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President: Mr. Nasrollah ENTEZAM (Iran).

Order of the consideration of agenda items

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The Second Committee, which is dealing with the question of the economic development of under-developed countries, will be holding a meeting tonight. That Committee's report appears as the second item on our agenda. In order to save our colleagues on the Second Committee the trouble of having to wait here until the second item is discussed, we could, if you agree, proceed to the second item and then return to the first. If, however, the Assembly should decide to hold a discussion on the second item, my request would lose its point and we should continue the consideration of the first item.

2. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Assembly agrees with my suggestion.

It was so decided.

Economic development of under-developed countries: report of the Second Committee (A/1524)

[Agenda item 28]

3. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Before calling on the Rapporteur, I shall ask the Assembly to indicate whether it wishes to discuss the Second Committee's report.

It was decided not to discuss the report.

Mr. Vilfan (Yugoslavia), Rapporteur, presented the report of the Second Committee and the accompanying draft resolutions (A/1524).

4. Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia), Rapporteur of the Second Committee: I should like to stress the fact that all the draft resolutions were approved unanimously by the Second Committee.

5. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall put to the vote, in turn, the draft resolutions

A, B, C, D, E and F contained in the Second Committee's report.

The draft resolutions were adopted unanimously.

Development of a twenty-year programme for achieving peace through the United Nations: memorandum of the Secretary-General (A/1304) (concluded)

[Agenda item 60]

6. Mr. SIROKY (Czechoslovakia) (*translated from Russian*): The People's Democratic Republic of Czechoslovakia, whose policy is based on work, peace, and the friendly and peaceful co-existence of nations, welcomes every honest plan which may result in a step forward in the effort to preserve and strengthen peace. It welcomes every peaceful plan designed to provide effective and concrete measures to guarantee the security of the nations.

7. In the consideration, therefore, of the twenty-year programme by the General Assembly, the Czechoslovak delegation is guided by a strong desire to contribute towards the successful solution of the basic problems of the struggle against aggression and war and on behalf of peace. My delegation, it is true, takes a critical attitude towards the various points of the plan which has been submitted, and also towards its general conception; for the so-called programme for achieving peace through the United Nations is an idea of the Anglo-American bloc, which is attempting to convert the United Nations into an effective instrument of its policy.

8. It was no accident that during the discussion of the Secretary-General's programme, the representative of the United States said [310th meeting] that the three resolutions already adopted at this session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on

“United action for peace” [302nd meeting], “Duties of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities” [308th meeting] and “Peace through deeds” [308th meeting] — represented an important step forward towards the realization of the principles set forth in the memorandum. All these resolutions to which reference is made here in connexion with the memorandum were adopted at the initiative of the States of the North Atlantic Treaty and, whatever else they may be, they are not an effective weapon in the struggle against aggression and war.

9. What is the real meaning of these resolutions from the point of view of the international campaign to secure peace? We are profoundly convinced that they are intended to serve a number of ends.

10. In the first place, they are intended to support the foreign policy of the prime mover in the Anglo-American bloc, the United States, which has replaced the principle of democratic collaboration by acts of interventionist aggression and an attempt to secure mastery of the world.

11. Secondly, they are intended to thwart the basic interests of the dependent, colonial and semi-colonial peoples and their liberation movement, and to support the expansionist interests of the capitalistic monopolies.

12. Thirdly, they are intended to legalize the present policy of interference by the colonial Powers in the domestic affairs of other States;

13. Fourthly, in connexion with the struggle against the ideological, political, strategical and material preparation for a new war, they are intended to sanction the present and future policy of the instigators of a new war, for they do not settle such problems as the prohibition of the atomic weapon, rearmament and disarmament or war propaganda.

14. Fifthly, they are intended to diminish the importance and undermine the authority of the Security Council, the chief organ of the United Nations for the preservation of peace and security among the nations.

15. Sixthly, they are intended to violate the basic principles of the United Nations Charter.

16. The first resolution mentioned by the representative of the United States contains a violation of the principles of the Charter unparalleled in United Nations history, and one which affects the competence of the Security Council; the resolution is, indeed, a genuine instrument of the interventionist policy of the Anglo-American bloc. The second resolution places the aggressor and the victim of aggression on the same level, and is a further link in the chain of documents directed against the Security Council. And the third resolution virtually buries the question of disarmament and the reduction of armed forces, as well as the question of the prohibition of the atomic weapon, and at the same time establishes a further legal basis for armed intervention in the domestic affairs of States.

17. The author of the memorandum himself emphasizes that his programme is only a general outline of preliminary projects, and requires to be made more definite. Thus it is clear that this proposal can serve as a basis for the preparation of a document expressing an effective peace policy only if the General Assembly is able to work out specific directives and establish specific principles for further work.

18. Two things are obvious in this connexion. The first is that in its present form Trygve Lie's programme does not contain these definite principles. It contains only a list of the questions which must be settled. The second is that it is the General Assembly itself which must work out and adopt these definite guiding rules for further work. The questions, which the memorandum enumerates but does not solve, are important political questions, and they are among the basic questions of international political significance. If these questions are to be successfully and thoroughly dealt with, it is obvious that the General Assembly must first establish the political principles on the basis of which they can be effectively settled.

19. For these reasons the Czechoslovak delegation cannot agree with the nine-Power draft resolution [A/1514]. We shall not vote for that draft resolution, for in our opinion the present international situation requires a very definite and concrete formulation of all measures for strengthening peace and security among the nations.

20. Great value must therefore be placed upon the initiative of the USSR delegation, which, basing its action on its consistently peaceful policy and its consistently constructive attitude in the United Nations, has submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly a draft resolution [A/1525 and Corr.1] which makes it possible to give practical consideration to the so-called twenty-year programme.

