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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Statement by the President.....	499
Reallocation of two items to the First Committee.....	499
Consideration of the various items on the agenda of the meeting: proposal by the President	499
Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: reports of the First Committee (A/1536) and the Fifth Committee (A/1572)	500

President: Mr. Nasrollah ENTEZAM (Iran).

Statement by the President

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): In the last few days I have received many messages and communications from institutions or persons whose hearts are filled with anguish as the result of the world situation and who ask me to approach the Powers directly concerned in order that the danger which threatens mankind may be averted. Since I am unable to answer each of these messages, I wish, now that we are taking up our work again in plenary meeting, to make a short statement.

2. I should be lacking in frankness if I tried to conceal the gravity of the present time. The situation is, indeed, very serious, though we may hope that it is not desperate.

3. The Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace, dealt with the question. Since the governments directly concerned are represented at the meetings of the Security Council, the world hoped that they would use the opportunity to make a renewed effort to understand one another. Owing to circumstances known to you, the Security Council was unable to reach a decision. The question will necessarily be referred to the General Assembly. This is a point which I may note without in any way committing the General Assembly or prejudging any decisions which it may take.

4. I address myself not only to those who have told me of their anguish but also to the peoples of the world. They must not allow themselves to be blinded by hate or by fear. Peace can be maintained if the peoples and their rulers are not guided by obscure feelings but bring a lucid mind to the study of the situation. The present meetings of the United Nations provide them with an opportunity to carry out that study, which

should lead to the maintenance of peace and security, which mankind desires.

Reallocation of two items to the First Committee

5. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Before taking up the various items on the agenda of today's meeting, I have to inform you that the General Committee has decided to recommend that two items which were referred to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee should be reallocated to the First Committee. They are item 20—"Palestine", and item 75—"Complaint by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the violation of Chinese air space by the Air Force of the United States of America and the machine-gunning and bombing of Chinese territory by that Air Force, and against the bombardment and illegal inspection of a merchant ship of the People's Republic of China by a military vessel of the United States". This recommendation was approved unanimously by the General Committee.

6. I was going to ask the General Assembly to endorse the General Committee's recommendation. But I suggest that it should not take any decision for the time being on the reallocation of item 20 but should approve only the General Committee's recommendation regarding the transfer of item 75 from the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee to the First Committee.

7. As no objections have been raised, I take it that the General Assembly accepts my suggestion.

It was so decided.

Consideration of the various items on the agenda of the meeting: proposal by the President

8. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): In order to save time, I shall make the following suggestion: before taking up the various items, the Assembly

should decide whether it wishes to discuss those items or not. By so doing it would render a great service to delegations which, if the decision is in the negative, will not have to prepare speeches, and to the heads of delegations, who will not have to take part in the discussion.

9. May I ask the Assembly to indicate whether it wishes to discuss the various items on the agenda of today's meeting.

It was unanimously decided not to discuss the two first items (items 22 and 23 of the agenda).

10. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): With regard to the third item, namely, "Admission of new Members to the United Nations, including the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice", it will be necessary to discuss it in plenary meeting because it has not been considered in committee.

It was unanimously decided not to discuss any of the ten other items (items 12, 29, 57, 21 (d) and (e), 39 (c), 13, 21 (c), 64, 31, and 63 of the agenda).

11. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union, who wishes to speak on a point of order.

12. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The President has put a question to the members of the General Assembly and they have replied; it would seem from their reply that they were unanimous in desiring not to proceed to a discussion of the items on the agenda of today's meeting of the General Assembly.

13. Nevertheless, I think I am not mistaken in believing that a number of delegations may wish to make brief statements in explanation of their votes. As none of the questions on the agenda of this meeting of the Assembly is to be debated—which will save a great deal of time—the USSR delegation considers that it would be reasonable to allow delegations which desire to make brief statements in explanation of their votes, to do so before the vote, and not after.

14. The delegation of the Soviet Union suggests this procedure. I repeat: it would be reasonable to allow delegations which desire to explain their votes on a particular item on the agenda of this meeting to do so before the vote, and not after.

15. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): As the Assembly knows, whenever it has been decided not to discuss an item on the agenda; delegations have had an opportunity to explain their votes. That practice has always been followed and will continue to be observed.

16. Personally, I should prefer it if representatives explained their votes afterwards. It is for the President to decide whether the explanation should precede or follow the vote. I do not wish to take advantage of my power and therefore, if any delegations wish to explain their votes in advance, I shall gladly give them the floor.

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: reports of the First Committee (A/1536) and the Fifth Committee (A/1572)

[Agenda item 22]

17. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall put the draft resolutions contained in the report

of the First Committee [A/1536] to the vote separately and in succession. If delegations wish to explain their votes, I am prepared to allow them the usual seven minutes each to do so. If they wish to explain their votes on the three draft resolutions in one speech I see no objection to their doing so.

18. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): It was the representative of Greece who submitted to the First Committee the draft resolution concerning the repatriation of members of the Greek armed forces which was approved by a majority in the Committee and is before the Assembly as draft resolution A. He based that draft on the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.¹

19. It would seem that, before approving the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Greece, the First Committee should have examined, in a more objective manner, documentary evidence to show that Albania and Bulgaria were really detaining Greek soldiers captured by the partisans. However, neither the Special Committee, to whose conclusions the draft resolution refers, nor the Government of Greece has submitted any such evidence, apparently in the belief that we are bound to take them at their word. The Special Committee refers in its report solely to the unilateral assertions of the Greek Government. Here again the Special Committee's bias and lack of objectivity are obvious.

20. Fully aware of the unfounded nature of its allegations, the Government of Greece deliberately formulates them in vague phrases, using such expressions as "highly probable" or "in all probability." In its letters of 13 and 24 April 1950, for example, the Greek Government stated that it considered it highly probable that 1,713 members of the Greek army captured in 1946 were in the territory of Greece's northern neighbours, and again, that they were in all probability in the territory of the three countries to the north of Greece.

21. In April of this year the Greek Government considered it probable that 1,713 members of the Greek armed forces were being detained in the countries north of Greece, but it subsequently moderated its tone and the Greek representative declared in the First Committee that he had in his possession 250 letters received from Greek prisoners of war in Albania. Here again, however, the representative of Greece confined himself to a bare statement, and failed to submit any letters or any list of Greek prisoners of war in Albania or Bulgaria. By way of evidence, the Greek representative referred to Radio Tirana which, he alleged, announced in 1947 that 200 Greek soldiers had been interned. Having no genuine evidence of any weight, the representative of Greece refers to the ether, to the radio. This is all the evidence that the Greek Government has been able to adduce in support of its new complaints against Albania and Bulgaria.

