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AGENDA ITEM 74

Question of Hungary

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE ON HUNGARY (A/4304)

1. Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand), United Nations Representative on Hungary: In introducing my report of 25 November 1959 [A/4304] to the Assembly, I wish to make a few observations on each of its main themes.

2. In the opening passages of the report, I have dealt with my appointment by the General Assembly as United Nations Representative on Hungary and I have given the Assembly full information about my approach to the task.

3. In the second and central part of the report, I felt it necessary to make certain observations which arise from the character of the replies received from Hungary and from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It seemed to me that the role of the United Nations Representative on Hungary would be open to misunderstanding unless the true nature of the question of Hungary was clearly restated in the light of the replies given to me.

4. In the third and last part of the report, I have entered briefly into the question of the character of the régime which prevails in Hungary at the present time. Let me add that I have of set purpose refrained from going into this matter in any detail. I felt it best to confine this report to certain specific questions of outstanding interest to the United Nations.

5. Throughout the report, and indeed, throughout the year during which I have held the office of United Nations Representative, I have at every stage kept in the forefront of my mind the question as to the wisest course to pursue in the broader interests of the United Nations and the achievement of its high purposes.

6. It seemed to me especially appropriate that I should commence my report by recalling the simple fact that I was designated United Nations Representative on Hungary by the General Assembly. When I agreed to undertake it, I was well aware that it would constitute a difficult and indeed delicate task. I accepted it because I am convinced that the question of Hungary raises matters of principle which it would not be proper for the United Nations to abandon. For this reason, it seemed to me unwarrantable that I should

hesitate to assume the office simply because of the difficult nature of the tasks which it would present.

7. I am concerned that in the discussions of these contentious questions, we continue to use seemly and courteous terms. I am, of course, conscious of the disparagement of my office by certain representatives; but this office has been created by the United Nations, and it is for the Members of the Assembly, not for me, to judge the good taste of remarks disparaging to the Organization and its agencies. Whatever differences may arise between us, may we not discuss them in the language of reasonable men? My own language and my own reports will certainly follow this line.

8. I would hope that, from the terms of my report, Members of the United Nations will feel justified in concluding that I have done all that lay within my power to discharge the responsibility conferred upon me in the true spirit of the United Nations.

9. I was asked by the United Nations to go into certain questions of fact. Despite the off-hand treatment accorded by them to the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary and to my predecessor, Prince Wan Waithayakon, I did not hesitate to make a renewed approach. It is regrettable that the Hungarian representatives did not see fit to reciprocate in a manner becoming Members of the United Nations in their relations with the Organization.

10. I would add that the date of the presentation of my report arose from my concern that I should not be open to the accusation of having unnecessarily exacerbated in any way an already difficult situation. Had I submitted a report during August or the early days of September, the reproach might not unreasonably have been levelled against me that such a report was untimely, in view of the developments then taking place and all that we hoped for from those developments, although not, surely not, at the expense of continuing injustices. Because of these developments, I delayed the presentation of a report on the question of Hungary until the present session was well advanced in its work. It seemed to me imperative, however, that the General Assembly should devote attention to the question at some stage during the present session. I accordingly took—and in my view, as a matter of plain duty—the initiative in submitting the question. I am most grateful to the Government of the United States for endorsing my initiative.

11. One final observation on the post of United Nations Representative. In paragraph 14 of my report, I have expressed my sense of obligation to continue in the office. At the time of writing the report, I could not be aware whether a draft resolution on the question of Hungary would be introduced during the debate. It seemed to me only fair that I should inform the Assembly as to my understanding regarding the terms of resolution 1312 (XIII) passed at the last session. I see that a draft resolution [A/L.273] is now before the Assembly which bears on the continuance of the office

which I hold. In the circumstances, therefore, paragraph 14 of my report should be construed purely in the sense that my services will continue to be at the disposal of the United Nations if the General Assembly so decides.

12. In the second and central part of my report, I have referred to the "fanciful version" of the uprising in 1956 circulated by the Hungarian authorities. I have quoted from their own party newspaper. This version—and it has been repeated in many forms—is that the uprising was incited and organized from outside with the aid of propaganda, money, and gun-running. Mr. Khrushchev, with that blunt honesty to which we have become accustomed, has spoken very differently in his speech to the seventh Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party which has just taken place. It is a pleasure to record his agreement with the report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary in paying full attention to the misdeeds of the Communist régime under Mátyás Rákosi. It is acknowledged that this régime was such as to create the circumstances for an uprising. Mr. Khrushchev has described that régime as one in which the leaders "took it into their heads that they could do no wrong, that anything was permitted them, and that they could disregard the objective conditions and the opinions of the working people". It seems hardly necessary to look further for an explanation of the uprising. The uprising was a spontaneous outburst of the Hungarian people against the intolerable oppression of tyrannical and largely alien rule.

13. Everyone knows that this uprising was suppressed by external intervention—by the armed forces of the Soviet Union. The report of the Special Committee [A/3592] gave a full account of how it was done. The recent speech of Mr. Kádár reveals that those armed forces are to remain in Hungary.

14. Am I not justified in concluding that in fact Mr. Khrushchev largely agrees as to what the facts were in 1956? In his recent speech to the Hungarian workers at the Ganz-Mavag Railway Factory, he has, I understand, cited the example of Czar Nicholas I, whose Russian force repressed the Hungarian uprising of 1848. I shall quote Mr. Khrushchev's own words:

"Comrades, during the Hungarian revolution of 1848, when the Hungarian people were fighting for their national liberation against the troops of the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph, it did not occur to the Russian Tsar Nikolai I that he was intervening in the affairs of the Hungarian people. He sent his troops to put down the revolution in Hungary, to come to the rescue of Franz Joseph's shaken throne..."

I confess that I had come to believe that it was no longer approved conduct for imperialist forces to repress the uprising of peoples in search of national freedom. It appears, indeed, from Mr. Khrushchev's speech to the full meeting of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party that some of his colleagues had expressed anxiety about the wisdom of intervention.

15. The problem is: should we forget all this? Should the question of Hungary be swept under the carpet? I come from a small country. Small countries are no less concerned to retain their national identity and their national independence than great Powers. What small country can feel secure in the enjoyment of its independence if the doctrine gains acceptance that it is the

privilege of the powerful to police and discipline the weak? That is the principle involved in the question of Hungary, as it has been the case of many small countries in recent years before and after 1939, beginning with Ethiopia. Is this a principle to be forgotten, to be put discreetly aside, because our temporary convenience might best be served by glossing over awkward but tragic facts?

16. I recall a statement of Lord Palmerston, made in the House of Commons on 21 July 1849, following the Czar's brutal intervention in Hungary:

"...opinions are stronger than armies. Opinions, if they are founded in truth and justice, will in the end prevail against the bayonets of infantry, the fire of artillery and the charges of cavalry..."

"I say, then, that it is our duty not to remain passive spectators of events that in their immediate consequences affect other countries, but which in their remote and certain consequences are sure to come back upon us."

17. If there be any problem raising an unforgettable question of principle—and who among us should want to forget it or consign it merely to the pages of history?—that problem is the question of Hungary.

