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President: Mr. Adam MALIK (Indonesia).

AGENDA ITEM 97

World Disarmament Conference (*continued*)*

1. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): Coming to the rostrum and seeing the place of the Secretary-General vacant, I should like to echo what Mr. George Bush of the United States has already said here and, through you, Mr. Chairman, send to U Thant, our Secretary-General, our very best wishes for a speedy recovery.

2. It was proper to postpone the consideration of the item before us until the Chinese delegation arrived. Its participation in this debate is indeed essential. Its opinions will certainly carry weight. The Assembly is to be congratulated on its unanimous acceptance of the proposal made by Mr. García Robles of Mexico [*1978th meeting*] to adjourn its discussion until the arrival of our Chinese colleagues. The presence among us today of the delegation of China is not only a victory for justice: it is a source of encouragement for us. No matter how long the struggle, right will prevail.

3. Those who have consistently refused to despair and have maintained their faith in the United Nations as a valid, universal framework for peace, justice and progress are gratified to see the representatives of China among us now. They not only speak for a great and friendly country; they also represent a people which gave the world one of its oldest and greatest civilizations and is still contributing its best to the common human heritage. The people of Egypt feel here a certain affinity with the people of China. The relations between our two countries are centuries and centuries old; but Egypt especially recalls today its meeting with China at Bandung in 1955.¹ Egypt recalls that meeting and all that Bandung represents in our modern history—indeed, in the modern history of Africa and Asia, in the evolution of Asian-African solidarity and in the history of ideas of peaceful co-existence.

4. We recall, moreover, that at Bandung the cry was loud and clear for the abolition of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, in its final communiqué the Conference:

“... considered that disarmament and the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear

* Resumed from the 1978th meeting.

¹ Asian-African Conference, held at Bandung from 18 to 24 April 1955.

and thermo-nuclear weapons of war are imperative to save mankind and civilization from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction. It considered that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here”—that is, in Bandung—“have a duty towards humanity and civilization to proclaim their support for disarmament and for the prohibition of these weapons and to appeal to nations principally concerned and to world opinion, to bring about such disarmament and prohibition.”

5. In the wake of Bandung in 1955, it will be remembered, Egypt established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. It is perhaps not common knowledge that Egypt was consequently subjected to pressures and harrassments, without, however, being swayed by them. We are therefore particularly glad, today, to see China with us and we are also glad to have heard, in the very first statement of the leader of the Chinese delegation [*1983rd meeting*], his warm words of support for our cause. Egypt and all the Arab countries greatly appreciate the fact that China, in its first statement here, solemnly declared that it resolutely supported the Arab people and their just cause and that it was confident of the ultimate success of their struggle to recover their lost territories and to restore to the Palestinian people their national rights.

6. Considering the item before us, the Egyptian delegation welcomes the initiative of the Soviet Union concerning the convening of a world disarmament conference [*A/8491*]. Three significant developments make the consideration of this initiative particularly appropriate at our present session. The first is the great leap forward taken by the General Assembly towards universality by its restoration to the People's Republic of China of its full and legitimate rights. The second is the recent movement that will hopefully lead to mutual accommodation between Eastern and Western Europe, making the prospects for European security brighter today. The third is the progress—admittedly limited—made towards reaching agreement on restraining some existing as well as potential weapons. The need to build on these three positive developments in order to achieve an accelerated process for meaningful disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, is, in our judgement, a historic responsibility that must be met by all members of this Assembly.

7. The non-aligned countries have consistently advocated and urged the convening of a world disarmament conference. Indeed, General Assembly resolution 2030 (XX), which urged the convening of a world disarmament conference, was adopted in 1965 in response to a decision by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in 1964. At their third Conference held at Lusaka in 1970, the non-aligned countries maintained and repeated that view.

8. The non-aligned countries have been constantly aware of the fundamental link between disarmament and meaningful peace established on the basis of justice for all, under which human energies and material resources at present wasted on armaments are instead devoted to the building of happy societies of men.

9. Ambassador Yakov Malik, in his lucid statement before this Assembly on 3 November 1971 [1978th meeting], brought to our attention the frightening figures compiled by the Secretary-General on the human and financial resources at present spent for military purposes. It is not only the industrial countries that are engaged in such waste; the developing countries are not spared this curse either. In more than one region aggressive régimes are financed and armed from outside in order to realize certain ambitions of territorial expansion and economic exploitation. The victimized nations are left with no choice but to seek to enhance their capacity to resist potential aggressor and to undo actual injustices. In many cases, unfortunately, this means slowing down or even forsaking some of their efforts at development.

10. The peoples of the world, and more particularly the peoples of the developing countries, are entitled to save all their human and material resources for development and progress, and the links connecting the present armaments race and the policies of violence with the problems of development are obvious to all of us. It was not a coincidence that our Assembly in 1969 decided to designate the 1970s the Disarmament Decade [resolution 2602 E (XXIV)], as well as the Second United Nations Development Decade. The developing nations call on the most developed to agree on a process of disarmament, not only because they are potential victims in any major war, but also because some of them are actual victims now. We have already referred to the Bandung Conference. Allow me to quote here from the statement of our late President Gamal Abdel Nasser before the same Conference; I shall quote only the following few lines:

“... There is a close connexion between raising the standard of living of the peoples and decreasing the armaments burden... modern science and technology, if utilized for peaceful purposes, offer the possibility of greater well-being for the human race... Put to peaceful uses, atomic energy offers hitherto undreamed of opportunities, especially for that vast majority of humanity that is still living in poverty and want.”

11. Despite the extensive debates in the United Nations on a number of disarmament questions, over a period of two and a half decades, the results actually achieved have been very limited. The process has proved to be painfully slow. This does not detract from the important achievements realized so far by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, especially the conclusion of the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty² in 1963 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] in 1968; nor does it detract from the efforts now being made to ban and destroy biological and

chemical weapons. The important Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) resumed in Vienna only yesterday should curtail certain strategic weapons by a binding treaty, hopefully soon. However, it is a fact that complete disarmament is still very far away. A comprehensive test ban is not on the horizon. The arms race continues unabated, together with the testing of new weapons. Our colleague from Tanzania pointed out last year in the First Committee [1757th meeting] that more nuclear weapons were tested annually than before the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty in Moscow in 1963.

12. The latest series of large-scale underground nuclear tests in Amchitka is sufficient reminder indeed of this deplorable situation. To borrow the words of Mr. Chiao Kuan-hua yesterday, “the super-Powers, while talking about disarmament every day, are actually engaged in arms expansion daily” [1983rd meeting, para. 210].

13. There is an appalling disparity between the magnitude of the forces behind the arms race, on the one hand, and the international efforts to achieve disarmament or even meaningful arms control, on the other. Powerful group interests exploit the real and imaginary fears of the military in order to escalate continually their multi-billion dollar programmes. That awful process will not end without effective international effort. Without such a collective—and indeed corrective—effort, a sense of helplessness and complacency may slowly be created.

14. A world disarmament conference would militate against that; it would constantly focus public attention on the urgent need to find adequate means to stop the race for armaments—particularly nuclear armaments—as a first step towards the final target of complete and total disarmament.

15. At present, disarmament talks are carried out in the three following forums: first, bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on strategic arms limitations (SALT); secondly, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva; and thirdly the debate on disarmament in this General Assembly and its First Committee, which provides an opportunity for an annual review of the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

16. The proposed world disarmament conference does not seek to stop the work in any of those forums. However, my delegation has some remarks to make on the subject.

17. First, some nuclear Powers are not at present participating in important disarmament negotiations. My delegation believes that there is now an opportunity to remedy this situation. As the representative of France, Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet, told us yesterday,

“The presence of the People’s Republic of China serves not only to fill a great void but also to provide a new impetus for our Organization. Its presence should be beneficial for the United Nations and for China itself. Our debates on problems as vital for the future of mankind as peace, disarmament, the atom and development are going to take on the universal dimensions that are appropriate to their solution.” [See 1982nd meeting, para. 54.]

² Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

18. Secondly, some other Powers are at present excluded from all disarmament deliberations. With China in the United Nations a great step has been taken towards the universality of the Organization. However, some important decisions remain to be taken in this respect.

19. Thirdly, even with the progress towards universality in the United Nations, there are still valid reasons for convening a world disarmament Conference. Foreign Minister Gromyko, in his address to the General Assembly on 28 September, stated the following:

“Achievements in limiting the arms race are only the first steps towards disarmament. However important they may be, to stop there would be to shirk the solution of the basic problem.” [1942nd meeting, para. 151.]

That statement sums up the present situation. There is a need to engage, within as universal a framework as possible, at a level as high as possible, in a thorough, comprehensive, detailed and uninterrupted examination of the fundamental aspects of disarmament. Such serious, concentrated examination is needed if the implementation of our resolution on the disarmament decade is to be attained.

20. Fourthly, the convening of a world disarmament conference should therefore create the necessary sense of urgency and give needed momentum to the present unsatisfactory efforts in the field of disarmament.

21. Fifthly, participants dedicating all their time and efforts to such a conference should be able to produce and to study specific and concrete proposals to achieve disarmament objectives.

22. Sixthly, the active and effective participation of the developing countries as concerned parties in such a conference should provide an opportunity for examining the interrelationship between the acute problems of development and the questions of disarmament.

23. Finally, the convening of a world disarmament conference would in itself be a major international event—the first of its kind since the League of Nations resolved to create a Preparatory Commission to “prepare for a Conference on the reduction and limitation of armaments”. The Conference met in February 1932 but was short-lived. Nobody even knows for sure when or whether that Committee was adjourned.

