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President: Mr. Nasrollah ENTEZAM (Iran).

Problem of the independence of Korea: reports of the First Committee (A/1422) and the Fifth Committee (A/1424)

[Agenda item 24]

Mr. Thors (Iceland), Rapporteur, presented the report of the First Committee and the accompanying draft resolution (A/1422).

1. Mr. THORS (Iceland): This great problem of the independence of Korea, which is of such vital interest to the whole world, was handled in a most efficient and deliberate manner by the First Committee,¹ and in presenting this report I venture to express the hope that the same will be the case here in the General Assembly.

2. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): May I remind members of the Assembly that they also have before them on this topic the report of the Fifth Committee [A/1424]. I do not think it is necessary to call upon the Rapporteur of the Fifth Committee to give a detailed explanation of that Committee's point of view.

3. Before I open the general discussion, I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Assembly to rules 67 of the rules of procedure, which I shall read. The rule runs as follows:

"Discussion of a report of a Main Committee in a plenary meeting of the General Assembly shall take place if at least one-third of the Members present and voting at the plenary meeting consider such a discussion to be necessary. Any proposal to this effect shall not be debated, but shall be immediately put to the vote."

4. In order to find out whether at least one-third of the Members present and voting wish to have a discussion on this item on the agenda, I shall put the question to the General Assembly and ask it to decide by a vote.

¹ For the discussion on this subject in the First Committee, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, First Committee*, 346th to 353rd meetings inclusive.

It was decided, by 14 votes to 7, to have a general discussion on the problem of the independence of Korea.

5. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The Assembly has approved the principle of a general discussion since at least one-third of the Members present and voting — in fact, two-thirds — have voted for it.

6. I shall therefore throw open the general discussion on the report of the First Committee and the draft resolution which it contains.

7. The first speaker on the list is the representative of Poland, but I shall first call upon the representative of the Soviet Union who has raised a point of order.

8. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I have asked for the floor before the General Assembly takes up the consideration of the substance of the Korean question which appears on its agenda, as I wish to make a preliminary statement on behalf of the USSR delegation.

9. The Korean question which is being discussed in plenary meeting is an important one. In accordance with the existing provisions of the United Nations Charter and with the accepted practice in its main organs — the General Assembly and the Security Council — when questions of such importance are considered, both parties involved or concerned in such questions are always invited to participate. If more than one party is involved in such questions or disputes, all are normally invited by the United Nations to participate in the discussions.

10. This practice, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, was followed in the discussion by the United Nations of the Palestine, Greek, Kashmir, Indonesian and other questions. There is no need to dwell in detail on these precedents, as they have been established in the United Nations and are in complete accordance with the fundamental principles of the Charter, which provides for the invitation of the parties involved or concerned in the dispute under discussion and gives them the right to be heard, without the right of vote, by

whichever United Nations body is dealing with the question.

11. The General Assembly is now about to discuss an important question involving the fate of many millions of Koreans. Both parts of that population — North Korea with a population of 11 million, and South Korea with a population of about 16 million according to one source and about 18 million according to another — have the same right to be invited to attend the General Assembly and to be heard during the discussion of that important question.

12. In accordance with the provisions and principles of the Charter, and in particular with Article 32, with the practice of the main organs of the United Nations — the General Assembly and the Security Council — and, finally, with the precedents I have cited, the delegation of the Soviet Union considers that it would be fair and in harmony with the Charter if the General Assembly were to invite the representatives of both North and South Korea so that they could state their views on the question before the plenary meeting of the General Assembly. Such a decision would be both fair and in complete accordance with the Charter.

13. Guided by these considerations, the USSR delegation proposes that both parties — North and South Korea — should be invited to participate in the discussion of the Korean question at the plenary meetings of the General Assembly devoted to the discussion of that matter.

14. Such is the proposal of the USSR delegation, which insists that this proposal should be considered and adopted by the General Assembly before it takes up the discussion of the substance of the Korean question.

15. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): You have heard the proposal made by the representative of the Soviet Union.

16. It has always been the practice of the General Assembly, when it wanted the parties concerned in a question under discussion to be heard, to ask the committee dealing with the matter to hear the representatives of those parties. There is no precedent for such an invitation being issued by the Assembly itself.

17. However, there is nothing in the rules of procedure to prevent the Assembly from taking such a decision. Consequently I do not think that the USSR proposal is a departure from the rules of procedure. I shall put it to the vote in order to avoid any discussion.

18. The Assembly is therefore called upon to decide whether it will invite the two parties referred to in the proposal to attend the discussion on the problem of the independence of Korea in plenary meeting.

The proposal was rejected by 41 votes to 6, with 6 abstentions.

19. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) (*translated from Russian*): Only a few hours after the end of our day's work in the First Committee and the adoption by a majority of the so-called eight-Power draft resolution [A/1422], the New York evening papers offered comments on that resolution, which were wholly in line with its spirit and with the true intentions of its sponsors. I need only quote the headlines — "MacArthur boss of the situation in Korea until the elections", "Mac-

Arthur to rule Korea until the elections". The American Press hit the nail on the head.

20. For several days an attempt was made at the meetings of the First Committee to persuade us that it was all in the interests of the cause of peace, the welfare of the Korean people and democracy. We heard dozens of speeches on this theme and torrents of idle words. And at that very moment streams of blood were flowing on Korean soil. The draft resolution sanctioned that state of affairs, sanctioned it for the present and for the immediate future and gave MacArthur full power.

21. The voting of course took place in accordance with the usual procedure, after a discussion which was exceptionally speedy and streamlined. No wonder the representative of Canada, Mr. Pearson, referred to strategic factors. That haste was certainly reflected in the level of the discussion. On the one hand, serious arguments were advanced and well-documented facts; the report of the Commission on Korea² was analysed and the situation was examined in the light of the binding rules of international law and of the principles of the Charter. The opposing side made no effort, possibly because it lacked ammunition, to argue the substance of the case or produce counter-arguments. With obstinate and equally futile persistence, it repeated the demagogic charges, the slander, the attempts to falsify history and to distort current facts.

22. Such was the character of the debate on two proposals which represented a diametrically opposite approach to the Korean people's desire for emancipation. The two proposals were the expression of two trends, of two ways of approaching that problem.

23. Let us take a closer look at the draft resolution of the five Powers headed by the Soviet Union.³ It was based on the irrefutable premise that the Korean people's just desire for the creation of a unified, independent and democratic State had not yet been realized. It is quite obvious that that fact is not open to doubt.