18. Mr. LODGE (United States of America): No delegation here regrets more profoundly than the United States delegation the tragic circumstances which oblige the General Assembly to consider once again the question of Hungary. Last year, in its resolution 1312 (XIII), the General Assembly declared that the United Nations would continue to concern itself with this situation because the Government of the Soviet Union and the present authorities in Hungary were disregarding the Assembly's resolutions on Hungary. The Assembly decided to appoint Sir Leslie Munro as the United Nations Representative for the purpose of reporting on how the Assembly's resolutions were being carried out.

19. The report of the United Nations Representative is now before us. It is a thorough and sobering document. It includes this statement:

"In the course of the past year, no evidence has been forthcoming of any basic change in the Hungarian situation which would warrant relaxation by the United Nations of its continued attention to the problem." [A/4304, para. 19.]

20. There have been hopeful developments on the international scene since the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, developments in which the United States played a part and which we welcomed; but the report of the United Nations Representative on Hungary brings home to us a hard and bitter fact: that on one of the important sources of tension in the world—and that is the injustice done to Hungary—the past year has brought no progress whatever.

21. The representative of the Soviet Union has charged that to debate the question of Hungary this year would interfere with the relaxation of international tension and would be contrary to what he called "the spirit of Camp David". I dealt with the point in the General Committee [125th meeting], but Mr. Kuznetsov raised it here again on 25 November. I quote his words:

"However, it is clear to every unbiased person that an attempt grossly to interfere in the domestic life of a sovereign State, in order to establish by

force a régime which is against the people cannot but conflict with the spirit of Camp David." [844th meeting, para. 51.]

The United States can accept every word of that sentence. If the spirit of Camp David is the spirit of promoting peace, then surely the country which continues—and I quote—"to interfere in the domestic life of a sovereign State"—namely, Hungary—"in order to establish by force a régime which is against the people" is acting contrary to that peaceful spirit.

22. The United Nations found long ago, as a result of an impartial investigation and by an overwhelming vote, that it was the Soviet Union which had interfered in the domestic affairs of Hungary and had imposed a régime there by armed force. Not surprisingly, that régime is unpopular; this is proved by the fact that it has never dared to test its popularity in a really free election.

23. And yet we who wish the United Nations to continue its concern with the question of Hungary are accused by the Soviet representatives here with "prosecuting the cold war". That really is turning the truth upside down and inside out. It is like saying that it is quite consistent with the United Nations Charter for a large nation to force injustice upon a small nation, but that it is wrong for the United Nations to talk about it. But that is not what the Charter says, and that is not what was said at Camp David. Indeed, nothing was said at Camp David which would require us to ignore or condone the situation which still exists in Hungary. No one in this hall would be more relieved than we of the United States, if the report of the United Nations Representative had been positive rather than negative, and if our debate could have taken place in an atmosphere of co-operation. The fact that this is not the case is the fault of the Soviet Union and of the present Hungarian régime. They have thus imposed upon us a duty which we cannot shirk.

24. Now, before we come to the situation which now exists in Hungary, let us recall briefly the essential facts about its origin in the events of October and November 1956. For this we do not have to rely on the Soviet and Hungarian authorities whose version of it the United Nations Representative correctly calls "fanciful". The General Assembly took the trouble to find out the facts when it created the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary. On 14 September 1957, the Assembly, after receiving the detailed and authoritative report of that Committee, adopted resolution 1133 (XI) among whose findings were these:

"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, has deprived Hungary of its liberty and political independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental human rights;

"The present Hungarian régime has been imposed on the Hungarian people by the armed intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

"...

"The present authorities in Hungary have violated the human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty of Peace with Hungary."

25. These were among the acts which the General Assembly, in that resolution, condemned by a vote of 60 to 10. Repeatedly in that resolution, and in others before and since, the General Assembly has expressed

its desire that Hungary may regain its independence and the Hungarian people may again enjoy the liberties for which they fought so heroically. To that end, the General Assembly has repeatedly called on the Soviet Union and the Hungarian authorities to cease their violations of the Charter. But they have persisted in their violations. Repeatedly also, the General Assembly has called upon the Soviet Union to co-operate with its appointed representatives, first with the Secretary-General, then with the five distinguished members of the Special Committee, then with Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand, and then with Sir Leslie Munro. In every case, they have refused and have denounced these representatives of the General Assembly in terms which were actually abusive. By their refusals, the Soviet and Hungarian authorities have denied themselves the opportunity to prove whatever truth lay in their own assertions. The world can hardly be blamed for not believing what they say.

26. Repeatedly also we have called attention here to acts of repression and persecution against Hungarians who were involved in the 1956 national uprising, acts committed despite promises of amnesty and leniency. In spite of repeated appeals by the General Assembly for an end to the repression, the world was grieved again in 1958 by the news of the secret executions of Prime Minister Imre Nagy, General Maléter and their companions. The United Nations Special Committee further reported, on the basis of official Hungarian communist sources, the names of thirty individuals put to death and 110 imprisoned for "counter-revolutionary crimes" between June 1957 and June 1958. As recently as December 1958, the General Assembly, in its resolution 1312 (XIII), called upon the Soviet Union and the Hungarian régime "to desist from repressive measures against the Hungarian people".

27. Yet always the claim from Moscow and Budapest was either that the reports were untrue or—if they could not be denied—that this was an internal matter and therefore none of our business in the United Nations.

28. Now, against that background let us review in more detail the events of the past year. To begin with, the Soviet army of occupation remains in Hungary. Sir Leslie Munro pointed out in his report: "Soviet forces have remained in the country, contrary to the requests of the General Assembly for their withdrawal." [A/4304, para. 20.] This statement of fact was confirmed by the head of the Hungarian Communist Party, János Kádár, on 30 November. He said that certain elements "placed hopes on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary". And he added: "These troops are stationed in Hungary, not for domestic political reasons, but solely for reasons connected with yet unsolved international questions."

29. So, the question presents itself: What "unsolved international question" requires the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary? Hungary has common frontiers with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and Austria. Mr. Kádár does not complain of any danger to his country from the Soviet Union, from Czechoslovakia or from Romania. As to Yugoslavia, he himself said on 30 November that Hungarian relations with Yugoslavia had returned to normal.

30. By process of elimination, therefore, we come to Austria, a country which is neutral and unarmed. Certainly nobody will claim that Austria is such a threat to Hungary or to peace and security in Central

Europe as to require at least 50,000 Soviet soldiers to stand guard in Hungary. The idea is absurd on its face. We must look elsewhere for the true explanation.

31. Now, Mr. Kádár offered a vague sort of explanation when he spoke ominously about "certain reactionary elements" which, as he put it, "pin their hopes on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary". We have heard that sort of talk many times. It reminds us of the charge which was made at the time of the national uprising in 1956, that that patriotic movement by virtually the whole Hungarian people was somehow instigated and directed by the United States. Mr. Kuznetsov followed that version when he said here on 25 November that "counter-revolutionary elements", to use his phrase—as though the communist revolution was the last revolution ever to come—were to blame for the events of 1956 and that the plotters were "supported from the outside", and that the Soviet forces intervened "at the request of the Hungarian Government".

32. That fictitious version of history was repudiated long ago by the General Assembly. The truth is that the Hungarian freedom fighters were the true revolutionaries; the communist agents were the true tools of reaction. Let us call things by their proper names. Indeed, neither the Soviet Union nor its Hungarian associates insist on the old version any more. If we examine what they now say we may find some clues to the real reason why Soviet troops are in Hungary today.

