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President : Mr. Luis PADILLA NERVO (Mexico)

Programme of meetings.

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : Before calling upon the first speaker on my list I should like to draw the Assembly's attention to our programme of plenary meetings for the next few days.

2. In order to complete the consideration of various Committee reports we shall meet morning and afternoon. May I ask representatives to co-operate so that we may complete our work as soon as possible. Accordingly, I would ask representatives in explaining their votes to do their utmost to keep strictly within the seven minutes' time-limit we have fixed for each statement. In order to help speakers I shall tell them when the first six minutes are up. In that way I think the speaker will be able to bear the time element in mind and do his best to finish his statement within the seven minutes.

Admission of new Members, including the right of candidate States to present proof of the conditions required under Article 4 of the Charter : report of the First Committee (A/2100) (*concluded*)

[Agenda item 60]

3. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) : A number of countries—altogether fourteen—which are named in draft resolution II of the First Committee's report [A/2100] have been waiting to be admitted into the United Nations, and some of them have already been waiting for several years. The blame for this can be attributed to the course adopted by the Anglo-American majority which has brought into this clear situation its policy of discrimination which is highly contrary to the principles of peaceful international co-operation and to the principles and objectives of the Charter.

For the conditions set out in Article 4 of the Charter, the Anglo-American bloc wants to substitute criteria which are contrary to the Charter and which serve exclusively the political interests of that bloc.

4. The Anglo-American majority is forcing the admission of countries which are dependent upon the United States and whose political, economic and social systems are adapted to the interests of its aggressive policies. The Anglo-American bloc wants to prevent the admission into our Organization of independent countries and of countries whose policies serve the interests of maintaining world peace and which do not want to submit themselves to imperialistic dictates.

5. The Anglo-American bloc tries to apply this policy by different means. Shattered was the attempt to revise the Charter ; and the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, which had been asked for against the clear provisions of the Charter, concerning the competence of United Nations organs, again brought the authors of that attempt justly deserved disappointment. This year, therefore, we have met with new attempts in that direction : the Peruvian draft resolution introduces into the matter a new, special procedure, one which is contrary to the Charter ; and about a new request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion the next General Assembly is to decide. The Anglo-American bloc thus obstinately persists in its policy of discrimination.

6. On the other hand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been ceaselessly and consistently defending the only correct course which fully corresponds to the principles and objectives of the Charter. The Soviet Union is proposing that the Security Council should consider the applications for admission of all fourteen States requesting admission into the United Nations. This

is the only road leading to a proper settlement of this matter. The approval of the USSR draft resolution in the First Committee and its acceptance by the majority of delegations show the conviction of a majority of Member States as to the fact that the USSR draft resolution serves the interests of the United Nations with respect to peaceful international co-operation and world peace.

7. For this reason the Czechoslovak delegation, as in the First Committee, wholeheartedly supports draft resolution II and will vote for it.

8. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq): My delegation will vote in the affirmative on all three draft resolutions, and we particularly support draft resolution II which corresponds to one submitted by my delegation in 1949 to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.¹

9. We take this position for the following reasons. In the first place, my delegation believes in the universality of membership of this Organization. We believe that admission to the United Nations should not be difficult and should be facilitated for all those who wish to come and subscribe to the principles of the Charter. In the second place, we believe that draft resolution II is of great political significance in view of the world tension that exists today. We believe that were it not for this world tension we would not have some peace-loving States, like Jordan, Ireland and Portugal, kept outside this Organization. We believe that once this deadlock between the great Powers is removed all will be admitted, and all should be admitted.

10. We face here a great problem concerning international peace. If we want international peace we must admit here that the two régimes—the capitalist and the communist—can exist side by side. If we admit this fact and if we are going to act on the principle that there shall be no aggression and that these two systems can coexist outside this Organization, I cannot see why we should not be able to work together within the United Nations. To my mind this is a principle of great fundamental significance and importance which we have to face very frankly, and if we are to stand for the advisability and the possibility of these two systems existing side by side then I cannot see how we can keep outside this Organization those nations which do not belong to a certain system. Let us face this fact very squarely.

11. My delegation regrets, in particular, that Libya should have been listed in this group of nations which have been kept outside, waiting at the door. Libya is a new Member State which should have been admitted, just as Indonesia was admitted, to this Organization.

12. My delegation believes whole heartedly that this question of the admission of Members desirous of entering this Organization should be decided by a meeting of the Big Four. This is one of the items on which they should meet, discuss and agree, and we sincerely hope that, once that is done, we shall not have this item on the agenda of the General Assembly again.

13. In regard to yardsticks for admitting Members to this Organization, we must use the same yardstick for those States which wish to be admitted as we have used for those nations which are already Members. If we apply the yardstick which was applied to the Members already here it should enable all States to come in and join us. When we speak of certain aggressors or certain violations of frontiers by some of the States wishing to enter the United Nations, we must remember that some such States are to be found here. When we speak of certain political

systems outside this Organization which are objectionable to some of us, we must again remember that some such political systems are to be found here. It is for this reason that I believe that in the admission of new Members we should apply the yardstick already applied to Members now sitting in this Organization. We cannot have new standards. I can give a very pertinent example of what I am referring to. In this morning's *Continental Daily Mail* I read the following: "Twelve Arabs have been killed, two wounded and forty-six captured along Israel's borders in the past fortnight, an Israeli Army spokesman announced tonight". The State which has committed this act is with us here and therefore I cannot see why other States which may commit similar acts should be kept outside. The same yardstick should be applied to all. Speaking of the...

14. The PRESIDENT: I do not think the last remarks of the representative constitute an explanation of his vote on the issue before us.

15. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq): It is an explanation of what I mean by a yardstick, and I think it is quite in order. The yardstick should be the same as that applied to Members already here. We must ask of others only what we ask of ourselves and we must have the same universal principles and yardsticks. It is for this reason that I appeal to my American colleagues, who are I am sure quite desirous that this Organization should be efficient and universal, to see to it that the same yardstick is applied to all and to help us in admitting this draft resolution which is based upon the universality of this Organization.

16. Mr. KOVALENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): It is not the first time that the United Nations is discussing the question of the admission of new Members to the Organization. A number of States applied for membership of the United Nations long ago. Six years ago, in 1946, Albania and the Mongolian People's Republic submitted applications. In 1947 Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania applied for membership of the United Nations. At various times Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Finland, Austria, Ceylon and Nepal have applied for membership. Nevertheless, the question of their admission, which has often been considered by the Security Council, has still not been solved because of the stand taken by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, and other countries too, which obediently follow the lead of the United States; these countries, in violation of the Charter, have made constant efforts to bypass the unanimity rule in the Security Council and have tried to admit to the United Nations only the countries acceptable to them.

17. The United States and its supporters are pursuing a policy of discrimination in the matter of admitting to membership of the United Nations such democratic and peace-loving States as Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, by stubbornly opposing their admission to the United Nations. At the same time, the United States is insistently trying to drag into the Organization countries which lie within the orbit of United States economic, political and military influence, and especially countries which are members of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc.

18. The First Committee has submitted to the General Assembly three draft resolutions on the question of admission of new Members. As we know, draft resolution I was adopted on the basis of a Peruvian draft, which represented an attempt to justify the United States policy of discrimination against the people's democracies and of favouritism towards countries agreeable to the United States. As a result of the sharp criticism expressed by many delegations,

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex*, vol. I, document A/AC.31/L.21.

the First Committee approved a considerably amended version of the Peruvian draft resolution, which was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly [369th meeting]. Nevertheless, the provisions of that amended draft not only do not conduce to an equitable solution of the long drawn-out question of admitting new Members to the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, but, on the contrary, hinder such a solution by complicating the actual procedure of admission and they are also contrary to the spirit and letter of the Charter.

19. Many representatives in the First Committee realized that the Peruvian draft resolution offered no way out of the impasse that prevails in the matter of admitting new Members into the Organization. That was shown by the Committee's approval, on the basis of a USSR draft, of draft resolution II recommending the Security Council to reconsider the applications of Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon and Nepal and to consider Libya's application for admission to the United Nations. The aim of that draft resolution was to reach a just and practical solution of the question of the admission of new Members. The proposal precludes discrimination against any State and is in full conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the rules of international law.

20. In view of the above considerations the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR voted against draft resolution I, which was adopted on the basis of the Peruvian draft. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR will vote for the adoption of draft resolution II submitted by the First Committee and based on the USSR draft.

21. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR also objects to the adoption of draft resolution III based on the draft of the five Central American States, which recommends that the question of the admission of new Members should be placed on the provisional agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly and that the joint draft resolution of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, requesting the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the matter, should be considered at that session. The International Court of Justice is not competent to give advisory opinions on such political questions as that of the admission of new Members. That is laid down both in the United Nations Charter and in the Statute of the Court, Article 65 of which provides that the Court may give advisory opinions on legal questions only.

22. The impasse reached on the question of the admission of new Members is due not to the absence of clear-cut provisions concerning the conditions and procedure of admission, since these are quite clearly defined in the Charter, especially in Articles 4, 18 and 27, but to the need for strict and close observance of the Charter, which the United States of America is trying to force the General Assembly to violate, in its desire to subordinate as many States as possible to its hegemony and control and in its endeavours to obtain admission to the United Nations only for States which are subservient and agreeable to the United States. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR will therefore vote against draft resolution III.