24. A conference such as the one proposed in the draft resolution submitted by the USSR [A/L.631] must of course be preceded by adequate, careful preparations. Should the General Assembly endorse the idea of convening such a conference, it would have two courses open to it: either simply to call upon all States to agree among themselves, by methods of their own choosing, on the modalities of the proposed conference, or, alternatively—and in the opinion of my delegation, preferably—to decide to begin some preparatory work itself. The Assembly may then request the Secretary-General to obtain the opinions of all States on the modalities of the conference, particularly on questions related to its time, place, agenda, its level of representation, and its relationship with the United Nations. The Secretary-General may also be requested to

consult the five permanent members of the Security Council. On the basis of these opinions and consultations the Secretary-General may be requested to submit a report to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

25. We are aware of the problems that face the Secretary-General when he is asked to solicit the views of States outside the United Nations. The Assembly may wish to specify such States. One way of doing so would be to request the Secretary-General to consult all States parties to any of these three treaties: the 1963 Moscow Treaty on the partial banning of nuclear tests, the 1968 non-proliferation treaty or the 1971 sea-bed treaty;³ of course, all the Members of the United Nations would also be consulted.

26. The report to be submitted by the Secretary-General at our next session would serve as a feasibility study and thus help the twenty-seventh session of the Assembly to take a final decision concerning the actual convening of the proposed conference. The Egyptian delegation believes these suggestions to be compatible with the draft resolution before us. As the leader of the Chinese delegation said yesterday: “the people of the world long for disarmament and particularly for nuclear disarmament” [1983rd meeting, para. 210]. If the adoption of the draft resolution would move us nearer to the realization of what we long for, this Assembly owes it to the people of the world to adopt it, either as it is or in an amended form, to reflect the few ideas I have had the honour of presenting today and any other ideas that may be considered later under this item.

27. The PRESIDENT: Before giving the floor to the next speaker, I should like to consult the Assembly regarding the list of speakers in the debate on this item. In order to be able to schedule its consideration, we should have an indication of how many representatives wish to speak before the vote on the draft resolution before us. I therefore propose that the list of speakers be closed at 5 p.m. tomorrow. May I take it that the Assembly agrees to that proposal?

It was so decided.

28. The PRESIDENT: It would also be of great assistance if delegations intending to submit draft proposals or amendments on this item were to do so as soon as possible.

29. Mr. KUŁAGA (Poland): For the Polish delegation the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference is in essence an answer to the need for a global approach to a problem of global dimensions within a universal framework. It is a bold move to implement an idea long discussed but never brought to life, namely to marshal all available human resources—political, diplomatic and other—in order to meet the menacing challenge of galloping technology geared to armament. It is aimed at building upon results already achieved in disarmament negotiations, in order to consolidate and broaden them, at capitalizing on favourable political conditions in order to provide an additional

³ Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (resolution 2660 (XXV), annex).

impulse to disarmament negotiations. It allies a common-sense approach with political foresight in the interest of what humanity expects and demands of us: an end to the arms race, the reduction and final elimination of armaments.

30. Indeed, from the very beginning of the Organization's activities, as a result of the experience of the past and particularly that of the Second World War, the prevention of a new arms race and thus the strengthening of the prospects for a lasting and secure peace have been the central preoccupation of the peoples of the world.

31. For a long time—too long a time—the policies of the cold war rendered any progress in the field of disarmament impossible. It was only in the 1950s that it became obvious, even to the most ardent supporters of the cold war policies, that attempts to impose a military superiority over the socialist countries were doomed to failure. A new and more realistic way of thinking made it possible to seek ways leading to a slow-down and, eventually, a reversal of the arms race. An important stimulus in that direction was the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament adopted on 20 November 1959 on the initiative of the Soviet Union [*resolution 1378 (XIV)*].

32. In the course of the past 12 years promising results have been achieved in curbing the arms race. A number of important agreements have been reached, mostly of a pre-emptive nature, which exclude different areas or environments from the armaments race or limit its scope. The Moscow partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 on the prohibition of nuclear tests, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof enter this category of negotiated agreements. We now have before this Assembly a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [*A/8457, annex A*]. Apart from its intrinsic importance, this draft convention is notable in that it is the first legal document to provide for effective disarmament measures through the elimination from the arsenals of States of a very dangerous category of weapons of mass destruction.

33. In the opinion of the Polish delegation, it is important that these objectively positive results be consolidated by measures of both an implementary and a complementary nature. Thus the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty should be implemented through the accession of all nuclear Powers, and complemented by the conclusion of an additional agreement banning underground tests of nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation Treaty will not be fully effective as long as a number of States, including some with advanced nuclear capabilities, refuse to sign it or delay its ratification. The sea-bed Treaty should be followed, in our view, by measures leading to a full demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor. The convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons should—and, we are convinced, will—lead to a speedy elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons as well.

34. There are also other fields in which prospects for disarmament measures are promising. The idea of nuclear-

free zones, first advanced by Poland from this rostrum at the twelfth session [*697th meeting*] is gaining increasing support and, in some parts of the globe, even practical application. Various proposals for regional disarmament measures are being advanced and are taking concrete shape. Europe is a case in point. For in Europe there is a recognition of the necessity, the possibility, the desirability and the potentialities of such measures. Europe has the historic opportunity of moving from the role of a breeding ground of wars and a giant battlefield into that of a blueprint for peace, security and co-operation for all mankind.

35. Further, it is our view that all States, big and small, have a role to play in disarmament efforts. But the Powers with a big military potential and, in particular, the nuclear Powers, bear special responsibilities in this respect. That is why we have supported the Soviet proposal for a conference of the five nuclear Powers to consider questions of nuclear disarmament. And that is why we attach great importance to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. We are of the opinion that any progress achieved in these talks will have a positive influence on prospects for progress in disarmament negotiations in other forums and, indeed, on the international situation in general. It is a fact that these talks have already had a beneficial impact on international relations. We would therefore like to express our hope that the resumption of these talks in Vienna will advance the course of nuclear disarmament.

36. In the view of the Polish delegation, disarmament negotiations have reached a new stage, characterized by three main elements. The first is the danger that what I have called "galloping" technology geared to armaments would irremediably outdistance our political and diplomatic efforts. We need therefore to apply our collective wisdom to respond to the challenge of technology adequately and in conformity with the collective will of mankind. The second and closely related element is the growing conviction that it is necessary to reverse the spiralling arms race, that it is high time to stop that "mad momentum", that it is possible to replace the precarious balance of fear with a balance of security. In this respect I submit that we have reached a psychological breakthrough. The third element is the growing awareness of the suicidal cost of a race which in effect is a race towards the potential suicide of mankind. Is it necessary to recall all the data amassed by the consultative group consisting of distinguished experts appointed by the Secretary-General? A few figures taken at random from their report [*A/8469*] will illustrate the point: over \$200 thousand million are spent each year on armaments, with the prospect of this being raised to \$300 thousand million a year in the next decade; probably at least a quarter of the world's scientists and engineers engaged in research and development are in fact employed on military work, while military research and development probably absorb more than one third of the total research and development expenditure in the world; and thousands of millions of dollars are spent by developing and medium countries, whose tasks in the economic and social fields are indeed great.

37. From all these premises, the Polish delegation deduces that the time is ripe to give serious consideration to what

further, concerted efforts could be made, what new, concrete steps could be taken to speed up disarmament negotiations, to give them a new stimulus. The proposal of the USSR to convene a world disarmament conference provides the necessary framework and platform.

38. The idea of a world disarmament conference is not a new one. The convening of such a conference was advocated, as was recalled to us by Ambassador El-Zayyat, by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Cairo in 1964. It was supported by a practically unanimous vote of the General Assembly at its twentieth session in 1965 [resolution 2030 (XX)]. There already existed a general recognition of the desirability of such a conference and of the necessity of guaranteeing the participation of all countries.

39. Today, a much more favourable general political situation exists. We possess greater knowledge and understanding of the concrete disarmament measures that should be urgently undertaken. Much better prospects for the convening of a world disarmament conference and for its success have thus been reached.

40. Such a conference, we strongly feel, should be universal. All States of the world—Members of the United Nations and non-members, big and small, developed and developing, those belonging to military groupings and those which are non-aligned or neutral—should be assured of participation in the conference. They all are vitally interested in putting an end to the arms race and they can all contribute to the success of disarmament efforts. In the opinion of the Polish delegation it is necessary that States with highly developed military capabilities, including, of course, all the nuclear Powers, participate in such a conference. As stated by many delegations during the debate in 1965, such a conference would provide an appropriate forum to deal with the most essential problem, to review the various political, economic and social, as well as military, aspects of disarmament. This remains even truer today. Such a conference could also discuss specific questions within the framework of disarmament, including the order of priorities for future disarmament negotiations.

41. The Polish delegation is of the opinion that at the conference priority should be given to the elimination of the weapons that are most dangerous to all mankind—weapons of mass destruction.

42. Indeed, any progress in the limitation of the nuclear arms race would strengthen international confidence and enhance progress in other fields of disarmament negotiations. It would bring us closer to the final goal—general and complete disarmament. Experience has confirmed the importance of partial measures to attain that goal.

43. Conventional armaments with their ever more sophisticated and costly weapons are a heavy burden for most countries of the world. This burden is felt by all nations, big and small, developed and developing. Poland is no exception and, like many other nations, we are concerned with the consequences of armaments for our economic and social progress. For us, who are concentrating on ensuring accelerated economic development and the most rapid growth of the living standards of our people, on satisfying

to the utmost its economic and social needs, who are devoting all available resources to this task, a priority task for our Government, the question of the burdens created by military expenditure is not an abstract one. Neither do we underestimate the negative influence of the armaments race upon international economic co-operation, nor upon the scope of international assistance for development purposes. Therefore this whole question has a very real, very practical and very direct meaning for all.

