considered almost extinct after the First World War is being reinforced by their use and the danger of their

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proliferation. The evidence produced by the United Nations on the increased use of poison gas in the latter stages of the Gulf war imparts a new sense of urgency to the matter. This should harden the resolve of the member States of the Conference on Disarmament to do all they can to ensure the earliest possible completion of the years-long negotiations. Maybe those who argue that if the ban is not enforced soon "the chemical cat will be out of the bag" are right.

Has the favourable political atmosphere one may ask, been translated into concrete results in the negotiations? It is hardly possible to give a simple answer to this question, since ups and downs have continued to characterize the pace of the Conference's negotiations. First and foremost, we would like to note that the Chairman of the ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, has made and is making great efforts to speed up the pace of the negotiations. In this respect he has been energetically supported by the chairmen of the working groups, Comrade Cima (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Macedo (Mexico) and Mr. Numata (Japan). We are very grateful to Ambassador Sujka and the three chairmen of the working groups for their dedication and contributions.

Among the unresolved problems in the negotiations, the issue of the non-production of chemical weapons in civil chemical industry looms large. The goal of the negotiations is clear - to establish a régime which, on the one hand, would guarantee the non-production of chemical weapons in civil chemical industry and, on the other, would not be an obstacle to the development and production of chemical products for peaceful purposes. The achievement of this goal, however, is a complex and difficult task. This is so because there is a need to elaborate and agree upon provisions which take into account different but justified requirements, first, to treat two types of property - State and private - on an equal footing; second, to take into account the special features of production not only in large industrial complexes, but also in medium-sized and small enterprises; third, to establish a verification régime that is both effective and financially reasonable; and fourth, to guarantee the confidentiality of information. The complexity of the task precludes by definition any maximalism and requires a great deal of effort to find a common denominator to achieve a solution which would inspire confidence in both the viability and the effectiveness of the convention.

My delegation supports all steps aimed at accelerating the settlement of problems related to the elaboration of article VI. In our opinion the meetings with representatives of civil chemical industry were a useful initiative. It is in the interest of the negotiations that such meetings should continue during the spring and summer parts of the Conference's session in 1989.

My delegation welcomes the Soviet proposal for holding an international experiment in civil chemical industry. We hope that this experiment will make a useful contribution to the elaboration of the verification régime's provisions for the non-production of chemical weapons in civil chemical industry. We would like to note with satisfaction that the preparations for the experiment have entered a practical phase.

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As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, His Excellency Mr. P. Mladenov, stated on 14 April at the Conference, my country's chemical industry does not produce any of the key precursors for chemical weapons included in schedule [2]. For this reason we will probably not have installations subject to routine international verification. Nevertheless, we are interested in the experiment's results. We hope that the information to be presented after the experiment will help in working out the provisions for ad hoc checks in which the protagonist will be the technical secretariat. In the future an international experiment on this type of verification may also be carried out.

We are encouraged by the progress in the elaboration of the provisions on challenge inspection, namely the procedure for appointing international inspectors and the activities of the Executive Council after receiving the verification report. We think that the implementation of this type of verification must aim at promoting better compliance with the convention. At all events, it should not create conditions for a confrontation that may lead to adverse consequences.

To a certain degree the question of the order of destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities remains an untied knot in the negotiations. All countries are interested in guarantees for their national security. That is why every country ought to be fully confident that the convention will not permit a situation where the security of any country or group of countries might be diminished.

If it is agreed that there is a need to level out chemical weapon stockpiles towards the end of the eighth year after the convention's entry into force, then it would be absolutely logical also that the process of destruction should proceed in compliance with an approved schedule under strict international control.

My delegation shares the view expressed by Ambassador Marchand of Canada that in developing the agreed régime for the phased destruction of chemical weapons "one of the primary concerns is to ensure that this process does not cause any diminution of ... national security ... during the very sensitive 10-year destruction phase". Hence it is not possible to regard as constructive proposals which, to quote my Canadian colleague again, "have the net effect of permitting the production and proliferation of chemical weapons during this crucial phase".

We are pleased that, in an attempt to finalize work on article V, it has been agreed that the joint Soviet-United States proposal on chemical weapon production facilities should be included in the "rolling text" of the convention.

We are concerned about the lack of tangible progress in working out article X. In our view the rendering of assistance to a member State in the event of a chemical weapons threat or the use of chemical weapons against it should be derived from the principle of undiminished security. Besides, it is necessary to think about the universality of the convention. It is logical to expect that the convention will be more attractive, both in political and legal terms, if it contains provisions for rendering assistance to every State party in the event of a chemical weapon threat or the use of such weapons against it.

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The proposal of the Soviet delegation made by Ambassador Y. Nazarkin on 11 August of this year, for the working out of collective measures among the States parties to the convention in order to resist the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, is very timely. We consider that it would be advisable to think about the elaboration of measures both of a technical and of a political nature.

In principle everyone shares the view that the convention should not harm the legitimate interests of the States parties in developing their civil chemical industries. We were puzzled at the difficulties which emerged in the process of elaboration of the provisions for widening economic, scientific and technical co-operation in the production and consumption of chemicals for peaceful purposes. Bulgaria is interested in taking part in such co-operation on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Therefore, we are encouraged by the progress achieved in Group A.

It is high time for the negotiations to become more intensive and purposeful on certain political and financial aspects of the convention. It is true that the problems related to the composition of the Executive Council and the setting up and functioning of the bodies which will be entrusted with the implementation of the convention are not without analogy in international relations. But it is also true that they are so specific in nature as to preclude borrowing in a mechanical way from past and existing experience.

We note with satisfaction that the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, has given impetus to the work on the final provisions of the convention. We think that the revised document presented by him for discussion is a good basis for our future work; it creates preconditions for making progress in the elaboration of articles XII to XVI - provisions which are important for the viability and effectiveness of the convention.

In our view it is desirable for efforts to finalize the convention to be supported by practical steps which would facilitate its signature and entry into force. We welcome with satisfaction the statements made by the delegations of Australia and Austria concerning the placing of controls on production of and trade in a certain category of chemicals. In this connection I would like to remind the Conference of the fact that on 30 December 1986 my Government approved a decree setting out restrictions on the export of dual-purpose chemicals.

In our assessment the summer session will make progress in solving some problems of the negotiations. But should we be satisfied with the pace of the negotiations? We are not inclined to give an affirmative answer to this question. My delegation supports the view that advantage should be taken of the inter-sessional period as much as possible to continue the negotiations. It is advisable for us to use in the most rational manner the time from November, i.e. after the completion of the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly, until the end of January 1989. Obviously this goal will be easier to achieve if we succeed in determining the issues on which the negotiations should concentrate during the inter-sessional period. It is necessary to do everything possible so that in 1989 the Conference will overcome the last obstacles blocking the way to finalizing a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation is ready to take part actively in this process.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Two other representatives have asked for the floor. They are the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I first give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): My delegation would like to take this opportunity to thank you very warmly for your successful work as President of the Conference in the month of August. Your dedicated work and diplomatic skill deserve high appreciation. They also reflect the constructive role your country plays in efforts to enhance international and regional security. At the same time, we would like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Teja, for his leadership in July, and wish him all the best in the future.

Yesterday, many of us returned from a remarkable trip to the Soviet Union. We had the opportunity to observe the destruction of SS-20 missiles on the spot. On behalf of the participants from the Group of Socialist Countries, I should like to request Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin to convey our sincere thanks to his Government and to the many military and civilian assistants who provided such excellent conditions for our stay.

We saw the INF Treaty going into action, and witnessed a fascinating weapons explosion for peace. There will be many more explosions of this kind. Seen from the political, military and technological viewpoint, it has become possible to do away with the most dangerous means of mass destruction, step by step. For the first time in history modern weapons systems were destroyed voluntarily in the presence of inspectors from the other side and representatives of the United Nations, the Geneva Disarmament Conference and the press. Not long ago, this was rather a nice dream.

After this event, increased attention will focus on follow-up steps to eliminate all nuclear weapons. As to the agreement on cutting by half the strategic arsenals of the USSR and the United States, work is going on. What is called for is that further "zero options" should follow in other fields without any offsetting of the weapons scrapped.

The destruction of SS-20 missiles which we witnessed also carries a message for our Conference. It calls upon all of us to make all-out efforts to agree on and tackle together multilateral tasks in the areas of cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The example of the INF Treaty constitutes a great encouragement to speeding up the elaboration of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Where there's a will there's a way.

We wish to thank our Soviet friends also for the opportunity to visit the memorials in the heroic town Volgograd. Here the Fascist conquerors were halted and a turn was forced in the Second World War that claimed many victims. Every one of us felt the intrinsic relationship between the history of this town and the event at the place of destruction of the SS-20 missiles. What needs to be done is to ensure peace for ourselves and succeeding generations through disarmament, growing international security and peaceful co-operation among all States and peoples. This is also the purpose of our Conference work here in Geneva.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): My brief statement will be made up of two parts. In connection with the declaration by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Burns, concerning the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar station in the Soviet Union, I should like to say the following. It is well known that the Krasnoyarsk radar station is a station for tracking space objects, and its use is not prohibited under the ABM Treaty. At the same time, in a spirit of good will, the Soviet Union has indicated its willingness to dismantle the equipment in the Krasnoyarsk facility should an agreement be reached on compliance for an agreed period with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972.

The second portion of my statement relates to a different subject. I should like to express my gratitude to the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose, and the delegations on whose behalf he spoke, for his very positive assessment of the Soviet Union's initiative in organizing a trip to witness the destruction of missiles in accordance with the INF Treaty. I should also like to express my gratitude to those participants in the visit who personally expressed their appreciation to the Soviet side for having organized the visit. The Soviet delegation will convey their assessment of the demonstration to Moscow.

Many participants in the visit have also approached me to ask how many States sent representatives. I think it would be useful to provide the following statistics. Representatives of 40 States, not counting the Soviet Union, of course, participated in the visit, including representatives from 32 member countries of the Conference on Disarmament and 15 countries which have been invited to speak before the Conference on Disarmament. Also present were the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Komatina, who at the same time represented the United Nations Secretary-General, and the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Berasategui. The total number of participants from the Conference on Disarmament was 64. There were also a few Security Council delegates or their representatives, and a large group of journalists.

I think that this demonstration, in which we saw with our own eyes the practical implementation of the Soviet-American INF Treaty, will stimulate the work of the Conference on Disarmament. In point of fact, we witnessed the birth of an era free of nuclear weapons. I hope the time will come when we will witness steps to implement multilateral disarmament agreements, too, in the area of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I give the floor to Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): This week, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency released an issue brief entitled "Soviet violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty: The Krasnoyarsk radar". I would like to read from that United States declaration to the Conference if I might.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

"The ABM Treaty - The United States and the Soviet Union signed the ABM Treaty in 1972, and later signed a Protocol to the treaty which entered into force in 1976. Together, the treaty and Protocol ban deployment of ABM systems, except that each Party is permitted to deploy one ABM system around its national capital area or, alternatively, at a single intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) deployment area. A major objective of the ABM Treaty is to prevent the deployment of an ABM territorial defense. The treaty places limits on ABM systems, including ABM radars, and constrains radars for early warning of ballistic missile attack which could, depending on their location, orientation, and capability, contribute to an ABM defense.

"The Krasnoyarsk Radar - For several years now, the United States has had serious concerns about Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty. In particular, the construction of a large-phased array radar (LPAR) near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, because of its location and orientation, constitutes a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty. According to the ABM Treaty, the only permitted functions for a large, phased-array radar with a location and orientation such as that of the Krasnoyarsk radar would be space-tracking and national technical means of verification (NTM).

"Based on conclusive evidence, however, we judge that the Krasnoyarsk radar is primarily designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking, not for space-tracking and NTM as the Soviets claim. Moreover, the coverage of the Krasnoyarsk radar closes a major gap in the coverage of the Soviet ballistic missile detection, warning, and tracking screen. Its location allows it to provide warning of a ballistic missile attack, to acquire attack characterization data that will enable Soviet strategic forces to respond in a timely manner and that could aid in planning the battle for Soviet defensive forces.

"The construction of an LPAR such as the one near Krasnoyarsk is especially important because such radars have always been considered to be the long lead-time element of a possible territorial defense. The Krasnoyarsk radar together with other Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities raise the possibility that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

"Since July of 1983, the United States has raised its concerns about the Krasnoyarsk radar with the Soviet Government. Although the Soviet Government has sought to convey the impression that it is addressing these concerns, it has not taken the necessary actions to resolve them. In October 1987, General Secretary Gorbachev told Secretary of State Shultz that he was imposing a one-year construction moratorium on Krasnoyarsk. Soviet officials have, from time to time, offered to take action with respect to the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar, but only in exchange for U.S. concessions. Neither of these proposals is acceptable: the Soviet obligation to abide by the terms of the ABM Treaty is not open to compromise or conditions. The way to resolve this issue is for the Krasnoyarsk radar to be dismantled without delay or preconditions.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

"The ABM Treaty Review - On August 24, the United States and U.S.S.R. began the third five-year review of the ABM Treaty. Under the treaty, these periodic reviews are required to give each side an opportunity to discuss the overall working of the treaty and any concerns related to it. The main U.S. concern are Soviet violations of the treaty, especially the Krasnoyarsk radar. Our primary objective at the review, therefore, will be to press the Soviets to correct their violations. We will make it clear to the Soviet Union that the existence of the Krasnoyarsk radar calls into question the continued viability of the ABM Treaty. Unless the Krasnoyarsk violation is resolved, the United States will be forced to consider the exercise of its rights under international law to take appropriate and proportionate responses. In this context, the United States will also have to consider whether to declare the Krasnoyarsk radar to be a material breach of the ABM Treaty.

"The president has directed the Department of Defense, working with other concerned agencies and the Congress to develop a range of appropriate and proportionate responses in case the Soviet Union continues to refuse to correct the Krasnoyarsk violation. After hearing what the Soviets have to say at the five-year review, the president will consult with the Congress and our Allies concerning next steps."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I give the floor to Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): In connection with the statement which has just been read out by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf, I should like to recall that matters related to compliance with the ABM Treaty are considered within the framework of a Standing Consultative Commission on a bilateral basis. Within the Commission the Soviet side has already presented the American side with the necessary clarifications concerning the latter's suspicions in connection with the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar station.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Nazarkin for his statement. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

As agreed at our last plenary meeting, I now intend to put before the Conference for adoption the recommendation contained in paragraph 10 of the progress report on the twenty-sixth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CD/853). The Group suggests that its next session should be convened from 6 to 17 March 1989. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the recommendation contained in paragraph 10 of the progress report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances has asked me to announce that informal consultations among the members of the Committee will take place immediately following the adjournment of this plenary meeting in room A.206.

(The President)

As we all know, Ambassador Douglas Roche of Canada is in Geneva consulting with members of the Conference on preparation for the work of the forthcoming session of the First Committee of the General Assembly. I understand that members have already been informed about consultations being held with various groups. In that connection, I should simply like to recall that there will be a meeting in this conference room tomorrow at 4 p.m. with the members of the Conference.

I also wish to inform members that the secretariat is proceeding today with the circulation of various sections of the draft annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The English text of the technical parts will be available this afternoon, and the various languages will follow immediately, on Thursday, in some cases possibly on Wednesday afternoon. The technical parts will be contained in document CD/WP.348. The documents listed in CD/WP.348 include all those issued up to and including CD/863. Draft substantive paragraphs will also be available in connection with agenda items 1, 2 and 7 in documents CD/WP.349, CD/WP.350 and CD/WP.351. Here, too, the English versions will be available today, with the other languages following on Thursday. The timetable of meetings to be held next week, which we shall adopt at our plenary meeting next Thursday, will make provision for meetings devoted to consideration of those documents.

As today's meeting is the last plenary meeting for the month of August, allow me to make a brief closing statement at the end of my presidency. As we know, most of us have just returned from witnessing a demonstration of the elimination of Soviet missiles, one important aspect in the implementation of the INF Treaty. I would like, therefore, to request our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Nazarkin, to convey our gratitude once more to the Soviet Government for having given us the opportunity of witnessing the demolition demonstration, as well as the impeccable organization of our visit, the courtesy extended to us and their unflinching kindness.

As distinguished representatives are aware, I have had consultations during the month of August with various co-ordinators from each group and Ambassador Fan of China, to consider organizational arrangements relating to items 1, 2, 3 and 7. Two rounds of informal meetings of the plenary were held to consider the valuable contribution submitted by the Group of Seven concerning the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament and the expansion of its membership. In addition, a round of consultations were held with the co-ordinators from the three groups and Ambassador Fan concerning the Conference's report to the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly. There was also another consultation with the chairmen of the various committees concerning the submission of their reports to the Conference. I consider those consultations and meetings to be very useful, and the new ideas and inputs which emerged from them could be used in our future work.

I also wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express my gratitude to all delegations for their support and understanding which has certainly lighted my path as President for the month of August. My thanks also go to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, as well as other members of the secretariat, the interpreters, the translators and the conference officers,

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for their valuable assistance in efforts to ensure the meetings run smoothly. May I also wish my successor, Ambassador Ardakani of Iran, all the best and pledge my delegation's full support to him. Once again, thank you very much.

Since there is no other business for today, I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. Before doing so, however, I wish to announce that the members of the Group of 21 are requested to remain in this room following the termination of the plenary, for a meeting to discuss urgent issues pertaining to outer space.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 1 September at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.479
1 September 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 1 September 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Ali-Akbar Velayati, (Islamic Republic of Iran)

later: Mr. Ali Shams Ardakani (Islamic Republic of Iran)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 479th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As the Islamic Republic of Iran assumes the presidency for the month of September and the inter-sessional period until the opening of the 1989 session, I have decided to open personally the first plenary meeting of this month. My country has always recognized the importance of the work carried out by the Conference on Disarmament and, for this reason, I am here today in my capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Chair of the Conference.

In my capacity as presiding officer, I should first like to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference, to Her Excellency the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mrs. Helga Hernes, and to His Excellency the Under-Secretary-General for Multilateral and Special Political Affairs of Brazil, Mr. Bernardo Pericás, who will be addressing the Conference today.

On behalf of the Conference, I also wish to extend our thanks to Ambassador Wisber Loeis of Indonesia for the very efficient manner in which he conducted the work of this body during the month of August. He has displayed his well-known diplomatic competence in dealing with a number of questions before the Conference.

In accordance with existing practice, I would like now to deliver an opening statement in my capacity as representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is presiding over the work of the Conference on Disarmament at a momentous time when significant developments in the international arena are being shaped. The Council Chamber in which the Conference normally meets is now being utilized for talks on the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 598 with the objective of bringing about a just, permanent and durable peace for Iran and Iraq and for the whole region. This is a symbolic manifestation of links existing between international peace and security on the one hand and disarmament on the other.

On this occasion, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Seyed Ali Khamenei, in a message to the Conference, has expressed his wish for the success of our work in making important decisions for the sake of humanity; decisions which can guarantee international peace and security and prevent the rampant arms race. The message concludes by saying "I hope that members of this august body will be able to take steps towards the realization of the lofty goals of the Conference for a safer world by adopting collective measures for genuine disarmament".

The halting of the arms race and the implementation of disarmament measures have meaning only when they are contemplated within the framework of guaranteeing the security of States collectively. One of the most basic problems underlying the arms race has been the ineffective implementation and use of the system of collective security envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. In the absence of an effective guarantee for the security of nations, they continue to seek security through military build-up and the self-perpetuating quagmire of the arms race. It has been proved that pursuing

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such a path has not been able to guarantee authentic security for a single nation or group of countries. The arms race today has become a vicious circle, dissipating the world's economic resources and recognizing no limit for itself. Although the grim future of the arms race is known to all, nevertheless, owing to the absence of any reliable international system or organization capable of checking aggression effectively, this race has become the Hobson's choice of every individual nation. The military build-up and soaring expenditure are not directly linked with the economic might of nations. Rather, the risk of aggression in one region on the one hand, and aggressive policies pursued by others on the other, have been the most instrumental factors in this trend.

The peoples of the world must be assured that if their security is threatened, the international community will come to their assistance. One of the most essential and effective methods of giving such an assurance is full respect for the binding rules of international law or jus cogens manifested in the Charter of the United Nations and crystallized in internationally recognized norms of law such as conventions. It is unfortunate that these rules have been violated in this decade in such a way that the hopes of peoples have almost been dashed. One of the very basic duties towards the cause of disarmament is to restore the hopes of nations in these international rules and regulations through confidence-building measures.

It is sad to see that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 has been violated with impunity so intensely and indiscriminately. It is a very dangerous trend that weapons of mass destruction such as chemical weapons are gradually being treated as normal, and that international reaction to reports of their repeated use, substantiated by various United Nations investigating teams, has been rather acquiescent. If the use of such weapons becomes a routine and effective way of pursuing military objectives, then curbing it will be almost impossible in the future. It is an urgent task of this Conference, as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, to put the final touches to the instrument being negotiated on a comprehensive, total and globally verifiable convention banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Achievements so far have been noteworthy, and the international community is keenly awaiting the early conclusion of this convention. In this respect, the reports of the investigating teams, and particularly Security Council resolutions 612 and 620, will facilitate our work in finalizing the convention.

The outcome of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was disheartening. There was a unique opportunity for the world community to articulate and adopt a multilateral programme of disarmament. Had there not been a lack of political will on the part of a handful of countries, consensus would have been achieved. We have to bear in mind that multilateral and bilateral parleys on disarmament are complementary and mutually supportive. Without one the other will be ineffective at best.

As we are all potential victims of a nuclear catastrophe, the Conference should give life to discussions and negotiations on the first three items of the agenda, dealing with nuclear issues. The nuclear arms race is a moral and spiritual tragedy. For over 40 years, various attempts have been made to justify it with different rationales. This is an effort to explain the

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inexplicable, defend the indefensible and justify the insane. The existence of nuclear weapons, let alone the threat to use them, is morally unacceptable under any circumstances. There can be no zone or region on Earth that is free from the threat of nuclear annihilation so long as these instruments of genocide are allowed to be developed, perfected and deployed. The INF agreement between the two super-Powers is a move in the right direction, provided that it is followed with concrete and tangible measures to cut nuclear arsenals drastically while at the same time not seeking to redress the balance in other areas. There are now no serious verification obstacles to a comprehensive nuclear test ban. It is a step which is not only technically feasible and politically feasible; it is also long overdue.

Outer space is the common heritage of mankind, and we support efforts to limit the potential for conflict in space, the exploration and exploitation of which is now being pursued by an increasing number of nations. It is essential that we reach agreements that will effectively prevent the weaponization of space and ensure the continuation of an "open skies" régime. The existing legal régime is not sufficient, and the Conference on Disarmament should speed up its efforts to consolidate, reinforce and complete it. Activities in the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out in accordance with international law including the Charter of the United Nations. The ultimate goal of the Conference on Disarmament should be the complete prohibition of the development, testing, production and deployment of space weapons. Until that is achieved, a most urgent partial measure could be a ban on anti-satellite weapons.

The Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons should continue its work on two issues under consideration. It is in the interest of all States to ban attacks on nuclear facilities, since they would lead to mass destruction with grave consequences. The ban on the hostile and clandestine dumping of nuclear waste should also receive due attention in the Committee.

The Conference on Disarmament is entrusted with the weighty responsibility of helping to save future generations from the scourge of war. This is a matter of great significance for all of us, and therefore issues before this Conference must be dealt with conviction and devotion to this cause. I pray to the Almighty to bless you all with success in discharging this valuable duty.

That concludes my opening statement. As Ambassador Nasser, our Permanent Representative in Geneva, is, as you are aware, fully engaged in the current negotiations with the Secretary-General on resolution 598, my senior adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Ambassador Ali Shams Ardakani, will preside over the work of the Conference during this month of September. I now invite Ambassador Ardakani to take this seat as President of the Conference on Disarmament for September.

Mr. Ardakani (Islamic Republic of Iran) took the Chair.

The PRESIDENT: The Conference continues today, in accordance with its programme of work, consideration of agenda item 8, "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". In conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however,

(The President)

any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Norway and Brazil, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons and the representative of Argentina. I give the floor to the first speaker for today, the representative of Norway, Her Excellency Mrs. Helga Hernes, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway.

Ms. HERNES (Norway): I would like to begin by congratulating you as the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran on your assumption today of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of September. I am pleased that you are assuming this high office at a time when developments in your part of the world are progressing in a favourable manner. I listened with great attention to the important statement given by your Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Ali-Akbar Velayati.

This session of the Conference on Disarmament is taking place in the wake of the third special session devoted to disarmament. My country remains convinced that the process of multilateral disarmament has to be pursued as an integral part of the disarmament process as a whole. In this context, we should not overlook the fact that the special session did bring about constructive discussion and even the narrowing down of different views. Looking back at the third special session, I believe that its outcome confirms the role played by the Conference on Disarmament in promoting the multilateral disarmament process at a time when progress is being achieved in the bilateral negotiations.

When the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, addressed this forum on 15 March, he presented the publication "Contributions by Norway to the Conference on Disarmament 1982-1987" (document CD/813 of 7 March 1988). Today, I have the honour to introduce two new documents which represent an additional Norwegian contribution to this important forum. They relate to various areas of the chemical weapons convention and a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

A comprehensive, global and effective ban on chemical weapons is a priority issue in the Conference on Disarmament. This important objective is now within reach. It is necessary to sustain the current momentum in the negotiations with a view to concluding the chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date. No effort should be spared to eliminate this category of weapons of mass destruction. I should like to pay tribute to the Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1988, Ambassador Sujka of Poland. He also ably guided this subsidiary body six years ago, at which time he initiated work on a number of important areas of the convention. Significant progress has been made since then. Nevertheless, we have to recognize that there are still a number of sensitive political issues and complicated technical problems to be resolved.

The convention involves verifying the elimination of stockpiles and production facilities over a 10-year period, as well as monitoring the chemical industry on a permanent basis. Never before has a multilateral treaty of such broad scope, which provides for such comprehensive verification systems, been concluded. The chemical weapons convention will therefore have an important bearing on future multilateral disarmament agreements.

(Ms. Hernes, Norway)

Non-production is one of the major outstanding issues. The discussions during the meeting of industrial experts in July have, however, clarified certain aspects of this question. Moreover, the Soviet proposal for trial inspections of chemical industry facilities, which is being followed up in the Committee on Chemical Weapons, may facilitate a further convergence of views.

So far, only the United States and the Soviet Union have declared that they possess chemical weapons. The other countries which have stocks of such weapons should follow suit. As the two countries possessing the world's largest stocks of chemical weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union have, however, a special responsibility for implementing a ban on chemical weapons. I am therefore pleased to note that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed at their meeting in Moscow the importance of efforts to address, as a matter of continuing urgency, the unique challenges of a chemical weapons ban and to achieve an effective convention.

The multilateral negotiating process has already been facilitated by the bilateral talks, most recently in the area of destruction of production facilities for chemical weapons. In this context, I also welcome the declaration made by the United States on 28 July concerning the location of its five chemical weapons production facilities.

All participating States in the Conference on Disarmament should make vigorous efforts towards the conclusion of a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention. At this stage in the negotiations there is in fact a need for a multilateral exchange of data relevant to the convention.

I can assure you that Norway, which has no chemical weapons, will continue its active role in the work towards a convention banning these insidious weapons. My country strongly condemns any use of chemical weapons in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Recent reports on the use of chemical weapons underline the necessity of ridding the world of these abhorrent weapons once and for all.