23. Mr. URRUTIA HOLGUIN (Colombia) (*translated from Spanish*): Colombia has always supported the principle of universality. Unfortunately, draft resolution II submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not make for universality.

24. It is inconceivable, for example, that Colombia, which has troops in Korea, should be asked to vote for the admis-

sion of other countries when the Republic of Korea does not appear among the countries listed in the draft resolution.

25. We consider that far from reaffirming the principle of universality, this draft destroys it, because it is obvious that if the draft resolution were adopted, if the Security Council were to follow its suggestion and if the States named in the list now before us were admitted, the door would be finally closed to the entry of other countries which are not now on the list in draft resolution II or which have not yet applied for admission because it seemed pointless to apply so long as the system hitherto governing applications for admission prevailed in the Security Council.

26. If at the next session another draft resolution is submitted including, in addition to Italy and Portugal, Korea, Libya and Spain—if they apply for admission—my delegation will have the greatest pleasure in voting for a draft resolution on these lines, but for the same reason it cannot now vote for the draft resolution before us today because, I repeat, this draft would finally close the doors of the United Nations to countries other than those named in the list which it contains.

27. For these reasons, the Colombian delegation will do more than abstain: it will vote against the draft resolution, for we feel it would be most dangerous if this draft resolution, which, I repeat, in our opinion destroys the principle of universality, were passed simply because of a large number of abstentions.

28. Moreover, we consider that since there can be no subject more important than the admission of new Members, no draft resolution on these lines can be adopted unless two-thirds of the Members present and voting in the Assembly vote for it. Accordingly, if the case should arise, we should want a ruling from the President on this point.

29. Mr. MACAPAGAL (Philippines): The Philippine delegation believes that, with the adoption of the Peruvian draft resolution which was submitted in the First Committee and which recommends that "the Security Council reconsider all pending applications for the admission of new Members", the USSR draft resolution, which proposes the admission of listed States, is redundant and superfluous. In fact, the USSR draft resolution contradicts the Peruvian draft resolution which we have already adopted, since it excludes the Republic of Korea whose application is also pending, and which is a qualified applicant. It is illogical to state in one resolution that the Security Council should reconsider all pending applications and in another resolution that the Security Council should consider all but one of the applicants. If the USSR draft resolution is also adopted, the Security Council will be confronted with the predicament of determining which of the two conflicting resolutions to act upon.

30. If my delegation understood him correctly, in his statement in the First Committee the USSR representative explained that the import of his draft resolution is that the Security Council should act favourably on all the applications of the States listed in that resolution. My delegation sees no objection to the admission of certain States *en bloc* so long as all those States are qualified under the Charter, but if an unqualified applicant is included in a panel of applying States, and it is proposed that all those listed in that panel should be admitted, including the unqualified applicant or applicants, or that otherwise none of them should be admitted, such a procedure is objectionable and savours of blackmail unwarranted by Article 4 of the Charter.

31. Therefore, while the Philippines looks with favour on the admission of some of the States listed in the USSR draft resolution, my delegation will be constrained to vote against that draft resolution.

32. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic feels bound to explain its vote.

33. The plenary meeting of the General Assembly has before it three draft resolutions approved by a majority of the Political Committee.

34. As representatives are aware, the first of these drafts, submitted by the Peruvian delegation, has just been adopted by the General Assembly. This resolution, which has been continually redrafted and amended, is directly opposed to the conditions and procedure laid down in the United Nations Charter for the admission of new Members. The action of the United States delegation in pushing through the Peruvian draft resolution is evidence that, in connexion with the admission of new Members, that delegation intends to be guided, not by Article 4 of the United Nations Charter, but by completely different considerations. That delegation, under various pretexts, has set itself the aim of denying admission to the United Nations of such democratic and peace-loving States as Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and the Mongolian People's Republic. The principal objection to the admission of these States to the United Nations is the dislike of the United States and the countries supporting it for the political structure of these States. The policy of the United States is aimed at admitting to membership of the United Nations only those countries which suit it. That is the aim which this resolution, which undermines the principles of the United Nations Charter, is intended to serve.

35. The United States is stubbornly sabotaging the simultaneous admission to membership of the United Nations of all the fourteen States which have submitted applications. The United States is accusing the Soviet Union of holding up the solution of this problem, whereas the blame lies entirely with the United States itself. The Philippine representative, speaking immediately before me, stated that the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union is a form of blackmail. This is not true. It is the Philippine representative and his masters who are engaging in blackmail by refusing to accept all the States proposed by the Soviet Union. That is where the real blackmail comes in. Everyone will be well aware that the Soviet Union and other States have been continuously proposing a just solution for this problem. The Soviet Union has frequently proposed that all those States which have submitted applications should be admitted simultaneously into the United Nations. If the United States had not been pursuing a policy of discrimination with regard to the peace-loving democratic States, and if it desired an equitable solution of this problem, then all the thirteen States, and also Libya, which are referred to in the USSR draft resolution on the subject, would long ago have been admitted. And that, I say to the representative of the Philippines, is the real reason for the present situation.

36. The delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic has continually pointed out that, in connexion with the admission of new Members, the General Assembly ought to be guided only by the provisions of Article 4 of the United Nations Charter. Notwithstanding the absolute clarity and precision of this Article, which lays down the conditions on which the United Nations may admit new Members, the United States and the States supporting it are pursuing a policy of protection for some States applying for admission to the United Nations and of discrimination against others. Their interpretation in the sense that the General Assembly may take a decision relating to the admission of new Members without reference to the Security Council constitutes a gross violation of the Charter,

which lays down that new Members shall be admitted to the United Nations by decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

37. In attacking the principle of the unanimity of the great Powers in the Security Council, the United States, Peruvian and Colombian delegations are attempting to impart some colour of legality to their unworthy attempts to exclude the Security Council from participation in the admission of new Members. Having been defeated in their frontal attack on the principle of unanimity, the representatives of Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, at United States instigation, are resorting to an attempt to bring the International Court of Justice into this matter again, with the object of obtaining from the Court an advisory opinion in support of their actions, which are at variance with the United Nations Charter. They are doing this although the Court is, of course, not competent to interpret the Charter.

38. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR is obliged to point out that the United States representatives have turned the whole problem of the admission of new Members into a disreputable game and are exploiting it for systematic slander against the Soviet Union, and for an attack on that keystone of the United Nations Charter, the principle of the unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

39. During the consideration of this problem, the representatives of the United States and their political supporters have resorted to dirty tricks and falsification of facts in order to make out that the Soviet Union is delaying the admission of new Members to the United Nations. However, the situation is precisely the opposite. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, with the delegations of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian SSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries, in their efforts to promote the speediest possible solution of the problem, are demanding as before that all fourteen States, including Libya, should be admitted to the United Nations.

40. The PRESIDENT: I would draw the representative's attention to the fact that he has now spoken for six minutes.

41. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): For this purpose the USSR delegation has submitted its draft resolution, by which the General Assembly would recommend the Security Council to reconsider the applications of the fourteen States for admission to membership of the United Nations. Thus, at the sixth session of the General Assembly also, the Soviet Union has reaffirmed its determination to obtain the simultaneous admission of all the fourteen States, irrespective of their political and social structure and without any discrimination whatsoever. Its draft resolution was approved by a majority of the First Committee.

42. The delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic will vote for draft resolution II.

43. As for resolution I, originally submitted by Peru, the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic considers that even in its amended form it is completely unacceptable, and has consequently voted against it.

44. The delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic will also vote against draft resolution III of the First Committee submitted by the delegations of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, since its purpose is to renew consideration at the seventh session of the General Assembly of the question of appealing to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the interpretation of the Charter, which the Court has neither jurisdiction nor power to give.

45. Mr. POLITIS (Greece) (*translated from French*): Even if, at the time when the First Committee began to consider the item we are now dealing with, we had agreed with the view voiced in some quarters that the Peruvian draft resolution merely restated some principles and criteria already enshrined in the Charter and hence was an unnecessary and superfluous repetition—even had we taken this view when the question of the admission of new Members was first taken up—the discussions in the First Committee and here would have sufficed to convince us abundantly of the need to support the Peruvian draft resolution, even, to put it more strongly, of the need to shelter behind it as a bulwark in the defence of the Charter from certain surprising and novel ideas, from a certain tendency to rebel against and subvert the spirit and letter of the Charter which has been openly displayed during this debate.

46. For instance, there is this new conception of the principle of universality, in other words, the desire to see the United Nations some day encompass all peoples of the world, which is in itself a most laudable trend but which, if pressed to the absolute limit as has been advocated, would result in circumventing and destroying the Charter. The notion of universality is admittedly implicit in the Charter; however, the Charter itself expressly states that before the principle can apply the candidates must possess certain qualifications which are strictly defined in Article 4. It is therefore a violation of the Charter to propose in so many words to disregard those formal provisions so as to admit candidates to the Organization *en bloc*, irrespective of whether or not they fulfil the conditions. This would mean allowing States guilty of aggression against the Organization itself to enter it as supposedly peace-loving countries likely to apply the principles of the Charter. It would mean admitting them despite their manifest misconduct.

47. It has been said this morning of the USSR draft resolution that it would set up a mechanical or automatic system not consistent with the principles of the Charter. On closer examination, however, the proposal, intrinsically unacceptable, does not even establish such a system. Supposing it did propose such a system, that would mean that, if some other State such as Germany or Japan were to apply for admission tomorrow, it would be automatically approved unconditionally and without hedging. But that has never been mentioned in our discussions.