24. After almost fifty years under the Japanese yoke, after the pledges given in Cairo, Potsdam and Moscow, the Korean people is still awaiting unification and full independence five years after the end of the war.

25. The five-Power draft resolution set forth the policy which the USSR has consistently followed towards Korea both during and after the war. Landmarks in that policy were the proposals made by the Soviet Union at the Moscow Conference, the activity of the USSR members of the American-Soviet Joint Commission on Korea and the withdrawal of Soviet forces. All this enabled the northern part of the country to set up its own organs of government and provided complete freedom for their independent development.

26. Long after the last Soviet soldier had left Korea, United States forces still remained in the southern part of the country. Only the USSR fulfilled the obligations it assumed at Potsdam and in Moscow. The United States army left Korea only after imposing on the population of the southern part of the country a régime

² *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 16.

³ This draft resolution was submitted in the First Committee as document A/C.1/567 and reintroduced in the General Assembly as document A/1426.

subservient to itself, which did not represent the interests or express the will of the Korean people.

27. The five-Power draft resolution noted that the principal task of the United Nations Organization was to bring about by peaceful means, and in accordance with the principles of international law and justice, the settlement of disputes which might lead to a breach of universal peace. That proposal was a sequel to the efforts made by the USSR representative to the Security Council from the very first day of his term of office as President of the Council, namely, 1 August 1950.

28. The proposal once again emphasized the obligations of the United Nations in the matter. Basing itself on the principles of the Charter, it stressed most emphatically the need for settling peacefully the problem of Korea and re-establishing peace and security in the Far East.

29. These were the fundamental premises of the proposal; the conclusions following therefrom are perfectly clear. The draft resolution demanded the immediate cessation of military operations in Korea. Indeed, what is the elementary prerequisite of any constructive approach to the Korean problem at a time when bloody fighting is taking place? Clearly, the first prerequisite is an appeal for the cessation of military operations.

30. Simultaneously with such an appeal, the two sides fighting in Korea should be given an opportunity to submit their views to the General Assembly. That was dictated not only by considerations of right, justice and duty but also by elementary logic. At the same time, that would be the most practical and businesslike approach to the question.

31. Representatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea have been refused admission to this hall. That refusal was due to the fear that they would submit documents regarding the true course of events on 25 June 1950 and that they would reveal who were the real aggressors and the real culprits responsible for the bloodshed. The Korean people have fallen a victim to the malice and dishonesty of those who since 1947 have been preventing successive sessions of the General Assembly from hearing their voice. The decision just taken by the General Assembly is absolutely unjustified. At each session the docile majority has, under one pretext or another, rejected the proposal for inviting representatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. That has happened once again in this hall, despite the fact that the decisions to be taken are of paramount importance for the future of the Korean people. And in the First Committee we heard only the statement of the representative of Syngman Rhee—a statement full of lies, slander and insults.

32. Thus an obviously unjust decision has been taken at the very outset of our debates. This decision will affect the entire course of our further work. The spokesmen of Anglo-American democracy have thus resumed the sorry practices of the Holy Alliance and of the Congress of Vienna and the colonial methods which, one would have thought, had long since become obsolete.

33. On behalf of the Polish delegation I should like to state that such a decision on the fate of a nation, taken in the absence of its representatives, is a flagrant violation of the basic principles of the Charter, particularly of the right of every nation to self-determination.

In this way, without hearing the representatives of the Korean people, the General Assembly is about to sanction further bloodshed in Korea.

34. The aim of the five-Power draft resolution was that the United States Government and certain other governments should immediately withdraw their forces from Korea and thus bring about conditions that would enable the Korean people to exercise its sovereign powers and determine its own destiny. I shall not mention again how and in what circumstances those forces appeared in Korea. Despite all the nonsense grandiloquently proclaimed by some representatives, a series of speakers have made it abundantly clear that the war in Korea is a civil war. Consequently, as we have already proved in the First Committee, there was not the slightest justification for armed intervention by the United Nations.

35. The forces dispatched to Korea have never been anything else but the troops of foreign intervention and, despite all hypocritical propaganda to the contrary, they have never become troops of the United Nations. They have carried death and destruction with them. Their presence in Korea means further suffering for the Korean people and the sooner they leave Korean soil the sooner will its people return to a normal, peaceful life.

36. Our proposal, however, is not limited to these introductory provisions. It contains a concrete, positive and constructive programme for the re-establishment of the independence and unity of Korea. Free elections would be held throughout Korea after the withdrawal of foreign troops. A joint commission composed of the representatives of the Supreme People's Assembly of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and of the National Assembly of South Korea would be set up to prepare those elections.

37. A special committee, elected at a joint meeting of the two national assemblies, would carry out the functions of governing the country pending the establishment of a single all-Korean government. We also propose that a United Nations commission should see that the elections were truly free and democratic and that they were carried out with all the necessary safeguards.

38. Our draft resolution also emphatically stresses the duty of reconstructing Korea which has been reduced to ruins and ashes. The reconstruction of Korea should be a point of honour for the United Nations, and the Economic and Social Council should draw up the requisite schemes in co-operation of course with Korean representatives. A truly free and independent Korea thus rehabilitated could become a Member of the United Nations.

39. What was the answer given by the majority of the First Committee to these clear and logical proposals—the only proposals based on justice? It confronted them with a draft resolution which would in no way help to settle the Korean conflict. Its own authors have always realized and still realize that. The draft resolution was submitted as a peace resolution, although it is difficult to find any indication of its peaceful character. The obvious aim of its authors was really to sanction their own aggression and the further military occupation of Korea. The draft resolution was designed to justify the retention of United States forces in Korean territory, and to justify it on the ground that those

forces were in Korea in the interests of the Korean people and on the instructions of this Organization.

40. The United States representative did, it is true, assure us in the First Committee that United States forces would leave Korea as soon as they were no longer required there and that the United States Government did not intend to set up military bases in that country. We are quite familiar with these assurances; we have heard them at one session of the General Assembly after another. We heard them in 1946 during the discussion on the Soviet Union proposal for the withdrawal of forces from the territories of other States. Since 1945 the United States have been withdrawing their forces from Greenland and from various points in North Africa where they had been stationed for purposes connected with military operations.