In 1981 Norway initiated a research programme on verification of the chemical weapons convention. The programme, which is being carried out by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, is concerned in particular with verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons. The objective of the Norwegian research programme is twofold. First of all, the task has been to develop concrete, practical procedures for verifying the alleged use of chemical weapons which can be applied on a year-round basis and which will cover all the phases of such an investigation. Secondly, field exercises and analytical work have aimed at providing a sound and realistic data base, which will facilitate implementation of the convention once it is in force.

Whereas our previous research has been concentrated on verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons in winter conditions, the exercises in 1987-1988 were undertaken in summer conditions. The main conclusions from this research are contained in document CD/861, which I take pleasure in introducing at this meeting.

(Ms. Hernes, Norway)

As stated in document CD/861, it is of interest in the context of the chemical weapons convention that the nerve agents sarin, soman, tabun and VX, as well as the blister agent mustard gas, can be verified in samples from water, grass, sand or soil after two weeks' exposure to summer conditions. The results have also proved that the procedures developed for winter conditions can be directly applied in summer conditions. The tests have further confirmed the validity of the proposed procedures for verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons, which Canada and Norway presented in document CD/766 of 2 July 1987, and to which the existing "rolling text" refers. Finally, the conclusions point to the necessity of improving the technical aspects of analytical methods in the light of rapid technical and scientific developments.

We believe that work of this nature is useful in connection with the ongoing discussions in the Committee on Chemical Weapons on the conduct of challenge inspections and relevant guidelines on the international inspectorate. In addition, several elements of the elaborated procedures can be used in the verification of other parts of the convention, such as destruction of stocks, etc. Therefore, I am pleased to inform you that the Norwegian research programme will continue with a view to contributing to an effective convention.

A nuclear test ban is one of the most important items on the agenda of this Conference. A test ban must prohibit both nuclear weapon tests and peaceful nuclear explosions, as the latter inevitably provide information of military relevance. My Government welcomes the first joint United States-Soviet verification experiment, which was conducted at the United States test site in Nevada on 17 August. We hope that this experiment and the one which is to take place in two weeks' time at the Soviet test site near Semipalatinsk will pave the way for early ratification of the two threshold treaties of 1974 and 1976.

A global seismological network should constitute the essential part of the verification system for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This underlines the significance of the work being done by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts on the large-scale global experiment in the exchange and processing of seismic data, and on the concepts of a modern international seismic data exchange system. This year marks the 20th anniversary of the agreement between the United States and Norway on seismic array research. This research co-operation has produced results with a far-reaching impact in the field of seismological verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This began with the establishment of the large-aperture Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) in 1968-1970. Another important step was the opening in 1985 of the advanced, small-aperture NORESS array in southern Norway, and a companion array, ARCESS, deployed in the Arctic region in Finnmark, northern Norway, in 1987.

Today I have the honour to present to this Conference document CD/862 on the establishment of a global seismic network incorporating small-aperture arrays. The document describes the initial findings from the ARCESS array, and addresses the importance of experience with NORESS and ARCESS in the work currently being conducted by the Group of Scientific Experts.

(Ms. Hernes, Norway)

In 1986 Norway proposed that the global seismological network should, as far as practicable, incorporate small-aperture seismic arrays, using the NORESS concept as a basis for standardization (document CD/714 of 14 July 1986). The initial findings from the new ARCESS array reinforce the arguments used as a basis for that proposal.

Norway will continue to attach importance to research efforts aimed at further exploiting the potential of seismic arrays in a future global network. The overall goal of this research will be to contribute to designing and testing a global system. When set up, it will be in the unique position of being capable of providing data for rapid and reliable detection, location and identification of seismic events all over the world. Such a system would be of crucial value in instilling confidence among all States that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is adhered to.

In my statement at the third special session devoted to disarmament, I had the honour to confirm the commitment of the Norwegian Government to making the three seismic installations in Norway - NORSAR, NORESS and ARCESS - available as stations in a global seismological network. These stations, which are among the most modern in the world, provide excellent seismic coverage for a large part of the northern hemisphere as well as parts of the southern hemisphere.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban would contribute to the promotion of both vertical and horizontal non-proliferation efforts. This year marks the 20th anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In our view, the Treaty remains the most important multilateral arms control agreement concluded so far. The Treaty has made a significant contribution to international stability and security. My country attaches fundamental importance to the fourth review conference, which will take place in 1990.

Before concluding I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my appreciation, through you, Mr. President, to the delegation of the Soviet Union for also inviting a representative of Norway to the demonstration of the elimination of three SS-20 missiles at the Kapustin Yar test range on 28 August. This demonstration was a manifestation of the significance of the INF Treaty, and my Government is highly appreciative to the two Powers who brought this Treaty about.

I have confined myself to addressing two of the items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Norway, which is the endorsed candidate of the western Group for membership of the Conference, takes part in the work of all the subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament. I can assure you that we shall continue our active participation in the important efforts of this Conference to promote the multilateral disarmament process.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Norway for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, His Excellency the Under-Secretary-General for Multilateral and Special Political Affairs, Mr. Bernardo Pericás.

Mr. PERICAS (Brazil): Mr. President, please accept the best wishes of the delegation of Brazil for the success of your work, and the assurance of our fullest co-operation. We listened with great interest to the statement made by the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. On behalf of the Brazilian delegation, I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia for the excellent work he accomplished as President of the Conference for the month of August.

The Brazilian Government attaches high priority to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, and firmly believes that the negotiating mandate given to it by the United Nations should be fully explored. The preservation and strengthening of this forum is essential to the international community, especially for the vast majority of sovereign States which, regardless of their military power, cannot renounce the right to have a voice on an equitable and democratic basis on questions related to their own survival.

Brazil is very conscious and proud of the contributions it has made by words and deeds to the cause of peace and disarmament. The record of this Conference and of its predecessor bodies shows that - together with other members of the neutral and non-aligned group - we have always been at the forefront of efforts to reduce the threat of war and international tensions, by presenting creative and realistic proposals, some of which eventually found expression in major international treaties, such as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the partial test-ban Treaty.

As the Conference on Disarmament enters the last month of formal plenary meetings in its 1988 session, Brazil feels this is an appropriate occasion to take stock of the situation in the field of disarmament and international security. 1988 has been a very significant year in international relations. Its main feature up to now appears to be the advances that have been made towards the solution of some of the major regional crises in the world.

The progress made regarding the question of Afghanistan, the negotiations between Iran and Iraq - which are taking place in this same building - and the quadripartite talks under way on the situation in southern Africa, including the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), are bright examples of the possibilities for peaceful solution of conflicts and a demonstration that there is no real substitute for peace and justice. Although the successes attained in the area of regional conflicts have spurred new manifestations of faith in the virtues of multilateralism, although the international community was quickly asked to give its endorsement and support to the agreements that have so far been reached, this renewal of trust in the United Nations has not extended to other fundamental areas of activity of the Organization.

Last June the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament took place. Preceded as it was by a significant agreement between the two super-Powers on intermediate nuclear forces, the third SSOD could have benefited from the improved climate to make real progress on the road to disarmament. The international community has, of course, ample reason not to be happy with the lack of consensus at the end of the third SSOD, but it has no grounds either to be severely discouraged or, even less, to feel defeated.

(Mr. Pericás, Brazil)

The same resistance and obstruction that have so far prevented the implementation of the Programme of Action adopted in 1978 would not evaporate even if a new consensual concluding document to complement it had been adopted. The important process of change that is under way on the international scene induced us, perhaps, to a certain degree of over-expectancy, as some of us were persuaded that if multilateralism cannot work when the super-Powers disagree, the converse would automatically be true. Unhappily, the logic of political thinking has once more surprised us. Starting from the same facts - the progress in the dialogue between the super-Powers and in their bilateral negotiations - others came to different conclusions; namely that bilateralism was the correct approach to most items on the disarmament agenda and that multilateralism could only operate, under strict control, in some very precise areas - such as chemical weapons - or on the so-called "horizontal themes" - such as confidence-building measures or verification.

Instead of believing that we are entering an era of renewed bilateralism or selective multilateralism, we would prefer to think that this process of change, if persistent and consistent enough, will gradually bear further results and will at last reinforce true multilateralism, not least in disarmament negotiations. We must recognize, at any rate, that the third SSOD was convened at a moment when trends were still not totally clear, when encouraging signs were still mixed with old fears, when new perceptions interacted with well-established reactions, be it at the bilateral, regional or global level, and these complex and ambiguous mixtures and linkages compounded our difficulties. The "quasi-consensus" of New York was in a way a by-product of this uncertain season the world is living through.

Brazil feels it did its part. As an expression of my country's very deep and serious commitment to disarmament, President Sarney took it upon himself to convey Brazil's message personally to the Assembly. He put forward some principles which we regard as fundamental in guiding multilateral deliberations on disarmament: no State should demand from any other disarmament measures that it itself is not prepared to take; concerns regarding the security of one State are just as valid, just as important and just as relevant as those of any other State; industrial and technological development do not free any country from the obligation to observe and respect disarmament measures which have been internationally agreed upon; the non-militarization of outer space constitutes an essential pre-condition for the adoption of significant measures for regional disarmament; and the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons compromises the policy adopted by many States in renouncing the nuclear weapon option.

Much of what happened during the third SSOD will only take its final historic shape in the months and years to come, even if history keeps colouring the past with the shades of time. Many ideas were presented at the third SSOD for the first time, and need to ripen and to be fully understood by all participants. Some old ideas were presented there for the last time, we hope, since they met once more with widespread rejection. Both of these trends will become clearer in the near future.

As a reaffirmation of its permanent dedication to peace and justice in international relations, and also as a demonstration of its disposition to

(Mr. Pericás, Brazil)

continue to work unceasingly for the construction of a better and safer world for all, Brazil promoted the First Meeting of States of the Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic, held in Rio de Janeiro from 25 to 29 July and attended by high-level representatives of 21 South Atlantic States. The main objective of the meeting, regarded by all participants as fully achieved, was to permit a fruitful and constructive discussion among South Atlantic States on means of promoting co-operation among them for peace and development.

Approved by consensus and already distributed as an official document of the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, the final document of the meeting requests the States of other regions, in particular the militarily significant States, to scrupulously respect the region of the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and co-operation and to demonstrate their willingness to adopt concrete measures to ensure the reduction and eventual elimination of their military presence therein, the non-introduction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the non-extension into the region of rivalries and conflicts that are foreign to it. The participants also shared the view that the adoption of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms limitation should not lead to or be followed by the redeployment of nuclear weapons to other geographical areas. As was stated by Minister Abreu Sodré,

"This initiative is a milestone in the history of international relations. It symbolizes our countries' determination to assume in a mature manner their increasingly relevant role in the international arena. Together with other significant undertakings in different areas of the southern hemisphere, it clearly reveals the resolve of developing countries to accept their share of responsibility for preserving peace and reducing tensions in their regions and for stimulating mutually beneficial co-operation."

We hold the firm conviction that the success of the Rio meeting will give further impetus to the efforts exerted by South Atlantic States to develop their relations in an atmosphere of peace and freedom, to their mutual benefit and that of the international community as a whole.

Before concluding, I wish to announce formally before the Conference on Disarmament that on 18 August 1988 the National Constitutional Assembly of Brazil adopted and included in the final draft of the new Brazilian constitution a clause laying down that "all nuclear activities on the national territory shall be permitted exclusively for peaceful purposes and with the approval of the National Congress". This sovereign decision of the representatives of the Brazilian people elected to write the new constitution of the country raises to the highest possible level the legal expression of the policy consistently followed by Brazil against all forms of proliferation of nuclear weapons. I am convinced that the significance of this decision will be fully understood by all countries represented here.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement, and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, Her Excellency Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom, who will introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee contained in document CD/864.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, may I begin by saying that I am very glad to be among the first to congratulate you on your accession to the presidency? Speaking for the moment as the delegate of the United Kingdom, may I extend a welcome to you on your assumption to this high office and assure you of the full co-operation of my delegation in the weeks ahead? And may I also thank Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia for his leadership during the month of August?

As you said, I am taking the floor today in order to introduce the annual report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, which I have had the honour to chair this year. The Ad hoc Committee was able to adopt its report in CD/864 at the end of last week. I am grateful to the delegations participating in the work of the Committee, whose co-operative approach allows me to introduce the report today.

I hope that distinguished delegates can agree that the report of the Ad hoc Committee presents a succinct but clear account of our work. That was, at any rate, our aim. It includes, of course, the reports from the two contact groups, that on the prohibition of radiological weapons in the traditional sense and that on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. To these reports are attached the co-ordinators' records, reflecting consideration of the issues dealt with. I myself feel that these records give a clear picture of the state of our work, with no attempt to veil the differences of view within the Conference. The Ad hoc Committee recommends that we should draw on these contact group reports as a basis for future work. They are not binding on delegations, who retain complete flexibility for their future action. I am sure that the report will provide valuable help to the Ad hoc Committee as it continues its task of reaching agreement on the substance of its work.

The contact group reports show that the Ad hoc Committee did make progress during this year. In the spring session the contact groups concentrated their attention on verification and compliance as well as on other main elements, and were able to fill gaps which had existed in previous reports. In the summer session the contact groups conducted a review of the texts, and new proposals were made helping to further clarify and elaborate the positions held by delegations. However, I have to say that considerable differences on substance remain which have shown no sign of being resolved.

As the report shows, the Ad hoc Committee this year as last year considered its two subjects in separate contact groups. The Committee did not attempt to discuss whether this approach might be retained next year, and in the past views have differed on its merits. However my own experience this year makes me concur whole-heartedly with Ambassador Meizster of Hungary, who when he presented last year's report, said that the procedure of separate contact groups had been a step in the right direction.

It is evident to all who have participated in the work of the Ad hoc Committee that the contact groups have shouldered the main burden. The report says that the two co-ordinators, Mr. Wayarabi of Indonesia and Mr. Györffy of Hungary, have assisted the Chair. This is a very measured way of putting it, as befits a printed report. In fact they have both devoted

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

considerable time, effort and ingenuity to their not always straightforward tasks. I have found it a great pleasure to work with both of them, and I am delighted to put on record my sincere thanks to them for their excellent work. My thanks go also to the group co-ordinators and of course to the secretariat for their co-operation and assistance. I have pleasure in presenting the report to you, Mr. President, and to the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons for introducing the report of that Committee. I wish to congratulate Ambassador Solesby for the successful completion of work in the subsidiary body over which she presided. I should like to note that this is the first Ad hoc Committee which has adopted a report when time is of the essence in order to conclude the annual session as scheduled. I intend to put the report of the Ad hoc Committee before the Conference for adoption at the end of our next plenary meeting.

I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cámpora.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): As you begin your term as President, Ambassador Ardakani, in your capacity as representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in this final stage of the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to convey to you our wishes for every success in this delicate task and also, on behalf of the Argentine delegation, state our readiness to co-operate with you. We listened with great interest to the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, His Excellency Dr. Ali-Akbar Velayati, and also the statement by Her Excellency the Norwegian State Secretary, Ambassador Helga Hernes, both of which we will study very carefully.

With the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament close to its conclusion, we have the impression that favourable conditions now prevail in the international scene which are not properly reflected in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We cannot ignore the fact that conditions are emerging which are conducive to the beginning of a period of international détente. A period of a marked slowing in the pace of the arms race, which with various ups and downs has placed its sombre mark on the years since the Second World War. The new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, together with the solutions gradually being reached in regional conflicts through the abandonment of military confrontation in favour of a political solution, are significant features of international life that ought to stimulate disarmament negotiations in the multilateral framework.

However, they are not doing so, and our deliberations seem to be falling back into a pattern that ignores this new and positive international atmosphere. We are still unable to find a way to overcome political inhibitions and remove procedural deadlocks that are blocking the work of the Conference. In particular we believe that a basic unjustified lack of trust remains with regard to the constructive negotiating task that can be accomplished in this Conference on some of the items on its agenda. We also believe that other items could be included which in our view are ripe for

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

tackling in multilateral talks within the Conference on Disarmament. The delegation of Argentina hopes that the next session of the United Nations General Assembly will offer a favourable opportunity to take up in an appropriate way the potentialities in the disarmament process opened up by the new international situation.

In the first place we would like to voice our agreement with those who have argued that the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on verification of nuclear testing will by then have cleared an important hurdle with the completion of the joint experiments. We have to say that we share the widespread concern throughout the world about these negotiations, which are moving forward slowly, step by step. We must recall that the heads of State or government who promoted the Six-Nation Initiative for Peace and Disarmament called for an international agreement that will put an end to nuclear testing once and for all when they stated in their Stockholm Declaration on 21 January 1988 that "any agreement that leaves room for continued testing would not be acceptable". Accordingly, we hope that the joint experiments will enable both parties to ratify promptly the threshold test-ban Treaty of 1974 and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty of 1976, so that decisive progress can be made towards the final and verifiable cessation of nuclear weapon explosions. Once this step has been completed, we think that the next session of the United Nations General Assembly could be in a position to adopt by consensus a single resolution on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests which would serve as a basis for the elaboration of a negotiating mandate for an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament. The effects of the progress made at the bilateral level must make themselves felt at the multilateral level, so that the United Nations organs can move forward in the negotiation of a universal ban on nuclear weapon tests, beginning with the setting up of an appropriate global system of verification which will subsequently guarantee effective compliance with the treaty. In this regard we feel that any bilateral progress made in harmonizing the various verification arrangements to be adopted should contribute to the important work that the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament has been carrying out for a number of years under the chairmanship of Dr. Dahlman of Sweden.

We note with satisfaction that the start-up activities for the large-scale experiment on the exchange of seismic data are about to begin under the co-ordination of Dr. Basham of Canada. On this point we would like to say that as far as the actual functioning of the future seismic network is concerned, we share the view expressed by several delegations, and reiterated by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the plenary meeting on 18 August, in favour of the adoption of the "open station" concept for States participating in the network, thus ensuring free, dynamic and unrestricted access to the information available. Argentina, in its exchanges of seismic data at the regional level, follows this approach informally with co-operating institutions in South America. The adoption of the "open station" approach is, we think, the most logical option, given the co-operative nature of this multilateral exercise.

We would also like to express our appreciation to the Governments of Canada and Japan on their announcement of seminars and technical workshops for the exchange of experience in seismic data collection and analysis, to be held

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

in spring and autumn 1989 respectively. This type of technical meeting, similar to those that Sweden organized on behalf of the Six-Nation Initiative for Peace and Disarmament last May in Linköping, furnishes clear proof that we enjoy the scientific support needed to achieve progress towards the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. There remains the political decision to do so.

We understand the intentions of the countries that have proposed the amendment of the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty of 1963 to make up for the lack of movement in the Conference on Disarmament towards initiating a negotiating process aimed at ending nuclear weapon tests. If the Conference on Disarmament is unable to negotiate a treaty for that purpose, it is understandable that some countries should propose the amendment of the 1963 Treaty. But at the same time, if there are countries that feel that the amendment process is not the most appropriate way to deal with the matter, they should not place obstacles in the way of responsible work in the multilateral negotiating forum of the Conference on Disarmament.

We also think that the adoption of a consensus resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space is not far off. It is fairly likely that the General Assembly will draft a resolution that will gather the unanimous support of delegations. This, too, would give a considerable boost to the work of the Conference next year. In this respect we feel entitled to demand that efforts should be made to facilitate at least the multilateral consideration of, and progress with, those proposals that are before the Ad hoc Committee and are in keeping with the existing multilateral legal régime on outer space, as well as with the provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty, on which the bilateral negotiations seem to be moving forward significantly, according to information available. We also think that the General Assembly will be in a position to adopt a consensus resolution on conventional disarmament and this might perhaps serve as a sound basis for our Conference on Disarmament to tackle this topic with a view to negotiating specific agreements on it.

If the topics already mentioned, particularly the ending of nuclear weapon tests and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, benefited from a convergence of political will, the Conference on Disarmament, which is currently working effectively on the drafting of a convention to prohibit chemical weapons, would then be engaged in a series of substantive negotiations on important topics on the disarmament agenda, and would thus bring the content of its work into line with the international situation, which has quite clearly improved. Otherwise, I am very much afraid that it will be difficult for us as responsible delegates here to deny the charge of not having found concrete formulas for disarmament agreements that reflect this favourable international atmosphere, created through the efforts both of the great Powers and of many States that have decided to seek a political solution to their regional conflicts. Disarmament should be, then, an inescapable consequence of this international climate if we intend to take full advantage of it.

On the subject of the cessation of the nuclear arms race, we think that the implementation of the provisions of the INF Treaty, as well as the encouraging news emerging from the current negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

weapons, will also form a framework for a new approach to this topic in the General Assembly and thus for movement towards the drafting of texts that bring closer together the various positions on the controversial resolutions on cessation of the nuclear arms race and the prevention of nuclear war.

In general terms, we imagine therefore that the forthcoming session of the General Assembly will reflect, in the deliberations of the First Committee, the existence of an international climate that is marked by détente. That will prepare the ground for statements reflecting a growing convergence of views on the various topics making up the programme relating to disarmament issues. The spirit that emerges from the statement we are making today is the same as that which will inspire the Argentine delegation's approach to disarmament matters at the ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement to be held in Cyprus next week, so as to make progress in the field of multilateral disarmament while upholding the role of the United Nations.

Before concluding I would like to place on record the Argentine delegation's satisfaction at the statement made by Ambassador Bernado Pericás, the Under-Secretary-General in the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, introducing the final document of the first meeting held by the countries that are parties to the initiative intended to turn the South Atlantic into a zone of peace and co-operation. We venture to recommend that this final document should be looked at very closely by the delegations that make up the Conference on Disarmament, since it is of great significance in the cause of peace and international co-operation in the South Atlantic.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers. Does any member wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during next week. As usual, this timetable is merely indicative and is subject to change, if necessary. You will notice that informal open-ended consultations on agenda items 1, 2 and 7 are scheduled for Monday 5 September at 10 a.m. to start consideration of draft substantive paragraphs under those agenda items. Provision is also made for an informal meeting on Tuesday 6 September immediately after the plenary meeting, to start the first reading of the technical parts of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. As announced by my predecessor at our last plenary meeting, the relevant working papers - CD/WP.348 for the technical parts of the report, as well as CD/WP.349, CD/WP.350 and CD/WP.351 for the draft substantive paragraphs - have already been circulated in English and other languages in delegations' pigeon-holes. It is expected that all languages will be available today. As is the practice of the Conference, we indicate only the opening meeting for the informal open-ended consultations on draft substantive paragraphs. Additional meetings, if necessary, will be decided upon as the work proceeds in those consultations. The secretariat also informs me that the draft substantive paragraphs on agenda item 3, as well as on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, will be circulated early next week. I should also like to recall that Thursday 8 September and Friday 9 September are official holidays in the United Nations Office at Geneva, and

(The President)

therefore no meetings will be held on those two days. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference agrees to the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I am requested to announce that informal consultations within the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space will be held on Friday, 2 September at 10 a.m. in room A.206, for discussion of the draft report of that Committee. The Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances has asked me to inform you that a meeting of the Ad hoc Committee will take place immediately following the adjournment of this meeting in this same room.

Since there is no other business for today, I now intend to adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 6 September at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.480
6 September 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 6 September 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Ali Shams Ardakani (Islamic Republic of Iran)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 480th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference to the new representative of Burma, Ambassador Aung Thant, who is attending this plenary meeting today. I assure him of the co-operation of my delegation in the performance of his important new function. I should also like to welcome to the Conference on Disarmament a delegation from the churches of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is attending this plenary meeting today. They are visiting Geneva and have expressed particular interest in disarmament affairs. I wish to thank them for their concern on such a vital subject.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today begins consideration of the reports of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies and the adoption of its annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. However, in conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As agreed in the timetable for meetings to be held during this week, the Conference will hold today, immediately after this plenary meeting, an informal meeting to start its consideration of the technical parts of the draft report to the General Assembly of the United Nations, contained in document CD/WP.348, which has been circulated in all languages in the delegations' pigeon-holes.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Egypt, Hungary and the United States of America. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elaraby.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): Mr. President, I would like at the outset to express my personal satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair. Our two delegations have, for many years, closely co-operated in the field of disarmament. And I do hope they will continue to do so in the future. The Islamic Republic of Iran very ably presided over the work of the Group of 21 during the month of August. And I am confident that under your wise guidance and leadership, the current session will be successfully concluded. I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia, and the delegation of Indonesia, for the excellent manner in which they conducted our work during the month of August.

In the past weeks, a few colleagues have assumed new responsibilities. Two of your distinguished predecessors have left us, namely Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary and Ambassador Teja of India, who has been a very close friend of mine for over 20 years. They have all left us with valuable memories of their most effective participation and contributions. We also wish to pay tribute to Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, and we remember with appreciation the admirable work he performed as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole at the third special session. I would also like to wish Ambassador Tin Tun of Burma and Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria well in their future endeavours. On the other hand, I believe we are fortunate to welcome into our midst Ambassador de Rivero of Peru, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Ruoro of Kenya and Ambassador Varga of Hungary.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament came to a close without adopting a final document. Several assessments and interpretations have been advanced. My delegation does not hesitate in expressing genuine feelings of disappointment. Yet my delegation recognizes that the session succeeded in focusing world attention on disarmament efforts. Participation was at a very high level. A general and useful exchange of views was conducted, and agreement on some issues was reached. Consensus, however, was not attained. SSOD-III could have presented, as Madame Theorin, the leader of the Swedish delegation, ably put it, "a unique opportunity for the world community to articulate and to endorse a multilateral programme of disarmament for the years to come". This unique opportunity was regrettably missed.

The failure to adopt a final document should not, however, be construed as an insurmountable impediment obstructing our future endeavours. The Final Document of the first special session, adopted in 1978, is universally considered a turning-point if not a landmark in disarmament negotiation efforts. With its programme of action and priorities listed in paragraphs 43 to 47, the Final Document, in our view, complements the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. We should be forward-looking and highlight the concrete steps so far realized, and strive to build upon them.

Our faith in multilateralism and multilateral disarmament machinery must be underscored. We believe the failure of multilateralism could lead to the collapse of the entire post-Charter system and thereby gravely undermine the maintenance of international peace and security.

Egypt recognizes the importance of bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers, who shoulder special responsibility in the field of arms limitation, disarmament and the full realization of the objectives of the Charter pertaining to international peace and security. However, in our view, bilateral negotiations should in no way substitute for or become an alternative to multilateral negotiation efforts in the Conference on Disarmament.

My delegation has had circulated, in document CD/850 dated 1 August 1988, the text of a declaration issued by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the twentieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is to be recalled that Egypt was among the first countries to sign the NPT on the first day of its opening for signature on 1 July 1968. We ratified it only on 22 February 1981. We did so despite the fact that a country in our region, namely Israel, has until this moment refused to accede to this important legal instrument, and my delegation wishes to seize this opportunity to call on Israel once again to do so without delay. Such a step would undoubtedly contribute to the relaxation of tension and anxieties in the Middle East.

It should also be recalled that the NPT provides for an extra measure to create a stricter régime to ensure the absence of nuclear weapons. I refer in particular to article VII of the NPT, which stipulates:

"Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories."

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Through the joint efforts of Egypt and Iran a draft resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East has been adopted by the General Assembly each year since 1974. Beginning in 1980 the General Assembly has been adopting this resolution by consensus, signifying not only the approval of all the countries of the region but also that of the five nuclear-weapon States. What we need at this juncture is to consider ways and means of carrying out the General Assembly resolution. Therefore, on 24 June 1988, Egypt presented to the Committee of the Whole at the special session in New York a proposal that the Secretary-General should be requested to "undertake a study with the assistance of a personal representative, or a group of experts, of the elements of a model agreement and specific practical measures capable of creating the necessary conditions to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East". We do hope that our proposal will soon be taken up by the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation will resubmit its proposal to the coming session of the General Assembly.