48. As I said in the First Committee, the truth is that a deal is being proposed, a wholesale bargain, the object of which is none other than the qualification or non-qualification of candidates. This "package" deal relates only to applications already submitted; tomorrow, it may well be superseded by some other system or arrangement if the interest of the one or other Power so requires.

49. My comments on the other theory, that of non-discrimination, developed by the USSR delegation, are on similar lines. Mr. Malik explained it to us the other day; he told us that fourteen States have applied for membership and that if we admitted some and rejected others, we would be discriminating in a manner not compatible with our principles. My reply to that is that we would definitely discriminate if it were shown that some candidates do not possess the required qualifications. We would be bound to discriminate for the simple reason that the Charter categorically requires us to do so. It would be a breach of the Charter if we did not make any distinction.

50. What is even more astonishing is that, apart from the thinly veiled proposal to dispense with the tests required by the Charter, it is ingenuously suggested that other

tests should be applied which have nothing whatever to do with the Charter. One such test is the fact that the candidate participated in the war against nazism. Quite apart from the consideration that different countries participated in the war in different ways, does this mean that a State which has since committed aggression against one or more States should be admitted without question merely by virtue of that doubtful and now obsolete qualification?

51. Because these new theories and these tendencies, which I have termed subversive, fill us with grave foreboding for the security of the Charter itself, we voted today for draft resolution I originally submitted by the Peruvian delegation and shall also vote for draft resolution III, whereas we shall vote against draft resolution II submitted in Committee by the Soviet Union.

52. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland): I would like to explain the position of the Polish delegation with regard to the three draft resolutions which the First Committee has submitted to the General Assembly. Two of them, namely the Peruvian draft resolution and the draft resolution of the five Central American Powers, have many common features. They are both a continuation of the same action which some countries have been pursuing within our Organization for a number of years: the action of by-passing the provisions of the United Nations Charter and of attempting by the use of all sorts of manoeuvres and subterfuges to achieve their aim. Their aim is the admission to the United Nations of only a few of the candidates, namely those whose political systems and policies conform with the interests and meet with the approval of the United States and the countries subordinated to it.

53. Through a false and improper interpretation of the principles of the Charter, the Peruvian draft resolution attempts to reduce the question of the admission of new Members to legalistic formulae, overlooking the political importance of the question. The problem of the admission of new Members has been endowed with importance by the Charter of the United Nations, and its weight has been confirmed, moreover, by the wave of machinations and subterfuges with which it has been enveloped by the United States. This is how the idea of universality, which constitutes the philosophical and ideological foundation of the Peruvian draft resolution, appears in practice. It is a special kind of universality, limited by its own interests and its own legal interpretation. It is an expression of the trend towards closing universally the doors of our Organization to all those countries which are not subservient to the policies of the United States, which do not yield to its pressure and which are not to be bought with dollars. Obviously the Polish delegation voted against this draft resolution.

54. The draft resolution submitted by Costa Rica and four other countries has aims similar to those of the Peruvian draft resolution. It differs from the latter in that it is not based on any principles, and least of all on the principle of common sense. It is absurd and unnecessary. It is not serious enough to warrant further consideration. We shall vote against it.

55. My delegation considers the draft resolution of the USSR delegation to be proper and just. This draft resolution satisfies those who approach the question of widening our Organization from the viewpoint of political realism, as well as those who wish to see in it the realization of the idea of universality. The draft resolution mentions the names of all the fourteen countries, and the Soviet Union, by proposing once more the admission of all these countries, has again proved that it does not practise discrimination and favouritism. The implementation of the USSR draft

resolution will greatly strengthen our Organization and will remove from our agenda one of the sharpest points of disagreement. The Polish delegation appeals to all delegations which are really concerned about peaceful co-operation among nations to support this draft resolution.

56. The representative of Colombia, for obvious reasons, raised here the question of the two-thirds majority in our voting. I wish to state emphatically our opposition to this false interpretation of the principles of the Charter and of our procedure in regard to this draft resolution. Article 18 of the Charter, and also the identically worded rule 84 of the rules of procedure, by no means require a two-thirds majority of the votes for the adoption of this draft resolution. According to these Articles, a two-thirds majority is needed for "the admission of new Members to the United Nations". The USSR draft resolution does not mean the admission of new Members. It is a recommendation to the Security Council that it should reconsider once more thirteen applications and consider one application for the first time, namely that of Libya. Only if the Security Council were to reconsider these applications and were to send a recommendation to the General Assembly in accordance with Article 4 would a two-thirds majority be needed to accomplish the formal admission of these States.

57. The desire to apply the rule concerning the two-thirds majority to this recommendation does not find any basis in the provisions of the Charter or in the rules of procedure. There are no precedents for this either. On the contrary, all the resolutions during the past years which have recommended a reconsideration of any candidatures have been adopted by a simple majority. Therefore the Polish delegation considers that, for the adoption of the USSR draft resolution, a simple majority of the representatives present and voting is sufficient, in accordance with Article 18, paragraph 3, of the Charter and rule 85 of the rules of procedure. This effort to find a new interpretation is a fresh manoeuvre in order to prevent the admission of fourteen countries to our Organization.

58. M. BELLEGARDE (Haiti) (*translated from French*): I propose to explain very briefly and in very sober terms my delegation's position in the discussion in this Assembly on the question of the admission of new Members to the Organization.

59. We maintained in the First Committee that the oft-mentioned principle of universality could not operate mechanically or automatically. The United Nations, like the League of Nations, aims at universality. That, however, does not imply that the admission of new Members is not subject to certain conditions. These conditions are laid down in Article 4 of the Charter.

60. The United Nations aims at universality as did the League of Nations in its time. I speak from experience, because, as I recalled in the First Committee, I represented my country in the League at Geneva. It was in that capacity that I pressed for the admission of Russia and Germany in 1922 and deplored the absence of the United States of America, an absence which was the main weakness of the League of Nations. This shows that I am in favour of universality.

61. But I must say that, contrary to a view held here, this universality cannot be applied automatically. Under Articles 5 and 6 of the Charter of the United Nations a State may be suspended or expelled from the United Nations. Should such a case occur, this automatic universality which has been mentioned would be affected. The principle of universality was impaired on several occasions in the League of Nations: Japan, Germany and Italy

ceased to be Members when they felt they were no longer in conformity with the rules and conditions of membership laid down in the Covenant. Also, you know of one State which was expelled from the League for violating the Covenant. Thus, this question of the automatic operation of the principle of universality must definitely be dismissed.

62. What then is necessary for a State to be admitted to membership of the United Nations? It must fulfil the conditions of membership laid down in the Charter. No other condition can be invoked against its admission. That is the case with Italy, for example. At this point I would point out that Italy is in quite an exceptional position: the General Assembly at its sixth session recommended [A/L.2] the admission of this country, which satisfies the conditions laid down in the Charter for admission to membership of the Organization.

63. It has been argued that the USSR draft resolution is in conformity with the Charter. Like other representatives, I should be tempted to accept this draft resolution to admit the fourteen candidate States. This draft, however, contains a condition not found in the Charter: simultaneity. According to the Charter, each case must be judged on its merits. The Security Council cannot be asked to refrain from exercising its right to consider each individual case with a view to judging whether a candidate State fulfils the conditions for membership nor can the General Assembly be denied the right to consider each individual case that arises before it can decide whether the applicant State is or is not to be admitted to membership of the Organization. Once it is recognized that a State which applies to the Organization for admission to membership satisfies the conditions laid down, it is improper to speak of a condition not contained in the Charter. That is why we attached great importance to the USSR draft resolution. As a matter of fact, in submitting this draft and in asking for a recommendation to the Security Council to admit the fourteen States, the USSR delegation admits that they fulfil the conditions necessary for admission to membership. Consequently, another condition cannot be introduced in order to prevent their admission.

64. The PRESIDENT: I would draw the representative's attention to the fact that he has now spoken for six minutes.

65. I note an instance of discrimination in the Soviet Union draft. The Republic of Korea has applied for membership. It is clear that by omitting the Republic of Korea an act of discrimination has been committed, an act all the more unjust as this Republic is the protégée—I may even say, the daughter—of the United Nations. And when the USSR representative speaks of a puppet government, I wonder to how many States this term puppet could not with equal justification be applied. We cannot disown our daughter. We cannot accept the brutal view taken by the USSR representative. We cannot, for our own daughter is involved. It is as if someone entered our home and began to beat, or even to kill, our children. We must protect the Republic of Korea. If the name of the Republic of Korea is not included, we cannot accept the list.

66. Mr. MUÑOZ (Argentina) (*translated from Spanish*): Though a great deal has been said about universality in connexion with this problem it would appear that each delegation has a different idea of universality; this makes the discussion very interesting but at the same time, naturally, does not help to make the solution of the problem any easier. What is certain is that, despite these general statements and the obstructions, the principle, the idea of universality seems to be making some progress.

67. With respect to the draft resolutions submitted to us by the First Committee, I wish now briefly to explain the

reasons for the way in which the Argentine delegation has voted or will vote in each case.