33. There were some noteworthy moments of candour at the recent communist meeting in Budapest. Neither Mr. Khrushchev nor Mr. Kádár, both of whom spoke there, was satisfied any more simply to blame the "fascists" and the "Horthyists" for the uprising of 1956, which always was an absurd claim, because there were neither fascists nor Horthyists in the Imre Nagy government which was overthrown by Soviet troops. Instead, they have shifted the principal blame to Rákosi, who had been the communist ruler of Hungary for years before 1956 and who had made himself thoroughly hated by all segments of the Hungarian people.

34. But now the world is asked to believe that the evil Rákosi days are over, and that all has changed for the better in Hungary. We are even told that the Hungarian elections prove this. But the fact that 98.6 per cent of the Hungarian electorate went to the polls in 1958 and voted "yes" for the only list of candidates on the ballot, in a country where there is no free press, no right of free opposition, and all power is concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party, cannot prove anything except the devotion of the régime to a thoroughly empty and meaningless ritual.

35. If we really want clues to the present state of affairs in Hungary, we can find them in other official admissions of the Hungarian communist leadership.

36. They have admitted that Communist Party membership is only about half of what it was before the events of 1956, and that "several hundreds of thousands of well-meaning, sympathizing, but not sufficiently staunch former party members stay outside the party".

37. They admit "that an important part of the intellectuals, many scientists and scholars have not yet adopted the Marxist-Leninist principles"; and Mr. Kádár went so far as to warn these intellectuals that they could no longer remain aloof "because the people

expect them to give clear answers, mostly in their works, on which side they stand in the class struggle". Such is the fate of the creative mind in Hungary today.

38. Then the Communist leadership also admits that the farmers do not take to the programme of collective farms, and Mr. Kádár suggested that they must be "guided"—that is the verb—into the right path by what he called "strength of persuasion", a phrase which, coming from the chief of a police State, is an ugly one indeed.

39. That is a true picture of the situation in Hungary today. Neither the former Communist Party members nor the intellectuals nor the farmers have rallied to this Soviet-imposed régime. Mr. Khrushchev said of Rákosi that he "became estranged from the masses" and that he "began to order the masses about". But it is perfectly clear that the present régime in Hungary is every bit as "estranged from the masses" as was that of Rákosi, and every bit as dependent on foreign troops to maintain its grip.

40. There we have the only true and plausible reason for the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary today. It does indeed stem, as Mr. Kádár said, from "unsolved international questions"—namely, how to make the Hungarian people accept a régime which was imposed from the outside and which they thoroughly hate. That is the unsolved international question. That question is not only unsolved, it is insoluble as long as it is approached in this way.

41. The United States hopes, as surely many other nations hope, that, as a result of the encouraging developments which have recently taken place in international relations, the Soviet Union will eventually recognize that it is to its own advantage to eliminate an important source of tension by complying with the United Nations resolutions on Hungary. These resolutions are designed solely to enable the Hungarian people to enjoy their fundamental human rights and attain real national independence. Until that day comes, the Soviet Union will remain responsible for the injustices which are visited on the Hungarian people.

42. The General Assembly is already familiar with most of these injustices. We have examined before in this forum the denial of a multi-party system, the refusal to permit free elections, the suppressions of the working man's right to strike, the suppression of facts about Soviet economic exploitation in Hungary, the denial of literary and artistic freedom and of all freedom of expression, and the encroachments on freedom of religion. All of this is in contrast with the liberal promises the Kádár régime made in 1956 and early 1957 when it was trying to get the confidence of the people, promises which were, without one single exception, broken.

43. As distressing as the facts which I have related are, there are, unfortunately, grounds for even more serious concern. I refer to the evidence presented in Sir Leslie Munro's report that reprisals against individuals who participated in the 1956 revolution are still continuing. In the past year, in spite of repeated promises that there would be no more reprisals, the roll of political executions and imprisonments has grown even longer.

44. It is well to recall the promises which were made to the Hungarian people and to the world on this score.

45. On 4 November 1956, the very day Prime Minister Imre Nagy was deposed, while Soviet troops were

shooting down freedom fighters in Budapest, the new Soviet-installed régime issued an appeal to the people in which it said:

"The Government will not tolerate the persecution of workers under any pretext for having taken part in the most recent events."

46. Then on 26 November, three weeks later, Mr. Kádár said in a radio broadcast:

"I repeatedly and unequivocally declare that we shall adhere to, and make everyone adhere to, the solemn promise made in our Government's appeal of 4 November, that no worker will come to harm as a result of his participation in the mass movement which began on 23 October."

47. In the face of those promises Imre Nagy and many others were put to death and thousands were imprisoned.

48. Then, beginning a year ago, we heard more assurances, some of them in this very building.

49. First, there was Mr. Sik, the Foreign Minister, who told us here on 22 November 1958, that court proceedings against the revolutionaries "have been wound up and terminated". [752nd meeting, para. 72.]

50. Then Mr. Sik's deputy, Mr. Peter, came before the Assembly on 12 December 1958, and said: "All these investigations and procedures were completed a long time ago". [787th meeting, para. 96.]

51. Then the Prime Minister, Mr. Münnich, said in Budapest on 18 February last that the judicial authorities "had completed the investigation of counter-revolutionary crimes and the calling to account of counter-revolutionaries".

52. Mr. Nezvál, who bears the title of Minister of Justice in the Hungarian régime, said on 27 February: "The courts have completely finished the trials of counter-revolutionary cases".

53. Now let us see how much these assurances were worth.

54. Beginning in April of this year reports began to circulate that thirty-five young people had been secretly tried in Ujpest, an industrial suburb of Budapest, for having taken part in the revolution. It was rumoured that ten were sentenced to death and that the rest had received lengthy prison sentences. Later, in the face of official denials, there were reports that eight of the death sentences had been confirmed and carried out.

55. Finally, on 17 October, after months of silence, the Hungarian authorities admitted that the executions ordered as a result of the secret trials at Ujpest had been carried out. The admission was made by László Gyáros, who is described as a Hungarian Government spokesman, in response to questions by a foreign newspaper reporter. Mr. Gyáros also confirmed the fact—an important and highly damaging fact—that these trials had resulted from activities of the defendants during the national revolution of 1956.

56. Reports are still coming out of Hungary that even more acts of vengeance are impending. One such report gives the names and birth dates of thirty-one Hungarians between the ages of 20 and 25 who are said to have been put to death in Hungary between 15 June and 1 September 1959, that is, just a little while ago.

57. It is clear that no segment of the Hungarian people, whether writers, workers, artists or farmers, have escaped the repressive measures. Sir Leslie Munro has reminded us in his report that some of the great names in Hungarian literature, including Tibor Déry, Gyula Háry, Domonkos Kosáry, József Gáli and Gyula Obersovsky, are serving prison sentences ranging from six years to life imprisonment.

58. On 12 April 1959, the Czechoslovak Communist newspaper Rudé Právo stated that Sándor Rácz and Sándor Báli, both of whom had been prominent in the Budapest Central Workers' Council set up by the revolutionaries in 1956, had been sentenced to life imprisonment and to twelve years' imprisonment respectively. It is hard to believe that this was not also an act of vengeance for their part in the events of 1956.

59. That is the record, up to the present time, of reprisals for what took place in Hungary in 1956, in so far as secrecy in that country makes it possible to compile a record at all. As to the future—that is, in the near future—we see little reason for confidence.

