

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Official Records



ANNEXES

TWENTIETH SESSION

NEW YORK, 1965

Agenda item 23: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

CONTENTS

| Document No. | Title | Page |
|-------------------------------|---|------|
| A/6000/Rev.1 | Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples | 1 |
| Check list of documents | | 462 |

DOCUMENT A/6000/REV.1*

Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

CONTENTS

| | Paragraphs | Page |
|---|------------|------|
| LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL | | 3 |
| <i>Chapter</i> | | |
| I. ESTABLISHMENT, ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE | | |
| A. Establishment of the Special Committee | 1-3 | 4 |
| B. Opening of the Special Committee's meetings in 1965 | 4-8 | 4 |
| C. Organization of work | 9-35 | 4 |
| D. Meetings of the Special Committee and its working group and sub-committees | 36-50 | 7 |
| E. Consideration of territories | 51 | 7 |
| F. Consideration of other matters | 52-66 | 8 |
| G. Relations with other United Nations bodies | 67-90 | 9 |
| H. Review of work | 91-107 | 11 |
| I. Future work | 108-112 | 14 |
| J. Approval of the report | 113 | 14 |
| II. MEETING HELD IN AFRICA (MAY/JUNE 1965) | | |
| Introduction | 1-10 | 14 |
| A. Meetings held at Lusaka | 11-150 | 16 |
| B. Meetings held at Dar es Salaam | 151-233 | 30 |
| C. Meetings held at Addis Ababa | 234-437 | 38 |
| D. Action arising from the Special Committee's visit to Africa | 438-467 | 56 |
| <i>Appendices I and II</i> | | 59 |
| III. SOUTHERN RHODESIA | | |
| A. Information on the Territory | 1-67 | 60 |
| B. Consideration by the Special Committee | 68-264 | 67 |
| C. Action taken by the Special Committee | 265-293 | 88 |
| D. Supplementary information concerning the Territory | 294-325 | 91 |
| E. Further consideration by the Special Committee | 326-445 | 95 |
| F. Further action taken by the Special Committee | 446-514 | 106 |
| <i>Appendices I-VII</i> | | 112 |

* Consisting of documents A/6000, dated 17 November 1965; A/6000/Add.1, dated 24 September 1965; A/6000/Add.2, dated 28 September 1965; A/6000/Add.3 and Corr.1 (part I), dated 11 and 27 October 1965; A/6000/Add.3 (part II), dated 18 November 1965; A/6000/Add.4, dated 24 September 1965; A/6000/Add.5, dated 11 October 1965; A/6000/Add.6, dated 15 October 1965; and A/6000/Add.7, dated 26 October 1965.

CONTENTS (continued)

| Chapter | Paragraphs | Page |
|--|------------|------|
| IV. SOUTH WEST AFRICA | | |
| A. Information on the Territory | 1-67 | 117 |
| B. Consideration by the Special Committee | 68-209 | 124 |
| C. Action taken by the Special Committee | 210-286 | 140 |
| D. Examination of petitions | 287-292 | 148 |
| V. TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION | | |
| A. Information on the Territories | 1-133 | 149 |
| B. Consideration by the Special Committee | 134-357 | 161 |
| C. Action taken by the Special Committee | 358-431 | 187 |
| D. Study of the activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in the Territories under Portuguese Administration | 432-490 | 195 |
| <i>Appendix. Report of Sub-Committee I</i> | | 200 |
| <i>Annexes I and II</i> | | 227 |
| VI. ADEN | | |
| A. Information on the Territory | 1-98 | 299 |
| B. Consideration by the Special Committee | 99-275 | 308 |
| C. Action taken by the Special Committee | 276-301 | 327 |
| D. Further consideration by the Special Committee | 302-327 | 329 |
| <i>Appendix I. Report of the Sub-Committee on Aden (April 1965)</i> | 1-31 | 332 |
| <i>Annexes I and II</i> | | 335 |
| <i>Appendix II. Report of the Sub-Committee on Aden (September 1965)</i> | 1-80 | 335 |
| VII. BASUTOLAND, BECHUANALAND AND SWAZILAND | | |
| A. Information on the Territories | 1-125 | 343 |
| B. Consideration by the Special Committee | 126-252 | 353 |
| C. Action taken by the Special Committee | 253-293 | 368 |
| D. Further consideration by the Special Committee | 294-360 | 372 |
| E. Further action taken by the Special Committee | 361-364 | 378 |
| VIII. COOK ISLANDS | | |
| A. Information on the Territory | 1-14 | 378 |
| B. Consideration by the Special Committee | 15-166 | 379 |
| C. Action taken by the Special Committee | 167-196 | 393 |
| IX. BRITISH GUIANA | | |
| A. Information on the Territory | 1-59 | 397 |
| B. Consideration by the Special Committee | 60-81 | 401 |
| C. Action taken by the Special Committee | 82-83 | 404 |
| <i>Appendix. Report of the Sub-Committee of Good Offices on British Guiana</i> | 1-8 | 404 |
| X. FERNANDO PÓO, RÍO MUNI, IFNI AND SPANISH SAHARA | | |
| A. Information on the Territories | 1-15 | 405 |
| B. Petitions | 16 | 406 |
| XI. GIBRALTAR | | |
| A. Information on the Territory | 1-12 | 406 |
| B. Petitions | 13 | 407 |
| <i>Appendices I-VI</i> | | 407 |
| XII. FIJI | | |
| A. Information on the Territory | 1-20 | 410 |
| B. Petitions | 21 | 411 |
| XIII. MAURITIUS, SEYCHELLES AND St. HELENA | | |
| A. Information on the Territories | 1-67 | 411 |
| B. Petitions | 68 | 416 |
| XIV. NIUE AND TOKELAU ISLANDS | | |
| Information on the Territories | 1-10 | 416 |
| XV. AMERICAN SAMOA | | |
| Information on the Territory | 1-9 | 417 |

CONTENTS (continued)

| <i>Chapter</i> | <i>Paragraphs</i> | <i>Page</i> |
|--|-------------------|-------------|
| XVI. GUAM | | |
| A. Information on the Territory | 1-14 | 417 |
| B. Petitions | 15 | 418 |
| XVII. TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS | | |
| Information on the Territory | 1-13 | 418 |
| XVIII. TRUST TERRITORY OF NAURU, PAPUA AND TRUST TERRITORY OF NEW GUINEA, AND COCOS (KEELING) ISLANDS | | |
| Information on the Territories | 1-36 | 420 |
| XIX. NEW HEBRIDES, GILBERT AND ELLICE ISLANDS, PITCAIRN AND SOLOMON ISLANDS | | |
| Information on the Territories | 1-42 | 423 |
| XX. BRUNEI | | |
| Information on the Territory | 1-29 | 426 |
| XXI. HONG KONG | | |
| Information on the Territory | 1-16 | 428 |
| XXII. FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS) | | |
| A. Information on the Territory | 1-16 | 429 |
| B. Petitions | 17 | 430 |
| Appendix | | 430 |
| XXIII. BERMUDA, BAHAMAS, TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS AND CAYMAN ISLANDS | | |
| A. Information on the Territories | 1-84 | 430 |
| B. Written petitions and hearings | 85-111 | 436 |
| C. Statements by members of the Special Committee | 112-124 | 440 |
| XXIV. UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS, ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, GRENADA, MONTserrat, St. KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA, St. LUCIA, St. VINCENT AND BARBADOS | | |
| A. Information on the Territories | 1-200 | 441 |
| B. Petitions | 201 | 455 |
| XXV. BRITISH HONDURAS | | |
| Information on the Territory | 1-24 | 455 |
| XXVI. INFORMATION ON NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 E OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND RELATED QUESTIONS | | |
| Appendix | 1-4 | 458 |

ANNEXES

| | <i>Page</i> |
|---|-------------|
| I. Letter dated 26 August 1965 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Chairman of the Special Committee | 460 |
| II. List of delegations | 461 |

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

New York, 15 November 1965

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, submitted to the General Assembly in accordance with Assembly resolution 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963. This report covers the work of the Special Committee during 1965.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Sori COULIBALY
Chairman

His Excellency U Thant
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York

CHAPTER I

ESTABLISHMENT, ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. Information on the establishment of the Special Committee is contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. I, paras. 1-7).

2. During 1965, the Special Committee continued to discharge its mandate as established by the General Assembly by resolution 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and other pertinent General Assembly resolutions, including resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963 and 1970 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963. The Special Committee did so in the context of the declaration made by the President of the General Assembly, at its 1330th plenary meeting on 18 February 1965, in relation to the note circulated by him on 10 February 1965 concerning the status of the agenda of the nineteenth session (A/5884). This declaration was to the effect that the General Assembly should, for its own official records, note that reports relating, *inter alia*, to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had in fact been received and that those bodies which had continuing responsibilities such as the Special Committee should continue to do their work, subject to the agreed budgetary limits for 1965.

3. This report covers the work of the Special Committee for the period 6 April to 10 November 1965 during which it held seventy-four plenary meetings, including thirty-five in Africa, and its Working Group and sub-committees held forty-one meetings.

B. OPENING OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S MEETINGS IN 1965

4. The first meeting of the Special Committee in 1965 (320th meeting) was held on 6 April 1965.

Opening statement by the Chairman

5. The Chairman stated that, after more than two centuries of colonial rule, the Gambia had attained independence on 18 February 1965. The Committee could take pride in its contribution to that achievement as it had considered the Gambia in 1963 and 1964 and had adopted a resolution (see A/5446/Rev.1, chap. XI, para. 105) reaffirming the inalienable right of its people to self-determination and independence. On behalf of the Committee the Chairman wished the Gambia every success and prosperity in the future.

6. Although the Special Committee had not made spectacular progress since its establishment, it had contributed to a better understanding of the conditions of people living under foreign domination. The Committee was still the hope of millions of people who, in difficult, trying and often unpublicized circumstances, were struggling in different parts of the globe to regain their right to equality and dignity. He was sure that all members were aware of the urgent need to do everything possible to put an immediate and unconditional end to colonialism, in order to establish relations of friendly co-operation among peoples on the basis of respect for the dignity and equality of all.

7. Concluding, the Chairman drew attention to the fifteenth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/

L.189) which contained a recommendation that the Special Committee should take up the question of Southern Rhodesia as the first item on its agenda.

Election of officers

8. At its 320th meeting, on 6 April 1965, the Special Committee elected by acclamation Mr. Huot Sambath (Cambodia) as Second Vice-Chairman of the Committee, in place of Mr. Voeunsai Sonn (Cambodia), who had been assigned to other functions by his Government. Mr. Sori Coulibaly (Mali) continued as Chairman, Mr. Carlos Maria Velázquez (Uruguay) as First Vice-Chairman, and Mr. K. Natwar Singh (India) as Rapporteur.

C. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

Statements by members

9. The Special Committee discussed the organization of its work at its 320th and 321st meetings.

10. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that, although the General Assembly had been unable to discuss the Special Committee's report, the mandate entrusted to it by General Assembly resolutions 1654 (XVI), 1810 (XVII) and 1956 (XVIII) remained in force. The Committee should organize its work in such a way as to ensure the most rapid implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence and of the decisions taken by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee on a number of colonial Territories, which had not been carried out because of sabotage by the colonial Powers.

11. Under its mandate, the Committee had not only the right but the obligation to reconsider the situation in any colonial Territory on which it had adopted recommendations, if it considered that events there required a further analysis and further measures to ensure the implementation of the Declaration.

12. The situation in a number of colonial Territories on which United Nations organs had adopted recommendations was giving rise to serious concern and the Special Committee should adopt specific measures to prevent a dangerous turn of events there. The Committee could request the Chairman of the sub-committees on Southern Rhodesia, Aden and British Guiana to report on the situation with regard to the implementation of United Nations decisions on those Territories. As far as South West Africa was concerned, the Government of South Africa was taking steps to implement the Odendaal Plan aimed at annexing that Territory. Such action was a direct violation of the United Nations Charter and a defiance of the warnings issued by various United Nations organs. The South African Government was thus launching a challenge to the United Nations and, in particular, to the countries of Africa. The situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration, too, was deteriorating. Not only were Salazar's troops being supplied with weapons by the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany and other NATO members to continue their war against the peoples of those territories; they were also engaging in provocative and aggressive actions against other independent

African States, thus creating a serious threat to peace on the African continent. Those provocations were designed to create a tense situation on the borders of neighbouring African States and thus to pave the way to greater interference in African affairs by the United States and other colonial Powers, which wanted not only to maintain their domination in southern and central Africa but to extend it to the peoples who had already thrown off the colonial yoke.

13. The Committee should not merely reaffirm its previous decisions but should request the administering Powers to give an account of the steps they had taken or intended to take in the near future to implement those decisions. It should set time-limits for the implementation of its recommendations and warn the administering Powers that failure to comply would be regarded as premeditated sabotage. The NATO Powers should be requested to remove their military bases and personnel from the Territories and to cease all military or other assistance to the Governments of Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

14. The Committee should also consider matters on which it had not had time to make recommendations previously. Those matters included the activities of foreign economic and other interests in the Territories under Portuguese administration, which had been referred to Sub-Committee I. In its report of November 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, annex) the Sub-Committee had said that it would consider the question as soon as the necessary working papers for the study had been prepared. Considerable time had elapsed since then and the Secretariat should be asked to provide the necessary material as soon as possible, so that the Sub-Committee could consider the question and submit conclusions and recommendations to the Committee. As far as Brunei and British Honduras were concerned, the USSR delegation thought that the Special Committee could itself make the necessary recommendations without referring those Territories to the respective sub-committees once again. There were other problems to be dealt with, in particular those mentioned in the fourteenth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.172/Rev.1). The Working Group was to continue examining the question of a list of all other Territories which had not yet attained independence.

15. As far as the order of items was concerned, his delegation thought that such questions as Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies and Aden should be given urgent consideration. It agreed with the recommendation in the fifteenth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.189) to the effect that the Committee should first take up the question of Southern Rhodesia.

16. Southern and central Africa should remain in the forefront of the Committee's attention because, in those regions, the struggle for liberation was being opposed by the combined forces of the major imperialist monopolies, which were amassing huge profits by exploiting the resources and people of Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and other Territories. The Committee should give every possible support to the people struggling in those Territories and in other parts of the world where colonial domination continued.

17. The representative of India read out the message sent to the Prime Minister of the Gambia by the Prime Minister of India on the occasion of the Gambia's achievement of independence. He welcomed the fact

that the Security Council had recommended the admission of the Gambia to the United Nations.¹

18. Developments in other parts of Africa were less encouraging. In particular, the situation in Southern Rhodesia had been aggravated by the dissolution of the so-called parliament of Southern Rhodesia on 31 March and the announcement that fresh elections would be held on 7 May. By some constitutional acrobatics, Mr. Smith, the leader of the white minority Government, was trying to remove the cross-race voting between the A and B rolls, thus ensuring a two-thirds majority for himself, a procedure which was totally undemocratic. It was obvious that the Southern Rhodesian Government intended to face the United Kingdom with a constitutional *fait accompli* and was preparing the way for a unilateral declaration of independence. The Indian delegation was eagerly awaiting the statement of the representative of the administering Power, who would no doubt enlighten the Special Committee on the latest developments in the Territory.

19. The situation in Aden was still causing concern; the Special Committee should take up that question without delay. Conditions in the Portuguese colonies had deteriorated still further and the Committee should consider those Territories and study the activities of foreign and other interests there. There were also the questions of British Guiana, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland and South West Africa, in addition to the island Territories of the Pacific, the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans. There could be no question of the Committee's relaxing its efforts to ensure the speedy implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, particularly resolution 1514 (XV).

20. The representative of Tunisia expressed his delegation's whole-hearted support of the recommendation that the Committee should take up the question of Southern Rhodesia without delay. The situation in that Territory was daily becoming more serious and Mr. Smith's latest decision to hold elections made it imperative for the Committee to study the problem.

21. Furthermore, his delegation considered the questions of Aden and of the Portuguese Territories to be of vital importance. The question of South West Africa should, in the view of his delegation, also receive high priority.

22. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania expressed the hope that the Special Committee was not tending to become a permanent body, for prolonged discussion merely delayed the achievement of independence by the countries concerned. He trusted that the year 1965 would see the acceleration both of the Committee's work and of the process of decolonization.

23. Tanzania was particularly concerned about the situation in Southern Rhodesia, which was its near neighbour; developments since the Committee's last meeting had not been reassuring. First, there had been the so-called *indaba* conference, where a few chiefs had come to certain decisions that were supposed to be binding on all the Africans in Southern Rhodesia. Secondly, there had been the visit of the Commonwealth Secretary of the United Kingdom Government; it was regrettable that, after that visit, the United Kingdom Government had given no indication that it was going to assume its responsibilities and ensure that Southern

¹ The Gambia became a Member of the United Nations on 21 September 1965.

Rhodesia obtained a government run by Africans. Lastly, there had been the "constitutional acrobatics" to which the Indian representative had referred. A statement by the United Kingdom Government was anxiously awaited.

24. His delegation fully supported the Working Group's recommendation that the question of Southern Rhodesia should be taken up as a matter of urgency. The question of the Portuguese colonies should be the next item on the Special Committee's agenda. His delegation would in due course submit suggestions on how the whole work of decolonization should be carried out.

25. The representative of Iraq said that, now that the Special Committee was entering the fourth year of its work, it could usefully consider its achievements and its failures. It had certainly made some progress with the tasks entrusted to it by the General Assembly. Since the beginning of 1962, more than a dozen new States had become Members of the United Nations. While it would be presumptuous to say that the Committee had been primarily instrumental in bringing independence to those countries, there was no doubt that the struggle of those people for independence had been given moral support by the United Nations, as reflected in the work of the Special Committee.

26. Nevertheless, there were many colonial problems which had yet to be solved. The Special Committee should redouble its efforts in dealing with those problems. Firstly, it should take up the question of Southern Rhodesia, in accordance with the recommendation of the Working Group. The situation there was rapidly deteriorating, particularly in view of the announcement of fresh elections in May and of the manoeuvres of the Smith Government to obtain a two-thirds majority.

27. The Special Committee should also take up the problem of Aden at an early date. He hoped that the Sub-Committee on Aden would shortly be able to report on its contacts with the administering Power and on developments in the Territory, which had been going from bad to worse. Then there were the two great problems in Africa, that of the Portuguese Territories and that of South West Africa. Despite the fact that the question of the Portuguese Territories had been before the United Nations for ten years, the Portuguese Government had not changed its policy one whit, the Special Committee should now consider the advisability of asking another organ of the United Nations to take effective measures. He was strongly in favour of a study of foreign interests and influences in the Portuguese Territories.

28. Although the decision of the International Court of Justice on the complaint regarding South West Africa brought before it by Ethiopia and Liberia was still pending, the Special Committee should consider the question once again, particularly the question of foreign financial interests in the Territory.

Decisions

29. At its 320th meeting, the Special Committee, on the recommendation of the Working Group contained in its fifteenth report (A/AC.109/L.189) decided to consider the question of Southern Rhodesia as the first item on its agenda for 1965.

30. By adopting the sixteenth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.190), the Special Committee, at its 321st meeting, decided that, following its consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia, it would

take up the question of Aden, and the Territories under Portuguese administration, in that order.

31. By the same decision, the Special Committee requested Sub-Committee I, II and III to continue their work² in order to consider any items which they were unable to dispose of during 1964 and to bring up to date, as necessary, their reports on the items considered by them in 1964.

32. By adopting the seventeenth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.196), the Special Committee at its 331st meeting, decided that it would accept the invitations extended to it by the Governments of Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia, to hold meetings at Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam and Lusaka and that these meetings would take place between 20 or 25 May and 20 June 1965. At the same time, the Special Committee approved the Working Group's recommendation that, during its meetings in Africa, it should consider the Territories under Portuguese administration, the question of South West Africa, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, and the question of Southern Rhodesia.

33. While at Lusaka, the Special Committee received an invitation from the Government of Somalia to hold meetings at Mogadiscio in the course of its visit to Africa. On the recommendation of the Working Group, contained in its nineteenth report (A/AC.109/L.205), the Special Committee, at its 341st meeting, decided that it would express to the Government of Somalia its deep appreciation of the invitation, but that, having previously established the programme for its meetings in Africa, including the closing date for these meetings, and taking into account the probable financial implications, it would prefer to take advantage of the invitation at a more convenient time.

34. By adopting the twenty-first report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.239 and Corr.1), the Special Committee decided, at its 374th meeting, to consider the following items, in the order indicated, at its remaining meetings during 1965:

(a) Report of the United Nations Representative for the Supervision of Elections in the Cook Islands (see A/5962);

(b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/5958) under operative paragraph 5 of the resolution on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, adopted by the Special Committee at its 299th meeting on 2 November 1964 (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII, para. 365);

(c) Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter (operative paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1970 (XVIII));

(d) Adoption of the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly covering its work during 1965.

35. At its 379th meeting, on 26 August 1965, the Special Committee had before it two letters from the Permanent Representative of Somalia, the first (A/AC.109/134) requesting that French Somaliland be taken up by the Committee at its current session and the second (A/AC.109/135), requesting participation in the Committee's discussions concerning this item. At the same meeting, the Committee decided to refer the first letter to the Working Group, and, as regards the

² For a list of the items referred to Sub-Committees I, II and III in 1964 for consideration and report, see document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. I, para. 110.

second letter, to authorize the Chairman to reply that the request for participation would be considered by the Special Committee when it decided to take up the question of French Somaliland.

D. MEETINGS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND ITS WORKING GROUP AND SUB-COMMITTEES

Special Committee

36. The Special Committee held seventy-four meetings during 1965, as follows:

First Session, 320th to 338th meetings, 6 April to 17 May 1965, United Nations Headquarters; 339th to 347th meetings, 25 to 28 May 1965, Lusaka; 348th to 363rd meetings, 31 May to 10 June 1965, Dar es Salaam; 364th to 373rd meetings, 14 to 18 June 1965, Addis Ababa.

Second session, 374th to 393rd meetings, 17 August to 10 November 1965, United Nations Headquarters.

Working Group

37. During the period covered by this report, the Working Group held nine meetings and submitted seven reports.³

Sub-Committee on Petitions

38. At its 61st meeting, on 17 May 1965, the Sub-Committee on Petitions elected Mr. Leonardo Diaz Gonzalez (Venezuela) as Chairman and Mr. Gabriel Rakotoniaina (Madagascar) as Vice-Chairman.

39. During the period covered by this report, the Sub-Committee on Petitions held fifteen meetings and submitted fifteen reports to the Special Committee.⁴

40. The Sub-Committee on Petitions considered, during the period, a total of 197 communications, including thirty-six requests for hearings. The petitions circulated by the Sub-Committee are listed in the chapters of the present report dealing with the Territories to which they refer. In addition to these, the Sub-Committee also distributed the following petitions:

| <i>Petitioner</i> | <i>Document No.</i> |
|---|---------------------|
| <i>General</i> | |
| Mr. L. F. S. Burnham, Premier of British Guiana | A/AC.109/PET.332 |
| <i>French Somaliland</i> | |
| Mr. Abdillahi Ardeye, Secretary-General, Front de Libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS) | A/AC.109/PET.412 |
| "Peuples Côte des Somalis" | A/AC.109/PET.413 |
| Mr. Ahmed Bourhan, Secretary-General, and Mr. Omar Abdullahi, Secretary for Information Mouvement de Libération de Djibouti | A/AC.109/PET.414 |

Sub-Committee I

41. Sub-Committee I held seven meetings and submitted a report (see below, chap. V, appendix) on its study during 1965 of the implications of the activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration.

42. In adopting the report of Sub-Committee I, the Special Committee, at its 392nd meeting, on 28 October

³ A/AC.109/L.189, L.190, L.196, L.203/Rev.1, L.205, L.210 and L.239 and Corr.1.

⁴ A/AC.109/L.188, L.191, L.195 and Corr.1, L.200, L.204, L.208, L.209, L.211 L.213, L.215, L.218, L.238, L.248, L.251 and L.258.

1965, approved the Sub-Committee's intention to review additional material and to submit a further report.

Sub-Committees II and III

43. Because of lack of time, it was not possible for Sub-Committees II and III to consider the items referred to them for consideration. Sub-Committee III held one meeting during the year.

Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia

44. The Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia held three meetings, between 31 March and 5 April 1965, and submitted a report on its work (see below, chap. III, appendix I) at the 320th meeting of the Special Committee on 6 April 1965.

45. Following its consideration of this report, the Special Committee, at its 328th meeting on 22 April 1965, adopted a resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia (see below chap. III, para. 292) by which it requested the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia to continue to keep the situation under review and to report as necessary to the Special Committee.

Sub-Committee on Aden

46. The Sub-Committee on Aden held three meetings between 2 and 26 April 1965. At its meeting on 2 April 1965, the Sub-Committee elected Mr. Huot Sambath (Cambodia) as Chairman to fill the vacancy arising from the departure of Mr. Vouensai Sonn (Cambodia). The Sub-Committee submitted a report on its work (see below, chap. VI, appendix I) at the 329th meeting of the Special Committee, on 27 April 1965.

47. Following its consideration of this report, the Special Committee, at its 338th meeting on 17 May 1965, adopted a resolution concerning the Territory (see below chap. VI, para. 300) by which it requested the Sub-Committee on Aden to keep the question under constant review and to report to the Committee as necessary.

48. The Sub-Committee held three further meetings between 23 August and 9 September 1965 and submitted a report on its work (see below chap. VI, appendix II) at the 386th meeting of the Special Committee on 16 September 1965.

49. In taking note of this report and endorsing the conclusions contained in it, the Special Committee, at the same meetings, decided to request the Sub-Committee on Aden, in accordance with operative paragraph 12 of its resolution of 17 May 1965, to keep the question of Aden under constant review and to report to the Special Committee as necessary.

Sub-Committee of Good Offices on British Guiana

50. The Sub-Committee of Good Offices on British Guiana submitted its report (see below chap. IX, annex) at the 389th meeting of the Special Committee, on 7 October 1965. In deciding to take note of the Sub-Committee's report, the Special Committee authorized the Sub-Committee to continue to carry out its task.

E. CONSIDERATION OF TERRITORIES

51. During the period covered by this report the Special Committee considered the following Territories:⁵

⁵ The Special Committee heard a petition concerning the Bahamas, but did not consider the Territory (see below chap. XXIII, paras. 38-64).

| Territories | Meetings |
|---|---|
| Southern Rhodesia | 320-328 (UN Headquarters) 339-344, 346, 347 (Lusaka) 372-373 (Addis Ababa) |
| Aden | 329-338 (UN Headquarters) 370 (Addis Ababa) 386 (UN Headquarters) |
| Territories under Portuguese administration | 345-346 (Lusaka) 350-356, 359, 361-363 (Dar es Salaam) 368-369, 372-373 (Addis Ababa) |
| South West Africa | 322 (UN Headquarters) 344-345 (Lusaka) 349-350, 357, 359-360, 363 (Dar es Salaam) 366-368, 370-373 (Addis Ababa) |
| Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland .. | 347 (Lusaka) 357-360 (Dar es Salaam) 365, 368-370, 372-373 (Addis Ababa) 384-387 (UN Headquarters) |
| Cook Islands | 375, 376, 378-382 (UN Headquarters) |
| British Guiana | 389 (UN Headquarters) |

F. CONSIDERATION OF OTHER MATTERS

Matters relating to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in general

52. At its 372nd and 373rd meetings, held at Addis Ababa on 17 and 18 June 1965, the Special Committee considered a draft resolution relating to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Southern Rhodesia, Territories under Portuguese administration, South West Africa and Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. The draft resolution was adopted by the Special Committee at its 373rd meeting on 18 June 1965 (A/AC.109/128/Rev.1). Details of the Special Committee's consideration of this item are contained in chapter II of the present report.

53. At its 386th meeting, on 16 September 1965, the Special Committee decided to reproduce as an annex to the present report (annex I) a letter dated 26 August 1965, addressed to the Chairman by the representative of the United Kingdom, covering the main constitutional developments in United Kingdom dependent Territories from November 1964 to July 1965.

Report of the United Nations Representative for the Supervision of Elections in the Cook Islands (A/5962)

54. The General Assembly, by resolution 2005 (XIX) of 18 February 1965, authorized the supervision by the United Nations of the elections to be held in the Cook Islands in April 1965 and authorized the Secretary-General to appoint a United Nations representative who would supervise these elections with the assistance of the necessary observers and staff and observe the proceedings concerning the Constitution in the newly elected Legislative Assembly. Under the terms of the resolution, the United Nations representative was to report to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly.

55. The Special Committee considered the report of the United Nations representative for the Supervision of Elections in the Cook Islands, at its 375th, 378th to 382nd meetings between 23 August and 30 August 1965 and adopted a resolution thereon at its 382nd meeting on 30 August 1965 (A/AC.109/136). Details of the

Special Committee's consideration of this item are contained in chapter VIII of the present report.

Report of the Secretary-General on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (A/5958)

56. The Special Committee, in operative paragraph 5 of its resolution of 2 November 1964, requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the administering Power, to undertake a study as to the ways and means of ensuring the economic independence of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland *vis-à-vis* the Republic of South Africa and to submit a report to the Special Committee and the General Assembly.

57. The Special Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General, submitted in compliance with this request, at its 384th to 387th meetings, between 9 and 20 September 1965, and adopted a resolution (A/AC.109/141) concerning this item at its 387th meeting, on 20 September 1965. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of this item are contained in chapter VII of the present report.

Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories under Article 73 e of the Charter

58. The General Assembly, by resolution 1970 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963, decided to dissolve the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and entrusted its functions to the Special Committee. The Special Committee accordingly considered, at its 383rd and 385th meetings, held on 7 and 15 September 1965, an item on information on Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of this item are contained in chapter XXVI of the present report.

Implications of the activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration

59. The Special Committee, in its resolution on Territories under Portuguese administration, adopted at its 277th meeting on 3 July 1964 (see A/5800/Rev.1 chap. V, para. 352) requested Sub-Committee I of the Special Committee, with the assistance of the

Secretary-General, to study the activities of foreign economic and other interests, which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration.

60. The Special Committee considered the report of Sub-Committee I at its 391st and 392nd meetings, held on 27 and 28 October 1965. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of this item are contained in chapter V, section D of the present report.

Implications of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation

61. The Special Committee in its resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia (see below chap. III, para 292) adopted at its 328th meeting, on 22 April 1965, decided to study, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the agencies of the United Nations, the implications of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation in order to assess their economic and political influence. The Special Committee hopes to submit a report on this matter to the General Assembly during 1966.

Question of the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable

62. In approving the fourteenth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.172/Rev.1), the Special Committee took due note of a letter dated 12 November 1964 from the Permanent Representative of Somalia (A/AC.109/107), requesting the inclusion of the question of French Somaliland on the agenda of its current session and of the Declaration adopted by the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries during October 1964 which was circulated as a document of the General Assembly (A/5763). By the same decision the Special Committee agreed to the Working Group continuing consideration of the question of preparing the list of "all other Territories which have not yet attained independence".

63. The Working Group, at its 28th meeting on 18 May 1965, considered a letter dated 13 April 1965 from the *Chargé d'affaires a.i.* of Somalia (A/AC.109/110), reiterating the previous requests of his Government (A/AC.109/107 and Add.1), for the inscription of the question of French Somaliland on the agenda of the Special Committee. After discussion, the Working Group, in its eighteenth report (A/AC.109/L.203/Rev.1), recommended that the Special Committee should accede to this request.

64. The Special Committee, at its 341st meeting on 27 May 1965, adopted the eighteenth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.203/Rev.1). In adopting this report, the Special Committee decided to include French Somaliland in the list of Territories to which the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies.⁶

65. At the 389th meeting, on 7 October 1965, the Chairman drew the attention of the Special Committee to a letter dated 1 October 1965 (A/AC.109/144) from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cuba which, referring

to the final communiqué of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Cairo in October 1964, requested the inclusion of the question of Puerto Rico on the agenda of the Special Committee. The representative of the United States of America, referring to General Assembly resolution 748 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, protested the circulation of this letter (389th-391st meetings) owing to lack of time, the Special Committee was unable to examine the request contained in document A/AC.109/144.

66. Subject to any directives the General Assembly at its twentieth session may wish to give for the speedy implementation of the Declaration, the Special Committee intends to continue its consideration of the question of the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable.

G. RELATIONS WITH OTHER UNITED NATIONS BODIES

Security Council

67. In its resolution 1956 (XVII), of 11 December 1963, the General Assembly invited the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of any developments in any Territory examined by it which may threaten international peace and security.

Southern Rhodesia

68. By operative paragraph 10 of the resolution adopted at its 328th meeting on 22 April 1965 (see below chap. III, para. 292) the Special Committee drew "the immediate attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia and, in particular, to the serious implications of the elections announced to take place on 7 May 1965 under a Constitution which has been rejected by the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia and the abrogation of which has repeatedly been called for by the Special Committee and the General Assembly since 1962".

69. The text of the resolution, together with the records of the debates on the question in the Special Committee was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 23 April 1965 (S/6300).

70. By operative paragraph 4 of a further resolution (see below chap. III, para. 513) adopted at its 347th meeting on 28 May 1965, the Special Committee drew "the attention of the Security Council to the extremely serious situation which would arise in the Territory if the authorities of Southern Rhodesia were to execute the persons sentenced to death under the amended Law and Order (Maintenance) Act". By operative paragraph 5 of the same resolution, the Special Committee further drew "the attention of the Security Council to the threats made by the Southern Rhodesian authorities, in particular, the economic sabotage which the Southern Rhodesian authorities intend to carry out in regard to the independent African States adjoining the Territory".

71. By operative paragraph 6 of the resolution, the Special Committee decided "to transmit to the Security Council the records of the meetings devoted to this question by the Special Committee during its visit in Africa, including the statements of the petitioners and of the representative of the Organization of African Unity, as a supplement to the document transmitted to the Security Council and reproduced as document S/6300".

⁶ Subsequent to this decision, the Special Committee circulated two memoranda relating to French Somaliland, one dated 25 May 1965 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Somalia (A/AC.109/121) and the other dated 8 June 1965 from the Permanent Mission of Ethiopia to the United Nations (A/AC.109/122).

72. The text of the resolution, together with the records mentioned in operative paragraph 6, was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 2 June 1965 (S/6412).

Aden

73. By operative paragraph 11 of the resolution adopted at its 388th meeting on 17 May 1965 (see below chap. VI, para. 300), the Special Committee drew "the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in the Territory".

74. The text of the resolution, together with the records of the Special Committee's debates on the question, was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 18 May 1965 (S/6368).

Territories under Portuguese administration

75. By operative paragraph 7 of the resolution adopted at the 363rd meeting on 10 June 1965 (see chapter V, para. 415), the Special Committee drew "the urgent attention of the Security Council to the continued deterioration of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination as well as to the consequences of the threats made by Portugal against the independent African States that border upon its colonies".

76. By operative paragraph 8 of the same resolution, the Special Committee requested the Security Council "to consider putting into effect against Portugal the appropriate measures laid down in the Charter, for the purpose of carrying out its resolutions concerning the Territories under Portuguese domination".

77. By operative paragraph 9 of the resolution the Special Committee decided "to transmit to the Security Council the records of the meetings held by the Committee on this question during its visit in Africa including the statements of the petitioners and of the representative of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity".

78. The text of the resolution, together with the records mentioned in operative paragraph 9, was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 17 June 1965 (S/6460)

South West Africa

79. By operative paragraph 5 of the resolution adopted at its 372nd meeting on 17 June 1965 (see below chapter IV, para. 285), the Special Committee recommended to the General Assembly and the Security Council "to take appropriate steps to safeguard the sovereignty of the people of South West Africa and the integrity of the Territory and to this end to take the necessary concrete and adequate measures in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity".

80. By operative paragraph 6 of the same resolution the Special Committee drew "the attention of the Security Council to the serious situation prevailing in South West Africa".

81. The text of this resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 21 July 1965 (S/6565).

Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland

82. By operative paragraph 4 of the resolution adopted at its 372nd meeting on 17 June 1965 (see below, chap. VII, para. 292), the Special Committee

drew "the attention of the Security Council to the threat to territorial integrity of the Territories posed by the expansionist policy of the Government of the Republic of South Africa".

83. By operative paragraph 5 of the same resolution, the Special Committee recommended "to the General Assembly and to the Security Council urgently to consider and initiate the measures necessary to ensure the territorial integrity of the Territories and the safeguarding of their sovereignty".

84. The text of this resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 21 July 1965 (S/6566).

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Southern Rhodesia, Territories under Portuguese administration, South West Africa and Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.

85. By operative paragraph 1 of the resolution (see chap. II, para. 463) adopted at its 373rd meeting on 18 June 1965, the Special Committee drew "the attention of the General Assembly and the Security Council to the explosive situation existing in this region of Africa owing to the intolerable behaviour of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and the minority settler régime of Southern Rhodesia".

86. By operative paragraph 2 of the same resolution, the Special Committee recommended "that the General Assembly and the Security Council, each acting within its own competence, should take the positive measures laid down in the Charter with a view to: (a) ensuring respect for the rights of the African populations in the region and in particular their rights to self-determination and independence, and putting an end to the dangerous activities of the Portuguese and South African Governments and of the minority settler régime of Southern Rhodesia; (b) strengthening the confidence which the peoples under colonial domination place in the United Nations".

87. The text of this resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 21 July 1965 (S/6567).

Trusteeship Council

88. In accordance with paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) which requested the Trusteeship Council to assist the Special Committee in its work, the President of the Trusteeship Council, by letter dated 30 June 1965 (A/AC.109/130), addressed to the Chairman, informed the Special Committee that the Council, at its thirty-second session, examined conditions in the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands under United States administration, and of Nauru and New Guinea under Australian administration. The letter stated that the conclusions and recommendations of the Trusteeship Council, as well as the observations of the members of the Trusteeship Council, representing their individual opinions only, were contained in its report to the Security Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (S/6490) and in its report to the General Assembly on Nauru and New Guinea (A/6004).

Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa

89. The Chairman of the Special Committee has maintained close contact with the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the

Government of the Republic of South Africa as regards matters of common interest relating to the work of the two Committees.

Specialized agencies

90. Collaboration of the specialized agencies with the Special Committee has been maintained by the presence of representatives of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) at meetings of the Special Committee.

H. REVIEW OF WORK⁷

91. During the year, the Special Committee continued to discharge the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly. At the commencement of its work the Chairman of the Special Committee noted with profound regret that the renewed hopes of freedom and independence without delay which were inspired in colonial peoples by the Declaration, on its adoption nearly five years ago, have with but a few exceptions not been realized. The Special Committee was aware that, in refraining from setting a time-limit for the complete application of the Declaration to all colonial territories, it was the expectation of the General Assembly that immediate steps to that end would be taken in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples of these territories. Nevertheless, owing to the negative attitude and the deliberate non-co-operation of the administering Powers concerned, progress has not been made in the implementation of the Declaration in most of the Territories, notably the larger Territories in Africa, to which the Special Committee gave extensive consideration in previous years. The Special Committee also noted that concern in this regard had most recently been expressed in the resolutions adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its fourth ordinary session held in Nairobi during February/March 1965.

92. At the same time, the Special Committee took note of the limited constitutional progress that had taken place in a few of the Territories to which the Declaration applies and welcomed the attainment of independence by the Gambia on 18 February 1965. In doing so, the Special Committee recalled that the Gambia had been the subject of consideration and of a resolution adopted during September 1963 by which, *inter alia*, the Special Committee reaffirmed the right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence and declared that the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) must be applied to the Gambia without delay.

93. The Special Committee wishes to report to the General Assembly that during 1965 it re-examined the situation regarding the implementation of the Declaration in a number of Territories to which it gave prolonged attention last year. In carrying out this review, the Special Committee was deeply concerned by the further deterioration, owing to recent developments, in the already grave situation prevailing in these Territories and by the increasingly serious threats to international peace and security which have therefore

developed. As regards the remaining Territories, the Special Committee took note of the information contained in the working papers prepared by the Secretariat and decided to transmit this information to the General Assembly as a supplement to the relevant chapters of its report covering its work last year. The Special Committee's intention was to enable the General Assembly in considering that report to take into account the latest developments relating to the Territories concerned.

94. An important development affecting the Special Committee's work this year was its decision to accept invitations which were extended to it by the Governments of Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, to hold meetings at their respective capitals. This decision was a reflection of the concern of the United Nations with colonial peoples generally, and was guided by the consideration that it was in Africa that the most difficult and serious colonial problems, as well as the largest number of people living under colonial rule, were to be found. The Special Committee was confident that by thus establishing direct contact with peoples under colonial rule in the continent, it would be in a better position to understand and therefore to assist them in their struggle for independence. It was also the hope of the Special Committee to facilitate the appearance before it of petitioners from colonial territories who would otherwise have found it virtually impossible to travel to New York.

95. At its meetings at the three capitals held between 25 May and 18 June 1965, the Special Committee considered the questions of Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, the Territories under Portuguese administration, and Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, and heard a large number of petitioners concerning these Territories as well as on Aden.

96. The situation in Southern Rhodesia, regarding which the Special Committee adopted a resolution prior to its visit to Africa, continued to show serious deterioration. The elections held by the minority settler régime on the basis of the 1961 Constitution, which had previously been rejected by the majority of the people of the Territory, emboldened that régime to intensify its repressive measures against the African majority, to further curtail democratic freedoms and political rights, to make threatening gestures towards neighbouring African States and to take steps in the direction of a unilateral declaration of independence. The Special Committee took note of the United Kingdom Government's adherence to its warning to the minority settler régime of the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence, and of the search by that Government of an agreed solution to the problem of constitutional advance. In this connexion, the Special Committee recalled that the objectives outlined in its resolutions and those of the General Assembly and endorsed by the recent Security Council resolution on the question, were the establishment by the United Kingdom of complete democratic freedom and equality of political rights in the Territory and the adoption, by means of a fully representative conference to be convened by the United Kingdom, of new constitutional arrangements based on universal adult suffrage, for independence at the earliest possible date. It was therefore a matter of great disappointment to the Special Committee that, while insisting on its exclusive responsibility for the constitutional progress of Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Government has not taken effective steps for the attainment of the above-

⁷ The views or reservations of individual members on matters reviewed in this section are set out in the relevant chapters of the present report (see chapters II to IX).

mentioned objectives. Having already drawn the attention of the Security Council to the extremely serious deterioration in the situation and its implications for peace and security in Africa, the Special Committee considers that measures must be taken without delay to secure the implementation of the Security Council's own resolution as well as those of the General Assembly and the Special Committee.

97. In Aden, the continued maintenance of the state of emergency and the carrying out of military operations, in disregard of the repeated demands of the General Assembly and the Special Committee, increased the tension in the area. While noting the United Kingdom Government's declared acceptance of the principles of self-determination and independence for South Arabia as set out in General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) concerning Aden, the Special Committee deplores the failure of that Government to apply the approach and methods outlined in that resolution, which, it may be noted, have received the widespread support of the political leaders in the Territory. The Special Committee also noted with deep regret that the United Kingdom continued its refusal to permit a visit to the Territory and its failure unequivocally to accept the recommendation contained in the above-mentioned resolution for a United Nations presence before and during the elections. At the same time, the United Kingdom Government has yet to make any moves towards the removal of its military base in Aden, although it has itself stated that no base is militarily or morally defensible unless it has the support of the people of the Territory in which it is situated. Further recent developments have led to a sharp aggravation in the already serious situation prevailing in the Territory. The Special Committee wishes to reiterate its conviction that any hope of arresting the continuing deterioration in the situation and of moving towards a peaceful solution of the problem lies in the taking of immediate measures for the strict and complete implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly and the Special Committee concerning the Territory.

98. With regard to the Territories under Portuguese administration, the Government of Portugal maintained its disregard of the obligation to transmit information under Article 73 e of the Charter and its attitude of non-co-operation with the Special Committee. Not merely did it fail to take any steps to implement the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Special Committee, but by pursuing its policies for the closer political and economic integration of the Territories with Portugal, it persisted in its flagrant defiance of these resolutions. Further, its repressive activities in the Territories were on the increase, and it intensified its military efforts to suppress the legitimate struggle of the African people for self-determination and independence. In this connexion, as noted by the Special Committee in the resolution adopted this year concerning the Territories, the Portuguese Government availed itself of the military and other assistance, direct and indirect, which it continued to receive from certain States, including some of its allies within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In that resolution, the Special Committee also noted with alarm threatening statements emanating from Portuguese official sources directed at the African States bordering upon the Territories. The Special Committee has drawn the attention of the Security Council to these developments which are cause for grave concern, with the request

that the Security Council should consider putting into effect against Portugal the appropriate measures laid down in the Charter in order to carry out its own resolutions concerning these Territories.

99. Regarding South West Africa, the Government of South Africa, in addition to maintaining its refusal to co-operate in the work of the Special Committee as well as intensifying the application of *apartheid* policies in the Territory, enlarged its own power to declare states of emergency and to take repressive measures against the African populations. Further, in complete disregard of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee, it took steps to carry out several of the recommendations of the (Odendaal) Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa Affairs (1962-1963), including measures preparatory to the establishment of non-European "homelands". In its resolution on this question, the Special Committee also noted with concern that the South African Government proceeded with the establishment of military installations in the Territory, including an important military base in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, which gave rise to concern on the part of the Governments of African States adjacent to the Territory. The South African Government has thus continued its persistent violation of the Charter and of the Mandate, as well as its defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee relating to South West Africa. As indicated by the Special Committee in its report on the implications of the activities of the mining industry and other international companies having interests in the Territory, the intransigence of the South African Government in relation to South West African is, in large measure, due to the failure of several States to take the measures outlined in paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) and to the acquiescence of some States in the support given to South Africa by their nationals who own and operate international companies in the Territory. In view of the continuing deterioration of the situation, which has been brought to the attention of the Security Council as a serious threat to international peace and security, the Special Committee considers it necessary that urgent measures be taken to secure the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee concerning the Territory.

100. Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland also engaged the attention of the Special Committee as regards the implementation of the Declaration in conformity with the wishes of the people and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee. Of concern was the threat to the territorial integrity of the Territories posed by the expansionist policies of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and by the preponderant influence of that Government in the Territories. In the view of the Special Committee, there is an urgent need for the General Assembly and the Security Council to take the measures necessary to ensure their territorial integrity and to safeguard their sovereignty. A problem of special importance affecting these Territories, to which the Special Committee devoted particular attention, was their heavy economic dependence on South Africa and their unsatisfactory economic, financial and social situation after several decades of colonial rule. In order to initiate appropriate remedial measures, the Special Committee requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the administering Power, to undertake a study and submit a report as to the ways and means

of ensuring their economic independence *vis-à-vis* South Africa. Having endorsed the proposals and recommendations contained in the Secretary-General's report (A/5958), the Special Committee commends them to the General Assembly for adoption and implementation without delay. In this regard, the Special Committee attaches great urgency and importance to the establishment of the proposed fund for the economic development of the Territories and the setting up of a United Nations Technical Assistance Office for each of them.

101. The delay in the implementation of the Declaration in several other Territories was also a matter of concern to the Special Committee. As regards British Guiana, a Sub-Committee of Good Offices was established by the Special Committee last year with the task of taking necessary measures, including a visit to British Guiana, for the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee concerning the Territory. The Special Committee regrets that, owing to the inability of the United Kingdom Government to permit a visit to the Territory the Sub-Committee of Good Offices on British Guiana was denied the opportunity effectively to carry out its task. The Special Committee considers that the General Assembly should call on the United Kingdom Government to co-operate with the United Nations in ensuring that British Guiana accedes to complete independence without further delay and in an atmosphere of harmony, peace and unity. In such other Territories as Fiji and Mauritius, recent political and constitutional developments fell far short of the requirements of the Declaration and the relevant recommendations of the Special Committee. In particular, the changes adopted or envisaged in the representational system and the continued delay in instituting an unqualified system of one man one vote constitute a negation of the objectives of the Declaration.⁸ In the opinion of the Special Committee, urgent steps require to be taken to enable these and other colonial territories to accede to independence in conformity with the freely expressed wishes of the people.

102. The Special Committee was also seized of the report of the United Nations representative for the supervision of elections in the Cook Islands (A/5962), who had been appointed under the provisions of resolution 2005 (XIX), by which the General Assembly authorized the supervision by the United Nations of the elections in the Cook Islands including observation of the proceedings concerning the Constitution in the Legislative Assembly to be elected. In addition to being highly appreciative of the work of the United Nations representative, the Special Committee welcomed the co-operation extended to it by the Governments of New Zealand and the Cook Islands, and expresses the hope that as a result of the General Assembly's examination of the report, co-operation between administering Powers and the United Nations will increase.

103. In laying special stress, in its last report, on the importance of sending out visiting groups, the Special Committee pointed out that the task of formulating concrete recommendations for the total application of the Declaration was sometimes hampered by

the lack of adequate information on the political, economic and social situations in the Territories concerned and as to the opinions, wishes and aspirations of the people. The Special Committee wishes once again to emphasize that it regards the sending out of visiting groups as one of the most effective means of discharging its mandate and recommends that the General Assembly should call upon the administering Powers to extend their full co-operation to this end by permitting access as desired by the Special Committee to Territories under their administration.

104. In this context, the Special Committee wishes to draw attention to the importance of its recent visit to Africa. While the Special Committee was unable, owing to the non-co-operation of the administering Powers concerned, to visit the colonial Territories which it considered at its meetings at the three African capitals, it was enabled, by reason of its proximity to these Territories, to establish closer contact with the realities of their situation and to obtain more direct knowledge than hitherto regarding the aspirations of their peoples. Although a few of its members had reservations about the wisdom of a visit to Africa by the Special Committee in the current financial circumstances of the Organization, the Special Committee considers that the validity of its reasons for proceeding with the visit have been amply borne out by the results.

105. Some indication of the great significance of the work of the Special Committee during its visit is contained in the resolutions adopted at its meetings in Africa. In reaffirming the inalienable rights of the peoples under colonial rule to self-determination and independence, the Special Committee, in its resolutions concerning Southern Rhodesia, Territories under Portuguese administration and South West Africa, explicitly recognized the legitimacy of the current struggle of the colonial peoples in Africa to attain the effective exercise and enjoyment of the rights set forth in the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration embodied in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Proceeding from this recognition, the Special Committee appealed to all States to give them the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights.

106. In the light of these considerations, the Special Committee attached particular importance to the role that the Security Council could play in realizing the objectives contained in the Declaration and in resolutions adopted during its visit to Africa. In this connexion, the Special Committee recommended that the General Assembly and the Security Council, each acting within its own competence, should take positive measures laid down in the Charter with a view to ensuring respects for the rights of the colonial peoples in Southern Africa to self-determination and independence and putting an end to the dangerous activities of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and the minority settler régime of Southern Rhodesia. A further recommendation of importance adopted by the Special Committee was the request addressed by the Special Committee to all States and international institutions to refuse assistance of any kind to the Governments of Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia so long as they fail to renounce their present colonial policies.

107. The work of the Special Committee in Africa also benefited greatly from the co-operation which it was able to establish with the Organization of African

⁸ The representative of the United Kingdom, referring to his letter (see annex I) covering the main constitutional developments in United Kingdom Territories, reserved the position of his delegation on the comments relating to Fiji and Mauritius, which were not discussed by the Special Committee during 1965.

Unity through the participation of the Chairman and the Executive Secretary-General of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa as well as of the Administrative Secretary-General of that Organization. It is the hope of the Special Committee that with a view to increasing co-operation between that Organization and the United Nations appropriate links between the OAU and the relevant organs of the United Nations under Chapter VIII of the Charter will be further developed and strengthened.

I. FUTURE WORK

108. In its last report to the General Assembly, the Special Committee expressed the opinion that, taking into consideration the tasks still to be carried out, the General Assembly should provide for the further examination of the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration in the Territories already considered by the Special Committee as well as in those Territories that had not yet been considered. Having regard to the considerations outlined in the preceding section of the present report, the Special Committee remains of this opinion and wishes to reiterate that in the light of the valuable experience it has hitherto gained it would be desirable that its mandate as established by the General Assembly in resolution 1956 (XVIII) and other pertinent resolutions, including resolutions 1899 (XVIII) and 1970 (XVIII), should be continued.

109. The Special Committee also wishes to repeat its recommendation that the necessary provision should be made by the Secretary-General and the General Assembly in order to facilitate its work and that, in particular, provision should be made to cover the expenses of the activities of the Special Committee, including the cost of visiting groups and of supervision of elections and other forms of consultation of the wishes of colonial peoples. Taking into account the need, as explained in the preceding section, for visits to several of the Territories to which the Declaration applies, particularly in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Ocean areas, the Special Committee wishes to place special emphasis on this recommendation. Further, considering the great importance of the work that its recent visit to Africa enabled it to carry out, the Special Committee, in the context of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI), may hold another series of meetings in Africa next year. The Special Committee accordingly recommends that the arrangements to be made for its activities during 1966 should also include provision for these meetings. The Special Committee anticipates that these activities will give rise to expenditure of the order of \$200,000.

110. The Special Committee further considers that the administering Powers should once again be requested to afford the Special Committee their fullest co-operation and, in particular, to facilitate visits to Territories, as the Committee may consider necessary. The Special Committee also recommends that the General Assembly should urge the administering Powers concerned to co-operate with the United Nations with a view to the establishment of United Nations presence as called for in the relevant resolutions in South West Africa and Aden as well as in such other Territories as the General Assembly may consider necessary and desirable.

111. The Special Committee wishes also to recall that the General Assembly, at its eighteenth session, took note of a report (A/5523) submitted by the Secretary-General in compliance with operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1848 (XVII), which requested him to continue his efforts towards large-scale circulation and dissemination of the Declaration through all the appropriate media of mass communication in all the Non-Self-Governing Territories. The Special Committee considers that efforts to widen the acquaintance of colonial peoples with the Declaration and with the work of the Special Committee should be increased in scale, and accordingly recommends that adequate provision for this purpose should be made. In this regard, the Special Committee also recommends that the General Assembly should once again invite all administering Members to co-operate more effectively with the Secretary-General in the circulation and dissemination of the Declaration and to include the Declaration in the curricula of all educational institutions in all Non-Self-Governing Territories.

112. Subject to any further directives that might be given by the General Assembly at its twentieth session and taking account of further developments in the Territories concerned, it is the intention of the Special Committee during 1966 to continue to seek the best ways and means for the immediate and total implementation of the Declaration with regard to the Territories it examined this year as well as to those it was unable to review, taking into consideration the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly, including resolutions 1899 (XVIII) and 1970 (XVIII). The Special Committee will also examine the situation in those Territories which might be included in the list of Territories to which the Declaration applies.

J. APPROVAL OF THE REPORT

113. The Special Committee approved the present report as a whole at its 393rd meeting on 10 November 1965.

CHAPTER II

MEETINGS HELD IN AFRICA (May/June 1965)

INTRODUCTION

1. Paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961 authorized the Special Committee "to meet elsewhere than at United Nations Headquarters, whenever and wherever such meetings may be required for the effective discharge of its func-

tions". Availing itself of this provision, the Special Committee held meetings at Tangier, Addis Ababa, and Dar es Salaam during May/June 1962 for a period of three weeks.

2. In the context of the same provision, the Governments of Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia extended invitations to the Special Com-

mittee during April 1965 (A/AC.109/111 and Add.1, A/AC.109/SR.327, A/AC.109/113) to hold meetings at Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam and Lusaka respectively, in May/June 1965.

3. During the Special Committee's consideration of the question of holding meetings in Africa, several members expressed the view that, as the Special Committee had not met outside United Nations Headquarters since 1902, its work was becoming divorced from the realities of the situation in Africa and from the aspirations of the African people. By holding meetings in Africa, the Special Committee would increase the effectiveness of its work, particularly as representatives of nationalist movements in colonial Territories in the continent would thus be enabled to appear before it. A visit to Africa would therefore assist the struggle of the African population of those Territories for their legitimate rights and freedoms.

4. The question was referred to the Working Group of the Special Committee, which submitted its recommendations in its seventeenth report (A/AC.109/L.196). During its consideration of this report, the Special Committee also had before it a report by the Secretary-General on the financial implications of the proposed visit of the Committee to Africa (A/AC.109/L.197). The report of the Working Group was adopted by the Special Committee at its 331st meeting, on 4 May 1965, by 20 votes to 3 (Australia, United Kingdom, United States), with one abstention (Denmark). In adopting this report, the Special Committee decided that it would accept the invitations extended to it by the Governments of Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia and that its meetings at the three capitals would take place between 20 or 25 May and 20 June 1965. The members which felt unable to support this decision explained that they had reservations concerning the wisdom of a visit to Africa by the Special Committee in the current financial circumstances of the Organization. By the same decision, the Committee approved the Working Group's recommendation that, during its meetings in Africa, it should consider the Territories under Portuguese administration, the question of South West Africa, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland and the question of Southern Rhodesia. The decision was the subject of a *communiqué* issued on 14 May 1965, by the Chairman on behalf of the Special Committee, which was widely disseminated in the three countries. The text of the *communiqué* is appended to this chapter (appendix I).

5. The members of the Special Committee, accompanied by members of the Secretariat, arrived at Lusaka on 23 May 1965. A list of the representatives present at its meetings in Africa is appended to this chapter (appendix II). At Lusaka, the Special Committee met at the Oppenheimer College from 25 to 28 May 1965; at Dar es Salaam, where it arrived on 29 May, it met from 31 May to 10 June 1965 at the Msimbazi Community Centre; and at Addis Ababa, where it arrived on 11 June 1965, it met from 14 to 18 June 1965 at Africa Hall.

6. During its stay in Africa, the Special Committee held thirty-five plenary meetings, the Working Group two meetings, and the Sub-Committee on Petitions seven meetings. The Special Committee heard twenty-three groups of petitioners and circulated sixteen written petitions, excluding requests for hearing, in connexion

with the items on the agenda for its meetings in Africa. In addition, the Special Committee heard one group of petitioners concerning Aden and circulated three written petitions concerning French Somaliland which, by adopting the eighteenth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.203 and Corr.1) at its 341st meeting on 27 May 1965, the Committee had decided to include in its list of Territories to which the Declaration applies.

7. In accordance with a decision taken by the Special Committee at its 339th meeting on 25 May 1965, the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was represented by an Observer at the Special Committee's meetings in Africa. In accordance with a further decision taken at the same meeting, the Government of Zambia was similarly represented at the Special Committee's meetings at Lusaka. In a letter dated 27 May 1965 (A/AC.109/119 and Corr.1) the representative of Somalia asked to participate in the discussions of the Special Committee on the questions of South West Africa, French Somaliland, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, and Territories under Portuguese administration. At its 345th meeting, on 28 May 1965, the Special Committee decided to grant this request on the understanding that French Somaliland was not on the agenda for its meetings in Africa. At the opening and the closing of its meetings in Addis Ababa, the Special Committee heard a statement by the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity.

8. At the opening of its meetings at Lusaka, Dar es Salaam and Addis Ababa, respectively, the Special Committee was addressed by H.E. Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia, by H.E. Mr. Rashidi Kawawa, Second Vice-President, on behalf of the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, and by H.E. Mr. Syum Haregot, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia. The Special Committee was also received by each Head of State during its stay at the three capitals.

9. Following consideration of the items on its agenda, the Special Committee adopted two resolutions concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia (see below chap. III, paras. 471 and 513), as well as an appeal to the United Kingdom Government to ensure the release of Mr. Joshua Nkomo, Rev. Sithole and other political prisoners, in order to enable them to appear before the Special Committee; one on the Territories under Portuguese administration (see below, chap. V, para. 415); one on the question of South West Africa (see below, chap. IV, para. 285); and one on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (see below, chap. VII, para. 292). An account of the Special Committee's consideration of these items is contained in chapters III, IV, V and VII of the present report.

10. In the light of its consideration of the above-mentioned items, and following a general discussion, the Special Committee also adopted a resolution concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Southern Rhodesia, Territories under Portuguese administration, South West Africa and Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (see para. 463 below). At the conclusion of its meetings in Africa, the Special Committee adopted by acclamation a further resolution expressing its appreciation to the host Governments (see para. 467 below).

A. MEETINGS HELD AT LUSAKA

*Opening of meetings**Address by the President of Zambia*

11. The President of Zambia recalled his emotion three years before, when he had had the honour of appearing before the Special Committee to describe his country's bitter experience in its struggle for human rights and independence; he still felt the sorrow of those days, for millions of his African fellowmen were still labouring under oppression and suppression in neighbouring Territories. Historically speaking, three years was but a moment, so that it was particularly gratifying that this year Zambia, in its own right as an independent Republic, should be having the honour to entertain the Special Committee. It was particularly fitting, too, that the Committee was starting its deliberations on Africa Liberation Day.

12. The people of Zambia, whose history of struggle was still so fresh in their minds and whose geographical position painfully brought home to them the atrocities committed against mankind in the name of the so-called "maintenance of civilized standards", knew only too well that the evil forces responsible were aware that world opinion was against them. The people of Zambia therefore believed that it was their duty to remind the Special Committee that it was time for less talk and more effective measures; too much shouting merely helped to cement, strengthen and entrench those forces.

13. All Zambia warmly and sincerely welcomed the Special Committee's visit, for the Committee and its predecessors had done much to encourage and assist that country in its efforts towards independence. It was hoped that the fact of meeting in Lusaka would help to hasten the attainment of independence by other countries. The visit was giving all Africans, including Zambia's less fortunate brothers and sisters, great encouragement. The latter could, by their own efforts, do much to help themselves, and Zambia, for its part, felt it a solemn duty to give them every possible assistance. But those who could give the greatest assistance and do the most to speed up matters, thereby preventing violence and unnecessary destruction of human life were the administering Powers themselves. He would therefore appeal to all the Powers concerned to face their responsibilities and, in co-operation with the Special Committee, to meet their obligations to the United Nations and to the people of the world.

14. It should be noted with regard to Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland that once those countries attained independence the situation might become more critical than was generally appreciated, because of their economic dependence on South Africa.

15. In Southern Rhodesia, the situation was clear. Mr. Ian Smith had worked up the issue of a unilateral declaration of independence to such an extent that, on the international level, the campaign had had the effect of neutralizing counter action for majority rule. In fact, he had actually achieved his aim—namely the continuance of white domination—even though only for the time being. Southern Rhodesia's Constitution was tantamount to independence, save in name, for the white electorate. So long as the people concerned continued to fear the unilateral declaration of independence, they would not talk of majority rule, and nothing could suit Mr. Smith better.

16. Zambia had been firm in its stand against Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia, its main concern

being the recognition of the importance of man, the individual, irrespective of his colour. That right had been ignored in the régimes of those countries and has resulted in the creation of second-class citizens, in the degradation and oppression of many millions who were being denied the chance of a dignified existence. Zambia's geographical position and the past development of its communications and economy had left it in a well-nigh impossible situation, but that situation did not deter it from condemning those who pursued imperialistic, racialist and colonialist policies.

17. The time had come for all Member States to make the United Nations a force for action, rather than a forum for speeches. Both the so-called big Powers and the small Powers must begin to respect the Charter and decisions of the Organization. Zambia promised to renew its efforts in that direction, and offered its full support to the Special Committee, whose deliberations would result in a step forward in the elimination of the forces of evil—forces which worked not only against the oppressed but against the oppressor as well. It was to be hoped that the goal would be rapidly achieved.

18. The Zambian people had the utmost confidence in the United Nations Organization. They had deliberately chosen United Nations Day, 24 October, as their Independence Day, to mark their complete acceptance of the principles of the United Nations Charter and to show that they fully supported the world Organization. It was a sad fact, however, that the United Nations was not yet a truly world Organization; the People's Republic of China was not represented in it.

19. The establishment of a counter organization had been suggested by the People's Republic of China but, much as he welcomed the desire implicit therein for a truly world-wide body, success would be more likely if that nation were admitted to the existing Organization. In the United Nations none had the moral right to blame China for thinking on those lines, for it had been driven against the wall by that Organization. The value of close and frequent joint discussions on matters of mutual interest could not be over-emphasized. Despite widely differing views and considerable suspicion and tension, the United Nations had played an important part in bringing about the nuclear test ban Treaty. The People's Republic of China, which was excluded from the United Nations, had just exploded its second nuclear device.

20. The People's Republic was not the only country that was outside the United Nations Organization. Indonesia's withdrawal had been an occasion of deep sadness for which the Organization could not be held to be without fault. The Members recognized its shortcoming only too well, but realized equally that, so long as those composing it were still dominated by human weaknesses of fear, suspicion and hatred, so long would any organization they might form remain ineffective. The President of Zambia made a strong and sincere appeal to President Sukarno and the Indonesian people to reconsider their decision. Indonesia's struggle for independence had been a shining example and a source of great inspiration for many. The world could not afford to dispense with Indonesia's potential contribution to its councils.

21. He mentioned those matters because he wished to stress once more what he had said over and over again: it was pure self-deception to believe that the United Nations could serve the entire world when so

many millions of people were excluded from it. Apart from all the citizens of the independent countries in that position, there were many millions still under colonial rule.

General statements by members

22. The Chairman thanked the President of Zambia and the members of the Government for their invitation, which had enabled the Special Committee to meet in a region of Africa in which many Territories and peoples were unfortunately still either under colonial domination or subjected to the most shameful régime which man had ever known: *apartheid*. In speaking thus, he was thinking with sadness of the African people of Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and South Africa. He felt anxiety, too, about the people of Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland, surrounded as they were by the racist Government of South Africa whose imperialism and desire for domination were a cause for real concern. Zambia's proximity to the authorities which had usurped power in that part of Africa placed its Government in a special position, of which the international community was well aware. That situation placed a heavy responsibility on the President and his Government for solidarity with the peoples of that region who were struggling in very difficult conditions to regain their human rights and sovereignty over their own country.

23. The Special Committee was meeting at Lusaka at a moment when the international situation was dominated by a number of very disquieting facts which concerned the sovereignty of certain peoples and which, by their very nature, were a violation of the United Nations Charter. He had noted with interest that the President had alluded to some of those events in his statement. The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, without disregarding the international context to which he and the President had alluded, was going to concentrate its efforts on the situation of the peoples which, under its terms of reference, it was to help to achieve independence. Everyone was convinced that peace was indivisible and that the rights of all men and of all peoples were universal. That being so, the members of the Special Committee were deeply concerned to note that, twenty years after the establishment of the United Nations and almost eighteen years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, millions of people were still deprived of their inalienable rights. That state of affairs was creating centres of tension which might at any moment bring about a breach of international peace. The Special Committee appealed to the men and the Governments responsible for such anachronistic situations to show reason and good sense.

24. To the Government of Portugal, it would say that the period of colonial domination was over. Portugal, which wanted to identify itself with a certain kind of civilization, should understand that history was a graveyard of empires. After the Roman Empire, which had left its imprint on the life of many peoples, the French and British colonial empires, which had been the greatest during the colonial period, had in their turn disappeared. The Portuguese colonial empire could be no exception to the rule. It was destined to disappear and it lay with Portugal to act in such a way that that

inevitable transformation would come about in friendly collaboration with the people who had been subjected to so many affronts to their sovereignty and their dignity.

25. To those who claimed to represent the Government of Southern Rhodesia, the Special Committee appealed to show moderation and reason. The 200,000 settlers in Southern Rhodesia should understand, in their own interest, that neither by force nor by discriminatory legislation nor by repression of the most fundamental freedoms could they continue to impose their domination on the 4 million Africans of the Territory. They would have to revise their ideas and in that connexion the example of the co-operation between the former colonized and colonizers in Zambia should encourage them to accept the changes which were henceforth inevitable throughout the African continent. They claimed to be a Government which was qualified to negotiate with the administering Power, the United Kingdom, concerning the future of the Territory and its inhabitants; they even wanted to proclaim the independence of the Territory, all without consulting the people. The Special Committee was convinced that, if they showed some understanding, new relationships based on recognition and respect for the rights of the majority could enable the two communities living in Southern Rhodesia to co-operate so as to ensure the well-being and social advancement of the entire population. It was because the members of the Special Committee were prompted by that sentiment that they wished to help the settlers of Southern Rhodesia not to remain outside international legality, and to that end asked them to accent and respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stipulated (Article 21 (3)) that:

“The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage...”

26. The Special Committee had come to Lusaka in the hope that the authorities established in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia would understand that the United Nations was the repository of human rights and that those rights should be protected so that man should not be forced as a last resort to revolt against tyranny and oppression. The fact that the Special Committee was meeting in Africa should also be interpreted as an additional effort on the part of the United Nations to give more tangible proof of its solidarity with all the people of that continent who were deprived of their right to sovereignty, with all those who were victims of racial discrimination, in a word with all those on that continent who were suffering the effect of men who did not believe in racial equality.

27. In conclusion, he expressed the satisfaction of the members of the Special Committee at the progress achieved by the people of Zambia since independence. That was something of which the Special Committee and the whole of the United Nations could be justifiably proud.

28. The representative of Ethiopia sincerely thanked Zambia for its warm welcome to the Special Committee. President Kaunda's words were indeed those of a statesman who was fully aware of the immense burden that the accidents of history and geo-politics had placed upon the shoulders of the young Zambian nation. They were full of wisdom and understanding and constituted a useful guide and inspiration for the Committee.

29. Zambia was regarded today as the farthest outpost in the heroic battle for African freedom and independence. The role history had thrust upon it could not be played effectively without great sacrifice on the part of its people. The same unenviable position had been filled in the past by many countries of Africa, including his own, and the confronting truth for Zambia was that all had emerged victorious.

30. It was true that the majority of African countries had attained the status of free nations, but the point at issue was whether their brethren in the remaining few but vitally important areas of the continent were to be left languishing under the evil domination of entrenched and bigoted alien races. Never would Africans abandon the disinherited masses of South Africa, Angola, South West Africa, Mozambique, the so-called Portuguese Guinea and Zimbabwe. A rude shock was in store for the reactionary few, since all progressive mankind, including the Africans, would never rest until the entire continent was free and independent.

31. The Europeans now living in Zimbabwe—outnumbered by the Africans by twenty to one—were apparently convinced that their survival lay in a policy of segregation and racial discrimination and in ruthless suppression of all African political activity. The determination of that ruling white minority had steadily pushed the country to the brink of national catastrophe. And the “winning” of the so-called national elections recently by Mr. Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front had been another tragic step in that direction. Those elections, based on the 1961 Constitution—which was unrelated to the political reality of the time—had been a mockery, designed to mislead international opinion. The facts were that the great majority of the African population were disenfranchised and that the small percentage eligible to vote had boycotted the election, since under that Constitution the Africans could never win at the polls.

32. Mr. Smith’s latest plans—to alter the constitutional legislation by introducing more racial laws on *apartheid* lines and to seize independence illegally—were well known to the United Kingdom Government. The equivocal attitude and lack of caution on the part of the latter was most puzzling, the representative of Ethiopia stated. The economic and diplomatic threats made by the United Kingdom Government had merely given Mr. Smith an opportunity to study economic consequences. One main target of his threatened counter measures would not be the United Kingdom but Zambia, which was dependent on Southern Rhodesia for coal and electric power. It was thus likely that the proposed United Kingdom economic sanctions, far from achieving the desired effect, might hurt innocent parties more than the intended target, and the Zimbabwe African nationalists regarded such sanctions as a poor weapon for subduing Mr. Smith.

33. It should not be forgotten that Mr. Smith was not without allies. Within Southern Rhodesia itself, “big business” was partly behind him, and he was backed by the whole Southern Rhodesian army and air force and the majority of the white electorate. Externally, he counted on sympathetic assistance from South Africa and the Portuguese authorities in Angola and Mozambique. That triangular axis seemingly in process of formation was signed for evil purposes and augured ill for tranquillity in the area, not to mention Africa as a whole. Pressure must be brought to bear to prevent its firm establishment.

34. Recalling that one of the United Kingdom arguments for inaction was that it had not been able to interfere in the internal affairs of Southern Rhodesia, as a self-governing colony since 1923, the representative of Ethiopia observed that self-government applied to the white community only, and African interests seemed to count no more today than they had in 1923, despite the radical and irreversible changes that had taken place throughout the African continent. That calculated ignoring of African interests was a tragedy and Mr. Smith had given no indication of how he intended to meet the aspirations of 95 per cent of the population. Any self-government which catered for the few at the expense of the majority was unacceptable on moral and other grounds. The fundamental fact that should not be overlooked was that Southern Rhodesia was a British colony and self-government of that kind could be instituted only through United Kingdom connivance with the minority Government. If the United Kingdom sought a formula for granting independence without the application of the democratic principle of “one man, one vote”, it would stand exposed before international public opinion.

35. In 1910, only fifty-five years ago, an Act of the British Parliament had made South Africa an independent country. By that Act, South African political realities had been ignored and political power blindly handed over to white South Africans, proponents for the most part of racialism and segregation. As a result, the majority of the people of South Africa had lived and were still living through untold suffering. Zimbabwe, under the ruling Rhodesian Front, was inspired by the same evil philosophy of *apartheid* and was facing a gloomy future similar to that of South Africa. The United Kingdom, more than Mr. Smith and his followers, must be held responsible for that situation.

36. Racial bitterness in Zimbabwe had been heightened to an explosive degree. Thousands of Africans were in prison for political reasons, in violation of human rights and others who had escaped were living in forced exile. Bigger detention camps were being established, and African political parties, and newspapers sympathetic to their cause, had been banned. Should they decide to take up arms to regain their rights or to set up a nationalist government-in-exile, the Africans of Zimbabwe could not be blamed. The Organization of African Unity had already warned that it would support a government-in-exile in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence.

37. Should that come to pass, the United Kingdom could not escape responsibility for the bloodshed that would inevitably result. The Ethiopian delegation was therefore strongly of the opinion that the United Kingdom Government must act swiftly to save the situation from further deterioration. It was not too late to summon a round-table conference of all shades of political opinion, for the purpose of working out a fair constitution that would form the basis for democratic government. The release of African political leaders and the reactivation of their political parties would be a prerequisite for serious political negotiations. In the event of Mr. Smith rejecting those proposals, Britain could exercise her powers to suspend the outdated 1961 Constitution, refuse to recognize the results of the recent fraudulent elections, impose economic sanctions and take military action to prevent the minority Government from declaring independence unilaterally. In the eyes of the world the use of its military strength for the

laudable purpose involved would be to the credit of the United Kingdom Government. In short, Zimbabwe was a test case for the United Kingdom's oft-vaunted sense of justice and goodwill towards Africa. With or without that goodwill, Zimbabwe would inevitably win its freedom.

38. In conclusion, the representative of Ethiopia appealed to the Africans of Zimbabwe to act as one united force. It was no time for division in their ranks. Only determined united action by all could eventually defeat the adversary; in the struggle the entire strength of Africa and of all progressive mankind stood solidly behind them.

39. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expressed his Government's gratitude to Zambia for giving the Special Committee an opportunity to meet in Lusaka, to consider the major issues involved in the elimination of colonialism in Africa. He wished the people of Zambia great success in establishing their sovereign national State. The Soviet Government hoped that the Special Committee, during its first session in tropical Africa, would be able to make a substantial political contribution to the noble cause of the colonial peoples in their struggle for liberation.

40. The era was one of revolutionary transformation to achieve man's well-being and eliminate social, national and racial oppression and inequality. The national liberation movement of peoples, which had resulted in the collapse of the colonial empires, was one of the most important elements of that gigantic revolutionary process.

41. The liberation of the countries and peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America from the colonial yoke was the result of the selfless heroic struggle which those peoples were successfully waging with the active support of all the progressive forces of the world. All the socialist States, including the Soviet Union, had helped and would continue to help the colonial peoples in their revolution against imperialistic domination, according to the Leninist principles adopted by the Soviet people from the first day of victory of the socialist revolution in Russia. It was a historical fact that the advent of the new socialist States had given an impetus to national liberation movements elsewhere, which now had a real chance of success. It was a source of pride that in the past two decades, about sixty newly independent States had emerged and, in particular, that the African continent had undergone marked changes. Those young States were now joining in the solution of major international problems, as an independent force in shaping the destinies of mankind.

42. The last and final stage in the elimination of the colonial régimes had begun; it was characterized by the desperate attempts of the colonial Powers to retain their domination in the remaining colonies and to restore and strengthen their positions in the newly liberated States. Strongholds of colonialism were scattered all over the world but the main front of the struggle lay in Africa, where the enslaved peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, South West Africa and Zimbabwe were waging an intense and courageous struggle for their inherent right to freedom and national independence.

43. In their response the colonialists had unleashed barbarous colonial wars and committed monstrous brutalities, with the object of prolonging their domination and retaining their opportunities for fabulous profits which was the main incentive for colonialism. The main

purpose of the colonialists was to plunder the natural wealth of the colonial Territories and use them for military bases to form the springboards for aggression. They were ready everywhere to apply force, as was evidenced by the events in the Congo, Viet-Nam, the Dominican Republic and the Republic of South Africa. Hardly a day passed without bringing further evidence of the uniting of the imperialists' forces in a common effort to halt freedom. The tangled web of the financial interrelation of American, British, Belgian and Portuguese monopolies, engaged in plundering the riches of the Territories he had mentioned, was supplemented by the system of military and political ties of the NATO partners. The reports of plans to create a military/colonial bloc in southern Africa, composed of the Republic of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia, under the joint aegis of the United States and the United Kingdom, were disturbing and deserved most serious attention. Therefore all the forces of freedom would suffer fewer sacrifices the sooner the final victory of the struggle for freedom and independence was achieved.

44. He noted with great satisfaction that more than half the States of the world, at the Addis Ababa and Cairo Conferences of Heads of African States and Governments and the Cairo Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, had expressed the firm determination to go on to victory in the just cause of ridding the world of the remnants of colonialism. Undoubtedly, imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism constituted the main sources of international tension and conflict, lending importance to the decision to unite in giving all moral, political and material assistance in the struggle against such forces. The fact that that policy was fully shared and supported by the Soviet Union, by all the socialist States and by the overwhelming majority of mankind was a major guarantee of victory.

45. He recalled that the founders of the United Nations had embodied in the Charter the principles of self-determination of peoples and of equality of rights of big and small nations. Those principles had been further elaborated in the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples adopted on the initiative of his country. Thus, the United Nations had taken a political stand on the side of the oppressed peoples and had established the Special Committee to watch over the application of the Declaration. As the Committee had already entered its fourth year of existence, the time had perhaps come to consider whether its work had redounded to the benefit of the fighters for freedom.

46. The work had produced some positive results. It had contributed to the political isolation of the colonialists, by bringing the situation to the attention of world public opinion. Important decisions had been adopted, governing the manner in which the status of any colonial Territory must be determined. It remained for those members opposing colonialism and imperialism to ensure that more effective decisions, giving even greater help, were adopted. And the conditions for fruitful work were more propitious in Lusaka than in New York. The Special Committee could establish direct contact with prominent African leaders and with the Organization of African Unity.

47. The items on the Special Committee's agenda regarding the progress made in carrying out the Declaration in the Portuguese colonies, Southern Rhodesia,

South West Africa, Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland were of great importance for the final elimination of the colonial system in the African continent. No matter how different those Territories might be under natural conditions, population density and tribal origin, their lot had many common features, grounded in the refined cruelty of the colonial authorities. In justification of the savage reprisals against the colonial population under Portuguese rule, the Portuguese Foreign Minister had stated at a press conference recently in London that his country was pursuing a policy which seemed to it as lawful and honourable as any other policy, and that Portugal would not wish anyone to doubt its determination and ability to carry out that policy. That was a perfect illustration of the cynicism of the colonialists. Southern Rhodesia's Prime Minister was defiantly attempting, with the virtual consent of the United Kingdom, to turn the country into a racialist State on the South African pattern and was trying to mislead world public opinion by alleging that the struggle in Southern Rhodesia was not between the indigenous population and the colonialists but between communism and western civilizations. That charge was as absurd in its substance as it was provocative in its purpose.

48. Another common feature was that the colonialists in Africa and elsewhere were backed by the United States, which had no colonial possessions of its own in Africa but which was taking an active part in plundering them and drawing a major share of the economic, military, strategic and other advantages derived from the continuance of the hated colonial régimes. Without that outside support, the colonial régimes in Africa would long since have collapsed.

49. Lastly, all the colonial peoples in Africa, as elsewhere, had an indisputable right to freedom and independence, as recognized by the whole world and by the United Nations. The member States composing the Special Committee had a special duty to help the enslaved peoples to establish their own independent sovereign States. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, that meant the establishment of an independent State of Zimbabwe, where the power would be in the hands of the indigenous majority.

50. The dozens of resolutions adopted by various United Nations bodies, calling upon the colonialists to grant freedom to those Territories, had thus far not been implemented. The present meetings, however, offered a further real opportunity for the Special Committee to bring the governing Powers and their supporters to book by reaffirming its solidarity with the struggling peoples and working out proposals for measures to be taken against them, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Under the Charter, there was no authority to take measures of force against those creating a threat to peace, except by decision of the Security Council. But the Special Committee had an indisputable right to express its competent opinion on the need for such measures and that opinion would carry considerable international and political weight. Such conclusions, adopted on African soil, would have to be given the most serious consideration by the Security Council; achievement of that objective required clarity of aim, political firmness and consistency of principles in the Special Committee. The Soviet Union, in line with its expressed principles, was willing to support any effective measures designed to rid African soil speedily of the last colonial régimes.

51. The representative of India said that President Kaunda's opening address had recalled his stirring appeal as a petitioner before the Special Committee of Seventeen on 18 April 1962 and the prediction by the representative of India concerning the part Dr. Kaunda would play in the future of Zambia. It was fitting that the Special Committee should be meeting in President Kaunda's free country of Zambia on African Liberation Day.

52. The President had played a leading part in building up the close friendship existing between Zambia and India, which was based on similar history and common interests and ideals. Both countries were in the process of economic and social change; and both believed in peaceful coexistence, non-alignment and Afro-Asian solidarity. Zambia's fight for freedom had had a special appeal for India because Dr. Kaunda had adopted Mahatma Gandhi's policy of non-violence, explaining his reasons for so doing to the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 1964 (1291st plenary meeting).

53. India had long been at the forefront of the struggle against colonialism and racialism, both in the United Nations, where his Government had been responsible for the question of racial discrimination in South Africa being placed on the agenda of the first session of the General Assembly in 1946, and as a non-aligned country attending the Bandung, Belgrade and Cairo Conferences.

54. In August 1963, speaking in New Delhi, the late Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru had referred to the awakening of Africa as the most exciting happening in the twentieth century. Today there were thirty-four independent African States Members of the United Nations. But in Southern Rhodesia, not far from Zambia, 4 million people were still being denied their rights. The Indian Government had already made known its attitude: that full and equal rights for all inhabitants, regardless of colour or creed, should come before independence. As a protest against the so-called general election held on 7 May 1965, against the wishes of the indigenous people and the recommendations and resolutions adopted by the Special Committee on 22 April 1965, the Government of India had withdrawn its mission from Salisbury and sent an explanatory note to the United Kingdom Government and its representative in Salisbury. In Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea colonialism in some of its worst forms still persisted; South West Africa faced the threat of illegal annexation by South Africa; Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland were still petitioning for independence. Efforts must not be relaxed as long as colonialism existed anywhere. The increasing support for the struggle against colonialism and racialism, particularly by socialist and Latin American countries, was a source of great encouragement. His Government had also welcomed the more progressive policies of the United Kingdom Government in recent years and hoped there would be no disappointment over Southern Rhodesia.

55. In a broadcast to the people of India on 11 June 1964, Prime Minister Shastri had referred to the names of Gandhi and Nehru as symbols of the movement of subject peoples for freedom from colonial domination. He had also spoken of the Afro-Asian movement, of which Pandit Nehru had been one of the founders. Afro-Asian solidarity was, he had said, not an end but a means of working for the freedom of the African

and Asian peoples, for peace and understanding among all nations, and for economic growth and better standards of living; India sought no leadership in the group, but would work on an equal footing with the other nations in the common cause.

56. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said it was gratifying to see the Special Committee meeting in the free country of Zambia which, barely three years earlier, had been petitioning for independence. There were advantages, too, in meeting in Africa. The cost and the difficulties of travel for petitioners would be considerably reduced; the Special Committee would be able to gain first hand knowledge of its subject; and the people still seeking their independence would realize that some of the Governments represented on the Committee were on their side.

57. On the general issue of colonialism the attitude of the United Republic of Tanzania could be summed up in the words of President Nyerere, speaking in Mbeya in 1962:

"Those of our brothers still under the colonial yoke must fight; if they do not do so they are cowards. And those of us who are independent must help them even if it means shedding our blood; if we do not do so then we shall also be cowards."

58. He stressed the importance of united action. Divided factions only prolonged colonial domination.

59. He urged the Government of Southern Rhodesia not to miscalculate the African's determination by declaring unilateral independence. He also spoke of the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government which, as the administering Power, had ignored the Security Council's appeal to call off the recent elections. He urged that the United Kingdom Government should declare the elections void and convene a constitutional conference. If the problem were not soon settled by peaceful means, it might ultimately have to be settled by military action.

60. His Government's views on the Portuguese colonies remained unchanged. The situation had worsened, because the African people had taken to arms, but he was sure of their ultimate victory.

61. He hoped that the colonial Powers would respond to the Special Committee's appeals before it was too late, so that Africa could achieve full freedom without being forced to abandon the ways of peace.

62. The representative of Yugoslavia thanked the Governments of Zambia, Tanzania and Ethiopia for their generous invitations, which would enable the Special Committee to make a maximum contribution to the struggle for independence of the peoples subjected to foreign domination. His delegation was happy to see that Zambia, which only recently had still been under colonial domination, was today an independent and sovereign State and was making a valuable contribution to the efforts made by peace-loving peoples to promote international co-operation and to safeguard peace and security. The Government and people of Yugoslavia were following with sympathy the efforts of the people of Zambia to resolve the many difficult problems which they faced, such as the heritage of the colonial era; they were sure that Zambia would, by its own efforts and with the help of friendly countries, succeed in solving those problems and they wished it every success.

63. The fact that the Special Committee was meeting in Africa was of great importance. That continent, which

had perhaps suffered more than any other from foreign exploitation, was unfortunately not yet rid of the colonialism, racial discrimination and *apartheid* which had long since been severely condemned by history and humanity. It was in Africa that some of the most difficult colonial problems still persisted, among which the problems of Southern Rhodesia, the Territories under Portuguese administration, South West Africa, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland and the problem of South Africa were the most disquieting. For Zambia and Tanzania, the situation in Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and South West Africa not only was a source of concern because of the suffering inflicted on their African brothers, but represented a direct threat to their security and independence. It was in Africa that colonialism, which had been conquered and condemned both morally and politically, was trying to re-emerge in other forms by exploiting the difficulties encountered by the recently liberated countries. The Special Committee's visit was not only a demonstration of solidarity with the peoples struggling for freedom and independence, it was also a demonstration of the firm determination of the international community and of the United Nations to give those peoples all the assistance they needed to remove immediately, once and for all, the last vestiges of the colonial era: discrimination and subjugation. The Special Committee should make a thorough examination of the problems of Southern Rhodesia, the Territories under Portuguese administration, South West Africa, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland and should reach conclusions and make recommendations in keeping with the aspirations and interests of the peoples of those Territories. The members of the Special Committee were going to meet many representatives of those peoples and through them would be able to gain a more accurate picture of the real situation, which would be of great value in the formulation of conclusions and recommendations.

64. He recalled a recent statement in which President Tito had said that, in spite of the efforts made by monopolist circles in the metropolitan countries to prevent or slow the process of decolonization, the end of colonialism was near and that the last bastions of colonialism were preventing the attainment of a stable situation in many regions of the world and were an anachronism from both the political and the humanitarian point of view. The Heads of States of Non-Aligned Countries who had met at Cairo in October 1964 had declared that lasting peace could not be achieved so long as peoples subjected to foreign domination continued to be deprived of their fundamental right to freedom, independence and self-determination.

65. One of the principal aims of the United Nations was to ensure that all men, without distinction, should enjoy the inalienable right to freedom and human dignity, to do away with colonialism once and for all, to promote peace and security and to ensure international co-operation on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and respect for the dignity of all human beings. The work of the Special Committee in Africa should be effective in helping to speed up the elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism and to create an atmosphere of peace and security in which the African people would be able to concentrate their efforts on solving the problems of economic, social and cultural development and to advance on the road to progress.

66. His country's position on the question of colonialism was well known and there was no need to state it again. As in the past, his Government would continue to give every assistance to the peoples of Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, South West Africa, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, as also to all other peoples struggling against colonialism and fighting for liberty and independence.

67. The representative of the United States of America recalled that in April 1962, Dr. Kaunda, today the President of Zambia, had with others presented to the Special Committee a detailed picture of the situation in their country. Since then, some of their momentous aspirations had been realized, and it thus seemed most fitting that the Committee should be meeting, three years later, in independent Zambia on Africa Liberation Day. Dr. Kaunda had spoken of his country's claim and emphasis on self-determination. That must be the inspiration of the Committee also, which should continuously seek ways of bringing closer the day when the peoples of each of the Territories on its agenda would exercise fully, freely and peacefully their right to self-determination.

68. His country's dedication to self-determination was firmly rooted in the very circumstances of its emergence as a sovereign independent nation. For the United States self-determination was not just a slogan, but a concrete concept which should include three specific aspects of choice: first, the choice of status, whether independence or some other status selected by the people; second, the right of self-government, i.e., the right to be ruled by a government which governed by consent of all the governed; third, the right to choose the kind of institutions under which the people wished to live. Those were the components of choice in the true exercise of self-determination such as his country would wish for all dependent peoples—a choice to be achieved through the process of peaceful change within a framework of agreement of all the parties. That was the process which had more than doubled the membership of the United Nations in the few short years of its existence, and it could not be abandoned. But the process was only a beginning; preserving independence was often as delicate a task as winning independence. President Johnson, speaking of the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa, had affirmed the United States' commitment to help those who were seeking to strengthen their own independence and to work closely with Governments dedicated to the welfare of all the people; the United States, he had said, did not seek to extend its power, but to strengthen the freedom of all peoples.

69. The representative of Italy, after thanking the Government and people of Zambia for the friendly hospitality offered to the Committee, said that Italy had been closely associated with Africa through the centuries and was proud to play a part, through membership in the Special Committee, in the historic process of decolonization, which would go down in history not only for what had been achieved but also for the way it had been achieved: namely by the bravery and tenacity with which the colonial peoples had pursued their ideals of freedom and independence, by the pressure of all liberal forces in the world and by the wisdom of all parties concerned who had decided that decolonization should be achieved by peaceful means. In the past, many empires had been swept away by violence, but historians would always ask them-

selves whether the results justified the cost in human suffering, or whether the new order did not contain in itself the seeds of future destruction. He did not believe that that was true of decolonization. The fact that the new order had been created by peaceful means was the best guarantee of its soundness and durability, and the Special Committee's presence in a newly independent country testified to the fortunate trend history had taken.

70. Not all the problems had been solved, and the virtues of wisdom, tenacity and restraint exercised in the past by the former colonial peoples and administering Powers would have to be exercised again and to an even greater extent. If the outlook was not bright in certain areas, the Committee should redouble its efforts. Italy was confident that the requirements of justice, freedom and peace would eventually be reconciled, and pledged its wholehearted co-operation to that end.

71. The representative of Denmark recalled that his delegation had, from the outset, found that the holding of meetings in Africa might be useful in helping the Committee to obtain a clearer understanding of African problems. He sincerely hoped that the meetings would further the cause of decolonization and lead to constructive measures on behalf of all peoples still living under colonial rule. The statements made by previous speakers had shown how strong was the pressure for the final abolition of all colonies and how great was the need for self-determination.

72. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland said he was impressed by the way in which the Zambian Government had set about the task of development which faced the country.

73. The United Kingdom Government's approach to the problem of the Territories in southern Africa was founded on the principle of self-determination as laid down in the United Nations Charter. His Government had pledged itself to that principle and had consistently honoured its pledge. In this connexion, he pointed to the changes that had taken place in Africa since the Special Committee's visit in 1962. During that period no less than six African countries formerly under British administration, with a total population of over 21 million, had attained full independence.

74. The record of the United Kingdom Government was proof of its sincerity and good faith, which the Committee should bear in mind when considering the solution of the remaining colonial problems in Africa and elsewhere. It was against that background, and with the basic principle of self-determination constantly in view, that his Government approached the four items to be dealt with by the Committee. The United Kingdom had direct responsibility in regard to only two of those items. In Southern Rhodesia, his Government had already declared its determination to find, by negotiation, a basis for independence which would be acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland were already well on the way to full independence, and Basutoland and Bechuanaland had fully representative Governments which were busily engaged in planning the final stages in their progress to independence. As to the Portuguese African Territories, the United Kingdom had repeatedly stated that the principle of self-determination should be implemented and had repeatedly urged the Portuguese Government to base its policies on that principle. The problem of South West

Africa was at present being examined by the International Court of Justice and, in his view, it would be incorrect for the Committee to say anything which might prejudice the Court's findings.

75. In discussing all those questions, his delegation would endeavour to play its part constructively. Where United Kingdom responsibilities were involved, frank discussions had been held with the United Nations to the fullest possible extent consistent with his Government's views on the competence of the United Nations and the limitations on its own authority and responsibility. It was his Government's firm intention and, he felt sure, the wish of Africa, to seek a peaceful solution to all those problems.

76. The representative of Poland, after expressing his delegation's gratitude and appreciation to the President, Dr. Kaunda, his Government and the people of Zambia for the invitation extended to the Special Committee to meet in that part of the African continent, welcomed the representative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in his capacity as an observer in the Special Committee. He pointed out that, although the sphere of colonial domination had shrunk in the last few years, the dangers inherent in the continued existence of colonialism had by no means decreased. The dependent peoples refused to live any longer under the colonial yoke, particularly when they could see examples in neighbouring countries of peoples enjoying their independence. However, through violence and the use of force, the colonial Powers still attempted to frustrate their just aspiration to achieve independence.

77. The problems that the Special Committee was called upon to discuss, together with the policy of *apartheid* in South Africa, were closely interrelated and constituted the most urgent matters facing the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations and the world as a whole. In southern Africa the colonial Powers were using all the means at their disposal to prevent the implementation of the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. They still continued to wage colonial wars against the indigenous population, thus creating a permanent source of tension and a threat to international peace and security. Recent events in the Portuguese Territories and Southern Rhodesia gave rise to serious concern. A unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia might lead to the creation of a new *apartheid* State in Africa, dominated by a minority settlers' Government.

78. Southern Rhodesia, Angola and certain other Territories in Africa were not merely colonies of the United Kingdom or Portugal, but virtually economic colonies belonging to South Africa, Britain, the United States and Western Germany, whose nationals were part-owners of the great trusts that exploited the natural resources and peoples of southern Africa. The unholy alliance of Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was based on the mutual ramifications of the international financial groupings. Confident in the support of the big monopolies, which were powerful enough to influence official policies, the Governments of Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were constantly intensifying their fight against national liberation movements.

79. The world was witnessing both open and disguised aggression by colonial and neo-colonial forces in different parts of the world in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter. Those desperate acts had

followed upon pronouncements that wars of national liberation would not be tolerated by the imperialist Powers. It was the duty of the Special Committee to reject the contention that the imperialists were entitled to decide what form the struggle for national liberation should take. If their contention were accepted, the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia would have to abandon their struggle for freedom and independence. That must not be allowed to happen.

80. The Polish people fully shared the desire of Africans to see their brothers liberated from foreign domination, humiliation and oppression. By virtue of its historical traditions and the nature of its socialist structure, Poland was opposed to any form of national or social oppression. It had on many occasions demonstrated its support for the cause of freedom and progress. Only a concerted effort by all the anti-colonial forces, as envisaged by the Addis Ababa conference and the Cairo Declaration of the non-aligned countries, could speed up the process of decolonization.

81. His Government considered that the Special Committee should draw the necessary conclusions from the fact that numerous resolutions adopted by the United Nations had been ignored by the colonial Powers. Certain cases could be submitted to the Security Council with a request that appropriate action be taken to enforce decisions in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Special emphasis should be placed on the urgent need to put an end to military and other assistance offered by NATO to the colonial Powers to help them to suppress nationalist movements in Africa and elsewhere.

82. The Polish delegation attached great importance to the present session in Africa, which would allow the Special Committee to make contact with the people still living under colonial rule. The representatives of the oppressed peoples would be given an opportunity to explain their views and their aspirations. The road to independence was not an easy one. It was for the colonial peoples themselves to decide which direction they wished to take. The task of the United Nations, and the Special Committee in particular, was to help them in their struggle.

83. The representative of Iraq said that the Special Committee's decision to meet in Africa reflected the growing concern of the United Nations for Territories still under foreign domination and its determination to see that the people in those areas gained their independence and freedom. His delegation hoped that independence would be achieved speedily, peacefully and smoothly. Many of the countries in the Special Committee were developing nations that needed peace and security to pursue their objectives of social justice, economic development and higher standards of living. The Afro-Asian nations had many common goals, foremost among them being to ensure that the colonial Territories gained their independence peacefully. History proved that domination and injustice could not last long and that oppressors would ultimately be defeated.

84. The Special Committee's work in Africa would necessarily be limited by the short time available, but its work would surely bear fruit. It would be an inspiration to those Territories still under foreign domination to achieve their goals of freedom and dignity.

85. While meeting in Zambia, the Special Committee would look into the question of Southern Rhodesia, Zambia's immediate neighbour. His delegation's

views on the situation there had been fully explained when the question was debated in New York. Since then the Special Committee had adopted a resolution calling upon the administering Power to assume its responsibilities by securing the release of prisoners and detainees, the repeal of discriminatory laws and the suspension of the 1961 Constitution. The recent elections in Southern Rhodesia and the return to power of the present racist Government, which had stated its intention of declaring unilateral independence, had created an explosive situation. It was for that reason that the Special Committee had decided to meet on African soil, in order to be physically closer to the Territories in question and to hear petitioners. He felt sure that the opportunity offered to the Committee would be valuable and would result in a fresh understanding of the problems involved.

86. The representative of Bulgaria recalled that his country had always stood solidly behind Zambia both in its past struggles and in its present endeavour to build an outpost of freedom on the frontiers of oppression. He was gratified to see the progress Zambia had achieved in the brief period since independence. It was a happy coincidence that the Special Committee should be starting its work on African Liberation Day, and he was sure its decision to come to Africa would prove timely and far-sighted. Millions of people in Africa still languished in colonial bondage, and the Special Committee's visit would bring it into closer touch with spokesmen for the liberation movements there.

87. The situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was far from satisfactory. It would soon be five years since the Declaration had been adopted, yet there was more need than ever for vigorous action by the Special Committee. As the President of Zambia had said in his opening address, what was required was action, not words.

88. In endeavouring to reflect the aspirations of dependent peoples, the Committee had always sought to adopt recommendations designed to bring about a peaceful solution of the problems posed by colonialism. Blame for the present situation must therefore lie with the colonial Powers, which had consistently refused to comply with the decisions of the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council. It was that stubborn opposition to the process of decolonization that constituted the common denominator of all the items on the Special Committee's agenda. The racial discrimination, oppressive measures and direct military action undertaken by Salazar, Verwoerd and Smith, and the assistance given them by the United States, the United Kingdom and other NATO countries, showed that the colonial Powers were resolved to do everything possible to preserve white domination in southern Africa and to further the interests of the monopolies which were exploiting the peoples and the natural resources of that whole region. While criticizing those policies in words, the imperialist Powers in fact acted as accomplices. Meanwhile, the United States had embarked on a series of aggressive acts in other parts of the world such as Viet-Nam, the Congo and the Dominican Republic. The United States policy of intervening to crush national liberation movements in flagrant violation of international law was thus another manifestation of the same fundamental attitude. The Special Committee could therefore not ignore the re-

sulting international situation, for it was highly relevant to the questions on its agenda. The Special Committee must take whatever steps were necessary to become an effective instrument in securing compliance with the Declaration. His country's unswerving support for the principles of that Declaration was well known, and the Bulgarian delegation would support any measures designed to secure its speedy implementation.

89. The representative of the Ivory Coast thanked the Zambian people for their welcome and congratulated President Kaunda on his message of welcome. He was particularly happy to be in Zambia, a State which, since its liberation from the colonial yoke, had welcomed to its territory its oppressed brothers from Rhodesia, South West Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland. They should know that they were not alone in that struggle and that all peace-loving peoples stood shoulder to shoulder with them.

90. The representative of Sierra Leone said that, by meeting in Zambia, the Special Committee would give new hope to those African Territories still under colonial domination and make clear the determination of most countries of the world to free them. It was the earnest desire of his delegation to bring about the speedy decolonization of Africa and other continents. In that respect he fully endorsed President Kaunda's call for immediate action rather than words, and hoped that some positive results would come out of the present session, for example the release of Mr. Joshua Nkomo and the Rev. Sithole.

91. Recalling its own colonial days, the Government of Sierra Leone was dedicated to the quest for the liberation of all oppressed peoples. It understood the problems involved in the struggle for emancipation and knew how cunning the colonial Powers could be. It was partly because all political parties had presented a united front on the question of independence that Sierra Leone had achieved its independence peacefully. He therefore hoped that where internal differences existed, the parties in any Territories under colonial rule would be able to unite for freedom, leaving the colonial Power no excuse for delay.

92. The Special Committee's agenda covered the High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, where the chief difficulty would be to preserve their territorial and national integrity, and South West Africa where the people had been forced into a system of *apartheid* against their will. Whatever the legal outcome at the International Court of Justice—and his delegation devoutly hoped that the result would be emancipation—a human tragedy existed in those countries and it would have to be discussed. In the Portuguese Territories the nationalists of Angola, Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique and other areas were denied the right to choose their own destiny. In Zimbabwe a few thousand whites under Mr. Ian Smith intended to create another South Africa. However different those countries might be, and however varied their problems, the basic situation was the same: millions of people were denied the inalienable right of every individual to be treated with human dignity and to enjoy his fundamental liberties.

93. He called upon the colonial Powers to release their subject peoples and allow them to fend for themselves. It was his delegation's wish to see the nationalist leaders of today installed at the United Nations as heads of truly independent countries.

94. The representative of Cambodia thanked the President of Zambia warmly for having allowed the Special Committee to meet in Lusaka.

95. Although it was situated far from the African continent, whose peoples were still suffering cruelly under colonialism, Cambodia was nevertheless an Afro-Asian country which had given and continued to give its firm and constant support to its African brothers in their lawful struggle for independence, for Cambodia itself had, for a long period, experienced the humiliation of the colonial yoke. In November 1953, however, alone among the countries of the former French Indo-China, Cambodia had succeeded in regaining its freedom and complete independence, without a drop of blood being shed.

96. At all international gatherings—at Bandung, at Belgrade, at Cairo and at each session of the United Nations General Assembly—Cambodia had raised its voice in condemnation of colonialism, neo-colonialism, racialism and imperialism. Cambodia, like the other Afro-Asian countries, could not leave several million of its African brothers at the mercy of the colonial Powers. They must be helped to recover their freedom and independence as speedily as possible. That was why, immediately after the Cairo Conference, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Head of State of Cambodia, had informed the Secretary-General of the Conference that the Royal Government of Cambodia, in solidarity with its African brothers, had decided to break off all relations with Portugal and South Africa.

97. The Special Committee, as also the General Assembly and the Security Council, had adopted a number of resolutions concerning, in particular, Southern Rhodesia, the Territories under Portuguese administration and South West Africa. Unfortunately, those resolutions had not been complied with. His delegation therefore considered that the time had come for action and for the consideration of specific measures designed to compel the colonial Powers and their allies, the imperialists, to respect and carry out the resolutions adopted. Millions of Africans living under the colonial yoke had placed their hope in intervention by the United Nations, and the Organization must not disappoint them.

98. The representative of Syria pointed out that Africa's rise to prominence in world affairs was one of the outstanding features of the twentieth century. Within a short space of time much had been done to unite Africa in defence of the rights of man. In that connexion the Special Committee had a heavy burden of responsibility. The time for action had come and it must ensure that its work was positive and effective.

99. In Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola, as well as in South Africa, the forces of bigotry and reaction were firmly entrenched. Devoid of any sense of humanity, they ruthlessly suppressed the indigenous peoples. Blinded by the immense profits they were accumulating at the expense of the majority, they still denied the masses their most elementary rights. Against the current of history and progress, they still carried out policies of colonial exploitation and racial superiority. In Zimbabwe, a small minority sought to achieve its so-called independence in order to deny the legitimate rights of 4 million Africans. For all of them, the African peoples represented no more than cheap labour.

100. It was not enough to decry their actions, because moral pressure was of no avail. They flouted

all moral and international obligations and defied the resolutions of the international community. It was therefore time to undertake a positive investigation. The remaining representatives of colonialism manufactured only small arms themselves. Where did they get their abundant supplies of modern weapons? What were their sources of foreign investment? Without animosity he wished to draw the attention of the major Powers to the fact that by condoning those supplies of arms, money and assistance they were doing a disservice to the cause of humanity. It was deeds and facts that mattered, not declarations of innocent intentions. Legalistic quibbles must not hamper effective action. Millions of lives were at stake and international peace was in danger. Amid the great revolution for the betterment of mankind, vile attempts were being made to debase human values and reinstate the worst forms of exploitation and slavery.

101. The Afro-Asian countries had long experience of the anti-colonial struggle, and had pronounced themselves in unequivocal terms in the historic resolutions of the Cairo Conference of non-aligned countries. Great hope had been placed in the work of the Special Committee, which should do its utmost to ensure that the expectations of the colonized countries were not disappointed.

102. The representative of Venezuela expressed warm thanks to the President of Zambia for his invitation to the Special Committee. The fact that the Special Committee was meeting in Africa was of particular importance, for it was certainly the African continent which had suffered most from the ravages of colonialism. Its land and its inhabitants had been exploited, and millions of Africans, torn from their native land, had nourished the soil of America with their blood, but millions, too, had finally become merged and identified with the other inhabitants of the American continent. It was to the African that Latin America owed its spirit of independence, its love of freedom and its courage in rebelling against every kind of oppression.

103. One hundred and fifty years previously, at great sacrifice, Latin America, and Venezuela in particular, had attained independence. There were still, however, peoples in America subjected to the colonial yoke and Territories occupied by foreign Powers. Those peoples too would regain their independence one day and the occupied Territories would be reunited with the States from which they had been severed.

104. For Venezuelans, inhabitants of a country where discrimination did not exist, where social democracy was not an empty word and where the Indian, the African and the Spaniard had blended into one freedom-loving people, it was hard to understand how there could be colonial régimes where some were denied the exercise of their fundamental rights.

105. Only universal suffrage, which was still denied to a large number of men, was capable of ensuring the free expression of the popular will. The Venezuelan Government had been elected by universal suffrage in elections in which more than 90 per cent of the registered voters had participated. His delegation therefore considered that the Zimbabwe people, and the millions of other Africans still under the colonial régime, could no longer be deprived of their fundamental rights. It was inconceivable that some Powers could believe that the anachronistic system of colonialism could continue in being or that a people could be denied its freedom and independence. A people might be deprived

temporarily of its freedom and independence, but sooner or later it would regain its rights.

106. His delegation was convinced that free co-operation among peoples and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter were enough to resolve all the problems which might face the international community. Venezuela had always defended the principle of non-intervention and would never allow a foreign Power to interfere in its internal affairs. It wished to see that principle respected also in the case of all other peoples, without distinction. The African peoples had the right to decide their destiny in complete freedom. That was an inalienable right which it should be possible to exercise peacefully, and it was incumbent on the United Nations to see that the right of the peoples was respected if it did not wish violence to break out.

107. Venezuela had always struggled against colonialism; in United Nations bodies it had always defended the right of the peoples of Africa to freedom and independence, and it would continue to do so.

108. The President of the Republic of Zambia, in the address he had given on the occasion of "African Liberation Day", had expressed the hope that the Special Committee would not have to return to Lusaka again as a committee on decolonization. The delegation of Venezuela associated itself with that hope.

109. The representative of Madagascar expressed satisfaction that Zambia, which had just gained independence, was already showing that it was resolved to contribute actively to the defence of the interests of the international community. Zambia was thus proving to the world that it regarded the plight of those still suffering under foreign rule as a matter of prime concern. That gesture deserved the admiration and gratitude of all.

110. Five years after the adoption by the General Assembly of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, there were still regions of the world, particularly on the African continent, where the exploitation of one people by another continued and where scorn for the most elementary human rights was the rule. The fact that recommendations and resolutions of United Nations bodies remained without effect was not the result of chance but the work of a few Governments and individuals who clung to principles which were dictated by their selfish interests.

111. The current of independence was becoming so strong in Africa that all those trying to oppose it were courting disaster, for the independent African States would not indefinitely tolerate the use of violence against their brothers.

112. The Malagasy Republic was whole-heartedly with those struggling for their freedom and hoped that the Special Committee, when it concluded its work, would have opened the way to an era of co-operation among all peoples.

113. The representative of Australia heartily endorsed President Kaunda's plea for a strengthening of the United Nations and its work. Having observed at first hand Zambia's development both before and after independence, he considered Zambia to be a good example of successful decolonization. Credit for that should go primarily to the leaders and people of the country, but also to the United Kingdom Government. A people's revolution was taking place in Zambia, but a revolution without violence or injustice. Race relations were

characterized by tolerance and co-operation. Hard work and the dynamic utilization of resources were the main-spring of development for the welfare of all and not for a minority. Less concern was shown for the maintenance of civilized standards—a negative and static concept—than for the steady raising of standards above the existing level for the whole of the population.

114. For leaders and peoples in Africa south of the Zambesi, those were lessons of the greatest importance. The Special Committee could exhort, appeal, and warn, but example had a more profound and permanent influence than precept. He hoped that the leaders and peoples south of the Zambesi would study the policies and plans of Zambia and see for themselves how transition to majority rule and advance to higher standards of productivity, welfare and human dignity for everyone could be achieved with justice and in peace. Such changes would not easily be achieved in Rhodesia, for example, where an extraordinary effort, in particular by the Rhodesian Government, would be required. The Special Committee was entitled to ask that such an effort be made, and he hoped it would continue to play a constructive part in achieving that end.

115. The representative of Chile welcomed the fact that Zambia, which was like Chile in that its principal source of wealth was copper, was today an independent democratic State.

116. The attitude of the Chilean delegation in the Special Committee was well known. It had always been guided by an unshakable faith in the principle of equality for all and respect for basic human rights. Chile had a deep interest in the African cause and in the process of liberation in Africa and looked forward to living in a world which was completely liberated, devoted to the task of improving the welfare of all and rid of the unjust system of discrimination. Latin America had struggled in the past to free itself from the colonial yoke; today it was the turn of the Africans to fight for liberty. The best wishes of the people and Government of Chile were with them.

117. It was regrettable that the Special Committee should once again have to consider the situation in Southern Rhodesia, its previous resolutions having so far been of no avail. The Committee's decision to ask for the release of the political leaders Nkomo and Sithole was of the utmost importance and he wished to address another urgent appeal to the administering Power to use its influence with Mr. Ian Smith's Government to obtain the immediate release of the political prisoners—who were the true representatives of Southern Rhodesia—and the convening of a constitutional conference on the basis of the principle "one man, one vote". The Chilean delegation was concerned also about the situation of the inhabitants of South West Africa and of the Territories administered by Portugal, and it strongly condemned the attitude of South Africa and Portugal. It would continue to co-operate actively with the efforts being made to restore those countries to their lawful owners. The inhabitants of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, too, had a right to self-determination and to a government of their choice. The Chilean delegation expressed its sympathy with them and warmly supported their cause. Lastly his delegation was glad that an observer from the Organization of African Unity was attending the Special Committee's meetings and hoped that consideration might be given to the possibility of having a permanent

representative of that regional organization at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

118. The representative of Iran recalled that, from the outset, his Government had backed every action taken by the United Nations for the liberation of people from colonial rule. As a sponsor of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Iran took a keen and active interest in its speedy implementation by peaceful means. The struggle of the Zimbabwe people for liberation from the racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia had received Iran's full support. The struggle for independence in other parts of Africa, in particular in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea where colonialism in its most cruel form prevails was of equal or even greater importance.

119. In addition to serving the cause of freedom, justice and human dignity, the struggle for independence had also been instrumental in bringing together the peoples of the Afro-Asian countries. Those fraternal ties should not be slackened once independence had been achieved. Independence meant only political liberation. True freedom implied economic independence and the eradication of poverty, disease, hunger and illiteracy. Since all developing countries were faced with similar problems, they should co-operate in solving them. Common action against social and economic ills should begin with small and feasible projects which could be successfully accomplished. A start could be made by creating or expanding commercial and economic ties and by exchanging technical knowledge.

120. Progress made under Zambia's transitional development plan, and the projects undertaken in agricultural development, the expansion of trade, health and education, indicated the high degree of competence and dedication on the part of the leaders of Zambia.

121. The representative of Tunisia associated himself with the speakers who had expressed their thanks to the Zambian Government for all the efforts it had made to ensure the success of the meetings of the Special Committee in Lusaka.

122. As long ago as 1959, President Bourguiba had raised the question of decolonization and suggested that the countries with colonies should hold a round-table conference to decide themselves on the procedures for the decolonization of the countries and peoples under their administration. President Bourguiba had pointed out at that time that decolonization was inevitable and that it was better that it should be brought about peacefully than that it should involve unnecessary bloodshed; colonialism was out of date and it was impossible to oppose the trend of history. President Bourguiba had concluded that it was in the interests of the colonial Powers themselves to bring about decolonization, since they would thus retain the friendship and sympathy of the colonized peoples. Although President Bourguiba's suggestion had not been taken up by the colonial Powers, the United Nations had in a way replied to it by establishing the Special Committee.

123. The Tunisian delegation wished to pay a tribute to the Special Committee for the way in which it had discharged its task so far. The Special Committee was a body of which the administering Powers should make the greatest use, since it enabled them to carry out decolonization in favourable conditions, and they should co-operate closely with it in the interests of world peace.

124. Tunisia would spare no effort to contribute fully to the observance of the principle of decolonization wherever it might be applicable, and, in particular, would do its utmost during the session to advance the Special Committee's work with regard to the items on its agenda.

Other statements

125. The representative of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity expressed the gratitude of the Secretary-General of the OAU for according the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of that organization an observer status on the occasion of the Special Committee's meetings in Africa. He also extended his good wishes to the members of the Special Committee for a fruitful stay in Africa. On behalf of the OAU, he thanked the Government and people of Zambia for the hospitality accorded to the various delegations and to the OAU observer.

126. He observed that the President of Zambia had eloquently stated the stand of the OAU with regard to the problem of colonialism in Africa which the OAU regarded as a challenge to the African continent and an affront to African dignity. A situation in which millions of African peoples were subjected to alien rule and exploitation with a reckless disregard for the aspirations of the peoples for a decent life and self-determination could no longer be tolerated.

127. It was the hope of the OAU and its Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa that the meetings of the Special Committee in Africa would bring new hope to the suffering peoples still under colonial domination and that the Special Committee, having met and heard the various nationalist organizations, would recommend to the General Assembly concrete action to ensure that colonial Powers grant independence to all the Territories under domination.

128. He offered to make available for distribution to members of the Special Committee the resolution of the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU. He explained that the documents related to the Lagos Conference (February 1964) resolution on Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/59), the Cairo Conference (July 1964) resolutions on *apartheid* and racial discrimination, Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese Territories, the High Commission Territories and the Nairobi Conference (February-March 1965) resolutions on Portuguese Territories and Southern Rhodesia.

129. He stated that in order to co-ordinate assistance to liberation movements in Africa, to give direction and purpose to the struggling peoples of Africa, and to focus world attention more intensely on the problems of colonialism in Africa, the OAU had established a Co-ordinating Committee of nine members with headquarters in Dar es Salaam.

130. He emphasized that it was the desire of the Co-ordinating Committee that there should be a peaceful transition to independence in all colonial Territories in Africa. Where colonial Powers showed a genuine desire and took practical steps to achieve such a goal speedily, all attempts had always been made to encourage them in their efforts and to ensure that nationalist parties, without prejudice to their cause, pursued their goal in a spirit of moderation. On the other hand, there were a few recalcitrant Powers and

racist minority groups which had proved impervious to reason and common sense, in the attitudes of which there could be no change unless brought about by violence and the destruction of human life. Conditions in Mozambique, Angola, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, South West Africa, Portuguese Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe and French Somaliland were such as to constitute a threat to peace in Africa and the whole world unless the United Nations exercised that sacred duty imposed upon it by the Charter to impose sanctions in order to ensure that a blood-bath was not let loose in Africa. Africa could not be expected to tolerate alien rule and a shameless exploitation of its peoples by a minority, however powerful.

131. The history of Africa was written in bloodshed by those who, under the guise of an evangelizing Christian mission, enslaved millions of people, banishing many to barren and unproductive lands in favour of a microscopic minority who, in all appearances, had lost all sense of justice and common humanity. In Zimbabwe, a minority had arrogated to itself the inherent right to rule the majority under a system that was akin to the Nazi Gestapo. The United Kingdom, as the administering Power, had failed to live up to its reputation for justice and fair play. It had refused to take the initiative to suspend the Rhodesian Constitution and to convene a constitutional conference of all shades of political opinion in Zimbabwe. On the contrary, the leaders of the people were either in jail or under restriction and yet all that the United Kingdom had done was to threaten economic and diplomatic sanctions against the Government of Southern Rhodesia if it declared independence unilaterally. The situation in Zimbabwe was explosive and constituted a potential threat to world peace. Africa, and no less the United Nations, had a responsibility to ensure that the situation did not deteriorate further as a result of the continued travesty of the elementary rules of justice and democratic principles by a recalcitrant racist minority waxing strong on the sweat of the labouring masses of Zimbabwe.

132. The racist minority Government was embarking upon a disastrous course by threatening to declare independence unilaterally. The OAU considered this a challenge to the integrity and good faith of the administering Power and a challenge to organized world opinion. If allowed to materialize, it would constitute, not only on the part of the racist Government of that Territory, but also on the part of the Government of the United Kingdom, a flagrant violation of the resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly.

133. The United Kingdom had threatened economic and diplomatic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence. It was therefore pertinent to draw a comparison between past experiences in South Africa and the possibilities presented in Zimbabwe. In spite of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) of November 1963, calling on all Member States, *inter alia*, to boycott all South African goods and to refrain from exporting goods, including arms and ammunition, to South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States together with their Western allies had not complied with the resolution. Since then, Western Germany and Japan had substantially increased their investments in, and trade with South Africa, thereby postponing the day of reckoning for the racial bigots of that coun-

try. Those two countries had in fact successfully taken advantage of the situation created by the trade embargo imposed upon South Africa by some countries. There were countries ready to take advantage of such sanctions, and in any case, Portugal and South Africa had already pledged their support should this become necessary.

134. Mr. Ian Smith had gone further, by threatening economic reprisal against Zambia and Malawi. The racist minority clique of white settlers should be warned without delay that any attempt to disrupt the economy of the young Zambian nation would be regarded as an act of hostility to the whole of Africa.

135. The Co-ordinating Committee called upon the United Kingdom to take the following steps:

(a) To seize the initiative immediately in Southern Rhodesia by giving Mr. Smith a time-limit within which to agree to a review of the Constitution in such a way as to ensure majority rule;

(b) To suspend the Rhodesian Constitution pending this review;

(c) To convene immediately a constitutional conference in London reflecting all shades of political opinion in Zimbabwe; and

(d) To order the immediate and unconditional release of all political detainees in Zimbabwe.

136. If Mr. Smith failed to comply with these conditions, the United Kingdom would be honour bound to intervene militarily in Southern Rhodesia as it had done elsewhere in the recent past. The Co-ordinating Committee endorsed the stand of the Special Committee that the United Kingdom use its good offices for the release of Mr. Nkomo and the Rev. Sithole to enable them to appear before the Special Committee.

137. He remarked that Africa did not desire bloodshed as a solution to the Southern Rhodesian problem. It desired a solution that guaranteed majority rule in a new society in which the worth of the individual was protected without regard to the colour of his skin. At the same time, Africa would leave no stone unturned to ensure that the common will was the basis of law in Southern Rhodesia.

138. Elsewhere, in the Territories under Portuguese domination—Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe—no visible step had been taken by Portugal to respect and comply with United Nations resolutions on decolonization. Portuguese authorities still claimed that these Territories situated in Africa were overseas provinces of Portugal; they still claimed a Christian civilizing mission although forced labour and political repression, mass illiteracy and poverty were all that could be shown for Portugal's five centuries in these Territories. NATO arms were being used in all these Territories to suppress the genuine aspirations of the peoples for self-determination. Portugal continued to practise genocide on a large scale and to mete out to a defenceless people a reign of terror reminiscent of Hitler atrocities in Europe. It was on record that some Members of the United Nations had not only flouted the resolutions of the United Nations on this issue, but had consistently sold war materials and munitions to Portugal though aware that such materials would be used in the Portuguese colonial Territories. How else could one explain the recent utterances of the Portuguese Foreign Minister in London and the threat of military reprisals against Tanzania simply because that country was host to the

OAU Co-ordinating Committee and was in no way responsible for the military rebellion going on in Mozambique? Let Portugal be warned that an attack on Tanzania would constitute a declaration of war on the whole of Africa and all the efforts of the whole continent would be employed to put an end once and for all to Portuguese militarism and oppression in Africa.

139. Portugal had joined in an unholy trinity with *apartheid* South Africa and racist Southern Rhodesia in a futile attempt to stop the onward march of history and the rising but engulfing tide of African nationalism. The Special Committee, currently sitting in Lusaka, in a country wedged between Mozambique, Angola and Southern Rhodesia, should recommend positive and definite sanctions against Portugal because the presence of Portugal in those areas constituted a threat to the peace of Zambia. Let the strength of the Special Committee's condemnation of Portuguese atrocities echo across the borders of Zambia to lift the hearts of those yearning for self-determination and a government chosen by themselves. He expressed the hope that the different liberation movements would present their cases before the Special Committee and explain the various turns and twists in imperialist strategy in the remaining colonial Territories in Africa as well as the aspirations of millions of people to participate in a government of their own choice.

140. He said that so-called French Somaliland, which was still regarded as an integral part of metropolitan France, served as a military base for about 20,000 French troops. One was tempted to ask why France was keeping so large an army in that small Territory even after it had granted independence to all of its other Territories in Africa. It was to be hoped that it was not an instrument of terror and blackmail to enable France to perform self-appointed policing duties in Africa. France had refused over the years to grant independence to that Territory and was prepared to maintain its position there with armed force, even though the history of the last fifteen years had demonstrated the futility of seeking to entrench a colonial régime in the teeth of determined opposition. Despite the special problems of French Somaliland, the overriding factor must be the necessity to allow the people of that Territory freely to determine their own future. France should be prevailed upon to withdraw from the area and to grant the Territory the same rights which France had found it necessary to grant to many of its former overseas provinces. It was hoped that some of the liberation movements representing the oppressed peoples of so-called French Somaliland would be given an opportunity to present their case before the Special Committee.

141. He stated that he would not attempt to recapitulate the oppressive role of South Africa in South West Africa because of the fact that the problem was already before the International Court of Justice.

142. On behalf of the Secretary-General of the OAU, he assured the Special Committee of Africa's total commitment to the liberation of every inch of any Territory under colonial domination and the desire of the OAU to co-operate with the Special Committee in ushering in a new period of peace and harmony all over the world without the spectre of domination of one group by another. The OAU believed that the activities of the Special Committee were complementary to the work of the Co-ordinating Committee in Dar es Salaam. The Special Committee's presence in Africa, at the in-

vasion of member States of the OAU, was evidence of their hope that the Special Committee's visit would mark an important turning point in the struggle to end man's inhumanity to man.

143. In conclusion, he emphasized that Africa did not desire bloodshed as a solution to the problem of colonialism, but that it would spare nothing and endure every hardship to ensure that alien rule disappeared from, and the dignity of man was restored in Africa.

Closing of meetings

General statements by members

144. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that he wished, as the representative of a State member of the OAU, to state that he had reservations concerning certain parts of the statement made by the representative of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa.

145. The Chairman said that, on the occasion of the last meeting of the Special Committee at Lusaka, he wished to thank the President of Zambia for his hospitable reception of the Special Committee. During its stay at Lusaka the Special Committee had listened to people whose sufferings were both of the body and of the soul. They were suffering because others who claimed to represent a certain form of civilization did not believe in the equality of men. Those whom the Special Committee had heard had been suffering because adventurers and renegades from European society had come, by trickery and force of arms, to steal their land and deprive them of their sovereignty. The colonialists and white racists who were killing Africans, robbing them of their freedom and compelling them to do forced labour to ensure the prosperity of certain metropolitan countries, were cynical enough to say that they were defending the values of Christian or Western civilization in Africa.