The principle enshrined in the 1967 outer space Treaty constitute, along with other relevant legal instruments, a legal régime that governs and regulates space activities. Mankind as a whole has a common interest and a legitimate right in strengthening this legal régime. We should all harness our efforts in this direction. However, because of rapid technological evolution this legal régime, notwithstanding many of its positive factors, continuously needs to be updated, articulated and strengthened. I referred in my statement on 21 April this year to one of the shortcomings that need to be redressed, citing the need to expand the scope of article IV of the 1967 Treaty on outer space to include the banning of all types of weapons instead of restricting the prohibition to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. This expansion aims at preserving outer space exclusively for peaceful uses. This requirement must be promptly honoured in the light of the increasing danger of an arms race in outer space. Egypt remains convinced that urgent measures are needed to consolidate, reinforce and develop the existing legal régime and enhance its effectiveness. By the same token we believe that existing bilateral and multilateral agreements should be strictly complied with.

The Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has had an arduous task this year. During its summer session the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela, has very ably guided its deliberations. He has provided us with a useful document containing a list of the existing proposals on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, along with the names of their sponsors. My delegation noted the interesting discussions and the numerous interventions which centred around these proposals. It is apparent that in its summer proceedings the Committee devoted more time and emphasis to these proposals. In our view, this is a fact that must be reflected in our report.

I now turn to item 4 on our agenda. My delegation once again welcomes the advanced stage reached in the negotiations on the preparation of the convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and providing for their destruction. In this respect, my delegation cannot fail to recognize with appreciation the prominent role performed by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka of Poland.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

I also wish to welcome the positive step taken by the United States on 28 July in declaring the location of each of its chemical production facilities. Egypt considers this as a contribution to the confidence-building measures needed to enhance our efforts with a view to concluding the convention. We also welcome the step taken last year by the Soviet Union in the military facility of Shikhany, and invite other States to take similar actions in order to strengthen the atmosphere of confidence.

Egypt fully supports the current efforts to conclude a convention to ban chemical weapons. Egypt is a party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Egypt was also at the forefront of the States that signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction in 1972. Unfortunately, certain circumstances prevailing in our region prevented us from speeding up its ratification. We do hope that such considerations will not arise with respect to future disarmament agreements.

I seize this opportunity to reiterate that Egypt considers that the prohibition of chemical weapons has become a basic norm of international law in our contemporary world, which should be scrupulously observed. Though Egypt recognizes that a considerable degree of progress has been achieved in our work, we do however realize that we still have a long way ahead. Many of the remaining differences concern concepts and methodology, and are not confined to mere drafting details. Like many other States, Egypt considers that the conditio sine qua non for a State to enter into a convention that affects important aspects of national security and undertake a wide range of obligations is that such a convention must be applicable to all States. Certain key countries, including all those in the so-called "hot" regions, should become parties simultaneously. The non-accession of some States could well be the rock upon which the convention would come to grief.

In pursuing the goal of attaining universality, we believe that two basic elements should at this stage be considered: prior consultations and guarantees and sanctions. To realize prior consultations, on the largest scale possible, Egypt does not subscribe to the view that the Conference on Disarmament should submit the convention directly to the General Assembly for adoption. Egypt prefers that an invitation be addressed to all States, members and non-members of the Conference on Disarmament alike, to attend a conference devoted to consideration of the convention. We also believe that some form of preparatory work should be initiated as soon as possible to exchange views on all the dimensions and possible implications of the convention. In this context, I would like to recall the proposal presented by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia at the SSOD-III for the convening of a special United Nations conference to consider and approve the CW convention. Egypt sees considerable merit in this proposal. We support the convening of an international conference under United Nations auspices, open to all potential signatories of the convention. In our view this procedure would ensure direct participation and would consequently greatly contribute to the conclusion of a comprehensive document acceptable to all.

The other element related to the concept of universality is the issue of guarantees and sanctions. In all candour, without guarantees and without sanctions, we fear, the convention may be neither universal nor credible. We

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

would like to see provisions containing specific sanctions should any State (party or non-party) violate the provisions of the convention. We would also like to have guarantees to ensure that sanctions will be applied effectively and without discrimination.

My delegation proposes that the Conference should consider the insertion of a new article dealing with this issue. The context and concept of such an article could be taken up during inter-sessional meetings before our next Conference on Disarmament session in 1989. The gesture of flexibility in the speech made by Ambassador Narzarkin of the Soviet Union on the 11th of last month is highly welcome. We welcome in particular his statement that assistance should be extended to States parties to the convention in the area of protection against chemical weapons provided for in article X. Egypt also supports the development of provisions on collective measures in order to enable States parties to resist the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. It is reassuring to note that the Soviet delegation is prepared to agree to the inclusion in the convention of provisions on co-operation among States parties to the convention in the area of defence against chemical weapons on the basis of voluntary bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Another area that should attract special attention is that of verification. We do share the views expressed by many delegations that we need a credible, verifiable convention without any loopholes. It is therefore imperative that the convention include effective verification provisions. Yet this requirement should not be abused. It should never be distorted and stretched to threaten the national security of States parties. We are inclined to consider the non-abuse of this device as important as the concept of verification itself. We therefore support the inclusion of detailed provisions for verification procedures, and in particular challenge inspection.

We believe that the accession to the convention will depend in large part on the extent of the provisions on international co-operation to develop the peaceful uses of chemical industries, while not, however, impeding peaceful chemical activities.

I now turn to the issue of convening inter-sessional meetings. Given the fact that we cannot start until after the First Committee has concluded its work in New York, and that at least three weeks through December and January are usually cut away for holidays, it becomes evident that we have only about six working weeks. In order to make the best use of the time allotted to us, my delegation proposes that we focus on certain specific issues or topics such as guarantees and sanctions and challenge inspection, articles X and XI.

My delegation notes with satisfaction the progress achieved in the work on article VI. However, we realize that more time has yet to be devoted to the super-toxic lethal chemicals listed in schedule [1] and produced on a laboratory scale, and the relevance of this to medical and defence research. We believe that for practical reasons, there should be a procedure to update the schedules annexed to this article whenever necessary. Egypt is of the view that schedules [1] and [3] should be subject to modification whenever new chemical agents are produced.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

My delegation participated in the meeting of industrial experts held on 22 July, and is of the opinion that such meetings are of major importance and have positive effects on the process of drafting of a convention to ban chemical weapons. I seize this opportunity to thank the Swedish delegation for the very able manner in which they moderated the meeting in order to accomplish so much in a very short time. We hope that this meeting will be the first of a series of such meaningful meetings.

Before concluding I would like to refer to an issue of grave concern to the African continent, namely the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in our continent. The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unit, meeting in its forty-eighth ordinary session in Addis Ababa from 19 to 23 May this year, discussed this matter and approved a resolution on the subject. Paragraph 1 of that resolution declared such dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa to be a crime against Africa and its people.

The distinguished Ambassador of Nigeria, Ambassador Azikiwe, declared on 11 August 1988:

"The dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes is a matter of serious concern to Nigeria, and we believe many other countries share this concern. We therefore consider it essential for this issue to be addressed in a clear and unambiguous manner in the radiological weapons convention being considered by Contact Group A."

Egypt supports the Nigerian request and hopes that the modalities for its implementation will soon be worked out.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Elaraby for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair, and I thank him also for kindly reviewing the collaboration between our two countries on the earlier work of the Conference. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Hungary, Ambassador Varga.

Mr. VARGA (Hungary): Mr. President, may I first of all congratulate you on your accession to the presidency for the month of September and wish you success in completing the work of the Conference in its 1988 session. My delegation will stand ready to co-operate fully with you in carrying out your responsible tasks.

I would like to express my gratitude to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Wisber Loeis of Indonesia, who presided over our proceedings in August with great diplomatic skill and devotion. August 1988 will remain memorable for me personally since it was the month when I was welcomed first by the President of the Conference and by many of my distinguished colleagues around this table. I would like to express my gratitude for the kind and friendly reception accorded to me. Reciprocating their good wishes and friendly words, I would like to assure them that my delegation and myself personally will do our utmost in the future to co-operate with them as my predecessors in this chair did in the past. May I, in my turn, warmly welcome the new distinguished representative of Burma in our midst and wish him every success in his work.

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

Being a newcomer in the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum on a global scale, where issues of international security, arms control and disarmament are discussed, is familiar to me in a particular way. I gained my experience in this field of multilateral diplomacy by participating in the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe as the representative of my country. My participation in the Madrid follow-up meeting and in the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament, and the humble experience gained there, will I hope be of considerable help to me in acquiring a substantive insight into the complicated political work and negotiating process carried on by this unique body on vital issues of multilateral disarmament.

With the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament drawing to its end, one may feel tempted to offer a general overview of the proceedings this year. Avoiding that, may I venture to be somewhat selective, commenting on certain issues only which have caught my attention during my short presence in this body.

My delegation has traditionally taken a keen interest in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, and therefore it is a matter of satisfaction to learn that it is the first among the committees to accomplish its work and present its report to the Conference. I would like to congratulate Ambassador Tessa Solesby of the United Kingdom for the efficient way she has guided the work of the Committee. I share her assessment as to the results of the work on the issues of the prohibition of radiological weapons, the significance of the modest but by United Nations standards substantive progress achieved during the 1988 session, as well as the further handling of the two issues.

My delegation is not alone in according high priority to the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Sujka of Poland, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, for his efforts and innovative guidance given to the work of the Committee. My delegation is following with great interest the preparatory work for the trial inspection experiment in the informal group led by Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. The successful completion of the trial inspection experiments by the interested States will hopefully contribute a considerable amount of practical experience in the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. This in its turn will facilitate the final clarification of the remaining issues in this field.

Our interest in the preparations for the trial inspection experiment also testifies to the fact that the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic continues to attach the greatest importance to the earliest possible conclusion of a convention on the complete and comprehensive prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons for all States without exception, as has just been wisely pointed out by the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt, Mr. Elaraby, in his statement. With a view to the possibly early conclusion of the convention, our authorities have conducted a thorough review of the position of the Hungarian chemical industry vis-à-vis the convention. As a result of that review, and in order to promote

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

openness in the multilateral exchange of relevant data, our Minister for Foreign Affairs in his statement of 4 February 1988 supplied information to the Conference on the production and use for peaceful purposes of relevant chemicals by our chemical industry. My predecessor's statement of 29 March 1988 further elaborated on the data previously supplied.

Continuing my selective survey I cannot but express disappointment over the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has remained unsuccessful this year too in making any headway on its highest-priority task: the nuclear test ban. We continue to adhere to the conviction that the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests would be an effective measure on the way to halting the nuclear arms race. Continuing testing is at variance with the efforts of the great majority of States to stop the improvement of the existing types of nuclear weapons and the development of new ones. Hence our insistence that all nuclear weapon tests in all environments should be prohibited for ever.

We are aware of the difficulties encountered in starting substantive work on the NTB in an appropriate organizational framework. Yet we believe that differences of views should not inevitably impede the start of substantive work. Several proposals have been made to solve the issue in or outside the Conference on Disarmament. One of them is the formal proposal by the Governments of Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and Venezuela to amend the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water at a conference of the States parties. We welcome this proposal as an effort to solve the problem of the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests outside the Conference on Disarmament.

We also welcome every effort aimed at solving the persisting deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament. That is why my delegation is encouraged by the initiative of Czechoslovakia, put forward by our distinguished colleague Ambassador Vejvoda in working paper CD/863, proposing "to initiate, as a first step towards achieving a nuclear test-ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification and compliance". My delegation is of the view that this proposal - which was on the table for quite a time on an informal basis - is suggesting what can realistically be achieved at this stage and in this forum.

In conclusion, let me say that the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has been pursued in the Conference on Disarmament for quite a long time, and was taken up again this year under the untiring guidance of Ambassador García Robles. As a personal remark let me say how impressed I was by the goodwill and constructive spirit in which the action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order was introduced by the delegation of India the other day.

Among the signals of the forthcoming closure of the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament is the fact that the ad hoc committees are introducing their reports to the plenary one after the other. We will hopefully soon receive the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances chaired by my distinguished colleague Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria. I hope that the ad hoc committees on chemical weapons and outer space will soon be in a position to submit their reports, enabling the CD to close its 1988 session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, you have assumed the presidency in a month when the work of our Conference culminates in the preparation of the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly, and when capable leadership is required to bring our session to a successful conclusion. Our delegation will work constructively and co-operatively toward such a conclusion of our work. Our delegation joins in welcoming the new representative of Burma, Ambassador Aung Thant. We look forward to working with him and his delegation. We also welcome the delegation of church leaders from the Soviet Union to our plenary session today.

On 30 August, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, William F. Burns, addressed this body. In his statement, General Burns referred to the third review of the 1972 United States-Soviet anti-ballistic missile Treaty, but noted that he was not in a position at that time to go into any detail on the subject. On 31 August, that review was completed, and the United States issued a statement concerning its outcome. In light of the interest generated with regard to this subject at the time of General Burns' remarks, and because of the general importance of bilateral nuclear arms control issues to this Conference, I believe it would be useful to quote the contents of this statement in its entirety today. The statement is as follows, and I quote verbatim:

"The United States and the Soviet Union conducted the third Review of the ABM Treaty as required at five-year intervals by the provisions of that Treaty. The Review was conducted from August 24, 1988 to August 31, 1988. The U.S. Delegation was led by William F. Burns, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

"During the Review, the United States emphasized the importance of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, which are a threat to the viability of the Treaty. Throughout the Review Conference, the Soviet Union gave no indication that it was prepared to correct the violations without linking their agreement to do so to unacceptable demands.

"Specifically, the United States discussed with the Soviets its serious concern that the Soviet Union's deployment of a large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk constitutes a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty. Such radars take years to build and are a key to providing a nation-wide defense -- which is prohibited by the Treaty. The Treaty's restrictions on the location, orientation, and functions of such radars are, thus, essential provisions of the Treaty. Hence, the Krasnoyarsk violation is very serious, particularly when it is recognized that the radar constitutes one of a network of such radars that have the inherent potential for attack assessment in support of ballistic missile defense.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

"In order for the Soviet Union to correct this violation, the Krasnoyarsk radar must be dismantled. The United States has been urging the Soviet Union for more than five years, both in the Standing Consultative Commission established by the Treaty and in other diplomatic channels, to correct this clear violation by dismantling the radar. During the Review, the U.S. outlined the specific Soviet actions necessary to correct this violation in a verifiable manner. The United States has also made clear that the continuing existence of the Krasnoyarsk radar makes it impossible to conclude any future arms agreements in the START or Defense and Space areas. The United States has observed a slowdown in construction, but this slowdown, or even a full construction freeze, would not be sufficient either to correct the Treaty violation or to meet U.S. concerns about the significant impact of the violation.

"The United States cannot continue indefinitely to tolerate this clear and serious Treaty violation. The violation must be corrected. Until the Krasnoyarsk radar is dismantled, it will continue to raise the issue of material breach and proportionate responses. Nothing that occurred during the Review Conference or its completion should be interpreted as derogating in any way from rights the U.S. has under international law with regard to any Soviet violation of the Treaty. Since the Soviet Union was not prepared to satisfy U.S. concerns with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar violation at the Review Conference, the United States will have to consider declaring this continuing violation a material breach of the Treaty. In this connection, the United States reserves all its rights, consistent with international law, to take appropriate and proportionate responses in the future.

"During the ABM Treaty Review, the United States also discussed the violation of the ABM Treaty involving the illegally deployed radars at Gomel. The U.S. also reserves its rights to respond to this violation in an appropriate and proportionate manner. The United States also discussed with the Soviet Union a number of ABM-related compliance concerns, the totality of which suggests that the Soviet Union may be preparing a prohibited ABM territorial defense. This is a particularly serious concern. As the President has noted, such a development 'would have profound implications for the vital East-West balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its capability.'

"The U.S. continues to have deep, continuing concerns about the implications of the pattern of Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty. As President Reagan observed in December 1987:

'No violations of a treaty can be considered to be a minor matter, nor can there be confidence in agreements if a country can pick and choose which provisions of an agreement it will comply with ... Correcting their violations will be a true test of Soviet willingness to enter a more constructive relationship and broaden the basis for co-operation between our two countries on security matters.'

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

"The U.S. will not accept Soviet violations or a double standard of Treaty compliance, and reserves the right to take appropriate and proportionate responses in the future."

That completes the United States statement.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all I should like to welcome you, Sir, as President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of September, and to wish you every success in this important post. I should also like to express my gratitude to your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Indonesia, Mr. Loeis, for his effective and successful discharge of his presidential duties for the previous month. I should also like to welcome a new colleague to the Conference on Disarmament: the distinguished representative of the Socialist State of Hungary, Ambassador Istvan Varga, whose statement we listened to today with great interest. I should also like to welcome the new representative of Burma, Ambassador Aung Thant.

I have asked for the floor in order to read out in my turn a statement that was made by the delegation of the Soviet Union on the results of the ABM Treaty review. The text of that statement is as follows.

"In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, negotiations were conducted between representatives of the USSR and the United States in Geneva from 24 to 31 August 1988 to review the ABM Treaty after a further five years of its operation.

"The Soviet side proceeded from the position that the review should lead to the strengthening of the Treaty, which is of key significance in securing further progress in the field of disarmament and the strengthening of strategic stability and international security. The preservation and strengthening of this Treaty is the common concern of the parties to it, the USSR and the United States.

"The delegation of the USSR conducted all the discussions in a non-confrontational spirit, with the aim of seeking mutually acceptable solutions both as regards political reaffirmation by the parties of their adherence to the objectives and purposes of the Treaty, and as regards the search for concrete technical solutions that could lead to the elimination of mutual concerns and unclear situations which have emerged during the exchange of views conducted between the sides.

"The Soviet delegation endeavoured to ensure that the reaffirmation of adherence to the Treaty and the agreed outline of ways of reducing the concerns of both sides were reflected in a joint statement or communiqué

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

to be published as a result of the review of the Treaty. Unfortunately, that was impossible because of the unwillingness of the American side to consider the concerns of the Soviet side in practical terms and its desire to reduce the entire ABM Treaty review to acceptance by the Soviet side of the American demand to dismantle the as yet non-existent Krasnoyarsk radar station.

"On the conclusion of the discussions the American side published a unilateral statement which offers an unobjective assessment of the situation that has developed.

"The present statement by the USSR delegation sets out the facts, which give a true picture of the situation as regards compliance with the ABM Treaty and the nature of the discussions which took place.

"As far as the radar station under construction at Krasnoyarsk is concerned, the Soviet side reaffirmed that the station is designed for space tracking and is not subject to the limitations of the ABM Treaty. Despite this, the United States has continued to ascribe to it functions relating to early warning of a missile attack. These American assertions are not based on facts but on prior assumptions and subjective assessments.

"In order to demonstrate good will and in an effort to remove the concern felt by the United States, we expressed our willingness to dismantle the equipment of this station so that it could be subject to checks and would not cause any doubts for the United States should agreement be reached on compliance with the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972.

"The American side also expressed concern over the transfer of individual radar station parts known as 'Pawnshop' and 'Flat Twin' in the United States from the Sary-Shagan test site to the Gormel area, in a move that it views without justification as the beginning of the deployment of ABM radar stations.

"On the basis of the facts we furnished and a visit to the Gormel area by official representatives of the United States, it was possible for the American side to satisfy itself that the individual 'Flat Twin' radar station parts and the 'Pawnshop' van are in fact being used in that area to construct rigs for the testing and adjustment of reflector antennae, which have wide applications in the economy. These activities do not in the slightest degree violate the ABM Treaty.

"At the same time, we have stated that in the context of allaying the concerns of both sides with respect to ABM Treaty compliance issues, the Soviet side would be prepared to undertake a radical solution of the problem of individual remaining 'Flat Twin' radar station parts and the 'Pawnshop' van referred to by the American side.

"The American side once again raised the possibility that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defence for its territory. In this context previously raised assertions were repeated, to which the Soviet side has

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

given the appropriate response. Not one of the issues that was raised individually, nor all of them taken together, give any grounds for the expression of such concern by the United States.

"The Soviet side also introduced a series of constructive proposals which, should they be implemented, would promote the solution of other issues that have been raised by either side. These proposals relate to efforts to reach agreement that the parties would give each other timely notification of plans for the construction of large phased-array radars, with an indication of the purpose for which they are intended; agreement on indications that would make it possible to distinguish ABM-related radar stations from others; the development of procedures for the dismantling or destruction of ABM radar stations at test ranges; and a decision to allow Soviet representatives to visit the American radar station in Greenland and the construction site of the rocket probe launching station on the island of Shemya, so as to provide the Soviet Union with a factual basis for looking into United States activities which available data lead it to regard either as violations of the Treaty (the radar station in Greenland) or as cause for concern (the construction on the island of Shemya).

"Unfortunately, our proposals did not receive a positive response from the American side, which despite the true facts of the case continues without proof to reject or pretend not to see the reasons for the Soviet Union's serious concern regarding compliance by the United States with its treaty obligations. Some of our proposals remain unanswered by the American side, while its responses on other points cannot be viewed as satisfactory.

"Nor has the American side shown readiness to take any steps to correct the violations of the ABM Treaty it has permitted.

"Beginning in 1975, the Soviet side has been expressing concern over the deployment by the United States of major LPAR of the 'Pave Paws' type both within the United States and abroad. The essence of our concern is that these large radar stations have specifications sufficient for an ABM role. In conjunction with the radar stations at the Grand Forks base, these stations could provide a basis for ABM defence of the territory of the United States, which is incompatible with the provisions of article I of the ABM Treaty, prohibiting the establishment of a base for ABM territorial defence.

"Of particular concern to the Soviet side is the breach of the ABM Treaty permitted by the United States through the deployment, after the Treaty entered into force, of a new LPAR of the 'Pave Paws' type in Greenland and the construction of a similar station in Great Britain. Under the ABM Treaty the deployment of LPARs with a potential of more than 3 million is strictly regulated in terms of the purposes of such radars. Radars for early warning of missile attack which have these specifications may be deployed only along the periphery of the national territory and oriented outward.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

"The American LPAR at Thule (Greenland) has a potential of well over 3 million. The Thule area is not a location along the periphery of the national territory of the United States. The American side has itself indicated that the Thule radar is designed for early warning of missile attack. Consequently, the deployment of an LPAR in the Thule area is a major breach of the ABM Treaty.

"The construction of a similar radar which has begun at Fylingdales (Great Britain) is also a violation of the Treaty.

"The Soviet side has also expressed concern on other matters relating to United States compliance with the ABM Treaty.

"In its desire to find solutions to the concrete problems which have arisen, the Soviet side has demonstrated in practical terms its willingness to allay the concerns of both sides. It is natural that the search for solutions should be based on a reciprocal approach and should not divert attention from the most important point - reaffirmation by both sides of their adherence to the purposes and provisions of the ABM Treaty.

"It was through no fault of ours that it was impossible to reach a satisfactory solution to the issues under consideration at the negotiations. However, the Soviet side is of the view that joint efforts to find solutions of principle could be continued, and we will work towards that end. In particular, the Standing Consultative Commission, provided for in the Treaty, exists to consider the concerns expressed by the two sides. The regular session of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission to be held in Geneva this autumn should be used for this very purpose, in accordance, inter alia, with any instructions that may be given to the Commission as a result of the forthcoming meeting between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the United States Secretary of State."

This concludes the text of the statement by the delegation of the USSR on the results of the ABM Treaty review.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me and my distinguished predecessor. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom.

Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): My delegation would like to join those who have welcomed Ambassador Aung Thant of Burma on his taking up his duties here in the CD. We would also like to welcome the delegation of churchmen from the Soviet Union who are observing our activities today.

The Government of the United Kingdom completely rejects any suggestion that the phased-array radar system at Fylingdales in the United Kingdom is in any way in violation of United States obligations under the ABM Treaty.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom, and I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I would like to respond to the Soviet Ambassador with regard to his allegations concerning alleged United States violations of the ABM Treaty at the Thule, Greenland, facility and Fylingdales in the United Kingdom. The Soviets made these allegations as they have in the past. These radars are not violations of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets raised the allegations in order to deflect attention from their violations of the Treaty. We responded at the recent talks, as we have before, that these two radar installations already existed when the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972. Modernization of these installations is allowed by the Treaty.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage?

You will recall that, at our last plenary meeting, I announced that today I would put for adoption the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, which was introduced by the Chairperson, Ambassador Solesby, at the 479th plenary meeting. We shall therefore proceed accordingly. I put before the Conference for adoption the report of that Ad hoc Committee, contained in document CD/864. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts that report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I am informed by the secretariat that the draft substantive paragraphs of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, contained in working paper CD/WP.353, were circulated in the English version yesterday afternoon in the delegations' pigeon-holes. The other languages will be available tomorrow, Wednesday, at noon. Draft substantive paragraphs on agenda item 3 are contained in working paper CD/WP.352, and will be circulated this afternoon in the delegations' pigeon-holes in the English language. As in the previous case, the other languages will be ready tomorrow at noon. As you know, informal open-ended consultations are now proceeding on agenda items 1, 2 and 7. After discussions on those items have been concluded, the informal open-ended consultations will deal first with the draft substantive paragraphs on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, followed by agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

As we approach the end of the annual session, we need flexibility in scheduling meetings of the Conference and the informal open-ended consultations dealing with the annual report to the General Assembly. Accordingly, I do not intend to circulate today a timetable of meetings to be held next week. In addition, we may need to revise the closing date if we are not able to proceed quickly to settle matters relating to the report in the coming days.

(The President)

As I noted at the opening of this plenary meeting, we shall now hold immediately after this meeting an informal meeting of the Conference to start our consideration of the draft annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. As there is no other business for today, I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 13 September at 10 a.m.

I give the floor to the representative of Burma.

Mr. AUNG THANT (Burma): I wish to express my most sincere thanks and appreciation for your warm words of welcome expressed to me at the beginning of this plenary meeting, and I also wish to thank most sincerely all the members of the Conference on Disarmament for their kind sentiments, and in particular the distinguished representatives of Egypt, Hungary, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Looking around this conference hall, I am very much overwhelmed by so much experience, expertise and wisdom, but I look forward very eagerly to working together with all of them, and if I may, I would like to express my hope that I will be able to contribute, in my own humble and small way, to the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Ambassador of Burma for his kind words to the Conference, to myself and my colleagues, and I assure him again of the full co-operation of my delegation in the work of the Conference.

This afternoon, instead of a formal meeting of the Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, there will be informal consultations at 3 p.m. in room VII. The Committee will meet tomorrow at 3 p.m. in room VII to adopt its report.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.481
13 September 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 13 September 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Ali Shams Ardakani (Islamic Republic of Iran)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 481st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies, as well as of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of Finland, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, the Netherlands and Sweden, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, as well as the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and Australia. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Finland, Dr. Rautio.

Mrs. RAUTIO (Finland): Mr. President, may I begin by wishing you well in your important office? I am convinced that you will guide the Conference successfully through the final days of its present session and into the next session in 1989.