60. On 30 November, Mr. Kádár said, somewhat ominously, that the Hungarian people, whose representative he claims to be, "still have a score to settle with the counter-revolutionaries".

61. To be sure, the Hungarian authorities still deny the truth of some of the reports which the world has received. Mr. Kádár denounced them recently as "vile and dastardly provocations", but world opinion is not going to be satisfied with such denials in the face of all the evidence.

62. If the Hungarian authorities want to make themselves believed by world opinion, there are a number of steps which they could have taken long ago and could still take and which would certainly be effective. The most modest step would be to admit to Hungary the Representative of the United Nations and to give him full freedom to learn the facts. This course is still open to the Hungarian authorities. If they have been maligned as they assert, they could by this means clear their good name and clear it for good.

63. Then they could long ago have proved their assertion that Hungary is a sovereign State by requesting, as they claim the right to do, the withdrawal of Soviet troops. But after three years that long-promised withdrawal has still not taken place. The belief naturally exists, therefore, that the Hungarian authorities want to keep the Soviet garrison to guard them against the people whom they oppress.

64. Another way to establish the truth would be to lift the iron curtain which cuts off the Hungarian people from the outside world. Immediately after the revolution of 1956 was crushed, the western borders of Hungary were sealed by Soviet troops, who shot down many of the Hungarians then trying to escape from the country. Later, this duty was handed over to reconstituted Hungarian border guard units. Since then the régime has spent large sums on what it hoped would be an escape-proof barrier. For 360 miles along Hungary's borders with Austria and Yugoslavia it has built a mile-wide belt of barbed wire, minefields, watch-towers, searchlights and armed patrols.

65. On 20 August last, the Prime Minister, Mr. Kádár, confirmed the strengthening of this barrier in these words:

"Recently there have been again many articles in the Press of certain capitalist countries that we have reinforced our frontier deficiencies and that there are barbed wire barriers on the frontier... What we say is this: We have strengthened our frontier defences in the light of the 1956 experiences and we shall keep the frontier strong for some time to come."

66. By this means the Hungarian authorities have reduced the flow of refugees into Austria to a trickle.

67. But that is not the only result of the iron curtain surrounding Hungary. The border patrols, the secret police and the rigid censorship have cast doubts on all the claims of the Hungarian authorities. They leave the world in doubt as to the fate of countless Hungarians whose crime was having resisted the subjugation of their country by Soviet armed forces. They are converting Hungary into an enormous house without windows. No wonder their credibility has fallen so low.

68. It is clear from this review of events that there is every reason for the United Nations to continue its concern for the Hungarian question. To that end, the United States has joined with twenty-three other Member States in submitting a draft resolution [A/L.273], which is now before the Assembly.

69. This draft resolution is simple and comprehensive. It acknowledges the report of the United Nations Representative on Hungary, Sir Leslie Munro, a report which records the continued persecutions, the continued presence of Soviet troops in Hungary, and the continued defiance of the United Nations by the Soviet and Hungarian authorities.

70. Then the draft resolution deplures the continued disregard by the Soviet Union and the present Hungarian régime of the General Assembly's resolutions dealing with the situation in Hungary. If these resolutions had been lived up to, Hungary today would be a truly independent country, and its people would be enjoying the freedom for which they fought so bravely.

71. Next, the draft resolution calls upon the Soviet Union and the present authorities in Hungary to co-operate with the United Nations Representative on Hungary. They can co-operate with him by admitting him to Hungary and by helping him in his task of "reporting to Member States or to the General Assembly on significant developments relating to the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly on Hungary". That is the task which we gave to our Representative, and I stress the words "developments relating to the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly on Hungary".

72. Finally, the draft resolution requests the United Nations Representative on Hungary to continue his efforts.

73. Behind these words about procedure, this draft resolution carries, in words of stark simplicity, a straightforward message. To the Soviet Union and to the authorities in Hungary it says: obey the Charter and restore the independence and liberty of Hungary; and—with particular urgency—stop persecuting and executing Hungarians for what happened in 1956. And to the brave and suffering people of Hungary this draft resolution says: you are not forgotten.

74. I should like to conclude by citing words that were uttered over a century ago by a man whose name in Hungary is a synonym for liberty, Louis Kossuth. He said this:

"I am a man of peace. God knows how I love peace; but I hope that I shall never be such a coward as to mistake oppression for peace."

75. Kossuth set a good example for us here in the United Nations. There is oppression today in Hungary, a foreign oppression, introduced by foreign violence against the most fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. That oppression is not peace; indeed, it was imposed by war. Let us not mistake it for peace, whatever disguises may be put upon it or whatever secrecy may surround it.

76. The Charter enjoins us all to settle our international disputes by peaceful means—and surely we are using peaceful means here this morning. It also enjoins us to settle those disputes "in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered".

77. Thus the Charter recognizes, as Kossuth recognized long ago, that peace and justice are inseparable. That is a hard truth, but nothing is to be gained by running away from it. Let us face that truth as steadfastly in our time as Kossuth did in his time. If we do, we shall thereby increase the hope that Hungary, by peaceful means and in God's good time, will one day again be free.

78. Mr. PETER (Hungary): At the very outset, I wish to draw the attention of the General Assembly to two fundamental facts relevant to the whole debate here. The first is the fact that the Hungarian people have one request, one well-founded demand, I should say, of the United Nations. It is to collaborate in extricating Hungary from being used in the "cold war", as it is today. It would be welcomed if all the delegations with friendly feelings towards the Hungarian people could really heed this appeal.

79. The second fact is that there exists a basic contradiction between the present-day United States political intentions in Central Europe and the real interests and aspirations of the Hungarian people. The intervention of Mr. Lodge, which we just heard, is a good indication of it. This basic contradiction has to be kept in mind during the whole debate.

80. I do not forget for one moment that, in the given situation, I have to be modest regarding the perspectives of this issue under discussion and I have to appreciate even modest progress. In this spirit, I wish to emphasize that the item we are discussing now was inscribed in the agenda by ten votes less than last year. Taking into consideration the most particular steps which preceded the inclusion of this item—and how particular these steps were is much more known to many delegations than to me—we may say that the decrease of votes is rather considerable. I wish to thank those who, for any reason, did not vote in favour of the inclusion of the question of Hungary in the agenda. The growing number of such delegations is a hopeful indication that the Charter is being more consistently implemented in this matter. My delegation appreciates even the slightest growth in that direction, because we know that many delegations were in a predicament about the true nature of the 1956 events in Hungary, and the confusion of those of good faith, together with the confusion created by hostile propa-

ganda, was used to blur a truthful evaluation of the real facts. The clarification of such a confusion cannot happen overnight, particularly when new confusing elements are being intentionally added. Therefore, I am really grateful even for the slightest steps forward. I thank those who have contributed to this progress; however slight, it is nevertheless considerable.

81. I have a special word to say to those who voted for the inclusion of this item for any reason but with good feelings towards the Hungarian people. I am not unrealistic. I suppose that, at this stage, most of the delegations have already received their instructions from their respective Governments. In the case of many, this debate cannot change the attitude prescribed by their instructions. Nevertheless, I ask for open-mindedness and understanding of the real problems of the Hungarian people. If there is still a chance for them to change their official position, so much the better. Even if they cannot change their official position, but have come to a better personal understanding of the real problems, this, in perspective, would be a valuable gain not only for the Hungarian people, but for the relaxation of tensions in this Organization in general as well.