22. It is hardly necessary to prove here that if we wish to approach the matter in a serious and conscientious way, complaints or demands cannot be based on probabilities or suppositions. It would be even more inadmissible for the General Assembly to take a responsible

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 11.*

decision on the basis of the irresponsible, unsubstantiated, unilateral and gratuitous statements of certain delegations, particularly the Greek delegation which, as experience has shown, has set itself the task of spreading unfounded and dishonest accusations against Albania and Bulgaria—in which it is actively assisted by the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.

23. In this connexion, the delegation of the Soviet Union cannot but draw the General Assembly's attention to the credulity—to put it mildly—displayed by the majority in the First Committee during the consideration of this question.² In fact, no thorough examination took place in the Committee, since there was nothing to examine. The representative of Greece, who raised this question, placed no evidence before the Committee other than his own uncorroborated statements. Having received the Greek representative's draft resolution on this question, the First Committee did not bother to ask the representative of the Greek Government to produce evidence in support of his complaints. It did nothing of the kind, although it was its duty to require such evidence before approving the draft resolution.

24. The Committee was content merely to vote on the Greek draft resolution, without any discussion. No one, for instance, asked the Greek representative for any of the following data: who the persons were whose repatriation the Greek Government desired, their surnames, the circumstances in which they were sent to the countries north of Greece, and to which countries specifically. Assuming that such cases had in fact taken place, it was necessary also to produce evidence to show that a particular former Greek soldier did in fact desire to return to Greece, where a savage campaign of terror is raging, and that he was being detained abroad against his will.

25. No such evidence has been provided. We do not even know who are the prisoners in question. At first the Government of Greece quoted the figure of 1,713 Greek soldiers. In the First Committee, the representative of Greece reduced that figure to 250 former members of the Greek armed forces alleged to have been detained in the countries to the north of Greece, from whom the Greek Government claims to have received letters. But what sort of letters these are and how they came into the hands of the Greek authorities—that again is something we do not know. That is the Greek representative's secret. By whom and to whom these letters were sent is equally unknown. How did the Greek Government know that these letters were written by former Greek soldiers and not by partisans or persons who joined the partisans? It may well be that no such letters exist.

26. The Greek delegation, which submitted its draft resolution on this question, should have checked all this and proved its statements by documents, facts and figures. But no documents and no reliable facts or figures have been placed before the General Assembly. It is precisely for this reason that the Greek Government, being unable to offer documentary evidence in support of its new complaints against its northern neighbours, deliberately uses, in its letters on this matter, such vague and indefinite expressions as "in all proba-

bility" and so forth, endeavouring to conceal behind these vague phrases the absence of any evidence and of any reliable documentary data.

27. But this highly important circumstance in no way embarrassed the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, which rashly declared in its report—categorically but without the slightest evidence—that the northern neighbours of Greece were in fact detaining members of the Greek armed forces. By this action the Special Committee again showed itself in its true light and demonstrated its bias and lack of objectivity.

28. It must therefore be conceded that the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee on the repatriation of members of the Greek armed forces from the countries north of Greece is based on the unilateral statement of the Greek representative, who has placed before the General Assembly no document, no reliable evidence on the matter.

29. It must also be admitted that the First Committee failed to examine this question thoroughly and that the representatives who wished to go into the substance of the question raised by the representative of the Greek Government were unable to do so because the Greek Government, which had brought up the question, had produced no reliable official evidence to support its complaints.

30. The Greek draft resolution was unfounded and unwarranted, and the First Committees by approving it without discussion and without demanding or considering any corroborative evidence, showed a lack of seriousness in dealing with the question. The delegation of the USSR therefore opposes the adoption of this draft resolution by the General Assembly and will vote against it.

31. If the President permits, I should like to explain my delegation's vote on draft resolution B.

32. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): You may do so if you propose to make a short explanation.

33. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I shall now explain my delegation's vote on draft resolution B.

34. The report submitted by the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans was subjected by the delegation of the USSR and by several other delegations to detailed criticism, in the course of which it was shown that the Committee's conclusions were contrived and tendentious, its methods of work unsound and its recommendations inappropriate and contrary to the true state of affairs. The Special Committee's activities have not only failed to promote a settlement of relations between Greece and the countries concerned, but have on the contrary impeded in every way the restoration of normal relations between Greece and those countries—as was conclusively proved, on the basis of the facts, in the First Committee.

35. In the discussion on the Greek question in the First Committee it was also pointed out that the Special Committee was openly pursuing a policy of hostility to Bulgaria and Albania, and had engaged in the fabrication of slanderous charges against them. At the same time, the Special Committee, which is the instrument of the policy of the ruling circles in the United States and

² *Ibid.*, First Committee, 346th, 392nd to 398th meetings inclusive.

the United Kingdom with regard to Greece, has in all cases taken the Greek Government under its protection, and has justified and glossed over the many acts of provocation committed by the Greek authorities against Albania and Bulgaria. Thus in all its activities, the Commission has taken an unobjective and biased position in favour of the Greek authorities.

36. In these circumstances, to approve the activities of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and maintain it in operation for a further year, would be a harmful step calculated to prejudice very seriously any attempt to restore relations between Greece on the one hand, and Albania and Bulgaria on the other, to normal.

37. For the foregoing reasons, the USSR delegation will vote against the Anglo-American resolution, now placed before us as a draft resolution approved by the majority in the First Committee, and will continue to press for the dissolution of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.

38. The experience of recent years has shown that there is no possibility of a settlement of the Greek question on the basis of the Anglo-American proposals. Those proposals are based on the false and unfounded assertion, belied by the facts, that Albania and Bulgaria threaten the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece; furthermore, they seek to conceal the true cause of the present abnormal situation in Greece.

39. The delegation of the Soviet Union therefore proposes that the Anglo-American draft resolution submitted by the First Committee should be rejected, since it is based on assumptions which are not borne out by the true state of affairs in Greece, and is not calculated to solve the Greek problem. The USSR delegation proposes that this draft resolution should be rejected because its adoption would merely complicate the solution of the Greek problem and would represent a new act of flagrant injustice to Albania and Bulgaria; it would constitute a new obstacle to the settlement of relations between those countries and Greece, to the restoration of a normal situation in Greece and to the maintenance of international peace and security.

40. The General Assembly must make every endeavour to secure the restoration of a normal situation in Greece. The way to achieve such a settlement, in the view of the Soviet Union, is to adopt the measures provided in the draft resolution [A/1560] submitted by the USSR delegation for the consideration of the General Assembly.