For several years, Finland has participated in the work of this important negotiating forum. I have asked for the floor today to introduce to you the second Finnish research report or "blue book" for 1988. This is the thirteenth report in the series on "Methodology and instrumentation for sampling and analysis in the verification of chemical disarmament". The first report of this year (CD/843) was introduced to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the middle of July, and was entitled "Standard operating procedures for the verification of chemical disarmament; D.1 a proposal for procedures supporting the reference data base". The present report (CD/873) is entitled "Computer-aided techniques for the verification of chemical disarmament; E.1 verification data base". Copies of the report will be distributed to delegations together with my statement.

The future chemical weapons convention will demand extensive declarations and detailed plans from the States parties. Verification of the implementation of the convention will require a huge amount of exact and reliable reference data to be readily available to the technical secretariat. The verification process will continue throughout the lifetime of the convention, and will produce mountains of data and an unwieldy number of reports and documents. The management of all this must be such as to ensure reliability and confidentiality. For all these reasons we feel that computer-aided techniques are the only reasonable approach to the task.

In this report we look at the possibility of applying computerized techniques to the storage and handling of verification data. The computerized data base is referred to as the verification data base. The applicability of the different techniques currently available for data management is discussed, and ways of exploiting them are outlined.

We have constructed a prototype data base based on the relational data base technique for the storage of analytical reference data, that is, data which are needed to unambiguously identify chemical compounds using different

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analytical techniques. The data base also includes tentative structures for storage of other than analytical data. These data include "static" data on the verification domain, such as organizations, targets etc., and data on operational procedures, such as inspection reports.

For the purposes of CW verification, the feasible data base techniques needed are: structural data base, text data base, chemical structures data base, picture and image data base, and reference data base. In designing the data architecture we have considered what data are to be stored, the format in which the data are stored, where the data should be physically stored, how these data would be used and by whom, data security, and how long the data should be preserved.

We illustrate how data base techniques could support the various procedures of CW verification. Some of the procedures we describe are preparatory procedures that could be introduced immediately. Others, the actual verification procedures, would be introduced only later, after the future convention enters into force.

For example, the creation of an open international verification data base would ease and speed up the exchange of information on research being done in different countries. The identification procedures for banned chemicals will have to be internationally agreed upon. By way of assistance, the data base could act as an evaluation forum for newly developed procedures. Such a forum would benefit all participants by allowing a review of research being done elsewhere, and instant feedback for one's own research.

If international co-operation between laboratories were to be arranged with a view to creating internationally accepted standard operating procedures for the analyses, the data base could be used for obtaining the preliminary working instructions, and for the storage of the results and comments on the methods. This would allow the status and progress to be continuously monitored, and facilitate statistical evaluations of the results. If the development work were to lead to scientifically sound and reproducible identification methods, the procedures could be used to produce reference data for the future international inspectorate on the compounds listed in the convention. The procedures could then be left to the preparatory commission for approval. This work would considerably diminish the work of the preparatory commission in its duty of developing procedures and instrumentation for verification, and training inspectors to use them. The data base would be an ideal tool to keep track of laboratories, timetables, statistical evaluation of the results, and distribution of the summary of results to each participating laboratory.

The main advantage of the CW verification data base will be achieved after the entry into force of the convention, when the actual verification process begins. The main activities that the data base can support are: storage of documentation, time scheduling, preparations for an inspection, registration of the inspection results, decision-making, reporting, sample tracking and acting as a reference data bank for laboratories.

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A well-organized document storage data base would facilitate the management of all the documents in the form of declarations, reports, facility attachments and so on, and reduce the personnel required for supporting administrative work, and thereby the overall cost of verification.

A time-scheduling system is a tool for work planning to ensure that all activities take place at the proper time and that personnel are available for the job. The future convention will specify a number of time-limits applying to different activities. If all agreed-upon timetables for all activities are entered into the data base, the data base can be used for planning timetables so that, for example, the inspections will not pile up in certain months. Those routine inspections that do not have a predetermined date could be planned so as to fit into slack parts of the timetable.

After entry into force of the convention, facility attachments will be prepared in accordance with model agreements for each declared facility. They will state all necessary points for verification, which instruments are to be used and where they will be installed, and so on. Each facility attachment, or relevant part of it, could be entered into the verification data base to serve as a check-list of all tasks to be performed during the inspection. A facility-specific list of all documents, equipment, spare parts, etc., needed during inspection, could be generated. The inspection report could be written on a text-processing system and stored into a text data base.

Nearly all the data collected during the verification of the implementation of the convention will have to be evaluated. This evaluation will be the most important task of inspectors, and a very laborious one too. The data will have to be checked for consistency with the earlier agreements, declarations and inspection reports. This may necessitate going through a large number of different documents. Here the capabilities of the data base for combination of data could be extensively used. Samples collected during inspection and not analysed on site will be sent to the laboratory at headquarters or to other accredited laboratories for analysis. The data base could aid in choosing the particular laboratory, using the information stored on available facilities.

Using the sample codes, the accredited laboratory could enter the results obtained by different analytical techniques directly into the sample data base. The system could compare the results obtained from control samples with the actual contents of the samples and indicate any inconsistency. The procedure would guarantee impartial analyses and protect proprietary information, since the analytical laboratories would not know the target from which the samples had been collected, nor by whom.

The accredited laboratories analysing the verification samples could use the analytical part of the data base containing the identification data and standard operating procedures. These data could also be made available to the laboratories of the national authorities to allow use of identical reference data needed, for example, to analyse duplicate samples collected during inspections. The sample and reaction data bases would be available to the personnel of the international inspectorate on a "need to know" basis only. However, the accredited laboratories should be able to enter their analytical results in the sample data base on "write only" basis through the sample codes.

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If full advantage is to be taken of computerized techniques, various supporting systems will probably be needed, in addition to the verification data base. The supporting systems could comprise the personal computer system of the inspector, a laboratory information management system for a verification laboratory, instrumental data systems for mass spectrometry and nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometry, data systems of the automatic monitors, and general-purpose international data banks.

A technical description of the prototype data base developed within the Finnish project is given in the report. The system is based on a relational data base (RDB/VMS), and runs on a MicroVax II supermicrocomputer. We have adopted an iterative data-oriented approach that relies on rapid prototyping techniques because verification procedures in the verification are not yet well defined.

The prototype system contains analytical reference data and operational data. We have focused our description on the analytical reference data since our experience lies mostly in analytical techniques and data handling. Reference-type data from organizations and targets etc. are included only to illustrate the possibilities of the data base. As operational procedures have not yet been agreed upon within the CD, or are to be agreed upon later within the preparatory commission, the description of operational data is far from complete.

Data on chemical compounds should be actively updated to be as complete as possible when the convention enters into force. New compounds may be included after the initial declarations. At the moment, our data base contains few identification data on the chemicals listed in the schedules of the convention, for we are now producing fresh data using these standard operating procedures for analyses described in our previous report (CD/843). We consider the use of identical conditions for recording the reference data and the actual verification data of samples to be essential for reliable identification. Our work in this field has been facilitated by the kind donation of listed chemicals by the United Kingdom. We are also very pleased by a detailed offer from Switzerland to provide us with listed chemicals. We also appreciate the interest shown by a number of other countries in providing us with such chemicals.

A user's manual for our prototype system is included in the report. Concurrently with the publication of this report we are offering the prototype system for international experimentation and evaluation, with the purpose of demonstrating the use of this kind of computer system for management of verification data. We encourage users to supply comments and contribute new ideas. User names and passwords will be provided on request to all the States participating in the negotiations. To encourage evaluation and ideas for further development of the system, we hope to be able to arrange a user's training course in the near future.

User names and passwords can be applied for by completing and returning to the delegation of Finland the application form attached to my circulated statement. At the moment, we have no restrictions as to the number of possible users of our prototype system, so that each delegation can decide how many users it would like to have. We would appreciate comments and

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suggestions from laboratories active in this field so as to further develop our prototype system for the day-to-day use of the future technical secretariat.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland for her statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador Kostov, who will introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee contained in document CD/868.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): In my capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, I have the honour to present the report of the Ad hoc Committee contained in document CD/868.

I should first of all like to express my appreciation to members of the Committee for the good will and active co-operation shown to me and my predecessor, Ambassador Tellalov, in the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee this year, both in the hectic time before the submission of the special report and in the interesting debate held during the second part of the session.

The report before you focuses on the negotiations and discussions held during the second part, and does not duplicate the account rendered in the special report of the state of negotiations on the question. However, a summary of the exchange of views held during the first part is set out before the actual work of the second part is discussed.

Let me say clearly from the start that the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee during the second part did not allow for any movement forward on the question; the differences in perceptions of the security interests of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States are still pronounced, and a common approach or common formula still eludes us. However, it would not be fair to omit the positive aspects that arose in consideration of the question this year.

Here I refer specifically to the fact that all delegations have once again reiterated their readiness to continue the search for a common formula concerning guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States, and in particular one which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding nature. This important common ground still prevails. In addition, I would like to underline that several new ideas have been put forward recently that have stimulated some interesting discussion and debate, though they remain as yet inconclusive. These ideas and discussions are reflected in the report before you. Furthermore, I should like to comment on the tone of the meetings this summer. The palpable lack of confrontation on the issue, and the business-like discussions, lead me to believe that this issue is also benefiting from what is perceived as a generally improved international political climate. This should not be underestimated.

The results of the meetings of the Ad hoc Committee this year therefore suggest that the need to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States against

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the threat or use of nuclear weapons is still acute - enough so that the Ad hoc Committee recommends further work on it, one means of which is the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee next year.

In conclusion, I should like to give voice to my sincere thanks to all the secretariat services which have assisted the Ad hoc Committee this year in the accomplishment of its work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons for his statement introducing the report appearing in document CD/868. I congratulate Ambassador Kostov for the conclusion of the work of the Ad hoc Committee. I intend to put CD/868 before the Conference for adoption at our next plenary meeting on Thursday 15 September.

I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, at the very outset, let me congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference this month. You have entered this responsible function at a moment when the opportunities for political solutions concerning a number of regional conflicts are beginning to take shape. This development strengthens our hope that increasing chances for collective measures designed to achieve genuine disarmament will arise. I would like to express my delegation's deep appreciation for the effective manner in which you are guiding the Conference during this month, in which the report to the United Nations General Assembly has to be finalized. May I also take this opportunity to express my thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia, for the excellent work he accomplished? At the same time, I would like to welcome whole-heartedly our new colleagues Ambassador Varga of Hungary and Ambassador Aung Thant of Burma, and wish them success in their work in Geneva. I should like to assure them of my delegation's readiness for close co-operation.

The negotiations on the CW convention have again been the focus of attention at this year's Conference. We would like to express our gratitude especially to the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Bogumil Sujka from Poland, and also to the co-ordinators of the three working groups, Andrej Cima from Czechoslovakia, Pablo Macedo from Mexico and Sadaaki Numata from Japan, for having accomplished such comprehensive and committed work. They have created the best possible prerequisites for progressing in our negotiations. A number of positive results have been achieved to date, and conditions for solving other complex issues have improved. On the other hand, numerous delegations have justly pointed to the slackened pace in the completion of the convention text. Intensive work pursued in an atmosphere of increasing political resolve and confidence could remedy this situation.

United Nations Security Council resolution 620 (1988) has positive impact on our work. It serves to promote the elaboration of international instruments against the use of chemical weapons. At the same time, this resolution explicitly makes reference to the negotiations in our Conference on a comprehensive and effective CW ban. We have also taken note of the

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statement made to this Conference only recently by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Burns, in which he reaffirmed his country's commitment to earnestly continue to work for a chemical weapons ban in the time to come, irrespective of the outcome of the presidential elections.

Let me now turn to some substantive issues of the draft convention. We welcome the fact that some headway has been made in the further elaboration of article II and the annex to article V. This was due to an agreement reached between the Soviet Union and the United States on the definition of production facilities for chemical weapons and the obligations to be undertaken by States in connection with their destruction. These provisions serve to ensure the security of all States in the 10-year phase after the convention enters into force. My delegation would like to reiterate the view that during this period any production of chemical weapons must be prohibited, and any exemption of CW stocks and production facilities from "international arrest" must be ruled out.

Great efforts have been made with a view to solving the outstanding problems in respect of article VI. It would certainly be of crucial importance to reach total agreement on a régime for schedule [1] chemicals. My delegation tried to promote an understanding by submitting working paper CD/CW/WP.195. A compromise solution could provide for the concentration of production of schedule [1] chemicals in a small-scale production facility. Two exceptions to this principle may be contemplated. The first concerns production for special pharmaceutical purposes. Evidence has been furnished in support citing one example, i.e. the production of nitrogen mustard. The production of this chemical in quantities corresponding to actual needs should be facilitated. The verification measures to be applied in this case would have to focus on guaranteeing the complete use of this chemical for pharmaceutical products. This régime would cease to apply once the chemical became an ingredient of the final product, i.e. medicine.

The second exceptional case could be synthesis for fundamental research or medical purposes. In this regard, we consider upper thresholds of 10 or 100 grams per year to be sufficient. Laboratories carrying out such synthesis ought to be specifically licensed by the Government concerned and should be required to submit a declaration to the technical secretariat. Furthermore, their number should be as limited as possible. Consultations on these questions should continue.

An answer also needs to be given to the question regarding the protection of confidential information in connection with article VI. As can be seen from our working paper CD/CW/WP.194, many passages in the draft convention testify to the fact that careful attention has been devoted to this matter for a long time. It has been suggested that information and data should be classified according to their degree of confidentiality. We support this proposal and are prepared to participate in the discussions on this subject. We would like to recall that the duties to be performed in this connection by the Director-General of the technical secretariat have already been set out in article VIII, which provides that a régime should be established governing the handling and protection of confidential data. The preparatory commission could work out a model for such a régime containing also a classification of information in different categories.

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There exists another problem in respect of former category [4]. In our opinion, it cannot be doubted that there are chemicals and facilities outside categories [1] to [3] which pose a risk to the convention. Attempts to identify them and to establish an appropriate régime have been in vain. But nevertheless they must be continued in future.

Considerable efforts have been undertaken to further elaborate on the problem of challenge inspection. This especially applies to the role of the executive council after the presentation of a report on such an inspection. The principles drafted last year under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus from Sweden have been amended. This is a foundation to build on. Intensive work has been accomplished concerning the guidelines on the international inspectorate for the conduct of challenge inspections. My delegation made a contribution to this end by presenting working paper CD/CW/WP.198. It provides for important elements to be added to the existing guidelines contained in the addendum. What needs to be done is to finally agree on some basic issues with a view to formulating the relevant provisions in detail. We hope that our ideas regarding special procedures set forth in our outline of a manual for challenge inspections, which was submitted to the Ad hoc Committee as working paper CD/CW/WP.208, will meet with a positive response. A profound understanding of those practical matters should help resolve the questions of principle.

Regrettably, no progress has been made so far concerning the composition of the executive council, decision-making and other procedural matters. We have proposed a solution in document CD/812. Its underlying aim is to set up an effective organ whose balanced composition and democratic functioning would guarantee that decisions are taken corresponding to the security interests of all contracting parties.

Positive developments are beginning to take shape in terms of activities which are undertaken parallel to the negotiations with the aim of promoting the early conclusion of the convention, its entry into force as soon as possible as well as universal adherence to it. In the first place, mention must be made of exchanges of data and information on the possession and non-possession of chemical weapons and CW production facilities as well as activities covered by article VI. The German Democratic Republic has supported the initiative of the Soviet Union since February 1988. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of our country, Mr. Oskar Fischer, declared in his statement at SSOD-III that the German Democratic Republic does not possess or produce any chemical weapons. Today I am in a position to supplement this declaration by introducing a working paper which will appear as document CD/871.

The compilation of the data provided in our working paper was made on the basis of schedules [1] to [3] of the present draft convention in CD/831, taking into account chemicals on which preliminary agreement has been reached so far. The data have been compiled relying on information gathered with the support of the competent organs and institutions. They reflect the situation in 1988. The compilation is of a preliminary nature and is subject to further refinement following the conclusion of the convention. The ranges for production, processing or consumption mentioned in our working paper have been chosen taking into account the situation in our industry. The number of

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facilities set out in the working paper correspond to the number of locations. The presentation of the above-mentioned working paper is another practical step on the part of the German Democratic Republic to promote progress in the negotiations, increase confidence and contribute to the early conclusion of the convention. We reaffirm our resolve to be among the first to sign and ratify it.

Several countries plan to conduct national trial inspections as a first step in multilateral experiments. The German Democratic Republic also plans to carry out such a national experiment, before the end of this year. Preparations are in full swing. Our thanks are due to Ambassador Ekéus for his readiness to co-ordinate the activities of the countries participating in these activities.

Considerations have been put forward on how to ensure the broadest possible adherence to the convention upon its entry into force. An interesting idea has been aired in this regard, namely the convening of a special conference for this purpose. The forthcoming forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly will offer a first opportunity to take up this question. I would like to make a few observations on how to take advantage of that opportunity.

When dealing with the report of the CD to the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, it would be advisable to inform all United Nations Member States about the state of the negotiations and the tasks to be solved prior to the entry into force of the convention. This we deem all the more important since the "rolling text" is not easy to grasp for those States not involved in the CD negotiations. The Chairman of the CW Committee could give an account of the state of the negotiations, and comments could be added by the item co-ordinators from the various groups. All delegations would thereafter have an opportunity to enter into an exchange of opinions. Informal consultations between delegations would be an additional form of discussion. A concluding statement by the Chairman of the First Committee and/or a draft resolution, if appropriate, would be suitable for recording the results of these activities.

In dealing with activities aimed at fostering the early conclusion of a global convention, I should also like to draw your attention to regional measures to this end. I have especially in mind the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe. We are firmly convinced that the establishment of such a zone in parallel with the preparation of a global CW ban would significantly stimulate the world-wide convention and promote universal adherence to it. The situation in which we find ourselves should impel us to combine all our efforts in the CD to conclude the convention banning all chemical weapons as soon as possible by vigorously pursuing our work on its articles and annexes. This is the only way to fulfil the task our Conference is facing.

In a few days I will leave Geneva after a stay of five years, winding up my duties as head of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic to the Conference on Disarmament. During this period I have been in a position to experience a positive breakthrough in the international situation. Moreover, I had the opportunity to participate in the demonstration of the destruction

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of SS-20 missiles as a symbolic expression of this development, which left a deep impression on me. Despite persisting complex issues, the atmosphere bears the imprint of blossoming hopes and the search for accommodation of interests. Starting-points for understanding and agreements are emerging in all fields of inter-State relations. This development should also have a stronger bearing on our Conference's work.

I am firmly convinced that this forum embodies great potentialities for fruitful co-operation with a view to reaching agreement on arms limitation and disarmament. It is truly in the interest of all States, big and small alike, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, to exploit this potential fully. That is why the Conference will play an even more significant part in future. In accordance with the joint peace and disarmament programme adopted by the socialist States, the German Democratic Republic has been unwaveringly committed to constructive and successful work by the Conference. It will remain so in the future. For us it is not a slogan to state that bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts should complement and reinforce each other. In our view, constructive parallelism is an urgent necessity in order to ensure peace and security for all mankind by reducing and abolishing weapons, and in the first place weapons of mass destruction.

May I take this opportunity to place on record my gratitude and thanks to all colleagues and members of delegations for their positive co-operation and friendly personal relations? I can assure you that I will preserve the best of memories of all the colleagues I worked with in the Conference, since they helped me to come to new realizations. I would also like to convey warm words of gratitude to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Miljan Komatina, and to his Deputy, Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, as well as to their able and helpful team, including the interpreters and translators.

Bidding farewell, I should like to wish all of you good health, much happiness and success in your responsible work hereafter.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. On behalf of the Conference, I should like to bid farewell to our colleague and friend, Ambassador Rose. He distinguished himself by representing his country in this Conference for five years with remarkable competence, diplomatic tact and hard work. He presided over the Conference at the opening of this annual session and proved then once more how valuable has been his contribution to the activities of the Conference. May I also thank Ambassador Rose for the co-operation he has extended to all members of the Conference during these years? While effectively representing his country, with his warmth he gained our respect and friendship. We wish him and Mrs. Rose personal happiness and success in his new post.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): Mr. President, please allow me first to congratulate you on taking over the presidency of our Conference. At this particular time your country is engaged in a complicated process of

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negotiations in a room which we gladly vacated for that purpose a few steps from here. We wish you and your country wisdom and success in these two endeavours, leading on the one hand to peace in the Gulf region and on the other to increased security through arms control and disarmament. We sincerely hope that the end of the terrible suffering in the Gulf area will indeed help us to make progress here, in particular on chemical weapons. I also wish to thank Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia and his staff for the exemplary way in which he has guided us in our work as President for the month of August.

We wish to welcome the newly arrived Ambassadors, Ambassador Aung Thant of Burma and Ambassador Varga of Hungary, and we hope soon to greet Ambassador Sharma of India; we look forward to close co-operation with them. Their predecessors, Ambassadors Tin Tun, Meiszter and Teja, have left their mark on the Conference and we wish them well. I wish to recall in particular the contribution made by Ambassador Dávid Meiszter, with whom my delegation co-operated very closely, a contribution also to the human face of the Conference. I have just learned with regret from Ambassador Harald Rose of the German Democratic Republic that he too will be leaving very soon, but we do hope he will keep an eye on our work in his new function, used as we are to the friendly and frank debates we have had with him.

Today I would like to address briefly a few subjects that play a role in the present work of the Conference and to which my delegation attaches particular importance. Before doing so, I wish to join all those who have expressed the hope that in the wake of the progress that is being made in disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, we in this body shall also achieve more concrete results.

We are grateful for the achievements made in the bilateral negotiations to date, and we are encouraged by the spirit in which these negotiations are being conducted. We take a strong interest in further progress by the two countries, in the first place in the START negotiations, but also in other areas, such as nuclear testing. However, we sincerely hope that the two countries will also find ways to give more substance to the multilateral negotiations in this forum. The concept of constructive interplay between bilateral and multilateral negotiations, as has been advanced by so many delegations (Ambassador Solesby, speaking for the British delegation, was I think one of the first), should gradually be materialized. I also have in mind the concept of constructive parallelism just referred to by Ambassador Rose.

This brings me to the first subject I wish to address today: nuclear testing. We are pleased that the bilateral negotiations have reached a point at which agreement on verification provisions for the two bilateral threshold treaties earlier concluded seems to be within reach. We do hope that soon conditions will be fulfilled for the ratification of these treaties. We note with appreciation the intention of the two States to enter into negotiations, immediately after ratification, on ways to implement a step-by-step programme towards a comprehensive test ban, i.e. by linking reductions in nuclear weapons to reductions in the number and yield of nuclear tests. We realize the difficulties involved in such steps. But it is on the basis of actual reductions in number and yield that progress can be demonstrated.

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This also relates to the role of the CD in this area, and to the way in which constructive interplay could be materialized between the bilateral negotiations and the work here in the CD. Very useful work is under way in the Group of Seismic Experts. But the work of that group can only be brought in to proper perspective when practical work can be undertaken in a broader context elsewhere in the CD, encompassing scope, verification and compliance. It is a great pity that such work, which of course is closely related to work being undertaken in the bilateral talks, is made impossible by continued disagreement on the mandate of the committee to be re-established.

My delegation wishes to urge other delegations finally to accept a mandate that would enable the ad hoc committee to resume its work. This could be done on the basis of the so-called Western mandate proposal. But if that is not agreeable, why not try to reach agreement on the basis of the proposal Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia has submitted? We are, of course, aware of the wish of some delegations, in particular from within the group of non-aligned countries, to start straight away with a more ambitious negotiating mandate. But since consensus cannot be reached on that basis at this moment, we believe that at least work should be undertaken with a more modest, practical objective.

Let me also say in this context a few words on the initiative taken by six countries for a conference of parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to consider amendments to that treaty. We fully understand the spirit in which this proposal has been submitted. However, my delegation wishes to make a few observations and ask some questions on the practical value of this proposal. First, it is clear that for various reasons the time is not yet ripe for a comprehensive test ban. Therefore, we do not understand why the six countries concerned believe that the proposed amendment conference would be the proper forum to settle this deeply seated controversy and, in fact, how this conference could bring the objective of a test ban closer. Second, the amendments have only been presented in part: the most difficult part, the promised verification provisions, are still unknown to us. Delegations will be aware that verification is exactly the major issue that, so far, has not been addressed in all its aspects; its solution has eluded us so far. We wonder why the proponents of the amendment conference think that this complex issue should be addressed outside the CD rather than within.

Also in practical terms, we foresee great difficulties when such a conference would actually meet. Should we, in the meantime, stop the work here in the CD, including the preparations for an experimental exercise by the seismic experts? How much time is going to be spent on discussions about the financing of the conference, its procedures, its venue? Frankly, we really think that we must continue our difficult, painstaking efforts to place the problem on the right track here in the CD, rather than try to divert attention to another forum, which, we fear, offers less chances for success.

I will now turn to my second subject, chemical weapons. I think we all here around this table share the objective of the establishment of a comprehensive agreement effectively banning the production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons. I hope that all of us also have the same perception of the urgent need to reach agreement on such an effectively verifiable convention. Recent reports on the repeated use of chemical weapons

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speak for themselves. They underline the urgency of the matter. Chemical weapons not only present a grave potential risk, they actually represent an atrocious reality. We note with deep concern the reports on the use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish population. We do not know the extent to which these weapons have been used, but such use, if true, is abhorrent.

After the many reports on the issue, there may be a tendency in public opinion to accept the use of chemical weapons almost as a kind of routine matter; not as a man-made disaster, but as a nature-made accident. Let me state emphatically that we consider the continuous violation of the letter and spirit of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 an inadmissible offence against international law and humanity which must be strongly condemned by the world community. Such violations must be stopped for ever. The world community must stand united here and work through appropriate channels, including the Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights and elsewhere, to apply the strongest pressure possible to stop this crime.

In the complex negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons we have made progress on a number of issues this year. Many problems remain, some of a more technical character, some of much wider scope, touching on security concerns, inter alia during the 10-year transitional period. These problems need to be fully discussed. But for the Netherlands the basic scope of the treaty on which we have been working for such a long time is clear. Under the convention all production of chemical weapons by parties will be forbidden, and the destruction and complete elimination of stocks and production facilities must take effect within a 10-year period.

Some remarks have been made recently about the amount of detail which has to be worked out before the convention is ready for signature. There is no doubt that the provisions of the convention must be crystal clear before we enter into far-reaching commitments, which, by the way, also have to be translated into national legislation. But every time we dig into the details, we must ask ourselves whether the common sense of the Director-General of the future secretariat, where necessary under the guidance of the executive council or the conference of States parties, would not enable him to cross bridges when these are reached. We cannot foresee all situations that may occur.

Notwithstanding the many points that still have to be worked out, the "rolling text" of the draft treaty is shaping up. There is growing consensus on the main orientations of its provisions. However, this is not yet the case with article VI, on the régime necessary to verify that permitted capabilities are not used for forbidden purposes. We trust that the national trial inspections to be conducted by a number of countries will help to solve some problems, in particular concerning schedule [2] facilities. You may be aware that the Netherlands held such a trial inspection two years ago. We are at present looking into the possibility of additional activities in this field.

Some major conceptual problems remain, however, in the context of article VI. I note the very interesting idea of so-called ad hoc checks, which may present a solution to deter illegal production in facilities capable of producing chemicals relevant to the convention but not falling under

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routine verification procedures. Much work remains to be done to understand all the consequences of the system of ad hoc checks, such as the types of chemical facilities or sites to be listed, the kind of checks inspectors may perform and the selection of the facilities or sites to be checked. In view of the potential importance of ad hoc checks within the overall system of verification of non-production, we consider serious in-depth discussion of this concept essential.