68. In the vote on resolution I, my delegation abstained for the following fundamental reasons.

69. First, we believe that the principle of universality referred to in the resolution should be set forth more simply and in more general terms than it is and should be based on the concepts of Article 4 of the Charter, whereas it links the idea of universality to other ideas which in our opinion complicate and confuse the meaning of the first. In addition to this, the decisive reason is the idea of proof which resolution I introduces. If this new principle has been put forward for the purpose of restricting to its proper limits the vote which the members of the Security Council have cast or will cast in each case of admission, the Assembly is already entitled to adopt resolutions on such cases; as we have said on several occasions, it has in certain cases already adopted resolutions giving a favourable reception to the applications of certain States and, in our opinion, so far as these particular States are concerned the resolution represents a step backwards. It was another step backwards when the proposed Argentine amendment to the fifth paragraph of the preamble of resolution I was rejected in the First Committee, although I would point out that it was accepted by the representative of Peru, the author of the original draft. The purpose of the Argentine amendment was to give shape to this general policy by seeing that the right of certain countries to be admitted to the Organization was recognized.

70. Secondly, if, as we believe, it is the object of resolution I to determine the limits of a vote in the Security Council, I should mention another Argentine amendment submitted in committee which proposed convening a special session of the General Assembly to study the problem of admissions. We regret the unfavourable reaction which led to its rejection in the First Committee in spite of the good intentions of the amendment, which was meant to solve this problem. We also think there is an important omission in resolution I as it stands in that it does not even propose that the next session of the General Assembly should consider the matter. Another proposal, now before us as draft resolution III, that of the countries of Central America concerning the advisory opinion of the international Court of justice had to be submitted before it occurred to the First Committee that it would be necessary to discuss the matter at the next regular session of the General Assembly.

71. I should like now to explain why we shall vote in favour of draft resolution II. We shall do so because we feel it expresses the principle of universality, particularly after the addition of the preamble, in the only way in which it can be expressed.

72. We believe that in the present circumstances, the only complete or partial solution to the problem of admission would be on the basis of universality, this being based in its turn on a spirit of conciliation. We have the example of the last resolution [A/L.2] of the Assembly recommending that the Security Council, in view of the very special position of Italy in the United Nations, should immediately recommend its admission.

73. The PRESIDENT: I would draw the representative's attention to the fact that he has now spoken for six minutes.

74. Mr. MUÑOZ (Argentina) (*translated from Spanish*): We already know the fate of this recommendation which called for an immediate decision. We regret, of course, that the Committee, by one vote, failed to approve our amendment to draft resolution II which proposed that the Security Council should report to the present session of

the Assembly, which was one of the basic reasons for the way in which my delegation reacted to the original draft by the Soviet Union.

75. We shall abstain from the vote on draft resolution III, not because we would be considering the substance of the matter but because the General Assembly already has sufficient information to decide. However, we reserve the right to discuss the substance of the matter at the next session.

76. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The list of speakers is now exhausted. We shall vote on draft resolution II. A vote by roll-call has been requested.

77. Mr. GROSS (United States of America): I wish to raise a point of order in connexion with the application of the rules of procedure. It is not clear to my delegation whether a formal request has been made for the application of the two-thirds requirement of the rules of procedure. In any event, I wish now formally to propose the application of the two-thirds rule and, with the permission of the Chair, I should like three minutes in which to explain the reasons in support of that motion.

78. It seems to my delegation that either rule 84 or rule 85 applies to this situation, and we believe that rule 84 applies to it. We think that this is a question involving "the admission of new Members to the United Nations". What other significance can the USSR draft resolution have if it does not raise an important question regarding the admission of new Members? Unless it involves a recommendation to the Security Council to consider favourably and recommend the admission of the applicants listed in the draft resolution, it means nothing at all. It would merely be a repetition in different language of the Peruvian draft resolution which the Assembly adopted earlier today.

79. The USSR representative and all the speakers who have indicated their intention to vote for the USSR draft resolution have explained that the reason for doing so and the underlying purpose of the USSR draft resolution is to obtain a declaration of policy from the General Assembly that all the applicants listed in the draft resolution should be admitted to membership. It is a declaration of policy of the most serious import, as has been demonstrated and admitted by the USSR representative himself. Moreover, it involves a fundamental interpretation by the General Assembly of Article 4 of the Charter.

80. If it is not an important question it is not a question at all. Even if—and I conclude with this comment—rule 84 does not apply, even if this is not a question involving the admission of new Members, it is, for the reasons I have just stated, an important question.

81. It is obviously, therefore, at least under rule 85, the type of question which the General Assembly by a majority vote may in its discretion consider to be a category of questions additional to those specified in rule 84 and thus subject to a two-thirds majority procedure.

82. The representative of Poland, I think, requires correction. If I understood him correctly, he said that in the past resolutions regarding a recommendation on membership have been adopted by a simple majority and the two-thirds question has not been raised. A careful survey of the history of the matter from 1948 until 1950 will show to the Members of the Assembly that all membership resolutions have been adopted or rejected by a vote of well over two-thirds of the membership. It is for that reason—and I am confident for that reason alone—that the two-thirds question has not been raised previously.

83. The PRESIDENT : On the point of order which has been raised by the representative of the United States with regard to rules 84 and 85 I would like, in order to make the situation clear, to ask the representative of the United States whether he is requesting a ruling from the Chair as to whether or not in this case rule 84 applies, or requesting that the General Assembly should be consulted on the application of rule 85.

84. Mr. GROSS (United States of America) : I would respectfully request that, in the discretion of the Chair, the Chair should rule that rule 84 applies, or that alternatively the Chair should leave it to the Assembly to decide whether rule 84 does apply. In the event of the Assembly deciding by a majority vote that rule 84 of the rules of procedure does not apply to this situation, I would request that the same procedure should be applied to rule 85.

85. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : The statement just made by the United States representative obliges the Chair to express an opinion in the first place on the question whether rule 84 applies to this draft resolution.

86. At the same time, if, in the opinion of the Chair, rule 84 does not apply, the United States representative asks that the Assembly should be consulted, in accordance with rule 85 of the rules of procedure.

87. My opinion is that rule 84, constituting as it does an exception to the general rule that the Assembly's decisions shall be taken by a simple majority except on the questions specifically mentioned in rule 84 and on any other questions which the Assembly considers important enough to require a two-thirds majority in accordance with rule 85—my opinion, I repeat, is that the reference in rule 84 to the admission of new Members applies to substantive decisions taken by the Assembly on this subject.

88. I cannot judge the draft resolution on which we are about to vote except by its actual text. As you are aware, the text states in the preamble that it is the judgment of the Organization which will determine whether the States are able to carry out the obligations laid down in the Charter and whether they are prepared to submit their international complaints or disputes for settlement by the measures established under international law. And, in its operative part, it recommends that the Security Council should consider these applications.

89. My opinion therefore is that rule 84 does not apply to this draft resolution. However, I do not wish to state this in the form of a ruling from the Chair. In accordance with the United States representative's motion, I think that in this case, in order to avoid establishing any dangerous precedents for the future, it would be better for the Assembly to settle the matter and express its opinion on the majority required only in this particular case.

90. Accordingly, the Assembly will have to decide whether, in its view, this draft resolution, to be adopted, requires a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting.

91. We shall therefore proceed to vote on this question.

92. Mr. FITZMAURICE (United Kingdom) (*speaking from the floor*) : On a point of order, Mr. President.

93. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : The voting having begun, I take it that the United Kingdom representative's point of order refers solely to the form in which the voting is to proceed.

94. Mr. FITZMAURICE (United Kingdom) : Since the President has decided to be good enough to leave this

matter to the Assembly, it seems to my delegation that it must be possible for Members to express their views on the very important point which has been raised, namely, whether or not this is an important matter under Article 18 of the Charter and rule 84 of the rules of procedure requiring a two-thirds majority. My delegation, for its part, would like to express its views on that subject. Have I the President's permission to make such an explanation ?

95. The PRESIDENT : I regret to say that, since the process of voting has already begun, I cannot open a debate on the question whether or not a two-thirds majority is required for the adoption of draft resolution II. It is my belief that the many statements which we have heard here have made the situation very clear to representatives, and that the General Assembly is now in a position to decide, without opening a debate or listening to further explanations, whether draft resolution II does in fact require a two-thirds majority.

96. Mr. FITZMAURICE (United Kingdom) : May I say, with great respect, that I cannot quite agree with the statement that the President has just made? The rule of procedure on points of order enables him to take a decision, and if he rules against my point there can be no debate. If the President's ruling is challenged, it is put to the General Assembly without a debate. But, as I understand it, the President has expressly declined to give a ruling. He has expressed an opinion, but he has not given a ruling. He has left it to the General Assembly to decide. In these circumstances I really think that Members must be entitled to express their views on the very important point which the President himself has elected to leave to them.

97. The PRESIDENT : In reply to the representative of the United Kingdom I would point out that rule 72 of the rules of procedure states :

" During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, and the point of order shall be immediately decided by the President in accordance with the rules of procedure "

That does not mean, however, that the decision of the President may not be what it was in the present case, namely, to leave it to the General Assembly to decide by a vote whether or not, in accordance with rule 85, a resolution requires a two-thirds majority.

98. The General Assembly is, of course, entitled to decide whether a debate shall be opened with regard to the application of rule 85, that is to say, on the question whether draft resolution II requires a two-thirds majority or a simple majority. If the representative of the United Kingdom insists on expressing the point of view of his delegation, I shall ask the Assembly whether it desires such an exchange of views so that the same opportunity may be given to all representatives to express an opinion on the matter. I am willing to do that if it is desired.