82. My intervention will be limited and concentrated on document A/4304 presented as a report by the honourable gentleman acting on the basis of General Assembly resolution 1312 (XIII). It is an analysis of this document that I wish to offer to the General Assembly.

83. Quite a number of representatives have asked me in the past few days whether my delegation intends to take part in this debate or not. There is no need to mention why such an idea crossed their minds at the time of the discussion on the Algerian question. Actually, my delegation would have every ground, both legal and political, to ignore this debate, especially this document. Besides referring to Charter provisions, according to which all matters proposed for discussion under this item are entirely within the jurisdiction of Hungary as a Member State, we warned the delegations that the debate on this provocative issue would only empoison the improving situation here—and not only here, but elsewhere also. Since that time, Members of this Assembly may already have experienced the bad effects of this debate not only within the General Assembly. Yes, with much regret, I have to say that developments consequent to such a debate will in all probability prove our gloomy forecast to be right. Therefore, we would have all legal and moral grounds not to take part in this debate. In spite of this, we decided to participate as a sign of respect to the General Assembly in order to show that we are ready to comply with General Assembly resolutions even in such a case, with the reservation, of course, that we shall not yield to attempts at interference in our domestic affairs.

84. We decided to participate also because we did not want to leave any of the delegations under the impact of a malevolent statement made here, as if we wanted any evil to be swept under the rugs. This expression was first used by Sir Leslie Munro in his Montreal speech on 20 November last. In the same context, it was used a few days later in this hall by the representative of the United States. Sir Leslie Munro applied it once more in his speech to the Overseas Press Club on 1 December, and today. One might wonder who is the epigone of whom. I do not. No, we have nothing

to hide under the rugs. On the contrary, we have chosen the document presented as a report as a subject matter for our consideration, precisely because it invites us and gives a good possibility to single out the real evils which ought to be swept, not so much under the rugs as out of the relaxing international situation and out of this Organization at a time when this Organization is showing greater effectiveness for the real sake of international peace and security and fundamental human rights.

85. In analysing this document, we first have to grasp its principal aims. The author of this document is rather helpful in this respect, because he defined the substance of his whole mission in very concise and expressive terms. We read in this document:

"I have... concluded that it is my duty to continue in the office of United Nations Representative on Hungary as a symbol of continuing United Nations concern to achieve the political independence of Hungary in accordance with the provisions of the General Assembly's resolutions." [A/4304, para. 14.]

86. So he is a symbol. Symbol of what? The symbol of concern to achieve the political independence of Hungary. This self-introduction may serve as a revelation to many. The definition in this sentence of his function gives a true and comprehensive interpretation not only of his function but also of all previous resolutions on this subject and of the present debate. Yes, this is a kind of revelation to many. We have not ceased stating from the very beginning of this controversy that the pressure exercised to include this item in the agenda and to fabricate unlawful resolutions against Hungary can be traced to unjustifiable political aims directed against Hungary, and not only against her, but also against other Member States with which Hungary is in alliance. What we have said and done in unveiling these political intentions has convinced some; but we have not been as effective in every direction as we ought to have been. Now the concise and eloquent confession is before the General Assembly, presented by the most competent expert. I repeat, all previous actions and the present debate are to be looked upon in the light of this clarification.

87. What is the concept behind this revealing definition given by the document under debate? What is the value and implication of the political independence for which the honourable gentleman whom I quoted claims to strive? In order to grasp the real content of this concept, we have to look for the source of these expressions in connexion with Hungary. These expressions are not to be found in such a comprehensive form in any of the General Assembly resolutions concerning Hungary. They reflect recent official United States statements dealing with Hungary. They have been taken from United States utterances, and the source provides the meaning.

88. What do United States sources mean when speaking about a long-term policy for achieving political independence for Hungary? These long-term expressions represent the third stage of United States policy concerning Europe or, more concretely, concerning Eastern Europe after the Second World War. The professed aims did not change during the transforming stages, only the contemplated methods, and even these only in some respects.

89. What are these stages? In the first stage of United States political strategy regarding Eastern Europe, the

main watchword was expressed as liberation by military actions. This stage of United States political strategy regarding Eastern Europe became bankrupt during the armed dead-lock in Korea, when it was known that the Soviet Union also possessed atomic weapons and the Eastern European People's Democracies, together with the Soviet Union, could spell disaster for any United States military venture. At that time the watchword was changed.

90. In the second period of post-war United States political strategy, the main watchword was: undermining the social and political system in Eastern European States through conspiracies, using mainly elements of the former ruling class adversely affected by many of the social changes. In that period, we witnessed this strategy in action in the German Democratic Republic, in Poland and most intensively in Hungary. This stage of United States political strategy for Eastern Europe, together with its principal watchword, faded out of existence as these States developed socially and economically, and that with considerable speed during the past few years; and it faded out of existence as the socialist States, growing in material and moral strength, tilted the scales in their favour.

91. In the present, third period, no official United States statements expect any sudden change. New watchwords are being evolved. At this stage, in conformity with the United States Secretary of State's elaboration in this year's general debate on the policy of peaceful change, the main watchword for Eastern Europe is: it may take a long time to achieve peacefully the independence of these States. In this period, all diplomatic, economic and political contacts of the United States with Eastern European countries are being co-ordinated to this end. Even the United Nations actions are being used for these political aims as is revealed in the document under discussion, and in the intervention of Mr. Lodge today.

92. What, then, are these political aims? To tear Hungary out of the alliance with the other socialist States, particularly with the Soviet Union, and then to turn back the clock of history by giving back lands and plants to landlords, bankers and aristocrats, and then to use Hungary as a springboard against other socialist States, first of all against the Soviet Union. That is the connotation in the political vocabulary of the United States for the watchword "political independence for Hungary".

93. As I stated at the outset of my intervention, there is a basic contradiction between United States intentions and the real interests and aspirations of the Hungarian people. In conformity with United States policy, United Nations actions and resolutions are being used against the Hungarian people, as is revealed in the crucial sentence of the document I quoted.

94. I hope nobody imagines that we attach too much importance to any of these strategic stages. We know that the third stage, with all its watchwords, will fade out of existence as surely as the two previous stages. Not only we, but the inventors of the new strategic watchword are also aware how ephemeral these new inventions are, but—until then—much harm may be done to this Organization, to the general international situation, and to some individuals as well.

95. At this moment, I wish to say a few words in emphasizing the harm to individuals involved. In order to beget more confidence in the sincerity of these strategic aims, individuals are being senselessly

sacrificed. I wish to start with an undeniably United States document. As far back as April 1957, the U.S. News & World Report published an article under the heading "Foreign Legion for US?". In that article it was made public that in one of the military centres of the United States young men from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria and so on are being trained for special military assignments against those countries. This in itself is an indication of what is meant in the United States under the term "peaceful intentions". But my main point in this respect is something else. In Fort Jackson and in several other camps in the United States and also in several Western European countries, preparations are being made not only for an eventual, over-all and direct military action, but for interim actions as well. From many of these camps individuals and groups have already been transplanted into Hungary for subversive activities. Some of the names have been made public; several others will be. The Hungarian authorities have seized specialized weapons and equipment either in their possession or en route to them. Some of these people have already been brought to trial; others will be. Most recently at the Party congress in Budapest, my Government's Minister of the Interior made public that a group of subversive elements in possession of instructions and equipment from the United States had been recently seized.

