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*President: Mr. Adam MALIK (Indonesia).*

*Tribute to the memory of Mr. Ivan Bachev,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria*

1. The PRESIDENT: We have learned with deep regret of the tragic death of Mr. Ivan Bachev, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria. On behalf of the General Assembly I extend to his family and to the Government and people of Bulgaria our profound condolences.
2. I invite members of the Assembly to stand and observe a minute's silence in tribute to his memory.

*The members of the General Assembly observed a minute of silence.*

3. Mr. GROZEV (Bulgaria) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, on behalf of the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and on my own behalf, I should like to express to you and to all the distinguished representatives here our great gratitude and thanks for the condolences that have been expressed and for the tribute you have paid to the memory of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Comrade Ivan Bachev, who has died so tragically.

4. As Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria from 1963 to the present time, Comrade Bachev attended and actively participated in all the sessions of our Organization. He was a convinced and an energetic defender of the lofty principles and purposes set out in the United Nations Charter. Those principles always formed the basis of his tireless diplomatic activity in the conduct of the consistent and peace-loving foreign policy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. He was a fervent champion of and fighter for friendship and mutual understanding in the Balkans, collective security in Europe, and peace and mutual understanding throughout the world. The untimely death of Comrade Ivan Bachev is therefore a great loss not only to Bulgaria and Bulgarian diplomacy but also to all those who are fighting for the great cause of the United Nations.

**AGENDA ITEM 23**

**Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples**

5. The PRESIDENT: Members will recall that this item was allocated to the plenary Assembly so that it might examine the question of the implementation of the Declaration in general. All the chapters of the report of the Special Committee relating to specific Territories have been referred to the Fourth Committee.
6. The Assembly will now begin its consideration of item 23 as a whole, and accordingly any question relating to this item may be raised. However, to facilitate the debate it would be preferable if representatives wishing to comment on specific Territories were to do so subsequently, when the Assembly takes up the reports of the Fourth Committee on those Territories.
7. Mr. TADESSE (Ethiopia): As Rapporteur of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, I have the honour to present to the General Assembly the report of that Committee covering its work during 1971. The report, which relates *inter alia* to item 23 of the agenda, is submitted in accordance with paragraph 11 of resolution 2708 (XXV), by which the General Assembly requested the Special Committee:  
*"to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of the Declaration in all Territories which have not yet attained independence and, in particular, to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism, taking fully into account the relevant provisions of the programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration".*
8. The complete report of the Special Committee is contained in documents A/8423/Rev.1<sup>1</sup> and A/8398 and Add.1.<sup>2</sup> An account of the Special Committee's examination of the situation in individual Territories is set out in chapters VI to XXVI of the former document. An account of the Committee's consideration of the other specific items referred to in the relevant General Assembly resolution is set out in the remaining chapters of that report.

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid., Supplement No. 23A (A/8423/Rev.1/Add.1).*

9. In addition, the report of the Special Committee relating to item 70, namely, "Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination in Southern Africa" is contained in document A/8398 and Add.1.

10. At the outset of the Special Committee's work for the year, many members noted with deep regret the withdrawal from the Committee of the United States and the United Kingdom, both of which had served on the Committee since its inception and are, together, responsible for the administration of the majority of the remaining dependent Territories. In the view of some members, the withdrawal of the two administering Powers impeded the full and speedy implementation of the Declaration and, hence, their action should be seen not only as a direct attempt to undermine the work of the United Nations in decolonization, but also as an indication of their design to suppress the struggle of the peoples under colonial domination to achieve their freedom and independence. It was also the feeling of the majority of members that the complete achievement of the goals laid down for colonial peoples in the relevant provisions of the Charter and in the Declaration itself had been delayed and that many of the problems entrusted to the Committee, particularly those relating to the Territories in southern Africa, had acquired greater complexity.

11. This, they felt, was evident from the intensified and parallel consideration given by the Security Council to the situation in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia, and to the repeated acts of aggression committed by Portugal against independent States bordering its African Territories. Notwithstanding these developments, the Committee was able, by adhering to a heavy schedule of meetings between February and November, to give adequate consideration to, and submit recommendations on, most of the items on its agenda and, as regards the remainder, to transmit to the General Assembly information which would facilitate its examination of them at the current session.

12. As envisaged in its previous report to the General Assembly and within the context of General Assembly resolutions 1654 (XVI) and 2621 (XXV), the Special Committee, at the outset of the year, decided to dispatch an *Ad Hoc* Group to Africa for the purpose of maintaining contact with representatives of national liberation movements of colonial Territories on that continent and obtaining first-hand information on the situation in those Territories. The Group, which consisted of six members of the Committee, headed by Mr. Germán Nava Carrillo of Venezuela, the Chairman of the Special Committee, visited Lusaka, Dar es Salaam and Addis Ababa, and held a series of meetings with representatives of a number of national liberation movements of the Territories in southern Africa and with officials of the Organization of African Unity.

13. As reflected in the observations of the Group, subsequently endorsed by the Special Committee, the findings of the Group corroborated the further deterioration of the

situation in those Territories and the threat that that situation constituted not only for the security of neighbouring African States but for international peace and security. As will be seen from the relevant chapters of the Committee's reports, the knowledge and understanding thus acquired by the Special Committee were duly reflected in the various resolutions and consensuses adopted on the Territories concerned. An account of the *Ad Hoc* Group's visit to Africa, together with an account of the Committee's consideration of the report of the Group, is set out in chapter V of the present report.

14. As will be seen from the relevant chapters of the report, the Special Committee devoted close and continuous attention to the problems afflicting the southern part of Africa, as it is there that millions of dependent peoples, denied even their most fundamental rights, live in conditions of ruthless colonialist and racialist repression. The Fourth Committee has already submitted reports on the Territories under Portuguese domination and Southern Rhodesia, setting out a number of important recommendations adopted on the basis of reports of the Special Committee. Further reports of the Fourth Committee on other Territories covered by the Special Committee's reports are expected to be submitted shortly to the plenary Assembly. In addition, the Fourth Committee has currently before it reports of the Special Committee relating to agenda items 65 and 70 to 73. The recommendations of the Fourth Committee covering these items will likewise be submitted shortly. I shall therefore confine the following remarks to those items dealt with by the Special Committee which relate to the more general aspects of the question of decolonization.

15. Having regard to the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2621 (XXV), 2708 (XXV) and 2709 (XXV), the Special Committee continued its examination of the military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their domination which might be impeding the implementation of the Declaration. In that connexion, members noted with serious concern that the colonial Powers have not as yet complied with the various General Assembly resolutions requesting them to withdraw their military bases and installations from colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones. On the basis of its study, the Committee viewed with special concern the situation in the Territories of southern Africa, where the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia have, in close collaboration with each other, continued to escalate their armed repression of the African populations.

16. In the opinion of the majority of the Committee members, these intensified military activities, as well as the acts of aggression committed by Portugal and South Africa against independent African States, have created a grave and increasing threat not only to the security of these independent African States but to international peace and security as well. As regards the smaller Territories, the Committee again found evidence that the military activities of the authorities concerned inevitably impede the process of decolonization and interfere with the economic and other developments of the Territories concerned. The conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee, formulated on the basis of these and other considerations, are set out in chapter II of its report.

17. Aware of the vital importance of securing adequate and first-hand information regarding political, economic and social conditions in the Territories, as well as on the views, wishes and aspirations of their peoples, the Special Committee again examined the question of sending visiting missions to Territories. In that connexion, members noted with satisfaction that, in response to the requests addressed to the administering Powers in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee, the Government of New Zealand had extended an invitation to the Committee to send a visiting mission to Niue and the Tokelau Islands in 1972. The Special Committee also noted that the Trusteeship Council had decided, on the invitation of the Government of Australia, to dispatch a visiting mission to observe the elections to the Third Papua-New Guinea House of Assembly in 1972, and that the membership of that mission would include two members of the Special Committee. In view of the constructive role played by previous visiting missions in assisting colonial Territories to achieve independence in conditions of peace and stability, it was deeply regretted that the unco-operative attitude of certain administering Powers towards the sending of visiting missions by the Special Committee had continued to impede the full, speedy and effective implementation of the Declaration. The Special Committee's recommendations in this regard are set out in chapter IV of its report.

18. In the light of the request addressed to the Secretary-General by the General Assembly in paragraph 16 of its resolution 2708 (XXV), the Special Committee continued its examination of the question of publicity to be given to the work of the United Nations in the field of decolonization. In that regard the Special Committee considered that a sustained effort must be made to keep world public opinion adequately acquainted with the situation in the colonial Territories and with the continuing struggle for the liberation of the colonial peoples.

19. The Special Committee accordingly invited the Secretary-General to take further measures to give wide-spread and continuous publicity to the work of the United Nations in the field of decolonization and, in particular, to ensure the widest possible dissemination of the relevant information to the national liberation movements of the colonial Territories and to those non-governmental organizations having a special interest in the problems of decolonization. A full account of the Committee's consideration of this question is contained in chapter I, section H, of the present report.

20. Having regard to the useful role being played in the dissemination of information relating to the work of the United Nations in the field of decolonization by the non-governmental organizations which have a special interest in the problem of decolonization, the Special Committee during the year established a close working relationship with several of those organizations, such as the World Peace Council and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization. Subject to any directives which the General Assembly might give in this connexion, the Special Committee intends to intensify the efforts for a strengthened co-ordination with those organizations.

21. In paragraph 13 of General Assembly resolution 2708 (XXV), the Assembly requested the Special Committee:

“... to continue to examine the compliance of Member States with the Declaration and with other relevant resolutions on the question of decolonization, particularly those relating to the Territories under Portuguese domination, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session”.

In the light of the mandate thus given to it by the General Assembly, the Special Committee considered the item, taking fully into account the various relevant General Assembly resolutions on the question of decolonization.

22. Further, under the terms of the same resolution, in paragraph 12, the General Assembly requested the Special Committee:

“... to make concrete suggestions which could assist the Security Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations with regard to developments in colonial Territories which are likely to threaten international peace and security, and recommends that the Security Council take such suggestions fully into consideration”.

The Special Committee, on a number of occasions in 1971, drew the attention of the Security Council to various aspects of the situation existing in Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination.

23. In paragraph 14 of the same resolution, the Assembly invited the Special Committee:

“... to pay particular attention to the small Territories, and to recommend to the General Assembly the most appropriate methods and also the steps to be taken to enable the populations of those Territories to exercise fully ... their right to self-determination and independence”.

An account of the Special Committee's examination of these matters is set out in chapter I, section G, of the present report. The Special Committee intends to continue consideration of these matters at its next session, taking fully into account the relevant provisions of United Nations resolutions concerning the question of decolonization.

24. In addition, the Special Committee on the basis of its own decision, which was subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly [resolution 2708 (XXV)], undertook the review of the list of Territories to which the Declaration applies. An account of the Committee's consideration of this matter is set out in Chapter I, section F, of the present report. I would draw attention in particular to the Committee's decision concerning the Comoro Archipelago.

25. The Special Committee, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to it in General Assembly resolution 1970 (XVIII) and other relevant resolutions, also examined during 1971 the question of information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the

Charter. Details of its consideration of this item are contained in chapter XXVII of the report.

26. In the light of the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2693 (XXV) and 2609 (XXIV) concerning the pattern of conferences, and taking into consideration its experience in previous years, as well as its probable work load for next year, the Special Committee has approved a tentative programme of meetings for 1972, as set out in paragraphs 136 to 140 of chapter I of its report, which it commends for approval by the General Assembly. In the same connexion and within the context of paragraph 6 of resolution 1654 (XVI) and paragraph 3 (9) of resolution 2621 (XXV), the Committee decided to inform the General Assembly that it might consider holding a series of meetings away from Headquarters next year and to recommend that, in making the necessary financial provisions to cover the activities of the Committee during that year, the General Assembly should take that possibility into account.

27. The Special Committee also considered during the year the question of petitions from the peoples of the colonial Territories which relate to article 15 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and to the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolution 2106 B (XX). In this connexion the Committee took decisions as reflected in chapter I, section I, of the report.

28. In addition, the Special Committee suggests that the General Assembly, in its consideration of agenda item 23 at the current session, might wish to take into account the various recommendations which are reflected in the relevant chapters of the Committee's report and, in particular, to endorse the proposals outlined in chapter I, section O, entitled "Future work", in order to enable the Committee to carry out the tasks it envisages for next year.

29. Moreover, the Special Committee recommends that the General Assembly should renew its appeal to the administering Powers to take immediately all necessary steps for the implementation of the Declaration and the various relevant United Nations resolutions. In the same connexion, the General Assembly might also wish to renew its appeal to all States, the specialized agencies and other international organizations within the United Nations system, to comply with the various requests addressed to them by the United Nations on the question of decolonization.

30. Further, the Special Committee recommends that, in approving the programme of work contained in chapter I, section O, the General Assembly should also make adequate financial provision to cover the activities of the Committee as envisaged for 1972.

31. Finally, the Special Committee expresses its confident hope that the Secretary-General will continue to provide it with all the facilities and personnel necessary for the discharge of its mandate.

32. On behalf of the Special Committee, I commend the report to the serious consideration of the General Assembly.

33. The PRESIDENT: I call on Mr. Jouejati, Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

34. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syrian Arab Republic) (*interpretation from French*): On behalf of the Special Committee, may I first of all be permitted to say how grieved we were by the news of the sudden death of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria. Bulgaria is one of the very active members of the Special Committee. The contribution to the work of the Committee by the Bulgarian delegation has been most productive, positive and effective. I would ask the representative of Bulgaria to transmit to the people and the Government of Bulgaria—and, in particular, to the family of the late Minister—our sincere condolences.

35. The over-all activities of the Special Committee in 1971 are presented with clarity and conciseness in the report that has just been submitted by the Rapporteur. I should therefore like to make some very brief comments before the Assembly about the work of the Committee, which I presided over as Acting Chairman.

36. The fact that, at the beginning of the year, two States left the Special Committee in circumstances which will be recalled—however regrettable this may have been—did not paralyse its activities. Our work was conducted normally and just as effectively, if not more so, than in previous years. Hence, we should be gratified at the faith and the dedication displayed by all the members in their participation in the fulfilment of the Special Committee's mandate.

37. During its work the Special Committee had a series of complete texts dealing with all aspects of decolonization. I am referring to a compendium which includes the Declaration, the programme of action and all the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The foundation of its action having been thus soundly established, the Committee concentrated on evaluating the extent to which various resolutions on decolonization were being implemented.

38. Furthermore, the Special Committee continued to seek appropriate ways and means to eliminate various persistent manifestations of colonialism. Finally, whenever current events called for it, the Committee took appropriate measures, as was the case during the events that took place in southern Africa in the course of the year and also following the incursions of Portuguese troops into Guinea and Senegal.

39. The task of the Special Committee was all the more difficult this year as the obstacles in the path of decolonization are particularly intractable. In southern Africa the adherents of colonialism and *apartheid* have continued to strengthen a bastion which they regard as impregnable.

40. The representatives of liberation movements and the officials of the Organization of African Unity confirmed to the members of the *Ad Hoc* Group that the situation in the colonial Territories has further deteriorated during the past year.

41. The intensification of military activities and the increase in repressive action against non-self-governing

peoples have been accompanied by armed incursions against the territories of Guinea, Senegal and Zambia. The attacks directed against the security and sovereignty of States bordering on colonial and *apartheid* régimes now constitute a serious threat to international peace and security.

42. Thus we face this tragic dichotomy: on the one hand, there is the overwhelming majority of States Members of our Organization which are deeply attached to peace and justice and which wish to put an end as quickly as possible to the evils of colonialism and *apartheid*; on the other hand, we have the adherents of one of the most abject and retrograde systems in the history of mankind, who are determined to perpetuate its discrimination and exploitation by all means at their disposal.

43. To the numerous resolutions containing appeals to reason and justice, adopted by the United Nations, the adherents of colonialism and *apartheid* have responded by increasing their military arsenals and intensifying repressive measures.

44. In the face of this arrogant attitude of the colonialists and of the defenders of *apartheid*, the only choice remaining to the Special Committee was to ask our Organization, the States and the specialized agencies to increase their material, financial, political and moral assistance to the colonial peoples.

45. Furthermore, it cannot be overemphasized—and many members of the Committee stressed this point during our debates—that it is essential for all States to put an end to any assistance, co-operation and collaboration with Portugal, South Africa and the illegal régime of the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia. This is one of the most effective means if we are consistent with ourselves and wish to shake the bastions of colonialism and *apartheid*. How can one claim to be in favour of the end of colonialism and *apartheid* if one continues to strengthen these systems by supplying them with the means of subsistence as well as military matériel and equipment which they require. Yet this is the paradoxical situation in which some of the allies of Portugal, South Africa and the illegal minority of Southern Rhodesia find themselves.

46. In studying the specific situation of the Territories under Portuguese domination—Namibia and Rhodesia—the Special Committee has once again unmasked the hideous face of colonialism and *apartheid*. It has also denounced and condemned the military alliance struck up in southern Africa between the Portuguese settlers, the racists of South Africa and the illegal minority of Rhodesia.

47. The Special Committee has once again appealed to all States, in particular the military allies of Portugal within NATO, to put an end to all forms of military assistance to Portugal, to respect the sanctions imposed by the Security Council in order to isolate the illegal régime of Rhodesia, and to refrain from supplying any military matériel and equipment to the South African Government. The Security Council is at present seized of several of these problems.