99. Mr. FITZMAURICE (United Kingdom) : I understand, then, that the President proposes to ask the General Assembly to decide whether there shall be a debate on this matter.

100. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : That is so. The Assembly will therefore vote immediately on the proposal to debate the question whether or not this draft resolution requires a two-thirds majority for adoption.

The proposal to debate the question was rejected by 29 votes to 20.

101. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : We shall now vote on the question whether this draft resolution requires a majority of two-thirds of the Members present and voting for adoption.

It was decided by 29 votes to 21, with 5 abstentions, that the adoption of draft resolution II required a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting.

102. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We shall now proceed to vote upon draft resolution II. A roll-call vote has been requested, and the General Assembly has just decided that a two-thirds majority is required for adoption.

103. Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand) (*speaking from the floor*): On a point of order, I request permission to explain my vote.

104. The PRESIDENT: I have to point out to the representative of Thailand that the process of voting has already begun. I shall, however, be very pleased to call upon him for an explanation of vote after the voting is completed.

105. Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand) (*speaking from the floor*): I wished to explain my vote on the procedural question which has just been decided.

106. The PRESIDENT: I would ask the representative of Thailand to deal with his vote on that point when he is explaining his vote on the draft resolution.

107. Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand) (*speaking from the floor*): I will wait if the President wishes.

108. The PRESIDENT: Since it has been decided that there should be no debate on this question I do not feel that I can give the representative of Thailand permission to speak now, but I will call upon him later.

109. (*Translated from Spanish*): We shall now proceed to vote on draft resolution II.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Iraq, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first.

In favour: Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Norway, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia.

Against: Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, United States of America, Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Greece, Haiti, Honduras.

Abstaining: Liberia, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Iceland, Iran.

The result of the vote was 22 in favour, 21 against, with 16 abstentions.

Draft resolution II was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority.

110. Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand): I wish to explain my vote on the procedural question. It depended on the interpretation to be attached to draft resolution II. It is true that in form it is a recommendation to the Security Council for reconsideration of the applications from the countries enumerated, but I put to myself the question whether that meant a recommendation to the Security Council for a completely free reconsideration. My reading of the draft resolution is that it is in fact a recommendation to the Security Council for a favourable reconsideration, and that is why I think it is a substantive and important question and therefore requires a two-thirds majority. Had it been a mere recommendation for a free recon-

sideration by the Security Council I would have voted differently.

111. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): I did not seek the President's permission to explain the vote of my delegation before voting on this draft resolution because in the circumstances I did not wish to do anything which would possibly tend to influence the decision of the General Assembly in this matter one way or the other, but since it has been alleged by one or two delegations, during the explanations of vote which preceded the voting, that there was some kind of inherent contradiction between draft resolutions I and II and that consequently it might be held illogical to vote for draft resolution I and not against draft resolution II, I should like to explain the abstention of my delegation on draft resolution II.

112. On the face of it, of course, as I think one or two speakers have already pointed out, the operative part of draft resolution II recommends that the Security Council should reconsider the applications of a certain number of States. That is all it says: it does not say that the Security Council must reconsider all these applications favourably. Equally, it does not say that the vote in the Council must be taken on all these States together, that is to say, that there must be a recommendation by the Security Council for their admission *en bloc*. To this extent, therefore, the draft resolution as it stood was quite harmless and the Security Council could have acted on the specific recommendation which it contained without in any way violating the Charter or the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 28 May 1948^a.

113. It does not, however, follow that the USSR draft resolution merits support even if this very narrow interpretation is the right one. As I think I stated in the First Committee, the draft resolution is defective—and this, of course, has been pointed out by many speakers here—because it does not include all the pending applications but only some of them, and above all because it makes the significant omission of the Republic of Korea. It is also largely otiose since we have, after all, adopted draft resolution I, which recommends that all pending applications should be reconsidered by the Security Council, and for this reason alone my delegation could not have voted in favour of draft resolution II even if, so to speak, the obvious construction which it carries was the right one. But it would be altogether naïve to suggest that Members of the Assembly should have considered draft resolution II without taking into account the interpretation or gloss which Mr. Malik put on it in the First Committee. It is quite true that he did not put that interpretation on it today in the discussion here for reasons which I suppose only he knows. But in the Committee he said categorically that any country which voted for draft resolution II should also vote, if it was a member of the Security Council, for the very similar USSR draft resolution which, as we all know, is pending there. This means in effect that if we had asked the Council to reconsider these applications we should, according to the USSR representative, have been asking the Council to reconsider them favourably. Now, even if this interpretation had been accepted and if the Security Council had acted on it and adopted the USSR draft resolution now before the Council itself, it would still not necessarily follow that the members of the Council who voted for the USSR draft resolution in the Council were acting contrary to the Charter or to the advisory opinion of the Court. If seven members of the Security Council are of the opinion that each of the States mentioned

^a See *Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Article 4)*, *Advisory Opinion*: I.C.J. Reports 1948, page 57.

in the USSR draft resolution before the Security Council, considered individually and on its merits, fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter, they would be quite justified, in our opinion, in voting in favour of the draft resolution and provided, of course, no veto is cast, the draft resolution would then be adopted.

114. Some members of the Council may take this view. There have certainly been a number of statements made in the First Committee in favour of the admission of all the applicant States and it has been suggested that if a liberal interpretation is given to the conditions of Article 4 of the Charter all these States could be held to fulfil those conditions. Speaking for my own delegation, however, I must at once say that in our view some at least of the States mentioned in the USSR draft resolution do not fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter. At the same time we recognize that this is not the attitude of some Members of the Organization whose motives can in no way be called in question. We cannot ourselves vote in favour of the admission to the United Nations of such States, whether each case is put to the vote individually or whether they are lumped together with a number of others which, we consider, do fulfil the conditions of Article 4 of the Charter.

115. I have already stated that our attitude towards draft resolution II must be to some extent influenced by the meaning which the USSR representative himself has given to it. But we still do not feel that all the arguments which I have mentioned have necessarily led us to vote against the draft resolution. It is a matter for argument, I think, whether one should attach more weight to what the draft resolution actually says or what its author says he thinks it means. It is particularly difficult when there is a direct conflict between the one and the other but, on balance, the view of my delegation is that the right course was to abstain on draft resolution II. We have voted, of course, for draft resolution I for the general reason that we consider this to be the most useful action which the Assembly can now take. Draft resolution II, whatever else it might have done, could certainly have added nothing to draft resolution I and in any case our abstention on draft resolution II should make it quite clear that we are not in any way committed to supporting the similar USSR draft resolution now before the Security Council.

116. Mr. Y. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): My delegation wishes to explain briefly its vote on the question whether the USSR draft resolution requires for its adoption a two-thirds majority.

117. My delegation voted against the United States proposal to apply the rule of the qualified, i.e., the two-thirds majority to the resolution, for the simple reason that the USSR draft resolution is not what the United States representative declared it to be. It contains a proposal of a procedural nature, recommending the Security Council to reconsider all the applications of the States mentioned in the resolution. Thus it does not relate to the admission of members, for the General Assembly does not possess the right to admit members to the United Nations without the Security Council's recommendation. The General Assembly would simply be expressing the desire that the Council should reconsider the applications.

118. Consequently the United States proposal to apply the two-thirds majority rule in this case was intended to prevent the draft resolution being adopted; and that is what the Anglo-American bloc, with its mechanical majority in the plenary meeting and in the United Nations organs, has succeeded in doing. This mechanical majority was displayed most clearly to day, when a draft resolution was

rejected by 21 votes although it secured 22 votes, i.e., more votes in favour than against. Such are the procedural manipulations by which the American bloc, with its majority in the plenary meeting, is sabotaging the USSR draft resolution which recommends that all the fourteen States should be admitted to the United Nations, a proposal which is widely accepted and enjoys support not only among many Member States but far beyond United Nations circles. The effect is to postpone the matter for another year and perhaps longer.

119. The full responsibility for the rejection of the USSR draft resolution consequently lies wholly and entirely with the United States, with the United States Government and with that delegation which, by a procedural manoeuvre, has prevented the adoption of a positive decision which would have opened the way for a settlement of the question of the admission of new Members, the admission of fourteen States with a population of more than 112 millions. So much for the decision.

120. A few words about the United Kingdom representative's explanation of vote. His explanation was a very abstract and, I may say, obscure one. So far as I understood his drift from the interpretation, the United Kingdom representative appears to intend to employ certain peculiar manoeuvres in connexion with voting in the Security Council and the General Assembly. He has abstained from voting here, and intends to abstain, that is to say not to apply the veto, in the Security Council; and if any State is accepted as a Member by the majority he reserves the right to vote here in the General Assembly against its admission—that is, if I understood him correctly. If I understood him correctly, I repeat, his remarks really mean that he will use manoeuvres to prevent the admission of certain States to membership in the United Nations.

121. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): As no other representatives have asked for the floor for an explanation of vote we shall now proceed to vote on draft resolution III.

Draft resolution III was adopted by 36 votes to 5, with 14 abstentions.

Consideration of the various items on the agenda of the meeting

122. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The next items on the agenda are reports from the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. I should first consult the Assembly concerning the application of rule 67 of the rules of procedure, whether or not there should be a discussion on these items. If there is no proposal to discuss these reports, I shall take it that it is the Assembly's will to proceed directly to a vote, though, of course, representatives will be entitled to explain their votes; but I must ask them not to speak for more than seven minutes in explaining their votes.