44. It is a matter of particular concern that many nations, which so urgently need to devote their material and human resources to productive ends, should channel such a large part of these resources into armaments and that the rate of growth of their military expenditure is faster than the world average. The world disarmament conference could thus usefully discuss cuts in the military forces of all States and a reduction in military budgets. In fact, the range of problems to be dealt with is so wide and so complex that the conference might decide to meet periodically. We envisage that a relationship with the other existing disarmament bodies would develop and this would ensure that their respective tasks and activities would be mutually interrelated and complementary.

45. The destructive role of the arms race in international relations is more than ever evident and calls for urgent and effective remedial steps. Practically all speakers in the general debate at this session have stressed the importance of this question. Many have expressed their support for the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference and indicated that a decision to this effect by the Assembly would considerably help to reinforce confidence among nations and create new incentives for further progress towards international *détente* and co-operation.

46. Poland is convinced that lasting peace and security require the elimination of aggressive wars and the extinction of hotbeds of tension and military conflicts. They require respect for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. They require genuine and concerted efforts towards disarmament. Our Organization, and indeed all nations, should do everything possible to contribute to the attainment of these goals. Poland, for its part, is ready to co-operate fully in those efforts.

47. Mr. AKWEI (Ghana): My delegation extends its warm congratulations to the Soviet delegation for the initiative taken by the Soviet Government in introducing the item under consideration, namely, a world disarmament conference [A/8491]. In connexion with this most important question of disarmament, let me quote the relevant portion of the general statement made on 8 October 1971 by my Foreign Minister, the Honourable W. E. A. Ofori-Atta, during the general debate in the plenary Assembly:

“The momentum of the armaments race and the alarmingly high expenditure it involves still remain a great burden for all mankind. It is a sad reflection on our sense of priorities—indeed it is a crime against humanity—for States to be spending more than \$200,000 million a year on the manufacture and perfection of weapons of destruction when they are unable to spend 1 per cent of their gross national product on the elimination of poverty, disease and squalor in the world. . . .

“That is why we must condemn the increase in the arms race and the lack of progress in disarmament. We appreciate the fact that in the field of arms control some agreements have been reached over the last few years, but we cannot conceal our disappointment at the lack of progress by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on general and complete disarmament including the simultaneous elimination of chemical and biological weapons. In this regard we regret the inability of the nuclear Powers to reach agreement on the banning of underground nuclear tests.

“We welcome the changed circumstances that are now making it possible for the People’s Republic of China to play a useful role in disarmament affairs. We also support in principle the Soviet draft resolution proposing a world disarmament conference, which is generally in line with suggestions made by my delegation in the First Committee at the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth sessions.”
[1958th meeting, paras. 93-95.]

48. The question may well be asked in all genuineness why, when organs and committees already exist in the United Nations, which carry out important and useful work in the field of disarmament, yet one more forum should be established to deal with disarmament. That is a legitimate question, which must be answered satisfactorily by all those who support the Soviet draft resolution proposing the holding of a world disarmament conference. My delegation has been moved to support the Soviet proposal for the following reasons:

49. First, the question of disarmament is of such fundamental importance to all mankind that all States must be involved in its solution on an equal basis. It is painfully obvious that there is no organization today, not even the United Nations, with such universal membership as to command universal allegiance and confidence. Admittedly, the General Assembly has, since its decisive vote on the China question, taken a historic and welcome step along the road to universality by the restoration to the People’s Republic of China of all its membership rights and obligations. We are proud and happy to welcome the representatives of that great country into our midst and look forward to sharing the benefit of their views on this most important question of disarmament, as well as on others still facing this Organization. But there are still important States outside the United Nations whose cardinal role and position in the question of armaments make it essential to involve them in any serious disarmament negotiations. The two Germanys, the two Viet-Nams, the two Koreas, Switzerland and others come readily to mind. Ghana would have been the first to oppose the holding of a world disarmament conference outside the United Nations if our existing Organization were sufficiently universal in membership. But until the United Nations is enabled to achieve this most desirable and necessary state of universality, there is no reason for opposing the holding of the proposed world disarmament conference in the light of the purposes I have already described. We cannot have one country or group of countries involved while others are left out.

50. Secondly, new developments in the manufacture and sophistication of armaments give them a character that is so

dangerous to man’s very existence today as to necessitate a total attack on the problem if a solution is to be at all effective. The development in recent years of nuclear weapons, particularly, anti-ballistic missiles and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, not to mention the lethal cosmic rays and laser beams now said to be under development, makes it almost certain that any future war, particularly nuclear war, will not be a respecter of persons or boundaries. The destruction resulting from such a war will be devastating, instantaneous, and spread over a wide area. The report of the Secretary-General’s consultative group of experts gives the following terrifying figures for the destruction that would befall a city with a population of 1 million which extended in all directions for about eight to ten kilometres and was attacked with a single one-megaton nuclear weapon burst at ground level: approximately one third of all the inhabitants would be killed as a result of blast and fire or from a radiation dose—that is to say, the same number of civilians as were killed by air raids both in Germany and Japan during the whole of the Second World War. This does not include other extensive destruction and injury which would occur.

51. Perhaps for the first time we are rapidly being confronted with the stark reality of the indivisibility of peace—a phrase which in the past many of us may have used rather lightly. If man is really to strengthen his security, only the collective protection of peace can ensure this and only collective universal disarmament can ensure this most effectively. The argument for a world disarmament conference is therefore unassailable. We have to stop the further development and refinement of arms before war-making becomes too easy and too suicidal.

52. Thirdly, the financial and economic consequences of the arms race can no longer be contemplated without serious alarm, even shame and indignation. A year or so ago the States of the world were spending some \$200,000 million a year on armaments, a sum that has increased to \$215,000 million this year. M. Malik of the Soviet Union has reminded us of the disquieting forecast that at the end of this decade the expenditure will reach \$300,000 million a year. It is incredible to contemplate such a rate of expenditure on armaments when sums spent for development assistance total only some \$15,000 million a year. Unless a determined effort is made by the international community to stop this trend and turn it in a different direction, we may never achieve the much sought-after goal of liberating resources from armaments for development. The Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [resolution 2734 (XXV)] has for the first time established a link between disarmament, security and development. Consideration of the social and economic consequences of the arms race therefore reinforces the argument for the holding of a world disarmament conference.

53. Fourthly, there is no getting away from the fact that the disarmament effort, as pursued since the General Assembly first established the goal of general and complete disarmament in 1959 [resolution 1378 (XIV)], has actually led to no disarmament. For the past 25 years, all that we have been able to achieve is a series of arms control or limitation measures. The Moscow partial test ban Treaty, the Treaty on the prohibition of stationing nuclear weapons

in outer space,⁴ the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the denuclearization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, significant and useful as these are, have actually regulated arms rather than eliminated them. Our present machinery and procedures have therefore taken us farther and farther away from the goal we have set ourselves. There may well be a link, therefore, between those who control the present machinery for disarmament discussions and the lack of progress towards real disarmament. Is this not a sufficient argument to turn to other machinery and procedures which can attack the core of the problem of disarmament?

54. There is yet a fifth reason why we need a world disarmament conference. It is mainly psychological. Prolonged periods of human coexistence with unsolved problems sooner or later lead to a dangerous belief that those problems need not be solved. This is perhaps the greatest danger confronting the United Nations today. Member States have developed a strange resignation to the evils of *apartheid* which makes them accept it as a tolerable evil. Developed States seem willing and able to contemplate the economic poverty of the developing world as inevitable. Permanent members of the Security Council are willing to condone military occupation of the territories of Member States and connive at the deprivation of dependent peoples of their right to self-determination and independence as though Chapter VII of the Charter did not exist, nor General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It is this same spirit of indifference which makes the nuclear-weapon-States shamelessly continue to test powerful nuclear devices underground, with all the consequences of these tests for the human environment and security while they preach nuclear disarmament and environmental protection to other States. We must arrest this slide into psychological indifference in the disarmament field, for man cannot safely coexist with more and better arms for long. Sooner or later the logic of the arms race will express itself in war, violence and destruction. Only a world disarmament conference can jolt mankind into a dramatic awareness of the danger of this psychological drift and generate the urgency which alone can hammer out new channels to eliminate the cancer of the arms race.

55. Sixth, Mr. Malik of the Soviet Union, in his impressive introductory statement in this debate [*1978th meeting*], quite properly drew attention to recent precedents which could be followed. We agree that the projected United Nations Conference on the Human Environment to be held at Stockholm in June 1972, and the conference on the law of the sea projected for 1973 are both based on the principle that where subjects of universal and urgent concern are to be discussed, this is best done outside the United Nations, either because of the extreme importance of the subject matter or because of the present unrepresentative nature of the United Nations itself. Therefore, we see no reason for any objection to the holding of a world disarmament conference, for what can be of more universal concern than disarmament?

56. The idea of a world disarmament conference is not all that new and the Government of Ghana has consistently

supported it even when it did not enjoy the support of the great Powers, particularly the super-Powers. Ghana has consistently advocated and supported the idea of a conference in which all States would participate on an equal basis. We supported it when it was first proposed by the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at their Second Conference, in Cairo in 1964. This proposal was considered by the General Assembly which, at its twentieth session in 1965, adopted a resolution endorsing the proposal of the non-aligned countries to hold a disarmament conference [*resolution 2030 (XX)*].