41. This is truly a curious way of withdrawing forces and winding up bases. It would appear that in actual fact these bases are being extended and the forces stationed there increased. New bases are being opened in other territories and other States. That is what United States promises to withdraw forces and eliminate bases amount to in practice.

42. It is not surprising, therefore, that we have no faith in Mr. Austin's promises and regard them merely as a clumsy manoeuvre designed to secure votes in favour of a resolution which will enable the United States to flag new strategic points on its staff maps.

43. It is quite clear that the aim of that draft resolution was to maintain at all costs the Syngman Rhee régime and its terrorist methods and to impose them upon the Korean people. Is any evidence required as to the nature of that régime? Even its sworn advocates have been somewhat shamefaced in its defence. It is not surprising, therefore, that the draft resolution endeavoured to conceal the true intentions of its authors under the cloak of alluring phrases about democracy and free elections. Those intentions, however, emerged in the statement made in the First Committee by the representative of Syngman Rhee. It is planned to continue police methods and political persecutions under the protection of foreign arms; moreover, it is hoped to extend this system to the whole territory of Korea.

44. The draft resolution adopted by the majority provides for the creation of a United Nations commission with very wide powers and a most characteristic composition. I do not wish to go into detail, once more, about the harm done to the Korean people and the prestige of the United Nations by the former Commission on Korea, the dissolution of which is rightly demanded in the five-Power draft resolution. The task of the new commission is not only to continue the harmful, nay, the wrecking role of its predecessor; in accordance with American plans, the commission is to play a far more important role. Hence there is nothing surprising in the fact that its membership comprises none of Korea's neighbours; it is apparently feared that those neighbours are too familiar with the position and needs of the country and its people.

45. In the attendant hurry, only six candidates were found for membership in the commission which, under the terms of the draft resolution, is to consist of seven members. This did not prevent the Committee from voting on the draft resolution before it was duly com-

pleted, contrary to the rules of procedure. This is a further instance of illegality in respect of this draft resolution which, unfortunately, was adopted by the First Committee.

46. I am obliged to recall that the Committee had before it at that same meeting a USSR proposal for a cessation of the shelling of non-military objectives, the civilian population, towns and villages by the United States Air Force. I imagine that the facts relating to the mass bombardments and destruction carried out by that air force are sufficiently familiar to all. Indeed, reports on them are received every day from the United States military headquarters.

47. There is incontrovertible proof that whole towns and villages, hospitals and schools have been razed to the ground. There is proof that airmen have fired upon peasants working in the fields. The United States representative has not denied these facts. Nevertheless, this humane proposal was rejected by the majority in the First Committee.

48. It became clear in the course of the discussion in the First Committee that a number of delegations were perturbed at the obvious indications that the eight-Power draft resolution—let us call it briefly the United States draft resolution—would be imposed upon the General Assembly. They endeavoured to find a compromise between those two drafts, realizing what dangerous consequences the United States draft resolution might have were it adopted by the Assembly. Those tendencies found their expression in the draft resolution submitted by the representative of India, proposing the establishment of a sub-committee to consider the possibility of a compromise between both draft resolutions so as to find a wording that would be acceptable to all.

49. The authors of the five-Power draft resolution and, above all, the USSR delegation, while maintaining that their draft resolution was the only fair and just one, expressed their readiness to consider the matter; they took the view that when it is a question of peace and the settlement of conflicts, one should not and must not reject even the slightest possibility of compromise. Together, therefore, with nineteen other delegations, we voted for that proposal. A total of twenty-seven States, comprising the twenty-four States which voted for the draft resolution and the three States which abstained, thus expressed their reservations regarding the American draft resolution. It must be emphasized that they expressed those views in spite of the United States representative, whose speech sounded like a threat and who proposed that the Indian proposal should be unconditionally voted down.

50. It is a sad fact in the life of our Organization that it is possible to secure a majority of votes by bringing pressure or threats to bear. That scene reminded us of the reports we read in the American press a few days after the beginning of the events in Korea. Those reports mentioned the visits of United States ambassadors to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Members of our Organization, and their insistent representations in connexion with the illegal decision of the Security Council. What those ambassadors were trying to do was simply to extort from those governments clear statements on the question of Korea and above all support for the military action taken by the United

States. The matter did not pass off without the use of threats affecting the economic life of the countries involved. After these visits, some of those governments declared their adhesion to the United States point of view. Some of them changed the positions they had adopted previously. The purpose of Mr. Austin's speech must evidently have been somewhat similar. In spite of this, almost half the Members of our Organization have sought a compromise, thus protesting against having decisions thrust upon them and against a policy of threats and dictatorial commands.

51. The draft resolution adopted by the First Committee contravenes the principles of the Charter. It will not help to secure a settlement of the Korean question; it will turn Korea into a territory subjected to foreign influences, and prolong the period of the Korean people's subjection. It will not produce that indispensable preliminary decision, which would be the only correct decision at the present time, the decision to halt the military operations in Korea.

52. Imbued with the spirit of genuine international collaboration, and taking into account the vital interests of the Korean people, the Polish delegation, as one of the authors of the five-Power draft resolution, proposes that that draft should again be considered by the General Assembly. We call upon the General Assembly and every representative individually to reflect once more on the great seriousness of the situation and, at such a difficult time for the Korean people, to adopt a resolution which, embodying a fair and correct decision, may be conducive to a peaceful settlement of the conflict and hasten the establishment of an independent and united Korea.

53. The PRESIDENT: Before calling on the next speaker, I should like to say that the Polish representative—as he was fully entitled to do—dealt not only with the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee but also with the other draft resolutions. I shall invite any representative who wishes to state his views not to limit himself to the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee but also to speak, if he so desires, on the other draft resolutions. After I propose the closure of the discussion to the Assembly, the discussion will be closed not only on the First Committee's draft resolution but also on all the others, and I shall then put the various texts to the vote in succession. I hope we are all in agreement on that point.

54. Mr. YOUNGER (United Kingdom): For three years now the General Assembly has been watching events in Korea and has noted with growing anxiety the failure of its efforts to restore unity in that divided land. During these three years of patient endeavour to promote a peaceful settlement, the General Assembly, taking its decisions year after year by large majorities, has never tried to evade its responsibility to the people of Korea and has sought every means of bringing the contending parties together, but it was in vain.