146. In South Africa, in Southern Rhodesia and in South West Africa *apartheid* was practised. It had been said that Mr. Verwoerd and his clique were even engaging in experiments with poison gas and atomic weapons with the idea of waging a war of extermination against the African peoples, all in order to maintain the supremacy of the white race in that part of the African continent. In Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea, the officials and armed forces of the dictator Salazar were deporting Africans or giving them poisoned food and drink. Salazar claimed to represent and defend Christian civilization in Africa. There was no doubt, however, that if Christ were to return to earth today, his first crusade would be against the Salazar, Verwoerd and Smith clique.

147. He felt certain that, when the Special Committee published its report, world public opinion would condemn the survival of colonialism and *apartheid* even more forcefully and that all sane forces would join more vigorously in the fight against those two scourges, which were real anachronisms in the present day and age. He was convinced that progressive forces would unite their efforts in all countries to see that the Portuguese Government and the illegal authorities in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were isolated and deprived of any kind of co-operation that might enable them to persist in their crimes against and exploitation of the African peoples, whose only desire was to live in peace and friendship with all peoples, to enjoy the benefits of

science and technology and to have their sovereignty respected.

148. The Special Committee would leave Lusaka the following day for Dar es Salaam, where it was to continue its work, but he was sure that no one would ever forget the freedom fighters whom the Special Committee was leaving at Lusaka and who from one day to the next might be done away with by the repressive forces of Salazar, Verwoerd and Smith.

149. The members of the Committee represented Governments with different economic, political and social systems. Their Governments differed even in philosophical outlook, but they had at least one obligation in common—to defend the principles of the United Nations Charter, to which they had all subscribed of their own free will, and to see that all men enjoyed the rights laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. That common obligation, and the thought that the petitioners they had heard at Lusaka might be tortured or murdered merely for having testified before the Special Committee, imposed an imperative duty on their Governments and on themselves to act, and act quickly, to secure the early and unconditional liquidation of colonialism and of all other forms of oppression of man by man.

150. He felt certain that the members of the Special Committee would make the necessary effort to understand him when, as an African and representative of the Republic of Mali, he concluded by saying that the Portuguese Government and the so-called authorities in South Africa had deliberately put themselves beyond the pale of international society by placing their own sordid interests, based on the exploitation and oppression of the African peoples, above humanism and international morality, and that they had consequently lost any moral justification for membership of the United Nations, the Organization which remained the hope of mankind as the guardian of human rights.

B. MEETINGS HELD AT DAR ES SALAAM

Opening of meetings

Address by the Second Vice-President on behalf of the President of the United Republic of Tanzania

151. The Second Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania said it was a great pleasure to extend to everyone present a warm welcome on behalf of President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere and the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania.

152. People of more than twenty-four nationalities were gathered together in the Special Committee from all parts of the world. Such meetings were rare and unique, and the people of Tanzania were conscious of the great honour and tribute which the United Nations had rendered to their country in holding sessions of one of its most important committees in their capital. Dar es Salaam was not new to some of those present. In 1962 the Special Committee, then known as the Committee of Seventeen, had visited the country, and he understood that, among the delegates present, were some who had been there in 1962; no doubt the representatives of Tanzania on the Special Committee had endeavoured to acquaint the rest with the outlook of their country and people and above all with the policy of their Government.

153. The present meeting was a unique occasion, with a unique and noble purpose. The Special Committee was charged by the General Assembly of the United Nations with the responsibility of implementing the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the fulfilment of that responsibility was of extreme urgency if Africa and the world were to be saved from explosions which could lead to another war.

154. For centuries, Africa had suffered under foreign domination and exploitation. Today about a third of Africa was still languishing under colonialism, imperialism and racial humiliation. The enslavement and abuse of Africa and her peoples by the colonialists, imperialists and racist régimes was an intolerable affront to all mankind.

155. For the people of Africa, a solemn decision had already been made. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the freedom fighters from colonial and European-dominated areas had resolved to bring the continued humiliation of Africa to an immediate end. As the distinguished delegates were aware, Dar es Salaam had been selected by the OAU as the headquarters of its Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa—the Committee of Nine. The Special Committee was the United Nations committee for the liquidation of colonialism. Although its stay in Dar es Salaam was only temporary, the highest importance was attached to the present session. The two liberation committees were of historic importance in the struggle against colonialism.

156. The Special Committee had played a considerable part in making Members of the United Nations aware of the extreme misery and suffering imposed on millions by colonialism and imperialism. Indeed, the United Nations, through the Special Committee, had helped to rally world opinion against those evils, which were gross examples of man's inhumanity to man. The historic General Assembly Declaration against colonialism and the numerous resolutions passed by the Special Committee had made it abundantly clear that peace in Africa and in the world was seriously jeopardized by colonialism. At the same time it was clear that the Special Committee realized that it could not fully achieve its noble and urgent mission if it met only at United Nations Headquarters, which was far from Africa where colonialism was still most rampant. Hence the wise decision to come to Africa. The ideal arrangement would have been for the Special Committee to visit the colonial Territories themselves, such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe or Southern Rhodesia, the High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland, South Africa, South West Africa, Angola, so-called Portuguese Guinea and the Spanish and other colonies.

157. But the colonial Powers were afraid of the Special Committee and the freedom movement. They were fooling nobody but themselves by playing the ostrich game. They could never succeed in hiding from the world the wicked and inhuman practices being perpetrated in the colonies which had been exposed by men of goodwill in the past and which would continue to be exposed in the United Nations, mainly through the Special Committee. In spite of all the efforts by the United Nations, however, it was disappointing to notice that even at so late an hour a small but powerful minority of its Members was still practising colonialism and continuing to give moral, economic, military and other forms of assistance to such inhuman and doomed

régimes as those of Salazar, Verwoerd and Smith. It could be seen from the records of the proceedings of the United Nations meetings, that a few Members of the United Nations, especially the powerful Western countries, still found it difficult or impossible even, just to vote for resolutions which unreservedly condemned colonialism and its leading advocates such as Salazar, Verwoerd and Smith.

158. Those Powers continued to help Salazar, Verwoerd and Smith to place their economic, military and other arrangements, and indeed their race, above the sacred principles of human freedom and dignity as well as national independence.

159. However, it would be noted, too, with inspiration, that through such efforts as those made by the Special Committee the die-hard colonial Powers and their allies were gradually being awakened from their centuries of sleep. Time was running very short and the colonialists had either to abandon their outmoded system or be compelled to do so by forceful action. The mounting world solidarity against colonialism was certain to defeat it once and for all.

160. The people of Tanzania had taken an uncompromising stand against colonialism. The sufferings of their brothers in colonial Territories were deeply felt and known. It was, after all, only a few years since they had broken the chains of colonialism. Moreover, their geographical position was such that they had on their southern border Mozambique, which was dominated by the ruthless régime of fascist Portugal under Salazar. Thus Tanzania was one of those countries which was in the actual front line of the battle against colonialism. Thousands of its brothers came to Tanzania to escape from the oppressive hand of the Portuguese and South African fascists, as well as from the British-dominated areas of Zimbabwe, or Southern Rhodesia, and other parts of southern Africa. The Special Committee would no doubt hear accounts of their suffering during its present tour of Africa. Tanzania had to concern itself daily with the actual survival of the thousands of its brothers coming in from the colonial Territories. As a matter of national policy, and within the context of the African Liberation Committee, Tanzania was determined to do its utmost to help the freedom fighters so that they could regain control of their countries and live as free men in an independent State like all others in the world.

161. There was ample opportunity for those people all over the world who supported the struggle for freedom to render moral and material aid to the freedom fighters. The least that could be expected of any person or State claiming to defend or cherish human freedom was an outright and public condemnation of the colonial system and, therefore, a vote in favour of all United Nations resolutions calling for sanctions against Portugal and South Africa. Equally urgent was the need for a unanimous call to the United Kingdom to carry out its responsibility in Zimbabwe or Southern Rhodesia, to release the nationalists who were being tortured under the ruthless European settlers led by Smith, and to establish majority rule. Any declaration of independence under the European settlers' régime would be resolutely and effectively opposed by the African people of Zimbabwe, with the full backing of the whole of independent Africa.

162. Time was running short and what was most important in the struggle for freedom from colonial rule was action rather than words. In that struggle,

and after many years of foreign domination and exploitation, Africa was steadily and surely distinguishing its true friends from its real enemies. Some States, especially among those of the Western world, continued to have friendly ties with the arch-enemies of Africa, which included Salazar's Portugal and Verwoerd's South Africa. Portugal and South Africa, for example, continued to receive economic, military and other forms of aid from some countries which regarded themselves as part of the free world. Such countries should not continue to entertain the illusion that they could at the same time establish true friendship with the 200 million and more people of Africa.

163. In the Africans' struggle to win back their human dignity, those who were not with them were against them. One of the greatest services which the distinguished representatives of the Special Committee could render to the United Nations and to their respective Governments and peoples was to make sure that nobody continued to have any doubts about African determination to liquidate colonialism, imperialism and *apartheid* once and for all. By their continued and unswerving solidarity with the cause of freedom they would hasten the day when all mankind would live in freedom and brotherhood. Only then would world peace be assured.

164. In that noble endeavour the Government and people of Tanzania were irrevocably committed to play their part. They regarded those people all over the world who were in full solidarity with them as true friends and reliable allies. The members of the Special Committee should therefore feel quite at home in Tanzania where the people fully shared their aspirations. The Government and people were happy to receive the Special Committee and would do all within their power to make its stay happy and successful.

General statements by members

165. The Chairman thanked Mr. Kawawa and asked him to express to President Nyerere and to the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania the gratitude of the members of the Special Committee for the courteous invitation which had enabled the Special Committee to meet for the second time at Dar es Salaam, the capital of Tanzania, which was also the headquarters of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa.

166. In the welcome that the Special Committee had been given upon its arrival in the dynamic capital, a note of gaiety, but at the same time full of significance, had been added to the traditional African hospitality. Everyone had been struck by it, and the various demonstrations with which delegations had been greeted at the airport had made the Special Committee even more aware of its responsibilities and of the confidence that the people who were still under colonial domination or subjected to the inadmissible system of *apartheid* placed in the United Nations and the Special Committee. The fact that the capital which was the headquarters of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa was also the temporary headquarters of the work of the United Nations Special Committee was no coincidence: in the eyes of the representatives, it testified to the important contribution that the Government and people of Tanzania were making each day to the realization of the noble ideals of equality, peace and justice which had always been mankind's objectives.

167. The members of the Special Committee were intensely aware of the threats and intrigues of every sort that the forces of reaction were bringing to bear against the Government of Tanzania because of the establishment of the headquarters of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa in its capital and because of the brotherly hospitality that Tanzania was offering to the African freedom fighters. It was common knowledge that at certain periods of their evolution peoples and men were suddenly faced with a dilemma: the choice between a selfish tranquillity, which made them indifferent to the arbitrary acts that were going on around them, and the prosecution of the struggle in fulfilment of their duty to support those who were deprived of their inalienable rights. The Government and people of Tanzania had chosen the hard path of struggle because they believed in the principles enunciated in the United Nations Charter and in the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For that reason the fact of holding meetings of the Special Committee in the capital of Tanzania was a matter of pride to the delegations and a source of inspiration. It was a source of inspiration because the members of the Special Committee had followed with great interest the actions and efforts of President Julius Nyerere to bring about peaceful decolonization.

168. As at Lusaka, the Special Committee was no doubt going to experience moments of intense emotion when it was told of the atrocities committed by Portugal against the people of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. It would certainly feel its indignation rising once again when it heard about the police brutality, death sentences and imprisonment of every type imposed upon the African people of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa.

169. He wished to tell all the representatives of national liberation movements and all the African people suffering under foreign domination that the visit of the Special Committee to Africa was an expression of the firm determination of the United Nations to liquidate colonialism rapidly by seeking ways and means of putting into effect the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Unfortunately, despite the wishes of the United Nations, which had been repeatedly reaffirmed, and despite the efforts that had been made, the progress achieved so far in the matter of decolonization had been slow and was inadequate in the light of the sufferings and the legitimate and urgent aspirations of the colonized peoples. Some people were tempted to connect this lack of progress with the fact that certain administering Powers took part, as members, in the work of the Special Committee.

170. In that connexion, it was worth pointing out that in keeping with its principles and its structure, the United Nations had recourse first and foremost to persuasion and sought peaceful solutions, that made discussion with the administering Powers essential. Certainly, in the assessment of the fact of colonialism and in the determination of the ways and means of liquidating the colonial system, there were divergencies, and sometimes profound divergencies, between the administering Powers and the anti-colonialist countries, especially those which had formerly been subjected to colonialism. That was clearly regrettable, since all Member States subscribed to the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

171. What should be denounced with force and indignation, however, was the attitude of the colonial Powers which refused to co-operate with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Those colonial Powers, such as Portugal and South Africa which refused to co-operate with the Special Committee stubbornly continued, in the face of international opinion and of good sense, to regard colonial problems as domestic problems.

172. The colonial system was based on the violation of the rights of other peoples and by its nature and its manifestations it was a threat to international peace and security. Being the result of a situation that had been imposed by force, it should be abolished and it was encouraging to note the efforts being made to that end by the United Nations and the OAU. He was sure that the work of the Special Committee in Africa, supplemented by the praiseworthy efforts already made by the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, would help to make world opinion increasingly aware of the urgent necessity of doing everything possible to liquidate colonialism.

173. The Government of Portugal and the illegal authorities established in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were worried about the work of the Special Committee in Africa. Mr. Smith had already shown his anxiety by declaring a state of emergency in certain parts of the Territory as soon as he had heard about the resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia adopted by the Special Committee. There was no doubt whatever that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples would be applied to all the Non-Self-Governing Territories; that would be so because it was in accordance with logic. The will of the colonized peoples would inevitably triumph in the end. The struggle of the colonized peoples would be victorious because it was just and it would gain the increasing support and sympathy of the free peoples of the whole world.

174. In 1962, when the Special Committee, which had then numbered seventeen members, had met at Daes Salaam, it had had the Territories of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Zanzibar on its agenda. All those Territories had now become independent and their peoples were making their contribution to the liberation of the rest of Africa with deep conviction. That was a source of pride, satisfaction and hope to the Special Committee. The Salazars, the Verwoerds and the Smiths would have to understand that all the African countries would be free. The Special Committee was asking them to understand that the march of history was irreversible and that imprisonment, murder and torture could not halt the movement of national liberation.

175. The representative of Ethiopia said he would like, on behalf of his delegation, to thank the Government and people of Tanzania most sincerely for the very warm and fraternal reception accorded to the Special Committee. He thanked the Vice-President for his wise and inspiring address, which would prove a useful guide to the Special Committee in its deliberations, and the Chairman for his animated reply on behalf of the Special Committee.

176. As his country's ambassador to Tanzania, he was privileged in having the rare opportunity of observing at close quarters the tremendous progress being

made there and witnessing the valuable contribution the country was making in all fields of human endeavour, under the wise and dynamic leadership of President Nyerere. Perhaps the greatest contribution of all was being made in regard to African salvation and emancipation, which at times had meant great risks and sacrifices in the face of threats from neighbouring hostile and ill-intentioned colonial régimes. Indeed, the fact that Dar es Salaam had been chosen as the seat of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa was itself eloquent testimony to the continent-wide recognition of the devotion and dedication of Tanzania's leaders and people to the cause of African freedom and independence. It was the fervent hope and prayer of his delegation that President Nyerere and his dedicated aides would be endowed with good health and long life, so as to be able to see for themselves the realization of their dream of the total liberation of Africa, and also to continue to lead Tanzania on the path of progress and prosperity for a long time to come.

177. It was not his intention to make any long statement on the agenda item to be taken up, for two main reasons. First, the position of his Government on the question of colonialism and imperialism was too well known to need any further restatement, and secondly, his delegation felt that the Committee should immediately address itself to its duty of meeting the various petitioners who had been anxiously and with great expectation awaiting its arrival in Dar es Salaam. He would, however, crave indulgence to say a word or two on the question of the Territories under Portuguese colonialism which, together with South Africa and more especially Southern Rhodesia, today constituted the greatest threat to African and world peace.

178. Portugal was perpetuating in the Territories under its domination a slave-state policy. Its tyranny had driven thousands of innocent Africans into exile. In addition, Portugal, in the name of law and order was today committing the crime of genocide on a massive scale in Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. The outcry of the millions of Africans would not remain unheeded. Experience taught that increasingly brutal acts such as were being practised by the Portuguese colonialists, unless checked in time, could provoke a chain reaction which would lead to catastrophe.

179. Portugal must realize that it could not reverse the course of history. No matter how barbarous the régime might be, no matter how abundant and mighty its allies and the sources of its power, no matter how calculating and cunning its social, economic and psychological warfare against the African people, it would not be able to withstand the wave of history much longer. Nothing less than the granting of independence would stop bloodshed. A fire had been set to the thick and cruel jungle of colonialism in Africa, and it had swept across the continent. That fire of freedom would not be extinguished before it consumed the remaining vestiges of colonialism. It was incumbent, therefore, upon the Special Committee to explore all avenues so as to be able to show the way, so as to bring to a speedy end the dreadful situation now obtaining in the Territories under Portuguese colonialism.

180. The representative of Cambodia, after expressing his gratitude to the Tanzanian Government for its friendly hospitality, said that the Royal Government of Cambodia attached particular importance to the work of the Special Committee and was sure

that in the course of its visit to Africa the Special Committee would have an opportunity to study and enact specific measures to ensure the rapid liberation of all Africans still living under the colonial yoke. Those Africans had the sympathy and the constant resolute support of the people and Government of Cambodia in their legitimate struggle against the colonialists and the white imperialists. For that reason, not only did Cambodia maintain no relations with the racist and colonialist Governments of South Africa and Portugal, but it was struggling and would go on struggling vigorously against the forces of racism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism that were the common enemies of the peoples of Africa and Asia.

181. The results that the United Nations was achieving in the matter of decolonization were slow in appearing and did not meet the wishes of the Africans, who, despite the resolutions that had been adopted, were still suffering and living in humiliation beneath the yoke of the colonialists and the white imperialists. That abnormal situation was due both to the fact that certain Member States refused to respect and comply with the resolutions adopted by the international organization and to the complicity of certain other countries with the fascist Governments of South Africa and Portugal.

182. That coalition of the imperialists and colonialist forces, whose obvious aim was to exploit the African countries, was a serious threat to the peace and security of the peoples of Asia and Africa. The Cambodian delegation considered that it was the duty of the United Nations to take urgent and resolute action to put an end to it, first by recognizing the legitimacy of the struggle of the African peoples and then by asking all States to sever all relations with the Governments of South Africa and Portugal. The Cambodian delegation was convinced that, thanks to their unity and to the support of all peoples who cared for peace and justice, the Africans would gain final victory, for theirs was a just struggle.

183. In conclusion, he offered the Government and people of Tanzania his most sincere wishes for the complete success of their work of national construction.

184. The representative of India thanked the Government and people of Tanzania for inviting the Special Committee to Dar es Salaam, and expressed appreciation of the important address delivered by the Vice-President.

185. Ever since attaining independence, it had been India's fervent wish to see a similar boon conferred on other dependent Territories. Tanzania's struggle for independence, and its present and future problems, bore a close resemblance to India's own; both countries had a common approach to world problems, sharing the same ideals of peaceful coexistence, non-alignment and Afro-Asian solidarity. There was therefore a solid basis for their future co-operation. India had watched with the greatest interest the steady progress of Tanzania in all spheres, and the changes that had taken place on the economic, political and social scene since the Special Committee's previous visit in 1962 were visible for all to see.

186. Having itself been under colonial rule, India could not but identify itself against colonialism and racism, India had taken action against the monstrous régime of Portugal, and condemned the repression being carried on in the Territories under Portuguese administration. He assured the freedom fighters of those Ter-

ritories of India's full support, and expressed the hope that their struggle would soon be crowned with success. While his delegation was dedicated to the peaceful settlement of all issues, there came a time when all roads to a negotiated settlement were closed and the freedom fighters had no other course but to oppose the colonial régime by every means at their disposal.

187. His delegation had stated its views on the question of Southern Rhodesia earlier at Lusaka. The freedom fighters of Zimbabwe had India's full support in their struggle against the white minority Government. However, the United Kingdom had great experience in dealing with colonial problems, and his delegation had confidence that a peaceful solution would be found.

188. In almost all parts of Africa today the fires of freedom were ablaze. As Mr. Nehru had once said, the awakening of Africa was an event of historic importance, not only for Africa itself but for the whole world. Yet there were parts of the continent where colonialism and racism still held sway. He trusted that the Special Committee's sojourn in Tanzania would help to speed their elimination.

189. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics thanked the Government and people of Tanzania for inviting the Special Committee to Dar es Salaam. Tanzania was indeed a worthy torch-bearer of African liberty, as had been confirmed by the Vice-President's speech.

190. During its stay at Lusaka, the Special Committee had come into close contact with spokesmen for the freedom fighters of a number of dependent Territories. An overwhelming majority of the Special Committee had voted for the resolution on Southern Rhodesia. In the days ahead, the Special Committee would hear further harrowing accounts of the monstrous crimes committed under colonialism and the machinations of the "Unholy Alliance" of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal once again be laid bare.

191. How was the Special Committee to meet the just demands of the African peoples? Deeds were required, not words. The Special Committee must adopt resolutions condemning the colonialists and call on all Member States to support indigenous peoples fighting for their freedom. It must demand the immediate release of political prisoners, the future statesmen of independent nations.

192. Observing that the term "petitioner" was becoming outdated he pointed out that the people who had been appearing before the Special Committee had come, not to plead, but as leaders of the people's rightful crusade for freedom. They were tomorrow's leaders of independent Mozambique, Zimbabwe and the other countries now under colonial domination.

193. He wished to read to the Special Committee the message of congratulation from the Government and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to the independent countries of Africa on African Liberation Day. It was relevant, as an expression of the attitude of the Soviet Government and people to the eradication of colonialism in Africa.

194. The message stated that the Soviet observed African Liberation Day together with the African peoples and they sincerely rejoiced at Africa's historic transition from colonial oppression to freedom and national independence, which had opened the way for the African peoples from fragmentation and backwardness

to unity and progress. The just and noble efforts of the Africans to achieve the final liquidation of colonial and racist régimes throughout the continent and to oppose neo-colonialism in all forms had invariably had and would continue to have the full understanding and support of the Soviet Union. The great movement for freedom in Africa, which had gathered irresistible force, was becoming merged with the universal struggle of progressive mankind for freedom, independence and peace.

195. The Soviet Union was convinced, the message continued, that at that moment, when the forces of aggression pitted against the liberation of peoples from alien domination were provoking dangerous conflicts in a number of Asian, African and Latin American countries, the solidarity and co-operation of peace-loving countries and peoples was of the utmost importance.

196. In conclusion, the message stated that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet Government sincerely wished each of the African States further success in their free national development and in the consolidation of unity and peace.

197. The Soviet delegation urged that the Special Committee should work closely with the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa in their common task of helping the Africans to speedier and less costly independence.

198. The Special Committee must seek to cut off the flow of economic, military and other assistance to Messrs. Smith, Salazar and Verwoerd. That assistance was the source of their strength and the Special Committee must call on the NATO countries to state clearly whether or not they intended to stop providing it. The representatives of some NATO countries had had the courage to vote for the resolution on Southern Rhodesia. Those who had abstained must choose which side they were on, and say whether they were with the enemies or the friends of Africa. As was rightly pointed out in an article published in the Tanzanian periodical, *The Nationalist*, the United Nations could do no less than call upon those of its Members which were willing to see the objectives of the Special Committee attained to give whatever material aid they could to the movements of national liberation. The Special Committee must face up to that challenge. His own country would do its utmost to comply with any decision by the Special Committee to that effect.

199. The representative of Poland, after paying tribute to the Government and people of Tanzania for the invitation and the warm welcome extended to the Special Committee, expressed his delegation's gratitude to the Second Vice-President for his inspiring and encouraging address. The Polish delegation, which had the privilege of being for the second time in Dar es Salaam, could not fail to be impressed by the achievements of the United Republic of Tanzania in many fields and by the determination of its leaders and peoples to follow firmly the course that would ensure the ultimate liquidation of colonialism, imperialism and racialism in Africa. Today, he greeted Tanzania as the headquarters of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa and the seat of the nationalist organizations representing people from the enslaved part of the African continent.

200. Poland fully shared the aspirations of the Africans and considered that the United Nations had a duty to help and assist the people struggling for their inde-

pendence and the final eradication of colonialism and racialism which still continued to cause much suffering and which still provoked armed conflicts and threatened peace and security in Africa. He believed that it was precisely in Africa that urgent and practical measures were needed in order to help the nationalist movements in their legitimate struggle against the most brutal forces of colonialism and racialism, represented by the unholy alliance of Verwoerd, Salazar and Smith.

201. The representative of Iraq thanked the Tanzanian Government for its generosity and co-operation, and expressed confidence that the Committee's work in Dar es Salaam would inspire hope and determination in the many organizations fighting to liberate their homelands. Most of the African continent was independent, but some areas were still suffering under colonial oppression. It had been confirmed that Portugal continued to disregard public opinion and trample on the human rights of the African population. Those evil policies were condemned by all at the United Nations.

202. The representative of Iran thanked the Government of Tanzania for its kind invitation which enabled the Special Committee to hold meetings in Dar es Salaam. That dynamic and beautiful city, which was also the headquarters of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, by giving refuge to those escaping from the suffocating conditions of colonial rule, made it possible for the Special Committee to obtain first-hand information about conditions prevailing in Territories still under colonial domination. The Special Committee had heard and through it the whole world would hear about the exploitation, imprisonment and destruction of the African peoples of Zimbabwe, South West Africa, and in particular Territories under Portuguese administration. Colonialism, like the many-headed hydra in the form of Verwoerd, Smith and Salazar inflicting its evils upon the indigenous population of Africa, had been exposed for what it really was.

203. The fight for freedom had brought forth a new phenomenon in international relations. It had resulted in concerted action and close collaboration among the Afro-Asian countries, with notable success in both political and economic fields. Once independence was attained, these links should be strengthened for the second stage of the fight for freedom, namely economic independence ensuring freedom from poverty, disease and illiteracy. Tanzania, under its dynamic leader, was already forging ahead with its development programme, supported by the vigour and enthusiasm of its emancipated people.

204. The contrast was striking between the situation there and the sorry picture in Mozambique as painted by the petitioners. The story there was that of an enslaved people, suffering under atrocities, exploitation and imprisonment at the hands of the oppressive Portuguese administration. Nevertheless, the people of Mozambique were continuing to strive for the noble cause of freedom and human rights, and he would assure them of the support and sympathy of his Government in their legitimate aspirations.

205. The representative of Yugoslavia thanked the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for inviting the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings in Tanzania and expressed his delegation's deep gratitude for its generous hospitality. Since its accession to independence, Tanzania had resolutely joined the

ranks of those who considered that colonialism, racial discrimination and the enslavement of peoples were intolerable scourges which could not be allowed to continue in the present-day world. His delegation fully appreciated the firm and courageous attitude of the Tanzanian Government and people which, as the Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania had stated, were ready to fight to accelerate the process of decolonization. They were thus making their contribution to the effort to ensure the triumph of and respect for the inalienable right of every people to freedom and independence.

206. The struggle would be difficult, for the colonial Powers were striving to slow down that process and to maintain colonial strongholds in certain regions which played a particular role in their political and economic strategy. Those strongholds were intended to serve the further purpose of enabling them to interfere in the affairs of countries which had recently freed themselves from the colonial yoke and to maintain them in a state of economic dependence. It was regrettable that that colonialist policy found the support and assistance of a number of other countries which themselves had interests in those Territories. The acts of the colonial Powers in those regions constituted a grave threat to the security and independence of countries which had recently freed themselves. Tanzania, in particular, was subjected to constant pressure by the colonialists and Portuguese racists, and the United Nations must take note of those threats. It was also desirable that the specialized agencies should give Tanzania assistance in respect of the refugees coming from countries under colonial domination whom it welcomed in its territory.

207. The struggle for independence of the people of the Territories under colonial domination was legitimate and deserved the support of the whole world and of the United Nations. It was more than time to take decisive steps and to sweep away the last vestiges of colonialism, to remedy the conditions of servitude and humiliation in which millions of human beings were still living, and to prevent colonialist circles from threatening the freedom of the countries which had recently attained independence. It was intolerable that an insignificant minority should be allowed to go on flouting the principles of the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The time had come when the principle of respect for human dignity, without regard to race, colour, or religion, must be made to prevail in the world and in international relations. His Government had always struggled and would continue to struggle to ensure respect for that principle. It had given and would continue to give its full support to the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, South Africa, South West Africa, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland and so-called Portuguese Guinea, the Zimbabwe people and all other peoples engaged in the struggle for independence. Peace and freedom were indivisible and could not be reserved exclusively to certain privileged countries and peoples.

208. As far as the situation in the Territories under the Portuguese colonial system was concerned, he thought that the Special Committee should, among other things, recommend that the General Assembly and the Security Council adopt economic and political sanctions against Portugal and invite all countries, in particular that country's allies in NATO, to cease giving it any assistance, direct or indirect. The Special Com-

mittee should draw the Security Council's attention to the danger to peace and security inherent in the existence of an alliance between Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

Other statements

209. The Minister for Agriculture of the United Republic of Tanzania, addressing the Special Committee on behalf of the Chairman of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, welcomed the Special Committee on the occasion of its second visit to Dar es Salaam and sincerely hoped that its session in Tanzania would produce positive results. The Special Committee would always be welcome, but it was to be desired that the purpose of any future visit would be to put an end to the process of decolonization for ever. The Special Committee must remember that it was essentially a temporary committee, and that it should finish its task in the shortest possible time.

210. He had asked to address the Special Committee because Dar es Salaam was also the Headquarters of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa. In May 1963, the Conference of Heads of African States and Governments of independent Africa had met in Addis Ababa with a view to establishing a framework for the promotion of African unity and a machinery which would pool their efforts to accelerate the liberation of the African continent. They had set up the OAU for that purpose; they had also constituted a special fund and established a Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa. They had pledged themselves to promote mutual understanding and to give expression to the reality of African brotherhood "in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences". In that way, the independent African States were helping one another to remove the colonial legacies of poverty, ignorance and disease, and to bring about Africa's economic and cultural revitalization. The urgent need to achieve the total liberation of the continent had been uppermost in the minds of the Heads of African States and Governments at Addis Ababa. The African States understood that their individual freedom was inseparable from that of all their brothers in Territories under colonial domination, and not until the whole of Africa, from the Cape to Cairo, had been liberated would there be genuine freedom. It was that deep consciousness of their common destiny which had led to the establishment of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa.

211. The Co-ordinating Committee had not been intended to supersede the work of the Special Committee. But the African States, which had been among the parties to the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, had every reason to desire a more rapid application of that Declaration, for it was in Africa that the most serious colonial situations were to be found. Some of the African States that had only recently regained their independence were adjacent to Territories still under colonial rule. For that reason they continued to cherish a passionate yearning for freedom and to identify themselves with the struggle of their colonial brothers. Further, they experienced the secondary effects of living with explosive colonial situations. The denial of freedom in the Portuguese Territories, in Southern Rhodesia, in South West Africa and in so-called French Somaliland had created great unrest and resulted in

streams of refugees into the neighbouring independent African States. The settlement of those refugees had necessitated for the neighbouring countries the diversion of much needed development revenue, and the refugees were giving the OAU, and the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa in particular, cause for much concern. A Refugees Commission was considering that question.

212. In the preceding few months conditions in Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese Territories had deteriorated into situations of grave unrest. The authorities had intensified their oppression of the African peoples, who had reacted with determination to defy their oppressors and fight for their rights with all the means at their disposal. The colonial authorities in those Territories had refused to remove the arbitrary, oppressive laws that were at the root of the African people's resistance, or to introduce democratic reforms; instead they had elected to charge the neighbouring countries with subversion because of their support for liberation movements. The Portuguese authorities in Mozambique had repeatedly violated the territorial integrity of Tanzania, while in so-called Portuguese Guinea they had violated Senegalese and Guinean territory. In their latest outburst, they had threatened wars of what they described as "legitimate retaliation" against independent African States adjacent to the Territories they held under domination. The racist Government of Southern Rhodesia had made similar threats to African States north of Southern Rhodesia.

213. The Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa considered those allegations and threats to be as dangerous as they were mischievous. In themselves, they were a clear admission by the authorities that an explosive situation existed in their Territories; in an international context they threatened the peace and stability of the African continent.

214. The administration of South West Africa continued to carry out the *apartheid* policy of South Africa. The elements of that policy were well known to the Special Committee: the calculated denial of human dignity and fundamental freedoms to the African population, the arrest, detention and torture of nationalist leaders, the forced deportation of whole communities with the consequent disruption of family and community life, in brief the complete absence of the rule of law.

215. In Southern Rhodesia, the racist minority Government appeared to be bent on a unilateral declaration of independence. The United Kingdom Government had abdicated its authority over the minority Government and refused to rescue the African people from the oppression and exploitation to which it had consigned them by default. Furthermore, the United Kingdom Government had failed to call for a constitutional conference to pave the way for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. It had refused to exercise its authority to effect the release of restricted nationalist leaders.

216. The position of the OAU and of its Co-ordinating Committee was clear. In their resolution on Southern Rhodesia, adopted at Cairo in July 1964, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government had agreed to take a vigorous stand against any declaration of Southern Rhodesian independence by a European minority Government.

217. They called on the United Kingdom to convene immediately a constitutional conference in which rep-

representatives of all political groups in Southern Rhodesia would participate with a view to preparing a new democratic constitution ensuring majority rule on the basis of "one man, one vote".

218. Such were the terms of the instructions to the Co-ordinating Committee from the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. It was accordingly determined to do everything to thwart any unilateral declaration of independence and to hasten the restoration of their rightful freedom and independence to the African peoples of Zimbabwe.

219. The Portuguese colonial Territories of Mozambique, Angola and so-called Portuguese Guinea were reaching the peak of armed opposition to colonial authority. Portugal clung shamelessly to its theory that the colonial Territories constituted overseas provinces and stubbornly continued to defy the many resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council and the OAU. In a ruthless attempt to suppress the forces of nationalism and freedom, Portugal had increased its military expenditure in the colonies and was dispatching more troops against the so-called guerrillas. In one peak month alone in late 1964, Tanzania had received more than 10,000 refugees fleeing from the Portuguese armies in Mozambique. The Republics of Guinea and Senegal had received even larger numbers.

220. The Portuguese colonial system stood resolutely condemned by the independent African States. At the inaugural assembly of Heads of State and Government at Addis Ababa it was decided to boycott Portugal by prohibiting the import of goods from that country, by closing African ports and airports to its ships and planes, and by refusing overflight to its aircraft. That decision had been respected at the first regular session of the Assembly at Cairo in 1964, and States members of the OAU had been relentlessly responding to it.

221. In the past year, the Portuguese Government had embarked on a vicious campaign to malign the nationalist movements in its colonial Territories and the OAU Co-ordinating Committee which supported those movements. The Portuguese Government had been issuing propaganda to the effect that the nationalist movements were not an expression of discontent under colonial domination but were communist inspired and directed. For example, the Portuguese Foreign Minister had drawn a parallel between Portugal's colonial situation and the turmoil in South-East Asia and the Middle East; the comparison was clearly calculated to mobilize the support of Portugal's allies in the Western world.

222. In past years, the High Commission Territories had witnessed the introduction of internal self-government. Satisfaction at that development must be tempered by the limits within which self-rule was to be exercised. The geographical situation of these Territories made them pockets in a vast morass of South African *apartheid* and Portuguese colonialism, and there was a danger that their free exercise of the right to self-rule might be seriously jeopardized by their hostile neighbours. He hoped that the Special Committee would remain alive to that danger and advise the administering Power accordingly.

223. The remaining colonial Territories in Africa were thus exposed to explosive developments. The obstinacy of the Portuguese Government, the blindness of the South African administration in South West Africa

and the recklessness of the racist minority Government in Southern Rhodesia constituted a grave threat to peace and stability, and would impose severe strain on the development of the African continent.

224. The United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence, the commitment of the OAU, and the mission of its Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa made it impossible to think that the outcome of the struggle for freedom in the dependent Territories should be at issue. What was at issue, however, was how long and violent the process of decolonization would be. The Special Committee would help to make that process less protracted and to avert unnecessary bloodshed. The Special Committee had been established in the expectation that it would reason with the colonialists; the African nationalist movements and their brothers in the independent African States, too, would prefer that independence should be won by peaceful methods. But they were prepared, if need be, to fight for it. They were not asking for independence as a gift; they were demanding it as a right. The time had come for the Special Committee to tell the colonial Powers that Africa would not be reduced to the state of appearing to beg for what was the sacred and inalienable right of its peoples. Time was not on the side of those Powers, and Africa was asking no more than that they should leave, while they could, with some grace.

225. Left to themselves, the authorities in the colonial Territories had neither the economic nor the military strength to withstand the onslaught of nationalism, and to defy international opinion. It was from the economic and military support, however indirect, of their allies that the Portuguese, Southern Rhodesian and South African Governments derived the courage and strength to continue their domination and exploitation of the African peoples. Whether or not independence was to come to those Territories without further bloodshed was a decision which in large measure rested with those allies.

226. Some of them were members of the Special Committee and he hoped that in the course of the Committee's deliberations they would be persuaded to reconsider their positions. But regardless of their attitudes, the Liberation Committee stood committed, and independent African States would not rest until the whole of Africa was cured of the cancer of colonialism and it could assume its place in the world, in freedom and dignity.

Closing of meetings

General statements by members

227. The Chairman thanked the Minister of Agriculture of the United Republic of Tanzania for the statement he had made on behalf of the Chairman of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa. The Co-ordinating Committee and the Special Committee each had its own structure and form of action, but their objectives were the same as far as decolonization was concerned. He hoped that the co-operation between the two bodies would be still further strengthened and he gave his assurance that the Special Committee would see to it that, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was applied without restriction or reservation to all the peoples still under colonial domination.

228. He also thanked the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the valuable assistance it had given the members of the Special Committee throughout their work, and again paid tribute to the warm welcome of the Tanzanian population and the determination displayed by the Government in its fight against colonialism and the oppression of man by man.

229. During the week it had spent in Dar es Salaam, the Special Committee had heard the petitioners of various Territories subject to the odious régimes of colonialism or *apartheid*. The members of the Special Committee had understood the sufferings and the legitimate aspirations of those populations. Their struggle, no matter how difficult, was a just struggle, for the rights denied them were inalienable. The Special Committee therefore assured them of its support and would redouble its efforts to hasten the independence of all the peoples concerned. He was convinced that world opinion would be informed of the atrocities committed by the racists in that region of Africa, in contempt of human rights. He was glad to note that courtesy and mutual respect had prevailed throughout the discussions, despite the emotional aspect of the relations between the members of the Special Committee and both colonizers and colonized. He was sure that he expressed the feeling of all when he affirmed that the Special Committee's visit to Africa had been a happy and positive initiative which would without any doubt hasten the application of resolution 1514 (XV).

230. On behalf of the members of the Special Committee, he thanked the petitioners and urged them to persevere in their struggle, for their Territories were the scene of colonialism's last-ditch stand, comparable to the last convulsions of a mad dog. Crazed animals did not behave rationally and ended up by causing their own death. The same would be true of Salazar, Smith and Verwoerd, who refused to reconcile themselves to the emancipation of peoples hitherto oppressed, an emancipation which should be effected in friendship with the former administering Powers. Those populations had reason to hope, for they would be set free thanks to their heroic struggle and the solidarity of justice-loving peoples. For the progress of mankind rested on international co-operation based on respect and, as the Special Committee approached the end of its second mission in Africa, he looked to the future with optimism. He expressed the hope that the Special Committee's next and third visit to Africa would be in order to celebrate the independence of all the still dependent Territories.

231. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, on behalf of his Government, thanked the Chairman and members of the Special Committee, as well as the petitioners and others who took part in the meetings, for the good work done at Dar es Salaam. The Government and people of Tanzania would always play their part in any efforts to advance the welfare of the African peoples and, more especially, in the struggle to free those still groaning under the colonial yoke. It was regrettable that some countries represented on the Special Committee should still continue to take a negative attitude, but their motive of self-interest was obvious to all.

232. It was the earnest hope of Tanzania that Mozambique, Angola and Southern Rhodesia would be sitting, as free nations, with their African neighbours, at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly.

233. In conclusion, he wished the Special Committee a safe journey and a pleasant stay in Addis Ababa.

C. MEETINGS HELD AT ADDIS ABABA

Opening of meetings

Address by the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on behalf of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia

234. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, delivering a message in the name of His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I and the Ethiopian Government and people, welcomed the members of the United Nations Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

235. Since the establishment of the Special Committee in 1961, His Imperial Majesty had followed with great interest the Special Committee's endeavour to implement the principle embodied in the United Nations Charter by which peoples at present under the colonial yoke would eventually be free to decide their future destiny. That principle did not admit of double standards; yet lofty though it was, the difficulties confronting the Special Committee in the face of deep-rooted prejudices and self-interest inherited throughout the ages could be appreciated.

236. So long as Member States, individually or collectively, ignored the pronouncement and disregarded the recommendations of the United Nations, so long as they shirked their obligations to the organization, and so long as they continued to pursue their individual aims and ends, the work of the Special Committee faced constant frustration. Nevertheless, His Imperial Majesty and the Government and people of Ethiopia were happy to note that the Special Committee's inquiries into specific matters had been conducted objectively and dispassionately. His Imperial Majesty had observed with pleasure that ever since the Special Committee was set up it had been able to devise practical measures for advancing the cause of independence for people at present under the colonial yoke. However, before the goal of independence was achieved, he knew that there would be bloodshed, that wealth would be wasted, and that countries would be weakened. The question was: where would the responsibility lie?

237. His Imperial Majesty prayed that the Special Committee's attempt to focus and direct the combined influence of world opinion on the solution of the problem would meet with success. On its part, Ethiopia would do its utmost to urge the accession to independence of all colonial countries.

Statement by the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

238. The Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU, speaking at the Chairman's invitation, said that, at a moment when the Special Committee was beginning its work in the third African capital on its itinerary, it would be superfluous to welcome it to the African continent. He wished to do so, however, because Addis Ababa, which had the distinction of being the capital of the continent's oldest independent State, was also the headquarters of the OAU.

239. On learning of the Special Committee's decision to come to Africa to continue on the spot the work,

in favour of decolonization which it had begun in New York, the whole of Africa had experienced with particular intensity the conflicting feelings of faith and scepticism, hope and anxiety.

240. It had felt faith, because the OAU knew that the United Nations, of which the Special Committee was a respected and responsible organ, had inscribed in its Charter and its methods principles which, properly observed, would definitely resolve one of the most important problems facing Africa, namely, the liberation of the whole continent from colonialism and racism.

241. It had felt scepticism, because the Articles of the United Nations Charter and those of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, not to speak of the various resolutions dealing with the self-determination of peoples, had been disregarded, with the complicity of certain great Powers which assumed vital responsibilities not only in the international community but also in the Special Committee itself.

242. It had felt hope, because the OAU knew that the United Nations was, in the contemporary world, the only instrument guaranteeing peace and security and better understanding between the States and peoples of the world community, and because Africa believed that the things which a United Nations committee, the Special Committee, would see and hear, feel and experience on African soil would impart a little more impetus and dynamism to the action of the United Nations in general, and of the Security Council in particular, on behalf of the peoples of Africa and world peace.

243. Lastly, it had felt anxiety because, seeing the world organization powerless to free those Africans who still lived under the colonial yoke or who were subjected to the worst type of discrimination, it wondered what avenues remained open to human hope and what refuge from despair there was for the many human beings who were waiting to regain their dignity.

244. The whole of Africa knew what the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was; it knew that that Declaration had been solemnly signed and accepted by all the States Members of the United Nations; Africa knew the history of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), adopted by the United Nations in December 1960, which demanded the unconditional granting of independence to countries under colonial domination; but Africa knew, too, that all those solemn declarations and statements of principle had not yet succeeded in finally eliminating colonialism, racism or their consequences from African soil.

245. That showed the extent to which decolonization, which was the Special Committee's *raison d'être*, preoccupied the peoples of Africa, and the close attention with which the Special Committee's work was followed by all, especially by the leaders of the OAU. Africa as a whole was particularly sensitive and exigent with regard to the smallest word, action, project or decision liable to influence in any way the sacred mission it had assumed to free the continent completely from foreign domination and its consequences, and from the injustice of racism and of its most carefully disguised forms.

246. That unanimous opposition to colonialism and racism, which had never been contradicted by the individual positions adopted by the African States in the United Nations, or by the action of any individual State after it had reconquered its sovereignty, had taken a decisive direction and had derived new strength from

the birth of the OAU. The miracle of May 1963 represented, among other things, the impulse of a whole people, of a whole continent and all its leaders, to pool their natural and human resources in the service of the general progress of their people. Moreover, and above all, it represented the decision to establish and maintain peace and security as indispensable conditions for its harmonious progress.

247. Indeed, peace and security for the African people meant nothing more than the elimination of colonialism and racial discrimination in all their forms. Decolonization was the first condition for any positive action by the OAU and that explained three significant events in the history of that young organization, to mention no others.

248. The first resolution unanimously adopted by the summit Conference which had established the organization was devoted entirely to the problems of decolonization, and declared, *inter alia*, that the colonial Powers' determination to maintain colonies or semi-colonies in Africa constituted a menace to the peace of the continent. Furthermore, it should be remembered that on that occasion all the African Heads of State had issued a solemn appeal to the allies of colonial Powers to choose between their friendship for the African peoples and their support of Powers that were oppressing those peoples. It seemed that that appeal had not been heeded.

249. The first organ that that Conference had established to lay the foundations for the organization's general action had been the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, whose headquarters was at Dar es Salaam and with which the Special Committee had established contact during its stay in Tanzania. Finally, the first bureau of the general secretariat, which had been established by a decision of the Heads of State and Government, was the Bureau of Sanctions, whose function was to co-ordinate the action of member States against the reactionary forces at work in Africa, particularly South Africa and Portugal.

250. Since that time, while the Co-ordinating Committee—the Committee of Nine—had intensified its action on behalf of the nationalist African movements, and Africa, thanks to the Bureau of Sanctions, had increased the ostracism and isolation of the Pretoria Government and the Salazar régime, the determination of the African leaders to co-ordinate their efforts to ensure that all traces of colonialism and racism should disappear for ever from that continent had become ever firmer from one resolution to the next, from one summit conference to another.

251. In point of fact, as the requirements for co-ordinated and harmonious development and for general progress in all fields crystallized within the framework of the OAU, the African leaders were becoming aware that solidarity was meaningless and progress would not be durable unless they could rely upon every individual to provide the support and assistance and make the sacrifices necessary for the final destruction of colonialism and the complete elimination of all régimes based on racial discrimination. The strengthening of African unity and the implementation of the basic principles of the Charter of the OAU depended exclusively upon the disappearance from that continent of certain situations whose mere mention sufficed to spur people to revolt, or at least to shake their faith in human nature.

252. Although within the special perspective of the United Nations such a matter did not fall within the Special Committee's terms of reference, he wished first

of all to describe briefly the situation in South Africa, because what was happening in that country represented, for all Africans, the most typical case of the most abject colonialism.

253. The phenomenon of *apartheid* established as a system of government constituted a flagrant injustice which enabled an infinitesimal minority of European settlers to profit from the advantages of 87 per cent of the richest and most fertile part of the country, while the African majority was reduced to deriving a bare subsistence from 13 per cent of the territory: in other words, an economic, social, political and cultural complex which condemned the Africans of South Africa to a status lower than that of second-class citizens, in fact, to sub-human status.

254. Without going into the details of the inhuman and criminal racist practices of *apartheid*, it should be stressed that the Pretoria régime represented a threat to the peace and security not only of Africa, but of the whole international community.

255. It was pertinent to recall that, on the pretext of ensuring its defence, the Pretoria régime had, in less than four years, quadrupled its military expenditure and had recently intensified its research in the field of nuclear and bacteriological weapons.

256. Since it was clear that all those military preparations could hardly be intended for the imprisoned, humiliated or disarmed Africans of South Africa, Africa now knew that it was ever more menaced by the folly of the Pretoria régime. It therefore needed the support of the whole international community, and it was the OAU's duty, no matter what the tribune, to appeal to all those complex forces which, some years ago, had united in Europe and elsewhere to crush the forerunner and model of the Pretoria régime, namely, Nazi Germany.

257. As the Special Committee was aware, there were very great similarities between the Pretoria régime and Nazi Germany. In view of those similarities the economic sanctions against South Africa which had been requested represented a strict minimum; nothing in contemporary international morality was more serious or more discouraging than the great Powers' hesitation to apply those sanctions systematically.

258. The solution of the South African problem lay in the hands of certain States which played an important role in the United Nations and in some cases in the Special Committee itself, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Japan and, of course, Portugal. Africa was convinced that those Powers, which had vital commercial and economic links with South Africa, possessed, by that very fact, peaceful weapons which could bring the Pretoria régime to its senses. Those Powers were therefore in many respects responsible for the colonialist threat to the peace and security of the African continent, for their benevolent neutrality, to say no more, and their refusal to impose economic sanctions, strengthened the position of the Pretoria leaders and, what was more serious, encouraged them to extend their vile system of government to other Territories, for example South West Africa and now Southern Rhodesia. Worse still, such international complicity intensified the havoc wrought by colonialism in Africa, since it encouraged others to imitate South Africa and gradually to tighten the screw in their machinations against the liberty and dignity of the African peoples.

259. Indeed, on close examination, it was apparent that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was already very similar to that prevailing in South Africa. Profiting by the dilatory pretexts advanced by the United Kingdom to evade its responsibilities with regard to the African majority in that Territory, Ian Smith, strengthened by the farcical elections he had held on 7 May 1965, had seized all fifty seats of the "A" list electoral constituencies and thus at the present time wielded dictatorial power, in the name of which the racist minority of 200,000 settlers intended to reduce the four million Africans to eternal servitude, slavery, and humiliation. That was something Africa would never accept. It was useless for the United Kingdom Government to declare that it was prepared "to undertake negotiations" with the obstinate, power-drunk minority group, for it was now clear that it would do nothing concrete to avoid the unilateral declaration of independence. The Africans now knew that Ian Smith had decided to declare independence unilaterally, using the recent elections to exert pressure on the United Kingdom, basing his action on the "1961 Constitution", all aspects of which had already been sufficiently denounced in the competent United Nations organs.

260. Severe and ever more brutal security measures had already been enacted against the African nationalist opposition, all because the Government of Ian Smith minimized the sanctions which the United Kingdom and the rest of the world might eventually impose upon it. It was clear that there, as in South Africa, the danger should not be underestimated, for the despicable régime of Ian Smith threatened not only the countries bordering Southern Rhodesia, not only the African peoples who supported those countries, but the whole world, which placed the ultimate responsibility for what was happening in Southern Rhodesia upon the United Kingdom Government, because the latter still bore the political and moral responsibility to construct that territory's future within a truly democratic framework.

261. There was nothing, in fact, to prevent the United Kingdom Government from assuming the responsibilities which it had formerly assumed elsewhere and suspending the "1961 Constitution" in order to demand and establish in Southern Rhodesia the conditions most favourable to the installation of a régime permitting equitable representation of all races, all creeds and all classes, for according to the moral judgement of the international community the elections of 7 May did not represent an ordinary political victory, since they had not been won by one party and its leader in competition with other parties and other leaders which had from the outset had the same opportunities to express themselves and the same openings. It was rather a declaration of intention by the settlers, instructing Ian Smith to implement the plan for a unilateral declaration of independence and to transform Southern Rhodesia into a second South Africa as quickly as possible. Africa had likewise taken a solemn decision not to accept such action. The Rhodesian Government was already strengthening its links with South Africa, and in order to complete the solidarity of the benighted exponents of colonialism and racism was effecting a *rapprochement* with Portugal, which quite naturally, in view of the international complicity, had no reason to respect the self-determination of peoples, the resolutions of the United Nations, the United Nations Charter or the appeals of world public opinion.

262. The extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, held at Lagos, had recently adopted some very important resolutions concerning Southern Rhodesia. He could not give the Special Committee any details until their contents had been submitted to the Ethiopian Head of State, but he assured the Committee that those documents would be made available to it before it left Addis Ababa.

263. The political reports from Mozambique, Angola and so-called Portuguese Guinea showed that Portugal was progressively intensifying its reign of destruction by extending the war of extermination against all African nationalists who were determined to resist foreign domination by all means. In defiance of Africa, in defiance of the United Nations, in defiance of the Special Committee's recommendations, in defiance of common sense and elementary logic, Portugal was increasingly determined to maintain on the African continent its so-called overseas provinces, where Africans were nothing more than slaves.

264. Portugal was undeniably benefiting from the chain of colonial complicity, for how else could it find the strength and power to oppose the numerous decisions by which the United Nations had demanded the granting of independence to all Territories under colonial domination? How else could its ability to flout the clearly expressed wishes not only on Africa, but of the world community, be explained?

265. The Lisbon authorities, emboldened by the support of the NATO Powers, were confronting Africa and the whole world with a situation from which there was no way out except through a war of liberation in which the whole of Africa, despite its love of peace, was prepared to engage its forces. But above all, it was the OAU's duty to inform the international community, represented by the Special Committee, of its conviction that, without the guilty silence and the passive and sometimes active contribution of many great Powers which were Members of the United Nations, Africa would not be on the brink of such a painful and extreme step. The members of the OAU had already stated, by principle and by conviction, that they wished the liberation of their continent to be peaceful. They would not hesitate, however, to resort to force if that proved necessary. It was the OAU's duty to state that every African held those great Powers responsible collectively for that was happening in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and all the Territories under Portuguese domination, perhaps because those Powers themselves wished to contribute in one way or another, in Asia as in Africa, to the maintenance of foreign domination over peoples who aspired only to freedom.

266. It was a fact that, although their situation was less explosive than that prevailing in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination, thousands of Africans were still subjected to English, French or Spanish colonization, and Africa was anxious to see them take their place in the community of independent African States. Their seats in the OAU meetings remained unoccupied. It must be clearly understood that the fact that a territory was tiny or that the colonizer was English, French or Spanish, did not exempt it from the African States' determination to crush colonialism. On the contrary, Africa was particularly vigilant in such cases and intended to do its best to ensure self-determination for those peoples and complete independence for all African territories. That was the solemn engagement entered

into by the African Heads of State in the very hall in which the Special Committee was now meeting.

267. The independence demanded by the African peoples could not be conceived as a privilege to be awaited from the hand of others. The African peoples had already proclaimed their desire to attain their ends by peaceful means, but independence was an inalienable right for which every African knew he must make the necessary sacrifices if he wished to save the little he had, develop his potentialities and take his place harmoniously, with dignity, in the concert of nations.

268. There colonial and racial problem was not only an insult and a danger to those continents which were still its theatre and its victims; it was a problem whose development threatened the peace and prosperity of the whole world, as was exemplified by the Second World War. The United Nations, established essentially to prevent for ever any relapse into that type of human folly, must rightly be in the vanguard of the struggle against colonialism and racism, those seeds of world catastrophe. It was in that profound conviction that the African States, individually and collectively, had constantly drawn the attention of the United Nations and of all the Powers which exerted some influence there to the explosive nature of the present situation in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and the Territories still under Portuguese or other domination.

269. There was still time to take preventive action to eliminate once and for all the risk of a world-wide confrontation, which would spare neither the small Powers nor the great. It was the duty of the OAU, which embodied the aspirations of all the African peoples for peace, solidarity, rehabilitation, dignity and harmonious development, to reaffirm those truths which the Special Committee had constantly heard from the lips of the sufferers themselves. Because it believed that its ideals were universal, the OAU would like to count on the combined effort of the international community, represented by the Special Committee, to eliminate colonialism and racism for ever from all those parts of the world where they continued to hamper the development of the human personality and human dignity.

270. Since the Committee was meeting at Addis Ababa, ancient capital of African independence and the headquarters of an organization which embodied the hopes of a whole continent, he hoped that its mission would be crowned with complete success, because that success was essential to the success of the United Nations itself, and because the fundamental progress of the OAU depended upon the complete liberation of the African peoples; the Special Committee knew that Africa was one of the United Nations most important concerns.

271. He hoped that during its stay on African soil, in the heart of the continent which had experienced more shame and humiliation than any other, through the cries of revolt of those still groaning under the colonial yoke; through the suffering of those who were denied the most elementary human rights; through the unanimous revolt of a whole people and the determination of a whole continent to assist those still subjected to foreign domination and if necessary to die with them and for them; through the explicit accusations levelled by every African against the great Powers, which remained silent while it was within their power to

stay the folly of a Verwoerd, of an Ian Smith or of a Salazar; through all that Africa had frankly revealed to the Committee; through all that Africa incessantly proclaimed from the depths of its being; through all that the Special Committee already knew and that it had felt and experienced during its African mission, the Special Committee had been able to discover, define and definitively strengthen the methods which would bring about the total and immediate liberation of Africa and the speedy elimination of racism.

272. The Special Committee now knew that that was the victory which Africa expected of it, for in the matter of decolonization the Members of the United Nations could no longer be content to remain in New York, to adopt resolutions and to wait. The Committee's visit to Africa should mark a definite turning-point in the world organization's methods, for its experience and the faith which inspired it had aroused great hopes in the hearts of all Africans. It should be prolonged by closer co-operation with the OAU, whose first objective was decolonization.

273. In that connexion, it was important to specify that henceforward Africans would be unable to understand how the international community, like any other committee, commission or body dealing with the problems of decolonization, could carry out its work without close and intelligent collaboration with the OAU. That organization which, although young, was already prepared for the inevitable dialogue and the necessary co-operation, expected a committee such as the Special Committee to harmonize general action and co-ordinate efforts so that the crucial struggle against colonialism and racism might at last enter the practical phase of concrete action, as opposed to the empty words which filled the United Nations archives. The OAU, which could never be content to play an observer's role when a combat as momentous as the decolonization struggle was being fought on African soil and on behalf of Africa, expected much of the Special Committee. Africa expected the Special Committee's conclusions—and the OAU was empowered to request as much from the Special Committee as the only possible solution for the welfare and security of the African peoples—to inspire the Security Council with a somewhat more realistic spirit and to prompt it not only to adopt resolutions but to take decisive action, irreversible decisions and practical steps through which the sanctions against South Africa, Portugal, and Southern Rhodesia and the opposition to the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith, in short, the programmes vital to the complete liberation of the African continent, might be implemented.

274. In conclusion, he said that the co-operation which Africa expected implied that occasions such as the present one would become more frequent, for Africa was convinced that it was only to the extent to which various United Nations organs, and particularly the Security Council, could come to Africa, to the very heart of the drama of colonialism and racism, in full collaboration with the OAU, which embodied the most noble ideas of the African peoples, that the United Nations, to save the tortured world, would be able to lay the new foundations which could strengthen the Organization and rehabilitate it in the eyes of Africa, and, what was even more important, in its own eyes. The OAU had confidence in the Committee and was prepared to collaborate with it in every possible way.

General statements by members

275. The Chairman said that the Special Committee was happy to be at Addis Ababa, capital of the oldest of the independent States of Africa, to hold the last meetings of its long journey devoted to a search for the solutions and methods that the United Nations should adopt in order to enable all the peoples still under colonial domination to exercise fully their right to self-determination and independence.

276. He wished, on behalf of all his colleagues, to express to His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I and to the Ethiopian Government, through the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, his deep gratitude for the kind invitation and for the attentive hospitality which had been extended to the Special Committee since its arrival at Addis Ababa. Many members of the Special Committee had already had the honour of becoming acquainted with Ethiopia and the Ethiopian people, and it was a great pleasure for them to return to that country. The Government of Ethiopia, an African State which had been a founding Member of the United Nations, had always made an important contribution to the Organization's activities, and the fact that the Special Committee had been given the opportunity to meet at Addis Ababa for the second time was additional proof of the Government's interest in its work. The Special Committee, meeting in Africa Hall, was aware that the first conference bringing together all the Heads of State and Government of the independent countries of Africa had been held in that same hall in May 1963, and he wished to pay a well-deserved tribute to His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I for the wise and constructive role he had played in order to enable that first African summit meeting, unprecedented by reason of its objectives and by reason of those who had attended it, to be held.

277. The important decision taken on that occasion by the African Heads of State and Government to free the rest of the continent from foreign domination, and the establishment for that purpose of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, had been greeted with great hope by the Special Committee. He thought it appropriate to mention that during its African journey the Special Committee had been greatly encouraged by the unreserved co-operation of the OAU, and it was certain that the links thus established between the United Nations and the OAU would be strengthened in the future, in order to ensure the speedy attainment of the basic objective of the two organizations, namely, respect of the rights of all peoples to self-determination and to the free choice of their own national institutions.

278. The Special Committee, whose mandate was to examine the situation in all the Non-Self-Governing Territories with a view to proposing to the United Nations General Assembly and to the Security Council measures to enable all the peoples under colonial domination to exercise without delay their right to self-determination and independence, had come to Africa because it was on the African continent that the most refractory and inhuman cases of colonialism were still to be found. During its stay at Lusaka and at Dar es Salaam, it had heard petitioners from Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, South Africa, Basutoland, Swaziland, Bechuanaland, Angola and Mozambique. It had also received written petitions concerning other African Territories still under colonial domination or subjected to the hateful régime of *apartheid*. No matter

what the political, economic or social systems of the various Governments represented on the Special Committee, all members had been moved and indignant upon learning of the atrocities and the various violations of human rights committed by the colonial authorities of Portugal and by the white racists of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

279. The Special Committee had learned that the Portuguese colonialists, in their deluded attempt to maintain the fiction of transforming the Africans of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea into second class pseudo-Portuguese, had carried their horrible, criminal acts to the point of mutilating and burning Africans after having savagely murdered them. It had learned that the Portuguese, in their stupid determination to stifle the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples subjected to their cruel domination, went so far as to give the African inhabitants poisoned food and drink. The Special Committee had even learned that at the beginning of June the Portuguese were thought to have employed poison gas in Angola. Those were crimes which should not be passed over in silence, for they constituted acts of genocide unworthy of the contemporary epoch. The Special Committee's journey to Africa was an eminently constructive step. The evidence obtained from petitioners who had come direct from the Territories still under colonial domination had enabled the members of the Special Committee to obtain a more realistic idea of the situation in those Territories. That evidence, and the impressions which the Special Committee had gathered on the spot had reinforced its conviction that the survival of colonialism and *apartheid* constituted a real threat to international peace and security. The Special Committee was now convinced that persuasive methods had no influence on the Portuguese Government or on the illegal authorities of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The alliance of those Governments to maintain régimes condemned by the international community represented a serious threat to the whole African continent.

280. In view of the persistent refusal of the Portuguese Government and the illegal authorities of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee, the latter had come to the conclusion that the Security Council should now take the appropriate action laid down in the Charter to ensure that the rights of the peoples still under colonial domination were respected.

281. The Special Committee knew that the Ethiopian Government and the other African Governments represented in the OAU were determined to do everything possible to free the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and all the other colonial Territories.

282. He had listened with much interest to the encouraging words which the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs had addressed to the Special Committee on behalf of His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I. The courageous struggle which His Imperial Majesty had always waged to safeguard his people's independence would be a source of inspiration to the Special Committee during its work at Addis Ababa.

283. The Chairman also thanked the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU for his important statement. The sincerity and frankness with which he had described the position of the OAU with regard to decolonization had greatly impressed the Special Com-

mittee, which was prepared to provide the OAU with ever more active support and to support any initiative taken by that Organization to rid Africa of colonialism and *apartheid* without further delay.

284. The Special Committee's journey through Africa had enabled it to acquire a deeper knowledge of the sufferings of the peoples still under colonial domination. Having been in a position to assess the situation in those Territories, the Special Committee had been prompted to take unprecedented decisions. It was, indeed, the first time that a United Nations body had officially recognized in a resolution the legitimacy of the struggle being waged by the African freedom fighters; it was the first time that the Security Council had been requested to take the appropriate measures laid down in the Charter to implement the resolutions on decolonization adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council; it was the first time that a definite appeal had been addressed to the military Powers of NATO to cease supporting Portugal.

285. He reiterated his thanks to the Administrative Secretary for the words of encouragement and confidence he had addressed to the Special Committee and assured him that the latter would spare no efforts to complete its task, namely, the liquidation of colonialism.

286. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania expressed the gratitude of his delegation to His Imperial Majesty and to the Government and people of Ethiopia for the kind invitation extended to the Special Committee to meet at Addis Ababa, and for the warm welcome accorded to the Special Committee members on arrival. The friendliness of the people of Ethiopia reflected the warm African hospitality that Ethiopia had shown since biblical times; and it would undoubtedly inspire the Special Committee and make for the smooth and efficient dispatch of its remaining tasks.

287. For hundreds of years, Ethiopia had been one of the few States that had breathed the air of freedom —yet not without being constantly on its guard against external aggression aimed at colonialization. For centuries Ethiopia had been an island in an Africa which had become a victim of aggressive colonialism. While the rest of Africa succumbed to colonial subjugation and ruthless exploitation, the people of Ethiopia successfully defended their land and had written a glorious page of history which all must admire.

288. In advocating the peaceful liquidation of colonialism, the Tanzanian delegation did so because it knew only too well what it meant to fight a war. Yet if the time came when the only means of liberating a people was to resort to arms, Africa would not hesitate to do so. In the dark days when fascism in Europe spread to Africa, in the form of aggression against the Ethiopian people by Mussolini, Ethiopia had had no alternative but to defend itself by arms. It was significant that the colonialists then had used the same methods of torture and cruelty against the gallant Ethiopian fighters as were used against some of the African countries still under colonial domination, e.g., Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, and so-called Portuguese Guinea. But in the end colonialism faced the same fate in Ethiopia as it was facing now in other parts of Africa, namely, defeat. His Imperial Majesty's courageous leadership in that struggle had been an inspiration to Tanzania in its own struggle for independence. The people of Tanzania would never forget that for many years Ethiopia had been a place of refuge

for some of the now prominent leaders in Africa, that financial and material aid had always been extended by Ethiopia to suffering brothers in colonized Africa; and that His Imperial Majesty had played the leading role in establishing the OAU. Ethiopia might be described as the umbrella of the OAU, and it was to be hoped that His Imperial Majesty would continue to exert all efforts to keep OAU united under it, in spite of the many hostile external forces that might have to be faced.

289. The enthusiasm with which the freedom fighters had petitioned had shown clearly their determination to be free and their resolve to fight to the bitter end. Their faith in the United Nations and in the Special Committee would have made the task of decolonization much easier if only the colonial Powers were willing to co-operate.

290. The Tanzanian delegation would like to state once again the policy of its Government with regard to colonialism. Tanzania would never have any truck with colonialism under whatever guise. The people of Tanzania had not only condemned it; they had sworn to do everything they could do contribute to its liquidation in Africa and elsewhere in the world. Hence, in spite of slander and intimidation from certain States, especially Portugal, the Tanzanian Government had consistently and boldly reasserted its stand.

291. The brutalities and atrocities committed by the colonizers, in their so-called civilizing mission, made distressing hearing and made it clear that the colonial Powers involved still regarded an African as fair game for enslavement and exploitation. At Lusaka, the petitioners had demonstrated how the United Kingdom was gradually handing over their African brothers to racist Smith and his band of criminals, thus creating another South Africa in Southern Rhodesia. Yet, when taxed with such matters, the United Kingdom representative merely evaded the issue.

292. After nearly a hundred years of colonization in Southern Rhodesia, the white racists today could still commit atrocities against Africans freely. In the Territories under Portuguese domination, things were even worse. Yet there were still Governments which had failed to condemn Portugal categorically.

293. It was disappointing to find that certain delegations had not seen their way to supporting the resolution on the Portuguese colonies adopted at Dar es Salaam (A/AC.109/124 and Corr.1), especially after they had seemingly sympathized with the petitioners' plight during the general debate. A delegation which, throughout the African tour, had not supported a single resolution adopted could hardly claim to be anti-colonial. The Tanzanian delegation noted with appreciation the newspaper report of steps taken by the Netherlands Government to provide practical assistance and legal defence for *apartheid* victims. It was to be hoped that other Governments would follow that example, thus responding to the Special Committee's appeal in operative paragraph 2 of its resolution on the Portuguese colonies for moral and material help to those now under the colonial yoke.

294. With regard to the Committee's programme of work at Addis Ababa, his delegation trusted that discussion of the questions of South West Africa and the High Commission Territories would culminate in the adoption of appropriate resolutions. In the discussion of the High Commission Territories, the machinations

brought to light were appalling. The administration of justice seemed to have become a mockery, despite the United Kingdom claim to be the custodian of respect for the law.

295. There were several issues which had come up during the meetings in Africa which merited consideration, e.g., the recommendation to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that all the testimony heard by the Special Committee should be printed in book form and submitted to all Governments so as to give them a more realistic view of what colonization meant for Africa.

296. Similarly, the question of refugees might be further discussed with a view to the adoption of a more detailed resolution appealing to the world as a whole on the issue of refugees from Territories still under colonial domination.

297. The representative of India thanked His Imperial Majesty and the Government and people of Ethiopia for inviting the Special Committee to the ancient African capital, which in the last few years had not only changed in a remarkable manner but had become the centre of African and Afro-Asian activity, especially since the establishment of the OAU headquarters.

298. Ethiopia's past and future problems were not unlike those of India. Both nations were now engaged in nation-building programmes and had declared war on poverty, ignorance and disease. In international affairs, the two countries had an identical approach to world problems and shared the same ideals of peaceful coexistence, non-alignment, Afro-Asian solidarity and faith in the United Nations. As one of the great and historic figures of the century, His Imperial Majesty was held in high esteem everywhere, and his generous moral and material support at a critical moment in India's history had endeared Ethiopia to the millions of his countrymen. The recent visit to Ethiopia by the Foreign Minister of India, and the forthcoming visit of its President as guest of His Imperial Majesty, would further cement the ties of friendship between the two countries.

299. The Special Committee's work thus far, at Lusaka and Dar es Salaam, had culminated in resolutions on Southern Rhodesia and on Territories under Portuguese rule. It would be a mistake to regard them as just two more mere resolutions to add to a long list. They crystallized a hope that even at the eleventh hour the administering Powers concerned would ensure the peaceful transfer of power to the indigenous peoples. The granting of independence to Southern Rhodesia by the United Kingdom Government must follow, not precede, the granting of full and equal rights to all the inhabitants of the Territory irrespective of their colour or creed. Elections should be conducted on the principle of one man one vote, and a constitutional conference of all concerned should be called by the United Kingdom, and all repressive legislation withdrawn.

300. With regard to the Portuguese Territories, a constructive discussion with the Salazar Government was out of the question. Portugal had shown no change of heart. Yet the liberation of people from alien subjugation was an irreversible process of history, and it would be unwise to resist that process by giving assistance—moral, military or monetary—to Portugal.

301. The problem of South West Africa had first been brought up some eighteen years earlier by the

Indian delegation. South Africa was the only State that had failed to accept the obligations incumbent on it under the United Nations Trusteeship System. The Special Committee was fully entitled to discuss South West Africa, and did not accept the argument that the matter was still *sub judice*. A country where *apartheid* was a State policy and which flouted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter, forfeited the right to be called a civilized nation.

302. It was the responsibility and duty of every member of the Special Committee to make the maximum contribution towards the rapid implementation of the Declaration contained in resolution 1514 (XV). In conclusion, he quoted the moving and inspiring words spoken by His Imperial Majesty, Emperor Haile Selassie, addressing the General Assembly on 4 October 1963 (1229th plenary meeting), twenty-seven years after his appeal to the League of Nations for relief from the destruction unleashed by the fascist invader, to the effect that undertakings were of little worth if the will to keep them was lacking, and voicing a message of cautious yet buoyant optimism. That same spirit should inspire the Special Committee today.

303. The representative of the United Kingdom said he would like to express the thanks of his Government to His Imperial Majesty and the Government and people of Ethiopia for the splendid hospitality enjoyed by the Special Committee in Ethiopia. He personally had been greatly impressed by the tremendous expansion and modernization of Addis Ababa in the last few years. The changes bore eloquent testimony to the energy and vitality of the Ethiopian people and their Government and the strides they had made in their economic and social development. It was fitting that the final stage of the Special Committee's work should be concluded in the capital city of a country which had so long a history of national independence and such a magnificent record of valour in its defence.

304. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics thanked His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I for his message and assured him that all the participants would be inspired by it in the course of their work.

305. After thanking the OAU for assistance it had consistently given the Special Committee since the latter's arrival in Africa, he reminded the participants that the establishment of close contact with that organization imposed certain obligations upon the Special Committee; it should not be forgotten that the OAU embodied the hopes of 200 million Africans.

306. During its initial meetings in Africa, the Special Committee had already taken a number of useful steps which, it was to be stressed, were unprecedented. It had, in fact, recognized the legitimacy of the African peoples' struggle for independence, it had requested Portugal's military allies, particularly those which were members of NATO, to refrain from supplying that country with any assistance which might help it pursue its policy of oppression, it had drawn the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the situation in the Portuguese Territories constituted a threat to international security, and it had also proclaimed the need to take steps against Portugal and to inform public opinion of what was happening in the Territories under Portuguese domination.

307. Recalling that twenty States which were members of the Special Committee had voted in favour of

the resolution on the Territories administered by Portugal and that eighteen had voted in favour of the resolution concerning Southern Rhodesia, he said that those votes reflected each country's real policy with regard to decolonization. Certain Member States were trying to create the impression that they were concerned about the destiny of the Territories under Portuguese domination and that of Southern Rhodesia, but their efforts deceived no one, for the votes on the two resolutions in question constituted deeds, not words.

308. The meetings at Lusaka and at Dar es Salaam had shown that the African atmosphere was favourable to the Special Committee, and the latter was indeed aware that in Africa it could do valuable work to promote the freedom of the African countries.

309. The USSR delegation supported the statements of the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU. It would do everything within its power in the Special Committee to help to solve the problem of sanctions against South Africa, Portugal and the Smith Government.

310. He confirmed his country's position with regard to Southern Rhodesia, which had been set forth by the Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations in a note addressed to the Secretary-General on 5 June 1965 (S/6416). In that note, the Permanent Representative had recalled that, when the question of Southern Rhodesia had been considered by the Security Council, the USSR representative had stressed that it was essential to prevent any further crimes in Southern Rhodesia and to prevent that country from being transformed into a racist State modelled on South Africa. The USSR representative had also stressed the fact that the United Kingdom should take steps to annul the elections which had been held in Southern Rhodesia on 7 May 1965, to revoke the Constitution on which those elections had been based and to convene immediately a meeting of representatives of all political parties with a view to drawing up a new constitution, based on the immediate granting of full rights to the indigenous population and of independence to the country. The Permanent Representative of the USSR had also stated that it was the duty of the United Nations to eliminate that shameful vestige of the past without delay.

311. The Special Committee must unceasingly assist the African peoples in their struggle for independence. The USSR delegation, for its part, was prepared to co-operate with all the members of the Special Committee to take more efficient action and to make, on African soil, a contribution to the welfare of Africa and to world peace. As the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU had said, the destiny of Africa and that of the world were inseparable.

312. The other members of the Special Committee also expressed their thanks and associated themselves with the tributes paid to His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I and to the Government and people of Ethiopia.

313. The representative of Ethiopia said that his delegation would be happy to convey to His Imperial Majesty and to the Government and people of Ethiopia the kind expressions of gratitude of the Special Committee. He, as well as other members of the Special Committee, also thanked the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU for the important statement which he had made.

314. The representative of Yugoslavia noted that the fact that Ethiopia was for the second time offering its hospitality to the Special Committee was but one more

manifestation of the traditionally anti-colonialist policy of Ethiopia and its sincere desire to help to eliminate the colonialist régime once and for all. For centuries Ethiopia had preserved its independence and its freedom, time and again fighting courageously against the efforts of the imperialists who had sought to bring it under their sway, and it had set an example to the peoples of Africa who had themselves been fighting for independence and freedom.

315. The representative of Poland observed that the Polish people had much appreciated His Imperial Majesty's official visit to Poland in September 1964 which, as the final *communiqué* had amply testified, had helped to strengthened friendly relations between the two countries and to confirm their common determination to prevent the rebirth of aggressive militarism and to work for the final liquidation of colonialism. The determination to help Africans still living under the colonial yoke had done much to forge the unity of independent Africa at the historic summit conference at Addis Ababa.

316. The Special Committee must co-ordinate its efforts with those of the OAU, and he agreed with the Secretary-General of that organization that the Security Council should act on the Special Committee's conclusions and take practical action, in the form of sanctions, against South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. The "unholy alliance" of Verwoerd, Salazar and Smith was the major obstacle to the liberation of the oppressed peoples of Africa. That alliance was founded on a common political outlook: racism and fascism, a common economic objective: ruthless exploitation of African natural and human resources, and a common military design: the defence of colonialism and the subversion of neighbouring African States. The Special Committee must bring the realities of that situation to the attention of the Security Council.

317. The representative of Bulgaria recalled that in a joint statement issued on the occasion of His Imperial Majesty's visit to the People's Republic of Bulgaria in 1964, the two countries had declared their support for the just struggle of peoples for freedom and national independence; urged the prompt implementation of the General Assembly's Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; condemned the *apartheid* policies of the South African Government, emphasizing the need for application of the sanctions adopted; and expressed their support for the struggle for national liberation of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. Bulgaria reaffirmed its readiness to co-operate with Ethiopia in the achievement of those aims.

318. The representative of Tunisia said that the statement made by the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU testified to the vitality and dynamism of the OAU, and it was to be hoped that the United Nations would take advantage of it by co-operating as closely as possible with that organization.

319. The Special Committee must do everything in its power to eliminate the scourge of colonialism. To attain that goal, it had first studied the situation in the countries still under foreign domination and had then recommended concrete measures designed to rid the world of the degrading acts of a number of persons who continued to represent humanity at its basest. Unfortunately, it so happened that those representatives of evil were protected by certain great Powers, which continued to put forward all manner of excuses

to justify their support and encouragement of the oppressors.

320. The moving statements of the petitioners only brought out more clearly that unhappy and painful state of affairs. He was convinced that the reason the petitioners' accusations were exclusively directed at certain Western Powers was that the facts were undeniable and the timid explanations with which those same Powers had tried to disclaim their responsibility had hardly been convincing. That was a serious matter for those Powers, for they stood to lose whatever prestige they might have acquired in Africa in recent years.

321. As a member of the United Nations and of the OAU, the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, the Conference of Afro-Asian Countries and the Arab League, Tunisia would spare no effort to make its full contribution to the attainment of the objectives which all those organizations had set themselves in liberating all the indigenous peoples that were still dominated by the blind force of colonialism. The day was nigh, without any doubt, when all the African continent would be in the hands of Africans. For just as America was for Americans, the Soviet Union for the Soviet people, and Europe for the Europeans, Africa must inevitably return to the Africans.

322. The representative of Chile said that he was particularly happy to express his thanks to His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, and his Government and people, for the kind welcome and generous hospitality they had extended to the Special Committee, for only a few days earlier, the Chilean Government had decided to open an Embassy in Ethiopia which would be its first in the region. Chile was a new country with a heroic history and had always been interested to observe countries having longer experience. That was what it hoped to do in Africa, by coming to Ethiopia, the corner-stone of the continent, a country whose principles and firm traditions it profoundly admired. Addis Ababa was the headquarters of organizations active throughout the African continent, just as Santiago was in Latin America. It was the headquarters of the OAU, which represented a common front for that region and sought to resolve the problems which arose there and to encourage its political, economic and social development.

323. Chile was proud to have contributed to the formation of that regional bloc by sending one of its experts to assist in its creation and in the drafting of its charter. The Chilean Government had always attached prime importance to regional organizations, particularly in Africa and Latin America which were made up of small countries the majority of which were economically weak and which must join forces in order to make themselves heard in the concert of nations.

324. The principal object of Chile's presence in Ethiopia, and hence in Africa, was to strengthen relations between Chile and the African continent. Chile was interested in African problems, which had much in common with its own. It shared the African countries' concern at the fact that some African peoples continued to live under the colonial system, which was unworthy of the modern world. It stood by their side in the war of liberation which it hoped would soon draw to a close, and sincerely looked forward to the establishment of very close links between Latin America and Africa which would enable them to fight together for the welfare of their peoples.

325. Chile had always insisted that the OAU should take a very active part in the work of the Special Committee; that organization should make its authoritative voice heard in all the Special Committee's deliberations. That was why, during the Special Committee's meetings in Lusaka, his delegation had expressed the desire to see an observer from that organization taking part, on a permanent basis, in the Special Committee's meetings in New York. The Chairman had stated at the time that talks to that effect were under way, and his delegation expressed the hope that those talks would soon be translated into reality.

Closing of meetings

Statement by the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

326. The Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) speaking at the Chairman's invitation, said that it was for him a very pleasant duty to express, first of all to the Chairman, in his dual capacity as Chairman of the Special Committee and as a great African patriot, and through him to all the members of the Special Committee on the conclusion of its African tour, his feelings of gratitude, esteem and confidence at the results the Special Committee had achieved at Lusaka, Dar es Salaam and Addis Ababa.

327. He stated that he had never made any secret, in the General Assembly of the United Nations, in the Security Council, in the Committees of the General Assembly, or, in particular, in the Fourth Committee of the disappointment, bitterness, discouragement and sometimes indignation that he felt, in regard to decolonization, at the routine methods, empty speeches and automatic adoption of resolutions, never implemented, which in many respects characterized the work of the United Nations and of its various organs in the field of decolonization.

328. That emboldened him to say, publicly, how glad he was on behalf of the OAU—which was primarily dedicated to the total and unconditional liberation of the African continent from all foreign domination—to express solemnly his deep appreciation and the new hopes inspired in him by the new methods which the Special Committee adopted some while ago, but which its visit to Africa had strengthened in a remarkable manner.

329. He had already said how mixed his feelings were on welcoming the Special Committee to African soil, at a time when so many millions of Africans, at a crucial moment in the history of their continent, had placed fervent hopes in its work from the outset, convinced that it could carry to the great glass house in Manhattan echoes of the cries of suffering uttered by the martyrs of colonialism, and the unanimous appeal by the African leaders, by their organization and by the peoples of their continent for the immediate restitution to their brothers still under colonial rule of their stolen freedom, their plundered riches and, above all, their daily flouted dignity.

330. His hope had been that the Special Committee, strengthened by the observations and findings derived from contact with African realities and with the criminal policies pursued by the colonial Powers with the complicity of their allies, would bear living witness, in the United Nations, to the serious threat to, and in some cases the breach of, international peace and se-

curity presented by the colonial wars waged by Portugal, the racist settler minority in Southern Rhodesia and the nazi régime in Pretoria.

331. Lastly, he had thought that the Special Committee would place particular emphasis on the role played by friends and allies and the encouragement, direct or indirect, witting or unwitting, and consequently the direct responsibility which those friends and allies effectively assumed in enabling the outdated régimes of Lisbon, Salisbury and Pretoria to pursue their policies of repression and genocide in Africa and their high-handed defiance of the United Nations, whose authority and prestige they incessantly undermined.

332. Now that the Special Committee was concluding its work, he would say that thanks to the atmosphere the Special Committee had created, the resolutions it had adopted, its dynamic presence, and its determination to get to the bottom of things and fully to assume its responsibilities under its mandate, none of the above-mentioned hopes had been disappointed. For all this, he would reiterate to the Special Committee his full and entire satisfaction.

333. It might be that the fundamental provisions of the Charter could not easily be adapted to the new realities of the modern world. Nevertheless, he thought and seriously hoped that the other organs of the United Nations, and more particularly those which, in various capacities, were concerned with African affairs, should at least be inspired by the Special Committee's example and, if at all possible, betake themselves to Africa; once there, he was convinced their findings and impressions, not only of poverty and the various forms of humiliation but also of the fierce determination of the African populations to live in freedom, would enable them to find adequate solutions to the problems falling within their respective spheres of jurisdiction.

334. The OAU would use all the means at its disposal to give maximum publicity to the immense work the Special Committee had done in a few days or the African continent. He was convinced that the visit of the Special Committee would not only confirm and strengthen certain hopes, but would remarkably reinforce the prestige and the moral and political authority of the United Nations in the eyes of the African masses, a renewal of confidence which was sorely needed, particularly in relation to decolonization.

335. He wished to emphasize one essential provision of the resolutions of the Special Committee, all of which he endorsed without any reservation, which in his view would largely suffice to justify its journey to Africa. By recognizing the legitimacy of the struggle of the African people under colonial domination and by appealing to all States to provide the freedom fighters in Africa with all the assistance necessary for their struggle, the Special Committee and, through it, the United Nations, had associated itself with the essential claim for unanimity made by the Heads of African State and Government at their first meeting in Addis Ababa in May 1963 when the OAU was created—a claim which had been constantly reaffirmed at all subsequent meetings of the OAU.

336. He believed that the conclusions to which he had referred could never have been reached as a result of mere debates in the luxurious rooms in which the Special Committee usually met in New York. That important result was one of the fruits of the visit of the Special Committee to Africa. It was the direct contact with the bare facts of African reality that had made it

possible for the Special Committee to reach so vital a conclusion—a conclusion which, he hoped, would be disseminated and fully implemented in the first place by all members of the Special Committee and in the second place by all justice-, freedom- and peace-loving Governments throughout the world.

337. He wished to state once again that Africa and its instrument for concerted co-operation, the OAU, continually proclaimed its peaceful determination and ardent wish that the great Powers, those that had a direct influence on Portugal, South Africa and the Southern Rhodesia settlers, should do all in their power, if need be by imposing a diplomatic strait jacket when the time came, to avoid war, bloodshed and the inevitable and long-term deterioration in the relations between the martyred African peoples and all those who, for one reason or another, had joined with their present-day executioners.

338. He was relying on the Special Committee to help the African people avert, against their strong conviction, against their political and moral principles and against obvious practical necessities, more devastation, more massacres and more useless sacrifices in the pursuit of their liberation, which would be achieved no matter how great the material forces opposed to their legitimate aspirations.

339. To this end, he thought it desirable that the Special Committee should persuade the other organs of the United Nations, and more particularly the Security Council, to hold in Africa, as close as possible to the theatres of colonial war, a session that would enable it to meet with honour, dignity and effectiveness the serious threats which colonialism at bay was levelling at stability in Africa, at the welfare of the African peoples, and above all at international peace and security.

340. He expressed to the Special Committee his special gratitude for the favourable reception given to the proposals for close co-operation between the Special Committee and the OAU in the field of decolonization. The decision of the Special Committee in that matter had been made clear not only in the numerous statements made by several representatives, statements which he welcomed with joy and reassurance; it was also officially recorded in operative paragraph 8 of the Special Committee's resolution (A/AC.109/128/Rev.1) concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Southern Rhodesia, Territories under Portuguese administration, South West Africa, and Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. This effective co-operation already existed and no matter how modest its present form, he was convinced that this joint action would spare the world greater misfortunes and enable tomorrow's African historians to see, in the struggles for national liberation, the historic role that the United Nations had assumed, thanks to the Special Committee, in the name of the international community.

341. For all the above reasons, he wished to thank the Special Committee whole-heartedly, on behalf of the OAU, for what it had already done and for all that it was resolved to do for the complete decolonization of the African continent.

342. In conclusion, he assured the Special Committee, on behalf of the OAU, of his complete faith and entire support in the battle the Special Committee had joined with colonialism, a battle in which it might consider the African people and the OAU as an instrument for concerted action; all the vital forces of the

African continent were constantly at the side of the Special Committee and ready to support its work in the service of justice, of equality, of freedom, in short, in the service of the noblest ideals inscribed in the United Nations Charter and repeated in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.

General statements by members

343. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation had never shared the doubts of those who had questioned the usefulness of the Special Committee's visit to Africa. Now that the Committee had completed its work, it was clear that much had been accomplished: by meeting with numerous representatives of national liberation movements from Territories still under colonial domination, the Special Committee had been enabled to enter into contact with the populations of those Territories and to arrive at a more realistic appreciation of the situation there. The on-the-spot testimony of the petitioners had strengthened the Committee's conviction that colonialism and *apartheid* would continue to constitute a threat to international peace and security until they were finally eliminated. The Committee's visit had also constituted an encouragement to the colonized peoples to persist in their struggle until victory was theirs.

344. During its mission to Africa the Special Committee had adopted a number of important resolutions. The resolutions concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration, South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia were of particular significance because the Committee, in calling on all States to give moral, political and material assistance to the peoples of those Territories in their struggle against the oppressor, had recognized the legitimacy of that struggle as the sole remaining means by which the peoples concerned could seek to liberate themselves in view of the refusal of the colonial Powers to co-operate in the attainment of this and by peaceful means. He hoped that all States, including those which continued to tolerate or give assistance to Portugal, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa, would realize that the elimination of colonial and racist régimes was inevitable and would take a positive attitude towards the resolutions adopted by the Special Committee.

345. Many of the petitioners had advanced practical suggestions as to the steps the United Nations might take to assist them in their efforts. The Special Committee should use the interval before the next session of the General Assembly to study those suggestions closely, and to reflect on the Committee's African mission as a whole. His delegation, for its part, could already say then and there that such missions were indeed useful, giving a new urgency to the Committee's work. He accordingly believed that such missions should be undertaken every year.

346. Another positive result of the Special Committee's mission was the close contact which had been established with the OAU. Both bodies had the same concern—decolonization—and it was important that their respective activities in that field should be further co-ordinated in the future. In conclusion, he again thanked the Governments of Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Zambia for inviting the Special Committee to meet in their capitals. That gesture had been a valuable contribution to the Committee's work.

347. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania recalled that in a previous statement he had

assured the Special Committee that the Government and people of Tanzania would always play their part in any efforts to advance the welfare of the African peoples, and particularly in the struggle to free those groaning under the colonial yoke.

348. In the opinion of his delegation, the Special Committee at its meetings in Africa had made an important contribution to the struggle and the results of its work had amply borne out the wisdom of its decision to visit Africa. In the resolutions adopted by the Special Committee at its meetings in Africa, the Committee had not been content simply to reaffirm the inalienable rights of peoples under colonial domination to self-determination and independence; it had stressed the legitimacy of the struggle of the colonial people to attain the effective exercise of the rights set forth in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Furthermore, the Committee had appealed to all States to give the African populations the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights.

349. He expressed the hope that the Security Council would, in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the Special Committee, take the necessary measures as laid down in the Charter to ensure respect for the rights of the African populations to self-determination and independence and to put an end to the dangerous activities of the régimes of Verwoerd, Salazar and Smith. He urged that all States, particularly the States members of NATO, and international institutions would forthwith withhold assistance of any kind to Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia so long as they failed to renounce their present colonial policies.

350. Referring to South West Africa and Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, he stated that his delegation attached importance also to adequate measures being taken to safeguard their territorial integrity and their sovereignty in the face of threats by the Verwoerd régime to disrupt their national unity.

351. The particular importance of the Special Committee's work in Africa had been due in very large measure to the close and direct contact the Committee had been able to establish with the realities of the colonial situation in Africa and with African nationalist leaders who might otherwise have been unable to come to New York. His delegation earnestly hoped that the Committee would increase its efforts to ensure the complete implementation of all the resolutions it had adopted during its visit to Africa.

352. In conclusion, he paid tribute to the Emperor as well as the Government and people of Ethiopia for their invitation to the Special Committee to meet in Addis Ababa. He also expressed his delegation's gratitude to the Chairman and the Bureau of the Committee as well as to the staff of the Secretariat.

353. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that as the Special Committee's work in Africa drew to a close, his delegation considered it necessary to state its views on the results of the visit.

354. During its visit to Africa the Special Committee had, in his delegation's opinion, done a great deal of highly effective work. In general, the purposes of the visit had been achieved: direct contact had been made with the national liberation movements of the peoples of the Portuguese, United Kingdom and other colonies in Africa, and the delegations of the countries belonging to the Special Committee had had an opportunity to acquaint themselves at first hand, on

African soil, with the progress of the struggle for the definite liberation of Africa from colonialism. It was no accident that during the Committee's visit to Africa a whole series of delegations had come to see events in a light different from that in which they appeared in Manhattan.

355. The results of the Special Committee's work in Africa also differed substantially from its previous work in New York. The Committee, representing the United Nations, had to some extent succeeded during its visit in passing from words about decolonization to deeds, to practical support of the struggle of the peoples for their freedom. Working on African soil, the Committee had been able to probe more deeply into the roots of colonialism. The part played by NATO as a union of colonizers co-ordinating their activities against the peoples striving for their freedom had now been completely revealed. The sinister role of the West German revanchists and militarists in Africa, and particularly in South West Africa and the Portuguese colonies, had been exposed. The social, economic and political roots of the unholy alliance of the enemies of Africa—Salazar, Verwoerd and Smith—had been brought to light. The Special Committee had received conclusive proof that the activities of the colonizers in the African colonies constituted a threat to international peace and security.

356. On the basis of the vast amount of information submitted to it by the leaders of the national liberation movements, the Special Committee had been able to make a realistic evaluation of the current situation, to affirm its resolution of the legitimacy of the national liberation struggle in the Portuguese colonies, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and other colonial Territories, and to appeal to all States to extend moral and material support to that just struggle and deny the colonizers any assistance. The Committee had made a completely justified proposal to the Security Council for the application of sanctions against colonial Powers that refused to comply with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The fact that the Committee had established contact with the OAU was undoubtedly of great importance. That contact must now be strengthened.

357. The positive outcome of the Special Committee's work during its visit to Africa had been the result of sharp conflict. Those who defended colonial interests in the Committee had tried to rebuff just criticism and lawful claims and accusations. Naturally they had failed in that aim and had only unmasked themselves with every speech. He was referring primarily, of course, to the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom, but also to those who had supported them either directly or indirectly at the meetings.

358. A very characteristic picture had emerged during the votes in the Special Committee. The delegations of the socialist and Afro-Asian States had voted for all the resolutions without exception. It was the solid co-operation of the socialist and Afro-Asian countries which had made possible the positive results of all the Special Committee's work during its visit to Africa. Some delegations (those of Italy and Denmark) had abstained on some resolutions and voted for others, thereby revealing inconsistency but clearly not deciding to give direct support to the dark cause of colonialism. One delegation had taken a peculiar position, abstaining during the voting on all the resolutions without exception; that was the delegation of Australia,

and its refusal even there, on African soil, to support the rightful cause of the struggle of the African peoples for freedom spoke for itself. Finally, there were two delegations which had voted against or at best had abstained during the voting on the draft resolutions. Those were the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom, and their position showed with absolute clarity whom they were for and whom they were against; they were for the Portuguese colonizers, Verwoerd's wild racist fanatics and the white racists of Southern Rhodesia, and against the peoples of Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, South West Africa, Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland and against the peoples of all Africa and African freedom.

359. Such a disposition of forces in the Special Committee had its origins and causes, and would have its consequences. However, it must be noted with satisfaction that the overwhelming majority of States represented in the anti-colonial Special Committee had really taken an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist position in support of the peoples of Africa.

360. From that fact one fundamental conclusion emerged: the Special Committee's visit had evidently been of some use and had justified itself. A conclusion could also be drawn for the future: if the Special Committee wanted to serve the cause of the peoples' fight for their freedom, it should travel more frequently to the scene of events and come into direct contact with the peoples fighting for their freedom.

361. The question now was what else must be done, what further tasks lay before the Special Committee upon completion of its visit to Africa. It was the Soviet delegation's profound conviction that the results of the Committee's visit were not the finish, but the beginning. The adoption of resolutions, even the best of them, was not an end in itself. The point of adopting them was that they should be implemented and that their provisions should become realities. What the Special Committee had adopted were not declaratory statements, but a programme of action, and now that it had adopted that programme the Committee must proceed to the wider task of implementing it. As it came to the end of its visit, it must make a start on further work in support of peoples fighting for national independence.

362. A characteristic feature of decisions by the Special Committee, even when they were expressed in the most energetic terms, was that they were still decisions on paper. If the Special Committee or any other United Nations body took weak decisions, then they might remain decisions on paper whatever happened, because there was nothing in them to implement. Strong decisions contained provisions whose implementation could really alter the development of events. The Soviet delegation wished to appeal for joint efforts to see that all the decisions taken by the Special Committee during its visit were really implemented. His delegation felt that the Committee should now subordinate its work to that task, at least until the twentieth session of the General Assembly. After a certain time, it must examine what had and what had not been achieved under each paragraph of the resolutions adopted, find out who was hampering the fulfilment of this or that paragraph and what more had to be done. In that connexion, his delegation wished to draw particular attention to both the operative paragraphs of the first resolution on Southern Rhodesia; operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the second resolution on

Southern Rhodesia; operative paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the resolution on the Portuguese colonies; operative paragraph 4 of the resolution on South West Africa; operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution on the Protectorates of Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland; and all the main operative paragraphs of the concluding general resolution.

363. When it had done that, the Special Committee would be able to submit to the General Assembly not merely a formal, but a workmanlike and effective report which would facilitate the consideration of questions concerned with the elimination of colonialism at the twentieth session of the General Assembly and would enable the Assembly to make further progress towards that great goal.

364. In conclusion, the Soviet delegation expressed its gratitude to President Kenneth Kaunda and the Government and people of Zambia, President Nyerere and the Government and people of Tanzania and His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I and the Government and people of Ethiopia for their hospitality and co-operation during the Special Committee's visit. His delegation also thanked the representatives of the national liberation movements who had addressed the Special Committee and submitted extensive information on the situation in their countries and the struggle of the peoples of those countries for national independence and freedom. His delegation was grateful to Mr. Sori Coulibaly of Mali, the Chairman of the Special Committee, for his able and effective guidance of the Committee's work during the visit; Mr. Huot Sambath of Cambodia, the Vice-Chairman of the Committee, and Mr. Natwar Singh of India, the Rapporteur. The Soviet delegation attached great value to the work of the Afro-Asian Group and Yugoslavia, which had shouldered the task of drafting the Special Committee's draft resolutions. His delegation was grateful to its colleagues for their co-operation and attention, and to the Secretariat and all the technical services for their efficient work during the Special Committee's visit to Africa.

365. The representative of Iran said that the Special Committee's purpose in coming to Africa was two-fold. First, it was to obtain first-hand information about conditions in dependent and Non-Self-Governing Territories, and to keep in direct contact with the subjugated peoples of those areas. Second, it was to show the United Nations' active interest and support for the liberation and independence of these peoples.

366. In connexion with these two objectives, the Special Committee's work had been a complete success. The impact of the high sentiments and aspirations of the African peoples of subjugated areas was strongly reflected both in the Special Committee's deliberations as well as in its decisions. Moreover, by the Committee's response to their wishes and its support of their just cause, it could be safely assumed that their confidence in the United Nations had been reinforced to a great extent.

367. In the course of the hearing of petitioners, to whom his delegation had listened with sympathy, colonialism in its ugliest and most shocking form had been exposed. The machinations and sinister designs of Verwoerd, Salazar, and Smith to keep the African peoples under their oppressive yoke had been unmasked. In its resolutions, the Special Committee had not only taken full account of these conditions, but had also

embarked upon important decisions in order to put an end to the situation once and for all.

368. On the questions of Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, the High Commission Territories, and the Territories under Portuguese domination, the Special Committee had decided, among other things, to reaffirm the right of the African peoples to self-determination and independence, and to recognize the legitimacy of their struggle for the enjoyment of rights that were unequivocally theirs by virtue of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

369. The Special Committee had also decided to bring to the attention of the Security Council the seriousness of the situation prevailing in these Territories, recommending measures in accordance with the varying circumstances of each case. On the question of Territories under Portuguese domination, the Special Committee had gone further, by recommending to the Security Council for the first time "to consider putting into effect against Portugal the appropriate measures laid down in the Charter".

370. In the course of the debate his delegation had pointed to the high degree of co-operation that had developed among countries from all continents, in particular, the Afro-Asian continents, for the sole purpose of bringing about the final liquidation of colonialism. That co-operation had been further reinforced by the solidarity and unity shown by the Afro-Asian countries in the preparation and adoption of the highly significant and even novel decision to which he had referred.

371. Referring to yet another important development in the conduct of international relations, he said that never before, to such an extent, had the deliberations and decisions of an international body been formulated by the participation of small States. Furthermore, never before, to such an extent, had such deliberations and decisions been influenced by the aspirations and direct participation of individuals at large. This was a highly salutary development because it tended to democratize the conduct of international relations. It tended to reduce the effect of power in international decision-making procedures in favour of general principles of justice and universally accepted rules of conduct.

372. That new democratic element, if allowed to develop, could only culminate in the firm establishment of the rule of law in international relations. However, complacency and an unrealistic appraisal of the world situation should be guarded against.

373. It would be a delusion to believe that power in all its forms no longer remained the dominant factor in international relations. The new democratic development must be prevented from suffering setbacks which might postpone to a distant future the firm establishment of a world system based on the rule of law and general principles of justice. The final outcome thus was more imperative than temporary successes which, though rewarding, might have the opposite effect.

374. In conclusion, he attributed part of the success of the Special Committee's mission to the hospitality and generosity of the host Governments of Zambia, Tanzania, and Ethiopia, to which his delegation was deeply grateful.

375. He also expressed his delegation's thanks to the members of the Secretariat, the interpreters, the *précis* writers, and all the others for their indispensable

assistance and untiring efforts, without which the Special Committee's work would not have been possible.

376. The representative of Poland said he would express briefly the views of his delegation on the work accomplished during the Special Committee's meetings in Africa.

377. In the opinion of the Polish delegation the Special Committee's deliberations and resolutions adopted in the three African capitals, Lusaka, Dar es Salaam and Addis Ababa, had been indeed extremely important and useful. They had proved the wisdom of the decision to have visiting sessions outside New York and no doubt marked a step forward in the performance of the task entrusted to the Committee. The meetings in Africa where the most difficult and complex problems of decolonization still existed had given the Special Committee the benefit of closer contact with Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea, South West Africa, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland and with their people, thus placing the Committee in a much more favourable position to obtain a realistic view of the nature of the problems besetting the dependent peoples in this part of the African continent. The Special Committee had been privileged to have the views of the prominent leaders of the respective host countries and to listen to their encouraging addresses. The Polish delegations also appreciated the importance of the direct contact established during the current African tour with the OAU and its Co-ordinating Committee which advocated, as the Special Committee did in the United Nations, the immediate liquidation of colonialism and *apartheid* throughout Africa.

378. During the Special Committee's African session, it had listened to outstanding leaders and representatives of the national liberation movements from the Territories, where Africans were still suffering humiliation and exploitation and were subjected to all kinds of repressions and atrocities committed by the Portuguese, South African and Southern Rhodesian colonizers.

379. From all the statements heard, it would be concluded that Africa was committed to liberate by all means the enslaved part of the continent. On the other hand, the Special Committee had learnt that the discredited régimes of Salazar, Verwoerd and Smith were closing their lines and were determined to stop the liberation of Africa at the very boundaries of the area they continued to dominate and oppress. Thus its African session had enabled the Special Committee to evaluate more profoundly the dangers inherent in confrontation between Africa and its enemies.

380. The Polish delegation considered that the Special Committee was well advised to have adopted a number of recommendations for both the General Assembly and the Security Council and to have denounced the policy of colonial Powers as well as of their allies, who cynically continued to pose as defenders of the so-called free world.

381. The Polish delegation, in accordance with Poland's peace-loving foreign policy, whose basic principles were determined by solidarity and support for all other nations and peoples striving for international co-operation and progress against imperialist and colonialist forces, attached particular importance to the recognition by the Special Committee of the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples in dependent Territories for freedom and independence. It also considered that the Special Committee should take credit for the appeal

made to all States to grant moral and material support to those Africans struggling for the restoration of their inalienable rights to self-determination and independence.

382. The Polish delegation viewed the decisions adopted during the current African tour as steps taken in the right direction. Yet, it was only a beginning, for the decisions had to be implemented vigorously and without delay. Thus, the Special Committee's main task still lay ahead. The Polish delegation for its part would continue to co-operate with other members in seeking the most effective and practical means for the speedy implementation of the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) in all dependent Territories.

383. His delegation reiterated its profound appreciation to the Governments of Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zambia for their kind invitation and all the facilities they had provided the Special Committee during its stay in Africa. His delegation also expressed its warm congratulations to the Chairman on the successful conclusion of the Committee's African session, and reiterated its admiration of the Chairman's outstanding qualities and devotion to the cause of peace and progress.

384. His delegation's congratulations and thanks also went to the Vice-Chairman, Ambassador Sambath of Cambodia and to the Rapporteur, Mr. Natwar Singh of India, whose contribution to the Special Committee's work in Africa was greatly appreciated. Last but not least, he thanked the members of the Secretariat, interpreters and technical staff for their hard work and the assistance they had extended to the Special Committee.

385. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the Special Committee's tour of Africa appeared in some measure at least to have achieved the main objectives set out in the *communiqué* issued in New York before its departure. He hoped the Special Committee would agree that, despite the financial and political misgivings about the visit which he had expressed in New York, his delegation had co-operated and played its full part throughout the tour whenever British responsibilities were involved.

386. His Government might have views to express in due course, but in the meantime he would mention—without casting aspersions or making attacks—some impressions which had occurred to him on the tour as a whole. The Special Committee could all agree that they were sometimes divorced to some extent from reality in New York. On the other hand, he thought that in Africa the Committee had been in some danger of going to the opposite extreme, with a tendency to consider the problems before them from a rather one-sided and even distorted point of view without access to all the facts which should be taken into account. He hoped, however, that the visit had contributed in some degree to the solution of the great issues of southern Africa, and he would certainly report all that had been said in the debates to his Government.

387. If his delegation had stressed the need for patience and for peaceful solutions it was because it considered, as Members of the United Nations, that all avenues of peaceful settlement must be explored and not because it did not fully appreciate the strength of feeling existing in Africa on the subjects discussed.

388. He felt bound to refer to the remarks just made by the distinguished representative of the USSR that his Government was the champion of decolonization and self-determination, and that the United Kingdom

Government supported the perpetuation of colonialism. There was so much humbug in this attitude that he was forced to ask the Soviet representative two simple questions. First, would he tell the Special Committee of one single Non-Self-Governing Territory administered by the Soviet Union, either acquired since 1939 or inherited from the former Czarist Empire in Asia, to which his Government had granted self-determination and national independence? Secondly, did the Soviet Government really accept the principles and obligations of self-determination and of Chapter XI of the Charter in respect of the Non-Self-Governing Territories of South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands under Soviet administration? Until these questions were answered positively he did not think the Soviet delegation should put itself forward as the champion of decolonization and self-determination in Africa, since surely the voice of Africa was sufficiently powerful to stand by itself.

389. In conclusion, he wished to repeat his delegation's gratitude to the Heads of State and Governments of Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania for their warm welcome and hospitality, and to pay tribute to the courtesy of the Chairman and other officers of the Special Committee, and to the admirable work of the Secretariat staff and of the many others who had contributed to the smooth running of the Committee's work.

390. The representative of Venezuela said that, for the sake of brevity, he would not attempt to evaluate the Special Committee's work in Africa or to state what conclusions the Committee should draw from its meetings. That would be the task of his eminent friend the Indian representative, the Committee's Rapporteur, in whose ability and competence he had complete confidence.

391. Before leaving the soil of Africa he wished, on behalf of the Chilean and his own delegation, to express once more his thanks to the President, Government and people of Zambia, to the President, Government and people of Tanzania and to His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I and the Government and people of Ethiopia for their invitations, welcome and magnificent hospitality which had afforded the Special Committee the inestimable opportunity not only of obtaining direct information on the colonial situation in Africa but also of making contact with the reality of that new world in ferment which was Africa today.

392. Their stay in Africa would be unforgettable and their gratitude was due to all those who made it possible and had helped to make their visit fruitful and pleasant. Thanks were due also to the Chairman for his competent direction of their meetings and their work.

393. Lastly, thanks were due to the translators and *précis*-writers for their co-operation in the smooth conduct of the Committee's work and especially, as far as the Spanish-speaking delegations were concerned, to the interpreters into Spanish for the hard work which had devolved upon them during the month's deliberations.

394. The Latin Americans were in complete sympathy with the aspirations of the peoples of Africa and their visit to that continent had certainly intensified that feeling.

395. The representative of Cambodia thanked His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I for inviting the Special Committee to meet in Addis Ababa. His delegation had great admiration for the courage with which

the Ethiopian Government and people had fought against Mussolini's fascist Italy, and paid tribute to their continuing vigour in the struggle against colonialism.

396. The Special Committee's visit to Africa had given him an opportunity to make known the Cambodian Government's unequivocal stand against colonialism and imperialism, and to work together with his African brothers in the struggle against common enemies. There could be no compromise with colonialists and imperialists. He had listened closely to the testimony of the petitioners from Territories still subjected to the odious régimes of Smith, Salazar and Verwoerd, whose crimes against the African populations must outrage the conscience of all peace-loving and freedom-loving peoples. He had been particularly moved by the documentary film informally presented to members of the Special Committee by the freedom fighters of Portuguese Guinea, certain scenes of which had been reminiscent of the criminal acts inflicted on the helpless people of Cambodia by the imperialists and their creatures. Like the African Territories, Cambodia, too, had learned that the arms used against its people came from one country alone, a country whose representatives dared to affirm that their Government's policy was to defend peace, freedom and justice. But deeds spoke louder than words.

397. During the Special Committee's stay in Africa, it had learned that the struggle for freedom had reached a decisive phase. International peace and security were in grave danger, and the United Nations—especially the Security Council—must take immediate steps to put an end to colonial domination on the African continent. Those who had it in their power to do so, but instead refused to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations and collaborated with the fascist régimes of Smith, Salazar and Verwoerd, must bear full responsibility for present and future bloodshed.

398. The peoples of Africa and Asia were long-suffering in the face of colonist and imperialist harassment, but their pacific nature must not be misunderstood as cowardice. The Cambodian people were glad to learn that their African brothers were resolved to free the African continent once and for all, and they offered their full support in that heroic struggle. There could be no doubt of their final victory, for their cause was just.

399. The representative of Bulgaria said that in his brilliant address at the opening meeting in Addis Ababa, the Secretary-General of the OAU had stated that the Special Committee's stay in Africa must clearly mark a turning point in the methods of the world organization, because the Committee's action in visiting Africa which had raised many hopes, must be continued.

400. It was the belief of his delegation that the results of the Special Committee's work during its meetings in Africa had clearly marked the beginning of such a turning point. The Committee had adopted several important resolutions. Its main task in the months ahead, as he saw it, should be to see to it that its recommendations did not remain just another set of dead words, but that they were translated into real facts of life.

401. In the opinion of his delegation, the Special Committee's meetings in Africa had contributed to a better realization of its tasks and its place in the great process of decolonization. This process had reached a very important and difficult phase. The most die-hard colonizers and racialists in the southern part of Africa

had clearly taken the course of holding on to their slave empire by all means, including military aggression. The difficulties arose mainly because of the support and assistance—military, financial and economic—which Verwoerd, Salazar and Smith were receiving from their allies and friends in the West, who cynically claimed to be the self-appointed guardians of freedom in the world.

402. Faced with this situation, the Special Committee and the United Nations as a whole were duty bound to take a course of support for the liberation movements. Having recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples in the colonial Territories for freedom and independence and having launched an appeal to all States to grant the colonial peoples the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights, it was the duty of the Special Committee to work for the adoption by the United Nations of such measures as would throw the whole weight of the world Organization on the side of the peoples fighting for their liberation and would put all its resources, moral and material, in the service of the right cause of freedom and peace.

403. This could best be achieved only in close co-operation with the OAU whose prime objective was decolonization. That was why his delegation hoped that the co-operation which had been established between the Special Committee and the OAU during its stay in Africa would be further strengthened in the interests of the African peoples still languishing under the colonial yoke.

404. He expressed the gratitude of his delegation to the Governments and peoples of Zambia, Tanzania and Ethiopia for all they had done to make the Special Committee's meetings in Africa possible and fruitful. He also thanked all petitioners, representing the national liberation movements in Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies, South West Africa, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, South Africa and Aden, who had appeared before the Special Committee to tell the truth about the situation in their enslaved countries and thus help the Committee to reach correct conclusions and make the appropriate recommendations.

405. Finally, he expressed the gratitude of his delegation to the brilliant and untiring Chairman of the Special Committee, to the members of the Bureau, to the Secretariat and to all others without whose efforts the Committee's work would have been impossible.

406. The representative of Syria expressed the sincerest gratitude of his delegation to the Governments and peoples of Zambia, Tanzania and Ethiopia for their generous gesture in allowing the Special Committee to come into intimate contact with the African atmosphere of generosity, genuineness, great expectations and warmth.

407. The visit of the Special Committee was extremely fruitful in crystallizing the vivid picture of African aspirations—aspirations which were noble indeed because the African people had faith in man and societies, in their struggle for emancipation and in the restoration of their rights.

408. The Special Committee's resolutions, as the distinguished representative of the USSR had so rightly indicated, were a beginning, not the end, of action. No effort should be spared until the total disappearance of the last remnants of colonialism was achieved.

409. It was unfortunate that these resolutions, especially the resolutions contained in document A/AC.109/128/Rev.1 (see para. 463 below), had not been adopted unanimously. It was also unfortunate that the distinguished delegations who had not participated in the vote on this resolution had failed to acknowledge the efforts of the co-sponsors to gain their support. However, it was evident, throughout the Special Committee's stay in Africa that these delegations, in spite of the manner of their voting, possessed a deep sense of humanity and had been gravely shocked at the treatment meted out to Africans in the remaining areas under foreign domination. These delegations would be making a useful contribution if they would, at least, convey to their Governments and peoples these experiences.

410. The unconditional support which the delegations of the socialist countries had consistently lent to the just anti-colonialist cause deserved sincere gratitude. It was a source of comfort to find such staunch supporters for the cause of humanity. The Latin American delegations, for their part, had shown their readiness to collaborate within every possible limit. His delegation had been struck by their genuine feeling.

411. One cause for great pride was the collaboration the Special Committee had established with the OAU, on which millions of Africans pinned their hopes. The statesmanship of the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU was an illustration of the great potentialities of the African personality.

412. In conclusion, he paid tribute to the Chairman of the Special Committee, for his statesmanship, and for being the incarnation of all that was noble in the African personality. The great continent of Africa had reason to be proud of the Chairman and his colleagues. He expressed the sincere gratitude of his delegation not only to the Chairman but also to the Vice-Chairman, to the untiring Rapporteur to whom the Special Committee owed a great deal, to the Secretary of the Special Committee and to the other members of the Secretariat, including the interpreters.

413. The prayer of his delegation was that the total liberation of Africa, and indeed of all other areas of the world still under foreign domination, might be achieved very soon. Incontestably, the determination and faith of the subjugated peoples, led by their liberation movements and supported by every friend of freedom and human dignity, would carry through the struggle for freedom to a successful conclusion.

414. The representative of the USSR, exercising his right of reply, observed that the United Kingdom delegation had found it necessary on the last working day of the Special Committee's visit to try to disrupt the normal conclusion of the Committee's work by making a provocative attack on the Soviet Union. He was confident that the United Kingdom representative would not achieve his objective and that the Committee would successfully complete its work in Addis Ababa.

415. Since the United Kingdom representative had put certain questions to the Soviet delegation, he felt that he should make a brief reply in spite of the aims which the United Kingdom representative was pursuing in the present instance.

416. The United Kingdom representative had asked him whether he could tell the Committee of any Non-Self-Governing Territory to which the Soviet Union had granted self-determination or independence. The Soviet Union had never had any Non-Self-Governing

Territories; hence, the question was meaningless except as provocation. Under the Constitution of the USSR the Soviet Union consisted of fifteen equal and sovereign Union Republics, each of which had the right to secede from the Union.

417. The United Kingdom representative had also asked whether the Soviet Government accepted the principles of self-determination and of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter in respect of "the Non-Self-Governing Territories of South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands". That question was also essentially meaningless, since South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, as the United Kingdom representative must know very well, had been incorporated into the Soviet Union in accordance with a decision adopted at the Potsdam Conference of the Heads of Government of the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom. Those territories did not and could not fall in the category of Non-Self-Governing Territories. They were an integral part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, one of the fifteen sovereign Soviet Republics forming the USSR.

418. The representative of Tanzania asked the United Kingdom representative to convey to his Government the Tanzanian delegation's gratitude for the hospitality extended to the Special Committee during its stay in London on the way to Lusaka.

419. His delegation also wished to thank the OAU and in particular its Administrative Secretary-General for its valuable contribution to the Special Committee's work. The need for closer co-operation between the United Nations and the OAU was recognized on both sides, and his delegation intended to introduce a resolution to that effect at the appropriate time in New York.

420. The representative of Yugoslavia thanked the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU for his important statement. He also thanked the officers of the Special Committee, and the members of the Secretariat, for their tireless efforts to make Committee's work a success.

421. The representative of Denmark, speaking on behalf of the Italian and Danish delegations, thanked the Governments of Zambia, Tanzania and Ethiopia for their kindness and hospitality to the Special Committee. He was appreciative of the opportunity the Committee had had of obtaining knowledge about the situation in Africa in a more concrete way than was possible in New York. He thanked the officers of the Special Committee, and the members of the Secretariat, for their hard work under what had often been strenuous conditions.

422. The representative of Ethiopia, reviewing the Special Committee's work in Africa, noted the adoption of five important resolutions on the questions of Southern Rhodesia, the Territories under Portuguese Administration, South West Africa, and the so-called High Commission Territories, and of a final resolution, the contents and conclusions of which reflected the aspirations of the peoples of dependent Territories concerned and indeed world public opinion.

423. The several petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee on behalf of their peoples had expressed their determination to be free from alien subjugation, domination and exploitation. On the question of Southern Rhodesia, they had appealed to the United Kingdom Government to discharge its obligations vis-à-vis the African population of that Territory by effectively compelling the present minority Govern-

ment to recognize majority rule on the basis of one man one vote. The nationalists from Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea had asked the United Nations to take effective and concrete measures towards the attainment of their inalienable rights to self-determination and independence. Identical requests had been addressed by the nationalists of South West Africa and the High Commission Territories.

424. As a founding member of the United Nations and the OAU, both of which reaffirmed faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, Ethiopia stood and would continue to stand for the immediate and total emancipation of colonial Territories from foreign rule. The contributions of Ethiopia in the General Assembly of the United Nations and its main committees, in the former United Nations Committee on South West Africa, in the Special Committee, and in the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the OAU demonstrated Ethiopia's determination to realize the final liquidation of colonialism in dependent Territories.

425. In every international forum, the delegation of Ethiopia had insisted on the restoration of rights and privileges to colonial Territories and peoples. It was to advance the cause of colonial peoples in Africa towards a fruitful and successful end that the delegation of Ethiopia had taken the initiative of insisting that the Special Committee should visit Africa. The Committee had done everything in its power to bring to light the actual situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, the Territories under Portuguese Administration, South West Africa and the so-called High Commission Territories. He was confident that the appropriate organs of the United Nations would take up the recommendations of the Special Committee on each of the above-mentioned Territories on a priority basis.

426. He thanked the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU and his colleagues for their close co-operation and for helping the Special Committee in the discharge of its duties. He expressed his confidence that this co-operation would continue and that any new elements in the African colonies that might come to the notice of the OAU would be transmitted to the Chairman of the Special Committee.

427. His delegation had been honoured by the presence of the Special Committee in Addis Ababa and hoped that the Committee would continue its work of decolonization as vigorously and as urgently as possible. Time was running out in the African colonies and unless the prevailing situation was remedied by all concerned, the consequences would be far-reaching and unfortunate.

428. Referring to the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter, he recalled that the signatories of the Charter had expressed determination "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-time has brought untold sorrow to mankind". Perhaps more relevant to the work of the Special Committee was the declaration of the signatories that "Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount" (Article 73). It was therefore fitting that the Chairman of the Special Committee should be attending the forthcoming twentieth anniversary celebrations in San Francisco.

429. Aware of the pressure of work during the visit of the Special Committee, he nevertheless hoped that the members of the Committee and of the Secretariat had had an enjoyable stay in Addis Ababa, and wished them pleasant trips to their respective destinations. He assured all the members once again that he would convey their messages of good wishes to His Imperial Majesty, the Government and people of Ethiopia.

430. The Chairman said that the Special Committee had exhausted the agenda for its meetings in Africa. He would therefore take the opportunity of extending sincere thanks, on behalf of all members of the Committee, to the Governments of Zambia, Tanzania and Ethiopia, not only for their kind invitations which had enabled the Committee to come to Africa, but also for all the facilities which they had made available to it. His thanks went also to the officials and all the officers of those Governments who had assisted the Special Committee with dedication and conviction throughout its work; thanks to their contribution, the Committee had been able to work in suitable conditions and to fulfil its mandate. He also wished to thank the OAU, through its Administrative Secretary-General, for its effective co-operation throughout the Special Committee's stay in Africa, and to express the Committee's support for the efforts of the Co-ordinating Committee of the OAU, whose action had strengthened and complemented that of the Special Committee. He had no doubt that more systematic relations would be established in the future between the Special Committee and the OAU, within the framework of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

431. He was sure all the members of the Special Committee would agree that its decision to visit Africa had been both fortunate and positive; the decision had been fortunate because the Committee's visit to Africa had been an expression of the interest and solidarity of the United Nations vis-à-vis peoples still under colonial domination. At the same time the decision to visit Africa had been a positive one because it had enabled the Special Committee to enter into direct contact with the peoples whose accession to independence was its mandate to hasten. Brought face to face with hard facts, the members of the Committee had come to understand the situation of African populations subjected to foreign domination. Those members of the Special Committee who had had the privilege of being spared the direct experience of the colonial system had been able, during the journey in Africa, to grasp the extent and nature of the sufferings imposed on colonized peoples.

432. They had heard irrefutable evidence of the atrocities committed by the Portuguese authorities and the white racist settlers of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. In this connexion, it was not excessive to draw particular attention to the testimony of the petitioners who had told the Special Committee that the Portuguese had burned Africans alive and cast them into rivers bound hand and foot. The violations of human rights committed by the white settlers and racists in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had been described by the very men who were their victims. The members of the Special Committee had seen for themselves that the existence of colonial Territories or foreign racist minority régimes constituted a grave threat to the peace and security of the African continent. Members of the Committee whose countries were military allies of Portugal were certainly concerned to learn that the assistance supplied by their countries

to Portugal was being used by the latter to burn African villages, and to torture children, women and old men who were often completely unaware of the reasons for these persecutions. It was to be hoped, judging by the statements made before the Special Committee following the hearing of the petitioners, that those of Portugal's military allies who did not wish to continue to share the responsibility for the crimes committed by the Salazar Government would withdraw their aid and bring to bear a more humane and more realistic influence on it.

433. The Special Committee's visit to Africa had been positive to the extent that it had enabled all its members to understand the significance and the legitimacy of the struggle waged by the African populations to regain their independence. Thus it was that in all the resolutions adopted in Africa, the Special Committee had not only affirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples oppressed by colonialism and *apartheid*, but had also addressed an appeal to all States to extend moral and material assistance to the freedom-fighters. That was an unprecedented decision which would certainly give rise to others and entail a fundamental change in the nature of future United Nations action to eliminate colonialism and *apartheid*. This strengthening of United Nations dynamism in the fight against colonialism and *apartheid* found its justification in the effect which the petitioners' testimony had produced on the members of the Committee. That was why it was highly desirable that the Security Council, the supreme decision-making organ of the United Nations, should shortly meet in Africa when it came to discuss the problems of colonialism and *apartheid* so that it might itself hear the evidence which the Special Committee had gathered during its journey. The members of the Special Committee were convinced that the Security Council, wherever it met, ought to hear the representatives of the freedom-fighters during its debates on colonialism or *apartheid*. All the members of the Council would then be convinced that colonialism and *apartheid* constituted grave threats to peace and security, and they would also understand that a dynamic interpretation must be placed on Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

434. The Chairman was convinced that the Special Committee's report on its work in Africa would contribute to a better understanding of colonial problems. It would make clear the fact that the patience of the African peoples was exhausted, and that those who were subjected to the tyranny of the Verwoerds, Salazars and Smiths could no longer rest content with resolutions affirming principles which no one contested in theory, but which in practice remained but a distant aspiration for the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, South West Africa, Zimbabwe, so-called Portuguese Guinea, South Africa, etc. The Special Committee's report would show that there was no longer any compromise possible between the victims and the apologists of colonialism. The rights of all men were universal, and there could be no sincere friendship between peoples except on the basis of scrupulous respect for the rights of all peoples to guide their own destinies. The Special Committee's journey to Africa had been positive, for it had added to its members' knowledge of the crimes committed in Africa by the fascists and racists who did not believe in the equality of men and races.

435. The Special Committee's deliberations had also helped to point up the contradictions of the time—at a time when man was seeking to overcome the laws of

gravity and conquer space, one could but be appalled to learn that human beings were still subjected to treatment more hateful than that which mankind suffered under the nazi régime. Competition or co-operation for the conquest of space had certain scientific merits, but the pooling of efforts to free man and to protect him against the forces of evil was even more meritorious.