21. In the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation, the Soviet Union draft resolution contains definite principles on the basis of which it would be possible to prepare a document that would be an effective instrument for seeking peace and ensuring peaceful co-operation among the nations.

22. The United States criticism that the USSR draft resolution reproduces old peace proposals advanced by the Soviet Union and already rejected by the General Assembly does not hold water in view of the international resistance to the preparations for a new war. The fact that the USSR is supporting effective measures against the preparations for a new war merely provides further proof of its consistent peace policy.

23. The Czechoslovak delegation entirely shares the view that the question, for instance, of the prohibition of the atomic weapon and other weapons for the mass extermination of people cannot be withdrawn from the agenda of the General Assembly and the other organs of the United Nations until an unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons has been adopted, until the vague formulae about so-called international control of atomic energy have been replaced by a specific and binding prohibition of the atomic weapon, until the just desire of hundreds of millions of people throughout the world — the desire that atomic energy should be used only for purposes of peaceful, constructive work in the service of mankind and human welfare — has prevailed.

24. The policy of the enemies of peace and the peaceful co-existence of nations is to use atomic energy for the production of atomic weapons and is vastly detrimental to the interests of progress, which require that atomic energy should be placed wholly and exclusively at the service of the economy and welfare of mankind.

25. Atomic weapons must be prohibited and destroyed because their purpose is the mass extermination of people and because they threaten all the achievements of civilization, progress and humanity. The question, therefore, cannot and will not be withdrawn from the agenda until mankind enjoys the beneficent results of this achievement of human genius for the development of its peaceful economy, welfare and culture.

26. Without the prohibition of the atomic weapon, there can be no effective international control of atomic energy. What, for example, could any organ of the United Nations do with regard to point 2 in the Secretary-General's programme, concerning the establishment of an international control system for atomic energy, which, apart from stating that "every possibility should be explored", makes literally no specific proposals and, in the spirit of the recently adopted resolution submitted by the Anglo-American bloc, avoids the question of the prohibition of the atomic weapon?

27. If the General Assembly does not clearly indicate that the system of international control must apply to the prohibition of the atomic weapon, how will the appropriate United Nations organ which is to examine this question know what is to be controlled? A clear indication of this kind is contained in the Soviet Union draft resolution, which requires the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and other weapons for the mass extermination of people, and at the same time the institution of control to ensure the observance of that prohibition.

28. The position of the United States representative on the question of the proper composition of the Security Council, in connexion with the proposal for the holding of periodic meetings, is hostile not only to the Security Council, which is primarily responsible for international peace and security and is now functioning with an illegal membership, but also to the great People's Republic of China. The USSR draft resolution, which is based on the necessity for changing this illegal situation so that the Security Council may function successfully and legally, requires that if it is decided to inaugurate periodic meetings of the Security Council, provision should be made to ensure that the Council is "fully and legally constituted with the participation of the representative of the People's Republic of China".

29. The argument advanced by the United States representative that this paragraph of the Soviet Union draft resolution is unacceptable because the General Assembly still recognizes the Nationalist Government of China, does not bear scrutiny.

30. It does not bear scrutiny because it is precisely the United States aggression against the territory of the People's Republic of China, in the form of a blockade and the occupation of the Chinese island of Taiwan, which is forcibly preventing the legitimate government of the Chinese people from exercising its authority in that portion of Chinese territory. It is only the illegal United States occupation of Taiwan which is prolonging the existence, in that portion of Chinese territory, of the bankrupt Kuomintang group which the Chinese people have expelled as a puppet of the United States imperialists. The United States argument does not

hold water because its purpose is to ensure that the General Assembly will perpetuate the present illegal situation which has been imposed upon the United Nations by the unilateral and hostile attitude of the United States Government towards the Chinese people.

31. This state of affairs, which is seriously impairing the authority of the United Nations and destroying the conditions required for peaceful co-operation, is in accordance with the trend of the aggressive United States policy in regard to the Pacific area in general, and the People's Republic of China in particular.

32. Shortly after the Second World War, the ruling circles in the United States, pursuing their plans for the establishment of United States world domination, began to count upon China as their strategic base in Asia. The war against the Japanese invaders was hardly over when United States militaristic circles were already making tremendous efforts to buttress the Kuomintang régime and that régime's extensive preparations for civil war against the Chinese people who had fought to secure the independence of China from foreign imperialists. The Chinese people were still fighting against the Japanese invaders when the United States monopolists developed and began to execute plans for the economic enslavement and exploitation of the huge territory of China.

33. The United States began to count more and more upon China as an enormous market and as a source of raw materials in view of the clear indications of an impending economic crisis in the United States. The victory of the People's Republic of China was a great defeat for the imperialists in general and for the United States imperialists in particular.

34. The United States ruling circles, in their preparations for a third world war, are striving to crush the national liberation movement of the colonial, semi-colonial and dependent peoples of Asia. By attacking the Korean people, its freedom and independence, the United States has proceeded from threats to direct acts of aggression.

35. The further development of United States policy in the Pacific area, the systematic air raids on the Chinese People's Republic, the violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China, the blockade and the occupation of an inalienable part of the Chinese People's Republic, the island of Taiwan — all this is not only in keeping with the general policy of the United States ruling circles in the Pacific area, but is also evidence of their obvious intention to extend the war in the Far East. This development of United States policy in Korea and against the People's Republic of China is causing not only the peoples of Asia, who are directly threatened by United States aggression, to be very much on their guard; it is also causing the peoples of the whole world, who most earnestly wish to ensure international peace and security, to keep a close watch on this policy.