55. In June of this year those who always frustrated a settlement by agreement recklessly plunged Korea into bloodshed in an attempt to impose their will by violence. What has happened since then is well known. The Members of our Organization, recognizing that this was aggression and that the future prospects not only for Korea but for world peace were at stake, took

the historic decision to resist the aggressor by a collective effort and by force of arms. That the main military effort, on this occasion, has had to be made mainly by one Member, the United States, does not in any way alter the significance of the fact that resistance to aggression has for the first time been recommended and approved by the majority of the Members of the United Nations, pledged to fulfil the purposes of the Charter, and the significance of the fact that these military operations have, as their sole object, the fulfilment of those purposes and will not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them.

56. These facts are so well recognized, I believe, by world opinion, that I should scarcely need to mention them, were it not that some here have sought to deny them. If there are any people outside this hall who still harbour any doubts about what I have just said; if, for instance, the Central People's Government of China, or any other of Korea's neighbours, still fear that the United Nations forces might carry hostilities further, or remain in Korea longer than these limited objectives demand, I give them my solemn assurance, as the representative of one of the Powers whose forces are now in Korea, that their fears have no foundation. Through the skill and heroism of the United Nations forces, I believe that the victory of the United Nations cause is in sight.

57. We all hope to see a speedy end to the fighting. My country has already, both through its representative on the Security Council and in a speech made only yesterday in England by our Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin, appealed to the North Koreans to give up the fighting and to acknowledge the authority of the United Nations. We hope that they will respond.

58. In any event, military victory will leave many problems to be faced. The United Nations could not now, even if it would, escape from the responsibility of actively promoting a settlement of the political future of the country and of setting the Korean people on the road to economic rehabilitation. The draft resolution [A/1422] which, as you have heard from the Rapporteur, was approved in the First Committee, is the first step towards carrying out these tasks. That draft resolution, proposed in the First Committee by eight delegations coming from all parts of the world, improved and completed by the co-operation of many other delegations and approved in many of its clauses by an affirmative vote of over fifty members, was finally passed as a whole by 47 votes to 5.

59. It is this draft resolution which I now commend to the General Assembly. Its purpose is to restore to Korea its unity and its sovereign independence at the earliest possible moment in accordance with the will of the Korean people ascertained by democratic means.

60. We must of course face the reality that the immediate aftermath of slaughter and of fratricidal strife is not an easy setting within which to adopt democratic processes, and there is no doubt that the Korean people will need the help of the United Nations in performing that task. It is the aim of the recommendations which appear in this draft resolution to give that help.

61. I should like to read the brief main recommendations which appear at the beginning of the operative part of the draft resolution:

"[The General Assembly recommends]

"(a) That all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea,

"(b) That all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea,

"(c) That all sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be invited to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of a unified government . . ."

62. The draft resolution goes on to state quite explicitly that the United Nations shall remain no longer than is necessary to achieve the stated objectives. Indeed I know that all the contributing Powers will hope that the period required for achieving those objectives will be short so that the troops may go home. But to let the United Nations forces go before their task is done would be a cynical renunciation of our collective responsibility.

63. The instrument through which the draft resolution proposes that the United Nations influence should be exercised is a United Nations commission. The General Assembly already has before it the names of six Member States which have signified their willingness to serve upon the commission and whose names are put forward to this General Assembly by the First Committee: Australia, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines and Turkey. I now have the honour to propose that a seventh name be added, the name of Thailand, whose government would, I understand, also be prepared to serve should the General Assembly extend an invitation to it to do so.

64. The General Assembly will see that the membership of this commission is well distributed over the face of the globe, with an appropriately strong representation of the continent of Asia. I cannot emphasize too strongly the need for men of standing, experience and energy to serve on this commission, and I can think of few tasks in the coming years more worthy of men of the highest wisdom and authority.

65. I hope the commission will soon be appointed, but since some brief delay is, I think, inevitable, the draft resolution proposes an interim committee to be formed at once to sit in New York and to advise the Unified Command on the initial measures for implementing the recommendations of the resolution.

66. Such is the machinery proposed, and there is within it ample room for the fullest consultation of the wishes of the Korean people while, at the same time I believe, it sets up the minimum necessary means to enable the United Nations to discharge its obligations.

67. There is before the General Assembly an alternative draft resolution [A/1426] upon which the representative of Poland has just spoken. That draft resolution has certain superficial resemblances to the draft resolution approved in the First Committee of which I have been speaking, but it is far removed in purpose and in effect. It is based on an interpretation of facts and of events in Korea so contrary to evidence and ex-

perience that it is small wonder that in the First Committee it found the support of only 5 members and was rejected by 46. It is based on the false premise that South Korea committed aggression against the North. It is based upon the contention that the United Nations forces should withdraw at once, leaving the fate of the country once more to the arbitrament of force—force to be wielded, we can only suppose, by those same ruthless elements which, having always withheld their co-operation from the United Nations, appealed to the sword in June of this year.

68. It is true that there are enough fine phrases in the preamble to this draft resolution, but the positive recommendations which follow are such as to overlay these phrases with a slime of hypocrisy. I do not think that the General Assembly will give this draft resolution any stronger support than it commanded in the First Committee.

69. May I now turn to the vast and urgent problem of relief and rehabilitation. This is a great human problem which brooks no delay. The land of Korea is largely devastated. Hundreds of thousands in all parts of it are homeless and hungry, and winter is coming. The draft resolution of the First Committee asks the Economic and Social Council to report within three weeks with plans which will permit the work to begin. All of us who acknowledge the United Nations responsibilities in Korea will vote for this to be done, but our duty only begins when we vote. We must all be ready thereafter to share the burden and to give generously according to our ability.

70. This draft resolution has been deliberately confined to what is essential for our task. The need to bring it into effect is urgent, and the United Nations commission, when set up, has scope, within the principles laid down, to fill in the details of the outlined plan. From this resolution the sorely tried Korean people has much to hope. Its neighbours have nothing to fear. Let us put the work in hand now.

71. General ROMULO (Philippines): The draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union and four other Member States, after having been turned down by an overwhelming vote in the First Committee, has now been revived [A/1426] on the floor of the General Assembly. Various delegations properly noted in the Committee the fact that the draft contained many features which, in other circumstances, might have commended it to our sympathy. Let us examine it.

72. It reaffirms the basic United Nations principle of the pacific settlement of disputes and recognizes the aspirations of the Korean people for a unified, independent and democratic State. That looks very harmless.

73. It calls for free elections throughout Korea and provides for the drawing up of plans for the rehabilitation of the Korean national economy. That, too, on the surface, appears harmless.

