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**President: Mr. Adam MALIK (Indonesia).**

*In the absence of the President, Mr. Longerstaey (Belgium), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

**AGENDA ITEM 8**

**Adoption of the agenda (*continued*)**

**FIRST REPORT OF THE GENERAL  
COMMITTEE (A/8500)**

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We shall continue our study of the recommendation contained in paragraph 18 of the General Committee's report [A/8500], namely that item 106 of the draft agenda (Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations), item 107 (Dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea) and item 108 (Question of Korea: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea) should be included in the provisional agenda of the twenty-seventh session.

2. Mr. HEARN (Canada): The Canadian delegation fully supports the recommendation of the General Committee to defer discussion of the question of Korea until the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

3. It has been the consistent position of Canada for many years that the annual repetition of the Korean debate in the General Assembly, every year in identical terms, contributes nothing to the solution of the complex problems with which the debate is nominally concerned. It does—and has done—nothing to achieve the objectives of the United Nations, nor of any Member or group of Members as they have expressed them here. Above all, it does nothing to assist the people of either part of Korea to overcome the political, social and economic difficulties created by the partition of their country more than 25 years ago.

4. The only way in which real progress can be made on this question is for the Koreans themselves to make it. The immediate prospects for progress lie not here but in Korea. We know that talks under Red Cross auspices on the reunification of divided families have begun. Some delega-

tions have asked why talks through a non-governmental organization should affect the deliberations of the General Assembly of the United Nations. That is a valid question.

5. The answer is simple. These are the first bilateral contacts of any constructive kind which have taken place between the two parts of Korea in over 20 years. The Korean question, as our perennial debates have shown, has been frozen at the United Nations for decades. If anybody doubted that it remained so, he had only to listen to the discussion we had here during our meetings yesterday and to what we shall, no doubt, hear further this morning. Now, through the agency of the Red Cross, we have awakening hopes for a thaw. We trust that, given a chance, the Red Cross talks will prove to be only a first step towards broader and more comprehensive contacts. For the General Assembly to turn the withering breath of yet another Korean debate on this promising but still tender beginning would be a totally self-defeating act from all points of view.

6. All that the General Committee recommends is deferment of discussion for one year. Perhaps by then we can approach the Korean question from new positions and with new perspectives. Let us by all means forgo the sterile arguments—which we all know by heart—for one year in order to give genuine progress an opportunity to take root in Korea itself. Some delegations have argued here that there must be some sinister or tendentious purpose in the proposal for deferment. If real progress, rooted in the interests of the Koreans themselves is sinister and tendentious, those delegations are right. If a just and rational solution, brought about by negotiations between those vitally concerned, is sinister and tendentious, they are right.

7. One may fairly ask why anyone should wish to perpetuate the Korean deadlock, either in the United Nations or in Korea? Who benefits? In whose interest is it? In 1971 my delegation would be sorry to believe that the unilateral methods exemplified by the armed invasion of South Korea from the North in 1950—the armed invasion of South Korea from the North: that is one of the facts which the representative of Somalia told us yesterday [1938th meeting] we should face, however embarrassing they may be for some people—could still claim supporters among us. But there are those who scarcely trouble to conceal their political objectives. A just and balanced settlement in the interests of the people of the whole of Korea is evidently as nothing to them. They dismiss practical measures leading towards such a settlement. Instead, what do they propose? That the General Assembly again discuss the Korean item, but only on terms which they dictate, and that the prejudicial items they have proposed for inclusion be maintained in the agenda in the hope that their will may be unilaterally imposed on the

unfortunate Korean people and on the international community.

8. The Canadian delegation, in the interest of new and constructive approaches—in Korea, in all East Asia and, indeed, everywhere—rejects these manoeuvres. Instead, we urge the General Assembly to approve the General Committee's wise recommendation to defer the Korean question as a whole—including all items related thereto, proposed by all parties—until the twenty-seventh session.

9. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Most of the preceding speakers have broadly commented on the problem before us; and, in order not to repeat what has already been said on this subject, I shall confine myself to stating briefly my delegation's position on this problem.

10. The reasons which prompted the General Committee to recommend that items 106 and 107 of the draft agenda submitted by the Secretary-General in his memorandum [A/BUR/177, para. 15] should be deferred to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly are difficult to understand and, in any case, they are inadmissible. It is a fact that these items, which deal with the Korean question, have been examined by the Assembly for many years now and they come regularly before us in our debates. But now, arbitrarily, it is felt that this session should not be seized of these items! We do not know on the basis of what new elements or of what sinister speculations there is a preference today for shelving this question and postponing it to the next session, when the Assembly, perhaps, will find even better reasons to avoid an examination of it. And, yet, this is a problem of direct interest to the United Nations because we cannot forget that our Organization has been involved in events which have led up to the present situation in Korea; and it is still involved in the maintenance of this abnormal, unjust situation. It is therefore the duty of the United Nations to find ways to correct its errors and to encourage the prompt re-establishment of a normal situation, in accordance with the will of the Korean people.

11. In any case, many countries which are now States Members of the United Nations—amongst them Algeria—were not yet independent at the time of the Korean war and they cannot agree to continue to bear a responsibility which is against their will and of which they fundamentally disapprove.

12. The fact that the United Nations is being used merely to cloak United States' action in Korea in no way decreases the Organization's responsibility, on the contrary, at the risk of falling into discredit, the United Nations must not allow itself to be used for imperialist purposes nor must it allow itself to be reduced to the unenviable role of a belligerent. The primary duty of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security and not to jeopardize it. The role of the United Nations is to encourage and facilitate a political solution to problems rather than to maintain them in a state of deadlock. The purpose of the United Nations is to eliminate obstacles to peace rather than to buttress such obstacles and to multiply them.

13. The solution of the Korean problem, as we see it, lies basically in the withdrawal of foreign troops now stationed

in South Korea and in giving the Korean people freedom to settle their own affairs.

14. By deferring items 106 and 107 to the next session, our Organization would seem to be shirking its responsibilities. Such a position would constitute a policy of dilatory tactics; it would be tantamount to ignoring the crucial problems of our times rather than attacking them with courage and wisdom. For that reason my delegation requests the General Assembly not to follow the recommendations of the General Committee and to retain items 106 and 107 on its agenda.

15. Mr. SZARKA (Hungary): I have asked for the floor to object to the recommendation of the General Committee in respect of two items relating to Korea: those items are 106 and 107, entitled, respectively, "Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations" and "Dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea".

16. The unwarranted decision of the General Committee to make that recommendation actually signals a new tactical approach in the policy of the United States on the discussion of the Korean question in the United Nations. This new tactic has been made necessary by well-known changes in the situation in the world in general and in Asia in particular. What does that new tactic require with regard to Korea? It requires the same approach as elsewhere: that the occupation troops must remain. A slight reduction in their number, with an increase in their armaments, may even serve the purpose of making the so-called "Guam doctrine" a bit more credible for innocent ears. So the troops—the so-called United Nations troops—are to stay on. So the United Nations flag is further stained and used as a camouflage. Needless to say, such a situation further damages the prestige of our Organization. Thus, according to the motion, a solution is to be found, not in the removal of the aggressive foreign troops from Korea, but in postponing the discussion on their illegal presence.

17. As a pretext for the deferment nothing better was found than the recently begun Red Cross discussions on family reunifications between North and South Korea. We are told, with the utmost seriousness, that there should be no discussion on the withdrawal of United States armed forces from Korea because such a discussion would hamper the Red Cross talks. These talks—as everybody knows, and as everybody should know—have been started on the initiative of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which for several years has put forward a number of similar and even more far-reaching constructive proposals.

18. For the same reason, we are told that there should be no discussion until the next session of the General Assembly on the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the so-called UNCURK, the limited membership of which reads like an extract from the membership lists of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization. It is not proposed that UNCURK should be dissolved so that its continued harmful reports should not poison the atmosphere; what is proposed is that

it should continue to exist, but that the Assembly should have no opportunity to consider its dissolution.

19. My country, as a sincere friend of the Korean people, has always advocated the termination of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Korea. We, as co-sponsors of the two items mentioned earlier, propose to discuss the military and diplomatic aspects of foreign intervention in Korean affairs with a view to putting an end to it. What we propose is to discuss and decide on the end of this intervention. What the General Committee, under United States pressure, recommends is to leave intact the tools of intervention and to stop even considering a ban on them. It is proposed that we should keep silent about the Korean remnants of the cold-war policies of the United States, kept alive under the name of the United Nations. We propose, that by including our two items, we should discuss and decide to rid this Organization, once and for all, of the responsibility which it was forced to undertake at a time when a majority of the present Member States had no say in United Nations decisions. We invite especially these Member States to declare that this Organization has come of age and cannot be manipulated any longer.