36. It is clear in the light of these facts that the negative attitude of the United States delegation to the question of the lawful representation of the Chinese people in the United Nations is prompted solely by the hostility of the United States ruling circles to the Chinese people and by their aggressive actions and plans against the Chinese People's Republic. These

facts once again confirm our point of view, which is that law and the Charter must triumph over the illegal position adopted by one Member State of the United Nations. That applies particularly to this specific case, where we are dealing with the programme of activities of the Security Council.

37. That is why the Czechoslovak delegation vigorously supports paragraph 2 (a) of the USSR draft resolution.

38. The Czechoslovak delegation attaches great importance to the elaboration of just and democratic methods and principles for the provision of technical assistance to the economically backward countries. On this important question the Czechoslovak delegation concurs entirely, on grounds of principle, with the ideas expressed in the USSR draft resolution. The draft resolution stresses that such aid must be provided mainly through the United Nations. The purpose of such assistance must be to promote the development of the domestic resources, national industry and agriculture of the economically backward countries, and to strengthen their economic independence, and must not be conditional on any demands for political, economic or military privileges for countries rendering such assistance.

39. The definition of these principles is all the more important in that the twenty-year programme indirectly refers to Point Four of President Truman's message of 20 January 1949 to the United States Congress. The Czechoslovak delegation fully agrees with the views of Mr. Thorp who stated in the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate that Point Four was not altruistic but was in the interests of the United States itself. In actual fact, Point Four of that message is an instrument of United States policy designed to enable the United States to penetrate into economically backward countries and to supplant the European colonial Powers in those countries. It is an instrument designed to enable the United States to export its capital through the Export-Import Bank, to intensify the exploitation of under-developed countries and to secure privileges of all kinds in the countries receiving "assistance".

40. It is common knowledge that, under the guise of "assistance", the United States is securing control of the national economy of entire States. In reality, the United States is disrupting the national industry and capital development of those countries by means of high rates of interest — rates which are as high as 10 per cent in the Latin-American countries. A much more convincing account of the ruinous consequences of such "assistance", which completely disrupts the development of the countries' own resources, could be given by the delegations of those States which know from their own experience the results of the so-called "bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of under-developed areas".¹

41. The economic development of backward countries requires, above all, the building up of their own national industries, and that is why assistance must be

provided, in the main, through the United Nations. Naturally, monopolistic circles are not interested in doing that, as they wish to transform such countries into suppliers of cheap raw materials for the United States war economy and into purchasers of American products.

42. The policy of discrimination practised by the United States in its foreign trade with other countries — particularly with the countries of eastern Europe but also with the countries that are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty — was discussed at various international conferences. The USSR and the countries of the peoples' democracies proposed, at those conferences, effective measures for the expansion of intra-European trade, particularly between Eastern and western Europe, bearing in mind particularly the need to put an end to the political discrimination practised by the United States. The grandiloquent statements of the representatives of the United States regarding freedom of trade were worthless, as they were accompanied by a policy of discrimination against free and democratic peoples and States which naturally rejected any attempt to interfere in their internal affairs.

43. The abandonment of freedom of trade and of equality in relations among States is, of course, of the very essence of the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan has proved to be an instrument of the expansionist policy of the American monopolists. Unheard-of political pressure is put on those capitalist countries which hesitate or refuse to subject their economy to the interests of those monopolists and which defend the principle of free trade. The American monopolies are putting pressure on the countries participating in the Marshall Plan in order to force those countries to apply a policy of discrimination in their trade relations with the eastern European countries. Yet it is quite clear that this American pressure is injuring the trade interests of the "Marshallized" States. The economic consequences of United States trade discrimination are reflected in the considerable decrease in trade between western Europe and the countries of eastern Europe. It is, I think, obvious that this policy is particularly harmful to the economic interests and national economy of the "Marshallized" countries of western Europe.

44. The Czechoslovak delegation believes that trade relations should be developed without discrimination, on the basis of equality and respect for State sovereignty and without interference in the internal affairs of countries.

45. The Czechoslovak delegation is firmly convinced that all who desire peace must do their utmost to thwart the criminal intentions of the war-mongers, who want to kindle the flames of a new world war, and to ensure that the only principle governing international relations is a sincere desire for democratic co-operation among peoples in the interests of lasting peace, international security and the well-being of mankind.

46. Since the USSR draft resolution is directed solely towards those ends, the Czechoslovak delegation will vote for it.

47. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan): The Secretary-General is to be commended and congratulated on placing before the Assembly his most

¹ Extract from President Truman's message to the United States Congress of 20 January 1949.

valuable memorandum. The memorandum constitutes a reminder to Member States of what needs to be done and to be undertaken if the Organization is to move forward towards the achievement of the objectives for which it has been set up.

48. Very little needs to be said in support or justification of the draft resolution now before the Assembly which Pakistan and eight other Member States have joined in sponsoring. If the Charter sets out accurately our aims, purposes and objectives, and if these aims, purposes and objectives have to be achieved through the United Nations, then not only can no exception be taken to any of the points set out in the Secretary-General's memorandum, but it must be confessed and affirmed that every one of these points needs to be taken up, studied and vigorously pursued.

49. If one were to select for comment and emphasis a few of the ten points, every one of which must indeed be pursued with speed, one would venture to invite particular attention to point 9 which, in our opinion, is the first of these points. This point emphasizes the "use of the United Nations to promote, by peaceful means instead of by force, the advancement of dependent, colonial or semi-colonial peoples towards a position of equality in the world". We have repeatedly drawn attention to this aspect of a very grave and serious international problem, and we attach the highest importance to this point in the memorandum.