96. This matter has several aspects. As to the actions themselves, they are absolutely futile and senseless. As to their initiators, they are playing a cynical game if they protest reprisals against such subversive actions. As to the representatives of a Government under whose authority such actions are being carried out, they have forfeited all rights, at least in connexion with Hungary, to appeal to the ideals of fundamental human rights.

97. In this context, it will be instructive to quote a rather relevant sentence of a press statement of the United States delegation in support of the inclusion of this item. The statement was made on 18 November and I already quoted it, but, because I wanted to comply with the rules of procedure, I did not comment on it in the General Committee. I shall do so now. It reads as follows:

"All those responsible in and out of Hungary should work with the rest of us to carry out the overwhelmingly adopted resolutions of the United Nations."

This sentence reveals both the political intentions of the United States Government and its expectations in connexion with General Assembly resolutions. According to the United States interpretation, all the resolutions are directed against the social, political and economic system of Hungary. Consequently, the appeal contained in the above sentence cannot be addressed to the responsible leaders of Hungary; on the contrary, it is addressed to elements hostile to the system of Hungary either inside or outside the country. It is an appeal to all who share the same political aims as the United States delegation here, directed against the political structure of Hungary; that is to say, with reference to previous General Assembly resolutions such appeals may be made with a view to promoting hostile actions either outside or inside Hungary against the orderly life of a society.

98. It is really helpful that the document under discussion gives a comprehensive interpretation of all previous and present actions. It may help many dele-

gations to a better understanding of the real issue. In the face of all these unjustifiable efforts, I have to emphasize that the basic interests and aspirations of the Hungarian people—as an independent nation—are to go ahead as successful as possible with building the socialist economic, cultural and political life in deep and friendly alliance with all the other socialist countries, first of all with the Soviet Union, and to live on good neighbourly terms with all other States. All the previous actions as instruments of United States foreign policy are directed against these basic interests of Hungary. They are, therefore, being used not only for interference in the domestic affairs of Hungary, but also for interference in the domestic affairs of other socialist States with which Hungary is in alliance.

99. The whole political concept contained in the document and all the political intentions of the United States in this respect, which were expressed also today and which had remained hidden to a certain degree in previous resolutions, are anachronistic phenomena in the relaxing international situation today, and they are fostered only to slow down and hamper the process of relaxation. We can all be sure that the trend of events today does not work in favour of these cold war manoeuvres.

100. The difficulties created by the United States Government in regard to relaxation are, we may say, blackening the reputation of United States foreign policy in the eyes of honest people all over the world. The intensification of tensions is popular only among those whose daily bread and career depend on the maintenance of world tension. In this respect, President Eisenhower's statement at his press conference prior to his departure is rather illuminating. When asked about his feelings on his forthcoming mission, he replied:

"I think that we can conclude, from all of the reports that come to us from abroad, that there is a great deal of doubt remaining in the minds of many people, and including our friends, allies and other friends, as to America's real sincerity in pursuit of peace. We have tried to emphasize this point in every possible way, through diplomatic contacts, through speeches of the Secretary of State, myself and others, and still it does not seem to come through."

101. Yes, also in the minds of all those who have some insight into the way the United States is using Hungary, amidst the ruins of the cold war period, to maintain some of its vestiges, there will certainly remain doubts about the sincerity and seriousness of United States declarations regarding, for instance, the validity of the support of negotiations instead of strength and wars. One could think that all other efforts of the United States for negotiations only seem to be peaceful preliminaries with the intent of creating cold war tensions also in other fields, as has been experienced here in the case of Hungary. Only the United States representative could dispel such doubts.

102. In the next part of my intervention, I wish to analyse the conception presented by the document under discussion regarding the nature of events in Hungary in October–November 1956. In this document, we are given an interpretation of these events with a view to justifying United Nations concern with them and their consequences. To those who are not acquainted with what happened, that interpretation may

even seem convincing. And to those who have not read the entire text of the speeches by Prime Minister Khrushchev in Budapest, the quotation given by Sir Leslie Munro may prove that there is a contradiction between the previous presentation of the origin of the Hungarian events of 1956 and the interpretation given today by Prime Minister Khrushchev. Anybody who reads the whole text, however, will understand that our interpretation is consistent in all respects. By oversimplifying and completely misunderstanding the real factors—because there are several factors—the document simply states that, since Soviet units were involved, therefore there was foreign intervention. It is that simple. According to that interpretation, it is concluded that the United Nations had and still has the right to concern itself with this situation. On the other hand, it is disputed in the document that there was any intervention on the part of the Western Powers. Consequently, the document questions why we did not bring our complaint before the United Nations if intervention on the part of the Western Powers did take place, as we hold it did.

103. Let us review the events in a concise way, as briefly and in as clear-cut terms as possible. As I shall not deal here with aspects of the matter which would require thorough-going study by those who are honestly interested in the matter, I restrict myself to publicly known and undeniable facts which can be checked by everybody.

104. The best way to start seems to be to show the undeniable interest and participation of Western quarters, which is entirely disregarded or even denied by the document under discussion.

105. First, the United States Government officially offered \$20 million in aid to the counter-revolution. This happened on 2 November, at a time when the terror against all sorts of progressive people was at its peak. Several hundred of them had already been massacred and tens of thousands were on the black list. The offer was made at that time in full awareness of these facts, and no objection was raised to the reigning terror—no objection, at least, on the part of the United States.

106. Secondly, this offer was made in full awareness of the happenings. Indicative of this is the fact that, one day before the offer, members of the United States legation in Budapest visited the headquarters of the counter-revolution, where they were informed about the situation and gave further advice and promised United States Government support. The public announcement of this support was made the following day. These are facts.

107. Thirdly, a large quantity of arms made in the United States and used as standard arms by United States units was captured during and after the counter-revolution. Several western papers, for instance, in Switzerland and West Germany, published reports on these arms shipments.

108. Fourthly, several groups of subversive elements directed and transplanted into Hungary by official and semi-official United States agencies prior to or during the counter-revolution have since been tried and the documents published.

109. Fifthly, the so-called Radio Free Europe, with its representatives and relay stations on the spot, acted as a sort of military headquarters, giving de-

tailed instructions as to when, and under what circumstances, particular kinds of arms should be employed, and assigning fighting groups. Even western papers amply criticized these activities. If somebody were to claim that this was a private enterprise, it would be very easy for me to show, through official statements, the interest of the State Department in this so-called private radio enterprise. It is enough to allude to an article in the New York Herald Tribune at the time when this so-called enterprise was set up on 3 April 1950.

110. So much for the time being about Western interests and participation. It may have been noticed that I spoke exclusively about United States agencies. It is a matter of course that I could have mentioned actions by other Western Powers or by various groups of people of Hungarian origin who dissociated themselves from and even turned against their native country. I have not done so for several reasons, one of them being that I wished to direct the General Assembly's attention to the main, decisive factor in this respect: the responsibility of the United States agencies.

111. If anyone really wishes to understand the October–November 1956 events in Hungary, he must take into consideration the special historic background of Central Europe. In this particular field Hungary has some features peculiar to itself.