48. In resuming consideration of the activities of the economic interests, the military activities and agreements of the colonial Powers, the question of the implementation of

the Declaration by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations, the Special Committee, after having carried out a general review of the situation for each case, has made concrete suggestions designed to further the work of decolonization.

49. As for the question of dispatching visiting missions to Territories, the Special Committee noted with satisfaction the co-operative attitude of the New Zealand and Australian Governments. Several members of the Committee strongly deplored the lack of co-operation of certain other administering Powers.

50. The Special Committee devoted several meetings to the question of publicizing the work of the United Nations in the field of decolonization. Among the proposals made I wish to highlight the one which invites the Secretary-General to take further steps to provide extensive and constant publicity to the work of the United Nations in the field of decolonization.

51. Those are, in substance, among the numerous decisions and aspects of the work of the Special Committee in 1971, the ones which I wished as far as possible to highlight.

52. Nevertheless, one of the most important decisions of the Special Committee had to do with its future activities. I am speaking of its tentative acceptance of invitations addressed to it by representatives of liberation movements to go to liberated areas in Territories under Portuguese domination. Talks have been held between the officers of the Special Committee and officials of the Organization of African Unity concerning preparations for such a mission. Nevertheless, the very nature of this question makes it impossible to speak at any length of the details. There can be no doubt that everyone is aware of the importance of the Committee's decision. The success of that mission will have a marked impact upon decolonization and its progress. The fulfilment of this mission will be an illustration of our determination to ensure that the universal principles of equality, human dignity, social justice and self-determination of peoples under colonial domination prevail. As a matter of fact, it is these same principles for which the organizers of the Oslo conference on colonialism are working; it is to be held in May 1972 and the Committee intends to make a contribution to its work.

53. The PRESIDENT: I wish to inform representatives regarding my intentions in dealing with agenda item 23.

54. In order to be able to organize our work and in view of the limited time available, we should have an indication of how many representatives intend to speak before the vote. With this in view, I propose to close the list of speakers in the debate on this item at 12 o'clock noon on Wednesday, 15 December, that is, the day after tomorrow.

55. If there is no objection I shall take it that the list of speakers will be closed on Wednesday, 15 December, at 12 noon.

*It was so decided.*

56. The PRESIDENT: I should also like to propose that a time-table for the submission of draft proposals should be set for Wednesday, 15 December, at 5 p.m.

57. If I hear no objection I shall take it that the deadline for submission of draft proposals is Wednesday, 15 December, at 5 p.m.

*It was so decided.*

58. The PRESIDENT: Lastly, I should like to remind representatives of the decision taken by the Assembly at its 2010th plenary meeting on Friday, 10 December:

"Speakers should make their statements in the order in which they appear in the list. Those prevented from doing so would normally be placed at the end of the list unless they had arranged to change places with other representatives." [A/8500/Add.5, para. 2 (c).]

In accordance with that decision of the General Assembly, I should like to appeal to representatives voluntarily to limit the length of their interventions to 15 minutes.

## AGENDA ITEM 22

### The situation in the Middle East (*continued*)

59. Mr. CORADIN (Haiti) (*interpretation from French*): The death of Mr. Ralph Bunche, who until very recently occupied the post of Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, is all the more strongly felt by us all since his strong personality, all that he tried to do, and all that he did do to restore lost peace in the Middle East still pervade our current debate. His outstanding qualities as a diligent and impartial mediator enabled him to achieve the 1949 Armistice Agreements, which ensured relative peace in the Middle East for approximately 18 years. His death is a loss to the international community at a time when understanding among men has become impossible, at a time when new hotbeds of discord are being ignited in various parts of the world—as if the world were meant to be constantly at war and the search for universal peace was no more than an illusion.

60. My delegation on behalf of the Haitian Government has already conveyed its sincere condolences to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Mission of the United States of America, asking them to convey to the family of Mr. Bunche our most heartfelt sympathy.

61. The debate in progress, the theme of which is "the situation in the Middle East", has lasted for over a quarter of a century and no solution has been achieved by the United Nations. Some think that the obvious signs of a hardening in the two camps are already being felt and will surely lead to the polarization of positions unless the international community, aware of its responsibilities, finally finds some means of establishing bases for true understanding between the parties. Be that as it may, the situation has evolved in this past year and while today it does not offer positive hopes of settlement, neither does it leave room for pessimism. The diminished guerrilla activities on the frontiers and the initiative, so full of promise, of the Organization of African Unity in the Middle East appear to my delegation to be elements of *détente*, on the basis of which constructive approaches to the dispute could be envisaged.

62. True, the task devolving on the General Assembly is not easy. It is all the more difficult since a number of delegations have taken an approach to the question which only favours a hardening of positions between the parties at war. No valid solution can be found unless this question is debated by the parties involved and if the parties not directly concerned continue to emphasize further a partisan approach rather than helping to establish a climate of understanding and conciliation which is essential for the achievement of peace in the Middle East. This is a point on which my delegation wishes to lay particular stress. The question of peace between belligerents concerns first and foremost those involved in the war. It is not very logical that those who are not directly concerned should split up into two camps, as if this antagonistic position alone could bring about a solution to the problem. A healthy climate, propitious for effective, logical, coherent and profitable work cannot be accompanied by slander and by condemnation. The truth is that the parties at war are involved in a ruthless struggle that leaves no room for nuances. There are no two ways for a soldier to press the trigger of his gun, as there are no two ways for a wife, be she Arab or Israeli, to mourn her husband fallen on the battlefield.

63. The time has perhaps come for the General Assembly to make a constructive contribution to the solution of the problem, bearing in mind the recommendations made by the Security Council in its resolution 242 (1967) on the establishment of peace in the Middle East. It has been repeated enough—and today it is repeated rather mechanically—that peace is vital to mankind, but unfortunately to invoke a principle does not mean that it can be implemented. We must strive to make it a reality and the most direct means of achieving this in the Middle East is to clear the problem of the slag that clouds it and suggest to the parties that they make mutual concessions. This can be done only around a conference table. This is the task to which we should like to see Mr. Jarring devote himself since his outstanding qualities of lucidity, understanding, tact and perseverance are a guarantee of the success of his goodwill mission.

64. That is the position that the Haitian Government will adopt in order to help to find a just and equitable solution to the Middle East problem. It can be summed up as follows.

65. The Haitian Government, while regarding resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council as the basic instrument for the restoration of peace in the Middle East, warns the Assembly against abusive interpretations of the resolution which in all its parts seeks to constrain none of the contracting parties to do or not to do certain things.

66. Paragraph 1 of that resolution, on which the arguments of some delegations calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories are based, does not give the resolution executive force. In the view of our delegation the optional tenor of the Security Council's formula that "a... lasting peace should"—I underline "should"—"include the application of both the following principles" expresses its desire to make only recommendations liable to bring a solution to the dispute.

67. Paragraph 3 states:

*"Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement . . ." of the problem.*

68. Paragraph 2 merely institutes a procedure under which the litigating parties could use the good offices of a diplomatic representative to discuss the different aspects of the dispute.

69. My delegation, therefore, does not see in this resolution any manifest or express intention on the part of the Security Council to dictate to either of the countries concerned the will of the international community. The resolution thus respects—for which we commend it—the principle of the sovereignty and political independence of States.

70. It is by virtue of this same principle that my delegation believes that no settlement of this conflict can be envisaged within the framework of any constraint.

71. The Government of Haiti is convinced that, in any search for an adequate and equitable solution of the conflict, Security Council resolution 242 (1967) must be regarded as the only valid diplomatic instrument which by reason of this fact, if properly interpreted, can provide the necessary elements for an agreement between the parties. To this end, my delegation advocates the resumption of the mission of Mr. Jarring who, with his strong personality and the tact and initiative he has shown at all times, will use his good offices with the Arab and Israeli peoples and Governments to bring about a negotiated settlement.

72. The delegation of Haiti, bearing in mind all of the foregoing, will therefore support any draft resolution advocating direct dialogue between the parties concerned as an essential element for the restoration of peace in the area. On the other hand, we shall oppose any draft resolution which makes resolution 242 (1967) a constraining instrument rather than a code of wise recommendations likely to restore a climate of peace and confidence in the Middle East.

73. Moreover, the Government of Haiti believes that the efforts made by the Organization of African Unity to bring about the resumption of negotiations between Egypt and Israel under the auspices of Mr. Jarring are most encouraging. The report of the Sub-Committee of the OAU, composed of the Presidents of Senegal, Cameroon, Zaire and Nigeria, appears to us to be eloquent enough for us to assume that the two parties wish to negotiate. On the one hand, Egypt accepts the proposal to conclude arrangements on the Suez Canal, on secure and recognized boundaries, on the creation of demilitarized zones, on the presence of international forces at Sharm el Sheikh. On the other hand, with a view to a peace settlement, Israel does not oppose the resumption, under the auspices of Mr. Jarring, of negotiations concerning the Suez Canal, the delimitation of secure, recognized and agreed boundaries and the withdrawal to agreed and recognized frontiers, as well as free navigation on all international waterways such as the Suez

Canal and the Straits of Tiran. All these are points that were established by the Committee of African Heads of State, on the basis of which the Jarring mission can be reactivated successfully.

74. It appears to my delegation that we have here the required elements for the agreement we seek and that, if they are used with the sole purpose of settling the dispute, they could well lead to the conclusion of a peace treaty in the Middle East.

75. It is in the light of these considerations that the delegation of Haiti has become a sponsor of draft resolution A/L.652/Rev.1, submitted by Costa Rica, El Salvador and Uruguay. To our satisfaction that draft objectively and impartially sets forth the basic elements for peace in the Middle East. It is the sincere hope of my delegation that it will be supported by all men of good will in quest of a better world from which discord, hatred and violence would be absent.

76. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): The Pakistan delegation regrets that it could not participate in this debate earlier. That omission, as all our colleagues will understand, has been due to our preoccupations of the moment. However, no crisis through which my country will pass can make it change its position of principle. The principle that is most closely and immediately involved in the situation in the Middle East is that of the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from all territories occupied by them. Allied with this proposition is, of course, that of the total inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by war.

77. During the recent debates, both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, on the India-Pakistan conflict a number of delegations made references to the Middle East situation. The signal failure of the Security Council in 1967 to couple its call for a cease-fire with that for a withdrawal of Israeli forces was deplored. It was evident that a conscientiousness, as intense as it is widespread, prevails now to the effect that the international community has had to reap the bitter harvest of that failure on the part of the Security Council.

78. My delegation was gratified that this regrettable thought was articulated even by those who did not seem to share it before. At the same time, it was ironic that a certain great Power, which had won admiration for its perseverance in espousing the principle involved, seemed now to depart from it.

79. I said a moment ago that the thought that the Security Council should have failed to call unambiguously for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories was a regrettable one. Let me, however, stress that it is also most pertinent. The present situation in the Middle East, which poses a danger to world peace, to the same degree as it reeks of injustice, cannot be ameliorated unless and until the damage done to world order by that failure is repaired. We are convinced that draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, of which Pakistan is a sponsor, is a step in that direction. We therefore commend it to the Assembly for overwhelming support.

80. In considering that draft resolution, the Assembly has to bear in mind that, despite all the diplomatic activity of

the last four years, no basis has yet been laid for peace in the Middle East. Quiet diplomacy, devoted to *ad hoc* and interim measures, has failed to achieve any results. The confabulations of four great Powers have not lead to any agreement. The mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General has been obstructed by Israel, which refused to respond positively to his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 [A/8541, annex II]. Resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council remains nothing more than a framework for evolving concrete measures to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

81. No effort to break through this perilous impasse will have any chance of success unless it satisfies five conditions. These are:

(a) It should not compromise the basic principle of the invalidity of military conquest;

(b) It should aim not merely at obtaining consent to a text embodying general principles but at working out the practical modalities of their application;

(c) It should avoid any attempt to isolate certain territorial or other segments of the problem. Nothing would be more self-defeating than giving exclusive attention to one segment and neglecting others. A solution, if it is to be viable, must be as much an organic whole as is the problem itself. While this does not mean that, in mapping out the solution and securing its implementation, some temporal gaps may not be allowed between one measure and another, the whole sequence should be clearly in view as soon as the first step is taken;

(d) It should address itself to the issue of the inherent right to self-determination of the people of Palestine as the core of the problem and to the question of the Holy City as the one component of it which involves the deepest sensibilities of populations all over the world;

(e) It must have a wider diplomatic base than the approval and engagement of one great Power or even that of all the four great Powers that have so far been involved in negotiations towards its solution. The General Assembly, and where appropriate the Security Council, alone can provide the essential authority and endorsement.

82. The merit of draft resolution A/L.650 is that, unlike some previous essays, it does not militate against any one of these conditions. It avoids general realities which are liable to conflicting interpretations. Operative paragraphs 6 and 8 in particular respond both to the legitimate rights and interests of all parties and to the necessities of the political situation which has emerged from four years of unsuccessful efforts. My delegation commends the initiative of the African States which has led to the formulation of this draft resolution and hopes that it will be overwhelmingly supported by the General Assembly.

83. We will vote for draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, but we would oppose separate votes on its provisions.

84. In regard to the amendments submitted by the delegations of Barbados and Ghana [A/L.655 and Add.1], we regret that we shall have to vote against them.

85. The amendments submitted by Senegal in document A/L.656 seek to suppress operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of draft resolution A/L.650. Therefore, we believe that they do not maintain a balance of approach towards the proposal and we shall have to vote against them.

86. The draft resolution submitted by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti and Uruguay in document A/L.652/Rev.1, does not, we believe, embody an equitable approach and therefore we shall also vote against this draft resolution.

87. Mr. DIALLO (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): The delegation of Guinea has learnt with profound sorrow of the death of the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Bulgaria and Guinea are maintaining, since our accession to independence, excellent relations in all fields. Thus it is that the sorrow that has struck the brother people of Bulgaria is deeply felt and shared by our people. May the delegation of Bulgaria to the United Nations accept the expression of our most sincere condolences.

88. The Guinea delegation has had the honour of presenting, on its own behalf together with 20 other Member States, draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2. Although, in the course of the general debate, my delegation reserved the right to revert to the presentation of this text, we would not have felt the need to speak again were it not for the draft amendments which had been submitted to this text and were it not also that the statement of the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Abba Eban, seemed to call for a few additional clarifications from my delegation.

89. Since this morning much has been said of Africa, the Organization of African Unity, and the special mission entrusted to the Committee of African Heads of State, of which there has been so much talk that at one point we were wondering whether this was indeed the initiative which we, African States, unanimously took last June to help Mr. Jarring to emerge from the deadlock into which Israel had forced his efforts at negotiation. If this is in fact the African initiative—and I stress *African* initiative—it might perhaps be more advisable not to try and tell us what we intended but to let us have our own say about what our point of view is, without attempting to misrepresent our purposes by the piecemeal use of a document which was supposed to be, if not secret—it is not any longer—at least a document to be kept under wraps until such time as our Heads of State had taken cognizance of it and had been able to discuss it at their forthcoming session, next June, in Morocco.

90. I shall, therefore, not come back to what the intention of the African initiative was and what it achieved. This will be done elsewhere at some other time. But, in examining the amendments submitted to our draft resolution, we shall be compelled to hark back to some aspects of this problem.

91. First of all we received the amendments, submitted by Barbados [A/L.655], to the text which I had the honour of presenting on behalf of 21 Member States. Our first impression is that the amendments from Barbados must be considered, not as amendments, but rather as a draft resolution. For that purpose, we only have to take the two texts—the text of Barbados' initial draft resolution [A/

*L.651], and the text of its amendments—in order to realize immediately that that Delegation has taken exactly the same text and introduced it as amendments to our draft resolution.*

92. What does our brother and friend from Barbados propose? First he proposes that operative paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of our text should be replaced by another text. Referring to our draft, we are asked to delete operative paragraph 1, which:

*"Reaffirms that the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored".*

I do not think—and I believe I can even assert this—that it was the intention of the sponsor of these amendments to deny the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories. I therefore think that it is difficult for my delegation to accept this first point, in view of the fact that it refers to Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which specifically emphasizes the inadmissibility of the acquisition and occupation of territories by force.

93. Secondly, we are requested to delete our request to

*"...the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to reactivate the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to reach a peace agreement as envisaged in the Special Representative's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971".*

If we are asked to delete that, then we no longer understand why an appeal is made for an African initiative or why a reference is made to it. In point of fact, what is the African initiative? It is precisely to help Mr. Jarring in continuing his peace initiative and his mission. And here I should like to read out paragraph 7 of our memorandum, since practically the whole Assembly has it:

*"That is why they welcomed the initiative taken by Mr. Jarring on 8 February 1971 to remove the divergence of view between the State of Israel and the United Arab Republic of Egypt, regarding the priorities to be assigned to the various undertakings to be entered into by the two parties for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). The proposals of Mr. Jarring represent a positive contribution to the implementation of the provisions of that resolution, whose acceptance was reaffirmed by the two parties before the Sub-Committee of Four. It is in the context of total support for the efforts of Mr. Jarring to bring about the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) that the Summit Conference of the Organization of African Unity, at its session in June 1971, appointed a commission of 10 Heads of State to help in seeking a solution."*

94. That is very clear and does not lend itself to any dual interpretation. Africa makes this clear in paragraph 10:

*"The mission which Africa has unanimously entrusted to the Commission of Ten, which has appointed the Sub-Committee of Four, is a mission of peace."*

95. For the messengers from Africa, it is not a question of supplanting Mr. Jarring in his role of mediator, and even

less the Security Council; it is rather a question of helping him to get resolution 242 (1967) applied. But if Africa wants to help Mr. Jarring to do this, how can we then be asked to delete any reference to his aide-mémoire [*A/8541, annex I*]—the aide-mémoire of the man we want to help, the man who considers that only a positive response to that aide-mémoire by both sides will make it possible for him to obtain the implementation of resolution 242 (1967)?