The convention will be a very complex agreement. We have already long since passed the point at which we can explain it to our children. Yet the need for logical consistency remains. In this connection, I would like to raise the issue of the need for schedule [4], or schedule [...] as it is now called, on super-toxic lethal chemicals. For my delegation the three dots are, for the time being, three question marks.

Three major reasons have been given for including schedule [4] in the convention. First, schedule [1] only lists STLCs that have actually been used to fill chemical munitions. According to the proponents, schedule [4] would have to cover other STLCs. It seems to us, however, that most chemicals liable for introduction in schedule [4] are unsuitable for chemical warfare. And if they are, they would be much better put into one of the other three schedules.

Second, it is argued that some of the facilities producing super-toxic materials may at present not be relevant for chemical warfare, but could none the less be used for producing chemical warfare agents. According to the proponents, such CW-capable facilities would be covered if a schedule [4] were introduced. However, this would only be a very partial solution, as most of the facilities with a capability for producing chemicals relevant to the convention would not fall under schedule [4]. In other words, facilities producing STLCs constitute only one amongst various categories with such a potential capability. An adequate system of ad hoc checks would in our view be much better to address these problems, as this would cover all relevant chemical facilities.

Third, proponents of schedule [4] apparently also consider such a scheme appropriate because it could offer the opportunity for verification of the non-development of chemical weapon agents. But in our view non-development is another issue that cannot be covered by a régime which is meant to check the non-production of known chemical weapon agents and their precursors in militarily relevant quantities. Development almost by definition implies that the agent is still unknown and that the quantities produced are irrelevant. If a verification régime for non-development is at all possible, it would be better taken up separately. In that case, we must address the question of what development exactly is - which stages must be passed before development becomes relevant with respect to the purposes of the convention. We may be able to elaborate some confidence-building measures, comparable to those agreed during the last review conference of the biological weapons Convention, which would suit the purpose.

All in all, it will require much time to resolve the complex issues of verifying non-production and related matters, taking also into account the

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discussions with industry that are needed to find optimum solutions. We therefore hope that delegations will focus their attention on these questions, so as to find adequate solutions within a reasonable time span.

Verification may prove to be the most time-consuming and most intricate problem to be solved before the convention can be drafted in its final shape. But the greatest political challenge may well be to ensure maximum participation by countries in the convention. The question is not only that those countries that at present participate in our work - the 40 member countries of the Conference and the 15 or so others that have joined us and make their contribution - should sign and ratify the convention. The question is also how to encourage other countries to take an interest in the enterprise. We think it is too early yet to foresee what procedures are most suitable to ensure that the convention becomes a truly global convention. One element could be the holding of a final conference open to all States once the details of the convention have been worked out.

At this stage we wish to limit ourselves to one observation valid for the short term. In the Netherlands' view, all countries that are interested in joining the work at present are welcome as observers. We fully understand that various countries, perhaps for practical reasons, do not have the opportunity yet to be represented in the daily affairs of the negotiations. But we do hope that representatives of those countries at least find an opportunity to get acquainted with the reports we have produced, and, if they so wish, put questions on an informal and individual basis to those of us here who are more closely associated with the work. This could be of use to us, and it may eventually also facilitate the ratification process once the convention is established.

Allow me to touch briefly on the issue of outer space. My country attaches particular importance to appropriate measures regarding arms control in outer space, a complex subject which defies simple solutions. The negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on these matters, in particular around the ABM Treaty, clearly show how difficult, how arduous the task is to achieve tangible results in this area. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Hans van den Broek, indicated at SSOD-III how important agreement on a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would be. It is therefore encouraging to hear that the United States and the Soviet Union are very slowly edging forward towards agreement on a period of non-withdrawal. Agreement on this period would add to stability because it would create a more predictable strategic environment.

Predictability has also been enhanced by the recently concluded agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the prior notification of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. I wonder whether it might not be possible to further study the implications of this agreement for other countries. Perhaps the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space may wish to consider the question of whether this agreement could serve as an example to other relevant countries. Since the bilateral agreement on prior notification of launches of intercontinental missiles clearly serves the cause of stability, and thus the security of us all, similar commitments by other relevant States would be important.

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I would not like to prescribe or predict what other relevant countries could do in this respect. But they may wish to consider acting as if they were parties to the bilateral agreement. They may also wish to consider formally adhering to the bilateral agreement. Or they may consider creating a multilateral mechanism of their own. I strongly believe that arrangements of this kind should ultimately have a firm foundation in international law with the purpose of securing binding commitments by all relevant States.

During the past session of the CD a lot has been said about the existing legal régime. The views of my Government on this subject are known to you: we believe that there is scope for improvement, to fill gaps, and we are of the opinion that the Conference on Disarmament should examine the subject in depth. One aspect concerns the strengthening of the registration Convention, which in our view should be given serious consideration. Pending agreement on the strengthening of its provisions, I wish to stress the importance of adequate implementation of the existing Convention. Proper application of the provisions of the Convention could lead, for example, to more and better information on the nature and function of objects in space. If the registration Convention were applied more fully, this could well increase transparency and strengthen confidence on the part of all countries concerned. States may also be prepared to improve on the notification provisions under the registration Convention. Notification could, for instance, be done before instead of after the launching of objects into space. Useful suggestions have been presented in a recent working document by Australia and Canada. The Netherlands fully supports these suggestions.

Before I conclude, I would like to use this opportunity to thank the delegation and the Government of the Soviet Union for their invitation to attend the first operation for the destruction of a number of SS-20 missiles, and for the hospitality rendered to us on that occasion. It was a significant experience to be a witness of the beginning of the destruction of a whole category of sophisticated weapons that for so long has blocked the road towards disarmament. It was with a big bang that those missiles were destroyed. My question is: when will we hear the first "bang" that is the product of this Conference? Not a bang on the table, but a bang marking the destruction of weapons. Or, if you wish, when will we see the fumes of destruction under agenda item 6? Or, for that matter, hear just silence as the fruit of our work under agenda item 1? We hope next year will bring us closer to that moment.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair, and I pray to the Almighty that his wishes for my country at the peace talks in the Persian Gulf region will be materialized soon. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Let me first express the great satisfaction of the Swedish delegation that you have assumed the presidency of the Conference for the month of September and the inter-sessional period. We interpret the decision of your Government to send such a distinguished, high-level official to preside over our work as an expression of the importance attached by your Government to the work of the Conference. May I also, through you, express our gratitude to Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia for his skilful leadership of

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the Conference during the month of August, which kept the Conference on a steady course and also brought some progress in our work? I would also like to address our warm welcome to Ambassador Varga of Hungary, Ambassador Aung Thant of Burma and Ambassador Sharma of India, who have recently joined us.

I will devote my statement today to the question of chemical weapons mostly, but before that I will make some short reflections on item 1. That item of our agenda, "Nuclear test ban", has the highest priority in the CD. This is an issue to which my Government attaches the utmost importance. Given the widely recognized urgent need to initiate negotiations on this item, it is a source of great concern that this negotiating body has not succeeded in starting substantial treatment of the nuclear test ban issue.

We have all welcomed the measures undertaken by the major Powers to carry out quantitative reductions in their nuclear weapon arsenals. The INF Treaty constitutes an important initial undertaking which must soon be followed by reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals. The Treaty is significant also as a means of building confidence and promoting dialogue, and is of great practical interest as to its verification methods. The demonstration of the destruction of intermediate-range missiles in the Soviet Union was a concrete event of great symbolic and political importance. We thank the Soviet delegation and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union for this initiative.

I wish, however, to reiterate our view that if the nuclear arms race is to be effectively checked quantitative reductions are not enough. By means of qualitative improvements the nuclear arms race can in fact continue. It is in this perspective that a nuclear test ban should be viewed. A test ban would provide an effective means of preventing the qualitative arms race and support efforts towards real disarmament. The Six-nation Initiative has - in Delhi, Mexico and Stockholm - called for an immediate halt to all nuclear testing. Broad political support for this goal has been manifested in this Conference, as well as in other international forums. A determination to seek to achieve a complete test ban is expressed in the partial test-ban Treaty as well as the non-proliferation Treaty and was repeated at the third review conference of the NPT. This is a commitment made by nuclear-weapon Powers too. Unless these commitments are pursued there is a strong risk of not only continued vertical proliferation but also horizontal proliferation.

The United States and the Soviet Union have decided to conduct joint verification experiments, one at the United States test site in Nevada and the other at the Semipalatinsk test site in the USSR. On 17 August one of these nuclear tests was carried out, and the second is scheduled to take place tomorrow, 14 September. In this context I must state that Sweden's view is that continued nuclear testing will help fuel the nuclear arms race. We cannot subscribe to a legitimization of nuclear tests. Neither can we endorse in principle testing in any form. We consider that confidence-building experiments in this area should take place within the context of a precisely defined plan to achieve a comprehensive test ban at an early and specified date. The aim is not controlled tests, but no tests at all.

While welcoming the increased transparency in this field, which should help to promote the elaboration of an effective verification system, it would

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be helpful if the international community could become involved in the data exchange. This is a modest idea considering that as much as 25 years ago the two major Powers proclaimed that agreement on general and complete disarmament should be subject to strict international control. Important international efforts are under way with the purpose of finding effective means of verifying a nuclear test ban. Sweden for its part is prepared to supply all relevant data from the Hagfors observatory.

During this summer session of the CD, the Group of Scientific Experts has held its 26th meeting. The Group conducted a thorough review of its report on the design of a modern global network for exchange of seismological data, including level II (wave-form) data. The separate parts of the system - a world-wide network of seismological stations, international data centres as well as national ones and appropriate means of communication - will provide us with adequate methods to verify a nuclear test ban. The Group has initiated a large-scale experiment on the exchange and analysis of level II data with the aim of arriving at further refined principles for the operation of a global seismological network. The different parts of the experimental system will be tested continuously and, later on, fully integrated testing of the whole system will take place.

As a result of the work of the scientific experts, we can now see that it will become feasible to create an effective global verification system which can be used to help observe compliance with obligations under a comprehensive test-ban treaty, even if a considerable amount of work still has to be carried out. Verification is thus now a political rather than a technical issue. Allegedly inadequate verification methods can no longer be used as an argument for deferring negotiations on a nuclear test ban. Why then is it that the CD is not taking decisive steps towards in-depth deliberations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty? There is a de facto convergence of views on the question of a mandate. Continued detailed elaboration of the wording of a mandate will most probably not help the matter, but rather prevent us from tackling the substance of the issue. There is a risk that the inability to define a mandate may be considered as a sign of lack of interest in moving forward on this issue.

Regarding the proposed mandates, my delegation finds the differences between them more artificial than real. For our part we support the proposed text contained in document CD/829, which in our view shows considerable flexibility on the part of the Group of 21. My delegation has also noted the proposal contained in document CD/863. When this proposal was first introduced informally Sweden expressed its interest in working on the basis of this text, and we still consider it as a possible approach for negotiating a compromise formula with regard to a mandate for the ad hoc committee. My delegation considers it imperative that multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be accorded the highest priority. The Conference on Disarmament is the one and only forum for such negotiations.

We have here a forum attended by all five nuclear-weapon Powers. We have easy access to advanced reference work on verification. We are thus well prepared and should be ready to give more substance to our work on the test ban issue. The CD provides us with an important forum for negotiations on a future agreement that should be acceptable to all. Bearing in mind the work

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of the forthcoming General Assembly and its First Committee, my delegation deems it important that efforts to further narrow the gap between differing views on the test ban issue should continue. If these efforts bear fruit, the prospects of having an ad hoc committee on item 1 of our agenda with an effective mandate during the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament next year will certainly look much brighter.

I would now like to turn to the question of chemical weapons. Work in the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical weapons convention has continued in 1988 against a backdrop of intensified and escalated use of these weapons of mass destruction. The situation is serious. We are faced with a threat of further proliferation of chemical weapons and further development of chemical warfare agents and methods for their dissemination. Recent United Nations reports on the continued use of these weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq, as well as other reports in its aftermath, demonstrate in a tragic way the importance of concluding our work without further delay. A comprehensive ban on chemical weapons would, by its effectiveness and globality, insure us all against the resurgence of chemical warfare, from the very date of its entry into force. This is what is expected by the Conference on Disarmament. Our work must be inspired by a new sense of urgency to address and solve all outstanding issues. For Sweden, the completion of a chemical weapons convention is a major priority of the Conference. That goal is within reach. Our success would also imbue the multilateral disarmament process with new confidence, with a new sense of purpose.

However, and much to our regret, we must note that our work in 1988 has fallen short of the repeated calls for renewed or even continuing urgency. Some important issues have hardly been addressed; solving others has taken unnecessary time and effort. We are conscious that substantive progress has taken place in bilateral work between the two major possessors of chemical weapons. We welcome this progress and are acutely aware of its importance, as an illustration of how bilateral and multilateral efforts can support and reinforce each other. We would however urge the two major possessors of chemical weapons to intensify their efforts and to present their results and agreements in a form which would facilitate their transfer to the multilateral context, i.e. into the "rolling text".

Yet if we feel frustrated by the slow pace of our negotiations, it would not be fair to paint too gloomy a picture. During the present session the Committee, under the steady and patient chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland, has made some substantive progress. The efforts and the dedication of the three working group chairmen, Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Numata of Japan, have not been in vain. The report which the Conference is presenting to the General Assembly contains valuable new elements.

I will mention some of them, if I may. The Chairman of Group A was able to bring to the report a well-balanced, carefully drafted text on article XI, "Economic and technological development". His success in this endeavour was in part made possible by the flexibility shown by members of the Group of 21, for which this article is of special importance. We regret, however, that the present text of article XI has not been included in appendix I of the report. The arguments that the text is at an early stage of elaboration and that no

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common understanding exists as to the terms and definitions employed in it are hardly convincing. The text of the article has been thoroughly discussed with inputs from delegations of all groups. Its terms and definitions have to a large extent been borrowed from the biological weapons Convention, which has been signed and ratified by most members of the Conference.

The major breakthrough in Working Group B has been the integration into the "rolling text" of a definition of chemical weapons production facilities and of clear language with regard to the undertaking that these facilities should be destroyed, as well as principles and methods for their destruction.

In Working Group C, the Chairman has managed to make considerable progress on the issue of challenge inspections and on procedures following the submission of inspection reports.

As a result of consultations on the final clauses, conducted by the Chairman of the Committee, well-structured elements presented as alternatives are included in appendix II. They form the necessary basis for completion of this important part of the draft convention. Furthermore, the meeting with industrial experts in July highlighted a number of points regarding confidentiality of commercial and industrial information, and also served to illustrate that the chemical industry in major industrialized countries is committed to facilitating the implementation of the convention.

Finally, substantial and results-oriented work has been made in the open-ended consultations on trial inspections. Having chaired those meetings, I will revert to the issue of trial inspections and report to the Conference on the results of our constructive deliberations at the end of my intervention.

Thus, the results which the Conference is able to present this year are tangible even if they are far from sufficient. I will briefly make some observations with regard to the problems that still remain unsolved and indicate areas where, in the view of my delegation, we will have to concentrate our efforts during the inter-sessional work and during the coming session.

Article I remains the very backbone of the draft convention and the basis for all our work. As a result of this summer session it has been further strengthened through the unambiguous undertaking by all States in paragraph 6 to destroy their chemical weapons production facilities. Remaining brackets seem less difficult to deal with. Consultations will have to be undertaken regarding preparation for use, a problem which is also linked to the issue of development of chemical weapons. The question of "jurisdiction or control" could be solved in relation to other articles.

The clarity and comprehensiveness of our scope provisions provide the practical and moral rationale for the whole draft convention and, in the view of Sweden, remaining issues can and must be solved without any major modifications of article I, which has acquired a definitive and timeless character.

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The same cannot be said about article II, another basic provision of our draft convention. Certainly, the inclusion of an agreed definition of chemical weapons production facilities this summer is a significant step forward. Other parts of the article, however, have not been addressed in substance for too long a period. The present text reflects an early stage of our negotiations and does not fully correspond to the present stage of chemical weapons technology. Definitions under article II must be basic and applicable to the future. However, the present language in article II has a provisional character; it has, on that basis, served us well up to a point, but it has not been of much help in the latest negotiations on article VI and its various régimes. Progress in those negotiations on activities not prohibited by the convention can bring us closer to a new set of definitions and methods of handling them. As a first step in dealing with the problem of definitions the Committee should, in our view, address article II and the schedules under article VI comprehensively in order to transfer relevant lists of chemicals together with some definitions, criteria and guidelines to a special annex on chemicals. Mechanisms for revision should ensure that this annex could be kept up to date. Article II itself should contain only fundamental and permanent definitions and criteria.

Article III, on declarations, does not seem to require any further work at this stage of the negotiations. The only outstanding issue is to fix a date as of which declarations should be made. In view of the comprehensiveness of the definitions of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, it would seem practical to choose the later date indicated in the text, i.e. 26 March 1975. This would help us to avoid unnecessary ambiguities in implementation, which could lead to irrelevant and potentially harmful challenge situations.

The main task remaining in articles IV and V is to agree on the order of destruction of chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities. These articles and their annexes are of pivotal importance for the implementation of article I so as to ensure the undiminished security of all States, including minor possessors of chemical weapons. This problem has been under consideration for a number of years. Useful material with regard to the principles and order of destruction of chemical weapons is now included in appendix II and reflects a rather advanced stage of elaboration. It is, however, clear that differences on the subject remain.

Most States have never seen the need for chemical weapons in their arsenals and others, like the United Kingdom, have unilaterally decided to destroy their chemical weapons and production facilities, obviously without experiencing profound feelings of diminished security. Still, States evidently have concerns regarding the destruction period. The proposal by France in CD/CW/WP.199 and the difficult discussion on the Committee's report these last few weeks convey the message that there exists a problem which has to be solved. Sweden therefore welcomes the consensus that the issue must be addressed in full. In doing so, however, we maintain that any solution to the problem of undiminished security must be found through a balanced and asymmetrical levelling out of chemical weapons stocks and a balanced phasing out of chemical weapons production facilities.

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Sweden, and indeed the whole of the Group of 21, does however reject the possibility of continued production or use of chemical weapons during the destruction period. This would constitute an open invitation to the legalized proliferation of chemical weapons, and would discriminate against all States which have refrained from such production. The draft convention is designed to prohibit the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and not to regulate how to produce, how to stockpile and when to use them.

Activities not prohibited by the convention, covered by article VI and its annex, constitute an area where we have not been able to make any major progress during this session. We hope that the industrial experts' discussion on confidentiality, the convincing demonstration of non-intrusive verification equipment like the "sample now, analyse later" (SNAL) concept introduced by the Federal Republic of Germany, and not least the planned process of trial inspections will provide us with fresh material and new insights so that rapid progress can be made. We must provide for effective inspection régimes but at the same time not allow ourselves to get bogged down in technical details which could usefully be left to the preparatory commission and the technical secretariat to solve.

The main goal of article VI must be to provide for measures that would give States parties to the convention confidence that the basic undertaking not to produce chemical weapons is fulfilled by all States parties. The article provides for methods and principles to control relevant production of chemicals in order to verify either that certain chemicals are not produced or that production of toxic chemicals and their precursors is for purposes not prohibited by the convention.

Our choice of approach must take account of several interests. First, we must provide for a high degree of probability that violations of the convention are detected and reported. This means a stringent régime of verification of declared facilities. In addition to the provisions for challenge inspections, there also seems to be a need to extend the possibility for inspections on a politically less visible level to facilities not declared under the respective schedules. Second, the hampering of research, development and production for peaceful purposes must be avoided. Especially at the most sensitive stage, research and development, legitimate concerns regarding commercial and industrial secrets must be respected. Third, the régime must be easily adaptable to future technological developments. To achieve such adaptability the principles and objectives of verification must be clearly and unambiguously stated, while on the other side the technical verification methods and procedures, as well as the lists of relevant chemicals subject to control, could be smoothly changed and updated in consonance with new technical achievements. Fourth, the régime must be designed in such a way that it can be implemented without incurring unacceptable costs and an unmanageable administration. It should thus be not only effective, but also efficient.

If we decide in the negotiations to widen the scope of routine inspections to undeclared facilities, as is proposed with the concept of ad hoc checks, we must be able to establish, first, that such a régime really would increase our confidence in the convention, secondly that it is made sufficiently effective in order not to create ambiguities which might decrease

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our confidence, and thirdly that the costs are commensurate with the objective. We must establish what the objective of ad hoc checks is supposed to be. Are we looking for undeclared production of listed chemicals? Do we want to control unlisted chemicals that could have military uses? Do we want to check that production capacity is not misused? A purely random, almost accidental, selection for inspection from an enormous number of facilities, most of which could not even be transformed for CW-related production, would be neither efficient nor effective.

Trying to verify what is not verifiable does not create confidence. Verification must be applied to what is relevant and significant. Verification cannot be an aim in itself. A case in point is the area of early research and development of chemical weapons, an issue which has been intensively discussed this summer. My delegation is not convinced that certain proposals advanced during the discussion on this specific issue lead us in the right direction.

The first stages of research and development of chemicals for weapons use in laboratories are undistinguishable from legitimate research for protection purposes. As far as chemicals not included in schedule [1] are concerned, such research is undistinguishable from legitimate research regarding environmental protection, industrial safety, medical or agricultural purposes. We must choose a stage in the development process where verification becomes meaningful, that is a stage where it could conceivably be possible to demonstrate a violation of the convention, or at least a serious inexplicable anomaly. This would hardly be possible before research and development have left the laboratories and entered a pilot plant or weapons testing phase.

A very brief outline of the Swedish position on article VI would be the following. Production of schedule [1] chemicals must be confined to single small-scale production facilities, with the exception of laboratory-scale synthesis and production for medical purposes of up to 10 kg a year. As far as schedule [2] chemicals are concerned, the régime as it now stands seems practicable on paper. The trial inspections will hopefully give us enough experience to finalize that régime. The régime for schedule [3] will need further elaboration. A system of spot checks could usefully be explored. As regards the last, unnumbered schedule, which was also touched upon by Ambassador van Schaik in his speech today, it seems to my delegation that it is the capacity of a given facility that would justify its being subject to control arrangements, rather than the actual chemicals it may be producing. The schedule might even be deleted if we were able to devise another method for identifying and controlling potential (from the technical point of view) facilities for production of chemical warfare agents.

As I have already mentioned, all the lists should be revised and updated and transferred together with relevant criteria and guidelines to a separate annex on chemicals.

In article VII there still remains a heading regarding national technical means without any text. My delegation would consider any language that may be proposed under the heading with great interest. If no such text is forthcoming we would suggest that the heading should simply be dropped next session.

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In article VIII the basic structure of the Organization has acquired almost final form. The core issue that remains to be solved is the composition, procedure and decision-making of the executive council. We maintain a flexible attitude on the relevant provisions. Our main concern is to make the executive council both representative and efficient. This leads us to favour a comparatively small body, certainly not bigger than the Board of Governors of IAEA. The composition of the executive council should reflect political balance and equitable geographical distribution. We fully understand the concerns of some States which, because of their level of industrial development, would carry a higher burden of routine inspections, and their wish for special representation. Those concerns could however be met within the framework of political and geographical criteria.

As to decision-making, rules that would be conducive to consensus should be striven for. Efficient and effective powers of decision-making, however, call for the possibility of voting, and the application of qualified majorities would seem appropriate. With respect to the required majority it is difficult to decide whether it should be two thirds or three quarters, as long as the composition and the full extent and nature of the decisions to be taken by the council are not known. Composition and decision-making must be addressed in parallel. It is also doubtful whether a solution can be found until articles VI, IX, X, XIII and XIV have been fully elaborated. At a later stage it might be useful to consider a differentiated approach to decision-making, implying that different kinds of decisions will be taken with different majorities.

The complex and difficult issue of how to initiate a challenge inspection under article IX, and the principles for the conduct of such inspections within the parameter of no right of refusal, has not yet been finally worked out. The material to be found in appendix II constitutes a sound basis for treaty language that would reflect a balanced approach to the interests of reassurance and security on the one hand and national integrity on the other.

Otherwise, it is the view of my delegation that progress in Working Group C under the skilful and energetic chairmanship of Mr. Numata has been a major achievement this summer. The general rules governing inspections under article IX, now included in the addendum to appendix I, constitute a comprehensive outline. It is our hope that the efforts will continue in such a way that the relevant part of the draft convention can be completed early next session.

Another issue addressed in Working Group C is reflected in a new text in appendix II on the procedure to be followed after the submission of the report. Some problems still remain in that text. Basically the question concerns the extent to which the executive council must, or should, or can express itself on the inspection report and what special importance, if any, should be given to the assessment of the requesting State.

For Sweden it seems obvious that the executive council must be given a high degree of freedom of action. We must therefore rule out a provision which would impose on the council the obligation to determine whether or not a violation of the convention has taken place. Sometimes this would simply not

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be feasible. On the other hand, we cannot deny the council the right to state that a violation has taken place if this has been substantiated by the inspection.

Article X, on assistance, has been thoroughly debated, especially during the summer session. The result, however, is disappointing. The text that now appears in appendix II is heavily bracketed and contains clearly contradictory elements. It seems necessary to reconsider the whole article. The main assurance against the use of chemical weapons lies in a convention of comprehensive scope, effectively verified and universally adhered to. This is the convention we are elaborating. If we conclude such a convention, the issues addressed in article X acquire a rather academic and theoretical character. Nevertheless, such a provision serves a purpose during the transitional period, and can therefore be viewed as yet another way of tackling the issue of undiminished security. But to serve a purpose it must be realistic in scope and possible to implement. Basically it must contain provisions for assistance in cases of chemical weapons use. Such provisions ought to be easy to elaborate. We have, regrettably, growing experience of extending such assistance to victims of chemical warfare. Furthermore, it can contain provisions for facilitating co-operation in the development by member States of programmes in the field of protection against chemical weapons use. Such co-operation must, however, be carried out on a voluntary basis. For many non-possessors of chemical weapons, undiminished security during the transitional period depends on a high degree of confidentiality regarding their own national programmes and equipment for protection against the use of chemical weapons. That national security interest is incompatible with the concept of model agreements.

I have already at the outset mentioned our progress regarding article XI. Suffice it to repeat briefly that in the view of my delegation the remaining brackets could be removed and the text transferred to appendix I.

As far as the final clauses are concerned, article XII has become a stumbling-block. For Sweden, as for many other delegations, our whole work would be undone if unilaterally declared "rights" under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 were to be transferred and thereby somehow eternalized in a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. This convention, as of its entry into force, unambiguously rules out the use of chemical weapons, and that means any use of chemical weapons. This does not mean that those "rights" fully cease. They will have a residual character, but only as a result of withdrawal from the convention. To solve the issue the proposal put forward by Canada that article XII should simply be deleted merits full consideration. It goes without saying that the convention would not limit the obligations under the Geneva Protocol.

The Swedish view on the issue of use leads us to the conclusion that States parties, in exercising their national sovereignty, will have the right to withdraw from the convention if extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of the convention have jeopardized their supreme interests. This right should only take effect if scope for remedying the situation under the convention has been exhausted.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

Openness and transparency are indeed important for our work. Sweden welcomes the declarations that have been made during this session regarding the possession or non-possession of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities. In this context, I am instructed to declare that Sweden does not possess chemical weapons.

This concludes my intervention in my capacity as the leader of the Swedish delegation. With your permission, however, I wish in my capacity as Chairman of the open-ended informal consultations on trial inspections to present a report on the work undertaken on that subject.