57. Despite this resolution, preparations for holding such a conference failed to materialize largely because of difficulties which can only be laid at the door of the major military Powers of the world at the time. Also, in 1968, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States—a conference which received little support from the nuclear Powers—once more called for a world disarmament conference. Again, largely because of the lack of enthusiasm on this issue on the part of the great Powers, the only decision taken by the General Assembly at its twenty-third session was to place on the agenda of the twenty-fourth session the question of the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, including the question of convening early in 1970 a meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to consider disarmament and the related question of the security of nations [*resolution 2456 A (XXIII)*]. At the twenty-fourth session, however, consideration of the question of a world disarmament conference was side-tracked and swallowed up in the general discussion of the Disarmament Decade. The best that could be achieved by those who pressed for a world disarmament conference was resolution 2605 A (XXIV), which further requested the Secretary-General to place on the agenda of the twenty-fifth session “the question of the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.”

58. It was not till 1970 that the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Lusaka again drew attention to the value of convening a world disarmament conference.

59. If I have gone into some detail to trace the history of the idea of a world disarmament conference, it is only to show what is clearly known to be the case, that the small and medium-sized States of the world, particularly the non-aligned, are those that have advocated such a conference most consistently and fervently, and that it is the major Powers, particularly the super-Powers, that have shown little enthusiasm for it. The reasons for this are not hard to find. First, the present organization of disarmament discussions is dominated by the super-Powers. The very status of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is itself unclear. Some believe it to be an organ of the General Assembly. The big Powers, particularly the super-Powers, promptly warn us, however, that this is not so and that it is a negotiating body, set up by them, albeit with the blessing of the General Assembly. The result is that ever since the establishment of that body it has been under the virtual control of its only two co-Chairmen.

60. Thus, when the membership of the Committee was expanded in 1969 from 18 to 26 and its name changed, it

⁴ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

was solely at the discretion of the two co-Chairmen. When the revised non-proliferation Treaty was submitted to the General Assembly, it was submitted by the two co-Chairmen and discussions on the Treaty at the twenty-second session revealed how little prepared they were to revise the text substantively in the light of the reservations and comments made by smaller Powers. Indeed the Secretary-General, in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization [A/8401/Add.1], has supported the appointment of a co-chairman from a non-aligned country in addition to the existing two. It is thus clear that whatever goes on in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament can only be described as virtually controlled discussion. No wonder France, one of the nuclear Powers, has refused to participate in its proceedings. Can we be surprised if another nuclear Power that enters the world scene refuses to be part of such an exclusive club, thus depriving the world of the benefit of its partnership and involvement in a matter that involves all humanity?

61. Again, let us consider the example of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. This is a bilateral negotiation between the two super-Powers. Nobody knows on what basis they are talking or what precisely they are talking about, or whether those talks are predicated upon principles endorsed by resolutions of the General Assembly. Unless this atmosphere of great-Power exclusivism and dominance is broken and all disarmament talks brought under the searchlight of world opinion and universally accepted principles, we shall continue to widen the gap between profession and performance in this field. Only a world disarmament conference can ensure the openness of diplomacy, equality of participation and exposure to public accountability that alone can lead to real action. Peace and security are not the exclusive monopoly of a few powerful States. They are the concern of all humanity. Such exclusivism can well be the cause of the slow progress towards actual disarmament.

62. Since the establishment of the Eighteen-Nation Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, general and complete disarmament has given way to partial and limited disarmament measures. Despite the fact that since 1959 the General Assembly has regularly adopted general and complete disarmament as its goal, the main work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been away from this goal. The only fully-fledged disarmament proposals before the Conference are the Soviet and United States plans presented in 1962.⁵ Since 1964 the content of these documents has not changed in any respect and no other comparable proposals have been submitted from any quarter. In a remarkable pamphlet entitled *Preface to Disarmament, an Appraisal of Recent Proposals*, by Marion H. McVitty, the author has this to say:

“In recent years the piecemeal approach has been followed almost exclusively, but in deference to general and complete disarmament as the avowed goal, such isolated steps are now known as ‘collateral measures’. This designation is apt; the measures which have been

⁵ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex I, sects. C and F respectively.

adopted and those under active consideration are not organically related to the larger objective.

“... ”

“A real question arises as to whether the step-by-step method is in fact easier or more expeditious than a frontal attack upon the problem as a whole.

“Official ingenuity has been devoted more to a search for the least onerous national commitment, than the pursuit of the most effective international solution.”⁶

63. It is for these reasons that my delegation supports the Soviet draft resolution proposing a world disarmament conference. But we cannot agree to the suggestion that it can exist side by side with already existing forums and channels that are being used at present for disarmament negotiations. I have said enough to show that these existing forums are dominated by the two super-Powers, which have actually not addressed themselves seriously to disarmament programmes as such, and are not sufficiently open and representative. These existing institutions, therefore, if they are to be used at all, will have to be modified and their terms of reference and procedures of work revised if we are to reach the goal of general and complete disarmament. We envisage a world disarmament conference meeting perhaps every two years, but having authority to set up its own subsidiary committees as it sees fit, with participation on an equal or equitable basis open to all. Only within such a framework can we see any value in a conference of the five nuclear-weapon Powers. Any other framework would not engender the necessary confidence all round to lead to real and positive results. And we can fully understand if any nuclear-weapon Powers reject existing forums as inappropriate, ineffective and discriminatory.

64. This is why we are not convinced of the connexion between a world disarmament conference and a conference of the five nuclear Powers as proposed by the Soviet Union. In our view, the two cannot be separated. Nuclear disarmament is a component of general and complete disarmament and the statement that the “conference of nuclear Powers could take decisions consonant with the interests of all peoples” cannot be reconciled with other statements that “disarmament concerns all, each and everyone” or that “the world disarmament conference would together consider disarmament problems in all their facets”. The nuclear Powers cannot alone claim to know what the interests of all peoples are. What they have clearly shown so far is the contrary, for they have exercised a monopoly of nuclear weapons, continued to test more powerful weapons and created such a state of insecurity and suspicion that threshold nuclear Powers like Brazil, India, Israel, Japan and South Africa, among others, have still not ratified the non-proliferation Treaty. We are convinced, therefore, that any conference of nuclear Powers must be firmly predicated upon, organized within, and subject to the guidance of, the world disarmament conference.

65. There is another aspect of the Soviet proposal on which we have reservations. This is the idea that the world

⁶ Public Affairs Press (Washington, D.C.).

disarmament conference "should probably become a permanent international forum active for a long time". In our view, nothing could distract more from the urgency of the Soviet proposal than this idea. For it would mean that the peoples of the world are being called upon to live with the arms race permanently. This should not be so. Rather the psychological momentum which the Soviet proposal creates for the cause of disarmament should make it possible and necessary to fix a time limit for the world disarmament conference to finish its job in an identifiable time. We do not care what time limit is fixed, whether 10 or 20 years. In fact, we would consider 20 years as not unrealistic, given the difficulty of the task. This is why the linking of a world disarmament conference with the Disarmament Decade is inescapable.

66. The value of giving a definite lifetime to the world disarmament conference would also have an important consequential effect on related matters of vital importance to international peace and security. In this respect, I would like to remind representatives that when the General Assembly adopted the concept of general and complete disarmament in 1959 it thereby rejected the earlier idea of disarmament based upon national responsibility for defence and protection in favour of the new concept of a "warless world", in which States would have only sufficient internal police forces to maintain domestic order and rely on an international peace and security system, preferably under the United Nations, to protect them and their rights. Progress in disarmament should therefore proceed simultaneously with progress in solving the peace-keeping problem. Advances in disarmament might, therefore, indirectly stimulate the solution of the problem of collective security. For these reasons the Ghana delegation maintains that a strategy for disarmament is necessary for the Disarmament Decade.

67. Thus, we envisage a conference which will set to work immediately to devise a blueprint for the Disarmament Decade we are supposed to be engaged in. My delegation has never understood how we can proclaim a decade of disarmament without setting any guidelines or targets for the achievement of the goals of that decade. This was not how we approached the Second United Nations Development Decade. For this we had a realistic and well-conceived strategy. A similar strategy is needed for the Disarmament Decade if the decade is to be taken seriously. Unless, as my delegation stated in the First Committee, at the twenty-fourth session, such a strategy is "seen from an over-all point of view, reflecting the universal will and purpose of mankind, spread over an identifiable period of time and involving commitments by all concerned—both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon Powers—over nuclear and conventional weapons, we shall be indulging all our lives in organized deception for which the people of the world will never forgive our generation" [1702nd meeting, para. 19].

68. Neither wealth, size of territory, population or technological advance gives superiority to any State or group of States in dealing with this most serious of world problems, the problem of disarmament. Our universal anxiety for peace and development in the face of the frightening and ever-growing danger of the arms race can and must find concrete and realistic expression in a world disarmament conference such as the one I have described. Let us all,

therefore, not only support the proposal to hold a truly universal world disarmament conference, but also ensure that it is so organized as to achieve within it freedom of expression, equality of participation and universal acceptance of its conclusions.

69. Mr. GROZEV (Bulgaria) (*translation from Russian*): The General Assembly of the United Nations is now considering one of the most important problems on the agenda of its present session, that of the convening of a world disarmament conference. Thus, our Organization once again returns to a question which in one form or another has confronted it since its creation. This fact alone eloquently confirms the importance which the United Nations attaches to problems of disarmament.

70. I should like from the outset to stress that the initiative for the inclusion of this question in the agenda of the present session has once again come from the Soviet Union.

71. This is certainly not fortuitous. It is fully in keeping with the consistent and peace-loving foreign policy which the Soviet State has followed since the earliest days of its existence. Lenin's famous Decree on Peace was the first of numerous Soviet initiatives aimed at strengthening peace and international security. It would be difficult to enumerate all those peaceful initiatives. However, they have one thing in common, namely that they have all been based on the long-term interests not only of the Soviet peoples, but also of mankind as a whole. The present initiative for the convening of a world disarmament conference is an example of this. In putting forward this proposal, the Soviet Government has not been guided by any short-term considerations of expediency, but by the long-term interests of international peace.