436. The Special Committee's meetings in Africa had often been stormy, because differences of opinion had emerged among its members as to the ways and means of fulfilling its mandate. But the Chairman was convinced that the Committee would continue its efforts to eliminate the colonial system. It would succeed, for it was unthinkable that the international community should capitulate before the alliance of Salazar, Verwoerd and Smith. He thought that the members of the Special Committee could congratulate themselves on the work they had done in Africa, thanks to the important contribution of the petitioners, to whom he wished to address his thanks. He also thanked all representatives for the understanding they had shown him in his capacity as Chairman, and for the encouraging words they had addressed to him. He might not always have been able to give satisfaction to all, but he asked them to believe in the consideration he had for each of them. He wished lastly, to thank the members of the Secretariat, the translators, the interpreters and all the other officers who made their valuable contribution. The Special Committee had often kept them late hours, but the Chairman was sure they were happy to make their contribution to the cause which the Special Committee was defending.

437. He wished, lastly, once again to extend the Special Committee's very sincere thanks to his Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I and his Government for the hospitality and all the tokens of sympathy which had been shown the members since their arrival in Addis Ababa.

D. ACTION ARISING FROM THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S VISIT TO AFRICA

438. At the 372nd meeting of the Special Committee on 17 June 1965, the Chairman, speaking as the representative of Mali said that he had been asked by the delegations concerned to place before the Special Committee a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.219) sponsored by Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia. The purpose of the draft resolution, he stated, was to draw the attention of the General Assembly, the Security Council and world opinion to the grave situation prevailing in part of the African continent. In so doing, the sponsors had had in mind General Assembly resolution 1810 (XVII), which invited the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of any developments in the Territories within its purview which might threaten international peace and security.

439. The sponsors of the draft resolution were convinced that the Portuguese Government's alliance with South Africa and the illegal authorities of Southern Rhodesia with a view to oppressing the African populations created a very dangerous situation. The members of the Special Committee would recall that at Lusaka, at Dar es Salaam and, finally, at Addis Ababa, their attention had been drawn to the threats of military and economic reprisals which the Governments of Por-

tugal and South Africa and the illegal authorities of Southern Rhodesia were directing at the independent African States adjacent to Non-Self-Governing Territories.

440. The Special Committee's visit to Africa would enable it better to inform world opinion of the situation prevailing in the Territories under consideration and the sponsors of the draft resolution felt it was necessary to give proper publicity to the Special Committee's meetings in Africa in view of the importance of the petitioners' testimony. For the goal of the sponsors was to act in such a way that the Governments of Portugal, South Africa and the illegal fascist authorities of Southern Rhodesia, which were defying the United Nations and ignoring the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, were isolated and deprived of their means of oppression.

441. Having drawn lessons from what they had seen and heard in Africa, the sponsors wished to place before the Special Committee a draft resolution proposing dynamic measures to the General Assembly and the Security Council designed to put an end to colonialism and *apartheid*, those two major causes of international tension. But, in a concern to win the support of other delegations, the sponsors had mastered their emotions and agreed to submit a compromise text to the Special Committee. In the eyes of the sponsors, the Special Committee's journey to Africa had enabled delegations to arrive at a more realistic appreciation of the misdeeds of colonialism and the dangers which it represented. That was why they felt that their text should command the unanimous support of the Special Committee. He then read out the draft resolution.

442. The representative of Italy said that, because of the nature and length of the draft resolution just submitted, his delegation would have to seek instructions from its Government, and a reply could not be expected within less than forty-eight hours. In the circumstances, it would seem to him that the Special Committee had three alternative courses of action: to defer a decision on the draft resolution until it met in New York; to decide to meet again in Addis Ababa on the following Monday; or to proceed to an immediate vote without the participation of the Italian delegation.

443. At the 373rd meeting, the representative of the United States, referring to the draft resolution, said that, until then, it had been his delegation's understanding that the Special Committee's presence in Africa had two main objectives: first, to enable the Special Committee to hear petitioners from each of the four Territories or groups of Territories on its agenda, thus permitting each delegation to update its appraisal of the situation there; and second, to pass resolutions dealing with each of those four items. His delegation had acquiesced in the latter, although feeling that the time available for evaluation of such new information as had been furnished by the petitioners had been undesirably brief. The Special Committee had carried out both those functions, within the time allotted.

444. It had further been the understanding of his Government that the Special Committee's African mission would terminate on 18 June, the day on which they were then meeting; on that basis, assignment of personnel to other important functions had been made and could not now be changed. Yet at the very last minute, the Special Committee was faced with a new draft resolution which, while purporting to summarize the results of its work in Africa, did not come under

any of the agenda items it had been considering. The submission of that omnibus draft resolution presented his delegation with an impossible situation, for it would not have time to study the draft, formulate recommendations to its Government or to receive instructions in regard to it. His delegation would therefore be unable to participate in the discussion on the draft, except to exercise its right of reply, or in any vote which might be taken.

445. His delegation had no objection to an attempt, at the proper time, to achieve a Committee view of the over-all significance of its African experience. But that could be best deferred until the Committee returned to New York.

446. The representative of Tunisia said that he would like to draw the attention of the members of the Special Committee to the fact that the sponsors of the draft resolution had made strenuous efforts to arrive at a text which would meet with the unanimous approval of the members of the Committee precisely because it was a special draft resolution, the aim of which was to combine in one text certain general points which were not controversial. In view of the spirit in which the draft resolution had been drawn up, and the numerous concessions which had been made by the sponsors, he appealed to all members of the Committee to give the draft resolution their unanimous support.

447. The representative of Australia expressed regret that his delegation would not have enough time to study the draft resolution or to obtain instructions from his Government. His delegation had been given the impression that the Special Committee's meetings would be concluded on 18 June and had even begun preparation of its report on the Committee's work. In the circumstances his delegation would be unable to participate in the consideration of, or the vote on, the draft resolution.

448. The representative of Denmark declared that a draft of such a wide scope as presented in the draft resolution should not be rushed through the Committee. Not having been given sufficient time to consult his Government for instructions, his delegation could not participate in the vote.

449. The representative of the USSR said that the general draft resolution submitted for the Special Committee's consideration by the Afro-Asian group and Yugoslavia concerning the implementation in the Portuguese colonies, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, was undoubtedly the fruit of considerable efforts on the part of its sponsors to summarize the political results of the discussions which had taken place during the Committee's visit to Africa. The draft contained important provisions of principle directed towards the immediate implementation of the Declaration in regard to the colonial Territories of Africa. The Soviet delegation supported the basic provisions of the draft resolution and would vote for it.

450. It should be noted that different points of view had been expressed on the draft resolution. There was nothing surprising about that. The fact that an overwhelming majority of delegations had declared their support for the draft was cause for satisfaction. The United States representative, however, had refused to give his views on the basic provisions of the draft, stating that he had not had time to consider it. That was nothing more than a clumsy colonialist manoeuvre.

No less absurd was the Australian representative's statement that he was already preparing a report on the results of the Special Committee's work and was therefore unable to start considering the draft resolution which had been submitted. And the Italian representative, who the previous day had expressed concern that the Committee might not be able to complete its work today had simply "voted with his feet" and failed to appear at the Special Committee's meeting.

451. Similar actions by the representatives of the NATO States merely revealed their desire to prevent at any price the successful conclusion of the Committee's work. But they would fail in their attempt. His delegation was convinced that the overwhelming majority of delegations would vote for the joint draft resolution and thereby make a further contribution to the work accomplished by the Special Committee during its African visit.

452. The representative of the United States, in exercise of the right of reply, said that the United States position on the Territories which had been under study by the Special Committee during its session in Africa was well known and that it was not for the Soviet delegate to explain the reasons behind his delegation's voting records.

453. He further said that the absence of the Italian delegate did not mean the latter's lack of interest in the work of the Special Committee, but that he had other duties to perform which required his presence elsewhere. Therefore, he did not think that it was for the Soviet delegate to suggest hidden meanings as to the absence of the Italian delegate.

454. As regards the term "voting with one's feet", which he understood the Soviet delegate to have used with reference to the distinguished representative of Italy, this was a term which had been most often applied to describe the only ballot box available to the people of East Germany who had so eloquently voted by fleeing in thousands until the erection of the wall in Berlin.

455. At the 373rd meeting, on 18 June 1965, a number of revisions were made to the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.219) by the representative of India, speaking on behalf of the sponsors.

456. At the same meeting, the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.219) was adopted by 15 votes to none, with no abstentions.

457. The representative of Venezuela said that the thirteen-Power draft resolution not only contained conclusions of a general nature but raised questions of substance on which he would have to seek fresh instructions from his Government. Since it was physically impossible to receive such instructions in time, his delegation had had no alternative but to refrain from participating in the vote.

458. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he had had no opportunity to obtain instructions from his Government on the resolution in the very short time available since its circulation. Moreover the resolution referred, among other matters, to Rhodesia. His delegation could not accept the validity or accuracy of many of the references to Rhodesia in the resolution. In view of his Government's well-known position regarding the competence of the United Nations to discuss or make recommendations about Rhodesia, and also since he was without instructions on the other matters involved, his delegation had not participated in the vote on this resolution.

459. The representative of Chile said that, in explaining their votes, the countries which had not participated had given the same reason for that decision, namely, that they had not had time to consult their respective Governments. The Chilean delegation thought it necessary to make a statement to the same effect, namely, that it deeply regretted not having taken part in the vote on the draft resolution which concerned the Committee's general activities during its visit to Africa and in which a series of measures for future action were suggested.

460. It was the lack of time for consulting its Government which had prevented the Chilean delegation from participating in the vote on the draft resolution.

461. In his delegation's opinion, the draft resolution should have been submitted for the Committee's consideration on its return to New York, so that all the States members of the Special Committee could have had an opportunity to study it with the attention that it deserved. Its contents were too important for it to have been put to the vote in the hasty way in which that had been done.

462. He asked that his statement should appear in full in the records.

463. The text of the resolution concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Southern Rhodesia, Territories under Portuguese administration, South West Africa, and Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (A/AC.109/128/Rev.1), adopted by the Special Committee at its 373rd meeting on 18 June 1965, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having held meetings from 25 May 1965 to 18 June 1965 successively at Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, at Dar es Salaam, the capital of the United Republic of Tanzania, and at Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, and having heard the spokesmen of the Governments of those countries,

"Having examined the situation in the following colonial Territories: Southern Rhodesia, the Territories under Portuguese administration, South West Africa, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, and having heard the petitioners from those Territories,

"Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, and in particular 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962, which invites the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of any developments in those Territories which may threaten international peace and security,

"Having heard the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and the Chairman of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of that organization,

"Profoundly disappointed and disquieted by the persistent refusal of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and the minority settler régime of Southern Rhodesia to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee,

"Profoundly shocked by the atrocities and violations of human rights committed by those Governments in order to stifle the legitimate aspirations of

the African populations to self-determination and independence,

"*Conscious* of the seriousness of the threats of military and economic reprisals uttered by the Governments of Portugal, South Africa and the minority settler régime of Southern Rhodesia against neighbouring African States,

"*Noting the concern* expressed by the Governments of the independent States of Africa bordering on the Non-Self-Governing Territories,

"*Noting with particular concern* that, according to the evidence submitted by the petitioners, efforts are being made by the Government of South Africa for the installation of military bases, the production of poisonous gas and preparations for the manufacture of atomic weapons,

"*Greatly concerned* by the co-operation and collaboration between the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and the minority settler régime of Southern Rhodesia, an alliance the purpose of which is to strengthen their military potential with a view to increasing the repressive measures taken against the African populations subject to their domination,

"1. *Draws the attention* of the General Assembly and the Security Council to the explosive situation existing in this region of Africa owing to the intolerable behaviour of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and the minority settler régime of Southern Rhodesia;

"2. *Recommends* that the General Assembly and the Security Council, each acting within its own competence, should take the positive measures laid down in the Charter with a view to:

"(a) Ensuring respect for the rights of the African populations in the region and in particular their rights to self-determination and independence, and putting an end to the dangerous activities of the Portuguese and South African Governments and of the minority settler régime of Southern Rhodesia,

"(b) Strengthening the confidence which the peoples under colonial domination place in the United Nations;

"3. *Requests* the Secretary-General of the United Nations to make all the measures necessary to publicize the work of the Special Committee as widely as possible, so that world opinion may be sufficiently informed concerning the grave threats to peace constituted by colonialism and *apartheid*;

"4. *Requests* all States to publicize the report of the Special Committee by all the means at their disposal so that all peoples may be informed of the atrocities committed by the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and the minority settler régime of Southern Rhodesia;

"5. *Requests* further all States and all international institutions to refuse assistance of any kind to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and the minority settler régime of Southern Rhodesia, so long as the latter fail to renounce their policy of colonial domination and the practice of *apartheid*;

"6. *Draws the attention* of the Commission on Human Rights to the evidence submitted by the petitioners respecting the violations of human rights committed in the Territories under Portuguese administration, in South West Africa and in Southern Rhodesia;

"7. *Expresses* its satisfaction that its visit to Africa has enabled it to obtain a more thorough knowledge of the colonial issue and has strengthened its determination to achieve the elimination of colonialism throughout the world as rapidly as possible;

"8. *Expresses* its pleasure at the participation of the Organization of African Unity in its work in Africa and hopes that the co-operation thus established between the two organizations with regard to decolonization will be intensified in the future."

464. At the 373rd meeting of the Special Committee, the representative of India introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.222) sponsored by Australia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile, Denmark, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, by which the Special Committee would express its appreciation to the Governments and people of Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Ethiopia for inviting the Special Committee to hold meetings at their respective capitals and for offering members their hospitality.

465. Introducing the draft resolution, the representative of India said that the Special Committee's visit to Africa had been extremely valuable. It had had the honour of being received by the Heads of State of the three host countries, whose interest in the Committee's work was a source of great inspiration. It had heard many petitioners. Lastly, the Committee's links with the Organization of African Unity had been further strengthened, to the benefit of all. He thanked the officers of the Committee, and the members of the Secretariat, for the efforts they had made to ensure the success of the Committee's work.

466. In conclusion, he had pleasure in submitting a draft resolution thanking the Governments of the three countries in whose capitals the Committee had held meetings. The resolution was co-sponsored by all delegations except those of Ethiopia and Tanzania, two of the host countries.

467. At the same meeting the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.222) was adopted by acclamation. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/129) thus adopted reads as follows:

"*The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

"*Having met* from 25 May 1965 to 18 June 1965 successively at Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, at Dar es Salaam, the capital of the United Republic of Tanzania, and at Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, and having heard the spokesmen of their Governments,

"*Expresses* its profound gratitude to the Governments and people of Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Ethiopia for inviting the Committee to hold meetings in their capital cities and for offering to the members of the Committee their generous and kind hospitality."

APPENDIX I

Communiqué issued on 14 May 1965 by the Chairman on behalf of the Special Committee

The Governments of Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia extended to the Special Committee invitations

to hold some of its meetings in 1965 in their respective capitals, Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam and Lusaka.

The Special Committee was highly appreciative of these invitations and decided at its meeting on 4 May 1965 to accept them. The Committee consequently decided to hold its meetings in the three African capitals during the period 20 May to 20 June 1965.

The Special Committee's decision to meet in Africa was taken in the context of operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) which, in establishing the Special Committee, authorized it to meet elsewhere than at United Nations Headquarters whenever and wherever such meetings may be required for the effective discharge of its functions in consultation with the appropriate authorities.

In deciding to proceed to Africa, the Special Committee was especially guided by the fact that it is in Africa that the largest number of people living under foreign domination, as well as the most difficult and serious colonial problems, are to be found. Indeed, the Special Committee notes with regret that despite numerous General Assembly resolutions, little progress could be recorded in the total and peaceful application of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Nearly twenty years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, millions of human beings still live under colonial rule, which is but a disguised form of slavery.

The Special Committee is aware of the importance of manifesting the most active solidarity of the international community with peoples who are struggling under difficult conditions to regain their inalienable rights.

The Special Committee is also convinced that by establishing direct contact with peoples under colonial domination, in the context of the realities of their everyday life, it will acquire a deeper knowledge of the situation and of the aspirations of these peoples. The Committee is certain that it will thus be in a more favourable position to understand and, therefore, to assist these peoples in their struggle for independence. In the opinion of the Special Committee, the visit to Africa will demonstrate not only the concern of the United Nations with the destiny of colonial peoples, but it would make it easier for representatives of nationalist movements, who would otherwise find it impossible to travel to New York, to appear before the Committee and to express their views concerning their country's future and their own destiny.

The tentative programme of the Special Committee's meetings in Africa is as follows:

Lusaka, Zambia, between 23 and 29 May 1965.

Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, between 30 May and 11 June 1965.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 11 June to 18 June 1965.

In addition to the hearing of petitioners, the items on the agenda of the Special Committee for these meetings will include the following:

- (a) Territories under Portuguese Administration;
- (b) Question of South West Africa;
- (c) Basutoland, Bachuanaland and Swaziland;
- (d) Question of Southern Rhodesia.

APPENDIX II

List of representatives who attended the Special Committee's meetings in Africa

- Australia:
H.E. Mr. Hugh Gilchrist, Mr. A. C. Wilson.
- Bulgaria:
Mr. Baruh Grinberg.
- Cambodia:
H.E. Mr. Huot Sambath.
- Chile:
Mr. Hernán Sánchez.
- Denmark:
Mr. Skjold G. Mellbin.
- Ethiopia:
H.E. Mr. Getachew Mekasha, Mr. Girma Abebe.
- India:
Mr. K. Natwar Singh, Mr. K. N. Gaiid.
- Iran:
Mr. Mohsen S. Esfandiary.
- Iraq:
Mr. Ala'uddin H. Aljubouri.
- Italy:
Mr. Ludovico Carducci-Artensio.
- Ivory Coast:
Mr. Julien Kacou.
- Madagascar:
Mr. Gabriel Rakotoniaina.
- Mali:
H.E. Mr. Sori Coulibaly.
- Poland:
Mr. Kazimierz Smiganowski.
- Sierra Leone:
Mr. G. E. O. Williams.
- Syria:
Mr. Rafic Jouejati.
- Tunisia:
H.E. Mr. A. Kedadi.
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
H.E. Mr. Yacob Malik, H.E. Mr. L. Mendelevich, Mr. P. V. Shakhov, Mr. A. V. Grodsky.
- United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
Mr. F. D. W. Brown, Mr. B. L. Barder, Mr. J. A. Molyneux.
- United Republic of Tanzania:
H.E. Mr. J. W. S. Malecela.
- United States of America:
H.E. Mrs. Marietta Tree, H.E. Mr. Bonsal, Mr. Christopher Thoron, Mr. Ernest C. Grigg, III, Mr. Robert K. German.
- Uruguay: _____
- Venezuela:
Mr. Leonardo Díaz González.
- Yugoslavia:
Mr. Miloš Melovski.

CHAPTER III

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

General

1. Information concerning Southern Rhodesia, as well as an account of action taken in respect of the

Territory, is already contained in the previous report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly. Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.

*Political developments**Test of public opinion on the question of independence*

2. In pursuance of the plans announced on 15 September 1964 by Mr. Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, for the testing of public opinion on the question of independence for the Territory, it was announced on 8 October 1964 that a referendum on the question would be held on 5 November 1964. The referendum would be of all voters registered on the two electoral rolls as at the end of August 1964, and voters would be asked to express themselves in favour of or against independence for Southern Rhodesia on the basis of the present constitution.

3. A bill to provide for the holding of this referendum was passed by the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly on 14 October 1964 by a vote of 31 to 22. During the preceding debate spokesmen for the opposition indicated their basic agreement with the bill, but criticized the formulation of the question to be put to voters in the referendum. They urged that the independence which voters were to be asked to accept should be defined as independence gained by negotiation only and within the Commonwealth. The African members of the Legislative Assembly made statements deploring the idea of independence under the present constitution.

Consultation of chiefs and headmen on the question of independence

4. On 15 October 1964, the Southern Rhodesia Government announced that elements of the regular army had been deployed in rural areas and units of the territorial force mobilized. According to the announcement, this had been done in the interests of public safety, in view of the spread to rural areas of violence and intimidation against Africans.

5. Addressing the Legislative Assembly, on 16 October 1964, about the proposed consultation, Mr. Smith stressed that intimidation in rural areas had been increasing and that, while this state of affairs continued, it would be impossible to elicit individual opinions from Africans in those areas. His Government had therefore decided that African opinion would be consulted through the chiefs and headmen, at meetings similar to those that had taken place in the past in order to ascertain the views of rural Africans.

6. On the same day, Sir Edgar Whitehead, the leader of the Opposition, told the Legislative Assembly that he saw no objection to the practical method of consulting with Africans in rural areas through tribal machinery, but could not accept that the opinions of the chiefs would necessarily be that of the majority of their people. The chiefs, in his submission, should be asked to give not merely their own opinions but also those of their people.

7. An African member of the Legislative Assembly, Mr. Gondo, said that he did not believe that the proposed consultation of chiefs would reflect the attitude of the man in the village. According to him, the chiefs were being coerced into attending the projected *indaba* (conference of chiefs and headmen); the procedure was so rushed and hemmed in with security precautions that the chiefs did not have a chance to talk to their people.

8. On 19 October 1964, the Commonwealth Relations Office in London issued a statement to the effect that the outgoing Government of the United Kingdom

had informed Mr. Smith of its dissatisfaction with the proposed method of consulting African chiefs and headmen. The incoming Government took the same view. It did not consider that such consultation could reveal satisfactory evidence of the wishes of the African population, nor did it find it appropriate in the circumstances to send observers to the *indaba* in response to Mr. Smith's invitation.

9. According to reports, 196 chiefs and 426 headmen gathered for the *indaba* at a government school near Salisbury on 21 October 1964. All cross-roads were closed and only persons issued with special passes could gain admittance. Justifying these measures, Mr. William Harper, Minister of Internal Affairs, stated that the chiefs and headmen might be confused by having other ideas put to them by foreigners. The Southern Rhodesia Government invited all foreign missions in Salisbury to send representatives to the concluding meeting of the *indaba*. Australia, Austria, France, Greece, Norway, Portugal and South Africa are reported to have been represented. The United Kingdom and the United States did not send representatives. A few selected Press observers were also allowed at the *indaba*. On 24 October 1964 the Army and Air Force staged a display, which included a paratroop drop, at the *indaba*; a Southern Rhodesia Government spokesman explained that this was part of the entertainment planned for the chiefs and headmen.

10. It was reported that, at the concluding meeting of the *indaba* on 26 October 1964, Mr. Harper, the Minister of Internal Affairs asked the chiefs and headmen for their decision on the question of cutting the strings that tied Southern Rhodesia to the United Kingdom. In response, spokesmen for the chiefs and headmen stated that the matter had been discussed in the traditional manner and that their decision, which had the support of their people, had been reached in accordance with tribal custom: all of them were in favour of the cutting of strings with the United Kingdom, and desired independence for Southern Rhodesia, so that they could assist the Government to rule the country. They asserted that people from outside the Territory did not and could not understand the country's problems. They stressed the traditional character of this position as leaders and categorically rejected insinuations that, being salaried officials of the Government, their judgement was biased. Finally, they asked that arrangements be made to enable them to be represented in their capacity as chiefs in the Legislative Assembly.

11. Mr. Peter Gray, a member of the opposition who attended the *indaba* was reported as saying on 28 October 1964, that, in his judgement, little value could be placed on the decisions reached there.

Proposal for talks

12. On 24 October 1964, Mr. Harold Wilson, the United Kingdom Prime Minister, invited Mr. Smith to visit London for discussions aiming at a solution to the present problems in Southern Rhodesia. The following day, Mr. Smith declined this invitation, explaining that a meeting at that time would be somewhat premature and suggesting instead that the proposed discussions take place after the test he was conducting of public opinion in the Territory.

13. On 25 October 1964, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, informed the Press that he had expressed to Mr. Smith

the desire to visit Southern Rhodesia if he could meet a cross-section of the people; in particular he had asked to meet Mr. Joshua Nkomo and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, the two African political leaders. Mr. Smith had not been able to agree to this and he would not therefore be visiting Southern Rhodesia.

United Kingdom Government's warning against unconstitutional action

14. On 27 October 1964, the United Kingdom Government issued a statement (see appendix II) warning of the political and economic consequences to Southern Rhodesia that would flow from a unilateral declaration of independence. The statement emphasized that an illegal declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia would bring to an end relationships with the United Kingdom, would cut it off from the rest of the Commonwealth, from most foreign Governments and from international organizations, would inflict disastrous economic damage upon it and would leave it isolated and virtually friendless in a largely hostile continent. The statement also expressed the hope that an early opportunity would be found for discussions with Mr. Smith before any irrevocable steps were taken. The statement was welcomed by other Commonwealth Governments.

15. In a speech on 31 October 1964, Mr. Hendrik Verwoerd, the Prime Minister of South Africa, is reported to have advised Southern Rhodesia to resist interference by the United Kingdom and to determine its own destiny. At the same time, he prescribed courage and patience as vital to the solution of the problems of Southern Rhodesia. He also promised that South Africa would assist Southern Rhodesia wherever possible.

16. On 20 October 1964, the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly adopted a motion taking note of the attitude of the United Kingdom Government towards the independence issue and rejecting any policy leading up to a unilateral declaration of independence based on the forthcoming referendum. In the debate on the motion, Mr. Smith described the United Kingdom Government's statement as blackmail and intimidation, and denied that there was anything original about the measures threatened. If Southern Rhodesia were driven to making a unilateral declaration, it would be because of the latest actions of the United Kingdom Government. He accused the United Kingdom Government of condoning despicable action by the African nationalists aimed at innocent people. Mr. Smith added, however, that his Government would not interpret the forthcoming referendum as a mandate for a unilateral declaration.

17. Sir Edgar Whitehead said that a unilateral declaration would lead to economic collapse, isolation and the advent of an African nationalist Government within six months. At the same time he considered that there was at present no possibility of achieving a negotiated independence. He was in favour of standing by the Constitution and awaiting a more favourable opportunity to negotiate independence.

18. In a television interview the same day, Mr. Smith stated that there would be no unilateral declaration until a full exercise on the pros and cons had been carried out and the facts presented to the public. If the results of this exercise proved that a unilateral

declaration was unwise for Southern Rhodesia, he would accept it. However, he was certain that a majority of the electorate would support a unilateral declaration, but they would require to be shown that it was a wise move.

19. In a speech on 30 October 1964, Mr. Smith reportedly stated that a unilateral declaration of independence would be inevitable, even without the full knowledge and consent of the electorate, if the United Kingdom Government attempted to upset the constitution or to violate what he considered to be the moral contracts binding on that Government. He also announced that his Government had undertaken a fresh examination of the possible effects of a unilateral declaration on the Territory's economy.

20. In an address on 30 October 1964, Mr. Bottomley denied that the United Kingdom statement on the consequences of a unilateral declaration was published in a spirit of hostility to Southern Rhodesia or as an ultimatum; it should not be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of the Territory. The grant of independence would be made only by an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament; and the statement was intended as a considered warning against any attempt to seize independence by rebellion. He was sure the people of Southern Rhodesia had not previously understood the attendant dangers, and the United Kingdom Government had felt it necessary to put the consequences squarely before them.

21. He stressed that what the United Kingdom Government wanted for Southern Rhodesia was a solution reached through discussion and negotiation, which would secure independence on a basis acceptable to the people as a whole. The United Kingdom Government hoped to see a peaceful transition to African majority rule, but did not wish itself to stipulate how this must be achieved or when that stage should be reached. In conclusion, he pointed out that Mr. Harold Wilson's invitation to Mr. Smith to visit London remained open and he hoped it would be possible to discuss the situation with him before long.

22. In a circular letter published on 2 November 1964 Mr. Smith stated that Southern Rhodesians had no hope of survival unless they could unite to sever the strings which tied them to the United Kingdom and which rendered them a pawn at the disposal of the United Kingdom Government. The African chiefs had given their support for independence and they must not be let down.

23. In a statement issued on the same day, the Southern Rhodesia Institute of Directors pointed out that the financial and economic consequences of a unilateral declaration would be disastrous for the whole community. Similar opposition to a unilateral declaration had previously been expressed by the Association of Rhodesian Industries. Subsequently, the Rhodesia Tobacco Association also warned its members that the tobacco industry would be disastrously affected by such a step.

Results of the referendum

24. In the referendum held on 5 November 1964, 58,091 votes were cast in favour of independence on the basis of the present Constitution and 6,096 against. Spoiled papers numbered 944. According to reports the total number of electors registered on the two rolls

is over 105,444, of whom 12,729 are Africans.¹ It is estimated that only 60 per cent of the European electorate participated in the voting; on the basis of a 68 per cent poll during the last elections, a government spokesman had predicted that 70 per cent of the European electorate would vote in the affirmative. According to reports, there was an almost complete boycott of the referendum by African voters.

25. Some Ministers of the Southern Rhodesia Government were reported to feel, contrary to Mr. Smith's assurances that the results of the referendum would not be regarded as a mandate for unilateral independence, that the size of the affirmative vote did provide such a mandate. Mr. Smith himself described the results as a tremendous victory. He attributed African non-participation to intimidation and to lack of interest in the Western system of government.

Invitation to Commonwealth Secretary

26. On 6 November 1964, Mr. Smith sent a message to the United Kingdom Government inviting the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to Salisbury for talks. In reply, Mr. Wilson restated the view that the Commonwealth Secretary would feel it to be his duty, in the event of such a visit, to obtain a cross-section of European and African views. He would accordingly welcome an assurance that the Commonwealth Secretary would be able to meet representatives of all sections of Southern Rhodesia opinions. Failing that he hoped Mr. Smith would be able to visit London for full frank and free talks.

27. On 7 November 1964, Mr. Smith was reported as saying that the Commonwealth Secretary could see anyone who was free to be seen if he visited Southern Rhodesia. It was interpreted to mean the exclusion of Mr. Joshua Nkomo and the Reverend Sithole who were both in prison at that time.

28. On 10 November 1964, Mr. Smith addressed a letter to the United Kingdom Government the contents of which were not disclosed. According to reports, the letter sought an assurance from Mr. Wilson that his Government would not insist on African majority rule as a precedent to independence for Southern Rhodesia. It also reiterated Mr. Smith's stipulation that before he visited London, the United Kingdom Government should indicate that progress can be made, set out its terms for independence and broadly accept the verdict of the referendum and the *indaba*.

29. On 24 November 1964, Mr. Wilson informed the House of Commons that he had pressed Mr. Smith a number of times to come to London for discussions. Following a further unpublished exchange of letters on the question of the usefulness of such a visit, Mr. Wilson told the House of Commons on 21 January 1965, that as it had not been possible to arrange for ministerial talks, he had proposed to Mr. Smith, as an alternative method of finding a way forward, a small all-party mission consisting of senior and experienced members of Parliament. This mission might visit Southern Rhod-

esia in order to obtain first-hand information on the situation. Unfortunately, Mr. Smith did not feel that the proposal would serve a useful purpose. Mr. Smith's subsequent comment on this statement was that in principle he could not have agreed to receive such a mission. Being solely responsible for affairs in the Territory, the Southern Rhodesia Government could supply any information required by the United Kingdom Government.

30. Meanwhile, on 19 January 1965, the Southern Rhodesia Government published a white paper concerning the *indaba* held in October 1964, in which it accused the previous United Kingdom Government of shelving the Rhodesian independence issue in order to avoid embarrassment in the general elections scheduled for that month. According to the white paper, it was reasonable to assume that in declining to send observers to the *indaba* that Government had no real intention of permitting a situation whereby the Southern Rhodesia Government could procure evidence of abundant African support for its claim to independence.

31. On 9 February 1965, Mr. Wilson stated in the House of Commons, in reply to questions, that at conversations which took place during Mr. Smith's visit to London for Sir Winston Churchill's funeral he had suggested to him that the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bottomley, and the Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner, should visit Southern Rhodesia for discussions and to meet a representative cross-section of opinions. The Southern Rhodesia Government had agreed to this visit on the understanding that Mr. Bottomley and Lord Gardiner would be able to see any persons who were not in prison for criminal offences. The visit would last ten days.

32. In response to another question, Mr. Wilson explained that during their visit, Mr. Bottomley and Lord Gardiner would, in addition to meeting representatives of the chiefs, wish to take a more widespread sample of African opinion, since in no country did the views of the chiefs represent the views of the whole population. He added that while his two colleagues would be able to see Mr. Nkomo, who was in restriction, they would not be in a position to see the Reverend Sithole, as he was in prison on criminal charges.

33. The inclusion of Lord Gardiner, who is the head of the United Kingdom judiciary, was thought to have been prompted partly by reports that the Southern Rhodesia Government, on the advice of South African jurists, was considering the making of amendments to the Constitution, which would, in effect, legalize a unilateral declaration of independence. According to these reports, these amendments would replace the present system of direct elections for Africans by one of indirect elections, in order to ensure that the chiefs would become the sole African representatives in the Assembly. Thus, armed with the requisite majority, the Southern Rhodesia Government would seek the passage of other legislation which would invest with constitutional propriety a unilateral declaration of independence. It was thought that during the visit Lord Gardiner would advise the Southern Rhodesia Government that the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 precluded such legislative measures.

Visit by Commonwealth Secretary and Lord Chancellor to Southern Rhodesia

34. On their arrival in Salisbury on 21 February 1965, Mr. Bottomley reiterated that the problems between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia

¹ The numbers of voters registered on the two rolls as at the time of the referendum were as follows:

| | "A" roll | "B" roll |
|-----------------|----------|----------|
| Europeans | 89,278 | 608 |
| Africans | 2,263 | 10,466 |
| Asians | 1,231 | 114 |
| Coloured | 1,308 | 176 |
| TOTAL | 94,080 | 11,364 |

would be solved only by careful and patient negotiation, and on a basis acceptable to the people as a whole. He added that they had come without preconceived ideas or cut-and-dried propositions. It was their wish to explore the whole problem and to hear the opinions of all sections of the people, African and European alike.

35. An *indaba* was convened on 23 February 1965 to enable Mr. Bottomley and Lord Gardiner to acquaint themselves with the views of an assembly of about 200 chiefs and 400 headmen. The spokesmen of the chiefs and headmen expressed serious concern that Mr. Bottomley and Lord Gardiner were proposing to make contact with the nationalist politicians, who, according to them, were wrecking the country with arson, murder and intimidation. They, the chiefs and headmen, were the sole representatives and spokesmen for the African people. They demanded immediate independence under the present Constitution, so that they and the present Southern Rhodesia Government, in which they had full confidence, might together sort out the problems besetting the Territory.

36. Mr. Bottomley and Lord Gardiner also undertook a tour of the agricultural and tribal areas of the Territory, during which they had conversations with some of the associates of the Reverend Sithole as well as with Mr. Nkomo, who had been brought from his place of restriction to another location for the meeting. Mr. Nkomo is reported to have told them that unless the Constitution was replaced by one granting immediate majority rule, he saw no end to the present political crisis in Southern Rhodesia. He accused the Southern Rhodesia Government of preventing the United Kingdom Ministers from visiting him at his place of restriction. He also claimed that there were about 2,000 Africans languishing in restriction camps; this was an illustration of the Rhodesian Front policy of suppressing legitimate African aspirations. The Africans, he stressed, did not regard the Europeans as a separate entity, but as part of the whole population; there was thus no question of granting special privileges to any section or group. As regards the *indaba*, Mr. Nkomo stated that the African people could only feel sadness for the chiefs and headmen who, in his view, were being exploited by their paymasters.

37. In an interview on 1 March 1965 with leaders of the banned Zambabwe African National Union (ZANU), who were under restriction, Mr. Bottomley is reported to have emphasized that Southern Rhodesia is responsible for its own internal affairs, in which the United Kingdom Government had no intention of interfering. He also reiterated that his Government desired a peaceful transition to majority rule, but was not proposing to say when or how.

38. The ZANU leaders told Mr. Bottomley that the only way of preventing violence in the Territory was to convene a constitutional conference, with or without Mr. Smith's agreement, in order to formulate a new constitution based on majority rule. The United Kingdom Government, they asserted, had the legal authority as well as moral obligation to intervene in the constitutional development of the Territory. While they themselves would not encourage their people to take violent action any delay in convening a constitutional conference would increase racial hostility and probably lead to bloodshed. They also urged that the United Kingdom Government should be ready for military intervention, in the event of a unilateral declaration.

39. The United Kingdom Ministers also visited the African townships in Salisbury and conferred with various European personalities including Sir Roy Welensky, Mr. Garfield Todd, Lord Malvern, and Mr. David Butler, the new leader of the Rhodesia Party. They also had a series of talks with Mr. Smith and his cabinet.

Outcome of visit of United Kingdom Ministers

40. At the end of their visit on 3 March 1965, Mr. Bottomley and Lord Gardiner said in a statement to the Press (see appendix III) that their main impression was of a hardening of attitudes among both Europeans and Africans. They were in no doubt about the great desire for independence among the Europeans some of whom were prepared to resort, if negotiations failed, to an unconstitutional seizure of independence. Similarly, the African chiefs, seeing immediate majority rule or immediate independence as the only alternatives open to them, had insisted on the cutting of strings with the United Kingdom without delay. The African nationalists on the other hand, had demanded the immediate convening of a conference to devise a new constitution based on one-man-one-vote. They had also urged military intervention, if necessary, to establish majority rule, as well as the release of all persons in restriction and detention.

41. Explaining the policy of the United Kingdom Government in this context, the statement emphatically denied that the Government wished to impose majority rule upon Southern Rhodesia, in violation of the 1961 constitution and of established convention. While the United Kingdom Government was seeking a peaceful transition to majority rule, it did not seek to stipulate how that goal might be attained or when it might be reached. The United Kingdom Government could not itself act unconstitutionally, by armed force or otherwise, to change the Constitution and it would be useless to call a constitutional conference unless all parties concerned were willing to attend it.

42. According to the statement, the greatest danger to peace and prosperity in the Territory at the present time was the threat of a unilateral declaration, and the steadfast opposition of the United Kingdom Government to such a step had already been made clear. All concerned must therefore address themselves to a sober search for ways by which the current dilemmas could be resolved constitutionally and honourably with a view to the common goal of independence.

43. On 4 March 1965, Mr. Smith expressed the view during a television interview that one notable achievement of the visit by the United Kingdom Ministers was the clear message conveyed to the African nationalists that the United Kingdom was not going to step in and hand over power to them. He denied that anything concrete had come out of the visit; the present position was that it was up to the United Kingdom Government from whom he awaited a further letter, to take the next step. Replying to a question, Mr. Smith stated that if it was in the best interests of the country, his Government would not hesitate to declare independence unilaterally.

44. In a statement to the United Kingdom House of Commons concerning the visit on 8 March 1965 (see appendix IV), Mr. Bottomley reiterated the points contained in his Press statement of 3 March 1965, and remarked that what was lacking in Southern Rhodesia was willingness on the part of Europeans and

Africans alike to discuss and compromise. However, he was not without hope of finding a solution that would win the support of all communities and lead to independence and prosperity for all the people of the Territory. He assured the House that, in the light of a report submitted by him and Lord Gardiner, the Prime Minister would be in communication with Mr. Smith.

45. Replying to questions, Mr. Bottomley informed the House that during his visit he had submitted to the Southern Rhodesia Government proposals for advance towards majority rule, and that in keeping with the recommendations made at the last Commonwealth Conference he had made representations to that Government about the release of persons in detention and restriction.

46. In a statement dated 10 March 1965, commenting on Mr. Bottomley's report to the United Kingdom House of Commons, ZAPU accused the United Kingdom Government of surrendering the initiative to the Southern Rhodesia Government and of allowing itself to lose grip of the situation by stages, under the camouflage of empty protestations in favour of majority rule. The acquiescence of the United Kingdom Government in Mr. Smith's rejection of the suggestion for a constitutional conference was a signal to Africans to resort to unconstitutional means.

Announcement of general elections

47. On 30 March 1965, the Southern Rhodesia Government published an official proclamation announcing that the Legislative Assembly was to be dissolved with effect from that date, and that general elections would be held on 7 May 1965. According to an official statement (see appendix V), the object of the Southern Rhodesia Government was to secure an overwhelming majority in the Assembly in order to strengthen its hand in its negotiations with the United Kingdom Government for independence. It is also believed, according to reports, that the elections would be regarded by the Southern Rhodesia Government as a referendum on the question of a unilateral declaration of independence.

48. The announcement was made within a few hours of the receipt of a letter from Mr. Harold Wilson on the question of independence for Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia official sources reportedly stated that the letter did not contain expected proposals on the independence issue.

Political parties

49. The Reform Group, led by Dr. M. I. Hirsch, which broke away from the Rhodesia National Party (now the Rhodesia Party) earlier in 1964, decided at a meeting held on 28 June 1964 to form themselves into a new party, to be known as the Reform Party. Dr. Hirsch explained that his party's attitude on independence did not coincide with that of either the Rhodesia Front or the Rhodesia National Party.

50. In a subsequent newspaper article, Mr. Hirsch explained that his Party believed with the Government that early independence was vital to the Territory's future progress and welfare and that a negotiated independence should be based on the present constitution. However, in the view of his Party, provision should be made for representation of unenfranchised groups in the population by indirect elections, including representation by chiefs, to an extent that would not endanger the standard of operation in Parliament. He also ad-

vocated the forfeiture of Southern Rhodesia's right to membership in the Commonwealth, if this proved a hindrance to the attainment of independence. These measures, he believed, would strengthen Southern Rhodesia's bargaining position in negotiations for independence and provide the moral justification for a unilateral declaration, if negotiations broke down.

51. It was reported that a new political party, the All African Peoples Party was established in Salisbury on 2 November 1964 by its President-General, Mr. Thompson Gonese. The Secretary-General is Mr. D. M. Matimba. A policy statement issued by the party called for the release of all nationalist leaders in detention or restriction, rejection of the referendum, and the convening of a constitutional conference to bring about African majority rule.

52. Sir Roy Welensky resigned from the leadership of the Rhodesia Party and announced his withdrawal from politics on 19 December 1964. In his letter of resignation, he explained that, as he required several months to recuperate from a recent surgical operation he would be unable to play an active part in the important period ahead. He still maintained his belief that a negotiated independence on a reasonable basis was possible and that there should be an organized opposition to the Government.

53. Sir Roy Welensky was succeeded on 11 February 1965 by Mr. David Butler, who defeated Sir Edgar Whitehead in a secret ballot at a convention called to elect a new leader of the Rhodesian Party. In a statement following his election, Mr. Butler expressed his continued support of the present Constitution and franchise, and condemned those Africans who, according to him, pursued their objectives by revolution or unconstitutional means. His feeling was that the Rhodesia Front Government intended to introduce into the Territory the full rigors of *apartheid* and to destroy the Constitution in order to halt the gradual assimilation of the Africans. In his opinion there was a danger that, in these circumstances, the educated Africans would turn to communism and to revolution. A unilateral declaration of independence would lead to economic chaos, emigration and the early introduction of an African nationalist Government. The future of the Territory did not, in his view, lie in becoming an economic satellite of South Africa and Portugal, which would be the only hope in the event of a unilateral declaration.

Relations with Portugal and South Africa

54. It was announced in December 1964 that Southern Rhodesian and Portuguese delegates had reached complete agreement in discussions in Salisbury about a trade pact between the two Governments, and that the ground had been prepared for further negotiations about closer co-operation. A subsequent meeting took place which led to the signing on 24 February 1965 of a five-year agreement providing for closer trading ties between Southern Rhodesia and Portugal as well as Mozambique and Angola.

55. On 30 November 1964, a new trade agreement between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was signed, providing for preferential tariff treatment in both directions between the parties concerned. An official statement said that the agreement would come into force immediately and would run at least until 31 December 1969. It reflected the determination of both Governments to bring about considerable expansion

in trade and the closest possible economic relationships. So far as Southern Rhodesia is concerned, the agreement was expected to offset lost markets in the African countries to the north. It was unofficially estimated that exports to South Africa would rise by between £5 to £10 million as a result of this agreement.

Developments concerning security

56. The General Officer commanding the Southern Rhodesian armed forces, Major General Anderson, was retired on 23 October 1964, reportedly on account of his age. He himself maintained however that he was dismissed because he had refused to support a possible unilateral declaration. On 29 October 1964, Mr. Smith denied this assertion; he possessed a letter signed by General Anderson stating that he would support a unilateral declaration in certain circumstances.

57. On 12 November 1964, the Southern Rhodesia High Court ruled that the Act under which Mr. Nkomo and sixteen of his aides were kept in preventive detention was inconsistent with the Territory's Bill of Rights and that their detention was therefore illegal. Mr. Nkomo had been under detention since he completed a term in prison for subversion a few weeks earlier. The High Court, however, agreed to suspend the court orders invalidating their detention, pending an application by the Government for leave to appeal to the Privy Council. This application was subsequently granted. On 16 November 1964, Mr. Nkomo and his associates were removed from preventive detention and placed under restriction in an area near the Mozambique border, 440 miles from Salisbury.

58. On 3 December 1964, the Minister of Law and Order, Mr. Lardner-Burke informed the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly that there were 1,936 people restricted or detained under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Harare and Highfield emergency regulations.

59. On 7 December 1964, the Legislative Assembly adopted an amendment to the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, which made the possession of a grenade or bomb punishable by death, and the possession of any other offensive weapon punishable by a maximum of twenty years' imprisonment. According to Mr. Lardner-Burke, there had occurred thirty-two incidents involving the use of grenades over the preceding thirteen months and two bomb attacks within the preceding three days.

60. On 7 January 1965, the state of emergency declared in the African township of Harare three months earlier was extended for a further three months by a government order. A motion to enable this to be done was approved by the Legislative Assembly during December 1964. Mr. Lardner-Burke told the Assembly at the time that though political crime had been stamped out, it was necessary to continue the state of emergency in order to maintain a peaceful situation.

61. On 16 January 1965, the Rev. Sithole won a High Court appeal against his conviction under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act during September 1964 on a charge of publishing a subversive pamphlet. However, he has not completed serving a twelve month prison sentence imposed on him in May 1964 after his conviction on a charge of publishing a subversive circular.

62. On 18 February 1965 the Legislative Assembly agreed to a three-month extension of the state of emergency for the Highfield African township. In seek-

ing the extension Mr. Lardner-Burke informed the Assembly that there had recently been a resurgence of violence in the township, which had probably been staged for the benefit of the visiting United Kingdom Ministers.

Other developments

63. On 17 November 1964, more than 400 African labourers rioted at a construction camp in the Nuenetsi region of Southern Rhodesia, near the area where Mr. Nkomo was being kept under restriction. According to the police, an African who had been dismissed for drunkenness attacked a European employee, who then shot the African; the subsequent death of the African in hospital had touched off the riot. More than 300 persons were detained in connexion with the incident.

64. During November 1964, the Southern Rhodesia Government took steps with a view to assuming full control over the privately owned Rhodesia Television (RTV). In a television interview on 27 November 1964, Mr. Smith explained that, television being the strongest propaganda weapon in existence, the Government would be irresponsible if it did not ensure that RTV was maintained in responsible hands. There would otherwise be no guarantee, according to him, that communist sympathisers could not gain control of RTV. Arrangements were accordingly being made for the government-controlled Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation to take over a controlling interest in the shares of RTV.

65. A Southern Rhodesia Government spokesman announced in November 1964 that his Government had under study a detailed blue-print of a massive immigration scheme which would provide for assisted passages, the speeding of immigration selection and re-settlement, and intensive propaganda to sell the image of Rhodesia overseas. Immigrants would, in return for the facilities envisaged, be expected to remain in the Territory for at least three years. It is estimated that during the first nine months of 1964, some 10,500 Europeans emigrated from Southern Rhodesia to South Africa.

66. It was announced on 21 December 1964 that the general overseas news service of the British Broadcasting Corporation in London, relayed every morning by the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation (RBC), would be discontinued from 1 January 1965 in favour of the Southern African Broadcasting Corporation news relayed from South Africa. Explaining this decision, the Director General of RBC said that it had no political overtones; reception of BBC news from London had recently been bad and further it was deemed wise to have a wider selection of news broadcasts.

67. On 7 January 1965, the *Gonakudzaiingwa News*, a six-page duplicated weekly newspaper published by Mr. Nkomo and his associates from their place of restriction, was banned after one issue. Other publications banned at the same time were *Africa and the World*, a monthly magazine published in London, *Spotlight on South Africa*, a sheet issued by the African National Congress of South Africa, and *Toward Angolan Independence*, the report of a seminar held by the World Assembly of Youth on Angola. The African edition of *Ebony*, a magazine published from the United States, the September 1964 issue of which contained an article about Mr. Nkomo, had previously been banned during November 1964 as was the *Central African Mail*, a weekly newspaper published in Zambia.

B. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

68. The Special Committee considered the question of Southern Rhodesia at its 320th to 328th meetings held in New York between 6 and 22 April 1965.² The Special Committee had before it the report of the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia which is appended to this chapter (appendix I). The report was introduced by the Chairman of the Sub-Committee at the 320th meeting of the Special Committee on 6 April 1965.

Written petitions and hearings

69. The Special Committee also had before it the following written petitions concerning Southern Rhodesia:

| <i>Petitioner</i> | <i>Document No.</i> |
|--|---------------------|
| Mr. G. B. Nyandoro, Secretary-General, Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) | A/AC.109/PET.373 |
| Mr. Luis Padilla, Secretary, World Federation of Free Trade Unions (WFTU) | A/AC.109/PET.374 |

70. The Special Committee also heard the following petitioners concerning Southern Rhodesia:

| | |
|---|------------------|
| Mr. Nathan Shamuyarira and Mr. James Mutambirwa | A/AC.109/PET.375 |
|---|------------------|

71. Mr. Shamuyarira said that it was now quite clear that Mr. Smith, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, was determined to seize independence for Southern Rhodesia's white settlers, while the United Kingdom Government's cowardly and futile objective was merely to prevent that happening. The United Kingdom Government had threatened to apply economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in the event of such a unilateral declaration of independence. The Africans of Southern Rhodesia contended, however, first that Mr. Smith was in effect declaring independence in the elections scheduled for 7 May; secondly, that in taking that step he was contravening parts of the 1961 Constitution; and thirdly, that the United Kingdom was fully informed about Mr. Smith's moves and was either acquiescing or in fact participating through its deliberate inaction. The Africans no longer believed the United Kingdom's assertion that it was determined to bring majority rule to Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Smith hoped to achieve two objectives as a result of the forthcoming elections: first, to establish Southern Rhodesia as a permanent home for a dominant white minority; secondly, to remove the African vote where it existed and to deny it where it did not exist. Those objectives had been clearly proclaimed in a number of statements by Mr. Smith and others in a document prepared by the Chairman of the Rhodesian Front. Moreover, Mr. Smith had been advised by professors of the University of South Africa that he should not declare independence unilaterally, since that would give the United Kingdom or the United Nations an excuse to send in troops and possibly remove white control, but that he should first obtain a two-thirds majority for his party in Parliament and then force through a motion stating that the country wished to be independent; his advisers were confident that the United Kingdom Government would not veto that motion.

72. Mr. Smith had admitted that one of his reasons for holding elections was to remove the cross voting on the A and B rolls. The system of cross voting, which was the very basis of the 1961 Constitution, was designed to palliate to some small extent the denial of voting rights to the indigenous inhabitants by permitting the 12,000 Africans on the B roll to vote not only for the fifteen Members of Parliament elected on that roll, but also for the fifty Members elected on the A roll. By eliminating the system of cross voting, Mr. Smith would not only be whittling away what small influence the African voters had and removing the spirit of compromise of the 1961 Constitution, but violating the letter of section 111 of that Constitution, which stipulated that certain clauses could not be changed without the agreement of the United Kingdom or without a referendum of the four racial groups voting separately. He hoped that the Special Committee would give that point serious consideration.

73. The second fundamental point in the coming elections was the position of the Chiefs. Mr. Smith planned to replace the fifteen Members of Parliament at present elected on the B roll by Chiefs. His strategy for achieving that was that his party would not put forward any candidates for election on the B roll, but would declare the independent members elected on that roll to be unrepresentative and would call for their replacement by the Chiefs, who allegedly represented the mass of the Africans. It would then be only a matter of time before the Chiefs were removed from Parliament and placed in a separate Assembly. The present Government of Southern Rhodesia had already induced the Chiefs to pass a resolution stating that they should send representatives to Parliament instead of representatives being elected on the B roll. Such a system which was very similar to that in use in South Africa, would bring the territory one step closer to *apartheid*.

74. Mr. Smith was also using more direct methods to destroy African resistance to his policies. Nineteen Africans were in the death cells in Salisbury, while numbers of African nationalists were being beaten and tortured in prison. It was unfortunate that Mr. Bottomley and Lord Gardiner had failed to visit the restriction areas when they had been in Southern Rhodesia and had thus forfeited the confidence of the African population.

75. Among the steps taken by the Smith Government to promote its dream of a white Southern Africa were the encouragement of white immigration to Southern Rhodesia, joint army and police training exercises, the construction of a direct railway line between Salisbury and Pretoria, and the preparations to sign a defence pact with South Africa, Mozambique and Angola.

76. The United Kingdom and the United Nations should do everything in their power to reverse the trend of events in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom Government had said that it would apply economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia if independence was declared unilaterally. Mr. Smith realized, however, that he could obtain what he wanted without a unilateral declaration of independence. Instead of waiting for such a declaration, the United Kingdom should use the Colonial Laws Validity Act to invalidate the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia, thereby cancelling the elections, and to introduce a series of temporary decrees for governing the area while a new constitution was discussed by the Africans and European

² See sections E and F for an account of the discussions on Southern Rhodesia which took place at subsequent meetings of the Special Committee.

representatives of Southern Rhodesia. If Mr. Smith refused to renounce the illegality and unconstitutionality towards which he was moving, the United Kingdom Government should send in troops to maintain law and order and should call on the loyal citizens of Southern Rhodesia to support it. If it did that, it would find all the country's 4 million Africans on its side, together with a large number of the settlers.

77. The Africans of Southern Rhodesia would never give up the fight for their rights. If the United Kingdom and the United Nations did nothing to assist them, they would be obliged to take whatever action they saw fit to redress the situation. A crisis of grave magnitude was developing and the Special Committee and the Security Council should prepare to deal with it.

78. Mr. Mutambirwa said that the Chiefs, who had been summoned to meetings on a few occasions by the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia to demonstrate their support of his policies, were no longer the spokesmen of the African people but were merely paid civil servants, whose duty was to carry out the wishes of the Government. The political power of the Chiefs had been destroyed at the time of the Mashongi rebellion of 1896; when Southern Rhodesia had been granted so-called self-government in 1923 they had become instruments for transmitting government policy to the rural Africans and ensuring government control over a vast area. If for any reason, political or other, a Chief no longer carried out the functions of a civil servant in a satisfactory manner, he was dismissed; according to the reports of the Chief Native Commissioners, at least fourteen Chiefs had been deposed between 1925 and 1944, and the Minister of Internal Affairs had stated in October 1964 that nineteen had been deposed between 1945 and 1964.

79. Thus, it was absurd for the Prime Minister to say that Chiefs were the spokesmen of the African people. Past reports of the Chief Native Commissioners had described many of them as lethargic, senile, opposed to new ideas and of little use administratively—statements which clearly showed the contempt of the Whites for those who, according to the Prime Minister, were the only politically mature representatives of the Africans. He wondered why popular leaders should have to hold their meetings surrounded by police and armed troops.

80. It should be noted that the few Chiefs who had known the purpose of the meetings called by the Prime Minister and who had refused to attend were now under restriction, as were those who had advised them to have nothing to do with the meetings until all political prisoners had been freed. At the same time, Chiefs who agreed, or were forced to agree, with government policy were free to dine in white hotels and were sent abroad to praise the Smith Government. The Chief Native Commissioner had said of the Chiefs' Council formed in 1961, that the statutory recognition of a structure and function which had been aimed at for years did not mean that the Government intended to turn Chiefs into politicians.

81. It was not surprising, therefore, that the majority of Africans did not regard the Chiefs as their representatives. Political change throughout Africa had been ushered in by nationalists, not by Chiefs. By acquiescing in the Smith Government, the Chiefs had made themselves unpalatable to the majority of Africans; many of them were now afraid to live among their own people and had asked for Government protection and

were living in a government rest-house. Several Chiefs, aware of the deep resentment which their participation in the meetings called by the Prime Minister aroused, had written to nationalists stating that they had disagreed with government policy but had been threatened by the Government. Most Africans, however, regarded the Chiefs as agents of a monstrous and vicious system which would destroy the African people, including the Chiefs.

82. He wished to bring to the Committee's attention the sufferings and hardships which restriction and detention had brought to the wives and children of those detained. Many had been evicted from their homes because they could not pay the rent, many children had left school because their fees could not be paid, and the Government was intimidating anyone who might wish to employ the wives. By such activities, the white minority Government was creating an inflammatory situation which might lead to bloodshed. He hoped that the United Nations would be able to forestall such a tragedy.

General statements by members

83. In introducing the report of the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia (see appendix I), the Chairman stated that the Sub-Committee had been deeply concerned at recent developments in Southern Rhodesia, particularly the decision of the minority Government to dissolve the Parliament of the Territory and organize new elections on the basis of the present Constitution. The Sub-Committee had therefore recommended that the question of Southern Rhodesia should be considered by the Special Committee as a matter of urgency.

84. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation wished to give the Committee an account of recent developments in Southern Rhodesia in the spheres in which his Government had responsibility, without prejudice to his Government's position concerning discussion of the subject. The authority and responsibility for bringing Rhodesia forward to independence rested with the United Kingdom Government and its view that the United Nations had no competence to discuss Rhodesian affairs was well known.

85. In the statement made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on 27 October 1964, the full text of which had been read to the Committee on that same day by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Wilson had expressed the hope that an early opportunity would be found for discussions with the Prime Minister of Rhodesia. On 17 November Mr. Wilson had confirmed in the House of Commons that his invitation to Mr. Smith to come to London remained open. He had also repeated that the basis of the United Kingdom Government's approach to the problem was the *communiqué* of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in July 1964 (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. III, app. V).

86. On 21 January 1965, Mr. Wilson had told Parliament that it had not so far been possible to arrange ministerial talks and that he had already proposed a parliamentary delegation to the Prime Minister of Rhodesia as an alternative method of finding a way forward. He had suggested a small all-party mission of senior and experienced members of the United Kingdom Parliament to acquaint themselves with the situation at first hand. Unfortunately, Mr. Smith had not felt that such a mission would serve a useful purpose.

87. Subsequently, however, Mr. Smith had come to London for the funeral of Sir Winston Churchill and had had a discussion with Mr. Wilson. From that discussion had emerged a proposal which the Prime Minister had announced in the House of Commons on 9 February 1965. Mr. Wilson had told the House that the Rhodesian Government had agreed to his suggestion that Mr. Bottomley, the Commonwealth Secretary, and Lord Gardiner, the Lord Chancellor, should visit Rhodesia to have discussions with the Rhodesian Government and to meet a representative cross-section of opinion. Mr. Wilson had said, in reply to questions that he would have preferred to send a Commonwealth mission of senior Commonwealth statesmen, since the difficult problems facing Rhodesia affected the whole Commonwealth and not only the United Kingdom, but that that had not been acceptable. Mr. Wilson had been asked whether the two Ministers would meet African Chiefs as well as African politicians and whether any distinction would be made between those whom they would be able to meet and those whom they would be unable to meet because they were under restriction or in prison. In reply to the first question the Prime Minister had said that the Ministers would wish to meet representatives of the Chiefs, whose views had of course been taken at the *indaba*. He had added that they would wish to take a more widespread sample of African opinion because in no country was it true that the views of the Chiefs represented the views of the whole population. To the second question Mr. Wilson had replied that the United Kingdom would not have put forward or agreed to the proposed visit unless it had felt that all sections of opinion in Rhodesia could be met and their views taken by the Ministers.

88. Mr. Wilson had also explained that the Ministers would not meet those in prison for criminal offences, even though he recognized that Rhodesian laws sometimes differed from British laws. There would, however, be no restriction affecting meetings between the Ministers and political leaders whose detention or presence in a restricted area was not the result of a criminal conviction. Thus the Ministers would be able to see Mr. Nkomo but not Mr. Sithole, who was still in prison. They would, however, be able to see lieutenants of Mr. Sithole and to get a fair picture of African opinion in Rhodesia.

89. The visit of Lord Gardiner and Mr. Bottomley to Rhodesia had taken place from 21 February to 3 March 1965. On the day of their departure from Salisbury at the end of their visit, Mr. Bottomley had made a full statement. He had said that the Ministers' visit to Rhodesia had provided the opportunity both to hold discussions with the Rhodesian Government and to hear the views of all sections of the population. They had had a full programme and their only regret was that it had not been possible for them to see everybody who had wished to meet them. They regretted that there had been no time available for a large number of individuals and bodies of all kinds who had asked for interviews. They had, however, talked with a wide range of representative opinion.

90. The main impression which the Ministers had received was that of a recent hardening of attitudes amongst both Europeans and Africans. They had singled out for particular mention the views that had been put to them by different groups of Europeans, by the Chiefs and by the African nationalists. They were in no doubt about, and fully understood the reasons for,

the great desire for independence on the part of the bulk of the European population. There had been forty years of self-government; many other countries in Africa had attained independence; and European initiative, energy, knowledge and capital had contributed so much to the massive economic development of the country. Some Europeans had told them that they considered independence to be such an urgent necessity that it must be taken unilaterally and unconstitutionally if it could not be negotiated quickly, but a majority of white Rhodesians to whom the Ministers had spoken were anxious that independence should be attained lawfully, peacefully and in a manner which would preserve friendly relations with the United Kingdom and other countries inside and outside the Commonwealth.

91. The Chiefs had emphasized to the two Ministers the importance of their position in the life of the country as the traditional leaders of their people. They felt themselves to be threatened by the political activities of the younger generation of Africans who had subjected them and their people to intimidation and violence. The Ministers understood that the Chiefs believed immediate majority rule or immediate independence to be the only alternatives open to Rhodesia. The Chiefs also believed that the United Kingdom Government favoured the African nationalists and they therefore insisted that the right course was immediate independence.

92. Mr. Bottomley had also said that the African nationalist representatives of both the ZAPU and the ZANU parties, as also many other Africans, had demanded that the United Kingdom Government should agree to a new constitution based upon the principle of one man, one vote, and should call an immediate conference for that purpose. They considered that the United Kingdom Government should, if necessary, use armed force to intervene in Rhodesia's affairs and establish majority rule; they also wanted the United Kingdom Government to press the Rhodesian Government for the release of all persons in restriction and detention.

93. Mr. Bottomley's statement made it clear that he and Lord Gardiner had found many grievous misunderstandings among Europeans, Chiefs and African nationalists about United Kingdom policy. They had therefore taken the opportunity to explain that policy. They had said that the United Kingdom Government did not propose to impose immediate majority rule upon Rhodesia. The electorate of Rhodesia had accepted the principle of eventual majority rule when they had approved the 1961 Constitution. The real issue was the period of transition to majority rule and the timing of independence. To attempt to impose a solution of those problems unilaterally would be to violate the 1961 Constitution and the established convention that the United Kingdom Parliament, except with the agreement of the Rhodesian Government, did not legislate on matters within the competence of the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly.

94. Mr. Bottomley had emphasized that the granting of independence was, constitutionally, a matter for the United Kingdom Government and Parliament. In seeking a peaceful transition to majority rule, that Government was not stipulating how and when that stage might be reached. Mr. Bottomley had also emphasized that the United Kingdom Government was completely opposed to unlawful and unconstitutionally acts of all

kinds. He had made it clear to the African nationalist leaders that the United Kingdom Government utterly condemned intimidation and violence. Those leaders had told him that they too were opposed to the use of such methods.

95. The Ministers had explained to the African nationalist leaders that the United Kingdom could not, whether by armed force or otherwise, act unconstitutionally to change the present Constitution. They had pointed out that it would serve no purpose to call a constitutional conference unless all parties concerned were willing to take part. They had made equally clear to the Rhodesian Government the strong opposition of the United Kingdom Government to unconstitutional action in the form of a unilateral declaration of independence which, they believed, was the greatest danger to the peace prosperity of Rhodesia at the present time.

96. In his concluding remarks, Mr. Bottomley had said that he and Lord Gardiner were deeply conscious of the hopes of Rhodesians of all colours and classes that, despite the hardening of attitudes, some way forward could be found to reassure both those Africans who felt themselves denied full political and human rights and those Europeans who feared losing what they had earned. The Ministers believed that all concerned should address themselves to a sober search for ways by which uncertainties could be removed, the current dilemmas resolved constitutionally and honourably, and the common goal of independence achieved.

97. On his return to the United Kingdom, Mr. Bottomley had made a similar statement in the House of Commons on 8 March 1965. He had referred to his meetings with Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Takawira, Mr. Sithole's second-in-command, and had outlined the points of view and demands of the various sections of opinion in Rhodesia. He had said that what was lacking was willingness on the part of Africans and Europeans alike to discuss and compromise. The fate of Rhodesians of all colours and classes lay largely in their own hands. Illegal action from any quarter would be calamitous. The problem must be solved by negotiation. Mr. Bottomley had concluded his statement by saying that he was not without hope of finding a way towards a solution that would win the support of all communities and lead to independence and prosperity for all Rhodesians. Mr. Bottomley had told the House that he and Lord Gardiner had made a report to the Prime Minister and that Mr. Wilson would be in touch with the Rhodesian Prime Minister.

98. Later, in reply to questions, Mr. Bottomley had reaffirmed that the United Kingdom, as he had made quite clear in Rhodesia, would not disturb the convention whereby it had undertaken not to interfere in the internal affairs of Rhodesia. But he had made it quite clear also that the United Kingdom Parliament had the final responsibility about whether a constitutional change to independence should be made. With regard to the future, Mr. Bottomley had said that before he had gone to Rhodesia it had certainly looked as though the doors were closed completely, but that now they were a little ajar and he hoped that it would be possible to continue discussions from now onwards.

99. Members of the Special Committee would know of the announcement made by the Rhodesian Government on 30 March that the Rhodesian Parliament was to be dissolved and that fresh elections under the present Constitution were to take place on 7 May. That decision was, of course, entirely one for the Rhodesian Government. It was an internal matter in

which, under the Constitution, the United Kingdom Government had no responsibility or authority. The United Kingdom Government would naturally follow the course of events during the election campaign with close attention. It did not think that the prospects for the negotiation of a peaceful settlement had been materially affected by the decision to hold elections at that time. Nor did it appear that the decision was in any way connected with the correspondence between the United Kingdom and Rhodesian Prime Ministers.

100. In his statement about the new elections, issued on 31 March 1965 (see appendix V below), Mr. Smith had pointed out that negotiations between himself and Mr. Wilson in London were still taking place and he had repeated his assurance that no unilateral declaration of independence was contemplated while those negotiations were in progress.

101. The Special Committee could see from the above account that since coming into office in October 1964 the United Kingdom Government had been constantly active in trying to find a peaceful way forward, by negotiation and discussion, towards a solution which would be acceptable to the people of the country as a whole. His Government was convinced that while the possibility of progress by peaceful negotiation remained open, as it did, it would be an abdication of responsibility and a betrayal of all the people of Rhodesia, whatever the colour of their skins, to take or precipitate violence or unconstitutional action of any kind. The United Kingdom Government had made clear in its statement of October 1964 the consequences for Rhodesia of a unilateral declaration of independence. Violent or unconstitutional action from any quarter would be calamitous. Wise and reasonable counsel must prevail if a peaceful solution was to be found. The responsibility for refraining from violent or unconstitutional action rested on all and it was the hope of his Government that all those who were concerned about and interested in that problem would do all they could in what they said and did to encourage restraint and thus to help remove obstacles to a settlement by peaceful negotiations whereby all Rhodesians might realize the great promise of their country.

102. The representative of Denmark said that his Government regarded the situation in Southern Rhodesia with great concern. He had already stated his delegation's opinion that the *indaba* that had been held had been totally inadequate; that opinion was shared not only by the African opposition in Southern Rhodesia but by the European opposition there, as also by the United Kingdom Government. The *indaba* had not by any means represented the opinion of the entire African population, for it had been inaccessible to everyone who had not been invited to it. The results had been exactly what the minority Government had wanted: a display of unanimity behind the position of the Government.

103. Another factor that caused his Government concern was the growing influence of South Africa in Southern Rhodesia. An example of that was the interference of South African jurists in Southern Rhodesian constitutional affairs, in the form of advice on the introduction of indirect elections for the African voters, in direct contravention of the principle of one man, one vote. He trusted that it had been made clear that the United Kingdom Government would not tolerate the introduction of such a system, which was in flagrant contradiction of a long-standing democratic tradition in the United Kingdom.

104. It was also disquieting that the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister had repeatedly stated his intention of declaring independence unilaterally, ignoring serious warnings from many quarters, including the unambiguous statement by the United Kingdom Government.

105. The Danish delegation had stated in October 1964 that the referendum to be held in November 1964 was completely unacceptable, and the conditions in which the referendum had been held had proved it to be right. Of a population of some 4 million, only about 100,000 people had been qualified to vote, among them only 12,000 of an African population of 3.7 million.

106. His delegation had been disappointed by Mr. Bottomley's statement that, while the United Kingdom wanted a peaceful transition to majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, it did not propose to say when or how. That had been interpreted by the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister as a clear message to the African nationalists that the United Kingdom did not intend to step in and hand power to them. The Southern Rhodesian Government was now going to stage elections with the officially declared aim of securing an overwhelming strength in Parliament as a backing in its discussions with the United Kingdom Government, and the elections were to be regarded as a referendum on a unilateral declaration of independence. Added to all those disturbing trends was the news that the Southern Rhodesian Government had taken steps to assume full control over television in that country and that the South African Radio was replacing the British Broadcasting Corporation in the Southern Rhodesian news broadcasts, a development which could only further the influence of the *apartheid* régime on Southern Rhodesian opinion.

107. As against those discouraging facts, there were only a few encouraging ones. The straightforward warning that the United Kingdom Prime Minister had given the Southern Rhodesian Government was still valid, as was the official motion of the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly taking note of that warning and rejecting any policy leading to a unilateral declaration of independence based on the referendum of November 1964. It was also encouraging that the United Kingdom Government had had an opportunity to exert its moderating influence and to gain an impression of the opinion of all groups in the Territory through the visit of two of its Ministers, and that after their visit those two Ministers had expressed the opinion that despite the many difficulties it should be possible to find a solution acceptable to the whole population. It was encouraging, too, that the European opposition in Southern Rhodesia dissociated itself from the introduction of any policy on the lines of *apartheid* in Southern Rhodesia and from a unilateral declaration of independence.

108. Although those positive elements were overshadowed by the negative ones, his Government still took it for granted that the Southern Rhodesian Government would not use its anticipated victory in the forthcoming elections as a pretext for a unilateral declaration of independence. It had noted the repeated statement that the United Kingdom Government had no constitutional power to intervene directly in the internal affairs of Southern Rhodesia, but it was confident that the United Kingdom Government would exert every possible influence to promote the development of a democratic system in Southern Rhodesia and to prevent the minority Government from taking extreme political steps. His Government would welcome

further assurances to that effect from the United Kingdom Government.

109. The representative of Sierra Leone said that his delegation considered that a situation of grave emergency had developed in Southern Rhodesia as a result of the Prime Minister's avowed intention of dissolving Parliament and holding further elections. That was a move of grave implications and a cause of serious concern to the majority of African peoples, who had hoped, from the many assurances given by the United Kingdom Government, that the principle of majority rule for Southern Rhodesia had been accepted, that a unilateral declaration of independence would be considered illegal and that no new steps would be taken under the existing Constitution.

110. The action of the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister constituted an unwarrantable provocation of the African peoples and placed an almost unbearable strain on the patience of those who would counsel moderation on the part of the Africans of Southern Rhodesia. The change in the United Kingdom from a Conservative Government, which many had considered too patient with the white majority régime in Southern Rhodesia, to a Labour Government, which seemed to be more concerned about the fate of the Africans, had encouraged the hope that there might be some improvement in the situation, and the visit of the United Kingdom Commonwealth Secretary and Lord Chancellor to Southern Rhodesia had accordingly been welcomed. Unfortunately it did not appear from the statement by the United Kingdom representative that any progress had been made. The Committee had heard only a repetition of the familiar United Kingdom arguments: the United Kingdom representative had informed the Committee that his Government did not intend to impose majority rule upon Southern Rhodesia immediately, that the electorate of Southern Rhodesia had accepted the principle of majority rule under the 1961 Constitution and that the issue was the transition to majority rule and the timing of independence. The United Kingdom Government was apparently still basing its position on the 1961 Constitution, which had been universally condemned. The electorate that had accepted that Constitution had been composed of the white minority; it was common knowledge that the African majority had completely rejected it.

111. It was the solemn duty of his delegation to remind the United Kingdom Government of its responsibilities and obligations to the African majority of Southern Rhodesia. The argument that Southern Rhodesia had been self-governing for forty years was not convincing. If there was a constitutional situation which placed the African majority at a great disadvantage, it was disingenuous to invoke constitutional arguments as a pretext for taking no action. If the United Kingdom, in the discharge of its responsibilities, had allowed a situation to develop which now operated against the interests of the African majority, it should squarely accept the blame for that development. The denial of justice and democratic rights to the Africans of Southern Rhodesia had created an explosive situation, not only in that country but in the whole of Africa.

112. His delegation had asked to speak at that early stage of the debate in order to record the disappointment with which it had received the statement that the United Kingdom representative had made at the 320th meeting. It had hoped to hear some useful declaration of the United Kingdom's reply to the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister's declaration of his intention

to press on with his policy of denying the African majority their rights. Grieved as it had been to see that challenge unheeded, it still hoped that the United Kingdom Government, even at that late hour, would come forward with fresh initiatives that would lead to a just solution of the problem and would show that a multiracial society, based on respect for the rights of all the people of Southern Rhodesia, was still possible in that territory.

113. The representative of United Republic of Tanzania observed that the statement made by the United Kingdom representative at the preceding meeting (see paras. 84-101 above) contained little more than the warning issued by the United Kingdom Prime Minister on 27 October 1964. His delegation was disappointed to note that, despite the change of Government in the United Kingdom, the Committee was still faced with the same arguments, including the argument that the United Nations was not competent to discuss the Rhodesian issue. The adoption of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1747 (XVI) was an indication that world opinion disagreed with the United Kingdom on that point. In any event, the question was not that of the competence of the United Nations; the question was whether the resolutions of the General Assembly on decolonization were being faithfully carried out by the United Kingdom as the administering Power for Rhodesia. The United Kingdom Government must be reminded of its unfulfilled responsibilities towards the African people of Rhodesia and of its full responsibility for the present situation in Rhodesia, where the establishment of the existing minority régime had been the outcome of that Government's so-called constitutional conferences, at which the Africans had not been represented. World public opinion would continue to condemn the United Kingdom Government until the situation in Rhodesia was rectified.

114. He hoped that the United Kingdom Government, whose representative had stated at the previous meeting that it held the authority and responsibility for bringing Rhodesia to independence, would exercise that authority urgently and immediately, so that the African majority of Rhodesia could exercise their rights to independence and thus avert the dangers inherent in the existing explosive situation. It was the duty of the United Kingdom Government to ensure that constitutional development in Rhodesia was such as to lead to independence with majority rule and it saw no reason why that Government should not call a constitutional convention to achieve that purpose.

115. Apart from the evils of the 1961 Constitution, there were certain facts which had given rise to great apprehension concerning the intentions of the United Kingdom Government with regard to Rhodesia. That Government had remained silent in the face of the repressive and savage laws passed by the Smith minority régime, the suppression of Africans by killing or imprisonment and the gaoling of practically all the known African leaders; to Mr. Smith's brazen threat of a unilateral declaration of independence it had opposed only words, not deeds; when the Commonwealth Secretary had visited Rhodesia, he had met the same brain-washed puppet chiefs who had betrayed the cause of the African people's freedom at the *indaba*, although the United Kingdom Government had refused to send a representative to that conference; lastly, and perhaps most important, with regard to the dissolving of Parliament in Rhodesia and the holding of elections by Mr. Smith's régime, the United Kingdom Govern-

ment's response had been nothing more than the assurances given by the Prime Minister on 27 October 1964.

116. The acts of the Smith régime had culminated in the calling of the so-called *indaba* of a chosen set of puppet chiefs and headmen paid by the régime. The preparations for the *indaba* had included the calling up of the reservists of the army composed of ruthless racists, the seclusion of the chiefs and headmen from journalists and the general public, intimidation through the holding of army and air force exercises in the vicinity, and the rounding up and detention of hundreds of nationalists and their leaders. Such nationalist leaders as Mr. Joshua Nkomo and Mr. Sithole were known to be languishing in goal for no just reason, although veiled legal terms might be used to cover the denial of their civil liberties and human rights.

117. Although the United Kingdom Government had said that authority and responsibility in Rhodesian affairs lay with it alone, the minority régime had been accumulating powers to do exactly as it pleased with impunity; the situation had gone from bad to worse because of the passive role played by the United Kingdom Government. According to the Secretariat's working paper,³ the Minister of Law and Order had announced on 3 December 1964 that there were 1,936 people restricted or detained under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Harare and Highfield emergency regulations; the most recent information given by the Secretary of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) quoted a figure of 9,000. Moreover, the Smith régime had concluded agreements with South Africa and Portugal, both countries known to be oppressors of African people.

118. The United Kingdom Government's attitude was indicated by the Commonwealth Secretary's statement, that it was not his Government's policy to impose immediate majority rule in Rhodesia (see appendix III below). According to an editorial in *The Times* of London of 1 April 1965, the purpose of the general elections in Rhodesia would unquestionably be to give Mr. Smith a mandate to declare independence unilaterally and unconstitutionally if and when his Cabinet saw fit. That view was further strengthened by Mr. Smith's statement of 31 March (see appendix V, below).

119. Those facts should be a serious warning to all people who loved freedom and peace and abhorred suppression and injustice. The African people of Rhodesia wanted no more than peace and freedom with dignity. The people of Africa as a whole, like all the freedom-loving and peace-loving peoples of the world, had pledged themselves to rid humanity of colonialism and exploitation; his delegation therefore felt in duty bound to outline a course of action in the face of the Rhodesian danger.

120. First, the Committee should once again adopt a resolution reminding the United Kingdom Government of the impending dangers of the situation in Rhodesia, in the light of that Government's failure to deal sternly with Mr. Smith. Secondly, it should appoint a sub-committee of three to make a final visit to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Thirdly, that sub-committee should appeal to the United Kingdom Government to use all its power to halt the present trend towards bloodshed in Rhodesia. Fourthly,

³ The working paper prepared by the Secretariat is incorporated in paragraphs 1-67 above.

the Security Council should be kept informed of the hardening of attitudes of the parties in Rhodesia, which might at any time lead to a conflict entailing bloodshed. Fifthly, an appeal should be made to the United Kingdom to convene a constitutional conference at which all parties would be represented.

121. His delegation, knowing how much the people of the United Kingdom respected public opinion, hoped that that people and its Government would take into account the strong feelings of the Special Committee, of Africa and of the peace-loving people of the world. If his delegation's appeal was ignored and independence was declared unilaterally in Rhodesia, the consequences would be disastrous. Such an act might lead to the break-up of the Commonwealth, for he could not imagine the United Kingdom Government handing over some 4 million Africans to slavery under a handful of whites, and it would certainly lead to chaos and bloodshed in Rhodesia. There were Africans who were prepared to die for their freedom; past lessons in Kenya and Algeria and present experience in Aden and other places suggested that the United Kingdom Government would not wish for a repetition of such events in Rhodesia. It must act promptly to stop the Smith régime from leading Rhodesia to disaster and bloodshed. His delegation had high hopes that the United Kingdom Government would act before it was too late.

122. The representative of Syria said that a most dangerous situation had arisen in that Territory. The decision of the Smith Government to hold elections on 7 May on the basis of the existing Constitution made it imperative that the United Nations, and in particular the United Kingdom Government, should take the most stern and effective measures to avert a catastrophe, not only to the African majority, but to the white minority also. Unfortunately, the latest statements made by the United Kingdom delegation in the Special Committee and in the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia provided no new elements which might help the Committee in its difficult task. The United Kingdom Government had, of course, warned the Rhodesian authorities in unambiguous language of what the United Kingdom would do if the Smith Government decided to declare unilateral independence. That warning, however, had been given on 27 October 1964 and his delegation had hoped for a more forceful statement reflecting the official reaction of the United Kingdom Government to the forthcoming elections. It was true that correspondence and contacts were taking place between the two Governments, but no assurance had thus far been given of any new measures contemplated by the United Kingdom in the face of possibly impending disaster.

123. The position of his delegation, which had been clearly stated on 27 October 1964 (A/AC.109/SR.295), was unchanged, but the world was facing a new threat which would considerably increase the international tension prevailing during the past few months and might ignite a struggle against the residue of colonialism and white supremacy in Africa. There was little time left for efforts by all, and by the United Kingdom in particular, to avert a tragedy whose consequences could not be predicted. *The New York Times*, in an editorial of 5 April 1965, had said that the implicit issue in the forthcoming elections was independence, that a unilateral declaration of independence would lead Southern Rhodesia towards tragedy, but that the United Kingdom while planning to break diplomatic and trade relations if independence was declared unilaterally, would

certainly not use force. The Smith Government and its racist elements, however, would apparently not be deterred by reason, by warnings or by threats of the breach of diplomatic and trade relations, the halting of economic aid and other measures from plunging Southern Rhodesia into a struggle which would make the country unsafe even for the white minority. His delegation considered that the United Kingdom Government could still find ways of bringing about some amendment of the present obsolete racist Constitution within the framework of articles 49 and 50 or any other relevant articles of that Constitution in such a manner as would ensure justice and equality for the African majority. Indeed, the United Kingdom could go further and stipulate the conditions under which Southern Rhodesian could attain independence, at the same time informing the Smith Government officially that, as a last resort, the United Kingdom might find itself obliged to use every measure at its disposal to avert an explosion, should the European minority attempt to declare independence unilaterally. The United Kingdom Government, which had helped many millions of human beings to regain freedom and independence, must at once—and not after the election—make a bold declaration that it would really shoulder its responsibilities. In so doing, it would have the support of all Members of the United Nations.

124. His delegation had been deeply moved by the petition from the Secretary of the World Federation of Trade Unions asking the United Kingdom Government to take the necessary action to ensure that five just and reasonable demands of the people of Southern Rhodesia were met (A/AC.109/PET.374). He appealed to the United Kingdom to give that request the most careful and sympathetic consideration.

125. The atmosphere of the past twenty years had been imbued with revolutionary ideas reflecting dissatisfaction with colonial rule, economic exploitation and traditional authority, ideas of the true value of human rights, the dignity and worth of the human person, and the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, "traditional authority" meant the puppet chiefs who had held the so-called *indaba*; they were not the true representatives of the African majority who could legitimately shape the destiny and future of the country.

126. His delegation shared the concern and anxiety expressed by speakers at the preceding meeting and agreed with the arguments, conclusions and constructive suggestions of the Tanzanian representative. He urged members of the Committee to form a united front in order to avert the spilling of African and European blood. His delegation would support any draft resolution along the lines he had indicated.

127. The representative of Mali said that the report of the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia (see appendix I) showed that the situation in that Territory was rapidly deteriorating. Parliament had been dissolved and elections were scheduled for 7 May 1965 on the basis of the existing Constitution. The Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia had said that the elections could lead to a unilateral declaration of independence; that did not augur well for the African majority.

128. The statement made by the United Kingdom representative (see paras. 84-101 above) had introduced no new elements but merely revealed contradictions in the attitude of the United Kingdom Government

towards the different colonial situations in which it was involved. That Government was taking refuge behind the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia and claiming that any intervention on its part would be unconstitutional. Such an attitude showed its complicity with the white settlers, since the existing Constitution was a discriminatory and undemocratic document designed to perpetuate their rule. It had been rejected by the African population, who were in the overwhelming majority, and could not be considered valid. Although the United Kingdom Government had justified the colonization of Southern Rhodesia by the need to protect and emancipate the African population, it was letting the white settlers violate that population's rights. Yet, while declaring that it could not intervene in Southern Rhodesia, it did not hesitate to undertake military operations against Yemen, on the pretext of protecting the people of Southern Arabia, to give the United States and Belgian Governments military bases for their aggression against the African inhabitants of Stanleyville and to amend the electoral law in British Guiana without the agreement of all the political parties. It had often repealed the constitutions of colonies with a system of self-government similar to that of Southern Rhodesia. The references to special clauses in those constitutions were merely legal arguments to justify arbitrary action.

129. By invoking clauses in the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia which prevented it from intervening to protect the interests and rights of the majority of the population, the United Kingdom was deliberately evading its responsibilities towards the African population and flouting international opinion. The United Kingdom Government, which was entirely responsible for the situation in Southern Rhodesia, should not merely declare its opposition to a unilateral declaration of independence but should take practical steps to lead the country to independence with a democratic constitution based on the principle of equality and a Government elected by universal suffrage and defending the interests of the majority.

130. The minority Government of Southern Rhodesia was showing dangerous irresponsibility and complete ignorance of the phenomenon of decolonization. Its acceptance of the results of the *indaba* was a challenge to the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The report of the Sub-Committee showed that the *indaba*, at which the chiefs had been isolated from the rest of the population, had been held under government pressure. History showed that feudal chiefs were always instruments in the hands of the minority Government and never defended or expressed the aspirations of the oppressed population. It would be cynical to consider that the chiefs' acceptance of the minority régime practising *apartheid* against the African people reflected the wishes of those people. Mr. Smith had said that the chiefs were expressing the feelings of a large fraction of the population. Even if that were true, the independence of a country was an event of such importance as to require the participation of the entire population.

131. By rejecting the results of the *indaba* the United Kingdom Government had displayed realism which should have been carried still further. That Government should take firm action to ensure that Southern Rhodesia attained independence in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and with the freely expressed wishes of the majority of the population. A new relationship

based on equality, friendship and understanding should replace the existing relationship between the white settlers and the African population.

132. His delegation proposed that the United Kingdom Government should be asked to oppose the elections scheduled for 7 May, which would have no validity since the majority of the population was excluded from the electorate. Secondly, the United Kingdom Government should convene a new constitutional conference to be attended by all the political parties, even if the minority refused to participate. Thirdly, the attention of the Security Council should be drawn to the situation in Southern Rhodesia, which constituted a serious threat to peace and security. The Special Committee should convey its concern to the United Kingdom Prime Minister, on the occasion of his visit to New York, and ask him to take the necessary steps to quell the unrealistic pretensions and ambitions of the minority Government of Southern Rhodesia.

133. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Special Committee was discussing the question of Southern Rhodesia at a time of increased aggression by the forces of imperialism and colonialism against peoples in different parts of the world, who were struggling for their rights, freedom and independence. The weapons used might differ but the objective was always the same: to keep the dependent peoples under colonial domination or to render the independence won by many States purely fictitious. The motive was robbery and exploitation and certainly not, as was hypocritically stated, the defence of freedom. The monopolists and colonialists, joined by hired lackeys from the countries concerned, were meting out cruel punishments to the fighters for independence. Their interference was creating tension and conflict, fraught with grave consequences for the cause of peace and security. The liquidation of the colonial régimes was therefore acquiring still greater significance and requiring still greater efforts from the United Nations and its organs.

134. Several months had elapsed since the Special Committee had last considered the question of Southern Rhodesia and since the United Kingdom Government had issued its announcement on 27 October 1964. The Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia had listed the measures to be taken to remedy the situation (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. III paras. 632-634). The measures had also been embodied in resolutions of the General Assembly. The United Kingdom, however, had not implemented a single recommendation and was thus adversely affecting the already serious political climate in Southern Rhodesia. The deterioration of the situation had been noted at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly by many representatives of African countries, who had called for positive action by the United Kingdom Government.

135. Similar concern had been voiced by representatives of the indigenous population of Southern Rhodesia. In a statement made in February 1965 to a correspondent of *Pravda*, Mr. Robert Chikerema, Acting Chairman of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), had said that his country had been turned into a concentration camp and that punitive expeditions were burning down villages and looting households; many families had fled to the mountains to escape prosecution. Mr. Chikerema had said that special responsibility for the crimes of the racists should be borne by the United Kingdom Government, which

kept admonishing Mr. Smith instead of taking decisive action.

136. Despite the announcement by the United Kingdom Government on 27 October 1964, Mr. Smith had not given up his plan to proclaim independence but was merely adapting it to new conditions. He was seeking support from abroad and, as could be seen from the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 54-55 above), that support was forthcoming. In a recent statement ZAPU had denounced the construction of military bases and airfields on the frontier between Rhodesia and Mozambique. Over 3,000 persons had already been deployed at one of the bases; aircraft were being sent from South Africa and troops from South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. The colonialists and neo-colonialists were disregarding the appeals of the Special Committee to refrain from providing arms and ammunition to the Government of Southern Rhodesia. A secret agreement on military assistance had recently been signed between that Government and the Federal Republic of Germany, providing for the dispatch of West German pilots to Rhodesia.

137. The Committee had already had an opportunity to judge the true value of the so-called referendum held among the European settlers. The consultation conducted among a handful of indigenous chiefs and headmen, who were maintained by the racist Government and unquestionably supported its plans, had been equally unconvincing. The undemocratic nature of the two consultations was clearly apparent from the Secretariat working paper (see paras. 4-11 above). The Smith Government had recently been making plans for a so-called "legal revolution". The purpose of that piece of legal trickery was to obtain independence, as it were, through the back door by means of a series of constitutional amendments and other legislation. The plan was to be implemented in six stages, during which the powers of the United Kingdom in Southern Rhodesia would be gradually reduced, paving the way for a unilateral declaration of independence in the exclusive interests of the country's racist minority.

138. It might be asked what the United Kingdom had done in recent months to help to solve the problem. It was of particular interest to know what had been the effect of the United Kingdom's statement of 27 October 1964, in which it had said that the Government of Southern Rhodesia had already recognized that independence must be based on general consent. Events had made it clear that the United Kingdom's statement had been intended merely as a screen for the policy of the Southern Rhodesian racists, who were continuing to oppose the convening of a constitutional conference in which all political parties would participate for the purpose of taking action to achieve independence on the basis of universal suffrage. Mr. Sithole, the leader of the indigenous political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), had stated in a newspaper interview published on 12 March 1965 that the United Kingdom should lose no time in calling a constitutional conference, since the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia had already said that he was unwilling to do so. The United Kingdom, however, had no intention of taking such action and was pursuing a policy of procrastination and of utterly futile negotiations with Mr. Smith.

139. The visit made to Southern Rhodesia in February by Mr. Bottomley, the United Kingdom Commonwealth Secretary, and Lord Gardiner, the Lord Chancellor, was significant in that connexion. The Com-

mittee would recall that Mr. Bottomley had cancelled plans for an earlier visit after Mr. Smith had refused him permission to meet two African leaders, Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole. Yet the United Kingdom Government had gone ahead with the visit in February, subject to Mr. Smith's condition that the two Ministers could not consult any imprisoned African leaders, which had meant that they would be unable to see Mr. Sithole.

140. The visit to Southern Rhodesia had clearly had no positive results whatsoever. According to Mr. Bottomley's statement in Parliament on 8 March, Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Takawira, another African leader, had called upon the United Kingdom Government to convene a constitutional conference and to ensure the release of political prisoners, the immediate introduction of universal suffrage and the imposition of majority rule, if necessary by force. Mr. Bottomley had indicated that the United Kingdom had no intention of employing force for that purpose. Moreover, the United Kingdom Government had made it clear that it did not intend to take any positive action in the near future and stated that the key to the situation lay in Salisbury. Mr. Bottomley had stated, in reply to a question, that the Government would honour the existing convention so long as no action of an unconstitutional nature was taken. He had, moreover, made no reply to a Member of Parliament who had asked whether the Government was unwilling to convene a constitutional conference to amend the 1961 Constitution and was thus supporting that Constitution. He wondered whether the United Kingdom representative in the Committee could reply to that question.

141. Mr. Smith had stated on 4 March that the visit of the two United Kingdom Ministers had changed nothing with regard to the question of independence and that its most important result had been that the African nationalists now realized that their demands would not be accepted. In the period that had elapsed since the United Kingdom Government's statement of 27 October 1964, which had aroused such high hopes, there had been no change in that Government's policy. The magazine *Statist* had asserted in its issue of 12 March that the Labour Party had abandoned its pre-election position on Southern Rhodesia and had embraced that of the Conservative Party, which it had formerly criticized.

142. It was clear that the situation in Southern Rhodesia had grown worse and that the United Kingdom Government was unwilling to take the necessary action to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee. The Smith Government had dissolved the Legislative Assembly and called elections for 7 May, at the same time making it clear that it was determined to attain "independence" at any cost. Public opinion in many countries had correctly interpreted that action as a challenge to Africa which would have far-reaching consequences, and *The New York Times* had declared in an editorial on 5 April that an international crisis was looming.

143. In the circumstances, his delegation felt that the Committee was entitled to call upon the United Kingdom Government to take the following urgent steps:

(1) To demand that the racist Smith Government should cancel the elections scheduled to be held on 7 May on the basis of the 1961 Constitution, which had been rejected by the Territory's political parties

as undemocratic and as designed to perpetuate the rule of the white colonialist minority;

(2) To put a stop to the Southern Rhodesian Government's persecution of fighters for that country's freedom and independence, to repeal the laws banning the activities of political and social organizations which favoured independence, to bring about the immediate release of all political prisoners convicted under those laws and to restore all democratic freedoms in the Territory;

(3) To proceed immediately thereafter to convene a constitutional conference with the participation of representatives of all political parties—even if the racist minority refused to take part—for the purpose of formulating constitutional measures, including the holding of elections on the basis of universal suffrage and the establishment of an early date for proclaiming the Territory independent;

(4) To halt any military and other assistance to the racist Government of Southern Rhodesia which was being used to suppress the national liberation movement, to deprive that Government of control over the troops and military equipment transferred to it after the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, to eliminate all foreign bases in Southern Rhodesian territory and to withdraw all foreign armed forces and military personnel from that Territory.

144. The Committee should also call upon all States to refrain forthwith from providing arms, ammunition and economic or financial assistance to the minority Government of Southern Rhodesia. It should instruct its Sub-Committee I to undertake a study, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia which were hindering the indigenous population's attainment of self-determination and independence.

145. His delegation was in full agreement with the delegations which had stated, both in the Committee and during the general debate in the General Assembly at the nineteenth session, that the situation in Southern Rhodesia called for consideration by the Security Council as a threat to international peace and security. His delegation was prepared to support any proposal concerning Southern Rhodesia which took account of the observations he had just made.

146. The representative of Iraq recalled that when he had last spoken on the question of Southern Rhodesia, in October 1964, he had welcomed the statement of policy that had been issued by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and had expressed the hope that a new chapter of fruitful co-operation between the Committee and the administering Power was about to begin. He had therefore been somewhat disappointed when the United Kingdom representative had opened his statement at the 320th meeting (see paras. 84-101 above) by referring once again to the question of the competence of the United Nations to deal with the question of Southern Rhodesia. That question had been settled long since by the General Assembly and was quite irrelevant at the present stage of the debate.

147. The question that the Committee was entitled to ask was what steps the United Kingdom proposed to take to follow up its statement of October 1964. The answer, unfortunately, was that not only had that Government done very little but apparently it did not contemplate any action in the foreseeable future. After three months of inaction following his policy statement,

the United Kingdom Prime Minister had declared in the House of Commons that his proposal to send a parliamentary delegation to Southern Rhodesia had been rejected by the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia; indeed, had it not been for the fortuitous circumstance of Mr. Smith's presence in London for the funeral of Sir Winston Churchill it was possible that the visit of the two Ministers would never have taken place. The results of that visit had been a great disappointment. It had been hoped that, following the visit, the United Kingdom would finally formulate a policy for the settlement of the question and would bring about its oft-repeated objective in Southern Rhodesia, namely, self-government based on majority rule. The statement made by Mr. Bottomley after the visit had, however, consisted of a series of negatives, outlining what the United Kingdom would not do but saying very little about what it proposed to do.

148. First, Mr. Bottomley had said that the United Kingdom Government would not impose majority rule by force. The fact of the matter was, of course, that the only party using force to maintain its position was the Southern Rhodesian minority Government. It seemed strange that, when force was being used in many Territories under the direct or indirect administration of the United Kingdom to maintain conditions that were clearly opposed by the majority, the United Kingdom Government should be so fastidious about the possibility of the use of force as a last resort in order to help the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia to achieve their legitimate aspirations. Moreover, he wondered whether the United Kingdom's repudiation of the use of force applied to physical force only or whether it included coercive measures in the economic and other fields. In its statement of October 1964 the United Kingdom Government had indicated that it would not hesitate to adopt coercive measures in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence by the minority Government of Southern Rhodesia. He would like to know why such measures, especially those of an economic and political character, could not equally well be taken in order to secure the compliance of the Southern Rhodesian minority Government with the declared policy of the United Kingdom Government to establish majority rule in the Territory. He hoped that the United Kingdom representative would explain and answer that point, for upon it would hinge the action to be taken by the Committee that year, the fourth year of its discussion of the question of Southern Rhodesia.

149. Secondly, Mr. Bottomley had stated that in seeking a peaceful transition to majority rule, the United Kingdom Government did not seek to stipulate how it might be achieved or when that stage might be reached. The impression to be gained from that was that the United Kingdom Government hoped that some miraculous situation would arise in Southern Rhodesia whereby the African majority would submit to the possibility of remaining in an inferior position for an indefinite period and the racist Government of Southern Rhodesia would ultimately decide that the time had come for it to accept majority rule; meanwhile, world opinion, and African opinion in particular, would stand idly by and wait for the miracle to happen. The fact was, however, that the Africans were not going to wait for the day that might never come when majority rule would be established in Southern Rhodesia, nor was it likely that the racists of Southern Rhodesia would accept anything short of complete independence, with total authority in their own hands. That placed the entire re-

sponsibility on the United Kingdom Government, which, having declared the aims of its policy, was now deliberately denying itself the means of achieving them.

150. Mr. Bottomley had also stated that the United Kingdom Government did not wish to violate the 1961 Constitution. Yet many members of Parliament in the Labour Party had expressed serious reservations about that Constitution when their party had been in opposition. He wondered whether the Labour Party had changed its opinion upon taking office. Moreover, the General Assembly had repeatedly condemned the 1961 Constitution as incompatible with the principles of the Charter and with the desires and aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia.

151. In his statement at the 320th meeting (see also paras. 84-101 above), the United Kingdom representative had said that the elections scheduled for 7 May in Southern Rhodesia were perfectly legitimate and did not necessarily affect the ultimate solution of the problem. Yet not only were the elections to be based on the 1961 Constitution, which had been rejected by the people of Southern Rhodesia, but Mr. Smith had made it quite clear that his Government intended the elections to give him a two-thirds majority in Parliament which would enable him to take such actions as he had hitherto not dared to take.

152. Lastly, Mr. Bottomley had referred to the constitutional convention whereby the United Kingdom was allegedly inhibited from legislating for Southern Rhodesia or interfering in the legislative processes of the Territory. The Iraqi delegation had dealt with that point some years earlier and he saw no need to repeat the arguments it had advanced at that time to show that that constitutional excuse was quite invalid. The constitutional convention might be applicable in colonies inhabited by predominantly English-speaking people, where Parliament was based on the cardinal principle of the British Constitution that governmental action must be based on the consent of the governed, but the Southern Rhodesian Parliament was a body in which only a tiny minority of the population was represented and its decisions were certainly not based on the consent of the governed but rather on a complete denial of the wishes and rights of the majority of the people it governed.

153. The United Kingdom maintained that in 1923 it had made Southern Rhodesia a self-governing colony. What it had done, however, had been to hand a predominantly African population over to the rule of a white racist minority; it could not be claimed that self-government had been given to the people of Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom was now, however, basing its policy on that mistake and thereby committing further mistakes which would have even greater consequences for the future of the people of Southern Rhodesia and for the African continent as a whole.

154. The time had come for the United Kingdom Government to do more than merely say that its aim was to provide for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia; it should state boldly what practical steps it contemplated taking in order to ensure that that aim was realized. Neither the Committee nor the United Nations as a whole could accept its claim that a constitutional convention, which was not applicable to the present case, deprived it of the possibility of taking any steps to rectify a past error and to put its own declared policy into effect.

155. The representative of Ethiopia agreed with the Iraqi representative that the United Kingdom was compounding the errors it had made in the past. While it was human to err, it was a different matter to come repeatedly to an international forum and ask for the errors to be accepted. The United Kingdom Government was repeating in Southern Rhodesia the errors it had committed in South Africa. It was no use saying that the situation had arisen in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and should therefore be ignored; the present-day world was different. France had used force to dictate realistic terms in Algeria before withdrawing from that country; there was no reason why the United Kingdom could not do the same in Southern Rhodesia or why its settlers could not be told that the time had come for them to live in equality with the African people. In fact, the United Kingdom would not need to use force. There had been no unilateral declaration of independence, simply because the United Kingdom Government had opposed such a declaration and had warned the minority Government of the consequences. That warning had been heeded because the economy, the political philosophy and everything else relating to the Government of Southern Rhodesia was basically English. Moreover, the minority Government was actually a minority of a minority; it was not supported by all the settlers but only by those who believed in racial discrimination. All the United Kingdom had to do was use its constitutional power to oppose anything that was against the interests of the African majority.

156. The purpose of the elections scheduled for 7 May 1965 was to enable the minority Government to consult its followers once more to see if it could make a unilateral declaration of independence and count on their support to the bitter end. Despite all the appeals by the General Assembly and the Special Committee, the United Kingdom Government was allowing the elections to be held on the basis of the 1961 Constitution. That Constitution had been deliberately designed to exclude all the inhabitants except those who would support a certain course—rule by the white minority. Faced with such an attitude on the part of the United Kingdom Government, Mr. Smith would draw the conclusion that it was not opposed to the 1961 Constitution or to the proposed elections and therefore must be in favour of his policy. The result was that the minority Government would be perpetuated.

157. The Committee had exhausted all the means at its disposal to resolve the problem and his delegation therefore thought that it should now be referred to the Security Council. He hoped that the Council, with its power, its prestige and its resources, would achieve better results and would be able to safeguard the more than 3 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia.

158. The representative of the United States said that the trend of events in Southern Rhodesia was on the whole a downward one, characterized by what Mr. Bottomley had described as a hardening of attitudes among both Europeans and Africans. The United States was extremely concerned about that trend, which made it apprehensive about the future of all the peoples of Southern Rhodesia.

159. While there were factors outside the country which could help, hinder or influence developments in Southern Rhodesia, in the end a just and equitable solution should be based only on a full and honest expression of the will of its entire population. The nec-

essary agreement and expression of the people's will should be achieved through communication, understanding, wisdom and sensible negotiation. Yet nothing was being done to promote communication or understanding among the Southern Rhodesians, and the Government of that country had resorted to measures resulting in worsening the atmosphere. It continued to exercise sweeping police powers and to detain a large number of citizens without trial under security measures about which the majority of the population had not been consulted and to which they had not assented.

160. The Government of Southern Rhodesia was continuing to play the futile game of seeking independence under minority rule, without a genuine expression of opinion by the people. It would do better to make a dedicated effort to enable all its people to enjoy fundamental human rights and the economic and social advantages which their richly endowed country could so well afford. A sincere effort to stamp out the growing breach of discrimination between the races in Southern Rhodesia and to provide equal opportunity and satisfaction for all would do much to ensure a promising future for the country and would win the sympathetic support of the entire world. The contrary seemed to be the case and it was not possible to be deaf to the ill-considered statements of certain political leaders in Southern Rhodesia calling for a unilateral and unconstitutional declaration of independence from the United Kingdom.

161. The United States' view on this question had not changed since its representative had expressed the conviction that a unilateral declaration of independence by the Government of Southern Rhodesia would inevitably lead to violence. In its unequivocal communication to the Government of Southern Rhodesia on 25 October 1964, the United Kingdom Government had clearly set forth the consequences of such a declaration. The overwhelming majority of the nations of the world endorsed that announcement; it was difficult to imagine that Southern Rhodesian independence, achieved under conditions which lacked the approval of the substantial majority of the people, would obtain international approval and recognition. A unilateral declaration of independence would wreck any possibility of establishing genuine communication between the various parties in Southern Rhodesia, which was the only way in which self-determination could be exercised and a formula for independence acceptable to a substantial majority of the people could be worked out.

162. The United Kingdom Government had exhibited vigorous leadership, taken a number of initiatives and indicated that it would utilize whatever meagre opportunities to help Southern Rhodesia to overcome its difficulties. The United States appreciated the fact that the United Kingdom had a special and heavy responsibility to lead Southern Rhodesia to independence on terms acceptable to all the people. It was confident that the United Kingdom would continue its search for ways of bringing the parties together for at least an informal discussion, if no other possibilities were available, and would help them to move towards a solution acceptable to all concerned.

163. The representative of Yugoslavia recalled that at the 226th meeting of the Committee he had pointed out that the recommendations of the General Assembly and the provisions of the United Nations Charter and of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples had not been imple-

mented in Southern Rhodesia and that, as the Government of the United Kingdom, the administering Power, had failed to respond to the just demands of the Territory's 4 million Africans, the situation had gravely deteriorated.

164. The question of Southern Rhodesia, which was still one of the most serious and disturbing colonial problems, was at present threatening to touch off a new international crisis. The racist Government of Southern Rhodesia had in recent months been provoking Africa and the rest of the world by announcing its intention of proclaiming unilaterally the independence of Southern Rhodesia and thus of creating another bastion of colonialism and racism in addition to that already existing in South Africa. On 21 October 1964, it had called a conference of chiefs and headmen, who were all on the Government's pay-roll and who were supposed to express the will of the Africans regarding independence. The Government had in fact declared that repeated acts of intimidation made it impossible to consult the entire African population and it had deployed military units in the regions inhabited by Africans. It was pertinent to note that the conference had been held in complete seclusion, on the pretext of shielding the chiefs from outside influences. On 5 November, a so-called referendum on the question of independence had been held. The 12,000 Africans entitled to participate, out of a population of 4 million Africans, had decided to boycott the referendum. Although he had even failed to win the support of a considerable part of the European population, Mr. Smith had maintained that the referendum was a great triumph and that the African boycott was to be explained by the Africans' lack of interest in Western systems of government. At the end of 1964, Mr. May, a South African expert on constitutional law, well known for his racist theories, had apparently been invited to Salisbury to work out the legal aspects of the plans for the independence of Rhodesia within the system of racial segregation. Finally, on 30 March 1965, the Government had dissolved Parliament and had set the date for elections on 7 May, elections in which the Africans would not be able to vote under the existing undemocratic Constitution. It was obvious that Mr. Smith intended to make use of those elections to proclaim unilaterally the Territory's independence. Meanwhile, the Rhodesian Government continued to persecute the Africans, maintaining martial law and enacting new measures which made their position still worse. A number of African political leaders had been in prisons and concentration camps for months, in conditions which endangered their lives. Rhodesia was also strengthening its economic and political ties with South Africa and Portugal, thus forming a colonialist racist alliance whose aim was to halt the national liberation movements short of the Angola-Rhodesia-Mozambique line and, eventually, to take action against neighbouring independent African States.

165. In a number of resolutions, the United Nations General Assembly had called upon the United Kingdom to block the plans of the racist sections of the white minority to legalize their supremacy by the unilateral proclamation of independence; to ensure without delay the accession to power of a majority Government based on the principle of "one man, one vote"; to convene, to that end, a constitutional conference of all elements genuinely representative of the population; to put an end to the terror and persecution to which the Africans were subjected; to demand the release of all the African

leaders and others who were fighting racial discrimination and to demand equality for all in a free and independent Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom, however, had done nothing and was allowing the Rhodesian Government to continue its activities.

166. His delegation had welcomed the warning issued by the United Kingdom to Southern Rhodesia on 27 October 1964 (see appendix II below), seeing in it a positive change in the attitude of the United Kingdom Government and an indication of its readiness to find an early and equitable solution to the problem. Unfortunately, as the Sub-Committee stated in its report, there was nothing to indicate that the United Kingdom was now pursuing "an active policy . . . to ensure the attainment of independence by Southern Rhodesia in conformity with the provisions of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples" (see appendix I, para. 17).

167. On 6 April, the United Kingdom representative had reiterated the earlier position of his Government that the United Nations was not competent to discuss Rhodesian affairs and had added that the authority and responsibility for bringing Rhodesia forward to independence rested with the United Kingdom Government (see paras. 84-101 above). He recalled, in that connexion, that in 1964 the Yugoslav delegation had stated that the theory of the self-governing status of Southern Rhodesia had no legal, moral or political justification, since nine tenths of the population were denied their most elementary rights and lived in the most degrading conditions under the rule of a racist minority Government whose reign of terror was based on an undemocratic and discriminatory constitution, and that the political future of the people of Southern Rhodesia could be considered only within the framework of a new constitution.

168. The United Nations was not only entitled but in duty bound to discuss all such situations and to support the aspirations of colonial peoples for independence, the more so in cases where the administering Power was not fulfilling its obligations. Not only had an enslaved people the inalienable right to freedom and independence, but the struggle against colonial domination was an integral part of the struggle for peace generally and for the establishment of sound international relations on new democratic foundations.

169. Without wishing to doubt the assurances given by the United Kingdom representative, who had said that his Government was making every effort to find a solution for Southern Rhodesia which would take into account the interests of all the inhabitants of the Territory, he felt constrained to state that the facts, and particularly the ambiguous statements of the United Kingdom Ministers who had visited Southern Rhodesia, provided no ground for thinking that that Government's efforts to carry out its stated intentions were really effective. The Commonwealth Secretary and the Lord Chancellor had stated that their Government did not propose to impose immediate majority rule upon Rhodesia; that in seeking a peaceful transition to majority rule it was not stipulating how or when that stage might be reached, that it could not, whether by armed force or otherwise, act unconstitutionally to change the present Constitution; and that no purpose would be served by the calling of a constitutional conference unless all parties concerned were willing to take part. Those statements could not but encourage the Southern Rhodesian Government to persevere in its intentions.

170. The Commonwealth Secretary had, however, stated that many Africans, in particular the representatives of the nationalist parties, had asked him to induce the United Kingdom Government to convene a conference immediately with a view to the introduction of a new constitution based on the principle of "one man, one vote". It might be asked what was preventing the convening of such a conference and whether Mr. Smith's approval was perhaps awaited. Surely the patience of the African population should not be strained further, nor should the Government of Southern Rhodesia be left to confront the world with a *fait accompli* by a unilateral declaration of independence. Mr. Smith had interpreted the results of the visit of the two United Kingdom Ministers as evidence that the United Kingdom Government was not going to intervene in the affairs of Southern Rhodesia and hand over the power to the African nationalists. It was regrettable that, at the very moment when the most disturbing developments were taking place in Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom representative was trying to persuade the Committee that his Government had no means of intervening with regard to the elections. The situation was fraught with danger, and his delegation urged the administering Power to take whatever steps were necessary to prevent the elections being held and to draw the attention of the Southern Rhodesian Government to the fact that, even if the elections were held, their results could in no way change the status of the Territory or entitle the Southern Rhodesian Government to carry out its plans. It was only through a solution based on the measures recommended by the General Assembly that the United Kingdom could discharge its responsibilities in the interests of both the African population and the white settlers themselves.

171. His delegation supported the Tanzanian representative's proposal to the effect that the Committee should inform the Security Council of the present situation in Southern Rhodesia and recommend it to take steps designed to prevent that situation from deteriorating further.

172. It was no accident that Mr. Smith had decided to dissolve Parliament and hold elections at the very time when the world was beset by new crises and the United Nations was facing serious difficulties. It was imperative to redouble the efforts made to remove the causes of tension, the most serious of which was colonialism, an essential element of the military, political and economic strategy of certain Powers.

173. The Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries had declared at the Cairo Conference (see A/5763) that lasting world peace could not be realized so long as there were peoples under foreign domination who continued to be deprived of their fundamental right to freedom, independence and self-determination. They had also expressed their regret that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had not been implemented everywhere and they had called for the unconditional, complete and final abolition of colonialism.

174. The representative of India recalled that, at the first meeting of the current session (320th meeting), his delegation had made a brief statement on the fifteenth report of the Working Group, which had touched upon the disquieting situation in Southern Rhodesia.

175. At the same meeting, the United Kingdom representative had made a statement which might have

been expected to cast more light on the latest developments in the Territory and to provide information on Mr. Smith's proposals regarding the A and B rolls. The United Kingdom representative had merely given the Committee a summary of the developments since the official statement made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on 27 October 1964; he had quoted extensively from the Press statement made by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations on 3 March 1965 and from his statement in the House of Commons on 8 March 1965. That had added practically nothing to what the Committee already knew of the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

176. Moreover, the United Kingdom representative had said that the exchange of communications between his Government and the Government of Southern Rhodesia was confidential. The Indian delegation fully understood that fact, but it hoped that the current negotiations would produce some concrete results in the very near future.

177. In his statement, the representative of the United Kingdom had repeated that the United Nations had no competence to discuss Rhodesian affairs. That view had not been accepted either by the Committee or by the General Assembly, since Southern Rhodesia had been included among the Non-Self-Governing Territories under General Assembly resolution 1747 (XVI). On the other hand, when the United Kingdom representative affirmed that his Government had the authority and responsibility for bringing Rhodesia forward to independence, the Special Committee wholeheartedly agreed; it contended, however, the United Kingdom had not yet exercised its authority to discharge that responsibility.

178. The United Kingdom Government, which had taken legitimate pride in the fact that in transferring power it had always ensured rule by the majority while protecting the interests of the minority, seemed to have a different policy in Southern Rhodesia, where the minority enjoyed complete protection and the rights of the majority were ignored. That disregard for the rights of the majority was contrary not only to the resolutions of the Committee and the General Assembly but also to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He quoted article 21, paragraph 3, which spoke of the right of universal suffrage and free elections to all people. He also cited article 2 of the Declaration which guaranteed this right to all persons irrespective of race, colour and political or constitutional status. Yet the representative of the United Kingdom had stated in 1948 that the United Kingdom had consulted its colonial Territories at every stage of the preparation of the Universal Declaration and that it would accept that Declaration not only on its own behalf but also on behalf of its Territories. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not legally binding, it was undoubtedly a moral obligation willingly undertaken by all Member States.

179. The statement made on 27 October 1964 by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, to which the United Kingdom representative had referred, had been welcomed throughout the world. It had been a forthright and timely statement of the United Kingdom's intentions and policies and had had the merit of preventing any unilateral declaration of independence by Mr. Smith at that time. Unfortunately, it seemed already to have lost some of its effect: the repressive legislation was still being applied, the nationalist movement was

being ruthlessly suppressed and several thousand nationalists, including Mr. Nkomo, were in prison or under restriction.

180. With regard to the Press statements made by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, it was encouraging to note the assurance that the United Kingdom Government was steadfastly opposed to unconstitutional action in the form of a unilateral declaration of independence. At the same time, however, he had some doubts about the statement of the Secretary of State that the United Kingdom Government had no intention of imposing unilaterally a solution which would violate the 1961 Constitution and the established convention that Parliament at Westminster did not legislate on matters within the competence of the Legislative Assembly of Rhodesia except with the agreement of the Rhodesia Government. It was hard to understand how the Parliament of the United Kingdom would be abusing its power by encouraging constitutional advance, as it had the responsibility to do. If that meant that no advance was possible in that sphere without the agreement of the minority Government of Southern Rhodesia, then the situation was indeed hopeless.

181. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations had concluded his Press statement by asking all concerned to search for ways by which current dilemmas could be resolved constitutionally and by which the common goal of independence could be achieved. Those sentiments were praiseworthy, but it would be difficult to put them into practice while Mr. Smith and his supporters assumed the right to a veto even on the holding of a constitutional conference.

182. The African nationalist leaders had made reasonable demands: abrogation of the 1961 Constitution, release of all prisoners and *détenus* and the convening by the United Kingdom Government of an immediate constitutional conference with the representatives of the people to devise a new constitution based on the principle of "one man, one vote". They had also asked that the granting of independence to Southern Rhodesia should follow and not precede the formation of a majority Government. In fact, similar demands had been accepted in the past by the United Kingdom Government in its erstwhile colonial Territories.

183. Unfortunately, Mr. Smith had different ideas. He considered that the question of majority government was so far in the future that it did not bear examination at the moment. He had also said that he had been given to understand that United States thinking had changed, but that did not seem to be borne out by the statement made the previous day by the United States representative. With regard to the holding of a constitutional conference, Mr. Smith had said that his Government was opposed to the idea, adding that the United Kingdom Government had accepted that position; perhaps he had been encouraged in that belief by the Press statement of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in expressing the view that it would be useless to call a constitutional conference unless all parties concerned were willing to attend it. The representative of India considered that it was not possible to wait indefinitely; moreover, it would not be the first time that a constitutional conference had been held despite the objection of one of the parties concerned.

184. While he understood the reluctance of the United Kingdom Government to force the issue, he con-

sidered that Mr. Smith should not be allowed to exercise a permanent veto on all proposals for an advance towards universal adult franchise and independence. A situation of that kind, in which all avenues of negotiation were barred, could only lead to violence.

185. His delegation would earnestly request the United Kingdom Government to take all possible steps to prevent any such tragedy for which it would be responsible and, in particular, to exercise greater pressure to bring the parties together. The question whether the United Kingdom Government would use force to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence which would be an act of rebellion against the Crown remained unanswered. The British Government would certainly be on stronger moral grounds to resist such a rebellion than it was when it tried to put down the revolt of the American colonies, a revolt which had the support of all but a small minority of loyalists. In Southern Rhodesia the vast majority of the population was opposed to the unconstitutional unilateral declaration sought by a small minority.

186. So far as the Indian Government was concerned, it would not recognize any such declaration since, in its view, Southern Rhodesia should only gain independence after the establishment in the Territory of a duly constituted democratic Government elected on the principle of "one man, one vote".

187. In the interim, he was convinced that there could be an immediate change for the better if certain steps were taken urgently, in particular the release of Mr. Nkomo and the other nationalists under arrest or detention for political reasons and the withdrawal of all restrictive and unjust laws. Subsequently, a constitutional conference of all parties concerned should be called without delay, and could be charged to work out methods for the rapid implementation of the various resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee seeking the establishment of a majority government at the earliest possible date through elections based on universal adult suffrage. It would be futile to insist on the sanctity of a constitution rejected by the majority of the people of the Territory. If those measures were not taken and Mr. Smith went ahead with the 7 May elections, the situation was bound to deteriorate with disastrous consequences. His delegation sincerely hoped that wisdom and goodwill would prevail and that a majority Government would emerge through peaceful means.

188. The representative of Poland said that on many occasions, both in the Special Committee and during previous sessions of the General Assembly, his delegation had condemned the racial and discriminatory policy practised by the Government of Southern Rhodesia. That Territory could only be led to self-determination in accordance with the principles embodied in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

189. The United Kingdom representative had repeatedly given assurances, in particular at the sixteenth and seventeenth sessions of the General Assembly, that the situation in the Territory was under control and that time, patience and peaceful negotiations with the Government of Southern Rhodesia might bring a solution which would lead to restoration of political and civil liberties and equal political rights for the indigenous population. That point of view had been reiterated by the United Kingdom Prime Minister at a press con-

ference at United Nations Headquarters on 14 April 1965.

190. Unfortunately, there was a lack of any sign in the development of the situation in Southern Rhodesia which would lead to the conclusion that that Non-Self-Governing Territory had achieved substantial steps toward the goals set forth in the numerous General Assembly resolutions on that subject, especially in resolution 1514 (XV). On the contrary, the racist policy of the Government of Southern Rhodesia had created a dangerous situation which might have very serious consequences.

191. On 27 October 1964, Mr. Harold Wilson, the United Kingdom Prime Minister, had solemnly declared that the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, would only grant independence to Southern Rhodesia after it was satisfied that such independence would be acceptable to the people of the country as a whole. But the statement made four months later by Mr. Bottomley, Secretary of State of Commonwealth Relations, during a visit to Southern Rhodesia, indicating that the United Kingdom Government would not act to change the Constitution, nullified the seriousness and effectiveness of the statement of 27 October. It was no wonder that Mr. Smith had interpreted that statement as an indication of the limits of possible United Kingdom action. All the measures undertaken by Mr. Smith were aimed at a unilateral declaration of independence. In that connexion it was significant that he was seeking political and economic aid and assistance from such countries as Portugal and South Africa whose position in colonial matters was well known.

192. In the opinion of the Polish delegation, two conclusions should be drawn. First, recent developments in the Territory proved that the Government of Southern Rhodesia was not influenced either by public opinion or by persuasion from the United Kingdom Government. Second, there was nothing to be gained from negotiations with the present Government of the Territory, which did not represent the vast majority of the African population.

193. The time had come to take immediate and categorical action to prevent the Southern Rhodesian Government from taking any decision which could lead to further deterioration of the situation in the Territory and to take all measures to find a solution in accordance with the legitimate rights of the people. The first step should be the revocation of the elections scheduled for 7 May 1965.

194. The majority of white Rhodesians, as well as the leaders of both banned political parties, were anxious to attain independence peacefully and lawfully. The Africans demanded that the United Kingdom Government should call an immediate conference to devise a new constitution based upon the principle of "one man, one vote". Those aspirations and legitimate demands should be satisfied.

195. The Polish delegation considered that the United Kingdom, as an administering Power, could and should exert pressure on the Government of Southern Rhodesia in order to arrest the dangerous development of events. His delegation would lend its support to any draft resolution based on those considerations and consistent with the provisions of the previous resolutions adopted by the Special Committee and the General Assembly. It was to be hoped that the United Kingdom would take a more co-operative and effective attitude in order to prevent the explosive situation in Southern

Rhodesia from leading to further deterioration of the situation in Africa as a whole.

196. The representative of Chile said that at the time, his delegation had welcomed the United Kingdom Government's vigorous statement warning the Southern Rhodesian Government of the serious consequences which a unilateral declaration of independence would have.

197. The Chilean delegation had hoped that the new Labour Government would be able to convince the minority Government of Southern Rhodesia of the need to accept reforms designed to end the unjust situation whereby the majority of the population was deprived of any effective participation in the Government.

198. His delegation was obliged, however, to note that that statement had had little effect, since there were still grounds for fearing that the Southern Rhodesian Government might take advantage of the forthcoming elections to declare independence unilaterally. Although the United Kingdom Government has repeated its warning, it had at the same time allayed the settlers' fears by declaring that it would respect the constitutional provisions which prohibited it from interfering in the internal affairs of the Territory. Mr. Bottomley's statements did not really constitute an urgent appeal to set up a Government which truly represented the majority of the people, and it was to be feared that the negotiations now in progress would result in a compromise either far removed from reality or else far too belated.

199. The Chilean delegation had associated itself on many occasions with United Nations condemnation of the situation in Southern Rhodesia and with efforts to find a remedy for that situation. It would therefore confine itself to stating that in its opinion the information provided by the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia fully justified the restatement by the Special Committee of the General Assembly's resolutions on the subject. The Chilean delegation would not slacken its efforts until a constitutional conference had been called to set up a majority Government.

200. It was particularly vital that the Special Committee should make further efforts to obtain the release of political detainees and the repeal of all repressive laws. The Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia should also be asked to renew its contacts with United Kingdom ministers and inform them of the feelings of the vast majority of the members of the Special Committee regarding the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia. It was regrettable that it had not been possible to establish such contact on the occasion of the British Prime Minister's visit to the United States, but he hoped that conversations with Lord Caradon or other Ministers in London would help to bring the points of view of the United Kingdom and the United Nations closer together.

201. The representative of Italy said he agreed with the representative of Denmark that the negative aspects of the present situation in Southern Rhodesia far exceeded the positive ones. He had been particularly disturbed by the statement made by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in the House of Commons on 8 March 1965 to the effect that what was lacking in Rhodesia was willingness on the part of the Europeans and Africans alike to discuss and to compromise and that the fate of Rhodesians of all colours and classes lay largely in their own hands. The Italian delegation sincerely believed that those words

revealed the true nature of the problems of Southern Rhodesia and of the tragedy that loomed over that country.

202. There were three main problems to deal with. The first problem was the danger of a unilateral declaration of independence. The Italian delegation felt that the United Kingdom Government had the political and constitutional power to exert the necessary restraining influence on the Government of Southern Rhodesia. The Special Committee had on several occasions stated its point of view on the matter, and it might be useful for it to do so once more, taking note again of the statement of the United Kingdom Government of 27 October 1964 and of the more recent reaffirmation of the principles and purposes contained in that statement.