It was decided not to discuss the eighth to eleventh items of the agenda of the meeting (items 10, 20, 22 and 19b).

Report of the Security Council: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/2094)

[Agenda item 10]

123. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): This draft resolution [A/2094], which the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee recommends to the Assembly for adoption, simply notes the report of the Security Council. I shall now put this draft resolution to the vote.

The draft resolution was adopted by 46 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

Libya : (a) annual report of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya ; (b) annual reports of the Administering Powers in Libya : report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/2097)

[Agenda item 20]

Mr. Sevilla Sacasa (Nicaragua), Rapporteur of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, presented the report of that Committee (A/2097).

124. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee recommends that the Assembly should adopt the draft resolution contained in its report [A/2097].

125. The representative of the United States has the floor to explain his vote.

126. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) : The United Nations has successfully completed its task of assisting the people of Libya to establish its independence in accordance with the decisions of the General Assembly. The Libyans have risen to the responsibility which they and they alone could discharge in determining their Constitution and form of government. Praise and tribute are due to all who have played a responsible part in helping to carry out the General Assembly's resolutions. The Libyans resolved their differences and made their own fundamental decisions in a spirit which should augur well for the manner in which they will now shoulder the responsibilities of statehood.

127. The United Nations Commissioner, Mr. Pelt, has displayed vision, patience and wisdom in carrying out the task entrusted to him. The United Nations Council for Libya has been a valuable source of encouragement to the Libyans and the Administering Powers have faithfully carried out their appointed duties.

128. It is not my purpose to deal with the many important matters which were discussed in the Committee during the consideration of this item. I wish only to explain the vote of my Government on operative paragraphs 5 and 4 of the draft resolution [A/2097], and I would request a separate vote on both paragraphs. It is our hope that on a separate vote those paragraphs will be dropped from the draft resolution.

129. The representatives of Libya have explained in the Committee that the Libyan Government has already decided upon machinery to receive and co-ordinate financial contributions which other Governments may make to Libya's economic development. In view of this decision and in the absence of any specific request from Libya, we feel that the United Nations should not at this time initiate a special examination of this problem of the elaboration of a special programme for the economic development of that country. We think that Libya should be dealt with within the framework of United Nations economic programmes and should not be treated as a special case. We should not, because of our concern for the wellbeing of this new State, run the risk of unduly infringing upon its recognized right as a sovereign State to make its own decision and to take its own initiative in matters affecting its economic life. We feel that the United Nations should not impose its unsolicited opinions on Libya as to the kind of arrangements which should be made for financing its economic development. It can hardly be helpful to the new Libyan State to subject it to the pressures which may arise from the differing views of Members of this Organization on how Libya should organize its own programmes. We are not at all confident that Libya's economic welfare will be advanced if it becomes a recurring item on the agenda of

the General Assembly or of the Economic and Social Council. It is the view of the United States delegation that the problem of how the United Nations can best assist the development of Libya should be treated within the framework of the general programmes of assisting the development of under-developed countries. As the United Nations develops or puts into effect various programmes in this field, these should and will, of course, be available to Libya at its request. Should Libya wish to do so it could, after having reviewed the working of the existing arrangement, request consideration of problems which may well have to be met.

130. My Government is as anxious as other Members of the United Nations to see that Libya obtains the assistance which it requires in order to achieve better standards of living. But, for the reasons I have stated, the United States delegation must oppose a proposal to have the Economic and Social Council make a special examination of arrangements for financial assistance to Libya through the United Nations.

131. When the General Assembly adopted its decision [resolution 289 A (IV)] on 21 November 1949 on the independence of Libya, it stated its aim that upon attainment of independence Libya should be admitted to membership in the United Nations. That aim was specifically re-asserted in the resolution of 1950 [resolution 387 (V)]. The United Nations should now fulfil the aim expressed in the General Assembly's past resolutions.

132. We are glad to join with all who have expressed their feeling of pride and joy in extending to the people and to the Government of Libya best wishes for their future welfare.

133. Mr. SOLDATOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*) : We have before us at this plenary meeting of the General Assembly the draft resolution on Libya approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on 28 January 1952. The USSR delegation considers that draft resolution unsatisfactory and unacceptable, because it proposes no measures designed to ensure Libya's genuine independence.

134. It is a well-known fact that, under the pretext of the defence of the Near and Middle East and regions of North Africa, the United States, the United Kingdom and France have established their military bases on Libyan territory. The British have installed themselves in the eastern part of Libya, Cyrenaica, the French in the Fezzan ; and the Americans have set up their air base in the western part of Libya, in Tripolitania. These measures, which amount to the occupation of Libya by United States, British and French forces, are designed to ensure perpetual interference by these States in Libya's domestic affairs, to prevent the creation of a genuinely independent State, and to make use of Libya's territory and material resources for their aggressive purposes.

135. During the discussion on the Libyan question in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee the statements by the United States, United Kingdom and French representatives provided confirmation of Press reports that the United States, United Kingdom and French Governments had imposed " agreements " on Libya even before the proclamation of Libya's independence, and that under these agreements those States will maintain their troops and military bases on Libyan territory for an unspecified period. We all know that the United States, United Kingdom and French Governments are continually strengthening their garrisons in Libya, expanding their network of military bases, and intensifying the construction of strategic roads

at an accelerated rate. They are even exploiting for their military and aggressive purposes the system of "technical assistance" to Libya. The authorities of these three countries have set up an oppressive régime of military occupation, and are conducting an anti-democratic policy towards the native Arab population.

136. Although the facts relating to the existence of an oppressive military occupation and to the anti-democratic policy followed by the American, British and French authorities in Libya were established with perfect accuracy during the discussion on this question in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, and no one was able to refute them, this question is passed over in the draft resolution at present before us. Moreover, the draft resolution makes no reference to the fact that the United Nations Commissioner, throughout his period of office in Libya, and the Administering Powers, the United Kingdom and France, have failed to act in accordance with the high principles of the Charter, which require respect for the principle of equality and the self-determination of nations; and that on the contrary they have applied a policy designed to satisfy the narrowly selfish interests of the rulers of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and have transformed Libya into an Anglo-American military operational base in North Africa.

137. The presence of foreign troops and the existence of foreign military bases in Libyan territory are measures designed to carry out the military plans of the aggressive Atlantic bloc, and represent a threat to peace and international security. The foreign troops and foreign military bases in Libyan territory not only represent an inadmissible method of pressure and interference in Libya's internal affairs, but are also being used to create an external threat and to exert pressure on the countries adjacent to Libya, particularly the Arab States.

138. From the very first day of the existence of the Soviet Union it has treated with understanding and sympathy the national aspirations of the eastern peoples and their struggle for national independence and sovereignty. It will be recalled that, in accordance with the Soviet Union's unwavering policy of support for the just national demands of all nations, both great and small, it has supported in turn the lawful demands of Syria, Lebanon and Egypt for the evacuation of foreign forces from their territories. The USSR delegation feels bound to state that the presence of foreign troops and the existence of foreign military bases on Libyan territory are a violation of the sovereign rights of the Libyan people and incompatible with Libya's national independence and sovereignty.

139. The USSR delegation considers that the General Assembly should reject the draft resolution submitted for its consideration and should take a decision providing for the withdrawal of foreign troops and military personnel from Libya at the earliest possible date, and for the liquidation of all foreign military bases on Libyan territory. The Soviet Union has submitted a draft resolution [A/2103] along these lines.

140. In addition, the USSR delegation wishes to point out that the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee contains an unacceptable clause, paragraph 7, relating to the admission of Libya to membership in the United Nations. The USSR delegation considers that the question of Libya's admission to membership in the United Nations should be decided by the Security Council at the same time as the question of the admission to membership of the other thirteen States which have submitted applications.

141. In accordance with the USSR delegation's attitude towards the admission of new Members, the USSR delegation in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee proposed the deletion of the paragraph in the operative part of the draft resolution dealing with Libya's admission to membership in the United Nations, as it held that to refer to the General Assembly for consideration the question of Libya's admission before it had been dealt with by the Security Council was a breach of the Charter and therefore illegal. As the USSR delegation's proposal was not adopted, it did not participate in the vote on the draft resolution.

142. Since this inadmissible paragraph is contained in the draft resolution before us as paragraph 7 of the operative part, the USSR delegation will not participate in the vote on the draft resolution, for the reasons stated.

143. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): In explaining the vote of my delegation on the draft resolution before us [A/2103] I am moved by two thoughts, the second of which is perhaps complementary to the first.

144. First, my delegation congratulates the people of Libya both warmly and wholeheartedly on the attainment of its independence. In the second place, my delegation feels that its fundamental right to deal in its own way with problems which confront it should be scrupulously respected. This right is inherent in our recognition of its new sovereign status. In its King, its Government, and in its freely elected representative Parliament which is shortly to be established, it has evolved a constitutional structure which, in the opinion of my delegation, is in itself both a reflection and a guarantee of its capacity to manage its own affairs.

145. We have, moreover, heard the Libyan Prime Minister declare his determination to abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. My delegation is confident that the future Libyan Government will be inspired and guided, so far as the rights and freedoms of both its own nationals and the resident nationals of other States are concerned, by the basic principles of democracy as well as the specific obligations of the United Nations Charter.