41. The delegation of the Soviet Union wishes to add a brief observation with regard to the letter from the representative of Greece, circulated as document A/1558. In this letter, the Greek delegation has seen fit to make slanderous attacks on the USSR, while saying not a word about the brutal reign of terror now raging in Greece. By so doing, it has confirmed the facts stated in the letters received from relatives of the imprisoned and exiled Greek patriots and in the letter from mothers, sisters and daughters of 2,600 women detained in Greek prisons. The delegation of the Soviet Union repudiates this slanderous statement by the representative of Greece with indignation.

42. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of the United States, who wishes to speak on a point of order.

43. Mr. COHEN (United States of America): I rise on a point of order solely for the purpose of suggesting that if we are going to follow the wise practice just introduced of voting to dispense with discussion, I think it very important that we should not renew discussion in our explanations of votes. I do not want to be critical of anything that has been done, but I would respectfully suggest that if we could have it understood that an explanation of a vote is a brief statement of the reasons for the vote, avoiding any discussion of detail, we should not only save time but also avoid the nullification of our rule to dispense with discussion unless it is desired by one-third of those voting.

44. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): More than once I have urged delegations to explain their votes as briefly as possible. I can hardly do more because a speaker can always say that in order to explain his delegation's position he has to mention certain facts. I agree with the United States representative that the reason for the General Assembly's decision not to have a discussion was to avoid wasting time with the repetition of statements previously made in Committee. I therefore appeal again to delegations and hope the members of the General Assembly will heed my appeal.

45. I call on the representative of the Ukrainian SSR who wishes to explain his vote.

46. Mr. UDOVICHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): I shall speak on all three draft resolutions together and explain the vote of the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR on these drafts.

47. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR voted in the First Committee against the draft resolutions which are now before the Assembly as draft resolutions A and B of the First Committee and abstained from voting on the draft resolution which is now before us as draft resolution C.

48. None of these draft resolutions can serve to promote a real settlement of the situation in Greece, because they all deliberately ignore the reasons for the present internal situation in Greece and that country's abnormal relations with its neighbours, Albania and Bulgaria. They ignore the fact that the real threat to the political independence of Greece lies in the open interference in the internal affairs of that country by the ruling circles and monopolies of the United States, whose support made it possible for the present anti-popular régime to establish itself in Greece and to pursue a policy of terrorism and oppression of all democratic elements.

49. The Soviet delegations and the delegations of the peoples' democracies demonstrated in their statements that the Special Committee had been guilty of including falsehoods and deliberate distortions of fact in its report with the object of vindicating the Greek Government and laying all the blame on Bulgaria and Albania which, so it alleged, were threatening the independence of Greece. The First Committee nevertheless recommended, by a majority, that the Assembly should approve the report of the United Nations Special Com-

mittee on the Balkans and should continue it in being for a further year.

50. Thus, although the discussions in the First Committee showed how completely absurd and unfounded were the allegations concerning the existence of any threats to Greece from its northern neighbours, draft resolutions were approved which retained these defamatory charges against Bulgaria and Albania and diverted attention from the real threat to Greece, namely, the continued interference in the internal affairs of that country by the United States, which determines and directs its domestic and foreign policy.

51. Terrorism and brutal violence against democratic elements continue to prevail in Greece, with the approval of the ruling circles of the United States. Contrary to the denials of the Greek delegation, new proofs are reaching us from every side that Greek courts are still passing death sentences.

52. During the current session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and many delegations have received large numbers of documents and telegrams from various organizations and persons in Greece and other countries drawing attention to fresh crimes committed by the Greek Government.

53. The resolution which the General Assembly adopted last year concerning the death sentences passed against Greek patriots [*resolution 288 C (IV)*] saved a number of lives. This year, the First Committee rejected a draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation which merely proposed that the President of the General Assembly should negotiate with the representatives of the Greek Government in order to secure the reversal of the death sentences passed by military courts in Athens against eleven Greek patriots, named in a letter from their mothers, and against eight trade union leaders. Such a humane decision would undoubtedly have stayed the hand of the executioner which was already lifted over the heads of the unfortunate victims.

54. In this connexion, the delegation of the Soviet Union has submitted to the General Assembly a draft resolution [*A/1569*] for the reversal of the death sentences passed by military courts in Greece against the Greek patriots. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR warmly supports this draft resolution and appeals to the General Assembly to discharge its duty and to support the draft resolution in the name of humanity.

55. The approval by a majority in the First Committee of draft resolutions on the Greek question conceived and drafted at the orders of the ruling circles of the United States, proves that the United States, supported by the United Kingdom and certain other States, wish to maintain the present abnormal position in the Balkans because it helps the United States and its partners to conduct their shameless political and economic expansion in Greece and gradually to transform the country into a tool for the execution of their aggressive designs on the Balkans.

56. That is why the United States is also hindering the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Greece on the one hand, and Bulgaria and Albania on the other, by encouraging and stimulating Greece's greedy appetite for her neighbours' territory—the valleys of Rhodope Mountains in Bulgaria and Northern

Epirus in Albania. This also explains the United States delegation's stubborn opposition at this session to the adoption of the USSR draft resolution proposing practical and effective measures for the settlement of the situation in Greece and of its relations with Bulgaria and Albania.

57. There are no threats whatsoever to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece from its neighbours or from any other peace-loving democratic country. The real threat to Greece lies in United States interference, which has permeated all aspects of life in the country and has subjugated the domestic and foreign policy of Greece to its interests. The reign of terror established by the present Greek Government against the people is not the least of the dangers threatening the Greek people.

58. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR therefore considers the draft resolutions on the Greek question approved by the majority in the First Committee to be unacceptable.

59. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR considers that an indispensable condition for the settlement of mutual relations between Greece and its neighbours—Albania and Bulgaria—is the cessation of military and political interference by the United States in the affairs of Greece.

60. In order to put an end to the tension between Greece and its neighbours, diplomatic relations must be established between Greece on the one hand, and Bulgaria and Albania on the other, and the frontiers between these countries must be determined once and for all in accordance with the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference.

61. The domestic policy of terrorism and of oppression of democratic elements now prevailing in Greece must end. It is essential to carry out democratic reforms in that country and, first of all, to declare a general amnesty and to abolish the concentration camps. Only a representative government, set up as a result of a general parliamentary election and enjoying the confidence and support of the people, can lead the country out of the difficulties into which it has been plunged by the policy of the present rulers in Athens, supported by the American residents in Greece.

62. These measures should be taken by the Greek people themselves without any outside interference. It is therefore inadmissible to retain the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, which was established illegally and which, by its hostile attitude towards Bulgaria and Albania, has merely served to aggravate the friction between Greece and its neighbours.