203. The second problem, which was a source of serious concern, was that of the forthcoming elections in Southern Rhodesia. Should their annulment be requested? If so, to whom should that request be addressed? Might not those elections result in a weakening of the extremist right-wing parties and a strengthening of the liberal tendencies? Was there anything that the Special Committee could do to contribute to the strengthening of the opposition in the Salisbury Parliament without yielding the question of principle concerning the Constitution? A few years before, the General Assembly had passed a resolution asking that certain elections in Southern Rhodesia should not be held. The elections had been held in spite of that resolution, and had marked the beginning of what had been called "the steady deterioration of the situation in Southern Rhodesia".

204. Lastly, there was the long-term problem of the future of Southern Rhodesia and of that Territory's accession to independence on the basis of a constitution acceptable to all groups of the population. The members of the Special Committee must not be discouraged by the fact that all their initiatives thus far had been defeated. On the contrary, they should pledge themselves to devote all their efforts in the months ahead to the solution of the problem. It must be borne in mind, however, that the problem could not be solved overnight, that it could not be solved by a Security Council or General Assembly resolution, even if such a resolution were adopted unanimously, and that the *dramatis personae* were, and always would be, the African majority and the European minority. Without their goodwill and consent, without their readiness to negotiate and compromise, no result could be achieved and no peaceful solution could be imposed on Southern Rhodesia from the outside.

205. The members of the Special Committee might seek formulas and constitutional devices for a gradual repeal and replacement of the present unsatisfactory Constitution and for the convening of a truly representative constitutional conference. Their main task, however, must be to use all their powers of persuasion and explore all possible channels—whether diplomatic relations, Commonwealth ties or the Organization of African Unity—to help create a suitable climate for the resumption of the dialogue between the two interested parties. That was a task requiring long and patient work.

206. The Italian delegation was sure that the United Kingdom Government would do all it could to help the Special Committee in its task and to convince the present leaders of Southern Rhodesia that they must consult and obtain the agreement of the leaders of the African majority.

207. Italy was opposed in principle to the use of violence and force as a means to solve political problems. It believed in the power of reason and in the methods of negotiation and conciliation of opposite interests. If it were not so, the future of Southern Rhodesia, and not only of Southern Rhodesia, would be very grim.

208. The representative of Bulgaria recalled that during the preceding four years his delegation, both in the Special Committee and in the General Assembly, had repeatedly stated his Government's position with regard to the policy of colonial oppression and racial discrimination deliberately introduced by the colonialists into Southern Rhodesia in order to continue their exploitation of the population. It was therefore difficult to offer any new solutions and fresh arguments.

209. Nevertheless, in studying the working paper prepared by the Secretariat and the report of the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia (see paras. 1-67 above and appendix I below), his delegation had been struck by the fact that the same methods and procedures were still being used by the colonialists to preserve the privileges which they had acquired by force, bloodshed and terror. Their actions had provoked indignation in Africa and throughout the world.

210. On 30 March 1965 the Government of Ian Smith, which had been returned to power and was supported by only a fraction of the small white minority in Southern Rhodesia, had called elections for 7 May, hoping, if it won, to amend the Constitution which, had been imposed in 1961 by the United Kingdom on the people of Rhodesia against their united will. The purpose of the constitutional amendment would be to prepare for a unilateral proclamation of independence by the white minority in the Territory, since it was not the independence of Southern Rhodesia that was sought but the independence of the tiny minority ruling the country. Such a proclamation would be a provocation in the eyes of the people of the Territory, of Africa and the world, and it would have grave consequences for peace. But it would be equally disastrous for the white minority, which would certainly not be able to continue exercising its domination over the Zimbabwe people as it had been doing. The African countries would certainly not tolerate an act intended to keep the inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia for ever in a state of subjection. World opinion would be alerted. That was probably one of the reasons why the United Kingdom Government stated that it was unlikely that the white minority would decide to carry out its threat. The representatives of that minority should think well before taking a decision which might be fatal for them.

211. Nevertheless, the danger of a unilateral proclamation of independence did in fact exist, and it was growing. The administering Power should therefore take the necessary steps to safeguard the interests of the Rhodesian people. The United Kingdom Government could, if it so wished, put an end to that venture and to the political blackmail of the Southern Rhodesian Government.

212. However, the United Kingdom Government seemed unwilling to act. By its statements and by its actions it was, in fact, encouraging the racists. At a time when it was expected to pursue a policy in conformity with popular sentiment and with the resolutions of the United Nations, i.e. a policy aimed at the granting of independence to Southern Rhodesia after the holding of free and democratic elections in which the whole active population would participate without

discrimination as to race, religion or economic status, certain statements had been made which were calculated, on the contrary, to encourage a part of the white population to continue its desperate efforts to preserve its privileges. Thus, on 27 October 1964, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom stated that before granting independence to Southern Rhodesia, the British Government had a duty to be satisfied that independence would be acceptable to the people of the country as a whole—including, therefore, the white racists. That was equally clear from the statement made by Mr. Bottomley on 3 March 1965 and from Mr. Smith's televised interview on the following day.

213. The various steps so far taken by the United Kingdom Government had not helped to facilitate the occasion of Southern Rhodesia to independence. In 1961, the United Kingdom Government had granted to the white minority a Constitution which had been rejected unanimously by the black population but accepted with enthusiasm by the racists, since it enabled them to perpetuate their colonialist and discriminatory régime. The petitioners' statements to the Committee moreover, had left no doubt as to the intentions of the white minority. If the Zimbabwe people did not resist, that Constitution would be only an added guarantee of perpetual exploitation of the blacks by the whites.

214. Obviously, the present Government of the United Kingdom could not and should not be held responsible, since the Labour Party had campaigned vigorously at that time against what was being planned. However, his delegation was surprised to hear the United Kingdom Government say today that nothing could now be done about a *fait accompli*. It considered that it was, on the contrary, the duty of the present Government of the United Kingdom to remedy the injustice done by its predecessor to the black population. It was not sufficient to say that any attempt by the British Government to impose unilaterally a solution of those problems would violate the 1961 Constitution and the established convention that Parliament at Westminster did not legislate on matters within the competence of the Legislative Assembly of Rhodesia except with the agreement of the Rhodesian Government, since that would be tantamount to the continuation of a colonialist policy. It was not only necessary but it was still possible to remedy that state of affairs.

215. The present Government of the United Kingdom had declared on several occasions that the granting of independence was, under the Constitution, a matter for the British Government and Parliament. It was clear from the many statements of the United Kingdom representative in the Committee that the United Kingdom's understanding of independence was similar to that of the African countries and international public opinion, i.e. independence under a government returned by a majority at elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. That objective should not be difficult to achieve if only the British Government would take the necessary measures.

216. The United Kingdom Government claimed that it could not allow the 1961 Constitution to be violated. By suspending that Constitution, however, it would in fact only be rectifying an injustice committed in the name of the people of the United Kingdom, who surely did not want to see other peoples fall into the clutches of the white slave-traders.

217. The representative of Syria had proposed that Southern Rhodesia should be declared independent and that specific conditions and terms should be laid down for the formation of a majority government, which would remove the threat of a unilateral declaration of independence by the white racists. The United Kingdom had the power to do that.

218. There were therefore two possible solutions: either to suspend the existing Constitution and get down to settling the question or immediately to declare Southern Rhodesia independent and hold free elections under the supervision of the United Nations or another organization. It had been said that the ways and customs of the United Kingdom did not permit its Government to take such measures, yet it had recently intervened in British Guiana against a Government which had been elected in accordance with democratic principles and with the Constitution given to that country. If the United Kingdom Government did not decide to use the powers which it possessed to put the Rhodesian racists in their place, grant independence to the people of Southern Rhodesia and implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, it would have failed in its duty not only to the United Nations and the peoples of Africa but also to posterity.

219. His delegation hoped that the United Kingdom Government would as soon as possible take necessary measures to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly on Southern Rhodesia and to halt a situation which was pregnant with tragic consequences. It would support any resolution recommending that steps should be taken immediately to check the advance of the racists in Southern Rhodesia, to oppose a development which might threaten peace in Africa and to enable the Zimbabwe people to accede to independence as rapidly as possible.

220. The representative of Tunisia said that he was glad to be with his old and new colleagues again and was determined to co-operate with them, as he had done in the past, in achieving the objectives of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

221. The pursuit of those objectives seemed to fit quite naturally into the framework of the International Co-operation Year and to lend itself to a *rapprochement* between peoples and the reduction of international tension. Unfortunately, the will to co-operate was not being followed by action and colonialism persisted, with all the exploitation and oppression of one people by another, which it entailed.

222. The Committee had resumed its deliberations in conditions which, if not more gloomy, were scarcely more promising than the year before. Despite the numerous resolutions adopted by the United Nations, Southern Rhodesia's liberation was being postponed from year to year and the country was living under the domination of an unbridled racist minority: according to a communication from Mr. Nyandoro, Secretary-General of ZAPU (A/AC.109/PET.373), more than 9,000 Africans were in prison, in detention camps or subject to restriction, tortured and deprived of their property and livestock. In a memorandum sent to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in November 1964, Mr. Robert Chikerema, Acting President of ZAPU, had said that the country had been turned into a concentration camp, that 50,000 men had been exiled to inaccessible regions and sentenced to

hard labour and that the Government was organizing punitive expeditions which resulted in arson and pillage.

223. While stepping up its repressive acts against the African population, the Smith Government was at the same time preparing the ground for a unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia and taking precautions to meet the difficulties which such a declaration would undoubtedly create. He had launched a large-scale immigration campaign in order to increase the size of the white population and was expanding contacts with racist Governments in order to conclude covenants of assistance and co-operation and agreements which would enable it to offset the loss of certain markets. For example, in February 1965 it had concluded a five-year agreement with Portugal providing for closer trading ties between Southern Rhodesia and that country, Mozambique and Angola, and in November 1964 it had signed a new agreement with South Africa in order to expand trade and achieve closer economic ties between the two countries.

224. For his part, the Prime Minister of South Africa, in a statement made on 31 October 1964, had advised Southern Rhodesia to resist any interference from the United Kingdom and had promised South African assistance.

225. International public opinion and the Committee had already condemned such designs and the African population had continually denounced them. Only recently, ZAPU had issued a statement containing the announcement that military airports were being constructed at the frontier between Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique, that there were already over 3,000 troops at one of them and that military aircraft and mobile troops had already been provided by South Africa and other friendly countries.

226. While seeking to strengthen its rule inside the country, the Smith Government was using every trick in order to declare independence unilaterally and force the opponents to assent. In October 1964, it had organized the *indaba*, a so-called referendum attended by the tribal chiefs, who were paid by the Government and were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the authoritative opinion of a group of Rhodesian anthropologists consulted by Mr. Smith's Government, the chiefs by no means represented the majority of the people: according to Professor Mitchell, the spokesman of the group, since the Africans in Southern Rhodesia were no longer organized on a purely tribal basis and about half the adults lived and worked outside the tribal zones, the only possible way of sounding out and ascertaining the Africans' views concerning independence was to give each one the opportunity to express his views by a vote. That sham and irregular consultation had not only evoked widespread censure but had been denounced by the administering Power itself, a fact which had led the Smith Government to dissolve Parliament and decide to hold elections on 7 May 1965 on the basis of the 1961 Constitution. Mr. Smith hoped that he would then be able to obtain a two-thirds majority in the new Parliament and, with his position thus strengthened, take the ultimate decision.

227. The Tunisian delegation continued to hold the United Kingdom Government responsible for that tragedy and to deplore its lack of firmness towards the racist majority and its evasive tactics. It also deplored the fact that the United Kingdom continued to deny that the Committee was competent to consider the situation in Southern Rhodesia, despite General As-

sembly resolution 1747 (XVI) and was taking refuge behind a constitutional convention repeatedly rejected by the United Nations.

228. The United Kingdom has warned Mr. Smith about the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence and in the Committee its representative had reaffirmed his Government's opposition to such a declaration, but, unfortunately, the problem remained unsolved when there had been reason to hope that the United Kingdom Government would adopt a firm attitude and say what it intended to do to solve the constitutional problem. The hesitancy of the United Kingdom Government was an encouragement to remedies of desperation and a challenge to African conscience and international public opinion; any procrastination would only further aggravate the situation and plunge the territory into violence and insecurity.

229. His delegation once again expressed the hope that the United Kingdom Government would assume its responsibilities fully and without delay and restore to the African majority its most legitimate rights, in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations, its own traditions and the requirements of law and justice.

230. His delegation would endorse any initiative by the Committee to liberate the African majority from the oppression of the minority Government and would favour any course and any action which would lead to the rehabilitation of the Zimbabwe people and the safeguarding of peace and security in that country.

231. The representative of Madagascar observed that the Special Committee's efforts to find a solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia had remained unproductive. There was no reason, however, to question either the appropriateness of the efficacy of the measures recommended by the General Assembly and the Committee, since nothing had been done to carry out those recommendations.

232. There were two new factors in the situation: the elections scheduled for 7 May and the negotiations between London and Salisbury, which, the Committee was being told, should quiet the concern caused by the elections. His delegation would not dwell on the harmful consequences of any elections held under the present Constitution of Southern Rhodesia; it could not but fully share the apprehensions so eloquently expressed by the preceding speakers and by the petitioners.

233. In his statement of 31 March 1965, Mr Smith had indicated that a two-thirds majority would be required for the passing of important parliamentary legislation. He had not specified the subject of that legislation, but in view of the laws already in force in that country, it was to be feared that Mr. Smith intended to further intensify the already harsh measures which oppressed the African population, to legalize acts which would enable him to establish what he called "Western civilization", and to consolidate his position through the suppression of the nationalist movement.

234. In the face of that danger, the United Kingdom Government appealed to the Committee for calm and moderation and asked for its co-operation; but the United Kingdom itself must lend its co-operation; instead, all it had done so far was harrass the Special Committee by citing its constitutional agreement with Southern Rhodesia and deny the competence of the United Nations. In those circumstances, its appeal

for co-operation was tantamount to an invitation to do nothing.

235. The question of United Nations competence had been discussed at length and had already been settled by the General Assembly in resolution 1747 (XVI). Consequently, the United Kingdom might be asked when it intended to satisfy the aspirations of four million Africans, who put all their hopes and all their faith in the ideals and principles of the United Nations, of which the United Kingdom was a founding Member.

236. As to the negotiations in progress between London and Salisbury, which for the moment were shrouded in secrecy, two points seemed to deserve attention. First, the United Kingdom apparently wished to justify its inactivity by stating that doors which had been virtually shut were now partly open, whereas everyone knew that the circumstances enabling contacts to be established were purely accidental. Secondly, the negotiations would deal with the independence of Southern Rhodesia. That, however, was a question which concerned the whole population, and the views of the African population were not being represented at all in those negotiations. His delegation would like the United Kingdom to assume a solemn undertaking to respect the aspirations of the African population, to protect its interests and to guarantee equality of political rights among the various communities in the country.

237. Mr. Smith's assertion that a unilateral proclamation of independence was not contemplated while the negotiations were in progress was not reassuring, since it was not impossible that the negotiations would break up. In view of that uncertainty and of the tragic turn that events in Southern Rhodesia might take at any time, his delegation considered that the Special Committee should make another solemn and urgent appeal to the United Kingdom Government to co-operate effectively with the Committee.

238. That co-operation might take the form of the immediate implementation of the recommendations of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee, and in particular, by the immediate suspension of the Constitution of 6 December 1961 and the cancellation of the elections of 7 May 1965, by the immediate convening of a constitutional conference for the purpose of preparing a new constitution on the basis of universal adult suffrage, by the immediate and unconditional grant to the whole population of all fundamental political rights, by placing all the inhabitants of the Territory on a footing of equality and by releasing all persons who were being detained or restricted on political grounds.

239. Because of the constant deterioration of the situation in the Territory and the unwarranted inaction of the United Kingdom, the Malagasy delegation wished the attention of the Security Council to be drawn to the question.

240. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that in their fight at the side of four million Africans, the United Nations and the Special Committee confronted the obstinacy of the usurpers of power, encouraged and abetted by the inaction of certain interests.

241. The question of Southern Rhodesia had been at a standstill for some time, but although the racists had so far failed to fully satisfy their ambitions, the majority of the population remained enslaved. In the meantime, the winds of nationalism were gathering force and becoming irresistible; colonialism, tacitly supported in the past, was falling apart. That Southern Rhodesia

would soon accede to independence was taken for granted by Africans and by the members of the Committee.

242. Events, therefore, must be so ordered as to make decolonization a peaceful process. There were, however, signs of an inevitable and bloody explosion: agreements concluded between the white minority of Southern Rhodesia and the racists of South Africa, the transfer of military forces to the minority Government after the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the concentration of those forces, the arrest and imprisonment of African leaders, mock consultations with tribal chiefs who were government puppets, declared intent to strengthen white domination by amending a Constitution already repudiated by the African majority.

243. The United Nations could not remain passive when the African grievances in Rhodesia were based on the most fundamental and noble of principles: access of everyone to civic rights, sharing of the responsibility of power on a footing of equality, universal suffrage, and the like.

244. His delegation considered that the Special Committee had done its work most conscientiously, and that the time had come to draw the attention of the competent bodies to the danger represented by the machinations of the white minority government. It considered that the United Kingdom, which assumed sole responsibility for the situation before world opinion, must react with firmness to Smith's threats and schemes and must publicly announce its intention to oppose a unilateral proclamation of independence by force if necessary. His delegation was convinced that the United Kingdom could use its forces and its navy, as it had done in similar circumstances, to prevent such a proclamation.

245. Africans would not be satisfied with statements threatening economic sanctions. They wished to secure from the United Kingdom an assurance that if necessary it would use its military force. They would like to continue to hope that the Government of the United Kingdom would not abandon four million human beings to a power-hungry minority and that it would do its duty and satisfy the just aspirations of the black people of Rhodesia. In his delegation's view, the Committee should reaffirm its desire that the United Kingdom convene a constitutional conference of all interested parties for the purpose of determining the administrative and governmental structure of Southern Rhodesia.

246. The delegation of the Ivory Coast was certain that, whatever happened, justice would be done, but it hoped sincerely that it would be done with reason and feeling by a new reconciliation of whites and blacks, before the problem assumed dimensions which perhaps were as yet not being sufficiently appreciated.

247. The representative of Venezuela observed that on a number of occasions—in the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council—his delegation had given a very full explanation of its position on the political and legal aspects of the question of Southern Rhodesia. He would therefore limit himself to a few observations on the report of the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia.

248. He commended the members of the Sub-Committee for the way in which they had carried out their task and stressed that their conclusions fully justified the priority given to consideration of the situation in that Territory. He shared the Sub-Committee's anxiety and concern.

249. In a statement to the Press, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations had said that his main impression was of a hardening of attitudes in recent months among both Europeans and Africans. If the "hardening" implied that neither of the parties was willing to make any further concessions, one might well ask what further concessions the Zimbabwe people could make to the white minority since they had lost their sovereignty and independence. Mr. Nkomo had declared that the Africans regarded the Europeans as part of the whole population and that there was thus no question of granting special privileges to any section or group. The concessions must therefore be made by the white minority, which was now governing Southern Rhodesia against the wishes of 4 million Africans.

250. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations had also said that it was not the intention of the British Government to impose immediate majority rule by force and that whatever settlement was reached must be acceptable to the majority of the population of Rhodesia. However, the majority was the 4 million Africans whom the white settlers treated as inferiors and aliens in their own country; moreover, independence and sovereignty were inalienable rights which could not simply be granted or withdrawn. To grant independence to the minority governing Southern Rhodesia would be tantamount to perpetuating the regrettable situation that had prevailed in the Territory for forty years. That was why any solution of the problem should take into account the wishes of the majority, without distinction as to race, colour or political or religious belief, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

251. The representative of Iran thanked the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia for its valuable contribution to the study of a problem which was of great concern to his delegation, first, because the right of a people to freedom and independence was at stake and, secondly, because the deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia contained the seeds of violence and turmoil which could very well endanger international peace and security.

252. The road to independence and freedom had never been an easy one, although the people of Rhodesia were no longer alone in their struggle. The African nationalists could count on the political support of a large majority of States. After the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the General Assembly had adopted, *inter alia*, resolutions 1883 (XVIII) and 1889 (XVIII) with a view to ensuring that Southern Rhodesia attained independence with a governmental system based on majority rule. The administering Power had, for its part, indicated its agreement with the granting of independence on those conditions. The only obstacle preventing the speedy implementation of the General Assembly resolution was the minority Government. Having wrongfully obtained power, the white settlers of Southern Rhodesia were resorting to terror, intimidation and all kinds of subterfuges to deny it to those who had a rightful claim to it. The present Government was now proceeding to hold elections based on the 1961 Constitution in order to pave the way for a unilateral declaration of independence, which would consolidate the minority's subjugation of the 4 million Africans.

253. The United Nations and the international community should hold the United Kingdom accountable

for the situation, because it was responsible for promoting the welfare and independence of the indigenous population. The United Kingdom could not absolve itself of that responsibility by transferring power to a minority of the population any more than it could deny the competence of the United Nations in the matter. It had also explicitly acknowledged that the decision to grant independence rested entirely with the United Kingdom Government and Parliament and, by threatening economic and political sanctions against the Government of Southern Rhodesia, had so far prevented it from unilaterally declaring independence. Mr. Smith was now seeking the legal means of by-passing the required approval of the United Kingdom and that was why he had been in such a hurry to schedule elections for 7 May. It had been cogently stated that the United Kingdom Government had the necessary constitutional powers to forestall a unilateral declaration of independence, but, as *The Economist* had pointed out in its issue of 17 April 1965, it was not politically possible for a British Government to stir things up in Rhodesia by, say, cancelling the Salisbury Constitution and sending in troops to enforce a new one.

254. Whatever the reasons, the fact remained that if no action was taken the situation would become explosive and endanger international peace and security. His delegation urged both parties concerned to refrain from any recourse to force and violence. He wondered, however, whether the African population, which had been subjected to a systematic policy of repression and deprivation, could be expected to heed such advice. He proposed that efforts should be made to create in Southern Rhodesia conditions for peaceful change, namely conditions which would enable the African nationalists to pursue their political objectives by peaceful means. In order to overcome existing difficulties and do away with the danger they posed to international peace and security, all repressive and discriminatory laws and regulations adopted against the African majority should be annulled and the African nationalists should be granted freedom of expression and political action. Only under conditions for peaceful change, whereby the need for resort to violence was completely removed, could a climate for meaningful political transaction be created. Therefore, any draft resolution to be brought before the Committee should also refer to the need for the creation of the conditions for peaceful change as a matter of basic policy, to encompass all circumstances, not only those enumerated in the draft resolution, but also those unforeseen at present.

255. Moreover, since the United Kingdom opposition to the calling of a constitutional conference had until now been attributed to the continued refusal of the leaders of the white minority to participate in such a conference, the United Kingdom might conduct separate bilateral negotiations with the majority and minority leaders, at which all political, economic and other important questions might be thrashed out and common ground reached between the two groups. Should those efforts fail because of the intransigent attitude of the Southern Rhodesian Government, the United Kingdom Government should then be able to find the appropriate means by which to exercise its prerogative with respect to the granting of independence to the people of Southern Rhodesia on a democratic basis.

256. The representative of the United Kingdom, in a further statement, said that he wished to clarify some of the points raised during the discussion about which

there might still be some misunderstanding. He would deal only with those aspects of the question which directly concerned the responsibilities and authority of the United Kingdom Government, and it was to be understood that his statement was subject to the same reservations about the competence of the United Nations as those he had made in his statement of 6 April (paras. S4-101 above).

257. A number of delegations had suggested that the present position of the United Kingdom Government represented in some way a retreat from the position defined by the statement of the United Kingdom Prime Minister on 27 October 1964. However, at his press conference at United Nations Headquarters on 14 April, the Prime Minister had reaffirmed that his Government's position remained the same as that defined in his statement of 27 October 1964 concerning the very serious consequences of any unilateral declaration of independence by the Rhodesian Government. It was and remained the United Kingdom Government's judgement that such a declaration would inflict disastrous economic damage on the country and leave it isolated in a largely hostile continent.

258. A number of delegations had asked too for clarification of the United Kingdom Government's position about amendments to the Constitution of Rhodesia by the Rhodesian Parliament, and in particular about possible changes in the cross-voting system. Three basic procedures for amending the Constitution were laid down in the Constitution itself, and they applied to different groups of provisions in the Constitution. First, the provisions affecting the position of the Queen and of the Governor as the Queen's representative could be amended only by an order in Council made on the advice of United Kingdom Ministers. That applied also to certain other provisions of the Constitution which permitted the Queen to disallow Rhodesian legislation affecting the international obligations of the United Kingdom, and certain other legislation affecting loans raised on the London market. Thus, the basic provisions governing Rhodesia's constitutional relationship with the United Kingdom could not be amended by the Rhodesian Government or Parliament.

259. Secondly, a number of particularly important provisions of the Constitution might be amended only after a two-thirds majority vote in the Rhodesian Parliament and also after approval in a referendum by a majority of those voting in each of the four principal communities—the Europeans, the Asians, the Africans and the Coloureds; alternatively, the proposed amendment could be referred to the United Kingdom Government for approval. In the event of that Government declining to give its assent, the amendment would have to be either dropped or else submitted to the referendum process. Until there were 50,000 registered African voters, the requirement for voting in the referendum by Africans would be primary education to the prescribed standard. The provisions in that category were those relating to the declaration of rights, appeals to the Privy Council, the Constitutional Council, the judiciary, amendment of the Constitution, civil service pensions, removal from the A or B rolls of persons who were entitled to be registered under the qualifications set out in the second schedule to the Constitution, and the Board of Trustees, who were responsible for tribal trust lands.

260. Thirdly, the remaining provisions of the Constitution could be amended by the Rhodesian Parlia-

ment, subject to the approval of two thirds of all the members of the Legislative Assembly.

261. Mr. Smith had said he would like to make changes in the cross-voting system whereby voters on the B roll also voted on the A roll, but their votes for the A roll candidates might only count up to 25 per cent of the A roll votes cast, and vice versa. That system, according to the Constitution, might be amended only by means of the second procedure he had described. Mr. Smith's declared hope of gaining a two-thirds majority in the elections on 7 May did not of course affect the question of Rhodesian independence, since the responsibility for deciding when and under what circumstances to grant independence to Rhodesia rested exclusively with the United Kingdom Government and Parliament. Independence could not legally be achieved by amendments to the Rhodesian Constitution whether passed by a two-thirds or any other majority in the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly. In order to put into perspective the fears which had been expressed it was important to bear those facts in mind together with the assurance given by the Rhodesian Prime Minister that a unilateral declaration of independence was not contemplated while his negotiations with the British Prime Minister were in progress.

262. There had also been some discussion in the Committee concerning the position of the Governor and of the armed forces in Rhodesia. Members of the police and army in Rhodesia were neither appointed by nor responsible to the United Kingdom Government. The Governor, in exercising his functions as Commander-in-Chief as in other matters which were constitutionally within the Rhodesian Government's competence acted on the advice of Rhodesian Ministers. The United Kingdom Government had no power or authority to give directions to the armed forces or the Governor on matters within the competence of the Rhodesian Government. There was no official in Rhodesia appointed by or responsible to the United Kingdom except the High Commissioner and his staff.

263. His delegation hoped that those explanations would allay some of the fears that had been expressed about the significance of the decision to hold some elections in Rhodesia. That decision had not materially affected the prospects of a negotiated settlement, although it introduced a new element, and the need for patience and restraint was as great as ever. The United Kingdom Government was steadily pursuing a policy designed to enable Rhodesia to become independent as soon as possible on a basis acceptable to the people of the country as a whole. The negotiations that were in progress between the British and Rhodesian Governments were of necessity confidential and must remain so if there was to be any chance of their successful conclusion. But the aims and the position of the British Government remained unchanged.

264. At the same time, nevertheless, Lord Caradon, as the head of the United Kingdom delegation and as a United Kingdom Government Minister, had offered to resume discussions with the Committee on aspects of the question affecting his Government's responsibilities; informal discussions had, in fact, taken place. His delegation, moreover, had always made its position clear about competence and responsibility but it had repeatedly shown understanding of the general concern over the Rhodesian problem by the contributions it had made to the discussions in the Committee and in other United Nations bodies and it had not hesitated to em-

phasize the gravity of the situation. At that critical stage, however, it was by discussion and consultation, and not by threats and conflict, that there could be some hope of contributing to the peaceful solution everyone was seeking.

C. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

265. At the 326th meeting, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania, and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.193).

266. Introducing the thirteen-Power draft resolution, the representative of Sierra Leone said that all the statements made by representatives in the Committee had noted the extreme gravity of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, and the co-sponsors of the draft resolution had therefore thought it their duty to renew the Committee's appeal to the administering Power to deliver the repressed and deprived millions in Southern Rhodesia from racist persecution. After reading out the draft resolution, he stressed that for the co-sponsors the political and individual liberty of every person was a sacred right to be respected and protected not only by the Committee but by all who were conscious of their responsibilities in the international community. Racist considerations must not be allowed to nullify that sacred trust. The co-sponsors hoped that the present appeal would be better heeded than appeals in the past and that the administering Power would, if it saw fit, invite a visiting mission to London in order to consider the situation.

267. In view of the prolonged discussion by the Committee of the question of Southern Rhodesia, it was the hope and intention of the sponsors to have the draft resolution put to the vote at the earliest possible date.

268. The representative of Venezuela said that in view of the considerations stated earlier by him, his delegation would vote in favour of the thirteen-Power draft resolution.

269. The representative of the United Kingdom said, with reference to the thirteen-Power draft resolution that the first point to be noted was that the United Kingdom Government was not the administering Power for Rhodesia. Its real and legal authority in relation to that country was very narrowly limited. It had neither the political nor the legal powers to take the action demanded by the draft resolution which, in its present terms, would not contribute to a peaceful settlement of the problem. Because of his Government's reservations about the competence of the United Nations to discuss those questions, his delegation would not participate in the voting on the draft resolution.

270. The representative of Australia thought that almost everything had already been said on the subject of Southern Rhodesia since its inclusion in the Committee's agenda, and that the position of each delegation was well known. The Australian delegation, for its part, had not failed to make its position and principles clear, for it represented an administering Power which had the responsibility of inaugurating and implementing policies in the kind of area in which the Committee was particularly concerned. In New Guinea, the Australian Government had frequently had the opportunity of putting into practice many of the things that the Committee considered essential in order to remedy the situation obtaining in Southern Rhodesia. In particular, it had introduced universal adult suffrage without any

conditions or restrictions and had thus created a parliament with a majority elected through a common roll by all the people.

271. Recalling the warning sounded in 1964 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations against the danger of a world racial conflict, he expressed his delegation's hope that the tragic problems of Southern Rhodesia would be approached on the basis not of white or black but of justice for all persons in that country, regardless of race. The Australian delegation had been asking itself in what way the Committee might play a constructive role in ensuring racial harmony among all the inhabitants; it thought that the Committee should, first of all, avoid seeing itself as Moses coming down from the mountain with the tablets. It was in the United Kingdom Government, not in the Committee, that the hopes for a solution must be placed. If that Government, by co-operating and negotiating with the Government of Southern Rhodesia, could not solve the problem, there was little hope that the Committee would be able to do so. The United Kingdom Government's statement of 27 October 1964 on the possible consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia had undoubtedly had and would continue to have repercussions in that country.

272. Since then, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations had gained the impression, after his visit to Southern Rhodesia, that, although the attitudes of both sides had hardened, the door to negotiations was slightly ajar. He himself was of the opinion that the adoption of the draft resolution before the Committee could serve only to harden still further the positions of both sides. One of the petitioners heard by the Committee, Mr. Shamuyarira, had informed it that the much criticized 1961 Constitution was at times being invoked against certain actions being put into effect or contemplated by the present Government of Southern Rhodesia; although the Australian delegation shared with the petitioner his regret that provision for the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act had not been written into the Constitution, it wondered whether the situation might not have been different if the Africans had participated as fully as they could have done in the elections. His delegation also wondered how the results of the forthcoming elections might be affected by full African participation. It was true that the present electoral system was too restricted and and unjust, but a single vote had been known to decide the results of an election. Furthermore, his delegation wondered whether the situation in Southern Rhodesia might not have developed favourably if the nationalist parties had been able to rise above their differences and combine their efforts with a view to obtaining an electoral reform that would benefit the entire population. In other words, if it was desired that the door to negotiations should be opened further, or even kept open, not only must the Southern Rhodesian Government move but so must the African nationalists.

273. The Prime Minister of Australia had stated in August 1964 that if Southern Rhodesia wished to be admitted to the Commonwealth, it must draft an electoral law that provided for an African majority. He had also said that most of the white Southern Rhodesians realized the need for reaching an agreement on that point and for accelerating the movement towards universal adult suffrage, which was indispensable if racial conflict and chaos were to be averted.

274. In operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution before the Committee, the sponsors called on the United Kingdom Government to take urgent and immediate steps to cancel the elections scheduled for 7 May in Southern Rhodesia. The Australian Government did not believe that the United Kingdom Government could do so in the existing circumstances without precipitating the disaster that it was seeking to avoid. With regard to paragraph 5, he said that, although he could not support a system which made political imprisonment a necessary part of its working, he believed that the United Kingdom did not have the power which it was invited to exercise and that, if it did attempt to exercise that power, it would only precipitate disaster. Similar difficulties arose in connexion with paragraphs 6 and 7.

275. While sympathizing deeply with many of the aspirations and hopes of the sponsors of the draft resolution, the Australian delegation did not feel that the text would be useful in the existing circumstances. On the contrary, it seemed to his delegation that it might aggravate the situation.

276. The representative of Denmark said that his delegation had always shown a keen interest in the question of Southern Rhodesia. His delegation had suggested the deletion of operative paragraph 8, which it considered to be outside the competence of the Committee. The sponsors had been unwilling to accommodate his delegation even on that single point. Further, his delegation did not consider that full responsibility for the deplorable situation in Southern Rhodesia could be placed on the United Kingdom Government or that the duty of solving the problem lay with that Government alone. His delegation agreed, however, with the principles and the main purposes of operative paragraphs 4 to 7 and felt that the essential point of the draft resolution was the application of those principles. It was still confident that the United Kingdom would do its utmost to further a democratic and peaceful development in Southern Rhodesia. His delegation would like to remind the Salisbury Government that it would bear a heavy responsibility if it continued to disregard all warnings from abroad.

277. The Danish delegation wished to record its reservations on the third preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 2, since they referred to resolutions which Denmark had not supported. Denmark could not accept the accusation against the United Kingdom made in operative paragraph 3 and would therefore vote against that paragraph if it was put to a separate vote. His delegation would also vote against operative paragraph 8, since the question of sanctions was within the exclusive competence of the Security Council. His delegation was not fully convinced of the usefulness of operative paragraph 9 and would abstain on that paragraph in the event of a separate vote.

278. Although it was in agreement with the most important part of the draft resolution, his delegation would be obliged to abstain on the draft resolution as a whole because of the transgression of the Committee's mandate in operative paragraph 8.

279. The representative of Italy, explaining the vote that his delegation was going to cast on the draft resolution, said that Italy's position on the problem of Southern Rhodesia had been clearly stated on many occasions in the General Assembly and in the Special Committee. At the present stage, therefore, he merely wanted to make clear that his delegation was deeply

concerned at the state of affairs in the Territory, that it was convinced that the deterioration in the situation must be halted and that partnership between Africans and Europeans must be based on the principles of mutual respect and equality.

280. Nevertheless, the Italian delegation had never concealed its serious misgivings about the way in which the problem had been approached by the Committee. The problem of Southern Rhodesia was not a typical colonial problem: historical factors had led to a situation in which two ethnic groups were called upon to live together in peace in the same territory. All that the Committee could do was to help to create the conditions and the climate for the resumption of the dialogue between Africans and Europeans in Southern Rhodesia. The Committee could and should ask the United Kingdom Government to use all available means to persuade the European population of Southern Rhodesia to discard outdated prejudices and to adopt a reasonable attitude towards the creation of a multiracial society based on democratic principles, in which the rights of the African majority would be recognized. To suggest, however, that the United Kingdom Government should be prepared to wage war against the settlers in Southern Rhodesia just as it had done against the rebellion in the North American colonies, was to ignore the fact that times had changed.

281. With regard to the negative effect that the resolution might have on the situation in Southern Rhodesia, he would recall his delegation's statement at the 232nd meeting to the effect that the resolution then being considered would strengthen the hand of the extremist elements in that country, weaken the position of the liberal forces in the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia, and impair the prestige of the United Nations. Unfortunately, his delegation's predictions had proved correct.

282. To its regret, therefore, the Italian delegation would be obliged to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution. He would refrain from discussing in detail the various provisions in the draft resolution which his delegation was unable to support, for the time for legalistic arguments was over. The problem of Southern Rhodesia was a political and moral issue which each delegation must consider on its intrinsic merits.

283. The representative of Ethiopia expressed disappointment at the suggestion that operative paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and, presumably, 7 of the draft resolution should be deleted, since those were the most important operative paragraphs. Paragraph 8 merely called upon States to abstain from providing arms and ammunition to the minority Government in Southern Rhodesia; that was a very mild request. The sponsors of the draft resolution felt that the provision of arms and ammunition to the Southern Rhodesian Government would be detrimental to the interests of the overwhelming majority of the African population.

284. The draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.193) was adopted by a roll-call vote of 18 to none, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Denmark, Italy, United States of America.

285. The representative of the United States, speaking in explanation of his delegation's vote, observed that everyone agreed that the Committee's objective was to aid in the realization of the legitimate aspirations of all the people of Southern Rhodesia. His delegation had presented its views on that point at the 323rd meeting and had voiced apprehension over the deterioration of the situation in Southern Rhodesia and the implications of a possible unilateral declaration of independence.

286. Nevertheless, his delegation had reservations about some provisions of the resolution just adopted. It felt that the use of the word "deplores" in operative paragraph 3 was inappropriate and that the paragraph did not take account of the realities of the United Kingdom's position and its relationship to the Government of Southern Rhodesia. His delegation also felt that, in view of the nature of that relationship, the recommendations in operative paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 were unrealistic and could be misleading. With regard to operative paragraph 8, his Government would continue to refrain from any action which could aggravate the existing situation in Southern Rhodesia. With regard to operative paragraph 10, his delegation had been unable to assess the precise implications of the forthcoming elections and their effect on the future of Southern Rhodesia. It had been somewhat but guardedly encouraged by Mr. Smith's statement on 14 April that the issue of a unilateral declaration of independence was not the reason for the elections and that he intended to continue negotiations. With regard to operative paragraph 6, his delegation had repeatedly urged that if it was not possible to call a constitutional conference now, every effort should be made to hold a broadly based informal consultation as a first step towards establishing the necessary communication between the various segments of the population of Southern Rhodesia. The recent visit to Southern Rhodesia by Mr. Bottomley and Lord Gardiner had been a positive move in that direction.

287. His Government remained deeply concerned over the situation in Southern Rhodesia and was prepared to use its influence and offer any appropriate assistance to the parties in trying to reach an equitable solution.

288. The representative of Uruguay, recalling that his delegation had supported all resolutions dealing with Southern Rhodesia that had been adopted either by the Committee or by the General Assembly, said that its decision not to participate in the vote on the draft resolution had not reflected disagreement with the basic purpose of the resolution. Had the resolution merely restated previous recommendations, such as those referred to in its preamble, his delegation would have cast a favourable vote, since its position on the substance of the question remained unchanged. In the course of the debate, however, a new aspect of the situation in the Territory had been discussed and a new course of action had been recommended. Since, in operative paragraph 10, the Committee was apparently referring the question to the Security Council in accordance with rule 3 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, his delegation wished to avoid doing anything that might be regarded as prejudging the issue and that might deprive it of complete freedom of action in the Council. It had therefore decided not to take any position until the question was discussed in the Council. That decision did not imply any lack of

respect for the considerations which had been put forward by other delegations.

289. The representative of the Soviet Union said that, although his delegation had voted in favour of the resolution, it had a few general reservations. The resolution was the most moderate one that could possibly have been placed before the Committee. It was in fact nothing but a duplication of the Committee's previous decision on Southern Rhodesia and constituted yet another appeal to the United Kingdom; yet although the United Kingdom Government had consistently ignored all such appeals, there was no clause in the resolution censuring that Government's attitude. Moreover, the resolution was weakened by the fact that although operative paragraph 10 drew the immediate attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, it did not make any recommendation about the measures which the Council might take to prevent dangerous developments in that Territory.

290. The representative of India, speaking as Rapporteur, proposed that the Committee should authorize the Chairman to transmit the resolution to the President of the Security Council, together with the relevant records of the Committee, so that the members of the Council might be in possession of all the necessary documents before considering the question of Southern Rhodesia.

291. The Chairman said that, in accordance with that proposal and with the Committee's usual practice, he would transmit the resolution and records to the President of the Security Council.

292. The text of the resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/112) as adopted by the Special Committee at its 328th meeting on 22 April 1965, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having further examined the situation in Southern Rhodesia,

"Having considered the Report of the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia,

"Recalling resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1747 (XVI) of 28 June 1962, 1760 (XVII) of 31 October 1962, 1883 (XVIII) of 14 October 1963 and 1889 (XVIII) of 6 November 1963 of the General Assembly,

"Deeply concerned at the further deterioration in the situation in the Territory resulting from the recent developments and particularly the decision of the minority Government to hold elections based on the 1961 Constitution and the threats of the minority Government to declare unilateral independence,

"1. Adopts the report of the Sub-Committee and endorses its conclusions;

"2. Reaffirms all the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee on the question of Southern Rhodesia;

"3. Deplores the continued refusal of the administering Power to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee concerning Southern Rhodesia;

"4. Calls upon the United Kingdom Government to take urgent and immediate steps to cancel the elec-

tions to the Southern Rhodesia Parliament scheduled for 7 May 1965 on the basis of the 1961 Constitution rejected by the overwhelming majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia;

"5. Calls upon the administering Power to effect immediately:

"(a) The release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees;

"(b) The repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation, and in particular, the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Land Apportionment Act;

"(c) The removal of all restrictions on African political activity and establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights;

"6. Invites once more the United Kingdom Government to suspend the Constitution of 1961 and to call immediately a constitutional conference in which representatives of all political parties will take part with a view to making new constitutional arrangements on the basis of universal adult suffrage and the fixing of the earliest possible date for independence;

"7. Requests the United Kingdom Government to ensure that the troops and military equipment transferred to the minority Government upon the liquidation of the defunct Central African Federation will not be used against the nationalist movement in Southern Rhodesia and to effect their immediate and speedy withdrawal from the control of the minority Government;

"8. Further calls upon all States to abstain from providing in whatever form arms and ammunition as well as logistic assistance and economic and financial aid to the minority Government in Southern Rhodesia;

"9. Decides to study in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the agencies of the United Nations the implications of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation in order to assess their economic and political influence;

"10. Draws the immediate attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia and, in particular, to the serious implications of the elections announced to take place on 7 May 1965 under a constitution which has been rejected by the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia and the abrogation of which has repeatedly been called for by the Special Committee and the General Assembly since 1962;

"11. Requests the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia to continue to keep the situation under review and to report as necessary to the Special Committee;

"12. Decides to maintain the Question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda."

293. The text of the resolution, together with the records of the debates on the question in the Special Committee, was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 23 April 1965 (S/6300).

D. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE TERRITORY

General

294. Information concerning Southern Rhodesia, as well as an account of action taken in respect of the

Territory, is already contained in the previous reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly. Information on recent developments is furnished in the working paper prepared by the Secretariat dated 5 April 1965 (see paras. 1-67 above). Supplementary information on the latest developments concerning the Territory is set out below.

Action taken by the Security Council in 1965

295. At its 1194th, 1195th, 1197th, 1199th, 1201st and 1202nd meetings between 30 April and 6 May 1965, the Security Council considered a letter dated 22 April 1965 (S/6294 and Add.1) from the representatives of thirty-five African States requesting the Council to examine the very serious situation existing in Southern Rhodesia.

296. At its 1202nd meeting, on 6 May 1965, the Security Council adopted a resolution (202 (1965)) by 7 votes to none with 4 abstentions (France, United Kingdom, United States and USSR). The operative paragraphs read as follows:

"1. *Notes* the United Kingdom Government's statement of 27 October 1964 specifying the conditions under which Southern Rhodesia might attain independence;

"2. *Notes further and approves* the opinion of the majority of the population of Southern Rhodesia that the United Kingdom should convene a constitutional conference;

"3. *Requests* the United Kingdom Government and all States Members of the United Nations not to accept a unilateral declaration of independence for Southern Rhodesia by the minority Government;

"4. *Requests* the United Kingdom to take all necessary action to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence;

"5. *Requests* the United Kingdom Government not to transfer under any circumstances to its colony of Southern Rhodesia, as at present governed, any of the powers or attributes of sovereignty, but to promote the country's attainment of independence by a democratic system of government in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the population;

"6. *Further requests* the United Kingdom Government to enter into consultations with all concerned with a view to convening a conference of all political parties in order to adopt new constitutional provisions acceptable to the majority of the people of Rhodesia, so that the earliest possible date may be set for independence;

"7. *Decides* to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda."

Latest developments concerning the Territory

Designation of the Territory

297. A question was asked in the United Kingdom House of Commons on 18 February 1965, as to why the United Kingdom Government continued to employ the designation Southern Rhodesia when, following the attainment of independence by Zambia, the Government of the Territory had decided that the country should be known as Rhodesia. In reply, the Prime Minister stated that it was already the practice of the United Kingdom Government, where appropriate, to use "Rhodesia" for informal purposes. It remained correct

for formal and legal purposes, however, to use the title "Southern Rhodesia".

Reaction to announcement of elections

298. Commenting on a statement made on 31 March 1965 by Mr. Ian Smith, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia (see appendix V) explaining the reasons for the calling of fresh general elections, Mr. David Butler, the Leader of the Rhodesia Party, said at a Press conference the same day that the elections were unnecessary and had been called in an effort to reassert Mr. Smith's party leadership. He admitted that his party stood no chance of winning the elections but was aiming at preventing the Government from winning the two-thirds majority it was seeking. If the Rhodesian Front was victorious, its party machine, in his estimation, would push the Government inexorably towards a unilateral declaration of independence.

299. In an interview given on 1 April 1965 at Gonakudzingwa, his place of restriction, Mr. Joshua Nkomo reportedly made it clear that the Peoples Caretaker Council and his followers would boycott the forthcoming general elections. In a telegram sent to the United Kingdom Prime Minister on 23 April 1965, the Malawi office of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) expressed shock at the announcement of general elections and claimed that this announcement had been encouraged by the letter addressed by the Prime Minister to Mr. Smith on 30 March 1965.

300. On 31 April 1965, the Commonwealth Relations Office in London issued a statement to the effect that the message of 30 March 1965 from the United Kingdom Prime Minister to the Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister did not contain any offer of independence for the Territory. The contents of exchanges with Mr. Smith remained confidential, but according to the statement it could be said that their object had been to explore possible lines on which a settlement could be based, and that the stage had not been reached where detailed proposals could be put forward on either side.

301. A few days earlier, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, had said in a broadcast that the United Kingdom would stand by its pledge to take action which would adversely affect Southern Rhodesia's economy, if the Government of that country took any unconstitutional action to secure greater authority over the Africans. He also stated that he would like to see a constitutional conference take place, but at that stage the idea was unrealistic. He was nevertheless determined to find a way of bringing about majority rule in the country.

Pre-election campaign

302. Opening his pre-election campaign at Fort Victoria during the third week of April 1965, Mr. Smith was reported to have said that the elections were undoubtedly another phase in the battle for independence. A two-thirds majority in the Legislative Assembly would enable the country to continue more decisively to fight for independence in Parliament itself by using every available legislative means to further the constitutional position of Southern Rhodesia. Continuing, he stated that a renewed mandate, the last such mandate he would ask for, could only strengthen his Government's hands in its negotiations with the United Kingdom Government. While emphasizing that the main

issue of the elections was independence, he denied that a unilateral declaration of independence was the reason for holding the elections.

303. During the same week, Mr. Butler was reported to have declared that the Rhodesia Party would not recognize a unilateral declaration if it came. Replying to questions, he said that his party would oppose such an illegal measure if it was introduced in the Legislative Assembly, but could do nothing about it if it was imposed by force. He offered as his party's alternative what he called the third choice, which was to maintain the *status quo*, and to work for negotiated independence as well as the maintenance of law and order, standards and responsible Government.

304. In another speech, on 20 April 1965, according to reports Mr. Butler challenged Mr. Smith to tell the country what changes the Rhodesian Front proposed in the Constitution that would require a two-thirds majority, to give details of the state of negotiations with the United Kingdom on independence and to publish the memoranda, which the Government had received, regarding the economic effects of a unilateral declaration of independence.

305. The same day, Mr. Smith was reported to have said that both his Government's assessment of these memoranda and its proposals for changes in the Constitution would be published shortly. He repeated former statements that negotiations with the United Kingdom were in a better state than they had been for many months. In reply to questions, he stated that his Government would continue negotiating to the bitter end, but that if negotiations failed, the only course open would be to seize independence.

306. On 26 April 1965, Mr. Clifford Dupont, the Deputy Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, said during a television broadcast that a unilateral declaration would not be made except as a last resort, if the very existence of the country was at stake. If all negotiations failed and if the choice was between freedom as the people of Southern Rhodesia knew it, and a handover to "black extremists", then a unilateral declaration would be made.

307. The same day, according to reports, the Rhodesian Front announced plans to amend the Constitution so as to give chiefs the right to sit in an enlarged Legislative Assembly and to make some changes in the voting system. Commenting on these plans in reply to a question in the United Kingdom House of Commons on 4 May 1965, the United Kingdom Prime Minister stated that he could not say in advance what view his Government would take, should the proposed changes come forward as part of a suggested basis for independence. The United Kingdom Government, he added, must also reserve its position on any amendment to the specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution.

308. In a further statement on 29 April 1965, Mr. Smith is reported to have said that the general elections were aimed at achieving UDI, the letters standing for united demand for independence (these letters had been widely used in the Territory to denote a unilateral declaration of independence). The following day, he announced that his Government had been taking precautions against an emergency in the country. If at some time in the future, his Government found itself heading for a take-over by the "extreme racialists", it would have to take matters into its own hands in order

to preserve the country and the Christian civilization its people had built there.

309. In another radio and television broadcast on 6 May 1965, Mr. Smith warned that the choice facing the nation was between a united white-governed Rhodesia and an ultimate "black extremist" government. He reiterated his denial that his Government would resort to a unilateral declaration, unless there was no reasonable alternative. He expressed the hope that the majority of voters would support the Rhodesian Front in what he believed would be the last stage of their battle for independence. Such a show of strength was their guarantee of obtaining a negotiated independence and of thereby avoiding the much discussed unilateral declaration.

Southern Rhodesia White Paper on unilateral declaration of independence

310. On 26 April 1965, the Southern Rhodesia Government published a White Paper (see appendix VI) on the economic consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence. The White Paper stated that most of the reports received by the Government on this subject were based on certain assumptions: firstly that the measures outlined in the United Kingdom Government's warning of 27 October 1964 (see appendix II) would be applied with a degree of severity designed to collapse the economy of the country within a relatively short period, and secondly, that such action would be supported by other members of the Commonwealth.

311. In evaluating the validity of these assumptions, the White Paper continued, it must be remembered that countries to the north of Southern Rhodesia would have to take into account the crippling effect on their own economies that such action would entail. Southern Rhodesia for its part would take the strongest counter-measures available to it. Further, the White Paper claimed that, bearing in mind the indications of communist influence in the countries to the north, it was incredible that the United Kingdom would attempt the destruction of the Southern Rhodesia economy and the overthrow of stable government.

312. Although initially, according to the White Paper, the measures contemplated by the United Kingdom would involve some inconvenience, Southern Rhodesia could obtain elsewhere all the imports it was currently getting from the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth and similarly could market elsewhere a great proportion of its exports. Conceding that the major problem would arise in the marketing of its tobaccos, the White Paper asserted that an embargo on Southern Rhodesia tobacco would give United States tobacco a virtual monopoly of the United Kingdom market and that in consequence the price of tobacco from other sources would harden. As regards future growth and development, the Government believed that investment money would be forthcoming, both from the private sector and from other sources in countries not unfriendly to Southern Rhodesia.

313. Another step arising from action by the United Kingdom Government, according to the White Paper, would be for Southern Rhodesia to consider the repatriation of foreign workers and their families, altogether comprising some 500,000 persons, to Zambia and Malawi, in order to protect the indigenous labour force. Other counter-measures had been decided upon by the Southern Rhodesia Government, the disclosure of which would not be in the country's best interest.

United Kingdom Prime Minister's statement on Southern Rhodesia White Paper

314. On 29 April 1965, Mr. Harold Wilson made a statement in the United Kingdom House of Commons (see appendix VII) rejecting the Southern Rhodesia White Paper's assessment of the likely economic effect of a unilateral declaration. The United Kingdom Government adhered to the statement issued on 27 October 1964. In its view, nothing that had happened since then afforded reasons for modifying the judgement expressed therein that the economic effects of a unilateral declaration would be disastrous to the prosperity and prospects of the people of Southern Rhodesia and that the Territory's external trade would be disrupted.

315. Mr. Wilson also pointed out that if the United Kingdom, the biggest buyer of Southern Rhodesia tobacco, imposed an embargo on this commodity, the effect would be disastrous to the tobacco-growing industry. The United Kingdom however would have no difficulty in procuring its tobacco requirements from other countries. Mr. Wilson's statement reiterated that a unilateral declaration by Southern Rhodesia would put a stop to the flow of capital from the United Kingdom, which had hitherto been the chief external source of capital for the country's economic development.

316. Continuing, Mr. Wilson rejected the view, implied in the White Paper, that it would be improper for the United Kingdom to react if Southern Rhodesia put itself in the position of a colony in rebellion, whereas Southern Rhodesia would be entitled to take whatever measures it chose against other countries in retaliation for the inevitable consequences of its own action. In conclusion, he reiterated his Government's conviction that constitutional negotiations were the only way for Southern Rhodesia to achieve independence without grave consequences. The answer lay in an agreed solution and his Government stood ready to carry forward its not entirely unhelpful negotiations with the Government of Southern Rhodesia after the elections in order to achieve this objective.

Other reactions to the Southern Rhodesia White Paper

317. On 4 May 1965, Mr. Butler gave a warning that economic disaster for Zambia could be achieved only by Southern Rhodesia imposing economic sanctions against that country's coal, power and transport. This, in his view, must result in a state of war, declared or undeclared, between the two countries. He was commenting on a statement made the previous day by Mr. Pieter van de Byl, the Parliamentary Secretary for Information to the effect that any attempt to destroy Southern Rhodesia economically, whether successful or not, would involve the total economic destruction of Zambia.

318. In a special broadcast on 5 May 1965, Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, the President of Zambia, accused Southern Rhodesia of planning wanton aggression and declared that his country would not hesitate to retaliate if this were justified. By threatening Zambia with economic strangulation, the Southern Rhodesia Government was holding his country at ransom for its own illegal acts. He also disclosed that recent visits overseas by members of the Zambia Government had been aimed at setting up defences against the possibility of economic aggression in the event of a unilateral declaration by Southern Rhodesia. He assured his audience that if such aggression occurred, Zambia would receive tremendous support from all over the world. Meanwhile,

he continued, arrangements were being made to deal with the Southern Rhodesia threat to repatriate Zambian citizens working in that country.

Reports by Southern Rhodesian business groups concerning unilateral declaration of independence

319. Despite warnings by Mr. Smith that such publication would be a disservice to the people and to the economy of Southern Rhodesia, on 2 May 1964 the Association of Rhodesian Industries and the Associated Chambers of Commerce made public their reports, prepared early in 1965, on the economic effects of a unilateral declaration of independence. Similar in substance to another document released a few days earlier by the Southern Rhodesia branch of the Institute of Directors, these reports made it clear that the United Kingdom Government would deal Southern Rhodesia a crippling blow if it carried out the measures outlined in its statement of 27 October 1964.

320. An illegal seizure of independence, according to these reports, might well lead, *inter alia*, to the loss of economic preference on Southern Rhodesia's exports, economic sanctions by the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries as well as by the Afro-Asian countries, and the severance of traditional sources of private and public investment, notably the United Kingdom. Such an act might also result in the serious disruption of the country's financial and credit machinery, its exclusion from the sterling bloc and from the London money market, the freezing of Southern Rhodesia assets in London, and the refusal of financial assistance by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and other international bodies.

Results of general elections

321. The general elections held on 7 May 1965, which according to reports were largely boycotted by the Africans, resulted in the Rhodesian Front winning all the fifty A-roll seats in the Legislative Assembly. Of its candidates for these seats, twenty-two were returned unopposed. The Rhodesian Party contested only twenty-six of the A-roll seats. Its leader, Mr. Butler, was defeated in his constituency by a margin of more than two to one. Two independent candidates also stood for election to A-roll seats. The Rhodesian Front did not contest any of the fifteen B-roll seats. Of the Rhodesian Party's candidates for these seats, two were returned unopposed.

322. After his party's election victory, Mr. Smith declared on 8 May 1965, that Africans in the Territory were still a long way from being ready for political responsibility and that the thought of an African Government taking over the government was unacceptable. The ideal, in his view, was to arrive, through an evolutionary rather than revolutionary process, at a position where people in the country would be accepted on their merit.

Other developments

Relations with South Africa

323. The South African Minister of Finance announced on 3 March 1965 that, as a gesture of goodwill and co-operation, his Government proposed to lend to the Southern Rhodesia Government R5,000,000 for specific development projects. That Government, he explained, was experiencing some difficulty financing

its essential development work. Further, South African exporters had interests in most of the projects concerned and from a general point of view it was to South Africa's advantage if these schemes were proceeded with.

324. On 12 April 1965, Mr. Ivor Benson, a public relations adviser to the Southern Rhodesia Government, in a Press statement in Durban, reportedly stressed the strategic importance to South Africa of Southern Rhodesia as a bastion against the southward thrust of communism. Mr. Benson is also reported to have predicted that Southern Rhodesia would become independent in July 1965.

Arrests of African political leaders

325. On 6 April 1965, it was announced that police reservists were called out to break up a meeting at Wha-Wha restriction camp. Sixty-six people were arrested and forty-four of them, members of the banned Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), were charged with taking part in an illegal meeting or with membership in a subversive organization.

E. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE⁴

326. The Special Committee gave further consideration to the question of Southern Rhodesia at its 339th to 344th, 346th and 347th meetings held in Africa between 25 and 28 May 1965.

Written petitions and hearings

327. The Special Committee also circulated the following written petitions concerning the Territory:⁵

| <i>Petitioner</i> | <i>Document No.</i> |
|--|------------------------------|
| Mr. Kotsho Lloyd Dube, representative Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) | A/AC.109/PET.373/Add.1 |
| Mr. G. B. Nyandoro, Secretary-General, Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) | A/AC.109/PET.373/Add.2 and 3 |
| Mr. L. F. S. Burnham, Premier of British Guiana | A/AC.109/PET.389 |
| League of Coloured Peoples | A/AC.109/PET.390 |
| Mr. Solomon Nkiwane | A/AC.109/PET.400 |
| "Highfield Women" | A/AC.109/PET.402 |
| "Highfield People" | A/AC.109/PET.403 |
| Mr. Ngcebetsha | A/AC.109/PET.404 |
| Mr. Arce | A/AC.109/PET.406 |
| "Arcadia Residents" | A/AC.109/PET.410 |

328. The petition indicated above as A/AC.109/PET.373/Add.1 contained a request for hearing which was approved by the Special Committee at its 330th meeting on 30 April 1965. However, at the time this report was prepared, the petitioner had not yet appeared before the Special Committee.

⁴ See also chapter II, paras. 438-463, for an account of the discussions on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 373rd meeting on 18 June 1965 (A/AC.109/128/Rev.1) concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Southern Rhodesia, Territories under Portuguese administration, South West Africa and East-toland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.

⁵ The following written petitions were circulated after the Special Committee had adopted a resolution concerning Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/120) at its 347th meeting on 28 May 1965: A/AC.109/PET.402-404, 406 and 410.

329. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning Southern Rhodesia:

- Mr. G. B. Nyandoro, Secretary-General, Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) (A/AC.109/PET.373/Add.4) (340th and 341st meetings)
- Messrs. Noel G. Mukono and J. W. Matuure, representatives, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (A/AC.109/PET.394) (342nd and 343rd meetings)
- Mr. Francis Nelhwati, President, Zimbabwe African Congress of Trade Unions (ZACTU) (A/AC.109/PET.395) (340th and 341st meetings)

330. Mr. Nyandoro (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union), speaking at the Chairman's invitation, said he was familiar with the attitude of the United Kingdom. In his opinion, the United Kingdom should not be represented on the Special Committee, but should be treated in the same way as South Africa and Portugal.

331. He would next like to appeal for the release of twenty-four freedom fighters now under sentence of death. Their names were listed in a communication (A/AC.109/PET.373/Add.1), which he now presented on behalf of ZAPU.

332. It was of great significance to the oppressed African people of Zimbabwe, suffering under the settler dictatorship imposed by the United Kingdom Government, that the Special Committee was meeting on African soil and so close to their country. They had followed the Committee's work closely throughout its existence and were now looking forward to practical measures for removing the settler dictatorship and ending British colonial rule.

333. Southern Rhodesia was a relic of the British imperialist dream of establishing little Englands wherever its people went. The United Kingdom Government had already prepared the ground for a white-dominated Government by the 1923 Constitution, which had been negotiated without the African people. Every political development since that time had demonstrated that the United Kingdom Government intended to give independence to a racist settler régime, despite the reserve clauses included in the Constitution under the pretence of protecting African interests, and loud assertions of support for the principle of majority rule for Rhodesia.

334. The Africans now regarded British utterances on majority rule not as expressions of honest intentions but as tactical diversions from her stubborn objective of promoting a dominantly white racist régime to sovereign independence. The Africans had long suffered oppression under the foreign régime of British settler agents. Under the notorious Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, discriminatory measures were applied on the pretext of safeguarding order and security—over twenty Africans were in prison condemned to death; Joshua Nkomo, the President of Zimbabwe, was in gaol; thousands of Africans were detained in Gonakudzingwa, Wha-Wha, Marandellas and numerous other camps throughout the country; and a five-year detention order had now been decreed for Africans opposing the régime—Joseph Msika, Lazaras Nkala and other leaders were detained under it.

335. Under the Land Apportionment Act, the British Rhodesian régime had seized the whole African land of Zimbabwe, but the African people were still obliged to pay taxes or to forfeit their few remaining

cattle. As a result, there was acute starvation and poverty in many areas.

336. Under a terrorist campaign by the police, Africans were being rounded up and ill-treated in an effort to intimidate the African population and to obtain by force information on activities against the régime. Many Africans had been murdered in the process and buried without their next-of-kin being notified. In the case of Alexander Mashawira, the constable responsible for his death had not been charged. The régime was also illegally applying a ninety-day detention rule and it was officially admitted that political prisoners and detainees in interrogation camps numbered over 10,000.

337. The African people of Zimbabwe, the Commonwealth countries, the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations had patiently and persistently appealed to the United Kingdom to end the colonial régime in Rhodesia and to restore Zimbabwe to its rightful owners, the African people, under a democratic government elected on the principle of one man, one vote. But the United Kingdom Government had ignored those appeals because of British economic interests in Rhodesia. The British attitude had been demonstrated by the statement of a Member of Parliament recently that it would be justifiable to send British troops to Rhodesia to protect the Kariba dam and power plant, but not to prevent the entrenchment of the minority régime.

338. Contrary to the impression given to the rest of the world, but not surprisingly, the United Kingdom Government had sided with the Smith Government against the African people, by declaring that it would not convene a constitutional conference or impose majority rule, and that it would not tolerate unconstitutional actions in Rhodesia or violence from any quarter. It could only be assumed that the violence practised consistently by the British Rhodesian régime was condoned because it was practised on another race.

339. In the face of the overwhelming evidence that the United Kingdom Government had never intended to bring about majority rule, the African people of Zimbabwe had been driven to the conclusion that the British Rhodesian régime could be eliminated only by force: they were now resolved on force, regardless of the losses they would suffer. The country was virtually in a state of emergency and there was a dangerous atmosphere of tension. Government troops were deployed all over the country, and arms were being stored in European farms for quick access. Deserted mines such as Conne-Mara were being converted into underground prisons, where it was feared the 10,000 detainees would be transferred. It was common knowledge that the Rhodesian Government was being provided with planes and military supplies by the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Portugal and South Africa and that the United Kingdom chose to ignore the fact that the Smith Government was negotiating military agreements with Portugal under the pretext of trade discussions. It was an open secret that the United Kingdom was negotiating trade agreements with South Africa to safeguard British interests in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, which it was feared would be endangered by an African government.

340. The United Kingdom Government, having made it clear that the African people would be excluded from any discussion on independence, was now engaged in prolonged negotiations with the Government in Rh-

desia to produce some plausible formula that would deceive the African people and the rest of the world; and Prime Minister Smith was endeavouring to subvert a number of African chiefs to give an impression of African support. Everything was being done to evade the only possible solution—that of a truly representative government elected on the principle of one man, one vote.

341. The threat of a unilateral declaration of independence was probably an expedient used by the United Kingdom Government in pursuing its policy of establishing minority independence; but the real problem was not the threat of unilateral independence but the existence of a dictatorship and the way to abolish it. The United Kingdom had rejected a military solution for Southern Rhodesia; but it had been ready to adopt military measures in other cases, such as Swaziland and Malaysia. All that was being asked of the United Kingdom Government was that it should sort out the confusion for which it had been responsible. The greatest danger in the United Kingdom Government's attempt to continue the settler régime lay in the intensification of racist régimes in Africa and the possibility of racial conflict with free Africa.

342. The Committee had spent many years passing resolutions and appealing to the United Kingdom Government. The time had come for it to obtain a categorical undertaking by the United Kingdom to implement, immediately and fully, the resolutions on Rhodesia adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. Those resolutions called for: the immediate release of Mr. Joshua Nkomo, President of the people of Zimbabwe, and all other political prisoners and detainees; the suspension of the 1961 Constitution which had been rejected by the African people and by the United Nations; and the convening of a truly representative constitutional conference to arrange for the immediate transfer of power from the present minority to the African majority, on the strict basis of one man, one vote.

343. Those demands were evidence of the Africans' reasonable attitude, but the alternative to a constitutional conference could only be bloodshed. If the undertaking were not forthcoming from Britain, he believed that the United Nations could fulfil its task of ensuring peace and justice only by intervening directly in Rhodesia with military assistance—particularly from the African countries—to support the African forces under the command of Joshua Nkomo, the peoples' leader of Zimbabwe.

344. He appealed to the members of the Committee who believed in liberty and in the United Nations Charter for help in destroying the racist régime of the Smith Government.

345. Mr. Nehwati (Zimbabwe African Congress of Trade Unions), speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, said that the 700,000 African workers in Southern Rhodesia suffered from capitalist and colonialist exploitation, for the industrial legislation applied in effect only to white settler workers. The Apprenticeship Act of 1959, although non-racial on paper, was applied only to the children of white settlers, and no African had as yet been admitted to the technical and skilled trades. Even where he had been able to acquire some technical skill from other countries, an African would not be able to use it in Southern Rhodesia, since skilled work was the preserve of the white settlers.

346. Although the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959 allowed the formation of trade unions, African trade unions were subjected to rigorous control. The Zimbabwe African Congress of Trade Unions (ZACTU) had been banned, in contravention of the provisions of the relevant Convention of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to which Southern Rhodesia was a party through the United Kingdom. No African union could hold a meeting without the approval of the so-called Minister of State for Law and Order, and no meetings had been allowed since February 1964. Where meetings were permitted, speakers had to speak to police tape recorders—again a violation of the ILO Convention. African trade unions were debarred from using their only weapon—calling a strike. More than fifty African trade union leaders were being held in detention camps without trial, for the offence of organizing to protect their own interests. Among them were Aaron Ndlovu, the General Secretary of ZACTU, and Mark Nziramasanga, the Financial Secretary.

347. As a result of repression, the workers were now taking spontaneous strike action and their leaders could no longer control them. Industry was frightened and there was an economic slump which was causing unprecedented unemployment. The situation had been reported by Mr. Joshua Nkomo in his memorandum dated 25 February 1965, to the United Kingdom Government.

348. The economic situation had produced poverty, starvation and widespread malnutrition among the working people, many of whom had been turned out of their homes for failure to pay rent, while their children had been expelled from school because school fees had not been paid. Disease was rife because the African people could no longer afford medical fees. The Press was full of statistics concerning disease and child mortality from malnutrition.

349. Those serious conditions were an advantage to the colonial settlers, since they made the Africans more easily exploitable. The cause of the unstable conditions was the undemocratic structure of the so-called Government which permitted the settler minorities to dominate and exploit the indigenous majorities.

350. Past resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly calling upon the United Kingdom to intervene had been ignored, and the situation had reached danger point. He appealed to the United Nations to intervene on behalf of the African people by direct intervention, without reference to the United Kingdom.

351. In reply to questions, Mr. Nyandoro said that negotiations between London and Salisbury could do nothing to improve the situation. Mr. Smith had made it abundantly clear that there was to be no African Government in his lifetime. A direct confrontation of black and white was therefore imminent, and the only course left open to the United Kingdom Government was to intervene decisively, as had President de Gaulle in Algeria, to ensure the establishment of democratic government.

352. The campaign to attract white immigrants was motivated by the determination to create a "little Europe" in Southern Rhodesia. People were being recruited from Mozambique, South Africa, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, France and Belgium. However, the campaign was meeting with little success.

353. Referring to West German capital in Southern Rhodesia, he said that in addition to the obvious cases, such as automobile companies, West German capitalists

owned shares in British-based companies operating in Southern Rhodesia. There was also considerable United States capital in the country. However, the bulk of the foreign capital in Southern Rhodesia came from the United Kingdom itself.

354. The United Kingdom was also the largest contributor of assistance to the Southern Rhodesia Army. Not only did the United Kingdom Government underwrite any loans undertaken by Mr. Smith's Government, it also arranged for the latter to borrow money on the London market, which it was unable to do directly, through intermediary companies. West Germany was the next largest contributor, supplying not only arms but also pilots and experts in guerrilla warfare to help train the Southern Rhodesian Army. Portugal, too, was supplying arms: and there was every probability that NATO weapons were arriving in Southern Rhodesia through Mozambique.

355. ZAPU regarded the Colonial Secretary's recent visit to Mr. Smith as tantamount to political surrender. It was evident that Mr. Bottomley's sole concern had been to avoid the embarrassment of a unilateral declaration of independence by Mr. Smith's Government, and his visit had done nothing to improve the situation. It was disappointing that the British Labour Party, which in opposition had been vociferous in its support for the United Nations, should show so little regard for the resolutions of the General Assembly now that it was in office.

356. The 210,000 Southern Rhodesians owned 52 per cent of the land and the indigenous population only 48 per cent. Much of the latter was barren. The European landowners were often out of the country, and they made little use of the land, except for speculation.

357. In reply to questions, Mr. Nehwati said that there was a gross disparity in the earnings and conditions of service of Europeans and Africans respectively. A European clerk, driver, teacher or constable earned two or three times as much as an African with the same qualifications performing exactly the same functions; even in the municipal service, where a university degree was required, there was the same disparity. Moreover, Europeans received pension rights, sickness benefits and family allowances, whereas Africans received no such benefits. Europeans were entitled to one month's paid leave a year, and Africans to only two weeks.

358. In a further statement, Mr. Nyandoro said that his testimony had made it abundantly clear that the situation was explosive. In order to avert violence, the Zimbabwe people had made repeated efforts to find a peaceful solution, by successive appeals to the United Kingdom, to the United Nations and to the British Commonwealth. The United Kingdom Government had rejected out of hand all advice on the action it should take. Finally, the Organization of African Unity had been approached, with precisely the same lack of effect. In the meantime, the Zimbabwe people were being killed off by Ian Smith, who derived his authority from the United Kingdom. It was an incontrovertible fact that all government ministers and judges in Southern Rhodesia took their oath of office to H.M. the Queen. Yet the United Kingdom Government maintained that it had no responsibility for the internal affairs of the country.

359. The world had witnessed the unjustifiable Western intervention in the Congo which was tanta-

381. The African peoples and their political representatives were being subjected to more and more serious persecution. The strengthening of the links between the Smith Government and South Africa and Portugal was a grave threat to the neighbouring independent African States. In that connexion, he referred to the statement made by President Kaunda on 5 May, expressing the anxiety to which the existence of that danger gave rise; he hoped that the Committee would take account of that fact in its conclusions. Equally disquieting was the presence in Southern Rhodesia of instructors who had come from West Germany to train pilots. He deplored the constant endeavours of the United Kingdom representative to invoke the supposedly self-governing status of Southern Rhodesia and to assert that it was impossible for the United Kingdom Government to intervene and prevent the racist manoeuvres of the Salisbury Government.

382. The petitioner had repeated once again the basic demands of the Zimbabwe people. He had requested the United Kingdom Government to take vigorous steps to halt the plans of the minority racist Government to legalize the reign of racial segregation in Southern Rhodesia by a unilateral proclamation of independence. He had asked it to ensure, without delay, the replacement of that minority Government by a majority government based on the principle of "one man, one vote", to convene to that end a constitutional conference of all the genuine representatives of the people of Southern Rhodesia, to request the present authorities in Southern Rhodesia to put an end to the terrorizing and persecution of the Zimbabwe people and its political representatives, and to release Mr. Nkomo and all the other detained African political leaders, as also all those fighting against colonialism and racial discrimination and for equal status for all the inhabitants of a free and independent Zimbabwe.

383. Unfortunately, there had so far been no positive response to any of those requests. The Yugoslav delegation wholeheartedly supported the requests and would support any decision which the Committee might wish to take after examining that question. Only steps in that direction would ensure that the inalienable rights of all would be recognized and respected. Any other steps designed to ensure the special privileges of the white minority to the detriment of the African majority could only end in results running counter to the wishes of the minority. Lastly, the Yugoslav delegation would again like to urge the administering Power to abandon its present attitude, which was only encouraging the racists in Southern Rhodesia, and to find a solution to the problem before it was too late. Otherwise, the United Kingdom would bear the whole responsibility if a new cancer, similar to that of South Africa, took root in African soil.

384. The Chairman, speaking as the representative of Mali, said that he wished to state at the outset that he was really disappointed by the passive attitude of the United Kingdom Government in the face of the arbitrary acts of the Southern Rhodesian settlers against the African people. He knew that even under the Southern Rhodesian Constitution of 1961, whose annulment had been repeatedly requested by the General Assembly and quite recently by the Security Council, the United Kingdom Government had special powers to abrogate all laws which interfered with the interests of the African people of Southern Rhodesia. In addition, the Queen of the United Kingdom had the prerogative of pardon. The fact that the United King-

dom had never made use of those reserve powers did not mean that opportunities to make use of them had been lacking. The fact that the United Kingdom did not intervene to prevent the folly and the insane acts of the settlers in Southern Rhodesia proved, rather, that the United Kingdom Government was an accomplice in everything that the settlers in Southern Rhodesia were doing. In the eyes of the people and the Government of the Republic of Mali, the United Kingdom Government was entirely responsible for all the sufferings imposed on the people of Southern Rhodesia.

385. His delegation could not accept the reasons put forward by the Government of the United Kingdom to justify its non-intervention in Southern Rhodesia. History had of course taught his delegation that the colonial Powers had transferred colonies and territories to each other without any consideration for the human dignity of the indigenous people. It even knew that certain African territories had been offered as wedding gifts. Times had changed, however, and the determination of formerly oppressed peoples to achieve emancipation had imposed qualitative changes on humanity. There were now thirty-five independent countries on the African continent, and, as those countries had asserted during the historic Conference at Addis Ababa which had seen the birth of the Organization of African Unity, they would never allow the United Kingdom to sell the four million Africans of Southern Rhodesia, like a herd of cattle, to the 200,000 settlers in the Territory. The very acts of the United Kingdom day after day belied the reasons it had put forward to justify its passive attitude in Southern Rhodesia. His delegation did not intend to accuse the United Kingdom Government of being racist, but he was bound to say how concerned he was to note the indifference of the United Kingdom Government in the face of the sufferings and injustices imposed on the African population of Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom Government itself recognized that Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing colony, but stated that it was unable to intervene to protect the interests of the African population. Therein lay an inexplicable contradiction, for the United Kingdom was a founder Member of the United Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council. The United Kingdom had taken part in the drafting of the United Nations Charter. He then read out Article 73 of the Charter.

386. He wondered whether the United Kingdom was really convinced that it had fulfilled, with regard to the people of Southern Rhodesia, its obligations under Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, which he had just read out. The answer was certainly in the negative. As an African, he was concerned to know the reason for the attitude of the United Kingdom Government in Southern Rhodesia. He had seen that quite recently the United Kingdom Government had given one of its African colonies as a military base to allow aggression against the people of Stanleyville in the Congo, pleading humanitarian reasons. Those humanitarian reasons, it had been alleged at the time, were to save some whites who had, however, undergone no maltreatment. The United Kingdom Government had undertaken reprisals against the Yemen, an independent country and a Member of the United Nations, on the pretext of protecting the population of the colony of Southern Arabia. It was therefore hard to understand why the United Kingdom Government could not intervene in its colony of Southern Rhodesia to protect the rights and interests of the African population.

387. For all those reasons, his delegation categorically rejected all the allegations made by the United Kingdom Government to justify its passive attitude, or rather its complicity, in relation to the crimes committed by the settlers of Southern Rhodesia against the African population. The United Kingdom could, and had the means to, suspend the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia and give the country a democratic constitution respecting the rights of the various sectors of the population of the Territory. His delegation was convinced that the United Kingdom could intervene, and could intervene successfully, to stop the execution of the twenty-four African nationalists whose names Mr. Nyandoro had given that morning. If the United Kingdom did not halt the criminal acts of Mr. Smith and his accomplices, it would be responsible for the massacre. If the United Kingdom Government acted like Pontius Pilate, looking on and allowing the settlers of Southern Rhodesia to do as they wished, the whole world would censure it severely.

388. The representative of Poland remarked that the picture emerging from the valuable information given by the petitioners showed a military build-up that entailed the danger of direct confrontation between the Africans and the white minority settlers. That constituted a real threat to peace in Africa and the world in general. His country fully supported the African people of Zimbabwe in their struggle for liberation and freedom. Poland was always in favour of the peaceful settlement of disputes and peaceful transition to independence. In view of the dilatory attitude adopted by the administering Powers, the patience of the African peoples was running out. It was the duty of the Special Committee, if bloodshed was to be avoided, to request the Security Council to take up the question immediately.

389. The representative of the United Kingdom said that a great many points had been made, many of them of great interest but many also touching upon matters that were not within the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government. And he would not attempt to answer more than a few at the moment. His delegation intended to take an early opportunity in subsequent discussions to explain once again the actual constitutional position in rather more detail, because there was clearly a great deal of misunderstanding about the United Kingdom's position and the extent of its ability to act. In the meantime, and subject to what he might say later, he would add a few further brief comments.

390. His delegation would not, of course, comment on the various things that had been said about Rhodesia's internal affairs, because his Government had no responsibility for them and no powers to intervene in any way in them. But that silence must not be construed as acceptance or acquiescence in any way in the charges or accusations that had been made. By the same token, his Government could in no way be called an accomplice—as the representative of Mali had alleged—in what might be done in internal affairs by the Southern Rhodesian Government.

391. Further, he wished to point out that members of the police and army in Rhodesia were neither appointed by nor responsible to the United Kingdom Government. That Government had no power or authority to give directions to the armed forces or to the Governor or to Rhodesian Ministers on matters within the Rhodesian Government's competence. There was no official in Rhodesia appointed by or responsible to

the United Kingdom Government, except the British High Commissioner, and all were aware of how small his staff was.

392. Reverting to the appeal made by the Committee concerning Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, he would only say now that the United Kingdom had no powers to grant pardons to persons convicted under Rhodesian laws, and no powers to repeal laws contrary to African interests or even to prevent such laws being passed. The representative of Mali had cited Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. That Article referred to Territories that had not achieved a full measure of self-government. Rhodesia had had full self-government since 1923.

393. He would add, since a great many remarks had been made about alleged British proposals for amendments to the Constitution and about British negotiations with the Southern Rhodesian Government, that the content of the discussions between the two Governments was of course confidential. Now that the elections were over, it was the British hope—expressed before and after the elections—that serious negotiations could continue. If those negotiations were to have the best possible chance of success in reaching agreement on measures acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole, it was obvious that they must be private and confidential. It was of no profit to guess at their content.

394. Finally, the Committee had heard much about bloodshed, killing and military intervention. It was sad to hear those things advocated in Lusaka. It was perfectly true that the United Kingdom had no appetite for killing Europeans in Rhodesia. But it had no appetite either for killing human beings at all, whether African or European. That was not racism; it was a desire to settle difficulties peacefully by negotiation, by co-operation, by consultation, by trying to establish common ground on which all concerned could agree. If there was anyone present, petitioner or government representative, who was ready to uphold that peaceful negotiation was wrong and that killing was right, he ought to say so plainly. That was not the path the United Kingdom Government had chosen. Its judgement was that the best hope lay in negotiation and it would pursue that policy relentlessly and to the very end.

395. As he had already said, he would comment later on the other points which had a bearing on the responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government.

396. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said he had listened to the statement made by the United Kingdom representative with the greatest grief, because the latter had once again made plain that the United Kingdom Government was not prepared to co-operate with the Special Committee or to bow to world public opinion on the Southern Rhodesian question. That latest stand was enough to blight all hopes for an early and peaceful solution.

397. The question of killing had arisen purely because Africa had witnessed such occurrences for a very long time and African delegations were moved by the desire to avoid bloodshed in Southern Rhodesia. Furthermore, the United Kingdom record, to go back but a bare five years, by no means upheld the statement that the United Kingdom Government and people had no interest in killing. He had no need to remind the United Kingdom representative of what had happened in Kenya, in Malaya and in India—events that bore ample testimony to the fact that the colonialists were

prepared to defend their system even by resorting to killing. The only obstacle preventing similar action in Southern Rhodesia was the large preponderance of African over white population. Had the situation been reversed, the United Kingdom Government would not have hesitated, he was convinced, to resort to force to remedy the situation. The Africans, for their part, were averse to the use of force, as their whole record testified. However, killing might indeed be the last means of saving Southern Rhodesia.

398. The representative of the Soviet Union said that the stand taken by the United Kingdom representative was tantamount to refusal to co-operate with the Special Committee; he had attempted to justify the colonial system which history had shown to be a blot on mankind. The United Kingdom was in fact washing its hands of the whole matter, and that attitude was totally unacceptable to the Committee. The full responsibility for the present state of affairs in Southern Rhodesia rested squarely on the shoulders of the United Kingdom.

399. In a further statement, the representative of the Soviet Union said that, listening to the petitioners from Southern Rhodesia, he had been struck by the very idea of "petitioner" had evolved. Petitioners no longer appeared before the Committee as humble plaintiffs seeking favours, but as fearless freedom fighters and worthy spokesmen of peoples which had as much right to freedom and independence as any Member of the United Nations. Gone were the days when the highest law in the African continent was the will of the colonialists, and it was no accident that the attempts of the United Kingdom delegation to tell the petitioners what they could and could not say in the Committee had aroused such indignation. Three years previously Dr. Kaunda had appeared before that same Committee as leader of the national liberation movement of the Zambian people, and today the United Kingdom delegation was obliged to treat him with the respect due to the President of an independent State. No matter how condescendingly the United Kingdom delegation treated the representatives of the Zimbabwe people today, the time would surely come, and soon, when it would have to deal with them as eminent statesmen of an independent Republic of Zimbabwe.

400. The representatives of the Zimbabwe people had done much to fill out the Committee's knowledge of the terrible situation in Southern Rhodesia: a country where United Kingdom, United States and West German monopolies were plundering four million Africans, where Africans were condemned to death for daring even to think of freedom and vast quantities of weapons were being imported for use against the indigenous population, where the maxim "one man, one vote" had been replaced by the colonial "one white gentleman equals twenty African slaves", where even the Christian Church proclaimed racism as little short of divine revelation.

401. Who was responsible for that intolerable situation? The overwhelming majority of delegations had reached the conclusion that the principal responsibility rested with the United Kingdom, and no matter how hard the United Kingdom delegation tried to convince members that its Government could not interfere in the internal affairs of Southern Rhodesia, nobody would take such a claim seriously. And if the British colonialists really had entrusted the business of oppressing and plundering the Zimbabwe people to the local white settlers, the responsibility of the United Kingdom

Government for the acts of those settlers was thereby increased. In any case, the United Kingdom delegation was hardly in a position to talk about non-interference in the internal affairs of self-governing colonies: the United Kingdom had shown no such fastidious concern for legality when it had felt that its interests were threatened in British Guiana, Kenya, Malaysia or Mauritius and had not hesitated to send in troops to crush the national liberation movements there.

402. The United Kingdom was also responsible for the events that could be expected to take place in the near future in Southern Rhodesia. It was no secret that the British colonialists and the Southern Rhodesian racists were planning to transform Southern Rhodesia into a racist State similar to the South African Republic. The plot against the Zimbabwe people had already passed through several stages: the armed forces had been handed over to the local racists, there had been convened an assembly of tribal leaders in the pay of those same racists, "elections" had been held on the basis of the discriminatory 1961 Constitution and the new racist Cabinet of Mr. Smith had been formed. It remained only to declare Southern Rhodesia an independent State, and the United Kingdom Government was apparently doing everything in its power to hasten the development of events, no doubt hoping to present Africa with a *fait accompli*. How else was it possible to interpret the fact that, so far from heeding the United Nations appeals and calling a constitutional conference with the participation of all political parties, the United Kingdom Government was conducting secret negotiations with Mr. Smith and doing everything possible to strengthen the position of the local authorities on the basis of the 1961 Constitution? It was inconceivable that Mr. Smith would behave with such arrogance, even going so far as to threaten neighbouring States, if he did not know that the United Kingdom stood firmly behind him. Judging by the criticisms levelled at the Government's colonial policy by the British Labour Party, it might have been hoped that they would revise that policy upon taking office. But those hopes had been dashed, and there was now absolutely nothing to distinguish the Labour Party's policy on Southern Rhodesia from that of its Conservative predecessors.

403. The British colonialists and South African racists were not the sole architects on the plot against the Zimbabwe people. The Committee had listened to circumstantial evidence which confirmed the statements of his own delegation at the first meeting devoted to Southern Rhodesia, namely that the plot had the full backing of the United States. The Committee had been told of United States capital in Southern Rhodesia, of deliveries of United States weapons, and of direct diplomatic relations between Washington and Salisbury.

404. Could the Committee do anything to avert the terrible danger hanging over the Zimbabwe people? His delegation had no doubt whatever that they would be victorious in their fight for liberation, no matter what the colonialists did. But that victory would come the sooner, and cost less, if they were united in their struggle against the oppressors and received the full backing of the independent African States. Meanwhile, the Special Committee's duty was clear: it must declare its unconditional support of the Zimbabwe people in their fight for liberation; it must call on the United Kingdom immediately to dismantle the embryonic racist State of Southern Rhodesia and to declare the independence of Zimbabwe, applying the principle of "one man, one

vote" to the whole population. The Committee should also take steps to prevent the provision of military and diplomatic assistance to the Southern Rhodesian racists by the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, South Africa, Portugal and other allies of British colonialism.

405. Such decisions by the Special Committee would carry great political weight. But it must be anticipated that the colonialists would do everything possible to prevent their implementation, and might even go so far as to launch a new colonial war if they considered that their interests were in jeopardy. If, therefore, the Southern Rhodesians continued with their plans to construct a racist State despite the decisions of the Special Committee, it would become necessary once again to bring the question before the Security Council—the United Nations organ which, under the Charter, was empowered to undertake enforcement measures in the interests of international peace and security. Under the terms of Article 28 of the Charter, the Security Council should be convened in Africa, in the immediate vicinity of Southern Rhodesia, and it should entrust the execution of the practical measures provided under the Charter to the regional organization of the African continent—the Organization of African Unity. The cause of the Zimbabwe freedom fighters was just, and they would surely win.

406. The representative of the United States, in exercise of the right of reply, expressed surprise at the Soviet representative's statement, and in particular at his unfounded accusations of United States responsibility for the conditions prevailing in Southern Rhodesia. His Government's position in that matter had been set forth at length on numerous occasions, and he would present it again as briefly as possible in the course of the discussion on the draft resolution.

407. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would take this opportunity to revert to the question of the policy and position of the United Kingdom in regard to Southern Rhodesian affairs.

408. The policy which the United Kingdom Government was pursuing was active and constructive. It had been formulated within days only of the new Government in Britain taking office in October 1964. The difficulties were immense and he had no wish to belittle them; nevertheless, it was his Government's view that it must pursue that policy resolutely and patiently. As Lord Caradon, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, had explained before the Security Council recently, it was based on three principles.

409. The first principle was that the United Kingdom Government, which alone had the authority to grant independence to Rhodesia, must be satisfied that any basis on which independence was proposed was acceptable to the people of the country as a whole—and he would emphasize, as a whole.

410. The second principle was that it was not by unconstitutional or illegal action that a way forward must be sought, but by negotiation.

411. The third principle was that no one, either within Rhodesia or without, must be left in any doubt of the true constitutional position or of the political and economic consequences of an illegal declaration of independence.

412. Those three principles were all related to one another. They had their own positive and negative aspects. On the first, the granting of independence, the

United Kingdom Government sought a peaceful transition to majority rule but did not seek to stipulate how that might be achieved or when that stage might be reached. The Rhodesian Prime Minister had formally accepted that independence must be based on general consent and had recognized that the United Kingdom Government was entitled to be satisfied about that aspect.

413. As the third principle implied, the United Kingdom Government had spoken with great firmness and clarity to warn all concerned about the disastrous consequences of an illegal declaration of independence by the Rhodesian Government. In his statement on 27 October 1965, Mr. Harold Wilson had described such a declaration as an open act of defiance and rebellion, and had said that it would be treasonable to take steps to give effect to it. He had also said that the economic effects would be disastrous to the prosperity and prospects of the people of Southern Rhodesia. It would inflict disastrous economic damage upon her and would leave her isolated and virtually friendless in a largely hostile continent. That statement had had a profound effect and had been widely welcomed in the United Nations, in the Special Committee, and elsewhere in the world. It had been reaffirmed in equally strong terms by Mr. Harold Wilson in his statement on 29 April 1965, when he had said that nothing which had happened in the previous six months had afforded reasons for modifying what he had said in October in any way. Mr. Wilson had said that there would be no justification for Rhodesia to nurse the delusion that it would receive widespread international support in the event of an illegal declaration. He had emphasized that it was not the United Kingdom which contemplated unconstitutional action. The only route by which Rhodesia could achieve independence without grave consequences to herself was by the process of constitutional negotiation.

414. Those statements about the consequences of illegal action from any side were complementary to the second basic principle of United Kingdom policy, which was that it was by negotiation that an advance must be made and not by unconstitutional or illegal action. The United Kingdom Government had pledged itself to uphold the law and the Constitution and had urged all others concerned to do the same. The consequences of either the United Kingdom or Rhodesia crossing the border into the realm of illegality or a breach of the Constitution would be very grave indeed, for Rhodesia and perhaps for others as well. Whatever the criticisms and misgivings that might be expressed in the Committee and elsewhere about the present Constitution and law—and he could assure the Committee that his delegation had taken solemn note of all that had been said at Lusaka—it was in his Government's view of prime importance that the Constitution and law be respected. One of the facts about the legal position was that the United Kingdom Government had only very limited powers in relation to Rhodesia. Many members of the Committee had indicated that they did not believe that. He was sorry to have to contradict them but contradict them he must. The simple fact was that for the United Kingdom to interfere in the internal affairs of Rhodesia would be to break the law, and also to invite illegality in return. The fact—and surely the Committee was concerned to establish the facts and to take account of them in what it said and recommended—was that that unique situation, unlike any other situation with which the United Kingdom had

ever had to deal, had been created long ago. The extent of Britain's powers and authority was clearly laid down in the Constitution and in the convention whereby it was bound to refrain from legislating for Rhodesia in regard to its internal affairs except with the agreement of the Rhodesian Government. That convention, like the Constitution itself, had binding force. For the United Kingdom to break it or to infringe it would be to take the illegal and unconstitutional action whose consequences would be so disastrous. The United Kingdom had certain limited powers affecting legislation which conflicted with treaty obligations and affected the Colonial Stock Acts. That did not enable the United Kingdom to repeal a law once it had been passed and if it had not been disallowed within six months. Once that had happened, there was nothing that the United Kingdom could do unless it broke the law to do it. There were certain powers which the United Kingdom might exercise if the Rhodesian Parliament wished to amend the Constitution in certain important respects and sought the necessary agreement of the United Kingdom Government to those amendments. In that case the request must of course come initially from Southern Rhodesia. But in all the day-to-day government and legislation of Rhodesia, in its internal affairs, the United Kingdom had neither the legal powers to act, nor the means of carrying out its decisions even if it was legally empowered to act. The civil servants, the soldiers, the police were all responsible solely to the Rhodesian Government. The Governor, even when he acted in the name of the Queen, did so in accordance with the advice of Rhodesian Ministers in all internal affairs, including the exercise of the power of pardon and the remission of sentences. There was no one in Rhodesia responsible to the United Kingdom Government or who carried out United Kingdom instructions except the British High Commissioner and his staff. Those limitations on the United Kingdom Government's authority did not exist in any other British colony; not in British Guiana, nor anywhere else. That was what made the situation unique. Those might be unpalatable facts, but they really were facts. The United Kingdom sincerely desired to co-operate with the Committee, but it could not do so at the expense of ignoring those crucial and central features of the situation. If the Committee's demands and recommendations ignored those facts, it had no alternative but to say so. Co-operation with the Committee on any other basis would be worthless; it would mislead the Committee and distort the real truth about the problems facing the United Kingdom.

415. He would repeat that the United Kingdom regarded itself as having a solemn duty to be satisfied, before granting independence, that it would be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. The Prime Minister had said in the House of Commons on 29 April 1965 that he believed that the one hope lay in the negotiations which the United Kingdom Government hoped to resume more actively after the elections. The British High Commissioner had returned to Salisbury after consultations in London following the elections and the discussions were now being actively resumed. It was the United Kingdom Government which had the authority and responsibility for bringing Rhodesia to independence. It was the United Kingdom Government's judgement that the best way forward lay in peaceful negotiation. It had actively pursued its policy of the three principles: that of independence on a basis acceptable to the people as a whole, of negotiation and not unconstitutional or illegal action, and of a warning of the consequences of an illegal declaration of inde-

pendence; and the responsibility was that of the United Kingdom and of the United Kingdom alone. His Government would pursue that policy with resolution and in good faith. And it had the right to ask that the members of the Committee should not make its task more difficult.

416. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that he wished first of all, as the representative of a State member of the Organization of African Unity, to state that he had reservations concerning certain parts of the statement made at the 340th meeting by the observer for the Organization of African Unity.

417. He had listened to the petitioners from Southern Rhodesia with the greatest interest. The most striking fact emerging from their statements was that the administering Power refused to use its authority to restore legality in Southern Rhodesia and allowed the white racists to be the sole masters of the situation. As a result, the four million Africans in the Territory were subjected to the worst forms of brutality and humiliation by a minority of 200,000 heavily armed white settlers.

418. He could not accept the constitutional and legal argument put forward by the United Kingdom representative and was convinced that the United Kingdom could and should intervene in order to settle a crisis which had already persisted too long and whose unforeseeable consequences might be disastrous for peaceful coexistence and world peace. The United Kingdom had abrogated more than one constitution and it might well be asked why it could not do so in the case of Southern Rhodesia. The passive attitude taken by the United Kingdom Government was an invitation to violence, for the Africans of Southern Rhodesia could not go on any longer without reacting.

419. He strongly urged the United Kingdom not to concern itself over tacit agreements, for Mr. Smith felt no such concern. He had held elections on the basis of a constitution which had been rejected by the General Assembly and he was now preparing a unilateral declaration of independence, which must at all costs be prevented.

420. In conclusion, he suggested that in the light of the statements of the petitioners, the Special Committee should give consideration to the problem of refugees from Territories under colonial domination.

421. The representative of India expressed disappointment at the statement just made by the United Kingdom representative. He had said much but conveyed little. He had again called Southern Rhodesia a self-governing colony; but the United Nations did not accept that idea, which was in any case a contradiction in terms. He had referred to the legal position: yet the laws in force in Southern Rhodesia were lawless laws, and even the International Commission of Jurists had said so.

422. The declared policy of the United Kingdom towards its colonies was that there should be majority rule, with safeguards for minorities. But that policy was being applied in reverse in Southern Rhodesia—except that the African majority would have no safeguards. To remedy that extraordinary situation, the United Kingdom Government should immediately release all political prisoners and detainees, abrogate the 1961 Constitution and call a constitutional conference to be attended by all concerned, whether Mr. Smith liked it or not, to work out a new constitution on the basis of "one man, one vote".

423. His delegation had learned with grave disquiet that as a consequence of the Committee's appeal for the release of Mr. Nkomo and his colleagues, certain further restrictions had been placed on the Zimbabwe nationalist leaders. If those reports were accurate, his delegation could only express profound regret that its attempts to establish a meaningful dialogue had met with such a short-sighted response. If Mr. Smith continued on his present course, he would surely be overtaken by the same fate as Sir Roy Welensky and the Central African Federation.

424. The representative of Ethiopia said that the United Kingdom statement would have been a great help to the Committee's work if it had been made at the beginning and not the end of its deliberations on Southern Rhodesia. He welcomed the admission that it was the United Kingdom Government which had the responsibility of bringing Southern Rhodesia to independence. But that was exactly what the members of the Committee had been saying all along. Why, then, had the United Kingdom representative insisted that his Government had no responsibility for Southern Rhodesia?

425. The United Kingdom representative had said that his Government alone had the authority to grant independence to the country as a whole. Why, then, was it carrying on negotiations, not with the country as a whole, but with the agents of the settler community only? The United Kingdom representative had also stated that his Government believed in a peaceful transition to majority rule: but if the Salisbury régime continued in its present path, it was inconceivable that the transition would be peaceful. If the British Government really believed in the principles set forth in its own statement, it should address itself to the task of clearing up its own mess—a mess for which the Zimbabwe nationalist leaders who appeared before us unanimously attributed responsibility to the United Kingdom.

426. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom statement was an improvement on that country's previous pronouncements, and he hoped that it would continue to think along those lines.

427. The representative of the United Kingdom said in a further statement that his delegation had received by telegram from the British High Commissioner in Salisbury that day the text of a statement issued by the Rhodesian Government according to which the Rhodesian Government had declared a state of emergency in a certain area of Southern Rhodesia. He read the text to the Committee and said he had no further information in response to the request made by the Indian representative.

428. The representative of Denmark said that it was a source of deep regret to all delegations that, so far from improving, the situation in Southern Rhodesia had further deteriorated in the two months since the Committee had last discussed the problem. The petitioners had confirmed the very strong feelings of the African population in Southern Rhodesia against the present régime. The simple and tragic fact was that Mr. Smith and his Government believed it right that 200,000 Europeans should rule over four million Africans in their own homeland. It was incredible that such a situation should still exist in the middle of the twentieth century, a century in which the lesson had been taught, as never before, that dictatorial and oppressive régimes begat violence, revolution and war, and that the oppressors must always lose at last. Nevertheless, all concerned should continue to seek for a peaceful solution. It was

encouraging that the petitioners still intended to seek such a solution, if only they could get a positive response to their aspirations. The United Kingdom Government, too, was seeking a peaceful solution. The Government in Salisbury, however, apparently had no intention of allowing matters to develop peacefully towards the inevitable conclusion: the independence of Rhodesia under the rule of the majority. The question therefore remained as to how the Committee could influence the intentions of the Southern Rhodesian Government.

429. His delegation felt that the United Kingdom Government was in a better position to do so. Notwithstanding the repeated declarations that the United Kingdom Government was constitutionally unable to interfere directly in Southern Rhodesia's internal affairs, he had full confidence that the United Kingdom Government would use all its power and influence to halt the present dangerous development and to see to it that reason prevailed in the last resort.

430. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said he had heard the United Kingdom statement with profound regret, for it closed the door to a better future for Southern Rhodesia thus destroying the Nationalists' hopes in the good offices of the Committee. It was plainly the intention of the United Kingdom Government to leave the African population to the mercy of the racist, Smith, under legal pretexts which required no further comment from him. It was deeply to be deplored that the United Kingdom Prime Minister had not followed up his statement of October 1964 and annulled the unacceptable 1961 Constitution and instituted majority rule.

431. Even at that late hour, however, Tanzania would call upon the United Kingdom Government to take that action; to suspend the shipment of arms to Smith; to secure the release of political prisoners and, lastly, to ensure that the Sub-Committee be given the opportunity to visit Southern Rhodesia. For he was sure that the Special Committee had much to contribute in solving what the United Kingdom owned was an intractable problem.

432. Those were legitimate demands. Should they go unheeded, the United Kingdom would bear the sole responsibility for whatever might ensue. History showed that no people could be held indefinitely in bondage and, despite the hard times that lay ahead, final victory would rest with the Zimbabwe people, supported in their struggle as they were by all right thinking people of the world.

433. The representative of Bulgaria said that recent events had brought the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia to the brink of disaster. The information given by ZAPU and ZANU, the two parties indisputably commanding the support of the African population, had filled the Committee with alarm. The responsibility lay on the United Kingdom Government, which had ignored all past recommendations of the United Nations and had transferred the bulk of the forces of the former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the Southern Rhodesian Government and was even now continuing to supply that Government with military equipment.

434. The United Kingdom's armed intervention in British Guiana, Malta and the Congo showed how worthless were the legalistic excuses advanced for non-intervention; indeed it was obvious that the overriding motive for action or inaction was self-interest of the foreign monopolies and the white settlers. Newspaper reports on the latest development, the secret negotiations being conducted between the United Kingdom and

the Southern Rhodesian Government, with the African leaders excluded, served to remove any doubt but that the intention was to make a new South Africa in Southern Rhodesia.

435. The representative of Yugoslavia said that he had hoped that after the administering Power and its representative had heard the various statements and the appeals and requests made to them, they would change their attitude and accept what reason dictated. Unfortunately, the United Kingdom representative's statement made no material change in the situation and brought no new elements. He deeply regretted that the United Kingdom had not seen fit to make a constructive and positive response to the appeals addressed to it. He wished to reaffirm that the people of Yugoslavia fully supported the Zimbabwe people and hoped for their early liberation.

436. The representative of Syria said that he discerned in the United Kingdom statement a change in the attitude of that country towards the intransigent Smith régime and a tendency to regard the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia more seriously. Other parts of the statement, however, were far from clear and, in a sincerely constructive spirit, he would seek enlightenment from the United Kingdom representative on the following points. First, what did the United Kingdom Government have in mind as a basis for "independence acceptable to the people as a whole"—the universally recognized principle of one man, one vote? Secondly, how long would negotiations to that end take—one year, two years or an endless time? Thirdly, what action was contemplated in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence—further negotiations or action of a more serious nature?

437. Explanations on these points would, he was sure, enable Committee members to take the right stand on the question, compatible with the legitimate rights of the Zimbabwe people, that had been too long withheld.

438. The representative of Sierra Leone said he thought it most important to make a determined effort to rescue the persons sentenced to death on political grounds.

439. With regard to the United Kingdom statement, he was pleased to note that the United Kingdom had at least recognized its responsibility for the solution of the problem of Rhodesia.

440. The United Kingdom representative had also stated that the Rhodesian Prime Minister had formally accepted that independence must be based on general consent. Could some clarification be given of the meaning of the term "general consent"?

441. The representative of Poland said that the United Kingdom policy, as outlined in the statement just made, was anything but constructive. The years were passing and still not a single provision of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had been carried out. And whereas no action had been taken in support of the African population's interests, the United Kingdom had since 1923 consistently condemned all repressive measures by the white minority, despite the residual veto on legislation which it retained. It was difficult to accept legal quibbles as good ground for non-intervention, for the 1961 Constitution itself was illegal, having been rejected outright by the African population. Negotiations could not be conducted in an atmosphere of police terror and repression, and with the complete exclusion of the African leaders.

442. The representative of the United States said she had refrained earlier from making a general statement on United States policy on the Southern Rhodesian question because of the heavy agenda at Lusaka. Such a statement was indeed hardly necessary, in view of the detailed account she had given in the Committee as recently as 15 April 1965, followed by the reaffirmation of her Government's views in the Security Council on 5 and 6 May 1965. However, she would explain in brief the United States position. Her Government had never minimized the dangers inherent in the current Southern Rhodesian situation, and had made repeated pleas that the Constitution should be amended and provide for the liberalization of the franchise with a view to universal adult suffrage. It had pressed for immediate steps to be taken to break down patterns of discrimination and to repeal discriminatory laws.

443. Independence, it was convinced, must come about in Southern Rhodesia; but it could only come about under conditions acceptable to the majority of the people. Such a process would be essential for establishing peaceful relations between that country and its neighbours. The possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence was an element often distracting attention from the essential issue of constitutional advance. The United States was unequivocally opposed to any such irresponsible act, which could have most serious and even tragic consequences, and would not recognize unilateral action of the kind.

444. As to ways and means for improving the situation, the United Kingdom representative, earlier that month in the Security Council, had enumerated the three principles guiding his Government's policy and action—principles which had been repeated earlier in the meeting.

445. In her delegation's view, the principles would seem to form a sound basis for moving ahead. Accordingly, the United States had welcomed the recent visit made to Southern Rhodesia by United Kingdom Ministers, as a positive undertaking to communicate with and obtain the views of all segments of the country's population. Willingness on the part of the United Kingdom to talk with all parties was a necessary prelude to the direct communication between them without which no solution would be possible. If a constitutional conference were not possible at the moment, informal discussions, responsive to the views of all, had to be undertaken, and the United States hoped that the policy instituted would be vigorously pursued until the stubborn deadlock was broken. That end would, however, fail of achievement unless there was a change in the attitude of the Southern Rhodesia Government and of the white Southern Rhodesians responsible for its election. For the minority to cling to predominant power and privilege was to fly in the face of history.

F. FURTHER ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Appeal to the United Kingdom Government concerning Mr. Joshua Nkomo and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole

446. At the 339th meeting, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, after expressing the deep regret of his delegation at the absence of Mr. Joshua Nkomo and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, proposed that the Committee should appeal to the United Kingdom Government to intervene with the Government of Southern Rhodesia to allow them to appear before the

Committee. He appealed further for their unconditional release together with all other political prisoners.

447. The representative of the Ivory Coast supported this proposal. In the view of his delegation an appeal should be made to the United Kingdom to intervene with the Southern Rhodesian authorities for the release of Mr. Nkomo and Rev. Sithole, so that they could come and give evidence before the Special Committee.

448. The representatives of India and the Soviet Union also expressed support for the proposal.

449. The Chairman said that since there was an evident wish on the part of the Committee that the appeal proposed by the representative of Tanzania should be made, he would proceed with the appeal in the absence of any objection.

450. In the absence of any objection, the proposal was adopted.

451. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would refer the appeal to his Government. He would remind the Committee, however, that his Government's responsibility in Southern Rhodesia did not extend to internal affairs.

452. The Chairman said that the appeal to the United Kingdom Government by the Special Committee was perfectly in order and in keeping with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council under which the United Kingdom was entirely responsible for Southern Rhodesia.

453. The representative of the Soviet Union said that the appeal was necessary and timely. Mr. Nkomo had already appeared before the Committee on an earlier occasion, and the United Kingdom Colonial Secretary had evidently experienced no difficulty in obtaining an interview with Mr. Nkomo. There was therefore no justification for making difficulties now.

454. The representative of India supported the previous speaker's view. The appeal was eminently reasonable, and he hoped that the United Kingdom Government would make it possible for Mr. Nkomo to appear before the Committee.

455. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania again urged that the United Kingdom Government should heed the Committee's appeal. Southern Rhodesia was to all intents and purposes a colony, and if the United Kingdom really wished to facilitate the Committee's work it would take steps to release Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole so that they might appear before the Committee.

Adoption of resolution concerning the reprieve of condemned persons and the release of political prisoners

456. At the 341st meeting, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.206) for the consideration of the Special Committee.

457. Introducing the draft resolution, the representative of the Ivory Coast stressed the non-political and purely humanitarian nature of the draft resolution and expressed the hope that the United Kingdom would use the prerogatives of pardon, reduction of sentences and release of detainees conferred upon it in chapter 4, section 9, of the unjustifiable Constitution adopted by Southern Rhodesia in 1961.

458. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that as a co-sponsor, his delegation would

do its utmost to obtain maximum support for the draft resolution introduced by the Ivory Coast.

459. The Chairman, speaking as the representative of Mali, said that in view of the extremely humanitarian nature of the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the Ivory Coast, his delegation was appealing to all delegations to adopt it unanimously. A unanimous vote in favour of the draft resolution would be an expression of the sympathy and solidarity of the members of the Committee with the African people of Southern Rhodesia, who had done nothing to deserve the fate which they were suffering.

460. The representative of Bulgaria stated that his delegation would support the draft resolution introduced by the Ivory Coast and would suggest that it be put to the vote at the earliest opportunity.

461. The representative of Poland said that in view of his Government's position concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, his delegation would support the draft resolution introduced by the Ivory Coast.

462. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would have preferred that the twenty-four-hour rule on voting should be observed. If the draft resolution were put to the vote before his delegation had had a chance to seek instructions on it, it would, in accordance with its normal practice, be obliged to take no part in the voting.

463. The representative of Venezuela pointed out that the draft resolution was of a purely humanitarian character. His delegation warmly supported it.

464. The draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.206) was adopted by 20 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

465. The representative of the United States said that her delegation agreed entirely with the humanitarian aims of the resolution just adopted. She had abstained in the vote, however, because her delegation felt that the resolution did not take fully into account the position of the United Kingdom in the matter. She expressed the deep concern of her Government for the fate of the persons now sentenced to death in Southern Rhodesia. For those whose conviction had been upheld against appeal, the United States urgently asked for clemency. It was also prepared to join in a further appeal for clemency, should the conviction of the remainder be confirmed under due process of law.

466. She would add, however, that her Government was opposed to acts of terror wherever they might occur, in the United States or anywhere else in the world, but it regarded the automatic imposition of the death sentence as unduly harsh.

467. Finally, the United States was most vigorously opposed to the detention of political prisoners without trial anywhere in the world and had repeatedly urged that legislation permitting such detentions be abolished.

468. The representative of Australia said that his delegation, too, understood and appreciated the deep humanitarian motives that inspired the resolution. It had, however, felt obliged to abstain in the voting because of uncertainty respecting some aspects of the situation, and particularly the possibilities of effective appeal by the United Kingdom. He wished to make it plain that his Government did not uphold the principle of mandatory death sentences, least of all for political crimes or offences, whether occurring in Rhodesia or anywhere else in the world.

469. The representative of the USSR said that it was a most damning piece of evidence that the United

States delegation had abstained from voting on the Afro-Asian resolution calling for the reprieve of the twenty-four freedom fighters condemned to death in Southern Rhodesia. The United States representative had even explained that her Government was in general opposed to the over-hasty execution of death sentences, except, of course, when the interests of United States monopolies were affected.

470. The representative of the United States, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he could not let pass the USSR representative's interpretation of his delegation's abstention in the vote on the resolution concerning the execution of political prisoners. That abstention had been fully explained, and his delegation's position regarding execution for political reasons was as fully known as that of the USSR.

471. The resolution concerning the reprieve of condemned persons and the release of political prisoners (A/AC.109/118), adopted by the Special Committee at its 341st meeting on 26 May 1965, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1747 (XVI) of 28 June 1962, 1760 (XVII) of 31 October 1962, 1833 (XVIII) of 14 October 1963, 1889 (XVIII) of 6 November 1963 and 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963,

"Recalling also Security Council resolution 202 (1965) of 6 May 1965,

"Deeply concerned about the fate of those condemned to death under the amended Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the fate of the many political prisoners detained without trial in Southern Rhodesia,

"1. Requests the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to use all its powers and prerogatives to save the lives of those who are condemned to death under the amended Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and to ensure the release of all political prisoners;

"2. Requests the Secretary-General to bring this resolution to the immediate attention of the Government of the United Kingdom and to report to the Special Committee on its implementation."

472. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom on 28 May 1965.

Adoption of resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia

473. At the 343rd meeting, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia submitted another draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.207) for the consideration of the Special Committee.

474. Introducing this draft resolution, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania observed that the evidence heard that day had brought to light a number of new elements previously unknown to the Special Committee. Accordingly, there was need for a further resolution to cover those matters. He would therefore introduce a joint draft resolution on behalf of the Afro-Asian members of the Special Committee and Yugoslavia, in order that all aspects of the Southern Rhodesian question might be covered during the Lusaka

visit. As the text had been prepared in haste, the sponsors would be ready to consider appropriate amendments, and also to welcome further sponsors. The provisions of the draft resolution were self-explanatory and covered an earlier suggestion of Ethiopia on sending a sub-committee to Southern Rhodesia to make contact with the various sectors of the population. He hoped the draft resolution would elicit unanimous support.

475. The representative of Ethiopia recalled that his delegation had not pressed its earlier suggestion regarding the dispatch of a sub-committee to Southern Rhodesia to make contact with the imprisoned leaders in view of the Chairman's appeal that more time should be given to reflect on the proposal; further, in the interim, the long-awaited reply from the United Kingdom Government to the first request that the two African leaders should be allowed to appear before the Committee might have been received. It would seem that no reply would ever be forthcoming, so his delegation was glad to join in supporting the joint draft resolution just introduced.

476. The attitude adopted by the United Kingdom Government should not deter the Committee from fulfilling the sacred duty entrusted to it, or helping in every possible way to ease the plight of peoples living under the cruel system of colonialism. It was unfortunate that the limitation of time and previous commitments made it impossible for the whole of the Special Committee to proceed to Salisbury for the purposes of the draft resolution, but a sub-committee would be the next best thing, and he trusted that the draft resolution would be given full support.

477. The representative of Iraq said that it was not his intention to comment in detail but there were a few points regarding the situation in Southern Rhodesia that needed to be stressed in supporting the draft resolution. His delegation had been shocked by the accounts given of the inhuman treatment and shameful atrocities perpetrated against the African population under the Smith Government, the full responsibility for which rested squarely on the administering Power.

478. The evidence given had brought to light the increasingly dubious role that was being played by West Germany, both in the economic field and in the supply of arms to Southern Rhodesia. That was a painful reminder of a similar recent activity in the Middle East, where West Germany had supplied arms to the Zionist régime imposed by colonialism on that part of the world.

479. The representative of Italy stated that his delegation had certain reservations with respect to the wording of the draft resolution. He would therefore have to seek the instructions of his Government.

480. The representative of India proposed that the following phrase be added at the end of operative paragraph 6: "...so that the Security Council may take measures under the Charter to ensure the implementation of United Nations decisions on Southern Rhodesia".

481. The representative of Poland said that his delegation was in general agreement with the aims and purposes of the draft resolution introduced by the representative of Tanzania.

482. For the sake of consistency, he proposed that the phrase "and of the representatives of the Organization of African Unity" should be added at the end of the second preambular paragraph. He proposed further that operative paragraph 1 should make express refer-

ence not only to the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but also to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Together, those three documents constituted the basis of the Special Committee's work.

483. The representative of Iran said that a few weeks earlier, in New York, he had pointed out that the question of Southern Rhodesia was of concern to the Special Committee not only because the freedom of the Zimbabwe people was in jeopardy, but also because the situation constituted a potential threat to international peace and security. After having heard the petitioners here in Africa and obtained first-hand information, his fears and concerns were definitely confirmed. Therefore the situation, in his opinion, called for immediate action. Since the Committee had paid some attention to the question of independence, it should pay equal heed to the problem of averting violence. He maintained that the only way to avert violence was to prevail upon the Smith Government to establish in Southern Rhodesia conditions for peaceful change. The draft resolution should take both aspects into account. In order to ensure that the conditions for peaceful change were present in Southern Rhodesia, he proposed that a new paragraph should be included in the draft resolution as operative paragraph 4 to read as follows:

"4. *Calls upon* the administering Power to effect immediately conditions for peaceful change which would include, *inter alia*, the following:

"(a) The release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees;

"(b) The repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation, and in particular, the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Land Apportionment Act;

"(c) The removal of all restrictions on African political activity and establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights."

484. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would take this opportunity to explain the position of the United Kingdom with reference to the draft resolution that was before the Special Committee.

485. His delegation was in sympathy with the spirit of a number of the paragraphs of this draft resolution, but there were others which did not recognize or do justice to the policies and actions of his Government. The fourth preambular paragraph, for example, ignored the action taken by the United Kingdom Government in pursuance of the three principles. It ignored the negotiations. It ignored the warnings. Other paragraphs, notably operative paragraphs 2 and 3, ignored the realities of the relationship between the United Kingdom Government and Rhodesia and the extent of his Government's authority. The last four operative paragraphs sought to refer to the Security Council a situation which in his delegation's view did not come within any of the categories defined by the Charter as justifying action by the Security Council.

486. He was instructed by his Government to make some further references to the appeal mentioned in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution and to the request in operative paragraph 3. First, on the appeal, it would, he thought, come as no surprise—because it followed absolutely logically from what he had been saying—when he described the basic position in the following way. The United Kingdom Government had no power or authority in internal affairs such

as those referred to in the paragraphs in question. Those were matters for the Rhodesian Government. That was the law. However, he was authorized to say that it would convey a report of the proceedings of the Committee to the Rhodesian authorities, without of course any prejudice to its view that the United Nations had no competence to discuss those matters. Nevertheless, it would take that action.

487. Secondly, on operative paragraph 3, his Government's response was of necessity on similar lines. The question of a visit to Rhodesia by a sub-committee was a matter for the Rhodesian Government. On the other hand, the solution of the problem of Rhodesia was the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government—and it believed that the proposal in that operative paragraph would not contribute to the solution, which could be approached only through negotiation and discussion. His Government was now engaged in that negotiation and that discussion. Once again, however, he was authorized to say that it would without delay inform the Rhodesian Government of the proceedings and views of the Committee.

488. Since the draft resolution referred to the Security Council's resolution, as of 6 May 1965, he would like to draw the Committee's attention to the reservations expressed at the time by Lord Caradon, the United Kingdom Permanent Representative, and especially to two important points which he had made: (1) that because the authority and responsibility for bringing Rhodesia to independence rested solely with the United Kingdom Government, the United Kingdom Government must reserve its complete freedom of action to carry out that responsibility according to its own best judgement; and (2) that because of its lack of responsibility for Rhodesia's internal affairs, it had not replied to the various allegations and charges that had been made about the internal situation in Rhodesia, but that that must not be taken to mean that it accepted the accuracy or validity of all those charges.

489. As he had said, Rhodesia had been fully self-governing for many years. The provisions of the Charter concerning Non-Self-Governing Territories could not therefore, as a matter of sheer logic, apply to Rhodesia. Thus in the view of his Government, as had repeatedly had to be made clear, the United Nations had no competence to discuss or pass resolutions about Rhodesia and, in accordance with its normal practice, his delegation would not therefore participate in the voting on the draft resolution.

490. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that he wished first of all, as the representative of a State member of the Organization of African Unity, to state that he had reservations concerning certain parts of the statement made at the 340th meeting by the observer for the Organization of African Unity.

491. He had listened to the petitioners from Southern Rhodesia with the greatest interest. The most striking fact emerging from their statements was that the administering Power refused to use its authority to restore legality in Southern Rhodesia and allowed the white racists to be the sole masters of the situation. As a result, the four million Africans in the Territory were subjected to the worst forms of brutality and humiliation by a minority of 200,000 heavily armed white settlers.

492. He could not accept the constitutional and legal argument put forward by the United Kingdom representative and was convinced that the United Kingdom

could and should intervene in order to settle a crisis which had already persisted too long and whose unforeseeable consequences might be disastrous for peaceful coexistence and world peace. The United Kingdom had abrogated more than one constitution and it might well be asked why it could not do so in the case of Southern Rhodesia. The passive attitude taken by the United Kingdom Government was an invitation to violence, for the Africans of Southern Rhodesia could not go on any longer without reacting. He strongly urged the United Kingdom not to concern itself over tacit agreements, for Mr. Smith felt no such concern. He had held elections on the basis of a constitution which had been rejected by the General Assembly and he was now preparing a unilateral declaration of independence, which must at all costs be prevented.

493. In the view of the sponsors of the draft resolution, it was the United Kingdom's duty to restore legality in Southern Rhodesia. It was in that spirit that they had submitted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.207), earnestly hoping that it would be adopted by a large majority.

494. The representative of India expressed the hope that the draft resolution would find the maximum possible support.

495. The representative of Tunisia said that, as a sponsor of the draft resolution, he would like to describe the spirit in which the text had been revised. An objective scrutiny of the draft resolution showed that it simply restated earlier resolutions adopted on the question and added some new facts of unquestionable truth. In other words, the sponsors had been concerned primarily to seek peaceful ways and means of securing the decolonization of Southern Rhodesia as soon as possible, for that was the mission assigned to the Special Committee by the General Assembly.

496. His delegation still felt that it was in the interests of the administering Powers themselves to facilitate such decolonization. By meeting the legitimate wishes of the peoples of Africa, those Powers would gain their sympathy and ensure their future co-operation. If, however, the administering Powers continued to waver, adducing fallacious reasons, the day would come when the former colonial countries, having attained independence, would break all ties with the Powers that had administered them. Accordingly, his delegation strongly urged all members of the Committee to support the joint draft resolution.

497. It was the duty of the great Powers to agree among themselves and to take joint action to stop the activities of certain people who continued to represent the most despicable in human nature; for it was those Powers which were primarily responsible for world peace and security. So long as they failed to recognize that fact and continued to make excuses to justify their support of the exponents of evil, dissension and insecurity would continue to prevail.

498. The representative of Italy said that, since it was the desire of the co-sponsors that the draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia should be adopted in Lusaka, his delegation would not stand in the way. Although he had not had time to obtain specific instructions, he would vote for the draft resolution as a token of his country's sympathy for all those, in Southern Rhodesia or anywhere else, who were denied justice and freedom.

499. To improve the text, however, he invited the co-sponsors to consider the following suggestion. In

regard to the fourth preambular paragraph, his delegation took the view that the Special Committee was not entitled to pass judgement on the implementation of Security Council resolutions, the more so as the question of Southern Rhodesia was still on the Council's agenda. In regard to operative paragraph 2, the present wording was not an exact rendering of the appeal which the Special Committee had addressed to the United Kingdom Government on 25 May; he would prefer that the co-sponsors adopt the formula advanced by the Tanzanian representative at the 339th meeting. It would also be preferable to say that "the United Kingdom Government has not yet responded to the appeal", since the Special Committee's mission in Africa was far from over. In regard to operative paragraph 3, his delegation would prefer it to read: "... to obtain that a sub-committee of the Special Committee be allowed to proceed...". That wording, without prejudice to the position of the various delegations on the constitutional relations between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia, would conform more closely to the language of the Security Council's resolution of 6 May.

500. The representative of Denmark said that his delegation fully subscribed to the principles and aims of the draft resolution and thanked the co-sponsors for taking into account a suggestion put forward by his delegation. However, he had some reservations: the third preambular paragraph contained references to resolutions which had not been supported by Denmark, and operative paragraphs 2 and 3 did not take into consideration the very difficult position of the United Kingdom Government. With those reservations, his delegation could vote for the draft resolution.

501. The representative of Bulgaria said that the need for urgent and resolute action was plain and it was to be hoped that the full information to be provided by the Committee to the Security Council would give added impetus to efforts to that end. His delegation attached special importance to the affirmation in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution and fully shared the apprehensions expressed in the Committee regarding Southern Rhodesian threats of retaliation against neighbouring African States. For all those reasons, his delegation fully supported the draft resolution.

502. The representative of Venezuela said that he had hoped that the Committee would vote on the joint draft resolution without further delay. He did not propose to restate his position on the problem of Southern Rhodesia or to specify the reasons why he would vote in favour of the draft resolution.

503. The representative of Madagascar observed that the draft resolution referred to the statement of the observer for the Organization of African Unity. He wished to make it clear that, although he had listened to that statement with interest, that did not mean that he supported it in its entirety or that the Malagasy Republic had authorized any person to speak on its behalf.

504. The representative of Poland thanked the sponsors of the draft resolution for embodying in its text two amendments suggested by his delegation. His delegation gathered that the question of Southern Rhodesia would still remain on the Committee's agenda despite the action proposed in the draft resolution. His delegation fully endorsed the draft resolution.

505. At the 347th meeting, the Special Committee voted on the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.207).

It was adopted by a roll-call vote of 20 votes to none, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, United States of America.