96. We have to be quite clear. If we are not going to mention this, then do we want to help Mr. Jarring? Our delegation doubts it.

97. That is why, in spite of all the friendship we have for our colleague, we believe we cannot accept the deletion of paragraph 2 of our draft resolution either.

98. If we are asked to delete paragraph 3, which expresses its full support for the efforts of the Special Representative, that would surprise us, because everybody here has congratulated Mr. Jarring on the efforts he has made. But if we are asked not to express our "full support"—no, the delegation of Guinea certainly does give him its full support, and we believe that the sponsors of the amendments themselves also support the efforts made by Mr. Jarring.

99. Now we come to paragraph 4, which reads:

*"Notes with appreciation the positive reply given by Egypt to the Special Representative's initiative for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East".*

Here it is a question of fact. It is not a question of saying "Yes, note has been taken. We note that there is a reply." In a negotiation one must not present one side of the question and place the other party in difficulties if the desire is to secure further concessions. We say "No"; one has to call a spade a spade even in diplomacy. But is it or is it not true that Egypt has replied, positively, to the questions put by Mr. Jarring? All of our delegations have at hand the relevant document, with not only the questions put but also the answers given. I shall not speak of the answers given by the other side, because not only is each one of us informed of them but has been himself able to accurately gauge the deadlock in which the United Nations mediator found himself, precisely as a result of Israel's failure to respond.

100. It is because we wish to help Mr. Jarring to continue his negotiations that in paragraph 5 we ask Israel kindly "to respond favourably to the Special Representative's peace initiative" of 8 February, the only possible initiative which could get Mr. Jarring out of the impasse in which he now finds himself. We are simply, and in very courteous terms, requesting an answer, and moreover a favourable one.

101. I shall not come back to the replacement text proposed, because that is reproduced in its entirety in the draft resolution proposed by Barbados, the original draft which each of our delegations has seen in document A/L.651.

102. Now I come to other proposed amendments [*A/L.656*], those introduced by our sister delegation of Senegal, which proposes the deletion from operative para-

graph 1 of the words "and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored"; and, secondly, the replacement of operative paragraphs 4 and 5 with a new paragraph, reading as follows:

*"Notes with satisfaction the replies given by Egypt and Israel to the memorandum of the Committee of African Heads of State and considers the replies sufficiently positive to make possible a resumption of the Special Representative's mission".*

103. When we received this text we did in fact take a close look at paragraphs 4 and 5 of our original draft resolution. In those two paragraphs we speak of the initiative of Mr. Jarring. We do not speak of the African initiative. We therefore did not understand, and we still do not understand, why in paragraphs 4 and 5, which speak of Mr. Jarring's initiative, that reference should be replaced by "the African initiative". We rather think that this should be the object—and here, perhaps, I am anticipating—of an additional element that should be tacked on.

104. Personally, I feel that since in the fourth preambular paragraph of our original draft we stated:

*"Expressing its appreciation of the efforts of the Committee of African Heads of State undertaken in pursuance of the resolution adopted on 23 June 1971 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its eighth ordinary session"*

and since we mention the initiative of the Organization of African Unity there, the operative part might have contained a paragraph which would perhaps have taken note with satisfaction of the replies given by the two States. But if the delegation of Guinea could accept such an addition on its own behalf we would like this to be taken to a logical conclusion; we would then propose an amendment to the amendment proposed by Senegal. Thus, to its text: "*Notes with satisfaction the replies given by Egypt and Israel to the memorandum of the Committee of African Heads of State*", we would add the words "and its conclusion". Why? Because reference has been made here to the text of a memorandum which has unfortunately now been made public. But, as the representative of Egypt has stated today when he mentioned the conclusion in order to dispel the seeds of doubt and equivocation which were sown here this morning, we read in the concluding part of the memorandum a fact of capital importance:

*"It appears possible, in the light of the data obtained by the Sub-Committee, to reinstitute the negotiations under the aegis of Mr. Jarring. Their success is held to be certain if the implementation of the concept of secure and recognized borders does not force Egypt to forfeit part of its national territory. In the final analysis it is a question of getting the State of Israel to agree to the setting up, without any territorial annexation, of machinery for the purpose of providing sufficient guarantees for its security."*

105. I think that if after the conclusions of the Committee of African Heads of State—not only the replies given but also the conclusions as formulated by the 10 wise men—we

were to add the language I read out—and I believe that these conclusions are pertinent since it is Africa which concludes a mission on the basis of answers it has received—the Guinean delegation might perhaps, with the other sponsors and the Senegal delegation, see to what extent such an amendment could be usefully discussed.

106. It is in the light of all these problems that we believe draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, submitted by the group of 21 States, does take into account the over-all situation in the Middle East; in particular it calls upon the State of Israel to respond favourably to the initiative of Mr. Jarring so that he may finally accomplish the mission entrusted to him.

107. I would not wish to conclude without dealing with two minor points. This morning [*2015th meeting*], the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel expressed astonishment that the Guinean delegation spoke of the pressure Israel is exerting on several States. I do not find it astonishing, because it is the truth, as the Minister is well aware. Each State is in an excellent position to be well aware of that fact. I would simply ask him to refer to the text of my statement [*2010th meeting*] which, in order to save time, I do not wish to repeat. But it is clear that all States having a strong Jewish or Zionist community undergo enormous pressure from that community and are sometimes obliged fundamentally to modify a mission of their own deciding.

108. I do not want to delve into details, since I do not wish to embarrass any State, but my second point is that when the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel says that the Republic of Guinea or its representatives have thrown mud at African States, I say "No"; that is going too far. I do not see how the Guinean delegation can be said to have besmirched the African representatives. The Republic of Guinea is a member of the Organization of African Unity; it is an African State which very sincerely respects all African States and the African cause, and never from a rostrum such as this or in any other international forum will we feel obliged to deal with problems we consider internal to Africa. When we want to tell African States our views as between brothers, we shall do so. But we shall do so among ourselves, in Africa, at our meetings, never from a public rostrum. So I want it to be quite clear that the Guinean delegation has never cast aspersions on either the dignity or the representative character of any African State present here. If inadvertently that may have happened, we think it was the duty of the African delegations themselves to bring it to our attention so that we might offer—not our apologies, because we will never behave in such a manner as to have to apologize—but an explanation of our position.

109. We therefore ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel not to implicate Guinea in any fantasies. We believe this is a warning to him, because the people of Guinea never has and never will feel any resentment towards Israel.

110. We have confirmed that here, and we have maintained excellent diplomatic relations with Israel. As we have already said, we consider the Jewish people to be a martyred people that has suffered domination and exploitation, and especially persecution by European States that have also persecuted us. We Asians, Africans and Arabs have all been persecuted peoples. We welcomed Israel into our

midst, and we understood it. But when, in June 1967, it turned against the Arab States and used methods we condemn in others, the Republic of Guinea broke its diplomatic relations with Israel, and we believe that once Israel ceases to be an aggressor, once it understands the need to coexist with and understand its neighbours, perhaps then, and only then, will Guinea contemplate a new situation. But until then we wish to affirm that we are not anti-Semitic, and never will be. We are not anti-Jewish; we are anti-Zionist. That is quite different.

111. Mr. KOMATINA (Yugoslavia) (*interpretation from French*): I should like first of all to express to the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria the most heartfelt condolences of the Yugoslav delegation on the tragic death of the Foreign Minister, Ivan Bachev. We would request the Bulgarian delegation to convey to its Government and the family of the late Minister our sincerest sympathy.

112. My delegation, as a sponsor of draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, opposes, together with all the other sponsors of that draft resolution, the amendment contained in document A/L.655 and Add.1, submitted by the delegations of Barbados and Ghana.

113. Our opposition is based on both procedural and substantive considerations; in fact, the most cursory consideration of the proposed amendments suffices to show that they are not amendments in the strict sense of the word but rather a completely new draft resolution. Moreover, the paragraphs submitted as amendments are identical to draft resolution A/L.651 of 10 December, submitted by the delegation of Barbados.

114. It is more than obvious that acceptance of those amendments would completely change the content of draft resolution A/L.650, submitted by Afghanistan and a group of other countries including my own. Obviously, the sponsors of that draft cannot accept such a change, and oppose it most categorically.

115. I am wondering, incidentally, whether the procedure of presenting an entire draft resolution in the form of amendments, thus depriving the draft resolution it seeks to amend of its original meaning, is in keeping with United Nations rules and regulations and practice.

116. We believe that this procedure is absolutely counter to practice and view it as nothing more nor less than a technique to obtain priority, via the back door, for draft resolution A/L.651 and Add.1 while rendering the adoption of an adequate and realistic draft resolution more difficult.

117. On the other hand, without going into a more detailed analysis, it is more than evident that the so-called amendments say absolutely nothing of the evolution of the problem in the Middle East over this past year.

118. As is well known, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jarring, in the course of last year, in the form of an aide-mémoire, with which we are all acquainted [A/8541, annex I], took substantive action with a view to the full implementation of resolution 242 (1967), which the almost totality of United Nations

Members regard as containing the necessary elements for the peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis.

119. The amendments in question in no way take into account the attitude assumed of the parties concerned vis-à-vis the action of Mr. Jarring, the merits of which were recognized by practically all countries. As we know, the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt replied affirmatively to the aide-mémoire by assuming the specific obligations for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) and fulfilled its international duties resulting from the United Nations decisions. Despite this constructive attitude, Israel not only refuses to assume similar obligations, but even refuses to reply to Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire.

120. Were the amendments of the delegations of Barbados and Ghana [A/L.655 and Add.1] to be accepted, they would put things back where they were as if nothing had happened and would place the constructive attitude of one side on an equal footing with the negative attitude of the other. Furthermore those amendments make no mention of essential questions such as the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force or the withdrawal of troops from all occupied and other territories, which they would seek to replace by the imprecise term withdrawal which would be included in the peace treaty.

121. The amendments refer to the proposals of the Committee of African Heads of State, which was engaged in a lofty mission of peace. We have heard comments in this connexion particularly from the representatives of Zambia and Egypt. We note, moreover, that several African States, including those whose Heads of State were part of the mission of the OAU, are among the sponsors of draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2. It goes without saying that the African States are the best interpreters of the meaning of that draft resolution resulting from the OAU mission.

122. For all of the foregoing reasons, the sponsors of that draft resolution will vote against the amendments proposed by Barbados and Ghana [A/L.655 and Add.1], and hope that the majority of delegations here will do likewise.

123. The sponsors will also vote against the amendments of Senegal [A/L.656], which in fact cancel out and annul the key paragraph in the draft resolution, namely, the need for a positive reply by Israel to the Jarring aide-mémoire as an indispensable condition for the continuation of his mission. Moreover, the amendments in question do not even mention Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire, which was the universally recognized, positive culmination of his mission and constitutes an analytical evaluation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

124. In addition, the deletion of paragraph 8, as provided in the Senegalese amendments, would take away from our draft resolution another essential element, which, incidentally, only speaks of the need to implement the resolution of the Council. Without this paragraph, the draft resolution would be no more than another pious wish, and the General Assembly a recording machine for its own wishes.

125. In our view, if Israel does not respond favourably to the Jarring aide-mémoire, we do not know what will remain

to be negotiated except for the methods of annexation of the occupied territories. The General Assembly cannot disregard this fact without endangering the chances for a peaceful but lasting and durable settlement of the Middle East crisis.

126. Mr. OGBU (Nigeria): My delegation is a sponsor of draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, and I should like to say what I have said more than once from this rostrum: Nigeria has relations with both Israel and Egypt, and we make no apologies for this, because we are convinced, in our policy, that we should maintain diplomatic relations with all friendly nations.

127. I am sure that a number of delegations have today, if not earlier, received in the mail from the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations comments on that draft resolution. My delegation also listened with keen interest and attention to the remarks made by the Foreign Minister of Israel this morning [*2005th meeting*]. Referring to the opening paragraph of those comments, I must express my delegation's disappointment that those comments start with a statement that the draft resolution is sponsored by a group of States "half of whom have no relations with Israel, while all have relations with Egypt", amongst other things.

128. Since I have said that Nigeria has diplomatic relations with both Israel and Egypt, that comment does not hold water as far as Nigeria is concerned. The Nigerian Head of State participated in the OAU mission fully convinced that Nigeria could make a meaningful and useful contribution to ending the impasse that has been reached in the current session in the Middle East. Therefore, any statements, contributions, or associations with draft resolutions by the Nigerian delegation now—as in the past—should be viewed in this light. I regret that the Israeli delegation has insisted on assessing the usefulness, reliability, viability or seriousness—I repeat, "seriousness"—of Member nations in this august Assembly by whether or not they maintain diplomatic relations with Israel.

129. Israel may be a small country but it is financially very able. But as we, the permanent representatives here assembled know, the maintenance of embassies abroad is quite an expensive proposition. Therefore, I think the above-mentioned comment is unfair when applied to some developing countries which, much as they would wish to establish diplomatic relations with all other friendly countries, cannot do so because of financial hardship.

130. I recall that last year from this rostrum [*1895th meeting*] I had occasion to remind the Foreign Minister of Israel, who is an accomplished politician and an astute diplomat in his own right, that he knows better than I how best to make friends for his country. It is certainly not done by talking down to the representatives of independent, sovereign countries who represent their countries in this august Assembly and who have an equal right to do so. I say this entirely without prejudice. I repeat, we have very cordial relations with Israel.

131. Speaking strictly in terms of the draft resolution of which Nigeria is a sponsor, I know that copies of a memorandum drafted by the African Heads of State commissioned by the Organization of African Unity have

been illegally circulated. I think it is incumbent upon me to stress this point, because my Head of State was one of the 10 members of the Committee of African Heads of State which was charged with the responsibility.

132. I should also mention from this rostrum that it is a very unpleasant task for me to have to say that the representative of Barbados has thought it fit to mention that memorandum which, so far as I know, is still a classified document—irrespective of whether it has been published elsewhere, from sources we cannot as yet ascertain. But nobody can gainsay—having heard it from the representative of Barbados from this rostrum—that there is no doubt as to the origin of the document. I regret very much to have to say this because among the several other hats I have to wear is that belonging to me in my capacity as my country's representative to Barbados, with which we maintain very cordial relations.

133. In support of the draft resolution of which my delegation is a sponsor, I should like to say that, as the representative of Zambia, the current chairman of the African group of States, said on Saturday [*2014th meeting*], Africa has 41 representatives in the United Nations and, if the OAU had decided that the African group should put across a particular point of view, we are sure that the 41 African permanent representatives in the United Nations would at least have known of it and would have very competently dealt with the situation.

134. I do not think I need to add to what the representative of Zambia said on Saturday. However, from the point of view of the Nigerian delegation, we find draft resolution A/L.651, submitted by the delegation of Barbados, unacceptable. We do not want to be embarrassed, and if the delegation of Barbados wants to support the initiative by the African States or by the Heads of State of Africa, my appeal to it would be to withdraw its own draft resolution and join in sponsoring draft resolution A/L.650, of which a number of African countries that have been involved in the negotiations are sponsors. That is the logical and reasonable course to take, rather than to introduce another draft resolution that quotes—if I may say so—out of context some of the principles enunciated by the heads of State. This is extremely important to my delegation because we shall not, for our part, accept as a catalyst something that will merely simulate action.

135. I would now revert to the Israeli comments on our draft resolution. They state that the Assembly is invited to express appreciation of the efforts of the Committee of African Heads of State and yet the Assembly has never been seized officially of the conclusion to which the efforts of that Committee have led.

136. That goes to support my earlier point that, since the delegation of the Organization of African Unity which went on the mission was not in fact reporting to this august body and has not done so, any reference to it which was implied or in fact stated by the representative of Barbados is out of order.

137. My delegation feels intrigued by the comment contained on page 2 of the Israeli document referring to operative paragraph 2, namely:

"The Security Council resolution envisages a peace agreement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). This draft narrows the option to a single working document which has been a source of deadlock since February 1971. The parties have a sovereign right to reach a peace agreement on whatever terms they mutually accept. They are not limited to the sole possibility of relying on the Special Representative's aide-mémoire. An aide-mémoire does not supersede an agreed resolution."

138. My delegation finds the Israeli reference to the "agreed resolution" very interesting. Simple logic tells us that Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire should not, according to Israel, supersede the "agreed resolution", and my delegation is very interested in the fact that the Israeli delegation at this point accepts the fact that the resolution was agreed. What is the basis of Ambassador Jarring's mission and what have we been talking about all this time if Israel accepts Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the resultant effect of Ambassador Jarring's mission? Why should Israel not co-operate with that mission or whatever results therefrom, be it a questionnaire or an aide-mémoire?

139. My delegation feels a little puzzled at this and, in fact, it feels that that is the crux of the whole matter.

140. I shall not bore members with other details but I should like to refer the Assembly to the Secretary-General's report of 30 November 1971 [A/8541]. My delegation believes that the whole matter hinges on whether or not the two parties accept the recommendation made by the Secretary-General in paragraphs 21 and 27 of that report. Permit me to quote part of paragraph 21:

"In submitting my report of 5 March 1971, I commented as follows:

"'...'