74. Finally, it provides that, after the establishment of an all-Korean government, the Security Council should consider the admission of Korea to membership in the United Nations. With that we have no quarrel.

75. Were this all that the draft resolution contained, my government would hardly have any reason to oppose it. But, having made a polite curtsy to these un-

exceptional principles and objectives, the five-Power draft resolution then goes on to propose that "the belligerents in Korea"—meaning the United Nations forces and the North Korean forces—"immediately cease hostilities"; that the United Nations forces then promptly withdraw from Korea; that a joint commission, composed in equal numbers of representatives of North Korea and South Korea, be elected jointly by the deputies of the Northern régime and the Republic of Korea to supervise elections throughout Korea; and that the joint assembly of the North and South should furthermore elect an interim all-Korean committee to govern the country pending the establishment of a permanent all-Korean government.

76. There are two things obviously wrong with these proposals: they are both unrealistic and naïve. They have no relevance to the actual position of the United Nations in regard to the Korean question; and they are based upon, shall I say, a childish though touching belief in the angelic qualities of human nature, whether Korean or otherwise.

77. The United Nations is not a belligerent, in the ordinary sense of the term, in Korea. Our forces are there at the request of the Security Council to put down aggression and to restore peace and security in the area. The only recommendation or order that can emanate from the United Nations at this stage is for the North Korean aggressor to lay down his arms. If he refuses to do so, then our forces must remain in Korea until the power of the aggressor is crushed.

78. Having placed the United Nations forces and the North Korean aggressors on the same level, the five-Power draft resolution then proceeds to treat the Republic of Korea and the North Korean régime as equal partners in a quiet and peaceful political enterprise. After the withdrawal of the United Nations forces and while the troops of the North and South are presumably still under arms, the deputies of both Assemblies are to meet in fraternal conclave to discuss the holding of national elections and the establishment of a national government. If this is not naïve, I do not know what word can better describe it.

79. The aggressor régime of the North, which has control of only one-third of the population of Korea, would have equal representation in the proposed joint commission; thus it will not only be absolved of all guilt but, in addition, will be given a reward for its contumacious attitude towards the United Nations and its brutal act of aggression against the South. How can we entertain that?

80. This proposal has been conceived in a political vacuum. It deals in false hopes and impossible abstractions. It draws nourishment from a hothouse world. It is indeed a clever strategem, but its deceptive allure is its own best refutation, for it dangles before our eyes the aim of a unified Korea, which is our common hope and desire. It does this by a method of hypnosis whereby not only we of the United Nations but the people of Korea themselves would be induced to accept the illusion that nothing whatever of any significance has happened in Korea during the past three months, nor indeed during the past three years. But three years have built up in Korea an accumulation of distrust, defiance, conflict and hatred. And it is neither human nor politically

wise to act as though these passions and their consequences did not exist.

81. The date of 25 June 1950 has been burned with a red-hot brand upon the soul of the Korean people and etched with acid upon the conscience of the world. Common sense dictates that we approach our task in the light of these uneffaceable facts and map out a programme for the unification and rehabilitation of Korea that takes due account of the realities, not the fantasies, of the situation.

82. The draft resolution that has come to us from the First Committee, which my government had the honour to sponsor with seven others, seeks precisely to face the realities of the situation. It accepts the reality of defiance and conflict, of aggression and counter-aggression, of war and its aftermath, and it fits logically into the series of resolutions on Korea adopted by the General Assembly in 1947, 1948 and 1949 [*resolutions 112 (II), 195 (III) and 293 (IV)*], and the decisions taken by the Security Council last June.⁴ The goal is twofold: first, the establishment of a unified and democratic government of Korea and, secondly, the relief and economic rehabilitation of Korea.

83. The basic condition for the accomplishment of these two tasks is the restoration of peace and security throughout Korea. This means that the North Korean forces must lay down their arms. If they refuse to do so, then the United Nations forces must continue their campaign in Korea until all resistance is overcome, and remain there until the two goals are achieved. Direct responsibility for the accomplishment of these tasks is lodged in a United Nations commission for the unification and rehabilitation of Korea. In its task of unification, the commission will assume the functions hitherto exercised by the present United Nations Commission on Korea, including consultation with the Republic of Korea and with representative elements in North Korea, and supervision of all necessary constituent acts that may be taken, including the holding of free elections. In its task of relief and rehabilitation, the commission will exercise such responsibilities as may be determined by the General Assembly after receiving the recommendations of the Economic and Social Council.

84. The principal feature of this proposal is the primacy of United Nations authority exercised by the General Assembly through its commission in the field, throughout the period from now until Korea is politically unified and able to rise from the ruins of war. There should be no abdication of this authority until these tasks are completed. But also, we must make equally certain that it will end once these objectives are achieved. Therefore the draft resolution provides that United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary to achieve the objectives already mentioned; and it is clear that the supervisory functions of the commission will end as soon as the new national government is in full operation and firmly in the hands of the Korean people themselves.

85. My government places the greatest importance on the task of assisting in the relief and rehabilitation of Korea. We in the Philippines know the depths of material privation, spiritual despair and moral anguish

⁴ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 15 and No. 16.*

that come in the wake of war. We have accepted ourselves, without a murmur of complaint, the penalties of liberation; we have paid in full — and are still paying in full — the high price of freedom. We have no doubt that the Korean people are ready to do the same. The United Nations, having acted swiftly to defend their freedom, must now act with equal swiftness to bind the wounds of the Korean nation and restore that devastated land.

86. Indeed, we have it in our power to do more. We must help them, not only to revive physically and to recover economically, but to seek every effective means of preserving their freedom and security. This will mean a long-range programme of social and economic reform, especially agrarian reform, which alone can make possible a major advance in the economic development of Korea.

87. For, while recognizing the war's aftermath of fear, suspicion and hate, we must not permit it to remain without mitigation and cure. When our forces have restored peace in that country — indeed, before the battle is over — we must turn to the winning of the confidence of the Korean people and to the development of their faith in themselves. This we shall be able to do through the measures of relief and rehabilitation contemplated in the draft resolution.

88. The Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Acheson, has put before us [279th meeting] the vision of Korea as the laboratory, the demonstration area, for that mode of international co-operation in the social and economic fields which is envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. The peoples of Asia will be watching very intently what we do or fail to do there. Let pronouncements and promises dovetail with performance.