63. All the necessary measures for the settlement of the situation in Greece are contained in the draft resolution [*A/1560*] submitted by the delegation of the USSR; the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR supports this draft and will vote for it. The adoption of this text and the speedy and effective execution of its provisions would ensure a real dissipation of the threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece and would at last enable us to delete from the agenda of the General Assembly a question which, through the fault of the Anglo-American bloc, the Assembly has been obliged to consider for the fourth time.

64. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR will vote against draft resolutions A and B submitted by the First Committee.

65. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): As the representatives of the USSR and of the Ukrainian SSR have already explained their votes on the draft resolutions under discussion, and since the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR is in full agreement with those explanations, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR will refrain from making a statement on the question.

66. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Thank you very much. I hope other delegations will follow the example of brevity set by the representative of the Byelorussian SSR.

67. Sir Carl BERENDSEN (New Zealand): I very much wish that I could in this and any other respects emulate the example of my old friend and colleague from the Byelorussian SSR. I shall do my very best to be as much like him as possible, but I cannot be quite as brief.

68. The appropriate draft resolutions were so fully and properly assured of approval in Committee that the New Zealand delegation took no part at all in the debate. But we fear that we cannot allow such an occasion to pass without explaining very briefly the votes which we are about to cast.

69. New Zealand has an interest in the fate of Greece and the Greek people which is special and particular to us, because by the act of war it fell to New Zealanders to live and to fight side by side with Greek comrades in circumstances of the sternest adversity, which tested all the highest qualities of both.

70. Those were to us and to the Greeks days of deep and stark tragedy, but we of New Zealand shall remember and shall never forget the noble spirit of those gallant Greek people who had already suffered so much and were to suffer so much more in the years to come. It was not the warmth of their welcome and their kindness to our sons on their arrival that we remember—that, of course, could have been expected—but when, at the end of the struggle, we were forced out of Greece and then out of Crete, the people of that suffering land—left, as they knew and as we knew, to the indescribable agonies and oppressions of a Nazi occupation—bade our sons farewell with the same garlands, the same songs and the same high fraternal spirit with which they had welcomed them.

71. We of New Zealand do not forget. Many of our New Zealanders were inevitably left behind in Greece and in Crete, and I cannot find words to describe the devoted fidelity and unbounded generosity which the Greek people, great and small, rich and poor, of all shades of political opinion, extended to our wandering and suffering sons, in circumstances in which to help such an outcast was a matter of real and instant peril, and to nourish him meant personal deprivation and suffering. Everywhere, those fugitive and desperate New Zealanders were succoured and preserved, hidden from the Nazi tyrant, and, in due course, in many, many cases, assisted to escape. These things we of New Zealand do not forget.

72. Greece held its head high through the rigours of the occupation and though subsequently, and most unhappily, Greece was rent with interna' dissension, we of

New Zealand know the real qualities of the Greeks and we see them now struggling to surmount their troubles and about to resume their proper place in the world of culture and of order. The Greek people—all of them—have and will have our sympathy and our friendship, and it is therefore a privilege for us to support the draft resolutions before the General Assembly which are calculated to maintain and accelerate the recovery of this great people and this great nation.

73. May I now be permitted to devote two minutes to another draft resolution. I feel it imperative, in explaining my vote on draft resolution C, to express, as best I may—because I cannot find words adequate to the occasion—my detestation of the cruelty that has been perpetrated on these Greek children, torn from their mothers and their families and sent abroad into a foreign land.

74. There can be no escape from the essential facts. If there is a human right which one would imagine to be completely undeniable in any quarter of the world, it is the obvious right of a little child to remain with its mother and its family; and the equally obvious right of parents to be with their children.

75. It is clear beyond any question that many, many thousands of Greek children have been removed and are still removed from their homes and their country. Whatever the motive for their removal—and one can scarcely imagine a motive that could in any degree be described as good—it is most certainly impossible adequately to condemn the holding of these children abroad for years. What can one say of those governmental and other authorities who have conclusively shown that they do not wish to make the slightest attempt to rectify this gross betrayal of all that is right and kind and good in human nature?

76. The tale is told, and it is a pitiful one, in sober United Nations reports which every right-thinking man and woman the world over should read. It is a saddening and a sickening story. I note, and I am sure the General Assembly will note, with real appreciation that in Yugoslavia an attempt is now being made to do something effective to reunite with their parents such of these unfortunate children as may be in that country. In common with every right-thinking person throughout the whole world, I give my warmest support to all such activities. I think the Yugoslavs are very much to be congratulated and thanked for their interest, and I wish them well in this noble endeavour.

77. Finally, may I have the indulgence of the President in order to express the most fervent hope that despite all that has passed, those in whose power it now lies to do something effective for humanity may even now join those who stand with their hands outstretched desperately ready and anxious to help those innocent little ones. Surely little children can be returned to their homes without loss or damage to anyone or any cause the world over. In so doing, who knows, we might perchance not only dispose of this crying injustice but, at the same time, by this united and joint effort in human kindness, we might perhaps come closer together and make some progress towards a better understanding and a solution of many wider and more practical questions of international suspicion and dissension. Can we not join together, all of us, in hope and in charity and get these children home?

78. Mr. PISEK (Czechoslovakia) (*translated from Russian*): From the very beginning of the discussion on the so-called Greek question, the Czechoslovak delegation has objected to the formulation of the question in a way which implies that the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece are being threatened by its northern neighbours. During the debate in the First Committee, it was clearly demonstrated by the delegations of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia that the threat came not from the northern neighbours of Greece—Albania and Bulgaria—but from the United Kingdom and the United States which, by their support of the anti-popular government and their interference, have created in Greece, a dangerous situation which threatens peace and security in the Balkans.

79. Terrorism is rampant in Greece and the democratic movement is being cruelly persecuted. The anti-popular Athens régime is carrying out provocative acts against its neighbours—Albania and Bulgaria. The representative of the Athens Government failed to answer the question whether that government recognized the present Albanian-Greek frontier. He and his patrons were also unable to refute the facts adduced concerning the unceasing reign of terror in Greece.

80. The biased attitude of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, which had been established as a smoke-screen for a policy of adventure in Greece—a policy directed against the Greek people and against peace and security in the Balkans—was demonstrated during the debates in the First Committee. Notwithstanding this, a draft resolution was approved under which the so-called United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans was to be continued in being, although even the sponsors of the draft resolution were obliged to make reservations, that is, to stipulate that the Special Committee should be continued until the sixth session of the General Assembly “unless meanwhile the Special Committee recommends to the Interim Committee its own dissolution”.