506. The representative of Australia said, in explanation of his vote, that the Australian delegation had listened with a great deal of sympathy to the petitioners who had been heard and shared the Committee's anxiety at the lack of progress to date towards reaching an acceptable solution to the Southern Rhodesian question.

507. It had also noted with great concern the repeated allegation of breaches of human rights in that country. The Australian Government held no brief for any system of political imprisonment, as was borne out by his delegation's statement in the Committee on 21 April 1965 that Australia had no political prisoners and no understanding of a system which made political imprisonment a necessary part of its working.

508. The Australian Prime Minister had already offered his advice to the Government of Southern Rhodesia on the substance of the matter stating the Australian belief that, if Southern Rhodesia wished to be admitted to membership of the British Commonwealth, there would need to be provision for a voting roll providing for an African majority. He had further expressed his belief that most of the white Southern Rhodesians realized that there must be an accommodation—and that in not too long a course the alternative must be accepted to the mounting internal disorder neighbouring hostility, a state finally achieved in an atmosphere of racial animosity unfavourable to the continuance of European settlement and out of harmony with the interracial relationships for which the new Commonwealth had come to stand.

509. As to the resolution just adopted, although sympathizing strongly with the hopes and aspirations of the sponsors, his delegation had been obliged to abstain. The resolution raised a number of doubts and reservations: whether at that stage it would be right to state categorically that no steps had been taken by the United Kingdom Government in implementing Security Council resolution 202 (1965); and, secondly whether the United Kingdom Government had the constitutional capacity to take any effective steps to enable a sub-committee of the Special Committee to enter Southern Rhodesia for the purpose the Committee clearly had in mind.

510. In brief, his delegation felt that, if there was to be a peaceful transition to majority rule, the efforts to explore the possibility of mutual concessions in Rhodesia must be continued, and thus bring about an improvement in political and social relations. It could only reiterate its hope and belief that the United Kingdom Government would continue to exert such influence as it possessed towards achieving that result.

511. The representative of the United States said that the text of the resolution met the urgent issues raised by the petitioners. The United States fully shared the concern of both the petitioners and Committee members about the fate of the persons sentenced to death under the amended Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, and again added its voice to the appeal

for clemency. Likewise, it, too, wished to see rapid constitutional progress towards the goal of universal adult suffrage, and shared the anxiety regarding irresponsible threats made against Southern Rhodesia's neighbours.

512. The United States had the greatest sympathy for the purposes in view but was unable to accept the second and third operative paragraphs of the resolution, as not reflecting realistically the actual United Kingdom position. The requests implicit in those two paragraphs exceeded the power of the United Kingdom in the circumstances and could not be applied without the full co-operation of the Southern Rhodesian Government. Accordingly, in the United States view, the resolution was unbalanced in its exclusive focus on United Kingdom responsibility. Nevertheless, the United States held that the United Kingdom had a particular and profound responsibility in the matter, but the attitudes of the parties, more especially that of the minority Rhodesian Government, were critical factors. It was for those reasons that her delegation had abstained in the vote.

513. The text of the resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/120), adopted by the Special Committee at its 347th meeting on 28 May 1965, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having re-examined the question of Southern Rhodesia,

"Having heard the statements made by petitioners and the representative of the Organization of African Unity,

"Recalling Security Council resolution 202 (1965) of 6 May 1965 and General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1747 (XVI) of 28 June 1962, 1760 (XVII) of 31 October 1962, 1883 (XVIII) of 14 October 1963, 1889 (XVIII) of 6 November 1963 and 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 22 April 1965,

"Considering that no steps have been taken by the administering Power to implement Security Council resolution 202 (1965) and that no constitutional progress has been announced in the Territory since the question was examined by the Security Council,

"Considering that, on the contrary, the situation continues to deteriorate in the Territory, in particular, as a consequence of the death sentences imposed under the amended Law and Order (Maintenance) Act,

"Considering that the question is still on the agenda of the Security Council,

"1. Reaffirms the right of the people of Southern Rhodesia to self-determination and independence and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle for enjoyment of the rights set forth in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

"2. Regrets that the United Kingdom Government has not yet responded to the appeal made to it by the Special Committee on 25 May 1965 to secure the release of Mr. Nkomo and the Rev. Sithole and other political prisoners so as to enable them to appear before the Special Committee;

"3. *Requests* the United Kingdom Government to take the necessary steps to enable a Sub-Committee of the Special Committee to proceed to Southern Rhodesia so as to make contact with the various sectors of the population and report back;

"4. *Draws* the attention of the Security Council to the extremely serious situation which would arise in the Territory if the authorities of Southern Rhodesia were to execute the persons sentenced to death under the amended Law and Order (Maintenance) Act;

"5. *Further draws* the attention of the Security Council to the threats made by the Southern Rhodesian authorities, in particular, the economic sabotage which the Southern Rhodesian authorities intend to carry out in regard to the independent African States adjoining the Territory;

"6. *Decides* to transmit to the Security Council the records of the meetings devoted to this question by the Special Committee during its visit in Africa, including the statements of the petitioners and of the representative of the Organization of African Unity, as a supplement to the document transmitted to the Security Council and reproduced as document S/6300;

"7. *Requests* the Chairman of the Special Committee to transmit the present resolution to the President of the Security Council."

514. The text of the resolution, together with the records of the debates on the question, was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 2 June 1965 (S/6412).

APPENDIX I

Report of the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia

INTRODUCTION

1. At its 315th meeting, on 17 November 1964, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples considered an oral report submitted by the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia^a on the work of the Sub-Committee.

2. By taking note of this report, the Special Committee agreed to authorize the Sub-Committee to keep the situation under review and to maintain contact with the United Kingdom with a view to the fulfilment of its mandate.

CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

3. The Sub-Committee held three meetings on 31 March and 2 and 5 April 1965. At its meeting on 31 March 1965 the Sub-Committee reviewed the situation in the Territory. It had before it a working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-67 above) containing information on the latest developments concerning Southern Rhodesia.

4. Following an exchange of views, the Sub-Committee decided, in accordance with its mandate, to invite the representative of the United Kingdom to provide information on the United Kingdom Government's position in regard to the question of Southern Rhodesia, in the light of recent developments, and on any steps which that Government had in mind to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee relating to the Territory.

5. In response to the Sub-Committee's invitation, the representative of the United Kingdom appeared before the Sub-

Committee on 2 April 1965. He recalled the statement made by Mr. Harold Wilson, the United Kingdom Prime Minister, on 27 October 1964 in which had been made clear the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence by the Government of Southern Rhodesia. He said that this statement had had a profound effect and he thought it had probably paved the way to more helpful contacts between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian Governments. These contacts had in turn led to the visit to Southern Rhodesia by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, and the Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner, from 21 February to 3 March 1965.

6. In keeping with an understanding reached between the two Governments, the two United Kingdom Ministers were able to see Mr. Joshua Nkomo who was under restriction but not the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole as he was in prison as a result of a criminal conviction. Continuing, the United Kingdom representative stated that the Ministers however met Mr. Takawira, Mr. Sithole's lieutenant and other African political leaders, and in the course of their tour were able to hear the views of all sections of the population of the Territory. They were also able to fulfil the other main purpose of the visit, which was to have discussions with the Southern Rhodesia Government.

7. The United Kingdom representative drew the attention of the Sub-Committee to the accounts given by the Commonwealth Secretary of the visit in statements in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, on 5 March 1965 and in the United Kingdom House of Commons on 8 March 1965. Before the Commonwealth Secretary went to Southern Rhodesia, it had looked as though the doors were closed completely. In the Commonwealth Secretary's view, they were now a little ajar and the United Kingdom Government hoped that discussions would continue from that point.

8. The United Kingdom representative also recalled the announcement on 30 March 1965 by the Southern Rhodesia Government that the Legislative Assembly was being dissolved and that there would be fresh elections on 7 May 1965. In connexion with this decision Mr. Smith had issued a statement in which he pointed out that his negotiations with the British Government on the question of independence were still taking place. He had promised to put before the electorate before the elections were held a considered analysis of the reports received by his Government from those bodies which they had consulted about the question of a unilateral declaration of independence. He had repeated his assurance that a unilateral declaration of independence was not contemplated while his negotiations with the British Prime Minister were still in progress.

9. The United Kingdom representative emphasized that the decision to call for new elections was entirely within the discretion and authority of the Southern Rhodesia Government, although naturally the United Kingdom Government would be following the course of events during the election campaign with the keenest interest. His Government did not think, however, that the prospects of negotiation of a peaceful settlement had been materially affected by the decision to hold elections.

10. In conclusion, he affirmed that the United Kingdom Government had been constantly active, ever since October when it came to office, in trying to find a peaceful way forward by negotiation and discussion towards a solution which would be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. His Government was convinced that there was no quick or ready-made answer. There must be patient negotiation, and while the possibility of progress by this means remained open as it did, it would be an abdication of responsibility and a betrayal of all the people of Rhodesia, whatever their colour, to take, or precipitate, violent or unconstitutional action of any kind. Such action from any quarter would be calamitous. Wise and reasonable counsel must prevail if a peaceful solution was to be found.

^a The Sub-Committee is composed of the following representatives: Mr. Sori Coulibaly (Chairman) (Mali); Mr. Ger-shon B. O. Collier (Sierra Leone); Mr. Tesfaye Gebre-Egzy (Ethiopia); Mr. Rafik Asha (Syria); Mr. Danilo Lekić (Yugoslavia).

11. However, the responsibility for refraining from violent or unconstitutional action rested on all; and it was the hope of his Government that all those who were concerned about and interested in the problem, would do all they could in what they said and did to use their influence in the direction of

moderation, restraint and statesmanship, and thus to help remove obstacles to a settlement by peaceful negotiation, whereby all Rhodesians might realize the great promise of their country.

12. In reply to a request for details of the proposals reportedly put to the Southern Rhodesia Government by the United Kingdom Government for advance towards majority rule and for the release of all persons in detention or restriction, the United Kingdom representative explained that the current exchange of communications between his Government and that of Southern Rhodesia were confidential; only if the confidential character of such exchanges was maintained could there be hope of progress. For this reason, nothing specific, going beyond broad statements of principle and objective, had been said in the United Kingdom House of Commons. He could only add that negotiations were still proceeding and re-emphasize Mr. Smith's statement that as long as negotiations were still going on, there was no question of a unilateral declaration.

13. On the question what the Southern Rhodesia Government's purpose was in calling for general elections at this time, the United Kingdom representative referred to a statement made by Mr. Smith to the effect that his Government's responsibilities had greatly increased since its election to office in 1962, when the Central African Federation was still in existence; his Government had faithfully and as far as possible, carried out its election pledges, but the situation had so altered that a fresh mandate from the country was necessary. The fact that the announcement concerning the general elections was made on the day Mr. Smith received Mr. Wilson's letter seemed to the United Kingdom representative to have been fortuitous. As to the timing of the elections, the United Kingdom representative stressed that this was entirely the responsibility of the Southern Rhodesia Government, as it was in other countries where the parliamentary system was derived from the British model.

14. Another question was put to the United Kingdom representative concerning the reactions of his Government to the holding of general elections in the Territory, having regard to the several resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee which had, *inter alia*, called for the suspension of the Constitution under which these elections were to be held. In reply, the United Kingdom representative said he could add nothing to his statement that the negotiations between his Government and that of Southern Rhodesia had not, in his view, been materially affected by the decision to hold elections.

15. With regard to reports that Mr. Smith intended subsequently to amend the Constitution so as to be able to make a unilateral declaration, the United Kingdom representative explained that, according to his own understanding of the position, independence could only be granted to Southern Rhodesia by decision of the United Kingdom Parliament. The provisions of the present Constitution governing the relationship between Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom could not be changed unilaterally by the Southern Rhodesia Parliament. Some other provisions of the present Constitution could be amended only after certain procedures had been followed, entailing plebiscites among the main racial groups in Southern Rhodesia or approved by the Queen on the advice of United Kingdom Ministers.

CONCLUSIONS

16. The Sub-Committee has taken note of the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom and, in particular, the information that the United Kingdom Government adheres to its warning published on 27 October 1964 concerning the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence by the Southern Rhodesia Government. The Sub-Committee also notes that the United Kingdom Government, on the basis of the visit to Southern Rhodesia by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Lord Chancellor is pursuing its contacts with the Southern Rhodesia Government with a view to a political settlement acceptable to the majority of the population of the Territory.

17. The Sub-Committee however considers that no changes have taken place in the position of the United Kingdom

Government which would encourage a belief that an active policy was now being pursued by that Government to ensure the attainment of independence by Southern Rhodesia in conformity with the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In the view of the Sub-Committee it is now more urgently necessary than ever that the United Kingdom should take energetic and effective action to implement the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Special Committee on the question of Southern Rhodesia, if the continuing deterioration in the already explosive situation is to be arrested.

18. The Sub-Committee notes with grave concern that on 30 March 1965 the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly was dissolved and a decision announced to hold general elections in May 1965, under the present constitution. The Sub-Committee cannot accept as a reflection of the aspirations of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia the results of elections to be held under a constitution which has already been categorically rejected by the General Assembly and the Special Committee. The Sub-Committee also views with deep concern the possibility that the results of the so-called elections may be used by the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia as a pretext for unilateral action.

19. Bearing these serious developments in mind and taking into consideration the growing intransigence of the minority régime of the Territory in the face of the legitimate aspirations of the African majority, the Sub-Committee is convinced that the question of Southern Rhodesia should be considered by the Special Committee as a matter of urgency.

ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

20. This report was unanimously adopted by the Sub-Committee on 5 April 1965.

APPENDIX II

Announcement by the United Kingdom Government on 27 October 1964

The Prime Minister is deeply concerned about future relations between Southern Rhodesia and Britain and particularly about any possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence on the part of the Southern Rhodesia Government. He therefore invited Mr. Ian Smith, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, to come to London for discussions early this week. Mr. Smith replied that he could not come at that time.

The British Government would not like there to be any misunderstanding that, in their view, the inevitable consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence would be very serious indeed. The previous Administration made this clear earlier in the year to Mr. Field and later repeated the warning to Mr. Smith. On Sunday, 25 October, the British Government communicated to the Government of Southern Rhodesia the text of a statement which they would feel obliged to issue at a very early date unless they received from that Government an assurance that no attempt at a unilateral declaration of independence would be made. The Prime Minister would have preferred to put the points in the statement to Mr. Smith privately and in person; he still hopes that an early opportunity will be found for him to have discussions with the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia before any irrevocable steps are taken. Since, however, the assurance sought was not forthcoming, the British Government are now publishing this statement.

The statement is as follows:

1. The British Government look forward to the day when Southern Rhodesia can take her place as an independent sovereign State within the Commonwealth. The decision to grant independence rests entirely with the British Government and Parliament and they have a solemn duty to be satisfied that, before granting independence, it would be acceptable to the people of the country as a whole. Indeed, the present Government of Southern Rhodesia have already recognised that independence must be based on general consent and that the British Government are entitled to be satisfied about this.

2. The British Government trust therefore that the progress of Southern Rhodesia will proceed on constitutional lines.

Nevertheless, in view of reports that there might be a resort to a unilateral declaration of independence, they find it necessary to declare what serious consequences would flow from such an act. The British Government cannot believe that, once the consequences have been made clear, the Government and people of Southern Rhodesia will take an irrevocable step of this kind.

3. A mere declaration of independence would have no constitutional effect. The only way Southern Rhodesia can become a sovereign independent state is by an Act of the British Parliament. A declaration of independence would be an act of defiance and rebellion and it would be treasonable to take steps to give effect to it.

4. In the final communiqué of the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in July it was made clear that no Commonwealth Government would be able to recognise a unilateral declaration. There would then be no prospect of Southern Rhodesia becoming a member of the Commonwealth, with all the economic consequences that would then ensue.

5. The British Government would be bound to sever relations with those responsible for such a declaration. It would not be possible for Southern Rhodesia to establish a new and special relationship with the Crown or with Britain. The British Government would not be prepared to advise Her Majesty to accede to any request that she should become a separate Sovereign of a territory which had rebelled. The ultimate result would inevitably be that Southern Rhodesians would cease to be British subjects.

6. The reactions of foreign Governments would likewise be sharp and immediate. With one or two exceptions, they are likely to refuse to recognise Southern Rhodesia's independence or to enter into relations with her. Many of them might recognise a Government in exile if, as seem probable, one were established.

7. The economic effects would be disastrous to the prosperity and prospects of the people of Southern Rhodesia. All financial and trade relations between Britain and Southern Rhodesia would be jeopardized. Any further aid or any further access to the London market would be out of the question. Indeed, most serious consequences would be involved for anyone in the United Kingdom, who afforded aid, financial or otherwise, to the illegal government. Southern Rhodesia's external trade would be disrupted.

8. In short, an illegal declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia would bring to an end relationships between her and Britain, would cut her off from the rest of the Commonwealth, from most foreign governments and from international organizations, would inflict disastrous economic damage upon her, and would leave her isolated and virtually friendless in a largely hostile continent.

APPENDIX III

Excerpt from Press Statement by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations on 3 March 1965

Our main impression is of a hardening of attitudes in recent months among both Europeans and Africans. We single out for particular mention the views put to us by different groups of Europeans, by the chiefs and by the African nationalists.

We are in no doubt about the great desire for independence on the part of the bulk of the European populations. We fully understand the reasons for this desire, especially after forty years of self-government, after so many other countries in Africa have attained their independence and after the massive economic development to which European initiative, energy, knowledge and capital have contributed so much.

Some Europeans have told us they consider independence to be such an urgent necessity that it must be taken unilaterally and unconstitutionally if it cannot be acquired urgently by negotiation. But a majority of white Rhodesians to whom we have spoken are not of this opinion, and are anxious that independence should be obtained lawfully, peacefully and in a manner which will preserve friendly relations with Britain and other countries inside and outside the Commonwealth.

The chiefs emphasized to us the importance of their position in the life of the country as the traditional leaders of their peoples. They feel themselves to be threatened by the activities of a younger generation of politically active Africans at whose hands they and their people have suffered intimidation and violence.

The chiefs, believing that the British Government favour the nationalists, insist that the right course is to cut the strings with Britain straight away. Our understanding is that in making this demand, they see immediate majority rule or immediate independence as the only alternatives open to Rhodesia.

The African nationalists of both the former ZAPU (PCC) and ZANU parties, whose leadership first accepted and then repudiated the 1961 Constitution, as well as many other Africans whom we met, demand that the British Government should call an immediate conference to devise a new constitution based upon one-man-one-vote. In their view, the British Government should intervene in Rhodesia's affairs, if necessary by armed force, to establish majority rule. They also want the British Government to press the Rhodesian Government to release all persons in restriction and detention.

In these talks with Europeans, chiefs and African nationalists, we have found that many grievous misunderstandings exist about the policy of the British Government. We therefore take this opportunity to explain that policy.

First, we wish emphatically to repudiate the allegation that the policy of the British Government is to impose immediate majority rule upon Rhodesia. The principle of eventual majority rule was accepted by the electorate of Rhodesia when they approved the 1961 Constitution.

What is at issue is how long the transition to majority rule will take and what the timing of independence should be.

Any attempt by the British Government to impose unilaterally a solution of these problems would violate the 1961 Constitution and the established convention that Parliament at Westminster does not legislate on matters within the competence of the Legislative Assembly of Rhodesia except with the agreement of the Rhodesia Government.

The granting of independence is, under the Constitution, a matter for the British Government and Parliament. In seeking a peaceful transition to majority rule, the British Government do not seek to stipulate how it might be achieved or when this stage might be reached.

The British Government are completely opposed to unlawful and unconstitutional acts of all kinds. During our talks with the African nationalist leaders we have made it clear to them that the British Government utterly condemn the intimidation and violence which have been taking place, mainly by Africans against other Africans. These leaders said that they opposed the use of such methods.

We also explained to them that Britain could not herself act unconstitutionally, whether by armed force or otherwise, to change the Constitution, and that it would be useless for her to call a constitutional conference unless all parties concerned were willing to attend it.

We have made equally clear the steadfast opposition of the British Government to unconstitutional action in the form of a unilateral declaration of independence. The threat of such action has already drawn from the British Prime Minister a warning of some of its inevitable consequences.

We believe that the greatest danger to the peace and prosperity of Rhodesia at the present time is this threat of a unilateral declaration and we have made our view known to the Rhodesia Government.

We return to London to report to the British Cabinet. In so doing, we are deeply conscious of the hopes of Rhodesians of all colours and classes that, despite the hardening of attitudes, some way forward can be found which will reassure both those Africans who at present feel themselves denied full political and human rights and those Europeans who fear losing what they have earned and won.

We believe that all concerned must now address themselves to a sober search for ways by which present uncertainties can

be removed; by which current dilemmas can be resolved constitutionally and honourably; and by which the common goal of independence can be achieved.

APPENDIX IV

Text of the statement by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in the House of Commons on 8 March 1965

During our 10-day visit the Lord Chancellor and I were able to establish personal contact with the Rhodesia Government and to hear the views of a wide cross-section of the population.

Our talks with the Rhodesian Prime Minister and Cabinet were in confidence. They naturally expressed the desire of most white Rhodesians for early independence. We fully appreciate their reasons for wanting it.

Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Takavira, who is second-in-command to Mr. Sithole, demanded that the British Government should call a constitutional conference at once and secure the release of themselves and their followers from restriction. They advocated immediate universal suffrage and considered that the British Government should impose majority rule, if necessary by armed force.

The chiefs, to whom the Rhodesia Government are restoring a measure of their former authority, are strongly opposed to the African nationalist movement because of the violence and intimidation and the threat to their own traditional leadership to which it has given rise. They see the immediate grant of independence as the only alternative to nationalist domination.

Some Europeans demand that if independence cannot be quickly obtained by negotiation, it should be seized by a unilateral declaration.

In all quarters we made plain where the British Government stood in this difficult situation.

We recalled the warning statement of the Prime Minister to Mr. Smith last October, and repeated our steadfast opposition to unconstitutional action. We condemned the intimidation and violence which have been taking place, mainly by Africans against other Africans.

We emphasized that it was not our intention to impose majority rule by force, and reiterated that whatever settlement was reached must be acceptable to the majority of the population of Rhodesia.

What is lacking in Rhodesia is willingness on the part of Europeans and Africans alike to discuss and compromise. The fate of Rhodesians of all colours and classes lies largely in their own hands.

Illegal action from any quarter would be calamitous. The problem must be resolved by negotiation.

But I am not without hope of finding a way towards a solution that will win the support of all communities and lead to independence and prosperity for all Rhodesians.

The Lord Chancellor and I have made a report to the Prime Minister, and he will now be in touch with the Rhodesian Prime Minister.

APPENDIX V

Text of statement by the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Ian Smith, on 31 March 1965

1. The Government has called an election for 7 May and I consider it only right that I should inform the country of the reasons for so doing.

2. At the time when we were elected in 1962, the Federation was still in existence and since then the Government's responsibilities have increased enormously and although we have faithfully carried out all the election pledges, so far as has been possible in the time available, I feel that the present situation has so altered from that which then existed, that a fresh mandate from the country is necessary.

3. One of our election pledges was that, whether we agreed with it or not, we would make every effort to make the 1961 Constitution work. We have done this. It has been

obvious, however, that in some respects changes are essential for the good of Rhodesia. I give you an example—the cross voting on the "A" and "B" rolls.

4. There are other improvements which require a two-thirds majority, which we wish to make and which we will put before you during the election campaign.

5. As you know, my negotiations with the British Government on the question of our independence are still taking place. We have been told publicly that the grant of independence is dependent on the will of the country as a whole. An overwhelming majority in this election will considerably strengthen my hand in these negotiations as well as demonstrating to me that I have your confidence.

6. On the question of independence it is my intention to place fairly before the electorate at the earliest possible moment and certainly before the election takes place, the considered analysis of all the reports received by Government from the various bodies consulted on the question of a unilateral declaration of independence. I reiterate, however, my Government's assurance that this latter step is not contemplated while my negotiations with the British Prime Minister are in progress.

7. I referred previously to cross voting. It is quite obvious that the "B" roll was primarily designed for the representation of Africans and African interests by Africans, and therefore, their representatives should be elected by them without any "A" roll influence.

8. Therefore, it is not the intention of the Rhodesian Front to submit any party candidates for the electoral districts. I believe that these members should be independent and free from any party ties to express the wishes of their constituents.

9. It was quite apparent during the last Parliament that the system then operating was a failure. Not only were the 1962 polls so low as almost to amount to a farce, but on several occasions electoral district members approached Ministers indicating that they were in complete sympathy with legislation under debate, but were compelled by party ties to oppose it publicly.

10. Through being tied to a European-dominated party they were placed in an invidious position of having divided loyalties between the principles which brought them into Parliament and their belief in the true interests of the African people. Further, for the same reasons they were subjected to assaults, intimidation and being branded as "stooges". By standing as independents they would be free from all these difficulties and able to fulfil their parliamentary responsibilities completely unfettered.

11. It has become quite clear to me and my Government that with the trend of affairs in Africa, matters cannot be allowed to drift. Rhodesia's destiny demands decisive and urgent steps to be taken for the protection of all the ideals of Western civilization in which we believe. An overwhelming vote of confidence and support from the Rhodesian people is essential to bring this about. I am therefore calling an election asking for and hoping for a two-thirds majority in Parliament which will strengthen our hand, not only for the passing of important parliamentary legislation, but also in our negotiations for independence with the British Government.

APPENDIX VI

Text of Southern Rhodesia White Paper on Unilateral Declaration of Independence

1. On 27 October 1964, the British Prime Minister issued a statement which set out various consequences that would in the British Government's opinion, follow a unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia. It has been assumed, in some quarters, that the proposals referred to in the statement would be applied by the British Government with a degree of severity designed to collapse the economy of Rhodesia within a relatively short period. It has also been assumed in the same quarters that such action would be supported by other members of the Commonwealth.

2. The Government has received reports from various associations and statutory bodies giving their views on the British Prime Minister's statement. The majority of these

reports are based on the foregoing assumptions. As a result, the imposition of the most severe economic sanctions is presupposed therein and the conclusions reached set out the worst consequences possible. If these proposals were not implemented then of course these reports would be of little relevance, a point which has been accepted by the authors of the various reports. It is therefore necessary to evaluate whether, in fact, Britain could or would implement in full the sanctions suggested as consequential upon a unilateral declaration of independence and to consider the likelihood of Commonwealth countries falling in with the British Government's suggested action. It must be remembered that countries to the north of Rhodesia would have to take into account the crippling effect on their own economies that such action would entail. Rhodesia would never take the initiative as an aggressor towards any other country, but should any country initiate action against Rhodesia the Government would have no option but to take the strongest counter-measures available to it.

3. It must be borne in mind that normally trade is a two-way traffic—for example, at present Rhodesian imports/exports from and to Britain balance out at approximately £35 million *per annum*. Although initially it would involve some inconvenience, it is certain that Rhodesia would obtain elsewhere all those imports which today it gets from Britain and the Commonwealth and that a great proportion of the country's exports could be marketed in those other countries with whom Rhodesia has trading relations. Moreover, Commonwealth Preference is also a two-way traffic (certain Commonwealth imports into Rhodesia enjoy as much as 30 per cent preference). The withdrawal of this concession could easily prove to be a two-edged sword.

4. There is no sentiment attached to money. Rhodesia has the potential and if it produces goods of the right quality and at the right price, countries will continue to trade with it. This happens universally. The growth and future development of a country depends primarily on stable government. Rhodesia's economic potential is accepted and provided stable government is assured the Government has every reason to believe that investment money will be forthcoming, both from the private sector and also from other sources in countries not unfriendly towards Rhodesia.

5. Certain countries to the north of Rhodesia already give every indication of submitting to Communist influences. It is quite incredible, therefore, that Britain would attempt the destruction of the Rhodesian economy and the consequent overthrow of stable government. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether other Western countries would necessarily support Britain, knowing what has happened, and is happening, in countries to the north of Rhodesia.

6. In the event of the loss of Commonwealth Preferences or total embargoes by Britain on Rhodesian exports, it is without doubt that Rhodesia's major problem would arise in the marketing of its tobacco. In any event it must be borne in mind that Britain has given frequent warnings that Commonwealth Preferences will gradually be eliminated. Should a complete embargo of Rhodesian tobacco be enforced, Britain would eliminate from her market America's strongest competitor, thus giving America a virtual monopoly. With this competition removed, it could well be that prices of tobacco from other sources would harden.

7. If, through British Government action, the Rhodesian economy was to suffer, even for a short time, an inevitable first step would be the necessity for Rhodesia to consider the repatriation of foreign workers and their families to Zambia and Malawi, in order to protect its indigenous labour force. It is estimated that at present there are 500,000 such persons in this country. The consequences to the countries concerned would be grave indeed and the responsibility would be with Britain alone.

8. A careful analysis has been taken out of the joint services of the Rhodesia Railways, Central African Airways and Kariba power and it is factual to say that if Zambia and Malawi were to break these agreements then that part of these services operating in Rhodesia for Rhodesia would all be viable projects even after accepting responsibility for that

part of the debt of these three services which would be applicable to Rhodesia.

9. It must be obvious that any action by Britain involving economic sanctions would be to the detriment of all races in the three territories of the former Federation, a factor which, no doubt, will be carefully considered by Britain.

10. Counter measures have been decided upon by the Government which would be necessary if Britain implemented her threats, but it would obviously not be in the best interests of Rhodesia to make these known in advance. The Government is, however, quite satisfied that these measures will be effective in protecting Rhodesia's national interest, economic and otherwise.

11. The rapid and tragic march of events in the newly independent countries of Africa is undoubtedly causing a great deal of re-thinking by the nations of the West. The collapse of the economy in most of these African countries is only being delayed by large amounts of outside financial support—the departure from their boundaries of many Europeans upon whom their productivity depended is bringing about unemployment and food shortages—their abandonment of all but the scantiest trappings of democracy has been rapid—infiltration of Communist and Chinese influences is causing great general concern. Many people in the West are already highly suspicious that the policies of their Governments towards Africa have been wrong. This is particularly true in Britain and is further exemplified by the recent sharp rebuff given to Ghana's application for additional financial assistance.

12. If an attempt should be made to force Rhodesia to capitulate to the demands of the African extremists by introducing economic sanctions, in order to achieve this it would require concerted action by all the trading nations of the world. History has shown this will not prove successful.

13. What the people of Rhodesia have to decide is whether they "drift" and allow their position to be rapidly eroded, or whether they accept their inherent responsibilities to govern for the good of all the people of this country and for their descendants. Economically there is no doubt that once it is clear to others that Rhodesians—black and white—intend their Government to remain in the hands of responsible people, capital investment will again be interested in the great potential of this country. Capital investment is showing very little interest, if any, in those countries that have been handed over to African extremists. There can be no doubt whatsoever that in the long term Rhodesians have nothing to lose but all to gain by accepting their responsibilities and becoming completely independent as a sovereign State.

APPENDIX VII

Text of statement by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in the House of Commons on 29 April 1965

The Rhodesia Government have issued a White Paper setting out their views on the economic effects of a unilateral declaration of independence.

Her Majesty's Government have no desire to try to influence the voters of Rhodesia in the General Election due to take place on 7 May and for this reason have not hitherto commented on what is being said by spokesmen of either the Rhodesian Government or opposition parties during their respective campaigns. They obviously cannot, however, remain silent in the face of official utterances in Salisbury about the probable content of decisions which would be taken in London. The Rhodesian Government did not consult Her Majesty's Government about their decision to issue such a White Paper, still less about its contents which completely misrepresent the likely economic effect on Rhodesia of a unilateral declaration.

The Rhodesia Government White Paper after returning to the Statement issued from No. 10 Downing Street on 27 October says "It has been assumed in some quarters that the proposals referred to in the statement would be applied by the British Government with a degree of severity designed to collapse the economy of Rhodesia within a relatively short period." It then purports to "evaluate" whether in fact Britain could or would implement in full what it calls the "sanctions" suggested after a unilateral declaration. By this means the

Rhodesia Government are seeking to convey the impression that they and not Her Majesty's Government are the best judges of what action Her Majesty's Government would take in the event of a unilateral declaration.

Her Majesty's Government adhere to the Statement issued on 27 October 1964. It expressed the view that the economic effects of a unilateral declaration would be disastrous to the prosperity and prospects of the people of Rhodesia and that Rhodesia's external trade would be disrupted. Nothing that has happened in the last six months has afforded reasons for modifying this judgement in any way.

The White Paper states that a great proportion of Rhodesia's exports could be marketed in countries other than Britain with whom Rhodesia has trading relations, and it discusses in particular tobacco, which is Rhodesia's chief export. Britain is by far the biggest buyer of Rhodesian tobacco and if Britain were to stop buying it the effect upon the tobacco growers and upon the whole economy of Rhodesia would be particularly severe. The Rhodesian Tobacco Association is itself reported to have reached the conclusion that the imposition of embargoes would be disastrous to the industry. There would be no difficulty in procuring British tobacco requirements from other countries.

The White Paper seeks to reassure Rhodesians that after a unilateral declaration money will be forthcoming for investment in Rhodesia from what it terms "countries not unfriendly" towards her. Britain has hitherto been the chief external source of capital for Rhodesia's economic development. A unilateral declaration would put a stop to this flow. The statement of 27 October made it clear that all financial as well as trade relations between Britain and Rhodesia would be jeopardized. That aid would cease and that with one or two exceptions other Governments would be likely to refuse to recognize Rhodesia's independence or to enter into relations with her. The establishment of an illegal régime in Rhodesia is least calculated to produce stable government there, which the Rhodesian Government themselves recognize to be a prerequisite for attracting investment from abroad.

Other Governments inside and outside the Commonwealth will no doubt make known their own views on the White

Paper. Commonwealth Prime Ministers in their Communique of 15 July 1964, noted with approval the statement of the British Government that they would not recognize any unilateral declaration of independence, and the other Prime Ministers made it clear that they would be unable to recognize any such declaration. Moreover, the entire Commonwealth expressed their approval of the declaration of 27 October. There can be no justification for the Rhodesia Government or people to nurse the delusion that they would receive widespread international support.

The Rhodesian view of events elsewhere in Africa and their effect on thinking in the West is profoundly mistaken, and it would be an error to assume that this view could affect Her Majesty's Government's policy towards an act of rebellion in Rhodesia.

The White Paper argues that the adverse consequences of a unilateral declaration would be the responsibility of Britain alone. It is not Britain however which is contemplating unconstitutional action. If such action were to be taken, responsibility for the consequence would lie squarely on the shoulders of those who took it. The White Paper appears to assume that it would be improper for Britain to react in any way if Rhodesia chose to put herself in the position of a colony in rebellion, whereas Rhodesia would be entitled to take whatever measures she chose against Malawi, Zambia, or any other country, in retaliation against the inevitable consequences of her own action. No Government outside Rhodesia is likely to share this view.

Her Majesty's Government remain firmly convinced that the only route by which Rhodesia can achieve independence without grave consequences to herself is by the process of constitutional negotiations. She cannot hope to defy Britain, the whole of the Commonwealth, nearly the whole of Africa, and the United Nations. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, profoundly hope that Rhodesia will not be misled into thinking that she could escape disaster if she were to fly in the face of world opinion. As I have indicated earlier this afternoon, the answer lies in an agreed solution and Her Majesty's Government stand ready to carry forward their not entirely unhelpful negotiations with the Government of Rhodesia after the election in order to achieve this objective.

CHAPTER IV

SOUTH WEST AFRICA

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

General

1. Information on the Territory is contained in the last report of the Special Committee on the subject of South West Africa (A/5800/Rev.1, Chapter IV), and in the previous reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly (A/5238, chapter IX, and A/5446/Rev.1, chapter IV) as well as in the special report of the Special Committee, submitted to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session, on the implications of the activities of the mining industry and of the other international companies having interests in South West Africa (A/5840). Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.

International Court of Justice

2. Public hearings in the South West Africa cases initiated by the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia against South Africa began on 15 March 1965 at The Hague.

Political parties

3. At the beginning of 1964, South West Africa had three predominantly African organizations, open to members of all races; the South West Africa National

Union (SWANU), the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO), which together formed the South West African National Liberation Front (SWANLIF), and the South West Africa United National Independence Organization (SWAUNIO).

4. Early in 1964, a new organization, the Caprivi African National Union (CANU), was formed in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, a native reserve located in the northeasternmost part of South West Africa and administered as an integral part of South Africa. The new organization, initially a separatist movement, later became affiliated with SWAPO. During 1964, the President and another official of CANU were reported to have been imprisoned in Windhoek and on their release ordered by the South African Minister of Bantu Administration and Development to be transferred to Ohopoho, the administrative centre of the Kaokoveld Native Reserve in the northwesternmost part of South West Africa, and subsequently to the Warmbad Native Reserve in the extreme south of the Territory.

5. In September 1964, an additional organization, the National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO) of Namib (South West Africa), was established. The new organization replaces the National Convention Independence Party (NACIP) and the United Namib

Independence Peoples Party (UNIPP) referred to in petitions dated 6 June and 6 July 1964 (A/AC.109/PET.279 and Add.1). In a petition dated 10 October 1964 (A/AC.109/PET.368), Chief Samuel Witbooi and the President of SWAUNIO disclaimed knowledge of or membership in NUDO. Chief Witbooi was listed by NUDO as the Deputy Party Leader of the organization; the President of SWAUNIO, described by NUDO as "the former leader of SWAUNIO", was listed among other leaders of the new organization.

6. Each of the above-mentioned organizations, as well as the Rehoboth Advisory Board elected by the Rehoboth community, has opposed the Odendaal plan for the future of South West Africa and sought the termination of South African administration over the Territory. Another body, the Coloured Council, composed of members appointed by the Administrator of South West Africa to represent Coloureds other than the Rehoboth Basters, has endorsed the Odendaal plan and expressed its support of the Government.

7. SWAPO opposition to the Odendaal plan led to the detention of a number of SWAPO leaders in Ovamboland and elsewhere during 1964, according to officials of that organization. Chiefs and headmen in Ovamboland, on the other hand, have endorsed the plan on behalf of the population of the area, according to a petition dated 24 October 1964 addressed to the Prime Minister of South Africa. The text of the petition from the chiefs and headmen of Ovamboland was made public by the Prime Minister on 23 February 1965 in response to a question from a Nationalist Party member of the South African House of Assembly from South West Africa.

8. In their petition, the chiefs and headmen referred to public gatherings held in Ovamboland between 13 and 21 October 1964 at which the people were informed of the decisions of the Government of South Africa concerning the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission. The petitioners endorsed the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, some of which, they noted, were already being implemented, and the decisions of the Government thereon. They considered, however, that some of the recommendations which the Government had deemed it inadvisable to proceed with at that stage would operate only in the best interests of their country and people. They therefore requested the Government to define the boundaries of Ovamboland and to proceed as soon as possible with the institution of a Legislative Council and Executive Council for the whole of Ovamboland and to develop the judicial administration. In this connexion, they expressed their desire for the development of closer co-operation among the different population groups of Ovamboland with a view to their future self-government and self-support under the guidance and with the help of the South African Government. The petitioners also requested the Government to lift the prohibition on the supply of liquor, as recommended by the Odendaal Commission. The Government's decision on this recommendation, it may be recalled, was among others deferred until after the conclusion of the case before the International Court of Justice. Article 3 of the Mandate requires the Mandatory Power to prohibit the supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to Natives.

9. In their petition, the chiefs and headmen asked to be given the opportunity of visiting South Africa to become personally acquainted with developments there, particularly in the Transkei. Subsequently, in March 1965, a group of approximately sixty chiefs and

headmen from Ovamboland as well as other areas of South West Africa visited various parts of South Africa, including the Transkei.

10. With respect to the European section of the population, both of the European political parties in the Territory, the Nationalist Party and the United National South West Party (UNSWP) contested a by-election held in August 1964 to fill a vacancy in the eighteen-member Legislative Assembly caused by the death of one of the two UNSWP members of the territorial legislature. The Nationalist Party candidate won by 1,510 votes to 1,020, a victory interpreted by Nationalist Party spokesmen as an endorsement of the Odendaal plan by the European electorate. The UNSWP, which opposed the Odendaal proposals, favoured proper consultation with the non-White population to seek a basis for the development of the Territory and to decide on priorities, consultations with South Africa as the Mandatory Power and an agreement with the United Nations as well as United Nations approval of steps to be taken to carry out the Mandate obligations.

National security measures

11. In January 1965, legislation authorizing the detention of individuals for a maximum of ninety days for interrogation purposes, referred to in a previous report of the Special Committee (see A/5446/Rev.1, chap. IV, para. 15), was suspended in both South West Africa and South Africa.

12. New security measures were proposed in bills published in March and April 1965. A proposed amendment to the Official Secrets Act, which prohibits the disclosure of certain defined defence matters in South Africa and South West Africa, would broaden the prohibition on military information and extend the prohibition to cover police activities. Under the proposed amendment, the disclosure of information concerning any military or police matter in a manner or for a purpose prejudicial to the State would be prohibited under penalty of a fine of up to R1,500, or seven years' imprisonment, or both.

13. Following the establishment, in the South African Government and later in the South West Africa Administration, of emergency planning divisions to implement national survival schemes, the African Government published an Emergency Planning Bill which would give it broad powers to muster men and materials in times of emergency. The Bill, which defined sabotage as one of the events which could lead to the declaration of a state of emergency, would render able-bodied men and women from 17 to 65 years of age who had not had military training and did not fall within specified categories of public service liable to compulsory training to cope with national emergencies.

Implementation of the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission

14. During 1964 and early 1965, the South West Africa Administration and the Government of South Africa were jointly engaged in carrying out recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, including measures preparatory to the establishment of non-European "homelands".

15. Before detailing these developments, it may be useful to review the main elements of the Odendaal plan. Under that plan, if fully implemented, separate "homelands" would be established for ten non-white groups, who would be allocated an aggregate of 40.07

per cent¹ of the land area of South West Africa in both the northern and southern sections of the Territory. Their administration and development would be entrusted initially to the South African Departments of Bantu Administration and Development and of Coloured Affairs, and their education to other relevant South African Government departments. The Odendaal Commission, which envisaged the gradual development of "homelands" towards political independence, recommended that "homeland" governments gradually take over from South Africa all functions except defence, foreign affairs, internal security and border control posts, water affairs and power generation, and transport.

16. The balance of South West Africa, to consist of a "white" area which would cover over 43 per cent of the Territory,² and the remaining portions of South West Africa, including the two large diamond-producing areas, would in effect be fully integrated with South Africa. With respect to the "white" area, the Odendaal Commission recommended the transfer back to South Africa of a major portion of the government functions now carried out by the executive and legislative branches of the territorial Government. The "white" area would thereby retain local government functions comparable to those of a Province of South Africa. Over the remaining portions of South West Africa, which were not to be included in any of the non-white homelands or the "white" area, all administrative and legislative authority would revert to South Africa.

17. There would also be a 92,421 hectare rural irrigation settlement for Coloureds.

18. As indicated in the report of the Special Committee, the full implementation of the Odendaal plan would involve transfers of population, to the extent, *inter alia*, that all non-whites living in areas to be included in a "homeland" for another group would be transferred to the "homeland" set aside for their own ethnic group. Non-whites for whom a "homeland" is established would accordingly live either in their respective "homeland" or in the "white" area. The Odendaal Commission has proposed that all citizens of the "homelands", with the exception of those who have been declared prohibited immigrants, shall have free access to their respective "homelands" at any time and without restriction.

19. The report of the Special Committee contains an outline of the proposed non-European "homelands" and the "white" area in relation to the distribution of each population group concerned. The situation may be also summarized as follows.

20. In 1960, a total of 283,335 Natives³ were residents of northern native reserves which would be altered into their respective "homelands"; the northern reserves also included others, namely 2,278 Bushmen, 9 Coloureds and 384 Europeans. In the southern section of the Territory, out of a total native population of 142,962 in 1960, only 13,709 lived in native reserves to be included in their respective homelands; 12,085 Natives, as well as 951 Coloureds and Basters, lived

in native reserves to be abolished or included in homelands for other groups. Of 11,257 Rehoboth Basters, 8,893 or less lived in their proposed "homeland", the Rehoboth Gebiet, the population of which also included about 4,000 others, mainly Natives.

21. Accordingly, in the southern section, less than 10 per cent of the native population, or less than 14 per cent of the total non-European population, lived in "home areas" to be included in their proposed "homelands". The rest of the native and coloured population of the southern section, and the white population, lived in "white" urban areas (53,680 Whites and 59,073 non-Whites in 1960) and in "white" rural areas (19,426 Whites and 68,334 non-Whites in 1960).

22. As previously stated in the report of the Special Committee, non-Europeans would continue to form the majority of the population in the "white" area unless continued European immigration altered the position. In connexion with this assumption, it may be explained that Natives constitute the bulk of the labour force in the "white" area, particularly in "white" urban areas and on white farms (see para. 66 below). The Odendaal Commission did not suggest the removal of Natives living in the "white" area to the proposed "homelands".⁴ Moreover, subsequent to the publication of the Commission's report and the Government's decisions thereon, the construction and planning of new housing and other facilities for Natives in "white" urban areas has continued. It may also be noted that, despite an increase of more than 50 per cent in the land area of native reserves between 1947 and 1952 and despite such steps as were taken to develop the native reserves since the Second World War, there has not been a shift of the native population from the "white" area to the reserves.⁵ In addition, past and current population trends in South Africa itself contribute to the assumption that non-Europeans may also remain the majority in the "white" area of South West Africa.⁶

⁴ While the Commission made no recommendations for removing Natives from the "white" area, it may be recalled that the Commission recommended with respect to two of the groups to be linked with the South African Department of Coloured Affairs—the Namas, who have heretofore been classed among Natives in South West Africa, and the Basters—that those in "white" urban areas be removed to their "homelands". In "white" urban areas, both groups live in native locations; in urban areas where the Administration has established separate school facilities for different groups of the native population, Nama school children attend school together with Damaras, both groups being Nama-speaking. For the third group to be linked with the Department of Coloured Affairs—the Coloureds—the Odendaal Commission recommended that the Coloured population in "white" urban areas be relocated in separate Coloured townships in three "white" urban areas. During 1964 and early 1965, separate Coloured townships were being constructed and planned in these as well as other "white" urban areas. Coloureds who had not yet taken up residence in a coloured township continued to live, as in the past, in native locations.

⁵ In the southern section, the native reserve areas were increased by about 35 per cent between 1947 and 1952. The population of the native reserves in the southern section (excluding Sessfontein) before the increase was approximately 26,000, according to information supplied to the United Nations by the South African Government in 1946; in 1960, there were 25,882 non-Europeans in the native reserves in the southern section (excluding Sessfontein). During the same period, the non-European population in the "white" area continued to increase.

⁶ With respect to South Africa, the Prime Minister stated in the South African House of Assembly in April 1965 that it was expected that by 1978 a decreasing number of Bantu would be required in industries situated in and around "white" urban centres and that if in the meantime the number of Bantu in the "white" areas continued to increase, it was not in conflict with the National Party's ultimate goal of turning the flow back to the Bantu homelands.

¹ Native reserves and the Rehoboth Gebiet at present cover 26.68 per cent of the Territory.

² European farms, which cover 47.34 per cent of the Territory, would be reduced to 43.22 per cent of the land area of the Territory. The "white" area would also include urban areas (0.58 per cent) and some of the game reserve land.

³ Including 28,621 contract labourers working in the southern section and excluding the population of the Sessfontein Native Reserve (309 Damaras, 200 Namas and 354 Tswana and others). Since the Odendaal Commission proposed that Sessfontein be included in Damaraland, the population of that native reserve is reflected in the population figures for the southern section.

23. The actual implementation of the fundamental political changes, territorial partitions, and population shifts recommended by the Odendaal Commission and endorsed in principle by the South African Government remained in abeyance as of April 1965, in accordance with the Government's decision to defer its decision on such questions owing both to considerations relating to the case before the International Court of Justice and to the necessity of carrying out preparatory measures of a practical nature. Meanwhile, in accordance with its announced intention, the Government has proceeded with the preparatory measures which it considered necessary and with the implementation of development plan projects.

Establishment of joint South Africa-South West Africa committees

24. In June 1964, the Prime Minister established a six-member temporary liaison committee, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Minister for South West Africa Affairs, to ensure the smooth functioning of interim arrangements in connexion with the Odendaal recommendations, pending final decisions on the future financial and administrative arrangements between South West Africa and South Africa. Members of the Committee include two members of the Executive Committee of South West Africa and public servants from both South Africa and South West Africa.

25. In December 1964, an eight-member committee of experts, also under the chairmanship of the Deputy Minister for South West Africa Affairs and including members from both South Africa and South West Africa, was formed to report on all the practical problems to be taken into account when the rearrangement of administrative and financial relations between the Republic and South West Africa is considered.

Preparations for the establishment of "homelands"

26. On 10 June 1964, the South West Africa Administration began purchasing farmlands owned by or leased to whites in preparation for the establishment of "homelands". By the end of December 1964, it had spent R8,089,611 in the purchase of 158 farms from 145 farmers. The first group of farms bought was reported to have cost the Administration an average of R6.20 per hectare and the second group R7.20 per hectare. By 11 March 1965, the South West Africa Administration had purchased a total of 195 farms at a total cost of R10,684,151; 61 of the white farmers were leasing their former farms from the Administration for 2 per cent of the purchase price, excluding an inconvenience allowance, and subject to the lessee's maintenance of improvements at his own cost. A further 227 farms or portions of farms were still to be purchased. By 26 February 1965 the Administration had also bought 52 urban properties for R532,215 in two urban areas, Welwitschia and Gibeon, which the Odendaal Commission had recommended be included in the projected Damaraland and Namaland "homelands".

27. It will be recalled that the Odendaal Commission had estimated a total expenditure of R20,862,485 for the purchase of farms, at the rate of R5 per hectare, to be added to "homelands" and for the purchase of native reserve lands, at the rate of R3 per hectare (see A/5800/Rev.1, chapter IV, para. 59).

28. A decision by the Government on the buying out of native reserve lands has been deferred until the conclusion of the International Court case. Under existing law, the withdrawal of any reservation of land for Natives can be accomplished simply by resolution of

both houses of the South African Parliament, subject only to the reservation for Natives of other land at least equivalent in pastoral or agricultural value. Prior treaty rights may also have to be taken into account in the case of at least one of the native reserves proposed to be abolished, the Bondels' reserve. The Bondels' reserve has been regarded by the South African Government as the property of the Bondelzwart Namas. After it assumed the Mandate, South Africa recognized and confirmed rights granted by the German Government to the Bondelzwart under treaty of 23 December 1906, during the former German administration of South West Africa. Another of the native reserves proposed to be abolished, the Neuhoof Reserve, has been identified by the South African Government as one of the areas occupied by Natives under old agreements. While traditionally owned or occupied native lands confiscated by the German Government were not restored during the Mandate period, all land over which native land rights were granted by or maintained during the former German administration and subsequently confirmed or recognized by South Africa has been maintained as native reserve land. Additional land areas have also been proclaimed as native reserves. Native reserves abolished and other lands withdrawn from native occupation during the Mandate period have heretofore been those described by South Africa as occupied on a temporary basis or lands over which Natives were not recognized by South Africa as having pre-existing rights.

Establishment of a Coloured rural irrigation settlement

29. In 1965, the Chairman of the Coloured Council indicated that the coloured community rejected the establishment of a rural irrigation settlement on the northern border of the Orange River as recommended by the Odendaal Commission, and sought instead the setting aside for Coloureds of three farming areas near urban areas.

Economic conditions and development projects

30. The economy of South West Africa was reviewed briefly in the report of the Special Committee (A/5800/Rev.1, chapter IV) and in more detail, with particular emphasis on the mining industry, in the special report (A/5840) submitted to the General Assembly in accordance with operative paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963.

31. Since then, mineral exports have increased considerably, to over R93 million in 1964, compared with over R62 million in 1963. Diamond sales accounted for R60.2 million of the 1964 exports, compared with R40.9 million in 1963. Profits of the Consolidated Diamond Mines, the principal mining company in the Territory, rose from R24,883,000 in 1963, after taxes of R14,539,000 and payment of fixed annual preference dividends of R336,000, to an estimated R34,191,000 in 1964, after taxes of R17,805,000 and the annual preference dividends.

32. In 1965, a French firm, Compagnie française des pétroles, was reported to have joined the search for oil in South West Africa. The company planned a preliminary survey of the northern part of South West Africa and areas in South Africa to determine whether a full-scale field study should be undertaken. The chief geologist for the company considered that the discovery of oil in Angola indicated the possible presence of oil in South West Africa.

33. The fishing industry was reported to have set new production and export records in 1964, with in-

creased catches accompanied by higher prices. Toward the end of the year, following reports that foreign vessels had been trawling within the twelve-mile fishing limit of the territorial waters, the Prime Minister established a fisheries protection service, consisting of ten units of the South African Navy and units of the South African Air Force to patrol the coastal fishing waters of the Republic and South West Africa.

34. Exports of karakul pelts, valued at R12.6 million in 1962, rose to over R15 million in 1963. Cattle exports, which had gradually fallen from 310,798 head exported in 1959 to a low of 170,121 in 1962, increased to 262,622 in 1963 and dropped again to 247,700 in 1964, exclusive of local slaughtering. A meat canning factory in Windhoek was reported in 1965 to be processing 400 head of cattle per day.

35. Sales of agricultural produce from Native areas in the southern section of the Territory have not since attained their 1957 peak of only R834,000. In 1962, according to official figures, 2,993 head of cattle and 6,073 head of small stock were sold in native reserves for a total of R97,011, compared to 19,930 head of cattle and 6,083 head of small stock sold for R500,036 in 1957. In 1964, livestock sales in native reserves in the southern section were reported to have amounted to R216,046.50.

36. During 1964, the Territory experienced another severe drought, resulting in food shortages in native areas and the death of tens of thousands of head of livestock. As a consequence, the territorial Legislative Assembly continued to allocate over R1 million per year to provide relief measures for farmers, emergency feeding in Ovamboland and emergency feeding for non-white children outside the Ovamboland Native Reserve.

37. The implementation of the five-year plan recommended by the Odendaal Commission and of other territorial development projects during 1964 and early 1965 was reflected in an increase in expenditure authorized by the territorial Legislative Assembly from R37,242,511 in 1963-1964 to an original appropriation of R71,389,600 for the fiscal year 1964-1965. Of the 1964-1965 expenditure, R46,189,600 was to be financed from territorial revenue, R20 million from a South African development plan loan, over half of which was spent during the fiscal year for the purchase of land to be incorporated in "homelands", and the balance from funds earlier appropriated from territorial revenue to the Territorial Development and Reserve Fund. Until 1964-1965, apart from railways and harbour development financed by South Africa, and grants by South Africa beginning in 1959-1960 for the development of native areas in South West Africa, the Territory's development expenditure has been financed from local revenue. In 1964-1965, over R19.5 million of the territorial appropriation from revenue was to be paid into the Territorial Development and Reserve Fund, and an additional fixed annual sum of R100,000 was paid by the Territory to South Africa for the development of native areas in the Territory. The latter payment is in turn paid into the South African Native Trust Fund.

38. The South African grant to the South African Native Trust Fund from its own revenue for the development of native areas in South West Africa⁷ increased

⁷Other than the development of health and education, for which South West Africa remained responsible. Services rendered by the South West Africa administration in native areas in fields for which South Africa is responsible have been financed by or refunded from the Native Trust Fund; sums of R50,963, in 1962/1963 and R45,774 in 1963/1964 were accordingly paid to South West Africa from the Native Trust Fund.

from R130,000 in 1962-1963 to R500,000 in 1963-1964, bringing South Africa's contribution for that purpose to R850,000 as at 31 March 1964. In 1964-1965, funds of at least R150,000 for the development of native areas in South West Africa were also reported to have been invested or allocated from still another source, the South African-financed Bantu Investment Corporation.

39. It will be recalled that the Odendaal Commission estimated a total expenditure of approximately R115 million under the five-year development plan, to be loaned and contributed outright by South Africa. South Africa also undertook to meet the Territory's anticipated annual excess of expenditure over revenue and to continue subsidizing railway and police services in the Territory (see A/5800/Rev.1, chapter IV, para. 60).

40. An estimated R93,650,000 of the five-year development plan expenditure was to be spent for development projects, more than half for the further development of the white area. A far greater proportion of the Territory's expenditure for development in the past has been for the development of the white area. For example, of R4.9 million authorized for administration buildings on which expenditure was incurred during 1962-1963, less than R300,000 was for construction in native areas and the Rehoboth Gebiet: R5,000 for a stone crusher on the Kunene, R49,892 for a new police station in Ovamboland and the balance for houses for white government officials and offices in Rehoboth for the District Magistrate. Major building projects authorized by the Administrator included a new Legislative Assembly building (R859,161), prison (R528,253), administration building (R433,594), district headquarters and police station (R298,276) and a new residence for the Administrator (R171,824 authorized, over R214,000 spent), all of them in Windhoek. Total expenditure from the South African Native Trust Fund for the construction, maintenance and demolishing of buildings in native areas amounted to R4,487 in 1962-1963 and R8,670 in 1963-1964.

41. Of a total of R2,764,634 authorized for school construction in 1962-1963 under the government buildings account of the Territorial Development and Reserve Fund, the following expenditure was authorized for non-whites: R29,461 for additions to the Augustineum secondary and teacher-training school for Natives, and R14,000 for a coloured school in Windhoek; mention should also be made of the expenditure of R7,545 for additions to a white school and hostel in Welwitschia, since it has been proposed that that urban area be included in Damaraland. There have been reports that the Augustineum, situated in Okahandja, is to be abolished at some future date and the training facilities transferred to Windhoek. If the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission are fully implemented, the one native reserve (Ovitoto) in the Okahandja District will be abolished. According to information published on 9 February 1965, the population of the District, to form part of the "white" area, consisted of 2,193 Whites and 10,000 non-Whites. In addition to the school construction authorized under the government buildings account, R71,180 was spent in 1962-1963 from the Native areas account of the Territorial Development and Reserve Fund for the erection of community schools in native reserves. The communities concerned were to be responsible for the maintenance of the schools.

42. Authorized public health construction for which expenditure was incurred during 1962-1963 totalled over R2.3 million, of which R1.7 million was for Whites

and the balance for non-Whites. Major expenditures authorized for Whites were for the new State hospital in Windhoek (R1,256,115) and a new State hospital at Walvis Bay (R364,500); for non-Whites, the major expenditures authorized were for extensions to the existing State Bantu hospital in Windhoek (over R200,000), pending the construction of a proposed new hospital in Windhoek, and new hospitals for non-Europeans in two other "white" urban areas (R145,185 and R106,231).

43. The Territory was also engaged in 1962-1963 in completing a R13.5 million telecommunications development programme. While the amount spent in native areas could not be ascertained from the information available, the Administration was reported to have stated that the annual loss sustained by the Administration on telephones amounted to between R300,000 and R400,000, some two thirds of the loss being on farm lines for Whites, which cost R40 per year to the farmer and R96 per year to the Administration.

44. Loans of R3.5 million were paid out from the Territorial Development and Reserve Fund during 1962-1963 mainly to local government authorities, the territorial Land Bank and the South African Railways. There was no indication of the proportion paid out for services to non-Whites other than an explanation that R797,803 was granted to local government authorities for housing for non-Whites.

45. Other development expenditure by the Territory in 1962-1963 included almost R7 million for road construction. The South African Native Trust Fund recorded expenditures of R11,656 in 1962-1963 and R15,896 in 1963-1964 for the construction of roads and bridges in native areas of South West Africa.

46. Beginning in 1964, development has been accelerated, particularly in the "white" area and in Ovamboland.

47. With respect to the Kunene hydroelectric scheme, the major development project proposed by the Odendaal Commission, it will be recalled that, pending the construction of hydroelectric facilities on the Kunene River at Ruacana Falls, power was to be obtained from the Matala hydroelectric scheme in Angola. In October 1964, the Governments of South Africa and Portugal concluded an agreement under which South Africa undertook to provide R8.25 million to finance the Matala project, in exchange for the supply of 90 million kilowatt hours a year of electricity at the South West Africa border at a cost of 0.5 cent per unit. The South African funds were to be used to finance a R5 million dam, half by a direct contribution and half by a twenty-year loan at the rate of 5 per cent. The balance would be in the form of a fifteen-year loan, to finance a R2.5 million power line and the installation of a third turbo-generator costing R750,000.

48. Both Governments agreed to study the technical aspects of the establishment of the hydroelectric facilities at Ruacana and the selection of a site for a storage dam for the South West Africa project. Since the new dam at Matala will reduce the regulated flow of the Kunene, further storage capacity will be required to ensure the additional minimum flow required for the Ruacana project. The Portuguese Government was reported to have stated that without the South African contribution to the Matala scheme, it would not necessarily guarantee that minimum flow. Meanwhile, the South West Africa Administration began construction of an airport at Ruacana capable of serving DC-4 and C130 Hercules aircraft.

49. A new R5 million private company, the Suidwes Afrikaanse Water en Elektrisiteits Korporasie Edms. Bpk. (SWAWEK), was established as a subsidiary of the statutory South African Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to establish, develop and control the power and water supply schemes throughout South West Africa. The company, to be financed directly by South Africa, is also entitled to obtain concessions in various mining areas, and to develop, exploit and mine those areas, and to acquire other immovable properties wherever possible. The company's membership is to be restricted to fifty persons and its board of directors to a minimum of two and a maximum of seven directors. On establishment, the company had three directors, one described as a manager and two as secretaries of companies in Johannesburg.

50. Construction of the Ovamboland canal system to provide the first permanent water supply for Ovamboland continued. Expenditure from the South African Native Trust Fund for this and other water supply schemes in Native areas had reached a new peak of R369,459 in 1963-1964, compared with R107,381 in the preceding year and the previous highest of R165,928 in 1961-1962. Tenders for the construction of new dams and boreholes in native reserves and in the area proposed for Bushmanland were invited during 1964 and early 1965. Expenditure authorized by the Legislative Assembly for two State water schemes in the "white" area amounted to R2.1 million in 1963-1964 and R1.1 million in 1964-1965.

51. A R4 million jet airport near Windhoek was expected to be completed and in operation by May 1965, and other new airports costing about R1 million each were under construction at Grootfontein, in the "white" area, and at Ondongua, the administrative headquarters of Ovamboland.

52. The South West Africa Administration was reported to be engaged in 1964 in road construction projects costing R16 million. Road construction projects were also being carried out in the northern native reserves, where the employment of local native residents was linked with their need to earn money to buy maize supplied by the Government to overcome the food shortage in the reserves during the drought. Maize was supplied free to elderly persons and children and had to be purchased by others. In the Okavango Native reserve, according to a report in the December 1964 issue of *Bantu*, a South African Government publication, the South African Government had employed 2,500 Natives on a local road-making project to enable them to earn money to buy the maize; each labourer worked for a period of two weeks and then rejoined the waiting list for employment. In January 1965, it was reported that road-building equipment worth R200,000 was being supplied by three Johannesburg firms to open up previously inaccessible parts of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel Native Reserve.

53. The banks of the Okavango River, where Natives were unable to obtain a sufficient harvest of food crops during 1964, was also reported to be the site of a pilot scheme, established by the Bantu Investment Corporation during the year at a cost of R100,000, for the production and decortication of jute on a commercial scale. Fifteen white and twenty-five non-white employees and up to 100 casual, or temporary, non-white workers were employed on the new scheme.

54. In Ovamboland, a furniture factory, the first factory to be established in the northern native reserves, was reported to be almost ready to begin production

early in 1965. The first native township in the northern reserves was also to be established in Ovamboland, at Okatana; tenders for the construction of the township were invited in 1964. In addition, the Bantu Investment Corporation was to invest R50,000 to establish businesses in the reserve, the first four enterprises, a general dealer's store, a butchery, a cafe and a garage, to be located also at Okatana. These were to be rented or sold to Ovambos after they became going concerns. In December 1964, the New South West Africa Native Labour Association (Pty) Ltd. (Nuwe SWANLA), the agency authorized by the Administration to recruit contract labourers for work in the southern section of the Territory, also invited tenders for the erection of forty dormitories and related structures as well as store-rooms and offices in Odongua, the administrative centre of Ovamboland.

55. Development projects being undertaken in 1964 and early 1965 included the establishment of government hospitals in the northern native reserves, and clinics in several native areas in the southern section as well as the construction of new or expanded health facilities for Whites and non-Whites in the "white" area. In 1964, the first government hospital in Ovamboland was under construction, which would bring the number of hospitals in that reserve to fourteen. However, in 1962 there were only four mission doctors in Ovamboland, to serve the largest concentration of population—203,666 non-Whites⁸ and 195 Whites—in any district in the Territory and vacant posts for government doctors for the area had been advertised unsuccessfully for several years prior to 1962. Similarly, in the Okavango, where there were in 1962 ten hospitals, including at that time the only government hospital in the northern native reserves, there were only two mission doctors to serve the population of 29,102 Natives and 104 Whites. During 1964, a new government hospital was under construction at Runtu to replace the existing government hospital, consisting of hut facilities, and another government hospital for lepers was to be established in the reserve.

56. New schools being constructed and planned during 1964 and early 1965, included, *inter alia*, new and separate secondary schools for Coloureds and Natives and a teacher-training college for Whites in Windhoek, and a school in Ovamboland to provide secondary education, teacher-training and technical training for Natives in the northern native reserves. In Ovamboland, the Administration was also proceeding with its plan to convert mission primary schools for Natives into community schools, following the pattern established in South Africa. By April 1965, Finnish mission schools had already been converted into community schools, to be followed by Roman Catholic mission schools, and negotiations were reported to be still taking place with the Anglican mission for the conversion of their schools. Meanwhile, in November 1964, a six-member Language and Publication Council was inaugurated. The Council is to develop eight native languages and school literature in those languages, pursuant to the Administration's policy of extending the system of separate school facilities and the use of the mother tongue as the medium of instruction in primary education for Natives.

57. The construction of a native township at the Uis Tin Mine in the Okombahe Native Reserve, in the southern section of the Territory, and of new native

locations and separate coloured townships in "white" urban areas were among other development projects being carried out during 1964 and early 1965. In August 1964, the Administrator-in-Executive Committee decided that coloured people residing at Katutura, the new native location in Windhoek, would be allowed to remain in that native location until sufficient accommodation was available for them at Khomasdal, the new coloured township in Windhoek. No new coloured people would be allowed to live in Katutura, however. Natives who continued to live in the old native location in Windhoek rather than move to Katutura have for several years been restricted from erecting new dwellings or extending existing homes. Eighteen Natives who did so and who failed to carry out official orders to demolish the new structures or extensions were tried in the Windhoek Magistrate's Court early in 1965. Fourteen were found guilty and fined R10, and the court left it to the local government authority to decide what should be done with the illegal structures.

Labour and manpower

58. The Territory has experienced an increasing shortage of professional, technical and administrative personnel, including architects, engineers, draughtsmen, mechanics and others needed to carry out the numerous development projects undertaken and to staff the existing and expanding health, educational and other facilities. Faced with additional manpower requirements for development projects, the Territory has at the same time lost a large portion of its professional and technical staff through resignations. During 1964 and early 1965, an unprecedented number of vacancy notices were published in the territorial Press in an effort to fill posts in the territorial Administration, in municipalities and the railways, as well as in mines, industries and other sectors of private enterprise.

59. While the influx of supplementary personnel, mainly from South Africa, has been sufficient to create a serious shortage of housing for Whites in Windhoek, it has been insufficient to meet the Territory's staff requirements, since there was also a shortage of professional and technical staff in South Africa itself. A major recruiting campaign was to be launched in Europe during 1965 in an effort to secure necessary personnel.

60. As a result of the general shortage of white manpower in the Territory, the Executive Committee in 1964 authorized the employment of non-Whites as artisans (e.g., bricklayers, carpenters) on State construction works. The decisions taken by the Executive Committee in this connexion, outlined below, serve to illustrate the operation of the existing system of job reservation in private enterprise through administrative action, which can be exercised by such indirect means as the licensing of businesses, the awarding of government contracts, the permit and pass systems and by direct means in the case of migrant contract labourers. The application of a system of direct government control over all employment of Natives in the "white" area was authorized by the South African Parliament in 1964 (see para. 65 below).

61. During 1964, contractors on State construction works, who had been prohibited from using non-white artisans, were permitted to employ coloured artisans. According to a statement by the Secretary for South West Africa, the territorial Executive Committee resolved in March 1964 to allow the employment of Coloureds on all buildings except those in which services were rendered solely for Whites. Contractors still could

⁸ Population figures are for 1960 and exclude native contract labourers working in the southern section.

not make headway with the building of urgently needed Administration houses, and pursuant to a decision taken by the Executive Committee in June 1964, diplomatic negotiations were entered into with the Administration of Angola to import artisans from that area. The Angola Administration could not see its way clear to allowing artisans to be drawn away from work in Angola, however, and the Executive Committee resolved in July 1964 that the employment of Coloured artisans for all Administration projects should, in view of the enormous expansion, be approved in principle. The Secretary indicated that if, as a result of these concessions, contractors were to pay off white construction workers except for good reason or reduce wages to an unreasonable level, this would not be in the spirit of the relations between the Administration and these contractors, and the Administration "would know how to deal with" contractors who had offended in that respect. Meanwhile, to help overcome the shortage of white artisans, a programme for the training of mentally handicapped white boys was being carried out at a technical training school for Whites in Windhoek and the Administration was contemplating a new crash training programme for white artisans.

62. In the Ovamboland Native Reserve, five teams of twelve Ovambos each, under the supervision of a qualified European foreman, were employed to do the brickwork on new schools under construction in the area; each bricklayer had a helper, while special teams were trained as carpenters to do roof construction and other carpentry. This also was reported to be with the approval of the Executive Committee. According to a statement by the Director of Education of South West Africa in April 1965, quite a number of Ovambos had thus been trained in a trade which was of the utmost importance to the future development of Ovamboland.

63. As indicated in paragraph 54 above, the South African Government, through the Bantu Investment Corporation, was promoting the establishment of business enterprises in Ovamboland to be leased or bought by Ovambos. On the other hand, in April 1965, Nuwe SWANLA issued a vacancy notice—clearly intended for a white candidate—for a single male store assistant at one of the retail stores run by the labour recruiting organization in Ovamboland. A salary scale of R1,080 with increments of R60 to a maximum of R1,500 was offered, together with other benefits, including pension scheme, medical aid scheme, leave bonus, free housing, thirty days annual leave and other fringe benefits.

64. In government employment, job classification by race may be illustrated by the fact that professional posts such as nursing and teaching are open to non-whites, whereas the post of chauffeur for the Administrator of the Territory, according to a vacancy notice published in 1964, appears to be reserved to white candidates. The post of chauffeur for the Administrator was offered at a salary scale of R1,308, with increments of R102 to a maximum of R1,920, which automatically signified that the post was for a white person, whose duties were described as driving and cleaning official motorcars; he was also to be prepared to assist in serving at receptions and in other duties in the official residence of the Administrator.

65. In 1964, the South African Parliament gave the State President authority to apply, by proclamation, the provisions of the Bantu Labour Act, No. 67 of 1964, to South West Africa. This legislation would prohibit a Native from taking up employment or working on his own account outside a native area except

with the permission of government labour bureaux and would, *inter alia*, establish a general obligation for native men and women living in the "white" area to work. Prospective employers, other than farmers granted government permits to do so, would be prohibited from hiring a Native except through the labour bureau or government-licensed agents. Companies, partnerships or associations of persons were specifically barred from becoming licensed agents.

66. Non-Whites form the bulk of the labour force in the "white" area. According to figures cited by a South West Africa Administration official in 1964, reflecting the position somewhat earlier, non-Europeans constituted 86 per cent of the labour force in agriculture, 89 per cent in mining, 47 per cent in industry, 59 per cent in the building trade, 65 per cent in the electrical trade and 66 per cent in social services. According to figures provided by the South African Government, 65,998 adult male Natives were employed in 1960 in the southern section of the Territory; 49 per cent were residents of the southern section while 41 per cent were recruited from native reserves in the northern section of the Territory. In January 1965, the minimum wages of contract labourers recruited to work in the southern section were increased by 50 per cent and previous experience was to be taken into account in determining wages. Of the total of 65,998 adult male Natives employed in the southern section, 29,858 were employed by a variety of employers in "white" urban areas, 25,087 by farmers, 7,471 in mines and factories, and 3,582 by the South African Railways and the South West Africa Administration. Native women are also employed in the southern section.

67. The South West Africa Administration also employs prison labour, supplied to it free of charge. During 1962-1963, a daily average of about 500 prison labourers⁹ were supplied to various branches of the Administration.

B. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE¹⁰

Introduction

68. The Special Committee considered the question of South West Africa at its 322nd meeting held in New York on 13 April 1965, and at its 344th, 345th, 349th, 350th, 357th, 359th, 360th, 363rd, 366th to 368th and 370th to 372nd meetings held in Africa between 27 May and 17 June 1965.

69. The Special Committee had before it a telegram dated 16 June 1965 from the Permanent Observer of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations (A/AC.109/125), with regard to statements made in the Special Committee to the effect that his Government was involved with the Government of South Africa in the development of missile stations and rocket bases in South West Africa. The Special Committee, at its 387th meeting on 20 September 1965, decided to circu-

⁹ Calculated on the basis of a six-day week. According to the audited accounts of territorial expenditure, the value of prison labour, assessed at 20 cents per unit per day, supplied free of charge to the Administration during 1962/1963 amounted to R30,726, compared with R32,517 during the preceding year.

¹⁰ See also chapter II of the present report (Meetings held in Africa) for an account of the discussions on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 373rd meeting on 18 June 1965 (A/AC.109/128/Rev.1) concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Southern Rhodesia, Territories under Portuguese administration, South West Africa, and Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.

late a letter dated 6 July 1965 from the Acting Permanent Observer of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations (A/AC.109/142) concerning a statement contained in document A/AC.109/PET.366/Add.1 relating to South West Africa.

Written petitions and hearings

70. The Special Committee circulated the following petitions concerning South West Africa:¹¹

| <i>Petitioner</i> | <i>Document No.</i> |
|--|--|
| Mr. Carl-Axel Valen, Secretary General, World Assembly of Youth (WAY) | A/AC.109/PET.328 |
| Mr. Mburumba Kerina, Party Chairman, National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO) of Namib (South West Africa) ... | A/AC.109/PET.330, and A/AC.109/PET.371/Add.3 |
| Mr. Gottfried Hage Geingob, South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) | A/AC.109/PET.331 |
| Mr. Sam Nujoma, President, SWAPO, on behalf Mr. Cato All, Secretary, International Refugee Council of Zambia (IRCOZ) | A/AC.109/PET.331/Add.5 |
| Messrs. Ismail Van Fortune, Secretary-General, Sam Nujoma, President, and Emil Appolus, Publicity and Information Secretary, SWAPO | A/AC.109/PET.366 and Add.1 |
| Mr. Jacobus Beukes, Rehoboth Community | A/AC.109/PET.367 and Add.1-3 |
| Chief H. S. Witbooi and Mr. J. D. Gertze, President, South West Africa United National Independence Organization (SWAUNIO) | A/AC.109/PET.368 |
| Mr. J. T. Beukes, on behalf of the Rehoboth Bastards | A/AC.109/PET.369 |
| Mr. A. M. Muyongo, Vice-President, Caprivi African National Union (CANU) | A/AC.109/PET.370 and Add.1 and 2 |
| National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO) | A/AC.109/PET.371 and Add.1, 2 and 4 |
| Miss A. M. Hughes, State Secretary, Union of Australian Women | A/AC.109/PET.372 |
| Damara Headmen, D. Loth Owasoab and E. K. Hetman, Otjimbingwe Native Reserve | A/AC.109/PET.385 and Add.1 |
| Mr. Alfred Ngokong, Director of Publicity, on behalf of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) | A/AC.109/PET.407/Add.1 |

71. The petitions indicated above as A/AC.109/PET.331 and Add.5 contained requests for hearings which were approved by the Special Committee at its 321st and 367th meetings on 9 April and 15 June 1965. However, the petitioners concerned have not yet appeared before the Special Committee.

¹¹ The following petitions were circulated after the Special Committee had completed its consideration of question of South West Africa A/AC.109/PET.367/Add.3, PET.370/Add.1 and 2, PET.371/Add.3 and PET.407/Add.1.

72. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning South West Africa:

- Mr. Sam Nujoma, President, and Mr. Albert Muyongo, chief representative in Zambia SWAPO (A/AC.109/PET.331/Add.1 and 2) (344th and 345th meetings)
- Mr. Vusumuzi Make, executive member, and Mr. Elias Ntloedibe, chief representative, accompanied by Mr. L. Masimini, Assistant Representative, Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) (A/AC.109/PET.393) (344th and 345th meetings)
- Mr. Jacob Kuhangua, Secretary-General, Mr. Andreas Shipanga, chief representative in Cairo, and Mr. Emil Appolus, publicity and information secretary, SWAPO (A/AC.109/PET.331/Add.3 and 4) (349th, 350th and 360th meetings)
- Mr. Gottfried Jario, assistant representative in Dar es Salaam, and Mr. Godfrey Goseb, Chief Representative in Dar es Salaam, South West Africa National Union (SWANU) (A/AC.109/PET.405) (357th meeting)
- Mr. J. D. Nyose, National President, Federation of Free African Trade Unions (FOFATUSA) (A/AC.109/PET.408) (359th meeting)
- Mr. Alfred Ngokong, Director of Publicity, accompanied by Mr. James Hadebe, Chief Representative in East Africa, and Mr. Maindu Msimang, Administrative Secretary, African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) (A/AC.109/PET.407) (363rd meeting)
- Mr. Mburumba Kerina, Party Chairman, NUDO (A/AC.109/PET.330/Add.1) (367th and 368th meetings)

73. Mr. Nujoma, speaking on behalf of SWAPO, said that Africans in South West Africa and other Territories were subjected to all sorts of atrocities at the hands of Europeans. They were denied their fundamental human rights, their children were denied a proper education and their standard of living was kept at subsistence level. He therefore wished to thank the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia for having initiated proceedings before the International Court of Justice against the settler Government of the Union of South Africa in order to free the oppressed people of South West Africa from the yoke of South African imperialism.

74. The peace-loving people of his country had fought against the German invaders, who had massacred the Herero tribe, and after the First World War, South West Africa had been declared a League of Nations Mandate so that its people should never be made to suffer again. The duty of the Mandatory Power was to promote the material and moral well-being, educational advancement and social progress of the indigenous inhabitants and to help them to advance towards self-determination. All the former German colonies had now become independent with the exception of South West Africa, which the settler Government of the Republic of South Africa planned to incorporate into South Africa. South Africa had persistently pursued a policy of colonialism, oppression and exploitation in South West Africa.

75. Mr. Nujoma stated, that since 1920, when South Africa had been entrusted with the Mandate for South West Africa, Africans had had no right to vote, no share in the economy of the country and no representatives in any organ of State. South Africa had imposed racial discrimination, *apartheid* and oppressive laws upon South West Africa. *Apartheid* was deliberately designed to enslave the African peoples and to perpetuate a policy of white supremacy. Bantu education had been extended to South West Africa with the purpose of keeping Africans ignorant and enslaving their minds so that they would not demand freedom and independence in the land of their birth. The political situation in South West Africa had become

explosive. The dangers had been increased by the Government's decision to implement the Odendaal Commission's report against the wishes of the African majority. In the northern region, for example, power had already been handed to puppet African chiefs; and about twenty-four police from Pretoria had been brought in to scare the African people and force them to accept Bantustan.

76. The Bantustan policy was intended to divide South West Africa into tribal groupings, to continue the old colonial policy of "divide and rule", and to continue the exploitation of the African masses. Bantustans could justly be compared with Nazi concentration camps, as the men, women and children of the country could be forced to work for European enterprises as slave labour. SWAPO therefore strongly opposed the creation of Bantustans in South West Africa and demanded complete and immediate independence. It would never accept the division of the country.

77. In violation of the Mandate, South Africa had established military bases, in Windhoek, Walvis Bay and at Katima Mulilo in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. In addition, several landing strips had been built in the area. A campaign had been started to mobilize Europeans in what were called "unit commandos" for training in all types of arms, and white settlers from the age of seventeen to sixty were being trained in the use of automatic weapons. Both the military build-up and white mobilization were aimed at the massacre and suppression of the African people.

78. South Africa was backed by certain Members of the United Nations, such as the United Kingdom, which had large investments in the country, the United States of America, Belgium, Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany. Mr. Nujoma stated that there was clear evidence of an unholy alliance between Salazar, Verwoerd and Smith. The Salazar police in Angola and the South African police collaborated in the arrest and deportation of political prisoners seeking asylum. There was similar collaboration between the Smith Government and the Verwoerd Government whereby many freedom fighters had been arrested in Southern Rhodesia and sent back to South Africa. There was evidence of a military pact between the Salazar and Smith Governments to defend southern Zambezi against the independent Africans in the north. Observing that about 13 per cent of the white population in South West Africa was German, Mr. Nujoma said that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany was keenly interested in South West Africa and had supplied experts to train South Africans in desert fighting and guerrilla warfare. The United States of America operated a copper mine and had shares in diamond mining companies along with the United Kingdom and South Africa, and help was being given in financing the South African Government in its measures for suppressing the African population in South West Africa.

79. The South African Government was only waiting for the result of the hearings at the International Court of Justice before taking over South West Africa by armed force. He urged that the United Nations should take steps to prevent South Africa from using arms against the African people of South West Africa.

80. On 10 and 11 December 1959, the South African police had killed twelve people and injured more when they had opened fire on the residents of the Windhoek location who had refused to move from

their traditional land to the Government township of Katutura.

81. The Verwoerd Government was engaged in a campaign of terror against the African inhabitants. The arrest, imprisonment and detention of SWAPO members had become daily activities of the South African police in South West Africa. On 29 July 1964, Mr. Simbwaye and Mr. Maswahu had been arrested while addressing a public meeting at Katima Mulilo and had been kept in custody for three weeks without trial. They had then been sentenced to one month's imprisonment, after which they had been served with restriction orders from Pretoria, signed by the so-called Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. On 23 October 1964, Mr. Simbwaye and his colleague were removed under police guard to Warmbad, about sixty miles from the South African border. SWAPO feared that they might be taken secretly to the Union of South Africa and charged under the Suppression of Communism Act. On 5 April 1965, four Africans, Messrs. Zakeus J. Uguanga, Alfred Shimoshili, Leo Johannes and Joseph Malhangu, had been arrested at Katima Mulilo while trying to go abroad for higher education.

82. He appealed for United Nations intervention in South West Africa in order to bring about the evacuation of South African troops and military personnel, to prepare for a democratic general election based on the system of "one man, one vote", and to bring peace to his country. He requested the Special Committee to make urgent representations for the application of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its fifteenth session calling upon all colonial Powers to grant freedom and independence to colonial countries and peoples. So long as men were still oppressed by their fellow men, world peace and international security would be in danger.

83. He also urged the Special Committee to visit South West Africa, where members could see conditions for themselves and hear petitions on the spot. He felt that the people would be disappointed to learn that the Special Committee had come so near to their land without visiting them.

84. Mr. Make, speaking on behalf of the PAC, said that recent events in South Africa had some bearing on the situation in South West Africa. A few weeks before, provincial elections had been held in South Africa, in which the Nationalist Party of Mr. Verwoerd had scored resounding victories. As a result the political strategists of the Nationalist Party had come to the conclusion that a general election should be called to consolidate gains in the provincial elections. The case of South West Africa, now before the International Court of Justice, would be used for propaganda purposes and, as soon as judgement was given, an election would be called with the slogan "Hands off the Republic of South Africa. Do you want your country to be ruled by the Government of your choice or by the United Nations?" He pointed out that as far as the African people were concerned, there was no real opposition in the South African Parliament. On the race question, the only difference between the United Party and the Nationalist was how to make racial discrimination more effective.

85. The South African Government was also using the case before the International Court to play for time. Large-scale military installations were being constructed at Walvis Bay, which would take about five years to complete. Once that base was ready for use, the South

African régime might agree to hand over South West Africa and try to police it from Walvis Bay. Extensive air force installations were being built at the Caprivi Strip, as well as a series of landing strips, and those bases constituted a threat not only to South West Africa but to neighbouring territories as well. Once they were completed, it would be extremely difficult for refugees to flee from South West Africa.

86. It was common knowledge that under its 1964-1965 budget South Africa was spending £105 million on defence and a further £65 million on security, a total of £170 million devoted to the effort to suppress the African people. The United Kingdom had been supplying arms until recently, and although Prime Minister Wilson had announced that supplies would stop, he had also stated that he would complete the supplies already contracted for, which included jet bombers. Military supplies received from the United Kingdom had included three submarines costing £30 million, under certain secret clauses of the Simonstown Agreement referred to by the United Kingdom Prime Minister. Furthermore, experts had been sent by the United Kingdom armaments industry to help South Africa to establish its own chemical and explosive industries. A new rifle had been produced, the R.1, which was superior to the one previously supplied by Belgium. Under an agreement signed in 1962, France had supplied large quantities of arms, and a South African company had been set up which was now making tanks of the Panhard A and L armoured car type used so successfully by France in Algeria. During the Algerian war, South Africa had sent men to be trained in anti-guerrilla warfare. Help from the Federal Republic of Germany included the setting up of arms and aircraft factories and experiments with poison gases. With respect to the development of poison gases, Professor le Roux, Vice-President of the South African Council for Industrial and Scientific Research, had been quoted in a Reuters report of 7 November 1963 as saying:

"We appreciate that these poisons are capable of being delivered in vast quantities by aircraft and long-range missiles, and they can have a destructive effect similar to that of a nuclear bomb of twenty megatons."

The West German team working on the project was led by Mr. Gunther Pruss, who had held a leading position in the poison gases department of the Nazi Wehrmacht.

87. Mr. Make said that there was also evidence that arms were being supplied by the United States of America, despite official assurances to the contrary.

88. South Africa, Portugal and South West Africa were known to exchange supplies of arms. Their police co-operated and there was an agreement for the return of fugitive prisoners. Recently, seventy-five prisoners from Angola had been granted refuge in Swaziland, but in endeavouring to reach Zanzibar they had been arrested and imprisoned in South Africa. South Africa had enlisted the support of the NATO countries on the pretext of being an important bastion in the fight against communism. However, the threat of communism did not exist in South Africa; the only threat was that of racial discrimination, aided and abetted by the Western countries.

89. Mr. Make stated that as part of its military activities, South Africa was now building nuclear reactors in its own country and in South West Africa. It was clear from statements by the Government itself that they were preparing not only to suppress the

African population, but to crush opposition from countries wishing to help the Africans. Mr. Verwoerd had stated that if any African country came to the aid of the Africans in South Africa, he would stop them "between South Africa and Cairo", which meant that South Africa was prepared to engage in warfare that would engulf the entire African continent.

90. Foreign investments in South Africa and South West Africa were also important. It was difficult to obtain a proper breakdown of figures between South Africa and South West Africa since the South African Government issued statistics only for its own country. Mr. Make stated that information concerning the situation in South Africa showed that the United Kingdom was the largest single investor, and had £1,000 million, or one third of its foreign investments, in South Africa. The United States of America was the next largest investor, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, France, Belgium and Switzerland. United Kingdom and United States interests owned vast monopolies in South Africa and South West Africa—for example, the diamond monopoly of the De Beers Mining Corporation and the the Rhodesia Selection Trust, which covered a complicated network of companies carefully designed to conceal the real owners. According to the United States Department of Commerce, United States companies had invested \$380 million in South African enterprises which they controlled and United Kingdom companies had investments worth \$790 million, excluding oil, insurance and banking.

91. A number of new companies had recently been registered, as offshoots of existing monopolies. Furthermore, a company had been formed for the express purpose of circumventing any oil embargo that might be imposed by the Arab world on South Africa; the partners included South Africa and Portugal. A recent press report claimed that Angola could supply enough oil to meet all South Africa's needs, both civil and military.

92. Mr. Make further observed that South Africa with West German collaboration, had instituted a big recruiting campaign to secure German immigrants with the objective, in time, of building up the white population of South Africa to equal or exceed the African population. The two Governments had, according to Mr. Make, also concluded an agreement under the terms of which West Germany recognized South West Africa as an integral part of South Africa, and South Africa recognized the Democratic Republic of Germany as an integral part of West Germany.

93. The Africans of South Africa and South West Africa were fighting the whole idea of white domination. They would continue to fight as long as vested interests were protected, even in the event of an African Government obtaining power and pursuing the same policy.

94. Mr. Make appealed to the Committee to intensify its efforts to bring about a speedy solution to the question of South West Africa. It should not allow itself to be deterred by the argument that any discussion of the subject would prejudice the decision of the International Court of Justice. That argument was being used by South Africa in a bid to gain time. In any case, there had been no categorical declaration by South Africa that it would comply with the Court's judgement. In conclusion, he urged the Committee to act before it was too late.

95. Mr. Ntloedibe, also speaking on behalf of the PAC, welcomed the opportunity to give the Special

Committee further information on the way in which the oppressive régime of South Africa was being extended to South West Africa under the policy of *apartheid*, sometimes called separate development. The African peoples were being concentrated in separate areas and could thus be bombarded in the event of an uprising, without danger to the white population. Although an appearance of self-government was granted to the African people, as in Transkei, the real power remained in the hands of Verwoerd.

96. Following the recommendation to divide South West Africa into Bantustans, barren areas alongside the Kalahari Desert had been reserved for Africans, while all the good land had been earmarked for Europeans. He appealed to the Special Committee to consider the situation seriously. The delaying tactics of the South African representatives at the International Court of Justice were designed to give South Africa time to gain a firm grip on the country before judgement was pronounced. Stating that oppression in South Africa could not continue indefinitely, he warned that unless urgent measures were taken, the Western Powers might have to carry out another Stanleyville operation on behalf of their nationals in South Africa.

97. The system of Bantu education was also being transferred to South West Africa. Since the introduction of the system in South Africa in 1953, Africans had been deprived of the type of education given to Europeans. The Bantu education system was intended to maintain Africans in a state of perpetual slavery. There were informers in every school who ensured that any teacher or student who expressed abhorrence of the system would be victimized. Universities had been reduced to the level of high schools, so that the African people would continue to be economically exploited, socially humiliated and politically oppressed. The purpose of all these measures was to defend foreign investment. Mr. Ntloedibe said that in his opinion South Africa, as an openly fascist régime, should be excluded from the United Nations.

98. Mr. Kuhangua, speaking on behalf of SWAPO, stated that the African population in South West Africa had no access to the country's political or judicial organs, and that the South African Government had sent soldiers and police to the borders of South West Africa and Zambia to prevent young people from seeking education abroad.

99. Africans were a source of cheap labour for capitalist mines and industries and the considerable mineral resources of the country were exploited to the sole advantage of foreign monopolies.

100. There could be no doubt that foreign investors were mainly responsible for holding up the struggle for independence. In spite of numerous appeals, such countries as the United Kingdom and the United States of America had deliberately sabotaged United Nations efforts to find a practical solution. The big companies were financing scientific research in collaboration with Harvard, the University of South Africa, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western Countries. He suggested that they would do better to use their profits to pay a decent living wage to African workers. He explained that, under the contract system, the African worker earned from 1s./9d. to 2s./0d. a day, which was not enough even for bare subsistence. The recruit was sent to work far from his region and family. He returned to the reserve exhausted and penniless, and frequently found his family dispersed for lack of support. No worker had the right to refuse a job

given to him by a white settler, and, if he complained about conditions, he was gaoled. An attempt had therefore been made to establish a labour movement outside South West Africa in Tanzania.

101. To his knowledge, no public statement had ever been made by any foreign company in protest against the racially discriminating policies applied in South West Africa. In fact, a petitioner to the United Nations at Tsumeb had been arrested at the Newmont and American Metal Climax Corporation and actually imprisoned on the premises. He believed that, under the law, companies had the right to regulate their own internal affairs and could therefore have introduced reasonable conditions.

102. With the support of the Western Powers, the *apartheid* régime of South Africa had set up an immense military machine in South and South West Africa.

103. Mr. Kuhangua stated that the greatest danger to South West Africa lay in the Federal Republic of Germany's decision to establish a rocket station in the Namib Desert. He appealed to the Special Committee to call upon the Federal Republic to dismantle its rocket station immediately, and suggested that, since South West Africa was an international Territory, the United Nations had every right to send observers to gather first-hand information. The South African Minister of Defence had begun to recruit scientists for his rocket programme; he had stated that his Government would attempt to purchase rockets abroad, but would like to build its own missiles in case of an international embargo. Press reports indicated that South Africa was experimenting with missiles and poison gases capable of mass destruction. Not only southern Africa but the whole of the continent was threatened.

104. With respect to the arms embargo imposed by the United Kingdom and the United States, he suggested that the embargo would be more effective if subject to United Nations control and inspection.

105. Mr. Kuhangua, stated that the objectives referred to in the General Assembly resolution on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had been ignored by the South African Government. In its "Uniting for Peace" resolution (resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950), the General Assembly had stated that peace depended mainly on respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and on the establishment and maintenance of conditions of economic and social well-being in all countries. Those obligations were disregarded by the South African Government, which continued to apply a policy of racial superiority in South West Africa. For eighteen years all the efforts of the United Nations had been openly defied by the South African régime.

106. Africans were obliged to live in so-called native reserves, which they could only leave as contract labourers—a system closely related to *apartheid*—while the rest of the country was reserved for white settlers. Tension was mounting in South West Africa. Its people had realized that there was no more room for negotiations and they would fight to the end for their freedom. The fact that military action by the United Nations had never been openly discussed explained why the prestige of the United Nations was at such a low ebb in many parts of the world. The United Nations had devoted too much time to empty resolutions and not enough to practical action. It must immediately take appropriate measures against South Africa.

107. He therefore requested that the matter be placed before the Security Council. He believed that legal, political and military action should be undertaken concurrently. In his view, military action by the United Nations was the only solution remaining for South West Africa.

108. He pointed out that although the International Court of Justice was still considering the case of South West Africa, the *apartheid* régime of South Africa was going ahead with the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission. He informed the Special Committee that a circular had recently been distributed in South West Africa condemning the President and Vice-President of SWAPO as communists and accusing them of interfering with the implementation of the Commission's recommendations. The circular had also warned the African people to beware of any repetition of the situation in the Congo. He also observed that antagonistic popular reaction to a recent visit of the South African Minister of Bantu Affairs to South West Africa had led to an attempt to win the people's allegiance through the recruiting of illiterate "stooges" for indoctrination. The recent visit of such "stooges" to the Transkei was part of the plan; their utterances were a mere repetition of what had been instilled into them and did not in any way reflect the aspirations of his people.

109. Mr. Kuhangua stated that the time had come to revoke the Mandate given to South Africa. He stressed, however, that revocation of the Mandate was in itself insufficient. Military intervention would also be necessary in order to establish a political system that truly reflected the aspirations of the people. Unless such action were taken, South Africa would continue its present policy. It was clear that the present tactics of the South African Government before the International Court were to delay its decision as long as possible. The invitation to Ethiopia and Liberia to have their representatives visit the Territory formed part of those tactics.

110. Mr. Shipanga, also speaking on behalf of SWAPO, observed that the activities of foreign monopolies had grievously affected the living and educational standards of the African people. In 1962, for instance, the Newmont Mining Corporation and the American Metal Climax Corporation had dismissed 500 workers who had protested against the conditions of employment. The men had been debarred from work for the rest of their lives. The fishing industry in Walvis Bay had also discharged and blacklisted workers, with the co-operation of the South African authorities. He explained that in South West Africa labour organizations and trade unions were illegal. Anyone who campaigned for better wages and conditions was dismissed and imprisoned. Factory workers were housed in special blocks, where they slept on concrete bunks and ate maize flour with a little meat twice a week. No compensation was given to injured or maimed workers. They were sent back to the reserves to fend for themselves. The De Beers company made such large profits because of the supply of cheap labour. The persons responsible for exploiting the African people were capitalists from the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany and France.

111. There was a growing German population in South West Africa. In 1962, a secret agreement had been concluded between South Africa and the Federal Republic of Germany under which large numbers of ex-Nazis had taken refuge in the Territory. Recently,

a South West African had been beaten to death by a German family and "roasted", as the local Press had put it.

112. Scientists from the United States and other Western countries had been in South Africa in 1961 when the Verwoerd régime had built an atomic station near Cape Town. Foreign scientists could also be found in South West Africa. As travel was restricted, South West Africa was highly suitable for secret undertakings. The research station in the Namib Desert, which, it was still asserted, was conducting purely scientific research, was a threat to all the peoples of Africa. He also referred to preparations to produce poison gases at low cost, so that the South African Government, supported by the Western Powers, would be in a position to wipe out the African population concentrated in the reserves in the event of any uprising.

113. He added that the United Kingdom was continuing arms deliveries to South Africa, in the form of bombers, on the grounds that existing contracts had to be honoured. The United States involvement was harder to document; when a Belgian munitions factory was set up in South Africa, for instance, it was difficult to determine how far United States capital was involved. Nevertheless, that country's complicity could not reasonably be doubted.

114. With respect to military co-operation between South Africa and Portugal, he said that in 1963 he had himself witnessed convoys of Portuguese troops crossing from Angola into South West Africa. In addition, Portuguese troops had called in at Walvis Bay on their way to Mozambique and had carried out exercises with their South African colleagues.

115. Concerning the implementation of the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, Mr. Shipanga stated that various projects, such as the canal from the Kunene River to Okatana, the construction of roads and the purchase of land near native reserves to make room for Africans brought from other parts of the Territory, had been carried out. Indeed, the South African Government had only been dissuaded from publicly announcing its intention of creating Bantustans in South West Africa as a result of advice from the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Once Bantustans had been created, he observed, South West Africa would cease to exist as a single country.

116. Mr. Appolus, speaking on behalf of SWAPO, observed that the Africans were facing a more formidable foe than Smith or Verwoerd: imperialism supported by the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France. It was therefore time for the Special Committee to tackle the problem at its roots. He considered it the height of hypocrisy for the United Kingdom and the United States to use the pretext of protecting lives to cover their military interventions in some areas of the world, while refusing to take any action in South West Africa. It was known from a reliable source that development work on poison gases had been started in an establishment near Johannesburg about three years previously, with West German collaboration. Information had also come in recently about the establishment of a missile tracking station in South West Africa. Owing to the security measures enforced, it was hard to get details and SWAPO had requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to investigate the matter.

117. He also referred to a recent statement made by the Chairman of the Newmont Mining Company

to the effect that his Company knew and trusted the Government and people of South Africa as proof that foreign monopolies were working hand in hand with the racist Government and the white settlers.

118. Mr. Jario, speaking on behalf of SWANU, said that the Special Committee was already well acquainted with all the facts relating to the situation in South West Africa. Over the past fifteen years, in response to the repeated petitions of the people of South West Africa, the United Nations had adopted one condemnatory resolution after another yet South Africa was still pursuing its ruthless tactics of introducing *apartheid* into the Territory—a policy which in every way violated the principles, the spirit and the purpose of the Mandate and of the Charter of the United Nations and was anathema to the enlightened conscience of mankind.

119. A number of United Nations fact-finding committees had carried out investigations for many years, some actually on the spot. He therefore asked what more his people could do to spur the United Nations to action, since it had been made abundantly plain that South Africa would not be open to a compromise. The exemplary patience shown by his people was running out and they were being driven inexorably to seek other ways and means of attaining their legitimate aspirations, outside the United Nations. Must blood necessarily flow before the United Nations would move from words to deeds? If its previous efforts had failed to have any effect, what chances of success would there be in a Congo-type situation?

120. The claims of the people of South West Africa were just and legitimate and legal technicalities should not be allowed to deprive them of the right to rule themselves. It was more than time for United Nations action to put an end to *apartheid*.

121. Mr. Gaoseb, also speaking on behalf of SWANU, confirmed that scientists had come from abroad and were working in South West Africa, but indicated that the nature of the experiments being undertaken was not known to SWANU. He said it was general knowledge that South Africa was making military preparations designed to suppress any African uprising as it might occur. The army, together with certain installations, had been placed on an immediate alert basis. No valid information, however, was available regarding preparations involving nuclear weapons.

122. In connexion with labour conditions, Mr. Gaoseb described the situation as very bad and pay for the African as derisory. The Territory was divided into two zones: the so-called reserves situated mostly in the north, and the Police Zone. Labour was recruited from the reserves under the contract system for work in the Police Zone, in the mines, on farms, etc. On recruitment, the worker was issued with a special pass, permitting him to remain in the Police Zone for eighteen months. The pay was 1s/9d a day; the worker had no right to strike or even to complain of unfair conditions; and there was no fixed working day. No requirements whatsoever were imposed on the employer.

123. With respect to education, he explained that literacy statistics covering the population as a whole were hard to come by. The only figures he had available related to the 1959 statistics on children in school attendance. At that time, European children had had at their disposal fifty-three government schools with an enrolment of 9,900, fifteen private schools with an enrolment of 1,241, and forty-eight hostels with 4,649

children, whereas the African children had had only seven government schools, and 190 million schools, plus two government schools for Coloureds. One African reserve containing more than 3,000 children had had only one school, and another with a still larger number of children, had no school at all.

124. Referring to the South African Government's publicly proclaimed intention not to apply the political recommendations contained in the report of the Odenaal Commission, but to make a start on its economic recommendations, Mr. Gaoseb stated that SWANU considered that the recommendations were so inter-linked as to make the application of one part alone impossible; any action would automatically require that the whole be put into effect. The Government's statement of intent was merely a device to deceive the world. Work had already started on carrying out the economic recommendations, the most important of which related to the Kunene River hydroelectric scheme and the building of roads; it was proclaimed that in both cases the work was for the advancement of the African people. The former, however, was entirely for the benefit of the white-owned mining and other industries and the road building was for government military purposes. The recommendations were therefore mainly directed towards enhancing the interests of the existing ruling class.

125. In a second appearance before the Special Committee, Mr. Kuhangua, of SWAPO, drew attention to a report in a local newspaper, the *Nationalist*, on 4 June 1965, that South Africa was building an air base in the Caprivi Strip near the Zambian border. According to the report, President Kaunda had stated that Zambia would not be intimidated by South Africa's plan to build an £8 million air base in the Caprivi Strip. Heavy equipment worth £2 million had been moved into the area—the Zambian President had continued—some of it through Zambian territory. The President had further stated that the South African project was nothing but war-mongering and constituted a threat to world peace.

126. The Zambian leader's statement was a challenge to the Special Committee. The appalling situation in South West Africa had already been brought to the Committee's attention. Any further deterioration could mark the beginning of the end for the African population. In South West Africa, the fate of the entire African people was at stake. They still had confidence in the United Nations. It was the Committee's duty to seek rapid and effective ways to put an end to the *apartheid* régime's military ventures in the international territory of South West Africa.

127. Should the United Nations prove ineffective in South West Africa, it might compromise itself for all time. In a situation in which human lives were threatened, the Special Committee must take immediate and appropriate measures in conformity with the aspirations of the African people. The world could not afford to ignore the dangers of *apartheid*, as it had ignored the dangers inherent in Hitlerism. The founders of the United Nations had conferred upon themselves the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Accordingly, the people of South West Africa had repeatedly stated that they did not want destruction or death. Nevertheless they would fight to regain their dignity, freedom and independence. Even from the strictly juridical point of view the maintenance of law and order could not be invoked to justify the heavy military build-up in South West Africa. He appealed to the Special Committee to fulfil

its obligations by stopping Verwoerd without further delay.

128. Mr. Nyaose, speaking on behalf of the Federation of Free African Trade Unions of South Africa (FOFATUSA), said that, despite the existence of a separate United Nations body with exclusive competence in South African matters, his Federation regarded itself as competent to speak for the vast labour force recruited from the three British High Commission Territories, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and South West Africa, to man the mines in South Africa under the slave-labour contract system. The system operated to the detriment of South Africa's own indigenous workers, by forcing down wages and thus preventing improvement of their economic and social conditions, the more so as so-called foreign native labour comprised about four fifths of the total mining labour force.

129. The United Kingdom and Portuguese Governments, while continuing to sell African workers into slavery, had done nothing to ensure their protection through trade unions. Accordingly, the indigenous South African worker, in face of the competition of slave labour, found it impossible to improve his own conditions. An assurance was sought that the Governments concerned would take steps to ensure that the slave labour force would not be subjected to South Africa's *apartheid* policies or else that the supply would be cut off until such time as the Verwoerd Government undertook to grant proper wage rates, trade union rights and all the other human rights embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, which those Governments were sworn to uphold. It was for the United Nations to halt the export of slave labour to South Africa.

130. It was noteworthy that the United Nations had done little or nothing towards protecting the right of asylum of refugees from Mozambique, South West Africa and South Africa. Although the United Kingdom Government recognized their right to claim asylum in Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, there was proof in a number of cases that had come before the South African law courts that political refugees were being arrested in those Territories, through collusion between their administrative personnel and police and the South African police, and returned to South Africa or Mozambique to face trial. There again, his Federation would like an assurance that the two Governments concerned, and the Special Committee, would take action to bring such practices to an end. The same applied to the abduction of refugees from the British High Commission Territories. The Committee should call upon the United Kingdom Government to repeal the 1963 Colonial Act on prevention of violence abroad, whereby the Verwoerd régime was virtually assured that the United Kingdom would co-operate in suppressing the political activities of South African refugees, irrespective of whether such activities represented a security danger.

131. Educational opportunities for South African refugees in the British High Commission Territories had been severely curtailed. His Federation therefore asked for an assurance that assistance would be given through the territorial administration for those refugees to be flown out to countries abroad where university education and employment were available. It was a serious matter that the South African Government was refusing transit visas to political refugees wishing to leave the British Territories. The Portuguese Government should also be approached on the subject of transit visas and safe conducts for political refugees and charter

planes used for their transport. It was well known that South Africa had threatened to stop such planes flying over its territory without specific permission. Obviously, as the struggle for liberation intensified, the inflow of African refugees to the British High Commission Territories would become greater and greater. In face of the expected mass exodus, the United Nations and the British Government should be ready to co-operate, together with voluntary organizations, to ensure the safe evacuation of threatened political refugees by airlift. Indeed, it was hard to understand why the United Nations had not already intervened to assist in getting out the refugees stranded in those Territories.

132. It was regrettable that, despite its welcome stand against *apartheid* and the perpetration of atrocities in South Africa and the Portuguese Territories, the United Nations was apparently powerless to put an end to that subjugation of human beings. United Nations assistance would soon be required if the refugee situation in the British High Commission Territories was to be handled effectively. Further, if they were to be kept independent of South Africa, those Territories would need financial assistance on a vast scale from United Nations financial and technical assistance bodies. Should such help not be forthcoming, the Territories in question, once independent, would have no alternative but to accept Verwoerd's overtures—and that would render their independence meaningless.

133. His Federation had decided to identify itself in the struggle for self-determination with the Pan-Africanist Congress, because it was certain that the evil white Government of South Africa would stop at nothing short of exterminating all Africans clamouring for liberty. Its members had therefore become political victims of the people's struggle for national liberation and, from 1963 onwards, some fifty had been sentenced to death as political activists.

134. It was useless for the Federation to appeal to the Special Committee to secure the release of the 10,000 South West African, South African and Mozambican workers languishing today in South African prisons, because it knew full well that release would come only through the attainment of independence and the establishment of African majority rule.

135. The people and workers of South Africa and South West Africa had pinned their hopes on military intervention by the United Nations when South Africa had moved armed forces into Walvis Bay. But the only result had been wordy condemnation of the move and, since that time, the whole area had been militarized, as reported by SWAPO. There was no need for him to go into details about the military preparations of the white settlers; the Special Committee was probably better informed. Nevertheless, he must utter the warning that the gravest threat of war was facing the African continent as a result of the aggressive plans of the imperialist Powers to use southern Africa as a battlefield in their war against the socialist countries.

136. It was unfortunate that the final decision on military intervention by the United Nations would have to be made by the Security Council, where the power of veto still remained precisely in the hands of those countries that had been accused before the Special Committee. That those countries were still rejecting a trade embargo on South Africa, still providing technicians and immigrants to build up its military power, and still maintaining the investments that were being used to perpetuate the social and economic exploitation

of the African working masses, was no matter for surprise.

137. Democratic decisions reached by the General Assembly of the United Nations were being blocked by a handful of nations—the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and the minority Taiwan Government, so that his Federation felt compelled to ask for re-thinking on the structure of the Security Council and review of the veto prerogative. The right to override majority decisions affecting the welfare and destiny of human beings should not remain in the hands of a few nations only. Furthermore, representation on the Special Committee should be drawn from countries not in any way involved in the subjugation and suppression of the African peoples, for the representatives of the abetting countries were committed to upholding the present iniquitous policies of their Governments. In addition, the Special Committee should explore ways and means of collaborating with the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity, with a view to speeding up decolonization in Africa.

138. All African and Asian workers were outraged that certain United Nations Members were using their position within the Organization in defence of the *status quo*. It was shameful that the struggle for freedom and independence should thus be hindered. In the circumstances, it was hardly surprising that the countries of Africa and Asia still under colonial domination were advocating the setting-up of a new progressive world body—one that would be prepared to undertake and ensure their liberation. The Special Committee, obviously, was unlikely ever to succeed in compelling the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France to abandon their present reactionary policies. The peoples of the world had witnessed unilateral military intervention by those Powers in defiance of the United Nations, such as the unprovoked war in Viet-Nam, the landing of British troops in Malaysia, and the establishment of military bases outside Western Europe, to the detriment of the security of the neighbouring countries. The pretexts advanced for all those aggressive military schemes did not fool the oppressed peoples of the world; they knew full well that no attack on Western Europe was being plotted by anyone, or even dreamed of.

139. In conclusion he stated once again the substantive motives of the realistic criticism of the United Nations made by his Federation: (a) the United Nations as at present constituted was unable to champion the cause of decolonization; (b) some of its powerful Members still retained vested interests in colonial domination and imperialist exploitation; (c) it had failed to reflect the aspirations of the newly emerged forces and of the oppressed peoples of the world. In other words, the United Nations had fallen a prey to imperialists who were using it to perpetuate their domination over the rest of mankind.

140. Mr. Ngokong, speaking on behalf of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), declared that he would be happy to explain anything that was not clear from the written petition submitted by the ANC to the Special Committee (A/AC.109/PET.407/Add.1), or to provide additional information. He stated that his main purpose was to expose the unholy alliance of white oppressor and fascist Governments in colonial countries, with special reference to southern Africa; and to show that the imperialist Powers were responsible for the continued existence of colonial régimes in southern Africa, because they were an extremely

profitable source of revenue. As stated in paragraph 26 of the ANC petition, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Japan formed an unholy and more powerful alliance than the unholy alliance of Verwoerd, Salazar and Smith; they had a large stake in the continued oppression and exploitation of the people and were giving an extended lease of life to a system that had been vigorously condemned; they were sabotaging efforts to end Verwoerd's system of *apartheid* in South Africa and South West Africa, Salazar's fascism in Mozambique and Angola and Smith's oppression in Rhodesia. It was the opinion of ANC that the Special Committee must devise means for the immediate destruction of colonialism and for material help to transfer power to the oppressed people in the colonial territories. As indicated in paragraph 55 of the ANC petition, to enable the Special Committee to succeed in its task, the United Nations must invoke the relevant provisions of the Charter against the Member States responsible for perpetuating colonialism or for failing to implement resolutions designed to end colonialism in southern Africa and elsewhere; declare its full support for the people fighting for the transfer of power to the majority; and urge all Member States and all other Governments, collectively and individually, to give the liberation movements the materials, manpower, technical skill, and if necessary arms and equipment, required for the speedy liquidation of colonialism in southern Africa.

141. Mr. Ngokong gave a detailed list of the quantities and types of aircraft supplied to South Africa, including fighter, interceptor, bomber and patrol, transport, trainer and support aircraft and helicopters, whose names indicated their origin. He also named some ten military air bases and some six air bases for citizen forces. With the new facilities in the Caprivi Strip in South West Africa, air bases would extend to the borders of Zambia. Strategic airfields for operative purposes were being constructed in various parts of the country, and defence material and fuel were being stored at strategic points for issue to troops, aircraft and vehicles, on mobilization.

142. Although he also had naval information available, he stated that he would prefer at that juncture to quote some press comment on the recent visit to South Africa by General Lauris Norstad, former supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces, Europe. The Johannesburg *Sunday Express* of 21 March 1965, describing the General's visit as further evidence of support for South Africa by overseas investors, said he had arrived with leading United States businessmen to discuss plans for a £500,000 expansion scheme for the fibre-glass industry and had spoken of his country's great interest and confidence in South Africa. The same paper, in its 4 April 1965 issue, had referred to a twelve-day business visit during which the former NATO Commander had held talks with South Africa's Minister of Defence and other top Defence Force officials. It had also quoted his comment to journalists on South Africa: "It's a dynamic positive country. You must accept overseas criticism as a form of flattery."

143. South West Africa, represented in the Parliament at Cape Town under the South African Constitution, was in the same military situation as South Africa itself, and South Africa was conducting military exercises in the Caprivi Strip.

144. The vested interests held in South West Africa by South African capitalists and their United Kingdom collaborators were proof that in South West Africa, too, military force would be used to subjugate the indigenous people. An example was given in paragraph 38 of the ANC petition. The Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Limited, now a wholly British and South African concern, had recently joined with Federale Mynbou in forming an £11 million investment company under the name "Main Street Investments". Federale Mynbou was an Afrikaner mining combine with vast interests in South Africa and South West Africa and was one of the companies established by the notorious Broederbond for the purpose of promoting Afrikaner nationalism.

145. Regarding former Nazis in South Africa, South West Africa and the Protectorates, Mr. Ngokong said that press reports in May 1965, indicating that a Jewish doctor in Cape Town, Dr. Kaplinsky, was to go to the Federal Republic of Germany later in the year to give evidence before a Nazi war crimes court, had been followed by a spate of threatening telephone calls to the doctor. The reports had led to speculation on how many former Nazis were secretly living in South Africa. An article in the issue of *Ons Land* dated 23 April 1965 had said that the possibility could not be excluded that Martin Borman was living in South Africa under an assumed name. The former Prime Minister Malan, and Verwoerd, had both been very sympathetic to the Nazis and had strongly favoured neutrality and a separate peace treaty with Nazi Germany; it would be understandable if some of the war criminals had turned to South Africa, especially after Malan became Prime Minister in 1948. Any secret ex-Nazi population would undoubtedly have been encouraged by Otto "Scarface" Skorzeny, former Nazi SS Commander and rescuer of Mussolini from an Apennine prison. According to reports in the Johannesburg *Sunday Chronicle*, the *Cape Times* and other newspapers, Skorzeny had been to South Africa on a public mission to promote trade between South Africa and Spain. He had visited Parliament on 23 April 1965 with Senator L. T. Weichardt, leader of the South African Grey Shirts, who had been interned by the Smuts Government during the war; the Senator had stated that the visit was connected with the Spanish pavilion at the Rand Easter show.

146. The *Rand Daily Mail* of 31 March 1965 had quoted a statement by Prince Hubert zu Lowenstein, during a recent tour of South Africa as a government representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, that he had been disturbed at the activities of German white radical groups making pilgrimages to South Africa; he had described them as neo-Nazis, touring South Africa making speeches on the supremacy of the white man. They were finding willing audiences at the numerous German clubs to be found in South African cities. According to the *Sunday Express*, the Commissioner-General of the Transkei had received a group of neo-Nazis whose leader, Heinrich Hertle, editor of an extremist West German paper called *Die Deutsche Wochenzeitung*, had said that the group were all supporters of *apartheid*. Hertle had been attacked by Prince Hubert zu Lowenstein in the South African Press for conducting Nazi propaganda at a German club near Durban.

147. The *Sunday Times* had reported that Nazi marching songs and talk of reviving the Hitler spirit could be heard nightly in the German club at Pretoria

—where there was a large colony of Germans who had fled their country at the end of the war. There were over 2,000 former Nazi army and SS officers in South Africa, many of whom, according to the Press, were now instructors in the South African army or holding high positions in the government munitions department or in the munitions industry.

148. Names and biographical information on other ex-Nazis, including two who were holding leading positions in atomic energy and poison gas research respectively, and a former Goebbels propaganda man who had published an anti-semitic pamphlet in South Africa, were also given.

149. There had been no decrease in the flow of former Nazis to South Africa. The ANC had carefully noted that after Prince zu Lowenstein's statement 800 more Nazis had come into South Africa. The ANC firmly believed that there was a direct link between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the South African régime, and although they had not expected to be called upon to prove it, they were ready to do so if any doubt existed.

150. Mr. Kerina, speaking on behalf of the National Unity Democratic Organization of Namib (NUDO), said that the most powerful enemy of African unity in South West Africa was the South African Government and the international interests it represented. South West Africa was advertised abroad as the "last major tax-payer's paradise". A brief look at diamond industry profits would give some idea of the magnitude of foreign interests in South West Africa and their complicity in Verwoerd's policy of oppression. Between 1959 and 1963 South West Africa diamond production represented a total profit, after taxation, of over \$230 million. In 1964, full-scale mining of the "marine" diamonds found beneath the waters of the South West African coastline had begun. As a result, South West Africa would soon become the undisputed leader in world diamond production. The South African Government had awarded the concessions to foreign-owned companies such as the Marine Diamond Corporation, whose chairman was a staunch supporter of Verwoerd.

151. Within South West Africa, the South African Government had pursued the classical colonialist objectives of exploitation and oppression. Its policy was based on force, isolation and division, backed up by massive governmental machinery. South Africa possessed the largest and best equipped military machine in Africa. Its alliances with the United Kingdom, Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany further enhanced its capacity for internal suppression. The defence budget had increased fivefold since 1959. South Africa was a military State, mobilized for internal and international war. Its existence was a serious threat to the entire African continent.

152. South West Africa was only nominally separated from South Africa, which had always intended to absorb it into South Africa as a fifth province. In defiance of the Mandate, South Africa had established numerous military bases in South West Africa, and was at present engaged in constructing emergency military airfields, equipped to handle jet fighters. The threat of force was everywhere and had effectively intimidated the African masses.

153. The situation was further complicated by the presence of South African and European settlers, who blocked every possibility of political and economic development. *Apartheid* was the foundation of their lives.

Such minor differences as did exist in European party politics within South West Africa were based solely on differences in approach to the application of *apartheid*. The nationalist movements had never received any support from liberal, progressive or Marxist elements of the European population in their struggle for independence. Consequently, the struggle had become one of Black against White. In a showdown, the entire settler population would stand as a solid block against the forces of freedom. Verwoerd's intelligence service, with its system of agents and informers, had permeated the whole of African society and extended far beyond South West Africa's borders, fomenting intrigues and undermining confidence. The enforced division of Africans impeded mass organization and helped to insulate the country from international public opinion. The masses were beginning to realize, however, that united, disciplined action was essential to success in the fight for freedom. The nationalists had studied the history of revolutionary struggles throughout the world and were ready to make all the sacrifices that were needed. They would not rest until all foreign companies had been removed from South West Africa, so that they could begin the task of national reconstruction.

154. South West Africa had been used by the Verwoerd régime as a proving ground for *apartheid* techniques. South African plans for the future were embodied in the Odendaal Commission's report, which proposed three basic schemes for the permanent annexation of South West Africa. They were complete administrative absorption, under which all branches of the South West African administration would be transferred to South Africa, total economic integration, under which South West Africa would be forced to finance its own destruction and the balkanization of the country, which would be achieved through the creation of Bantustans. It should be emphasized that the sole purpose of the Bantustan policy was to reduce the Africans to slavery in their own country. The African people had never asked South Africa to develop South West Africa. They demanded freedom to develop the country for themselves. No one should be deceived by Verwoerd's decision to shelve the application of the Odendaal recommendations while the case of South West Africa was pending in the International Court of Justice. That was merely a manoeuvre on the part of the Western Powers.

155. The Special Committee had recently produced a mild memorandum on the foreign economic interests operating in South West Africa. The United States of America and the United Kingdom had opposed that report, in order to protect their own economic interests. In public, the United States condemned *apartheid*, but in fact continued to profit by the cheap labour supplied under Verwoerd's policies. The United States' attitude was a betrayal of the sacred principles of Woodrow Wilson, Jefferson and Tom Payne. Through the South West Africa Native Labour Association, American companies bought young men as slaves. They were responsible for the acute suffering of the African people.

156. After the First World War, the Territory of South West Africa had been given to South Africa without consulting the people, who had been promised their freedom from German rule. They had never accepted that situation, and had revolted against South Africa in 1923. On the outbreak of the Second World War, the South African and United Kingdom Governments had asked South West Africa for manpower and promised to return the country to its people once Nazism

had been defeated. That promise had never been honoured. After their experiences in the war, the people of South West Africa were not surprised to see that the Federal Republic of Germany was now a staunch ally of Verwoerd, that ex-Nazis were producing poison gases in South West Africa and that a nuclear reactor had been built in their country. They demanded immediate action.

157. The time had come to call upon the Security Council to take up the question of South West Africa. President Kaunda of Zambia had revealed that the South African Government was building an air base in the Caprivi Strip. That alone warranted action by the Security Council. The Special Committee should not wait for the results of the Algiers Conference and the OAU Conference in Accra. It should not be satisfied with an interim resolution. It should adopt a decisive resolution that would strengthen the hand of the African and Asian countries in their forthcoming deliberations. The time had come to revoke the South African Mandate. That was the essential move in any attempt to remove the South African menace to world peace. The fact that the International Court of Justice had not yet announced its decision should not be used as an excuse for further delay. The people of South West Africa had come to the end of their patience. They were ready to take a hand in shaping their own destiny. On behalf of his people, he wished to thank all countries, and in particular the United Republic of Tanzania, which had offered support in South West Africa's struggle for independence, and to assure the Special Committee that when a national Government came to power in South West Africa, its policy would not be racialist. He hoped the Committee would reconsider its position in the light of the information he had presented, and he appealed to the representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom to support any solution to the problem of South West Africa proposed by the Committee. In conclusion, he requested permission to circulate a study on the Federal Republic of Germany's interests in South West Africa.¹²

158. In response to questions, Mr. Kerina stated that he had gone to Bechuanaland in 1963 and had remained there until late in 1964, when his people had sent him on mission abroad. During his absence, the United Kingdom Government had declared him a prohibited immigrant and he had been unable to return and join his family. The South African Security Police had been on his track for alleged subversive activities and "serious carnage charges"—the latter allegations concerning riots in South West Africa in 1959 which had been blamed on him because he had cabled his friends to resist South Africa's efforts to eject them by armed force. His brother had been killed in the riots.

159. He hoped the United Kingdom Government would remove the ban so that he could return to his family and to his fellow South West Africans, of whom there were now 20,000 in Ngamiland in Northern Bechuanaland. It was important to work for unity between Bechuanaland and South West Africa so that when independence came Bechuanaland, as a landlocked country, would not have to be dependent on South Africa. He was determined to try to return to his home, even if he were arrested and handed over to the South

¹² The study in question, entitled *Germany and South Angola, 1898-1903*, by Dr. Horst Drechsler, has been placed in the files of the Secretariat, and is available to members for consultation on request.

African Government. He would oppose the ban in the courts if necessary.

160. He said that Bechuanaland had taken on a serious responsibility in respect of South West Africa, dating back to the beginning of the century when many South West Africans had sought refuge there from the German colonizers. Refugees continued to go to Bechuanaland from South West Africa, but they were now encountering obstacles from the security officials, who were mostly South African nationals and acted without authority. According to Bechuanaland law, no one who was not a Bechuanaland citizen or a United Kingdom subject had the right to interfere in local politics while in the country. Many leaders and refugees from South Africa and South West Africa had had difficulties with the United Kingdom authorities, which accused them of taking part in local politics, and for that reason he had tried to keep his activities strictly among his own people, the South West Africans. The case of the South West African people had originally been taken up by compatriots living in Bechuanaland who had helped the Rev. Michael Scott in his successful efforts to have the question put on the agenda of the General Assembly at its first session in Paris. He himself was responsible for keeping the South West Africans informed of what was happening. Under the immigration laws, refugees could be handed back to their country of origin—though no instance had as yet occurred. Recently, 154 young refugee students, on their way through Bechuanaland to independent African territory, had been held in Makunda. The local United Kingdom authorities in Bechuanaland had tried to classify them as non-refugees as a pretext for sending them back to South West Africa. After appeals over a period of about six months, the case had been won before the High Court and the students had been given official status and permission to stay in Bechuanaland for a year while seeking other refuge. His mission abroad had been partly to seek scholarships for them in other countries. The South African Security Police had entered Bechuanaland to intimidate the students and he himself had narrowly escaped kidnapping. Another example was the case of Dr. Abrahams, who had been refused permission to work as a medical officer in Bechuanaland and was now at Lusaka.

161. He assured the United Kingdom representative that he had no intention of interfering in the internal politics of Bechuanaland. If he were allowed to return, he would confine his activities to work among his own fellow-countrymen and would endeavour not to abuse Bechuanaland's hospitality.

