



**General Assembly
Security Council**

Distr.: General
9 November 2012

Original: English

**General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 94
General and complete disarmament**

**Security Council
Sixty-seventh year**

**Letter dated 5 November 2012 from the Permanent
Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to submit to you the joint statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of member States of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on the Non-Proliferation Treaty made on 27 September 2012 at their working meeting in New York (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex were issued as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 94, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Byrganym Aitimova
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations



Annex to the letter dated 5 November 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]

Statement by the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on the issue of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

New York
27 September 2012

We, the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, aware of the need to ensure the sustained functioning of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as one of the basic mechanisms of the collective security system, reaffirm our strong support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and welcome the multilateral efforts to strengthen it.

Noting the successful conduct of the 2010 Conference to Review the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we support the Final Document on its results, which was adopted by consensus, and confirm our readiness to promote its comprehensive and balanced implementation.

We express the conviction that the current review cycle to prepare for the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference must lay the basic foundation for its successful conduct with a view to further enhancing the effectiveness of the Treaty on the basis of the unity of its three fundamental components: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of atomic energy.

In the conviction that the present risks and threats of proliferation can and must be removed on the basis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we call for the expansion and strengthening of the monitoring capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including through approval of the Additional Protocol to the agreement with IAEA on safeguards as a universally accepted procedure for verification of compliance by the parties to the Treaty with their obligations relating to non-proliferation.

We are convinced that one of the most important measures for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime would be the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We call on all States which have not yet done so, especially those whose signature and ratification of the Treaty is required for its entry into force, to follow our example and sign and/or ratify the Test-Ban Treaty without further delay and without any preconditions.

Confirming our commitment to the noble objective of creating a world free of nuclear weapons, we support the efforts of States relating to discharge of the obligations under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We view the conclusion and entry into force of the new legally binding Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms as an important contribution to work towards disarmament.

We are counting on all nuclear-weapon States joining on schedule in the disarmament efforts of Russia and the United States.

We support the proposal to make the obligations under the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles global in nature.

We are convinced of the need to give new impetus to multilateral political and diplomatic formats in the field of disarmament. Among others, an important step in this direction would be the renewal of substantive work by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in the framework of a balanced programme of work for the Conference based on document CD/1864.

Emphasizing the importance of raising the level of confidence among States, we support discussion in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva of the conclusion of a legally binding agreement to give the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty negative security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them.

We note the important role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the process of strengthening nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We continue to promote the process of effective functioning of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the creation of further such zones, as well as of potential zones free from weapons of mass destruction.

We consider it important that, after the holding of the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and the ratification by the Russian Federation in 2011 of protocols I and II to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba), this process received new impetus. We call on other nuclear-weapon States which have not yet ratified the relevant protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba to do so as soon as possible.

One of our priorities in relation to non-proliferation and disarmament is the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia signed in Semipalatinsk, which entered into force on 21 March 2009. We reaffirm our firm support for this Treaty. We believe that the full international legal formulation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia after signature by all nuclear-weapon States of a corresponding protocol to the Treaty will significantly strengthen regional and international security and raise the level of mutual confidence in the region. We also emphasize the important role of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia in encouraging cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the environmental rehabilitation of territories suffering from radioactive contamination.

We express the hope that the consultations under way between the Central Asian States and certain countries of the nuclear “five” which still have questions about the Treaty and its protocol will yield mutually acceptable results resolving these questions.

We welcome the progress made towards formalizing the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia (the Bangkok Treaty) between the nuclear-weapon States and the States members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2011. We expressly hope that the nuclear “five” will soon sign the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty.

Expressing support for the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, we call for the maximally productive conduct in Finland in 2012 of the conference on the creation in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery, with the participation of all Middle Eastern States, as prescribed in the decisions of the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

We reaffirm the inalienable right of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, embodied in article IV of the Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty. We share the view of those States which regard nuclear energy as an important contribution to the strengthening of energy security, to economic and social development and to the easing of the consequences of climate change.

At the same time, we note the need to take steps that will guarantee that the expansion of the use of nuclear materials and technologies and the development of civil atomic energy take place in the context of the strengthening of the global non-proliferation regime and are in conformity with the highest non-proliferation standards and nuclear safety rules.

We support the proposals for strengthening of the international legal basis in the area of nuclear security put forward after the accident at the Japanese Fukushima I nuclear power station and the Russian initiatives to amend the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident.

We are firmly convinced that the broad advancement and practical implementation of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, with IAEA playing the central role, could reduce the risks of proliferation while at the same time strengthening energy security and assuring all interested States of optimal and economically attractive access to the nuclear fuel needed for their peaceful nuclear energy programmes. Mechanisms for multilateral approaches and guaranteed deliveries of nuclear fuel will facilitate the establishment of a new proliferation-resistant architecture of international cooperation in the nuclear power field.

In this connection we note the importance of the initiative put forward by the Russian Federation jointly with Kazakhstan for the establishment of multilateral centres to provide nuclear fuel cycle services, and of the establishment, as a first step towards that end, of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre in Angarsk, which is already in operation. The States participating in the work of the Centre will have guaranteed access to enrichment services to meet their nuclear fuel requirements. We single out the guaranteed reserve of low-enriched uranium established by the Russian Federation at the Angarsk Centre under IAEA auspices, as well as the initiative by Kazakhstan for the location in its territory of the International Low-Enriched Uranium Bank of IAEA, as substantial contributions to supporting the legitimate and inalienable right of each State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty.

The States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization confirm their readiness to engage in constructive cooperation with all interested delegations in the course of the current review cycle of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to ensure the success of the 2015 Conference to review the Treaty.

**Minister for Foreign Affairs
Republic of Armenia**

**Minister for Foreign Affairs
Kyrgyz Republic**

**Minister for Foreign Affairs
Republic of Belarus**

**Minister for Foreign Affairs
Russian Federation**

**Minister for Foreign Affairs
Republic of Kazakhstan**

**Minister for Foreign Affairs
Republic of Tajikistan**