50. This problem has been neglected so much and the failure to resolve it has already occasioned so much mischief, distress and destruction, that rapid progress must now be made towards its solution if further disaster is to be averted. Some of these areas—for instance Malaya and Vietnam—are ready to assume the responsibilities of self-government. It is true that the atmosphere in these two countries has lately been gravely vitiated. But it is not delay in the setting up of self-governing institutions and responsible governments in those countries that will adequately resolve the problems with which they are faced. Rather it is speed towards the achievement of those objectives that will adequately meet the menace to peace that has risen in those two countries of South East Asia.

51. There are other countries, say, of North Africa, that are even readier and better prepared to assume the responsibilities of self-government, and others that remain must follow as rapidly as possible. There are, for instance, the British colonies of West Africa, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Senegal and the Belgian Congo; there is also Equatorial Africa and so on. There are all these achievements in the political field to be accomplished as speedily as may be possible.

52. I have had the honour on previous occasions to draw attention to the fact that so long as there are any dependent areas in the world, they will continue to constitute the most potent temptation for breach of international peace.

53. As a corollary to point 9, I would venture to draw attention to point 5, that is, the need to achieve universality for the United Nations Organization. As we continue co-operating and helping towards the building up of sovereign independent States, they must continue to be invited to take a due place in the comity of nations. It follows that we must admit rapidly to the member-

ship of this great Organization and to the fellowship of the comity of nations such sovereign States as are awaiting admission. The deadlock must be resolved at an early date. It is a sad reflection that the question of the admission of those States has not on any occasion been approached—and, I venture to submit, by either side concerned in the work on this question—simply on the merits of the case. It is high time that at least one of these deadlocks should be resolved in a spirit not so much of give and take, but in strict compliance with the spirit of the Charter.

54. We would then draw attention to points 6 and 7 of the memorandum, which may be taken together. Point 6 proposes "a sound and active programme of technical assistance for economic development and encouragement of large-scale capital investment, using all appropriate private, governmental and inter-governmental resources". Point 7 calls for "more vigorous use by all Member States of the specialized agencies of the United Nations to promote, in the words of the Charter, higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress".

55. I wish to call the attention of the Assembly during this general discussion to a fact which is now patent to everyone, namely, that mankind is one. It is one organism, and if any portion of it is under-developed, diseased, afflicted by poverty or other wants, then none of it can really advance at the necessary rate for mankind to progress toward prosperity if even a minimum standard of human happiness is to be secured. It is therefore necessary that more urgent attention should be paid to the achievement of these objectives—not merely to the planning for them, although planning of course is essential and a necessary preliminary to embarking on the execution of any programme. The execution of these programmes must be more speedily undertaken and on a much more generous scale than is contemplated at the moment. That is the one investment which is bound to pay rich dividends wherever it is undertaken.

56. In other words, with regard to this portion of the programme, what we are seeking to establish is the strengthening of peace through prosperity. The maintenance of peace in the sense of an elimination of armed conflict is only a preliminary. It is not only a matter for regret but, I might be impertinent enough to say, even a shame for mankind that, after half of the twentieth century has elapsed, and even when science and learning, both in the abstract and in their application, have taken such tremendous strides towards placing mankind above the fear of want, we should still be struggling to find means for keeping ourselves from flinging ourselves at each other's throats. But once that is achieved, our real task will begin, and our real task is to put mankind beyond these elementary fears so that the object of the creation of man which a beneficent Creator had in mind may begin in some measure to be achieved.

57. Lastly, I would venture to draw attention to point 10, which proposes the "active and systematic use of all the powers of the Charter and all the machinery of the United Nations to speed up the development of international law towards an eventual enforceable world law for a universal world society". In this connexion I would draw particular attention to a sentence in the commentary on this point, which says that: "There are

many specific steps which need to be taken—for example, under point 10, ratification of the convention on genocide, greater use of the International Court of Justice, and systematic development and codification of international law.”

58. Greater use of the International Court of Justice would in itself indicate and prove a greater and a keener desire on the part of parties to a dispute to settle their disputes by peaceful methods. We go on paying lip-service to our readiness, to our keenness, to our eager desire to settle our disputes by peaceful methods, but when it comes to the actual attempt to settle any dispute, more often than not, almost in every instance, one meets with reluctance on the part of parties to a dispute to submit their dispute, if it is of a justiciable character, to the International Court of Justice and, if not of a justiciable character, to international arbitration. Each is anxious to settle the dispute, ready to settle it at any moment by peaceful methods, provided it is settled in the manner in which they desire to see it settled, that is, in its own favour. That is not the way to settle disputes by peaceful methods and, as I have submitted, the greater the recourse to the International Court of Justice and other similar agencies and instruments for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the greater and the clearer will be the proof that countries have no desire to go to war to settle disputes of an international character.

59. We must recognize that we have now to engage ourselves actively in setting up what this memorandum describes as a better world society. The only way to do it is to strengthen the foundations and build the structure of a social, economic and political edifice which embraces within its beneficent scope the whole of mankind. We can leave aside for the moment all controversies which cluster round the troublesome question of national sovereignty. When we have learned to do by voluntary co-operation what we are afraid to agree to do as a matter of legal obligation, all reason for that fear will have disappeared and we shall then be ready to accord recognition to the reality that has already established itself. That, I venture to submit, is the only method of advancing towards the setting up of a universal world society.

60. This draft resolution which is before the General Assembly does not really seek to do any of these things by itself, lest it should cause anxiety in any quarters. It invites attention to the memorandum, and commends the Secretary-General for placing that memorandum before the General Assembly. The memorandum has been described by the Secretary-General himself as a working paper which draws attention to what needs to be done, and all that the draft resolution does is to request the appropriate organs of the United Nations to give consideration to those portions of the memorandum with which they are particularly concerned and to report progress from time to time.