20. Sir Laurence McINTYRE (Australia): The Australian delegation welcomes the recommendation made by the General Committee that items 106, 107 and 108 of the draft agenda, concerning Korea, should be included in the provisional agenda of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly and that consideration of this question at the present session should be deferred. We believed that the arguments advanced in the General Committee by those Member States which supported this proposal are both sound and convincing. The fact that after so many years contacts between both sides in Korea are now taking place must be regarded as encouraging. It makes no difference that the present contacts are between the two Red Cross societies and are concentrating on humanitarian objectives. Even this has not been possible in the past.

21. Now, this is a beginning which we hope—and I am sure all those sincerely working for a peaceful and stable settlement in the Korean peninsula hope, and as I know the Government of the Republic of Korea hopes—will lead on to further talks on an increasingly wider range of subjects between the Republic of Korea and North Korea. I should like to remind this Assembly that the United Nations Commission, acting within its mandate and in the spirit of the General Assembly resolutions regarding the unification of Korea welcomed this development and expressed its hope for the success of these discussions. I might also quote from the newspaper *Pravda*. *Pravda* has said:

“Judging by the reports received, public opinion in the North and South of Korea expects that the meeting in Panmunjom will facilitate the solution of problems causing the anxiety of all Korean peoples, in line with their national hopes and aspirations. These hopes are shared by the Soviet people, and people of good-will throughout the world who are interested in the establishment of a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula.”

22. For many years, the Australian delegation has taken an active part in debates on the Korean question. When this question is debated here again we shall again be ready to try

and reach a consensus based on the realities of the situation in Korea, a consensus which, we hope, would contribute to an ultimate settlement there. But we have seen in the past, and we see now, no indication of willingness on the part of North Korea or its supporters in this Organization to adopt a more flexible or forthcoming attitude towards United Nations involvement in the Korean question. We regret the sterility and the acrimony that have marked the annual exchange of views on Korea in this General Assembly and that have characterized the remarks of many of those who have already spoken against the General Committee's recommendations.

23. The agreement to start talks aimed at alleviating the personal hardships caused by the separation of families in North and South Korea comes as a promising new element in what has hitherto been a stalemate. My delegation considers that yet another contentious debate at this time could do nothing to assist what the Korean people themselves are doing to reduce tensions between them, and it could very well hinder it. We therefore support the recommendation in the General Committee's report to defer consideration of these items until 1972, and we urge all Members who sincerely want to see peace and stability come at last after so long to the Korean peninsula to vote in favour of the General Committee's recommendations.

24. Mr. ISMAIL (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen): As a member of the General Committee I think it is necessary to mention in brief how the idea of postponing the question of Korea arose, for the information of the Member States which did not attend the General Committee meeting in which this item was under debate [192nd meeting]. My delegation believes that we should bind ourselves to a procedural discussion as long as we are discussing a matter of procedural aspects.

25. Mr. President, as you are aware, a member of the General Committee suggested delaying three items concerning Korea until the next session of the General Assembly, without giving any reasons. Later, another member of the General Committee supported this suggestion because, he said, there were contacts between the Red Cross societies of North Korea and South Korea. Unfortunately, the explanation of this excuse used up valuable time in the debate of the General Committee.

26. My delegation believes that that excuse is very weak. Is that representative suggesting that the Red Cross societies should share the responsibility for Korea with this world body?

27. The aspects of the Korean problem are of international scope. The question we must ask ourselves is whether or not foreign forces under the flag of the United Nations should continue to be stationed in Korea. Are those forces real peace-keeping forces, or do they contribute to the tension in Korea?

28. Before us is the problem of the reunification of Korea. With all due respect to the Red Cross societies of both Koreas, what real power have they to settle this question? My delegation believes that the aforementioned excuse for delaying the discussion of the Korean problem is baseless and disrespectful of the intelligence of all representatives.

We are all aware that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea still intends to put before the United Nations the problem of the occupation by foreign Powers of part of Korea under the United Nations flag. My delegation believes that the General Assembly should not be deprived of the opportunity of examining the problem thoroughly and continuously—especially since this is an internal matter of concern to the United Nations.

29. In conclusion, I must emphasize that my delegation cannot accept any delay in debating the Korean problem, although we are aware that it has already been debated for many years. However, the question is not for how many years Korea has been under discussion but rather what such discussion and debates have achieved.

30. Our delegation supports the inclusion of items 106 and 107 in the agenda of this session of the General Assembly.

31. Mr. ECOBESCU (Romania) (*interpretation from French*): The delegation of the Socialist Republic of Romania has already had occasion to state its position in respect of the subject under discussion in the debate that took place in the General Committee. My delegation has asked to speak again today to express its firm opposition to the recommendation of the General Committee to defer consideration of item 106, "Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations", and item 107, "Dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea", to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

32. This position stems from the continued policy of the Government and people of Romania of firmly supporting the legitimate aspiration of the Korean people to the peaceful and democratic unification of its fatherland. It is well known that Romania has always pronounced itself, and continues to do so, in favour of the withdrawal of United States and other foreign troops from South Korea, and in favour of respect for the inalienable right of the Korean people to decide their own destiny.

33. Here in the United Nations, in requesting the inclusion of items 106 and 107 on the agenda of the current session [A/8443 and Add.1, A/8444 and Add.1 and 2], Romania started from the premise that there was a need to put an end to all forms of interference in the internal affairs of the people of Korea while ensuring conditions enabling it to determine its own destiny in accordance with its will. We believe that the Korean question, in keeping with the demands of the norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, is within the exclusive competence of the Koreans themselves.

34. More than 25 years have elapsed since the end of the Second World War, and peoples still continue to live divided because of artificially created frontiers. In the opinion of the Romanian delegation it is high time that something be done resolutely to put an end to this abnormal situation in order that all peoples, among them most definitely the Korean people, may achieve their national unity.

35. We believe that the eight-point programme adopted by the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea offers a realistic and constructive basis for achieving the peaceful reunification of Korea.

36. In a special statement, the Foreign Policy Commission of the great National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania welcomed those proposals because it felt that their implementation would respond to the vital interests of the Korean people while at the same time representing a contribution to the cause of peace and security in that area and throughout the world. It is, in fact, undeniable that the division of Korea, following the occupation of the south by United States troops, had serious consequences at all levels for the whole Korean people.

37. It is in the light of those facts that we have always believed, and continue to believe, that the withdrawal of United States and other foreign troops from South Korea and the dissolution of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea are current and urgent questions. We are therefore unable to understand either the reasons invoked for deferring consideration of these two questions until the next session of the General Assembly or the conclusion drawn therefrom that meetings between the representatives of the Red Cross societies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Korea warrant such a decision by the General Assembly.

38. Public opinion in my country, like that of all progressive forces throughout the world, received with keen interest and welcomed with satisfaction the news of those meetings, which constitute the first direct contact between North and South Korea in more than a quarter-century. In our view, that first step, rather than inducing us to delay the positive solution of the two questions, should encourage the General Assembly to act to put an end—without delay and once and for all—to foreign military presence in South Korea and to any interference in the internal affairs of the Korean people.

39. For those reasons, we believe that the items entitled "Question of Korea: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea" should no longer appear on the agenda of General Assembly sessions.

40. As regards the items relating to the withdrawal of United States and all other foreign troops occupying South Korea under the United Nations flag and the dissolution of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, we are in favour of their inclusion in the agenda of the current session in order that an appropriate examination conducive to concrete solutions—which flow clearly from their very title—may be carried out, and we firmly oppose the proposal to defer their consideration.

41. Mr. DIOP (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): The Korean question has been a matter of concern for the United Nations for more than 15 years now. It is amongst those artificial problems which have been created in order to perpetuate the foreign domination by dividing peoples.

42. Korea, after a most horrible and bloody war and after having paid in millions of human lives and in the almost



complete destruction of its northern region, has been arbitrarily divided by means of lines of latitude and longitude. This division into what has been called North and South Korea exemplifies the tragedy of this country which is only seeking unity through reunification. The role of the United Nations is to facilitate this reunification by peaceful means. But what is the United Nations doing? The United Nations is maintaining foreign troops in the southern part of Korea under the screen of the United Nations flag. Far from promoting reunification this promotes the division of the country and aggravates the conflict which is being fed by those who stand to profit from this situation.

43. The Government of my country is opposed to any division and to any secession in any country whatsoever. The peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America have been victims of artificial divisions perpetrated by colonialism and imperialism. The United Nations should not support the maintenance of an artificial division of a single people especially when that country is only seeking unity as in Korea, where the conditions are favourable for reunification.