"While I still consider that the situation has considerable elements of promise, it is a matter for increasing concern that Ambassador Jarring's attempt to break the deadlock has not so far been successful. I appeal, therefore, to the Government of Israel to give further consideration to this question and to respond favourably to Ambassador Jarring's initiative."

141. My delegation, being a party to a peace initiative and at this present moment concerned not so much with who is right and who is wrong as with the reactivation of the Jarring mission, will consider for incorporation in the draft resolution words to the same effect as the Secretary-General's observation in paragraph 27 of the same report:

"After recalling the responses of the United Arab Republic and Israel to Ambassador Jarring's initiative of 8 February, I said that I continued to hope—as I still do—that Israel would find it possible before too long to make a response that would enable the search for a peaceful settlement under Ambassador Jarring's auspices to continue."

142. My delegation therefore keeps an open mind, as we have heard that there might be possible helpful amend-

ments to be proposed by one or more groups of States—perhaps the Western European group and others—along the lines of paragraph 27 of that report. Therefore, in this connexion, my delegation, in a spirit of co-operation and conciliation, will be very willing to consider any such amendments to our draft resolution, provided that those who propose such amendments will vote for the draft resolution when and if their amendments are accepted by its sponsors. We had the experience last year of amending some sections of the draft resolution only to find that those who proposed the amendments at best abstained or perhaps did not participate in the vote.

143. My delegation has a very open mind. But, finally, I should like to say that, in line with past experience, I know that the various capitals of the co-sponsors are being harassed. Elbows and wrists are being twisted to induce us to forgo the stand we have taken. I have just received a telegram from Lagos containing a message from my capital. Fortunately—more so perhaps for us than for others—my instructions are quite clear. We should and we must do everything possible to ensure that the Jarring mission is reactivated. My delegation will not be in favour of anything short of this. All those who favour the initiative of the African Heads of State should either co-sponsor the draft resolution which the Africans have introduced or vote for it; or alternatively they should offer meaningful and constructive amendments, which would be considered by the co-sponsors. My delegation will be very sceptical about anything short of the reactivation of the Jarring mission.

144. Mr. DEPASSE (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): The delegations of France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Belgium have done me the honour of asking me to introduce document A/L.657, which contains a series of amendments to draft resolution A/L.650.

145. Speaking immediately after the representative of Nigeria, I can tell the Assembly that these amendments are submitted in the spirit which he indicated; in other words, the States sponsoring these amendments are willing to vote in favour of draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2 if, as we hope, it is duly amended.

146. The amendments which we propose are, of course, intended to make it possible for the Jarring mission to resume. We are presenting seven amendments. I believe they may be divided into two categories. The first few are purely stylistic. We modestly believe that there is some room for improvement in the text of the draft resolution. In addition, there are amendments of substance which we believe could make the draft resolution more balanced and which would bring it more closely into line with Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which remains the basis of the policy of States of the European Economic Community and the United Kingdom concerning the Middle East.

147. Very briefly, I should like to guide the Assembly through these amendments.

148. The first amendment has to do with the second paragraph of the preamble. It attempts to introduce an idea which was expressed in the second preambular paragraph of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) stating that the

General Assembly, like the Security Council, is pursuing a policy aimed at making it possible for every State in the area to live in security. This is what we propose should be added to that paragraph.

149. The second amendment that we propose and which has to do with the third paragraph of the preamble calls for no comment. It is editorial—I would even say virtually grammatical—in character.

150. The third amendment that we propose is one of substance. It attempts to improve, as I explained a few moments ago, the balance of the draft resolution by quoting paragraph 1 of resolution 242 (1967), which deals with the balance that must be established between the withdrawals which we are calling upon Israel to carry out and the peace undertakings which must be subscribed to by the parties. These are commitments relating to respect for "sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence within secure and recognized boundaries". This appears to us to be essential.

151. The fourth amendment is designed to show in a very clear fashion that our support goes in fact to all the efforts and initiatives of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. It is thus that we propose a text which eliminates specific reference to the aide-mémoire of 8 February—not that we do not like it, but simply because we find it is only one phase in the efforts of the Special Representative which we all support.

152. The fifth amendment is pure drafting and I shall not dwell on it.

153. The sixth amendment would ask the Secretary-General to report not only on the implementation of the present draft resolution but also on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

154. The last amendment, the seventh, relates to operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution. It proposes to replace the words "to ensure" by the words "with regard to". Actually what we are doing here is showing the respect of the General Assembly for the autonomy of the Security Council by avoiding wording which might give the impression that the General Assembly wished to impose a restriction upon the Security Council.

155. This is the very simple, straightforward presentation of the amendments of the States members of the European Economic Community and the United Kingdom which we commend to the attention of the Assembly.

156. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi), (*interpretation from French*): I believe it was Montesquieu who, in his book *De l'esprit des lois*, said that the law of peoples was naturally founded on the principle that the various nations must in peacetime treat one another in the best way possible, and in wartime do one another the least possible amount of harm.

*[The speaker continued in English.]*

157. On the basis of that principle, we think that the Assembly is not gathered here to make peace in the Middle East but to produce some constructive guidelines to help

the parties directly interested, which are the Security Council, the Secretary-General and Ambassador Jarring and all who are involved in the complexities of the issue in one way or another, so that they may pursue their course with something of a mandate and something of a consensus of the views expressed by the totality of the United Nations Members and their respective Governments.

158. My Government is not disposed to play the role of an indifferent by-stander. We are an African State. One of the directly interested parties is an African State; two indirectly involved are also from Africa. Africa is closer to the Middle East than are any of the big Powers. A conflagration in the Middle East could not leave us untouched, any more than did the Second World War, during which our country became a major battleground. But my Government is vitally concerned, as a member of the Organization of African Unity, which has taken a valiant initiative in making its contribution to the effort to break through the stubborn impasse in which we now find ourselves.

159. It will not be surprising if the position we take here coincides with those guidelines and principles which have emerged from the consultations of our African leaders with all the parties concerned. We are the more prone to adhere to their findings since they have been made on the basis of political realities, with no attempt to render judgements, and certainly with no sacrifice of the major Charter principles relevant to the issue.

160. If I may sum them up, the Organization of African Unity's conclusions support the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in particular its major dictum under the Charter barring the acquisition of territories by force of arms and conquest. That is the key principle involved. Equally sacred is the parallel principle, under the Charter of the United Nations, of the right of all States of the area, as of all other States, to sovereignty and national existence free from the threat or use of force, particularly in their capacity as States Members of the United Nations. We uphold this principle not juridically but realistically because there can be no peace in the Middle East unless it is final, total and unchallengeable; and this means that it must be a United Nations peace, underwritten and, if necessary, guaranteed by the United Nations framework.

161. Equally immutable are the rights of the Palestinian refugees and the incorporation of those rights in any peace accord.

162. To negotiate these principles between the parties, we are fully in accord with the majority of States which have from this rostrum expressed their full confidence in the good offices of the Jarring mission and the necessity that that mission be reactivated and stay reactivated, with no further breaks in what is at best a most difficult assignment. Our expression here should be not a mere vote of confidence, so to speak, in the statesmanship, patience and objectivity of Ambassador Jarring as a man: it should also signify to the parties that his mission is an integral part of the whole quest for a peace agreement and a vital provision of the ruling resolution, and that the attitude of the parties to the efforts of that mission is an acid-test of their *bona fides* in acceding to the negotiations provided for by the Council.

163. The question has been raised of the tempo of these negotiations. There seem to be two schools of thought on this, the gradualist school and the school of urgency. My delegation has no strong views on this if the parties choose to agree to a phased or total agreement. In general, however, we must note that the history of the Middle East crisis has already been protracted beyond safe limits. Its 23 years of turbulent history show that time in the Middle East does not heal, but exacerbates and has in effect spawned two wars since the first conflict in 1948. Furthermore, my delegation fears that a lazy time concept here is only producing a dangerous arms race, which itself becomes a deterrent to agreement.

164. But another factor in the timing issue is the fact that the world is now faced with still another crisis, this time on the subcontinent of India, while a new dispute in the Middle East itself has come before the Council. If this multiplication of incidents is accelerated we shall soon reach the point of paralysis and exhaustion in dealing with them. When two new wars have broken out, it is all the more urgent that the first one should be subdued as quickly as possible. For these considerations my delegation is prone to counsel negotiations with a sense of urgency.

165. My delegation will therefore support draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, which embodies those principles and which is conducive to speeding up the time when that strategic region of the world will not only be a region of peace but an example of peace and a contribution to it in other regions of our planet.

166. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): The main purpose of my intervention is to comment on the amendments just introduced by the representative of Belgium [A/L.657]. But before doing so, I wish to make some observations concerning the other amendments which are before this Assembly. However, to follow the example of my colleague and brother, the Ambassador of Nigeria, I should perhaps state for the sake of the record that the United Republic of Tanzania also maintains diplomatic relations with Israel; but that cannot under any circumstances be construed as a certificate for us to acquiesce to injustice and aggression. Tanzania has always been in the past, and will continue to be in the future, firmly and unequivocally opposed to the threat or use of force to settle disputes. We shall also never condone territorial expansionism under whatever form or disguise.

167. I think these observations are pertinent in the light of the deliberate campaign of misrepresentation and confusion designed to side-track the true motivations of the sponsors of draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, of which my country is privileged to be one of the sponsors. The sponsors have one fundamental objective in their present draft resolution, and that is, to make a serious attempt to bring about a peaceful and just solution to the serious and complex problem of the Middle East, a problem which, I believe, everyone here in this Assembly agrees poses a serious threat to international peace and security.

168. The efforts of the sponsors are geared to providing serious and effective assistance to the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Gunnar Jarring, in his role. If these efforts are to have any meaning at all, we must face

certain realities. Foremost among these is the fact that, whereas one party to the conflict, the Arab Republic of Egypt, has responded favourably to the Special Representative's peace initiative of 8 February 1971, the other party, Israel, has chosen not to give a positive reply, to put it mildly. Thus, if we are really to accomplish anything at all, then we must spare no effort to ensure that Israel does respond positively to the peace initiative. This, therefore, is the reason behind operative paragraphs 4 and particularly 5 of our draft resolution.

169. It is not sufficient to pretend that the problem does not exist. It is not sufficient to call on the representative of the Secretary-General to resume negotiations. I have here, with me, the report of the Secretary-General, which contains certain pertinent observations. The Secretary-General says:

“Ambassador Jarring has clearly defined the minimum conditions that are required to move the peace talks ahead and, until those conditions are met,”—I repeat “until those conditions are met”—“it is hard to see what else he can do to further his efforts. Steps to ensure that those conditions are met must be taken by the parties concerned and, failing this, by the Security Council itself or by States Members of the United Nations and, particularly, the permanent members of the Security Council, both because of their special responsibility within the United Nations and of their influence on the parties concerned.” [A/8541, para. 28.]

170. I do not have to go into the details of Mr. Jarring's initiative. We all know of those details, but suffice it to say that we have a situation where one party has given a reply and the other party has not found it fit to give a positive reply. In this context, my delegation, and I believe in this respect I am speaking on behalf of the co-sponsors of our draft resolution, very much regret that our brothers in Senegal have found it necessary to introduce amendments contained in document A/L.656. We believe that these amendments tend to side-track the main issue confronting the General Assembly.

171. We also believe that there is another element concerning these amendments and the proposals first submitted as a draft resolution and then as amendments by my colleague and friend, the Ambassador of Barbados.

172. With regard to the amendments in document A/L.656, circulated by the delegation of Senegal, we believe that when we refer to the replies to the memorandum which had been discussed by our respective Heads of State and Government, it is only fair to the General Assembly that the Assembly should have a complete and thorough picture of what transpired. To the best of my knowledge, the General Assembly has not discussed the memorandum and many members of this Assembly, if not most members here, I suspect, are not even aware of its contents. This is how it should be, for it is a document of the Organization of African Unity. In all propriety, the document ought first to be referred to our respective Heads of State and Government before it is made the subject of public discussion. If, however, there are those who feel very strongly that a reference should be made to the memorandum and to the replies contained in this particular

document, then it is only fair, and indeed a matter of elementary courtesy, that the record of the entire proceedings and all the relevant documents should be circulated to all the members of this Assembly. Only then will the Members of our Organization be in a position to make a proper evaluation of what really transpired. But then, if we were to do so, my delegation wonders whether such a course of action would do justice and courtesy to our respective Heads of States of the Organization of African Unity? For, as has been aptly pointed out by my colleagues, both the representative of Nigeria and the representative of Zambia [2014th meeting], this document has not yet been discussed by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government. Moreover, there are some Heads of State and Government who have not even seen the document. I wonder, therefore, whether as a matter of elementary courtesy, it would be proper for us to raise issues which are supposed to be basically first and foremost for the consumption of the Heads of State and Government of our organization in a public discussion before those Heads of State or Government have had an opportunity to discuss them.

173. In the circumstances, the Tanzanian delegation has no alternative but to reject the amendments proposed by our brothers from Senegal, whose motivation we have no reason to doubt, because these amendments do not, we believe, help in the situation which now prevails, and we would urge all the supporters of our draft resolution to reject those amendments accordingly.

174. Concerning the amendments proposed by the delegation of Barbados, in document A/L.655, I would simply reiterate the position so eloquently explained by both the delegations of Nigeria and Yugoslavia in particular. It is the submission of my delegation that these are not really amendments. In this respect we feel that, although they are presented as amendments, they really constitute a completely separate draft resolution. We would not, however, want to debate this point, and we would request you, Mr. President, in your wisdom and with your experience, to rule on this matter accordingly. If, however, you should rule that the amendments presented by the delegation of Barbados are valid, then we shall vote against them and we shall ask all the supporters of our draft resolution to reject them decisively.

175. Finally, I turn to what my delegation and those of the other sponsors consider to be a serious attempt on the part of the European States to extend fruitful co-operation in the search for peace and justice. Though I must admit we consider our draft resolution to be drafted in such a way as to reflect the most realistic appraisal of the problem before the Assembly, we do recognize the constructive spirit behind the amendments proposed by the six European States in document A/L.657. And it gives me great pleasure to declare that the sponsors of draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2 accept those amendments. We do so in a spirit of accommodation. We do so in a spirit of a genuine desire to have our resolution receive support as broadly based as possible. And we do so because we believe that those amendments have been presented in the spirit of one common objective—that is, the objective of avoiding a conflagration in the area, and restoring peace based on justice in the Middle East.

176. Mr. GAYE (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): This is the second time that I have spoken in this debate, but my purpose in both cases remains the same. I only seek the success of the mission that the Organization of African Unity has entrusted to the Committee of 10, of which my country is a member. I should like to explain once again that the mission which the Organization of African Unity entrusted to the Committee of 10 was designed to enable the Jarring negotiations to break out of the deadlock. The mission of the 10 Heads of State draws its mandate from resolution AHG/Res.66 (VIII),<sup>3</sup> adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its eighth session held in Addis Ababa from 21 to 23 June 1971.

177. On that occasion the OAU called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the occupied territories to the lines of 5 June 1967, in implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The OAU similarly expressed its support for the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to implement that resolution. In the same resolution it expressed its support for Mr. Jarring's peace initiative of 8 February 1971. The OAU entrusted the Committee of 10 with the task of opening negotiations with the Heads of State and Government to ensure the full implementation of the resolution, the essential provisions of which I have just recalled.

178. The action of the OAU Sub-Committee was essentially based on the desire to find points of agreement in order to overcome the difficulties which brought the negotiations to a standstill. The nature of that action—and I repeat this deliberately—is not to replace by new measures any of the provisions of resolution 242 (1967). Its *raison d'être*, its aim, its purpose—and on this the Assembly has already heard me speak—is the resumption of negotiations for the achievement of peace in the area, and it was to that end that contacts were established with the authorities of Egypt and the authorities of the State of Israel.

179. The OAU Committee felt that it was possible to draw from the replies of both sides a number of positive elements. I believe it is essential for me to recall them once again in order to dispel any possible misunderstanding about the work done by the Committee of 10. The first of those elements is the affirmation by both sides of their willingness for peace; the second is their renewed adherence to Security Council resolution 242 (1967); and the third element to be highlighted is the acceptance by both sides of the resumption of negotiations under the aegis of Mr. Jarring and, consequently, the implicit acceptance of indirect negotiations.

180. What difficulties has the mission encountered thus far? Essentially two: the question of the withdrawal of troops from the Arab territories occupied during the recent conflict—the very terms of resolution 242 (1967) will be recognized here—and the question of respect for the right of each of the States in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized frontiers. It was precisely that reference to secure and recognized frontiers that was linked, in the discussions that took place, to considerations

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1971*, document S/10272.

of national security. It is understandable, as I have already stated, that in a country the responsible authorities should place national defence in the forefront of their concerns; but I would add that, obviously, it must be security on both sides of the frontier. Because, we repeat, there is no question in the last analysis of either side attributing to itself the right—in the name of defence needs—of taking territory over which another State has sovereignty.

181. Before going any further, I wish to reaffirm that the memorandum has no purpose other than that of leading to the reopening of negotiations for the implementation of all the provisions of the resolution 242 (1967).