In the draft chemical weapons convention, a number of provisions relate to on-site inspections within the chemical industry. In order to expedite work on the convention, and to assess whether the proposed text has adequate and practical provisions to provide the necessary assurance to States that civil facilities are used only for purposes not prohibited by the convention, it has been suggested that trial inspections could be undertaken.

In a first stage, such trial inspections should be carried out on a national basis. In the second stage, the experience in the national trial inspections should be pooled and evaluated together, in the light of the relevant provisions of the draft convention. This process could be devoted to discussion of what might be involved in, and elaboration of, modalities for the third stage: trial inspections with multilateral participation.

Under the auspices of the Ad hoc Committee, and at the request of the Ad hoc Committee Chairman, I held informal, open-ended consultations to prepare the ground for such multilateral trial inspections in the chemical industry. As a result of these consultations a paper was elaborated. This paper has now been distributed to you. The paper is primarily intended to assist interested States in their preparations for the national trial inspections. The suggestions contained in the paper are not in any way binding or mandatory, but can be regarded as a list of issues of relevance to the trial inspections. The paper will be issued as a working paper of the Ad hoc Committee by the Chairman of the consultations.

As was agreed during the preparations for this round of consultations, delegations are free to add their comments to the paper before the end of this session. The present document, as I said, is issued under the responsibility of the Chairman of the consultations. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part (part A - General approach) could be used for the development of scenarios for the trial inspections. The second part (part B - Detailed approach) provides a kind of check-list for the elaboration of procedures for the conduct of the trial inspections. The third part (part C - Specific aspects) provides a list of issues which might be addressed by the trial inspections. Parts of the paper could also be used by States as a reference in preparing reports of the results of their national trial inspections.

Information available regarding the national trial inspections could be discussed during the inter-sessional work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The detailed elaboration of modalities for the multilateral trial inspections could commence in the 1989 spring session with a view to beginning the actual inspections as soon as possible after these modalities have been worked out.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, Ambassador García Robles, who will introduce the report of that Ad hoc Committee contained in document CD/867.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, my delegation congratulates you and welcomes the fact that it has fallen to a person of your experience and qualities to preside over our deliberations in the last month of this year, which is always the most important. Likewise, we would like to reiterate our congratulations to your predecessor, Ambassador Loeis, the distinguished representative of Indonesia, who presided over our deliberations last month.

As you have just stated, Sir, I am going to speak today in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament in order to introduce the Committee's report to the Conference on its work to date during 1988. The report starts with a brief summary of the work of the Committee and the documentation the Committee had before it. It goes on to refer to some progress that has been made towards harmonizing positions and reducing areas of disagreement indicating, however, that in the short time available it was not possible to reach agreement on all outstanding issues, for which reason the Committee agreed that it should resume work at the outset of the 1989 session with the firm intention of completing the elaboration of the Programme for its submission to the General Assembly at the latest, and I quote, "at its forty-fourth session".

The brief introduction is accompanied by a lengthy annex of 31 pages setting forth the provisions that the Programme might contain. These provisions are grouped together in six chapters with the following titles: Introduction, Objectives, Principles, Priorities, Disarmament measures, Machinery and procedures. With regard to the first four chapters as well as the sixth and last, the Ad hoc Committee has made very considerable progress. There are but a few items that are still outstanding in the introduction, Objectives, Principles and Priorities, and it may be said that it would suffice to abide firmly by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to settle any problem concerning these chapters. Turning to the fifth chapter, dealing with disarmament measures, it should be borne in mind that the United States and the Soviet Union have succeeded in reaching positive agreements, among which the joint statement of 8 January 1985 provides an eloquent example of co-operative efforts to halt and reverse the arms race and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it has been possible to reach consensus on most of the basic elements for that objective. It has also been possible to indicate the obligations and responsibilities of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, with regard to preventing an increase in the numbers of the former and reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons. With regard to other weapons of mass destruction, it has been agreed that all States should accede to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which is known by the name

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

of the Geneva Protocol because it was signed in this city on 17 June 1925. There is agreement that it is necessary to make all possible efforts to secure the positive conclusion of the negotiations that are being carried out in the Conference on Disarmament on an international convention that will bring about the elimination of all chemical weapons; there is also agreement that a treaty should be concluded on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, bearing in mind the negotiations under way in the Conference on Disarmament and all proposals made in connection therewith.

It was possible to reach a common position on the need to pursue resolutely, together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. In this connection there is also agreement that the States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of reducing these arsenals. It has also been possible to adopt the conclusion that the gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of allocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly in developing countries. There is consensus with regard to the need for further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, as well as further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, and to prevent an arms race in outer space.

In order to facilitate the process of disarmament it has been agreed that it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. There was also agreement on strict adherence and full commitment by all States Members of the United Nations to the purposes of the Charter of the Organization, and their obligation strictly to observe its principles. Likewise, there is general acceptance of the need for Member States to make all efforts to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament, to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments, and to concentrate on the widest possible dissemination to all sectors of the public of reliable information on the danger of the escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Consensus has also been reached on the fact that disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all, without this implying any undue intrusion in the internal affairs of other States.

The sixth and final chapter of the Comprehensive Programme, entitled "Machinery and Procedures", with the exception of five words related to the Charter of the United Nations, is totally free of square brackets. In it, reference is made to the three stages - the first stage, the intermediate stage and the final stage - that will comprise the programme; it is envisaged that the implementation of the measures included in the various stages of the

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

Comprehensive Programme will be periodically reviewed - including at special sessions of the General Assembly; it is stipulated that, in addition to the periodic reviews to be carried out at special sessions, there should be an annual review of the implementation of the Programme, and to facilitate this the Secretary-General would annually submit a report to the Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme. The chapter and the draft Comprehensive Programme end with the statement that "at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation".

The undoubted importance of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament - and there is conclusive proof of this in the sections already adopted by consensus, of which I have only given an illustrative example in those I have outlined in this statement - highlights the good grounds for the "firm intention" of the Ad hoc Committee that I referred to today, quoting from the conclusion appearing in the last paragraph of its report for this year, in which it emphasized its decision to "resume work at the outset of the 1989 session", in order to complete the elaboration of the Programme for submission to the General Assembly, as I have already said at the beginning, at the latest at its forty-fourth session.

My statement would be incomplete if I were not to conclude by expressing my gratitude, and, I am sure, that of all the members of the Conference on Disarmament, to those whose efforts have made it possible for us to make progress, although perhaps not to the extent we would have wished, on various of the items with which we have been dealing. I would therefore like to place on record the names of those who acted as co-ordinators of the contact groups to whom I will refer in order which we followed every week in reviewing our subjects: Mr. Renié, representative of France, who dealt with Objectives; Mr. Paliakkara of Sri Lanka, who dealt with Principles; Mr. Fagundes of Brazil, Priorities; Mr. Sood of India, who dealt with the bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and measures to avoid the use of nuclear weapons and prevent nuclear war; Mrs. González, of Mexico, who was responsible for everything pertaining to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; Miss Letts of Australia, co-ordinator of the contact group on zones of peace, and Messrs. Dejanov, Bulgaria, and Lundbo, Norway, who in their personal capacity and as "friends of the Chairman" lent their valuable co-operation in the consultations designed to produce a text that would receive the approval of all on disarmament and international security. I should also mention Miss Wilma Gibson, who helped the Committee in its work, replaced when she was away by Miss Anne Dolan and Miss Audrey Williamson, as well as Mrs. Beatrice Malinverni.

In order to avoid any involuntary omissions, I will say that our thanks go to all the members of the Secretariat who have been working with the Committee, both visible as well as invisible, among whom the interpreters deserve special mention. Finally - and a better use could hardly be found for the expression "last but not least" - Miss Aída Levin, Secretary of the Ad hoc Committee for seven years now, that is to say since just a year after it commenced its activities as a working group, who, as I have already said in the past and I am very happy to repeat today, has played her important role with a competence and objectivity which are exemplary in every way.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for his statement introducing the report of the Ad hoc Committee. I also wish to thank His Excellency for the kind words addressed to me. I also extend congratulations to Ambassador García Robles on the completion of the work of the Ad hoc Committee. As in the case of the other report introduced today, we shall take action on document CD/867 at our plenary meeting next Thursday.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, as I am taking the floor for the first time under your Presidency, I would like to wish you every success in the discharge of your important responsibilities during these crucial last days of this year's session. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Loeis, for the efficient manner in which he steered the work of the Conference during the month of August. I am pleased to welcome Ambassador Aung Thant from Burma, whom I wish all the best for his future work in the Conference.

Next Thursday the Conference on Disarmament will be presented with the report of its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I would like to express my appreciation and thanks to the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Sujka, and the chairmen of the working groups, Mr. Cima, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Numata, for the committed efforts and the hard work they have undertaken during the past session to move the negotiations forward.

On 16 August I promised a further contribution on ad hoc checks in the light of comments made since my delegation presented the case for ad hoc checks in working document CD/791 of 25 January this year. The purpose of the proposed ad hoc checks is to come to terms with the existing verification gap and provide an additional and easily manageable possibility for monitoring also those chemical industry facilities which would not be covered by on-site inspections under the provisions so far contained in the "rolling text".

Encouraged by the interest which was shown in our basic idea, we proceeded to elaborate on our concept of ad hoc checks. Today I would like to introduce document CD/869, which, taking account of the interesting discussions we have had on the issue in recent months, tries to develop the concept further, and I hope it will provide a useful basis for future work aimed at strengthening the verification régime for non-production.

In submitting this paper we do not claim to provide all the answers; rather, it is our intention to stimulate further thinking. The following points mark the basic framework from which we propose to proceed. Ad hoc checks are of a complementary nature; they are to be seen solely in the context of article VI, and represent an additional, unintrusive measure for verifying non-production, their main purpose being to verify the absence of substances listed in schedules [1], [2] and [3]; ad hoc checks are of a strictly routine character, with the technical secretariat initiating them on a random basis without any outside interference; and they are to cover the whole chemical industry on the basis of national registers listing all chemical industry facilities in accordance with an agreed definition.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

We hope that our paper will contribute to finalizing expeditiously the provisions on non-production in the "rolling text". In our view it should help to resolve some of the problems which have arisen in the context of article VI, for which we have so far not been able to work out solutions acceptable to all. In this regard I am thinking particularly of the STLC problem which has been debated for a considerable time and on which differences persist. Today's remarks in the Conference seem, in part, to confirm this view. Ad hoc checks could offer a solution to this problem, and thus help to overcome the deadlock on it in the negotiations. Admittedly ad hoc checks, due to their very nature, may not be the answer to all questions which have been raised with regard to the verification requirements of an effective convention. Therefore, I believe that all concerns in this connection warrant our close attention.

In conclusion I would like to express my satisfaction at the prospect of inter-sessional work starting on 29 November this year. We should make the best possible use of the time available during the agreed inter-sessional period. Indeed, I believe that we should not use the inter-sessionals merely to continue our work along the familiar lines. Rather, we might think of focusing our attention on the few specific items we have agreed to deal with during that period. It should be possible as a result of intensive work to make considerable headway on these issues. The Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, will be able to count on the full and active co-operation and support of my delegation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia.

Mr. MORRIS (Australia): The following statement is made on behalf of a group of Western delegations. It addresses item 1 of the Conference agenda - Nuclear test ban.

The group of States for which I am speaking deeply regrets that once again it has not proved possible for agreement to be reached on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on item 1 of our agenda. The group has stated repeatedly its belief that such an ad hoc committee should be established in order to carry out the practical work that would be required before a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty could be brought into existence. It was for this reason that on 20 July 1984, the group placed before the Conference a mandate for such an ad hoc committee, the text of which is given in document CD/521. As was made clear then, the terms of CD/521 represented a compromise proposal by our group.

That draft mandate was then supplemented by a suggested programme of work for an ad hoc committee, the terms of which were given in document CD/621, and by numerous working papers submitted by members of the group both to the Conference and to the Group of Scientific Experts.

We have indicated repeatedly that we would welcome discussion of our draft mandate and our draft programme of work in order to determine where they may be misunderstood or where other difficulties with their terms might lie. This offer has never been accepted. It remains open today.

(Mr. Morris, Australia)

In the face of these disappointing realities, but because we continue to attach very great importance to the establishment of an ad hoc committee under item 1, we indicated a year ago that we would be prepared to discuss with others, as a possible basis for developing a consensus, the draft mandate which had been drawn up by Ambassador Vejvoda in his capacity of President of the Conference for the month of April 1987. That offer was met by the claim, made by some member States of the Conference, that it would not be possible to consider Ambassador Vejvoda's draft unless it were first tabled in the Conference. That action has now been taken by Ambassador Vejvoda, who tabled his draft proposal on 25 August 1988 - document CD/863.

Accordingly, the group of Western States for which I am speaking wishes to record, again, that while its preferred approach would be for an ad hoc committee to be established on the basis of the mandate given in document CD/521, if this proposal cannot find consensus then it is prepared to enter into discussions of the Vejvoda proposal with other groups and delegations as a possible basis for reaching agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee under item 1 of the agenda.

The group for which I am speaking, notes that the same willingness has been expressed by the Group of Socialist States and by China and regrets that, to date, a similar indication has not been given by the Group of 21. Indeed, no reply has been given by the Group of 21 to requests that it agree simply to begin discussions of the Vejvoda proposal.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement, and I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): What the distinguished representative of Australia has just said impels me to take the floor very briefly since I think that would be sufficient. It is not a matter here - at least that is the interpretation of my delegation - of our referring to proposals that have been made by a group of delegations or a delegation several years ago and proposals that are being made this year. It is a matter of comparing them, and seeing whether there have been any substantive changes in these proposals. The distinguished representative of Australia has referred to the proposal that was distributed in document CD/521 of 20 July 1984. Prior to that, on 28 March 1984, the Group of 21 had submitted proposal CD/492. What we would like is a comparison between the 1984 proposals and the 1988 proposals.

What did we say in 1984? In 1984 we said, and I quote:

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish for the duration of its 1984 session the ad hoc subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban to initiate immediately the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests and to exert its best endeavours in order that the Conference may transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session the complete draft of such a treaty."

I think that what the Group of 21 was asking for in 1984 was quite clear. Since then we have said that we were ready to display flexibility, to try to

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

understand the point of view of other delegations, and in a proposal that was ultimately reproduced in document CD/829 of 15 April this year - What does the Group of 21 say? The Group of 21 says:

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee on item 1 of its agenda with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty."

"The ad hoc committee will set up two working groups which will deal, respectively, with the following interrelated questions:

"(a) Working group I - Contents and scope of the treaty;

"Working group II - Compliance and verification."

I think that this text is clear, but if there were a need for an explanation, then I would venture to recall what I said when I introduced this text to the Conference on Disarmament. I said that the words "with the objective" are open to many interpretations, but that each participant could, at the time the mandate was adopted, place on record his interpretation of these words "with the objective".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico. I see no other speaker.

I am sure that all members are aware by now that we are well behind schedule in the preparation of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations, so much so that we will not be able to close the annual session on Thursday, as originally planned. In principle, it might be possible to conclude the session with a plenary meeting on Friday at 5 p.m., if consideration of the draft substantive paragraphs is completed at midday today or immediately after the open-ended consultations on the substantive paragraphs of item 1 to take place at 3.15 p.m. in room 302. Unfortunately, there is a large amount of documentation to be processed during the last stages of our work, as some subsidiary bodies were not able to conclude their work as originally planned. Accordingly, the technical processing of the revision of the technical parts of the report, plus the substantive paragraphs for certain agenda items, will take a bit longer than on previous occasions. I do hope that we can finish on Friday, but I would prefer to formalize any decision concerning the closing date at our next plenary meeting, when we will have a better idea of where we stand concerning documentation. Of course it is understood that, if we are able to conclude on Friday at 5 p.m., the plenary meeting will be devoted only to adoption of the report. Any statement on substance should therefore be made at the plenary meeting next Thursday.

I have no other business to consider today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 15 September at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.482
15 September 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 15 September 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Ali Shams Ardakani (Islamic Republic of Iran)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 482nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the outset, I wish on behalf of the Conference to extend a warm welcome in our midst to the new representative of India, Ambassador Sharma, and in doing so I would like to assure him of the co-operation of my delegation and wish him success in the important task ahead of him.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues its consideration of the reports of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies as well as of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

I have on my list of speakers for today the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the representatives of Czechoslovakia and the United States of America, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, as well as the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Pakistan and Australia.

I now give the floor to the first speaker, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons which has been circulated today under the symbol CD/874.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Before introducing to the Conference the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which I have had the honour to chair during this session, let me congratulate you, Mr. President, on the effective way you are performing your duties as President of the Conference in the usually difficult last month of the session. In seeing you, representative of Iran, in the Chair of the President, I cannot but use this opportunity to express my delegation's sincere hope that the talks on stopping the armed conflict in the Persian Gulf, which have started at Geneva, will soon bring the favourable solution awaited by the whole world.

I have the pleasure today to present to the Conference the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons as contained in document CD/874. This report was adopted in its entirety by the Ad hoc Committee at its 21st meeting on 12 September. During this year's session the Committee has worked again on the basis of the same mandate which was given to the Committee for the first time in 1984. This mandate is indicated in paragraph 1 of the report.

As agreed at the beginning of the session, the Committee dealt with all the articles of the draft convention, as indicated in its preliminary structure. The work was carried on in three working groups chaired by Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Numata of Japan. In addition I held a number of open-ended consultations on articles XII to XVI of the draft convention.

Under the auspices of the Ad hoc Committee, and at my request, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden held informal, open-ended consultations to prepare the ground for multilateral trial inspections in the chemical industry. The results of these consultations are included in working paper CD/CW/WP.213. I wish to express to Ambassador Ekéus my deep gratitude for his efforts and efficiency in performing these duties.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

In July, a meeting of chemical industry experts from many countries was held. Let me again turn to the Swedish delegation and thank Dr. Santesson, who put a lot of effort into chairing this useful meeting.

If we turn to the report we can see that, in general, it maintains the structure and follows the pattern of previous sessions. It consists of several parts on which I would like to comment briefly.

In the so-called technical part I would like to draw your attention to the conclusions and recommendations, especially the recommendations on inter-sessional work to be held in two phases before the beginning of the 1989 session. The session of limited duration in January is to be preceded by open-ended consultations. Both are needed more than ever as we are at a decisive and very specific stage of the negotiations. The inter-sessional work corresponds well with the often reiterated wish of public opinion for the early conclusion of a global, comprehensive draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

As I have already touched upon the inter-sessional work, let me take this opportunity to inform the delegations that as a result of my consultations, I propose that during the open-ended consultations in November, December and during the resumed session in January we should concentrate our efforts on the following main issues: confidentiality with regard to verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry; undiminished security during the destruction period; guidelines on the international inspectorate; and article X on assistance.

Turning to the report, may I draw your attention to appendix I, which represents the updated version of the "rolling text" of the draft convention, thus reflecting the present stage of elaboration of the provisions of the draft convention. That is why it can be considered as a fundamental part of the report. As you will see, progress has been made in many important areas. Changes of various kinds, from very substantive improvements to rather editorial corrections, have been introduced in a majority of the articles and annexes. I assume that these changes are well known to the delegations and that there is no need to go into detailed identification and evaluation of them.

Let me, however, point out some of the achievements which I would place among the most important during this session. In article II the term "chemical weapons production facility" has been largely agreed upon. Article V, and especially the annex to this article, have been further developed and rectified. A new part of the guidelines on the international inspectorate concerning general rules governing inspections under article IX has been developed and agreed upon. I wish to stress, however, that despite hard and intensive work by all of us during the whole session, the results achieved, though important, are not - at least in my view - fully satisfactory.

Appendix II represents negotiating material at a less advanced stage. It contains papers reflecting the results of work undertaken so far on issues under the convention. Its content illustrates its transitional character.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

New material has been added; other material has been further developed or moved into appendix I. I have, however, a feeling that in some areas we could have achieved more.

It is therefore necessary to look at appendix I and appendix II as two parts of one entity. Only using this approach can the work of the Committee be seen in the proper perspective. Each delegation will, on its own, and in the light of its own expectations, analyse and evaluate the progress achieved. For my part, I will only say that we have worked hard, with devotion, in a good business-like atmosphere, and credit for that goes to all delegations, item co-ordinators and individual delegates who did not spare their time and good will to help us move forward.

I warmly thank my collaborators Mr. Cima, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Numata, whose strenuous efforts have been crucial to what we have achieved in the "rolling text". I am convinced that we will continue our excellent co-operation during the inter-sessional consultations and the resumed session next January. My special thanks go to the Secretary of our Ad hoc Committee, Mr. Bensmail, and his assistant Ms. Darby, for their constant devotion and tireless hard work. I wish also to express my gratitude to the interpreters and all the technical staff who have helped the work of the Ad hoc Committee to proceed smoothly and effectively.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for introducing the report of the Ad hoc Committee contained in document CD/874, and I also thank him for the kind words addressed to me and pray to the Almighty that his wishes for peace in our region will be answered soon. I also wish to congratulate Ambassador Sujka for the successful completion of the work of that subsidiary body. I shall invite the Conference to take action on document CD/874 at our last plenary meeting. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): First of all, Mr. President, allow me as head of the Czechoslovak delegation to welcome you to the Chair of the Conference. You have already proven your ability to guide us successfully with wisdom and diplomatic skill through the difficult concluding period of our Conference. Allow me also to take this opportunity to welcome the newcomers to our Conference - Ambassador Varga from Hungary, with whom, as a representative of a country with which we maintain brotherly, close relations, my delegation will certainly work as closely as with his predecessor, Ambassador Meiszter. I also wish the best in our midst to Ambassador Thant of Burma and Ambassador Sharma of India. My delegation is looking forward to having close relations with both of them also.

Mr. President, allow me now to read the statement by the Group of Socialist Countries on the results of the 1988 CD session.

The session of the Conference on Disarmament this year coincided with an important event among the multilateral efforts aimed at disarmament - the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The delegations of socialist countries expected that the two events would influence each other in a positive way. Firstly, that the Conference on Disarmament would intensify its work during the spring session

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

and present to SSOD-III if not finalized agreements, then at least substantially advanced work on its individual items with an appropriate, both flexible and efficient, organizational framework. Secondly, that SSOD-III would duly assess results achieved by the CD as well as at other disarmament forums, confirm the General Assembly's conclusions of 1978 and 1982 and provide a new impetus for further multilateral negotiations on disarmament.

Unfortunately, the CD failed to accomplish the first step of this mutually interdependent action. Our report to SSOD-III, summarizing the CD's work and results for the period between 1982 and April 1988, was far from encouraging. While some important results were reported to SSOD-III, in the first place the conclusion of the Soviet-American INF Treaty, the report from our Conference, apart from registering further progress on the elaboration of the chemical weapons convention and a substantial increase in openness and transparency in work on it, otherwise had little to offer. Undoubtedly, that contributed to the fact that SSOD-III was not in a position either to elaborate specific recommendations for further multilateral negotiations on disarmament or to increase the effectiveness of the negotiating machinery. The socialist countries consider that the course of SSOD-III and the proposals advanced there confirm the important role that multilateral negotiations on disarmament should play.

It is not encouraging to realize that during this year our Conference has yet again failed to achieve specific results which are long overdue. What is even more disquieting is the fact that another year has passed without the CD taking substantive action on priority items of nuclear disarmament. This also applies to the nuclear test ban, in spite of the fact that a number of positive developments have taken place with regard to this important issue. The socialist States continue to regard the early elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests as among the most urgent and significant measures for halting the nuclear arms race and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. All avenues should be pursued to achieve progress on that priority issue.

While expressing their support for the ongoing full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, members of the Group have reaffirmed their strong interest in the parallel work within the Conference on Disarmament aimed at early achievement of an NTB. In that connection, they considered the draft mandate of the Group of 21 (CD/829) as a good basis for starting practical work on the item. At the same time, the Group of Socialist Countries lent their support to the draft proposal made initially on an informal basis by the President of the CD in April 1987 and formally tabled as Czechoslovak working paper CD/863. The Group of Socialist Countries views with understanding the proposal by Mexico, Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and Venezuela for amending the 1963 partial nuclear test-ban Treaty. They have already stated that in principle they support the idea of broadening the scope of the Moscow Treaty by incorporating into it a ban on underground tests. This approach was also reflected during the last United Nations General Assembly session in their support for resolution 42/26 B on this issue.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Positive developments have taken place in the field of nuclear disarmament. The Soviet-American INF Treaty represents a first real measure of nuclear disarmament, providing for the destruction of two whole categories of nuclear weapons. Delegates to the CD had a unique opportunity to witness the destruction of the first Soviet medium-range missiles in the area of Volgograd. This was a demonstration of high political importance. The socialist countries consider that the time is ripe for our Conference to contribute to efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament in its multilateral dimension. This will become even more imperative when, as they hope, agreement is reached between the Soviet Union and the United States on the substantial reduction of their strategic nuclear weapons. The delegations of socialist countries welcomed the action plan for a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world presented by India.

The Group of Socialist Countries regrets that meagre progress has been achieved in the elaboration of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. The Ad hoc Committee on this item, which has been working since 1985, is not in a position to move forward in working out measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, which should be used only for peaceful purposes, since it has been functioning for four years on the basis of the same mandate, which does not provide for negotiations. The delegations of socialist countries made an effort to render work within the framework of the existing mandate and programme of work as fruitful and intensive as possible. The best way to achieve this goal was to focus attention on the discussion of proposals made by various delegations. Thus the main result of this year's session was the concentration of discussion on item 3 of the programme of work. This debate was useful, and made it possible to demonstrate the positive potential of the proposals introduced as well as a positive stock of initiatives accumulated by the Ad hoc Committee. The discussion further confirmed the need for the substance of submitted proposals to be examined by experts and subjected to in-depth and thorough analysis, taking into account their complex scientific and technological character. It confirmed once again the timeliness of the Swedish proposal for the establishment of a group of governmental experts. The Group of Socialist States is in favour of giving the Ad hoc Committee a full-fledged negotiating mandate next year and enabling it to fulfil its primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

The socialist countries deeply regret that once again the Conference was not in a position to commence practical work on item 3 of its agenda - Prevention of nuclear war. Socialist countries, while open to any procedural arrangement, supported the draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21, for it was goal-oriented and flexible enough to allow the consideration of both the prevention of nuclear war and all related matters. Six annual sessions of deadlock on item 3 are irrefutable proof that no procedural arrangement can be a substitute for the political will lacking in some delegations to start practical work aimed at lessening and finally completely removing the threat of nuclear war.

The prohibition of chemical weapons continued to be the only CD item where real negotiations on an international convention were under way. Some positive results were achieved this year. The Ad hoc Committee has reached

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agreement on the definition of CW production facilities, and the relevant text has been included in the main body of the future convention. The socialist countries welcome this development as a substantive contribution to the important process of identifying and completely destroying CW production facilities. They also welcome the fact that article XI, on which practical work was initiated only at the end of last year's session, has been substantially developed. In the view of the socialist countries, economic and technological development and co-operation in the field of peaceful chemistry should have its due place in a convention prohibiting CW, taking chemical industry under control and thus objectively imposing certain restrictions on those involved in it. They regret that the present text of article XI could not be included in appendix I of the "rolling text".