81. The Czechoslovak delegation is in favour of the immediate dissolution of the illegal United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, whose retention is not only superfluous but actually harmful.

82. Let me also draw your attention to the twenty-third report [A/1555] of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions which states that the appropriations for the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans for the current year amount to \$780,200, and that the estimates for 1951 come to \$573,600. This is an irresponsible squandering of money to no purpose, harmful in its consequences. The Czechoslovak delegation is firmly opposed to such a way of managing the affairs the United Nations.

83. For these reasons the Czechoslovak delegation will vote against draft resolutions A and B.

84. I should like now to deal with draft resolution C. The Czechoslovak delegation cannot vote in favour of this draft resolution which, in a spirit of partiality, reproaches the countries which have given refuge to Greek children—with the single exception of Yugoslavia—for not having taken definite action to comply with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its third and fourth sessions. We have shown that action

has been taken but that the chief obstacle is the attitude of the Athens Government. At previous sessions we agreed that the children should be returned to their parents on certain conditions; at this session of the General Assembly we have also asked for guarantees that the children would be returned directly to their families and their parents and that the returned children and their parents would not be victimized.

85. These guarantees have not been forthcoming. We quoted the testimony of a former observer of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, Mr. Kenneth Spencer, who declared that the camps which were being prepared on Greek islands provided evidence that the Greek Government had no intention of permitting the Greek children to return directly to their families. The representative of the Athens Government did not refute this testimony.

86. That is the cause of our disagreement. You say that the children must be returned to Greece and that the matter then no longer concerns us. Our prime concern, however, is to know to whom they will be returned, under what conditions, and to what kind of life. We are concerned with the fate and happiness of the Greek children. Do you suppose that millions of people and millions of mothers throughout the world would agree to the Greek children being left to the vagaries of fate, sent off to death camps or handed over to be educated by gendarmes, agents of the secret police or other “educators” of that kind? No, they would never agree to that and would consider us guilty of a crime if we were to act so thoughtlessly.

87. The Czechoslovak delegation cannot, therefore, support a draft resolution which provides no definite guarantee that the children will be returned directly to their parents and to normal living conditions.

88. All our efforts should be directed towards bringing the situation in Greece back to normal. My delegation therefore firmly supports the draft resolution of the Soviet Union [A/1560], which sets out the basic conditions for achieving that aim.

89. There is one last question with which I should like to deal. During this fifth session we have received a number of important documents testifying to the fact that terrorism in Greece is not abating. This testimony refutes all the Greek Government’s assertions that it has adopted a more lenient attitude towards political prisoners. These documents are disturbing world public opinion and call upon us to take steps to save the lives of Greek patriots under sentence of death, of whom there are now almost 3,000.

90. The Czechoslovak delegation considers that the General Assembly will be acting with justice and humanity if it adopts the USSR draft resolution [A/1569], which requests the President of the General Assembly to enter into negotiations with representatives of the Greek Government concerning the repeal of the death sentences passed by the military courts on Greek patriots. The Czechoslovak delegation whole-heartedly supports this draft resolution of the Soviet Union.

91. Mr. KANELLOPOULOUS (Greece) (*translated from French*): As regards draft resolution A, the text of which was submitted in the First Committee by Greece, I would request the President’s permission to reply briefly to the representatives of the Soviet bloc.

92. Those representatives have denied the presence of Greek officers and men in their countries. The mere fact such persons were in Yugoslavia and are being returned to us now—which is an important step towards settling the position in the Balkans—shows that there are no grounds whatsoever for the cynical denial of the facts which the representatives of the Soviet bloc endeavoured to make in the First Committee and have endeavoured to make even here. How could Greek officers and men have been detained in Yugoslavia and none in Albania or Bulgaria?

93. Apart from these facts, people who have transgressed international principles and humanitarian rules have no right to ask for proof and witnesses. In any case, the names and even the present addresses of a large number of these Greek soldiers have been communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations through the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. That is all I had to say concerning draft resolution A.

94. The Greek delegation will, of course, vote in favour of draft resolution B, concerning the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.

95. That Committee has done good work, worthy of recognition by all the free and peace-loving peoples of the world. It has been and still is the guardian and defender of truth. It is true that it had neither the material strength nor even the authority to ward off the evils from which Greece has suffered for so long. Yet the Greek people are grateful to the Special Committee for the courage it has shown, not only in establishing the truth, but also, and above all, in insisting on the truth with the impartiality which has always been its greatest virtue.

96. The evils which befell us thanks to the aggression committed by the hordes of red totalitarianism, which we resisted with sacrificial ardour, are known to the Special Commission, which has recorded them and revealed their true causes. It has recorded the fact that the trials to which the entire Greek people have been subjected during the last few years, the crucial phase of which came to an end as a result of the victories of our armed forces towards the end of the summer of 1949, were the result of the international character of that war which the representatives of the Soviet bloc persist in calling a civil war. Only the complicity and the participation in that war of the northern neighbours of Greece rendered that war possible. That now applies, as far as our immediate neighbours are concerned, only to Albania and Bulgaria. For since Yugoslavia has effectively closed its frontiers, it has been easy to see that armed communism cannot survive in areas adjacent to a closed frontier.

97. Since the victory of Greek arms last year, the position in Greece has considerably improved. There is no longer any militarily organized banditry in the country. But Greece still has long frontiers which, owing to the reduction of the national armed forces, are practically open and cannot be patrolled from end to end. Beyond those frontiers lie the neighbouring countries which maintain, organize and arm the bandits who took refuge there after the defeat inflicted by the Greek army on their fighting units. The report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans contains

concrete information clearly proving that the threat to Greece has not been dispelled.

98. In the First Committee, the representatives of the Soviet bloc hurled insults at the members of the Special Committee set up by the General Assembly. These representatives should either make use of their right to take part in the work of the Special Committee or else keep silent, thus tacitly and modestly admitting their guilt for what has happened in Greece. Their noisy demonstrations not only reveal their responsibility for past events, but are indications of their future intentions. Thus they are themselves adding another argument in favour of continuing the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.

99. The First Committee, which approved the two draft resolutions concerning the retention of the Special Committee and the repatriation of members of the Greek armed forces by an overwhelming majority, rejected the USSR draft resolutions, which were based upon lies and slander and were intended only to undermine and destroy the democratic and liberal régime of Greece. Both the form and the substance of those drafts were unacceptable.