182. In truth, the resumption of such negotiations, if we study developments since their inception, leads to practically one exclusive point, namely, the favourable reply of Israel to the initiative of the Secretary-General. This is the right time and place to speak clearly. The awaited reply is the affirmation by Israel that it does not seek to annex territory. That assertion—and this is the point I wanted to make—appears in the memorandum of the Committee of 10. In other words, we must overcome every obstacle we know in order to bring about the resumption of negotiations.

183. It is exclusively in that spirit that we have submitted for consideration by the Assembly the amendments contained in document A/L.656. They merely represent our earnest desire to put an end to tensions that have lasted for too long.

184. No one can say that we are not on the eve of new confrontations if the current situation we witness continues. The permanent representative of France to the United Nations in the course of his intervention launched an appeal that deserves emphasis: “There is no momentary weakness that does not in the long run find the energy and the resources for revenge” [2012th meeting, para. 124].

185. The whole drama is there, and the best means of avoiding such extremes is the establishment of peace in the Middle East. That is the reason for the amendments proposed in document A/L.656, which seek nothing more than the resumption of negotiations for the implementation of all the provisions of the Security Council resolution.

186. Mr. TRAORE (Mali) (*interpretation from French*): Draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, presented by 21 countries including my own, is based essentially on certain considerations regarding the explosive situation prevailing in the Middle East and is intended to permit the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jarring, to continue his delicate mission for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

187. The preamble, which is self-explanatory, expresses our concern at the serious state of war prevailing in the Middle East, especially since June 1967. As was so aptly pointed out by the Secretary-General in his report of 30 November 1971 [A/8541], this explosive situation may at any time lead to a conflagration that might spread beyond the limits of that region of the world.

188. The two paragraphs that follow are explained by Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and General Assem-

bly resolution 2734 (XXV). The second paragraph of draft resolution A/L.650 therefore expresses the virtual unanimity of the membership of the United Nations on the fact that the correct application of the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) offers real possibilities for returning to a just and honourable peace in the Middle East. There can therefore be no challenge or no reservations to such an affirmation.

189. The third paragraph of the preamble to the draft resolution complements the previous one. The conviction that peace could be restored to the Middle East through the application of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) would be more than ever evident if Israel showed itself as willing as the Arab Republic of Egypt to seek a just and honourable solution to the crisis. The references to one of the fundamental principles of the Charter, on the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by means of war, and to General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV) lend that paragraph a general and universal character.

190. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble, the sponsors wished to pay a tribute to the peace initiative of the African Heads of State and Government, an initiative that resulted in sending to Israel and Egypt a mission of illustrious Heads of State to help create conditions favourable for the reactivation of the Jarring mission. That initiative eloquently shows the attachment of African leaders to the cause of peace.

191. But these efforts, like all those made both by the United Nations Secretariat as well as on a bilateral basis, can be of no real significance if they do not flow from the international community's constant desire to eliminate the aftermath of Israel's aggression of 1967 against its Arab neighbours. The occupation of the Arab territories, which has lasted four years, is surely one of the most disturbing sequels of that crisis.

192. The fifth paragraph of the preamble has no purpose other than to express that concern.

193. It is in the light of these preambular paragraphs, whose logic is unassailable, that the operative part of our draft resolution should be viewed.

194. The provisions of paragraph 1 are known to the General Assembly. The evacuation by Israel of all the Arab territory it has occupied since June 1967 flows logically from the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, a principle enshrined in Article 2 of the Charter, Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV).

195. This condition constitutes a prerequisite to any settlement of the crisis. It is not sufficient merely to proclaim one's desire for peace, and the pursuit of peace from positions of strength appears to us shaky, to say the least.

196. Operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution contained in document A/L.650 merely request the Secretary-General to reactivate the Jarring mission with a view to implementing Security Council resolution 242 (1967). But we are aware that the success of that mission depends upon

the genuine desire to co-operate of the parties to the conflict.

197. For its part, the Arab Republic of Egypt has willingly accepted entering into such co-operation. Operative paragraph 4 expresses gratitude to it for that.

198. The delegation of Mali, on 8 December 1971, expressed in the General Assembly /2006th meeting/ its profound regret at the refusal of Israel to respond favourably to the various proposals of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General mentions that fact in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization in the following terms:

"The United Arab Republic accepted the specific commitments requested of it, but so far Israel has not responded to the Special Representative's request. Ambassador Jarring feels, and I agree with him, that, until there has been a change in Israel's position on the question of withdrawal, it would serve little purpose to attempt to reactivate the talks." [A/8401/Add.1, para. 219.]

199. Our draft resolution has no purpose other than to attempt to reactivate the Jarring mission. The preliminary condition for this is thus well known to us. It will not be possible to ask the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to reactivate any talks in the dark, when he has already given us a clear and precise opinion about the conditions for the resumption of these talks. According to him, indeed, the *sine qua non* for the resumption of the mission is that Israel respond favourably to the aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 [A/8541, annex I]. I am convinced that the General Assembly will agree with this logic.

200. Operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution derives from the previous provisions contained both in resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council and also pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly.

201. As will be seen, by adopting this draft resolution, the General Assembly would merely help the Secretary-General and the Special Representative in the delicate mission that has been entrusted to them in accordance with resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council.

202. Our draft resolution merely appeals to Israel to respond favourably to the aide-mémoire. To make the blanket appeal to both parties when one of them has already responded would seem to us biased.

203. We have no doubt that the universal conscience has grasped the gravity of the situation in the Middle East. The draft resolution which we submit for the Assembly's attention, based on acknowledged facts, has no other goal but to reactivate the Jarring mission. It is because we are convinced of the fact that time is working against the restoration of a just and honourable peace in the Middle East that we are proposing this draft resolution.

204. As was so well stated by the Chairman of the African group, Mr. Mwaanga of Zambia, it would not be courteous or respectful for our Assembly to take up a document of

the Organization of African Unity which has not yet been sanctioned by the Heads of African States, for whose benefit it was drawn up. Some of them, as a matter of fact, have not even received it.

205. Without wishing to anticipate the final decision of the African Heads of State concerning this, the realism that has always characterized the actions of the Assembly and the fruitful and excellent relations that exist between the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations are such that it would not be proper to refer to this document at the present stage in our debate. The Organization of African Unity will of course not fail to bring the matter before the United Nations, as it did in the case of the Manifesto on Southern Africa adopted at Lusaka, as soon as the document has been given its final form. The fact that this document has been published by press agencies and circulated by those who wish to create confusion in no way detracts from the confidential character that we have conferred upon it.

206. The delegation of the Republic of Mali is assured in advance that the Assembly will fully appreciate the evil role that it is being induced to play and that in the final analysis its customary vigilance and its realism will not be found wanting.

207. Draft resolution A/L.651, presented by Barbados, will have to be considered in the light of these considerations. Actually, we find it difficult to understand how a draft resolution can be submitted to the General Assembly and on the next day be presented as an amendment to another draft resolution, because in fact—and Members of the United Nations have already noted as much—draft resolution A/L.651 and the amendments in document A/L.655 are one and the same text.

208. Lastly, the Assembly has just received the amendments in document A/L.657, presented by Belgium on behalf of the States members of the European Economic Community and the United Kingdom. As much as we reject the other amendments to our text, so in these amendments we find many positive points that we would wish to consider with the sponsors.

209. Mr. WALDRON-RAMSEY (Barbados): The representative of Nigeria, in his earlier intervention, introduced elements of heavy innuendo which, as nothing else but a lawyer, I find inadmissible and contentious. Now, I shall not dwell on the elements which gave rise to this noxious expedient, but I would want to address, for the serious consideration of the representative of Nigeria, through you, Mr. President, a few questions which I think might assist the Assembly in getting at a proper understanding of the ephemeral element which certain delegations would have the Assembly seize upon while losing sight of the substance, the quintessence of the problem, which is properly before this august Assembly.

210. The first question I would like to put to the representative of Nigeria—and in this connexion I couple the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania with respect to the direction of these questions—is this: Are the proposals contained in the memorandum of the African Presidents in fact the recommendations of the African

Presidents? Secondly, are those recommendations of the African Presidents bad in themselves; that is, irrespective of the authorship or the sponsorship of the recommendations? Thirdly, are the recommendations of the African Presidents calculated to maintain the fragile cease-fire in the area under discussion, and are they calculated to reactivate the negotiations under the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Gunnar Jarring? Can the delegations of Nigeria, or Tanzania for that matter, vote against those recommendations of the African Presidents—I say “vote against the recommendations of the African Presidents”—because they are bad in themselves? I shall repeat this: Can the delegations of Nigeria and Tanzania vote against the recommendations of the African Presidents to the Governments of Israel and Egypt because those recommendations are bad in themselves? If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, if the answer is yes, I shall return to this podium and withdraw my amendments—of course, assuming that the Government of Ghana, which now also sponsors my amendments *[A/L.655 and Add.1]* and the draft resolution which stands in our names *[A/L.651 and Add.1]*, agrees to this procedure. Of course, if Ghana is not considered an African Government or an African State, another issue arises.

211. The fifth question I want to put to my distinguished brothers of Nigeria and Tanzania is this: Do the delegations of Nigeria and Tanzania oppose the amendments of Senegal as well? In this connexion, I should like to observe that the delegation of Senegal was formerly a sponsor of draft resolution A/L.650; but my delegation notes that Senegal—whose illustrious President, incidentally, was the Chairman of the Sub-Committee of Four which went to the Middle East—has withdrawn from sponsorship of the text in document A/L.650 and, on its own, has submitted amendments to that text *[A/L.656]*.

212. What are those amendments? What is the purport of those amendments? As far as my delegation is concerned, the second Senegalese amendment could suffice as the only procedural draft resolution which could get us out of this impasse.

213. What does that amendment say? I shall read it. The amendment would replace operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of document A/L.650, the contentious paragraphs, by this single formulation:

“Notes with satisfaction the replies given by Egypt and Israel to the memorandum of the Committee of African Heads of State and considers the replies”—and this is significant—“sufficiently positive to make possible a resumption of the Special Representative’s mission”.

214. Now I cannot, of course, speak for Ghana in these matters; but speaking for Barbados I am quite prepared to withdraw the amendments and the draft resolution which stand in my name, if the amendment submitted by Senegal will constitute essentially the body of the procedural resolution that will come from this Assembly.

215. I agree that I tend to be fastidious in these legalistic matters, but I wonder if my colleagues who question in such plenitude the receivability of the proposals of the African Presidents consider what Senegal has formally done

here. In its amendment, Senegal is speaking about the replies given by Egypt and Israel to the memorandum of the Committee of African Heads of State. Is that not a formal introduction to the proceedings before this Assembly of the memorandum of African States? Is Senegal an African State? Was the President of Senegal a participant in the Sub-Committee of Four which went on a journey of peace to the Middle East?

216. One cannot, on the one hand, say the document is not admissible and, on the other, admit it. For a positive vote on the Senegalese amendment *ipso facto* is a vote for the receivability of the document of the Committee of African Heads of State in all formal proceedings.

217. And while I am touching on this quasi-legalistic point, I should like to say that, although I did not hear the entire intervention of my colleague and friend from Tanzania—because a mutual colleague and friend was at that very time imploring us to try to draft together with him a new text which might prevent the 13 African States from having even to abstain on the amendments submitted by Ghana and Barbados—I heard enough of his statement to gain the understanding that he was indicating to the President that the amendments which stand in the names of Ghana and Barbados in document A/L.655 and Add.1 were in fact not a series of amendments but in themselves a draft resolution; and that he was asking the President, under some specious, ephemeral rule of procedure, to so rule. That line of argumentation has no *locus standi* either in logic or in the rules of procedure which we employ.

218. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote before the vote. Representatives will also be given an opportunity to explain their votes after all the votes have been taken on the draft proposals under this item.

219. There are 11 names inscribed on the list of speakers for explanations of votes. I would like to appeal to delegations to limit voluntarily their interventions to five minutes so as to make it possible for the General Assembly to proceed to the vote at this meeting.

220. Mr. FACK (Netherlands): I want to explain briefly the vote of the Netherlands delegation on draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, with the changes accepted by the sponsors.

221. As I said in my statement before this Assembly on 9 December *[2009th meeting]*, it is, in the opinion of my delegation, hard to see, in view of the delicate balance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), how this Assembly can make a constructive contribution of its own. I also explained our constitutional doubts in this respect with regard to the provisions of Article 12 of the Charter, and I concluded that perhaps a simple appeal to the parties to resume the Jarring talks on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) would be the answer. Essentially, we are still of that opinion.

222. In its original form draft resolution A/L.650, although containing some constructive elements in its basic conception, tended to distort Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Therefore it could not have obtained the affirmative vote of my delegation.

223. In its revised form the draft resolution is still far from perfect, but at least it indicates that the only possible point of departure for a solution is Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in its entirety. In such a context we feel that an appeal to the parties to co-operate with the Special Representative, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, is not out of place. The operative paragraph appealing to Israel to respond favourably to Ambassador Jarring's initiative is, in our view, worded in an unfortunate manner. The text could conceivably be interpreted as setting a distinct pre-condition for the resumption of negotiations.

224. My delegation wishes to stress that such a prejudicial interpretation cannot be accepted. In our view the text should be read to mean that the General Assembly appeals to Israel, as the Secretary-General put it in his report [A/8541], to make a response to the Special Representative's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 that would enable the search for a peaceful settlement under the auspices of the Special Representative to continue.

225. On that understanding the Netherlands delegation, having consistently supported the efforts of Mr. Jarring, will cast its vote in favour of draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, as revised by the incorporation of the amendments of the six European States [A/L.657].

226. Mr. BEAULNE (Canada) (*interpretation from French*): The Canadian Government is convinced that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) is still the best available support for efforts to bring about a comprehensive and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East. Hence, the Canadian delegation had earnestly hoped that the debate just concluded would produce recommendations broadly acceptable to both parties, which could have given fresh and positive impetus to Ambassador Jarring's mission. In this hope we had been encouraged by the constructive endeavours of the recent mission to the Middle East of the distinguished Heads of State of four African countries, acting for the Organization of African Unity.

227. My delegation has closely examined the draft resolutions before the Assembly and the amendments with a view to assessing their potential for furthering the progress of peace talks. We regret that there is no text which we could honestly support as a realistic and clear-sighted point of departure for renewed peace talks.

228. A more positive outcome would have emerged from both parties displaying more willingness to move forward from fixed positions which have been the root of the long-standing impasse. This essential measure of flexibility has been lacking. Consequently, our deliberations will apparently not lead to the discussions which are so urgently needed.

229. Nevertheless, efforts must be made through increasingly substantive exchanges to facilitate the elaboration of a peace agreement. Such a settlement will not necessarily depend on the outcome of the Assembly's deliberations. However, the framework for a peaceful settlement, and adequate machinery for elaborating its terms, remain intact and open to both parties in the form of resolution 242 (1967) and the Jarring mission.

230. There is, in the view of my delegation, no valid reason why an attempt to reach agreement should not be made immediately after this debate. Renewed dedication of the parties to this task, with the extensive help available to them, could offer new opportunities for peace.

231. Mr. HSIUNG (China) (*translated from Chinese*): In our statement on 8 December [2006th meeting], the Chinese delegation stated the principled stand of the Chinese Government on the Middle East question.

232. Draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, on the Middle East question, has failed to condemn United States imperialism for its support of the Israeli Zionist aggression against the Arab countries and people and has failed to mention that the just national rights of the Palestinian people must be restored.

233. Therefore, the Chinese delegation cannot but state with regret that we shall abstain in the vote on that draft resolution. However, this does not in the least mean that China is not in favour of Israeli withdrawal from all the territories it occupied during the war of June 1967, as called for by the draft resolution. On the contrary, the Chinese Government has consistently held that Israel must immediately and unconditionally withdraw from all the Arab territories it has occupied and that only when it has done so can there be any talk about a reasonable settlement of the Middle East question.

234. I also wish to state that the Chinese delegation opposes the other two draft resolutions and amendments concerning the situation in the Middle East.

235. Mr. AKE (Ivory Coast) (*interpretation from French*): The delegation of the Ivory Coast, which has not participated in the debate on the item, wishes to make a short statement to explain the vote it will cast on the draft resolutions now before the General Assembly.

236. On 28 April last, President Houphouët-Boigny stated:

“The Ivory Coast is neither with Israel against the Arabs nor with the Arabs against Israel. The Ivory Coast is for lasting peace in the Middle East. Profoundly attached to peace, we in the Ivory Coast are not only hopeful but are also trying to work with all our strength to restore peace in the Middle East—a peace which is dear to us all as men, as Africans and also, and especially, as believers.”

237. It was therefore animated by a sincere desire to restore a just and lasting peace in the Middle East that President Houphouët-Boigny, responding to the kind and brotherly invitation of Mr. Ould Daddah, the President of Mauritania and the current President of the Organization of African Unity, agreed to be a member of the Committee of African Heads of State charged by the Organization of African Unity with helping to find a peaceful solution to the Middle Eastern conflict.

238. Although his numerous duties and his health did not allow him to participate personally in the meetings which took place in Kinshasa and Dakar, he nevertheless followed the work with interest and has supported the efforts made

by his colleagues and in particular by the Heads of State of Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire, the members of the Sub-Committee of Four that held direct contacts with Egypt and Israel in order to find a common ground which would make it possible for the Jarring mission to be reactivated. It was in full agreement with his colleagues, therefore, that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ivory Coast affixed his signature to the memorandum of the Committee of African Heads of State addressed to the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Prime Minister of Israel.