112. After the First World War—not so long ago—after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the Hungary of the Korthy régime became a centre for people who had escaped from Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, such as big landowners, members of the old Austro-Hungarian administration, aristocrats, all sorts of people who, either for social or nationality reasons, were hostile to the new States of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. In this respect, at that time Hungary was a little New York. With these incendiary reactionary elements, Hungary was the most backward State in Central Europe, earning the epithet of the "country of the three million beggars", in which one-third of the population lived at starvation level.

113. After the Second World War, social problems had to be solved in order to rehabilitate the three million beggars and to benefit the working people in general. Social reform was bound to be disadvantageous to some of those who had lived off the great masses. It meant that two categories of incendiary elements were being created by historic factors.

114. Parallel with the solving of these social problems in order to raise the standard of living and because of an extremely tense world situation, industrialization, particularly in heavy industry, had to be as speedy as possible. At that time, insufficient attention was paid to the human side of building a new society. Despite the fact that, during this period, the basic economic factors of the country developed with unprecedented rapidity, a certain degree of resentment was built up even among those who belonged to the constructive elements of the socialist society. There were several factors. Thus there were incendiary elements of different values and character.

115. At a time when the surmounting of domestic difficulties had begun in the Government and in the Party in the process of democratization, the incendiary elements of the first two categories, with the

help of their international allies, became increasingly active. It is in the nature of historical change that representatives of any country where historic changes have taken place with progressive tendencies will recall that, at critical times, all the international reactionary forces unite to prevent or to turn back such progressive developments. On 23 October 1956, reactionary forces, inside and outside Hungary, launched their attack, with the connivance of many misguided people, against all the social and economic gains of the working people, against all the neighbouring countries. The West was involved from the very beginning, as I have said before. The intervention of Western Powers began long before the Hungarian Government decided in favour of the most energetic action against the counter-revolution by requesting the help of Soviet units. Yes, it was a tremendous decision.

116. Hungary was on the verge of an all-embracing civil war. In danger of being torn in two, repeating the Korean tragedy in Central Europe, and so in danger of becoming the powderkeg of a new European war, or even a world war, we had to choose between life and death, and we chose life. When the Presidential Council recalled Imre Nagy, who had brought the nation to the brink of death, and appointed the new Government under János Kádár, the decision was made to end the terror with the help of Soviet units stationed in Hungary under the Warsaw Treaty, which had been concluded some time before. The Soviet units acted under the responsibility and jurisdiction of the Hungarian Government.

117. To sum up: there was no foreign intervention on the part of the Soviet Union in putting an end to the counter-revolution; exclusive responsibility for these actions rests with the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic. The quelling of the counter-revolution saved the Hungarian people from an all-embracing civil war and from the threat of war. Thus, those who blame the liquidation of the counter-revolution for the lives which it cost, wittingly or unwittingly, regard as insufficient the number of lives which were lost.

118. As to the question posed in the document under discussion, why we did not bring the complaint against Western intervention to the United Nations, our answer is very simple. Our main objective was to heal the wounds inflicted by the counter-revolution and to develop the social, economic and cultural life of the country in a relaxing international situation with the friendly assistance of all the socialist States. We are not seeking in this Organization causes or pretexts to increase tensions. It is a painful experience having to intervene here today with a statement which inevitably heaps up tensions. It is not our fault that this debate is taking place. Our main demand with respect to this Organization is that the Hungarian people be given help to extricate themselves from being used in the cold war.

119. Let me quote a few passages from the speech of János Kádár, First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, to the recent Party congress in Budapest. After speaking of consolidation and general progress, he stated:

"The 1956 counter-revolutionary uprising will always remain a black day in the annals of our people. The fact that today, barely three years after those events, we can say that the counter-revolution already belongs to the past proves also

how greatly our people have gained in political experience, how strong was their determination and unity to overcome the wrong and evil conjured up by the counter-revolution, that they were able to bury the counter-revolution."

120. This is the basis for our earnest expectations regarding this Organization. From the domestic point of view, the counter-revolution already belongs to the past and this is beneficial to the Hungarian people and to the international situation. In the same way, this Organization would be acting to benefit the Hungarian people internationally only if it acts as we did, instead of using the Hungarian people time and time again for creating new tensions.

121. As to the presence of Soviet units in Hungary, I have to emphasize that this is in no way connected with the domestic situation. They were there before the counter-revolution under the Warsaw Treaty and they will remain there as long as the States parties to this treaty deem it necessary. The very fact that NATO Powers, as today, through resolutions of the General Assembly—and I emphasize this—are trying in an illegal way to press for the withdrawal of these troops, is a further indication that strategically, not only for the safety of Hungary, but also for the safety of other socialist States, it is still necessary to have these units in Hungary. Even the resolutions in this respect pressed by NATO Powers are justification for the presence of these units. Nobody should forget that exactly at the time when Soviet troops were withdrawn from Romania, new United States military bases were created in Italy.

122. After having proved that the interpretation given by the document of the counter-revolution is incomplete, arbitrary and inadequate and after having shown that the foreign intervention described in the document did not take place, I wish to emphasize the words of the Charter "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State"; I emphasize especially the words "nothing contained in the present Charter". That is to say, no paragraph in the Charter authorizes any organ of the United Nations to intervene in the matters discussed under the heading "Question of Hungary", because these matters are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Hungarian People's Republic.

123. I now turn to what the document contains and what it omits regarding judicial actions. It is part of the psychological preparation for this debate that rumours, allegations and fantastic falsifications were invented and spread during the last few months with a view to impressing representatives of good faith to favour inclusion of this agenda item. Some of these allegations are omitted and others are only referred to and alluded to in the document. One can understand why this document was not tabled as a report for inclusion in the proposal to inscribe this question in the agenda of the General Assembly; one can understand that, since the document does not contain any factual statement which could justify the urgency of this debate, though the explanatory memorandum, with its vague allusions to alleged news regarding impending executions, tried to justify the state of urgency. Certainly if representatives had been acquainted with this document before deciding on inscription, the proposal would have received even fewer votes.

124. I now intend to give some information to the General Assembly regarding the origin of allegations contained in the document and those to which only allusion is made.

125. First, about the scandalous invention concerning the alleged imprisonment of 150 young people who were minors at the time of the counter-revolution and who are awaiting execution as soon as they reach the age of 18, when they will be legally adults. It was a television network in the United States that started spreading this allegation. A distinguished producer hired by two advertising sponsors launched an appeal to the American public to organize mediating actions to save these fictitious people. Two gentlemen whom I know personally asked the producer on what grounds he was organizing such a campaign. He then named the source which had supplied him with the information and added that he had received the approval of the State Department as well to his actions.

126. If this fact is not enough, here is another. According to a periodical published here in New York, the New York City Board of Education, under the impact of this television appeal, urged student organizations to undertake similar actions. The periodical inquired from the Board of Education on the strength of what information they were organizing the students. The answer was that the State Department had approved the action, saying that it wanted as much publicity as possible on the matter. This is a much greater scandal than the case of the rigged quiz shows.

127. In this connexion, the document under discussion reproduces the denial made by János Kádár, First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, who spoke about this scandalous invention at a public meeting in Budapest. Although the document claims to welcome the denial, it omits a part of it. János Kádár in his speech added the following words:

"The time is not far off when the people misled by such provocative actions will reprimand the provocators, asking them: Why did you lie to us?"