61. We also have the USSR draft resolution under discussion. It appears to me that that draft does not question the need of directing attention to the points set out in the Secretary-General's memorandum. It seeks to emphasize certain particular points of view, some of which may, in their turn, not be open to serious objection, while others may not be acceptable to some of the Member States. Some of the proposals of the Soviet Union draft resolution are directed towards securing

the enforcement of acceptable policies and achieving agreed objectives, but by certain special methods.

62. The nine-Power draft resolution does not lay down methods and procedures. It raises no controversial issues. Methods, procedures and details of enforcement can be studied by the relevant and appropriate organs of the United Nations. At the moment, all that it invites the General Assembly to do is to request the appropriate organs to pay due consideration to these points and, from time to time, to report progress. Methods of enforcement, the pace to be set, and the policies to be accepted and enforced will be questions for the appropriate organs to consider. I have no doubt whatsoever that the particular points of view that are being stressed or sought to be stressed in the USSR draft resolution will then be raised before the appropriate organs, from time to time, when these points are considered.

63. With these words, I commend the draft resolution of the nine Powers to the General Assembly.

64. Mr. VAZQUEZ (Uruguay) (*translated from Spanish*): The delegation of Uruguay will vote in favour of the joint draft resolution [A/1514] submitted by Canada, Chile, Colombia, Haiti, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sweden and Yugoslavia on the Secretary-General's memorandum on the development of a twenty-year programme for achieving peace through the United Nations. This memorandum undoubtedly represents a most commendable effort on the part of the Secretary-General and gives concrete expression to a purpose that all must share.

65. Any attempt to establish collective measures to ensure international peace and security through the United Nations, without prejudice to freedom and justice, must be welcome here, especially at this time. It is welcome here because our basic function is to establish such measures; it is welcome at this time because no time could be more appropriate.

66. Directly or indirectly, all peoples are familiar with the terrible evils of war. They all desire a just and lasting peace. They are all watching, with growing fear, the dangerous trend of current events which are turning into a growing threat to the peace all desire.

67. Moreover, notwithstanding their national differences and the diversity of their social structures, all the governments represented here have also, in the name of their peoples, affirmed their faith in peaceful international co-operation, under the rule of law, as the only proper method of settling international disputes.

68. Two days ago [309th meeting], for example, the USSR representative, who speaks for a régime certainly very different from that which is characteristic of the western democracies, assured us that he and his government believed in the possibility of the peaceful co-existence of the political, social and economic systems into which the world is divided. He stated that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was directed towards the achievement of peaceful co-operation among the peoples and respect for sovereignty, and he has on various occasions reiterated his government's faith in the efficacy of the United Nations as an instrument for achieving those ends. The draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation [A/1525 and Corr.1] begins by expressly approving the raising of the item proposed by the Secretary-General, namely, "Development of a

twenty-year programme for achieving peace through the United Nations”.

69. Nevertheless, a sharp cleavage of opinion has become apparent with regard to that programme, a cleavage such as to dash the hopes of achieving at this time the unanimity required for its complete success. The opposition arises with regard to the manner of formulating the programme rather than with regard to its subjects.

70. The Secretary-General's programme contains ten points, which we feel must be considered, and they are put forward in an objective manner so that, while no solution of the controversial problems is offered, the underlying premises are clearly stated, thus providing a definite basis for future study and negotiation.

71. The ten points, which I think it would be inappropriate to analyse at this juncture, include points concerning political matters, such as periodic meetings of the Security Council attended by Foreign Ministers, the plan to renew negotiations for the solution of the problem of atomic energy and armaments, and the question of the admission of new Members to the Organization. They include points concerning politico-legal problems such as the development and implementation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, promotion of the full legal equality of dependent peoples, and speeding up of the universalisation of international law. They also include points concerning economic questions, such as the technical assistance programme for the so-called under-developed countries.

72. In our opinion, the joint draft resolution which we support offers the best procedure for the consideration of the Secretary-General's memorandum. After expressly noting that progress has been made by the present session of the General Assembly with regard to the solution of matters relating to certain of the points contained in the memorandum and implicitly taking into account the fact that the memorandum is only an outline for a future programme, the completion of which will require careful preparation, the draft resolution requests the appropriate organs of the United Nations to give consideration to those portions of the memorandum with which they are particularly concerned and to inform the General Assembly, at its next session, of the results of their consideration.

73. That is undoubtedly the correct procedure and it also permits a proper division of labour for a task so complex and so difficult as that which is proposed to us.

74. As has already been pointed out, the consideration of the points raised in the programme, although in general within the terms of reference of the General Assembly—which is now considering them—is also a matter within the special competence of various organs of the United Nations.

75. For example, points 1, 2, 3 and 4 are specifically within the competence of the Security Council; point 5 concerns the Security Council and the Assembly, jointly or in turn; points 6, 7 and 8 are matters for the Economic and Social Council; point 9 is within the competence of the Trusteeship Council; and point 10 is the concern of the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice.

76. It is therefore logical that, as the joint draft resolution proposes, the organs concerned should divide the

preparatory work, in accordance with their terms of reference and their specialized functions, so that it may be possible to secure the best correlation of the results of their studies at the next session of the General Assembly. In this way, in the light and under the pressure of current events, it will be possible to give fresh force to the study—already initiated and partially completed—of the main problems which must be adequately settled if a comprehensive and effective programme for the maintenance of peace is to be worked out.

77. My delegation cannot, on the other hand, accept the draft resolution of the USSR. In spite of the statements of its sponsors and supporters, that draft suffers from an essential defect which makes it unworkable as a useful instrument in future negotiation for the strengthening of peace.

78. The USSR draft resolution, as is apparent from the text and in particular from sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of paragraph 2, lays down, as an essential condition for the further development of the programme for peace, the prior acceptance of the solutions which the USSR supports, and which it fully realizes are disputed by most of the other Powers represented here.