72. This initiative is based on a sober and thorough analysis of the contemporary political and military world situation. It is based on a practical appreciation of the fact that every opportunity can and should be used to promote the evolution of international life towards the elimination of the threat of war, which would be a catastrophe for the whole of mankind.

73. The first and most important condition for the elimination of that threat and the guaranteeing of peace and international security is the suspension of the insane arms race and a definite transition towards disarmament.

74. The monstrous scale of the arms race, that most dangerous symptom of our age, is well known. One need only recall that, according to United Nations publications, world military expenditure for 1970 amounted to \$204,000 million. That means that now, in conditions of peace, over \$500 million a day is spent on purposes which give rise to concern, tension and the danger of a new world war. Furthermore, the efforts of tens of millions of young men, the skills of thousands of scientists and technicians and the highest achievements of human knowledge are being used not for the benefit of the peoples of the world, but to create weapons of untold destructive force. The destructive power of nuclear weapons, the increasing stockpiles of such weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers and the race to perfect new systems for launching

and delivering nuclear warheads are a constant source of the greatest threat to peace and to life on earth.

75. According to some incontrovertible data, stocks of nuclear weapons in the world total about 50,000 megatons. This is 2.5 million times the power of the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima and is equivalent to 15 tons of TNT for each inhabitant of the world. Nuclear weapons are found not only in the arsenals of countries which produce them; they are everywhere in the world. Submarines carry them under water and aircraft carry them in the air above us. New intercontinental missiles can deliver them over thousands of miles. There is no longer any point on the globe which is out of their reach.

76. In these conditions of an ever-increasing arms race which can lead mankind to unforeseeable consequences, there is only one solution left to us, namely, to take urgent and decisive measures to limit and eliminate the danger.

77. It is an indisputable fact that such measures must be designed above all to settle one of the most important problems in the modern world—the problem of disarmament, which is directly linked to the vitally important political, economic, scientific and technological problems which confront all countries in the world.

78. That is why in his letter to the Secretary-General [A/8491], the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Comrade Gromyko, stressing the exceptional importance of the problem of disarmament, wrote:

“The international situation of the future will to a great extent depend upon its solution, which may lead, on the one hand, to a lessening of international tensions and a slowing of the arms race or, on the other hand, to continuing preparations for war at an ever-increasing pace and an increased threat of another world war.”

79. It is in that clear and alarming perspective that the true dimensions of the problem of disarmament are apparent. It is clear to everyone that there is no alternative, and for that reason, these dimensions acquire an exceptional and vital importance for the future of the world which, justly, is a cause of alarm for all the peoples of the world.

80. As is well known, disarmament has a lengthy history. Through protracted and difficult talks, at various levels and in various forums, certain results have been achieved whose beneficial influence is undisputed. In recent years some important international agreements have been concluded which, to a certain extent, limit and slow down the arms race. Such agreements include, for example, the 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, the draft Convention on bacteriological weapons, prepared this year, and several others. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) continue between the USSR and the United States and give us great hopes.

81. However, we must admit that what has been achieved up to now in this field is far from being equal to the importance and significance of the problem. The very pace of the talks is not in keeping with the urgent necessity to act as speedily as possible. In addition, even the most significant of those achievements do not completely settle the problems concerned. Thus, for example, although more than eight years have elapsed since the signing of the Moscow Treaty, two nuclear Powers have not adhered to it at all. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has also not been signed or ratified by a number of States, including some Powers which possess sufficient technical and financial potential for the production of such weapons. Furthermore, some countries have not to this day adhered to the Geneva Protocol of 1925⁷ prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare. In other words, what we have done up to now certainly cannot be compared to what remains to be done, and what we must do.

82. The history of disarmament is to some extent a history of missed opportunities. At the same time it is a history of new difficulties which complicate the task every time we enter a new phase in the arms race. A particularly enlightening example of this can be seen in the field of nuclear weapons. Each generation of new weapons creates new and more complex problems. It is clear that if we do not do what we can and must do now, we shall barely be able to regain the time lost. What we must do today is to take measures to adopt a radically new approach to disarmament problems, to stop the arms race, and to stop the dangerous process of perfecting and stockpiling weapons, above all nuclear weapons.

83. It is well known that the arms race is neither a supernatural phenomenon nor a natural calamity. It is the product of a specific policy of the imperialist Powers, and first and foremost their leader, the United States of America.

84. Since the time of the Second World War, the ruling circles of that country have undertaken the creation of a military machine designed to ensure the absolute superiority of the United States in order to enable it to be master of the world's destiny. Typical of that policy has been the stockpiling of increasingly sophisticated destructive weapons, the establishment of hundreds of military bases on foreign soil, and the formation of aggressive military blocs. That policy has also been typified by interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States and the unleashing of wars in various parts of the world.

85. The clear-cut threat to the independence of peoples and their right to manage their own internal affairs which is inherent in such a policy has drawn all countries, large and small, into the spiral of the arms race. It is that threat which is the cause of the continuous increase in military budgets. For example, for this year alone the military budget of the United States amounted to about \$75,000 million, and quite recently the United States Secretary of

⁷ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

Defense declared that he would request an increase in the budget of his Department for 1972 to \$80,000 million.

86. At the same time the ruling circles of the United States reject various proposals aimed at slowing down the pace of the arms race, violently oppose new Soviet initiatives in this field and are establishing what American writers have called the "industry of death" as the basis of their national policy and national economy. Sometimes openly, more often with silent disdain, those ruling circles oppose proposals for consideration of some important disarmament problems, such as, for example, the Soviet proposal to outlaw nuclear weapons and the proposal to conclude an agreement prohibiting the use of those most terrifying weapons of mass destruction. By erecting artificial barriers the United States of America is hindering the achievement of agreement on the cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests. It was opposed to the simultaneous conclusion of agreements on the banning of bacteriological and chemical weapons and, despite many appeals by the United Nations, has still not ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol. As is well known, the representatives of the United States have not agreed to the full demilitarization of the sea-bed, they do not intend at present to hold talks on military bases on foreign soil, and they show no interest in the problem of general and complete disarmament. Such are the facts.

87. From this high and responsible rostrum of the United Nations, the representatives of many countries have often and, I should say, quite rightly, made statements appealing for objectivity, precision and justice. But if we really want to be objective, precise and just, we must see and recognize the truth as it is.

88. The truth in this case is that responsibility for the existing arms race and for the fact that strong enough steps are still not being taken towards disarmament rests not on one or two of the greatest Powers of the world but on one Power only—the United States of America.

89. Just as one cannot say that white equals black or that truth equals untruth, one cannot find a common denominator between the Soviet Union and the United States. The facts show that it is the Soviet Union which, with the utmost sincerity, and in deeds, not in words, shows the greatest initiative and persistence in matters relating to partial as well as general and complete disarmament. Can one say the same about the United States of America?

90. It is clear that the interests of all peoples, including the peoples of the United States, require that the existing opposition should be overcome, so that we may be able to pass from an arms race to true disarmament and to the creation of all the conditions necessary to guarantee peace and strengthen international security.

91. At this moment in history, which is characterized by exceptional activity in international life, the main efforts, as is shown by many recent events, are directed towards solving problems which are of vital importance for the very future of mankind. In the forefront of these tasks are the strengthening of peace and international security and the organization of international economic co-operation. The close relationship between these two tasks has been stressed

by many delegations both in the General Assembly and in various committees. I should merely like to remind the Assembly that between those two tasks, on the one hand, and disarmament, on the other, there are also very close links of interdependence. There is no doubt that the adoption of decisive measures to halt the arms race will create conditions for a stable peace and economic prosperity.

92. The development of contemporary international relations makes it imperative that the efforts of all Powers—large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear—should be greatly intensified in order to solve the problems of disarmament. We consider that there is an urgent need for persistence in seeking and finding a new approach to those problems, that new methods of international co-operation in that field must be worked out and applied, and that new forces must be mobilized. The slow progress of the talks up to now, without the participation of certain countries, serves only the interests of those who oppose decisive and specific measures for a speedy solution to the problem of disarmament.

93. It is such measures which the Soviet Government is proposing in the present tense yet favourable situation. The complete programme approved by the twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union raised the problems of disarmament to their proper level. Two proposals in this programme stand out: first, the convening of a conference of the five nuclear Powers and, secondly, the convening of a world disarmament conference.

94. At the present time, the nuclear Powers bear the greatest responsibility for international security. It is they who created and who produce and possess nuclear weapons. Who, if not they themselves, can study the problems which arise as a consequence of this situation? One can vote in favour of dozens of the most just resolutions; one can send the most fervent appeals; one can be inspired by the best possible intentions—all without achieving any genuine result, because in the final analysis it is upon the nuclear Powers alone that the formulation of practical measures to eliminate the nuclear danger depends.

95. For that reason our Delegation is convinced that the proposal to convene a conference of the five nuclear Powers remains one of the most important questions of present-day international life.

96. The very fact that so mighty a Power as the Soviet Union is calling for the solution of the problem of disarmament already provides a practical basis for such a proposal. That basis is in fact even broader if we take into account the warm support with which all peace-loving States have greeted the Soviet proposal. In the words of Comrade Brezhnev:

"These proposals are not propaganda slogans; they are a programme of action reflecting political objectives which are becoming ever more attainable in our time."

97. And that is so because questions of nuclear disarmament and disarmament questions in general are not the exclusive concern of some countries. They are problems for all countries and peoples, for the whole of mankind. It is

quite natural that these problems should be considered by all, that all countries should participate in the adoption of measures we so urgently need. That is the meaning of the Soviet initiative regarding the convening of a world disarmament conference.