146. Turning to the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee [A/2077], my delegation holds that the five paragraphs of the preamble faithfully record the purposes of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and their effective execution by the various authorities which have played a part in the creation of the new sovereign Libyan State. As regards the operative part of the resolution, it will be clear from what I have already said that we shall vote in favour of paragraph 1; we shall also support paragraph 2, which gives an expression of our confidence that the elections shortly to be held in Libya will be conducted on free and democratic lines. We are, however, unable to support paragraphs 3 and 4 of the operative part of the resolution, and that for two reasons.

147. First, we hold that Libya, having taken its place in the comity of free peoples, should be treated on the same footing of absolute equality in the fields of economic and social development as that which is accorded to a Member State of the United Nations. We fully appreciate the need of the new State for technical and financial assistance, assistance which is being generously given and gratefully received. However, we feel that there is no need for special arrangements or for special reports. The standard technical assistance machinery which is being set up in Libya provides, we believe, all that is required. The Libyan Government has already taken constructive and independent action in the fields of financial and economic development. By Libyan law it has already set up Libyan agencies for dealing

with external financial and technical assistance. In expressing in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee [53rd meeting] the readiness of his Government to accept with gratitude such financial assistance as might be offered, the representative of the Libyan Government himself made it clear that such assistance would be welcome provided only that its acceptance involved no diminution of Libyan sovereignty or any intervention in Libyan affairs. Moreover, the Libyan Government will be more than fully employed for many months to come in consolidating its administration and in coping with other internal problems. In the opinion of my delegation no additional burden or report or study should be imposed upon it, unless that is invited.

148. This brings me to my second objection to operative paragraphs 3 and 4. It seems to my delegation that nothing should be included in the resolution which could in any way infringe, or be interpreted as infringing, upon the fundamental right of the Libyan Government to control its own budget and its own development programme and to devise and decide upon the administrative machinery needed for those purposes. There should be nothing which suggests, either directly or by implication, that the Libyan Government is not itself fully capable of utilizing effectively such financial resources as may at its request be placed at its disposal. There should be nothing which might make it difficult for the Libyan Government to decline either to submit to, or to invite the imposition of, a control, however optional on the face of it such control might appear to be. To sum up, it would seem to my delegation to be quite inconsistent to congratulate the Libyan Government on its competence on the one hand and to deny, or to appear to deny it, on the other.

149. My delegation will support the remaining paragraphs of the operative part of the resolution, laying stress once again on our view that Libya is fully qualified for membership in the United Nations.

150. As regards the USSR draft resolution [A/2103], my delegation entirely rejects the implications and the purport of these proposals. The continued presence of some United Kingdom forces on Libyan soil is dependent on the full consent of the Libyan Government and people. We shall therefore vote against this draft resolution.

151. In the one minute remaining to me, I should like to raise the question of the voting procedure in regard to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee's draft resolution. As we see it, it would be in order—and we hope that the President and the Assembly will so agree—that the rule of the two-thirds vote should apply, and that for three reasons.

152. In the first place we believe that on grounds of common sense, if nothing else, it should be considered that this is an important question within the meaning of Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter. I think that this will be one of the most important resolutions of the Assembly; at any rate it is certainly one of the most significant. The ratification by the Assembly of the constitution of a new kingdom, a new independent State, is one which, on the face of it, is of the greatest importance.

153. However, if that argument is not accepted, there is the additional argument that this is a matter which relates, in some degree at any rate, to the question of new admissions, as will be seen from paragraph 7 of the draft resolution before us. And we have already, not so very long ago, decided that a draft resolution regarding new admissions which came from the First Committee was in a category to be dealt with by the rule of the two-thirds vote. I do not see that this draft resolution is in any different category from that one.

154. Finally, even if those arguments are rejected, which I trust they will not be, there is the argument that paragraphs 3 and 4, which we shall vote against, and, even if those paragraphs are rejected, certainly paragraphs 5 and 6 possess considerable potential budgetary implications, which again under Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter would seem to imply that the draft resolution should be dealt with by a two-thirds vote. Therefore, even if the Chair does not see fit to rule under rule 84 of our rules of procedure that this is a matter for a two-thirds vote, I hope the Chair will see fit under rule 85 to consult the Assembly itself on that point.

155. Mr. ULLRICH (Czechoslovakia) (*translated from Russian*): The Czechoslovak delegation, in appraising the documents submitted in connexion with the Libyan question, drew attention to the barbarous, sub-human conditions of life which prevail in Libya as a result of the colonial policy pursued by the western Powers.

156. The Czechoslovak delegation cited many facts to prove that the interest of the western Powers, in particular the United States of America, in Libya is connected with their preparations for war; with the construction of military aerodromes, strategic highways and other military installations which, as we conclusively proved by quotations from American sources, are intended for aggression against Europe and the heart of the USSR.

157. The USSR delegation, true to the interests of peace and to the policy of the group of peace-loving nations, submitted to the General Assembly a draft resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel from Libya, and the liquidation of all foreign military bases in that country. The fulfilment of those demands is one of the essential prerequisites for the free development of the Libyan people and the transformation of Libya into an independent State. If the provisions of the USSR draft resolution are put into effect, the Libyan people will be enabled to develop peacefully and to raise themselves from the sub-human level to which they have sunk through no fault of their own, but as a result of the imperialistic policy of the western Powers.

158. The Czechoslovak delegation will oppose any other policy, and will vote for the USSR draft resolution.

159. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) (*translated from Spanish*): Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the operative part of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee's draft resolution were sponsored by the Chilean delegation. Accordingly, I feel obliged to say a few words to explain the reasons why we made the proposal which was subsequently approved.

160. To begin with, I should like to remind the Assembly that the Chilean delegation confined itself to presenting in a new, and rather less drastic, form a very sweeping amendment submitted by the Arab countries, in which they requested the General Assembly to invite Member States to supply financial assistance to Libya and recommended that all such financial assistance should be supplied through United Nations channels.

161. The two approved paragraphs recommend, to my mind, a method which in no way infringes the sovereign rights of the new State to put in order and organize its own economic system and to set up whatever machinery it deems fit to co-ordinate and receive assistance from abroad, as well as to carry out its financial programmes, including those for economic development. They simply propose a study of the way in which the United Nations could be of most service if it receives a request for assistance from the State of Libya, precisely in the same way as has been done with regard to technical assistance.

162. These recommendations keep in view existing circumstances and do not and cannot impede the continued effectiveness of the financial agreements between Libya and the United Kingdom as they exist today, and cannot prevent any new bilateral agreements that the Government of Libya may deem fit to conclude with other governments.

163. The paragraphs to which objections have been raised are based in the main on four considerations: first, the extreme urgency of the problems of Libya and their gravity, so clearly explained in the reports of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya, the outstanding features of which are the poverty of its natural resources and the total lack of native technicians and professional persons and the terribly low level of its public health and education: 10 per cent of the population are blind and more than 90 per cent are illiterate.

164. The second consideration is the United Nations' particular responsibility for the future of Libya which, in my opinion, justifies giving it special treatment, deriving as it does from the fact that the United Nations has promoted and sponsored the immediate independence of a country which, it was known beforehand, would encounter tremendous difficulties in surviving independently. The United Nations cannot risk a failure which would be absolutely disastrous if Libya, owing to its economic backwardness, failed to maintain its political independence and to establish a democratic and liberal political system. We have always maintained that it is impossible for the independence and freedom of a country or a democratic system of government to be sustained if the people do not enjoy a reasonable standard of living.

165. The third consideration is that the United Nations must prefer and recommend that international assistance in the form of a subsidy should be accorded through an international organ. That is the principle that the Assembly laid down in its resolution of 12 January on the financing of economic development [A/L. 32], and that which the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development himself has advanced so resolutely and brilliantly. And it is also the principle which the United Nations Commissioner in Libya has recommended in his report and in his statement to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee as the most advisable for the young State of Libya.

166. The fourth consideration is the acknowledged inadequacy of the existing specialized agencies of the United Nations to give assistance of this kind. This does not mean that the organs of the United Nations reject or disapprove bilateral assistance. They would have no right to do so under the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, which forbids interference in the domestic affairs of States. Furthermore, there would be no reason to do so, as bilateral financial and technical assistance has in recent years produced such excellent results as the Marshall Plan and the Point Four programme of the President of the United States.

167. The draft resolution approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee is confined to a request that the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with the Government of Libya, should study and recommend to the General Assembly ways and means by which the States Members of the United Nations, through the United Nations and the specialized agencies, could best furnish additional assistance to the Government of Libya with a view to financing in particular its fundamental programmes of economic development, including the possibility of opening a special account to that end.

168. In brief, the Economic and Social Council is being asked to suggest what ways and means it deems fitting to

assist Libya financially through the United Nations. It may be a request to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to give sympathetic consideration to any requests made by Libya; it may be a recommendation to Member States to give direct assistance to Libya through a special account which might be managed by the Secretary-General, the Technical Assistance Board or the International Bank itself. Thus, the door is left open for the members of the Economic and Social Council, among them the United States and the United Kingdom, which play such a prominent part in its debates, to use their imagination and exercise their goodwill.

169. The reference to the possibility of opening a special account derives from the fact that this was one of the ideas advanced by several members during the discussions of the subject, but it will in no circumstances bind the Council's hands with regard to the solution it may propose, in consultation, as I have said, with the Government of Libya.