44. In North Korea, as well as in South Korea, the same people speak the same language and have the same traditions and customs. This is one of the few cases in the world where there are no ethnic or linguistic minorities. The United Nations should assume its responsibility by including in its agenda the Korean question as proposed in items 106 and 107 of the draft agenda. It should continue, patiently and resolutely, to create favourable conditions for the peaceful reunification of Korea.

45. Although we are gratified to note the meetings between the Pyongyang authorities and the Government at Seoul, it should be observed that these are purely meetings of a social nature. The respective Red Cross societies, however well-meaning in their efforts, can at best only hope to establish communications and contacts between families which have been separated by the arbitrary division of the Korean territory. While welcoming this initiative, we should not consider it as an end in and of itself. On the contrary, the General Assembly should take this opportunity to stimulate the process of reunification. Those representatives who suggested the postponement of this question in order not to hamper the efforts of the two Red Cross societies do not realize the consequences of this, inasmuch as the foreign troops in the southern part of that country have a protective mission which is purely and simply to manipulate the leaders under their orders, leaders who have been imposed by force and who govern by decrees dictated from abroad.

46. My delegation feels that a solution in conformity with the aspirations of the Korean people can be achieved only on the basis of freedom, to the exclusion of all foreign intervention.

47. For these reasons, my delegation has, together with 18 other delegations, requested the inclusion of items 106 and 107 in the agenda [A/8443 and Add.1, A/8444 and Add.1 and 2].

48. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to draw the attention of the Assembly to rule 75 of the rules of procedure, which reads as follows:

"During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the General Assembly, declare the list closed. He may, however, accord the right of reply to any Member if a speech delivered after he has declared the list closed makes this desirable."

49. I suggest that the list of speakers be closed.

50. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, should we not allow representatives who might wish to inscribe their names on the list of speakers time to think it over until mid-day?

51. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In those circumstances, I propose that, if there are no objections, the list of speakers should be closed at mid-day.

*It was so decided.*

52. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (*interpretation from French*): The General Committee, at its 193rd meeting on 23 September, decided to recommend the postponement of the discussion of the three items relating to Korea, items 106, 107 and 108 of the draft agenda and their inclusion in the provisional agenda of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

53. This proposal was made in a very skilful manner, it is true, by the representative of the United Kingdom in order that certain Western Powers—first and foremost the United States—might be dispensed from hearing the criticism and views of members of the General Assembly on the policy of aggression and intervention in Korea.

54. While the items of the "Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying the South Korea under the flag of the United Nations" and the "Dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea" were being discussed in the General Committee, the representative of the United Kingdom introduced his proposal to defer all questions relating to Korea until the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly in order, he said, to allow the possibility of the development of contacts that had been opened between the Red Cross societies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of South Korea and to let them work without the annoyance of noisy discussions of the Korean question in the General Assembly.

55. This explanation, which is easy to offer whenever there is need to debate a question that disturbs the atmosphere of possible constructive discussions between the parties concerned, particularly among those which long ago made the necessary preparations for substantial negotiations—and it is to be hoped that discussions between the Red Cross societies of the two parts of Korea will be constructive—would apply to another question, namely, item 108 of the draft agenda, "Question of Korea: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea". This reasoning, however—and I am referring to the reasoning of the United Kingdom representative—in no way relates to the two items proposed by a number of non-aligned and socialist countries, among them my own country, on the withdrawal of United States

and all other foreign forces from South Korea [*A/8443 and Add.1*], and on the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea [*A/8444 and Add.1 and 2*].

56. We fully agree that the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea—a commission that was constituted at the instigation of those who intended to occupy South Korea in order to facilitate the introduction and maintenance of troops in that bridgehead in the Far East—might prevent the development of constructive contacts between the two Koreas. In fact, the only aim and the result of all the reports of this “famous” commission submitted thus far have been to facilitate the maintenance of United States troops in that country, thus making it what the United States wants it to be, namely a United States bridgehead in the area.

57. We must say that this tragic and even sinister comedy of discussing the report of the so-called Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea has been staged for over 18 consecutive years by those who are interested in maintaining the military occupation of South Korea.

58. If it were only a question of deferring the consideration of the report of the Commission which is an accessory to the division of Korea, we would have no objection. We are prepared to vote in its favour, as we have proposed that this item should be eliminated from the agenda through the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

59. Yesterday the representative of the United Kingdom provided us with a perfect example of the results obtained following the discussion of the report of the Commission. He said:

“It is a regrettable but inescapable fact that the debates we have held each year for many years on this question have followed an entirely predictable pattern . . . . We cannot pretend that we have made any contribution to the solution of the Korean question by these debates.” [*1938th meeting, para. 132.*]<sup>1</sup>

60. We agree fully, in fact, with the representative of the United Kingdom when he says that the side which he represents has not made a contribution to the solution of the Korean question through the debates that were held in the past on the report of the Commission. However, we must clearly explain that such results apply only to the efforts to embroil and confuse matters and not to the discussion of other questions, the object of which is to help in unifying Korea.

61. Taking advantage, however, of the lassitude among the States Members of the United Nations resulting from the presentation each year of a report whose only object is to maintain the division of Korea and the occupation of its southern part by United States forces, the authors of the proposals for deferment of the items use a manoeuvre which, under the pretext of helping the Korean people in their wish to achieve unification of their country, will result only in perpetuating the division of that heroic and unhappy people.

62. The pretext is well chosen. However, it goes far beyond the boundaries of impertinence and can deceive no one. There are those who say they are surprised to find two questions diametrically different in their substance placed together, the question of the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which has always hampered any possibility for the withdrawal of United States forces, and the questions relating to the dissolution of the United Nations Commission and the withdrawal of United States troops, proposals that were made in order to facilitate the task of the Korean people and enable them to decide on their own destiny without foreign occupation of one part of their territory.

63. We are surprised to find that there are certain representatives who claim that the withdrawal of those troops from South Korea would hinder understanding between the two parts of the divided country. There is one undeniable fact: the division of the country was the result of foreign occupation and was brought about by that very occupation. To claim that the maintenance of foreign occupation which led to the division of the country—and the United Kingdom proposal seeks only to perpetuate that occupation—could lead to understanding and facilitate contacts between the two parts of the divided country is, to say the least, impertinent. Be that as it may, that is the position of some of the United States allies.

64. We understand full well and quite readily that some of the allies of the United States should seek to continue to facilitate the occupation of South Korea. Some have themselves played the part of occupying Powers in the past, and may wish to do so again in the future. We also understand the representatives of certain countries which, side by side with the United States, have participated in the occupation of South Korea or still participate in that sinister so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Perhaps they can do nothing else, although we believe it is high time for them to change their attitude.

65. We have difficulty in understanding the position of certain countries which declare themselves to be enemies of colonialism and foreign intervention in their own affairs and in the affairs of others and which endeavour here to find reasons for explaining their support of the United Kingdom proposal, which is no more than a United States proposal and which seeks to maintain the occupation of South Korea by United States forces indefinitely. We have great difficulty particularly in understanding that certain representatives of countries recently liberated from foreign and colonial yoke should even consider voting in favour of or abstaining on the proposal of the United Kingdom, which seeks to maintain the foreign occupation of a country and a people that aspires to freedom from that occupation.

66. Without wishing to go into any detail, I should like to state that there is a powerful current of heroic struggle—especially among the South Korean youth—against United States occupation and the régime that instituted that occupation. That struggle has been going on, irregularly but ceaselessly, for a long time. The elections organized in that country occupied by American troops, and therefore under its domination—the Presidential and other elections—are

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in English by the speaker.

witness to this. Now that this trend is daily becoming stronger in the South there are clever attempts to prevent any talk of the withdrawal of American troops in order to let it be understood that there is no hope for withdrawal, thus preventing the people of South Korea from developing its movement and, consequently, facilitating the task of those who, through their occupation, wish to perpetuate the division of Korea.

67. Were there any need of proof that this new trend against the American occupation in South Korea is developing and gaining momentum we could well provide it by elaborating on this question in the General Assembly. But we shall refrain from doing so. We believe that all the Members of the General Assembly have full knowledge of all these facts and that the Assembly itself is aware of this powerful unification movement that is so manifest in Korea. It is for that reason that the People's Republic of Bulgaria has co-sponsored the request for the inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly of the item on the "Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations".

68. We should also like to mention here the great efforts deployed by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in favour of the unification of the Korean people. On repeated occasions it has made a large number of proposals for the peaceful unification of Korea on a democratic basis and without, of course, foreign occupation. That attitude is proof of the goodwill and the sincere desire of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to arrive at an effective solution of the problem in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

69. From the very first days of the artificial division of Korea through the occupation of the southern part by United States forces, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea put forward concrete proposals for the unification of the country, thus realizing the unanimous aspirations of the people of Korea, which has done everything in its power to have those proposals implemented.