More clarity has been achieved with regard to the functions of and interrelationship between the organs to be set up under the future convention, including the enumeration of the specific functions of the technical secretariat. Active consultations on the composition, procedure and decision-making of the executive council have revealed possibilities for convergence of views in some areas. With regard to on-site inspection on challenge, possible building-blocks for the process after the submission of the report have been discussed and are now reflected in appendix II. Further development of article X as well as practical work undertaken on the final clauses also represent positive results of this year's session. Another positive element in the negotiations was furnished by first steps in the process of multilateral data exchange, to which socialist States made their contribution both by presenting relevant data and by putting forward ideas on the scope of the exchange. This process should be continued and further developed. Future negotiations can also be assisted by the carrying out and appropriate evaluation of the multilateral experiment involving trial inspections of chemical industry facilities, as suggested at the beginning of this session by the Soviet Union. The Group of Socialist Countries expresses its hope that the experiment is going to be carried out as expeditiously as possible, at both national and international levels, so that it will influence our work positively at an early stage of the next CD session. It would be helpful if the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons were asked at the beginning of next year's session to start the final drafting of the chemical weapons convention.

Non-production of chemical weapons has emerged as one of the most important unsettled areas. The socialist countries consider that a strict verification régime is required in order to ensure that chemical weapons are not developed and produced in the future under the guise of peaceful chemical activities. Appropriate forms of monitoring and verification should be applied to various kinds of such activities, depending on the risks to the convention. It would be potentially harmful to the convention if verification were applied only to some areas, while some other fields of activity were left without any monitoring and verification. The Group of Socialist Countries hopes that the verification of non-production of chemical weapons will be treated in all its dimensions. There is also a need for a more goal-oriented approach to work on article II, on-site challenge inspection and some other important questions.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

What is needed now is a much more acute sense of urgency in the upcoming inter-sessional work and at next year's session of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We must not forget that while we are "successfully" developing the "rolling text" of the chemical weapons convention, new chemical weapons are being produced and stockpiled and chemical weapons are being used on an unprecedented scale. The overall sophistication of chemical weapons will make it more and more difficult to trace them in the wide network of chemical industry facilities; their further proliferation is contrary to the basic objectives of the convention we are negotiating. In this connection the Group of Socialist Countries considers the continued production, modernization or acquisition of chemical weapons after the chemical weapons convention enters into force to be unacceptable, since that could lead to further proliferation of chemical weapons and would thus be contrary to the objectives of the convention. The security of the States parties can be ensured immediately after its entry into force through the implementation of a number of measures which would freeze chemical weapon stocks at current levels and would lead to their gradual, balanced and complete destruction.

The delegations of socialist countries welcome the modest substantive progress reached on the prohibition of radiological weapons in relation to both subject-matters. However, they consider that given the nature of the problem under consideration, more substantial results were warranted. The Group continues to be interested in more efficient, more goal-oriented work on the issue, and supports the recommendation of the Ad hoc Committee that it should draw upon the annexes to its 1988 report as a basis for its future work.

The delegations of socialist States note a growing new interest in developing legally binding assurances to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Fresh approaches are urgently needed to overcome the difficulties encountered in the Ad hoc Committee on item 6. The proposals submitted to this Committee offer a way out of the present deadlock. The delegations of the socialist countries favour continuation of the search for a "common approach", in particular a "common formula", on the substance of the security assurances, and are ready to be fully co-operative in the search for an agreement.

The Group of Socialist Countries is definitely prepared to continue work on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, leading to general and complete disarmament. In the first place, this programme should do away with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The Group regrets that this objective is not shared by all delegations in the Ad hoc Committee, which makes it impossible to finalize the draft CPD and submit it to the United Nations General Assembly. The Group expresses its hope that the CD will continue the effort to improve its effectiveness. The relevant proposals of the socialist countries were submitted in the Prague Declaration of the ministers for foreign affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The Group of Socialist Countries expresses the hope that the forty-third United Nations General Assembly session will properly assess the work of the CD in 1988. It should, in the first place, call for further impetus to be given to its consideration of individual items and further progress in its work. Such a course of action would undoubtedly reinforce the image of the CD as a unique multilateral negotiating body on disarmament.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

In conclusion, I would like to express the thanks of my Group to the Secretary-General of our Conference, Ambassador Komatina, his deputy, Ambassador Berasategui, and all their staff as well as the Secretariat staff providing us with all the services.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement as well as for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Before I begin my prepared statement, please allow me to extend a warm welcome to the new representative of India, Ambassador Sharma. Our delegation looks forward to working with him in future months.

At the close of the summer part of the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament, our delegation believes it important to single out for special attention what is clearly the most active and urgent item on our agenda. Accordingly, I would like to provide my delegation's assessment of this summer's work on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Overall, the results of the negotiations this summer present a mixed picture. Ironically, this does not stem from the lack of a common purpose. The members of the Conference share a common objective - a complete, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons. The Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, and the chairmen of the three working groups, Mr. Numata, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Cima, have worked in a serious and dedicated way to bring such a convention into being. We appreciate their commitment and their hard work. Furthermore, we are pleased that, despite some differences, the Ad hoc Committee was finally able to find compromises that allowed it to reach agreement on its report. In particular, the Committee has recommended that a new procedure be established that should end the repeated disputes over listing of documents in its reports, reduce unnecessary duplication, and promote the principle of fiscal responsibility. The United States delegation will continue to seek ways to make economies in the work of the Committee, while not harming the substantive negotiations. I might add that this effort, in line with the overall need to economise, should extend across the board to other areas of the Conference's work.

However, the fact remains that the tempo of progress has slowed down when it should be maintained at a pace reflecting the continuing urgency of our work. An example is the work on the so-called "final clauses", where there has even been backward movement. I would like to offer this morning some constructive suggestions for moving ahead. These suggestions can be grouped into three categories: first, greater participation and openness; second, a focus on the hard problems; and third, an effort to find creative approaches. I would like to outline our own ideas on each of these categories.

With regard to greater participation, the United States is encouraged by the fact that the importance of achieving a truly global ban is increasingly recognized. For example, the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Egypt have made constructive suggestions for consulting countries who are not currently represented in the negotiations. We welcome these ideas.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

Attracting the attention of non-member States is very important. But it should not be forgotten that active participation by members of the Conference is even more important. If a truly global convention is to be achieved, negotiators must hear and take into account the views of a wide variety of States. Toward this end, there needs to be more vigorous discussion at all levels. We would encourage other delegations, particularly those neutral and non-aligned delegations who have not done so recently, to present their views both in the plenary sessions and in the negotiating working groups. Active participation in the negotiations is seen as an important expression of commitment.

Another important form of commitment is support for the 1925 Geneva Protocol. That agreement provides the foundation for negotiation of a complete ban on chemical weapons. All of us must do everything possible to prevent further erosion of the norm it contains. For States that are parties to the Geneva Protocol that means taking action to stop the continuing violations that have been found. In this connection, I wish to inform the Conference that the United States is gravely concerned over the reports of Iraqi use of chemical weapons against its Kurdish population. We have stressed this concern, and the potential impact on United States-Iraqi relations, to the Government of Iraq at a very high level. The United States has been consulting with United Nations officials, Security Council members, and others on the need for an impartial investigation by a team of experts.

States that are not party to the Protocol should accede to it - as suggested by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Sir Geoffrey Howe, during the third special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. Regrettably, as noted by Ambassador Solesby in her plenary statement on 16 August, some members of the Conference have still to become parties to the Protocol.

Greater openness is also a form of commitment. We welcome the data that have been presented this summer with the aim of facilitating the negotiations. I am referring particularly to the data provided in the statement by Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia on 17 July, and in the working papers from the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The United States delegation also presented new data to the Conference. None the less, much more information is needed, particularly from socialist and neutral/non-aligned delegations. For example, nearly one fourth of the members of the Conference have apparently not yet even indicated whether or not they possess chemical weapons. A number of countries with known significant chemical industries have not yet indicated whether they have industrial facilities subject to the convention's monitoring provisions. We urge countries that have not yet provided these kinds of general information to do so in the near future.

It is probably human nature to want to avoid difficult and sensitive issues. But avoiding the hard issues in the negotiations will only prolong efforts to complete the draft convention. Instead, the Conference needs to identify the real obstacles to an agreement and to deal with them. To stimulate this process, I would like to highlight three issues that the United States delegation believes are central to the success of the negotiations.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

One of the most difficult and sensitive issues is certainly the problem of ensuring undiminished security during the transition period, that is, during the 10-year period in which chemical weapons and their production facilities are being destroyed. As a country that has maintained a deterrent chemical weapons capability as an important aspect of its overall security, the United States considers it essential that, as this capability is phased out, our security, and that of our allies, remain undiminished. We certainly share the concerns expressed by others on this subject. We believe that it is high time to deal directly with these matters, in order to determine the nature and extent of the problem and to exchange views on how the issue may be resolved to the satisfaction of all. We welcome the plan to discuss these concerns, which could affect several articles of the convention, in the inter-sessional discussions.

Another issue that the Committee needs to come to grips with is how to deal with the possible development of new agents. This issue has been raised recently by the delegations of the Soviet Union, Italy, the United Kingdom and Czechoslovakia. We share the view that the provisions of the draft convention need to be scrutinized carefully to make sure that they deal as effectively as possible with the potential threat from new agents. Let us look at the real issue, though, not at a shadow of it. Our impression is that the concern expressed by some delegations about laboratory synthesis of small quantities of schedule [1] chemicals is really a concern about development of new agents. The Ad hoc Committee has had months of fruitless debate over proposals for declaration of such laboratories. We share the concerns expressed by the Swedish delegation on 13 September about these proposals. So far the Committee has not tackled the underlying problem, the new agent issue, which has been allowed to block progress on other issues related to schedule [1]. Our delegation believes that those issues should be settled promptly and that the Committee should then focus on the new agent issue separately.

The third key issue I want to raise today is what approach to take to challenge inspection. Intensive consultations held by Ambassador Ekéus during the 1987 session demonstrated clearly that, although there is broad support for a mandatory régime, serious reservations still exist on the part of some delegations. Recognizing that a continued head-on approach would not be productive and that other aspects of the challenge inspection régime have an important role in shaping views of delegations, the Chairman of Working Group C, Mr. Numata, perceptively has focused work this year in these other areas. Under his patient and skilful leadership the discussions have been very productive, and have led to important additions to the "rolling text". We believe that this successful work will facilitate resolution of the central issue of the mandatory nature of challenge inspections when the discussions focus on it again. In this connection, I would also like to express appreciation for the recent working paper on challenge inspection procedures by the German Democratic Republic. This very useful paper is the latest in a series of significant contributions from the German Democratic Republic, and I might add, on a personal note, that our delegation regrets very sincerely the departure of Ambassador Harald Rose of the German Democratic Republic and his important contributions to the Conference will be long remembered.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States of America)

Clearly, the issues I have mentioned are not the only difficult ones remaining. Ambassador Ekéus listed other issues in his important statement on Tuesday. Other delegations may want to highlight other issues as well. We urge them to do so in order that everyone may have a clear picture of where the real problems lie. A convention will only be achieved with a better sense of priorities and the scope of the work remaining.

I want to emphasize the need for creative approaches to the unique challenges posed by a chemical weapons ban. This year a number of imaginative ideas have been put forward, for example, suggestions for promoting a truly global convention; for building confidence during the negotiations; for creating a badly needed data base; for testing inspection procedures; and for increasing the effectiveness of the régime for monitoring the chemical industry. Open-ended consultations on trial inspections, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus, have produced a valuable compilation of suggestions. In each case the authors of these ideas have each made an important contribution. They have given us new, potentially fruitful approaches to the complex and difficult problems that must be resolved.

In addition, Norway has presented further results of its very useful studies on investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons. Finland has also presented additional findings of its uniquely thorough research. We consider these research efforts on verification methods to be important contributions to the progress of the negotiations. These contributions enrich the negotiations and provide the intellectual capital needed to construct a sound agreement. In short, they are part of our common effort to move forward together toward the achievement of a convention that truly meets the security needs of the world community.

Many more new ideas are needed - and from more delegations. Those who wish to see further progress in the negotiations have an obligation to contribute the new ideas that will make this progress a reality. We hope that when the negotiations resume, such additional proposals will be forthcoming and that further progress will be the result.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Ambassador Taylhardat, for the introduction of the report of the Ad hoc Committee appearing in document CD/870.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Thank you Mr. President. Since I am taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, I would like as representative of Venezuela to express our pleasure at seeing you guiding our work during this month of September. Our two countries are not only linked by solid ties of friendship, but also have a long tradition of reciprocal co-operation in the organization whose main aim is to ensure the protection of the resource that is the principal natural asset of our countries, where you have personally played a very active role. We offer you our co-operation and wish you success in your delicate task. My delegation adds its voice to those of other delegations in the hope that the

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

current negotiations will lead to a final solution of the conflict in the Gulf. I would also like to take this opportunity to extend a welcome to our new colleagues, Ambassador Varga of Hungary, Ambassador Aung Thant of Burma and also Ambassador Sharma of India, to whom we offer our broadest collaboration and wish them success in their new functions. I would also like to say to Ambassador Harald Rose, or to say to him through his colleague, that we sincerely regret that he will be leaving Geneva for good. He has offered us his agreeable company and his always balanced and constructive participation in the Conference. We are sure that the new functions to be assigned to him by his Government will furnish us with an opportunity to meet him from time to time so that we can continue to benefit from his always invaluable collaboration and his warm friendship.

I now have the honour to present to the Conference on Disarmament the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, which I have been privileged to chair during the current year. The report of the Committee appears, as you indicated, in document CD/870 and consists of four chapters - the introduction, a description of the organization of work, an account of the substantive work done during the 1988 session and the conclusions. Although a clear idea of the activities carried out may be obtained from the report itself, I would like in addition to offer the Conference a few thoughts on the work done.

First I would like to express well-deserved appreciation to my three distinguished predecessors as chairmen of the Committee, Ambassadors Alfarargi of Egypt, Bayart of Mongolia and Pugliese of Italy, who in their respective terms as chairman laid the foundations which underpinned the work accomplished by the Committee in 1988. Each of them in turn gave a new and vigorous stimulus to the work, and that made my task even more challenging.

I do not think I am exaggerating when I say that this year agenda item 5 of the Conference had some very special characteristics, because two dominant trends vied for influence in the handling of this item in multinational forums. On the one hand the vast majority of countries want specific measures to be adopted that will forestall the spread of the arms race to outer space. On the other hand this issue is a particularly sensitive and delicate one for some countries, prompting them to adopt a very cautious position which leads them to prevent the Conference from playing a significant role in this area, by subordinating action at the multilateral level to the development of efforts being carried out bilaterally. Nevertheless, I think that the report I am presenting to the Conference today will make it possible to see that this year the topic has been the subject of growing attention. More delegations spoke, both in the plenary of the Conference and in the Committee, to express their opinions and to make specific proposals. That in my opinion is a reflection of the increasing priority that the topic has been enjoying within the overall disarmament agenda. My main concern as Chairman of the Committee was to try to ensure that, on the basis of the work accomplished in previous years, the discussion this year would be organized in such a way that we could take a step forward in the efforts of the international community to prevent an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

When we started our work I said that to do this we would have to work in the most effective and practical way possible, and at the time I echoed an expression that had recently been used by Ambassador Morel of France when he stressed that it was necessary to tackle the question of preventing an arms race in outer space "in a specific, concrete and realistic manner". I think that this approach to the Committee's work produced a favourable impact, since this year, although some people are still reluctant to recognize it, there has been a qualitative change in the consideration of the topic. This change can be clearly seen in chapter III of the report, which shows that in 1988 we went into much greater detail in the substantive consideration of the questions covered by the programme of work. This led to better awareness of the delicate political and technical implications of the topic. At the same time, the important differences between the fundamental positions of the main participants in this complex of problems were brought out. Rather than being a step backwards, in my opinion this marks a step forward because until we have a clear idea of what it is that separates us from each other, it will be impossible to try to resolve the differences and close the gap between the extremes.

Another aspect that chapter III of the report brings out clearly is that during the current year, most of the discussions have revolved around the various proposals that have been presented during the debates on the topic. This made the work action-oriented, and also highlighted the fact that although all the members of the Committee recognize that the three topics covered by the programme of work are of equal importance, and that discussion cannot be considered to have been completed on any of them individually, at the same time there is an important segment of the Committee that does not wish the work programme to turn into a kind of strait-jacket that would prevent any progress in the work of the Committee. The discussion on the proposals was helped considerably by an informal paper that I took the liberty of preparing, putting forward a compilation of the proposals presented by the various delegations during the four years in which the Committee has been in existence. In brief, the fact that we concentrated attention on the item of the programme of work relating to existing proposals and future initiatives served to bring out further what has been called the "organic link" between the three points covered by the programme of work. At the same time, it showed that if we want to make progress, we have to focus on identifying specific measures that the international community can take to prevent an arms race in outer space.

I must confess that throughout my term as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, I have often felt as if I was driving a four-wheel-drive vehicle with one of the wheels jammed - sometimes it was even going in the wrong direction - with the result that the vehicle moved only with difficulty. That is why, as far as conclusions are concerned, the Committee has simply reproduced in the report that is now before the Conference the same conclusions as those that appeared in the special report submitted to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Since this is the part of the report that brings together the ideas and concepts on which it was possible to achieve consensus, we were unable to go beyond what you read here. The decision to reproduce the conclusions of the special

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

report was the result of a compromise which shows the spirit of flexibility of the member States of the Conference and their desire to ensure continuity into the future of the work of the Ad hoc Committee. To conclude my presentation of the report of the Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, I would like to commend it to the Conference for approval and at the same time express my sincere hope that next year the work of the Committee will be given the stimulus demanded by the importance of the topic so that its results faithfully reflect the profound concern of the international community over the growing danger that outer space will become another arena for the arms race.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the representatives of Egypt, Mongolia and Italy, the item co-ordinators for the various groups, and also the representative of China, for their invaluable support for the work of the Committee and their ever appropriate and relevant words of guidance which helped me considerably in my task. I would like to address special words of thanks to Miss Aida Levin, the Secretary of the Committee, for her invaluable co-operation at all times and her tireless work for the Committee. I would like to extend my thanks to all the other members of the Secretariat staff who directly or indirectly made our work possible and helped to provide all the services needed so that the meetings of the Committee ran smoothly and without interference. A well-deserved word of thanks, too, to the interpreters, and our great admiration and profound respect for the professional skill and devotion with which they did their job.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Taylhardat, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, for his statement introducing the report of that subsidiary body contained in document CD/870, as well as for the kind words expressed to me and to my country. I extend to the Ambassador congratulations on the completion of the work of the Ad hoc Committee. We shall also adopt the report at our last plenary meeting. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): With your permission, Mr. President, I would like to extend a warm welcome to our new colleague, the Ambassador of India, Mr. Sharma, and wish him success in our work. I would also like to extend a friendly farewell to Ambassador Rose, my neighbour, who has made many valuable contributions to the work of the Conference, and wish him well in his new functions.

Today I want to take the floor only briefly to fulfil a promise I made to the Conference on 18 August 1988, the day after the first joint verification experiment test explosion conducted on the Nevada test site in the United States of America.

One month ago, when the nuclear explosion of the first experiment was detonated, the seismic recordings of the Gräfenberg array in the Federal Republic of Germany were presented to the CD. The purpose was to demonstrate the advantages of "open" seismic stations that provide immediate and unhindered access to seismic wave-form data. As elements within a global seismic monitoring system, open stations are considered to facilitate the procedures for wave-form data exchange among national data centres and international data centres.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

Now, on the occasion of the second experiment, which took place yesterday at 0400 hours UT (universal time) on the USSR test site at Semipalatinsk in Eastern Kazakhstan, the capability of the "open station" concept has been demonstrated again. This time, however, the plots of seismograms which are being distributed to you together with the text of my statement show the recordings of two "open" stations. The first one is, as for the previous experiment, from the seismic stations of the Gräfenberg array. At a distance of 4,000 km from Semipalatinsk, the seismic signals arrived in the Federal Republic nearly eight minutes after the explosion. The seismograms of the second plot show the signals as recorded at the CTB (Charters Towers) three-component station located in Queensland, Australia. Owing to the distance of 10,000 km from Semipalatinsk, the signals arrived at this site five minutes later at 0413:07 hours UT. Right after the expected time, the open Australian system was accessed via the high-speed communication lines of the international packet switched data network in order to initiate transmission of the recorded wave-forms to the Federal Republic of Germany's national data centre. From there we received the plots of the seismograms in Geneva by telefax yesterday morning.

Although this experiment on wave-form data exchange was conducted on a bilateral basis, other stations of this type could easily have been included because the "open station" concept does not require either special arrangements for the organization of the data transfer or sophisticated technical procedures. In any case, this small-scale test again proves the efficiency of this concept and documents the advantages of free and unhindered data access.

As far as the explosion of the second experiment is concerned, the magnitude of this event turned out to be $m_b=6.0$ at both stations. The seismic data from the Australian station confirm this result. Assuming the explosion was conducted in wet hard rock, the Gräfenberg magnitude corresponds to a yield of just below 150 kT of TNT. This assumption certainly corresponds to the geological conditions of the USSR test site in Eastern Kazakhstan much better than those of the United States test area in Nevada. Therefore, the degree of confidence of this result should be higher than that for the explosion of the first experiment, which was estimated to be only 75 kT. If both explosions had the same yield, the strength of the United States nuclear test is underestimated as long as the unique geological conditions of this area are not taken into account. The uncertainties in yield estimation by seismological means are expected to become smaller if data on the experiments as well as on previous nuclear tests are made publicly available as indicated by the United States and the USSR.

Likewise we continue to hope that the Conference will soon find itself in a position to commence practical work on the issue of a future NTB in a properly mandated subsidiary body. As the results of the experiment have demonstrated, some problems remain to be solved in the context of the effective verification of a globally enforced test ban - problems that, using the expertise of the members of the Group of Scientific Experts, could well be tackled in this Conference. The bilateral United States-Soviet talks on questions related to nuclear testing and the joint verification experiment

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

have, after a long period of virtual standstill, significantly altered the political landscape. The members of this Conference should react to this development by displaying the necessary flexibility to render possible constructive parallelism between bilateral and multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement. I am now giving the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Mr. Ezdi.

Mr. ASIF EZDI (Pakistan): Mr President, as I am speaking for the first time this month, I would like to begin by congratulating you warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for September. As two brotherly Islamic neighbouring countries, Pakistan and Iran enjoy the closest of relations and have a long tradition of co-operation with each other in international forums. My delegation would like to assure you of our full support in the fulfilment of your important responsibilities this month and during the inter-sessional period. You have already amply demonstrated your skilfulness in guiding our work, and we are confident that under your stewardship this year's session of the Conference will be brought to a conclusion smoothly and efficiently. May I also express the appreciation of my delegation to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia, for the capable manner in which he handled the work of the Conference last month?

I should like to take this opportunity to welcome Ambassador Varga of Hungary, Ambassador Aung Thant of Burma and Ambassador Sharma of India, who have joined the Conference since my delegation last took the floor. We look forward to working in co-operation with them in the accomplishment of the many difficult tasks with which we are faced in the Conference. May I also extend the best wishes of our delegation to Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic in his new assignment, and express our appreciation for the valuable contribution he made to our work?

In his address on the opening day of the Conference this month, the Foreign Minister of your country, His Excellency Mr. Ali-Akbar Velayati, reminded us of the urgency of concluding a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. It is this subject that I propose to take up in my statement today.

The importance of a comprehensive, effective, verifiable and equitable ban on chemical weapons is more evident today than it has ever been before. Independent investigations by the United Nations have made repeated findings of the almost routine use of these weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. Among the victims have been not only military personnel but also innocent civilians. The world-wide outrage and distress at this flagrant violation of the Geneva Protocol was not, however, sufficient to deter the use of these abhorrent weapons. On the contrary, their use was intensified and became more frequent in later months. We view these developments with grave concern. The Iran-Iraq war has demonstrated the military utility of chemical weapons. These weapons have helped the users in winning successes on the battlefield. The prohibition on the use of chemical weapons seems to have been weakened. These are lessons which will have to be borne in mind in our task of drafting an effective chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

At the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, there was general recognition of the importance of the early achievement of a convention banning chemical weapons and of pursuing this matter as one of continuing urgency. We would like to place on record our appreciation for the dynamism and skill with which the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, and the three group chairmen, Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Numata of Japan, have guided our work. However, despite their resourcefulness and hard work, the results achieved this summer have fallen short of expectations. It seems that our negotiations are losing momentum.

We are mindful of the difficult problems which still remain, some of which are essentially of a technical nature, while others are political in character. In tackling these issues, and as we work through the details of the draft convention, we should never lose sight of our goal - a convention which ensures that no significant violation goes undetected and which guarantees undiminished security to all States parties. Only such a convention would be viable and capable of attracting wide adherence.

Our discussions in Working Group A on monitoring non-production in the chemical industry have not been encouraging. The texts of article VI and its annex which were handed down to us at the beginning of the session have not been developed to any significant extent. On some of the issues, we have seen a restatement of old positions rather than a serious effort to find solutions. We do not underestimate the complexity of the task of elaborating an effective verification régime for a vast industry producing all kinds of chemicals for a variety of purposes and posing different levels of risk to the convention. We also acknowledge that no undue impediments should be placed in the way of legitimate industrial activities. However, the paramount consideration should be to evolve mechanisms which create confidence in the observance of the convention and, where such be the case, bring non-compliance to light. If we have to err, we should err on the side of greater, not less, intrusiveness.

Although no concrete progress was registered under article VI, considerable useful work was done nevertheless. Our dialogue with representatives of the chemical industry this summer was a useful experience. The concept of ad hoc checks was given a further airing, and the problem of confidentiality of information was taken up in a focused manner for the first time. Both these questions address legitimate concerns and will need further detailed study. As my delegation stated earlier this year, the problem of clandestine production in facilities not subject to routine inspections is a real one. In trying to solve it, we should be careful not to give the technical secretariat any powers which could compromise its non-political character. We understand the importance which industry attaches to the protection of sensitive information vis-à-vis commercial competitors. These concerns should not, however, be allowed to override the need for effective verification. Considerations of commercial advantage, we feel, should here yield to those of national security.

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

We welcome the readiness shown by several countries producing chemicals relevant to the convention to conduct experiments at the national level to test verification procedures under the convention and to pool their experience for evaluation in the Ad hoc Committee. This exercise should be followed by multilateral trial experiments at an early date. We have no doubt that the results of these experiments would be helpful in developing and refining inspection procedures. In this context, I should like to express appreciation for the valuable work done by Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden as Chairman of the open-ended consultations on trial inspections.

My delegation as well as most of the other members of the Group of 21 attach special importance to article XI, concerning economic and technological development. This subject was discussed intensively in Group A, and a text which is very largely free of brackets was evolved. My delegation had expected that, like other texts which have received in-depth consideration and on which a wide measure of agreement has been achieved, the language negotiated on article XI would be placed in appendix I. Regrettably, some delegations have seen fit to oppose its inclusion in the "rolling text" on grounds which we find totally unconvincing.

The agreement reached in Working Group B on a definition of production facilities, on the principle that all such facilities would be destroyed and on the consequent changes in articles II and V of the "rolling text" is one of the major achievements of this year's session. The question of the order of destruction of chemical weapon stocks and production facilities remains a major problem area. As we have said in the past, any concerns about security in the destruction period should be addressed by appropriate adjustments in the order of destruction. The maintenance of secret stocks or continued production during this period would however be in conflict with the basic purposes of the convention.