General statements by members

162. The representative of Venezuela, speaking on behalf of the delegations of Venezuela and Chile, said that there was no need to describe their position with regard to colonialism. Venezuela and Chile would continue to fight to defend the interests of peoples under colonial rule and to enable them to attain independence. South West Africa, together with all countries fighting for independence, could count on the vigorous support of Chile and Venezuela.

163. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics observed that his country supported all the countries and organizations—especially the Organization of African Unity and its Committee of Nine—which were endeavouring to help the African people of South Africa and South West Africa. He particularly emphasized the importance of unified effort, to

ensure the speedy liberation of the Africans. It was regrettable, therefore, that certain African countries had succumbed to outside pressure, causing disunity which only helped the imperialists and colonizers and those who wished to prolong colonial rule.

164. The evidence which had been heard by the Special Committee confirmed that NATO and NATO countries were collaborating with the Governments of South Africa and South West Africa in their colonialist activities. It was vital for the Special Committee to tackle the problem without delay and take measures to stop the supply of arms by the Western Powers in support of those who were trying to prolong the colonial régime. The threat of communism had been unmasked as a pretext used by the colonial authorities to gain support from the reactionary Powers, by reviving the old communist bogey used by Nazi Germany in promoting its policy of racial supremacy.

165. The representative of Poland said that his delegation had constantly upheld the view that the question of South West Africa was primarily a political one; what was involved was the granting of independence to the African population.

166. South Africa had consistently flouted world opinion and the resolutions of the United Nations with regard to the Mandated Territory. It was now trying to partition South West Africa, with a view to applying its *apartheid* policy more vigorously and strengthening the position of the white minority. The purpose of the Odendaal plan was the dismemberment of South West Africa so as to prevent it from becoming a unified State with a single Government capable of leading it to independence. Despite the South African Government's assurances to the contrary, the Odendaal plan was being carried out, in flagrant violation of South Africa's obligations under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations.

167. The petitioners had indicated that the South African Government was spending vast sums for military and so-called security measures to oppress and terrorize the African people, both in the Mandated Territory and in the Republic itself. It was building a series of military installations, such as in the Caprivi Strip, constituting a threat, not only to South West Africa, but also to the neighbouring independent States and endangering peace and security in Africa. Such activities were incompatible with the obligations of the Mandatory Power and must be stopped immediately.

168. Many delegations had rightly stressed the dangerous role played by the Federal Republic of Germany in southern Africa. The petitioners had confirmed the military assistance given by Bonn to the Verwoerd régime, in particular the development of poison gases and missiles. The West German team working on that project included scientists formerly employed on gas research by the firm of I. G. Farben.

169. The African Press had also noted the systematic support given by the Federal Republic of Germany to the Government of the Republic of South Africa. An article published on 8 March 1965 in *The Nationalist* had given details of the alliance between those two countries and the secret military pact concluded in July 1961. At that time, the Verwoerd régime had been in a difficult situation owing to international horror at the Sharpeville massacre, the United Nations decisions on *apartheid*, and South Africa's departure from the British Commonwealth and had found help and support in the Federal Republic of Germany. The

task of carrying out the secret agreement had been entrusted to a former member of Hitler's General Staff living in Johannesburg; for helpers, he could draw on a reservoir of over 2,000 former Wehrmacht and SS officers who, fearing punishment for their war crimes, had sought refuge in South Africa.

170. In September 1963, the article continued, the South African Minister for Defence had announced that South Africa was practically self-sufficient with regard to arms and ammunition and could answer an arms embargo by increasing domestic production. West German arms firms had built branch factories in South Africa. More important was the fact that the South African arms industry was almost entirely controlled by the increasingly powerful Boer and State-monopoly trusts linked with West German banks and monopolies. West German advisers and former Nazis were active not only in South Africa, but also in the neighbouring Portuguese colonies and Southern Rhodesia.

171. Thus, the West German imperialists, heirs of the traditions of the Third Reich, were giving every possible assistance to the Verwoerd régime, the arch-enemy of all Africa. It was not surprising therefore that, as reported in the German Press itself, West Germany's main interest in South Africa was research on long-range missiles. It was the Special Committee's duty to express its anxiety concerning that situation. Poland, which had suffered from Hitlerite indignities and atrocities stemming from the master-race policy, fully shared the determination of the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee to fight against the evils of *apartheid*, imperialism and colonialism.

172. On the question of mining industries, he recalled that the Special Committee, in its recommendations, had requested the major trading partners of South Africa—the United States of America and the United Kingdom—to put an end to the activities of the companies owned by their nationals. Not only had no heed been paid to that appeal, but new private companies, established specifically for the purpose of exploiting the natural riches of South West Africa, were being registered.

173. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland said that his delegation would like to state categorically that the United Kingdom Government did not in any way support, help or condone the internal policies of the South African Government. On the contrary, it had repeatedly and publicly condemned those policies. He wished once again to make it clear that the policy of *apartheid* was completely abhorrent to his country.

174. By reason of its attitude to *apartheid* and in order to carry out the relevant United Nations resolutions, his Government, directly it had come into power, had declared that no arms or ammunition would be supplied to South Africa, except in the limited number of cases where deliveries were due under then existing contracts. Thereafter, no new contracts would be permitted. There was thus a total embargo on the export by Britain of arms to South Africa. The United Kingdom Prime Minister had not, as had been suggested, made any exceptions or qualifications in either of two statements he had made on 17 and 25 November 1964 in connexion with the Simonstown Agreement.

175. With regard to allegations that his Government had prevented South West African petitioners from leaving Bechuanaland in order to appear before the

Special Committee, he said that refugees or emigrants from South or South West Africa in Bechuanaland were encouraged to move on and were free to go to any country which was willing to receive them and to which they wished to go. If there was no such country, they were free to remain in Bechuanaland; they were not obliged to return to South West Africa or to South Africa, even if they were not political refugees and had no reason to fear arrest or prosecution upon their return. Indeed, several such persons had returned of their own free will. As far as the Bechuanaland authorities were concerned, such petitioners were free to leave for New York at any time.

176. The representative of the United States of America, commenting on points made during the hearing of petitioners, said that NATO did not supply arms to South Africa. If individual members of NATO were supplying arms to that country, the matter was a bilateral one.

177. As to the supply of arms by the United States to South Africa, it might perhaps be well to repeat her Government's well-known position. The United States Government had supported the adoption of Security Council resolutions 181 (1963) of 7 August 1963 and 182 (1963) of 4 December 1963, and had vigorously enforced the recommendations contained therein. The United States was not supplying arms, directly or indirectly, to South Africa, nor was it establishing facilities there for the manufacture of arms. On 24 May 1965, a State Department spokesman had said that there had been informal requests for external defence equipment since the arms embargo had taken effect in August 1962, but that those requests had not been filled. The embargo, which covered both government and private sources, had been strictly applied, and in December 1963 had been extended to the sale of machinery and equipment used for the manufacture of arms. The United States Government had taken those steps in an effort to eliminate a factor which might contribute directly to international friction in southern Africa and as a means of impressing on the South African Government its deep concern about that Government's abhorrent racial policies. The United States Government was not involved in the construction of a rocket base in South West Africa or in any other kind of military endeavour there.

178. With regard to nuclear research in South and South West Africa, she said that there was a research reactor in Pelindaba, South Africa, purchased by South Africa from the United States on the basis of an agreement concluded in 1957 under the United States Atoms for Peace Programme. That agreement with the South African Government was similar to the agreements entered into by the United States Government with many other countries willing to accept safeguards. The reactor in question was designed for basic research and testing materials and the production of isotopes, as set forth in the directory of nuclear reactors published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Its design was not suited to the production of fissionable material by the irradiation of source material.

179. That reactor and its fuel were subject to the safeguards administered by the IAEA, which were designed to ensure that the nuclear materials, facilities and technology placed under that system would not be diverted to military purposes.

180. The application of those safeguards to the reactor at Pelindaba was of particular importance to the African nations, fifteen of which were already

members of IAEA; those countries had often expressed the desire to preclude the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the continent of Africa. There were four reactors on the continent of Africa. Two, provided through the assistance of the United States of America were under the safeguards system administered by IAEA. The other two reactors, provided with the assistance of the Soviet Union, had not been placed under that system of safeguards. The lack of international safeguards might arouse some apprehension among those who were sincerely interested in minimizing the possibilities of nuclear proliferation on the continent of Africa.

181. Her delegation was not aware of any reactor or any plans for constructing a reactor in South West Africa.

182. In response to a question by the representative of the Soviet Union concerning the United States Government's views on the sending of a United Nations mission to examine the alleged installation in South West Africa, she stated that even a cursory glance at the United States position on the question of South West Africa would reveal the answer to that question. The United States had consistently favoured the establishment of a United Nations presence in South West Africa. It had repeatedly supported efforts to establish such a presence and dispatch missions to the Territory. In addition, it had urged publicly and privately the Government of South Africa to accept such missions to the Territory. The acceptance of a mission clearly fell within the terms of South Africa's obligations as Mandatory Power, particularly in view of its continued refusal to fulfil its obligation to supply information on the Territory.

183. The United States Government continued to favour the establishment of a United Nations presence, or the sending of a United Nations mission, or a visit by an individual representing the United Nations to obtain information on a wide range of subjects, including the question of possible nuclear arms developments in the Territory, particularly since such developments would clearly contravene the spirit, if not the letter, of article 4 of the Mandate and would be therefore a question of special interest to the world community.

184. Noting that the question of whether foreign companies had ever objected to the labour laws imposed by the Government of South Africa in South West Africa had been raised, she felt that the Special Committee might be interested to know that the Chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation had pointed out that the low productivity of an uneducated, unskilled labour force, together with low wages, was not only undesirable in itself, but also an obstacle to industrialization. Attempts to remedy the situation, he had said, were made more difficult by the colour bar imposed on industry. Again, the Chairman of the American Metal Climax Company had expressed the hope that the South African Government authorities would permit substantial modernization of the standards and conditions of employment of African workers in the Territory.

185. It had also been suggested that there was complicity between the United States and South Africa in regard to implementation of the Odendaal report. That was not the case; on the contrary, her Government was concerned at the South African Government's apparent intention of following all the recommendations in that report.

186. The representative of Yugoslavia recalled that for almost twenty years various United Nations bodies had been concerning themselves with the problem of South West Africa. Numerous resolutions had been adopted by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Special Committee and other bodies. Appeals had been addressed to the South African Government to co-operate with the United Nations in finding a just and peaceful solution to that tragic problem. All those efforts had been in vain. The situation was growing worse from year to year and the South African Government was continuing to trample on the sacred principle of the inalienable right of every people to freedom, independence and respect for human dignity. Day after day since its arrival in Africa the Committee had heard moving testimony by petitioners concerning the lot of the African inhabitants of South West Africa. Day after day it had heard details concerning the various manifestations of the evil policy of the South African Government, details which could not but revolt the human conscience. The only purpose of the so-called Odendaal plan was to facilitate the application of the policy of *apartheid* in South West Africa, the strengthening of the position of the Whites, who were continuing to pour in from South Africa and from Western Europe in large numbers, the execution of the programme to partition the Territory, the forced migration of the masses of the indigenous population to reserves where the basic conditions for subsistence were lacking and, finally, the outright annexation of the Territory.

187. Moreover, it was impossible to disregard the testimony of the petitioners concerning South Africa's military preparations, the installation of military bases in the Territory of South West Africa, as also the secret chemical and nuclear research in which certain circles in Western Europe, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, were participating, together with the Government of South Africa.

188. The United Nations had repeatedly tried to put an end to that catastrophic policy of the South African Government. Unfortunately, the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, notably resolutions 1761 (XVII) and 1899 (XVIII), had been unavailing, partly because the most powerful partners of South Africa, namely the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan and Belgium, had refused to sever diplomatic and economic relations with the Pretoria Government and were continuing to invest capital in South Africa and South West Africa.

189. Accordingly, the Special Committee should again stress, *inter alia*, the need to apply the resolutions of the General Assembly, in particular resolutions 1761 (XVII) and 1899 (XVIII), and should request all States, particularly those which still maintained relations with the racist Government of South Africa, to take a positive stand with regard to those resolutions and to put into effect the measures which they called for. The Special Committee should also draw the attention of the Security Council to the situation in South Africa and South West Africa, for it constituted a real danger to international peace and security. Yugoslavia, for its part, had always condemned the South African Government's policy of *apartheid* and had followed the recommendations of the United Nations to the letter. For example, the Federal Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had adopted a law, which had entered into force on 13 November 1963, prohibiting all diplomatic and economic relations with

the Government of South Africa and terminating those then in existence. His delegation would therefore give its whole-hearted support to any steps which the Special Committee might decide to take to that end.

190. In conclusion, the representative of Yugoslavia expressed the hope that it would not be long before the people of South West Africa would triumph in their legitimate struggle for independence.

191. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania paid tribute to the action of the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia in applying to the International Court of Justice in 1960 for a judgement on the status of South West Africa as a Territory under international Mandate assumed by South Africa on 17 December 1920, and in pursuing the case subsequently, thus demonstrating their determination to help their brothers to achieve independence.

192. The Tanzanian delegation favoured the adoption of a strong resolution on South West Africa. Even though the matter was still before the International Court of Justice, there were issues of great significance with regard to South West Africa that could very usefully be examined in the Special Committee. Ever since the German occupation the people of South West Africa had been a colonized people. The Herero people had fought gallantly but vainly to repel the invaders. In the First World War, the people of South West Africa had fought side by side with the allies against the Germans. They had done so with the hope of regaining their independence after the defeat of the Germans. Unfortunately, their victorious struggle had meant for them merely a change of colonial master, just as his own country had found that it had shed its blood merely to change over from German to British masters. The representative of Tanzania stated that he was reluctant once again to condemn certain Western countries, but it was, after all, they, under the League of Nations, that had handed over his African brothers to the racist régime of South Africa. If the history of the struggle of the people of South West Africa had to be written in blood, such Powers would stand condemned in the eyes of the world.

193. The taking over of the administration of South West Africa by the South African Government, with the acquiescence of certain Western Powers, was a tragic development. It amounted to the absorption of that part of Africa into the South African *apartheid* régime. The Africans in South West Africa had not been allowed to play their rightful role in the affairs of their own country, which was run by a handful of South African Boers deliberately induced to go to South West Africa to extend *apartheid* to the Territory. As early as 1946, the South African Government had decided to annex the Territory of South West Africa; some 30,000 white adults had presumed to decide the fate of about half a million Africans by adopting a resolution in 1954 to terminate the Mandate. Subsequently, measures had been introduced to incorporate South West Africa into the Bantustan system, to enslave the Africans and turn them into a source of cheap labour. As Verwoerd himself had said, there was no place for the African in the white community above the labouring level. The Whites had appropriated all the good lands to themselves, turning the African into a landless peasant who was either forced to work in the mines or face starvation in the concentration camps.

194. Some quite surprising evidence had been furnished by petitioners concerning the financial in-

terests of certain Western Powers in mining concerns geared to that system. There was no doubt that the greater the foreign investment in South West Africa, the more cruel the pressure on the black people to produce profits at all costs. The statements made by the managers of American companies deploring the situation in South West Africa were no more than pious declarations, whereas, in the opinion of the Tanzanian representative, what was needed was action. If they continued to do business under conditions they claimed to abhor, they were a party to those conditions. He would have been better pleased if they had decided to close down their factories in protest. He also found it difficult to accept the disclaimer of complicity with regard to the Odendaal report. The implementation of the Commission's recommendations would turn South West Africa into a forced labour camp. Some American companies were profiting by the supply of cheap labour. His delegation appealed to the Western Powers to stop the flow of investments into South West Africa. Any act by the West to put a stop to that investment would be regarded by Africa as a humanitarian move calculated to weaken the repressive South African economy. That was not an ideological issue; the African countries were entitled to ask for such co-operation from all who professed to condemn *apartheid* and to be their friends.

195. Turning to the military build-up in South West Africa, his delegation had been greatly disappointed by the role of West Germany and the United States of America in nuclear development in South West Africa as disclosed by the petitioners.

196. In connexion with the statement made by the representative of the United States, he felt obliged to point out that a representative of South Africa had informed the Disarmament Commission that a nuclear reactor was being built in South West Africa, although—it was claimed—for peaceful purposes only. It was regrettable that the United States Government had found it appropriate to co-operate with South Africa on such an important project as a nuclear reactor. The African countries would never be convinced that the aims of that project were peaceful only. The United States must understand that in the eyes of the African countries it stood condemned for co-operating with South Africa when the rest of the continent sought to isolate South Africa. The United States must understand that South Africa's policy was to exterminate the Africans and that it would never hesitate to use atomic bombs for that purpose. On behalf of millions of Africans threatened by South Africa, he appealed to the Government and people of the United States to withdraw their reactor and all nuclear co-operation with South Africa. To contribute to South Africa's development of nuclear armaments was not only at variance with the decision of the African States to denuclearize Africa; it also meant placing an important weapon in the hands of South Africa, whose declared aim was the extermination of the black man. The construction of an atomic reactor was a most serious threat to the peace and security of Africa.

197. Other disquieting episodes were the construction of air bases near the Zambian border with the intention of intimidating Zambia, and the development of poison gases for eventual use against the African peoples. Africa was watching all such developments with concern, and would certainly come to the aid of Zambia should any further act of intimidation be perpetrated by South Africa against that State. The parallel with Nazi methods strengthened Tanzanian

disapproval of West Germany's involvement in South West Africa, and his delegation would urge West Germany to put an end to such activities.

198. The Tanzanian delegation would like to see a resolution reaffirming the right of the people of South West Africa to self-determination and independence and the legitimacy of their struggle against the South African Government. It would condemn all Powers still collaborating with South Africa either economically or militarily, especially in regard to South West Africa. Such a resolution should contain a strong condemnation by the Special Committee of militarism in South Africa, especially the development of a nuclear reactor. Reference might be made to the unholy alliance now spreading to South West Africa and to the building of air bases on Zambia's borders; and disapproval should be expressed regarding the enslavement implicit in the implementation of the Odendaal report. South Africa constituted a terrible danger in the African continent, and he hoped that a resolution on the above lines would have the support of all delegations represented on the Special Committee.

199. The representative of the Ivory Coast recalled that his delegation had previously analysed the political, juridical and social aspects of the question of South West Africa and noted that despite innumerable efforts and proposals the essence of the problem had remained unchanged. The whole world was witnessing a tragic crisis which the United Nations was apparently proving powerless to overcome, owing to the blind and absurd obstinacy of the South African Government, which was doing nothing to apply the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and was continuing to defy the United Nations. The guiding principle of the Verwoerd Government was that of the supremacy of the white race. That was why it denied the indigenous inhabitants any possibility of advancement or any hope of exercising their right to self-determination. The petitioners had given the Committee clear proof that the situation was deteriorating from day to day: Bantu education, the expropriations, the pass laws, the deportations of Africans to reserves and the prohibition of trade unions and political parties were all aspects of the persecution of the Africans by that Government in contempt of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights. The odious five-year plan of separate development was nothing other than a diabolical plan of debasement and segregation, providing substantial sums for the establishment of new reserves, the strengthening of the police, the formation of commando units and so forth. Hand in hand with it went the no less iniquitous Odendaal plan, which, despite the affirmations of the Pretoria racists, was inadmissible because it was based on segregation.

200. The racist Government of Pretoria, moreover adopted a contradictory attitude with respect to the Mandate entrusted to it by the international community: it claimed the rights and powers conferred by the Mandate, yet at the same time it denied the validity of the instrument from which those rights and powers emanated and refused to recognize the role of the United Nations, which should supervise the implementation of the Mandate and ensure that its provisions were observed.

201. In the view of his delegation, the problem of South West Africa was not only a juridical one; it was also a colonial problem, which the Special Committee was qualified to consider. The Africans were fully aware of the course which events were taking in that area,

of the factors determining those events and of their implications for and repercussions on the African continent as a whole. The time had come to take more effective action than in the past. The United Nations should no longer be content to seek to put an end to conflicts once they had broken out, but should strive to prevent them, particularly when it knew the origin of the danger. The origin of the Second World War was still fresh in the minds of all. To prevent the recurrence of such a tragedy, South West Africa must be removed from South Africa's control. To enable the people of South West Africa to obtain national independence, adequate measures must be enacted, such as the complete and early revocation of South Africa's Mandate and the immediate and effective establishment of either an emergency force or an international volunteer corps. Those measures were all the more essential in that they would have the effect of preventing the racist South African Government from occupying South West Africa, as it intended to do even if the decision of the International Court of Justice was unfavourable to it. The urgent measures required would include the early convening of a constitutional conference at which all the country's political parties would be represented and the holding of elections on the basis of universal suffrage with a view to the establishment of a democratic government. In addition, the independence of the country should be proclaimed without delay. The Special Committee should also recommend that the General Assembly, and through it the Security Council, use the powers invested in them by the Charter to impose on South Africa the United Nations presence in South West Africa. The United Nations was an instrument in the service of justice and must not disappoint the hopes of the inhabitants of South West Africa. Finally, his delegation appealed once again to the Western Powers to cease encouraging the fascist Verwoerd régime, directly or indirectly, by their vacillation. Those Powers should understand that independent Africans could not go on passively observing the sufferings of their compatriots who were still under the colonial yoke. The independent Africans had solemnly undertaken, in May 1963 and in the very hall where the Special Committee was now meeting, to liberate the entire African continent from the colonial yoke and from racism. His delegation hoped that human wisdom would decide in favour of peace and reconstruction, for the other alternative would be a great conflagration in the context of African evolution.

202. The representative of Ethiopia said that, for forty-five years, the gallant people of South West Africa, after helping to drive out their German colonial masters, had been suffering under the ruthless domination of the tainted Government of South Africa, which regarded the Mandate as equivalent to authorized annexation. As the Mandatory Power, South Africa had violated Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations as well as the Mandate provisions committing it, *inter alia*, to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants.

203. He recalled the failure, due to South Africa's intransigence, of the steps taken at the inception of the United Nations to have the Territory placed under the Trusteeship system, which had resulted in South West Africa remaining the sole Territory still under Mandate; worse still, it was subjected to the abhorrent racist policy of *apartheid*. Not only had South Africa failed to fulfil its obligations under the Mandate with

respect to economic, political, social and educational advancement but, by establishing military bases in the Territory, it had committed a serious breach of article 4 of the Mandate. In short, the South African Government had flagrantly violated the Territory's international status and impeded the people's advance toward self-determination.

204. Coming to more recent developments in the Territory, he recalled the action taken by the Special Committee, on the basis of its well-documented report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1), condemning South Africa for its policy of complicity with foreign monopolies, engaged in plundering South West Africa's natural wealth and in exploiting the inhabitants, in violation of Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations and calling upon the Government to put an immediate end to *apartheid*.

205. Apologists for *apartheid* might do well to consider the proved facts that Africans in the Republic and its dependencies by no means enjoyed the highest standard of living on the continent. Education and health were cases in point. According to a reputable publication,¹⁸ there was no compulsory education for the under-privileged Africans, and most children of school age did not attend school. Under the Bantu Education Act, schooling was designed to fit Africans for an inferior place in life. The incidence in parts of South Africa of malnutrition and related diseases was the highest recorded in the world. The 1961 infant mortality rate in one divisional area had been 480 per thousand live births, and surveys that 57 per cent of African children died before the age of five.

206. It would thus be seen that the argument that the African population would be the first to suffer from any outside pressure on South Africa's slave economy was not valid. Moreover, the leniency of the major Western Powers was interpreted by Verwoerd as approval of his fascist régime.

207. Almost simultaneously with the issue of the Special Committee's report, containing appeals directed particularly to South Africa's major partners, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, to exert their influence to put an end to the activities of the international companies in South West Africa, a spate of newspaper reports had appeared in South Africa affirming that trade was on the increase, not only with the United Kingdom and the United States, but also with Europe, Asia and even Africa (Portugal's colonial Territories), in seeming proof that South African business was gaining in confidence and prestige, despite United Nations condemnation and world-wide indignation. Specific countries mentioned included Japan, the Netherlands and France. Another press report had quoted a member of the United National South West Opposition Party, claiming that the cost of living had gone up tremendously as a result of the Odendaal plan, the objective of which was to divide the Territory and regroup the population into Bantustans and a white area.

208. Other press reports illustrated the lopsided development of African education, under the guidance of an administration whose legislative colour bars, according to the Chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation, impeded training programmes to increase the productivity and consequently the earnings of the indigenous labour force. The obvious conclusion had been

clearly expressed by at least two leaders of the *apartheid* State: meeting the demand for better wages could not only damage the upward economic trend and undermine the competitive ability of South African goods overseas, but would require curtailment of the necessary expenditure for South Africa's safety. That "necessary expenditure", according to an allegation reported in the April 1965 issue of *Africa Digest*, had gone into the manufacture of poison gases, said to have the destructive effect of a 20-megaton bomb.

209. Such was the situation in South West Africa and, as the petitioners had testified, matters had deteriorated to the point of explosion. Hence, there was urgent need for United Nations action. As had been repeatedly stated, the Government and people of Ethiopia were solidly behind the African population of South West Africa and would co-operate with all efforts to bring about the restoration of their legitimate rights.

C. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

210. At the 367th meeting of the Special Committee, on 15 June 1965, the representative of India introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.216) sponsored by Cambodia, India, Iran, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.

211. In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of India observed that it might appear more moderate than the circumstances warranted. The reason was that the question of South West Africa would be discussed at the Algiers Conference of Non-Aligned States and at the OAU Conference to be held at Accra. After studying the conclusions of those two meetings, the Special Committee would have a further opportunity to review its resolution in New York in September. The joint draft resolution should therefore be regarded as an interim resolution, based on the information placed before the Special Committee during its African tour.

212. The position of the co-sponsors was that the racial policies enforced in South Africa were basically more wrong and dangerous than those currently pursued almost anywhere else. The intractability of the South African Government had made it impossible for the United Nations to enter into negotiations of any kind. Certain representatives had claimed that the Special Committee had been too ready to accept the petitioners' statements at face value. In the case of South West Africa, no discussion with South Africa was possible, so the Special Committee had no alternative but to accept what the petitioners had said as a true description of the situation in South West Africa. And it was no longer possible for the Special Committee or the United Nations to give the Government of South Africa the benefit of the doubt—its past and present deeds were only too plain for all to observe.

213. He hoped that the members of the Special Committee would support the draft resolution unanimously. Every effort had been made to make the resolution as acceptable as possible, and he appealed to all delegations to vote in favour of it.

214. The representative of Iran observed that the Special Committee and the United Nations as a whole faced a difficult situation with regard to South West Africa. For twenty years a Government which benefited from all the advantages of membership of the United Nations had with impunity pursued a policy of total disregard for General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Every appeal to the Government of South

¹⁸ *Africa, A Foreign Affairs Reader*, ed. Philip W. Quigg, New York and London, 1964.

Africa to co-operate with the United Nations in a peaceful settlement of the question of South West Africa had been in vain. Instead, South Africa was now contemplating a total annexation of the Territory. The Odendaal plan was an attempt to prepare the way for that step. The main objective of the plan was to divide the Territory into small parcels as a way of dealing with the fact of an African majority. It served to strengthen the position of the European settlers, who were coming to South Africa in increasing numbers, both in the economy and the administration of the Territory, through the full application of *apartheid*. On the other hand, measures had already been taken to carve up the Territory into "homelands", which might more appropriately be termed concentration camps, since they were filled by means of forced migration. Africans lived there under appalling conditions and served as a source of cheap labour. In short, the Odendaal plan was an attempt to enslave the African population.

215. South Africa's obstinate refusal to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples represented a challenge to the United Nations. The petitioners had amply justified their people's determination to resist Verwoerd's schemes. Success in their struggle for independence must primarily depend on their own efforts, and on the support and sympathy of the world community in general and the African States in particular. The sponsors of the draft resolution had attempted to embody in it the aspirations of the people of South West Africa. There were nevertheless certain shortcomings in the draft resolution, which did not, for instance, provide for co-ordinating machinery for the effective application of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII). In the circumstances, however, the delegation of Iran had joined in sponsoring the draft resolution in its present form in order to ensure the widest possible measure of support. He appealed to the members of the Special Committee to adopt the resolution unanimously, so that the South African Government would be faced with a united front.

216. The representative of Syria said that the behaviour of the South African Government in violating the terms of the Mandate, in pursuing its policy of *apartheid* and in subjecting the people of South West Africa to hardship and atrocity came as no surprise. Its behaviour fitted into an elaborate pattern of colonial oppression that had been put to the test in other colonial territories. The South African Government was bent on destroying the African personality in South West Africa. It denied the Africans every right to advancement and education and reduced them to slavery. The best land had been given to settlers, while Africans were confined to barren areas. Having thus created appalling conditions in South West Africa, the South African régime then claimed that the people were incapable of governing themselves. The fact that the case of South West Africa was before the International Court of Justice was being exploited by the South African Government in order to hasten the process of conquest and to face the world with a *fait accompli*.

217. The civilized world had no common language with South Africa. In the name of law, justice, morality and reason, the Special Committee was investigating South Africa's activities, but such notions were foreign to South Africa, which had ignored all appeals by the United Nations. The adoption of strong resolutions, particularly unanimous resolutions, would certainly

help, but the mainspring of effective action lay elsewhere. He therefore appealed to the OAU to give the most serious consideration to South Africa's plan to reduce the people of South West Africa to slavery. The organic link between the OAU and the problems of the remaining African dependent territories and international action had been rightly emphasized by the Administrative Secretary-General of that organization. That link must be further strengthened. The most immediate task was to ensure that all members of the international community refrained from extending any assistance whatsoever, direct or indirect, military or non-military, to the Government of South Africa. In that task, a direct confrontation with the protagonists of persuasion was unavoidable. The fact was that by maintaining contacts with South Africa they increased its potential to defy world opinion. The new African policy therefore had to be clearly stated: in its struggle for independence, Africa could not accommodate half-friends. Other countries had either to be full friends or enemies. In order to be sincere and effective, professions of sympathy must be accompanied by deeds.

218. It was also essential to offer an international guarantee, not only for the preservation of South West Africa's territorial integrity, but for that of neighbouring countries whose independence and sovereignty were menaced. The draft resolution could only derive its force from vigilance, especially on the part of the African countries, condemnation of South Africa leading to its complete isolation, and international solidarity.

219. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics explained the Soviet Union delegation's position on the draft resolution in the light of the statements made by the petitioners and the Special Committee's deliberations on South West Africa. It had become quite clear that the violation of international law was now the rule in South West Africa. The Verwoerd régime had perpetrated an outrage upon the dignity of the human personality. Instead of the independence promised to the people of South West Africa in return for their participation in the First and Second World Wars, they had been placed in the clutches of the pro-Nazi supporters of Verwoerd. Instead of territorial integrity, to which the people of South West Africa had the same right as all other peoples, they were threatened with absorption into South Africa, thanks to the support given to Verwoerd by certain Western Powers. The country had been dismembered, reduced to a series of concentration camps, in order to facilitate its control by South Africa. In South West Africa today the only law was the violation of the dignity and of the rights of man. The people of South West Africa were reduced to slavery, denied all education and medical assistance. Such was their situation. Yet they were human beings like all other peoples. The situation in South West Africa was a monstrous contradiction of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. No person, not even those countries that were assisting Verwoerd, could deny the truth of that statement.

220. In the course of the Special Committee's deliberations, it had been shown that the crimes perpetrated against South West Africa, against the entire continent of Africa, and against man himself had been perpetrated in the name of profit—the profit made by investors from the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Belgium.

The Special Committee had produced a report on the implications of the activities of the mining industry and of the other international companies having interests in South West Africa (A/5840). That report had revealed which countries were deriving profit from the sufferings of the people of South West Africa. During the present session positive evidence had been produced of the reality of those facts.

221. In addition, a new feature had emerged, namely the military build-up in the Territory. One might have thought that the people of South West Africa had suffered in every conceivable way, but now the Special Committee had learnt that the Territory was being converted into a war machine. Evidence had been produced of highly dangerous activities, such as the manufacture of poison gases, the construction of rockets and nuclear weapons. He wished to point out to the representative of the United States of America that the petitioners had referred to nuclear activities in South West Africa, not to the United States reactor in South Africa. It was significant that the United States representative had acknowledged that the United States Government was co-operating with South Africa in nuclear matters. A further menace to peace was the base being constructed in the Caprivi Strip as a springboard for aggression. That evidence was worthy of the most minute examination and should be reflected in the draft resolution.

222. In the course of the Special Committee's work, it had also been revealed that South Africa had become a haven for Nazi war criminals who had fled from Europe after the Second World War. As the representative of a country that had suffered 20 million deaths in the battle against Nazi Germany, he could not remain impassive at the news that fascist killers and torturers were now finding refuge in southern Africa. It had been said that Nazism was a thing of the past. But what was happening in South West Africa was of the present, and every step must be taken to ensure that it did not extend into the future.

223. The Special Committee had heard the representatives of movements that were actively struggling against oppression. It was clear that the people of South West Africa would not always be slaves, but the battle was being waged against skilful enemies. With the support of NATO, and particularly of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, a criminal alliance had been formed between Verwoerd, Salazar and Smith. It could not be too strongly emphasized that it was the Special Committee's duty to assist the people of South West Africa; that was in fact the very reason for its presence in Africa. The Committee's task did not consist in the multiplication of documents and words, but in assistance for the struggling people.

224. The draft resolution was one of the ways of achieving that end. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, its value depended on the extent to which it reflected the actual situation in South West Africa and the extent to which it fulfilled the Special Committee's main purpose. It contained many important proposals, which followed the lines of the previous resolutions adopted by the Special Committee. The preamble, in the view of the Soviet delegation, was objective and even dynamic. It gave a clear description of the situation in South West Africa.

225. On the other hand, the operative paragraphs seemed to lack clarity, although many of them corresponded to the Special Committee's task. In operative

paragraph 2, for example, no mention was made of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which had rightly been referred to in the resolutions on Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese Territories (A/AC.109/120 and A/AC.109/124 and Corr.1). Operative paragraph 5 was sound, but its wording seemed slightly ambiguous. If the co-sponsors contemplated measures against South Africa under the Charter, they should make their appeal to the Security Council, not to the General Assembly. If other measures were contemplated, they should be stated more clearly. Operative paragraph 6 was a repetition of the resolution adopted in 1964. The corresponding paragraph in the resolution on the Portuguese Territories set out the Special Committee's reasons for drawing the Security Council's attention to the prevailing situation, which seemed to leave less room for doubt. He therefore suggested that the reasons should also be stated in the draft resolution on South West Africa. With regard to operative paragraphs 7 and 8, he recalled that a similar provision had been included in the 1964 resolution. In the event, only fourteen States (see A/5690 and Add.1-3) had seen fit to inform the Secretary-General of the measures they had taken to carry out operative paragraph 7 of resolution 1899 (XVIII), which called upon all States to refrain from supplying arms and petroleum to South Africa. The States in question were the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, India, Syria, Tunisia, Nigeria, Indonesia, Kuwait, Nepal, Liberia, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Spain whose reply had been somewhat ambiguous. He understood that the Governments of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had also responded favourably. But what of the other States? Why had no NATO Powers replied to the Secretary-General? What was the attitude of the members of SEATO, CENTO and ANZUS? Were they still supplying arms and petroleum to South Africa? The Soviet Union delegation strongly doubted whether a second appeal would meet with a more favourable response than the first.

226. With a view to strengthening the draft resolution, the Soviet Union delegation wished to suggest the addition of certain important points. In the first place, the question of rocket bases and nuclear activities in South West Africa was not mentioned in the draft resolution, despite the information received by the Special Committee. The United States representative had confirmed that the United States Government continued to co-operate with South Africa in nuclear matters and had not suggested that such co-operation would cease. In view of the clear and convincing statements made by the petitioners, he thought it would be right to appeal in the draft resolution to the United States of America and all other countries to put an end to nuclear co-operation with South Africa, whether for peaceful or warlike purposes.

227. He also wished to suggest that some mention should be made in the draft resolution of the dangerous presence of Nazi war criminals in South West Africa.

228. Furthermore, the draft resolution made no reference to capital investment in South West Africa which gave added support to the policy of *apartheid* and the annexation of the Territory by South Africa. The Special Committee had taken a clear stand on that issue by recommending that the General Assembly appeal to all States whose nationals had public or private interests in the international companies in South West Africa, especially the United Kingdom and the United States of America, to cease to give any support to the Gov-

ernment of South Africa and to observe the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 1761 (XVII), and 1899 (XVIII), and by recommending further that all such States should exert their influence to put an end to the activities of the international companies which were detrimental to the interests of the population of South West Africa. In view of that clear statement of the Special Committee's position, he felt that a similar provision should be included in the draft resolution.

229. The resolution on the Portuguese Territories had called upon the specialized agencies and in particular the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance so long as the Portuguese Government failed to renounce its colonial policy. There seemed no reason to limit that appeal to Portugal. Only the United States representative had voted against the paragraph in question, and he felt sure that no other delegate would question its wisdom. He therefore thought that it should also be applied to South Africa. With those additions, he felt that the draft resolution would embody the minimum requirements of the South West African people.

230. In presenting the draft resolution, the representative of India had explained that it had been drafted in liberal or moderate terms because it was interim in nature. In view of the fact that the question of South West Africa was before the International Court of Justice, that attitude was understandable. All previous resolutions, however, had been interim in nature, and the time had surely come to produce something more permanent. Even if the temporary nature of the draft resolution was accepted, there still seemed no reason why it should not be clarified. In connexion with the Indian representative's second argument, namely that the draft resolution had been liberally drafted in order to gain the widest possible measure of support, the Soviet Union wondered whether there was any real possibility of the draft resolution's being unanimously adopted. Moreover, it was a mistake to regard unanimity as an end in itself. The main criterion in framing the draft resolution should be the extent to which it would benefit the people of South West Africa. The Soviet Union had always stood for agreement and co-operation between all nations, including the United States of America and the United Kingdom. Its policy was not enmity but concord, as recent events had clearly shown, but the Soviet Union would never sacrifice its basic principles in order to achieve unanimity. As the representative of Syria had said, Africa could no longer tolerate half-friends, or even quarter-friends. The resolutions on Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese Territories had been adopted by a large majority, and the Soviet Union would be satisfied to see a more strongly worded resolution on South West Africa adopted by a similar majority.

231. It seemed to the Soviet Union delegation that too much remained unsaid in the draft resolution. As it was not yet in final form, he appealed to the sponsors to make every effort to ensure that it would fulfil its basic purpose, that of giving active support to the people of South West Africa. If the draft resolution was not modified along the lines he had suggested, he wished to reserve his right to intervene again after the voting.

232. The representative of India observed that the Afro-Asian members of the Special Committee appreciated the unwavering support of the delegations of the

socialist countries. As he had said when introducing the draft resolution, the sponsors were aware that the text was couched in moderate terms. That was not at all because they were seeking unanimity at the cost of principle. The reason was the interim nature of the resolution. The African-Asian States scheduled to meet at Algiers, and OAU at its session later in the year at Accra, would both have recommendations to make with regard to the question of South West Africa before the next session of the General Assembly.

233. The question of unanimity was incidental; he hoped however that all members of the Special Committee would find it possible to vote for the draft resolution.

234. The representative of Sierra Leone stated that it was impossible to think of South West Africa apart from South Africa, in view of the ever-present threat that the Territory would be engulfed by its expansionist neighbour. South Africa, nominally the Mandatory Power, was introducing into the Territory the odious practice of *apartheid*. Its determination to give effect to the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission should cause great anxiety to the Special Committee. As a result of its racist policies, Africans in the Territory were not allowed to participate in the economy except as labourers. South West Africa's enormous economic potential was being plundered by the numerous foreign interests active in the southern part of the continent. The Special Committee had been told that South Africa was constructing bases in the Territory, and that countries other than South Africa were assisting in a general military build-up.

235. Since 1963, when most African States had adopted a trade boycott, some countries had actually expanded their trade with South Africa. They should be condemned as enemies of the African people.

236. The only remaining obstacle to a complete take-over by South Africa was the case before the International Court of Justice concerning the status of South West Africa. Even so, South Africa was becoming ever more deeply involved in the Territory and the Special Committee must devise a way of curtailing South African influence there. That was a world problem and all countries must join forces to deal with it. It was in that spirit of co-operation that his delegation had joined in sponsoring the draft resolution.

237. The representative of Bulgaria said that one more year of discussions and resolutions had brought the Special Committee no closer to a solution of the case of South West Africa. On the contrary, it was clear from the statements of the petitioners that the situation in the Territory continued to deteriorate. The South African Government continued to defy the resolutions of the United Nations and to suppress the national liberation movement in the Territory. The South African Minister for Justice had recently revealed that during the past five years a total of 494 people had been executed in South Africa.

238. The inhuman policy of *apartheid* had penetrated every aspect of life. In defiance of the Special Committee's resolution, the Verwoerd régime had begun to carry out the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission. The complete application of those recommendations would amount to nothing less than partition and, later, full annexation of the Territory.

239. There was nothing in the draft resolution to which his delegation could not subscribe. The first three operative paragraphs brought it into line with the

resolutions recently adopted by the Special Committee on the questions of Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese administration (A/AC.109/120 and A/AC.109/124 and Corr.1). However, the sponsors had omitted, in operative paragraph 2, to make reference to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

240. He attached great importance to operative paragraph 4, for South West Africa was being rapidly transformed into a base for internal suppression and aggression against neighbouring States. He also attached particular importance to operative paragraph 7, which referred to General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII). That resolution had urged all States to refrain forthwith from supplying petroleum or petroleum products to South Africa in any manner or form. That provision had to be considered in conjunction with the provisions of various other resolutions calling upon all States to take certain specific measures against South Africa, including the breaking-off of diplomatic and economic relations and the imposition of a total arms embargo. His Government followed a policy of strict compliance with those recommendations. Information available to the Special Committee indicated that not all States took the same line.

241. Thus the claim made by the United States of America and the United Kingdom that their policies in regard to an arms embargo were in full agreement with United Nations resolutions were belied by the facts as revealed by petitioners. A British company had recently been granted a licence to export military vehicles to South Africa. The South African Minister for Defence had revealed that even prior to the alleged imposition of the arms embargo, South Africa had already been supplied with all the necessary equipment for the manufacture of light arms and ammunition. Furthermore, the United Kingdom and the United States had done nothing to induce their NATO allies, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, to heed the appeals of the United Nations. The net result was that, far from being adversely affected by those resolutions, South Africa had now greatly increased its military strength.

242. The Special Committee must be particularly disturbed at reports of South African efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, with the assistance of its Western allies. The United States delegation had repeatedly denied the military implications of the atomic reactor built by the United States in South Africa. The fact remained, as pointed out in the Belgian Press, that South Africa had everything it needed to produce its own atomic weapons, including a nuclear reactor and scores of nuclear technicians trained abroad. Only the most naive could believe that the transfer of nuclear technical knowledge to the South African racists was an innocent matter.

243. The Western Powers had displayed a similar reluctance to apply the economic sanctions called for in United Nations resolutions. In their public pronouncements, Western businessmen unashamedly put profits before human dignity. Furthermore, the United Kingdom Prime Minister had said that his Government was not committed to any form of control over trade in relation to South Africa and, in particular, did not feel an oil sanction to be appropriate. It was only too clear why the South African Government felt able to continue its defiance of the United Nations and world public opinion.

244. Despite its failure so far to induce the Western countries to effect a real change in their policies vis-à-vis the South African Government, the United Nations must continue to insist on effective political and economic sanctions and a total arms embargo against South Africa. Those were the only means, short of military action, which could induce Verwoerd to change his policies. If the Western countries continued to ignore the appeals of the United Nations, they would be exposed as accomplices of the South African racists.

245. In the circumstances, his delegation seriously doubted whether operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution was an adequate response to the existing situation. Another defect in the draft resolution was that it overlooked the need for an urgent appeal to all States to discontinue financial and technical assistance to South Africa. Such an appeal should also be addressed to all the specialized agencies, and in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund.

246. Another flaw in the draft resolution was that it did not reflect the information given by the petitioners regarding the use of South West Africa as a haven for Nazi war criminals.

247. Finally, his delegation believed that the situation in South West Africa was so serious that it warranted an appeal to the Security Council to examine the question.

248. He assured the people of South West Africa of his delegation's full support in their just struggle, and expressed the conviction that they would soon break the chains of colonial bondage.

249. The representative of Denmark said that, in defiance of numerous United Nations resolutions, the South African Government was still clinging to its own policy with regard to South West Africa. The ideas set forth in the Odendaal report were incompatible with the interests of the African population. The report was based on the principle of *apartheid*, and its main purpose was to uphold white supremacy and to facilitate the *de facto* incorporation of South West Africa into South Africa. The system of "homelands" was probably unworkable, and the partition of the Territory suggested in the report would not give the indigenous population a fair share of the country or its resources.

250. The South African Government had already begun to put into effect some of the suggestions in the report, although it had also declared that it would not carry out any of the political measures before the International Court of Justice had rendered its judgement regarding the Territory. The report was an integrated entity, however, and the fulfilment of one part would necessarily facilitate the fulfilment of its other parts.

251. It was no wonder that the African nationalist parties in South West Africa had unanimously rejected the Odendaal report and expressed the wish that the South African administration of their country be brought to an end. In retaliation, the South African authorities had resorted to the imprisonment of African leaders, and looked to the so-called Coloured Council and the chiefs for support. Yet there was nothing to indicate that the latter represented any substantial part of the population.

252. The petitioners had testified that a military build-up was taking place in South West Africa, and the Special Committee had also heard about the military co-operation between South Africa, Southern Rhodesia

and Portugal. The Danish Government condemned the policies pursued by the Verwoerd régime in South West Africa, and considered that the Pretoria Government was violating the Mandate, the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

253. His delegation could therefore support the draft resolution, with certain reservations. In the first place, he considered the phrase "a continuing threat to peace and security", in the penultimate preambular paragraph, to be too categorical, as well as unduly reminiscent of the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter. Secondly, he was not clear as to the implications of operative paragraphs 2 and 3; his delegation fully sympathized with the aspirations of the people of South West Africa, and assumed that those paragraphs were to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Charter and the established rules of international law. With those reservations, his delegation could vote for the draft resolution as it stood. If the text should be changed, his delegation might have to reconsider its position.

254. The representative of Poland recalled that, according to the statements made by the petitioners, large numbers of former Nazis had not only sought refuge in South and South West Africa but were also serving as military instructors and assisting the Verwoerd régime to develop weapons of mass destruction. The ruling Nationalist Party of South Africa was pursuing a "master race" policy under the guise of *apartheid*. Although the Second World War had finished twenty years previously, the prosecution of Nazi war criminals had never ceased to be a matter of concern. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights had recently decided that there should be no period of limitation on the prosecution of those responsible for crimes against humanity, and requested all Governments to co-operate in the prosecution of such criminals (see E/4024, para. 567).

255. Poland had lost 6 million people at the hands of the Nazis, and felt very strongly that no Nazi criminal should be allowed to go unpunished. The world could not remain indifferent to the news that former Nazis were seeking asylum in South West Africa, and the petitioners' testimony to that effect should be brought to the notice of the appropriate United Nations organs. He accordingly proposed the inclusion in the draft resolution of an operative paragraph drawing the attention of the Commission on Human Rights to the presence of Nazi war criminals in South West Africa.

256. The representative of Chile stated that his delegation had studied closely the draft resolution concerning South West Africa and would vote for it. His delegation hoped that the adoption of the draft resolution would produce the desired effect and lead to a solution of the problems burdening the African population.

257. His delegation attached particular importance to operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution, which recalled paragraph 7 of resolution 1899 (XVIII) urging all States to take certain measures against the South African Government—and in particular to impose an arms embargo—to prevent it from pursuing its repressive action against the population of the Territory. He wished to recall that, when the Secretary-General of the United Nations had consulted Member States on that point, the Chilean Government had decided to suspend all deliveries and sales of arms to the South African Government. Furthermore Chile had

recalled its diplomatic representatives accredited to that Government.

258. At the 371st meeting, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, on behalf of the co-sponsors, said that the second preambular paragraph or the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.216) should be revised to read "*Having heard* the statements made by petitioners", and that a third preambular paragraph should be added as follows: "*Having also heard* the statement of the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity on the problem of decolonization in general and on the specially dangerous situation that exists in South West Africa".

259. Secondly, operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution should be revised to read as follows:

"*Recommends* to the General Assembly and the Security Council to take appropriate steps to safeguard the sovereignty of the people of South West Africa and the integrity of the Territory and to this end to take the necessary concrete and adequate measures in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity."

260. At the 372nd meeting, the Chairman drew attention to a further revision desired by the co-sponsors, whereby the phrase "and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" would be added to the end of operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

261. At the same meeting, the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.216) as orally revised, was adopted by 20 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.

262. The representative of Australia, explaining his delegation's vote on the resolution, said that clearly the text represented the results of much give-and-take among the delegations, and it was in large part acceptable to his delegation, especially as it dealt with a Territory which had a special interest for Australia as a former Mandatory Power. Indeed Australia had made a direct approach to South Africa in regard to compliance with the international obligations imposed under Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations in respect of a territory which Australia regarded as a Non-Self-Governing Territory.

263. The preamble to the resolution recalled a number of previous resolutions which for various reasons his delegation had not been able to support. Nor did it feel that the reference to the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission precisely reflected the actual position as described in the working paper prepared by the Secretariat.

264. A further difficulty for his delegation was the statement in the ninth preambular paragraph that the situation was a continuing threat to peace and security. Australia could not subscribe to that view, at any rate in the present circumstances. While his delegation did not endorse the South African argument that consideration of the question infringed the *sub judice* principle, parts of the resolution could be construed as doing so. The United Nations must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the validity of its legal position before taking measures based on purely political considerations, and the Australian Government would regard any International Court of Justice ruling as providing a definitive legal opinion on the matter.

265. His delegation had reservations with regard to operative paragraph 7, though Australia did not supply arms to South Africa nor, so far as it was aware, were there any Australian commercial interests in South

West Africa. Thus for reasons which might appear unduly legalistic but which could not be lightly dismissed, his delegation had felt obliged to abstain in the voting.

266. The representative of Italy explained that he had voted in favour of the resolution because he was aware of the dangers inherent in the South West African situation. There were three main causes for concern: first, the South African Government's failure to comply with the League of Nations Mandate; secondly, the South African Government's refusal to recognize and apply to South West Africa the principles and ideas embodied in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; and thirdly, the extension of the policy and practice of *apartheid* from South Africa to South West Africa. He had acted in accordance with his Government's consistent attitude on the question.

267. He wished, however, to reserve his position on the wording of the penultimate preambular paragraph and on the meaning and implications of the second and third operative paragraphs, on which he held views similar to those expressed by the representative of Denmark. He also reserved his position on the revised text of operative paragraph 5, which had wide implications. His reservations in no way weakened his support for the resolution as a whole.

268. The representative of the United States of America expressed sincere appreciation of the effort made by the sponsors of the draft resolution on South West Africa to find a basis for general agreement among all those desirous of promoting changed and improved conditions in that Territory. His delegation had given the draft resolution most careful consideration and had abstained in the vote principally because—particularly in the seventh and eighth preambular paragraphs of the text adopted—the resolution seemed to take a stand on the very question which the International Court of Justice had been asked to decide, i.e., the question of South Africa's performance under the terms of the Mandate.

269. The United States had always insisted that South Africa was bound to comply with all the terms, conditions and obligations of the Mandate, and in particular to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants. Its view that South Africa had not lived up to its obligations in that respect, and hence had been derelict in its obligations to the international community, had been stated again and again. Nevertheless, the United States did not believe that the General Assembly or any organ thereof should take action or make recommendations relating to the question until the International Court of Justice had rendered its decision. That stand was consistent with the feeling of the majority of United Nations Members that the rule of law was of great importance in the conduct of international affairs. Furthermore, any action taken by the United Nations in the matter should rest upon a solid legal foundation, commensurate with the obligations of the world community to the peoples of the former Mandated Territories.

270. The United States firmly upheld the right of the peoples of South West Africa to a full exercise of self-determination and continued strongly to oppose many aspects of the South African Government's policy in the administration of the Territory, as calculated to isolate the majority of the people from the trends of the twentieth century. The application of that policy

was seemingly an attempt to slow down progress toward self-determination, if not to halt it entirely, and that attempt had been accompanied by many forms of *apartheid*. The United States condemned *apartheid* and its application anywhere in the world; it was shocked at the existing labour laws and their application in South West Africa. The practices instituted and enforced under that legislation were unworthy of the present day and age.

271. Finally, his Government was following with great interest the proceedings now unfolding before the International Court of Justice. By maintaining its participation in the case, the South African Government had accepted the Court's jurisdiction in the matter. He would like to re-emphasize in that connexion the importance the United States attached to respect for the judgement of the International Court as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations; under Article 94 of the Charter, each Member of the United Nations undertook to comply with the decision of the Court in any case to which it was a party. The United States would therefore expect that the decision of the Court in the particular case in question would be complied with.

272. The interest of the United States in the question and in the future of the peoples of South West Africa remained undiminished. His Government would continue its support for the United Nations special training programme for South West Africans and would go on providing assistance to South West Africans through other educational programmes. Furthermore, it would seek additional opportunities to help, in the hope of hastening the day when the peoples of South West Africa would be given the opportunity to speak for themselves and to make their own choices, on the basis of full equality with the rest of the world community.

273. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland recalled that his delegation had already spoken briefly in the course of the African tour about the United Kingdom Government's attitude to the question of South West Africa. The basis of his Government's approach, as in the case of its colonial policies in the Territories for which it was responsible, was respect for the principle of self-determination as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, together with support for the Charter obligations and principles affecting Non-Self-Governing Territories. It was the belief of his Government that those obligations and principles, including in particular the principle of self-determination, were applicable to South West Africa and should form the basis of the South African Government's policy with respect to that Territory.

274. The United Kingdom Government also had repeatedly made plain, in the United Nations and elsewhere, that it dissociated itself completely from the racial policies of the South African Government and that it regarded the doctrine of *apartheid* as both abhorrent and impractical.

275. The question of the obligations of the South African Government in relation to the League of Nations Mandate and to the United Nations was before the International Court of Justice and, therefore, was *sub judice*. The United Kingdom Government believed that it would be wrong for the Special Committee or for members of the Special Committee to take up positions now on those matters, pending the Court's decision. It therefore considered any resolution on South

West Africa inopportune. Quite apart from the impropriety of saying or doing anything which might prejudice the Court's proceedings, it seemed to his delegation that no expression of opinion or recommendations about the legal position regarding the Mandate and the United Nations could be justified in advance of the Court's rulings on those highly complicated questions.

276. His delegation welcomed the moderation of the content and wording of much of the resolution adopted on the question of South West Africa and appreciated the effort of the sponsors to avoid the inclusion of unnecessarily controversial matter. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom vote on the resolution had had to be determined by its actual content, and an examination of certain important paragraphs revealed a number of points which unfortunately could not be reconciled with the attitude of his Government. On the sixth preambular paragraph, his delegation was not satisfied that the evidence showed a deterioration in the situation and noted—so far as the Odendaal report was concerned—that, in fact, as the Secretariat working paper confirmed, the South African Government had given an undertaking not to implement the report in full, pending the decision of the International Court of Justice, although it would appear that certain preparatory measures had been taken. The paragraph in question was defective in that it took no account of that undertaking.

277. The eighth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 5, in the view of his Government, were calculated to prejudice the proceedings in the International Court of Justice and would seem, by implication, to anticipate the Court's decision. The ninth preambular paragraph, by using the language of Chapter VII of the Charter, went further, in his delegation's view, than the situation warranted. Although regarded as serious and a source of international friction, the situation in South West Africa did not, so far as his Government could see, constitute a threat to international peace and security. Under Article 39 of the Charter, it was in any case quite clearly for the Security Council and not for the Special Committee to determine the existence of a threat to peace.

278. The reference in the tenth preambular paragraph to "obligations" again appeared to concern matters that were now under consideration by the International Court of Justice and hence were *sub judice*. Operative paragraph 4 made an assumption about the presence in South West Africa of bases and military installations that was not, in his delegation's view, justified by the information so far available to the Special Committee or to the United Kingdom.

279. Although his delegation supported many of the underlying objectives of the resolution, the reservations and difficulties which he had just described, especially in respect of the importance of not prejudging the decision of the International Court of Justice, the unacceptability of the reference to a threat to peace and security and the related matter of the Special Committee's competence to determine the existence of such a threat, had made it impossible for his delegation to vote in favour of the resolution and it had therefore been reluctantly compelled to abstain.

280. The representative of India said he felt in duty bound to answer some of the comments made by the delegations that had been unable to support the resolution on South West Africa. The sponsors had hoped to gain unanimous support for a resolution which, because of its interim nature, had been drafted with

particular care. Unanimous support would have been helpful, both to the Special Committee's work and to the peoples of South West Africa. It was a moot point whether the South African Government would not misunderstand the position, for it was unwise and dangerous to put faith in any Government which by official policy was acting in every way contrary to the Charter, the Declaration of Human Rights, and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The delegations abstaining at the present juncture would, in the next few months, have another chance to change their attitude and he hoped that they would find it possible to vote affirmatively in the General Assembly, when the Special Committee's report came up for consideration.

281. The matters referred to the International Court of Justice were relatively limited in scope and could not be set against the dangerous situation created by South Africa's racial policy as a reason for inaction on the part of the Special Committee. That situation was a threat not only to the peace of Africa but to the peace of the whole world, and all that the co-sponsors were concerned to do was to draw attention to the urgency of the matter. The sponsors had been moved by a sincere desire to be helpful and constructive and it was a matter of deep disappointment to them that there had not been unanimous support for the resolution. After the forthcoming meetings of Heads of States, it was their intention to apply themselves to the drafting of a more adequate text.

282. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, speaking on behalf of his own delegation and those of Poland and Bulgaria, explained his vote on the resolution concerning South West Africa. The three delegations had voted with somewhat mixed feelings. If the resolution in question did contain provisions calculated to assist the people of South West Africa in their fight for independence, it was still not adequate. When the draft resolution had first been submitted, the delegations of Poland, Bulgaria and the USSR had not been sure how they should vote, and they had even put forward a number of proposals; fortunately, the discussion had led to a clear improvement in the text, which had finally enabled the three delegations to vote in favour.

283. He was gratified that the Special Committee had decided to associate the Organization of African Unity in its work, and to recognize the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of South West Africa to exercise the rights set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. He was also gratified at the changes made to operative paragraph 5, as a result of which the Special Committee was no longer recommending just the General Assembly but also the Security Council to initiate the necessary measures, in collaboration with the OAU, whose collaboration had become indispensable.

284. He realized, in the light of the Indian representative's explanations, that, in the minds of its sponsors, the resolution was only intended to constitute one stage in the work of the Special Committee and not the search for a solution at any price; furthermore, the sponsors intended to draft a new text which would take into account considerations not contained in the resolution just adopted.

285. The resolution (A/AC.109/126) on the question of South West Africa, adopted by the Special Com-

mittee at its 372nd meeting on 17 June 1965, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having examined the situation in the Mandated Territory of South West Africa,

"Having heard the statements made by the petitioners,

"Having also heard the statement of the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity on the problem of decolonization in general and on the especially dangerous situation that exists in South West Africa,

"Recalling Article 73 of the United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Also recalling General Assembly resolutions 1702 (XVI) of 19 December 1961, 1805 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 and 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963, and the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 21 May 1964,

"Noting with deep concern the continued deterioration of the situation in South West Africa resulting from the intensification of the practice of apartheid and from the determination of the South African Government to apply in the Territory the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission in violation of Article 73 of the Charter and operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),

"Having heard the expressions of concern by the Governments of the African States adjacent to South West Africa regarding the military installations established in the Territory by the South African Government, including the installation of an important military base in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel,

"Considering that the South African Government has persistently failed to discharge its international obligations in the administration of South West Africa and that by its insistence on pursuing the policy of apartheid in defiance of world opinion it has forfeited its moral authority to administer the Territory,

"Considering that in general the behaviour of the South African Government towards the African populations under its administration, and its persistent refusal to observe the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples constitutes not only a serious challenge to the United Nations but also a continuing threat to peace and security,

"Aware of the obligations of the United Nations towards the population of South West Africa,

"1. Reaffirms the right of the people of South West Africa to self-determination and independence and condemns the South African Government for its persistent refusal to apply the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee;

"2. Recognizes as legitimate the struggle of the people of South West Africa for the effective exercise of the rights set forth in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the

Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

"3. Appeals to all States to give the African population of South West Africa the necessary moral and material support to enable them to accede to national independence and to exercise fully their sovereignty over their country's natural resources;

"4. Requests the South African Government to withdraw forthwith all the bases and other military installations situated in the Territory of South West Africa; and to refrain from using the Territory in any way whatever as a base for the concentration of arms or armed forces for internal or external purposes;

"5. Recommends to the General Assembly and the Security Council to take appropriate steps to safeguard the sovereignty of the people of South West Africa and the integrity of the Territory and to this end to take the necessary concrete and adequate measures in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity;

"6. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the serious situation prevailing in South West Africa;

"7. Invites the Secretary-General to request all States to inform him of the measures they have taken to carry out operative paragraph 7 of resolution 1899 (XVIII);

"8. Further invites the Secretary-General to transmit this resolution to all States and requests him to report to the General Assembly and the Special Committee on the application of paragraph 7 mentioned above;

"9. Requests the Chairman of the Special Committee to transmit this resolution to the President of the Security Council;

"10. Decides to maintain the question of South West Africa on its agenda."

286. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 21 July 1965 (see S/6565).

D. EXAMINATION OF PETITIONS

287. In operative paragraph 8 (a) of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII), the Special Committee was requested to continue its efforts with a view to discharging the tasks assigned to it by resolution 1805 (XVII). In operative paragraph 3 of resolution 1805 (XVII), the General Assembly requested the Special Committee "to discharge, *mutatis mutandis*, the tasks assigned to the Special Committee for South West Africa by resolution 1702 (XVI), taking into consideration the special responsibilities of the United Nations with regard to the Territory of South West Africa...". One of the tasks accordingly assigned to the Special Committee is that of examining petitions relating to South West Africa.

288. In its report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session, the Special Committee had recommended for adoption by the General Assembly a draft resolution on eighty petitions concerning South West Africa examined by the Special Committee during 1964 (see A/5800/Rev.1, chapter IV, para. 237).

289. During its nineteenth session, the General Assembly was unable to dispose of the report of the Special Committee covering its work during 1964 or to adopt any resolutions concerning South West Africa.

290. Since the submission of its report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session, the Special Committee has received and examined sixty-two additional petitions, which it has taken into account in its consideration of South West Africa. These petitions, which are listed above in paragraphs 70 and 72 of this chapter, relate, *inter alia*, to the general situation in and recent developments concerning South West Africa, the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, the activities of mining and other international companies having interests in the Territory, the arrests of political leaders and restrictions on political activity in the Territory, South West African refugees in Bechuanaland, the ejection of Africans from urban areas, and the non-implementation of General Assembly resolutions concerning South West Africa.

291. By adopting the sixty-eighth report of the Subcommittee on Petitions (A/AC.109/L.248), the Special Committee, at its 383rd meeting on 7 September 1965, decided to draw the attention of the General Assembly to these facts so that they might be taken into account by the General Assembly in its consideration of the draft resolution mentioned in paragraph 288 above.

292. In the light of the foregoing, this draft resolution requires revision so as to cover petitions subsequently received concerning the Territory. The Special Committee accordingly recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following revised draft resolution on petitions concerning South West Africa examined by the Special Committee during 1964 and 1965:

DRAFT RESOLUTION RECOMMENDED TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

*"Petitions concerning South West Africa
The General Assembly,*

"Bearing in mind the special responsibilities of the United Nations with regard to South West Africa,

"Noting that the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples has received and examined 142 petitions concerning South West Africa, in accordance with paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 1805 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 and paragraph 8 (a) of Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963,

"Noting further that these petitions relate, inter alia, to the general situation in and recent developments concerning South West Africa, the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, the activities of mining and other international companies having interests in the Territory, the arrests of political leaders and restrictions on political activity in the Territory, South West African refugees in Bechuanaland, the ejection of Africans from urban areas, and the non-implementation of General Assembly resolutions concerning South West Africa,

"1. Notes that the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples has taken these petitions into account in its consideration of the situation in South West Africa;

"2. Draws the attention of the petitioners concerned to the reports submitted by the Special Committee concerning the Territory and to the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth session on the question of South West Africa, as well as the reports of the Secretary-General relating to the Territory."

CHAPTER V

TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

1. *The Territories in general*

Introduction

1. Information concerning the Territories, as well as an account of the action taken in respect of these Territories, is already contained in the report of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese administration (A/5160 and Add.1 and 2) and in the previous reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly (A/5238, A/5446/Rev.1 and A/5800/Rev.1). Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.

Political and constitutional developments

2. In 1964 further measures were taken towards the completion of the institutional framework for the political and economic integration of the Overseas Territories with Portugal. The publication of a decree (No. 45,830 of 25 July 1964) providing for representation of the Overseas Territories in the Corporative Chamber completed the changes required to give effect to the provisions of the Overseas Organic Law of 1963 which calls for "greater intervention" by the Territories "in

the direction of national policy" (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 18).

3. The Corporative Chamber is the highest central consultative body, to which all bills are submitted for an advisory opinion before being presented to the National Assembly. The Chamber occupies a special position in the structure of the Portuguese corporative State, ranking in importance only below the President, the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly. The Corporative Chamber consists of elected and nominated members and includes representatives of various economic, social and cultural units, as well as local government bodies (such as the municipal councils) and the public administration. The Chamber works in some twenty-four divisions or committees, each of which is concerned with specific interests or a group of activities, as for instance agriculture, fisheries and canning, extractive and construction industries, commerce, etc.

4. Although under the law the overseas Territories have been considered to be an "integral" part of the Portuguese nation since 1951, they have not been repre-

sented hitherto in the Corporative Chamber, which in 1964 had approximately 185 members. Under the new decree, Angola and Mozambique will each have two representatives in the Corporative Chamber and the other five Territories one each. These nine representatives are to be assigned to the committees or sub-committees by the Corporative Council.

5. The 1958 presidential elections were the last to be held by direct vote. At those elections, the opposition candidate, General Delgado, withdrew at the last moment, and the Government candidate was elected. In 1961, the procedures for the election of the Head of State were changed; the election is now through an electoral college. This college has some 500 members, comprising representatives of the National Assembly, the Corporative Chamber, the representatives of municipalities (the mayor of municipal councils) in each district or each Territory not divided into districts, and representatives of the legislative councils of the Territories (Decree No. 43,548).

6. The number of representatives of the municipalities is to equal half the number of municipal councils. The seven Territories have sixty representatives in the electoral college designated by the respective legislative councils as follows: Angola, 24; Mozambique, 24; Cape Verde, 4; Guinea under Portuguese administration, 2; São Tomé and Príncipe, 2; Macau, 2; Timor, 2.

7. In view of the forthcoming presidential elections, there is some interest in the recent cabinet changes. Under the Portuguese Constitution, the President selects the Prime Minister, who has the principal responsibility for the administration of the Government and the cabinet, and is also responsible to the President. In March 1965, three Ministers and five Secretaries or Under-Secretaries of State were replaced. The most significant changes were those of the Minister of National Economy, Dr. Teixeira Pinto, who was succeeded by Dr. José Correia de Oliveira, and the Under-Secretary for Agriculture, Mr. Azevedo Coutinho, who was succeeded by Mr. Vitória Pires. A third change was the replacement of the Minister for Overseas Territories, Commander Peixoto Correia, by Dr. Joaquim da Silva Cunha. The other new officials are Dr. Rui Patrício, Under-Secretary for Overseas Development, Dr. José Almeida Cota, Under-Secretary for Overseas Administration and the Secretaries of State for Industry and Commerce.

8. The elections to the National Assembly are to be held in November 1965. At the last elections held on 12 November 1961, according to the *Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, 1964*, prepared by the Council of Foreign Relations, 58 opposition candidates were nominated but withdrew on 6 November, leaving the Government candidates unopposed. Angola and Mozambique each have seven representatives in the present National Assembly, Cape Verde two and Guinea under Portuguese administration, São Tomé and Príncipe, Macau and Timor one each, giving the overseas Territories together a 15 per cent representation in the total membership of 130. So far, despite the emphasis placed by the Portuguese Government on an increased participation by the overseas Territories in the central organs of government, there has been no change in the territorial representation in the National Assembly, in which Angola has one representative for every 650,000 persons, Mozambique one per 900,000, and Portugal one representative per 80,000.

9. Another matter of interest is how many of the indigenous inhabitants, who are now all Portuguese citizens, will qualify to vote in the elections to the National Assembly. Under the existing electoral rules (including Decree Law No. 35,426 of 31 December 1945 as amended), male Portuguese citizens who have attained their majority are entitled to vote (see A/5160, paras. 113 and 114) if they have been emancipated and can read and write Portuguese, or if, being unable to read and write, they nevertheless have legal capacity and "contribute to the State or administrative bodies a sum not less than 100 escudos in payment of one or more of the following taxes: property tax, industrial tax, professional tax, or tax on the use of capital" (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 57). Since most of the indigenous inhabitants do not read and write Portuguese, they would be able to vote only if they qualified under the second provision. It is uncertain, however, how many indigenous persons could qualify, since the majority live in *regedorias*, in which, as a general rule, individuals are not governed by Portuguese civil law, and presumably do not therefore have "legal capacity". In any case, even if this lack of "legal capacity" did not restrict their right to vote, indigenous inhabitants living in the *regedorias* could not meet the tax provisions, since they do not own property, or industries, or have a profession as defined in the professional tax legislation, nor do they own capital. Thus, despite the position taken by the Portuguese Government, which emphasizes that the right to vote is extended to all on the same basis, two barriers, one of language and the other of wealth, continue to deny the vote to the majority of the indigenous inhabitants, especially in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration.

10. At the territorial level, there has been a gradual but continued move to provide more opportunities for participation in the local administrative bodies, and to transfer to the territorial Governments some of the functions relating to economic and financial matters previously exercised by the central Government.¹

11. Elections to the local administrative bodies, i.e., the parish boards, municipal and district councils, took place in the Territories in December 1964. Newspaper reports on these elections did not give the total number of local government bodies at each level, the numbers of registered voters, or the voting results, but in the case of Guinea under Portuguese administration, official sources emphasized that more Africans were elected to the municipal councils. The elections were conducted under the Electoral Law of 6 December 1963 (Decree No. 45,408) (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 54-64).

12. Under the provisions of the 1963 Overseas Organic Law, the new local administrative bodies will have increased power, and will perform certain functions previously exercised by administrative officials. Among the functions which now devolve to district boards, for instance, are: (a) the approval of the draft budget of the areas under their jurisdiction; (b) approval of the distribution of funds for public construction; (c) approval of fines, not exceeding certain limits; (d) establishment of certain taxes and licences which form the revenue of their budget.

13. In October 1964, the Overseas Council, in which the overseas Territories were represented for the first time (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 25-28), met

¹ By Decrees Nos. 45,288, 45,719 and 45,790, the Governments of Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde were authorized to approve import duties on foreign goods.

to consider a new administrative code for the Territories to replace the Overseas Administration Reform of 1934 (for details, see A/4978, para. 202, and A/5160, paras. 72-74). Among the members and alternates representing the Territories were various former officials or members of the armed forces. These included, for Angola, administrative inspector Hortensio Estevão (with General Venâncio Augusto Deslandes, former Governor of the Territory, as alternate); for Cape Verde, Commodore Daniel Duarte Silva; for Guinea under Portuguese administration, Commander Avelino Teixeira da Mota; and for Timor, Colonel Filipe José Freire Temudo Barata (with Brigadier Francisco António Pires Barata as alternate).

14. There is as yet no information on the details of the administrative code for the overseas Territories.

Military activities and expenditure in the Territories

15. A few weeks before Portugal entered her fifth year of war in Angola, on 18 February 1965, Premier António de Oliveira Salazar, in a speech at Oporto, ruled out any "political solution" to the fighting in the African Territories under Portuguese administration and said that continued military effort was the only way to achieve "order in the Territories and peaceful progress of the inhabitants". This statement was made in the face of Portugal's still growing military efforts to bring under control the guerrilla activities in Angola, the increased fighting in Portuguese Guinea and the more recent developments of a similar nature in Mozambique.²

16. In his speech, Premier Salazar lamented that it was a pity that three and a half thousand million escudos were spent on defence and that many other hundreds of millions were spent for the same purpose in the larger Territories. He did not, however, forecast an early or easy victory. In fact, he warned that the "brunt of wars" in the overseas Territories could not be borne and "much less won without sacrifices in blood and money".

17. Since 1961, Portugal's actual military expenditures have each year been more than double the original budgetary allocation. New sources of revenue have had to be found to raise the ordinary revenue from 8,238 million escudos in 1961 to 11,624 million escudos in 1965 and the extraordinary revenue from 3,654 million escudos to 6,027 million escudos.

18. Increased direct and indirect taxes on various sectors of the economy have provided the additional revenues for the ordinary budget. Substantial increases are expected in 1965 over the previous year in revenues from the industrial tax (up 25 per cent), real estate tax (up almost 30 per cent), professional tax (up 50 per cent), tax on dividends and interests (up 35 per cent), estate transfer and donation tax (up 18 per cent), and stamp tax (up 14 per cent). In addition, a new tax has been introduced on agricultural industries. The extraordinary budget has been financed by internal and external borrowing and by creating new sources of revenue, such as the special tax for defence and development of the overseas Territories.

19. Portugal's 1965 budget provides for a total expenditure of 16,739 million escudos, of which 10,712

million escudos is for the ordinary budget and 6,027 million for the extraordinary budget. Of this latter sum, 3,527 million escudos, or approximately 60 per cent, is for "national defence and public security". Compared with 1964, expenditure on national defence has increased by 918 million escudos, or approximately 40 per cent over the previous total of 2,609 million escudos.

20. The largest single item under the main heading "national defence" is for "extraordinary military forces in the Overseas Territories" (*Forças militares extraordinarias no Ultramar*), with an allocation of 2,000 million escudos. Although the 1964 budget provided only 1,750 million escudos for this item, additional allocations had to be made which brought the total up to 3,601,400,000 escudos, or approximately \$US130 million. From this item alone, it is seen that Portugal's war effort in the overseas Territories is currently costing it about 10 million escudos, or \$US350,000, a day.

21. The 1965 extraordinary budget will be financed as follows: internal sale of bonds and loans, 1,603 million escudos; sale of National Development Bank notes, 673 million escudos; external borrowings, 1,366 million escudos; and "other" sources, 1,472 million escudos, including an estimated 100 million escudos from the special tax for defence and development of the overseas Territories.

22. Under the extraordinary budget, expenditures on the Transitional Development Plan (see paras. 35-36 below) are estimated at 2,389 million escudos, compared with 2,021 million escudos for development in the 1964 budget. More than half the 1965 allocation will be spent under the authority of the Ministry for Public Works (1,368 million escudos). The Ministry for the Overseas Territories has direct responsibility for allocations totalling 200 million escudos which are to be used as subsidies and loans in Cape Verde, Guinea under Portuguese administration, São Tomé and Príncipe and Timor in the implementation of projects under the Plan.

23. Although the 1965 budget estimates show a small surplus of revenue over expenditure amounting to 1.4 million escudos, this surplus may be wiped out easily if additional allocations are needed during the year. The growing burden of the military expenditures on the national economy is reflected in the size of the allocation for servicing the public debt. This allocation which was 1,570 million escudos in 1964, increased to 1,869 million escudos in 1965, representing approximately 18 per cent of the ordinary budget.

24. According to available information, Portugal's total direct debt on 30 September 1964 represented approximately 29 per cent of its gross national product and comprised 18,158 million escudos in internal debt and 6,271 million escudos in external debt. The increase in the external debt by almost 50 per cent between 31 December 1961 and 30 September 1964 was accounted for mainly by the external loans and bond issues already reported (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 82-84). In addition, Portugal received, in 1964 a South African Reserve Bank loan of R2.5 million under the agreement with South Africa for the development of hydroelectric power on the Kunene River along the border between Angola and South West

²Details of the military activities in the individual Territories are given in the relevant sections below.

Africa.³ Towards the end of the year, Portugal, for the first time, raised a loan of \$US20 million on the United States market with a 5¾ per cent bond issue. This bond issue, which is to finance the Transitional Development Plan, has been underwritten by some sixty banks and other companies in Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

25. As previously reported (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 83), loans have also been raised in Angola and Mozambique to help finance the military and development expenditures. At the end of 1963, Angola's public debt was 3,474 million escudos, an increase of 42 per cent since 1961, and Mozambique's public debt was 2,165 million escudos. In 1965, Portugal negotiated a special loan of \$US35 million in favour of Angola from the General Trade Company of Geneva, Switzerland, for the purpose of financing the cost of industrial machinery and equipment within the framework of the development plan. A Government spokesman is reported to have said that the money is from European sources and the machinery will also be of European origin.

International relations of Portugal affecting the Territories under its administration

26. In February 1965, Portugal was reported to be negotiating to purchase from the Federal Republic of Germany sixty Canadian-built jet-fighters. According to newspaper reports, the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and of Canada were discussing how to prevent the Canadian F86 Sabers from being used in the African Territories. In a statement, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic said that, in so far as the Federal Republic had supplied arms to Portugal as a NATO ally, it had always insisted that the use of the material should be restricted to the NATO area.

27. A question relating to the supply of arms to Portugal was made in the United Kingdom Parliament in November 1964. In reply, the Prime Minister, Mr. Wilson, stated that the United Kingdom Government did not propose to permit the supply of arms to Portugal for use in its overseas Territories.⁴

28. Following an air agreement signed between Portugal and South Africa in 1963, the South African Airways concern was granted traffic rights in Lisbon enabling it to put down and collect passengers there. The South African Airways calls at Luanda frequently and is reported to be negotiating rights to use the Sal Airport in Cape Verde.

29. The Portuguese National Airline, TAP, is scheduled to start operating scheduled services from Lisbon to Johannesburg in April 1965.

30. Pursuing a policy of strengthening its ties with countries of economic importance to Angola and Mozambique, in February 1965, Portugal signed a formal trade agreement with Southern Rhodesia. This agreement, which replaces a previous agreement with the former Central African Federation, provides for increased trade between Southern Rhodesia, Portugal and Angola and Mozambique.

Economic integration and development

31. To Portugal the progressive integration of all the "national" Territory and the establishment of an economic union is no longer simply a matter of policy but "the only formula for defence and prosperity".⁵ Recognizing that there can be no effective economic union so long as the Territories' resources remain under-developed, Portugal has in 1962-1963 made an effort to attract more foreign investments to the Territories.

32. There has been some progress in the establishment of the free trade and unitary monetary zone. According to schedule, import duties were formally abolished on domestic goods circulating in "national" Territory on 1 January 1964 and, as a result, inter-territorial trade and trade with Portugal increased during the year. For various reasons, however, some import duties have had to be retained or special taxes imposed. In Angola, for instance, two special taxes were applied to wine from Portugal after import duties were removed. Although no new exchange irregularities occurred during the year, currency transfers remained restricted.

33. Interest by foreign investors has been reported mainly in respect of Angola and Mozambique. In these Territories, the mining sector has received the greatest attention, as is reported elsewhere. There is also some interest in fisheries (Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde) and other industries, principally those transforming agricultural products, including sugar refineries, especially in Mozambique. However, by comparison with the money available for mining, these investments are considerably smaller and less concentrated in ownership.

34. In 1964, new diamond prospecting licences were granted in Angola, where the Angola Diamond Company had held a monopoly since 1921. New exclusive prospecting licences were also granted for petroleum and other minerals in various parts of the Territory. There have been recent newspaper reports of Netherlands, French, Japanese and South African interests in new investments in Angola and of Krupp's interests in the fishing industry in Cape Verde. In Mozambique, also, a large exclusive concession was granted for diamond prospecting for the first time.

35. The Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, already referred to, envisages a total investment of 48,800 million escudos in Portugal and the seven Overseas Territories. For Portugal, the investments, totalling 34,448 million escudos aim at obtaining at the end of the period a 6.1 per cent rate of annual increase of the gross domestic product, and 8.1 per cent annual increase of the gross capital formation. For the Overseas Territories a target investment of 14,400 million escudos is envisaged. The individual territorial investment targets in escudos are: Angola, 7,200 million; Mozambique, 5,400 million; Macau, 660 million; Cape Verde, 500 million; Timor, 270 million; Guinea under Portuguese administration, 180 million; São Tomé and Príncipe, 180 million. The amounts to be invested in the main sectors are shown in the table below, and details are given in the sections on the individual Territories.

³ For further details, see the section on Angola below.

⁴ *Hansard*, 26 November 1964, c.1466.

⁵ Statement by the Minister of National Economy, Sr. Correia de Oliveira, *Diário de Notícias*, 27 March 1965.

INVESTMENT TARGETS IN THE TERRITORIES, 1965-1967

(in million escudos)

| Sector | Angola | Mozambique | Macau | Cape Verde | Timor | Guinea | São Tomé and Príncipe |
|-----------------------------|--------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------------------|
| Industry | 2,068 | 1,436 | 29 | 21 | 21 | 16.5 | 20 |
| Transport | 1,930 | 1,771 | 194 | 70 | 100 | 51 | 42.5 |
| Energy | 850 | 400 | 39 | 23 | 8 | 3 | 15 |
| Education, health, etc. . . | 820 | 500 | 21 | 50 | 40 | 33.2 | 18.5 |
| Agriculture | 630 | 760 | 15 | 42 | 39 | 33.3 | 30 |
| Fishing | 370 | 328 | — | 258 | 10 | 18 | 20 |
| Housing | 260 | 114 | 161 | 20 | 30 | 10 | 9 |
| Tourism | 24 | 30 | 198 | — | — | — | — |
| Others | 258 | 61 | 3 | 16 | 22 | 15 | 25 |
| TOTAL | 7,210 | 5,400 | 660 | 500 | 270 | 180 | 180 |

36. For the overseas Territories as a whole, the envisaged funds are to be financed almost in equal parts by the Government (including territorial funds), private investors, and loans from abroad.⁶ Discussions in the National Assembly in connexion with the Transitional Development Plan have pointed to the need to revise various laws to bring them into line with the new policy. Particular attention has been drawn in the National Assembly to the disadvantages of the present system under which large exclusive prospecting concessions are granted for long periods and rights to exploitation may be for an unlimited time. The procedures for capital investment in the overseas Territories are also being reviewed and a new law is expected. In early April the National Assembly, and also the Overseas Council at its first plenary session, discussed the question of population settlement in the Territories with a view to revising the existing legislation. Even though the Transitional Development Plan sets much lower targets for investments in settlement schemes in Angola and Mozambique, the emigration of Portuguese from Europe to settle in the overseas Territories is, nevertheless, according to the Minister for Overseas Territories, Dr. Silva Cunha, "one of the most urgent and important problems which require our action, both because of the significance it can have in absorbing the surplus population from some regions of the National Territory, as well as in strengthening the social and political structure of those provinces, and giving the policy of national unity a more dynamic expression".⁷

Education

37. In 1964 compulsory primary education based on the system prevailing in Portugal since 1960, was extended for the first time, with some modifications, to children in the overseas Territories. This system was to have come into effect the following school year. In July 1964, a Council to co-ordinate the educational activities of the Overseas Ministry was established.

⁶ See paras. 22-23 above, and the sections on individual Territories. There is criticism that unfortunately the Government's policy on investments incentives was not clarified before the Transitional Development Plan was launched, and the possibility of completing the Plan as envisaged is somewhat uncertain.

⁷ Speech by the Minister for Overseas Territories, before the first plenary session of the Overseas Council, convened under Decree No. 45,888, and reported in the *Diário de Notícias*, 1 April 1965, p. 2.

Its specific task was to examine existing legislation relating to the overseas Territories with a view to bringing it into conformity with the general educational policy. Subsequently, in September 1964, new legislation was introduced remodelling the system of primary education in the overseas Territories in order to adapt it "to the local circumstances and conditions" by giving emphasis to aspects which relate to economic and social developments.

38. In principle, the primary school system in the Territories remains patterned on the Portuguese system. However, whereas, in Portugal, primary education now comprises one cycle of four classes, in the overseas Territories a two-cycle system has been reintroduced. The first cycle, known as the elementary state (*ensino primário elementar*) is to comprise four classes and a pre-primary (preparatory) class (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 96). The second cycle, known as the complementary stage, is to be introduced later.

39. The new legislation introduces a concept of three levels of primary schools. At the lowest level there are school "posts" (*postos escolares*), which must provide the pre-primary class and the first three elementary classes. At the next level is the elementary primary school, which must have the four elementary classes, and at the final level there is the full primary school, which includes the second cycle, or the complementary primary class. Primary education in the rural areas is to be based on the school post; in urban areas and other population centres, the basic unit is the elementary primary school. The full primary school as it exists in Portugal will presumably be established as needed, probably mainly in the cities with large European populations.

40. Elementary primary education in the overseas Territories is of six years' duration and is compulsory for all children between the ages 6 and 12. The parents or guardians are responsible for school attendance by the children in their charge and are subject to fines for their non-attendance.

41. The new legislation provides for three categories of teaching staff in the elementary primary system. There are to be (a) elementary primary teachers with diplomas from the recognized teacher-training schools (known as *escolas magistérios*); (b) school post teachers who must complete a course of training at the specially established schools, known as *escolas de habilitação*; and (c) school monitors, who may be of

either sex and who have obtained recognition of their ability to teach in the primary elementary system in the rural areas. Monitors may be used in school posts, under supervision when there are not enough qualified teachers.

42. In addition to the establishment of a network of primary elementary schools, other measures have been introduced to speed up the education and training of other sectors of the population. The upper age limit of persons attending primary elementary teacher-training schools (*escolas do magistério primário*) has been raised to thirty-five; technical high schools, as well as academic high schools, have been authorized to operate in sections so as to accommodate more students; some adult evening classes have been established and formal recognition has been given to classes established by commercial and industrial enterprises. A special fund has been set up for scholarship loans for students from overseas Territories and new measures are being taken to enable pupils whose parents are serving in the overseas Territories to join their families during the school vacation.

Question of racial discrimination

43. At the forty-eighth session of the International Labour Conference, during the discussion on the application of the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), a number of delegations charged that Portugal was practicing a policy of racial discrimination. In a letter addressed to the Director General of the ILO, dated 28 August 1964, the Foreign Minister of Portugal requested that the Governing Body appoint an impartial commission to examine these allegations. The letter suggested that the terms of reference of the Commission should be to determine how far discrimination on the basis of race or colour exists in respect of employment or occupation as defined in Convention No. 111 in "any part of Metropolitan Portuguese Territory or the Overseas Provinces".

44. For the purpose of Convention No. 111 the term "discrimination" includes, specifically:

"Any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation."⁸

45. The ILO Report of the Committee of Experts to the forty-seventh session of the International Labour Conference points out that "the term 'race' cannot be given a very precise scientific definition, the essential point being the way in which the persons concerned consider their differences, and the attitudes resulting therefrom..."⁹

46. In March 1965, at the eighth sitting of the 161st session of the Convening Body of the ILO, the officers of the Governing Body unanimously recommended that consideration of the request by Portugal for a Commission of Inquiry should be deferred until the 162nd session of the Governing Body, which would meet later in the year.

⁸ International Labour Conference, forty-seventh session, report III, part IV, *Report of the Committee of Experts on the application of conventions and recommendations* (Geneva, 1963), appendix I, page 229.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 182, para. 23.

2. Angola

The war in Angola

47. The war in Angola has now entered its fifth year. Although there is almost no news in the English language Press on the fighting in Angola, Portuguese military bulletins are issued and published regularly in the Portuguese Press. These carefully worded bulletins give some idea of the area of fighting and the military strength that Portugal is using against the guerrillas, but it is difficult to make any over-all assessment. It appears that the guerrillas are now fighting with more mobility and seldom engage in combat, and Portugal has no alternative but to maintain large numbers of armed forces, including army, navy and air force, in the northern part of Angola.

48. Because of the nature of the warfare, the superior power of the Portuguese troops has not assured them of victory. A military communiqué issued in Luanda on 3 April 1965 and covering the period 24-31 March 1965 reported "assault action aided by the air force in the region of the Suede Valley." It also reported intensive action by naval units supported by the two other forces in reconnaissance and patrols. Guerrilla activities are reported in Nóqui near the border, in the regions of the Bite-Bite and Lulumba rivers. These last-named areas are in the general region of and to the north of Nambuanguo, which at one time was reported to be one of the major guerrilla strongholds.

49. Since 1962, the Voluntary Corps in Angola has grown in importance as an auxiliary to the regular armed forces. The military bulletins reporting actions against the guerrillas make frequent reference to the Voluntary Corps and the *Sunday Times*, London, in 1964 (26 July) referred to the *voluntários* as "the highly paid legionnaires of the Portuguese army". In the last part of 1964, the *voluntários* took over the functions of the civil defence corps.

Economic conditions

50. In the past year newspaper articles have reported gains in the economy of Angola. Special attention has been drawn to the increased mineral production, more particularly of iron ore and petroleum. Sometimes, the inference is made that there has been a major shift in the pattern of the economy of the Territory.¹⁰

51. Preliminary data for the first five months of 1964 show that exports increased by 18 per cent and imports by 16 per cent over the corresponding period in 1963. The increase of exports resulted mainly from coffee, which has been Angola's leading export over the past decade. Angola is now the third largest coffee producer, after Brazil and Colombia, with an annual production of some 180,000 tons in the last two seasons, and accounting for 5.7 per cent of the world's coffee exports. Under the International Coffee Agreement, Angola has a quota of 2,247,062 bags for the 1964-1965 season. About 30 per cent of Angola's coffee is grown on large plantations.

52. In the first part of 1964 there were some increases also in the exports of sisal, fish meal, iron ore and crude petroleum. These changes, however, were

¹⁰ For instance, a report in *The New York Times*, dated 25 January 1965, from Luanda, Angola, says: "Traditionally an agricultural region, Angola has seen a major shift in its economic make-up in recent years. Mineral products in 1964 accounted for about 30 per cent of exports, double the amount three years ago"

less significant and did not affect the pattern of Angola's principal exports, which has remained substantially the same since 1959.

53. In 1963, as in previous years, diamonds were the second most important export, accounting for 16 per cent by value, and sisal third, accounting for 12 per cent. With coffee, these three products accounted for 69 per cent of all exports, as compared with 63 per cent in 1959. In 1963 the next most important exports were iron ore (2.9 per cent); crude petroleum (2.7 per cent); maize (2.6 per cent); and fish meal (2 per cent).

54. Iron ore production was 350,000 tons in 1959, 660,000 tons in 1960 and 800,000 tons in 1961, but decreased in 1962 and 1963. Exports of iron ore, valued at 143 million escudos in 1961, were 131 million escudos in 1962 and 137 million escudos in 1963.

55. Petroleum production in Angola, which has attracted much attention, was 471,000 tons in 1962 and 800,000 tons in 1963, when 231,000 tons were exported to Portugal and 87,000 tons to other countries. In 1964, production in the first five months was 50 per cent higher than in the previous corresponding period and it was expected to reach 1 million tons by the end of the year.

56. There have been recent newspaper reports that Federale Mynbou Beperk of South Africa is actively negotiating with the Portuguese Government and the Belgian interests in Petrangol for a share in the Angola oil industry. The Chairman of Federale Mynbou is reported to have said that his company was seeking an interest in Angola oil, not only for economic reasons, but also because of the vital strategic value of petroleum to South Africa. So far there is no information that any petroleum from Angola has been exported to South Africa, though there has been a report of a prospected pipeline from Angola to South West Africa. On the contrary, Portugal is reported to be planning to take all the excess crude oil from Angola in 1965 for its new refinery.

57. Since 1961, emphasis has been given to industrial development, and each year new industries have been established. According to an official source, in 1963 the equivalent of more than \$US13 million was invested in Angolan industries and in the first five months of 1964 more capital was invested than in the whole of 1963. Among the more important operations of foreign interests that have been reported is the acquisition of the largest fishing operation in Angola by a South African group called S.A. Angola Investments, a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation. To the existing two fish-meal plants owned by the Angola company there will be added cold storage and freezing plant with a capacity of 960 tons. The South African company is reported to have received certain tax concessions from the Portuguese Government and a guarantee that dividends and interests may be repatriated.

58. In the period 1962-1963, production increased in some industries, including fuel oil, from 192,000 to 266,000 tons; other fuels, from 144,000 to 175,000 tons; cement, from 169,000 to 194,000 tons; beer, from 25,000 to 30,000 litres, and wood pulp, from 9,000 to 19,000 tons. However, production of refined sugar decreased from 71,000 to 65,000 tons and that of fish products from 59,000 to 57,000 tons.

59. Under the Transitional Development Plan for the period 1965-1967, the largest investment allocation is for industrial development totalling 2,068 million

escudos. Of this, 150 million is earmarked for extractive industries. In order to encourage private investment in manufacturing in Angola, new legislation is being prepared to speed up government administrative procedures. There are also plans to set up industrial parks, and a new industrial labour code is to be adopted.

60. The next largest allocation is for transport and communications. Of the 1,930 million escudos envisaged, 850 million is for roads, 557 million for railways, 278 million for ports and navigation, 200 million for air transport and 45 million for telecommunications.

61. In contrast to the First and Second Development Plans, which provided large expenditures on settlement schemes, the Transitional Development Plan provides only 240 million escudos for such expenditures. The target for fisheries is 370 million escudos and that for agriculture is 630 million escudos. The investment in agriculture will concentrate mainly on coffee, maize, wheat and oil palm, and 60 million escudos will be made available to the small producer to supplement the present agricultural credit.

62. In Angola, almost 40 per cent of the total expenditure of 7,210 million escudos under the Transitional Development Plan is to be financed from external sources, principally for equipment.¹¹ Of the 4,360 million to be financed from "national sources", the Central Government in Lisbon will provide 1,000 million escudos and the Angolan Government 750 million escudos. Private enterprise is expected to invest a total of 2,407 million escudos, as follows: 1,607 million in "self-financing" (*autofinanciamento*); 200 million through private financing companies; and 600 million in development bonds.

63. There are no details available as to how the Territory will raise its share of 750 million escudos to finance the Transitional Development Plan. Already in 1964, when Angola's share of military expenditures was increased by one third over 1963 to 474.4 million escudos (which was double the actual military expenditure in 1962), development expenditure had to be reduced by 10 per cent in the ordinary budget and 5 per cent in the extraordinary budget. However, if the Transitional Development Plan can be realized, the rate of annual investment from all sources will be three times the budgetary allocation for development in 1964.

64. It is reported that the Territory's 1965 budget will provide for an expenditure of almost 4,000 million escudos. Several new taxes have been introduced to meet the generally rising costs of government and the increased burdens of defence and development. A special defence tax introduced in Angola at the end of 1964. This tax will be levied at a graduated rate on all incomes earned in the Territory by individuals or companies, national or foreign, and exceeding 500,000 escudos. As usual, this new tax does not apply to companies and enterprises whose contracts provide specifically for tax exemption privileges, such as, for instance, the Angola Diamond Company. In January 1965, new taxes were imposed on wines, liquified gases, highway transport and some new industries.

65. Closer economic co-operation between Angola, South West Africa and South Africa is being developed

¹¹ Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde are the only three Territories for which external sources are available for financing the Transitional Development Plan. For Angola, a loan of \$US35 million has been obtained for equipment (see para. 25 above).

both by the Governments concerned and by business interests. At the government level, one of the major projects of economic co-operation between Portugal and South Africa is the use of the Kunene River, on which there has been a series of agreements dating back to the 1920's.

66. Under the new agreement signed in October 1964, South Africa will assist in financing a dam on the Kunene River at the cost of R5 million, in return for which South West Africa will have the use of the hydroelectric power generated. South Africa will provide half of the cost of the dam in the form of a direct part-contribution, and the remainder in a twenty-year loan, at the rate of 5 per cent.

67. This new dam forms part of the basic scheme for developing hydroelectric power at Matala. It is reported that the Portuguese Government also intends to raise additional loans in South Africa to finance the power line, costing R2.5 million and a third turbo-generator costing R750,000.

68. In March 1965, South Africa announced the decision to establish a special body, the South West Africa Water and Electricity Commission (SWAWEC), in connexion with the Kunene River project. The Commission will be a subsidiary of the Industrial Development Corporation, which will provide capital for financing the various loans.

69. In the interest of furthering economic co-operation, visits between government and business representatives have increased. The Mayor of Windhoek, for instance, was among the visitors to Angola in 1964. Shortly after his visit, he said in an interview that there were "huge possibilities" for trade between the two Territories, including the supply of plant and machinery by South Africa to Angola. In return, Angola could supply South Africa with raw materials, including coffee. "Angola lacks three things", he is reported to have said, "all of which we could give them for mutual benefit. They are: capital, know-how and organization".

Education

70. There are no official statistics available on schools and school enrolment in Angola for 1963-1964. The latest published data for Angola are for 1962. According, however, to a newspaper report from Lisbon dated 25 January 1965, "By the 1964-1965 school year, there were 150,000 primary- and secondary-school students in Angola." Although the article concludes that there has been a 100 per cent rise over the number of students in 1958, this is not confirmed by official statistics for the 1958-1959 school year, which gave the total at 96,229 (see A/4978).

71. As reported previously (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 142), according to an official Portuguese source, pupil enrolment in Angola on 31 December 1961, amounted to a total of 141,222 in all schools, including pupils in the "pre-primary" or preparatory classes. The new figures in the Lisbon article, if reliable, would indicate that there has been little increase in enrolment over the past three years.

72. Although legislation introduced in February 1964 (*ibid.*, para. 95) made school attendance compulsory for children between the ages of 6 and 12, the full implementation of this depends on the establishment of schools and the provision of teaching staff. Under the Second Development Plan, which ended in 1964, the sums allocated to education were only 27 million

escudos in 1963 and 30 million in 1964. By the end of 1963, actual expenditure on education had been increased to 70 million escudos, but even this was less than the amount spent on the Cela and Kunene River (first phase) settlement schemes.¹²

73. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, the target for expenditure on education is 540 million escudos, or about 7.5 per cent of the total. This means that the average annual investment in education will be more than double the amount spent in 1963 on school buildings and equipment. There is no information yet, however, to indicate what proportions will be spent on rural schools and urban schools respectively.

74. It is also important to ascertain the rate at which the African population is acquiring literacy in Portuguese, since this is one of the two basic conditions for the attainment of the right to vote (see para. 9 above). School attendance data, even if available, would not provide an adequate basis to assess the progress in raising the literacy rate of the African population, since African school children cannot begin formal school instruction until they have acquired proficiency in spoken Portuguese, a training which may require from one to three years in the pre-primary class, in which instruction is to be entirely oral.

75. The new measures to increase opportunities in education, which have been reported above (see para. 42), mainly affect the larger urban areas with school facilities above the primary level. A new development, in 1964 was the establishment of a "crash programme" of English and Afrikaans courses in many cities as a result of increased interest in closer relations with South Africa and South West Africa.

3. Mozambique

Visit of the President of Portugal to Mozambique

76. The President of Portugal, Admiral Américo Thomaz, made an official visit to Mozambique from 23 July to 7 August 1964. It was his second visit to Africa (he visited Angola in 1963) and the first official visit by a Portuguese Head of State to Mozambique in thirteen years.

77. According to official statements, the purpose of the visit was to strengthen Mozambique's sense of identity with what is termed the "great Portuguese family" and to show the world that the Territory was secure and at peace. As proof of this, he travelled widely throughout the Territory and was accompanied by a large corps of Portuguese and foreign journalists who were assured that they could go anywhere and see anything. In numerous speeches, the President emphasized the theme of national unity and said that he had come to Mozambique "to sound out the feelings and fears of the population".

Appointment of the new Governor-General

78. Air Force General José Augusto da Costa Almeida was sworn in as the new Governor-General of Mozambique on 2 June 1964. He replaced Admiral Sarmiento Rodriguez, who had reached the mandatory retirement age in June 1964. The new Governor-General, who was born in Lourenço Marques, combines the duties of Governor-General with that of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

¹² Banco de Angola, *Relatório e Contas, Exercício de 1963*, Lisbon, 1964, pp. 156 and 170.

Defence and security measures

79. As noted in the previous report of the Special Committee (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 78), Portugal was engaged during much of 1964 in strengthening the military defences of Mozambique in anticipation of disturbances. By July 1964, it was reported that there were 25,000 troops stationed in the Territory and there were later reports of further transfers of troops from Angola, bringing the estimated total at the end of the year, according to different sources, to between 35,000 and 40,000. A Reuters report on the military parade held in honour of President Thomaz' arrival noted that the troops appeared to be well-equipped with arms from many countries and were escorted by various types of aircraft.

80. According to reports, military detachments had been placed in all large villages and a civilian militia had been organized. Military defences were said to be particularly strong along the Ruvuma River, where a network of fifty landing strips for fighter bombers had been cut out of the bush and five military air bases established at Palma, Umtamba, Mwiduma, Ngamba, and Muada. It was also reported that the population had been removed from a five to ten-mile strip south of the Ruvuma River. A news report in January 1965 noted the use of napalm bombs during military exercises in this area.

81. In addition to these defensive preparations, the *Star of Johannesburg* of 19 June 1964 reported that the Portuguese secret police, PIDE, frequently launched decoy "rebel movements" with PIDE agents as "organizers" as a means of discovering and arresting dissident elements. The Southern Rhodesia Special Branch (secret police) was reported to be co-operating closely with PIDE, its Portuguese equivalent, in tracking down insurgents in transit to Tanzania, for repatriation to Mozambique.

82. In early 1965, a number of non-Portuguese newspapers carried reports suggesting that there had been large-scale arrests for political reasons following an attempt in December 1964 to place a bomb in the cathedral of Lourenço Marques. These reports were officially denied by the Government which, however, admitted that eight persons had been arrested during December in connexion with the bomb attempt and that on 1 January four well-known intellectuals, among them the editor of a local newspaper, the *Tribuna*, had also been arrested, for political activities.

Outbreak of disturbances

83. Towards the end of September 1964, leaders of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) declared a general armed insurrection in Mozambique, and announced that on the night of 25-26 September, commando groups had infiltrated into the Territory and had linked up to attack Portuguese military emplacements along a 700 mile front. It was also reported about the same time that large numbers of refugees from the northern region of Mozambique were seeking asylum in Tanzania.

84. The first official Portuguese confirmation of insurgent activities was issued in Lisbon by the news agency A.N.I. on 11 October. According to this report and a subsequent government clarification, issued in Lisbon on 13 October, five groups of guerrillas had entered Mozambique from Tanzania. Three of these had been captured and the others located. Among those captured was said to be Lucas Fernandez, de-

scribed as a "terrorist chieftain". The Portuguese clarification denied a report that Portuguese military aircraft had violated Tanzanian air space and accused the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania of training and supplying arms to Mozambique insurgents in its Territory.

85. During the ensuing months, there were various reports of armed clashes between insurgents and Portuguese forces. Most of those occurred in the northern part of the Territory, although incidents were also reported near Vila Gouveia, about 100 miles from the Southern Rhodesian border, at Metangula on Lake Malawi and at Posto Manguéin in the Zambézia district. Further sporadic incidents were reported in November, December and January. A claim by FRELIMO that two Portuguese military airplanes had been shot down was denied by the Portuguese authorities.

86. The incidents in October 1964 were accompanied by a movement of refugees across the Ruvuma River into Tanzania. These refugees, variously reported to number from 5,000 to 10,000 were being cared for by the Tanzanian authorities at camps in Southern Tanzania. This assistance was supplemented by a grant of emergency supplies of food worth about \$US170,000 made in November by the United Nations/FAO World Food Programme.

Economic conditions

87. Mozambique's share in defence costs continued to rise with the increased number of troops in the Territory. In 1964, the Territory's contribution to the expenditure on armed forces amounted to 495.5 million escudos,¹³ of which 382.1 million was allocated for the army, 89.6 million for the air force and 23.8 million for the naval forces. Of these amounts, 195.3 million escudos was to come from Mozambique's ordinary revenue, 178.9 million from the autonomous revenue-producing services, 15.0 million from special funds, 65.5 million from the receipts assigned to the Overseas Military Defence Fund, and 40.8 million was to be derived from the Government's participation in the receipts of the Beira Railway. These amounts, which constitute only part of the total cost of defence, represent about 13 per cent of the Territory's ordinary receipts totalling 3,743.4 million escudos in 1964, an increase of about 3 per cent over the previous year.

88. The budget estimates of Mozambique for 1965 envisage a total expenditure of 3,941.1 million escudos, of which 91.2 million represents extraordinary expenditure. Ordinary receipts are expected to increase by 106.4 million escudos over 1964, the additional revenue to be derived mainly from customs duties and indirect taxation. In December 1964, the Territory received a loan of 379.5 million escudos from Portugal to finance outstanding expenditures under the Second Development Plan 1959-64. This loan is repayable over twenty years, beginning 31 December 1965 with interest at the rate of 4 per cent per annum (Decree Law 46,130 of 31 December 1964).

89. Under the Transitional Development Plan for the period 1965-1967, which was made public in late 1964, 5,400 million escudos, or 37.5 per cent of the total target for the Overseas Territories, is allocated to Mozambique. Compared with the previous development plan for 1959-1964, the rate of investment will be nearly trebled, increasing from an average of 648

¹³ *Portarias* Nos. 20,630-20,632 of 12 June 1964.

million escudos yearly to 1,800 million escudos. As before, the principal allocation is for development of transport and port facilities which, in view of the important transit trade, represent Mozambique's main source of foreign exchange. In other respects, however, the new plan is very different from its predecessor. Whereas the emphasis previously was on infra-structural development, the new plan is more concerned with revenue-producing investments. Thus a major allocation, 1,436 million escudos, or nearly 27 per cent, is for the development of industries, the bulk of it (1,350 million) being earmarked for transforming industries. Agriculture, which under the previous plan had been a major item, receiving over 1,000 million escudos, is allocated only 760 million under the Transitional Development Plan, of which 500 million is to be used for irrigation and settlement projects and 150 million for development of livestock and forestry resources. In addition the Plan contains a new allocation of 328 million escudos for development of fisheries, a field of investment which had previously been largely ignored. The amount allocated for expenditure on education and health is 500 million escudos, or 9.25 per cent of the total, compared with 370 million spent during 1959-1964.

90. A further important aspect of the Transitional Development Plan is the inclusion of targets for foreign loan financing in respect of specific Overseas Territories. In the case of Mozambique, the target for external loans is 1,500 million escudos, or 27.8 per cent of the total, a much smaller percentage than is the case in Angola, where foreign capital already plays a more important role. Other sources of financing for Mozambique, according to targets set in the Plan, are the Government of Portugal, 1,120 million escudos; territorial funds, 750 million escudos; and private investment, 1,680 million escudos. In March 1965, it was reported that the territorial Government had been authorized to raise a local loan of 61 million escudos, repayable in twenty years at one per cent interest to finance extraordinary expenditure.

91. Mozambique suffers from a chronic and steadily growing trade deficit which amounted to 983 million escudos during the first six months of 1964, an increase of 182 million escudos over the corresponding period in 1963. This increased deficit resulted from a 13 per cent rise in the value of imports due to growth in investment and consumer demand, which more than offset a rise in the value of exports from 1,182 million escudos to 1,258 million escudos during the corresponding periods. The growing trade deficit emphasizes the Territory's heavy dependence on revenue from the transit trade of neighbouring territories, but, despite this, Mozambique's balance of payments showed a deficit of 386 million escudos in 1963, which was probably exceeded in 1964. About 80 per cent by value of Mozambique's domestic exports consists of agricultural products, of which the most important up to 1962 were cotton and sugar, accounting for between 30 and 35 per cent of the value of all domestic exports. In recent years, however, there has been a substantial increase in the production of cashew nuts, exports of which, mainly to the United States of America, have more than doubled in the past ten years. In the first five months of 1964, exports of cashew nuts rose to 245.9 million escudos in value, from 157.4 million escudos during the corresponding period in 1963. This performance, coupled with a sharp increase in production of sisal, served to offset a severe decrease in

cotton exports, which dropped from 141.7 million to 64.7 million escudos during the five-month period.

92. There was evidence during 1964 of a strengthening of economic relations with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. In October, three agreements were signed with South Africa which concern Mozambique. These agreements, details of which have not yet been released, related to: (a) commercial relations between the two Territories; (b) the provision of additional cold storage facilities at the port of Lourenço Marques to permit a greater volume of citrus fruit exports from South Africa; (c) the evision of the Mozambique Convention of 11 September 1928, under which African workers are recruited in Mozambique for work in the Transvaal and a guaranteed tonnage of South African exports passes through Lourenço Marques. In the field of private investment, it was reported in the Press that the Anglo-American Corporation, which already has interests in a fishing company in Mozambique (see A/5800/Rev.1 chap. V, para. 165), had acquired a concession to prospect for diamonds through a subsidiary company formed in Portugal and was investigating the possibility of investment in sugar production. The Corporation already has an important financial interest in the Swaziland iron mines, to serve which the railway line from Lourenço Marques to Goba, near the border of Swaziland, was extended under an agreement between the Portuguese and United Kingdom Governments, signed in April 1964.

93. With respect to Southern Rhodesia, discussions held at Salisbury in December 1964-February 1965 between Rhodesian officials and a thirty-nine man technical delegation from Mozambique, resulted in February 1965 in the negotiation of a new trade agreement to replace the previous one with the former Central African Federation. Details of the trade agreement are not yet available. In the meantime, work was completed in December 1964 on the construction of a pipeline to transport crude oil from the port of Beira to the Feruka petroleum refinery at Umtali, in Southern Rhodesia. The pipeline was financed partly by Rhodesian interests at a cost of 360 million escudos and is expected to produce an annual revenue for Mozambique of 138 million escudos.

94. A major new investment in 1964 was the formation of a Portuguese company to develop a new sugar plantation at Maputo, near Lourenço Marques. Tentative projects to establish other sugar plantations are still pending.

Educational conditions

95. It was reported in December 1964 that work had begun on the construction of four new primary schools in the Lourenço Marques, Tete, Niassa and Zambézia districts, at a total cost of 1.9 million escudos, and also on the construction of new elementary technical schools at Tete and Porto Amélia. The latter are being financed under the Territorial Development Plan and are expected to cost about 15 million escudos.

96. The Governor-General of Mozambique officially opened the new Faculty of Science of the Estudos Gerais Universitarios, in Mozambique on 21 April 1964. The new Faculty comprises the Departments of Chemistry, Botany, Biology, Minerology and Physics. Work on the construction of the University City in Lourenço Marques was begun in January 1965. When it is completed, it is believed that residence facilities will be available for about 70 per cent of the student-teachers and technical administrative personnel. Student

enrolment in the University in March 1965 was reported to total 400, of whom 230 were enrolled in the school of engineering, 60 were studying medicine and 60 were following courses in education. The remainder were studying agronomy and veterinary science.

4. Portuguese Guinea

Constitutional and political situation

97. There is no recent information on the constitutional situation in the Territory.

Military developments

98. Since May 1964, the fighting in Portuguese Guinea has intensified. In July, it was reported that the insurgents had cut the Territory in two and that the sea port capital of Bissau had been completely isolated from the Portuguese-held outposts in the Territory.

99. Portuguese troops, which are estimated to total over 20,000, were reported to have been engaged more actively in fighting after the arrival in May 1964 of General Arnaldo Schultz to assume his duties as Governor-General. The intensified fighting in the latter part of 1964 is evident from the long military official bulletins and the numerous localities frequently mentioned. These include many towns within a radius of less than 100 miles from Bissau, in the regions of Binar, Falacunda, Tite and Geba. Continued activities are reported in northern areas south of the Cacheu River, such as Cacheu, Bula, Bissora, Mansaba and Farim. Repeated military activities are reported in the area south west of Buba, including the regions of Catio, the Como Island and the peninsula of Cacine.

100. Towards the end of the year Portuguese military bulletins were not only reporting activities of Portuguese troops but also denying rebel successes reported in their own communiques.

101. In spite of official claims that the situation in the Territory is returning to normal, the Portuguese military bulletin covering the period 7-13 March 1965 reported rebel activities at numerous widely separated points, including areas around the Great Buba River lying south east of the capital, the Cacheu River, which lies between Bissau and the Senegal border, and the Cacine peninsula, in the extreme south west of the Territory.

102. There has been an exodus of refugees into both Senegal and the Republic of Guinea. Between 1 March and 1 August 1964 refugees from Portuguese Guinea in Senegal increased from some 6,000 to over 28,000 and were reported in February 1965 to be still increasing at the rate of 1,000 a month.

Economic conditions

103. The continued fighting since 1963 is reported to have disrupted the economy of the Territory to the extent that some commercial firms are closing down. The Sociedade Comercial Ultramarina was reported last year to have ordered the winding up of its operations and dismissal of its employees and the Companhia União Fabril, more commonly known as CUF, was also reported to be closing down its installations.

104. According to a press report, the large number of troops stationed in the Territory has made it necessary for special imports, which in December included 1.2 million litres of gasoline, 227 thousand kilos of

sugar, 230 thousand kilos of potatoes and 214 thousand litres of wine.

105. The Territory's 1965 ordinary budget estimates, according to a press report, are balanced at 151.75 million escudos. Over 10 per cent of the ordinary revenue is to come from industries subject to special taxes (*Indústrias em regime tributário especial*). The estimates are 9 million more than those for 1963 and over half of this increase (4.8 million) is being paid for by the Ministry for Overseas Territories.

106. Estimated expenditures include 16.4 million escudos for servicing public debt, 47 million escudos (or just under one-third of the total) for the general administration of the Territory (*Administração geral e Fiscalização*); 32 million for development; 22.3 million for general charges and 12 million for "national defence". Since the sums spent on "general administration" for Angola was only about 15 per cent of the total in 1963 and 1964, it appears that the 47 million escudos allocated under this item probably include considerable expenses other than those of a routine nature.

107. The extraordinary budget for 1965 stands at 2.85 million escudos financed from budgetary surpluses. It is to be used for a geological-hydrographic survey and the construction of public buildings.

108. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 the total investment envisaged (180 million escudos) is one of the two lowest (the other being S. Tomé and Príncipe). Although the Territory has approximately the same population, the investment target is only two-thirds of that of Timor.

109. The sums allocated under the Plan to the principal sections have been given in paragraph 35 above. It may be seen that as far as the Territory is concerned the two most important areas of investment are agricultural and social development. The principal agricultural allocations are for the improvement of 4,000 hectares for rice growing; 1,000 hectares for manioc; 5,000 hectares of oil palms (*Palmeira-do azeite*); 10,000 hectares of bananas; and 10,000 hectares of cashew.¹⁴ Two-thirds of the investment in social improvements is for health and welfare and only 10 million escudos are envisaged for education, which gives approximately an investment of 20 escudos (less than \$US1) per inhabitant over the three-year period.

110. In January 1965 it was reported in the Press that the Secretary-General for the Territory had made a plea in the Portuguese National Assembly (in which he is a deputy) that more assistance be given to promote the Territory's economic and social development. He said that Portuguese Guinea had not been given the same benefits as Timor and Cape Verde (500 million escudos) in the Transitional Development Plan, and he pointed out that the Territory "lacked doctors, engineers and technicians". He said that salaries were also lower than in other Territories under Portuguese administration and that the cost of living was higher.

5. Cape Verde

Recent developments

111. There is no recent information on the constitutional and political situation in the Territory.

¹⁴ As reported previously, almost all the Territory's exports go to Portugal.

112. In 1964 there was renewed interest in developing the fisheries potential of the Territory. According to newspaper reports, Krupp has shown interest in obtaining a fishing concession in Cape Verde and has plans to build a refrigeration plant for the export of frozen fish to the Federal Republic of Germany and West Africa.

113. Under the Transitional Development Plan which was adopted at the end of 1964 (see para. 35 above), 258 million escudos, or more than half the investment target of 500 million escudos for Cape Verde, is allocated to fisheries development. Of the total investment target, half is to be financed by Portugal and half by external loans. According to official information, the investments in fisheries will be used to stimulate the national exploitation of marine resources, to modernize the existing fishing fleet, to build new plant and equipment, including cold storage facilities, and to renovate existing installations.

114. The Transitional Development Plan also envisages an investment of 70 million escudos in transport and communications; 50 million escudos are allocated to social development and 42 million escudos to agriculture. Of the investments for social development, 18 million escudos will be used for education and 30 million for public health.

115. The overwhelming concentration on fisheries represents a new orientation in the economic development of the Territory. As reported previously (see A/AC.108/I.10, para. 82), until the First National Development Plan was put into effect in 1953, there had been no consensus about the future potential of the islands; some economists were even said to be completely pessimistic as to their future because of the high rate of emigration and the general state of the economy. Nevertheless, the First and Second Development Plans both gave priority to agricultural production for export and to the improvement of ports, harbours and road construction. In the Second Development Plan only 5.5 million escudos were allocated to fisheries, representing 2.6 per cent of the total investments under the Plan.

116. Expenditure for development has been accelerated since 1960. In 1964 special loans were provided from Portugal to complete various projects under the Second Development Plan. These loans (granted under Decree 42,479 of 31 August 1959) included 7.8 million escudos for roads and 18.3 million escudos for ports and harbours, and are repayable after seven years at an interest rate of 3 per cent per annum.

117. It is reported that the Territory's budget estimates for 1965 total 84.7 million escudos, of which 82 million represents expenditure under the ordinary budget and 2.7 million represents expenditure under the extraordinary budget. About one-fifth of the revenue is derived from the Territory's autonomous services, which include the ports and the steamships.

6. São Tomé and Príncipe

Recent developments

118. There is no recent information on the constitutional and political situation in São Tomé and Príncipe.

119. The Transitional Development Plan (see para. 35 above) provides for a total investment of 180 million escudos in São Tomé and Príncipe. This represents a

per capita investment over the three-year period of approximately 2,000 escudos, or 650 escudos, per year, and is considerably more than that for Portuguese Guinea, which is less than 100 escudos per year.

120. The major emphasis in the Transitional Development Plan is on transport and communication, for which the target investment is 42.5 million escudos, including 30 million escudos for roads, 1 million for ports and navigation, 9 million for telecommunications. The next largest investment is for agriculture, followed by 25 million escudos for surveys and studies of national resources.

121. Almost half of the amount to be spent on agriculture is for a scheme for the settlement of independent farmers, some of whom will be brought from Cape Verde. The plan is to settle a nucleus of 50 families in two different locations in 1965, 100 families in 1966 and another 150 families in 1967. Special importance is attached to this scheme as a means of solving the chronic labour shortage on the island (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 205 and 206), especially on the large cocoa plantation belonging to absentee landlords.

122. As reported previously (*ibid.*, para. 208), the airport facilities at São Tomé have been expanded since 1964 to accommodate increased traffic and troop movements from Portugal to the Territories in Africa. In September 1964 a Government order made Angola and Mozambique each responsible for 43 per cent of the 4 million escudos annual expenses for maintenance and operation of the airport. The remaining 14 per cent will be financed by the Territory.

123. With the coming to an end of the Second Development Plan, expenditures were accelerated in 1964 to complete some of the projects. Special allocations of funds were made for this purpose including 2 million escudos for land surveys, 3.3 million escudos for a stereo-photo survey, 8.5 million escudos for the development of electricity and transport and 7.1 million escudos for equipment for the hydroelectric scheme on the Contado River which is to be spent over the period 1964-1967.

7. Macau

Recent developments

124. There is no recent information on the political and constitutional situation in Macau.

125. After undergoing a period of change (see A/AC.108/L.12, para. 60), the economy of Macau is now being stabilized and developed on the basis of manufacturing industries and, more particularly, tourism. Regular visitors from Hong Kong have increased to the extent that in May 1964 a hydrofoil service was introduced with ten trips daily to Macau. Additional ferries were being added in 1964 to bring the capacity up to two thousand passengers daily.

126. Substantial investments are to be made under the Transitional Development Plan (see para. 35 above) to develop tourism. Of the total investment target of 660 million escudos, 198 million escudos are allocated for the tourist industry and 194 million escudos for the development of transport facilities. In addition, 114 million escudos will be invested in housing, while education, which has always been provided mainly by the Chinese community in private schools, will receive an allocation of only 7 million escudos.

127. According to a press report, a new agreement has been signed with a Hong Kong group for the hotels concession. The conditions of the concession are: (a) an annual payment of 3 million pataca¹⁵ to be raised to 3.5 million within three years; (b) the construction of a new hotel, casino and additional facilities for transport to and from Hong Kong; (c) financing of the harbour dredging operations; (d) reinvestment of 90 per cent of the profits within the Territory; (e) investment of the balance of the profits in welfare activities.

8. Timor

Recent developments

128. There is no recent information on the constitutional and political situation in Timor.

129. Because of its distance from Portugal, transport and communications are of special importance to the Territory. Under the Transitional Development Plan (see para. 35 above), 100 million escudos, more than one-third of the total investment target for Timor, is to be devoted to the development of transport and communications. Of this sum, 45 million escudos is allocated to air transport and airports, 30 million escudos to ports and shipping, 20 million escudos to roads and 5 million escudos to telecommunications.

130. Other allocations under the Plan (in millions of escudos) are: extractive industries, 12; transforming industries, 9; agricultural surveys and studies, 12; development of resources, 27; fisheries, 10; energy resources, 8; education, 21; public health, 18.

131. Compared with the Second National Development Plan (A/AC.108/L.13, table 7), the principal change is the new allocation for development of extractive industries. The envisaged investment is probably related to the new mining concession that was granted in September 1964 to the Sociedade Agricola Pátria e Trabalho, Limitada. The company obtained an exclusive licence to prospect for copper, iron, manganese, magnetite and zirconium. The concession is for an initial period of three years and is renewable for two more years if all terms of the contract are fulfilled. Mining rights in respect of deposits pegged will be for an initial period of seventy years and renewable for an additional twenty years. The company is authorized to establish a transforming plant within five years of the commencement of extracting operations.

132. During 1964, a number of special allocations were made for the completion of projects under the Second Development Plan. These included 8.5 million escudos for the airport. In addition 21.3 million escudos were made available as a development loan from Portugal, of which 6 million was for the Port of Dili, 6 million for communications, 2.3 million for schools and 1.9 million for public health.

133. Among other special measures taken in 1964 were the establishment of a road maintenance fund, for the revenue of which new taxes were imposed on gasoline imports, and the establishment of an agricultural credit fund, with an initial capital of 10 million escudos to provide medium and long-term loans to agriculture and special short-term loans to help in establishing working funds.

B. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE¹⁶

Introduction

134. The Special Committee considered the Territories under Portuguese administration at its 345th, 346th, 350th to 356th, 359th, 361st to 363rd, 368th and 369th meetings held in Africa between 28 May 1965 and 16 June 1965.

135. On the question of refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration, the Special Committee had before it a note by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/L.212) concerning the situation with regard to refugees from Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique and Angola, and the measures taken to extend medical and other assistance to them by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and specialized agencies concerned in response to operative paragraph 5 of the resolution on the Territories under Portuguese administration adopted by the Special Committee on 3 July 1964 (A/AC.109/90).

Written petitions and hearings

136. The Special Committee circulated the following written petitions concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration.¹⁷

| Petitioner | Document No |
|--|-------------------------------|
| <i>Angola</i> | |
| Mr. Luís Ranque Franque, President, Front pour la Libération de l'Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) | A/AC.109/PET.337 |
| Mr. Carlos Gonçalves Cambando, Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE) | A/AC.109/PET.376 |
| Messrs. S. K. Njocomba, D. K. Mapulanga, S. G. Chata and W. G. Ndumba, on behalf of Angolan refugees in Zambia | A/AC.109/PET.397 |
| Mr. Adão José Domingos Kapi-lango, Chief Representative, União das Populações de Angola (UPA) | A/AC.109/PET.398 and Add. 1 |
| Mr. Anibal de Melo, representative, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) | A/AC.109/PET.399 and Add. 1 |
| Messrs. Kassongo Paul and John Victor, Union nationale angolaise (UNA) | A/AC.109/PET.401 |
| Messrs. Lukoki Lunzinga, Founder, Muanza Fernandes, Adviser, and Tshingani Mingiedi, Secretary, on behalf of the Ntobako Angola .. | A/AC.109/PET.416 |
| Mr. François Lele, General Chairman, and two other members of the Ntobako Angola | A/AC.109/PET.416/ Add.1 and 2 |
| Mr. Marcos Kassanga, member of the Commissio. Nationale Exécutive, Conseil du Peuple Angolais (CPA) | A/AC.109/PET.421 |

¹⁶ See also Chapter II of the present report (Meetings held in Africa) for an account of the discussion on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 373rd meeting on 18 June 1965 concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Southern Rhodesia, Territories under Portuguese administration, South West Africa, and Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.