70. After the Korean armistice the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to make sincere efforts to bring about the unification of the country. The proposals that were made repeatedly and that are continuing to be made to date by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are so numerous that it would be difficult to list them all, but I should like to quote some examples.

71. As early as in October 1954 the eighth session of the Supreme People's Assembly proposed the holding, either in Pyongyang or in Seoul, of a joint conference of representatives of the political parties and the social organizations of North Korea and South Korea or a joint session of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the National Assembly of South Korea, and the convening either in Panmunjom or Kaesong of a conference of representatives of North Korea and South Korea with a view to opening economic and cultural exchanges between North Korea and South Korea.

72. In August 1955, in his report to the assembly commemorating the tenth anniversary of liberation, on 15 August, Prime Minister Kim Il Sung proposed that measures be taken for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, with a view to proclaiming that the authorities of North Korea and South Korea undertook never to resort to armed force against each other, to solve the question of the reunification of their fatherland only through peaceful means, to reduce military personnel in North Korea and in South Korea to a minimum and to convene a conference of representatives of the authorities of North Korea and South Korea.

73. In April 1956 the third congress of the Workers' Party of Korea insisted on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and at the same time proposed the establishment of a standing committee comprising representatives either of the authorities in power and the supreme legislative authorities or of political parties and social organizations. As can be seen, it offered broad possibilities—a committee that would be able to discuss even the question of the unification of the North and South, beginning with the question of the speeding up of political, cultural and economic contacts.

74. In September 1967, at the first session of the second legislature of the Supreme People's Assembly, Prime Minister Kim Il Sung proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty between North Korea and South Korea, a considerable reduction of the military forces of North Korea and South Korea after the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the country and the establishment without delay of economic and cultural relations between the North and the South.

75. In February 1958, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea proposed that all countries having troops in Korea be requested to take measures for their immediate withdrawal. It also proposed the reunification of Korea through peaceful means by free elections to be held throughout the whole of Korea—after the complete withdrawal of foreign troops, of course, because one cannot easily hold elections in the presence of foreign troops. During a discussion yesterday we were told that a referendum had been held somewhere, despite the foreign occupation. It is quite obvious that the presence of troops there means the maintenance of the foreign occupation.

76. On 15 August 1960 Prime Minister Kim Il Sung made a new proposal consisting of the following: either to establish a confederation of North Korea and South Korea as a transitional measure pending complete reunification; or to establish economic and cultural exchanges and postal links to facilitate travel by individuals and so on, if, of course, the authorities of South Korea could not agree to the holding of free general elections in the North and in the South.

77. The eighth session of the second legislature of the Supreme People's Assembly, held in November 1960, made concrete proposals for the establishment of economic and cultural exchanges and co-operation between North Korea and South Korea, thus favouring the independent development of the national economy in South Korea.

78. In June 1962 the eleventh session of the second legislature of the Supreme People's Assembly proposed a

meeting either at Panmunjom, Pyongyang or Seoul for the discussion first of all of questions such as the withdrawal of the troops of aggression from South Korea—which is the prior condition for the solution of all questions—the conclusion of a peace treaty between North Korea and South Korea, and the reduction of the military potential of both, if the South Korea authorities were not yet prepared to discuss the question of reunification.

79. In October 1962, in its report to the first session of the third legislature of the Supreme People's Assembly, Prime Minister Kim Il Sung reiterated his concrete proposals for unification through a series of immediate measures.

80. In December 1963 the joint conference of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic Front for Unification and the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of Korea proposed a meeting between representatives of North Korea and South Korea to discuss political problems with a view to the reunification of the country.

81. At the third session of the third legislature of the Supreme People's Assembly, held in 1964, it was proposed that national co-operation could be realized either through the joint convening of the political parties of North and South Korea or through exchanges of views and contacts between representatives of the North and the South. It also proposed that, each year, 2 million seuk of rice, 100,000 tons of steel, a thousand million kilowatt-hours of electricity, 10,000 tons of synthetic fibres, cement, wood, machinery and so forth, be provided in order to help in the development of South Korea's economy.

82. It is thus that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has consistently resorted to all means and has taken all possible measures to achieve the peaceful reunification of that country.

83. All of those proposals and initiatives on the part of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, however, have been rejected by the authorities of South Korea, where the United States forces have been in occupation preventing any initiative to be taken for the unification of Korea, because it would cost the United States the bridgehead it has established in that area.

84. In April 1971 the fifth session of the fourth legislature of the Supreme People's Assembly presented an eight-point proposal:

First, to compel United States troops to withdraw from South Korea;

Second, to reduce the armed forces of North and South Korea to 100,000 men, respectively, or to a lower figure;

Third, to abolish and declare null and void the Mutual Defence Pact between South Korea and the United States, and the Treaty between South Korea and Japan and all other treaties and agreements concluded by South Korea with foreign countries to the detriment of the Korean people;

Fourth, to establish a central unified government following on free general elections, to be held in full freedom and on a democratic basis, both in the North and South;

Fifth, with a view to the holding of free general elections in the North and South, to ensure to all political parties, all social organizations and to individuals absolute freedom to carry out political activities in all areas of North Korea and South Korea, and unconditionally to liberate all political prisoners and all patriots who have been arrested and imprisoned in South Korea for fighting for the unification of Korea;

Sixth, before complete reunification, to create a confederation of North and South Korea as a provisional measure, while preventing the existing social systems in the North and South;

Seventh, to develop trade and co-operation between the North and South in the fields of culture, the arts, sports and sciences, to have an exchange of correspondence and allow persons to travel freely between the North and South;

Eighth, with a view to discussing these problems, to convene a meeting for the purpose of political consultation between North and South Korea, which would include the different political parties, movements and social organizations.

85. Furthermore, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has declared that it is prepared to accept any suggestion that would favour the unification of Korea and will do everything in its power to achieve better understanding with the South.

86. No one doubts that the unification of Korea must be regarded as an exclusively internal affair of the Korean people itself. This, in fact, was recognized as a need even in the United Kingdom proposal, which seeks to give the impression that it wishes to ensure for the Korean people the possibility of settling its own affairs through talks and negotiations between the two parts of Korea.

87. However, we must ensure for that people the necessary conditions that will enable it to solve its problem on a democratic and peaceful basis in keeping with the will of the Korean people as a whole. That means that the first measure to be taken is the withdrawal of all foreign forces—first and foremost, United States forces—from South Korea, whose presence is the main obstacle to the unification of Korea.

88. The military presence of the United States in South Korea in such circumstances should not be favoured by the United Nations. Such an attitude is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

89. The lengthy discussions that have taken place in the past have made it abundantly clear that the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea has also been one of the great barriers to the unification of that country. It is high time to dissolve that Commission and thus facilitate the task of unification.



90. Created during the most exacerbated period of the cold war, that Commission has served only to justify the occupation of the South by the United States forces; it has no reason for being at a time when, despite the tendentious proposals of the United Kingdom, the latter none the less implicitly recognizes that it is the Korean people itself which must achieve its own unification.

91. It is for those reasons that the People's Republic of Bulgaria has co-sponsored the request for inclusion on the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly of the question of the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

92. If we are truly concerned about the future of the Korean people, if we sincerely seek the peaceful reunification of Korea, then we must proceed to include those two items on the agenda. Only thus will we help unify Korea and thereby, at the same time, help eliminate the dangerous hotbeds of tension that endanger peace in that part of the world.

93. For all those reasons, we support the proposal of the representative of the People's Republic of Mongolia [1938th meeting, para. 121], who requested a separate recorded vote on items 106 and 107 of the draft agenda.

94. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria wishes, therefore, to draw the attention of all delegations in this Assembly to the importance of the questions covered by items 106 and 107 of the draft agenda. We therefore request delegations to reject the United Kingdom proposal, which was put forward under the false pretext of helping in the unification of Korea. We cannot work seriously for the unification of that divided country except by requesting the withdrawal of all United States and other foreign forces occupying South Korea, thus enabling the South Korean people freely to settle the question of the reunification of its country.

95. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): My delegation is, frankly, surprised at the recommendation of the General Committee that consideration of this important question should be deferred for one complete year. We are all the more surprised when we consider the fact that those who have taken the position of delaying discussion of the item are the very people who would like the world to believe that they are in favour of finding a peaceful and permanent solution to the Korean problem. For how can one rationalize their position except by concluding that they are in favour of the *status quo*?

96. What is the *status quo*? Very briefly, it includes the military occupation, as has been repeatedly pointed out, creates a serious obstacle to the natural desire of the Korean people for national unification. Furthermore, the maintenance of the *status quo* implies condoning the continued violation of the principles and ideals of the United Nations Charter by allowing the Organization and its authority to be used as a cloak for the military and other designs of the United States. This state of affairs makes a real mockery of our Organization, and there is every justification for correcting this anomaly without further delay.