98. We know that in 1965, at its twentieth session, the General Assembly voted in favour of a resolution supporting the convening of such a conference. That testifies to the fact that the present Soviet initiative is popular and timely, although it has still not been carried out. There is therefore an even greater need today for the urgent convening of a world disarmament conference.

99. The proposed conference, as a world forum at which all countries of the world without exception would be represented, will be able to examine the whole range of disarmament questions. There is not the slightest doubt that during the course of the preparations for and the holding of such a conference new initiatives, new ideas and new proposals will appear and practical measures will be found to solve the problem of disarmament on a broad basis which is acceptable to all and in the interests of the whole of mankind.

100. The proposal of the Soviet Government limits neither the range of questions which can be considered at the conference nor the measures it can recommend. It is quite logical to consider that particular attention will be devoted to the question of the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. It follows that the participation of all the nuclear Powers is absolutely essential. In that sense the Soviet proposals for a conference of the five nuclear Powers and for a world disarmament conference are closely linked.

101. A world disarmament conference will also be able to consider all other disarmament questions, from separate partial measures to general and complete disarmament. Here we might mention such questions as the banning of chemical weapons, the cessation of underground nuclear tests, the elimination of military bases on foreign soil, the reduction of military budgets, and so on. In this connexion, it should be emphasized that the convening of the conference will not mean either that other forms of talks will be excluded or that the work of other organs, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, will be underestimated. On the contrary, a world disarmament conference will be a logical extension of the efforts of such bodies, and will supplement and intensify them.

102. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria unreservedly supports the new initiatives of the Soviet Government. As the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhikov, said at the tenth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party:

"In their totality, the Soviet initiatives constitute one of the main strategic tasks in the programme for strengthening international peace."

103. My delegation is deeply convinced that the implementation of the Soviet proposal on the convening of a world disarmament conference would be an important and

decisive step towards solving one of the fundamental tasks of the United Nations.

104. In supporting the Soviet draft resolution, the Bulgarian delegation joins in the appeal made therein to the Governments of all countries of the world to contribute to the preparation and early convening of the conference and to efforts to ensure the fullest success of the world disarmament conference. The Bulgarian Government, for its part, will participate willingly in the necessary consultations on this matter on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis.

105. We believe that as a result of consultations between States the necessary preparations will be carried out during the coming year and that thus it will become possible to convene the conference at a very early date.

106. By adopting the proposed resolution on the convening of a world disarmament conference, the United Nations will truly be able to focus the attention of this decade on the great problem of disarmament, which is vitally important for humanity.

107. That will unquestionably be a most significant contribution by our Organization to the great and noble cause of strengthening peace and international security.

108. Mr. KHATRI (Nepal): The restoration of China's rights in the United Nations has not only lent urgency to the question of convening a world disarmament conference but has also considerably enhanced the prospects for such a conference. One of the major stumbling blocks to Peking's participation in the conference and to its success has now been removed.

109. A world disarmament conference has taken on added significance because China's participation in the quest for disarmament will require new modalities and new forums for the conduct of disarmament negotiations. The outdated disarmament modalities and forums of the 1960s cannot cope with the added dimension of China's entry into the world disarmament picture.

110. For those reasons the delegation of Nepal wholeheartedly supports the Soviet initiative for convening a world disarmament conference. One of the first tasks of that conference would be to establish a new negotiating forum that would be appropriate for Peking's participation, because the existing negotiating forums, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), for obvious reasons do not lend themselves to such participation. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks constitute a bilateral forum aimed at freezing the "overkill" capacity of the two nuclear giants. The People's Republic of China, which, far from having reached an "overkill" capacity, is still striving to achieve a credible nuclear deterrent, could hardly be expected to participate in SALT until it had managed to achieve, at the very least, a capability to inflict unacceptable damage. As for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, past and recent statements by the Chinese leaders give us no reason to believe that the Chinese Government will take part in that body as at present constituted. To secure the participation of the People's Republic of China, changes in the structure and the rules of

the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will have to be effected to such an extent as to render that body as it is now constituted, completely unrecognizable. It would be far easier and more satisfactory to all concerned to establish a new negotiating forum. This would be one of the urgent tasks of the world disarmament conference.

111. Along with a new negotiating forum, new rules and modalities for disarmament negotiations will have to be devised. The Zorin-McCloy joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations,⁸ of a decade ago, and the Soviet and United States draft treaties on general and complete disarmament will have to be revised and brought into conformity with the developments that have taken place since 1961. These are but two items in the whole complex of problems relating to disarmament which urgently need the attention of all nations. The convening of a world disarmament conference, therefore, has become an acute necessity, although we feel that the reactivation of the Disarmament Commission, now that the People's Republic of China is among us, would serve more or less the same purpose.

112. Previous attempts by the United Nations to convene a world disarmament conference failed primarily because China did not think it proper to take part in a conference convened by or held under the auspices of the United Nations until its rights had been restored in the world Organization.

113. Now we see no obstacle to the participation of the People's Republic of China in a world disarmament conference or in a session of the Disarmament Commission, whichever comes into being. In our opinion, a session of the Disarmament Commission might suffice, unless it is decided to hold a conference at the summit level, in which case a world disarmament conference would be more appropriate. We do not believe that there would be any insurmountable difficulty in inviting non-Member States to participate in a session of the Disarmament Commission. However, neither the type of forum nor the level of representation is at this stage as important as the agenda of the conference.

114. It might be suggested that the General Assembly, at its current session, appoint an *ad hoc* committee of, say 20 Member States, which would be entrusted, *inter alia*, with preparing the agenda of that conference. Among the first items on the agenda should be the question of establishing a new negotiating body and providing it with guidelines so that it could negotiate and study the implementation of those guidelines.

115. The question of the non-use of nuclear weapons should also be accorded one of the top places in the agenda of the conference. At the twenty-second session, in rejecting the concept of security assurances in connexion with the non-proliferation Treaty, I stated in the First Committee, on behalf of my delegation, that the ideal security guarantee was for the nuclear Powers to make a categorical pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries, as well as against one another [see 1559th meeting]. Such a pledge could be incorporated in a

declaration by the five permanent members of the Security Council similar to the tripartite declaration on security assurances made in the Security Council in conjunction with the adoption of its resolution 255 (1968) on 19 June 1968. It is now highly imperative that China and France be associated with the concept of guaranteeing security assurances. It seems to us that the non-first-use concept is the most feasible formula for achieving that objective, as well as for settling satisfactorily the controversial question of security assurances for non-nuclear weapon States.

116. A logical follow-up to the non-first-use item would be the Soviet proposal for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. However, that proposal cannot be considered separately from the idea of a freeze on the production and deployment of strategic weapons and systems, both offensive and defensive. When considering the idea of a freeze, special emphasis must be given to an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to halt the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and anti-ABM systems, and to halt the production of delivery vehicles. The absence of such a freeze will only serve to postpone the arrival of a credible Chinese deterrent, and consequently China's participation in a forum similar to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

117. Closely linked to the freeze and a "must" on the agenda of the conference is the Soviet proposal to reduce to a minimum the number of delivery vehicles held by the nuclear Powers during the process of general and complete disarmament.⁹ The Gromyko proposal, as this formula is called, would fix the numerical ceiling on delivery vehicles at the level where both sides would be assured of an adequate deterrent. With China now on the disarmament scene, the numerical ceiling under the Gromyko proposal would have to correspond to the minimum number of missiles that China needs to deter a nuclear attack. This, we believe, is a realistic condition for any meaningful dialogue with the People's Republic of China on general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. These details will have to be worked out by the parties concerned in the new negotiating body.

118. There are other important measures that need to be discussed at the conference, such as the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific, as well as in other areas of the world, and a mutual non-aggression pact between the nuclear Powers, to which such major economic Powers as Japan and West Germany could also become parties.

119. In discussing the question of a world disarmament conference, one cannot overlook the proposal for a conference of the five nuclear Powers recently made by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The proposal has great merit. In our opinion, the seating of the People's Republic of China as a permanent member of the Security Council has now obviated the need for such a conference outside the United Nations. As permanent members of the Security Council, the five nuclear Powers will certainly have every opportunity to meet and discuss questions relating to the preservation of international peace and security, particularly those relating to nuclear disarmament.

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Eighteenth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1208th meeting.

120. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): The Hungarian delegation welcomes the draft resolution of the Soviet Union for the convening of a world disarmament conference, contained in document A/L.631. We attach great importance to this question and are ready in every respect to take part in the preparation of such a conference and to do our utmost towards its success. My delegation feels that the Soviet initiative is a necessary and timely move.

121. The necessity of convening a world disarmament conference is fully confirmed by the steadily rising expenditure on armaments, by the development of ever newer and more complicated and destructive kinds of weapons and of weapon systems and by the threat of a world nuclear catastrophe. It is high time to halt the race, imposed on us by imperialism, in which a considerable proportion of human and material resources is wasted on armaments, thereby hampering or slowing down economic and social progress and the raising of living standards. Permit me to refer to the report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security [A/8469 and Add.1].

122. In the general debate this year the Foreign Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic pointed out that:

“Humanity can be saved from a new world war, and the hazards of thermo-nuclear war can be eliminated only by a gradual approach to general and complete disarmament.

“The partial agreements already concluded or still under discussion all serve this historic purpose. No one must be naive as far as these high aims are concerned. In this connexion I refer to the Soviet proposal for a meeting of the five nuclear Powers and a world disarmament conference. The purpose of those proposals is to keep the ban on the armaments race and the realization of general and complete disarmament on the agenda of our everyday life. Humanity is capable of bringing disaster on itself, even without thermo-nuclear war, merely by maintaining and stepping up the present arms race.” [1964th meeting, paras. 121 and 122.]