100. As regards form, they are designed to bring about the intervention of the United Nations in the domestic affairs of Greece, which is an independent country. Greece is prepared to agree to any reduction of sovereignty to which other Members of our Organization would agree for their part, if it can thereby help to strengthen peace and to set the affairs of the world on a new and firmer basis. We know quite well—and I shall take this opportunity to say so—that the world cannot survive without the co-operation of all. Such co-operation can be achieved only if all peoples, great and small, are prepared to sacrifice their national egotisms; that sacrifice may be made by stages, but it must ultimately be complete. We could not accept interference in our domestic affairs unless exactly the same interference on the part of this international Organization took place in the domestic affairs of all the other Members.

101. The USSR draft resolutions which were rejected in the First Committee were unacceptable not only on account of their form, but also on account of their substance. Their motivation was only too obvious. The Soviet Union cannot yet admit the fact that in Greece democracy has triumphed over red totalitarianism and barbarism. It cannot yet resign itself to the fact that the Balkan peninsula which dominates the eastern Mediterranean has not fallen into the hands of international communism. It cannot resign itself to the fact that the Greek people, as in 1940 and 1941, have once more paved the way to victory over the powers of darkness. When communism was defeated in Greece, the USSR tried—and it is still trying—to change the victorious democracy of Greece into a passive, atrophied and lifeless democracy which would be robbed of its victory by the resumption of the subversive activities of communism.

102. Greek democracy is fully conscious of its mission, a mission of world-wide importance at one of the world's nerve-centres, and it is not prepared to hand over its moral weapons to those who, after slaughtering millions of Greeks over many years and laying waste hundreds of villages, have finally been forced to hand over

the weapons used for their crimes to the victorious Greek democracy.

103. Greece is generous and tolerant by nature, as any visitor to my country not blinded by doctrinaire principles can find out. It is the country of true light, where nothing can be hidden. But, though Greece is generous and tolerant, that does not mean that it is ready to throw open its doors to red fascism or red nazism and have its foundations undermined once again. Greece is not prepared to betray its democratic mission, that is, its duty towards the United Nations, a duty which is all the more important since the geographical situation of the country places the Greek people in the proud position of fighting in the vanguard of democracy. The Greek people were fully conscious of their duty at a time when they were entirely isolated and when public opinion in the great democracies, disinclined to face hard facts, was passively accepting all the slanders put out by the enemies of Greece. If we did not yield then, it is very certain that we shall not yield today. The Greek army, which is strong in morale and considerable in numbers, is ready to make any sacrifice in the defence of freedom. That army, in spite of the desperate efforts of Moscow to weaken Greek democracy, is and will remain at the service of the United Nations.

104. The President will allow me also to explain my vote on draft resolution C, concerning the repatriation of Greek children.

105. The Greek delegation expresses its profound regret that no solution has been found for a problem of of such great moral importance. Greece is grateful to the International Committee of the Red Cross, to the League of Red Cross Societies and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for their untiring efforts to solve the problem in the name of humanitarian principles. It notes, however, with serious apprehension as regards the future of the world, that there is a group of States which persist not only in ignoring the basic principles of the moral dignity of human beings, the family and society, but in trampling them underfoot in the most cynical fashion.

106. Unlike those countries, Yugoslavia has just made a first gesture in the direction of restoring kidnapped Greek children. We hope that, despite the grave fears expressed by some, a difference in social systems and politics need not involve differences in the fundamental moral conceptions regarding human beings and families.

107. Everything said here by the representatives of the Soviet bloc to hide the fact that, even while they were voting in previous years for resolutions recommending the return of the Greek children, they had no intention of letting them go, has been no more than a smoke-screen for their devilish purposes. I feel myself called upon to denounce those purposes and to draw the attention of the United Nations to the consequences which would inevitably ensue if they were finally achieved.

108. The countries of the Soviet bloc will certainly release those unfortunate children some day. But when? Only when, after a long training dispensed by ruthless methods, they have ceased not only to be men with free consciences but have also lost even the possibility of acquiring a free conscience as a result of moral re-education.

109. The right of choosing one's own way of life is surely the most precious gift given by God to man. An adolescence deprived of the right to question—to intellectual questioning, to moral questioning—an adolescence deprived of all right to doubt, of the right to choose ideas freely, will lead to the creation—I was going to say to the manufacture—of men who are not human beings; it will lead to the mass production of morally blind biological specimens. The inhuman and monolithic form of education instituted by the Soviet régime robs the soul of all its human qualities. The purpose of the States of the Soviet bloc which are still detaining Greek children is to return those children to Greece only when the human element in their soul has been entirely destroyed.

110. The representatives of the Soviet bloc have not failed to assure us that the education which these children are receiving includes systematic instruction in their mother tongue, that is to say, Greek. But who has ever denied that? The Cominform has no intention of using those children in the territories now under its control. Its purpose, of course, is to send them to Greece later, and therefore they must have a perfect knowledge of Greek. They will certainly learn their mother tongue, but they will none the less have ceased to be Greeks in the true sense of the word, because they will have ceased to be men with free consciences.

111. While it is still not too late for the sake of those at least for whom there is yet time—the countries of the Soviet bloc must be forced under the pressure of world opinion to give up their devilish plans.

112. The problem of the Greek children who have been taken from their homes is one of the most tragic of our century. Greece demands today that these Greek children should be set at liberty and delivered as soon as possible from this morally inhuman treatment, so that they may return to their families and to the society of free men.

113. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): We have never had a discussion like this before. The speeches could not have been longer if the Assembly had decided to hold a debate on the question, nor could matters which have no direct bearing on the subject have been dealt with more thoroughly.

114. I appeal to you once more. As there were three draft resolutions on the Greek question, and I said that I would allow representatives to explain their votes on each of them, I have allowed speakers to go on beyond the stipulated time. But I give notice to the Assembly that, with its approval, I shall be more strict when we come to deal with other questions, and I shall limit the time for explanations of votes to seven minutes.

115. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): After the request of the President, I shall not reply to all that nonsense which we have just heard from the representative of Greece. We all know what he spoke about and how matters look, apart from his high-sounding phrases. I shall limit myself to an explanation of the vote of my delegation on the several draft resolutions which we have before us concerning the Greek problem.

116. The first—draft resolution A—concerns the repatriation of Greek armed forces allegedly captured by Greek guerrillas and transported to the countries neighbouring on Greece.

117. Despite several requests by the Polish delegation, as well as by other delegations, the authors of this draft resolution were unable in the First Committee to support it with any kind of facts which would justify the introduction or the adoption of such a text. That continues to be so. We found it impossible to discuss the charges brought forward by the Greek delegation since no specific data referring to the case had been supplied and since the relevant part of the Special Committee's report was based entirely on the Greek statements, which were not supported by any evidence, any facts or data. My delegation, therefore, intends to vote against this draft resolution, which is merely another attempt to launch slanderous attacks against some of Greece's northern neighbours.