97. There is yet another important element accruing from the recommendation of the General Committee to postpone consideration of the Korean problem. This is an indirect admission that the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea has nothing to report and is doing absolutely no useful work. This obvious admission is not new to my delegation, which has consistently maintained that the whole farce of UNCURK's presence in Korea should be abandoned. Therefore it is quite clear that, rather than postpone the discussion on, for example, item 107, "Dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea", this Assembly should address itself to the item with the objective of taking immediate concrete action.

98. The present situation in Korea constitutes a serious aggravation of tension in the region. It is a situation where imperialist interests are bent on frustrating the legitimate aspirations of the Korean people by imposing on them through military means a continued foreign occupation. It is a situation which requires immediate action by the international community, not only to eliminate the injustice of foreign occupation but above all, to prevent the situation from escalating to more dangerous proportions. The responsibility of this Assembly in this question is not to condone those who wish to indulge in an exercise in procrastination but rather to act, and act firmly and fairly, in support of the genuine desire of the Korean people to be left alone to work for the peaceful unification of their motherland.

99. To avoid discussing the items related to this question at the current session would be to prevent the international community from taking a more rational course on the Korean problem. To defer the matter to next year would be to fail in our responsibility to do our utmost to support the legitimate aspirations of the Korean people for the withdrawal of foreign military forces now occupying one half of their fatherland. To defer consideration of this matter to next year would be to acquiesce for one more year in the despicable and absurd situation where the name, flag and authority of this Organization continue to be used to further imperialist interests.

100. Mention has been made, in the course of the procedural debate on this problem, of the recent contacts made between Red Cross officials of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of South Korea. Those contacts are a welcome development. Yet my delegation fails to see the logic of describing those contacts as being partly responsible for the General Committee's recommendation. Indeed, one would have thought that, because of those contacts, the Assembly should, without further delay, put an end to the present inglorious role played by those misusing the name of our Organization in Korea.

101. At this stage of our deliberations my delegation does not wish to go into the substantive aspects of the problem. Therefore I shall conclude by reaffirming that my delegation finds the recommendation of the General Committee unfair, unreasonable and illogical, and accordingly we shall vote against it.

102. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): It is now 12 noon. In accordance with rule 75 of the rules of

procedure and with the agreement of the Assembly, I now close the list of speakers.

103. Mr. SPÁCIL (Czechoslovakia) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of Czechoslovakia wishes to express its deep regret that the General Committee has adopted a recommendation not to consider the items relating to intervention in the internal affairs of the Korean people. We hope that the General Assembly will consider the recommendation of the General Committee to be mistaken and will change it in such a way as to allow consideration of the questions which were included in the agenda on the proposal of the delegations of Mongolia and a group of other countries, including Czechoslovakia, as can be seen from the relevant documents, A/8443 and Add.1 and A/8444 and Add.1 and 2.

104. The Czechoslovak delegation is firmly convinced that there is an urgent need to deal with these items, in the first place, because there is no justification for the existence of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which still exists. The question of the unification and rehabilitation of Korea is an internal matter for the Korean people and nobody here has any right to intervene. Unfortunately, our Organization has been involved in this not only because it established that notorious Commission. It is an even greater cause for regret that the flag of our Organization conceals the illegal presence of foreign troops in the southern part of that country. The very evolution of the situation in the Korean peninsula shows that it is essential to put an end to such a situation. The way to do this is indicated in the programme for peaceful unification, consisting of eight points, which was adopted at the fifth session of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the contents of which have already been stated here.

105. The contacts that have been established between representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Korea, of which much has been said here, are an example of how this programme is beginning to be implemented. These contacts do indeed underline the fact that the Korean people can achieve peaceful unification without foreign intervention under the cover of the blue flag of the United Nations. Our Organization has a duty to promote constructive progress towards the peaceful unification of Korea which has been begun on the initiative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It must do this, of course, not by intervening in the matter. This help must consist in ensuring that at this session, in the presence of representatives of both parts of Korea, this question is considered once again, the illegal United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea is abolished and measures are taken for the speedy withdrawal of foreign troops from the southern part of the country.

106. I hope that the General Assembly, as a result of the discussion now taking place and having due regard for the weighty arguments that have been adduced here, will be convinced that the recommendation of the General Committee regarding agenda items 106 and 107 is mistaken and regrettable and that it will change it. The Czechoslovak delegation will then have an opportunity to explain its position on these items in detail.

*Mr. Malik (Indonesia) took the Chair.*

107. Mr. MOLINA (Costa Rica) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, on this first occasion on which my delegation has spoken in this General Assembly, I am very happy to congratulate you upon your election and to wish you every success in the fulfilment of your lofty duties.

108. My delegation supports the recommendation of the General Committee of the Assembly that items 106 and 107 be included in the provisional agenda of the twenty-seventh session.

109. In view of the happy circumstance that direct talks began last August between the humanitarian Red Cross organizations, we believe that a tendentious debate of the kind that would no doubt take place in the General Assembly on these items could well prejudice the normal course of the dialogue that has been opened for the first time after 20 years of conflict.

110. We wish at the same time to reaffirm that in our view direct contacts between those involved in a conflict is the most adequate and effective means for arriving at a final solution that will meet the demands of the contending parties and the just aspirations for peace that should prevail in the world today.

111. Moreover, this solution is clearly contemplated in Article 33, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, which lays down that:

"The parties to any dispute, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

112. For these reasons, my delegation believes that it is essential to postpone consideration of items 106 and 107, so as not to hamper in any way the possibility of a direct settlement of the Korean question.

113. Mr. DAO (Mali) (*interpretation from French*): In a few days my Foreign Minister will have the opportunity of congratulating you, Mr. President, on your impressive election to the presidency of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

114. With regard to the problem before us, my delegation is gratified at the spontaneous interest shown by certain delegations in the recent contacts that have been undertaken at the initiative of the Red Cross societies of South Korea and North Korea in an attempt to alleviate the sufferings of families that have been divided for almost two decades.

115. However, my delegation, which is a co-sponsor of the document calling for the inclusion in the agenda of items 106 and 107 of the draft agenda, cannot support the motion of those delegations which call for the postponement of these items to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

116. In the view of my delegation, the Korean problem is a political one. No society of a humanitarian nature could

solve it and the argument that it is necessary to consider these problems today as an internal Korean affair appears to us to be of doubtful objectivity. For if they were, then almost 20 years were needed for the very ones who dragged the United Nations into an illegal war, contrary to the principles of peace and security enshrined in the Charter, in their attempts to transform its international character into a national one!

117. At this time when currencies, even the strongest, are floating, and when the United Nations budget is at a crucial stage, my delegation feels that the definitive solution of the Korean question would be a valuable and welcome contribution to the budget and operation of our Organization.

118. For all these reasons—which are not inconsiderable in the present international situation—my delegation requests the retention and the examination at the present session of items 106 and 107, which deal with the entire question.

119. Mr. PANYARACHUN (Thailand): Mr. President, my Foreign Minister in due course will have an opportunity during the general debate to convey to you, on behalf of the Thai delegation, our sincere congratulations on your election to the presidency of the current General Assembly. I should like, however, to extend to you my own personal felicitations.

120. When items 106, 107 and 108 on the question of Korea were discussed in the General Committee many arguments and contentions were introduced into the debate. In the view of my delegation the deliberations were complete and exhaustive and there was a full hearing by both sides. My delegation is in full agreement with the recommendation of the General Committee that these items should be included in the provisional agenda of the twenty-seventh session.

121. We did not arrive at this conclusion in a light-hearted manner. The delegation of Thailand has been closely associated with the question of Korea from the very beginning and we have always maintained that, while the United Nations has both the competence and the authority to deal with the question of Korea, the interests of both the Republic of Korea and North Korea must always be of paramount importance. Here is a country divided against its will, a country whose people, energetic and resourceful, have been separated for over 20 years. Without going into the origin and the substance of the matter, we believe that the problem of the reunification of both parts of Korea is primarily and fundamentally a matter to be decided between the two parts.

122. The United Nations, whose timely intervention ensured the end of the war in Korea and whose presence now helps to stabilize the situation, should make every effort to promote the well-being of the Korean people and encourage the parties directly concerned to adopt measures which would gradually lead to the settlement of the Korean problem.

123. In past years we have seen the debate on the Korean question in the United Nations degenerate into ritual acrimony. The contents of the debate in particular brought no new or positive elements into the question. The debate

was sterile and the deliberations became an exercise in futility. The discussion each year brought us no nearer to the solution of the problem. Are we, then, determined to have another re-run of the polemics and bitter denunciations this year? And I think we have had ample evidence of that in the plenary meetings this morning and yesterday.