123. The present Soviet proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference is not the first of its kind, either in general or on the part of Soviet Union. The proposals made earlier could not be realized for various reasons, but mainly because of the opposition of world-wide forces of aggression and colonialism. The timeliness of the present Soviet proposal is enhanced by today's general political situation, which is much more favourable than ever before for the convening of such a conference. I should like to refer to such factors in this more favourable general situation as the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin¹⁰ and, further, the treaties between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany¹¹ and between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany,¹² which we hope will be ratified soon. The earliest possible realization and successful outcome of the proposal of the socialist coun-

tries for the convocation of an all-European conference on security and co-operation would give a considerable impetus to regional disarmament measures in Europe. Let us also add to the list the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the Soviet Union and the United States, which we hope will soon produce results and a declaration of the intention to reduce the armed forces and armaments in Europe.

124. We are convinced that the results of decolonization, the results of the national liberation movements, the advancement of the heroic struggle of the people of Viet-Nam and the elimination of the consequences of armed aggressions in various parts of the world would contribute to a large extent to the creation of a better international situation and one more suitable for effective disarmament measures. Last but not least, I wish to mention in this context the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.

125. Accordingly my delegation believes there can be no doubt about the timeliness of convening a world conference. We are of the opinion that a world disarmament conference would be worthy of the Disarmament Decade inasmuch as it would give a new impulse to the various efforts at disarmament by discussing as widely as possible the problems of disarmament, by formulating new proposals, ideas and plans and by taking concerted action to implement them.

126. In the judgement of my delegation it would not be expedient or useful for anybody to wish to ensure that the world conference—even though with the best of intentions—should enjoy some sort of exclusiveness in the field of disarmament questions. We think this would create new difficulties and problems. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and any possible future forum or framework of negotiation are not in contradiction with a world disarmament conference but complement each other. A world disarmament conference might promote considerably the disarmament talks taking place in other forums, already existing or to be created, while the results of the work of the Committee on Disarmament and of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks create better conditions for the work of a world disarmament conference.

127. In the opinion of the Hungarian delegation the world disarmament conference, the one dealing with the whole complex of disarmament issues, should concentrate on the prohibition and elimination of the weapons of mass destruction, including first of all nuclear weapons.

128. That is why my Government has welcomed and endorsed the Soviet proposal for a meeting of the five nuclear-weapon Powers. It is self-evident that any progress in the field of nuclear disarmament can be made only with the participation of all nuclear Powers and by their mutual agreement. I should like to express the hope that the great responsibility which these States bear for the peace of the world and the strengthening of international security will eventually make it possible to convene and put through a conference of the five nuclear Powers. As far as nuclear disarmament is concerned, we deem it extremely urgent and important to draw up and conclude an international treaty on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We

¹⁰ Signed at Berlin on 3 September 1971.

¹¹ Signed in Moscow on 12 August 1970.

¹² Signed at Warsaw on 7 December 1970.

also attribute great urgency and importance to the earliest possible prohibition of underground nuclear explosions based on national means of detection and control.

129. We hold the view, furthermore, that the partial results so far attained in the curbing of the nuclear arms race should be made universal.

130. As regards the prohibition and elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, my delegation is pleased to take note of the results achieved by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva with respect to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their destruction, as expressed in the draft convention submitted to the General Assembly. We consider it absolutely necessary that some progress should also be made as soon as possible on the question of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons—an aim towards which the representatives of Hungary have been consistently working from the very beginning, both in the General Assembly and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

131. In our opinion it is an indispensable and fundamental requirement that all States of the world should participate in the world disarmament conference. The tasks facing us in respect of disarmament call for the participation and contribution of all States, regardless of whether they are Members of the United Nations or not. I should like to emphasize particularly that of the non-Member States the German Democratic Republic has made a positive response [A/8452] to the proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference.

132. Our experience of international negotiations for disarmament shows that we are faced here with a historical process and not with an isolated act. The very task before us is so enormous that it cannot be resolved by one conference. Consequently my delegation welcomes and supports the proposal that the conference should function at some length and meet in session every two or three years or at any justified intervals.

133. Our Charter in its very first preambular paragraph gives expression to the determination of the peoples of the United Nations “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. It is as a practical implementation of this determination that the Charter defines the primary purpose of the Organization: the maintenance of international peace and security and the prevention of aggressive war. The formulation and application of effective disarmament measures are the best means of safeguarding international peace, of strengthening international security without limiting the right to individual or collective self-defence and to national independence and self-determination. This interdependence was already underlined by the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security adopted by the General Assembly last year [resolution 2734 (XXV)].

134. In its reply to the letter sent by the Secretary-General pursuant to the request contained in that Declaration my Government stated among other things:

“The Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic attaches great importance to the discussion of the

questions of disarmament and to efforts at their solution made both in and outside the United Nations. We were pleased to have been invited to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, to have been given an opportunity to use also this important forum, in accordance with our modest ability, for the promotion of the cause of disarmament. The Hungarian delegation participating in the work of the Committee is guided by the desire to contribute as actively as possible to working out disarmament measures and having them accepted . . .”
[See A/8431.]

135. The Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic has always paid particular attention to the formulation and practical implementation of disarmament measures. Not only in multilateral international treaties approved by the General Assembly, but also in recently concluded or renewed bilateral treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, my country has assumed an international obligation to continue its efforts to consolidate international peace and security. The endeavours of the Hungarian Government have consistently been aimed at lessening international tensions, strengthening international peace and security, securing the withdrawal of aggressive forces from occupied territories, fostering the movements of national liberation, eliminating colonialism, putting an end to the arms race and achieving general and complete disarmament.

136. In conclusion, permit me to express the hope that the vast majority of States will support the proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference, for it might open up new prospects for more rapid and effective progress in the field of disarmament.

137. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): We are, like many other small States, very fortunate indeed in not being a nuclear Power. I say “fortunate” because we can be as objective as is humanly possible when we address ourselves to the item under consideration from the rostrum of the General Assembly. We know very well that the policies of States big and small are predicated on economics. Man has to have bread and a job, otherwise he cannot be politically free. World economic development and social progress will proceed at a very slow pace if States, large and small, continue the arms race. Two world wars have proved that conventional weapons are adequate for wreaking mass destruction, as was evident in Coventry and Dresden during the Second World War. Two small atomic bombs were enough to flatten Hiroshima and Nagasaki and bring about untold suffering upon the survivors of those two Asian cities. Asian cities! They were not dropped on Europe during the Second World War; they were dropped on two Asian cities. Bear that fact in mind and forget that Japan was a foe of the Western Powers. The better part of wisdom prevailed and no nuclear weapons were used in the Korean war. Why? Because at that time the major power which had dropped the two atom bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima knew that the Soviet Union had nuclear bombs in its own arsenal.

138. So a new phrase was coined, “the deterrence of fear”. In other words, had there been no fear, atomic weapons would have been used in the Korean War. But, as I said, the better part of wisdom prevailed.

139. In the Viet-Nam war it seems there was some tacit agreement that nuclear weapons would be kept locked in the arsenals, although the destruction was stupendous and we are told that more bombs were dropped on that unhappy country than had been used during the whole of the Second World War.

140. Over a quarter of a century has elapsed since the United Nations Charter was proclaimed to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. I witnessed the signature of the Charter at San Francisco. Somehow I was not very hopeful. But many of my friends said, "You are a pessimist. This Charter will bring about peace." And what happened? We have had many bloody conflicts during that period of over 25 years since the Charter was signed, besides the wars in Korea and Viet-Nam to which I have just referred. Over \$200,000 million—due to inflation I hear now the figure is \$220,000 million—are disbursed annually on armaments, and the race to invent more diabolical weapons of mass destruction is proceeding at higher and higher speeds. No wonder that the economies of many countries are suffering from deficit spending to maintain a race with no end in sight.

141. In 1965 attempts were made to hold a world disarmament conference, and those efforts were abortive. I remember that personally I tried my best to point out to our Afro-Asian group that the world disarmament conference would bear no fruit if France and the People's Republic of China were left outside the pale of such a convocation. Again, I was told, "You are a pessimist. They will join. France will be persuaded to join and the People's Republic of China will also join." I still recall that France at that time did not evince any desire to participate in that conference. On the other hand, I was personally assured by one of the major powers that the People's Republic of China would be invited as a principal Power to join in the deliberations of that conference. I was very doubtful and I personally did not encourage the convening of such a conference. I was vindicated in my assumption that neither France nor China was ready then to take part in a conference as contemplated in 1965, and for a very simple reason: there was a wide nuclear disparity between France and China, on the one hand, and the other major nuclear Powers, namely, the United States, the Soviet Union, and I believe Britain. I do not know how strong Britain was. They made special arrangements with the United States. You know the Anglo-Saxons!

142. Then we were confronted by the non-proliferation Treaty of the nuclear Powers. This was to a large extent a feeble attempt to prevent other States from developing their own nuclear weapon industries. The major Powers formed a club amongst themselves—a club! We refrained from signing the Treaty for two reasons: first, we had no armament industry to begin with: whatever arms we needed we had to import; and secondly, we thought that if we signed such a treaty, it would be tantamount to endorsing a monopoly by members of a sort of exclusive club that had such weapons in their arsenal.

143. But it is about six years now since the idea of convening a conference first came into being. Can we still afford to be pessimistic about the future? I think if we remain pessimistic—and I for one am not a congenital

optimist—I think we may as well mark time; within 30 years this world will blow up—let man disappear from the surface of this earth because he does not deserve to live. Something should be done. The "old fogies" of my generation are bankrupt. They could do nothing. But the young have a right to live.