The importance of article X for a viable convention which ensures undiminished security for all participants can hardly be over-emphasized. It would be unrealistic to imagine that the chemical weapons threat would vanish with the signature or entry into force of the convention. Before becoming a party to it, each State would have to satisfy itself that by doing so it did not become more vulnerable to a chemical weapons attack by a potential adversary. These weapons have in the past been used against those who did not possess the ability to retaliate in kind and to protect themselves against these weapons. With a ban on the production and possession of chemical weapons, the importance of possessing a protective capacity would become even more important for parties to the convention. A sizeable number of countries possess this capability, but a larger number do not. It is, therefore, of vital importance that the convention should contain effective and reliable provisions on assistance in protective measures. It is only in this perspective that this question can realistically be addressed. The issues are not academic or theoretical in character, as one delegation suggested at our last meeting. They have a direct bearing on the national security of many countries and cannot be lightly dismissed.

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

My delegation made some proposals this summer in Group B to make article X truly meaningful, including a proposal that States parties should conclude agreements with the Organization, on the basis of a model agreement, on the provision of assistance in protective measures. Certain delegations, however, would prefer to keep the provisions of article X nebulous and ill-defined. Such an approach is not likely to enhance the credibility or viability of the convention or to attract wide adherence to it. I should like here to express our appreciation for the statement made by Ambassador Nazarkin of the Soviet Union on 11 August 1988, in which he expressed support for provisions on collective measures by States parties under article X and for special agreements between States parties and the technical secretariat on this subject.

In Working Group C tangible progress was made in two specific areas connected with challenge inspection, i.e. the procedure after the submission of the report and guidelines for the conduct of challenge inspections. Many of the key problems in article IX remain, however. These should be resolved on the basis of a multilateral approach which recognizes the interest of each State party in the clarification of doubts which have given rise to a challenge inspection. For this purpose, the executive council should be given the power to resolve contentious issues.

Discussions on the final clauses of the convention under the guidance of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee have served to clarify different aspects of the issues involved. We hope this will be a first step towards a solution of the problems. In our view, the convention should contain explicit provisions to preclude any reservations. Furthermore, any reservations made under the Geneva Protocol with regard to the prohibition of use would clearly be inconsistent with article I, and would therefore stand annulled for States parties to the convention.

We would like to express appreciation to those delegations which have provided information to the Conference on their chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities, as well as on other chemicals of relevance to the convention produced by them. This information will enhance mutual confidence and facilitate the task of developing effective procedures for verification.

Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt in his statement last week drew our attention to an important issue which has so far not been considered fully in our deliberations. I refer to the question of measures to be taken by States parties collectively against another country, whether a party to the convention or not, which uses chemical weapons or otherwise poses a chemical weapons threat to a State party. As recent instances of the use of chemical weapons have shown, a reprimand or condemnation by the international community is not an effective deterrent against their use. It is essential in addition that the international community should have a mechanism at its disposal to make the recalcitrant State desist from its acts, or at least to raise the costs for that State of pursuing such a course. The present "rolling text" already envisages the establishment of a multilateral institutional structure for the implementation of the convention. The question of which one or more

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

of its organs should be entrusted with responsibility for initiating measures to be taken against the offending State should now be taken up. While this organizational question falls essentially under article VIII, we also recognize that it has a bearing on other parts of the convention. It might therefore be worth while to deal with this issue in a separate article and to take it up during the inter-sessional period along with other subjects mentioned by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee a short while ago.

The importance of the universality of the chemical weapons convention has been emphasized by several delegations. We agree with this view. Universality can best be achieved if the provisions of the convention are such that each State finds that its security interests are better served by being a party to it than by staying out. In this context, we would like to underline that effective provisions on assistance and on action to be taken in cases of violation can serve as significant incentives for acceding to the Convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement as well as for the kind words he addressed to me and to my country, for the recognition of the speech of my Minister before this august body, as well as for the kind words he rendered to my predecessor, Ambassador Loeb. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Before making my statement today, I would like to invite the attention of the Conference to document CD/872 which I have asked to be circulated today. This provides the text of a statement made on 9 September by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, on the reported use of chemical weapons against Kurdish tribes in northern Iraq.

This plenary meeting of the Conference brings to an end, five years of service by me as leader of the Australian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament. Under these circumstances I thought it might be appropriate and, hopefully useful, if I made a few personal observations. I emphasize the word observations. I pretend to offer nothing more.

When I took up my duties at the Conference in February 1984 I did so as the first Australian Ambassador for disarmament. The decision by the Australian Government in 1983, to allocate resources dedicated solely to the task of disarmament was a direct reflection of at least two very specific Australian concerns. First, our steadfast belief in the multilateral institutions that had been established following the terrible events of the Second World War. Australia played a leading role at the San Francisco Conference on the Charter of the United Nations, and was an original Member of that Organization. We Australians were convinced then of the need for a world community shaped by a new set of values and rules, at the heart of which was the determination - and I quote the Charter - to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". We hold the same view today. Indeed, if anything that view has strengthened as the community of nations has grown, following the great movement of decolonization, which brought with it the reality of the interdependence of our modern world.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Second, the depth of belief that existed in Australia five years ago, and remains today, that the maintenance of international peace and security demands the negotiation of concrete, practical and enduring measures of arms control and disarmament. I took my place at this conference table strengthened in the knowledge of those distinctly Australian points of view, but not a little awed by the knowledge that, throughout this century, the various forms of the Conference on Disarmament that have worked in Geneva had been attended by persons of great stature who had always faced tasks of both immense complexity and importance.

My personal experience of the work that has taken place during the last five years, that is, for half of the life of the modern Conference on Disarmament, has done nothing to alter my view of the importance of and the necessity for the work that we conduct in this body. Yet, like all of us who work here my experience has been a mixed one. There have been moments when depression or frustration over the difficulty of our work and the slowness of progress has seemed to predominate. On other occasions the light at the end of the tunnel has more than flickered. Perhaps such a mixed experience is inevitable because work on disarmament can be described as a good example of philosophy in action. On a philosophical level we all face questions about the nature of human life and human relationships.

For example, we are compelled to ask, is it inevitable that there will be conflict between people? In the sense that there will be differing points of view the answer is probably, "yes". But must it be inevitable that those who differ with each other will then take up arms and wage war? Surely not. There is the related question - does the possession of arms make violent conflict inevitable? Or is it the perception of differences which leads people and States to take up arms? I cannot pretend to have any oracular answers to such questions. But I will make one simple assertion relevant to them and to our time.

The period in which we live has become the most heavily armed age of all time. This is true in absolute terms, that is, in terms of the proportion of resources devoted to arms, but also in relative terms, that is, defined by the degree of the technological sophistication and destructive power of modern weapon systems. I believe this assertion is fact and that it provides a single imperative. We need disarmament and arms control more urgently, more thoroughly, than ever before in recorded history. This fact imposes an irreducible significance upon the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

It is because I hold this view of the importance of our work that I propose now, to offer some constructive criticism of the way in which we conduct our work. I do this as a friend of the Conference and I do it with optimism. Because we are charged with such a vital task distractions of an ideological, indeed of an almost theological character, have no place in our Conference. Too much of our time is wasted in what are merely linguistic disputes about whose doctrinaire orthodoxy on disarmament is the superior or holiest one.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The work of the Conference would be greatly improved if its focus were to be shifted from such disputes and turned, sharply, upon practical proposals related to the real world of: expenditure on arms; the elimination of weapons of mass destruction; the elimination of chemical weapons; the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

I think there is too much diplomatic nicety in the conduct of the work of this Conference. A disproportionate amount of time is spent on our congratulating each other on taking up offices to which either our Governments have appointed us, in the normal course of events, or when through the mere sequence of the alphabet we have taken up jobs simply because it has become our turn to do so. The rules of procedure of the General Assembly of the United Nations, in rule 110, seek to prevent the waste of time that is involved in formal speeches of congratulation. We should follow the same rule in our Conference, as I have done today. If we do not do this we will run the risk of appearing to the public as a nice club rather than a work place.

Too often in my experience at this Conference, we have spent time arguing about mandates for the establishment of ad hoc committees - committees which should form the boiler room of our serious work on disarmament. This shadow play, this substitution of form for substance is not only stupefying, but I earnestly submit, is probably in contravention of our rules of procedure, rules which we adopted and wrote ourselves. The relevant rule of procedure - rule 23 - recognizes that our consideration of and our work on the various subjects on our agenda may take a variety of forms. A distinction is drawn, in rule 23, between subjects on which there may be "a basis to negotiate a draft treaty or other draft texts" and other subjects on which the most appropriate way for us to conduct our work may be in working groups, or technical groups, or groups of governmental experts.

Now, this brings me back to the concept of theology and I must recall that in Christian theology there was once an argument, 500 or 600 years ago, about how many angels could fit on the head of a pin. The argument was never resolved, but thankfully seems to have been consigned to the dustbin of history. We should do the same with regard to arguments about mandates and thus reject any further preference for a diplomatic minuet as against the harder and more crucial work of bringing about arms control and disarmament.

At the end of each of our annual sessions we produce a report to the General Assembly of the United Nations on what we have done during the year. In that report we seek to give an account of our stewardship of the crucial tasks with which we have been entrusted. The report writing sessions are conducted in private. I suggest that we should be grateful for at least this fact, because I do not believe that the people who send us here, ultimately the people of all of our countries, could believe their eyes if they were to see what happens in those private meetings.

The Lemming-like rush to apportion blame for lack of progress is as blind as those poor creatures. The point surely is not who was at fault but what the problems were and how we may be able to solve them, next time around.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

During my time at this Conference there has been a sea change in what is usually called East/West relations. That change has brought significant progress in disarmament and, beyond disarmament, in the potential or actual resolution of serious conflict in a number of regions of the world. I congratulate those in both East and West who have forged this change and I have the temerity to ask them for more.

We are on the right track. Progress should and must continue. But it is of central importance to recognize that the Conference on Disarmament is a universal body. It represents the whole community of nations and is thus also a body within which so-called North/South relations are worked out, as well as those of the East and the West. I am deeply concerned that North/South development in our field of disarmament is now lagging behind that of East/West development. What is required is a new and major effort on both the armaments and the arms control and disarmament issues which so beset a number of the countries of this world which are not a part of the East or the West. The absence from our agenda of such issues, particularly, conventional arms issues, is wrong and needs correction urgently.

Having said this I would want to be clear that I do not deny the global character of the threat posed by nuclear weapons. In this sense it is right that the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament includes major nuclear weapons issues. But it is puzzling, to say the very least, that a number of member States of this Conference who are not nuclear-weapon States and who speak most stridently against those weapons, and against nuclear testing, refuse consensus on our starting practical work on these issues. This seems to represent a preference for ideological protest as against practical progress, and when in some cases there is added to this stance a justifiable concern about the domestic nuclear programmes of such countries, it appears that ideology runs the risk of being identified as hypocrisy.

On the other hand if I were asked to identify what I thought was the major problem we presently face in this Conference, I would say that it is the problem of the potential conflict between what is being done bilaterally between the two major military States, and what is happening or sometimes not happening in this Conference. It is a matter of supreme irony that three years ago the most popular reason advanced for lack of progress in this Conference was that the bilateral relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was not going well. It was said, how could it be expected of us - a mere 38 countries - that we could do well if those other two were in a stand-off. Interesting arithmetic.

Well those two are now not doing badly so according to the logic employed previously, we should also be doing rather better. But this logic has not proven to be the case. So what can we make of the logic? One answer would say that what has been revealed was that the earlier claim that we could not move unless the two great Powers moved was false. I am not sure that this was or is true. Another answer could be that the prior logic had simply been deployed as an argument to mask other agendas.

One could analyse this phenomenon at greater length, but I suspect fruitlessly. Surely the central reality should be that those of us who are not so-called super-Powers should insist upon co-operation and interdependence

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

in actions on disarmament. We should insist not only on bilateral progress between those who hold the overwhelming quantity of weapons but that such progress should lead them to a more co-operative attitude towards our multilateral efforts and lead us to seize the opportunity provided by their bilateral efforts to ensure that the world community moves ahead, together, towards the measures or arms control and disarmament that are essential.

I think we should all recognize that progress in arms control and disarmament will necessarily be tortuous and, that it is a linear process. Quantum leaps are rarely available and indeed, if not measured, could even cause anxiety. Because I believe that we are dealing with such a process I reject any suggestion that this Conference has failed. I mention this suggestion merely because it is heard frequently. I wish to give it no currency. As the chemical weapons negotiations indicate we are involved in a process which is broadly characterized by progress.

The narrow view of the work of this Conference during the last 10 years is necessarily a critical one. It states simply - that the task of the Conference is to produce agreements, it has produced none, therefore it has failed. To say this is like taking a snapshot of a long journey and then saying that the one photograph is the whole picture of the whole journey. I prefer the broader view which recognizes that we were involved in a linear process and attempts to show the whole picture, a picture of a continuing process.

I have attempted to suggest ways in which the whole picture can be improved. Any such journey relies to a good extent upon those who take part in it. In this context, we do face an issue about the membership of our Conference. It is not an easy one but the one main comment I would make is that it is clear that there are a number of States working as observers at this Conference who are making truly substantial contributions to our work on disarmament, even though they are not members. We must find a way to allow these States to sit at the table. In principle, while I do not believe that the Conference would work well with a greatly expanded membership, it also must surely be the case that we should facilitate our being joined by any State which is willing and able to make a real contribution to our work.

I do not believe in change for its own sake but I certainly reject a static view of life or history. I firmly believe in the saying that - those who refuse to learn from history will be condemned to repeat it. Our Conference is vital. If by some means it were to disappear tomorrow individuals would earn the title of "statesman" through proposals to reinvent it, instantly. Our Conference needs to change and grow. I have tried to suggest today some ways in which this might occur.

In conclusion, I do believe fervently that we are involved in this Conference in a great endeavour. Perhaps we should be guided in this endeavour by one of the conclusions drawn by Jacob Bronowski, who, writing in his remarkable book The Ascent of Man, said:

"All knowledge, all information between human beings can only be exchanged within a play of tolerance. And that is true whether the exchange is in science, or in literature, or in religion or in politics".

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

I want to thank my colleagues at this Conference for the friendship they have shown to me and to my wife. I am deeply grateful to the Secretariat for its work and dedication. I wish you all well in the future, and above all, that your work will prosper.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. As Ambassador Butler will be leaving us and the Conference, I would like to reiterate here that his outstanding contribution to the work of the Conference, and his conviction and valuable commitment towards a safer world, will be with us and with all those who render their services in this field. Ambassador Butler well represented a country which has a responsible approach towards matters affecting international peace and security. A vivid example of this valuable approach is manifested, as we have seen, in today's paper by Australia and the strong position adopted by that country vis-à-vis the repeated and verified use of chemical weapons. On behalf of the Conference, I wish him well in his new functions and in his personal life.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia.

Mr. LOEIS (Indonesia): As I am taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, may I at the outset express the pleasure of my delegation at seeing you, Sir, the representative of an Islamic country with which Indonesia enjoys friendly relations, assuming the highest office of this Conference? May I also take this opportunity to warmly welcome the distinguished ambassadors of Burma and India, Ambassador Aung Thant and Ambassador Sharma, and pledge the co-operation of my delegation? We have learned that our distinguished colleague Ambassador Harald Rose of the German Democratic Republic will be leaving us soon. It has also just been made known to us that Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia is to end his service as leader of the Australian delegation to the CD. We wish Ambassador Rose and Ambassador Butler all the best in their future assignments.

As the co-ordinator of the Group of 21 for the month of September, I wish to comment on the references to the Group of 21 concerning item 1 made by the distinguished co-ordinator of the Western group and Ambassador van Schaik during the plenary session on Tuesday, 13 September 1988.

I would like to start by recalling that the Conference on Disarmament is not a deliberative but a negotiating body. In the context of item 1 of the Conference agenda, it is only natural that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately negotiate and conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. The Group of 21 firmly believes that by doing so the Conference would make a concrete and meaningful contribution to disarmament. Throughout its existence, however, the Conference has been prevented from undertaking such negotiations. Most unfortunately, the Conference has succumbed to procedural debates over these last few years.

During those debates the Group of 21 has demonstrated its flexibility in the search for a consensus so that an ad hoc committee on item 1 could be established. As evidence, the Group of 21 in the course of these last five years has put forward three concrete and distinct proposals, namely CD/492, CD/520 and CD/829. The latter was tabled just this year on 21 April 1988, and was acceptable to the socialist group and a nuclear-weapon State not belonging to any group. Furthermore, the Group of 21 would like to

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

point out that CD/829 also incorporates the main elements of the proposal made by a member of the Western group during its presidency in February 1986. Accordingly, the Group of 21 maintains that CD/829 is best suited to accommodate the positions of all States represented in the Conference. To our regret, this flexibility on the part of our Group, supported by the majority of the Conference, was not reciprocated by the Western group. On the contrary, the Western group has kept on insisting on CD/521 for more than four years, and to date this is still considered as its official position.

The proposal contained in CD/863 was officially tabled by the distinguished Ambassador of Czechoslovakia on 25 August 1988, when the Conference was at its busiest preparing the report of its 1988 session. Even then, the Group of 21 apparently was the group which spent more time than any other group in discussing the proposal and analysing it in depth because of the highest importance it attaches to this item. The reason is clear: we want to treat the proposal in a constructive and responsible way. Indeed, we also wish to prevent the Conference from being plunged into an unnecessary round of procedural debates in the final days of its 1988 session, which would complicate the work of the Conference.

The Group of 21 will live up to its commitment in the most appropriate manner and at the most appropriate time, and will be prepared to give its response to and discuss the proposal as well as other proposals at our next session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia for his statement and for his kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the Ambassador of India, Ambassador Sharma.

Mr. SHARMA (India): Mr. President, I have sought the floor briefly to thank you and the many colleagues who have spoken today for their words of welcome to me. Ambassador Butler suggested in his address that we seem to be expending too much time in congratulating each other on our appointments, but I must say that I feel quite comfortable at being made welcome with so much warmth. I would like to assure you, Mr. President, that I and my delegation will work tirelessly towards the fulfilment of the crucial goals and objectives of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Sharma for his statement and I assure him, as I said at the beginning on behalf of the Conference, of the full co-operation of the Conference during his work. I now give the floor to Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Excuse me for taking the floor again, Mr. President, but this time I shall be very brief. I only wanted to express in a more formal way, and independently of my longer statement, how myself, my delegation and my group regret that Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic is leaving us. Yes, it is the rule of diplomatic life, that merry-go-round of colleagues and friends, to which there is no exception and which sooner or later affects all of us. But anyway, I deem it quite proper to express good wishes, congratulations and appreciation for the work of our colleagues, and especially, in my case, for the work of Ambassador Rose, one of my closest friends in the Conference, and my close friend for many years before, who has been representing his country, with which my country has excellent brotherly relations, so well.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Allow me also, Mr. President, to say goodbye to Ambassador Butler, who just announced that he is leaving us too. He also was one of the outstanding figures of this body, and I wish him all the best in his future career. In doing this, I hope that he will forgive me for the fact that I have probably breached rule 110 of the General Assembly's rules of procedure, which Ambassador Butler just called us to observe strictly.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Vejvoda for his statement, and now I certainly have to give the floor to Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): As everyone is breaking rule 110, let me express my pleasure in seeing at this table my old friend Mr. Sharma from India. I really took the floor to speak as Western co-ordinator on item 1 of the agenda in response to what the distinguished Ambassador of Indonesia has just said on behalf of the Group of 21. First, a point of clarification: the official position of Western group on this subject was as expressed in the statement made by my delegation at our last plenary meeting. Secondly, I want to express our appreciation to Ambassador Loeis for the assurance that he gave us in the statement that he made on behalf of the Group of 21.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Butler for his statement, and with this I think that concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I see none.

As announced at our last plenary meeting, I now intend to invite the Conference to take action on the reports of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use of Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The relevant documents, CD/868 and CD/867 respectively, were circulated at the last plenary meeting.

May I suggest that we turn now to the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapons States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons? I put before the Conference for adoption document CD/868. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: We shall now turn to the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I put before the Conference for adoption document CD/867 containing the report of that Ad hoc Committee. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now turn to another subject. You will recall that, at our last plenary meeting, I drew attention to the fact that we were well behind in the preparation of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. I noted then that there was a large amount of documentation to be processed during the last stages of our work, and pointed to the possibility that we might not even be able to conclude the 1988 session on

(The President)

Friday at 5 p.m., as I tentatively indicated. Unfortunately, my doubts have been confirmed. I am informed by the Secretariat that it will not be possible for the technical services to process the documentation required for adoption of the report in all languages, as is the rule in this Conference.

This morning I informed the group co-ordinators of the situation and, on the basis of the needs of the technical services, suggested to them as the new closing date Tuesday, 20 September at 10 a.m., a possibility that I had already mentioned on 7 September. As documents will be issued immediately after processing, we should be able to receive some of them before that date. The translated versions of the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will be available between tonight and tomorrow morning, and document CD/WP.348/Rev.1, containing the technical parts as well as the substantive paragraphs of the draft report, will be ready in English in the delegations' pigeon-holes on Monday at 11 a.m., followed in the afternoon by some of the other languages.

I therefore propose that we adjourn the 1988 session of the Conference on Tuesday, 20 September and that, for that purpose, we hold a plenary meeting devoted exclusively to adoption of the report. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today. I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 20 September at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.483
20 September 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 20 September 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Ali Shams Ardakani (Islamic Republic of Iran)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 483rd plenary meeting on the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with the programme of work, the Conference is to adopt today the reports of two subsidiary bodies, as well as its annual report to the forty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. As I announced at our plenary meeting last Thursday, we shall first take up for adoption the report of the ad hoc committees on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and chemical weapons. We shall now deal with the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, contained in document CD/870. That document was circulated at our previous plenary meeting. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is contained in document CD/874, which was also circulated at our last plenary meeting. I put before the Conference for decision the report of the Ad hoc Committee. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: We shall now turn to the draft report of the Conference to the forty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The secretariat distributed the relevant document, CD/WP.348/Rev.1, in the delegations' pigeon-holes yesterday, and a second distribution has been made today in the conference room. The document issued by the secretariat contains the technical parts of the annual report, as well as the substantive paragraphs relating to agenda items on which no subsidiary bodies were established during the 1988 session of the Conference. The reports of the ad hoc committees will be included in the text once this document has been adopted by the Conference and issued later as an official document.

The blank spaces appearing in the draft report will be filled in by the secretariat at the time of processing the relevant CD document. As usual, members finding any errors of an editorial or technical nature in the various languages should transmit the observations directly to the secretariat, as there is no need for us to take up these minor questions. This also applies to slight corrections to maintain harmony in the text in the various official languages. In connection with the annual report, I should also like to inform you that the secretariat will circulate at the end of this week the index of the verbatim records of the Conference for the 1988 session which must be attached to the report of the Conference to the General Assembly in accordance with rule 45, paragraph (e), of the rules of procedure. The index to be circulated by the secretariat covers the period up to and including the 480th plenary meeting, since it had to be submitted at that stage to the technical services for processing. The final text will also include the remaining plenary meetings, in particular the last plenary devoted to substantive questions, which was held last Thursday. The secretariat would be grateful to receive any corrections to the index not later than Thursday 29 September at noon, so that the annex may be submitted for translation and processing immediately afterwards.

(The President)

I now turn to the text of the draft annual report, contained in document CD/WP.348/Rev.1. As I mentioned earlier, there is no need for us to deal with minor editorial points. In fact, the secretariat has already noted some technical errors which will be corrected. There is, however, a minor addition to be made in paragraph 7 of the document, which could not be included earlier as the question of the closing date of the 1988 session was still open when this document was being processed. That addition would read as follows:

"At its 482nd plenary meeting, the Conference also decided to close its annual session on 20 September 1988."

I trust that this is acceptable. I see no objection.

We shall now proceed to the adoption of the annual report to the forty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, as contained in document CD/WP.348/Rev.1 and as orally amended by me by the addition made in paragraph 7. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts its annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: May I now make my closing statement as President of the Conference during the month of September?

I would like to thank you all for giving me the honour of co-operation in bringing this year's work of the Conference to a conclusion. Special thanks are due to our ad hoc committees, sub-committees and working groups and those who chaired them, as well as their members. I should specially name His Excellency Mr. Miljan Komatina, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, His Excellency Mr. Vicente Berasategui, notwithstanding the great appreciation we all have for the work of the secretariat, the staff and the interpreting team.

My country is proud to be a member of the Conference on Disarmament and takes great interest in the work of this august body. Regular appearances of our Foreign Minister before this Conference to share his views and those of our Government attest to this. We think that in a world which still accommodates aggressors, ideals of disarmament raise hope for humanity. My country, which has been the victim of the bloodiest aggression of modern time, stands as a manifestation of the need for the implementation of these ideals. However, we are glad that disarmament's traditional hall was designated for the peace talks. We hope that all efforts to achieve a comprehensive, just, honourable and durable peace will bear fruit and that the chance denied to our nation during many years of foreign domination, followed by years of imposed war, will be restored so that our nation can play its deserved role in promoting international peace and security.

(The President)

It is most unfortunate that we have been victim of the most vicious and barbaric forms of weapons, i.e. chemical weapons. We have seen the extent of genocide by Iraqi forces not only against Iranian military and civilian targets but also against the Kurdish population of Iraq as well. More unfortunate than the crime is the inability of the international community to move against those who are committing these crimes. As my President in his message to the Conference has mentioned, we hope that shortcomings in international regulations governing the use of chemical weapons, genocide and all crimes against humanity and peace will be worked out so as to contribute to our resolve to finalize the convention concerning a ban on the production, storage, transport, transfer and use of chemical weapons.

As my President said in his message of 2 September 1988, "the Islamic Republic of Iran assesses the new developments in bilateral talks to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles positively and hopes that this step will lead to new and concrete measures for general and comprehensive disarmament." This is to say we welcome the INF Treaty of 7 December 1987, hoping it will be implemented fully by the signatory parties.

Even though the third special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, a significant step in the direction of disarmament, did not succeed in formulating a workable final document, it was however able to address the areas of divergence of views impeding its successful conclusion. These efforts keep all of us hopeful that our ideals and goals are achievable, thus enabling us and all other soldiers of peace to work for a better world, free from threats of mass destruction and genocide. Any further delay in creating ad hoc committees on the first three priority items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament will not be considered a step "not taken" by the Conference, but a backward step.

I hope our shortcomings will not lead us to face other grim realities in the same way as in the case of the use of chemical weapons, where even the recognition and condemnation of the crime, let alone its punishment, is hostage to short-sighted and self-serving petty economic and political concerns. This inaction remained even after special technical teams dispatched by the Secretary-General of the United Nations verified the extensive and frequent use of chemical weapons. To prevent a repetition of such horrors, the Conference as the sole international body responsible for multilateral negotiations on disarmament should be empowered to finalize expeditiously a comprehensive convention. A world free from threats of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons, and the threat of war in general. May future generations remember us as those who chose and achieved real progress in this area over and above exchanges of diplomatic niceties! Insha-Allah (God willing).

I thank all of you again.

That concludes my statement. I have no other questions to consider during this annual session of the Conference on Disarmament. Before adjourning this plenary meeting, I wish to announce that the next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 7 February 1989 at 10 a.m., in conformity with rule 7 of the rules of procedure.

(The President)

As agreed by the Conference today in adopting the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/874, and in accordance with paragraph 11 (d) of that report, the Ad hoc Committee will hold a session of limited duration during the period 17 January to 3 February 1989 and, in preparation for the resumed session, open-ended consultations of the Ad hoc Committee will be held between 29 November and 15 December 1988.

This plenary meeting stands adjourned and the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament is closed.

The meeting rose at 10.40 a.m.