124. How often in past years have we heard a plea that there should be direct communication between the representatives of both parts of Korea. When the invitation aspect of the Korean question is considered in the First Committee each year there is a consensus that the representatives of North Korea should have the opportunity to meet face to face with the representatives of the Republic of Korea.

125. The co-sponsors of items 106 and 107 have stated in their explanatory memoranda, contained in documents A/8443 and Add.1 and A/8444 and Add.1 and 2, that both Koreas "should be given the opportunity to decide the problem by themselves without any outside interference" and that the question should "be solved by means of direct negotiations".

126. Now, for the first time since the Korean war, we have direct talks at Panmunjom between the Red Cross societies of both South and North Korea on the problem of divided families. The direct negotiation which many of us advocate is being held on their own initiative and may, it is to be hoped, lead to arrangements for communications and possible reunion of an estimated 10 million Koreans, separated from their relatives for more than 20 years.

127. We feel, without being unduly optimistic, that the Red Cross society talks could well be the start on a long road towards rapprochement between the two parts of Korea. It was reported in *The New York Times* of 21 September 1971 that:

"...the chief South Korean delegate, Dr. Kim Yeon Choo, the external affairs and health director of the South Korean Red Cross, read a statement in which he said:

"It is an unbearable agony that family members are kept separated in the North and the South for as long as a generation without knowing whether their beloved ones are dead or alive.

"If we succeed in settling the problem,' he declared, 'I believe it would serve as a basis for removing one by one the barriers blocking dialogue between the North and the South.'

"His North Korean counterpart, Kim Tae Hui, said in his turn that all the Korean people 'ardently hope that the talks will gain success and the door of national reunification be thus opened'."

128. We have no way of knowing how fruitful and constructive those talks will be or whether they will expand and lead to further direct negotiations on other problems relating to the reunification of Korea. But it seems to my delegation that the two sides are earnest in their desire to have serious and meaningful talks. Let us not spoil whatever

chances there may be for the successful conclusion of the talks.

129. A debate in the United Nations during this session—and I am speaking on the basis of past experience and yesterday's and today's discussions—is bound to have adverse and unhealthy effects on the atmosphere surrounding the talks and could well be responsible for the failure and eventual break-up of such meetings. And surely no well-meaning delegation in this Assembly is prepared, wittingly or otherwise, to do anything that would jeopardize the prospects for success of the talks: that would be too high a price to pay. Let us give both the South and the North Koreans a fair chance to proceed in a calm atmosphere in the attempt to unify their families. Let us set aside our political differences and objectives and regard our approval of the General Committee's recommendation to postpone consideration of the Korean question as an act based entirely on humanitarian considerations. That should be the overriding concern of us all. Let us uphold this noble humanitarian spirit in this matter, because, if we do not, we may condemn the peoples of Korea to perpetual partition. Let us keep the door to national reconciliation open—a sentiment expressed by the North Korean representative at the Red Cross talks and shared fully by the delegation of Thailand.

130. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. President, yesterday you were lenient, very lenient I must say, with most of us. I must add that my good friend the representative of Belgium, who occupied the Chair as your deputy during your absence this morning, was exceedingly patient. Both of you thought it was the better part of wisdom not to draw the attention of the speakers to the fact that it was the inclusion of the Korean question in the agenda for discussion during the current session which was at stake. Instead a good number of my colleagues addressed themselves *in extenso* to the substance of the Korean problem. It is, of course, quite difficult sometimes to draw the line between procedure and substance.

131. However, I submit that some of our colleagues have delved into the substance of the matter to such an extent that, were we not sitting in this General Assembly hall, many of us, including me, would have thought that we were having a full-dress debate in the First Committee before the General Assembly could pronounce itself on whether or not to include the question in the agenda. Therefore, I shall strictly limit myself to procedure.

132. What I said when I spoke at the 192nd meeting of the General Committee still stands. However, it seems quite appropriate to make the following points. First, the United Kingdom proposal in the General Committee was not to delete the question of Korea from the agenda, but to remit its discussion to the twenty-seventh session. Incidentally, no one can delete for good a problem like that of Korea. But I want to remind some Powers that they have succeeded in preventing the inclusion of many items as important as, if not more important than, Korea, at successive sessions since 1947.

133. I shall give some examples: Berlin—as if Berlin was the monopoly of the four States that occupy it; the two Germanys—as if we all had no say in the matter, with the

exception, of course, of those who think it is their prerogative to pronounce themselves on it; Viet-Nam—the war in Viet-Nam has not been inscribed at all on the agenda, not because of one party, or certain countries of a certain ideology, but because of all those parties which thought it was not in their interest to bring such a momentous question to the attention of the General Assembly, or, for that matter, of the Security Council.

134. When our colleague of the United Kingdom made his proposal, he asked us to consider remitting the question to the twenty-seventh session. Some representatives are giving the impression that our colleague from the United Kingdom said "Let us delete the Korean question from the agenda of this session, and subsequent ones." Now, let us not labour under any false impression.

135. Secondly, the object of setting aside a full debate on the Korean question during this session is precisely to see what the political picture will be next year, the political picture in the Far East—or what they call South-East Asia. We are part of Asia; the Middle East is part of Asia. We are concerned about our continent. Do not for a moment think that we want to defer consideration of this problem until next year because we do not think it is an important problem. On the contrary, we favour deferring it precisely because we know that a debate during this session will not be very conducive to reaching any fruitful result.

136. We were all happy when the cold-war ceased before the focus of our debates. A decade or so ago there was no more cold-war, relatively speaking. It looks to me as if some—perhaps unintentionally, unwittingly, inadvertently—would wish to revive the cold-war. And we the small countries will be the poor witnesses of that cold-war. We should have a respite on this question, and possibly other questions, to see how the wind is blowing with regard to the Chinese problem and to see what the General Assembly will do with regard to the question of China. I use the term "Question of China" in a general context taking into account the Albanian draft resolution [A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2] and the so-called United States draft resolutions [A/L.632 and Add.1 and 2, A/L.623 and Add.1 and 2].

137. Why do my good friends who are speaking for the immediate inscription of the item during this session want to precipitate matters here, when we know that nothing will come out of it except recrimination, invective, and blowing the horn of one's own ideology? We the small countries will witness all that tragi-comedy being played out again during the twenty-sixth session.

138. Thirdly, having followed this question for the last 21 years, since the war broke out in Korea, I must say that we have not been able to get anywhere. Do those who propose that a full discussion of the question should be carried out during this session feel that they will attain any better results than last year, or the year before last, or since 1966—when I called the bluff of the parties which did not at that time think it was appropriate to have a reunification of Korea, and I daresay still are not ready for the reunification of Korea? We small countries would like to see one Korea because we do not believe in partition; we do not believe that ideology should transcend ethnology.



139. Those were the reasons that I think prompted our good friend Sir Colin Crowe, the representative of the United Kingdom, to make his proposal in the General Committee, and we subscribed to that proposal for the reasons I have adduced.

140. We have no ulterior motive, as small delegations, one way or the other, except that Asian States like mine would like to see peace prevail, when the big Powers can really look at the question with goodwill and not in a spirit of serving their separate national interests.

141. Mr. PRATT (Sierra Leone): In view of the advanced hour you will forgive me, Mr. President, for not following the pattern of multiplying words congratulating you on your election. I shall extend my congratulations on a later occasion.

142. I should like to say that we do not support the proposal that this twenty-sixth session of the Assembly should not deliberate upon and discuss the question of Korea. We think that question should be included in the agenda. While we cannot go into too much detail on matters of substance, it is necessary in giving reasons to allude to one or two peripheral matters of substance.

143. It is well known that the inhabitants of Korea for some 4,000 years or so enjoyed one country and that they were a homogeneous whole. During the past 21 years or so they have been divided into what is now one of the potentially explosive areas of the world by the imaginary thirty-eighth parallel.

144. People from my country have had the opportunity of visiting both sectors of Korea. I myself was privileged to be there only last month. I was in North Korea, and I can say that from what I saw in North Korea there is not a single foreign military soldier on its soil. And from what the official delegation of Sierra Leone saw in South Korea there are numerous foreign military troops stationed there.

145. The Korean reunification problem has been before the General Assembly for many years now. The Sierra Leone Government is satisfied that the inhabitants on either side of the thirty-eighth parallel genuinely want the peaceful reunification of their country and peaceful co-existence. Why, then, should we in the United Nations be unable to deal with this matter and settle it?

146. It has been suggested by the delegations of the United Kingdom and other States that we must run away from this problem out of fear of polemics. Why should anyone be afraid of polemics? The President has authority to restrain any member who abuses his rights at this rostrum. It has also been suggested that we must not debate the issue. Why should we be afraid to debate it? Is it because we have certain things to hide?