239. The mission of the wise men of Africa was essentially a peace mission, designed not to replace Mr. Jarring, but on the contrary to facilitate the resumption of his mission—which is again at an impasse as it has been for several months—and especially to give support to his efforts to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which constitutes a reasonable basis for the peaceful settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict.

240. The difficulties encountered thus far by Mr. Jarring and his mission derive essentially from fundamental divergencies between the two parties with respect to the priorities to be given to the fundamental principles contained in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the respective commitments to be subscribed to by them with a view to the effective and total implementation of that resolution, which they have agreed to apply in its entirety and to which we give our full support as before.

241. It is in this context that we must view the peace initiative of Mr. Jarring as contained in his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 [*A/8541, annex I*], in which he invited Egypt and Israel to make, on the basis of reciprocity and under certain conditions, certain prior and simultaneous commitments, designed to achieve, on the one hand, the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the occupied territory and, on the other, the conclusion of a peace treaty.

242. These difficulties have, as a matter of fact, not escaped the attention of the Heads of State and they, after a careful study of all the aspects of the situation and the answers to the pertinent questions which had been put to the two parties, came to encouraging conclusions with respect to the resumption of negotiations under the aegis of Mr. Jarring, whose initiative they support as a positive contribution to the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

243. In their respective answers of 23 and 28 November 1971<sup>4</sup> to the memorandum of the Heads of State, the Governments of Egypt and Israel accepted the recommendations of the Heads of State. In particular they agreed to resume direct negotiations, under the aegis of Mr. Jarring and in the framework of resolution 242 (1967), to achieve a peace agreement. This acceptance by both parties seems to us to be important, and indeed essential. Indeed, as is recognized by numerous delegations which have intervened in this debate, the memorandum of the Heads of State of Africa contains extremely positive and constructive ele-

ments on the basis of which we believe Mr. Jarring could resume his mission or which could be effectively utilized by him.

244. The memorandum, while being conciliatory towards the positions of both parties, contains suggestions which could have been used as a basis for the preparation of a draft resolution omitting any element of controversy between the parties and inviting the parties to resume negotiations without any prior conditions for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

245. We regret most sincerely that the African members of the Committee who were responsible for a peace mission were unable or did not even attempt to come to an agreement on a draft resolution which would be in accord with the mission entrusted to them and which would take up the pertinent recommendations which they had made to the parties concerned.

246. Our goal is to work for a peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East and the restoration of a just and lasting peace in the region. We do not think it serves any useful purpose to espouse the position of one side or the other; on the contrary we should seek solutions with an objective approach while remaining firm on essential principles.

247. By requiring that Israel not only respond to the aide-mémoire of Mr. Jarring but respond positively we are not simply trying to humiliate that Government and to complicate things and to prevent a resumption of Mr. Jarring's mission. We therefore fear that draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, regardless of its merits and the motives of its authors, might create additional difficulties and might undermine the efforts made by the African Heads of State to reconcile the views of the parties concerned. In addition the adoption of that draft would be tantamount to denying the constructive work accomplished by the Committee of African Heads of State.

248. We wish to contribute to finding a peaceful solution to the Middle Eastern conflict—not a diplomatic victory, which, although it would certainly have its importance in such a situation, is of no real interest to us because it would not bring us any closer to our goal, which is to reach a solution of the problem.

249. Since the two parties have indicated that they would be prepared to enter into indirect negotiations under the aegis of Mr. Jarring, it is our duty to encourage them to resume such negotiations. We must avoid getting bogged down in situations which might once again paralyse our efforts and cause us to be caught short by a resumption of hostilities, the consequences of which are barely conceivable in view of the military potential accumulated by the parties concerned.

250. The memorandum of the African Heads of State provides an opportunity for getting the Jarring negotiations out of their deadlock. Let us grasp this opportunity which has presented itself for it could lead us further on the difficult road—to peace and justice in the Middle East.

251. The Ivory Coast, a member of the Committee of 10, is distressed that draft resolution A/L.650 makes only a

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1971, documents S/10443 and S/10438.

passing reference to the important and constructive work accomplished by that Committee, because it believes that the Committee still has a part to play, discreet though it may be, and will abstain on this draft resolution in order to allow the Committee full freedom of action.

252. However, if the amendments presented by the Senegal delegation [A/L.656], whose Head of State has played an extremely useful role in the mission and in the elaboration of the memorandum, were to be accepted by the sponsors of draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, my delegation might reconsider its position in view of the fact that these amendments contribute to eliminating the controversial and biased material which mar the draft resolution. Otherwise, my delegation would ask, under rule 91 of the rules of procedure, that operative paragraph 5 of that draft be put to the vote separately. My delegation cannot support such a provision which is so patently at variance with the memorandum of the African Heads of State.

253. Mr. ESPINOSA (Colombia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Colombian delegation once again expresses its full impartiality in this lengthy Middle East conflict and reiterates its respect for the rights of the Arab States and of Israel.

254. We had already on other occasions stated our support for Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which, because of the spirit of justice and equity that pervades it, we regard as the essential basis for peace in that part of the world, which is so rich in past glory and history and today so tormented by painful conflict, the solution of which we have been seeking in vain.

255. In compliance with his mandate Ambassador Jarring has laboured with devotion and faith worthy of greater success than that achieved thus far. No one has sought to undermine his authority, but rather to strengthen it. The primary objective pursued by the action of the United States Secretary of State was to reactivate that mission on the basis of an interesting initiative. The cautious and very wise suggestions of the Committee of African Heads of State also tends to facilitate the resumption of his work and shows unequivocally that there is not a single road to peace; rather we should devise several possible courses and tread daringly along those paths.

256. In my delegation's view, similar purposes were behind the debate that is about to conclude—that is, to revitalize the Jarring mission and create the necessary conditions that will enable it in this new stage to move forward rapidly towards the achievement of the aims and purposes of Council resolution 242 (1967)—of all its goals, without any discrimination whatsoever, and, if possible, concomitantly.

257. I am gratified to acknowledge, in all honesty and justice, the very worthy efforts made by those who have placed draft resolutions before us for our consideration. They have all endeavoured, to the best of their ability, to preserve the harmonious balance of resolution 242 (1967), whose principles have been universally accepted.

258. In the draft resolution sponsored by some of the Latin-American delegations [A/L.652/Rev.1] we readily

find a reflection of the juridical traditions that have characterized our part of the world throughout its historical development. May I be permitted, therefore, to pay a tribute to those delegations for their concern and for their skill.

259. However, the draft resolution that will be put to the vote first will be quite different, since it was submitted before the others. I am referring here to draft resolution A/L.650, submitted by Afghanistan and other States.

260. This draft resolution doubtless implies a desire for peace. In its preamble and operative paragraphs it appropriately mentions several subjects and includes principles such as the inadmissibility of acquiring territories by force—a principle that has constantly prevailed in the legal thinking and in the laws of Latin America; the principle of the peaceful settlement of conflicts, which we have always supported; and the principle of the political independence of States, which is the very *raison d'être* of our republican life.

261. I must point out quite frankly that there were lacking certain assertions and nuances which, fortunately, were included, in part, in the amendments proposed by Belgium and other Western European countries [A/L.657]. Those amendments corrected much of the imbalance that my delegation had noted in draft resolution A/L.650, wherein, for instance, no reference was made to the concept of "secure and recognized boundaries". Nobody is unaware of the fact that that concept is the very corner-stone of council resolution 242 (1967). Neither was anything said about the termination of situations of belligerency which prevent millions of human beings from living in peace.

262. Unfortunately, there is still much to add. The ideal would have been to merge draft resolution A/L.650 and the European amendments thereto with the Latin American draft resolution. Since that was not possible, however, the Colombian delegation, despite its reservations, particularly in regard to operative paragraph 5 and 8 of draft resolution A/L.650, will none the less vote in favour of it together with the amendments proposed by the European States, in the hope that new opportunities will thus be opened for Ambassador Jarring to resume his mission within the irreplaceable framework of resolution 242 (1967), and that the States that are at war—Israel and the Arab countries—will achieve a just and equitable peace that will enable them not only to live without fear, but also to co-operate in vast undertakings of collective enterprise for the benefit of both Arabs and Israelis.

263. Now that another bloody struggle has broken out in the world, we must bend another effort so that the tragic and recurrent Middle East conflict may find a satisfactory solution. We do not seek to do the impossible. The Jewish and Arab peoples, who have added so many pages of glory to the history of mankind, deserve a better fate than the tragic and cruel destiny of destroying each other. Those who have made great achievements in science, the arts and politics have the right, even the obligation, to go on living in order to bring about a beneficial peace that will enable them once again to astound the peoples of the world with the admirable fruits of their ingenuity.

264. The delegation of Colombia expresses its most fervent desire for peace between Israel and the Arab States, which have fought so bravely for so many years.

265. Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait): It is incumbent upon me to take the floor at this time to explain the views of my Government concerning draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2 before the voting takes place.

266. Since the Israeli aggression of 1967, my delegation has refrained from casting an affirmative vote on any draft resolution based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The reasons that deter my delegation from voting in favour of such draft resolutions emanate from my Government's assessment of some preambular and operative paragraphs of that resolution.

267. First, that resolution links the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories to certain political-juridical requirements placed upon the Arab countries concerned. That means that the absolute obligation to withdraw is made conditional. In my Government's view, that constitutes a dangerous precedent in international relations, inasmuch as it rewards the aggressor and might encourage the resort to force.

268. Second, my Government believes that paragraph 2(b) of that resolution, which reads as follows: "For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem", is ambiguously worded and inadequate to fulfil the aspirations of the people of Palestine.

269. The General Assembly, at its twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth and current sessions, has adopted resolutions which fully recognize the inalienable rights and the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian Arab people, including its right to, and aspirations for, self-determination.

270. The General Assembly has emphatically declared that full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace [*resolution 2672 C (XXV)*]. It is only when it is interpreted in this context that the phrase "a just settlement of the refugee problem" can be acceptable to my Government.

271. My Government believes, as many of you here do, that the problem of Palestine will not be solved unless the Palestinians exercise their inalienable right to self-determination, in accordance with the aforementioned resolutions of the General Assembly. Peace will reign in our area only when the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people are taken into account.

272. The second paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution states:

*"Convinced that the immediate implementation of all the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 provides for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East".*

273. In the view of my Government, the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) does not, unfortunately, provide for a just and durable peace in our area

unless the paragraph concerning the "just settlement of the refugee problem" is interpreted in the context of the resolutions of the General Assembly that recognize the right to self-determination for the Palestinian people. I want to put on record that Kuwait accepts this paragraph on the understanding that it means the self-determination of the Palestinian people.

274. Kuwait will cast an affirmative vote in favour of the draft resolution, which is based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967), bearing in mind that my Government is not a party, either directly or indirectly, involved in the progress of the implementation of the resolution.

275. Notwithstanding my Government's reservations on resolution 242 (1967), which are still valid, my delegation will cast a favourable vote on the draft resolution for two main reasons.

276. First, the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force; this is a principle which my Government strictly observes and respects. It is a principle which, if scrupulously maintained, will undoubtedly enhance international security, and entrench the ideals of the United Nations Charter in the minds of the present generation and set a criterion for solid and fruitful international relations.

277. On this principle we cannot afford to falter. In our understanding, as in the understanding of the overwhelming majority of this august body, Israel should withdraw from all the territories occupied after 4 June 1967.

278. Secondly, my Government believes that the Arab countries whose territories were flagrantly occupied in 1967 have the right to choose the means by which they can restore and regain their occupied territories. If these Arab countries still nurse the hope that their occupied territories can be restored by peaceful means, through United Nations efforts, my Government will support that attitude.

279. As regards the other draft resolutions, in documents A/L.651 and Add.1 and A/L.652/Rev.1, and the Barbados-Ghana amendments in document A/L.655 and Add.1, my delegation will vote against these texts as they overlook the basic facts in the conflict.

280. The amendments of Belgium and some other Western European countries [A/L.657] evoke the same reservations my Government maintains in regard to draft resolution A/L.650 since the European amendments are based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967). However, in view of the acceptance of the amendments of the Western European States by the sponsors of the draft resolution, my delegation will support them.

281. Mr. EBAN (Israel): I have already explained [*2015th meeting*] the reasons for Israel's intention to vote against the texts submitted by Afghanistan and a number of other States in document A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2. Indeed, the multiplicity of the alternative draft resolutions and amendments submitted to the General Assembly reflects what is obviously a wide-spread, legitimate and well-founded dissatisfaction with that text.

282. I also had occasion to commend the thoughtful proposals made in the name of Barbados and Ghana and by

Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti and Uruguay. I believe that these amendments and draft resolutions embody a logic which will become inexorable, namely, the logic in favour of negotiation to which the doors must be opened wide, instead of negotiation to which the doors must be narrowed down or closed by being rigorously subjected to a single document which has been a source and a focus of deadlock for 10 months. I am certain that, as the weeks and months pass, the logic of the proposals made by these six States will recommend itself more and more as reflecting the basic ethic and principle of free negotiation.

283. In the meantime new texts have been proposed in the form of amendments submitted by the delegation of Senegal [A/L.656] and a series of amendments submitted by Belgium and other West European States [A/L.657].

284. The proposal submitted by Senegal is important in itself. It also has a special authority in that it emanates from the Government the Head of which conducted and led the African initiative which, during the past few weeks, has engaged the hopes and the imagination of peace-loving people across the whole of the Middle East. It seems to me that it would be paradoxical if, having obtained affirmative responses to a set of proposals fully within the letter and spirit of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), the General Assembly were to refuse its consent. I feel that the General Assembly, for the sake of its own prestige, would be well advised not to appear to prefer deadlocks to solutions. The Senegal amendments make a solution possible. They are based on the fact that proposals have been made to which a degree of acceptance has been given which has not been given to other documents.

285. I am not able to follow the representatives of Nigeria and the United Republic of Tanzania in their reluctance to have the memorandum of the Heads of African States alluded to at all. First of all, this memorandum is alluded to even in their own draft resolution [A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2]. In the second place let us look at the political realities. In recent weeks, when all other activities were at a virtual standstill, there took place this hopeful initiative: two visits to Israel, two visits to Egypt, lengthy and detailed discussions, consultation between the representatives of 10 Heads of State in Dakar. And out of this activity there arose a memorandum which does not have the occult character ascribed to it, partly because it has been published verbatim in the Egyptian newspaper *Al Ahram*, as well as in certain newspapers in Africa. It has also been submitted quite officially and without any classification to the Governments concerned as a memorandum from the Committee of African Heads of State—the Committee of 10—to Mr. Anwar El-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and to Madame Golda Meir, Prime Minister of the State of Israel.

286. This memorandum does not contain the material to which the Permanent Representative of Egypt referred this morning [*2015th meeting*]. But if he thinks there has been selective quotation, why does he not take the whole of the memorandum and, on the basis of the replies given thereto, agree to make it the basis for a renewal of the Jarring peace mission. At the end of all this activity, the Prime Minister of Israel, like the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, is addressed quite formally and with signatures by the

Heads of State, with recommendations which are accurately embodied in the amendments and draft resolution submitted by Barbados and Ghana.

287. The Heads of State conclude:

"The Heads of State, members of the OAU Committee, are of the view that these suggestions reconcile the essentials in the respective positions of the two parties. They rely on their being accepted by the Israeli and Egyptian authorities, whose yearning for peace was clearly manifested. They earnestly appeal to the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and to the Prime Minister of the State of Israel to accept these suggestions and thereby allow the resumption of the Jarring negotiations and the establishment in that region of a just peace, which they wish to be lasting, as between brothers."

288. Many people, as well as future historians, will be puzzled that the General Assembly shows reluctance in attributing importance to the fact that Israel, despite its reservations on many of these concrete proposals, accepts this as the occasion and starting-point for renewing discussions, and that so many who have spoken here prefer instead to adhere rigidly to previous working papers which, with the best of intentions and with all their catalytic effects, have in fact for nearly 10 months been a source of deadlock.

289. Why not try something else? Why not open a new door? If old methods and devices and documents have not served their purpose, why not try new ones? Is one ever likely to solve a conflict of this kind without a spirit of versatility and innovation and empiricism, without a spirit which says that the aim is so important that if one approach to it has not succeeded we shall not sink down in eternal despair but shall seek another way, equally consistent with the general principles which inspire and animate the international community?

290. There should not be here a situation or a condition of either organizational or institutional patriotism, or of a monopoly of concern. With one single aim, the road to peace must be approached by many, many avenues until, in the final resort, the ice is broken and the deadlock is resolved.

291. I therefore repeat that the Senegal amendments are important amendments. They would have the effect of enabling us immediately to continue co-operation with the Jarring mission, in an affirmative spirit and with good hope of success. They would also be an encouragement to such initiatives as those voluntarily assumed by the Committee of African Heads of State and its Sub-committee of Four. Alternatively, not to vote for the amendments would in effect be to refuse endorsement of the most deliberate, prudent and statesmanlike initiative that has been taken in recent weeks and months. What is at stake, therefore, is the General Assembly's capacity to endorse and reward thoughtful initiatives and to seek new avenues when old ones have become blocked. Why should there be a repudiation of such an effort, or of those who have undertaken it? Why should there not be encouragement for the maintenance of this effort, and of others in the future?