¹⁷ The following written petitions were circulated after the Special Committee had completed its consideration of the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration: A/AC.109/PET.365/Add.1, A/AC.109/PET.411, A/AC.109/PET.416 and Add.1 and 2, A/AC.109/PET.421, A/AC.109/PET.424 and A/AC.109/PET.425.

¹⁵ 1 pataca equals \$HK 1.00 or 5.5 escudos.

| Petitioner | Document No | Petitioner | Meeting |
|---|-----------------------------|--|----------------------|
| Mr. Francisco Thomaz and others, on behalf of the Nto-Bako Angola Associacao dos Conguenses da Expressao Portuguesa, Ngwizani a Kongo | A/AC.109/PET.424 | Vice-President; Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) A/AC.109/PET.396/Add.1) | 350th-356th meetings |
| <i>Mozambique</i> | | <i>Portuguese Guinea</i> | |
| Messrs. Mathew S. Kambezo and D. L. Maibeki, Mozambique African National Congress (MANC) | A/AC.109/PET.364 | Dr. Amilcar Cabral, Secretary General, Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) ¹⁸ (A/AC.109/PET.411) | 368th-369th meetings |
| Mr. Zarica J. Sakupwanya, Secretary, Comité Preparatório do Congresso Constitucional do Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO) | A/AC.109/PET.392 | <i>Petitioners concerning Angola</i> | |
| Mr. Eduardo Mondlane, President, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) | A/AC.109/PET.396 and Add. 1 | 138. Mr. Muliata, speaking on behalf of Angolan Refugees in Zambia, said that Portuguese rule could not be compared with other European colonial régimes in Africa. In South Africa and Rhodesia, where the Governments were known to be oppressive, Africans still had a limited freedom of political expression. In Angola the case was completely different. Africans there had been denied freedom of expression since the beginning of colonial rule. There had been a military build-up throughout the colony. In every administrative centre there was a military camp whose task was to stamp out any political reform in the villages. People were not allowed to move from one district to another without permission. Angolans found it extremely difficult to fight for their freedom since, once an African was suspected of political activities, he was arrested and liquidated. Consequently nationalists were obliged to organize the struggle from outside Angola. | |
| <i>Portuguese Guinea</i> | | | |
| Dr. Amilcar Cabral, General Secretary, Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) | A/AC.109/PET.411 | 139. With regard to education and health facilities in Angola, he pointed out that the Government had built no schools for African children in rural areas. The few schools that existed were conducted by missionaries acting under Government control. There was no government health service, so that people still depended on primitive ways of treating and curing diseases. Africans were not allowed to possess radios. Social gatherings could not be held without a special licence. The people were not allowed to practise their traditional customs. | |
| <i>Cape Verde Archipelago</i> | | | |
| Mr. F. de Mello e Castro, President, Mouvement de Libération des Iles du Cap-Vert (MLICV) | A/AC.109/PET.356 | | |
| <i>São Tomé and Príncipe</i> | | | |
| Mr. Miguel Trovoada, President, Comité de Libertação de S. Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP) | A/AC.109/PET.365 and Add. 1 | | |

137. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea:

| Petitioner | Meeting |
|--|----------------------|
| <i>Angola</i> | |
| Mr. Lufuino M. Muliata and Mr. S. K. Njolomba, on behalf of Angolan refugees in Zambia (A/AC.109/PET. 397) | 346th meeting |
| Mr. Adão José Domingos Kapilango, Chief representative, União das Populações de Angola (UPA) (A/AC.109/PET.398) | 346th meeting |
| Mr. Anibal de Melo, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) (A/AC.109/PET.399) . | 346th meeting |
| Mr. Marcos Kassanga, member of the Commission Nationale Exécutive, Conseil du Peuple Angolais (CPA) ¹⁸ | 387th meeting |
| <i>Mozambique</i> | |
| Mr. Zarica J. Sakupwanya, Secretary, Comité Preparatório do Congresso Constitucional do Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO) (A/AC.109/PET. 392) | 345th-346th meetings |
| Messrs. Eduardo C. Mondlane, President; Lazaro Kavandame, Member of the Central Committee, Mateus Muthemba, and Uria Simango, | |

¹⁸ This petitioner was heard after the Special Committee had adopted a resolution on the Territories under Portuguese administration (A/AC.109/124 and Corr.1) at its 363rd meeting on 10 June 1965.

140. In the cultural field, the Portuguese had introduced a policy of "assimilation", which in fact meant absorption. The entire aim of that policy was to make the Africans abandon their own culture and regard themselves as Portuguese citizens. Under that disguise, the Portuguese pretended not to practise colour discrimination. The policy of assimilation was further advanced by marrying African girls to whites in order to produce mulattoes who, because of their good knowledge of Portuguese, automatically became Portuguese citizens. Politically speaking, the policy of assimilation was much more dangerous than *apartheid* or the Land Apportionment Act of Rhodesia. Its aim was the complete extermination of the African race. African children were taught the history and geography of Portugal and told that they were Portuguese.

141. Economically, Angola had rich natural resources which the Portuguese had failed to exploit because Portugal itself was economically a very poor country. In addition, the Portuguese feared that if other countries invested money in Angola, it would lead to the rapid advancement of Africans and consequently to political reforms. In more than 400 years the Portuguese had done practically nothing to develop Angola and its people. Instead they had imposed high taxes and failed to provide employment. No African was allowed to conduct a business; the African existed solely for purposes of exploitation.

142. In Angola, Africans had always been treated like beasts of burden. They could be beaten mercilessly and driven into forced labour. As a result, millions of Angolans had sought refuge in neighbouring countries. More than one million had fled to the Congo and about 500,000 to Zambia, Rhodesia, Bechuanaland and South West Africa. In addition, 250,000 had been slain by the armed forces. Massacres and atrocities were everyday events.

143. Angola was part of Africa, and the freedom of other African countries would be meaningless while their neighbours continued to be exploited and maltreated by white minorities. He therefore appealed to the Special Committee to arrange visits to the colonized as well as the independent countries; to continue its welfare work on behalf of refugees and help them to escape from their refugee status; to request Portugal to withdraw its troops from Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea; to request the United Kingdom and the United States of America to stop giving military aid to Portugal, and to request Portugal to allow Africans to choose their own government.

144. Replying to a question, Mr. Njolomba, who also represented Angolan refugees in Zambia, said that there were approximately 350,000 Europeans in Angola. They occupied all the administrative posts in the entire country.

145. Mr. Kapilango, on behalf of the UPA, informed the Special Committee that the UPA was founded on the liberation of the people of Angola from the colonialist system and accession to independence. In his statement, which was circulated by the Special Committee as a written petition (A/AC.109/PET.398/Add.1), he indicated that the disturbances in Angola would not cease until the Portuguese colonial authorities put an end to the colonial system and that the Europeans must understand and recognize that the liberation movement being carried out was not directed against them or their property, but against the system of exploitation and servitude. He hoped that the Special Committee would help his people and that an end would be put to the criminal acts of the Salazar Government. Their war was just, because it was a war of national liberation. If the colonizing Governments understood their aspirations, agreement was possible; otherwise they would be obliged to consider the colonizers as the enemies of their emancipation.

146. Salazar's army was supported by certain imperialist Powers which enabled Portugal to continue to exploit their national resources and exterminate the people. The Angola nationalists were at that moment being slaughtered by the bullets of Salazar's soldiers and many political and non-political prisoners still languished in the foul prisons of Salazar. Some prisoners were subject to a system of undernourishment and received food only once a week; on other days they were given 300 grs. of water with 250 grs. of sea salt three times a day.

147. Portugal had increased the tax for the defence of Angola; according to official figures, it was costing Portugal about \$166 million per year. He added that NATO was furnishing arms used by the Portuguese soldiers as well as incendiary bombs.

148. Regarding education, Mr. Kapilango said that the situation in Angola was deplorable; tuition charges were much too high and there was a shortage of teachers and elementary schoolmasters. The position of the workers was particularly bad; out of an African

population of more than 4,500,000, some 15,000 earned their living in the normal way. Two million Africans were subjected to what amounted to forced labour in agriculture, mines and coffee plantations. The capital invested in Angola came mainly from the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium, and was chiefly in the hands of large mining companies producing copper and iron.

149. Mr. de Melo, speaking on behalf of the MPLA, stated that the problem of Angola had never been so serious. He had brought with him a group of refugees who had recently fled from Angola and could testify to the truth of the information he gave. He saw the Special Committee's arrival in Africa as a gesture of reassurance for the oppressed peoples, since their faith in a final victory rested largely on the Special Committee's activities. After five years of struggle, he had no need to dwell on the familiar aspects of the Angolan problem: the enslaving of workers, corruption, massacres and mass deportations, the barefaced exploitation of Angola's wealth and a social and political situation unparalleled on African soil. He stressed the determination of the Angolan people, who were resolved to regain their most sacred rights in the face of the Salazar Government's fascism. In his view, the integration of which the Portuguese spoke amounted in fact to the absorption of Angola's vital energies. It was not possible to speak of integration in a territory where genocide was practised daily, or to speak of peace when the Portuguese newspapers themselves made daily mention of soldiers killed in battle. The liberation movement could not be reversed, for day after day more Angolans came to join the freedom fighters. The armed struggle had lost none of its intensity. When the MPLA had been expelled from Leopoldville, it had naturally gone through a difficult period, but since its reorganization at Brazzaville it had found its impetus again and stepped up its activities. There were still about 300,000 refugees and over 500,000 emigrants in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; he did not have figures on Angolan refugees in other areas.

150. Several strategic and economic objectives in Angola had been destroyed recently and more than 150 soldiers had been put out of action. Many weapons had been captured and some areas were under the control of the MPLA, whose guerrilla forces were growing daily. He emphasized that the MPLA was the only organization which had set itself up inside Angola; moreover, the guerrillas to the north of the capital were directed by a member of the political bureau of the MPLA. In 1964, the area assembly organized in that region had enabled more than 2,000 loyal MPLA members to gather. Furthermore, the MPLA, in addition to its political and military activities, was active in the social sphere and concerned itself, among other matters, with the refugees.

151. He pointed out that Mr. Salazar had just concluded a military pact with Mr. Ian Smith and that the presence of South African elements in the Portuguese Army had been noted on several occasions. Mr. Salazar had held a number of talks with the authorities in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The Portuguese newspapers had themselves referred to the Smith-Salazar military pact.

152. A new factor in the colonialists' racist policy was the communion of the racists with the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium with a view to gaining possession of Angola's resources, even at the cost

of the complete extermination of the African population. Portugal, in a recently floated loan, had succeeded in procuring the following amounts: the Federal Republic of Germany had lent 1,000 million, a United States bank 2,000 million, the French Foreign Trade Bank nearly 1,000 million, a consortium of United States banks almost 1,000 million and another United States bank 500 million. Moreover, in a recent speech in the Portuguese National Assembly, a member of the Portuguese Army had boasted of receiving money from NATO.

153. As far as the number of victims of the Salazar régime was concerned, it was extremely difficult to give figures because many people disappeared every day and it was not known whether they had been killed, imprisoned or deported. After the events of 4 February the Portuguese had embarked on a campaign for the mass liquidation of Africans, during which more than 50,000 Angolans had perished. In order to discover the exact number of victims, however, the rivers of Angola would have to be dredged and the forests scoured; he related how the Portuguese settlers loaded their lorries with Africans on the pretext of going to welcome some official or other, and then shot them once they arrived at the river bank. He said that the Portuguese forces numbered about 60,000.

154. Mr. de Melo considered that the Special Committee should unequivocally condemn those Powers which contributed directly or indirectly to the maintenance of racial discrimination in the territories under Portuguese rule and should recommend strong and effective sanctions against Portugal.

155. Mr. Kassanga, speaking on behalf of the Conseil du peuple angolais, said that the Angolan people placed all their hopes in the United Nations, which should defend the weak peoples against those who sought to dominate them. The United Nations had been established, after the victory over the Axis Powers, in order to ensure peace in the world and to prevent the reappearance of a movement such as nazism, but Portuguese colonialism was a thousand times worse than nazism. Powers which had formed an alliance to fight nazism and fascism were now giving moral and material support to Portuguese colonialism, which oppressed the defenceless Angolan people, whose only crime was to dare to demand freedom, equality and social justice.

156. In its struggle against the oppressors, the Angolan people had learned to recognize their true friends as well as their enemies. In order to sow confusion in the ranks of those who were fighting for freedom, the Portuguese colonialists had placed men who were in their pay at the head of certain organizations. For example, an Angolan leader who a few years previously had spoken before the Special Committee to denounce the imperialist ambitions of the colonial Power had subsequently become a docile tool of that Power, which was using him to try to establish in Africa an empire which would encompass northern Angola, part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and part of the Republic of the Congo. During the armed uprising of 1961, the Association of South African Students in Europe, through its Belgian branch, had supplied financial aid to certain reactionary Angolan groups in order to encourage them to wreck the liberation movement. Those who wished to aid the Angolan peoples to free themselves from colonial domination should beware of those false friends and should support only the truly revolutionary organizations such as the

Conseil du peuple angolais, which grouped several Angolan organizations, the principal one being the União Nacional Angolana (UNA).

157. UNA, which had originally been known as the União dos Naturais do Angol (UNATA), had been founded in 1948, at the time of the revolt of the people of Benguela and Bie-Cuando-Cubango. UNATA had led the revolt against the Portuguese colonial administration, during which scores of people had lost their lives. As a result of Portuguese military intervention the revolt had been stifled and many patriots, including the tribal chief Kassela, had been arrested and imprisoned. Chief Kassela and his lieutenants had subsequently been transferred to Portugal and their fate was unknown.

158. From that moment UNATA had begun to reorganize in southern Angola, which was the richest part of the Territory. Despite the vigilance of the Portuguese authorities, it had secretly held its first national conference of leaders in 1956, in the province of Benguela, to draw up its statutes and prepare its programme of action for the liberation of Angola. In 1958, the Central Committee of UNATA had addressed a manifesto to the Portuguese colonial Government proposing that the Angolan problem should be solved by peaceful means in order to prevent the situation, which was already explosive, from becoming more serious. By way of reply, the Portuguese authorities had carried out a mass arrest of the organization's leaders.

159. Between 1958 and 1961, the activities of UNATA had been limited to the interior of the country, owing to the troubled situation prevailing at that time in Northern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Katanga, territories where Angolan patriots could normally have found refuge. After calm had been restored in Katanga, UNATA had convened its second national conference of leaders, which had been held at Elisabethville in July 1963, to approve the statutes and programme drawn up by the Central Committee. It had been at that conference, which had been attended also by representatives of the Union des femmes angolaises (UMA) and the Mouvement national de la jeunesse angolaise (JUNA), that the organization had adopted the name União Nacional Angolana (UNA) and the present National Executive Council had been elected. From that time on, UNA had extended its activities to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to Northern Rhodesia and to the Congo (Brazzaville). The organization's headquarters, which had first been situated in Leopoldville, had been transferred to Brazzaville in October 1963, but since Mr. Tshombé's Government had shown great understanding of the Angolan problem and had permitted UNA to resume its activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the headquarters of the organization had been established at Leopoldville once again.

160. During the first days of its activity in that country, UNA had launched a solemn appeal to all Angolan political and non-political organizations, to all Angolans residing in the country or abroad, to all tribal chiefs and to representatives of all Angolan circles, inviting them to join forces to speed the liberation of the Territory. On 4 April 1965 a great sovereign, plenary assembly of the Angolan people had been held at Leopoldville, attended by more than 250 delegates representing the different regions of Angola and all sectors of the population. The participants at the assembly had decided to found the first united

organization of militant Angolans, the Conseil du peuple angolais (CPA).

161. A crowd estimated at 30,000 persons had attended the public meeting held on 4 April 1965 at Bock Park at Leopoldville, during which a manifesto had been adopted stating that for four years the struggle for the liberation of Angola had resulted only in misery, despair, and suffering, owing to a lack of systematic organization and unity among the various Angolan political organizations and trade unions. The leaders of those organizations had sought to satisfy their personal ambitions to the detriment of the Angolan cause and all attempts at reconciliation had failed. Under the direction of leaders in whom they had confidence the Angolan people had therefore decided to establish CPA, whose aims were to free the Angolan liberation movement of all elements hampering the Angolan people in the achievement of their legitimate aspirations, to place at the head of the movement Angolans who were concerned with the people's future, to reorganize the national liberation struggle so as to force the Portuguese colonial Government to recognize the Angolan people's right to self-determination and independence, to free Angola and to build a great Angolan nation in prosperity, peace and harmony, to implement the principles of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and to strengthen the unity of Africa so as to ensure the peace and prosperity of its peoples, and to collaborate with all countries favouring peace and social justice in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

162. The CPA had launched an appeal to all Angolans to rally round it. That was the last chance for the liberation of the Territory. For four years the struggle had been handicapped by the actions of demagogues and adventurers, and world public opinion should no longer support individuals but the struggling people who had united round CPA. In addition to the representatives of the various sectors of the Angolan people, the leaders of the following organizations had fully and publicly endorsed all the decisions of the sovereign plenary assembly of the people: the Comité de l'unité nationale angolaise (CUNA); the Union nationale angolaise (UNA); the Union générale des travailleurs angolais (UGTA); the Mouvement national de la jeunesse angolaise (JUNA) and the Union des femmes angolaises (UMA). From the moment that it had been established, CPA had completely changed the atmosphere of the Angolese struggle. All those who had been uncertain about the road to follow now knew that there was an organization which was capable of freeing Angola from Portuguese slavery. Day after day more people were joining CPA, individually or in groups, for they realized that in the past they had been, consciously or unconsciously, tributaries of Portuguese colonialism. For example, in March 1965 Major Armindo Freitas, supported by a number of officers and men of the Armée de libération nationale de l'Angola (ALNA), had told the Press that he was joining CPA and had invited the others to follow him. In June, the Ligue générale des travailleurs de l'Angola (LGTA), followed shortly afterwards by the Service d'assistance aux réfugiés angolais (SARA), had joined the organization. Lastly, the entire Armée de libération nationale de l'Angole, with Alexandre Taty, responsible for armaments, had joined CPA. The Portuguese colonialists had endeavoured to sow dissension among them. They had tried to discredit Alexandre Taty but

fortunately he had retained both control of the military situation and the unconditional support of the Armée de libération nationale de l'Angola.

163. It could therefore be said that CPA was now the Government of the Republic of Angola in arms, since it comprised the most representative Angolese organizations. The CUNA was very popular in the north of the country and UNA grouped together all the peasant masses of the centre and the south. Apart from organizations members of CPA, there was no organization which was really representative on a national scale, since all other organizations were formed on a regional, tribal or racial basis. Consequently, any formula other than that of uniting round CPA would be tantamount to sabotage of the Angolese struggle.

164. The CPA had as its supreme organ a people's National Advisory Commission composed of delegates from member organizations and representatives of the various strata of the population. The Commission drew up the programme of CPA, which was carried out by the National Executive Commission, composed of a chairman and various departments responsible for administration, finance, social affairs and so forth. It was at present headed by Chief André Kassinda, who was General Chairman of UNA, while the National Advisory Commission was headed by the leader of CUNA.

165. It could be said that the struggle against Portuguese colonialism in Angola had only just begun. The CPA was training Angolan cadres and providing assistance for refugees. Several clinics had been set up on the frontier between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola to help refugees. A school for Angolan cadres had been opened at Benseke-Futi, in the Congo, at which various subjects were taught and which was also a school of military instruction. The CPA was thus preparing itself for a long and hard struggle.

166. All those who wished were invited by CPA to visit the area to see for themselves that the unity of action so far achieved by CPA was really based on the aspirations of the Angolan masses. It was a tangible unity, based on the suffering people, and not something evolved by ambitious individuals around a conference table.

167. The Portuguese colonial Government was carrying on a defamatory campaign against CPA. Anxious to know the truth about the situation, the secretariat of OAU had sent a delegation headed by Mr. Pagnon, Assistant Secretary-General of OAU, to Leopoldville in August 1965. It was to be hoped that the conclusions of the inquiry carried out by Mr. Pagnon would make it possible for some countries members of OAU to rectify certain mistakes which they might have made in the past.

168. The CPA had proved to international opinion that the Portuguese Government had signed a co-operation agreement with certain Angolan leaders who were wrongly reputed to be revolutionaries. Under that agreement the Press was given false reports on alleged military operations carried out in Angola by those wretched individuals. The fact was that there was not a single member of the Armée de libération nationale de l'Angola at present under the orders of those false leaders who had taken shelter in the Congo; the leaders who had remained in Angola were under the orders of CPA.

169. The CPA would not ask the Special Committee to adopt a resolution against the Portuguese Govern-

ment, for that Government would reject any resolution, as it had rejected the earlier resolutions. The CPA did, however, request the Special Committee to ensure that Member States, and in particular the Afro-Asian countries, would hear the voice of CPA, which was the voice of martyred Angola, in order that those countries might do all in their power to discourage any enterprise which served the interests of Portuguese colonialism and might give CPA their unconditional support.

Petitions concerning Mozambique

170. Mr. Sakupwanya, speaking on behalf of COREMO, said he would like to address the Special Committee on behalf of the nationalist movements leading the struggle for the emancipation of the oppressed African people of Mozambique and of the hundreds of refugees in Zambia. For over 450 years Portugal had held on to Mozambique and had ruthlessly suppressed the indigenous inhabitants of the colony, not only subjugating and exploiting them economically but endeavouring to wreck their culture and reduce them to a position of inferiority. COREMO was anxious that the facts should be brought before the Security Council so as to divert the tide of popular uprising which had become the only solution if the oppressed people of Mozambique were to regain their human dignity within the present generation.

171. In spite of Portugal's insistence that Mozambique was an extension of Portugal, that never was and never would be true. The very phrase "Overseas Province" reflected political-administrative discrimination, and was geographically meaningless. The African had never had access to the higher positions in the legislative or executive branches of Portuguese public administrations.

172. Education was one of the fundamental aspects of civilized life. Yet the laws enacted by the so-called "Portuguese Civilizing Mission" made a mockery of education for the Mozambique African. The backbone of education—the family—was disrupted by the *shibalo* or forced labour system, whereby the mother was forced to toil in the fields, leaving the children without anyone to care for them. In Mozambique, 98 per cent of the African population was illiterate. Two types of education were provided—the "elementary" schools, and the "rudimentary" schools, under the Roman Catholic missions, for Africans only. African children under eight years of age were not admitted to schools. At the end of the three years' course, children who passed an examination were entitled to start at the third-year level of a public or mission primary school. It was against the law to use an African language except for religious instruction, which, along with Portuguese history, was considered the most important school subject. There was no teaching of personal or public hygiene adapted to African conditions, or the prevention of tropical diseases.

173. In the social field, the indigenous population was not admitted to hotels, restaurants or other places of public entertainment. The Portuguese claimed that Mozambique was a province, yet there were customs barriers and a passport was required for travelling between Mozambique and Lisbon.

174. Some of the colonial laws enacted by Portugal were good and vindicated the rights of the African population; unfortunately, they had never been brought into force; and there was similar discrimination

in regard to judicial matters, hospitals, etc. There were special courts to try the Africans, while the white settlers were tried in the regular courts.

175. The large companies operating in Mozambique belonged to the British, Belgians and Americans, who ran them with the help of the Portuguese Government, using cheap labour from Mozambique. The convention of 1928, which allowed agents of the mining companies to recruit up to 800,000 Africans annually, and established that 47.5 per cent of the sea traffic to and from the Transvaal should pass through the port of Lourenço Marques, brought a highly profitable business to the colonial Government of Portugal, but at the same time it brought misery, suffering and exploitation to the African people in their own country.

176. When the independence of the United Republic of Tanzania was proclaimed, the Portuguese security police (PIDE) had started a new wave of terror, imprisonment and torture. Many freedom fighters were still in PIDE's torture-chambers. It was hard to escape the conclusion that a well-planned genocide operation was being conducted by the Portuguese colonial régime on the innocent and unarmed Africans of Mozambique with the aid of the NATO Powers. Thanks to that aid, Portugal had been able during the past five years to construct eight new military bases and to maintain some 40,000 troops. The colonial Government of Portugal was also backed by the fascist Government of South Africa and the white settler minority Government of Rhodesia, their aim being to stamp out the liberation movement of the Africans and to entrench colonialism and imperialism. He cited instances of individuals and groups taken by PIDE and tortured for alleged political offences.

177. Taxation was yet another burden on the Africans of Mozambique: the hut, professional, water, excise, medical and other taxes tended to destroy the foundations of life and morals.

178. For almost five centuries the Portuguese had deliberately created conflicts between tribes. Religion had been used for the purpose of dividing the people and intrigues had been fomented in order to perpetuate Portuguese domination. The colonial régime imposed upon the people was an insult to Mozambique for the people had been reduced to servitude and were gradually being liquidated. Since the beginning of the colonial period there had been no change in the Portuguese policy of extermination. A ruinous tax system threatened the very life of the people. The situation in Mozambique was characterized by forced labour, unemployment, imprisonment, massacres and high taxation.

179. He appealed to the Committee to let the world know of the people's plight before Mozambique became a vast graveyard and so that when the people took matters into their own hands world opinion would not be against them. He asked the Special Committee to pass a resolution condemning Portugal and calling upon all countries to annul their treaty agreements with Portugal and to withhold aid so that Portugal would be forced to withdraw from the African continent. Racial conflict in the southern portions of Africa was a threat to world peace, and it was up to the United Nations to take immediate steps to avert bloodshed. The only way to put an end to a disgraceful situation was by immediately granting complete independence to Mozambique.

180. Mr. Mondlane, speaking on behalf of FRELIMO, said that the Central Committee of

FRELIMO had sent a delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in order to announce that the armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique had already started, to explain why it had been necessary to resort to force, and to appeal for support from the United Nations and its Members. The sudden adjournment of the General Assembly had made it impossible to present the petition, but the Central Committee welcomed the opportunity of presenting it to the Special Committee.

181. He recalled that the last occasion on which FRELIMO had proposed negotiations with the Portuguese Government was at a meeting of the United Nations Fourth Committee in 1963. At that time many had believed in the possibility of independence by negotiation. Although the leaders remained anxious to avoid the sacrifice of human lives, the Portuguese Government's manoeuvres had forced them to the conclusion that the only effective means was armed action. Examples of Portuguese tactics over the past five years included the legal trick of calling the Territories overseas provinces, introduced more than five years before; the Portuguese brand of self-determination which had been used during the past two years and particularly in 1963; the new Organic Law, designed to demonstrate that Portugal had accepted and was practising self-determination; opposition to the United Nations and rejection of its resolutions; and pseudo-negotiations with independent African States in 1963.

182. In 1950, the African-Asian countries had taken a firm stand against Salazar in the controversy between Portugal and India over Goa. To counteract the resulting condemnation and criticism, the Portuguese Government had promulgated legislation in 1951 transforming the Portuguese colonies into overseas provinces—ostensibly an extension of the metropolitan provinces. The purpose of the legislation was to enable Portugal to join the United Nations without restriction, since the colonies it had been rapidly acquiring would, as provinces, be free from the provisions of Article 73 of the Charter. During the ensuing decade, Portugal had tried desperately to prove her claim to possess overseas provinces which were prosperous and in which people of different races lived in peace and harmony. While States Members of the United Nations were in doubt as to whether the Territories in question were provinces or colonies, Portugal had been free to suppress all evidence of a revolt and to exploit the people of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, St. Tomé, Macau and Goa without hindrance. It was not until December 1960 that the United Nations had defined the Portuguese Overseas Territories as non-self-governing and had concluded that they were in fact colonies. Thus Portugal had been unmasked as a colonial Power.

183. Portugal had therefore adapted its political position to the new climate of opinion and was seeking to prolong discussion of the whole affair by another manoeuvre. While still claiming that its overseas Territories were provinces, it was asserting that they were moving towards self-determination. Self-determination, in the accepted sense, was the determination of one's own acts without compulsion; in international law, it implied a decision by the population of a territorial unit as to its future political status without compulsion from outside. For Portugal, however, self-determination meant a premeditated decision imposed by a will other than that of the people concerned, or, as defined by Portugal: "agreement by a population to adhere to a given political structure, a certain type of State or a

given administrative organization". Portugal simply assumed agreement and adhesion to a prearranged form of political organization and made no effort to consult the peoples of her colonies on their future political status. It was that lack of respect for their ideas and feelings which was forcing the people of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea to armed combat.

184. The Portuguese Government could no longer deceive the people; but it could still mislead others. In a report to the Security Council dated October 1963 (S/5448) the Secretary-General of the United Nations had stated that from the explanation of Portugal concerning her position, it could be inferred that the Portuguese Government had not denied the principle of self-determination to the peoples of her Overseas Territories.

185. In October 1963, representatives of nine independent African States appointed by the Organization of African Unity had held informal conversations with Portuguese representatives under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It had soon become clear that the Portuguese Government, far from altering its position, expected the African States to alter their definition of self-determination. The African representatives had refused, insisting that self-determination should be defined as "the right of the people to determine the future of their Territories, including the option of being independent from Portugal", and had reported that "there had been nothing new concerning the basic principles of colonial policy of Portugal".

186. That conclusion meant the rejection of the Portuguese claim to have taken decisive steps towards self-determination for the people of the Territories in question, the most important step being the publication of the "Organic Law of Overseas Portugal", on 24 June 1962. In fact, the law had no connexion with self-determination: it was intended, if ever applied, to establish a more centralized system of government, with headquarters at Lisbon, reaching out to the most remote parts, and linked by an administrative network. The Portuguese Foreign Minister had described as one of its most important features the creation of new local government bodies (articles XLV *et seq.*). The Portuguese Government intended that measure to be taken as evidence of decentralization in its colonial policy; but article XLIV stated that the administrative activities of the local authorities were under the direct control of the provincial government, which could dissolve any legislative body even if it were elected directly by the people. Furthermore, the Governor-General, who headed the provincial government, was not an elected official, but a nominee of the Council of Ministers at Lisbon. Far from being an indication of a trend towards decentralization, therefore, new local government bodies were instruments of increased centralization to enable the central Government to reach the more remote areas and more easily control and dominate the people.

187. The Portuguese Foreign Minister had also drawn attention to the provision under the Organic Law for a larger number of members of the Legislative Council in each Overseas Territory, all of whom would in future be elected, in accordance with a new electoral law empowering the people to elect not only the Legislative Council, but also the Council of Chiefs, Municipal Councils, Economic and Social Council, Overseas Council, Corporative Council and National Assembly.

188. In March 1964, elections promised in accordance with the new law had taken place in Mozambique, and presumably also in Angola and Guinea, but it was now known how the elections had been conducted and who had qualified as voters for the Legislative Council, one of the most important bodies mentioned by the Foreign Minister. A table giving facts and figures of the elections (see the annex to A/AC.109/SR.350) showed that in Mozambique 93,079 inhabitants had been granted the right to vote, out of the total population of about 7 million. Even assuming that the qualified voters were drawn at random from the total adult population of Mozambique, the percentage of 1.3 per cent was very small; but it would be seen from the chart that in most of the districts the number of qualified voters was roughly the same as the number of non-African inhabitants. The obvious conclusion was that only the white settlers, and possibly a few Asians and mulattoes, had taken part in the elections. The March elections were one of the most telling pieces of evidence against the Portuguese Government's claims.

189. If there had been any doubts as to Portugal's real intentions, they would have been destroyed by Salazar himself when he stated in May 1964: "Portugal is determined to maintain control of Angola and all other Overseas Provinces, in spite of the pleadings of the United Nations for them to be given independence." It was no longer possible to pretend that a peaceful solution by negotiation was possible. The time for condemnation by censure was past unless it was accompanied by a programme of direct action. Resolutions by international organizations would not alleviate the misery of the people, or remove the electrified iron fences built round them, or free them from the constant terror of the secret police, the armed police and the Portuguese soldiers, or give them any hope of a better life. The people of Mozambique had become convinced that their oppressors would not leave their land until they took up arms.

190. On 25 September 1964, led by FRELIMO, the people of Mozambique had declared a general armed insurrection against Portuguese colonialism in order to win their total and unconditional independence. The United Nations and the Special Committee had recognized their right to freedom, but there were still States Members of the United Nations—some of them represented on the Committee—which, while expressing support for the independence of colonial peoples at international conferences, continued to provide Portugal with arms and financial aid. It was only that support which had enabled Portugal, one of the smallest, poorest and least developed countries of Europe, to withstand a war on two fronts—Angola and Guinea—for over two years, and the past six months on three fronts, including Mozambique. One of the greatest contributions the Special Committee could make would be to persuade the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Belgium, to stop giving economic and military support to Portugal.

191. He pointed out that weapons manufactured in those countries had been found inside Mozambique. Between 1951 and 1961 the United States had contributed 500,000,000 dollars to Portugal in the form of weapons. There was nothing to indicate that such aid had since ceased. The Federal Republic of Germany not only sold weapons to Portugal but had established a military base in Portugal where training was given to

the armed forces of the NATO Powers. The Federal Republic had recently purchased sixty war planes from Canada to supply to Portugal and had increased its economic aid to that country. Several German companies were establishing factories in Portugal's African colonies. For instance, Krupp was setting up an iron and steel plant in Angola. The Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic had recently held discussions with the Portuguese Ministry of Defence.

192. United States investors were also interested in the Portuguese colonies. A high official of the Inter-American Capital Corporation had assured the authorities in Mozambique that the United States would invest not less than \$1,000 million in the country. Loans worth several million dollars had been raised by the Portuguese Government in London. Those investments helped to meet the expenses of Portugal's colonial wars. France had concluded an agreement with Portugal to establish a base in the Azores, in return for which it would build 120 ships of various kinds for Portugal. A Portuguese officer who had deserted had informed the nationalist movement that the Portuguese forces in Mozambique were equipped with United States helicopters, French jet planes, United Kingdom frigates and weapons from the Federal Republic of Germany.

193. According to available information four airstrips had been built in Northern Mozambique immediately adjacent to Tanzania: Portugal was trying to make the rest of the world believe that the fighting in Mozambique was instigated from outside, specifically by Tanzania. Military jet aircraft kept a constant watch on the Mozambique-Tanzania border and violated Tanzanian airspace. Portugal had, in fact, announced that the military bases were to be used for launching an attack on Tanzania to avenge the Mozambique war.

194. Roads had been built from north to south to facilitate troops movements and avoid exposing troops to the dangers of the forests where they risked attack by Mozambicans. Since the task was far beyond Portugal's means it was assumed that the road building was part of allied aid. The only known case of assistance was the construction of a north-south highway, started in 1958 but not yet completed, at a total cost of more than £1 million with money provided by a Western Power. It was known that assistance was being received from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and that there were exchanges of military officers and technicians between Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. As long as the United Kingdom Government remained silent and did not openly condemn the arrangement between Portugal and Southern Rhodesia, he was forced to believe that the United Kingdom was not only condoning but also participating in them.

195. With regard to South Africa, armed forces were present in Mozambique as technicians, and army chiefs visited Mozambique regularly and made pronouncements of support for Portugal in its policy of white supremacy there.

196. Loans from United States and international financing institutions over the preceding ten years had been used to finance the settlement of European Portuguese in Africa. Loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in particular, had mostly gone into the purchase of farming equipment for such settlers. It had been Portugal's long-standing policy to build up the white population in Mozambique to a proportion comparable to that obtaining in South

Africa and Southern Rhodesia, with the object of creating a situation which would allow for an appeal to European sentiment in their interest. European and American banking corporations were aiding those nefarious plans by granting loans purporting to be for the support of economic development. In fact, however, such loans were an instrument for further exploiting the Africans by displacing genuine African farmers and jeopardizing the marketing outlets of others. The Government was having little success with its settler programme, however: in 1965, the white population, including an estimated 35,000 to 45,000 soldiers, had amounted to no more than 100,000 out of a population of 7 million. The Portuguese being brought to Africa were themselves ordinary peasants. Portugal was already losing 1 million people a year through emigration, and simply could not afford to send its exiguous middle class to settle in the colonies. Since the Portuguese peasants were themselves poor and oppressed, there was no reason why they should not fit into a free Mozambique, and they would be welcome to stay if they wished.

197. Mr. Mondlane said that most of Mozambique's industry was subsidiary to parent industries in neighbouring Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, and most of the territory's labour force was exported to those countries. The Special Committee was no doubt familiar with the "interlocking directorates" of Western-financed monopolies which controlled the economy of southern Africa from the Cape to Katanga, and understood that the determination to maintain white supremacy in that region was not sentimental but economic in origin. Mozambique was not an independent economic unit; it was an integral part of the vast apparatus of exploitation set up by Portugal and its Western allies. The disparity between the wages paid to African and European workers was so great that the indigenous inhabitants were virtually a slave population. The profits derived from that merciless exploitation were enjoyed by Portugal and by all those Western countries which had investments in Mozambique.

198. Mr. Mondlane informed the Special Committee that reports received from within Mozambique every week showed that Portugal failed to respect any of the international conventions concerning prohibited weapons and the humane treatment of prisoners of war. Not only were freedom fighters tortured, but innocent men, women and children were arrested and brutally questioned as to the whereabouts of guerrilla fighters. Crops were now being burnt in an attempt to starve out the freedom fighters. There was no limit to the brutality of the treatment inflicted on both combatants and civilians.

199. A number of humanitarian and religious organizations had agreed to undertake the routine work of caring for the growing number of refugees from Mozambique, but there was no common policy applied in the various Territories and countries concerned. In Malawi, for example, where the refugees numbered about 2,500, the Government had as yet taken no action to obtain from outside the material aid they needed. Not even the Malawi Red Cross was doing anything on their behalf. He was unable to give any plausible reason for the lack of action. All FRELIMO could do was to appeal to the Special Committee to remind the Malawi Government of its responsibilities in respect of refugees freely admitted to the country.

200. The remaining three Territories concerned were under British control. The number of refugees in Rhodesia ran into thousands. Political escapees among them were in constant danger of arrest and extradition to Mozambique. The police of the two Territories were working hand in hand in the matter. In Bechuanaland, treatment had been very good until lately, when nineteen refugees had been illegally arrested. Their release had been welcomed and additional refugees arriving there had not been molested. It was to be hoped that illegal arrests would not occur again.

201. The situation in Swaziland had likewise been good in the early stages. Refugees had been given asylum and issued with working permits, and humanitarian organizations, such as Oxfam, had been allowed in to give material help. However, a change had intervened in the Government's attitude in the preceding month and the Portuguese police were being allowed official access to the refugees with the object of encouraging them to return home. Lately, too, there had been reports of leaders being called for questioning by the local police and next being heard of back in Mozambique. According to press reports, one such leader was now being arraigned on State security grounds. As would be readily understood, that new situation opened the way to kidnappings of key persons. The Portuguese police went openly to the camps in Swaziland and threatened even refugees who had work permits. Another police method was bribery, by which the Portuguese poet José Cravelinha had been persuaded to return home under guarantee of a document signed in Swaziland. After a few days' freedom, during which he had time to issue statements to the Press criticizing his leaders, he had been arrested; according to a Portuguese news agency dispatch, he and many other leaders were now being charged before a military court for activities against the security of the State. Persuasion was not a violation of international law. However, a case which did constitute violation was that of a leader living legally in Swaziland who had disappeared after being summoned by the local police to appear before the Swaziland authorities, and had later been reported back in Mozambique, sent there by the Portuguese police who had obtained access to him in Swaziland.

202. Mr. Mondlane also said that the Governments of Portugal and South Africa had signed an agreement on the exchange of criminals which, unlike similar agreements between other countries, also covered the exchange of political leaders fleeing from political persecution. There had been several cases of South African fugitives to Mozambique being arrested and returned to South Africa, the most notorious being the recent arrest and deportation of Dr. Brutus, which had attracted world-wide attention. Similarly, Mozambicans had frequently been arrested in South Africa, the most serious instance being that of seventy-five Mozambicans who had originally been given asylum in Swaziland. Representations had been made to the appropriate international organizations concerning their treatment. It was hoped that they had not been returned to Mozambique and that the South African authorities would send them back to Swaziland, or allow them to continue their flight from Mozambique.

203. He had nothing but praise for the great help furnished by the Governments of Tanzania and Zambia. Tanzania had taken to heart the lesson to be learned from the 1961 incidents in Angola and had made preparations in advance to deal with the large inflow of refugees from Mozambique. What was needed was

help from international refugee organizations and United Nations specialized agencies on their behalf. Portugal had shown manifest unfitness to be their representative in those bodies and some way should be found to circumvent the legal obstacles to direct assistance. Conditions had improved in the past ten months in respect to food and health services and, more recently, education as well. There was a problem, however, due to the narrower definition of "refugee" applied to the African. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, for instance, was obliged to act through outside agents.

204. Mr. Kavandame, a member of the Central Committee of FRELIMO, described his experience as a peasant farmer under Portuguese colonial domination. The Portuguese Government, far from being interested in advancing the welfare of the people of Mozambique, as it claimed, was making certain that the Africans would remain forever in ignorance, by ruthlessly and barbarously suppressing all their attempts at improving their miserable conditions of life.

205. In 1957, he had presented a petition to the Portuguese authorities, with the object of alleviating the lot of the local people ruthlessly forced to work on European and Asian farms and in other colonialist enterprises. At the outset, he had believed that the root of the trouble lay in the people's poverty and ignorance. He had therefore asked permission to institute instruction to eliminate illiteracy and improve methods of cultivation, in the hope that by producing better work results the constant whippings, imprisonments and fines would cease.

206. He had tried to impress upon the Portuguese authorities that the farm labourer's monthly pay of 60 escudos (\$U.S.2) was wholly inadequate for subsistence. The head tax alone amounted to 120 escudos a year. Eventually, they had authorized him to institute an educational programme in his district and to establish a farming co-operative, on the understanding that so long as each peasant family produced its quota of cotton it could cultivate as much land as it wished. The local Portuguese administrator had vainly tried to discourage the venture by maintaining that illiterate people were unteachable and that the only means of making the "lazy blacks" work was the whip. Nevertheless, the co-operative had been established with an original membership of 500. Sorghum, groundnuts and maize had been cultivated in addition to the fixed four hectares of cotton per peasant farmer. Permission had been requested to set up a special fund for the purchase of certain equipment and the problem of marketing had been tackled.

207. The success of the venture had led the Portuguese authorities to the conclusion that he was secretly being paid for his efforts by some unknown source and they had tried to suborn him by offering highly remunerated work with the concessionary cotton company, SAGAL. The offer had been refused, for it would have been treason to desert the people whose welfare he had at heart and who trusted in him.

208. By 1958, the co-operative had grown to more than 1,000 members and by mid-1959 to 1,500, the attractions being the greater production achieved by working together and release from the oppressive supervision of the Whites. A Government ban was then imposed, at the instigation of the SAGAL company, on further extension of membership. The edict was that thenceforward all African Mozambicans must

work for the company. The measure failed to satisfy SAGAL, however, and with Government authority it had instituted direct harassment of the co-operative's members by sending out visiting inspection teams which had ordered the destruction of all fruit trees on the farms on the ground that they were detrimental to the production of good cotton. Planning of crops other than cotton was made subject to imprisonment and soon thereafter many co-operative members had been arrested, on the charge of having failed to fulfil the official cotton quota, and removed to sisal or cotton plantations elsewhere. Thus it was obvious to everyone that the Portuguese Government had no real interest in the welfare of the African people and, indeed, was opposed to freedom for the black man and the betterment of his living conditions.

209. Meanwhile, he had persuaded the co-operative members to build roads to ease the transport of produce to the main market centres. That had led to his arrest on the pretext that he had not sought prior Government authorization. He had been kept in prison without trial for two years, during which time the co-operative had been dissolved by Government order and many other leaders were also arrested. On release in 1961, he had been confined to house arrest and questioned at the administrative post on his future plans. The proposal had been made that he should establish another co-operative, under direct Government control and with a restricted membership of not more than twenty-five. Having no alternative, he had been forced to accept the proposal and in the following two years the new co-operative had worked strenuously, trying to rebuild what had been lost. Rice, sesame plant, potatoes, castor-oil plant and maize had been put into cultivation, and to facilitate expansion of tilling, a tractor had been bought out of co-operative funds. The delivery of the tractor had been celebrated by a feast attended by practically all the people of the Mueda region. He had seized the opportunity of explaining to the people the significance of the tractor purchase: that there were no grounds for the charge of laziness and that organizing among themselves and learning better ways of farming was all that was needed for prosperity.

210. The Portuguese authorities had taken exception to his speech, and soon co-operative members began to be arrested on a variety of charges. He himself had been questioned about his knowledge of events in Tanganika and about a new political movement called FRELIMO. Despite his denial of any knowledge of or connexion with that movement, he been brought in almost immediately for further questioning, the object being quite plain: to put him in fear for his life. His only chance of salvation had been to escape into the forest, in the hope of maintaining contact with the African people from there. Subsequently, after police efforts to find him had been given up, he had arranged for a meeting of the people's leaders in the forest, to discuss what could be done to regain freedom and rid the country of the Portuguese oppressors. The conclusion had been that the Makonde people alone could not succeed in getting rid of the enemy and that it must link forces with Mozambicans elsewhere in the country. Contact had therefore been made with the FRELIMO liberation movement.

211. As the Special Committee was aware, on 25 September 1964 FRELIMO had declared a general armed insurrection against the Portuguese colonialists in Mozambique. His people had been waiting for the

day when they could fight for their freedom, and had therefore received the declaration with rejoicing, even though aware of the ruthless reprisals they would be called upon to suffer at the hands of the Portuguese police and army. No matter what the cost might be, they were determined to fight on to victory. God had given them the will to live as free people and nothing would be allowed to stand in the way of their freedom.

212. Mr. Muthemba of FRELIMO described some of the effects of Portuguese colonialism in education, economics and politics.

213. The Roman Catholic Church was responsible for the education of African children, but most African children were unable to find schools to attend; classes were held out-of-doors and without equipment. Most of the children came from very poor families and had to pay their fees in kind: by bringing eggs or chickens instead of money; by gathering cashew nuts for the Church; and by working on school farms to raise rice, maize, cotton and ground-nuts for the Church. Even fee-paying children were forced to work on house building and crop cultivation. There was little time left for studies and few children finished their primary school courses. No one knew what was done with the revenue from their work. Furthermore, the teachers were unqualified and frequently prone to drunkenness, which set the children a bad example.

214. A recent proclamation by the Portuguese Government authorized African children to attend schools formerly reserved for white children, but only the few able to speak Portuguese could take advantage of the decree. The Portuguese Government had also introduced a new "adaptation" system to teach the African children Portuguese. It took at least three years to acquire an adequate knowledge of Portuguese which meant that a child would be ready to apply for a place in a Portuguese school at the age of ten; but another regulation prohibited registration in the first grade at the age of ten years or over.

215. Even children who knew enough Portuguese to start their education in European schools were not free from handicaps. It was difficult for poor parents to pay the cost of school fees, books, clothing and other items. The difference in cultural and material background had a bad psychological effect on the African child who was part of a very small minority in a European school. All those problems only increased if the child managed to reach secondary school: in other words, a European school in Mozambique was meant for European children. There was much discrimination against African students in examination; in July 1964, all the African students at one secondary school had been failed.

216. Because of such difficulties, only two Africans in Mozambique had graduated from a Portuguese university in four and a half centuries of Portuguese colonialism, and both had been to Portugal for secondary education before they could qualify for university entrance. Only a handful of Africans had successfully emerged even from Mozambique secondary schools. The few children attending mission or Government schools were subject to intensive Portuguese nationalist propaganda which permeated their studies. They were taught to be proud of Portuguese exploits in wars against Europeans, or in the conquest of Africa, and to shout slogans of praise for Portuguese generals noted for massacres of Africans.

217. With all those problems and difficulties, the African children in Mozambique were unable to make much progress in their education. The Portuguese Government seemed to wish to keep them in the dark, to be exploited by the settlers. But the Africans refused to accept a system of education manifestly designed to degrade and oppress them. The Mozambique Liberation Front had therefore worked to establish the Mozambique Institute, whose main purpose was to prepare young people for higher studies abroad. The Institute was now functioning as an independent educational organization, with a board of trustees composed of nine Tanzanian leaders. As a result of its work, in co-operation with FRELIMO, seventy-five Africans were now attending academic courses in various countries, including the United States of America, the Soviet Union and Algeria. Thanks were due to the Tanzanian Government for its co-operation, through its Ministry of Education, as well as to embassies in Dar es Salaam for helping to arrange for students to study in their countries, and to religious and civic organizations which provided essential educational, medical and other facilities.

218. The United Nations General Assembly had passed resolution 1808 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 empowering the Secretary-General to channel applications for scholarships from students in Portuguese colonies to countries offering education facilities, and funds voted by the United Nations had already provided scholarships for six students now attending secondary school in East Africa. However, in most countries, the qualification requirements were too stringent. He urged that the United Nations should allocate more funds so that the educationally under-privileged could be helped to prepare themselves for the heavy responsibilities of self-government and independence.

219. With regard to the economic situation, the people of Mozambique were known in Central, East and Southern Africa for their industry, and were employed all over subtropical Africa. It was estimated that 1 million were working outside their country in gold and copper mining, cotton, sugar, sisal and tobacco plantations and also in harbour, railway and road work in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. In Mozambique, they worked in all the country's industries and services as unskilled labour. They were regarded as imaginative, resourceful and tireless workers.

220. Thus the Portuguese had exploited the Africans, who were made to work for the Portuguese economy and for industrialists outside Mozambique at wages below the survival rate, without any limit on hours of work, and in bad living conditions. The few who had acquired sufficient education to train as skilled workers remained at the same salary, while their European counterparts with the same qualifications were rapidly promoted. The highest position attainable for an African was that of assistant officer. The minimum wage for an African skilled worker was about 500 escudos a month (\$U.S.17) compared with 2,000 escudos (\$U.S.67) for a European. The situation for unskilled workers was much worse. Between 1949 and 1960 it had been illegal for any employer to pay an African domestic worker more than 150 escudos (\$U.S.5) a month; and although the rule had now been abolished, there was no minimum wage for African unskilled workers. Another system of exploitation prevailed in farming, of which he could speak at first hand, having owned a farm in a region where

European wheat farmers employed large numbers of African labourers. In the Limpopo valley in southern Mozambique, the average white farmer owned 250 acres of farmland and employed an average of eight Africans a year, paying an average of 300 escudos (\$U.S.10) per month to each labourer. In that region, 250 acres could easily produce an average of four tons of wheat per year, which would fetch about 300,000 escudos (\$U.S.10,000) on the southern African market, with only 10 per cent labour costs.

221. That and other examples showed what it meant to be a Mozambican worker under Portuguese colonial control, and how profitable it was to be a Portuguese colonial settler in Mozambique. The countries investing in Mozambique through the Portuguese colonial system were no doubt getting a handsome share of the profits, and it was not surprising that international economic journals were reporting an unusual flow of capital into Portuguese colonies from the United Kingdom, France, the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Switzerland.

222. Another case was that of the African who wished to become self-employed, for example as a carpenter or mason, a farmer or a trader. The Portuguese law defining a self-employed African was highly restrictive, in order that the maximum number of people would be available as cheap labour for Government and settler concerns and for export to South Africa, Rhodesia and elsewhere. The very few self-employed Africans were hampered in every way possible, to limit competition with European settlers. A carpenter, for example, would be refused loans by the banks and be obliged to pay cash for his tools; he would be refused Government licences to buy tools for cutting his own wood from the forests and thus forced to buy wood from European companies at exorbitant prices. For an African farmer, there was the additional problem of marketing. The Mozambique farmer, like all East Africans, was a cattle breeder. In a population of about 7 million, over 8 million head of cattle were reared, mostly by African peasants. The colonial law provided that cattle owned by white settlers automatically fetched higher prices in the open market than cattle owned by Africans, on the pretence that the former were better cared for and therefore of better quality. In fact, European farmers bought African cattle at Government-imposed prices for resale at a profit. The African farmer was forbidden to sell direct to the butcher and remained as a breeder for the white farmer. In Mozambique an African was not allowed to compete with a European or an Asian, yet he had to pay the same taxes and the same prices for medical services, education, rent, clothing and all his other needs.

223. Since the Second World War, the Portuguese Government had been sending thousands of Portuguese white families to Africa, chiefly for settlement in rural areas as farmers. The African population had been encouraged to open up new and difficult areas for farming, with government aid, but once the hard work had been done the areas were allocated for European settlement and the Africans were dispossessed of the fruit of their work. Anyone who protested was punished as a black nationalist or a communist.

224. On the subject of political persecution, Mr. Muthemba said that any expression of political awareness had long been prohibited by every known fascist method. Methods had been intensified since the establishment of FRELIMO, and a close network of

police spies (PIDE) had been set up in the cities to report on anything said or done against the colonialist régime. There were members of PIDE in every church, school, commercial enterprise or other institution in Mozambique. Anyone accused of criticizing Government policy or the privileged position of Europeans in Africa was arrested and held incommunicado for months, or even years, without being charged. Public assembly was forbidden, and two Africans could not talk together in public without coming under immediate suspicion. Africans were forbidden to read Portuguese newspapers, and the authorities were now moving to prohibit the possession of radios other than those tuned exclusively to the Government station. People caught listening to foreign stations were liable to arrest. Police informers were everywhere, and people lived in constant fear. Anyone petitioning the authorities for any purpose was punished. The term "communist" was used as a pretext for indiscriminate arrest. Recently a group of peasant farmers, dispossessed by Portuguese settlers, had complained to the local administrator: he had had soldiers sent to gun them down as "communists".

225. Since the beginning of the armed struggle in Mozambique, the Government had adopted strict measures curtailing the movements of Africans, in order to check the spread of war to the main cities. The public was being told that the fighting was by foreign countries trying to conquer the colony.

226. As a result of the Government's ruthless terrorist methods, more than 40,000 Africans had left Mozambique between 25 September 1964 and 1 May 1965 to seek safety in neighbouring countries. Most had gone to Tanzania, but many were in Malawi and Swaziland and some had even fled to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Many of those not fortunate enough to be in Tanzania were in constant danger of rearrest by the Portuguese police or by the security forces of their countries of refuge who would hand them over to the Portuguese PIDE for return to Mozambique. The British Protectorate Government of Swaziland had given asylum to many of the refugees and allowed them to make contact with international refugee organizations. He himself had enjoyed hospitality for two months after escaping arrest in Lourenço Marques in December 1964. Recently, however, some of the exiled political leaders had been arrested and sent back to Mozambique. As a result, some hundreds of refugees, feeling insecure, had decided to risk crossing South Africa clandestinely. Seventy-five of those who left Swaziland in May 1965—among them his own three sons—were known to have been arrested in Middelburg, Transvaal; their whereabouts were still unknown and it was feared they might have been returned to Mozambique.

227. Since early 1961, the British colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia had been used by the Portuguese secret police to hunt Mozambican refugees, with the co-operation of the British colonial police. A number of FRELIMO leaders had suffered from the co-operation of the British colonial police and PIDE.

228. The people of Mozambique were often amazed at the numbers of people from United Nations countries who visited Mozambique under the auspices of the Portuguese Government but returned home without saying anything of the misery they had seen. They evidently preferred to accept the false claims of the Portuguese propagandists concerning the "happy black man". Since their country had been conquered, the

Africans had been harnessed to serve the interests of the white settlers and their fellow White abroad. Everything was done to ensure that the African would never emancipate himself, except by arms. The people of Mozambique had been forced to take up arms and fight for freedom. They would fight to the bitter end.

229. Mr. Simango, Vice-President of FRELIMO, spoke on the question of Mozambique refugees. It was not a new problem. However, since the beginning of armed insurrection in September 1964, many more refugees were leaving the country than in the past. People living in areas where fighting was going on faced an intolerable situation. Villages were razed to the ground, their inhabitants arrested, tortured or beaten. In October 1964, a suspected person had been tortured to death, his body cut into pieces and publicly burnt. Two members of FRELIMO had been arrested at the same time, tortured, sprinkled with petrol and burnt to death. Many other examples of atrocities could be cited.

230. Persecution of that kind had led to a great influx of Mozambicans into neighbouring countries. In Tanzania alone there were at least 12,000 refugees, mainly from the northern provinces of Mozambique. Refugees from other provinces had fled to Malawi, Zambia, Southern Rhodesia and Swaziland. The arrangements made for refugees varied from country to country, but Tanzania offered the most favourable conditions. The Tanzania Government had provided services to assist refugees and to obtain help for them from international bodies. The main camp was situated in the south of Tanzania, while FRELIMO itself maintained other camps in both Tanzania and Malawi.

231. There were more than 2,700 refugees in Malawi who could not be assisted because of lack of funds. A few had been brought to Tanzania and sent abroad to study. Those who remained lacked food, clothes and medical care. Refugees who escaped to Swaziland encountered serious difficulties. The authorities did not guarantee them protection and allowed the Portuguese police to harass them. Some had been arrested or kidnapped. Of the 250 refugees who had reached Swaziland, most had fled to Bechuanaland via South Africa, where 75 had mysteriously disappeared in East Transvaal. An unconfirmed report said that they had died of suffocation in a closed wagon. The Verwoerd régime collaborated with the Portuguese authorities by repatriating refugees. He requested the Special Committee to seek an assurance from the United Kingdom Government that it would guarantee the safety of refugees in Swaziland and Bechuanaland. The Smith régime also co-operated with the Portuguese administration in Mozambique by arresting and repatriating refugees found in Southern Rhodesia. Generally speaking, all Mozambican refugees relied upon FRELIMO for transport, food, clothing and medical care until they reached safety in Tanzania.

232. In Mozambique itself, innocent villagers were rendered homeless and forced to live in the forests. Indiscriminate arrests and killings were the measures used to reduce the African population and to isolate the freedom fighters. Napalm bombs were now in regular use. Intimidation only incited the people to support the nationalist movement. In their efforts to exterminate the people of Mozambique, the Portuguese were using modern weapons supplied by their allies. He called upon the United Nations to condemn Portugal. Mozambique must not be used for experimental

warfare. The arms supplied by Portugal's allies were responsible for the deaths of countless Mozambicans. The people of Mozambique were determined to win their freedom and would fight until every Portuguese soldier had left the country.

233. Mr. Cabral, speaking on behalf of PAIGC, stated that his party was fighting an armed war against colonialism. He recalled that in 1953, when the people had begun to organize in order to improve the situation of the Africans, he and his brothers in the fight had not yet thought either of armed combat or of independence. Only after several years of attempts at lawful struggle had the petitioners realized that protests, demonstrations and strikes were useless in the face of Portuguese repression and that a struggle of that kind would not solve the problem.

234. In 1955, he had been sentenced to local banishment in his country. In 1956, he had established a clandestine party to hasten the liberation of the people. At that time it had been simply a question of organizing the urban workers and carrying on the struggle by peaceful means. From 1956 to 1959, many strikes had been organized and on 3 August 1959 a general strike of workers had paralysed the port of Bissao. In less than twenty minutes the Portuguese racists had killed 50 Africans and wounded more than 100. It was at that moment that PAIGC had realized that it had committed two serious mistakes, in that it had fought in the towns and had fought with empty hands. In September, during the clandestine national party congress, it had been decided to take the struggle into the rural areas and to answer violence by violence. That had been a difficult decision, for many party members had preferred peaceful solutions, and direct action had been contemplated only after 500 party members had been imprisoned and tortured.

235. The first manifestations of armed resistance had been in the form of sabotage of roads, telephone lines and bridges; there was no railway in the country. The PAIGC had thus succeeded in paralysing movement in the centre and the south of the country. As a reprisal, the Portuguese colonialists had set fire to whole villages, imprisoned and tortured hundreds of party members and leaders, some of whom had been burned alive and others thrown into the rivers, and had deported more than 400 persons to the Cape Verde Islands. In 1962, there had been some 2,500 prisoners in the Portuguese prisons. At the present time the country's prisons and concentration camps were still crowded with prisoners. That was why PAIGC had taken up arms and had not laid them down.

236. He recalled that his party, having demonstrated unequivocally that the struggle of the peoples of Guinea and Cape Verde was of more than national or African significance, had submitted concrete proposals to the United Nations for the peaceful elimination of colonial domination in those Territories and for the granting of effective aid to the people. The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its seventeenth session and later by the Security Council had been a source of encouragement to the people of the Territories. He was convinced of the effectiveness of the political and moral contribution that the United Nations was making to his country's struggle for liberation.

237. The people of so-called Portuguese Guinea were aware of the real situation, and particularly of the conflicting views which affected the practical activity of the United Nations; they considered, however, that

the increasing isolation of the Portuguese Government within the Organization and at the international level, as also the strict application of the resolutions already adopted, particularly by Member States allied to Portugal, could help to hasten the liberation of the people of those Territories. It was essential, however, that the United Nations should continue to give realistic consideration to the actual circumstances of the struggle. Analysing the present situation, he considered that, with the liberation of about 40 per cent of the country and the intensification of the armed combat, the situation was comparable to that of a State whose national territory was partially occupied by a foreign Power. Indeed, while PAIGC was developing the instruments of statehood day by day in the liberated regions, the enemy was gradually losing political and military control of the regions not yet liberated. The people were identifying themselves more and more with PAIGC, which had become their national organization of unity, combat and preparation for the future. Moreover, the degree of political awareness that the people had already attained, the very nature of PAIGC and its total independence from all kinds of foreign influence guaranteed the maintenance of a political line which was fundamentally designed to protect the highest interests of the country, of Africa and of mankind.

238. The facts had demonstrated that the 20,000 Portuguese soldiers in the country and their modern arms (infantry, naval and air weapons) were not and would not be capable of halting the armed struggle, which on the contrary was making headway day by day. Again, while it was true that the Portuguese Government was facing an economic crisis which was becoming more and more acute and which was aggravated by the colonial war that it was now waging in three African territories, it was also true that in Portugal itself and in Guinea the enemy was floundering in serious internal conflicts, at both the political and the military level. As the liberation fight had in the main eliminated the practice of colonial exploitation, the presence of Portuguese troops in the country was justified only by the vital need to preserve Portugal's "prestige", to avert disastrous consequences in the other colonies and to await the miracle that would enable the Portuguese colonialists to continue their exploitation of the population. It was common knowledge, moreover, that the Portuguese presence was possible only because of the substantial aid, in arms and money, which the enemy was receiving from its NATO allies and from other sources such as South Africa.

239. Mr. Cabral recalled that his party had already on a number of occasions, in particular at the United Nations in 1962, reported the presence of Spanish soldiers in the Portuguese units. It had been claimed that they were volunteers, but that had proved to be incorrect, since the Spanish Government's control over its territory was too tight for leaks of that kind to be possible. Moreover, the PAIGC special services had reported the presence in Portuguese Guinea of soldiers speaking a language which could be English. Certain armaments, in particular PV-2 aircraft, could not be used by the Portuguese, since they did not know how to handle them. There were non-Portuguese pilots in so-called Portuguese Guinea who were teaching Portuguese to fly those aircraft.

240. With the exception of the atomic bomb, all the arms allegedly intended for external purposes were used against the population. They included grenades, Mauser rifles, Breda machine pistols, mortars, aircraft,

and napalm bombs, which were not manufactured by Portugal but certainly supplied by NATO. Portugal did not manufacture arms but only explosives and, recently, machine pistols. The weapons used by the Portuguese troops came mainly from West Germany, the United States of America and Italy (the latter supplied large quantities of explosives). The aircraft used by the Portuguese were generally United States jet fighters and bombers. The Portuguese aviators' helmets, moreover, bore the insignia of the United States Air Force. Weapons captured by PAIGC fighters had been displayed at Conakry and Dakar.

241. It was childish to say that Portugal received NATO arms but was forbidden to use them. Anyone who put a knife in a madman's hand need not be surprised if he used it. He was not asking Portugal's allies to stop providing it with arms, for that would be difficult for them. On the other hand, since they claimed to be opposed to Portugal's racist policy, those countries could give arms to the PAIGC fighters, too.

242. The delivery of arms, however, was not the only problem. Portugal was also receiving substantial economic and financial assistance. For example, Portuguese soldiers wounded in combat were given medical treatment in West Germany. That was rather an odd thing, for it might be asked whether the PAIGC was at war with West Germany. He stressed that his party did not want to indict any particular State; it left each State to examine its own conscience. He was, however, convinced that the representatives of the countries allied to Portugal who were on the Special Committee each represented his country's anti-colonialist movement. He therefore asked them to do their best to persuade their respective Governments actively to oppose Portuguese repression in Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands. He considered them, as members of the Special Committee, to be comrades in the struggle. He asked them, in considering the question of so-called Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, to forget their alliances as far as that was possible. He recalled that some of the delegations of members of the Special Committee which were allies of Portugal had met Salazar in Portugal and that the latter had consistently refused to reply to questions or observations concerning the liberation of Angola.

243. Portugal continued to use the most modern weapons, including napalm bombs, but it seemed unlikely that it would be able to use poison gas. In this connexion, he explained that the PAIGC fighters had never killed a Portuguese civilian or even an unarmed soldier, which was the best proof of their goodwill; but as soon as his party learned that the Portuguese general staff were contemplating the use of poison gas against the Liberation Front fighters, the party had declared that, if gas was used, Portuguese civilians would be killed as a reprisal. For that reason and probably for other reasons too, the Portuguese had not yet used poison gas. It would be difficult for them to do so, for the PAIGC fighters were vigilant.

244. The PAIGC had significantly strengthened its military resources during 1964. The establishment of the regular army and the intensification of guerrilla warfare had brought about a radical change in the character of the colonial war. In the areas not yet liberated, the regular army, in co-ordination with the partisans, was expanding its activities day by day and gradually reducing the possibilities of manoeuvre and survival open to the enemy, which would be obliged

from now on to fight on all sides. The PAIGC was, however, encountering considerable difficulties in the matter of the supplying and economic development of the liberated regions. Moreover, it was struggling with steadily rising financial needs arising from the increased demands of the fight.

245. Unfortunately, it seemed to be difficult for Africa to provide national liberation movements with aid commensurate to their needs; moreover, the situation was aggravated by disputes among the African States. That was the more regrettable in that the enemy would spare no effort in its attempt to suppress resistance, for which it was becoming more and more dependent on the massive support provided by its allies as part of imperialism's general strategy against the freedom and advancement of peoples.

246. Guinea had become the "Achilles' heel" of Portuguese foreign policy. Analysing the prospects of the struggle, he said that, in view of the impossibility of inducing the Portuguese Government to change its attitude, it was necessary to strengthen the armed struggle for national liberation and the organization and political consciousness of the people, with a view to the immediate and complete elimination of foreign domination of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, for the Portuguese had left the people of those Territories no other choice.

247. In view of the progress already achieved in the fight and considering the support of the African countries and the anti-colonialist forces in the world, the prospects for the development of the struggle were quite favourable. It must be borne in mind, however, that the enemy possessed still more powerful resources and could depend on effective support from its allies. In order to intensify the fight, to overcome the difficulties and to conquer the obstacles in the path of freedom and progress, PAIGC must consolidate the situation in the liberated regions of the country by liquidating the remnants of the Portuguese contingents stationed there and must continue to develop the new political, administrative, economic, social and cultural structure in those regions; it must intensify armed action in the regions of Guinea which had not yet been liberated and initiate direct action in the Cape Verde Islands in order to bring the colonial war and the national oppression imposed by Portuguese colonialism to an end once and for all; it must study and work out the methods best calculated to eliminate the vestiges of colonialism and lay solid foundations for the country's economic development; lastly, it must bring about an appreciable improvement in the living conditions of the people in the liberated regions, while preparing to assume national, African and international responsibilities with dignity and independence, in the context of fraternal collaboration with all peoples.

248. He then raised the question of how the United Nations could assist his people in the present state of their fight for freedom and progress. The resolutions adopted by United Nations bodies and the decisions taken by the African Heads of State at Addis Ababa, as also the actual circumstances of the struggle, bore witness to the fact that the time for denunciation of Portuguese colonialism and for moral or legal arguments had passed. The issue now was a political and military dispute between the Portuguese Government and the people of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands. Having started an armed struggle against the African people, the Portuguese Government was introducing a

new threat on that continent to the sovereignty of the independent African States and to international peace and security.

249. While the Portuguese Government's attitude was undoubtedly striking evidence of a total lack of respect for the United Nations, PAIGC did not see any practical advantage in the possible exclusion of Portugal from the Organization. The Portuguese Government was not necessarily Portugal and he was confident that his people's struggle would compel that Government to respect the United Nations. The essential thing was that all those who, like the United Nations, could assist the people of so-called Portuguese Guinea should grant them all possible aid. Nothing could halt the victorious progress of their struggle.

250. As for the building of economic, social and cultural progress after the securing of national independence, he was convinced that the United Nations had sufficient resources to be able to grant effective assistance. Through its specialized agencies and in collaboration with PAIGC, the United Nations could grant the people of the Territory practical assistance forthwith, with a view to consolidating their position in the liberated regions and preparing the foundations for the building of the country's future. The United Nations could take the following specific steps: it could appeal to the International Red Cross to grant, through its national members, effective aid in medicines, public health equipment, foodstuffs and other essential articles; it could ask the World Health Organization to provide some physicians who were specialists in tropical diseases and some surgeons, at United Nations expense; it could furnish technical assistance to PAIGC, through the Special Fund and with FAO collaboration, to speed up the economic development and consolidation of the liberated regions; it could, through UNESCO, grant effective aid for the development of the educational services already set up in the liberated regions of the country; it could furnish, through UNICEF, effective aid to the country's children, who were innocent victims of the colonial war; lastly, it could permit the United Nations specialized agencies to study, in collaboration with PAIGC and on the basis of the actual position of the country, ways and means of effective co-operation in economic, social and cultural reconstruction after the conquest of independence.

251. The United Nations could and should aid Guinea, which asked, not for arms, but for humanitarian assistance on behalf of people who, being the victims of colonialist aggression, were obliged to fight to defend themselves and to defend the prestige of the highest international body of the present day. His people could not understand how any consideration of a juridical nature could prevent the United Nations from giving them practical assistance in their struggle against Portuguese colonialism—that colonialism which, in defiance of even the most elementary juridical principles and standards, continued with the providential aid of its allies to threaten peace and security in Africa and in the world. He again stressed his people's peaceful attitude, their devotion to the cause of peace and their hatred of war. Both directly and through the United Nations itself, PAIGC had already made plenty of constructive and realistic proposals to the Portuguese Government, with a view to the peaceful elimination of colonial rule in Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands through negotiation. It would make no more. Weapons in hand, the people, who were daily becoming better armed and more determined to pursue the struggle,

were sure to succeed in bringing the Portuguese Government to respect international legality and morality, of which one of the fundamental principles, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, was the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination and national independence.

252. In conclusion, on behalf of his party, he urged the Special Committee or a sub-committee to come and establish direct contact with the people of so-called Portuguese Guinea and of the Cape Verde Islands. The Special Committee's visit to Africa was a great step forward; its visit to so-called Portuguese Guinea would be a second step as important as the first.

General statements by members

253. The representative of Ethiopia said it was clear from the petitioners' statements that over four centuries of Portuguese colonization had produced only massacres, illiteracy and poverty. Portugal still claimed Angola as an overseas province of Portugal. It refused to comply with United Nations resolutions on decolonization.

254. Portugal was perpetuating a slave-State policy in the Territories under its domination. Its tyranny had driven thousands of innocent Africans into exile. In addition, Portugal, in the name of law and order, was today committing the crime of genocide on a massive scale in Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea.

255. The outcry of the millions of Africans would not remain unheeded. Experience taught that increasingly brutal acts, such as were being practised by the Portuguese colonialists, unless checked in time, could provoke a chain reaction which would lead to catastrophe.

256. Portugal must realize that it could not reverse the course of history. No matter how barbarous the régime might be, no matter how abundant and mighty its allies and the sources of its power, no matter how calculating and cunning its social, economic and psychological warfare against the African people, it would not be able to withstand the wave of history much longer. Nothing less than the granting of independence would stop bloodshed. A fire had been set to the thick and cruel jungle of colonialism in Africa, and it had swept across the continent. That fire of freedom would not be extinguished before it consumed the remaining vestiges of colonialism. It was therefore incumbent upon the Special Committee to explore every possibility of bringing to a speedy end the dreadful situation now obtaining in the Territories under Portuguese colonialism.

257. The representative of Iraq observed that the statements made by the petitioners had thrown much light on the situation in the Territories concerned. The struggle of the Angolan people had won the admiration of all freedom-loving peoples. Portugal was practising genocide, and the world could not stand aside; he therefore condemned the Portuguese atrocities and demanded their immediate cessation.

258. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania had been deeply moved by the evidence produced by petitioners concerning the imprisonment and murder of Africans by the so-called defenders of law and order. Africans were condemned to forced labour or imprisoned in detention camps. In some areas evidence had been produced of the use of poison against them. All those crimes had been committed because

Africans had demanded self-determination and independence, because they had refused to be cowed or to accept the right of the colonial Powers to enslave them. It was regrettable that in 1965, when some countries were planning journeys to the moon, Africans were still fighting for their birthright. The first actions of the Bandung Conference and of the Organization of African Unity had been to pledge themselves to the liberation of the colonized countries. He felt sure that freedom would soon be theirs.

259. Some years previously, Portugal had tried to hoodwink the world into accepting that it had no colonies, claiming that its overseas Territories were provinces of the metropolitan country; that the peoples of those Territories were contented Portuguese citizens; and that there was no movement for independence. Yet the world had witnessed the events in those Territories, making it plain that, for all those years, Portugal had in fact continued to subject the African populations to the most brutal forms of oppression. The world was being deafened by their cries of suffering. Colonialism was aggressive by its very nature and its continued existence was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

260. His own country had experience of that kind of aggression. Portugal had several times uttered threats against the Government and people of Tanzania, including the threat to bomb Dar es Salaam and other cities as a retaliatory measure. Statements of the kind were of grave concern to his Government, for the disastrous consequences of any such move were totally unforeseeable. His people were determined to defend their independence to the last man.

261. The harassment to which Tanzania had been subjected was illustrated by Portuguese spying activities, numerous instances of which had come to light, and even more serious, air-space violations that were contrary to international law, and an affront to his country's sovereignty. He went on to give documented details of many such violations committed by Portuguese military aircraft with the sole object of intimidating the Tanzanian people. Yet, despite all its own unwarranted offences, Portugal had chosen to accuse the African countries of subversive activities directed against its colonies. In making those baseless and senseless charges, Portugal had singled out Tanzania as its chief enemy, in an attempt to cover up its own brutal crimes. In itself, the maintenance of colonies was a subversion of human rights.

262. According to a recent press report, the Portuguese Foreign Minister had even tried to convince the other NATO Powers that Tanzania was a communist base. His delegation rejected that baseless accusation in the strongest terms. Portugal should understand that the people of Tanzania were committed to the liberation of the whole of Africa and would continue to give every assistance to the freedom fighters. It was proud of that stand, and in that spirit it had welcomed the establishment of the Liberation Committee of OAU in its capital city, although fully aware of what the consequences might be.

263. He went on to reiterate the basis of Tanzania's complaint against NATO. The bombers supplied to Portugal were undoubtedly being used for purposes of intimidation; the Portuguese soldiers trained under NATO auspices were being used to butcher fellow

Africans and to make incursions into Tanzanian territory; NATO support in modern weapons was strengthening Portugal's obduracy in Africa; some NATO Powers, while professing to be on the side of the Africans, were at the same time arming their enemy. He therefore appealed to the NATO Powers to reconsider their position towards Portugal. The day on which their military aid ceased would see the people free. And since the Western Powers were the only ones willing to sit round the same table with Salazar, they were the only people to whom he would pay heed.

264. Economic aid to Portugal was a further factor strengthening Salazar's hand. The Tanzanian delegation was aware that some Western countries believed in the rightness of the African case. Their help was wanted now in material form, not in expressions of sympathy, if the goal of freedom was to be attained in time. Every day that passed saw more Africans being brutally murdered or enslaved.

265. Tanzania, poor as it was, had had to take in thousands of refugees, and his delegation would also appeal to the United Nations, through the Special Committee, to increase its aid to those suffering people. Any resolution adopted on the subject should cover the following points: (a) condemnation of the countries that had been instrumental in arming Portugal; (b) a further effort to obtain assurances from some of the Western Powers that their military aid to Portugal was ended; (c) further assurance from the United Kingdom that refugees from Mozambique in transit through British High Commission Territories would be guaranteed safe conduct; (d) condemnation of the criminal alliance between Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa; (e) reaffirmation of the right of the people to independence.

266. In conclusion, he assured the people of Mozambique that independence was their birthright and that the flames of liberty could never be extinguished, as events in Algeria had shown. The African Mozambicans should unite solidly in their struggle and Tanzania would remain by their side to the bitter end; that was no mere empty bombast; it was an article of faith for his people. Tanzania was determined to help all brother Africans still suffering in the chains of colonialism. His country was heartened by the staunch determination of the people of Guinea not to succumb to threats or force and rejoiced that a large part of so-called Portuguese Guinea was now under the revolutionary forces fighting against Portugal. Their victory would be a victory for the whole of Africa. Along with all the free countries of Africa, Tanzania stood firmly behind the people and would spare no moral, material or financial effort to help them. Portugal would be the main enemy as long as it pursued its colonial policies.

267. The representative of Venezuela stated that the Venezuelan Government would, as in the past, continue to support unreservedly the just demands of the people of Mozambique and those of the other peoples still suffering under the colonialist yoke. He recalled that at the United Nations Venezuela had been among the first to refute the claim that Mozambique was a Portuguese province.

268. He also stated that the Venezuelan Government offered fellowships and other educational facilities to African students wishing to pursue university or technical studies in Venezuela and that those facilities

would be offered to nationals of the Territories under Portuguese administration if they so desired.

269. The representative of Iran, noting the statements of Mr. Mondlane concerning the situation of Mozambican refugees, observed that he would have thought that some of the specialized agencies whose main objectives were humanitarian in character would have come forward to the assistance of those people. WHO, for example, could contribute considerably in the health field and for the prevention of disease among the refugees. UNESCO could provide facilities for essential and primary education as well as offer scholarships, and FAO and the World Food Programme could supply foodstuffs for those refugees who could not earn their own living. He requested that the Special Committee formally impress upon the specialized agencies the urgent need for increased assistance. That kind of help was a small token of the sympathy of the United Nations for the sufferings of fellow human beings and in no way had any political implications.

270. In conclusion, he stated that Iran fully supported and sympathized with the people's fight for freedom and independence.

271. The representative of India said that his country was helping the refugees in Tanzania with medical services and with teachers for their children. India fully supported the people of Mozambique and the freedom fighters in so-called Portuguese Guinea. The Indian Government and people wished them speedy success in their struggle against one of the most antediluvian, stubborn and gruesome colonial machines the world had ever seen. It was strange that professedly civilized countries should associate with Portugal in the present day and age. Pandit Nehru had described Portugal's policies as the crux of the world's colonial problem and of Africa's future.

272. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he had listened to the petitioners with great interest and would convey their views and all other comments made before the Special Committee to his Government. However, referring to the allegations that Mozambique refugees in Swaziland were being handed over to the Mozambique authorities he said that his Government was already urgently investigating the specific case mentioned by the FRELIMO petitioners and that his delegation had already been in touch with the Swaziland Government. The facts, so far as he had been able to establish them, were: the two men referred to by the petitioners were indeed missing from Swaziland; one of them had not asked for political asylum and the other had asked for, and been granted, asylum. Neither had been arrested by the Swazi authorities, or handed over to the Mozambique authorities, or sent back to Mozambique, or required to leave Swaziland. Their disappearance was being urgently investigated by the Swazi Government, and as soon as his delegation had any further reports it would see that the petitioners were informed.

273. He wished to state categorically that in no circumstances were genuine political refugees, of any race, returned to the Portuguese or South African authorities by the Governments of Bechuanaland, Basutoland or Swaziland; these Governments had consistently upheld the highest international standards in their treatment of the numerous political refugees who had sought asylum—a fact widely acknowledged and welcomed by the independent organizations and authorities concerned. The United Kingdom was always willing

to co-operate in trying to establish the facts about the refugees whose whereabouts were unknown or about whom there was any concern.

274. Regarding the reference made to the "kidnaping" of Mozambique refugees in Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, the petitioner concerned had not produced any evidence or details of a single case where it could be substantiated that kidnapping had occurred. In the case of the two men referred to both by himself and by the petitioner, there was no evidence available to the Swaziland or United Kingdom Governments to show that the men had been kidnapped, and until the investigations being undertaken established the facts, it was quite unjustifiable for him to speak as though kidnapping had been proved or admitted. If the petitioner had any evidence to that effect which he was withholding, it was to be hoped that he would give it at once to the United Kingdom Government in the interests of the two men concerned. If not, it was regrettable that the petitioner had seen fit to speak as he had.

275. The United Kingdom delegation deplored the utterly unfounded allegations that his Government's attitude to political refugees depended on their racial origins. Reflecting on his country's attitude in that matter, he wondered whether any delegation represented on the Special Committee could claim that nationals of its country had not, at one time or another over the centuries, sought and found political asylum in the United Kingdom. That was part of his country's democratic way of life; that was its record. And in the overseas Territories where it had responsibility in the matter, that was its policy.

276. With regard to the Portuguese Territories, the United Kingdom advocated the principle of self-determination, which was the fundamental starting point of its own colonial policies. The United Kingdom Government considered that Portugal was bound by the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations, which included the transmission of information to the United Nations on economic, social and educational conditions as well as the obligation to promote the well-being of the inhabitants by developing self-government, and assistance to the peoples in the progressive development of their free political institutions. There was also a clear obligation under the Charter to ensure the political, economic and social advancement of the inhabitants of the Territories, their just treatment and their protection against abuses. The policies of all countries administering Non-Self-Governing Territories, including the Portuguese overseas Territories, should be founded on those obligations.

277. In pursuit of that end, the United Kingdom had acted and continued to act by persuasion. It did not accept the view that it was too late for persuasion. It had repeatedly urged the Portuguese Government to accept self-determination with a view to bringing about a reasonable and peaceful solution, and continued to hope that the Portuguese Government would recognize the wisdom of that policy, which alone offered the prospect of a mutually satisfactory settlement. Action by persuasion should not be lightly dismissed. It was a primary function of the United Nations and the Special Committee to seek solutions to world problems by peaceful negotiation, while the possibility still remained open. All countries, and indeed the Special Committee itself, had a duty to help in finding a solution by persuasion rather than by condemnation or compulsion.

278. To begin with, contacts must be established between the Portuguese Government and the nations of the world, inside or outside the United Nations. Where such contacts already existed, they should be strengthened and enlarged. Some delegations had suggested a policy of isolating Portugal. While understanding that attitude, the United Kingdom still believed that a solution should be sought by persuasion. There were some indications that Portugal might be willing to enlarge its contacts with the rest of the world. One petitioner had spoken of visits to Mozambique and other Portuguese Territories of groups representing the ILO, ECA and other United Nations bodies. Such visits provided a channel of contact, offering the possibility of productive discussion. Portugal had played an active part in WHO, FAO and the ILO and had shown its willingness to accept visits by international rapporteurs to its Territories. Another valuable point of contact was the United Nations special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration, a good example of positive and constructive United Nations action, worth any number of condemnations. The United Kingdom hoped that the Secretary-General would take heed of the petitioners' suggestion that certain defects, especially with regard to the level of qualifications required by some countries, should be eliminated. The activities he had mentioned were no more than pointers, but they indicated that all possibilities of peaceful persuasion had not yet been closed, and should be further explored.

279. In addition to persuasion, the United Kingdom Government had taken concrete action which, though negative in a sense, had been in full accordance with the appeals and requests made in the United Nations and the Special Committee itself. The United Kingdom gave no military aid whatever either to Portugal or its overseas Territories. Since 1961, the United Kingdom had neither given nor sold arms or military equipment to Portugal for use in its overseas Territories in Africa or elsewhere. It was satisfied that arms and munitions of United Kingdom origin were not being used in the Portuguese Territories. Thus United Kingdom policy on the supply of arms was fully in line with Security Council resolution 180 (1963) of 31 July 1963. Moreover, the United Kingdom had voted in favour of the even stronger Security Council resolution 183 (1963) of 11 December 1963, which had been approved and confirmed by the General Assembly and the Special Committee.

280. The factual questions raised during the Special Committee's deliberations about NATO had been fully covered by the representatives of Denmark, the United States of America and Italy. NATO did not provide arms as military aid to Portugal, nor had it any responsibility for the defence of Portuguese overseas Territories. There were no NATO or British bases, indeed no foreign bases at all, in the Portuguese African Territories. The position was clear and the United Kingdom delegation fully endorsed all that had been said on those points. The object of NATO was to preserve the freedom and independence of the countries in the NATO area. NATO was in no way hostile to African national aspirations, and its activities and policies could not harm the interests of African countries. In fact it could be held that Portugal's NATO obligations reduced its capacity for military or economic action in its overseas Territories. The existence of NATO had done much to bring about a situation

in which freedom and independence could flourish not only in Europe but elsewhere. In saying that, he did not mean to suggest that NATO itself had been responsible for the gaining of independence by so many former colonial countries, nor to underrate the efforts of the African and Asian peoples.

281. With regard to capital investment and financial transactions involving Western countries and Portugal or its Territories, his delegation understood that most developing countries welcomed overseas private investment. Provided there were reasonable safeguards to ensure that the benefits were fairly shared between the investors and the developing countries concerned, such investments seemed to have an essential part to play. The safeguards were a matter for the Government of the developing country and the private investors. The Governments of the countries to which the investors belonged had no responsibilities in that sphere. Doubts had been expressed about the purposes of the financial contributions towards the cost of building roads in Mozambique. A road could be used by military vehicles, but it should not be condemned on that account. Almost all development programmes tended to concentrate on the improvement of communications. Consequently, there was no reason to apologize for private investment in developing countries, including Territories under Portuguese administration. Moreover, persuasion and influence could be exercised through financial and commercial contacts.

282. The representative of Yugoslavia considered that the United Nations must take note of the fact that Tanzania was subjected to constant pressure by the colonialists and Portuguese racists. It was also desirable that the specialized agencies should give Tanzania assistance in respect of the refugees coming from countries under colonial domination whom it welcomed in its territory.

283. His delegation had listened with the greatest attention to the highly interesting and useful statements made by the petitioners on the situation prevailing in the Territories under Portuguese colonial domination, on the cruelties of the colonial system, the sufferings and aspirations of the people, and their firm resolve to win freedom and independence. The struggle for independence of the people of Mozambique and other Territories under colonial domination was legitimate and deserved the support of the whole world and of the United Nations. It was more than time to take decisive steps and to sweep away the last vestiges of colonialism, to remedy the conditions of servitude and humiliation in which millions of human beings were still living, and to prevent colonialist circles from threatening the freedom of the countries which had recently attained independence. It was intolerable that an insignificant minority should be allowed to go on flouting the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The time had come when the principle of respect for human dignity, without regard to race, colour, or religion, must be made to prevail in the world and in international relations. His Government had always struggled and would continue to struggle to ensure respect for that principle. It had given and would continue to give its full support to the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, so-called Portuguese Guinea, and to all other peoples engaged in the struggle for independence. Peace and freedom were indivisible and

could not be reserved exclusively to certain privileged countries and peoples.

284. He thought that the Special Committee should, among other things, recommend that the General Assembly and the Security Council should adopt economic and political sanctions against Portugal and invite all countries, in particular that country's allies in NATO, to cease giving it any assistance, direct or indirect. The Special Committee should also draw the Security Council's attention to the danger to peace and security in that part of the world inherent in the existence of an alliance between Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

285. The representative of the United States of America regretted the absence from the Special Committee of the colonial Power in question. The sombre picture painted by the petitioners of events in the Portuguese colonies was a matter of grave concern to all Governments dedicated to the advance of human rights.

286. The United States Government regarded the progress already achieved in self-determination for the African peoples and in their freedom to choose institutions and organizations for themselves, both in the domestic and in the international field, as one of the most heartening developments of the past decade. The attitude of the Government and the people of the United States was amply illustrated and continuously expressed in the interest shown and the assistance provided by Governments, by private organizations and by individuals. There was probably not a single nation in the continent and certainly not a dependent area that could be oblivious to that interest. In the words of the President of the United States, speaking for the people, the United States was seeking not fidelity to an iron faith but a diversity of belief as varied as man himself; not to extend the power of America but the progress of humanity; not to dominate but to strengthen the freedom of all peoples. The President had said in December 1963 that the United States was dedicated to the same goals as the peoples of Africa—justice, freedom and peace—and that, under the late President Kennedy, it had made significant advances towards the attainment of those goals. The President had gone on to say that his administration would continue to work toward those same objectives, in the desire to help in building a world in which all men would have a better opportunity to improve their lives, both materially and spiritually; thus the United States would continue to press for equal rights for all, both at home and abroad, and would continue to assist the new and emerging nations of the world in their efforts to strengthen their foundations of freedom and independence.

287. The United States position on the Portuguese Territories had been stated both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, as well as in the Special Committee. Nevertheless, in order to refute some of the comments made in the discussions and to serve the Committee's legitimate interest, she would be glad once more to recapitulate its major elements.

288. First, the United States upheld the view of the General Assembly that the Territories under Portuguese administration were Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and, consequently, irrespective of how they might be designated, were subject to the provisions of that Chapter. In virtue thereof,

it had repeatedly urged Portugal to co-operate with the United Nations and to fulfil the obligations devolving on an administering Power under the terms of Chapter XI, both in respect to territorial administration and to the submission of information to the Secretary-General. Compliance with those clear provisions of the Charter would be in the best interest of all the inhabitants of the Territories and in the interest of the administering Power itself. Furthermore, the work of the Special Committee would be facilitated as a result.

289. Secondly, the United States had steadfastly supported the right of the peoples of the Portuguese Territories to a full and genuine exercise of self-determination that included the choice of future status, whether one of independence or of any other form the people might select; the right of self-government, in other words, the right of peoples to be ruled by a government freely chosen by them; and the right of peoples to choose the kind of institutions, the forms of government, under which they would wish to live.

290. In accordance with that stand, the United States had consistently supported United Nations action calling for Portuguese recognition of the principle of self-determination and for a complementary speeding-up of political, economic and social advancement toward the full exercise of self-determination for all the inhabitants of the Portuguese Territories. Publicly and privately, on repeated occasions, it had urged Portugal to accept that principle and give it practical effect. Therein lay the core of the problem: there was no conceivable step which would contribute more to the peaceful resolution of the problem than the immediate acceptance and subsequent application of the right of self-determination by Portugal. That step would break the existing stalemate, which was fraught with danger and which unquestionably would be broken one way or another. Self-determination would come; the question was whether it would come by peaceful means or by violence.

291. The United States could not accept the petitioners' thesis that the situation in Mozambique could be changed only by violence. Even now, the struggle for self-determination could be channelled into peaceful negotiations.

292. The idea of self-determination held by Portugal—that there was more than one modality and that self-determination meant the agreement and consent of the population to a certain political structure, type of state, and administrative organization—was not adequate in the view of the United States. As she had said, the act of self-determination should furnish a full choice of modalities and a full choice of political structures including, though not limited to, independent sovereignty. Her delegation therefore believed that the United Nations must continue to seek ways and means of advancing those objectives in peace.

293. With regard to the points raised in the discussions, she restated unequivocally that the position of the United States Government on the question of the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese Government was consonant with the relevant Security Council resolution (180 (1963) of 31 July 1963), and in particular with the provisions of its operative paragraph 6. At the time of its adoption, the United States representative had said that, since in its opinion arms supplied to Portugal for other purposes and used in its overseas Territories might

well contribute to an increase in friction and danger, the United States had for a number of years followed a policy of providing no arms or military equipment to Portugal for use in those Territories, and had further prohibited direct export of such items to the Portuguese Territories; he had also given the assurance that the United States would continue to adhere to that policy. Her Government still maintained that firm policy, which was applied equally to both government and commercial sources of supply.

294. There could be absolutely no substance to the charge made by the representative of FRELIMO that United States assistance in agricultural development in Mozambique was in effect enabling more settlers from Portugal to take root there at the expense of the Africans. The United States Government had no programmes of economic assistance in Portugal itself or in its overseas Territories, either in agricultural development or in any other sphere.

295. Next, she would confirm that the designation for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was accurately chosen as a reflection of the area within which the Treaty was operative; and that area did not include the Portuguese African Territories. The Treaty, the text of which was available in any reference library, was quite clear on that point. And there were no secret protocols in existence, defining the operative area in any other manner.

296. One of the most extravagant charges yet advanced by the Soviet representative—who himself was no stranger to the United Nations discussions on disarmament—was that the United States of America was engaged with the Government of Portugal in planning and actually building up nuclear warfare capacities in Mozambique, presumably for eventual use against the African peoples. The Soviet representative knew full well how concerned her country was at the possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world, and particularly in Latin America and Africa, feeling as it did that the rivalry provoked would imperil the peace of those continents. Further, on 1 June 1965, the United States had submitted a resolution¹⁹ in the United Nations Disarmament Commission stressing the urgent need for a non-proliferation agreement at the international level. To close the subject, she would merely note that the only country to embark on a nuclear weapons programme with the help of an existing nuclear power had been Communist China—and the United States had not been the country furnishing the needed assistance.

297. She stated that her delegation had listened with interest and attention to the petitioners and had greatly appreciated their efforts to inform the Special Committee of the situation as they saw it. It had listened with equal care and attention to the various views, some of them strong, expressed by Committee members, which would certainly be conveyed to her Government, in particular those of the African representatives. Mounting concern had been expressed for the refugees from Portuguese Territories. From the inception of the problem, the United States had taken an active interest in and substantially contributed to programmes for the support of those refugees and for their peaceful resettlement in self-supporting conditions. Those contributions had been made through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and, in addi-

¹⁹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January-December 1965*, document DC/220.

tion, foodstuffs had been channelled to the refugees through voluntary agencies. More than 50 per cent of the approved annual programme of the High Commissioner had been directed to refugee assistance in Africa; and \$950,000 out of \$1.3 million contributed by the United States had been earmarked for that work. Over the past three years, the United States contribution in foodstuffs had averaged in value about \$2 million annually. Her Government would continue to give sympathetic consideration to the needs of refugees in Africa.

298. In conclusion, she noted that there was little difference in objective, and no difference in purpose, between her delegation and the large majority of members of the Special Committee. However, the United States felt strongly that the pursuit of peaceful change ought not to be abandoned and accordingly would call on Portugal to recognize the right of self-determination in the universal sense for all the peoples of its Territories. To that end, it would again urge that conversations between the appropriate parties be undertaken immediately. Such would be the constructive course for the administering Power to follow, the course which would redound to the benefit of all and which all were so earnestly seeking.

299. The representative of Bulgaria, said that, from the evidence presented by the petitioners, it was plain to all that the economic, financial and military assistance Portugal was receiving from its allies was of crucial importance in the colonial wars it was waging. The sooner that assistance was discontinued, the sooner the African peoples concerned would achieve their independence. The Western NATO countries concerned had resorted to ingenious devices in an attempt to conceal their complicity, but irrefutable evidence proving that NATO arms and other assistance were involved had come to light in the war in Mozambique; and assurances given since then were obviously worthless, since no one could be expected to take Salazar's word as a guarantee. Assistance of any kind to Portugal merely served to strengthen its position and convince the Salazar régime that it could with impunity continue to defy the United Nations and world public opinion. Another consideration to be borne in mind was the division of labour established among NATO members. Several claimed to be adhering to the arms embargo on Portugal but others were failing to follow suit. The need for calling upon NATO to ensure that a total embargo was imposed by all its members was therefore plain.

300. As early as 1962, the United Nations Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese administration had expressed the view that assistance of any kind to Portugal had implications for the suppression of the liberation movements in its overseas Territories. Three years later, NATO was still needing to be reminded that its continued assistance to Portugal made it a willing accomplice in the ruthless colonial wars now going on in Africa.

301. In his delegation's opinion, it was high time the Special Committee recommended to the appropriate United Nations bodies that a policy of sanctions be adopted against Portugal. In that connexion, Bulgaria fully supported the recommendation adopted by the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Cairo in 1964, calling for the breaking-off of diplomatic and consular ties and active measures to suspend all economic and trade relations with Portugal.

302. If the United Nations wanted to take effective measures against the brutal colonialism of Portugal, it should make that recommendation its own.

303. In conclusion, he gave the assurance of his country's complete solidarity and support in the peoples' legitimate struggle for freedom and independence.

304. The representative of Mali stated that the atrocities of the Portuguese Government appeared to be even more horrible than the crimes of the Nazis, which in their time had aroused the indignation of the entire world. The Africans, however, had fought against nazism; on every front, Africans had died to safeguard the rights and dignity of Europeans. It was disappointing to note that certain Governments, in whose cause hundreds of thousands of Africans had shed their blood and given their lives, were providing aid to Portugal, thus enabling it to continue oppressing, torturing and killing Africans. He hoped that those Governments would change their attitude when the evidence of the petitioners was brought to their knowledge. The Portuguese Government was the most brutal, the most reactionary and the most backward of all the colonialist Governments; it should be isolated and should be called upon to free the African peoples, who had hitherto been kept in poverty and ignorance.

305. The petitioners had informed the Special Committee that the British were handing over to the Portuguese authorities refugees from Mozambique who had sought refuge in Africa with their brother Africans in Zimbabwe, Basutoland, Bechuanaland or Swaziland. The Africans thus handed over to Salazar's police had not sought refuge in the United Kingdom, but in Africa, with other Africans. Yet the United Kingdom knew what persecutions awaited the refugees handed over to the Portuguese authorities. The United Kingdom representative had said that it was not his country's intention to hand over African nationalists to the Portuguese. The Malian delegation took note of that statement and regarded it as an official statement defining the United Kingdom Government's position with regard to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration. He hoped that in the future the United Kingdom would respect in Africa the right of asylum to which African nationalists fleeing from persecution in Mozambique, Angola and elsewhere were entitled.

306. Petitioners had testified that NATO arms were being used in Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. In its resolution 180 (1963) of 31 July 1963, the Security Council had requested that all States should refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories under its administration and take all measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment for that purpose to the Portuguese Government. It seemed that, despite that resolution, certain Powers that were members of NATO were still giving Portugal military assistance, thus enabling it to carry on a colonial war against the African nationalists who aspired to independence. He wished the members of the Special Committee whose Governments were members of NATO to be fully aware of the consequences of the aid supplied to Portugal by that organization. When the fascist Government of a country engaged in a colonial war received arms, it could not resist the temptation of using them to oppress the Africans. If NATO members were aware of and sympathetic to the sufferings undergone by the African

peoples, it would be preferable if, instead of saying that those arms were not intended for war against the Africans, they simply stopped giving aid to Portugal until that country revised its colonialist behaviour. He declared to the Governments members of NATO, whether or not they were members of the Special Committee, that his delegation could not believe in the sincerity of their statements so long as they continued to deliver arms to Portugal.

307. Mali's anti-colonialist policy and its determination to continue the struggle until the liberation of the African continent was complete was well-known. Mali's attitude had been proclaimed repeatedly by the President of the Republic of Mali and was exemplified in the action taken within the framework of the Organization of African Unity. Mali was unable to believe in the friendship of any Government which oppressed or assisted in the oppression of African populations. Mali would not agree to any compromise in regard to decolonization, to any compromise in matters affecting the inalienable rights of all human beings—the right to life and the right to self-determination.

308. The representative of Madagascar said that the petitioners from Mozambique had provided the Special Committee with full information on the situation which obtained there and on the cynicism and corruption of the Government of Portugal. He stated that the Foreign Ministers of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and Madagascar had received a mandate from the African Heads of State or Government of the member countries of OAU to represent Africa before the Security Council. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Madagascar, for his part, was awaiting the decisions of the Special Committee; he would be guided by them and would act in the light of the facts that had been presented to the Special Committee. His delegation would spare no effort in defending the cause of Mozambique in international bodies.

309. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics observed that from the evidence presented by the petitioners, the Special Committee knew the grim facts of Portugal's brutal colonial rule and her bloody war on the colonial people seeking their rightful freedom. After centuries of Portuguese domination, there could be no equality for black and white except in the graveyard.

310. The time had come for action by the United Nations. The Special Committee must declare itself firmly and unequivocally in favour of sanctions against Portugal. It must also have the courage to condemn and outlaw Portugal's fascist supporters, the Verwoerd and Smith Governments, and those who were backing them. The representatives of FRELIMO had told how Portugal was being helped by her NATO allies, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and France, whose sole concern was to protect their profitable monopolies. After centuries of oppression, the people of Portugal's colonies had reluctantly taken up arms. They had the same right as the Americans who had freed themselves from British domination in the eighteenth century and the Soviet people who had risen against the Russian bourgeoisie in 1917. They, too, would be victorious, but how much longer must they fight and how many more victims must be sacrificed? But the facts could not be denied.

311. He recalled that the United States had abstained from the vote on the resolution calling for the

suppression of military aid to Portugal in its colonial wars, adopted by the Security Council in July 1963, because some of the wording did not conform with its position, but had supported the substance of the resolution. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sierra Leone had said that only time would show the true position of the countries abstaining from the vote. Now, two years later, his words had proved prophetic. Those countries were on the side of Portugal and not of the African people. They continued their alliance with bloodthirsty Portugal to safeguard the fantastic profits they derived from the blood and sweat of the Angolan and Mozambique people. There had still been no answer to the important question whether commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty extended to the Portuguese overseas territories, though the analogous case of France, which had declared Algeria an overseas metropolitan territory, suggested that they did.

312. As to the action to be taken by the Special Committee, he strongly supported the suggestions made by the representatives of Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Tanzania, Bulgaria, Iraq and Madagascar. He also proposed that the Special Committee should state its support for the recommendations of the Second Conference of Heads of States or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo from 5 to 10 October 1964, calling for the suspension of diplomatic and consular, and economic and commercial relations with Portugal, and appealing for financial and military aid to be given to the people who were fighting to free themselves from Portuguese domination. The Special Committee should follow the plea by the President of Zambia and by the Organization of African Unity and its Liberation Committee and move from words to deeds.

313. Indeed, in the present circumstances it was impossible to envisage a peaceful solution to the problem of the Territories under Portuguese domination and only those who had not known aggression and the occupation of a part of their territory could still speak of peaceful methods. The USSR would therefore continue to support the people in their struggle. He quoted from a poem by Mali's famous poet Dyavara, a compatriot of the Chairman, prophesying that the people of Mozambique would break their chains and forge them into the weapons that would win their fight for freedom.

314. He considered that the desire expressed by Mr. Cabral that the specialized agencies of the United Nations could furnish aid to the liberated areas of his country deserved to be taken up. He did not think, however, that it was necessary to adopt a new resolution on that subject, since the provision of aid by the International Red Cross, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNESCO, the United Nations Children's Fund and other specialized agencies should not raise any difficulties from the legal point of view. The United Nations had recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the Territories under Portuguese administration, and it was the Special Committee's duty to bring the opinion of its members to the notice of the specialized agencies.

315. With respect to Mr. Cabral's invitation to the Special Committee to visit the liberated areas of so-called Portuguese Guinea, the Soviet representative observed that the Special Committee's terms of reference certainly did not exclude a visit of that kind and by paying a visit to that Territory the Committee would simply be carrying out its terms of reference.

The Special Committee might perhaps arrange for it to be considered at its next meeting and, if possible, before the next session of the General Assembly.

316. The representative of Poland observed that it was clear that, were it not for the support of its allies, Portugal would long since have been forced to abandon its colonies. In the ten years since the United Nations had first taken up the question of the Portuguese colonies, a number of resolutions had been passed; Portugal had consistently flouted those resolutions, and the time had come for more resolute action. The Special Committee must make it clear to the national liberation movements that it was on their side; it must make Portugal understand that it was violating the Charter and that the United Nations stood ready to take all measures under the Charter to enforce its resolutions.

317. The proper conclusion from the information given by the petitioners was that Portugal's allies, far from heeding the many appeals to the contrary, were continuing to supply that country with financial and military assistance. His delegation supported the resolutions adopted by the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Cairo in 1964. It would strongly support a resolution recommending that the General Assembly call upon all States to break off diplomatic, trade and military relations with Portugal. He assured the national liberation movement in the Portuguese colonies of his delegation's full support for their just cause.

318. The representative of Denmark said he had listened to the petitioners with interest and concern and had carefully studied the working paper prepared by the Secretariat. From the mass of information produced, it was clear that the situation in the Portuguese colonies was extremely serious. Armed fighting was going on and the Portuguese forces were suppressing the African people, whose living conditions were very poor: health education and the social situation of the African population, all were bad. Portugal's claim that its colonies were overseas provinces of Portugal was a fiction. Practically speaking, the Africans had no rights whatever. In Portugal itself, representation in the National Assembly amounted to 1 per 40,000 of the population; the corresponding figures for Angola and Mozambique were 1 per 650,000 and 1 per 900,000 respectively. Moreover, in elections in the Portuguese colonies, Africans had virtually no voice. Educational and financial barriers were erected against them.

319. He noted that in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea, Portugal was said to be using NATO arms; it had even been hinted that NATO was opposed to African aspirations. As a member of NATO, Denmark wished to assure the Committee that that allegation was untrue. NATO had been created for political and military purposes relating strictly to Europe and North America. It was a purely defensive organization designed to preserve the freedom of its members and had no aggressive intentions.

320. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was not responsible for the defence of Portugal's African colonies. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty stated: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." A Protocol to the Treaty, signed upon the accession of Greece and Turkey in October 1951, further stated: "For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed

attack—(i) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer." The word "include", the representative of Denmark added, meant "only include" and excluded every other territory.

321. With regard to the use of NATO arms in the Portuguese colonies, it was important to determine what exactly was meant by the expression "NATO arms". NATO itself did not manufacture weapons. Each member country provided arms which were used only under the conditions described in the Treaty. The Danish Government would be greatly disturbed if arms delivered to Portugal through NATO were being used against Africans in the Portuguese colonies. In that connexion, his delegation would inform its Government of all that had been said in the Special Committee. He felt sure that his Government would give the utmost attention to such information.

322. Denmark had no sympathy whatever for the policy of repression carried out in the Portuguese colonies. That policy was senseless. He questioned how Portugal could believe that it alone among colonial Powers could retain its empire by force when larger and richer countries had realized that their empires had to be liquidated. If Portugal thought it might succeed by collaborating with the régimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the situation was tragic. Portugal must immediately call off the fighting in its colonies in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and hold consultations with the nationalist leaders on the steps to be taken to bring about independence and self-government.

323. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the statement made by the representative of Denmark raised questions of principle. Since Portugal claimed that its colonies were provinces of Portugal, the Tanzanian delegation could only conclude that Portugal considered its overseas Territories as falling under the definition in the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty.

324. It had been stated that NATO possessed no arms factories. Nevertheless, certain member countries manufactured arms and distributed them to other countries. A Portuguese plane that had come down in Tanzania had been supplied by Portugal's allies. When questioned, the countries concerned had stated that they did not supply arms to Portugal, but only to NATO. Moreover, it was obvious that if NATO provided Portugal with arms, the Portuguese Government could use the resources thus released to purchase further weapons for use in Africa. In addition, military exercises and training courses were organized by NATO. Consequently, Portuguese soldiers trained by NATO in Europe could later be sent to Mozambique to kill Africans.

325. He also recalled that, in 1962, the Rev. Michael Scott had produced photographs of certain weapons in use in the Portuguese colonies. The countries in which those weapons had been manufactured had denied that they had any bilateral agreement to supply arms to Portugal. The arms in question had reached Portugal through NATO. Not until Portugal was excluded from NATO and ceased to receive NATO assistance would Mozambique be free.

326. The representative of Tunisia recalled that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia, duly empowered by OAU—together with his colleagues from Madagascar, Liberia and Sierra Leone—to speak for the African countries in the Security Council, had several times had occasion to set forth his Government's views regarding the crimes committed by Portugal in Africa with the complicity of certain European Powers.

327. The Special Committee must do everything in its power to eliminate the scourge of colonialism. To attain that goal, it had first studied the situation in the countries still under foreign domination and had then recommended concrete measures designed to rid the world of the degrading acts of a number of persons who continued to represent humanity at its basest. Unfortunately, it so happened that those representatives of evil were protected by certain great Powers, which continued to put forward all manner of excuses to justify their support and encouragement of the oppressors. The peoples of the Territories must be given proof that the United Nations supported their claims and would do everything in its power to give effect to their legitimate aspirations. It was also desirable that the Special Committee should address an urgent appeal to the specialized agencies and to the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees to increase their humanitarian aid to the refugees who had fled the repression raging in the Territories under Portuguese administration.

328. In conclusion, he observed that Tunisia, having itself suffered long years under the colonial yoke, was well able to understand the real meaning of the struggle for independence.

329. The representative of Chile said that, now that the Special Committee was considering the tragic situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration, he would like once again to give the African populations the assurance that his delegation whole-heartedly supported their struggle to exercise their rights in the land of their birth. It was incomprehensible that in the mid-twentieth century, in 1965, which had been designated International Co-operation Year, there were still subject peoples who lived in conditions unworthy of the human race. In the case of the Territories administered by Portugal, the world, which was fully aware of the equality of all men, saw a country which trampled underfoot the most elementary rules imposed by coexistence in a modern society and which continued to exercise its domination over the regions of another continent which it called "overseas provinces".

330. It might be asked of what use had been the efforts made so far by the United Nations to lead Portugal back to the right road, and what purpose had been served by so many years of deliberation, if each day that passed brought an increase in the sufferings of the indigenous inhabitants and made their conditions of life harsher. The delegation noted that in all fields—political, economic and social—the representatives of Portugal were holding themselves ever more aloof from the activities of the United Nations. Those representatives were obviously not unaware of the reasons for their isolation, and that situation could not but weigh upon them.

331. Chile could not approve of the colonial system that Portugal was imposing on the African Territories. The Chilean people had known foreign domination and knew what it meant to recover freedom. Being now in

possession of all their sovereign rights, they considered that all men without exception should be able to enjoy equal justice. Chile was deeply distressed to see the indigenous populations of Mozambique, Angola, Portuguese Guinea and other regions of Africa suffering intolerable conditions imposed by a foreign minority. Chile was participating in the most effective manner in the efforts now being made to put an end to discrimination and the denial of the free exercise of the will of the majority.

332. Chile was a small country which faced numerous economic problems, but it had a stable institutional system of which it was proud; it had always been ready to give concrete proof of the interest it took in the African situation, for it was united with the African continent by historic links and by common principles and needs. It wished to make a contribution, no matter how modest, to the success of the efforts now being made by that continent to recover its legitimate possessions.

333. At the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, in 1962, the Chilean representative, at the 1376th meeting of the Fourth Committee, had expressed the Chilean Government's concern about the difficulties encountered by some African students in undertaking specialized studies. He had indicated on that occasion that nationals of African countries could obtain scholarships from the Chilean Government which would enable them to study in Chilean universities. In making that offer, the Chilean Government had been thinking especially of nationals from Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea, who for incomprehensible reasons could not enjoy such advantages in their own schools.

334. In conclusion, he stated that Chile hoped that truth would soon triumph over injustice and that the Territories administered by Portugal would soon accede to independence.

335. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that the tragic situation resulting from the clear contradiction between the general movement for the emancipation of the colonized peoples and the anachronistic ideas of Portugal, which persisted in deliberately violating its obligations under the Charter, was deeply disturbing and distressing to the African countries. The Ivory Coast delegation had on several occasions drawn attention to the baneful consequences of Portuguese colonialism. The petitioners' testimony had shown that throughout more than five centuries of Portuguese rule the indigenous peoples of Mozambique, Angola, so-called Portuguese Guinea and other Territories had known nothing but repression, ignorance, poverty, discrimination and the exploitation of their resources. After more than 500 years, the literacy rate was still only 1 per cent and the public health services were the most inadequate on the African continent.

336. For years the United Nations had been trying, by moderately toned resolutions, to convince Portugal of the need to recognize the right to free self-determination and independence of the Territories under its administration. The African countries, and the nationalists of those Territories, had displayed towards the Lisbon authorities a spirit of conciliation and co-operation which all would acknowledge. Salazar's only reply had been an uncompromising and obstinate refusal. What was more, he was waging, with arms received from friendly countries under the North Atlantic Treaty, a war of extermination against the nationalists. Portugal's repression and acts of barbarism had caused many of the population to flee the Terri-

ories. The patience of the nationalists had been exhausted and they had rightly decided to take up arms.

337. National insurrection constituted an inalienable right and was, moreover, invincible—as the Algerian war had shown. The martyrdom of the people of the Territories under Portuguese domination was an insult to the freedom of the independent African States. He read out to the Committee a statement made by Mr. Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania. According to that statement, the West had the means and even the duty of bringing peaceful pressure to bear on its ally Portugal, to the end that the latter's colonies might freely obtain independence. Mr. Nyerere had added that the African countries would regard the Western countries as their allies in that peaceful progress towards freedom, but that if their efforts were fruitless they would be forced to give up the idea of freeing the Portuguese colonies by peaceful means; if, as was not likely, the West refused its aid, help would have to be sought elsewhere. Mr. Nyerere had asked the West to take action, while there was yet time, to ensure that that did not happen.

338. He then read out some extracts from a speech made by Mr. Houphouët-Boigny, the President of the Republic of the Ivory Coast. The latter had stated that the liberation of the African Territories was of concern not merely to his own country but to the Organization of African Unity as a whole. The Ivory Coast was accordingly making its financial contribution to the committee specially set up for that purpose and was ready to make any sacrifice requested by that body. It belonged, however, to a group of countries which attached prime importance to discussion. Mr. Houphouët-Boigny had added that those countries, while desiring to achieve a speedy solution by the most practical means, should also be able to engage in discussions; war had never settled anything. For that reason they sought a peaceful solution to the problem of the liberation of those Territories. Nevertheless, the Ivory Coast had a formal commitment and, faced with Portugal's stupid obstinacy, it had agreed to seek, with its African partners, any means which would ensure the liberation of those Territories.

339. The peoples of Africa were at the end of their patience and were prepared to fight side by side with their brothers for freedom, man's first necessity. He suggested that the Special Committee should complete its work by adopting a resolution which, reaffirming the principles of self-determination, would confirm the previous resolutions, would condemn Portugal's acts of barbarism, would invite States to withhold from it all material aid, would urge the specialized agencies and the International Red Cross to succour the refugees and would draw the attention of the Security Council to the danger created by the situation prevailing in the Territories under Portuguese domination.

340. He appealed to the great Powers—particularly those of NATO—to cease their help to Portugal, since by their present acts they were indirectly aiding and abetting the massacre going on in those Territories. He asked the United States of America and the United Kingdom to hesitate no longer, for their hesitation merely encouraged Salazar in his disgraceful course. They should join the majority in the adoption of future resolutions and cease to abstain, so that the Portuguese colonialists might be isolated and condemned by world opinion. Only in that way could peace be preserved.

341. The representative of Syria said that the statements made by the petitioners had clearly brought into the open the abominable persecution inflicted on the Africans of Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea. The myth of integration, to which Salazar still clung, had already proved a complete failure. The Portuguese would never be able to force millions of Africans to abandon their rights, to forswear their national allegiance, or to forget their languages, traditions and religions, in order to become Portuguese. Salazar might be able to impose his dictatorship over Portugal, but he had no business in Africa. The only reason why Portuguese rule in Africa had persisted to the present time was that Portugal had succeeded in assembling an army equipped with modern weapons which it was itself incapable of producing. By various pretexts, Portugal had obtained weapons from other countries to use against Africans who merely sought to secure their freedom, rights and dignity.

342. For centuries, the Portuguese colonialists had done nothing constructive for the great mass of Africans. On the other hand, they had attempted to suffocate the African personality, but despite all their efforts they had met with no success. The Africans were not intimidated and would fight to emancipate themselves. Faced with a situation in which right was suppressed by force, thus endangering international peace and security, he asked what the Special Committee could do.

343. That question was of vital importance and he therefore supported the proposals made by the representatives of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Tunisia. In his view, the inclusion in the final resolution of the five points elaborated by the representative of Tanzania was the essential minimum required of the Special Committee in order to translate its decisions into action. In the last analysis, of course, everything depended on the continuation of the struggle by the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese administration and their African brothers, backed by the OAU and supported by the African-Asian group and all other peace-loving nations. The Government and people of Tanzania had shown the way. With a view to obtaining a better understanding of the situation, the Security Council might decide to meet in Dar es Salaam when the time came to take up the question of African Territories still under colonial rule.

344. The representative of Italy said he would like to express his delegation's views on the problem of the Territories under Portuguese administration and on the point which was given so much attention in the Special Committee, namely, economic and military assistance to Portugal within the framework of NATO. His delegation fully endorsed the comments made by the Danish representative in that respect. They constituted a full reply to the attempt made by the Soviet representative to indict NATO as a whole for the policies pursued by the Portuguese Government in respect to its colonies. In particular, the citation of the relevant articles of the North Atlantic Treaty disposed once and for all of the question of the geographical limits of NATO commitments.

345. A tendency had recently developed in the Special Committee to regard NATO as the source of all the evils existing in the world. When the Atlantic Pact was signed and ratified in 1949, the democratically elected Government of Italy had realized that the Alliance was the only means of defence for its members against repeated threats of aggression, against the

danger of themselves becoming the colonies of a Power bent at that time—and still perhaps bent—on world domination. Those feelings had been amply justified by events in Europe after the end of the Second World War; if others doubted their rightness, that was their privilege.

346. What could not be denied or challenged was that the Atlantic Alliance had saved Europe, and indeed the world, from total war and destruction; that it had contributed to the maintenance of peace and security in the world—a circumstance which, *inter alia*, had created the conditions for the orderly accession to independence of millions of Africans and Asians, thus enriching the United Nations by over sixty Members, all of them, if he was not mistaken, formerly Territories under the administration of NATO countries.

347. Those were self-evident truths that could not be left aside when matters having a connexion with NATO were under discussion; and they belied the distorted reasoning of certain delegations in trying to draw the conclusion from petitioners' statements that the sole purpose of the Atlantic Alliance was to defend the economic interests of its member countries in Europe, Africa or elsewhere. That doctrine was devoid of all foundation, and was not shared by the Italian Government. It was based on obsolete ideologies, which saw in materialistic interest the only moving force of human actions.

348. Addressing himself particularly to the African members of the Special Committee, to whom it might seem that NATO stood in the way of the independence of the Portuguese colonies, he would point out that what they saw—and he was the first to recognize that the plight of Angola, Mozambique and the other Portuguese colonies fully justified their emotions—was merely an over-simplified version of an infinitely more complicated situation. Their contentions were, first, that Portugal, by itself, could not maintain its colonial rule in Africa, secondly, that some NATO members were providing Portugal with military and/or economic assistance, and finally, that NATO was consequently responsible for Portugal's non-observance of the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. That was a well-known form of fallacious reasoning whereby a partially or totally false conclusion was drawn from a series of premises apparently true. By such reasoning, it might be maintained that the policies of the Soviet Union had made it necessary for the Western countries to form a defensive alliance; *ergo*, the Soviet Union was responsible for the perpetuation of Portuguese colonialism. That conclusion was equally, although only partially true. It might further be contended that Soviet policies and the formation of the Atlantic Alliance were both the consequences of the still imperfect organization of the community of nations, and, hence, that that circumstance was the real cause of the continuance of Portuguese colonialism. Again, there was a grain of truth in the conclusion.

349. His point was that the political and economic and social realities of the world were full of situations—and not only in the colonial sphere—where justice did not apply and where the wrong course was not or had not been remedied. Those were not imaginary cases; in matters that had come under the consideration of the United Nations, he would merely recall, by reference number only in order to preclude any accusation of dragging extraneous matter into the

discussion, General Assembly resolutions 1004 (ES-II) of 4 November 1956, 1005 (ES-II) of 9 November 1956, 1353 (XIV) of 21 October 1959 and 1632 (XVI) of 27 October 1961. His object in recalling those not-too-distant tragedies was merely to remind the Committee members that problems remained problems because no easy and ready-made solutions to them existed.

350. The problem of the Portuguese Territories was a case in point, and his delegation was grateful to the petitioners for having shown the Special Committee the great sum of human sufferings involved, the injustices committed, the wrong policies applied and, at the same time, the complexity of the problem that those policies had created.

351. The Italian delegation agreed with much that had been said in the Committee as to the substance of the problem: that the Portuguese Government's policies in respect to the so-called overseas Territories were not only in contradiction with a number of texts adopted by the United Nations by an overwhelming majority, but, first and foremost, were obsolete and out of step with the trend of history and the realities of the world today.

352. Pursuance of such policies was bound to result in greater struggle, fighting and suffering on both sides and, in the end, in defeat of the forces of conservatism. Italy had time and again urged the Portuguese Government to seek a change in policy and make a significant start on implementing General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). If the true intention was eventually to promote some form of loose association between metropolitan Portugal and its former colonies, action to that end should be all the more important for the Portuguese Government; for the longer the act of self-determination was postponed, the less the chances would be of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and the other Portuguese Territories accepting that alternative solution.

353. The Italian Government, which in accordance with the spirit of Security Council resolution 182 (1963) of 31 July 1963 was keeping under strict control the supply of arms and ammunition to Portugal, offered its sympathy to all those suffering because of their aspirations to freedom and justice. However, he had been saddened to hear certain statements in the Special Committee implying, through harping on the need for deeds rather than words, that the sole solution lay in the hands of the Western countries and that they, out of sheer wantonness or selfishness, were impeding action.

354. Each and every one was called upon to contribute to a solution and his delegation would report fully to the Italian Government on the substance and tenor of the discussions. He maintained, however, that the joint draft resolution was not entirely calculated to achieve the Special Committee's goals. The emphasis in it partly distorted the truth: the core of the problem lay in the will of Portugal and its people to come to grips with the realities of the times and to change their ways accordingly, rather than wholly in the so-called NATO assistance to that country.

355. The same had been true of all the self-governing territories that had come up for consideration in the past three years. And it was true in the case already mentioned where a member of NATO had fought with determination for seven years, allegedly with the support of NATO arms, in resistance to the demands

for independence by the population of a territory considered by it to be part of the metropolitan country. Although the population concerned had fought a gallant fight, it would be only fair to say that the conclusion of hostilities had come about only when the administering Power had come to change its stand and recognize independence as the only way out.

356. Furthermore, severance of the links between Portugal and the other members of NATO would not in any way affect the obduracy of the Portuguese, for they would merely seek closer allies, less concerned to uphold world ideas and consequently, from the Portuguese standpoint, more dependable.

357. Before concluding, he felt bound to comment on statements made by the petitioners on the role of the Roman Catholic Church in the education of the Mozambique population. His delegation had not felt justified in taking up time by seeking the additional clarification needed on the subject. But the Special Committee would have a more precise idea of the magnitude of the problem were it furnished with exact figures on the total school-age population in Mozambique, the number of missionaries engaged in educational activities and in particular, the funds allotted by the Portuguese Government for African education. The real responsibility for the alleged state of affairs could then be ascertained. Furthermore, the representative of FRELIMO had partially admitted that the Church in Mozambique had not entirely failed in its educational mission, in acknowledging that it had taken no advantage of its privileged position to indulge in indiscriminate proselytizing of the local population. Lastly, he could not help wondering what the literacy situation in the Portuguese colonies would now be, had education been entrusted to lay Portuguese teachers rather than to the Catholic Church. He hardly need remind the Committee of the merit accruing to the Catholic Church, and generally to the Christian Churches, for supplementing the educational efforts of the administering Powers in all colonial territories. The Catholic Church, in dependent and independent countries alike, had for centuries been a gallant advocate and defender of human rights, long before the very idea of a United Nations Organization had emerged as an aspiration of mankind.

C. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

358. At the 359th meeting, held on 8 June 1965, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.214), jointly sponsored by Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.

359. The representative of Tanzania stated that his delegation would always remember the hair-raising tales of atrocities committed by the Portuguese in Africa, as revealed by the petitioners appearing before the Special Committee. He had been particularly moved to see the representative of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola dissolving into tears on being questioned on the numbers and details of people butchered in Portugal's desperate attempt to hold back the tide of progress.

360. The panic-stricken Portuguese soldiers in the fighting areas were merciless in their fear, as the representatives of FRELIMO had testified. Houses were being burnt around their occupants, individuals sprayed

with petrol and burnt to death, and so on. That was the price Africa was having to pay to rid itself of colonialism: the price Portugal and its allies expected the Africans to pay for their legitimate right to independence. The question now was how long Africa would continue to bear that inhuman treatment. His delegation had missed no opportunity of appealing to Portugal's Western allies to exert their influence to end those evil crimes, which clearly presented a danger to peace in the continent. The danger was further aggravated by Portugal's reported attempts to extend the same kind of terror into independent African States. His own country had suffered in that regard, as well as Senegal, where villages had been bombed and innocent people killed. Such a situation could no longer be tolerated; Africa must unite to remove the cause of the trouble.