147. We want to run away from discussing the matter because some of us do not want to improve the international atmosphere. The international atmosphere of today is not the same as the international atmosphere of last year or of other years when this matter was debated. And if we must take advantage of the improvement in the international atmosphere, then there should be no procedural

reason why we should not include the Korean question in the agenda of the General Assembly.

148. The United Nations is inextricably connected with the Korean question. We participated in the Korean war. We have troops stationed in South Korea under the United Nations flag. With that involvement, are we now saying we should abdicate our interest to the Red Cross, a private organization? If we say we must abdicate our interest to the Red Cross, then we can equally argue that we must abdicate our interest as far as security and peace-keeping matters are concerned to other equally private institutions of the world.

149. And there is also a fallacy in this argument. It is suggested that the Red Cross, a private institution, is involved in some conversations between private individuals of North and South Korea and we must therefore not discuss Korea this year. Next year it will be advanced that the Wolf Cubs are involved in private discussions between members of the North and the South. What could stop such an argument? The following year it may be advanced that the Boy Scouts or Girl Guides are involved in private discussions between North and South, and the whole thing will be reduced to absurdity.

150. If we must not discuss the subject because private institutions, private organizations and private individuals are having discussions, let us make it a general principle. But when we try to make it a general principle we shall see the absurdity of it all.

151. Further, there is the question of the withdrawal of troops from the South. I have already said there are no foreign troops in the North. Why do we keep troops in the South? Are we suggesting, to justify the United Nations keeping troops in the South, that the Korean war is still going on? If so, then let us not discuss it. But that is not the reason being advanced. It is well known that the Korean war ended long ago. There are those who fear that any withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet and other foreign troops from South Korea might result in an invasion of South Korea by the North. But that is untenable. South Korea has a population of some 30 million people—with, as we have been told, all the benefits of democracy and the advancement resulting from the connexion with a certain great Power. North Korea, on the other hand, has only about 12 million people, and there are no foreign troops there. Are we saying that the cat is afraid of the mouse? That is what is implied: that we do not want foreign troops to be removed from an area of some 30 million people—the cat—because the mouse, only 12 million people, might attack. That is no justification. We must debate the issue. Even if there is such a fear, one of the reasons we should debate the Korean question is to see whether that fear is justified, and if it supports the necessity of keeping troops in the South.

152. It has been suggested that the Korean question should be postponed to the twenty-seventh session. Now, there has been no indication whatever from those who have made the suggestion that they would be ready to support its discussion at the twenty-seventh session. Rather, indications are that even when we come to the twenty-seventh session they will not—I repeat, not—support its inclusion in

the agenda for the following reasons: first, that there will merely be polemics at the twenty-seventh session; secondly, that the debate will not be progressive; thirdly, that as hitherto the whole matter has been stalemated and it will be stalemated again at the twenty-seventh session.

153. Thus this is nothing but a device to postpone the discussion of this matter instead of facing the problems realistically and discussing them thoroughly. The United Nations force belongs to the United Nations. The United Nations Commission known as UNCURK is a commission of the United Nations. We must bring good sense into this troubled and explosive area and, if possible, bring peace to it during the present session. It is the belief of my delegation that if we approach the problem in the spirit of really wanting peace in the area we can discuss it. There have been no indications from the speeches that we have heard that there is not a genuine desire to bring this stalemate to an end. Therefore, my delegation supports the idea that we should discuss this problem in its entirety and not use devices to postpone it indefinitely. It flags the good name of the United Nations down into the mud to keep a so-called United Nations force looking after a so-called United Nations war which no longer exists.

154. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): The United States wishes to join those who have supported the recommendations of the General Committee to include questions concerning Korea in the provisional agenda of the twenty-seventh session, for consideration next year. The permanent representatives attending this meeting are only too well aware of how increasingly polemical and sterile the debate on Korea has become in the First Committee in recent years.

155. We would have no objection to holding a debate once again this year. In fact I feel constrained to observe that we have wandered rather far from procedure yesterday and today. But no argument has been advanced to suggest that such a debate would have positive consequences. My delegation regrets, for instance, that many speakers yesterday and again this morning have chosen to speak in language so reminiscent of cold-war dialogue. We are concerned that the repetition of this polemical and sterile debate could disrupt the hopeful beginnings of a new era on the Korean peninsula that we see in the Red Cross talks.

156. The representative of the Soviet Union has spoken of tension in the Korean peninsula. We see in Korea today steps being taken by the Korean people themselves to reduce that tension, the first moves towards national reconciliation. We fervently hope that these talks will bear good fruit. In order to give them the best possible chance of successfully acting in favour of the reconciliation of the Korean people, we ask all Members to support the recommendation of the General Committee.

157. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Cuba to explain his vote before the vote. Under rule 90 of our rules of procedure, the President may limit the time to be allowed for such explanations. I would ask representatives to limit their explanations of vote to five minutes.

158. Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation opposes the recommendation of the

General Committee for the following reasons. The questions covered by items 106 and 107 are of great urgency for the United Nations because it is the Organization's duty to create the necessary conditions that will put an end to foreign interference in Korean affairs which has been going on for two decades under the protection of the United Nations flag.

159. It would be difficult for anyone to deny the fact that thousands of American soldiers, financed by the Pentagon and following only the orders of the United States military command, but under the flag of the United Nations, are violating the rights of an independent people or to deny that this is a question that calls for urgent treatment and solution by the United Nations.

160. Similarly, the fact that the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea has been interfering for 20 years in the internal affairs of the Korean people is a matter that should be discussed urgently by this Organization in order to dissolve this interfering Commission created under American pressure.

161. My delegation believes that the solution of these two problems, the immediate withdrawal of United States troops from South Korea and the dissolution of a body that has done nothing to contribute to the solution of the Korean problem except to complicate it further—the problems that we have been living with for almost two decades and which jeopardize the prestige of our Organization—are matters of the highest urgency whose consideration can under no circumstances be delayed or postponed.

162. As regards item 108, the report of that United Nations Commission, my delegation wishes to reiterate its position that that document and the activities of that Commission should no longer take up the time of the United Nations and that the Commission should be dissolved forthwith.

163. It is well to remember that for two decades it was the United States Government that compelled this Organization to interfere in the internal affairs of Korea and it has been compelling this Assembly mechanically each year to discuss the report of the so-called United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

164. Now, when they are beginning to become concerned at the possible results of the discussions in this Assembly on Korea, now, when the changes that have taken place in the world have given greater participation in this Organization to the independent peoples of Africa and Asia, the United States is beginning to see with fear that the General Assembly may take clear-cut positions on what is happening in Korea.

165. My delegation believes that not only can we not defer until next year the question of the withdrawal of forces and the dissolution of the Commission, but that in actual fact these two questions should have been solved many years ago. Few international problems weigh so heavily on the prestige of this Organization as the fact that its banner, its symbol, its flag, should be used to oppress a small people, that they be used to violate the most sacred

national right to the reunification of a temporarily divided people, that they even be used to violate the very principles of the United Nations Charter.

166. My delegation urges all those States that desire to preserve the independence and sovereignty of nations, all those that desire to implement the provisions of the Charter, resolutely to oppose this manoeuvre, the effect of which would be to perpetuate the military occupation of Korea and perpetuate interference by the United Nations in Korean affairs, which, far from contributing to help us move forward in the solution of problems affecting that peninsula, would only help to aggravate them and to delay even further the time when this Organization will rescue the validity and purity of its principles that have been outraged by the United States intervention in Korea.

167. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly will now take a decision on the recommendation of the General Committee contained in paragraph 18 of its first report [A/8500].

168. The representative of Mongolia has proposed separate votes on the recommendation concerning items 106 and 107. Accordingly we shall vote first on the General Committee's recommendation that item 106 of the draft agenda should be included in the agenda of the twenty-seventh session. A roll-call vote has been requested.

*A vote was taken by roll call.*

*Malaysia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Khmer Republic, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi.

*Against:* Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, People's Republic of the Congo, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Hungary, India, Iraq, Libyan Arab Republic.

*Abstaining:* Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Tunisia, Uganda, Afghanistan, Austria, Bahrain, Burma, Cameroon, Ceylon, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon.

*The recommendation was adopted by 68 votes to 28, with 22 abstentions.*

169. The PRESIDENT: I shall now put to the vote the recommendation of the General Committee that item 107 of the draft agenda should be included in the agenda of the twenty-seventh session. The request for a recorded vote has been withdrawn.

*The recommendation was adopted by 68 votes to 25, with 22 abstentions.*

170. The PRESIDENT: I shall now put to the vote the recommendation of the General Committee that item 108 of the draft agenda should be included in the agenda of the twenty-seventh session.