79. It is not in that way that negotiations can be begun in an atmosphere of equality and good will to reconcile States at a time like this, when the future of the world is gravely threatened by the growing danger of war. If negotiations among equals are to be honourable and effective, the parties concerned must be prepared to consider contrary arguments and, if necessary, to make concessions if their reason convinces them that they should do so or if regard for higher interests so requires. In our opinion it would have been possible, in the present case, without impairing the conditions which are essential for the conduct of negotiations, for the Soviet Union to submit its wishes and objectives in its draft resolution as an individual expression of views prior to the discussion.

80. We do not, however, believe that such wishes and objectives can be laid down as a necessary basis or *sine qua non* for the preparation of a programme for the negotiations themselves, especially when the position of the other nations, a position fully and clearly expressed in the debates of the United Nations at this and previous sessions of the General Assembly, is known beforehand—as it was to the USSR delegation.

81. That in itself would make it impossible for our delegation to accept the Soviet Union draft resolution as a whole, although some portions, such as paragraphs 2 (e) and (f), might well be considered separately and might well be borne in mind as subjects for discussion.

82. In view of these general considerations, which summarize our position, the delegation of Uruguay will vote in favour of the joint draft resolution on the Secretary-General's most valuable memorandum. Our country, whose greatest strength is its law, hopes that, at this time of anxious expectancy for all the peoples of the world, the representatives of those peoples, meeting in this universal parliament, will prove equal to their great responsibilities and will answer the hopes of mankind by outlawing aggression wherever it arises and in whatever form it may appear, and by collaborating whole-heartedly in the essential task of framing a programme for lasting peace, in conformity with the rule of law and based on freedom and justice.

83. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I do not intend to make a long speech, since Mr. Vyshinsky, the head of the USSR delegation, has made a detailed statement [309th meeting] on our delegation's attitude to the question of the "development of a twenty-year programme for achieving peace through the United Nations".

84. In spite of all their attempts, the representatives who have spoken here have been unable to refute a single one of the points which the head of the Soviet Union delegation made so effectively in his statement.

85. I shall confine myself to two or three brief comments on the statements made here by the United Kingdom Minister of State, Mr. Younger [311th meeting]. Mr. Younger asserted that the United Kingdom Government had been unaware of the contents of the proposed programme, denying the assertion of the head of the USSR delegation, Mr. Vyshinsky, that the text of the programme had been agreed upon in advance by the western Powers. No one has any doubt, however, that the programme was agreed upon in advance with the State Department in Washington.

86. I shall not name the persons who prepared this programme, nor those of them who went to Washington to prepare it. The facts are known to the representatives who were here at the time and it is therefore unnecessary to enlarge on the matter. I would repeat, however, that no one doubts that the programme was agreed upon in advance with Washington. I do not think that even the authors of the programme will deny this.

87. With regard to Mr. Younger's assertions and his interminable references to majority votes of 51, 52 or 53 in organs of the United Nations—such arguments are worn threadbare and carry no conviction, and for the Anglo-American bloc to base its policy on them is quite futile. The fact is that the only arguments that the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom use in any organ of the United Nations, and especially in the General Assembly, are references to 50-vote majorities. But we all know how they obtain such a majority, particularly on a series of questions which have been put to the vote here. I shall not be revealing a great secret—I have already mentioned it in the Security Council—if I say that one of the representatives who was obliged to vote for a particular proposal stated that he was fully aware and convinced that the proposal on which the Anglo-American bloc was insisting was illegal, but was voting for it because he had a tight noose of American rope around his neck. Those are the circumstances in which certain representatives have to vote and that is how the so-called majority is obtained. That is why references to a majority obtained in such a way are unconvincing.

88. The last remark which I should like to make to the Assembly relates to the flagrant distortion of facts perpetrated by Mr. Younger when he spoke of the transfer of the World Congress of the Partisans of Peace from Sheffield to Warsaw. Mr. Younger tried to make us believe that the organizers of that congress transferred it to Warsaw because they were afraid that there would be too many real partisans of peace in Sheffield. But this is merely a juggling with words which is very close to falsehood and slander, since the organizers of the Sheffield congress were unable to hold

the congress there owing to the police action taken by the United Kingdom Government.

89. Who were the persons who were not allowed to attend that congress? I shall list the delegates from the USSR. First there were the writers: Ehrenburg, Tikhonov, Korneichuk, Vassilevskaya, Zaslavsky and Fadeyev. They are all talented and respected writers of the USSR, popular among the Soviet people. The United Kingdom Government did not give them visas to go to Sheffield. I shall now name the composers. The United Kingdom Government refused visas to the world-renowned composer Shostakovich and to Khrennikov, also a well-known composer of the Soviet Union. It also refused visas to the academicians Volgin, Grekov, Oparin and Nesmeyanov, and to the artists Cherkasov and Alexandrovskaya. It also refused a visa to the Metropolitan Nikolai, who cannot be regarded as an agent of the Comintern, although Mr. Younger tried to allege that all the persons who were refused visas were Comintern agents. Finally, visas were refused to the Stakhanovite worker Rossiysky, an honoured citizen of the Soviet Union, who has distinguished himself by his labours, and the famous tractor driver Angelina. These are the Soviet citizens, ardent and sincere partisans of peace, whom the United Kingdom Government prevented from attending the congress of the Partisans of Peace at Sheffield.

90. That is the real position; outstanding scientists and artists of other countries, such as France, were not granted visas either, and in some cases force was used to send them back to the countries from which they came. That was the situation created by the United Kingdom with its police measures in Sheffield. The organizers of the congress obviously could not carry out their work in those circumstances.