144. Should we follow the same pattern as heretofore by taking instructions and lacking conviction? We cannot afford that. We have children and children's children, whose world is different from ours. We cannot follow the semantics of our generation. Such words as "imperialism", on the one hand, and "glorified democracy", on the other hand are empty words when it comes to people who have a right to live, deluded as they have been for more than two and a half decades by such epithets as "justice" and "fairness", while sneakingly the politicians concoct new weapons of mass destruction. This is a schizophrenic approach to a new world which we wish to proclaim and which we thought we had proclaimed in the San Francisco Charter in 1945.

145. A major prerequisite for the success of a world disarmament conference would be to stop testing nuclear weapons. Quite recently, France wisely stopped testing nuclear or hydrogen bombs—I do not know what kind; I am a layman, a man of peace; I hear the words but I do not know what kind of diabolical bombs these are. France heeded the appeals of many States. But, unfortunately, the Government of our host country here exploded a bomb about 10 days ago in the Aleutians, although I had tabled a draft resolution on that subject in the First Committee, [A/C.1/L.567]. But who is Baroody? What is Saudi Arabia? What is Canada even? Who are the people who protested? To use an analogy, like horses with blinkers, they see only the way they have set themselves to run, while those who are on the sidelines are neglected and ignored.

146. We have no assurance from our friends from the Soviet Union that they will not carry out some underground or undersea tests; we have no assurance. And our friends sitting here can give us no such assurance because, after all, they receive instructions from their capital, like everyone else.

147. And what assurance do we have from our Asian brothers from the People's Republic of China who are today sitting with us that their Government will not test more bombs?

148. Yesterday I remarked to friends who asked me that we have no assurance from them, not because I am criticizing anybody here, but because they are in a predicament. They want to achieve parity as a nuclear Power with the other nuclear Powers. And let me tell you that trying to achieve parity is as elusive as a mirage in the desert, because nuclear weapons and similar weapons of mass destruction are devised with great secrecy. How could we achieve parity if we were a nuclear Power? Who is to be the judge of parity, since these things are done secretly?

149. We are caught in a vicious circle; is it necessary, therefore, to convocate a world disarmament conference? I submit that it is high time for us to do so, now that France

has acted wisely; now that we have our brothers from China sitting among us—and China happens to be a nuclear Power; and now that the Soviet Union declares that we should hold such a conference at an early date; and I am sure our colleagues from the host country, the United States of America, would favour such an idea. Why not? For fear that such a conference may fail? We are failing anyway. Why not try? What is the alternative if we do not have a conference? A rat race? The difficulty is to race in tunnels like moles in the ground. One mole does not see the other. These are nuclear moles. Do not feel insulted: it is a figure of speech. I wish sometimes we were moles, guided by the instinct for survival.

150. However, I have a suggestion to make to our Soviet friends. It is not as yet an amendment; I do not want to precipitate an amendment at such an early stage. I could turn my hand to an amendment, but I want to think very carefully before doing so. It is a mere suggestion. I personally believe that a world disarmament conference would stand a better chance of success if, in the period between now and the date set for the conference, the nuclear Powers were to come to an understanding on a common denominator, an area of agreement, which should not be a burden to them in so far as their Defence Ministries are concerned, and that would be to see if within, say, a period of six months they would stop all testing of nuclear weapons. Inasmuch as the draft resolution to which I referred has been tabled, I should like to read part of it from this rostrum to refresh the memory of those representatives who I believe have it in their power to communicate with their Governments and to tell them how we small Powers feel about testing

151. The second and third preambular paragraphs read as follows:

“Considering that for the last few years the United Nations has been preoccupied with finding ways and means of diminishing the pollution of the earth’s atmosphere.

“Noting that physicists have been unanimous on the conclusion that the fall-out from nuclear explosions is injurious to human and animal life and that such fall-out may poison the earth’s atmosphere for many decades to come”.

Some tell us that they have a clean bomb. Suppose the others cannot devise a clean bomb and have a dirty bomb. What shall we do about that? Can you guarantee to us that all your nuclear bombs are clean? Nobody can guarantee that. Suppose one nuclear Power guarantees that its nuclear bombs are clean; can the other nuclear Powers guarantee that their nuclear bombs are clean? We have no such assurance.

152. The fifth preambular paragraph reads:

“Recognizing that there already exist sufficient nuclear and other lethal weapons in the arsenals of certain powers to decimate the world’s population and possibly render the earth uninhabitable”.

153. Then there are two simple operative paragraphs. Operative paragraph 1:

“Appeals”—we do not say urges; we small Powers cannot urge the nuclear Powers—“to the nuclear Powers to desist from carrying out further nuclear explosions, whether underground or in the earth’s atmosphere;”—and, I should add, under water.

154. The peoples of the world are losing faith in us here in the United Nations. We squabble and quarrel and pick on one another, using all kinds of epithets and vilification. I went through the cold war here. Then we thought there was a *détente*, but suddenly there has been a flareup of insults among us. With what results? The poisoning, not of the atmosphere, but of our hearts and our minds, which has caused us to reply with similar epithets. This is what we have been doing for the better part of 25 years—getting nowhere. The peoples of the world, and especially the young, are tired of us. And we play our role here, assuming the posture of diplomats, receiving instructions from our Governments, and reading our instructions like homework—with dignity. What kind of dignity? Let us be frank with one another. Humanity, suffering humanity—what have we done about alleviating many of its ills? And here we throw invectives at one another.

155. Operative paragraph 2 *“Reassures the peoples of the world”*—the peoples and not the Governments. We are the Governments, but the Charter says “the peoples of the world”, not “the Governments of the world”. I must remind our colleagues that we are the servants of the people, and if we do not serve them we do not deserve to be in authority. An Arab proverb states: “The leader of a people is its servant, and once he is found not to be its servant, that people rebels against him and replaces him by another servant.” It is a great honour to be the servant of a people. I am not using the word in the sense of servility. There is no more noble calling than that of being the servant of one’s people or of people at large. So operative paragraph 2:

“Reassures the peoples of the world that the United Nations will continue to raise its voice against nuclear explosions”—or tests—“of any kind and earnestly requests the nuclear Powers not to deploy nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.”

This should be a prerequisite in the interim period between now and the holding of the conference, in order to see whether the nuclear Powers mean business or are just beguiling themselves and us with empty talk.

156. The second prerequisite concerns the expenses of the conference. I earnestly believe that the expenses of the world disarmament conference should be borne exclusively by the nuclear Powers and by voluntary contributions of the non-nuclear Powers. I am speaking advisedly, because our purse is empty. We have no money. I do not think we shall get more funds. Who is going to pay the \$32 million owed by the Republic of China? I do not know whether you here are going to pay it. We need the money. Come on, pay into the budget. We should praise France for having made a voluntary contribution. What about you people here whose countries are prospering? Come on, show us what you can pay. The United Nations cannot pay the salaries. How do you expect to hold a world conference? Will our finances be any better in 1973? I do not think

they will. I read the Soviet draft resolution on salaries and finances submitted to the Fifth Committee [see A/8531/Add.1, para. 27]. It was rather like a strait jacket and I tried to amend it so as to make it a little flexible. The United States had its own pet draft resolution [*ibid.*, para. 25] and what did that draft attempt to do? It was specific only about certain posts which the United States would like to see maintained. So we have either one extreme or the other, and we cannot afford that. We have to set our Organization in order: that is a prerequisite. Who is going to pay for the world disarmament conference? When you big Powers pay the lion's share of \$200,000 million annually on armaments, you should be able to afford a couple of million for such a conference. Do not tell us that the small countries should be false witnesses and should participate in the conference. Participate in what way? They have no power, they have no nuclear industries. Participate in what way? By words? We want deeds. We cannot afford any more words. If we continue wagging our tongues like this the peoples of the world will hold us accountable. They may rebel against us all and say that we are no good and should no longer have any authority.

157. There is a third prerequisite for a world disarmament conference, namely the establishment of certain terms of reference. Politics should be set aside. None of the nuclear Powers should be able to produce "clients" whom they could use to advantage by having them say that colonialism is still with us. Of course it is; so is neo-colonialism; and so is racial discrimination. But it would only confuse the issue and we small Powers would be beating our small drums while the big Powers laughed up their sleeves.

158. The terms of reference of the conference should include the provision that the conference should not serve as a platform for propaganda by States, big or small. It should be a technical conference—if I may use the word—not to be injected with the policies of States, serving their petty national interests. That is the third prerequisite

for the conference proposed in the Soviet draft resolution, a draft which deserves our scrutiny and careful consideration.

159. After I have read the statements already made by my colleagues and those that will be made, I may find it useful to introduce certain amendments, if not suggestions, in the light of what they have said but I will not do so at this stage.

160. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the United States in exercise of the right of reply.

161. Mr. PHILLIPS (United States of America): I have asked to reply very briefly to certain comments made this afternoon by the representative of Bulgaria which grossly distort and completely misrepresent the policies of my Government with respect to this important question of disarmament.

162. My delegation can agree fully with the representative of Bulgaria that objectivity and truth should characterize all speeches given from this platform. But judging from his example there still exists a wide gap between that ideal and present reality. I will not reply in detail to the distortions of the Bulgarian representative with respect to my Government; they do not merit further attention and, of course, I categorically reject them all. I hope we can continue these deliberations without further crude one-sided attempts to fix the blame for the so-called arms race.

163. Suffice it to say that the record of my Government over the years in working to reduce the heavy burden of armaments is clear and well known. We have persevered, and we will continue to persevere, in the difficult but essential process of negotiation, which is the only sure road to world disarmament.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.