118. The report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and the draft resolution subsequently submitted on the basis of that report were extensively discussed during several sessions of the First Committee. My delegation, during the debate, made clear its views on the report as well as on the internal situation existing in Greece, on the relations between Greece, on the one hand, and Bulgaria and Albania, on the other, and on the charges contained in the report. We expressed the view—and we now continue to maintain it—that the five-Power draft resolution, which is now before us as draft resolution B, is not intended to enable us to find a solution to the Greek problem. Its purpose is to maintain the present conditions in Greece and the existing state of tension and so to justify continued foreign intervention in Greece's internal affairs and the subordination of Greece to foreign military, strategic and economic interests.

119. My delegation opposed the inclusion of this item in the agenda, for it was fully aware that it was not intended to protect the independence of Greece; we knew that it would be used for the continuation of that foreign intervention in Greece which we have been discussing since the very inception of this Organization. Foreign intervention, war preparations and designs, territorial claims against the northern neighbours of Greece, nostalgic dreams and megalomaniac desires for a greater Greece at the expense of a small and peaceful country like Albania—these are some of the international aspects of the Greek affair. This is what threatens the peace in the Balkans.

120. We have demanded at this session of the General Assembly, as at previous sessions, a simple and straightforward declaration by the Greek delegation that Greece has no territorial design on the Balkans. At this, as at previous sessions, no such declaration was made. At the same time, the increasing number of frontier provocations shows that the Athens régime is prepared to follow up its claims by the use of force.

121. Draft resolution B approves the report of the Special Committee and continues the existence of that Committee until the next session of the General Assembly. This point in the draft resolution is the crux of the matter. The whole aim of the discussion and of the draft resolution is to have the Special Committee continued and so constitute a phony United Nations stamp on the activities of United States interventionists.

122. My delegation considers that to continue the Special Committee in being is certainly not the way to improve the situation in the Balkans. On the contrary,

we contend—and we have given ample evidence to support our contention—that the Special Committee's sole contribution is to add to the existing tension. During the debate we proved that the report prepared by the Special Committee was based on rumours, on hearsay, and on statements of criminals and provocateurs. Seldom has a report so clumsily concocted as this one—a report whose conclusions were drawn up beforehand for the benefit of certain States with strategic interests in Greece—been submitted to the United Nations. None of our charges concerning the Special Committee has been answered; the same is true of the contradictions which we have pointed out in the report.

123. Every demand of logic shows that there is something totally wrong in the proposed solution, and honesty and decency should require a change of methods and the seeking of better ones. That has not been done in the draft resolution. My delegation will vote against draft resolution B, and will also oppose any financial appropriation to implement it.

124. As regards the Soviet Union draft resolution [A/1560], my delegation considers that only through internal conciliation in Greece on the one hand, and through conciliation with the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria on the other, can the normalization of the situation in Greece be achieved. Foreign intervention must cease so that the Greek people may be free to decide their own fate. They should have the right to express their opinions and desires in free parliamentary elections based on proportional representation. The economic and social burden which rests so heavily on the backs of the Greek people should be lessened, and the terror and oppression in prisons and concentration camps should be removed by the declaration of a general amnesty and the abolition of concentration camps. Conciliation between Greece and Albania and between Greece and Bulgaria should lead to the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with those countries.

125. These are some basic requirements for any action which sincerely aims at solving the Greek problem. This is the path of action that the General Assembly should recommend, and this is what the Soviet Union draft resolution proposes. We strongly support this draft resolution, which gives a ray of hope to the oppressed people of Greece.

126. The oppressed people of Greece, who live in fear, hunger and starvation, who are suffering, starving and dying, look towards this Assembly with the hope that their strivings for a free and democratic country will finally be taken up by the United Nations. We have failed them many times. If this Organization wants to fulfil its role as a centre for harmonizing the activities of nations and for developing international collaboration, it cannot afford to fail them again. We cannot shun the basic issues brought forth in this debate and formulated in a plan of action by the USSR draft resolution. This plan of action is the only real solution. It alone puts the problems in their real perspective, and proposes concrete measures. My delegation will vote in favour of this draft resolution.

127. My delegation abstained in the First Committee on the vote on the draft resolution concerning the repatriation of Greek children, which is before us now as draft resolution C. We emphasized, and we do so

again, that this is a problem which should be approached only from the humanitarian point of view. We consider it abominable to use the fate of these children as a weapon of political propaganda, as it has been used in the past and as we heard it used this morning. The Polish delegation strongly maintains its position that the children should join their families whenever there is an express will for it and whenever it is carried out in conformity with the principles of the resolutions on this subject adopted in 1948 and again in 1949 [resolutions 193 C (III) and 288 B (IV)].

128. It is most unfortunate that the discussion of this problem was used as an opportunity to attack those countries which gave protection to the children at a time when their lives were in danger and when they were in direst need of care. My delegation fully recognizes that there were reasons for the evacuation of Greek children from the war-stricken areas of Greece. In view of the heavy bombardment of the guerrilla-held areas and in view of the economic blockade, the lives of these children would have been in danger had they remained there. Their evacuation was conducted so as to include only the children whose parents had expressed the wish that they should be taken to safer places. The voluntary character of this evacuation cannot be denied by anyone, despite the tremendous propaganda drive launched by the Athens Government.

129. I wish to emphasize that all the countries which have given shelter to Greek children have fulfilled a great humanitarian duty. They have given the children excellent care and protection. They have guaranteed their upbringing in a spirit of healthy patriotism and love of the history and traditions of Greece. The gratitude of the Greek mothers of these children, expressed in so many letters, should be supplemented by the high praise of this Organization for the countries that have given refuge, care and protection to the young and innocent victims of the war, victims of the Truman doctrine, victims of the Athens régime.

130. At the same time, those countries, having undertaken the task of protecting these children, are responsible for their fate and hence must have a real guarantee that requests for their return are genuine and voluntary; for, as we have proved, many requests were false and manufactured. The General Assembly must itself, therefore, demand guarantees that the children will not become victims of reform camps, will not be punished for the political convictions of their parents or for their stay in countries whose social system is looked upon with disfavour by the Greek Government.

131. This Assembly has been presented, however, with a draft resolution which, unfortunately, uses the problem of Greek children as a political tool. Without any justification whatsoever, the draft resolution accuses the countries harbouring the Greek children of creating difficulties and, in spite of the action of the Red Cross, proposes the formation of a committee whose only effect would be to make the return machinery more difficult. While in agreement with certain parts of the draft resolution, we cannot accept it in its present form and we reject the unjustified accusations it contains.