89. Though we cannot build a wall around that unhappy land, we can hold back the tide of subversion by helping to raise the people's standard of living. Having saved Korea by the force of its collective will, the United Nations must now help Korea to save itself in future through the application of its collective intelligence to the social and economic problems of the Korean people.

90. Mr. VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands): My delegation was among the eight sponsors of the draft resolution on the problem of the independence of Korea which is now before the General Assembly. The sponsors came from many corners of the world, from the Americas, from Europe, from Australia and from Asia.

91. We attach a special importance to these voices from Asia. The unity, the independence and the security of Korea as a whole are, in the first place, the problem of the freedom and well-being of an Asian country. It is therefore fitting that two Asian nations, the Philippines and Pakistan, are among the sponsors of a draft resolution which aims at the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea and at the economic rehabilitation of a country which has had to undergo the devastating effects of warfare as the price of regaining its liberty.

92. But the Korean issue has a scope which extends beyond the borders of Asia. On the one hand, it has

given the world an example of unprovoked aggression and, on the other, an example of the practical application of the principle of collective defensive action for the protection of peace and security such as is provided for by the Charter of the United Nations and such as is now being implemented under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Because of that collective responsibility, the draft resolution now before the General Assembly, which was approved in the First Committee on 4 October by 47 votes to 5, was sponsored by nations not only from Asia, but from three other continents as well. That fact, together with the wide geographical distribution of the countries which voted for the draft resolution in the First Committee, should convince the world in general and the Asian States neighbouring on Korea in particular that the real aims of the resolution are not the promotion of the particular interests of particular outside nations, but that they are twofold: freedom for a unified and reconstructed Korea and reaffirmation of the task of the United Nations as the guardian of the collective security of its Members and peoples against armed aggression.

93. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union and four other Powers was rejected because its basic intentions were incompatible, in our view, with the real freedom which most of us heartily desire the Korean people to possess. After the description which the representative of the Philippines has just given us of the merits of that draft resolution, I believe and I hope that we can apply to its fate the dying words of Hamlet: "The rest is silence".

94. There is no need for me to explain at length why the Netherlands delegation will once again vote for the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee. We voted for it in committee, and there can be no single reason why we should be of a different opinion now. The facts of the North Korean aggression remain, the need to repel it remains and so does the need to establish peace and security for the Korean people as a whole as the prerequisite for the reconstruction of their own free institutions. For this, the draft resolution now before the General Assembly designs ways and means, not in a spirit of revenge but in a spirit of conciliation and co-operation. That this is true can be most clearly seen from sub-paragraph (c) at the beginning of the operative part of the draft resolution, in which it is recommended:

"That all sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be invited to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of a unified government."

95. All we want is a free, secure and united Korea at the earliest possible moment, in the first place, for the Koreans themselves, but also for ourselves, for this moment, when it comes, will enable us and others who contributed their forces to the collective effort to stem the tide of aggression to withdraw them and bring them back to the places whence they came. It is obvious that none of us who are now working together to uphold the principles of the Charter have any desire to add new long-term burdens to the many heavy ones which already we are obliged to carry in a world which is out of joint. We desire no new conflicts. Our united forces in Korea are no threat to anyone who does not menace

us. We believe in a spirit of tolerance, provided that it be practised on a basis of reciprocity. We also believe that, on the basis of such tolerance, a diversity of thoughts and social and political conceptions and systems can be a source of richness to human life, provided that everyone is prepared to respect the rule of "live and let live".

96. I need say little more. The draft resolution before this General Assembly has been conceived in the spirit which I have just outlined. I hope and expect that it may be brought to the North Korean people and authorities in the speediest and clearest possible manner, and that it may convince those responsible for the breach of peace in Korea that what is offered now is not a threat to Korean freedom, but a working scheme in which once more, amongst others, a number of Asian countries will take an active part, and which aims solely at the promotion of secure and rightful Korean self-determination.

97. Mr. PRICE-MARS (Haiti) (*translated from French*): As soon as the Korean crisis occurred on 25 June 1950, Haiti, as a Member of the United Nations, took its stand⁵ in favour of the decision of the Security Council which, by a resolution adopted on the same day, called for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel.

98. As that appeal went unheeded, we were forced either to sit back and do nothing or to act, in accordance with Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Charter, which provides that one of the purposes of the United Nations is "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace" for the purpose of preventing a local dispute from developing into a general conflagration. That is the provision under which the United Nations, through the Security Council, called upon Members of the Organization to lend their assistance in the achievement of this aim. But as the North Koreans defied the United Nations, this attitude could have only one inevitable consequence: the collective suppression of the act of aggression perpetrated by the North Koreans, war, with all its horror of destruction of human life and property.

99. At this time, when the General Assembly at its fifth session is called upon to take momentous decisions to re-establish peace, promote stability, and work for the reconstruction of Korea, I should like in a few brief remarks to clarify the position of my delegation in the matter under discussion.

100. I have followed with ever-increasing interest the long and impassioned debates which have taken place on the Korean crisis since it arose on 25 June last to take pride of place among those world events which provoke general unrest and anxiety. The Haitian delegation, on behalf of the Republic of Haiti and in accordance with the instructions of its government, has assumed its share of the responsibility by giving its wholehearted support to the steps decreed by the Security Council in its resolutions of 25 and 27 June last. That was in our

opinion the only possible attitude which could be adopted to combat this threat to the peace and to prevent the conflict from spreading.

101. Bitter criticisms have, however, been levelled by one sector of our Organization which not only has disputed and continues to dispute the legality of those resolutions of the Security Council, but which also accuses the countries which have supported them of following the lead of the United States; that country, according to those critics, has provoked the Korean crisis in order to start a world war. And every day we see this paradoxical interpretation reinforced by a formidable onslaught of voluminous dialectic.

102. I shall deal first with the legal validity of the decisions. Attempts have been made to show that they were taken in the absence of one of the permanent members of the Security Council. Under the terms of Article 27, paragraph 2 of the Charter, "Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members". Nowhere does the Charter provide that the voluntary absence of one of the five permanent members shall stultify the role of the Security Council, the essential structure of which is based on rapid and effective action for the maintenance of peace. Therefore, in our opinion, the accusation of illegality, considered from the present point of view, lacks any logical foundation and cannot be maintained.

103. As to the other criticism, which concerns the representation of China in the Security Council, so long as this question has not been decided by a vote of the General Assembly, the present representation of China in the United Nations cannot be called illegal.