292. I should like to point out, in reference to statements that have been made by African representatives, that draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2 is not sponsored by the group of countries to which the 10 members of the Committee of African Heads of State, or even the four members of the visiting sub-committee, belong, and the statements made in that connexion by the representatives of Zaire (*2010th meeting*) and the Ivory Coast merit great thought. When a representative of an African Government speaks of that draft resolution as containing elements of controversy and partiality, I believe that those remarks deserve careful and constructive consideration. Therefore there ought not to be any hesitation about adopting the Senegal amendments which would have a very marked effect on my Government's attitude and on its capacity immediately to initiate the resumption of fruitful talks.

293. I would only say in reply to the remarks made this morning by the Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt, first, that the memorandum was published in his country and that I published my reply to the six points with the explicit consent of the chairman of the visiting sub-committee. In any case, it is a fact of historic importance, whatever the arithmetical outcome may be, that African and Latin American States have sincerely sought here to break the deadlock arising from the difficulties of prior commitment, and that they have preferred negotiation itself to any particular documentary framework for negotiation. This is a political fact which endures, and I repeat that the Senegal amendments [*A/L.656*], the Barbados-Ghana draft resolution [*A/L.651 and Add.1*] and the draft resolution presented by the four Latin American States [*A/L.652/Rev.1*] would all be important contributions to the resumption of an active peace effort. Therefore, every vote for those documents would be a vote for active negotiations, for agreement and for peace—and I say that in the full knowledge that none of them gives full endorsement to many things that my Government considers necessary, though their over-all effect would be in the direction which I have mentioned.

294. The amendments proposed by the European delegations [*A/L.657*] do not have a similar unfreezing effect. I believe I understand the motives which underlie the substantive amendments, chiefly the feeling that the original draft was unsatisfactory in its balance. The seventh amendment pertaining to paragraph 8 of draft resolution A/L.650 is salutary as far as it goes, since it abandons any hint of enforcement, but that paragraph had very little life in it even before. The third amendment makes it clear that the only United Nations jurisprudence is the literal text of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

295. The fourth amendment, which would omit from paragraph 3 the reference to the *side-mémoire* of 8 February, would have been of decisive importance if the authors had carried this logic through in the ensuing paragraphs. In order to open the door wider to negotiations and to end the deadlock they proposed words which would indicate that the support of the Security Council is given only to initiatives such as that of 8 February; but this "unblocking" philosophy would have had effect only if it had been carried forward in the subsequent paragraphs, especially paragraph 5 of the draft resolution. There is, therefore, an inherent contradiction between the intention of this partic-

ular amendment and the lack of its application to paragraph 5. As a result, these amendments leave the deadlocked situation as it was. Therefore, unlike the other proposals, the amendments proposed by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom do not fundamentally change the situation. They leave it as it was. They do not open the door any wider. Therefore they cannot affect my Government's negative vote on the draft resolution as originally submitted.

296. Another reason for our negative vote is that by such a vote we would open the way to a positive vote on what we believe are the more constructive proposals, presented by Barbados and Ghana and by four Latin American States. It is therefore in that spirit that my Government will vote against draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, even as modified, because it would leave the political situation in the Middle East just as it was. It would register the missing of an opportunity, when the opportunity was made available in the other documents to which I have referred.

297. Mr. PHILLIPS (United States of America): Mr. President, you have asked representatives to keep their statements to five minutes. I shall do my best to accede to your request. If by any chance I should exceed that by so much as 30 seconds I would hope you will call me sharply to order.

298. My Government is in agreement with much of draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2 with the inclusion of the amendments in document A/L.657. It reflects the central belief of this body and the firm policy of my Government that we must continue to give unwavering support to Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which has established the basic principles for a just and lasting peace in the area. It reflects the clear desire of all of us that negotiations towards a settlement based on the principles and provisions of that resolution should move forward. It reflects our common support and endorsement of Ambassador Jarring's mission. And it reflects the common conviction that the settlement must be worked out by the parties directly concerned.

299. My Government wishes especially to take note of, and to commend, the efforts of the 10 African Heads of State for their constructive initiative. Their designated representatives sought and obtained a deeper understanding of the issues and the prospects for an advance towards peace through their visit to the area and their detailed consultations with the Governments of Egypt and Israel. Their efforts reflect a high order of statesmanship, and my Government believes that a closer reflection of their viewpoints in the draft resolution before us might well have obtained a wide endorsement from this body.

300. My Government has given this draft resolution most careful study. We shall abstain in the voting on two counts. First, we believe the draft resolution contains language that tends to alter the balance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), and we attach the greatest importance to strict and careful adherence to that basic document, upon which our hopes for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East are based. The language to which I refer is contained in the penultimate preambular paragraph and in the last clause of operative paragraph 1.

301. Secondly, my Government is concerned about the practical effect of this draft resolution. We are, I believe, all agreed that this body should centre its attention on what can be done to facilitate and promote the process of negotiations between the parties concerned. We are all disappointed—and no Government more than mine—that more progress has not been achieved in this direction since the last session of the Assembly. Had we here been able to work out a draft resolution whose terms were acceptable to the parties directly concerned, we should have made a real contribution towards the restoration of the negotiating process. But this body cannot by itself resolve the differences Ambassador Jarring has not been able to overcome, and we fear that the present draft may delay rather than promote the engagement of the parties in productive negotiations. It is our belief, therefore, that a draft resolution could have been designed that would have better served the central purposes of creating the climate for the beginning of serious negotiations. We made a number of suggestions which, had they been incorporated in the draft resolutions, would, we believe, have contributed to that end. Specifically, we urged that the reference to Ambassador Jarring's initiative last February be taken note of in the preambular section of the draft resolution and that the operative clauses be more general in order to leave open as many options as possible to Ambassador Jarring in his efforts to resume his mission.

302. That approach, which in our view would parallel that taken in the report of the Committee of African Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity would have reflected the reality that Ambassador Jarring's February initiative, commendable as it was, did not then succeed in breaking the deadlock in the negotiations and would be unlikely to do so today.

303. In abstaining on that draft resolution, as well as on the two other draft resolutions before us, I want to stress that nothing in our abstentions should be taken as a change in United States policies. We continue to give Security Council resolution 242 (1967) our full support. Our own views on the elements of a peace settlement remain as we have stated them frequently over the past two years. We continue to give our full support to Ambassador Jarring's efforts to promote negotiations between the parties.

304. For our part, the United States will continue to do its utmost to get those negotiations under way. That has been our intention and our desire in these past months, and we have exerted our best efforts in that direction, notwithstanding the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union to the contrary [*2009th meeting*].

305. We believe that the most promising avenue now available is to continue to explore the possibility of agreement on measures of an interim nature involving a reopening of the Suez Canal and a partial Israeli withdrawal in Sinai as a step toward a final peace. We shall persist in trying to help the parties in pursuing negotiations on this matter so long as they continue to wish us to do so. We regard our endeavours in this respect as supportive of Ambassador Jarring's mission, and as directed towards a practical step towards an over-all peace settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

306. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): I am not speaking in exercise of my right of reply. The Assembly has been sitting for a long time. I come to the rostrum to say how we shall vote and to explain why.

307. We have before us documents A/L.655 and Add.1, A/L.656, A/L.657 and A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, as modified. The amendments proposed in document A/L.655 are not really amendments. That was explained earlier. This is perhaps a clever way to try to get priority for draft resolution A/L.651 and Add.1. We shall vote against those amendments, since we must apparently vote on them. We shall also have to vote against draft resolution A/L.651.

308. Concerning the amendments in document A/L.656 presented by the very distinguished Minister of Foreign Affairs of Senegal, whose speech [*2002nd meeting*] we heard with great admiration and to whom we express our gratitude for all the efforts he exercised before and since his arrival in New York, these amendments, which, as representatives have seen, have already been accepted by the Foreign Minister of Israel, would delete in paragraph 1, for example, the words "and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored". Now, I hope perhaps the Minister had no reason to believe that the occupied territories must not be restored. I do not know why he has proposed that deletion, and, of course, should we accept that amendment, that would mean acceptance of that principle. In short, with reluctance, we shall vote against the amendments proposed in document A/L.656 and would ask for other representatives to do likewise.

309. I turn now to the amendments in document A/L.657, presented by Belgium and five other European Powers, which have been introduced and explained by the representative of Belgium. We are going to vote for those amendments. Consequently we are going to vote for draft resolution A/L.650 with the addition of the amendments in document A/L.657. In short, we are going to vote for the draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan and other countries, as amended by Belgium and other countries.

310. In casting these votes, the delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt considers that these resolutions are not to be taken in isolation from all the other resolutions adopted by the Assembly on the Middle East. They complement them. But we are going to vote for the draft resolution as amended by Belgium, with a loud declaration: that it is peace that we want, peace in accordance with the provisions of our Charter, peace in accordance with the resolutions of our Council and our Assembly, peace in accordance with the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of our Organization, peace in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the African Heads of State and Government, peace in accordance with the basic, cardinal principle of the findings of the Heads of State of Africa, which is that Israel should not be permitted any territorial annexation under the pretext of security needs.

311. I repeat that the allusions made to the findings of the Heads of State of Africa have all been based, and still are based, on the principle that Israel must be permitted no territorial annexations under the pretext of security needs. Egypt here has accused, and accuses, the responsible

authorities in Tel Aviv of fighting with tenacity, desperately, against this kind of just peace.

312. Egypt, with every Arab, African, Asian, Latin American, European and any other country which bases its policy on the Charter, is waiting to hear your verdict, loud and clear. We accept it and thank you in advance.

313. Mr. TOUKAN (Jordan): Jordan will vote in favour of draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, sponsored by Afghanistan and other Member States. My delegation wishes to record its deep appreciation for the relentless efforts made by the sponsors in their endeavour to reach an acceptable resolution.

314. Jordan feels that the aforementioned draft resolution embodies the basic principle of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), the implementation of which Jordan has accepted, with all its provisions; accordingly, we fully co-operated with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring.

315. For over four years, half of the Kingdom of Jordan--that is, the west bank--has been under Israeli military occupation and our people there are suffering from the evils of this occupation. Peace will never be reached in the Middle East except with the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied in June 1967.

316. The aforementioned draft resolution embodies, in operative paragraphs 2 and 6, the principles I have just expounded. Thus, we shall vote affirmatively for it, as amended by Belgium and other European States.

317. Mr. AHMED (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): For over a quarter of a century what we call the Middle East conflict has been the subject of debate in our Organization. I would be tempted today to paraphrase a sentence spoken here only a few days ago from this very rostrum. Speaking of the phenomenon of development, our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Baba Hassane, asserted that "never has a disease been studied so long and so well by a doctor" [1955th meeting, para. 35]. I would be tempted to say as much of the Middle East conflict, with which we are all well acquainted.

318. One is led to ask oneself why this important problem, so well known to all, finds no solution. Some readily reply that it stems essentially from the all-too-familiar confrontation between the great Powers. Others reply that the question arouses too much passion for them to be able to come to a decision.

319. On reflection, whatever the reasons which dictate the behaviour of one and the other in regard to a conflict that for 23 years has been threatening international peace and security, one thing is certain: our Organization, at its birth baptized as the guardian of peace among men in the practice of the principles that govern it, tends to become the guardian of the insecurity of the weak in this world of ours, an institution where the law of weapons, *ergo* the law of the strongest, prevails over reason, over the right of men to live in peace and security, over the right of States to live within secure frontiers guaranteed by international law. As testimony of this, it suffices to cite the recent events confronting India and Pakistan.

320. It is in the name of scrupulous respect for the basic principles that govern our Organization—even if today they are at the service of force rather than at the service of reason and persuasion—that my delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, as revised.

321. Mr. DIAZ-CASANUEVA (Chile) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Chile will vote in favour of draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, incorporating the European amendments in document A/L.657. We are gratified at and reassured by the balance introduced into the original proposal by the European Powers, to which we express our thanks for their valuable and effective contribution, as well as for their equanimity.

322. In voting in favour of the draft resolution with the European amendments, we do not incline in favour of either side in the Middle East conflict. We have the greatest respect and friendship for all the States in the area, and we express the sincere hope that those States will see a way to reconciliation and achieve stable peace and fruitful co-operation.

323. We deplore the fact that Israel should not be in a position to vote for, or consider favourably, the draft resolution. We very much fear the difficulties that the proposal contained in this draft might encounter later.

324. The Government of Chile wishes to contribute, inside and outside the United Nations, to the respect and recognition of the existence and security of Israel and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. Similarly, my Government seeks to ensure that all Arab nations, including of course the Palestinian people, will have all their rights recognized, as well as the integrity and inviolability of their territories.

325. My delegation's vote is to be construed essentially as support for the Secretary-General and a vote of confidence in the Jarring mission. After lengthy and painstaking efforts Mr. Jarring arrived at the conclusion that the only possibility for breaking out of the deadlock in which the negotiations found themselves was to get each of the sides to assume parallel and simultaneous commitments—unavoidable requirements for a future peace treaty between them.

326. We shall vote in favour of the fundamental principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967)—the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and security for all States in the area.

327. My delegation supports the recognition expressed in draft resolution A/L.650 and its appreciation of the work of African Heads of State who accepted the Jarring negotiations. My delegation expresses the sincere hope that our African brothers will continue their peace mission. The Jarring mission is paralysed; the permanent members of the Security Council do not consult each other; we see no hope on the horizon of a peaceful settlement. While it is true that a positive factor persists, namely, the cease-fire, the cannons may roar again across the Suez Canal and an already explosive situation, a situation that is a danger to world peace, may well become aggravated.

328. In our view, we must have faith in Mr. Jarring. We are convinced that the reactivation of negotiations under the aegis of Ambassador Jarring is an imperative need for the achievement of a peaceful settlement of a conflict that causes so much anguish for the whole of the international community.

329. Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): As the time to take a decision approaches, I should like to explain the vote to be cast by my delegation.

330. In our intervention last Saturday [*2014th meeting*] I stated the position of principle of my Government concerning the Middle East conflict. I should like at this time to reiterate Cuba's views concerning the two factors that, in our opinion, are essential and indispensable conditions for the settlement of that dispute or conflict and the establishment in that area of a just and lasting peace. They are the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories they have occupied as a result of the 1967 war and, at the same time, respect for the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

331. Unless both requirements are fulfilled we do not believe it possible to achieve peace in the Middle East. Its attainment is, moreover, essential if we wish the settlement of that conflict to be achieved in a manner compatible with the interests and national rights of all the Arab peoples victims of aggression.

332. We have similarly pointed out that the General Assembly must condemn the imperialist Government of the United States of America as being responsible for the aggression committed against the Arab peoples and as the prime cause of the lack of solution to this conflict.

333. Consistent with such criteria my delegation will vote against draft resolutions A/L.651 and Add.1 and A/L.652/Rev.1, as well as against the amendments in document A/L.656.

334. As regards draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, we must state that it is not satisfactory to our delegation. Nevertheless, and bearing in mind the position taken on it by Egypt and other Arab States, and in the hope that its adoption will contribute to the strengthening of the Arab cause, we have decided to give it our support.

335. The PRESIDENT: I should like to draw the Assembly's attention to the revised text of the 21-Power draft resolution, which has just been issued [*A/L.650/Rev.1*]. This text combines the original draft resolution [*A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2*] and the amendments contained in document A/L.657, which have been accepted by the sponsors.

336. Mr. EL-SHIBIB (Iraq): The draft resolution contained in document A/L.650/Rev.1 has Security Council resolution 242 (1967) as its basis. The views of my Government on that resolution are too well known to need further elaboration and can be summarized as follows.

337. First, we doubted the motives of the United States and its allies in preventing the Security Council, in June 1967—in a departure from its usual practices—from coup-

ling its call for a cease-fire with a demand for the withdrawal of the invading Israeli forces from the territories of the Arab countries invaded by Israel. This attempt had a precise motive that was a clear breach of the spirit of the Charter, namely, to allow the aggressor to extract a price for his military victory. Resolution 242 (1967) was, in our view, born with this embryonic defect.

338. Secondly, we have always believed—and events have proved us right—that no just and lasting peace can be established in the Middle East without allowing the people of Palestine to exercise their right to self-determination in their homeland. In resolution 242 (1967) the question of Palestine was treated as a mere question of refugees and its treatment in that resolution appeared almost as an after-thought.

339. Thirdly, we doubted the practicality of that resolution, since we had no doubt about the expansionist aims of Israel and no doubt that unless coercive measures, as stipulated in Chapter VII of the Charter, were adopted, Israel would not disgorge its territorial loot. Here again events have proved us right.

340. For all those reasons we cannot, though we may wish to do so, vote for draft resolution A/L.650/Rev.1. We cannot, however, vote against that draft resolution, in spite of all our reservations, because we trust and respect the motives, the will and the intention of the delegations that presented and sponsored it, the reason uppermost in our mind being that Egypt, behind which we stand in solidarity and brotherhood, has found that draft resolution acceptable. We could not abstain either because that might give rise to the impression in the minds of some representatives that we are mere onlookers and fence-sitters, and our position is certainly not that.

341. We have decided, therefore, not to participate in the vote.

342. May I be allowed to say a few words on the possible adoption of that draft resolution. In spite of the spirit of flexibility and compromise shown by Egypt, the Zionist State, as expected—because of its arrogance, conceit and determination upon territorial aggrandizement—is again trying to close every door that Egypt and the international community have sought to open. What Israel has attempted throughout the past five years—and a sample of such attempts is being witnessed this evening in the voting manoeuvres—is not merely to force Egypt to negotiate while its territory is under occupation, but also to force Egypt to concede, in advance of any negotiation, the possibility of the annexation of part of its territory.