170. I must beg the President to let me have a few more minutes to deal with the question of the need for a two-thirds majority vote on the draft resolution, as requested by the representative of the United Kingdom.

171. I believe I am right in seeing in that request a concern that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the operative part of the draft resolution should be adopted by a two-thirds majority, because the remainder had only a few votes cast against it in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

172. I am going to argue that these paragraphs do not and cannot require a two-thirds majority. Rule 84 of the rules of procedure, which reproduces Article 18 of the Charter, indicates the precise questions for which a two-thirds majority is required. It thus leaves the door open for the Assembly by a majority vote to include other subjects and matters. I feel that the reason why Article 18 permitted such latitude was that it was not believed possible to include in an exhaustive list all questions that were of real importance. But the Assembly must employ some method and follow some principle if it is to adopt this exceptional requirement of a two-thirds majority. It seems to me that one such principle would be to require the two-thirds majority for resolutions which would have permanent effects, would have irreparable results or would place some Member in particular in difficulties by laying upon it some burden that it would be bound, even though only morally, to assume.

173. None of these situations arises in this case. I do not see what permanent effects or what irreparable situation could be caused by the Assembly's requesting the Economic and Social Council to consider ways and means by which the United Nations could supply financial aid to Libya at Libya's request.

174. I think it is a purely procedural matter, and if the system of the two-thirds majority should be adopted in this case, we would risk setting up precedents which may be dangerous.

175. Furthermore, I should like to remind the author of the proposal that I appreciate the difficulties which a country and a delegation accustomed to being among a majority must feel in finding itself for once in a minority; but this happens quite often to other countries, and I do not think that it is sufficient reason to ask for exceptional treatment for a draft resolution of this kind.

176. Mr. KRAJEWSKI (Poland) (*translated from French*): The Polish delegation wishes to explain its vote on the draft resolutions submitted to us.

177. The General Assembly has to decide on a USSR draft resolution which is of the greatest importance for the

independence and sovereignty of Libya and for international peace and security. The USSR draft resolution recommends that all foreign troops and military personnel should be withdrawn from Libya within three months and that all foreign military bases should be liquidated within the same time.

178. During the present session, as at the fourth and fifth sessions of the General Assembly, the Polish delegation has expressed its interest in, and sympathy for, the Libyan people's struggle for independence and the respect of its sovereign rights. At the same time it has drawn attention to the main reasons why the Libyan people cannot achieve complete independence. The principal reason is the presence on Libyan soil of American, British and French troops and military bases. The USSR draft resolution emphasizes that the presence of these bases and these troops in Libya constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Ever since they occupied Libya, the Administering Powers and the United States have been trying to transform the country into a military base designed to further their aggressive plans against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. That is the share assigned to Libya in the warlike preparations of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc. Every debate on the subject brings to light further evidence of the development by the imperialist Powers of already existing military bases and the establishment of new ones and fresh proofs of the ever-growing strategic preparations being made in Libya. The debate in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee this year also furnished new evidence.

179. The Powers which are carrying out this policy do not even trouble to hide or deny the facts. They give as a reason the agreements concluded with the Provisional Government of Libya, regardless of the fact that they already had troops and bases in Libya before the Provisional Government existed. It is an old tradition of the colonial Powers to make agreements with countries which their troops are already occupying. It is well-known that the Libyan people have never been asked for their opinion on the presence of foreign troops and the existence of foreign military bases in their country. The Egyptian representative, however, described at length in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee the feelings of the Libyan people on the subject of the occupation and the so-called protection of the imperialist Powers. He cited a number of instances of the oppression and terrorism suffered by the Libyan people, which objects to the presence of foreign troops in its country. The Libyan people demands the immediate withdrawal of these troops and the liquidation of the foreign military bases, not only because it is convinced that the occupation prevents its achieving full and complete sovereignty, but also because it is aware that the imperialist Powers, and particularly the United States, are transforming the country into a military base. The Libyan people, like other peoples of the Middle East and North Africa, is opposed to that policy.

180. The United Nations cannot tolerate that the United States, the United Kingdom and France, with the support of their troops, should interfere in Libya's domestic affairs and infringe its sovereignty. A new danger spot for international peace is being created in the Mediterranean by the inclusion of Libya in the preparations for war within the framework of the Atlantic Treaty. The Polish delegation therefore wholeheartedly supports the USSR draft resolution and will vote for it.

181. On the other hand, with respect to the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the Polish delegation is unable to support paragraph 7 of the operative

part. In our opinion, since the admission of new Members has been discussed in the First Committee it was pointless and unjustifiable for another Committee to take a decision on the same subject. Moreover, we know that it is the United States which is blocking the admission of fourteen States, including Libya, by the kind of manoeuvres of which we have just had an example, because of their discriminatory attitude towards countries whose policy does not fit in with their plans.

182. The PRESIDENT: I would draw the representative's attention to the fact that he has now spoken for six minutes.

183. Mr. KRAJEWSKI (Poland) (*translated from French*): Hence we consider the recommendation embodied in paragraph 7 of the operative part of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee's draft resolution, with regard to the admission of Libya, to be ineffectual and improper. If paragraph 7 is retained, the Polish delegation will be unable to take part in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole.

184. Mr. LACOSTE (France) (*translated from French*): The French delegation will vote for the draft resolution approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, which we feel on the whole covers the situation.

185. Nevertheless, we shall vote against operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft resolution, as we did in the Committee. My delegation feels that the alterations made in the original drafting of these paragraphs do not remove all the objections to which they give rise. The chief objection is the restriction imposed by these two paragraphs on the universally recognized right of every State to draw up its own development programmes and to finance them as it sees fit. Even in their present form we feel that paragraphs 3 and 4 are misleading. Moreover, they are superfluous in so far as their provisions repeat those of paragraph 6. They therefore add nothing useful to the resolution, but rather tend to distort its meaning.

186. The USSR draft resolution, which has already been rejected by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, is based on inaccurate premises and cannot therefore be considered. Nothing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional defensive arrangements between the governments of independent States. The French delegation will therefore vote against the USSR draft resolution.

187. I may add that my delegation considers that this is an important question which should be decided by a two-thirds majority.

188. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee recommends to the Assembly for adoption the draft resolution reproduced in the report [A/2097].

189. A request has been made that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the operative part of this draft resolution should be voted on separately.

190. Although some representatives have made comments and given their personal opinions on the procedure to be followed in the voting, on the majority required for its adoption, I should like to enquire if there is a formal motion in that sense from any representative.

191. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) (*speaking from the floor*): I would submit a formal proposal to that effect.

192. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The representative of the United Kingdom moves a point of order in this connexion. I must give my opinion on this subject and state once again that, so far as the Chair is

concerned, resolutions can only be interpreted by reference to the Charter and to the rules of procedure, without any political judgment on each individual case.

193. I consider that, as in the previous case, this draft resolution does not require a two-thirds majority, but in the same way as for resolution II relating to the previous item on the agenda, I shall put it to the Assembly whether or not this draft resolution requires a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting for its adoption.

194. I should also like to make it clear to the Assembly that the issue which I am now putting to the vote is whether the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee [A/2097] requires, in the opinion of representatives, a two-thirds majority.

195. I make this comment because, just as in the previous case, I am putting to the vote a concrete case contained in a resolution, and not a rule, because I think that it would be dangerous for the future to establish the precedent that when we decide that a draft resolution requires a two-thirds majority, each of the subjects mentioned in the various paragraphs of the preamble or operative part of that draft invariably requires a two-thirds majority. I think that in this way resolutions affecting each other would set up a chain reaction, until the ordinary rule of voting by simple majority would become inapplicable.

196. To sum up, I shall now call upon the Assembly to decide by its vote whether the draft resolution will require a two-thirds majority for its adoption.

It was decided by 29 votes to 17, with 5 abstentions, that the adoption of the draft resolution did not require a two-thirds majority.

197. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The Assembly has decided that this draft resolution may be adopted by a simple majority.

198. I shall now put to the vote the preamble and paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution.

The preamble and paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part were adopted by 52 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

199. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We shall now vote on paragraph 3 of the operative part.

Paragraph 3 of the operative part was adopted by 30 votes to 16, with 5 abstentions.

200. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We shall next vote on paragraph 4 of the operative part.

Paragraph 4 of the operative part was adopted by 30 votes to 12, with 5 abstentions.

201. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We shall now vote on the remainder of the draft resolution, that is paragraphs 5, 6 and 7.

Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 were adopted by 50 votes to none.

202. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We shall now vote upon the draft resolution as a whole.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 53 votes to none.

203. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We also have before us a draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation [A/2103], which I shall now put to the vote.

The draft resolution was rejected by 34 votes to 6, with 10 abstentions.

The appropriate adjustment of the frontiers between Egypt and the former Italian colony of Libya, with particular reference to paragraphs 2 and 3 of Annex XI of the Treaty of Peace with Italy: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/2096)

[Agenda item 22]

Mr. Sevilla Sacasa (Nicaragua), Rapporteur, presented the report of the Ad Hoc Political Committee (A/2095) and then spoke as follows:

204. Mr. SEVILLA SACASA (Nicaragua), Rapporteur of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (*translated from Spanish*): In submitting this report, I must express my satisfaction at the formula which has been obtained for the best possible settlement of this question as between Egypt and the new independent State of Libya.

205. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We shall vote on the draft resolution contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee [A/2095].

The draft resolution was adopted by 40 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.