104. And as for the servile attitude so slanderously attributed to the nations which have shouldered the responsibility for the decisions of the Security Council, I repudiate it with all my might on behalf of my country and in so far as it concerns my country's participation in the United Nations.

105. Of course, Haiti is a very small nation which occupies only a minute spot on the globe and has only a very small number of inhabitants. Our presence among you would in truth have very little significance if the size of our territory and the number of its inhabitants were the only consideration. Perhaps it might be thought, because of all these drawbacks, that we need to follow the lead of some great Power. But our claims are justified by history.

106. We represent an idea which transcends in grandeur and nobility any question of numbers or area. We represent here an idea, that of the emancipation, not only of a nation, but of a great variety of human beings. We represent the idea which we dramatically transformed into reality: that slavery is the most horrible abomination which has ever disfigured the face of mankind. We represent the idea that all men are human beings. We represent the idea of racial equality, the idea that all men are brothers.

107. We defended that idea by fire and sword for fourteen years in the most horrible of wars. We were victorious, and thus we won the right to be men who think and act for themselves without following the lead of anyone.

⁵ See document S/1559.

108. We have adopted our present position in this Organization and in the questions we are dealing with, because it accords with our historical traditions and because we believe that it embodies law, justice and truth.

109. We may therefore be permitted to state that it is for those reasons, and after a most careful analysis of the facts, that we shall vote in favour of the draft resolution presented by Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines and the United Kingdom, and that we shall not vote for the draft resolution submitted by five Powers including the Soviet Union.

110. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): We are about to take a major decision. That decision will have a profound effect on the future of the 30 million people in Korea. It will also have a profound effect upon the peoples of the world. It will openly prove whether we who are Members of this great Organization mean what we say in our pledges that Korea shall be independent and free to work out its own destiny in the way that the Korean people decide.

111. It has been three years since this Assembly put its hand to the task of creating a unified Korea which could exist without coming under the domination of any Power or Powers. That task is not yet accomplished. However, by our vote today and by our continued support hereafter of our decision of today, we can, I am sure, bring the Korean people nearer to the end of their present suffering and to a state of political independence and economic well-being.

112. Since the beginning of the debate in the First Committee on 30 September, we have heard a great many words uttered both for and against the draft resolution sponsored by Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines and the United Kingdom.

113. Of course the United States delegation opposes the draft resolution of the Soviet Union and the four other Powers which has been revived here from this rostrum. I need to adduce only one reason, though there are many which the United States presented in the First Committee. But there is one profound and broad reason for opposing it, namely, that the draft aims at the virtual surrender of the United Nations to the Soviet group, a surrender to all the aggressive purposes expressed in that draft.

114. My government believes that in supporting the eight-Power draft resolution, it is supporting freedom, unity, the real independence of Korea and of all small countries on earth. My government's purposes are clear, open and unequivocal.

115. First I would recall very briefly the facts of the Korean situation since 1945.

116. From 1945 to 1947 the United States tried again and again to come to some agreement with the Soviet Union on the unification of Korea. It soon became apparent that when the Soviet authorities talked of a free Korea, they meant a Korea that was completely under the thumb of the USSR. If you need any additional proof of this, examine that draft resolution which was reintroduced here today and you will see how it emphasizes that heavy hand of the neighbours of Korea.

The communist neighbours of Korea would supervise the establishment of that so-called free government of Korea if that draft resolution were adopted.

117. The political parties representing most of the Korean people bitterly criticized the decision of the Foreign Ministers in Moscow, in December 1945, which envisaged a temporary trusteeship. Trusteeship is anathema to any freedom-loving people, of course. Only a tiny well-trained minority of Korean communist groups kept silent. Most Koreans did not like the idea of a big-Power trusteeship for Korea. I do not blame them. One cannot blame a people for wanting to be free — free even to make their own mistakes.

118. When the time came for consultation on the steps towards Korea's independence, the Soviet Union refused to listen to any person or any party that had ever criticized the Moscow decisions. Even when the political parties pledged themselves to a faithful observance of that decision, the USSR refused to consult with some twenty-four parties representing 15 million people, the vast majority of the adult electors of the country.

119. Was that democracy? It hardly seems so to us. When the United States suggested country-wide elections by secret ballot to select representatives to set up a government, the Soviet Union refused. All attempts to unify the country broke down on the refusal of the USSR to agree to any election, or electoral body, or government that it did not completely dominate through its henchmen.

120. In 1947 the United States placed the problem before the United Nations. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union opposed any type of fair settlement for the area of Korea controlled by Soviet guns. The United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in 1947, 1948 and 1949 for measures that nearly all Member nations hoped would bring independence and unity to Korea. The General Assembly appointed the United Nations Commission on Korea [*resolution 293 (IV)*] which included Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines and Turkey. The Ukrainian SSR refused to appoint a member to serve on the United Nations Commission on Korea.

121. The Soviet commander in North Korea refused to allow the Commission established by the Assembly even to consult with him or with the Koreans in his area. In contrast, the Commission was free to do its work for the General Assembly in the area where the United States troops were accepting the surrender of the Japanese occupants.

122. The Soviet Union and its associates refused to participate in the Interim Committee. That Committee, you will remember, was created by the General Assembly [*resolution 111 (II)*] and vested with special responsibility for Korea, namely, to act in lieu of the General Assembly in advising and directing the United Nations Commission on Korea. Thus the elections in the Republic of Korea were held pursuant to the advice of the Interim Committee⁶ which the USSR tried to sabotage.

123. At this time I should like in passing to pay tribute to the members of the United Nations Com-

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Supplement No. 10*, document A/583.

mission on Korea. They have borne many hardships. They have undergone many disappointments. They have risked their lives and one of them, the Indian military observer, Colonel Nayar, lost his life in the performance of his duty. But they have been the eyes and ears of the United Nations, and we understand that under the draft resolution before us they will remain at their posts until the new commission envisaged in that draft arrives in Korea. The members of the United Nations Commission on Korea have deserved well of the United Nations and when they clasp hands somewhere in Korea with the men who are to succeed them in a broader activity, I know that they will realize that they have the heartfelt thanks of this General Assembly as expressed in this draft resolution.

124. We have had frank reports from the Commission on both the shortcomings and the virtues of the Republic of Korea. The Commission members were able to tell us that the government was representative and freely elected. They were able to tell us that that government and the people of Korea were the victims of an unprovoked aggression on 25 June last.