343. The adoption of draft resolution A/L.650/Rev.1 could mean another crucial test of the will of the international community to give meaning to its words. This draft resolution can become, like others adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, a mere piece of paper that can be contemptuously and arrogantly dismissed by Israel, or it can become a guide to action for resort to measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. We believe that these are the only measures which Israel understands and which have a chance of restoring peace and justice in the Middle East.

344. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Nigeria in exercise of the right of reply.

345. Mr. OGBU (Nigeria): I should like to explain the position of my delegation and at the same time answer the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Israel. My delegation feels that that statement may leave some doubt in the minds of some of our friends, and we should like to clear up the doubt.

346. I have two points. First, the Foreign Minister of Israel stated that he could not understand—or words to that effect—why the delegation of Nigeria did not wish to have any allusion to the recommendations or proposals of the African Heads of State in the draft resolution proposed by Barbados and, latterly, Ghana, when in the original proposal contained in draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2 the sponsors had in fact made such a reference in the fourth paragraph of the preamble:

*"Expressing its appreciation of the efforts of the Committee of African Heads of State undertaken in pursuance of the resolution adopted on 23 June 1971 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighth ordinary session".*

347. I am aware that before tomorrow morning the news media will be carrying distorted versions of this text and all sorts of reports to the effect that permanent representatives in the United Nations are going contrary to the recommendations of their Heads of State. I do like my job and I want to keep it. I know this will be deliberate, wilful, mischievous, but I must set the record straight.

348. I did say that if the proposers of draft resolution A/L.651 and Add.1 were in favour of the spirit and intention of the African Heads of State, then they ought to support draft resolution A/L.650/Rev.1 because it was originally sponsored by at least three of the four delegations whose Foreign Ministers participated in the mission. I proceed to name them: Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire. Three of those delegations, Cameroon, Nigeria and Senegal, were originally among the sponsors of the draft resolution which appears in document A/L.650. My delegation is not opposed to an allusion to the efforts of the Heads of State. As a matter of fact, in our draft resolution we express appreciation of those efforts, but, as distinct from that, draft resolution A/L.651 and Add.1 in operative paragraph 1 *"Expresses... support for the following proposals submitted by the Committee of African Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity for the consideration of the parties"*.

349. The first question is: To whom did the Committee of African Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity submit those proposals? Even the comments by the Israeli delegation on draft resolution A/L.650/Rev.1 mention that these are not properly before the General Assembly. My delegation maintains that this is in fact correct. My delegation further maintains that these recommendations have not in fact been received by all African Heads of State. Therefore, most of my African colleagues here are not in a position to have received instructions one way or another. This smacks of an attempt to divide and

rule, an attempt to embarrass us by saying, "Will you now go back on the recommendations of your Heads of State?" That is not the issue. The effort is acknowledged and appreciated for it is expressed in the 21-Power draft resolution and, in a spirit of co-operation and conciliation, we have accepted the amendments proposed by the Western European group [A/L.657].

350. We hope that no one in this Assembly will be misled into thinking that any of us, permanent representatives of Africa, has the right or the guts, or even the power, to disagree with the person he is representing. To say this is entirely mischievous, entirely misleading and entirely misdirected. We know that ever since we became a sponsor of the draft resolution on 9 December, four days ago, there has been arm-twisting in our capitals and I know that if we delay much longer there will be some other changes. Every sovereign country has the right to change its mind and I am not criticizing any representative who receives instructions to that effect. Thank goodness, as I said earlier this evening, my instructions are clear and I do not expect to change my attitude. My delegation will vote for the revised draft resolution.

351. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Guinea on a point of order.

352. Mr. DIALLO (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): I shall be extremely brief and will not speak longer than 30 seconds, although I have already taken up 10 of them. I wish to appeal to my friend and brother of the Ivory Coast not to press the proposal he made a short time ago for a separate vote on operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2. I make this appeal to him because, first, as a sponsor I shall oppose his proposal, but also and especially because, knowing his commitment and his determination to reach a solution, I think that he will be good enough to accede to our appeal and withdraw his request for a separate vote, which my delegation would oppose.

353. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Mali on a point of order.

354. Mr. TRAORE (Mali) (*interpretation from French*): A question of principle leads me to oppose the proposal of my friend and brother Mr. Aké, of the Ivory Coast, whose good faith is of course not in question. I refer to the proposal for a separate vote on paragraph 5 of our draft resolution. The sponsors oppose this firmly because what is involved is the substance of their draft. As we all know, without a favourable response from Israel, the Jarring mission, which we all, including the Ivory Coast, hope will be unblocked, will remain in an impasse.

355. Mr. Jarring and the Secretary-General have laid down this response as an indispensable condition for resumption of the talks and the paragraph in question calls upon Israel to respond favourably to the aide-mémoire of Mr. Jarring. By insisting on keeping in paragraph 5, we believe that we are working towards the reactivation of that mission, in which reside all our hopes for a settlement of the crisis.

356. As you will see, therefore, this is an essential feature of our draft resolution, which should be supported, if not

by all members of our Assembly, at least by an overwhelming majority, if it is to support both the Secretary-General and Dr. Jarring in their efforts at mediation.

357. On behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution A/L.650/Rev.1, I therefore formally reject the proposal of my brother and friend the representative of the Ivory Coast. We do not see how an appeal for co-operation can humiliate a State—in this case, Israel.

358. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Barbados, who wishes to speak on a point of order.

359. Mr. WALDRON-RAMSEY (Barbados): It will be recalled that the amendments contained in document A/L.655 and Add.1, submitted by the delegations of Ghana and Barbados, pertained to the text of the draft resolution originally contained in document A/L.650, with its various addenda. Now the Assembly has before it document A/L.650/Rev.1, and therefore it is necessary—and, indeed it is incumbent upon us—to place the ordering of our voting process in the proper perspective. We therefore must revise our own series of amendments, and it will be left to you, Sir, to decide whether or not you would want to see the revision of our document out in draft before we vote, or whether or not, consistent with the intentions which I shall now declare, you might find it convenient for the Assembly to proceed on the demonstrations which I shall now indicate.

360. I am sure I speak for Ghana in this respect. We, for our part, are quite happy to proceed to the vote on our revised text, without a new document emerging. What, then, is our position? Our position is as follows. We would want to maintain the first amendment which we suggest which, as you will glean from document A/L.655, is the addition of a new paragraph after the fourth preambular paragraph, which ought to read as follows:

*“Expressing its appreciation for the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East to bring about a peace agreement between the parties in pursuance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967”.*

361. Then comes the pertinent revision. In the second amendment, instead of “Replace operative paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 by the following:”, we would propose a new operative paragraph—which should not pose insuperable difficulties for my colleagues because the text will substantially be the text which we have before us at the moment. The new operative paragraph would read as follows:

*“1. Expresses its support for the following proposals submitted by the Committee of African Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity for the consideration of the parties:*

*“(a) Acceptance, by the two parties, to resume indirect negotiations under the auspices of Mr. Jarring, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, and within the terms of resolution 242 (1967) in order to reach a peace agreement;*

*“(b) Acceptance, by the two parties, of an interim agreement for the opening of the Suez Canal and the stationing, on the eastern bank of the Canal, of United Nations forces between the Egyptian and Israeli lines;*

*“(c) Acceptance, by the two parties, that the terms of withdrawal from occupied territories be embodied in the peace agreement”.*

That is the new operative paragraph 1 (c).

*“(d) Acceptance, by the two parties, in order to guarantee freedom of navigation of all ships through the Straits of Tiran, of the stationing of international forces at Sharm el Sheikh.”*

That concludes operative paragraph 1. You will note, therefore, that we have excised from our text the old paragraphs (c) and (d).

362. In the same amendment, operative paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 would be what is contained as numbers 2, 3 and 4 in the existing text, A/L.655:

*“2. Takes note of the response of the parties to the aforesaid proposals;*

*“3. Calls on the Secretary-General to reactivate the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East in pursuance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967);*

*“4. Further calls on the parties to resume immediately the conversations under the auspices of the Special Representative with a view to concluding a peace agreement.”*

Those last paragraphs are unchanged.

363. We would seek a roll-call vote on the new text of operative paragraph 1 in my second amendment, which we have just introduced and revised, as well as on operative paragraph 3 of that amendment, which, as I indicated earlier, calls upon the Secretary-General to reactivate the mission.

364. Now, while I have the floor on a point of order, and since this touches on and concerns the process of voting, may I be permitted to indicate, consistent with my instructions, how my delegation views the revised text contained in document A/L.650/Rev.1 with respect to the voting. I certainly would not want to interpose my delegation between the fraternal calls for accommodation from Mali and Guinea to the Ivory Coast; that is their business. But as far as my singular business is concerned, I am instructed to ask for a separate vote, under clear governmental instructions which are of a juridical nature, on the word “favourably” in the paragraph reading *“Calls upon Israel to respond favourably to the Special Representative’s peace initiative”*, which is now operative paragraph 6 of document A/L.650/Rev.1. We do not ask for a separate vote on the entire paragraph—and this is where we differ from the position taken by Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Mali and the others—we ask for a separate vote on the word “favourably” itself.

365. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Tunisia on a point of order.

366. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): Under rule 118, I ask that the debate be closed and that we proceed immediately to the vote.

367. The PRESIDENT: We have heard the last speaker who wished to explain his vote before the vote.

368. The following draft resolutions are before the General Assembly under this item: draft resolution A/L.650/Rev.1, which combines the original draft resolution contained in A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2 and the amendments contained in document A/L.657, which have been accepted by the sponsors. Therefore, only the amendments to the draft resolution contained in documents A/L.655 and Add.1 and A/L.656 are before us. We also have before us draft resolution A/L.651 and Add.1 and draft resolution A/L.652/Rev.1. Separate votes have been requested on operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of draft resolution A/L.650/Rev.1, which were operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of the original text.

369. In accordance with rule 92 of the rules of procedure I shall first put to the vote the amendments in document A/L.655 and Add.1.

370. We shall now vote on the first amendment in that document. A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:* Barbados, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Israel, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Sweden, Uruguay.

*Against:* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, France, Gambia, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

*Abstaining:* Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Khmer Republic, Laos, Malta, Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Swaziland, Thailand, United States of America, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Zaire.

*The first amendment was rejected by 65 votes to 16, with 42 abstentions.*

371. The PRESIDENT: We shall now vote on paragraph 1 of the proposed new text in the second amendment, as revised, in document A/L.655 and Add.1. A roll-call vote has been requested.

*A vote was taken by roll call.*

*Netherlands, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* New Zealand, Nicaragua, Barbados, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Haiti, Israel, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi.

*Against:* Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, France, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco.

*Abstaining:* Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Khmer Republic, Laos, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal.

*Paragraph 1 of the second amendment, as revised, was rejected by 63 votes to 14, with 47 abstentions.*

372. The PRESIDENT: Since paragraph 1 of the second amendment has been rejected, paragraph 2 will not be put to the vote.

373. I now put to the vote paragraph 3 of the second amendment in document A/L.655 and Add.1. A roll-call vote has been requested.

*A vote was taken by roll call.*

*Ethiopia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Ghana, Haiti, Israel, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, New Zealand, Nicaragua, United States of America, Uruguay, Barbados, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic.

*Against:* France, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, People's

Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea.

*Abstaining:* Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Laos, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Zaire, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador.

*Paragraph 3 of the second amendment was rejected by 63 votes to 17, with 45 abstentions.*

374. The PRESIDENT: We shall now proceed to vote on paragraph 4 of the second amendment in document A/L.655 and Add.1. A recorded vote has been requested.

*In favour:* Barbados, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Haiti, Israel, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Uruguay.

*Against:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, France, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

*Abstaining:* Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Laos, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, United States of America, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Zaire.

*Paragraph 4 of the second amendment was rejected by 63 votes to 15, with 45 abstentions.*

375. The PRESIDENT: We turn now to the amendments in document A/L.656. I shall put to the vote the first amendment in that document.

376. I call on the representative of Egypt on a point of order.

377. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): Mr. President, I think there has been no request for a separate vote on each of the amendments in document A/L.656, and I do not know why we should waste all this time. I therefore propose that the Assembly should take one vote on all the amendments contained therein.

378. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Barbados on a point of order.

379. Mr. WALDRON-RAMSEY (Barbados): It is my understanding that we are now proceeding to the vote on the amendments contained in document A/L.656—that is to say, the amendments submitted by Senegal. Now, there are two different categories of amendments in that document. One concerns operative paragraph 1 of document A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, the other concerns operative paragraphs 4 and 5. So I do not quite understand how my colleague from Egypt intends us to proceed, but at least for tidiness of procedure we must vote upon each *seriatim*.

380. The PRESIDENT: We shall now proceed to the vote on the first amendment in document A/L.656. A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:* Barbados, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Israel, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malawi, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Senegal, United States of America, Uruguay, Zaire.

*Against:* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

*Abstaining:* Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Chad, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Laos, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sweden, Upper Volta, Venezuela.

*The first amendment was rejected by 65 votes to 16, with 40 abstentions.*

381. The PRESIDENT: I shall now put to the vote the second amendment contained in document A/L.656. A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:* Barbados, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Senegal, United States of America, Uruguay, Zaire.

*Against:* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

*Abstaining:* Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Khmer Republic, Laos, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Thailand, Upper Volta, Venezuela.

*The second amendment was rejected by 63 votes to 21, with 38 abstentions.*

382. The PRESIDENT: I shall now put to the vote the third amendment contained in document A/L.656. A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:* Barbados, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Israel, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Senegal, United States of America, Uruguay, Zaire.

*Against:* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

*Abstaining:* Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Khmer Republic, Laos,

Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Upper Volta, Venezuela.

*The third amendment was rejected by 63 votes to 16, with 44 abstentions.*

383. The PRESIDENT: I now invite representatives to turn their attention to the draft resolution contained in document A/L.650/Rev.1. As I mentioned earlier, separate votes have been requested on operative paragraphs 5 and 6, which were paragraphs 4 and 5 of the original text. Is there any objection to that request for division?

384. Mr. AKE (Ivory Coast) (*interpretation from French*): In response to the appeal of the delegations of Guinea and Mali, my delegation will not insist upon a separate vote being taken on operative paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/L.650/Rev.1. Nevertheless, my delegation wishes to state that it has always supported the Jarring mission and that it is in favour of the resumption of negotiations between Egypt and Israel under the aegis of Mr. Jarring, in accordance with the agreement that the two parties have given to the Committee of African Heads of State. We believe that the principal purpose of the United Nations is to work for peace and to encourage all efforts aimed at achieving peace. The United Nations should not get involved in situations which may paralyze its action, situations that, instead of freeing the Jarring negotiations, which we all hope for, would only, on the contrary, help to solidify the deadlock in which we now are because of our stubbornness and our demands, which are not always in harmony with our desire for peace.

385. My delegation will not insist on a separate vote on paragraph 6 and we shall abstain on the text as a whole.

386. Mr. STAVROPOULOS (Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs): We still have a request for a separate vote on the word "favourably" in paragraph 6 of the revised document. A recorded vote has been requested on that word.

387. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Zambia on a point of order.

388. Mr. MWAANGA (Zambia): My delegation is taking the floor to oppose the request which has been made by my friend and colleague the permanent representative of Barbados to have a separate vote on the word "favourably".

389. I wish to draw the attention of the General Assembly to the fact that the Secretary-General, in his report, states the following very clearly:

"While I still consider that the situation has considerable elements of promise, it is a matter for increasing concern that Ambassador Jarring's attempt to break the deadlock has not so far been successful. I appeal, therefore, to the Government of Israel to give further consideration to this question and to respond favourably"—I repeat, "to respond favourably"—"to Ambassador Jarring's initiative." [A/8541, para. 21.]

That is why I oppose the proposal for a separate vote on the word "favourably" in operative paragraph 6.

390. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Tunisia on a point of order.

391. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): Point of order. I should like to support the motion of the representative of Zambia. I oppose a separate vote on the word "favourably" because this would be an encouragement for a reply to be either unfavourable or inoperative. The United Nations must not encourage negativism.

392. The PRESIDENT: Rule 91 of the rules of procedure reads as follows:

"A representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment shall be voted on separately. If objection is made to the request for division, the motion for division shall be voted upon. . . . If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are subsequently approved shall be put to the vote as a whole. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole."

393. We shall now vote on the motion for division.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:* Australia, Barbados, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Israel, Malawi, Uruguay, Venezuela.

*Against:* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Gambia, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

*Abstaining:* Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia, Dahomey, Denmark, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Zaire.

*The motion for division was rejected by 69 votes to 9, with 44 abstentions.*

394. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will now vote on draft resolution A/L.650/Rev.1. A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

*Against:* Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Israel, Nicaragua, Uruguay.

*Abstaining:* Algeria, Australia, Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, China, Dahomey, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Honduras, Iceland, Ivory Coast, Khmer Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, United States of America, Upper Volta, Zaire.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 79 votes to 7, with 36 abstentions (resolution 2799 (XXVI)).*

395. The PRESIDENT: Draft resolution A/L.651 and Add.1 has been withdrawn.

396. The Assembly will now vote on draft resolution A/L.652/Rev.1.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:* Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Israel, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Senegal, Uruguay.

*Against:* Afghanistan, Albania, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, France, Gambia, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

*Abstaining:* Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Zaire.

*The draft resolution was rejected by 56 votes to 18, with 47 abstentions.*

*The meeting rose at 9.10 p.m.*