91. I would ask Mr. Younger whether a majority depends on the place of the meeting. I seriously assert that if the General Assembly were to meet in Warsaw, or even in Moscow, the American bloc would have its majority there also. Thus, wherever the World Congress of the Partisans of Peace may be held—in Sheffield, in Warsaw, or anywhere else—the real partisans of peace will certainly always vote for peace, against aggression and for the prohibition of the atomic weapon.

92. Thus the enemies of peace will never succeed in disparaging the great historical work that has been undertaken by the Partisans of Peace. None of the verbal juggling by which the United Kingdom representative has tried to besmirch this congress—this noble initiative by scientists, cultural leaders and men of religion who are fighting for peace under such hard conditions—can succeed in discrediting, besmirching or belittling the immense significance of this undertaking.

93. These are the brief remarks which the USSR delegation felt obliged to make in connexion with Mr. Younger's statement.

94. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I had hoped it would not be necessary for me to add anything to this discussion, since I have already taken enough of your time. But Mr. Malik's statement from this rostrum imposes upon me the necessity of pointing out that something which has been said here is not true and will not be made true by repetition.

95. It has been said that my memorandum was sanctioned, or even drafted, by the Governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom. This is not true, and those who say it must know that it is not true. I must make it absolutely clear that the memorandum was my own conception and that I myself drafted it in consultation only with my eight—I repeat, eight—Assistant Secretaries-General, and other principal assistants. The text which I discussed in Moscow was precisely the same text which I brought to Washington, London and Paris, and it appears in my communication to the Member Governments without the alteration of a single word or a single comma.

96. Before I conclude, I want to thank you all and tell you how gratified I am at the serious tone and the generally high level of this debate. Despite the reiteration of well known differences, it shows the desire of the Member nations to do their utmost to achieve a lasting peace. May I add my special thanks to those representatives who have so warmly endorsed my memorandum and to the sponsors of the nine-Power draft resolution which is now before you.

97. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The discussion is closed. We shall now proceed to the vote.

98. The General Assembly has before it two draft resolutions: the first has been submitted by the delegations of Canada, Chile, Colombia, Haiti, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sweden and Yugoslavia [A/1514], the second has been submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union [A/1525 and Corr.1].

99. The United Kingdom delegation has submitted an amendment [A/1535] to the joint draft resolution. I shall first ask the sponsors of the joint draft resolution if they agree to the amendment. If so, it will form part of the draft resolution; if not, I shall put the amendment to the vote separately. The representative of Sweden, who is one of the authors of the draft resolution, has signified assent. Do the other delegations sponsoring the draft also agree to the amendment?

100. Mr. SIMIC (Yugoslavia) (*translated from French*): On behalf of the People's Republic of Yugoslavia, I regret that I am unable to support the amendment proposed by the United Kingdom delegation.

101. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): As the Yugoslav representative, who is one of the authors of the joint draft resolution, does not accept the amendment, I shall have to put it to the vote separately.

102. The amendment proposed by the United Kingdom [A/1535] calls for the substitution of the following text for the last paragraph of the draft resolution:

"Requests these organs to inform the General Assembly at its sixth session, through the Secretary-General, of any progress achieved through such consideration."

103. The United Kingdom representative explained this amendment in his speech here today [311th meeting]. I shall now put it to the vote.

The amendment was adopted by 44 votes to 7, with 5 abstentions.

104. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall now put the joint draft resolution [A/1514], as amended, to the vote.

The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by 51 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

105. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The General Assembly will now vote on the USSR draft resolution [A/1525 and Corr.1]. Afterwards, those who wish to explain their vote, either on the joint draft resolution or on the draft resolution of the Soviet Union, will be able to do so.

106. The USSR representative has asked for a vote on his draft resolution paragraph by paragraph. If there is no objection, we shall adopt this course.

107. I have been reproached for not reading draft resolutions submitted by the Soviet Union. Usually I do not read any draft resolution, in view of the fact that they are to be found in the documents distributed to the members of the Assembly; in this case, however, it will be easy for me to read each paragraph of the USSR draft resolution as I put it to the vote.

The President read the text of the Soviet Union draft resolution paragraph by paragraph.²

The preamble and paragraph 1 of the operative part were rejected by 27 votes to 11, with 17 abstentions.

The first sentence and sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 of the operative part were rejected by 42 votes to 8, with 5 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2 of the operative part was rejected by 40 votes to 5, with 12 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 2 of the operative part was rejected by 36 votes to 6, with 13 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 2 of the operative part was rejected by 38 votes to 5, with 14 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 2 of the operative part was rejected by 24 votes to 16, with 15 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (f) of paragraph 2 of the operative part was rejected by 23 votes to 15, with 17 abstentions.

108. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): As none of the paragraphs of the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union has been adopted, there is no need to put the resolution as a whole to the vote.

109. I call upon the representative of Greece, who wishes to explain his vote.

110. Mr. KANELLOPOULOS (Greece) (*translated from French*): The Greek delegation voted in favour of the joint draft resolution because it is convinced that the draft is sincerely inspired by the ideal of peace.

111. My delegation also believes that the memorandum of the Secretary-General of our Organization is a remarkable contribution to the conception and creation of the technical conditions which would make it possible to strengthen peace.

112. Nevertheless, in voting for the draft submitted jointly by the nine nations, my delegation was not carried away by fleeting illusions. All of us here know that the technical conditions must be supplemented by

² The text of the draft resolution appears in the record of the 309th meeting.

moral conditions if they are to be effective. These moral conditions have so far been banished from our Organization by the aggressive attitude, totalitarian mentality and monolithic doctrinairism of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Mr. Vyshinsky, speaking from this rostrum, has not been able to convince anyone. I am sure he has not even been able to convince his own conscience. He, a member of the Communist Party but once a free man, knows full well that it is we who are right. But he is not allowed to admit it in public. When he has this right, the right to acknowledge his thoughts in public—and I hope with all my heart that he will enjoy that right one day—it will prove that the necessary conditions have been created for the establishment of peace throughout the world.

113. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Before calling upon the representative of the Netherlands to explain his vote, I shall read the list of countries which have taken part in the discussion: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Philippines, Sweden, Denmark, Egypt, Poland, Canada, Yugoslavia, United States of America, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Lebanon, Colombia, Israel, Haiti, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, France, Chile, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Czechoslovakia, Pakistan, and Uruguay. I cannot call upon those countries to speak again in order to explain their vote; I can only call upon those which have not taken part in the discussion.

114. Mr. VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands): My delegation voted for the joint draft resolution presented by the nine Powers and for the amendment proposed by the United Kingdom. We did so because we believe that the memorandum concerning a twenty-year programme for achieving peace through the United Nations, which was submitted by the Secretary-General, offers a number of suggestions, based on the Charter, which in our opinion might be fruitfully considered by the appropriate organs of the United Nations, with a view to furthering and encouraging the indispensable evolution of the machinery for promoting peace and the welfare of nations.

115. The points raised in the memorandum of the Secretary-General are in our view worthy of the most careful examination by the relevant organs of the United Nations. Some of these studies have meanwhile, as has been observed by preceding speakers, been initiated as separate problems, and in a number of cases produced important results under the stress of particular circumstances. However, when we view the twenty-year programme as a co-ordinated whole, the approach to such a long-term problem should be unprejudiced by the special needs of a special situation. Therefore we should, in our opinion, leave it to the appropriate organs of the United Nations to consider how far and how soon just and practical ways and means can be prepared in the light of an ever-evolving world situation. The resolution submitted by the nine Powers formulates requests which can serve this purpose. For that reason we supported it.

116. For the same reason, we found ourselves unable to support the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union. As the representative of the United Kingdom explained this morning [*311th meeting*], apart from the

fact that the USSR seemed to be trying to smuggle into its draft resolution a number of pronouncements on issues on which the General Assembly had already expressed a contrary opinion, the Soviet Union was also seeking in its draft to prejudge the results of the study of the points raised in the Secretary-General's memorandum by imposing its own conclusions, thereby considerably limiting the scope of an impartial study and consideration of the matter.

117. As I have said before, my delegation feels that the preparatory work for a long-term peace plan must be undertaken in an unprejudiced manner, guided by the principles of the Charter and by the possibilities of practical reality. For we do not want nominal, high-minded or quasi-high-minded but unrealistic and empty formulae. What we need are solutions or directives which can be applied and implemented and which will find widespread support in the sense of justice of the peoples of our world.

118. For all these reasons, my delegation rejected the draft resolution of the Soviet Union; that draft may contain a few paragraphs here and there which, on their own merits, perhaps would not be wholly unacceptable but which, in their context in the draft resolution as a whole, obtain a very peculiar significance.

119. However, in order to prevent any misunderstanding, I should like to say a few words on one particular point of that draft. I refer to paragraph 2 (a) of the operative part, where the question of the representation of China is once again introduced—in our view, in the wrong place and at the wrong time. Regarding this particular issue I want to make the position of the Netherlands delegation perfectly clear.

120. My government has for some time recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China. Therefore it stands to reason that we should be willing to see China represented in the United Nations by the government which we have recognized and not by a government which we have ceased to recognize. For reasons of the same order we should consider it correct if the Chinese Government which we have recognized were put in a position to accept the binding obligations which the Charter of the United Nations rightly imposes on all its Members—obligations designed to preserve and protect the peace of the world.

121. This being so, my delegation voted at the opening meeting of this session of the General Assembly in favour of the draft resolution introduced by India [*A/1365*]. In that draft resolution it was said that the obligations of a Member under the Charter could not be carried out except by a government which, with a reasonable expectancy of permanence, actually exercised control over the territory of that Member, and commanded the obedience of its people; further, that the Central Government of the People's Republic of China was the only such government functioning in the Republic of China as now constituted and that therefore that government should represent China in the General Assembly; and also that other organs of the United Nations should be recommended to take a similar view. My delegation voted for that Indian draft resolution. Apart from constitutional arguments, we believe that the final settlement of the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations might

lessen some of the grave difficulties and tensions which our divided world is now encountering in a number of danger spots.

122. The Indian draft resolution, however, was rejected by a majority in the General Assembly. The Assembly then adopted, at the same meeting, a draft resolution submitted by Canada [A/1368] and amended by Australia [A/1371]. In that resolution, the Assembly took note of the differences of view concerning the representation of China in the United Nations and established a special committee to consider that particular problem and to report back, with recommendations, to the current session of the General Assembly. The Netherlands delegation voted in favour of that resolution.

123. The question of Chinese representation will therefore come under examination, and we feel that it would be unwise and incorrect to prejudge the outcome of such studies. That, however, was the effect of the provision inserted in the operative part of the USSR

draft resolution in which a premature conclusion seemed already to have been reached on a problem which the General Assembly was still considering.

124. As I have explained, my government recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China, and, as a result of that, would consider it logical and realistic to have that government occupy the Chinese seat in the United Nations and thereby become responsible for the observance of the obligations, the rights and duties of a Member State under the Charter. At the same time, having given its vote to the proposal for the study of the problem by a special committee, the Netherlands delegation believes that the result of these studies should first be presented before the General Assembly, in whatever context, pronounces itself on this subject.

125. For these reasons my delegation voted against the Soviet Union draft resolution as a whole, and also against paragraph 2 (a) of the operative part of that draft.

The meeting rose at 5.5 p.m.