125. It might have been amusing in the First Committee — if it were not so tragic — to hear the kind of cracked victrola record of charges that the aggression came from South Korea. We know the facts because the Commission on the spot has given them to us. We know who brought the horror of war upon Korea. We know where the blame for what has happened must lie and does lie. It is not with the South Koreans, nor with any of the countries that have contributed to the United Nations effort to restore peace in Korea.

126. So much for the past. The time has come when the Members of the United Nations must go forward with determination. Let us not postpone, falter or weaken. We must go forward with the strength that rises out of unity. Only by persistent, accelerating progress can we reach the goal without further bloodshed. Abstaining from decision when aggression threatens will not help to preserve the peace of the world. Sometimes it only makes danger greater, and that is a lesson that many of us learned in the fire of the recent world war.

127. The American people has firmly supported the United Nations because it believes that this great body can exert an influence for good, an influence for peace, by its determination in moments of crisis such as this one. Let us advance together with every nerve and muscle exerted to make this Organization of the world a stronger support for those who are threatened by war or famine or disease, as is little Korea today.

128. We have heard talk by the Soviet spokesmen to the effect that the United States is using the United Nations only to secure the interests of American monopolies in Korea. I thought that that was an idea that was long ago exploded. In fact, I went into some detail in the Security Council showing that the United States had contributed far more to Korea than the worth of all the American investments in that country.⁷ We want nothing from Korea. We want no bases in Korea. We do not want to and will not threaten any other

country through the temporary presence of the United States troops in Korea on a United Nations mission.

129. The United States will co-operate in fulfilling the policy of this resolution that United Nations forces shall remain in Korea only as long as is necessary to achieve the essential objectives of the General Assembly — to wit, the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea. After the end of the fighting, the quicker Korea is permitted to live its own life without foreign interference the better for the whole world and the better for us.

130. My government is willing to do its full part in the United Nations forces that will help Korea in the future to regain its peace and stability, but we should be well pleased if other countries were to feel that they were able to take a larger share in the arduous task that still confronts the United Nations. It will be an arduous task. I have no doubt of that. We do not gain or hold the peace by taking our ease. The war that the aggressor has brought to Korea has caused widespread and deep devastation.

131. As if the damage of shell and bomb were not enough, I am informed that the aggressor forces themselves set fire to and destroyed many of the big buildings in Seoul, the capital, before they fled northward. Amid all the devastation, the population of Seoul enthusiastically welcomed the return of United Nations forces to relieve it from an intolerable communistic dictatorship.

132. Who can tell at this distance and at this time just what will need to be done to unify Korea politically and restore it economically? Certainly we here cannot, but the commission proposed in this draft resolution will be able to on the spot. It will be able to cope with conditions as it finds them, a task for selfless, able, strong and resolute men. These men will be provided by Australia, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey and Thailand.

133. Under the authority of this Assembly, the commission will have wide powers to go where it will. It will be able to get the views of everyone who is interested in the future and the well-being of the country. It should hold itself open and ready to talk with all who may approach it from whatever quarter. The commission will, of course, be in consultation with the Republic of Korea. In the confusion following the war, there will be many problems that can be settled only by co-operation between the United Nations commission, the Republic of Korea, and the United Nations Commander-in-Chief.

134. There has been criticism here of President Syngman Rhee by the Soviet spokesmen. My government certainly does not feel that it is the duty of the United Nations to impose President Rhee, or any other official, upon the Korean people in any area. Let them say what their appraisal of President Rhee is, or of any other candidate in political contention.

135. It is a fact, however, that Mr. Rhee was elected to his position as the result of an election certified as fair by the United Nations. It is also a fact that in the most recent election his supporters lost out and parties who oppose Mr. Rhee gained a majority. It has often been the case in my own country that the President belongs

⁷ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 31.*

to one party and the Congressional majority to another. Such a possibility under the Korean Constitution is not cause for surprise or dismay. If the Korean legislators wish to change their Constitution, they can do so by a two-thirds vote as the Constitution now stands. But the type of government the Korean people will have — what political arrangements will be made — is freely and entirely up to the Korean people so long as the methods they use do not include coercion and are fair and regular in the view of the United Nations commission representing this General Assembly.

136. For this General Assembly the draft resolution we are supporting is the keystone of the arch of United Nations action in Korea. This Assembly, as I have said, in 1947, 1948 and 1949 went as far as was then possible in unifying that country and protecting its independence.

137. In June and July of this year, the Security Council gave all the necessary military authority to the United Nations Commander to repel the aggressor army and restore peace in Korea. The United Nations forces have pursued that task with vigour and some success.

138. Two things appear necessary to be done now: first, to carry out the objectives of the United Nations in the northern area where United Nations observers have never yet had the opportunity to ascertain the political wishes of the people; secondly, to commence forthwith the task of rehabilitating the shattered Korean economy.

139. This resolution will give authority for both. In addition, it will announce to the men who are now fighting and dying for a United Nations ideal that this Assembly supports wholeheartedly the work they are carrying forward so effectively under Security Council authority, under the banner of the United Nations.

140. The vote on this draft resolution is the culmination of all the work we have been doing over the years on behalf of Korea. With it the arch will be complete

and strong. What the United Nations has worked for since 1947 is stability in Korea — a unified, independent and democratic government in a sovereign State. This has been our objective, and this is what we are voting for in approving this draft resolution.

141. We propose by the action under this draft resolution to guarantee that no country shall tell the Korean people what they must do. The United Nations aims to keep people free, not bound in slavery to anyone. The United Nations will help people who are battered by war, not harm them. The United Nations will help rebuild, not destroy. The United Nations will lift the shadow of fear from men. The United Nations will liberate their minds from thought control and give their energies the opportunities of freedom and the blessings of liberty.

142. I believe that in order to achieve these things, we all, every one of the sixty nations of the world which are here represented, must be prepared to take some risks and endure some hardships. But I believe also that if the United Nations keeps firm and unified, advancing toward our great objective, we can ensure a peace such as the world has never enjoyed before.

143. It is for these reasons that my government will gladly vote for the draft resolution sponsored by Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines and the United Kingdom.

144. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to point out that so far we have heard five speakers and that the list of speakers contains the names of the following countries: Chile, New Zealand, the USSR, France, Czechoslovakia, Bolivia and Greece.

145. I propose that the General Assembly should declare the list of speakers closed.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.