128. I could quote other scandalous inventions contained in this document. In paragraph 31, it is stated that a "Hungarian spokesman" had conceded on 17 October 1959 that death sentences had recently been carried out. Actually, this Hungarian spokesman had stated just the opposite. Two Reuters correspondents paid a visit on that day to the Hungarian Government spokesman in connexion with the same list of thirty-one people who, as representatives here have also been told, had been executed. The spokesman informed Reuters that during the last three years not one of the people on the list had even been up for trial or arraignment in Hungary. Probably they never even existed. Somebody played a tremendous and terrible joke on credulous and malevolent people. Reuters gave a misleading report of this interview, which was followed by a letter of apology addressed by the Reuters correspondent to the Government spokesman in Budapest stating that his teleprinter had gone out of order during the transmission of the interview to London. The following day, Reuters issued a correction. However, the document under discussion claims that the Hungarian spokesman actually confirmed the news about these executions.

129. I could reveal many other inventions. I think that, for the time being, what I have said is conclusive enough to show up the malevolent international con-

spiracy to villify my country in some parts of the world.

130. I shall finish up this point by stating that what we declared at the last session of the General Assembly and what was quoted here today regarding the completion of investigations and legal proceedings connected with the counter-revolution is valid, and nothing has changed the validity of that statement since the last session. But on the other hand, I must declare most resolutely that all judicial actions fall entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of the Hungarian People's Republic, and we protest against all attempts at interference. I should add that if, among the subversive elements transplanted by United States or other organs, there happened to be anyone who had taken part in the counter-revolution, his share in the counter-revolution would not be qualified by any means, certainly, as a "laissez-passer" in his new unlawful undertakings.

131. As a last point in analysing the document under discussion, I should like to draw the attention of the General Assembly to certain rather relevant inconsistencies in the document and in the attitude of its author, Sir Leslie Munro. In paragraph 15, he states that he exerted himself to bring about "an amelioration of the relationship between the Organization and the present Hungarian authorities". The terminology used in this sentence proves that he is not trying to promote an amelioration at all. But this is not my main point. As a contrary to this declaration, if anybody reads the reports in the Canadian press, for instance, about his lecture in Montreal, or about his speech at the American Dental Convention in New York in September, or his statement at the Overseas Press Club, then he can but conclude that, during the last year, Sir Leslie Munro was the most ardent, active and outstanding propagator of cold war allegations against Hungary and the Soviet Union. And what is more, in his last statement, on 1 December, he even ventured to spread allegations not only against these two socialist States, but also against Poland, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria as well.

132. These are facts. I could continue analysing further many other obviously malevolent assertions in his document. What I have shown may indicate that the honourable gentleman, acting on the basis of resolution 1312 (XIII), has disqualified himself in many respects and has made it impossible for himself to represent the General Assembly in any capacity in connexion with Hungary.

133. After all, I am nevertheless profoundly convinced that, however, harmful this debate is in many respects, the Hungarian people will continue resolutely and undisturbed on their way.

134. What has really been happening in Hungary is also relevant in this debate. This year, too, in spite of the false assertions and allegations heaped on us, considerable progress was made in all fields of life. It will be interesting in this respect to quote the New York Herald Tribune of 25 October. The correspondent who visited Budapest gives his impressions in just a few words:

"The green-flowered parks look very much like the parks in New York or Peoria, filled with children on their see-saws and girls swinging their hula-hoops. The churches are well filled", he writes, "and shortly after noon the people wander out,

dressed not unlike the burghers of Philadelphia or Muskegon. A three-year-old imp of a boy has on a sailor's suit, neatly pressed and looking like Brooks Brothers."

Then he describes the whole family, in this article, and continues:

"Throngs of Sunday walkers pass you by, wheeling baby carriages that surely are the envy of the entire baby-carriage trade with their little windows and sliding panes all done in a quilted white. About this Sunday morning scene there is an air of genuine benignity", he continues, "an atmosphere that makes the tragedy of 1956 seem ridiculously out of date."

So it is reported in the New York Herald Tribune by somebody who was there, from New York.

135. Of course, the correspondent had to add something bad too, and he describes that in the evening of the same day, in front of a shop window, he was unable to get into conversation with a woman looking at the same window because they were being watched. But the same correspondent, in the same newspaper, himself denies this sad end of the story a few weeks later, when he recounted his whole journey through six socialist States and said that nowhere and never was he followed.

136. Another piece of information about Hungary, datelined New York. A Hungarian language daily paper—I should say one of the papers most hostile to the Hungarian People's Republic—has recently published rather disadvantageous data issued by the United States Information Service, of course, about Hungary. But at the end, the editor of this paper felt himself obliged to add the following afterthought: "on the other hand, tourists returning from Hungary say that the living standard in Hungary has improved..."

137. In this connexion, it is also relevant to know what is really happening in Hungary and not only what malevolent speculations have to say.

138. Per caput national income was doubled between 1938 and 1958. Industrial output is 350 per cent higher today than in 1938. In recent years, the growth of industrial output has been 10 to 12 per cent yearly. The consumption of industrial goods has doubled since 1949. This year, agriculture produced about 20 per cent more in crops than in 1958. The growth of real wages per caput in the years 1957 and 1958 totalled 20 per cent.

139. The number of high school students was 52,000 in 1938 and is 177,000 today. There were 11,000 university students in 1938 compared with 31,000 today. In 1938, 9 million copies of books were published; this figure reached 27 million in 1958.

140. While preparations for this debate in the United Nations were under way, at the same time, two States Members of the United Nations—and rather important ones—raised their diplomatic missions from legations to embassies, and three other Member States established new diplomatic relations with Hungary.

141. Our foreign trade increased by 12 per cent this year.

142. These are some parts of the true picture of Hungary today. It is a rather painful experience that, at a time when this Organization could be making many constructive contributions to benefit the nations, and

when we in Hungary are seized with the requirements and results of a developing new life, the General Assembly is bound to this debate which is really detrimental not so much to Hungary as to the international situation in general.

143. This debate on the so-called question of Hungary is a characteristic phenomenon in the present international context in the struggle of different trends. Prime Minister Khrushchev stated during his recent visit to Budapest:

"We do our utmost to speed up the melting of the cold war. Two tendencies are now distinctly appearing in the international situation: on the one hand, not only the peoples, but also many statesmen and many political leaders recognize the necessity of liquidating the cold war; on the other hand, the desires of certain quarters to halt the process of easing international tensions that has begun and to preserve the state of the cold war."

144. These are the two trends and the question of Hungary on the agenda of the General Assembly is a clear-cut reflection of this struggle of opposing trends.

But we have every reason to say that even in this matter, even in the United Nations, the trends of the cold war are weakening and the trends for relaxation are waxing in strength.

145. I conclude on the basis of the analysis I presented regarding the document under discussion. My delegation cannot take notice of it. I consider it a reflection of United States policy against Hungary and we shall deal with it accordingly. I wish to emphasize again: the Hungarian people has one request to the United Nations, namely, to help us extricate ourselves from the position of being used in the cold war. With all respect, I ask the delegations not to take notice of this document and not to vote for any action connected with this document. Voting against any such action, as, for instance, against the draft resolution just tabled, or even only abstaining from voting will be of considerable assistance to the Hungarian people and to the relaxation of world tension.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