132. My delegation supports the Soviet Union amendments [A/1568] to draft resolution C. If they were adopted, we should be prepared to accept the draft

resolution. We cannot, however, accept the draft resolution as it is now worded.

133. Finally, I come to the draft resolution [A/1569] submitted by the Soviet Union delegation concerning the death sentences imposed upon Greek democrats. We all heard and read the moving appeal which the eleven mothers of those unfortunate young men submitted to Generalissimo Stalin. During the debate in the First Committee we heard hair-raising stories of terror, persecution and torture in prisons and concentration camps of men, women and children. We know the heavy toll the Greek nation has had to pay in death sentences. Three thousand more prisoners are in their cells awaiting their turn to be taken out to be shot. This Assembly cannot remain deaf to the appeals for mercy and leniency towards men whose only crimes were their democratic beliefs.

134. We all remember how united we were at the third session, in Paris, in our desire to save the lives of several trade union leaders. We saved their lives only temporarily, for they are still under sentence of death and may be executed any moment. If we ask whether the General Assembly has done anything at all to help solve the Greek problem, no doubt this is the only positive achievement to which we can point.

135. Today we have an opportunity to save a few human lives and thus bring hope to thousands more who live in constant fear of death. No responsible person can agree to the continuation of the persecution. No responsible person can take upon his conscience the rejection of a draft resolution which involves human lives. My delegation will vote in favour of this draft, in the firm belief that we are thus fulfilling a great humanitarian duty and taking a step which could mark the beginning of leniency and conciliation, a lightening of the heavy burden which has befallen the Greek people, whose history and gallantry we all admire.

136. Mr. VAN GLABBEKE (Belgium) (*translated from French*): The Belgian delegation wishes to give a brief explanation of its vote; its position here will be the same as in the First Committee.

137. In the first place, it will vote against the draft resolutions submitted by the USSR [A/1560 and A/1569], because they provide for series of measures which are exactly the kind of measures which should not be adopted.

138. It will vote against the amendments [A/5168] submitted by the Soviet Union to draft resolution C, because their only purpose and their only effect would be to make the draft resolution say exactly the contrary of what it should.

139. It will vote in favour of the three drafts approved by the First Committee, because they say exactly what should be said, no more and no less.

140. It will vote in this way because it wishes to remain faithful to the General Assembly resolutions of 1948 and 1949, urging all States Members of the United Nations, and the other States which are harbouring Greek children, to take all possible measures, in consultation and collaboration with the international Red Cross organizations, to facilitate the speedy return of the children to their homes.

141. Belgium will vote in this way, as it voted before, because it disapproves of the attitude of some countries

in voting for two consecutive years for resolutions such as those which I have just mentioned and then doing nothing to implement them. Those countries have not only done nothing to implement the General Assembly resolutions but, on the contrary, have hindered their implementation.

142. The Belgian delegation will vote in this way because to its great regret, it sees, from the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans that the countries harbouring Greek children—except Yugoslavia, of course—have completely failed to take any action; because the report states that a continuation of the present situation is absolutely unjustified; and because, finally, the report expresses the Special Committee's grave concern about the fact that, notwithstanding the two resolutions unanimously adopted by the General Assembly and the unremitting efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and international Red Cross organizations, not a single Greek child has yet been returned to his native land, with the exception of those who have been repatriated from Yugoslavia.

143. The Belgian delegation will vote in this way because it cannot accept evasions on a question such as that of the repatriation of Greek children.

144. The representative of Poland told us just now that the problem should not be considered from a political point of view. Nevertheless, it was said in the First Committee that, if the form of government in Athens changed—in other words, if there were a communist government in Athens—the Greek children would be returned to their families. My delegation cannot accept an argument which amounts to saying: "These children are better off where they are now; let us not send them back to Greece."

145. My delegation will vote in this way because it cannot agree that to-day, after so many years, the argument should be used that there are errors in one or other of the lists of children. As the lists contain the names of thousands of children, such errors are inevitable.

146. My delegation considers that, when a country does not even reply to letters inviting it to give proof of its goodwill and to participate in the very human work of repatriating the Greek children, that is a proof that obligations are being shirked and even, perhaps, a proof of bad faith.

147. Furthermore, my delegation does not consider that it can accept the argument that because some children lost their parents in Greece during the civil war, they should not be returned to their homes. There may be other members of the family—grandparents, uncles or aunts—who are entitled to claim these children, and in any case we think that the Greek Government itself has the right to assume responsibility for orphans who have no family at all.

148. My delegation would like to see the same principles applied in the case of these Greek children as Belgium applied in the case of the Spanish children repatriated after the Spanish civil war. That repatriation caused deep suffering among those who had adopted little Spanish children; but when the time came to send them back, we did not say: "We do not like the

Spanish Government; we shall wait until there is another government in Madrid". We applied the principles which, by our vote, we ask the General Assembly to apply.

149. These are the reasons why my delegation will vote in the way I have indicated.

150. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): We shall now proceed to vote. I shall first put to the vote draft resolution A submitted by the First Committee [A/1536]. No amendment has been submitted to this draft resolution.

Draft resolution A was adopted by 53 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

151. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I put draft resolution B, to which no amendments have been submitted, to the vote.

Draft resolution B was adopted by 53 votes to 6.

152. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I have before me three amendments proposed by the Soviet Union [A/1568] to draft resolution C submitted by the First Committee. I shall put these amendments to the vote separately.

153. I now put to the vote the first amendment, calling for the deletion of the first paragraph of the preamble.

The amendment was rejected by 49 votes to 5 with 1 abstention.

154. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The second amendment of the USSR calls for the substitution, in paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution, of the words "in conformity with the resolutions referred to above" for the words "and, whenever necessary, to allow the international Red Cross organization free access to their territories for this purpose". I put this amendment to the vote.

The amendment was rejected by 48 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

155. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I now put the third amendment to the vote; it calls for the deletion of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the operative part or draft resolution C.

The amendment was rejected by 51 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

156. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall now ask the Assembly to vote on draft resolution C submitted by the First Committee [A/1536].

Draft resolution C was adopted by 50 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

157. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The Assembly now has to vote on two draft resolutions submitted by the Soviet Union.

158. I put the first of these draft resolutions [A/1560] to the vote.

The draft resolution was rejected by 50 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions.

159. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I put the second USSR draft resolution [A/1569] to the vote.

The draft resolution was rejected by 38 votes to 6, with 11 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.