*The recommendation was adopted by 70 votes to 21, with 23 abstentions.*

171. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote after the vote.

172. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): During the debate on the question of Korea in the First Committee at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, my delegation voted in favour of inviting a delegation from North Korea in a spirit of equity and justice. We felt that in order to pass judgement the judge—in this case the United Nations—must hear both sides, that is the two parties involved.

173. During that debate we made the following statement:

“Otherwise, what is the use of discussing these problems every year? What is the use of wasting our time? What is the use of taking up the discussion every year at the same starting point, when we all know that a decision must be awaited—a decision which will be taken elsewhere—for our votes to change from affirmative to negative or from negative to affirmative?”<sup>2</sup>

And I added: “. . . today, Tunisia wished clearly to signify its independence in casting its vote”<sup>3</sup> in favour of inviting a delegation from North Korea.

174. If the debate we have just had on the inclusion of items 106, 107 and 108 of the draft agenda were not a question of procedure and permitted putting forward proposals and amendments, we would have made the postponement of those items contingent upon the invitation of a delegation from North Korea. In accepting the postponement of the items, my delegation feels that deferment is consistent with our analysis and with the circumstances underlying the problem of Korea. The discussions which we have had yesterday and today confirm our assessment that a new debate would not have yielded any positive decision. However, we wish to repeat that if the discussion had covered matters of substance, we would have been in favour of inviting the delegation from North Korea.

175. We take note of the decision taken today, in the hope that the holding of discussions on a humanitarian basis may result in a reconciliation between the two Koreas.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, First Committee*, 1747th meeting, para. 106.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 107.

That is the only condition—or, at least, the essential condition—for the total liberation of Korea.

176. Mr. SPÁCIL (Czechoslovakia) (*translated from Russian*): I shall be very brief. I should merely like to explain the reasons for our vote on item 108. The Czechoslovak delegation's vote against the recommendation of the General Committee concerning item 108 should not be interpreted as indicating that it agrees to the item being considered at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. We voted against the recommendation because we are altogether opposed to this item being considered at the twenty-sixth or the twenty-seventh or at any other session, since we consider this Commission illegal.

177. The PRESIDENT: We turn now to the agenda which the General Committee recommends for adoption by the General Assembly. In accordance with past practice, we shall follow the numbering given in paragraph 19 of the General Committee's report and consider together several items in groups, where that seems appropriate.

178. Items 1 to 6 have already been acted upon in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly. May I therefore consider that their inclusion has been approved?

*It was so decided.*

179. The PRESIDENT: In connexion with item 7, "Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations", the General Assembly is required only to take note of the communication submitted by the Secretary-General in document A/8396. If there is no objection I shall consider that the General Assembly takes note of that communication.

*It was so decided.*

180. The PRESIDENT: I now submit to the General Assembly items 8 to 36 inclusive. If there is no objection I shall take it that the Assembly approves their inclusion in the agenda.

*Item's 8 to 36 inclusive were included in the agenda.*

181. The PRESIDENT: Item 37 relates to the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa.

182. Mr. VON HIRSCHBERG (South Africa): Mr. President, may I, on behalf of the South African delegation, extend to you our warm congratulations on your election as President of this session of the General Assembly. We wish you every success in the performance of your duties, and we assure you of our whole-hearted co-operation at all times.

183. I have asked to speak simply to reaffirm my Government's reservations with regard to the inclusion in the agenda and the eventual consideration of item 37. As my Government's attitude on this matter has often been explained in the past, I shall not repeat it again today.

184. The PRESIDENT: May I take it that item 37 has been approved for inclusion in the agenda?

*Item 37 was included in the agenda.*

185. The PRESIDENT: I now submit to the General Assembly items 38 to 78 inclusive. If there is no objection I shall take it that the Assembly agrees to their inclusion in the agenda.

*Items 38 to 78 inclusive were included in the agenda.*

186. The PRESIDENT: In connexion with item 79, entitled "Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly", I have just been informed that a member of the United Nations Staff Pension Committee has tendered his resignation. It will, therefore, be necessary for the Assembly to appoint a person in his place. Accordingly, a subitem (*f*), reading "United Nations Staff Pension Committee", should be added to that agenda item. If I hear no objections it will be so decided.

*It was so decided.*

*Item 79 was included in the agenda.*

187. The PRESIDENT: Are there any objections to the inclusion of items 80 to 92 inclusive? If there are none I shall consider that the Assembly decides to include them in the agenda.

*Items 80 to 92 inclusive were included in the agenda.*

188. The PRESIDENT: The next item, item 93, has been included in the agenda in accordance with the General Assembly's decision on paragraph 16 of the General Committee's report [*1937th meeting*].

189. If there are no objections to the inclusion of items 94 and 95 I shall consider that the Assembly decides to include them in the agenda.

*Items 94 and 95 were included in the agenda.*

190. The PRESIDENT: The next item, item 96, has been included in the agenda in accordance with the Assembly's decision of paragraph 16 of the General Committee's report.

191. The last item, item 97, has been recommended for inclusion in the agenda. I take it that the Assembly adopts the General Committee's recommendation.

*Item 97 was included in the agenda.*

192. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly has now adopted its agenda for the twenty-sixth session, as proposed in paragraph 19 of the first report of the General Committee [*A/8500*], with the amendments decided on by the Assembly.

193. We shall now turn to the question of the allocation of items, which is dealt with in section IV of the report. The modifications indicated in paragraph 20, as well as the decisions in paragraph 21, are reflected in the proposed allocation. We shall consider them when we come to the relevant items.

194. I invite members to turn first to the items recommended for allocation to plenary meetings.



195. Regarding item 12, the General Committee's recommendation is contained in paragraph 20 (a). If there is no objection I shall take it that the Assembly adopts the Committee's recommendation.

*It was so decided.*

196. The PRESIDENT: The General Committee's recommendation on item 15 is to be found in paragraph 20 (b). May I take it that the Assembly adopted that recommendation?

*It was so decided.*

197. The PRESIDENT: Regarding item 23, the General Committee has recommended that all the chapters of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to specific Territories should be referred to the Fourth Committee, as was done at previous sessions, to enable the General Assembly to deal in plenary meetings with the question of the implementation of the Declaration in general. I take it that the Assembly adopts this recommendation.

*It was so decided.*

198. The PRESIDENT: I refer now to item 26. The General Committee recommends that section IX of the report of the Special Committee, on the Rationalization of the Procedure and Organization of the General Assembly dealing with documentation, should be allocated to the Fifth Committee and that section XII, annex I, relating to amendments to the rules of procedure, should be referred to the Sixth Committee. May I take it that the Assembly has no objection to this recommendation?

*It was so decided.*

199. The PRESIDENT: Are there any objections to the allocation of the remaining items listed for consideration in plenary meetings? If not, I shall take it that the Assembly approves the allocation of items as listed for consideration in plenary meetings.

*It was so decided.*

200. The PRESIDENT: We turn now to the list of items which the General Committee has recommended for allocation to the First Committee. I take it that the Assembly adopts this recommendation.

*It was so decided.*

201. The PRESIDENT: Five items are recommended for allocation to the Special Political Committee. Regarding item 3 (d) of the list of items to be referred to that Committee, I would refer the Assembly to the recommen-

dation in paragraph 20 (c). I take it that the Assembly adopts that recommendation.

*It was so decided.*

202. The PRESIDENT: If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the General Assembly approves the allocation of the other items to the Special Political Committee.

*It was so decided.*

203. The PRESIDENT: I now invite members to examine the list of items recommended for allocation to the Second Committee. With regard to item 12, the General Committee has made recommendations in paragraph 20 (d). If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Assembly adopts those recommendations.

*It was so decided.*

204. The PRESIDENT: May I take it that the General Assembly also approves the allocation of the other items to the Second Committee?

*It was so decided.*

205. The PRESIDENT: We come now to the proposed allocation of items to the Third Committee. In paragraph 20 (e) the General Committee has made recommendations regarding the report of the Economic and Social Council [item 12]. May I take it that the General Assembly adopts that recommendation?

*It was so decided.*

206. The PRESIDENT: May I take it that the General Assembly approves the allocation of the other items to the Third Committee?

*It was so decided.*

207. The PRESIDENT: Are there any comments on the allocation of the 11 items to the Fourth Committee? If not, I shall take it that the Assembly approves that allocation.

*It was so decided.*

208. The PRESIDENT: If there is no objection, I shall take it that the General Assembly approves the recommended allocation of items to the Fifth Committee.

*It was so decided.*

209. The PRESIDENT: May I take it that the General Assembly approves the recommended allocation to the Sixth Committee?

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.*