361. He explained that the joint draft resolution was based on the evidence the Special Committee had heard and should be acceptable to all declared supporters of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

362. The reference in the sixth preambular paragraph to NATO arms being made available to Portugal might be regarded as controversial by Western delegations. The main operative provisions related to the imposition of sanctions, and an end to United Nations aid to Portugal as inimical to African interests. The Special Committee had a duty to the African peoples still suffering under Portuguese domination and he would urge all members to support the draft resolution.

363. The representative of Italy said that in view of what he had said previously (see paras. 344 to 357 above), he had serious doubts that his delegation would be able to support the joint draft resolution. He thought preambular paragraph 6 should read as follows: "Considering that, according to the evidence submitted by the petitioners, Portugal is continuing to make use... of the aid and weapons which are at its disposal as a result of its alliances"; operative paragraph 4 should be rephrased along the lines of the corresponding paragraph of the Security Council resolution of 31 July 1963, without reference to any specific group of States; and operative paragraph 8 should be deleted, as the Special Committee was not empowered to give instructions to the Security Council.

364. He hoped that the resolution to be adopted as a conclusion to the Special Committee's debates would take account of his delegation's points, so that he might be able to give the text full support.

365. The representative of Ethiopia said that, as a co-sponsor of the draft resolution, his delegation naturally supported all its recommendations. Having heard all that had been said in the meetings, including the evidence of the petitioners, he felt that the recommendations contained in the draft were a strict minimum in the way of concrete action on behalf of the peoples now suffering the evils of Portuguese colonialism.

366. The mood of the petitioners had made it abundantly clear that they were tired of pious declarations and vague promises. The time had come to demonstrate a real spirit of humanity and to dispense with mere lip-service to high-sounding ideas. The sufferings of the tortured peoples called urgently for alleviation, and their call must not go unheeded.

367. With regard to NATO, it was evident that the NATO members represented on the Special Committee were ashamed of the fact that Portugal was one of their number, but they were not frank enough to say so. Failure to do so indicated not only blindness to the facts but a latent duplicity.

368. The core of the problem, as the Italian representative had rightly said, was the need for a change of heart on the part of Portugal. But that was hardly feasible while Portugal was being assisted, directly or indirectly, in pursuing its nefarious policy.

369. He appealed to all those who were concerned to see a real solution of the problem to support the resolution.

370. The representative of Mali observed that the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration was on the agenda of the Special Committee. It was rather a question of "Portuguese domination" and not of "Portuguese administration". The Malian delegation considered that Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea were Territories under Portuguese domination. If Portugal had considered itself an administering Power, it would have complied with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, respected the obligations placed on it by virtue of Article 73 and striven to promote the economic and political independence of those Territories; it would also have respected their civilization and culture. The fact was, however, that Portugal was oppressing, torturing, murdering and exploiting the people of those Territories. The petitioners had revealed to the Special Committee facts so horrible that they might appear unbelievable. For instance, the members of the Special Committee had learned to their horror that the Portuguese fascists dismembered and burned the bodies of those they had murdered. A Government which permitted such atrocities did not deserve the title of administering Power. Portugal oppressed; the least that could be said was that it dominated and the sponsors of the draft resolution were justified in using the expression "under Portuguese domination".

371. In the draft resolution the sponsors, in keeping with the mandate given to the Special Committee by the United Nations, requested Portugal to recognize the legitimate rights of the populations of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. It was necessary to reaffirm the right of those peoples to self-determination and independence, as also the principles accepted by those who had adopted the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

372. In the preamble of the draft resolution the sponsors noted with concern that, in spite of the measures laid down by the Security Council, the Government of Portugal was intensifying its measures of repression and military operations against the African populations. Those facts had been established many times over and borne out by a great deal of evidence. Moreover, the sponsors considered that the evidence of the petitioners had confirmed that Portugal was continuing to use against the territories under its domination the aid and weapons available to it because of its membership of NATO. That was also a fact and the members of NATO were well aware that the fact that Portugal was killing and torturing in Angola, Mozambique and elsewhere showed that it was not keeping the arms supplied to it in storage. On the contrary, those arms

were being used to massacre and murder the African inhabitants. NATO would be better advised to take action and to bring pressure to bear on Portugal to make it desist from its oppression. That was the duty and obligation of the members of NATO which had accepted the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, by virtue of which they were bound to respect all peoples.

373. The Government of Mali respected all international organizations, provided that they themselves respected other peoples and their right to self-determination. There was no question of attacking NATO as an organization. If the countries members of the Warsaw Pact or of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) had assisted Portugal, the African States would have made the same complaints against them as they had made against NATO. The fact that the African States were non-aligned did not mean that they were accomplices, and NATO would be mentioned until such time as it ceased its assistance to the Portuguese fascists who were massacring and murdering Africans. The Malian delegation categorically denied the assertion that NATO had contributed to the liberation of certain African territories: NATO was incapable of so doing. It was through their own struggle and efforts that those African countries had gained independence. The Government of Mali maintained friendly relations with some countries members of NATO, but Portugal's hands were stained with the blood of African peoples and those countries should force it to remove that stain before negotiating with the members of NATO.

374. Furthermore, it was illogical to compare Portugal with France. In any event, France had not granted independence to the Algerian people; the Algerian people had won their independence. Portugal, for its part, stubbornly refused any discussion of the independence or self-determination of the territories it dominated. In colonial problems, there was no compromise position: either people were on the side of the colonialists and helped them to kill and oppress, or they were on the side of the colonized and helped them to liberate themselves. Those who accepted the principles of the United Nations Charter, the idea of the equality of races and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights must of necessity choose the side of the oppressed.

375. In the joint draft resolution the sponsors requested the Security Council to take the necessary measures under the United Nations Charter to carry out its own resolutions. In fact, Article 6 of the Charter laid down that countries which persistently violated the principles of the Charter could be expelled from the Organization. It was the right, and even the duty, of the Special Committee to make appropriate proposals to the Security Council, since the General Assembly, in resolution 1810 (XVII), had invited the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of anything which might threaten peace in those territories. If the Special Committee were to neglect that duty, it would have failed in its mission.

376. In view of the Portuguese atrocities, and of the mission entrusted to the Special Committee, the sponsors of the draft resolution considered that it represented the minimum which could be proposed to the General Assembly. The Malian delegation therefore considered that all delegations which were indignant at the attitude of Portugal should approve the reso-

lution. In speaking as they did, the sponsors of the draft resolution were only showing their friendship for and desire to co-operate with the countries members of NATO. Those countries had to be put on their guard, because they were not perhaps aware of the use to which the assistance they were giving Portugal was put.

377. The former colonial countries of Africa had many difficulties to overcome but they would not stand idly by while day after day their brothers were killed or tortured. Africa had helped Europe in its struggle against Hitler's fascism. Hundreds of thousands of Africans had shed their blood or lost their lives to help European countries to fight Nazism. The African States were disappointed to find the Governments of those same European countries supporting the fascist régime of Salazar. If Portugal persisted in the course it was following, all the African countries would be forced to fight against it. When that time came, the countries which were members of NATO would have to choose between their friendship for the African nations and the unconditional support they were giving to Salazar. It was to spare them that painful choice that the sponsors had drawn up the draft resolution.

378. He wished to reaffirm Mali's friendship with certain States members of NATO and to repeat that his statement was not an expression of hostility to NATO but of the suffering and fears of the peoples of Africa. He appealed to those countries to give no more arms to Portugal. That appeal should be understood and should not be misinterpreted. The sponsors were asking all delegations for their support against Salazar's colonialist régime. Their support for the draft resolution was not too much to ask, since it was part of the obligations they had undertaken in subscribing to the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) embodying the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

379. The representative of Venezuela said that he had followed with interest the discussion concerning the preparation of the draft resolution. He was particularly grateful to the Afro-Asian group for submitting the draft resolution, which reflected the concern not only of the African countries but also of the Latin American countries at the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination.

380. His delegation was ready to support any measures designed to put an end to Portugal's colonial policy. It would have liked, therefore, to be able to support the draft resolution without reservation. However, while it was in agreement with regard to the substance of the draft resolution, it would like to see the wording of some of the paragraphs amended. It therefore urged the sponsors to make the changes in question so that the Latin American countries would be able to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

381. The representative of Australia said that at that stage of the discussion his delegation had some general observations to make; it reserved the right to make more specific comments on the draft resolution at a later stage. He had been impressed by the skill and eloquence of the petitioners. He noted in particular that Mr. Mondlane who, he felt sure, had no hatred for the Portuguese people or culture, had made it clear that his quarrel was with a particular system of administration, not with a people. Australia had been deeply

disturbed by the evidence produced on the condition of Africans in the Portuguese colonies.

382. On several occasions the Australian Government had publicly declared its views on the African Territories under Portuguese administration. At the 277th meeting of the Special Committee, the Australian delegation had clearly stated that a policy of self-determination should be applied to these Territories. His Government had tried, not only through the United Nations but also through diplomatic channels, to persuade Portugal to change its policy. The response had been discouraging. It was disappointing that so little weight had been given to African interests in the representation provided under the Overseas Organic Law of 1963. Australia felt obliged to contrast that situation with the position in Papua and New Guinea. There the House of Assembly included a majority of members democratically elected by the whole of the adult population without discrimination as to race and its leading members were being given an opportunity to gain the necessary experience for a take-over of the administration in an orderly progress towards self-government. He regretted that Portugal was moving so slowly in Mozambique and Angola.

383. In December 1963 Australia had voted for General Assembly resolution 1913 (XVIII), and it would be prepared to vote now for a similar resolution in the Special Committee. However, the proposed draft resolution presented difficulties to the Australian delegation. With regard to preambular paragraph 6 and operative paragraph 4 he thought that the modifications suggested by the representative of Italy were wise. He well understood the appeals made by the representatives of Tanzania and Mali, and he assured them that the Australian delegation had taken most careful note of the petitioners' statements. But the evidence produced had to be transmitted to Governments for analysis and assessment. The Australian Government had not yet had time for that. He therefore requested the Special Committee to allow time for consideration and appealed to the co-sponsors of the draft resolution to modify the categorical statements made in the two contentious paragraphs.

384. The Australian position with regard to operative paragraph 8, he said, was well known. He did not feel that it was the role of the Special Committee to make that type of recommendation to the Security Council. The Organization of African Unity had already instructed four African States to place the question of the Portuguese Territories in Africa before the Security Council. If those States, after examining the Special Committee's records, should come to the conclusion contained in operative paragraph 8, then they could make that suggestion to the Security Council. He did not feel that paragraph 2 reflected the sort of ways and means of bringing about independence envisaged in the resolutions defining the scope of the Special Committee's work. The Australian delegation still awaited instructions and, unless the draft resolution was modified, he would have to reserve his delegation's position, not only with regard to the paragraphs which he had mentioned, but possibly with regard to the draft resolution as a whole.

385. The representative of Chile supported the request of the Venezuelan representative, who had spoken for the countries of Latin America.

386. The representative of Denmark said that Denmark supported the modifications proposed by the

representative of Italy. Unless they were accepted, his delegation would not be in a position to support the draft resolution.

387. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics observed that the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania had rightly stated that however strongly the draft resolution was worded, it could not be strong enough. The time had come to pass from words to deeds. The present situation represented too great a threat to Africa, to world peace and to mankind as a whole for the Committee to be satisfied with a draft resolution lacking in substance. There could be no compromise between colonialism and the eradication of colonialism, between freedom and slavery, between life and death. Viewed in that light, the draft resolution would be seen as an honest attempt by its sponsors to reflect the results of the Special Committee's work and to meet the demands of the situation. The sponsors of the draft resolution had faced up to their political responsibilities—their responsibilities to the peoples struggling under Portuguese colonial rule and to Africa as a whole. The draft resolution was not just rhetoric, but a valuable arm in the fight for independence. For that reason he proposed to examine certain paragraphs in detail.

388. With regard to operative paragraph 2, he agreed that it would be useful to appeal to all States to grant moral and material support to the African populations of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. However, he wished to remind the sponsors of the much stronger wording used in the Cairo Declaration, which had been approved by a large number of African and Asian Governments. The Cairo Declaration had called for military and financial support for the oppressed nations, and he wished to suggest that those terms be included in the Special Committee's resolution.

389. The second idea that he wished to submit to the attention of the sponsors of the draft resolution concerned operative paragraph 4. While he supported the text, he felt that it did not altogether reflect the desires expressed in the Committee by the representatives of the African and Asian countries. They had quite correctly pointed out that if NATO members, such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Italy and Denmark, were really ashamed of their association with Portugal, if they really felt pangs of conscience with regard to Africa, they should go further than the action called for in paragraph 4. They should expel Portugal from NATO. The Special Committee should appeal to the NATO Council to examine the question of Portugal's expulsion from the alliance.

390. With regard to operative paragraph 8, he recalled that various representatives had stated during the discussions that the sanctions to be put into effect against Portugal should be the same as those proposed in regard to South Africa. That should be stated in the draft resolution. The Soviet Union supported the proposal that the Security Council should consider sanctions against Portugal and thought that the Special Committee should make concrete proposals.

391. At the 363rd meeting, the representative of Ethiopia introduced an amended text of the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.214). After drawing attention to a number of drafting changes, he explained that the co-sponsors, in a spirit of compromise, had gone to great lengths in trying to accommodate views expressed on the original draft, and especially those of the Latin

American delegations, in the hope that they would be able to give the draft resolution full support. They had accordingly made major concessions in the sixth preambular paragraph and in operative paragraph 8, without however, impairing the original force and impact of the draft resolution.

392. The reference to NATO in the sixth preambular paragraph had been replaced by the broader term "military allies", so as to cover also Portugal's special military alliance with Spain outside the scope of NATO. The specific mention of NATO in operative paragraph 4 was, however, regarded as essential. In operative paragraph 8, the word "sanctions" had been replaced by the word "measures", so as to bring the wording into conformity with that of the Charter of the United Nations.

393. The sponsors sincerely hoped that the revised draft resolution would be given serious consideration by all members of the Special Committee. Should some regard the text as too strong, they might bear in mind that mere words would not be strong enough to condemn the brutalities perpetrated by Portugal in its African colonies, while those feeling that it was too weak must remember that every compromise, such as that on which the United Nations itself had been built, entailed some sacrifice. In the view of the sponsors, the revised draft went a long way towards meeting the needs of the situation. They trusted that it would receive the broadest possible measure of support.

394. The representative of Australia, while expressing appreciation to the co-sponsors of the revised joint draft resolution, stated that his delegation was still unable to accept the formulation of the sixth preambular paragraph and of operative paragraph 4. In its view the emphasis in those paragraphs was wrongly placed and the assertions made were not justified by anything the petitioners had said on the subject.

395. Secondly, his previous comments on operative paragraph 8 still applied, although its wording had been improved. His delegation also had to reserve its position in respect to the seventh preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 2 and 3. It would, however, abstain in the vote rather than vote against the draft resolution as a whole, because Australia was profoundly disturbed by both the professed objectives and the practice of the Portuguese Government in relation to the Territories in Africa under its administration.

396. His country believed that the principle of self-determination applied by Australia as an administering Power, should be applied to all Territories, including those under Portuguese administration. As had been stated before, his delegation felt that Portugal had fallen far short of fulfilling the obligations devolving upon it, as laid down in the Charter. That view had repeatedly been made known to the Portuguese Government, with its corollary that Portugal should transmit information on its Territories to the United Nations and should likewise establish conditions there which would lead to self-determination and self-government or independence, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the indigenous majority.

397. Australia understood and in large measure shared the feelings of the African members of the Committee regarding the state of affairs in the Portuguese Territories. However, in the co-operative efforts of the Special Committee to convince the Portuguese Government of the moral necessity and political realism of

taking action on the lines urged in the draft resolution, his Government believed it desirable to work for a peaceful solution. Efforts to that end would be more productive if the Special Committee's resolutions were couched in the language of reason and persuasion rather than in extreme terms likely to increase Portuguese obduracy.

398. The representative of the United Kingdom said that with regard to the draft resolution, his delegation appreciated the spirit in which the latest amendments had been made and regarded them as improvements. They did not, however, affect the substance of the points which gave rise to particular difficulty. While appreciating the objectives of the draft resolution, the United Kingdom did not consider the methods recommended to be the most likely to bring about the kind of solution needed. For example, preambular paragraph 6 ignored the statements made about NATO, and by implication misrepresented the United Kingdom's position. Preambular paragraph 7 attempted to make a determination more appropriate for the Security Council and went further than the situation warranted. Operative paragraphs 2 and 3 were inconsistent with the policy advocated by the United Kingdom, while operative paragraph 4 misrepresented NATO's position and went further than previous resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on arms supplies to Portugal. Operative paragraph 6 made demands which would put the specialized agencies in an impossible position, since it seemed to require the complete cessation of technical assistance for, and financial relations with, Portugal and its Territories. Finally, operative paragraph 8 appeared to instruct the Security Council to take specific action, which was inappropriate for a Committee of the General Assembly.

399. The United Kingdom had no objection to the remaining paragraphs of the draft resolution and in particular supported operative paragraph 5. It was glad to note from document A/AC.109/L.212 that action along these lines had already begun. However, for the reasons he had stated, and in particular because of his delegation's objections to operative paragraphs 4 and 8, the United Kingdom would vote against the draft resolution as a whole.

400. The representative of Iran said that his delegation had been deeply disturbed by the testimony of the petitioners from Mozambique and Angola. Their detailed account of the appalling situation in those Territories confirmed what was already known from other sources. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace had published a report on the Territories under Portuguese administration which described the plight of the African populations in those Territories in almost identical terms. Meanwhile, Portugal refused to recognize the very principles of self-determination and independence. The United Nations could not disregard such continued defiance. The draft resolution constituted an attempt to ensure that Portugal should apply the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

401. His delegation could not accept the contention that NATO was responsible for Portuguese atrocities, or that it provided arms for the purpose of aiding Portugal in its wars of colonial oppression. Nevertheless, it was evident that Portugal was abusing its position as a member of NATO and diverting arms supplied to it for NATO purposes for use against the

African populations. Until evidence to the contrary was forthcoming, therefore, an appeal to all States, including the States members of NATO, to refrain from supplying Portugal with arms and munitions was in order.

402. His delegation had no difficulty in supporting operative paragraph 8. The General Assembly was empowered under Article 10 of the Charter to make recommendations concerning sanctions, unless the question was under consideration by the Security Council. The African populations concerned had clearly lost faith in the continuation of efforts to obtain a solution through reason and persuasion. By asking the Security Council to take action, the Special Committee was proposing the adoption of collective security measures in order to avert what had become a threat to international peace and security.

403. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics commenting on the revised draft resolution, expressed disappointment that the considerations he had put forward were not reflected in the revised text, which was, in some respects, even weaker than the original. However, while he would have preferred the resolution in its original form, he would support the revised text.

404. Addressing himself to the Italian delegation, he recalled a time when the Italian people had been in much the same position as the unhappy populations of Mozambique and Angola. Labouring under the fascist régime of Mussolini, and occupied by the German invaders, the Italian people, too, had fought gallantly to regain their freedom. Unlike the NATO Powers today, the members of the anti-Hitler coalition—which were later to give birth to the United Nations—had not been concerned to tone down their decisions in support of the oppressed people of Italy, and the USSR was proud to have numbered its countrymen among the Italian partisans. He asked whether the Italian delegation's present attitude to the question of the Portuguese Territories was worthy of its country's noble traditions; he appealed to it to join the Special Committee in voting for the draft resolution.

405. He said, in reply to the Australian delegation, that he noted a certain inconsistency in its position. Having admitted that Portugal had remained intransigent in the face of appeals to reason and had consistently flouted the resolutions of the United Nations which were not strong enough, the Australian representative had then said that he would be unable to vote for the draft resolution, which was stronger than all previous resolutions. Moreover, he had claimed that he was not responsible for his Government's policy. That, of course, was true of all delegations. But a vote for or against the draft resolution must rest on the grounds of general principle. Australia was rightly proud of its democratic traditions; was it now to be numbered among the allies of Portugal?

406. The United States and United Kingdom representatives, too, claimed that their Governments sympathized with the oppressed peoples of Angola and Mozambique, and wished to strengthen the freedom and independence of all peoples. Yet in the same breath they counselled patience and insisted that the possibilities of peaceful persuasion were not yet exhausted. That was the old, familiar colonial philosophy: the African peoples were not fit to manage their own affairs, and should heed the wise white man's counsel. But that philosophy had long since ceased to correspond to reality. The oppressed peoples of Africa would no

longer listen to colonialist exhortations while their brothers were being massacred. The Algerian people had fought for seven long years for their freedom: what help had the NATO Powers given them? If they served no other purpose, the statements of the United Kingdom and United States representatives should persuade any representative who still hesitated to vote for the draft resolution.

407. The United States representative had said that, as one closely associated with the disarmament negotiations, he himself should know better than to accuse the United States of preparing for the manufacture of nuclear weapons in Mozambique and Angola. In fact, he had suggested nothing of the kind. The Territory in question was South West Africa, and it was the petitioners from that Territory who had brought the matter up. His delegation had simply suggested that representatives of the nuclear Powers, together with those of the African-Asian countries, should proceed to South West Africa to establish the facts.

408. It was simply not true that there was nothing secret about NATO. The excerpts from the North Atlantic Treaty read out by the Danish representative dated back to 1949, but it was not until 1951 that the first reference to the Algerian departments of France had appeared in that Treaty. It followed that no one outside NATO was in a position to know what had been added since in connexion with the Portuguese colonies in Africa.

409. His country had taken sides with the peoples fighting for their freedom, and would do everything possible to hasten their victory. The goal pursued by his country was the triumph of freedom itself. As Lenin, a true friend of oppressed peoples everywhere, had said, the old world of national oppression and slavery was giving way to a new world in which there would be no place for such things.

410. The representative of Bulgaria said that the evidence submitted by the petitioners showed that the situation in the Portuguese Territories had seriously deteriorated. Not satisfied with waging colonial war on three fronts, Portugal was threatening military action against the independent African States adjacent to its Territories. That was a very serious situation and a clear threat to international peace and security. It was therefore appropriate that the draft resolution should draw the Security Council's attention to it, and call for the imposition of sanctions.

411. Portugal was threatening "legitimate retaliation" against African States which dared to assist the national liberation movements in its colonies. The Special Committee must ask the Portuguese Government whether it was "legitimate" to hold African populations in colonial bondage, to deny them the right to freedom and independence laid down in the Charter, or to use force to suppress their struggle to exercise that right. There was only one possible answer: Portugal had committed a crime, and was no more entitled to "legitimate retaliation" than was a criminal apprehended in the act of breaking the law. The draft resolution set forth that basic principle with great clarity, leaving no possible doubt as to the consequences of any such "retaliatory" measures by Portugal.

412. Operative paragraph 4 called upon all States, and in particular the States members of NATO, to refrain from supplying Portugal with military and other assistance so long as it failed to renounce its policy of colonial domination. It was not fully recognized

that such assistance served to bolster Portugal's determination to continue on its present course, and that only a total embargo by the Western Powers could effect any improvement in the situation. The statements of both the United Kingdom and United States representatives had overlooked the fact that NATO arms were being used in the Portuguese Territories, and that NATO assistance was one of the main reasons for the appalling situation there.

413. His delegation regretted the deletion of specific reference to NATO in the sixth preambular paragraph of the revised draft resolution. It was true that Portugal obtained arms from more than one military alliance, but that paragraph could have enumerated them.

414. While the draft resolution in its present form had some defects, he understood that the changes were the result of the sponsors' efforts to accommodate the views of certain delegations. His delegation would accordingly vote for it as a step in the right direction.

415. The representative of Poland welcomed the revised joint draft resolution and observed that its adoption would constitute a further step towards helping the oppressed peoples concerned to rid themselves of the criminal colonial yoke of Portugal.

416. It would be advisable, he thought, to bring the wording of operative paragraph 10 into line with that of operative paragraph 4, which was addressed to "all States and in particular the military allies of Portugal, etc.". He therefore proposed that the expression "all States" in operative paragraph 10 be replaced by "all the States mentioned in paragraph 4 above". That would serve to cover the case of West Germany.

417. The representative of Tunisia noted that certain delegations had made long statements of intention on the practical steps to be taken to put an end to Portuguese repression in the African Territories. Those delegations, which had affirmed their sympathy for the African populations, nevertheless announced that they would not vote for the draft resolution. The Special Committee's mandate was precise: to bring about decolonization as quickly as possible. Thus far, however, it had been content to note facts without proposing measures.

418. The truths proclaimed by the Special Committee were obvious; if they were bitter, that was regrettable, but if it wished to fulfil its mandate the Special Committee must not disappoint the millions who had placed their hopes in the United Nations. If NATO had been mentioned, it was because Portugal was a member of that organization and received arms from it which it was using to further its policies of blind repression in Africa. That was an irrefutable truth. Besides, to name an organization was not to insult it; the Special Committee did not wish to insult anyone; it wished merely to give an objective account of incontestable facts. The Heads of State of the non-aligned countries had chosen a policy aimed in the first place at improving the lot of the African populations. It was the threats of extermination that obliged the co-sponsors to name the organizations responsible. If tomorrow another organization should begin supplying arms to Portugal, they would do likewise.

419. The representative of Mali observed that some delegations had criticized the co-sponsors for advocating a number of measures and using language which fell rather within the competence of the Security Council. Those criticisms were without serious foundation. Thus,

some delegations had criticized the co-sponsors for mentioning NATO in operative paragraph 4. His delegation considered that the Special Committee did not have to justify itself to NATO or to its members; it was they, on the contrary, who had to justify themselves in the eyes of the Special Committee and the African populations. So long as Portugal continued to receive arms, it would continue its war of extermination. Of that even the members of NATO who were represented on the Special Committee were convinced, for they had said that their Governments had made representations, repeatedly and without success, to the Portuguese Government. The Governments of countries belonging to NATO must therefore allow the Special Committee to address that perfectly justified appeal to them. It was not a matter of attacking NATO as such. The non-aligned countries did not interfere in the domestic affairs of the members of NATO, and if some other organization were supplying arms to Portugal, they would draw attention to it in the same way.

420. Secondly, the co-sponsors had never meant to give orders or instructions to the Security Council, but it was the Special Committee's mandate to make proposals which would facilitate the application of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The Special Committee had adopted resolutions, and it was the Security Council which was empowered to take steps to ensure the application of those resolutions. If all the attempts made hitherto had been in vain, the Special Committee must take new steps to give effect to its own resolutions. No one could deny that that fell within the competence of the Special Committee. Lastly, it had been said that it was not for the Special Committee to recommend measures against Portugal, and that only the Security Council was empowered to do so. He was disappointed that the delegations which wanted the Security Council to decide what steps should be taken were the same delegations which, in the Security Council, regularly opposed the adoption of sanctions against Portugal and South Africa. That attitude was somewhat strange.

421. At the 363rd meeting on 10 June 1965, the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.214), as revised by the sponsors, and the amendment orally proposed by Poland were put to the vote, as follows: The Polish oral amendment to operative paragraph 10 was adopted by 13 votes to 1, with 9 abstentions; the sixth preambular paragraph was adopted by 16 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions; operative paragraph 4 was adopted by 16 votes to 4, with 3 abstentions; operative paragraph 6 was adopted by 16 votes to 1, with 6 abstentions; operative paragraph 8 was adopted by 16 votes to 3, with 4 abstentions. The draft resolution as a whole (A/AC.109/L.214), as orally amended, was adopted by a roll-call vote of 18 to 2, with 3 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Australia, Denmark, Italy.

422. The representative of Venezuela thanked the sponsors of the draft resolution for the spirit of understanding and co-operation they had displayed, which

had made it possible for him to vote for the draft. His delegation's instructions were to vote for any measure directed against colonialism and calculated to facilitate the comprehensive and rapid application of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples; for any other questions which might arise during the Special Committee's mission in Africa, his delegation would have to request new instructions from his Government. It was for that reason that his delegation had abstained on the sixth preambular paragraph, which contained certain categorical statements on which he was unable to vote without first communicating with his Government, which was, of course, physically impossible.

423. For the same reason, it had abstained on operative paragraphs 4 and 7; regarding the latter, there was also a question of drafting. If the seventh preambular paragraph had been put to a separate vote, his delegation would again have abstained, for reasons which it had already stated on a number of occasions regarding the competence of the various United Nations organs. It had abstained on operative paragraph 8 for the same reasons. If beginning of that paragraph had read "*Requests* the Security Council to consider the possibility of taking measures against Portugal...", his delegation would have voted for it.

424. It had voted for the draft resolution as a whole because it unreservedly approved its substance, and everything which dealt with the independence and freedom of the Portuguese colonies.

425. The representative of the United States of America said that his delegation had voted against the draft resolution for two main reasons. While it fully understood and shared the sponsors' feelings, and their objectives for the most part were also the objectives of his Government, the resolution as drafted did not in his delegation's view constitute the best approach. The situation in the Portuguese Territories called for the utmost continued efforts of persuasion rather than for condemnation. Nor did his Government agree with the emphasis placed on NATO and the alleged effects of Portugal's membership therein on the situation in the Territories in question. That aspect had already been sufficiently discussed in the Special Committee, and his Government's views were well known. In particular his delegation had heard no evidence to justify the statement contained in the sixth preambular paragraph. Lastly, with reference to operative paragraph 8, his delegation considered that the existing situation in the Portuguese Territories by no means warranted the application of measures by the Security Council, under the terms of the Charter of the United Nations.

426. The representative of Chile thanked the sponsors for having accepted certain of the suggestions proposed by the representatives of Venezuela and Chile in order to reach agreement. His own delegation had expressed its agreement with the substance of the draft resolution, and had consequently voted for the resolution as a whole. However, he regretted having had to abstain on the sixth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 4, 6 and 8, for his delegation felt that they did not exactly correspond to the clearly defined task which the General Assembly had entrusted to the Special Committee. He assured the populations of the Territories under Portuguese domination of his Government's sincere sympathy for their legitimate struggle.

427. The representative of India said that India's views on Portuguese colonialism were well known

and were based on bitter experience. Fifteen years of vain effort on India's part had shown conclusively that no meaningful dialogue could be conducted with the Portuguese Government. The co-sponsors of the resolution just adopted, anxious as they were to find without delay a peaceful solution to the question of the Portuguese Territories, would be grateful to be informed if any country represented on the Special Committee had been fortunate enough to find a successful formula to that end.

428. His Government's stand on military alliances was equally well known. It was opposed to any such alliance, wherever it might exist; pacts of the kind tended to enlarge the area of disagreement, whereas India was dedicated to enlarging the area of agreement and of peace. The Portuguese Government was benefiting, directly or indirectly, from the support received from its allies. His delegation's sponsorship of the resolution had been grounded in the spirit illustrated by the statements on this subject by the late Prime Minister of India, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru.

429. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that in view of the great importance of the resolution that had just been adopted, he wished to propose that it receive the widest possible dissemination through all United Nations channels, in particular to the Territories under Portuguese domination.

430. The resolution concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration (A/AC.109/124 and Corr.1) adopted by the Special Committee at its 363rd meeting on 10 June 1965, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having re-examined the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination in Africa,

"Having heard the statements made by the petitioners and the representative of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling also Security Council resolutions 163 (1961) of 9 June 1961, 180 (1963) of 31 July 1963 and 183 (1963) of 11 December 1963, General Assembly resolutions 1807 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, 1819 (XVII) of 18 December 1962 and 1913 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963, and its own resolution of 3 July 1964,

"Noting with deep concern that in spite of the measures laid down by the Security Council in its resolution 180 (1963) of 31 July 1963, the Government of Portugal is intensifying its measures of repression and military operations against the African populations with a view to defeating their legitimate hopes of achieving self-determination and independence,

"Considering that the evidence submitted by the petitioners has confirmed that Portugal is continuing to use against the populations of Angola, Mozambique and other Territories under its domination, the aid and weapons that it receives from its military allies,

"Convinced that the attitude of Portugal, both as regards the African population of its colonies and the neighbouring States, constitutes a threat to peace and security in Africa,

"1. Reaffirms the right of the populations of the African Territories under Portuguese domination to self-determination and independence and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve the rights laid down in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the granting of Independence to colonial Countries and Peoples;

"2. Appeals to all States and requests them to grant the African populations of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and other Territories under Portuguese domination, the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights;

"3. Condemns the colonial policy of Portugal and its persistent refusal to carry out the resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee;

"4. Calls upon all States, and in particular, the military allies of Portugal within the framework of NATO, to refrain from supplying that country with arms and munitions and all other forms of assistance so long as the Portuguese Government fails to renounce its policy of colonial domination;

"5. Requests the High Commissioner for Refugees and the specialized agencies of the United Nations to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination;

"6. Appeals to all the specialized agencies of the United Nations and in particular the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, and requests them to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance so long as the Portuguese Government fails to renounce its colonial policy, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations;

"7. Draws the urgent attention of the Security Council to the continued deterioration of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination as well as to the consequences of the threats made by Portugal against the independent African States that border upon its colonies;

"8. Requests the Security Council to consider putting into effect against Portugal the appropriate measures laid down in the Charter, for the purpose of carrying out its resolutions concerning the Territories under Portuguese domination;

"9. Decides to transmit to the Security Council the records of the meetings held by the Committee on this question during its visit in Africa, including the statements of the petitioners and of the representative of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity;

"10. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit this resolution to all the States mentioned in paragraph 4 above;

"11. Requests the Chairman of the Special Committee to transmit this resolution to the president of the Security Council;

"12. Decides to maintain the question of the Territories under Portuguese domination on its agenda."

431. The text of the resolution, together with the records of the meetings held by the Special Committee on the question, was transmitted on 17 June 1965 (see S/6460) to the President of the Security Council and on 7 July 1965 to all the States mentioned in operative paragraph 4 of that resolution.

D. STUDY OF THE ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH ARE IMPEDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

Introduction

432. On 3 July 1964, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on Territories under Portuguese administration (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V para. 352), in paragraph 7 of which it requested "Sub-Committee I of the Special Committee, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, to study the activities of foreign economic and other interests, which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration".

433. The Rapporteur of Sub-Committee I introduced the Sub-Committee's report (see appendix below) at the Special Committee's 391st meeting on 27 October 1965. The Special Committee considered the report at that meeting and at its 392nd meeting on 28 October 1965.

General statements by members on the report of Sub-Committee I

434. The representative of the United States of America said that her delegation considered the Sub-Committee's conclusion, in paragraph 275 (f) of its report, that foreign interests were impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration, to be a distorted finding, since it was based on only some of the facts and on only some of the relevant considerations.

435. In paragraph 260 of its report the Sub-Committee said that in order to make a full assessment it was necessary to take into account the nature of the Portuguese colonial system. In her delegation's view, it was equally necessary to consider the nature of the process of economic development. If the Sub-Committee had considered the role of foreign economic interests in providing the social overhead capital on which further economic development of the Territories depended, and if it had considered the effect which the contributions made by the firms had on the welfare of the inhabitants, it might then have been able to make the full and balanced assessment of the activities of foreign economic interests which its report purported to be. The Sub-Committee had chosen, however, to ignore that important aspect of foreign investment, although it was not unaware of the economic advantages of such investment, as could be seen from the fact that in its recommendation in paragraph 280 (h) it referred to the activities of foreign enterprises "which under present conditions" are detrimental to the interests of the peoples of the Territories. Mr. Muliata, a petitioner, had told the Sub-Committee that the Portuguese feared that if other countries invested money in Angola, it would lead to the rapid advancement of Africans and consequently to political reforms (see ap-

pendix, para. 222). A thorough study should have been made of the benefits of foreign investment, in regard both to the welfare of the people and to the economic development of the Territories, to determine whether those benefits outweighed any short-term effects that such investment might have in support of the *status quo*. No such study had been made.

436. The report gave no information regarding what percentage of the revenues the Territories derived from foreign companies, nor was any estimate made of the amount in wages and purchases which local expenditures of the companies contributed to the economy. The report considered only the argument that by its payment of taxes, dividends and shares profits to the Portuguese Government a foreign company supported that Government's colonial policy directly or indirectly, that it thus impeded the granting of independence and hence was detrimental to the interests of the inhabitants. It was not surprising, therefore, that the conclusions of the report were unfounded, unrealistic and unconstructive reaffirmations of its biased mandate.

437. There was another defect in the report: the oversimplified, Marxist point of view of the minority of the Sub-Committee, which opposed all private enterprise as exploitation. According to paragraph 268, the interests of foreign economic activities and of the Portuguese Government were linked by a system of mutual benefits. On the one hand, mining companies enjoyed cheap labour and, on the other hand, the revenues and profits paid by the companies helped the Government of Portugal to continue "its repressive measures and military operations against the African inhabitants". As an example of the latter, the figure of 88.6 million escudos was given as the amount that the Angola Diamond Company had contributed in 1962 towards the defence of Angola. That paragraph formed the keystone of the argument on which the direct indictment of foreign enterprises was based. Her delegation considered that the allegation made in it was a prime example of the lack of foundation in the argumentation and of the inconsistent relationship between the conclusions and the material from which they purported to be derived. In the first place, nowhere in the report was there an analysis of the advantages which allegedly accrued to an industrial mining company from the presence of a large unskilled labour force. Secondly, with regard to the reported contribution of 88.6 million escudos by the Angola Diamond Company, a more valid interpretation of the relationship between that firm and the Portuguese Government could be made from paragraph 133 of the report on mining in Angola and Mozambique (see annex I below), which stated that in 1962 the Company had been assessed in the amount of 88.6 million escudos for the extraordinary defence tax and that, following litigation, it had been exempted from such payment. The relationship between the foreign enterprises in the Territories and the Portuguese Government was similar to that existing elsewhere. The foreign company was subject to the law of the Territory and must observe the commercial practices in effect.

438. Another example of the outmoded, doctrinaire point of view was the repeated suggestion that NATO supported Portugal's colonial policy. In that regard, she would recall the Danish representative's statement (see appendix, para. 82) and that made by the United States representative during the Special Committee's meeting in Africa, to the effect that the area covered

by NATO did not include the African Territories administered by Portugal.

439. Her delegation found that the conclusions of the report were in some cases unfounded, in others inconsistent with and unsupported by the material from which they purported to be derived, and on the whole so thoroughly restricted to one aspect of the effects of foreign economic interests in the Portuguese Territories as to be completely distorted.

440. Her Government had been and continued to be committed to the principle of self-determination for the Portuguese African Territories, and it had repeatedly urged the Portuguese Government to take steps to give effect to that principle.

441. Her delegation failed to understand how a withdrawal of foreign investment would lead to anything but a more embittered stalemate, a more impoverished population and a more fragile leash on violence. For those reasons, her delegation opposed the adoption of the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations in their present form. It hoped that the Special Committee would take action to give the report the balance appropriate for such a study before submitting it to the General Assembly.

442. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that his delegation could not accept the allegations of the United States representative that the report reflected the views of a minority and that its conclusions were distorted. The only objections recorded in the report were those of a single representative; all the other members of the Sub-Committee had endorsed the finding that the activities of foreign companies in the Territories impeded the attainment of independence. It had been shown that foreign companies made direct contributions in cash to what had been referred to as "the defence of Angola and Mozambique" but what was in reality the protection of the interests of those companies.

443. It seemed that, in trying to draw the Special Committee into a discussion of what she had referred to as the "economic advantages enjoyed by the people", the representative of the United States had not understood the objective of the Sub-Committee's study. The Sub-Committee had been asked to study how the activities of foreign economic and other interests were impeding the attainment of independence by the people of the Portuguese Territories. His delegation did not wish to be diverted from that objective and it rejected all the allegations that had been made. The activities of the foreign monopolies and the assistance which certain Powers were giving the Portuguese colonialsists were impeding the attainment by the people of their legitimate and natural rights.

444. His delegation suggested that the Special Committee should endorse the report as it stood. Any shortcomings in it were due to the fact that information had been deliberately withheld from the Sub-Committee.

445. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation regretted that the United States delegation had not seen fit to reconsider its position with regard to the role played by foreign economic interests in the Territories under Portuguese administration and that it had repeated the same arguments which it had voiced when the Special Committee had studied the question of the activities of foreign interests in South West Africa. Once again the Special Committee had been told that the Sub-Committee's report represented only the opinion of a minority of delegations. He wished to

point out to the United States representative that the Sub-Committee's report had been supported by the entire membership, with only a few reservations. The Danish delegation had made one reservation but had nevertheless supported the conclusions of the Sub-Committee regarding the situation of the inhabitants of the Portuguese Territories.

446. The United States representative had not said one word about the tragic situation of the people in the Portuguese colonies or one word in condemnation of Portuguese colonialism, which was causing great turmoil throughout Africa and which denied the people of the Portuguese Territories their right to self-determination and independence.

447. The Sub-Committee had made a careful study of conditions in those Territories and had endeavoured to present conclusions which would meet the requirements of the present situation and reflect the true role played by foreign interests in the Territories under Portuguese administration. The Sub-Committee had presented facts which, unpleasant as they were, must be faced.

448. Although the United States delegation had heard the statements of the petitioners from Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea during the Special Committee's meetings in Africa, the United States representative had not seen fit to make any comments on their demands for United Nations assistance in abolishing colonialism.

449. The United States representative had referred to the Sub-Committee's recommendation in which it was stated that under present conditions—namely, when the people of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea were under foreign domination and had not been given an opportunity to express their views on the activities of foreign companies, to negotiate about them or to have any part in them—the activities of such companies were detrimental to the interests of the peoples of the Territories. That was a fact which could not be changed in any way by unfounded statements. He therefore appealed once again to the United States delegation to reconsider its position.

450. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the entire Committee would adopt the Sub-Committee's report and endorse its conclusions and recommendations.

451. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Sub-Committee's report demonstrated the deplorable role played by international monopolies in hampering the implementation in the Portuguese colonies of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. There was ample evidence on that point in the report, and the assertion of the United States representative that foreign investments benefited the peoples of the Portuguese colonies was an old imperialist theory designed to disguise the real role played by foreign monopolies. The United States representative had denied the involvement of NATO countries in Portuguese operations in its colonies, but she could not deny the assistance being given by NATO Powers to the Portuguese régime, which was using all such assistance in suppressing liberation movements. He recalled that during the session held in Africa, Mr. Mondlane had quoted figures showing that from 1961 to 1964, United States companies gave assistance to the extent of \$500 million to the Portuguese administrations, and at no time had the United States repre-

sentative attempted to refute this assertion. Considered in the light of the latest events, the facts showed that in December 1963, after the decision of the Security Council on this matter, the *Diario do Governo* reported that a fresh loan of \$35 million had been obtained from United States banks. In January 1963, Portugal had received \$20 million from the United Government, and in March 1965, \$6 million had been invested in the Portuguese airline serving Angola and Mozambique. All this had been done in order to help the Portuguese airline to resist the boycott of the African countries.

452. The report provided detailed evidence in support of its conclusions. It was a fact, for example, that there were special agreements between the Portuguese Government and international monopolies under which the monopolies contributed certain sums towards defence.

453. He submitted that the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee were based on facts and should be endorsed by the Special Committee. The material which had been submitted would help the General Assembly to understand the circumstances impeding the exercise of the right of the peoples in the Portuguese colonies to self-determination and independence.

454. The representative of Italy said that he did not propose to make a statement on the general subject of the Portuguese Territories in Africa but would concentrate on the immediate question, namely whether the evidence in the Sub-Committee's report bore out the assertion that foreign economic and other interests were impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration.

455. With regard to the mining industry, he noted that the Secretariat working paper (see annex I below) did not indicate, in percentage form, the extent of the participation of foreign—i.e., non-Portuguese—firms in the exploitation of the natural resources of Angola and Mozambique. Various foreign interests were evidently involved in some sectors of the mining industry in Portuguese Territories in Africa, but his delegation was not sure whether the evidence justified the conclusion that they exerted a significant influence on Portuguese policy in Africa.

456. Information given in the *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1963*²⁰ showed that Mozambique imported considerably more than it exported and that, in the case of Angola, there was almost a balance between imports and exports. The exports consisted basically of raw materials, and the imports of manufactured commodities. That did not seem to indicate that the two Territories were being exploited by foreign countries. In fact, the international trade pattern of Angola and Mozambique was similar to that of the independent African countries.

457. The report criticized Portugal for promoting the activities of foreign interests in the Territories on the grounds that that was inconsistent with United Nations resolutions. The complaint was made that the mining industries were exempt from all or most taxes. Yet the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development had recommended that Governments of developed countries should not hinder the flow of capital to developing countries and should provide incentives for investment in those countries. He

wondered whether it was really the Special Committee's policy to retard the economic development of Non-Self-Governing Territories, rather than to promote investment there. Surely it would be in the general interest to remove Angola and Mozambique from the exclusive control of the Portuguese economy.

458. Even if it could be shown that foreign interests occupied a significant place in the economy of the Territories, the question would remain whether the foreign interests were impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In that connexion, he noted the views expressed by the representative of Denmark during the Sub-Committee's discussions. As recorded in paragraph 190 of the report, the Danish representative had pointed out that the fact that various foreign interests were involved in most sectors of the economy of the Portuguese Territories in Africa did not mean that those interests *ipso facto* were impeding the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and he had added (para. 193) that the backward conditions prevailing in the Portuguese Territories were due not to the activities of foreign interests but to the colonial policies of Portugal.

459. He would not comment on the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations at the present stage; more time would be required to study the whole report. He would suggest that the Special Committee should adjourn the discussion of the report, for it was doubtful whether at the moment it could reach any significant degree of agreement on it. It would be a pity to submit to the General Assembly a report which had not obtained the general support of the Committee. The best course would be to transmit to the General Assembly the material assembled by the Secretariat, together with the statements of members of the Special Committee, and to inform the General Assembly that the Special Committee had not been able to reach a definite conclusion on the question whether the activities of foreign economic and other interests were impeding the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the Portuguese Territories in any substantial way.

460. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation was unable to endorse the recommendations and conclusions in the Sub-Committee's report on the activities of foreign economic and other interests impeding the implementation in the Territories under Portuguese administration of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Like the Danish delegation, it was not satisfied that the conclusions and, in particular, the recommendations were supported by the factual information given in the annexes to the report. Indeed, in some cases the recommendations seemed to have no connexion with those annexes or with the questions on which the Sub-Committee had been asked to report, and to that extent they went beyond the Sub-Committee's field of competence.

461. Moreover, his delegation could not agree with the recommendation in paragraph 280 (j) of the Sub-Committee's report, since his Government was opposed to the intrusion of political considerations in the activities of technical assistance agencies. The recommendation in sub-paragraph (k), too, seemed open to serious objection. It was surely not for the Sub-Committee, or for the Special Committee, to tell the Security Council what it should do, or that it should

²⁰ United Nations publication, Sales No.: 64 XVII.12.

take steps to compel Member States to comply with General Assembly resolutions.

462. When the Special Committee had discussed the report of Sub-Committee I on mining and other interests in South West Africa (A/5840, annex), in November 1964, his delegation had expressed the view (*ibid.*, paras. 84-88) that the Sub-Committee's recommendations reflected a general hostility to any form of foreign investment in developing countries and that that in turn stemmed from a particular political and ideological doctrine, held by only a minority of the members of the Committee. The report now before the Special Committee embodied the same preconceived ideas and was therefore open to the same basic objections. That did not mean that his Government supported the colonial policy of the Portuguese Government. His Government's views on those policies had been fully set out and explained most recently in the course of the Special Committee's debates in Africa. His delegation disagreed sharply with many aspects of Portugal's colonial policies but that disapproval did not blind it to the shortcomings of the conclusions and recommendations in the report before the Special Committee and their unmistakable ideological slant. His delegation would therefore vote against the adoption of the report.

463. The representative of Ethiopia said that his delegation wished to comment briefly on the statements made by a number of delegations which did not share its views regarding the report before the Special Committee. Those delegations had repeated their arguments of the previous year. The fact that the Sub-Committee was opposed to the policies of *apartheid* and Portuguese colonialism in Africa and that the companies which supported the Portuguese authorities were acting against the interests of Africans had led those delegations to conclude that the Sub-Committee was against investment in general. That was a misrepresentation of fact and, what was worse, a misrepresentation of intention. Those delegations were well aware that that was not the Sub-Committee's intention. Nowhere did the report condemn private investment in general. What the report said was that firms operating in South Africa, South West Africa and the Portuguese Territories supported the policies of the colonialists and exploited the resources of those countries for the exclusive benefit of the white settlers. If those delegations wished to refute those findings, they should produce evidence to prove their case. Until they did so, his delegation would continue to believe that the Sub-Committee's conclusions were consistent with the facts. A large amount of foreign capital was being invested in most of the developing countries, but there the situation and conditions were totally different: investments were made for the benefit of the people, contracts were freely entered into and there was no racial discrimination.

464. His delegation would accordingly continue to support the conclusions in the report.

465. The representative of Mali said that Portugal would not have been able to continue its war in Angola, Mozambique and elsewhere without the financial assistance of the Powers whose nationals invested money in those Territories. The problem of the Portuguese colonies involved the future of millions of Africans who were living in abject poverty or sold as slaves to the agents of racist South Africa, in defiance of the Charter and numerous recommendations adopted by the General Assembly and the Special Committee.

466. To connect the question of economic assistance from the developed to the developing countries with what was happening in the Portuguese colonies was to ignore the fact that Portugal and its companies had always been and still were foreigners in Angola and Mozambique. The independent Governments of African countries had freely signed bilateral agreements for the welfare of their people, but Portugal was not empowered to do so for Angola. His delegation remained convinced that all agreements signed by Portugal for the so-called benefit of the Angolans and Mozambicans were illegal because they had been signed without the consent of the majority of the people. The foreign companies were impeding the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). They were paying Portugal 50 per cent of the profits which they derived from their exploitation of the natural resources of the Territories at the expense of the African population, and that contribution enabled Portugal to continue its industrial development at the national level without decreasing its war effort in Africa. In order to make the maximum profit, those companies did not hesitate to provide the administering Power with all necessary means to ensure political stability in the Territories. Furthermore, as they had representatives in each of the Governments of the countries concerned, it was easy to ensure that international agencies such as NATO gave their support to the discriminatory régimes in the Portuguese Territories. His delegation had been disappointed at the contradictory attitude of some delegations which, while condemning the colonial policies of Portugal, acted in such a way as to perpetuate those reactionary policies by defying the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations.

467. He hoped that the Special Committee would adopt the Sub-Committee's report, together with its conclusions and recommendations, which his delegation considered to be the minimum assistance that could be given to the people of Angola and Mozambique in their struggle to regain their freedom and dignity.

468. The representative of Syria recalled that during the Sub-Committee's discussion of the activities of foreign economic and other interests which were impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration, many delegations had made it clear that they did not oppose foreign capital as such. No one objected to foreign investment if such investment took into account the legitimate rights of the people, if it observed business practices based on justice and equity and if it did not interfere with the aspirations of the people to independence and sovereignty. What the developing countries objected to was the unfair treatment of African workers by the majority of foreign companies, which paid them starvation wages and denied them an opportunity to acquire skills and gain promotion. The developing countries also objected to the plunder of African natural resources and the use of unjustified profits by the colonialists for purposes that were detrimental to the interests of the people as a whole. That was why the Sub-Committee had recommended that the activities and operating methods which were detrimental to the interests of the African inhabitants should be strongly condemned.

469. It had been suggested that an increase in foreign investments would weaken the hold of the Portuguese authorities on economic interests. Those foreign interests, however, made common cause with the op-

pressor. Instead of giving assurances that their Governments would exert pressure on their nationals who owned companies operating in those Territories, certain delegations had advised the Committee to consider the benefits accruing from foreign capital. He wondered whether those delegations had considered the fact that an African worker's wages sometimes amounted to only \$12 a year, a wage which did not allow the African to develop his personality and prepare himself for independence. It was such attempts to suffocate the African personality that impeded the attainment of independence by the African Territories. The Sub-Committee's recommendations were therefore the least the Special Committee could prescribe in order to put an end to such a state of affairs.

470. The representative of Bulgaria said that his delegation was glad that in its conclusions the Sub-Committee had confirmed many of the views expressed on a number of occasions during the examination of the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration.

471. The report confirmed that foreign monopolies were directly or indirectly supporting Portuguese colonialism, which enabled them to exploit the human and natural resources of the Territories, and that their activities were impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in those Territories. It had also been shown that some Western Powers and NATO were providing Portugal with assistance including military aid, in order to defend the interests of the powerful and influential mining, financial and other interests which were mercilessly exploiting the African population and the riches of the Territories under Portuguese domination. It had confirmed that such companies as DIAMANG and CARBONANG and some of the most influential members of NATO bore an equal responsibility with Portugal for the sufferings of the people in those Territories. That was why his delegation fully subscribed to the conclusions reached by the Sub-Committee and supported the recommendations in the report.

472. The Italian representative had said that the findings in the report were in contradiction with the current policies of developing countries concerning the role of private investment in those countries. The parallel drawn between the role of investments in developing countries and their role in the Territories under Portuguese administration was an attempt to confuse a perfectly clear situation.

473. The Italian representative was surely aware that the indigenous inhabitants of the Portuguese Territories had no say in the use of the funds made available to Portugal.

474. The people of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea were at war with their colonial masters, who stood condemned by the United Nations and by humanity for their brutal oppression of national liberation movements in those Territories. Portugal's colonial policy might set the whole of Africa ablaze. It was clear, therefore, that anything which would increase the economic, and consequently the military, potential of Portugal was detrimental to the interests of the indigenous inhabitants of those Territories.

475. With regard to the contention that the factual information in the report and its annexes did not support the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations, he said that the Sub-Committee had had at its

disposal official publications and other documents, statistics, press reports and statements by petitioners. It had examined company balance-sheets showing that contributions had been made for the construction of military barracks and outposts and for the purpose of what Portugal called "defence of the national heritage". It had also paid due attention to evidence submitted by the petitioners representing the African population of the Territories. For instance, Mr. Mondlane, President of the Liberation Front of Mozambique, had informed the Special Committee that loans from United States and international financing institutions for the past ten years had been used mainly to finance the settlement of European Portuguese in Africa; that it had been Portugal's long-standing policy to build up the white population in Mozambique to a proportion comparable to that obtaining in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia; that between 1951 and 1961 the United States had contributed \$500 million to Portugal in the form of weapons; and that foreign investments helped to meet the expenses of Portugal's colonial wars.

476. That was the voice of the people of Mozambique and they knew best what was good or bad for them. Some representatives, however, were trying to convince the Special Committee that they knew better. In that case, they should produce evidence to contradict the findings of the Sub-Committee's report. They had not done so because they could not. He was sure that, with the exception of those who were interested in denying the complicity of foreign monopolies and certain Governments in the crimes of Portuguese colonialism, the overwhelming majority of the members of the Special Committee would unreservedly approve the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations.

477. The representative of Poland said that the exhaustive document submitted by the Sub-Committee provided a picture of the brutal form of colonialism existing in the Territories under Portuguese administration and revealed clearly the role of foreign monopolies in exploiting the Territories and in impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. As was clear from the report, the Portuguese administration and the foreign monopolies joined forces in ensuring the continued exploitation of the people of the Territories and it was only because of the assistance given by the countries whose monopolies had an interest in the maintenance of the colonial system that Portugal was able to defy world opinion and persist in its present policies. The assistance rendered included military aid. The assurances of NATO countries regarding such aid could not conceal the obvious fact that it helped Portugal to suppress the liberation movements in the Territories under its rule.

478. The conclusions set out in the report were supported by references to books and publications from all over the world and it could not reasonably be denied that foreign monopolies were co-operating in preserving the colonial order in the Territories. He could not agree, therefore, with the view that the Special Committee was not in a position to assess the role of foreign monopolies and should transmit the Secretariat working paper to the General Assembly without any accompanying recommendations. It was the Special Committee's duty to investigate the obstacles delaying progress to independence, and in the case of the Portuguese colonies there was no doubt that foreign monopolies constituted the main obstacle.

479. He could not accept the assertion that the activities of monopolies in the Territories stimulated economic development, or agree with the interpretation which had been given of the recommendations of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

480. His delegation fully endorsed the conclusions and recommendations in the Sub-Committee's report.

481. The representative of Australia said that his delegation was deeply disturbed by Portugal's policies with respect to the Territories in Africa under its administration and by its failure to transmit information on those Territories to the United Nations. His delegation considered that Portugal should create conditions in its Territories which would lead as speedily as possible to self-determination. At the same time, he doubted whether the report before the Special Committee was likely to help towards that goal. While he appreciated the work which had gone into the preparation of the report, he did not feel that it represented an objective study of the situation, and that view was reinforced by the observations made by the representative of Denmark as a member of the Sub-Committee. The effect of the document was to give a distorted picture of the economic situation and the relationship between economic and political development in the Portuguese Territories. The references to NATO, too, gave a highly misleading impression of that organization's attitude to and influence on developments in Africa.

482. Consequently, despite its strong desire to bring pressure to bear on Portugal by any constructive means possible, his delegation could not support the adoption of the report.

483. In view of the very limited time in which the Special Committee was being asked to express a judgement on the document, his delegation felt unable to offer any more detailed comments on it.

484. The representative of India said that his delegation strongly condemned the practices of Portugal in relation to its African colonies. His delegation was in broad agreement with the Sub-Committee's recommendations and supported its report.

485. The representative of Tunisia associated himself with the reply given by the representative of Ethiopia and Bulgaria to the attempts which had been made to confuse the issue by relating the question of foreign investments in the Portuguese Territories to that of investments in developing countries in general. His delegation condemned foreign investments in the Portuguese Territories because it considered them to be detrimental to the interests of the people, impeding their progress to independence.

486. His delegation hoped that the Special Committee would adopt the Sub-Committee's report.

487. The representative of Chile, explaining his vote, said that it had not been possible for him to obtain instructions from his Government on the report in the time available. He would therefore have to abstain in the vote, but in so doing would not be expressing any view on the report. He hoped to have instructions from his Government by the time the General Assembly took up the question. The views of Chile concerning Portuguese colonialism were well known and there could be no doubt regarding the spirit in which it would approach the report.

488. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation reserved its right to comment on the report when it was discussed in the General Assembly.

Action taken by the Special Committee on the report of the Sub-Committee I

489. At its 392nd meeting on 28 October 1965, the Special Committee adopted the report of Sub-Committee I (see appendix below) by a roll-call vote of 14 to 3, with 4 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Chile, Denmark, Italy, Venezuela.

Conclusions and recommendations

490. In adopting the report of Sub-Committee I, the Special Committee endorsed Sub-Committee I's conclusions and recommendations. These are set out in paragraph 260-280 of the Sub-Committee's report (see appendix below).

APPENDIX

Report of Sub-Committee I*

The activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration

INTRODUCTION

1. On 3 July 1964, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on Territories under Portuguese administration (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 352), in paragraph 7 of which it requested "Sub-Committee I of the Special Committee,^a with the assistance of the Secretary-General, to study the activities of foreign economic and other interests, which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration".

2. Subsequently the Secretariat sent letters to several specialized agencies and a regional commission of the United Nations, requesting them to provide information on the subject dealt with in operative paragraph 7 of the above-mentioned resolution. In reply to the Secretariat's request, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the International Labour Office stated that they were not in a position to provide such information. The Economic Commission for Africa replied that it had no information concerning the Territories in question other than that contained in some of its publications.

3. The Sub-Committee first considered this item at its 15th meeting held on 2 November 1964, when it was informed by the Secretariat of the steps already taken to collect material on the subject and to organize the necessary research. At the same meeting, members of the Sub-Committee made comments regarding the preparation by the Secretariat of the necessary working papers for the study. Taking these statements into account, the Sub-Committee, in its report to the Special Committee (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, annex), stated that it decided to consider that question as soon as such working papers were prepared, subject to any decisions that the Special Committee might take. At its 313th meeting on 16 November 1964, the Special Committee took note of that report.

* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.257.

^a The Sub-Committee is composed of the following members: Denmark, Ethiopia (Chairman), Mali, Syria, Tunisia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia (Rapporteur).

4. The Sub-Committee further considered the question at its 16th to 22nd meetings, held between 19 August and 12 October 1965.

5. The Sub-Committee had before it two working papers prepared by the Secretariat, one concerning mining in Angola and Mozambique and the other concerning concession, occupation and settlement of land in Angola and Mozambique (see annexes I and II below). In addition, the Secretariat presented to the Sub-Committee, at its request, excerpts of statements made and communications submitted by petitioners from Territories under Portuguese administration during the Special Committee's meetings in Africa in May and June 1965.

6. The Sub-Committee decided to include the above-mentioned excerpts in the present report. It also decided to reproduce the two working papers as annexes to the present report, in the belief that the information contained therein might be of interest to the Special Committee and the General Assembly in examining the subject.

CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

Statements by members

7. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that while it was true that his delegation had made many statements on the question of Portuguese colonialism in Africa, more especially during the Special Committee's tour of Africa, the Sub-Committee was now dealing with another aspect of that colonial exploitation. The study that it was now to make was concerned with the activities of foreign financial and other interests in the Territories under Portuguese colonial domination and with their effect on the movement for the liberation of those Territories. However, his delegation wanted to make it clear at the outset that it did not intend to criticize those financial involvements simply for the sake of criticism but because it was obliged to point out the realities that had led to the degradation of human values and, especially, the reduction of the African to a state of slavery. Not only was the African made to work like a slave in the undertakings in question, but the share that he received for his toil and sweat was so negligible that it could fairly be stated that those financial involvements had turned the African into a slave in his own country. It would also be true to say that, to a large extent, the profits derived from such financial involvements not only had enabled the Portuguese to continue their extermination of the Africans but also had turned Portugal into an obstinate country that so far had refused to bow to world opinion and, more especially, to the universal opinion expressed by the United Nations in the form of resolutions, particularly those of the Special Committee. It could therefore be foreseen that, during the Sub-Committee's examination of the subject before it, some facts would unquestionably be revealed that would be unpleasant not only to Portugal but also to many others who had financial interests in the Portuguese colonies.

8. He therefore wished to refer to the document that had been prepared by the Secretariat. While his delegation realized how burdened the Secretariat was with work, it felt that the document could have contained more detailed information. His delegation had been somewhat surprised that, in preparing the document, the Secretariat had not only limited itself to taking colonial documents as a source of information but had also completely eliminated statements by the nationalists, which gave the other side of the story. Thus, his delegation had to some extent been forced to seek information from its own sources, paying a great deal of attention to the information provided by the nationalists, who were inhabitants of the colonies and were experiencing the hardships resulting from the financial involvement of foreign forces.

9. In continuing its futile, arrogant and stubborn colonial domination of the Territories, the Portuguese colonial régime had increased the economic concessions to its allies in financial exploitation, in an effort to maintain its unacceptable thesis that those colonies thousands of miles from Portugal should be regarded as part of Portugal. The irony of that position had been laid bare during the Special Committee's tour of

Africa, as well as in the deliberations of the Special Committee and by other international bodies that were sincerely concerned with the high ideals of human dignity and peaceful development in conditions of freedom.

10. His delegation had not really been surprised at the scantiness of the information provided, since colonialist Portugal constantly sought to hide its barbarous crimes of exploitation and plunder by withholding information that would expose it to the world. Yet, the heroic patriots of those Territories had exposed the outrages committed by Portugal. In recognition of their noble work in advancing their own cause of freedom, his delegation would draw upon their store of hard-won information in order to complement the Sub-Committee's study.

11. In order to be objective in considering the question, it was imperative to recognize that Portugal was today one of the poorest and most backward countries in Europe. One wondered how Portugal could withstand the winds of change. The most logical conclusion was that it could hold out as long as it had financial backing from other quarters. Portugal's shaky economic position was well described in a book by J. Gottman. The book showed that, while fewer than 20,000 jobs were created each year in that country, the labour force increased by well over 50,000 annually. Thus, the jobs created in Portugal itself absorbed less than 50 per cent of that increase, a circumstance which demonstrated the shakiness of Portugal's domestic economy and explained why Portugal had directed all its greed towards exploiting the rich resources of the colonies, without regard to the human suffering to which the Africans were subjected. That was also relevant when the part played by Portugal's financial partners in exploiting the resources of the colonies was considered.

12. The two large Territories under Portuguese domination, Angola and Mozambique, were well known for their varied wealth, which formed a vast reservoir of economic resources. In the case of Mozambique, while it was stated that the economy was largely agricultural, mining and the exploitation of oil reserves and subsidiaries occupied a prominent position in the Territory's economic structure at the present time. Moreover, while the general economic structure was subject to the Portuguese colonialists' directives, other foreign financial interests also held a dominant position in the Territory's economy.

13. In paragraph 242 of the working paper on mining in Angola and Mozambique provided by the Secretariat (see annex I below) it was made clear that Mozambique had good deposits of bauxite, as well as other minerals, and that since as long ago as 1938 those deposits had been a monopoly of the Wankie Colliery Co., Ltd. Furthermore, the entire output of the mines was exported to Southern Rhodesia, where the company had its head office, or to that bastion of *apartheid*, South Africa. It should also be noted that Belgian interests were involved, since the company was partly owned by the Union Minière du Haut Katanga. Such selfish exploitative practices had, of course, been a direct factor in depriving the people of Mozambique of any gainful employment in that field and of control of the resources of their native soil.

14. Another important mining activity in Mozambique was coal mining. Since 1949 the exploitation of the estimated 400 million tons of coal in the Moatize area had been intensified. That venture was the exclusive monopoly of the Companhia Carbonífera de Mocambique complex, of which the majority share, 60 per cent or some 400 million escudos, was Belgian; 30 per cent belonged to the Companhia de Mocambique and the rest was owned by the Portuguese Government.

15. While on the one hand the natural resources of the Territory were exploited for the benefit of foreign financial monopolies and not for the people, contemporary studies of the involvement of these financial groups showed that the human resources of the Territory were also being used as an expendable commodity of the exploiters. Donald L. Wiedner, in his book, *A History of Africa South of the Sahara*, wrote —when discussing the practice of forced labour (page 466)— that "labour recruitment has remained, partly because theory

approves it, partly because it is practical and profitable." He went on to say:

"The law does not authorize any corvée except for punishment or in lieu of taxes, but it does require all able-bodied men to hold acceptable, gainful employment for at least six months out of every year. Such men are supposed to volunteer for work. However, if their identity cards show no employment—employers are said to charge fees for making such entries on the cards—the Government retains the right to assign them on contract to any public project or essential private enterprise that needs labourers. In this manner about 100,000 workers from Mozambique—some 10 per cent of the eligible force in that colony—are contracted each year to the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association for work in South African goldfields. The Portuguese Government collects their pay which, after tax deductions, is doled out to the men when they return to Mozambique."

Similar practices, the author stated, were apparent in Angola.

16. That gross exploitation of Mozambique by the Portuguese and the South African fascists was thus a direct factor impeding the people of Mozambique in the exercise of their national rights as citizens in control of their own Territory.

17. Mr. Z. J. Sakupwanya, Secretary, Comité Preparatório do Congresso Constitucional do Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO), had declared before the Special Committee in Africa:

"The large companies operating in Mozambique belonged to the British, Belgians and Americans, who ran them with the help of the Portuguese Government, using cheap labour from Mozambique. The convention of 1928, which allowed agents of the mining companies to recruit up to 800,000 Africans annually, and established that 47.5 per cent of the sea traffic to and from the Transvaal should pass through the port of Lourenço Marques, brought a highly profitable business to the colonial government of Portugal, but at the same time it brought misery, suffering and exploitation to the African people in their own country" (see para. 175 above of the present chapter).

18. It was of vital importance to record that the financial power groups operating in the two large Territories of Angola and Mozambique were in various ways connected with the financial monopolies operating in those Territories and in such neighbouring countries as Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa. Hence, it was not surprising that those foreign companies operating in the Territories were at present taking an active part in suppressing the African nationalists in those rich and strategic regions. Table 2 of the working paper showed that the Angola Diamond Company, which had received large territorial concessions, had paid the sum of 88.6 million escudos "for the defence of Angola" and, above all, had made a handsome profit of some 74 million escudos in 1962 alone (see annex I below).

19. Apart from diamond mining, those international financial groups had made huge sums available for the exploitation of Angola's petroleum and oil resources. In 1964 alone, a total of 1 million tons of crude oil had been extracted. The exploitation of those resources was being carried out by Portuguese, Belgian and United States companies, with the possible association of the South African financial groups. In that connexion, the Belgo-Portuguese companies combined in Companhia de Petróleos de Angola (PETRANGOL) had had an income of some 117 million escudos in 1963, of which the Belgian party had received a profit amounting to 44 per cent of the total, while the rest had gone to the other party. Within that complex, negotiations were under way to invite direct participation by the South African Federale Mynbou Beperk group, which foreshadowed the violation of resolutions adopted by the United Nations.

20. As a postscript, he would recall the words of Waldemar A. Nielsen, who, in his book *African Battleline*, published for the United States Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Row, New York, stated the following:

"In strategic terms, the importance of Angola and Mozambique for all of southern Africa is very great. Each constitutes a landbarrier, or link, between independent and

white-controlled Africa. Lobito, the chief port of Angola is of key importance because it is the terminus of the Benguela Railway, a system that serves not only the highlands of Central Angola but also the Katanga region of the Congo."

The author went on to say:

"Mozambique's excellent port, Lourenço Marques, is a major outlet for the agricultural and mineral products of South Africa, Swaziland and Rhodesia."

21. As a result of the close links of the financial Powers with vested interests in those Territories and their policy of exploiting the Territories' natural resources by extracting their raw materials, the economic grip on the Territories was being further tightened against the people by the introduction of increased foreign influence for both economic and political reasons, as could be seen from the preceding quotation.

22. With the launching of a political struggle by the peoples of those colonies against political oppression by decaying Portuguese colonialism and the economic exploitation practised by the international financial groups, evidence had been produced that direct military and other aid was being provided to Portugal by certain Powers, which in return were given a share in exploiting the resources of the colonies.

23. Mr. Eduardo C. Mondlane, the leader of Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) an organization of the people's movement against Portuguese oppression in Mozambique, had made the following statement to the Special Committee in Africa:

"Between 1951 and 1961 the United States had contributed 500 million dollars to Portugal in the form of weapons. There was nothing to indicate that such aid had since ceased. The Federal Republic of Germany not only sold weapons to Portugal but had established a military base in Portugal where training was given to the armed forces of the NATO Powers. The Federal Republic had recently purchased sixty war planes from Canada to supply to Portugal and had increased its economic aid to that country. Several German companies were establishing factories in Portugal's African colonies. For instance, Krupp was setting up an iron and steel plant in Angola. The Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic had recently held discussions with the Portuguese Ministry of Defence. United States investors were also interested in the Portuguese colonies. A high official of the Inter-American Capital Corporation had assured the authorities in Mozambique that the United States would invest not less than \$1,000 million in the country. Loans worth several million dollars had been raised by the Portuguese Government in London. Those investments helped to meet the expenses of Portugal's colonial wars. France had concluded an agreement with Portugal to establish a base in the Azores, in return for which it would build 120 ships of various kinds for Portugal. A Portuguese officer who had deserted had informed the nationalist movement that the Portuguese forces in Mozambique were equipped with United States helicopters, French jet planes, United Kingdom frigates and weapons from the Federal Republic of Germany" (see paras. 191 and 192 above of the present chapter).

24. His delegation wished to emphasize that everything it had said about the involvement of other countries was information presented as evidence in Mr. Mondlane's statement.

25. It had been stated that such weapons were being given to Portugal for the defence of Europe. However, since Portugal had no active enemy in Europe, it was difficult to believe that the weapons had not been used against Africans in defence of those financial interests by Portugal.

26. He would also like to quote from the publication *African Digest*, No. 26 of 25 June 1965, which said the following:

"An international consortium headed by Krupp of Essen has been awarded a \$52 million contract in order to develop iron ore deposits at Cassinga. The project includes the mining installations and also the modernization of a 400-mile railway to the coast and port facilities at Saco. Deposits

exceeding 100 million tons of iron ore with an iron content of 63 per cent have been proved at Cassinga."

27. That "modernization" of the railway and port at the present time was, of course, part and parcel of the Portuguese colonialists' schemes to increase their aggressive war efforts against the people's movement for liberation.

28. Again, Mr. James Duffy, in his book *Portugal in Africa*, had the following to say:

"In 1960 diamonds and iron ore were the only minerals to make any sizable contribution to the gross national product. DIAMANG,^b mining 60 per cent gem-stones and 40 per cent industrial ones, plans to increase its production. (In 1959 the value of diamonds mined was some £7,500,000 and in 1960 some £6,500,000 constituting each year about 10 per cent in value of total exports.) Iron ore was exported for the first time in 1957 by the Companhia Mineira do Lobito from deposits at Cuima, Bailundo and Andulo. Production in 1960 almost doubled the 1959 total of 350,000 tons. With the receipt of credit for some £16,000,000 from the German Krupp firm, the Companhia speaks of exporting up to four million tons a year. The Companhia de Manganês de Angola now produces about 200,000 tons from its deposits west of Malange. A small amount of manganese and copper has been exported in recent years, and Alumínio Português has announced plans for a plant at Dondo to be completed in 1962."

29. The Lobito Mining Company, which held a dominant position in that exploitation of the iron ore deposits, was enmeshed within the financial oligarchy comprising the Benguela Railway complex and the British firm of Tanganyika Concessions in partnership with the Union Minière du Haut Katanga. There was no need to emphasize that the activities of the Union were a crucial part of the chapter of African history connected with the international financial power groups—a chapter which African patriots would never forget.

30. Turning briefly to the agricultural aspects of economic activity in the Territories, he would note that, owing to the large acreage of good farmland being given to Portuguese and other groups, the African population was largely forced into subsistence farming. Cotton production, which was the principal activity in that sphere and accounted for the largest share of agricultural exports, was thus dominated by foreign forces. The African's part was best described by Marvin Harris in his *Portugal's African "Wards"* (1956), as quoted by James Duffy in his book *Portugal in Africa*:

"In this modern serfdom the role of the medieval lord is exercised by twelve private Portuguese companies, each of which has received monopolistic concessions over cotton production in vast areas of Mozambique. *Indigenas* within the concession areas of each company are assigned cotton acreage by the administrative authorities. They have no choice in the matter and must plant, cultivate, and harvest cotton wherever they are told. Then they must sell the raw cotton to the concession company of their areas at prices which are fixed by the Government far below those available on the international market. . . . In 1956 there were 519,000 African cultivators participating in the cotton campaign. . . . The actual number of men, women and children being forced to plant cotton (on acreage taken out of food production) probably exceeds one million. In 1956, the 519,000 sellers received an average of \$11.17 per person as their family's reward for an entire year of work."

After quoting that passage, James Duffy made the following observation in his book:

"By conservative estimate, the state-controlled cotton programme in Mozambique has had a direct and often disastrous effect on 15 per cent of the native population."

31. If the figure of \$11.17 was broken down, it amounted to an average salary of 93 cents per month per family. A family which had not had time to grow its own food because of its cultivation of cotton had to live on 93 cents. It was no wonder that thousands of people were dying of starvation. He hoped that the Sub-Committee would not consider that an

^b The Angola Diamond Company.

exaggeration, for the source of his delegation's information was an American writer who had surely sought to be objective.

32. He also wished to emphasize that that quotation was corroborated by the evidence given to the Special Committee by Lazaro Kavandame at the Committee's meeting in Dar es Salaam.

33. Having made those observations, his delegation wished to present the following conclusions in summary form:

(a) Those economic activities of foreign interests had led to what could be described as slavery. For example, the Sub-Committee had heard how the colonial authorities contracted with South African companies to send more than 100,000 Africans to South Africa every year; many of those people went to such places against their wishes, which meant the dislocation of family life, quite apart from the fact that they were paid slave wages. With regard to agriculture, it should be noted that even in Europe, in the dark days of serfdom, workers had never been paid as little as 93 cents a month; yet that was what was paid to people in the Portuguese colonies in 1965.

(b) All the wealth produced at a great cost in African misery was exported to Portugal and other foreign countries, leaving the people who should have enjoyed that wealth in terrible suffering. That suffering had been made even greater by the barbarous murder of Africans by the Portuguese authorities.

(c) Some of the profits derived from the activities of foreign financial groups in those colonies were paid to the Portuguese colonialists, who use them to redouble their oppression of the African people.

(d) Portugal's colonial trade brought it profits estimated at not less than \$150 million annually—a sum many times greater than the profits derived from economic activities in Portugal itself.

34. In the light of those conclusions, his delegation wished to put forward certain recommendations based on the paper now before the Sub-Committee. He wished to emphasize once again that the facts he had presented should not be taken as criticism of nations other than Portugal. His purpose had been to point out to the world that Africans in the Portuguese colonies were dying as a result of poverty and oppression so that dividends could be paid to the share-holders of the foreign companies operating in those Territories.

35. His delegation would therefore like to make the following recommendations:

(a) That all foreign companies should refrain from making further investments in those colonies until Portugal changed its attitude and accepted the natural right of freedom of the African people in the Territories.

(b) That all foreign companies should refrain from supplying Portugal with the vital capital which it used to suppress the patriots of those Territories.

(c) That all Powers whose nationals held interests in those colonies should themselves refrain from giving Portugal any help, whether direct or indirect, which could be used against the liberation movement in the Territories or was detrimental to the economic and financial life of the peoples of the Territories.

(d) That the provisions of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) should be immediately put into force in those Territories in order that their nationals might enjoy their freedom and control their economic resources in the interests of their own development and progress.

36. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Special Committee's study of the activities of foreign monopolies in southern Africa, in particular in South West Africa, made it clear that because of their financial ramifications the United States, British, Belgian, West German and other monopolies constituted a single giant organization straddling all the countries of the region and that many firms and companies operating under different names in various countries, such as South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, etc., were for the most part merely branches of that organization. The Special

Committee's recent session in Africa had confirmed that that group of imperialist monopolies which had their head offices overseas was the chief obstacle to the application of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The defence of the interests of those monopolies, which had shamelessly plundered the African peoples and made enormous profit from the exploitation of the colonies—and not of the colonies alone—was the principal reason why the great Western Powers were compelled to give assistance—especially military assistance—to the countries which possessed Territories in that region and to oppose the adoption by the United Nations of practical steps to eliminate the effects of the colonial régimes in Africa. All these observations fully applied to the Portuguese colonies in Africa.

37. More than 12 million people, or 30 per cent of the population of all the Territories of the world still dependent, lived in the Portuguese colonies in Africa. How was the paradox to be explained that Portugal, the most decadent of the colonial Powers, was able to keep vast colonial Territories in Africa under its domination? Why, at a time when decolonization was proceeding apace, was it stubbornly refusing to grant their inhabitants the right to self-determination and freedom? The answer was a simple one in the light of the economic situation in the Portuguese colonies. It was clear to all that Portugal was perpetuating its domination in Africa solely because it was surrendering the wealth of its Territories to foreign capital. Analysis of the documents available revealed that international capital played a very large role in the exploitation of the Portuguese colonies: two-thirds of all investments in Portugal and its colonies were made directly or indirectly by foreign monopolies. The Salazar Government granted very favourable terms to monopolies investing in the Portuguese African colonies; in 1960 it had removed almost all obstacles to the import of capital and the export of profits; James Duffy, in his work *Portugal in Africa*, wrote: "Henceforth the door is wide open to the entry of foreign capital into the Portuguese Territories". That conclusion was confirmed by Salazar, who had stated: "We grant capital invested in our country (so-called 'Greater Portugal') guarantees, advantages and privileges such as are rarely enjoyed by local capital" (Mr. Gersdorff, *Wirtschafts-probleme Portugiesisch-Afrikas* (Bielefeld, 1962), p. 256). Thanks to those terms, foreign monopolies had gained a strong economic position in the Portuguese colonies. A rapid glance at any branch of industry in the Portuguese colonies sufficed to reveal the widespread presence of foreign capital. The diamond industry in Angola, for instance, had been monopolized by the Angola Diamond Company (DIAMANG), an Anglo-Belgo-American company closely linked with the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, i.e., the Morgan and Oppenheimer financial group, and with the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, notorious for its dark deeds. Forty per cent, and according to the Italian Weekly *Vie Nuove* as much as 72 per cent, of the company's capital was controlled by United States monopolies. Besides the direct holdings, control was also exercised through other companies and trusts. For instance, a United States group held 25 per cent of the shares of Forminière, which in turn held 7 per cent of the capital of DIAMANG. The Banco Burnay, closely linked with the Guggenheim group and the Sofina trust, also held 6 per cent of DIAMANG's shares, whereas the Portuguese Government held only 11.5 per cent.

38. In the petroleum industry, the Belgian PETROFINA trust, a member of the Société générale de Belgique group, controlled PETRANGOL, a company which prospected for and extracted petroleum in Angola. That company owned a 550,000-ton refinery near Luanda. CARBORANG, which held vast prospecting concessions for petroleum, gas and other minerals, was controlled by British and Belgian capital. The Gulf Oil Corporation of America, a member of the Mellon group, had a subsidiary, the Portuguese Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, which had obtained a concession from the Portuguese Government for petroleum prospecting and extraction in the Cabinda enclave (Northern Angola). Gulf Oil also controlled the Mozambique Gulf Oil Company and Mozambique Pan-American Oil, which prospected for and extracted petroleum in Mozambique, where they had a conces-

sion covering almost 95,000 km². Standard Oil of New Jersey, which was part of the most powerful monopoly in the United States (Rockefeller), had a forty-year concession to work petroleum deposits in so-called Portuguese Guinea. The Companhia Carbonifera de Moçambique (engaged in coal-mining) was controlled by Belgian capital to the extent of 60 per cent of its shares. The French Péchiney trust, together with the Netherlands companies, had monopolized the aluminium industry in Angola.

39. Ninety per cent of the share and all the income from the bonds of the Angolan corporation Companhia do Caminho de Ferro de Benguela belonged to Tanganyika Concessions, which was controlled by British and American capital. That company operated the Benguela railroad, more than half of whose freight consisted of ore from the "copper belt" consigned to the port of Lobito. The Portuguese Government held only 10 per cent of its shares. Generally speaking, the entire transport system of Angola and Mozambique was dominated by the international monopolies. The Swedish corporation Companhia Mineira Lillas de Moçambique had an exclusive right to prospect for and mine ore.

40. One of the principal colonial banks of Portugal, the Banco Burnay, of French and Belgian capitalization but closely linked with United States capital, controlled and possessed large holdings, *inter alia*, in major companies in Angola, Mozambique and São Tomé. The British South Africa Company, a United Kingdom corporation, was the principal shareholder in the Companhia de Moçambique, which controlled many commercial industrial firms.

41. Bauxite mining in Mozambique was carried on by the Wankie Colliery Company of Southern Rhodesia, whose shares were held by the Anglo-American Corporation and the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga.

42. Only one of the three Mozambique banks was Portuguese. Eighty per cent of insurance transactions in the Territory were carried on by foreign companies.

43. The flow of West German capital to the Portuguese colonies had begun in 1950 and was continuing at an ever-increasing rate. Economic penetration by the Federal Republic of Germany was attested by the fact that in the past ten years its exports to Africa had increased eightfold and its imports from Africa had tripled. West German capital was penetrating the Portuguese colonies at a rapidly increasing rate. At the end of 1958 a German-Portuguese company had obtained the right to mine lignite deposits estimated at 500 million tons in the Luso region of Angola. West German investors held 40 per cent of the company's stock. Since 1951, Siemens had been providing Portugal and its colonies with signalling and other equipment for the railways. West German firms (Mann, etc.) were the principal suppliers of trucks and automobiles. Others were engaged in Mozambique in rebuilding the port of Beira and the railways which carried the raw materials intended for export (Nacala-Catur; Cabral-Metangula, the railway to Northern Rhodesia; Lourenço Marques-Inhambane (see *Aussenpolitik*, No. 5, 1964, p. 360).

44. West German capital had also been invested in the chemical and petroleum industries in the Portuguese colonies. In 1963, construction had begun in Angola of a new Petroquímica chemical plant at an estimated cost of £6,250,000, with the financial and technical support of a company of the French Khulmann Group and the German limited liability company Friedrich Ude Dortmund, associated with the Hoch Group (D.L., 7 March 1965) (*Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin*, No. 1, March 1964).

45. On 13 May 1961, West Germany and Portugal had signed an economic co-operation agreement. The Krupp Corporation had played a most important role in the implementation of that agreement. In 1961, for example, that corporation had drawn up, with a view to the development of the mining industry in Angola, a plan for the establishment of a consortium consisting of Krupp (Essen), Eurardt and Schultz (Copenhagen) and Sociedade de Empreitadas e Trabalhos (Lisbon and Luanda). The contract of operations, signed in March 1961, provided for works to a total value of 1,300 million escudos (£16,250,000) in the mining industry, railways,

port construction and equipment. The consortium had supplied the necessary plant for the development and operation of the Cassinga mines and had taken steps to modernize the main railway line of Moçâmedes to increase its ore-carrying capacity, and to construct a new port capable of handling 1,000 tons of ore per hour at Moçâmedes, which at that time had been the terminal. In the Cassinga mining region, Krupp was building an ore-enrichment plant and railway repair shops. At present only one mine of the complex was being operated and its output was sent to the port of Lobito. That port was already exporting 500,000 tons of iron ore annually, a figure which was expected to reach 1.5 million tons in two years and 2.5 million tons in four years (I. Nank, "Portugal and Portuguese Africa", *Aussenpolitik*, No. 5, 1964, p. 358).

46. In 1964, Krupp had begun construction of a 300-mile railway linking the Cassinga mining region with the port of Lobito in Angola (*Africa*, 1964, No. 16, 14 August 1964). The total cost of the project was expected to be \$65 million, \$40 million of which was to be provided by the consortium (*Blick durch die Wirtschaft*, 12 June 1964). As reported by the publication *Angola and Mozambique—News and Opinion*, a sizable iron-ore complex established by the Companhia Mineira do Lobito would increase its production in a few years from 500,000 tons to 5-6 million tons.

47. Krupp had also stretched its tentacles towards the mineral deposits in Mozambique. It had drawn up plans for creating an international consortium under its direction and consisting of large European trusts to prospect for and mine iron ore in that Territory. The consortium also had support of corporations established in Mozambique, such as the Companhia Portuguesa de Fornos Electricos, the Angases Co., and Mogás. It was expected to produce iron concentrates valued at £1.5-2 million, according to the daily *Diário de Lisboa* of 9 February 1964, and the total cost of the project was estimated at £1,850,000 (*Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin*, No. 2, April 1962).

48. All that information had appeared in the working document on the mining industry in Angola and Mozambique, which had been prepared by the Secretariat for Sub-Committee I (see annex I below). It was interesting to note that the five most important of the seven companies which had been granted exclusive concessions for the prospecting and exploitation of mineral deposits in Angola (see annex I, table 1 A) were under the control of the United Kingdom, United States, Belgian and West German capital. The most important companies (Companhia Carbonifera de Moçambique, Mozambique Gulf Oil and Mozambique Pan American Oil, Companhia dos Diamantes de Moçambique and Companhia de Urânio de Moçambique) which had been granted similar concessions in Mozambique were in the hands of United States, United Kingdom and Belgian capitalists. It was thus evident, and the Secretariat report made available to the Sub-Committee confirmed the fact, that foreign, and in particular United States, United Kingdom, West German, Belgian and French, capital played an exceptionally important role in the economy of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. The foreign and Portuguese monopolies were exploiting the people and the natural resources of those colonies to the utmost and were making colossal profits. According to the weekly publication *France-Observateur* of 9 March 1963, the annual profits of the monopolies ordinarily amounted to between 20 and 45 per cent. Information concerning profits derived from the plunder of the colonial territories was, of course, strictly confidential. However, fragmentary data gave some idea of the colossal profits made each year by the foreign and Portuguese monopolies operating in the Portuguese colonies. Thus, the profits of the Tanganyika Concessions merely from the operations of the Benguela Railway amounted to £1 million. The size of DIAMANG's profits could be judged from the following figures: diamond exports by that company had amounted to \$15 million in 1956, \$20 million in 1958 and \$22.5 million in 1963 (*Angola and Mozambique—News and Opinion*). In fifty years, it had exported more than 25 million carats of diamonds, most of which (70.5 per cent in 1962) were intended for the manufacture of jewellery (*Statist*, 25 June 1964, p. 968). In 1958, 1 million carats of diamonds had been mined (according to *France-Observateur*), and the company had made a profit

of more than \$4.5 million. In 1921, its capital had amounted to £2 million, but by 1963 it had risen to \$100 million (see paras. 90 and 91 of annex I). In 1963, PETRANGOL, engaged in the extraction and refining of petroleum, had done 116.7 million escudos worth of business, and its net profit had been 19.8 million escudos.

49. One could go on enumerating facts concerning the plunder of the Portuguese colonies by the foreign monopolies. What had been said made it abundantly clear that the true purpose of their activities was profits and the ruthless exploitation of the indigenous population and natural resources of those Territories in their own interest.

50. The situation with regard to agriculture was similar; the bulk of agricultural output was monopolized by the large concessions companies backed by Portuguese and foreign capital. In Angola, two companies, Sociedade Agrícola do Cassequel and Companhia do Açúcar de Angola, produced 90 per cent of the sugar; another (COTONANG) controlled nearly 70 per cent of all cotton production. The coffee plantations were in the hands of a few large enterprises.

51. Cotton, coffee and sugar were the main agricultural exports of Angola and Mozambique. The Belgian bank Ralle was the power behind the cotton and coffee-producing companies in Angola, and one of the large sugar-producing companies was financed by United Kingdom capital. In Mozambique, a French enterprise (Companhia de Boror) owned the largest coconut plantations in the world. In the economy of so-called Portuguese Guinea, which specialized in the production of ground-nuts, three European companies occupied a dominant position. According to a book, *Portugal in Africa*, published by Prof. Duffy in 1963, almost the entire agricultural production of Mozambique was carried on by three large companies (Mozambique Company, Niassa Company and Zambézia Company) which worked two thirds of the land.

52. In his book, *Portugal's African "Wards"*, Marvin Harris described the system of cotton production in Mozambique as follows: "In this modern serfdom, the role of the medieval lord is exercised by twelve private Portuguese companies, each of which has received monopolistic concessions over the cotton production of vast areas of Mozambique. *Indigenas* within the concession areas of each company are assigned cotton acreage by the administrative authorities. They have no choice in the matter and must plant, cultivate and harvest cotton wherever they are told. Then they must sell the raw cotton to the concession company of their area at prices which are fixed by the Government far below those available on the international market... In 1956, there were 519,000 African cultivators participating in the cotton campaign... The actual number of men, women, and children who are being forced to plant cotton therefore probably exceeds one million. In 1956, the 519,000 sellers received an average of \$11.17 per person as their family's reward for an entire year of work."

53. With regard to the production of wheat and livestock, the situation was the same. According to Mr. Muthemba, a petitioner from Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) (see A/AC.109/SR.353), the Europeans set up so-called "producers' co-operatives" with the aim of buying the produce of the African farmers at low prices and selling it on the European market at a great profit. Thus, the petitioner had concluded, the Africans worked as slaves on the European farms.

54. As in industry, the foreign monopolies, together with the Portuguese monopolies, had a stranglehold on agriculture, where they were amassing enormous profits. In industry as well as in agriculture, the indigenous population of the Portuguese colonies received ridiculously low remuneration, with which they eked out a half-starved existence. The Salazar régime had, moreover, solved the manpower problem in a rather special manner for the benefit of the foreign monopolies. It had instituted what was in fact a system of forced labour. Any African unable to pay the "personal" tax, which was levied against all persons aged sixteen to sixty years and represented more than one third of their annual wages, had to redeem that debt by working on the construction of roads or on the plantations or in mines of the foreign companies. Forced labour was even imposed in concession areas, where

the Africans were obliged to cultivate only those products in which the enterprise holding the concession specialized. On the basis of the law of "contract labour" the indigenous inhabitants of the Portuguese colonies were handed over virtually as chattels to foreign enterprises. Workers recruited in Angola and Mozambique continued to be "exports" sent to the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia to work in agricultural or industrial enterprises. In that regard, the review published in New York, by FRELIMO, *The Mozambique Revolution* (see vol. I, No. 3, p. 8), revealed that under an agreement concluded between Portugal and the Transvaal Republic in 1875, and amended in 1901, 1928, 1934, 1936, 1940 and 1950, 100,000 labourers from Mozambique were to be sent each year by Portugal to work in the gold mines of the Transvaal. In return, 45.5 per cent of the products of the Transvaal had to pass through Lourenço Marques. The Portuguese colonial administration received a direct cash payment for every worker recruited. As the petitioners had indicated, the Portuguese Government received \$US6 per worker, plus 50 per cent of their cash wages during the first four months of employment. Mozambicans were not, moreover, allowed to reside in South Africa except as contract labourers; if they did not fulfil that condition, they were deported to Mozambique.

55. In addition to the persons coming under the above-mentioned agreement, more than 200,000 Mozambique labourers were hired to work on plantations and farms or as servants in South Africa, as labourers in mines and industrial enterprises in Southern Rhodesia, or as servants of the white settlers in the latter country.

56. The situation of the indigenous population in the Portuguese colonies was extremely desperate. Wages were determined according to racist principles, that was to say, the earnings of an African worker were between one-fifth and one-tenth of those of a European worker, even though his working hours were generally much longer. The economic situation of the African worker was made even worse by the fact that he was barred from most of the skilled trades.

57. Apart from being subjected to forced labour and racial discrimination, the workers of Angola, Mozambique and the other Portuguese colonies were not allowed to form trade unions. They enjoyed no kind of work protection measures, social security or old-age and disability pensions.

58. Millions of peasants lived in abject poverty. The Portuguese colonialists expelled the indigenous inhabitants from the fertile land, even if they were unable to settle there themselves, with the result that only 2 per cent of the arable land was being used in Mozambique. In Angola, the Africans were thirty times more numerous than the Europeans, but they cultivated only about 1 per cent of the land. The African peasant was compelled to work at starvation wages for the landowners or on the plantations held as concessions by foreigners.

59. The labour legislation in force in the Portuguese colonies, the system of forced labour "contracts" and the policy of expropriating land and transferring it to the foreign holders of concessions had a twofold objective. The first was to prevent the African peasant population, which constitutes the overwhelming majority of inhabitants in the colonies, from becoming a force which could compete with the European farmers and the companies holding concessions. The second was to keep the immense majority of the indigenous population impoverished so as to compel them to seek work in the mines or on the farms of the Europeans as a means of avoiding starvation and earning the money needed to pay the taxes with which the colonialists burdened them. That policy was in full accord with the interests of the European farmers and foreign companies that needed cheap labour.

60. Hence, it was not only the Portuguese colonialists but also the foreign monopolies operating in the Portuguese colonies that were directly responsible for the suffering and torment being endured by the people of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and the other colonies still under the domination of Portugal.

61. The frantic exploitation of the people and the shameless plundering of the Territories' natural resources had had

deplorable social consequences. As everyone knew, 99 per cent of the population of the Portuguese African colonies was illiterate. Although the Portuguese were outnumbered by the Africans by seventy to one, the primary schools had an enrolment of 4,500 white and 5,000 African pupils. In Angola, only 3.3 per cent of the 880,000 African school-age children actually attended school. The language of instruction in all schools was Portuguese. Only 1 per cent of the budget was allocated to education, as against more than 30 per cent to the armed forces.

62. Medical services were practically non-existent in the Portuguese colonies. There were 380 doctors for 12 million Africans, or one for every 85,000 inhabitants in Portuguese Guinea, one for every 22,500 inhabitants in Angola and one for every 30,000 inhabitants in Mozambique. The level of living of the indigenous population was extremely low. The hand of the modern settler weighed upon it even more heavily than that of the erstwhile Portuguese noble. It had been established that in Mozambique each European consumed 58 kilogrammes of meat and 63 litres of milk a year, and the African 1 kilogramme of meat and less than a litre of milk.

63. Life expectancy at birth was only twenty-eight years. This was why the Africans, fleeing from the Portuguese colonialist yoke, sought refuge abroad: during the last fifty years nearly 2 million indigenous people had left Angola and settled in neighbouring countries, where in fact they fell into the hands of the same foreign monopolies, which exploited them still more cruelly. In the Republic of South Africa, for example, where racist legislation was in force, about 400,000 Africans coming from the Portuguese colonies received a wage between one-twelfth and one-fifteenth of that of Europeans doing the same work. The situation was the same in Southern Rhodesia, where a great many Africans from the Portuguese Territories worked. The *apartheid* policies and the racist laws enforced in those two countries deprived the Africans "recruited" from the Portuguese colonies of the right to choose their employment and to refuse to carry out orders even if they were forced to work in inhuman conditions. Anyone contravening those laws was liable to prosecution.

64. Forced labour, shameless exploitation, almost universal illiteracy, disease and chronic hunger, the denial of political rights—that was the tragic situation resulting from the activities of the Portuguese colonialists and foreign monopolies in the Portuguese possessions.

65. It was not only economic advantages, however, which attracted the Western Powers and international monopolies to Portugal's colonial possessions in Africa. Another no less important reason why Portugal's allies in NATO supported the Salazar Government by every means at their disposal was related to the strategic position of the Territories. Salazar's strongpoints in Angola and so-called Portuguese Guinea, and the airfields at Beira, Tete and Nacala in Mozambique, were part of the network of aggressive bases of NATO. "The frontiers of the United States and of the West pass through the Azores, Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea, claimed Salazar's newspaper, the *Diário da Manhã*, in January 1964, an argument which was continually being repeated to the Portuguese by the United States leaders: speaking at a dinner given at the American Club in Lisbon on 14 April 1964, Admiral George Anderson, United States Ambassador to Portugal, after mentioning the concrete assistance given by United States military advisers to the Portuguese armed forces which they trained and equipped, had said that, in the political field the United States had always stood up against other Powers which had tried to call in question the legitimacy of Portugal's participation in international meetings and by combatting "African terrorism" (from the newspaper *Primeiro de Janeiro*, 15 May 1965) it had helped Portugal to settle certain difficulties which had arisen from Salazar's colonialist policy. The United States Secretary of State had written in a letter published in the magazine *Fortune* of 14 May 1964 that Portugal was the only ally which had made and was making an important contribution to their joint security by authorizing the United States to use its military base in the Azores; to sacrifice the interests of Portugal by supporting,

for example, the attacks made on it in the United Nations could only lead to catastrophe (quotation taken from *The Mozambique Revolution*, vol. I, No. 3, p. 3).

66. Mention had already been made in the Special Committee and in other United Nations bodies of the large sums made over to Portugal by its NATO allies in military and economic assistance and long-term loans. According to the *Diário de Lisboa* of 21 June 1963, Portugal had received, in 1962 alone, about \$37.5 million from the United States of America, about £7.5 million from France and £12.5 million from the Federal Republic of Germany. In December 1963, the United States banks had granted a new loan of \$35 million to the Salazar Government. In the previous month, that Government had obtained a loan of \$30 million from a group of European banks. In April 1964, Portugal had received a long-term loan from France of \$125 million and had signed an agreement with that country under which the latter undertook to build 120 vessels of various types for Portugal in exchange for the right to establish a base in the Azores. In 1964, too, the Netherlands had invested \$12.5 million in the Portuguese colonies. In January 1964, Portugal had received a loan of \$20 million from the United States Government and in March 1965 a group of United States concerns had invested \$6 million in the Portuguese airline which served Angola and Mozambique, to enable it to withstand the boycott to which it was being subjected by the African States.

67. In the address already referred to, which he had given on 14 April 1964 at Lisbon, the United States Ambassador had said that United States bankers had increased their loans to Portuguese companies and had recently arranged in the United States a large loan to the Portuguese Government; United Steel and Morrison Knudsen were completing the construction of a bridge on the Tagus River costing \$55 million, financed by the United States import-export banks.

68. The Inter-American Trust Company had recently made known its intention of investing some \$500 million in the Portuguese colonies, and, as Mr. Mondlane had informed the Sub-Committee, a high official of the Inter-American Capital Corporation had said that the United States intended to invest \$1,000 million in Mozambique.

69. In 1963-1964, Portugal had received from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development \$12.5 million, which, according to the testimony of the petitioners (see para. 196 above of the present chapter), had mostly gone into the purchase of farming equipment for white settlers from Portugal.

70. United States military aid had amounted to \$337 million in 1963, according to *The Monthly Economic Review, Portugal Overseas Provinces* (No. 46, 1963). The figure given in the review was probably below the real figure. As Mr. Mondlane had indicated in the petition he had submitted to the Special Committee during its visit to Africa, between 1951 and 1961 alone the United States had contributed \$500 million to Portugal in the form of weapons and armaments (see para. 191 above of the present chapter). He had added that there was nothing to indicate that such aid had since ceased. It was precisely that assistance, that uninterrupted flow of dollars, pounds sterling, marks and francs which enabled Portugal to maintain an army of 50,000 men in Angola (according to B. Davidson, writing in the 2 May 1964 issue of the review *West Africa*, p. 484, with reference to an article published in the *Economist*), to build large numbers of military bases and airfields and to maintain a regular force of at least 30,000 men in Mozambique to fight the guerrillas (see "The Unholy Alliance", in the *New Statesman* of 26 February 1965; according to petitioners, there would appear to be up to 45,000 officers and men in Mozambique and 20,000 to wage the colonial war in "Portuguese" Guinea). Thanks to the credits granted to it chiefly by its Western allies and the foreign monopolies, Portugal regularly carried out three-year and five-year plans for the "development of the overseas territories". Great publicity was being given to the implementation of those plans and it was claimed that their purpose was to ensure the development of those territories and their inhabitants. In fact those plans served to entrench the foreign monopolies still more firmly, to consolidate the presence of

the Portuguese colonialists in the African colonies, to create the conditions to enable them better to exploit the population and natural resources and to crush the national liberation movement of the peoples. Thus, out of 9,000 million escudos allocated to the "plan for the development of the overseas territories" for 1959-1964, 46 per cent had been devoted to the opening of roads and 26 per cent to the establishment of settlers. In the new three-year plan announced by Portugal at the end of 1964 (see *The New York Times*, 4 October 1964) and begun in 1965, \$114 million was being allocated to the "development of the territories". The greater part would again go for the construction of strategic installations and for benefits for Portuguese settlers and the implementation of the plans would help to increase the enslavement of the indigeneous inhabitants of the Portuguese Territories.

71. It seemed particularly appropriate, with regard to the intensive roadbuilding proceeding in the Portuguese colonies in recent months, to emphasize not only the strategic importance of the roads but also another aspect of the matter to which Jack Woddis, on page 240 of his book *Africa, the Roots of Revolt*, published by The Citadel Press, New York, 1962, referred in the following terms: "In general, the plans for economic development in Africa being carried out by the different imperialist powers are plans to develop the infrastructure of communications and services which will enable the exploitation of Africa's raw materials to continue and be intensified". The major Western Powers and Portugal had considerable economic interests in the Portuguese colonies, which together they were striving to preserve. It was for that purpose that Portugal's NATO allies provided that country with economic and military assistance. The semi-official *Frankfurter Allgemeine* had expressed itself on the subject with unusual frankness: "In the final analysis, the economic interests and investments of the Western States in Africa are objectives which those States must be in a position to defend". The imperialist Powers refrained from intervening directly on the side of Portugal in the colonial war that it was waging in Angola, Mozambique and "Portuguese" Guinea, hoping that they would thus escape the charge of colonialism and leaving the Portuguese colonialists to be the scapegoats. Nevertheless, those imperialist Powers were continuing as in the past to furnish Portugal with direct military aid. According to the Dar-es-Salaam weekly *Vigilance*, Portuguese troops in Angola had been provided with new United States equipment at the beginning of 1964. In exchange, the Pentagon had been authorized to enlarge its bases in the Azores. The Federal Republic of Germany was also playing an important role: according to the Press (e.g., *The New York Times* of 3 May 1965, publishing a dispatch from Lisbon) it had delivered a large number of automatic weapons to Portugal and negotiations were in progress for the delivery of sixty F-86 jet fighter aircraft which Bonn has purchased from Canada. Bonn was trying to justify its action by claiming that Lisbon had undertaken not to use the aircraft in its African territories. But who could believe in the innocence of the merchant who said he had only sold arms to the bandits because they had sworn not to use them? Everyone was well aware, both on the banks of the Rhine and in the Pentagon, of the use to which the Portuguese colonialists put the arms delivered to them by the NATO Powers.

72. As Mr. Mondlane had stated with reference to the testimony of a Portuguese officer who had deserted (see para. 192 above of the present chapter), Portuguese forces in Mozambique were equipped with helicopters from the United States, jet aircraft from France, frigates from the United Kingdom and weapons from the Federal Republic of Germany. With funds provided by its NATO allies, Portugal had constructed in northern Mozambique, in the immediate vicinity of Tanzania, a series of military installations and landing strips and a north-south road network and in 1958 had begun construction of a strategic highway that would cost £1 million (*ibid.*, para. 194).

73. He felt it his duty to remind the representatives of the NATO countries in the Special Committee once again that it was precisely the assistance which their respective Governments were giving to Portugal that enabled that country to commit atrocities in its colonies. The most recent had been

carried out by Portuguese aircraft and paratroop units whose bases were precisely in northern Mozambique. According to a dispatch from a Western newspaper correspondent from the island of Likoma (Lake Nyasa), on 24 August 1965 Portuguese troops, commencing a new wave of bloody repression against the peaceful African population, shelled and machine-gunned a number of villages in that region and surrounded a number of others, shooting their entire population. Over 3,500 refugees from those villages were at present on the island of Likoma in Malawi.

74. He wondered whether it was not high time to place the responsibility for such atrocities not only on Portugal but on its NATO allies, whose assistance made them possible.

75. In spite of the many resolutions adopted by the United Nations calling on them to cease their aid to the Portuguese colonialists, Portugal's NATO allies were still giving them military and economic aid. Encouraged by this assistance given them by the NATO countries in its war against the peoples of the colonies fighting for freedom and independence, the Salazar Government was asking its allies for more and more assistance. In January 1965, for example, Mr. Nogueira, the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, had called for a revision of the NATO Agreement and its extension to the Portuguese overseas territories, his object plainly being to induce the NATO military bloc to give Portugal more active support in its colonial wars. It seemed that the Portuguese colonialists had every reason to hope that their demands would be met, for Mr. Brosio, the Secretary General of NATO, had said that Portugal had played its part in the Agreement with all the energy, determination and devotion that could be expected of it (quoted in *The Times* of London of 6 January 1965).

76. Furthermore, in recent months the "unholy alliance" which ruled the entire southern part of the African continent had taken new steps to organize mutual assistance and support. Economic and military co-operation between Portugal and Southern Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa—which bordered on its African colonies—had been strengthened still further. It would be recalled that early in October 1964 the Salazar and Verwoerd Governments had signed an agreement providing for increased economic co-operation, declaring themselves, according to *The New York Times* of 14 October 1964, determined to continue to defend Western interests in Africa. Although Mr. Muller, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, had stated at a press conference in Lisbon that the two countries were not at present contemplating a military agreement, it was no accident that in 1964 General Grobbelaar, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Republic of South Africa, had inspected the Portuguese bases and support posts in Mozambique (*The New Statesman* of 26 February 1965). According to the statements of petitioners, that visit was not an isolated event but had been carried out within the framework of the semi-annual inspections provided for by the agreements. Similar negotiations had been held also with the Salisbury Government in February 1965.

77. It was generally known—and the fact had been confirmed on several occasions during the Special Committee's session in Africa—that military bases and landing strips had been constructed or were at present being constructed in Angola and Mozambique, along the frontiers of independent African States and in the Caprivi region in the Territory of South West Africa, with the aid of foreign monopolies and certain Western Powers, for clearly aggressive purposes against the independent States of Africa; it was also known that poisonous gases and nuclear weapons were to be manufactured for the purpose of crushing the national liberation movement in southern and central Africa. In his statement of 10 May 1965, Mr. Franco Nogueira, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, had openly referred to the aggressive plans of the Republic of South Africa when he had maintained that henceforth there existed a doctrine of "legal reprisals", which he used as justification for threatening the United Republic of Tanzania. It should be noted in passing that the military budget of the Republic of South Africa had increased fourfold between 1961 and 1964, that its army had been equipped with matériel supplied by Western companies

and that the armaments factories had been reorganized with the assistance of those companies. Moreover, the Press had announced that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany had agreed to help the Governments of South Africa and Portugal to produce synthetic fuel in Africa, which constituted an open challenge to the African peoples who were fighting against the vestiges of colonialism on the African continent and were organizing a trade boycott against the Republic of South Africa. The Verwoerd Government realized the danger that the boycott of petroleum products, in particular, would represent for it. According to a report broadcast from Lourenço Marques on 18 August 1964, the Portuguese Government and the Government of the Republic of South Africa had begun negotiations in July 1964 concerning the sale of Angolan oil to the Republic of South Africa. The Portuguese were seeking not only to secure free access to the South African market but also to obtain the services of South African specialists in the technical and commercial exploitation of Angolan oil. It had been stated in the *Star* of Johannesburg, 1 August 1964, that "Angola could save the Republic of South Africa if the Afro-Asian bloc succeeds in cutting off South Africa's vital oil supplies. . . . In the event of a total embargo, Angolan oil could supply South African industry and defence with enough to keep them alive. . . . The easiest delivery route would be by sea from Luanda to Walvis Bay or to Cape Town. Should an oil embargo be accompanied by a port blockade, it could be taken overland via South West Africa." At present, South African specialists were working on the modernization of oil installations at Lourenço Marques; the capacity of those installations was to be increased to 750,000 tons a year. In addition, according to the *South African Digest* of 26 March 1965, the South African Republic intended to invest £4 million in the construction of a network of power-stations in Angola with a view to supplying electricity to the south-western part of the Republic of South Africa.

78. Analysis of the documents provided by the United Nations Secretariat and of the information from other sources brought out the following conclusions:

(a) (i) The economy of the Portuguese African colonies was largely in the hands of foreign capital. Foreign companies controlled, directly or indirectly, about two thirds of the funds invested in the Portuguese colonies and in Portugal itself.

(ii) At present, from the economic point of view, the first places were occupied by foreign monopolies, including the Anglo-Belgo-American Diamond Company, which had monopolized the entire Angolan diamond industry, the Belgian company PETROFINA, the Mellon, Rockefeller and other United States groups, which were carrying out petroleum exploitation and research in Angola, Mozambique, "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cabinda enclave; and the French Péchiney trust which, together with Netherlands capitalists, had monopolized the aluminium industry in Angola. Belgian capital occupied a predominant place in the coal industry and in the production of coffee and cotton; the Federal Republic of Germany was represented chiefly in the coal, petroleum and iron-ore industries; through the intermediary of Tanganyika Concessions, United Kingdom and United States interests controlled the means of transport in those Territories; United States, Belgian and French capital played an important role in the banks and insurance companies.

(iii) Foreign companies operating in the Portuguese colonies were exempt from all taxes or duties, whether they consisted of export or import duties, income taxes or any other form of taxation. Many of them occupied vast areas of territory, where they had their own police and security forces, and even their own armies. As a result, huge international concerns, with activities extending to various sectors of industry and agriculture, constituted a state within a state. Thanks to the guarantees, advantages and special privileges granted to them by the Portuguese Government, those international monopolies used the colonial system to exploit the indigenous population and natural resources of the Portuguese Territories pitilessly for the extraction of the highest possible profit. Their annual profits varied between 20 and 45 per cent; for example, the annual profits of DIAMANG

exceeded \$4.5 million, while the annual profit of Tanganyika Concessions from the operation of the Benguela railway alone amounted to £1 million sterling.

(iv) In return for the advantages, privileges and opportunities of huge profits granted them, the foreign monopolies paid Portugal fixed sums of money, and turned over to it free shares in their stock, on the basis of an agreed scale.

(v) Under the agreements concluded between the Portuguese Government and the companies in question, the latter were required to give the Government assistance in "the preservation of law and order". They built barracks and police stations at their own cost, paid the Portuguese Government enormous sums for the defence of "the national heritage", and so forth.

(vi) The foreign monopolies operating in the Portuguese colonies were not separate and distinct entities, but were connected with much more powerful trusts with headquarters in New York, London, Frankfurt-am-Main, Paris, Brussels, Pretoria and Johannesburg. Those trusts, which included the Morgan, Rockefeller, Mellon, Krupp and Henry Oppenheimer groups, the British Midland Bank group, Belgian and French bank groups, etc., had built up and controlled in southern Africa a powerful armaments industry, of which the enterprises operating in the Portuguese colonies with Portuguese or other capital were only a part. American firms, operating for the profit of both the foreign monopolies and the Portuguese Government, represented the active element in the industrial structure of Portugal and its colonies.

(vii) The conclusion was thus that the Portuguese colonies had become the condominium of a number of foreign monopolies, which, thanks to the colonial system and to Portugal's support, were able to exploit the colonies greedily and pitilessly, Portugal acting only as a steward.

(b) (i) Foreign investment went mainly to industries offering the highest profits; it was predominant, for example, in the extractive industries (diamonds, oil, coal, precious metals), in transport, and in agricultural production for export (cotton, coffee, sisal, ground-nuts).

(ii) The monopolies refrained, however, from investing in less profitable activities (manufacturing and building, consumer goods industries, production of basic food-stuffs, etc.), the development of which was essential if the Portuguese colonies were to achieve harmonious economies aimed at supplying the Territories' needs.

(iii) The economies of the Portuguese colonies were thus one-sided and unbalanced; they were at the mercy of world market fluctuations and of production in the capital-investing countries.

(c) In agriculture, the result of the predominance of the foreign monopolies, which had taken over the best lands, had been the dispossession of the indigenous population. The great majority of the peasants had thus been forced to become the tenant-farmers of the European landowners or of foreign companies, under conditions which were reminiscent of serfdom. The African peasant had to concentrate solely on the type of agricultural production in which the concessionary company specialized. He was forced to sell his crops only to the company's buyers, at prices fixed by the company, which were much lower than the prices paid to European farmers and than world market levels. The result was that the foreign monopolies and the Portuguese colonialists were able to make increasingly large profits despite the fact that the Territories were unable to supply their own basic food needs and had to import large quantities of food-stuffs.

(d) (i) Forced labour and the "contract" system had made the Portuguese colonies the cheapest labour market in the world. Dispossessed of their land, underfed, and groaning under the burden of heavy "capitation" taxes, which were levied on the entire adult male population, the indigenous inhabitants were forced to hire their labour out in the mines and on the European settlers' farms in order to keep starvation at bay and earn the cash they needed to pay the taxes imposed on them by the colonialists. There was no evidence to show that the foreign monopolies had ever protested

against that system of recruitment. That was easy to understand, since the profits they derived from cheap labour went both to their own coffers and to those of the Portuguese Government.

(ii) At the same time, the indigenous inhabitants of the Portuguese colonies represented one of the main "export items" supplied by the colonies to enterprises operated by the foreign monopolies in the Republic of South Africa and other neighbours of Angola and Mozambique. They constituted one of the principal means by which the Portuguese colonialists obtained foreign currency, which they used to repress the national liberation movement.

(c) (i) The social consequences of the domination of foreign monopolies aiming solely at the extraction of super-profits had been disastrous. The indigenous inhabitants had no rights and were bereft of all political liberties. They were kept out of government, and all power rested in the hands of the Portuguese settlers. Living in frightful poverty, the people of the colonies were compelled to sell their labour at the lowest price to the foreign exploiters and slaveholders. Wages were based on the principle of racial discrimination; the African worker earned five to ten times less than the white worker. The indigenous inhabitants had no right to form trade unions; they had no labour protection, social insurance or old-age or sickness pensions.

(ii) Ninety-nine per cent of the indigenous population of the Portuguese colonies were illiterate. They had virtually no medical services. Child mortality in the rural areas was as high as 60 per cent; and the average life of the Africans was twenty-eight years.

(iii) Living in such absolutely intolerable conditions, the people of the Portuguese colonies were compelled to seek refuge abroad. The flood of refugees had swollen particularly in the last few years, as a result of the massacres of fighters for freedom and independence which had been perpetrated by the Portuguese colonialists. The Portuguese Government was carrying out a criminal policy of genocide and the mass extermination of entire African races and peoples. After a tour through the south of Mozambique (province of Sul do Save), whence indigenous inhabitants were sent to work in the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Marcelo Caetano, a former Portuguese colonial minister, had written: "Anyone who travels through the province of Sul do Save is shocked by its depopulation. Practically no one remains but women and old people. The magnificent people of the province are gradually degenerating, and will soon be incapable of survival."

(f) (i) Not only were the international monopolies directly responsible for the maintenance of "law and order" in the Portuguese Territories, but they gave the Salazar Government considerable economic, financial and other assistance.

(ii) Those contributions and forms of assistance, as was well known, had a single goal: to stifle the national liberation movement in the Territories and preserve the latter as sources of raw materials and cheap labour, or as bases of aggression against the independent African States. Thus, the international monopolies had concluded a virtual alliance with the Portuguese Government for the repression of the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, "Portuguese" Guinea and the other Territories still under the Portuguese yoke. They were the main obstacle to the liberation of the Portuguese colonies, to the freedom and independence of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, "Portuguese" Guinea and the other Portuguese colonies in Africa and to the realization of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

(g) (i) The facts showed also that the Western Powers regarded Angola, Mozambique, "Portuguese" Guinea and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as important strategic outposts for protecting "White Africa" (the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia), where the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the other NATO countries had their strongest positions in the African continent, against African nationalism. With the assistance and support of the Western Powers and, in particular, the

active participation of West German revanchists, a military and political alliance was being set up in southern Africa between the Portuguese colonialists and the racist régimes of the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, its essential aim being to crush the national liberation movement in the south and centre of the continent. That notorious alliance was receiving considerable military and economic aid from the NATO countries, foremost among which was the United States of America.

(ii) Thus the freedom-fighters of Angola, Mozambique and "Portuguese" Guinea were actually faced with what might be called a collective colonialism. It was only the political, material and military support given systematically by the NATO countries, directly or indirectly, that enabled Portugal to maintain its colonial empire in Africa.

(iii) It was only the manifold assistance, both military and financial, that Portugal received from the NATO countries that had enabled it, one of the smallest countries in the world, one of the poorest and most backward in Europe, to wage for over two years a war on two fronts, and even, during the last six months, on three fronts, as had been noted in a statement by the Central Committee of FRELIMO dated 25 May 1965.

(iv) At the special session that the Special Committee had held in Africa, the representatives of the NATO Powers had sought, under the pressure of African and international public opinion, to deny the supplies of arms and military assistance which Portugal received and which enabled it to suppress the nationalist movements in its colonies. They had claimed that Portugal had promised not to use in Africa arms supplied to it through NATO.

(v) Against those claims could be set the statement by Mr. Mondlane, President of FRELIMO, that the patriots of Angola and Mozambique had not been given any assurance that any of the three Powers—the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America—had ever received a written guarantee from Portugal on that point. The United States Government had evaded that question when the representatives of FRELIMO had raised it in the United Nations in 1963; nor had NATO ever stated explicitly that the Portuguese provinces in Africa were not regarded as part of the so-called "national territory" of Portugal—i.e. that they were not covered by the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty (see A/AC.109/SR.354). In Angola, Mozambique, "Portuguese" Guinea and the other Portuguese colonies, the freedom-fighters had come up against the combined forces of the imperialist Powers. The support of its NATO partners, however, could not save the Portuguese colonial empire from collapse and ruin. No other proof was needed than the spread of the national liberation movement which the peoples of the Portuguese colonies had started in order to defend their rights, their freedom and their independence. It was the duty of the United Nations and of all States claiming to be anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist to give the freedom-fighters of Angola, Mozambique and "Portuguese" Guinea all possible moral and material aid, for their cause was just and lawful.

79. With regard to the practical steps that the United Nations could take, they were set forth in the well-known resolution which the Special Committee had adopted on the question of the Portuguese colonies at its special session in Africa.

80. The Soviet Union firmly supported all the proposals in that resolution. In its attitude to the struggle of the peoples under Portuguese domination, the Soviet Union was guided by the principle that all possible support should be given to colonial peoples who had risen up to win their freedom and independence.

81. The representative of Denmark, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he wished to make a number of comments as the representative of a country which was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

82. After the Special Committee's meetings in Africa, it might have been hoped that the name of NATO would no longer be brought into the discussions on the Territories

administered by Portugal. The representative of the USSR, however, had seen fit to repeat accusations which his delegation had already made in Africa. That attitude merely showed that in the Sub-Committee the USSR was pursuing aims which had absolutely nothing to do with the work of the Sub-Committee and hence made no contribution to its progress. He wished to make it clear that NATO did not support Portugal's colonial policy. Furthermore, the African Territories administered by Portugal were not—and, in his opinion, would never be—covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, as was shown by the very name of the Treaty and by the relevant provisions, which had been read out to the Special Committee at Dar es Salaam.

83. Denmark, for its part, did not export any arms to Portugal, and it would be recalled that while in Africa the Special Committee had received similar assurances from other members of NATO.

84. Finally, contrary to the Soviet Union delegation's assertions, NATO's aims were in no way aggressive. On the contrary, it was a defensive organization, for reasons well known to all, including the representative of the USSR.

85. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that he was surprised that the representative of Denmark should contest the Soviet Union delegation's statements. It was confirmed from many sources, including official ones, that the NATO countries were giving Portugal military aid on a considerable scale, which Portugal used in its fight against the indigenous people in Africa.

86. His delegation took note of the Danish representative's statement that the African Territories administered by Portugal would never be covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. It asked the Danish representative to remember, however, that a list of the arms to be found in the possession of the Portuguese colonialists had been communicated to the Special Committee. That list afforded abundant proof that Portugal used arms from NATO countries.

87. The representative of Denmark said that he wished to repeat his statement that NATO did not support Portugal's colonial policy. Nothing that the Soviet Union representative had said was any indication to the contrary.

88. The representative of Yugoslavia said that during the session of the Special Committee in Africa, numerous petitioners representing the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea had appeared before the Committee and effectively demonstrated the true nature of Portuguese colonialism in all its aspects and manifestations, and had confirmed the close relations existing between foreign monopolies active in the Portuguese colonies and the colonial régime.

89. All the petitioners without exception had repeated the truth about the Portuguese presence in Africa, which was characterized, to use the petitioners' own words, by the worst colonial domination, the deliberate oppression and the determined exploitation of the African peoples.

90. In fact, despite the unceasing efforts of the Portuguese colonialists to glorify their so-called civilizing mission in Africa, Portugal's colonial régime, not only in the opinion of the petitioners—who could hardly be accused of subjectivism—but also in the opinion of numerous foreign observers who had studied closely the Portuguese presence in Africa, had been and remained one of the most primitive and defective forms of the old colonial system in Africa.

91. Professor James Duffy, whose competence in the matter was beyond question, had said:

"...the Portuguese presence in Africa today is still characterized by ignorance, repression and a careless exploitation of the African people and in purely human terms the lessons of the past offer little hope for the future" (*Portuguese Africa*, Harvard University Press, 1959).

Elsewhere, he had declared:

"...the patterns of Portugal's African policy have remained pretty much the same: the concept of the African as a ward of the State whose tribal authorities and values are to be replaced by Portuguese authority and values; the indiscriminate use, and abuse, of African labour; a seeming

indifference to the physical and social welfare of the African people; an equal indifference to their educational needs; and exploitation of African agriculture and the promotion of white estate agriculture to the detriment of African land rights and interests; the encouragement of white immigration; and the repression of the African dissatisfaction, real and imagined, by imprisonment, exile, beatings, torture, and even murder. This has been the past, it is the present and the Portuguese would like to make it the future" (*Portugal's African Territories: Present Realities*, edited by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1962).

92. It was no accident that Portugal had refused and continued to refuse all co-operation with the United Nations with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problems of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea on the basis of the principles of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), turning a deaf ear to all appeals for a return to the paths of reason and realism and completely identifying itself with the colonial and racist extremists of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

93. It followed that no study of the activities of foreign monopolies in the African Territories under Portuguese rule or of the question how far such activities stood in the way of decolonization and the immediate accession to independence of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea, could be complete if it failed to take into account the nature of the colonial system and the political, economic and social framework in which the monopolies developed their operations.

94. Without embarking upon a very detailed description of the various aspects, he wished to dwell briefly on certain facts which demonstrated the reality of the Portuguese presence in the Territories under its domination, facts to which all the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee in Africa as well as all who had studied Portugal's colonial régime (not, of course, counting the apologists of colonialism and of Portuguese colonialism in particular) had drawn attention.

95. The political, economic, legal and social inequality of Africans and the policies of terror and oppression to which they were subjected were in many cases unprecedented in the history of colonialism in Africa. Despite all the theories the Portuguese had used to mask their policies in the colonies and their attitude towards the indigenous populations, in practice the Africans had been and continued to be treated as *indigenas*, that was to say, in accordance with Legislative Decree No. 39666, as "persons of the Negro race or descendants thereof... who have not yet acquired either the degree of education or the individual and social customs necessary for the full application to them of the public and private law applicable to Portuguese citizens". The meaning of that legal system as applied to those so defined was shown, for example, by the following provisions: article 23, for example, denied all indigenous inhabitants all rights pertaining to non-indigenous political institutions; article 9 limited their freedom of movement; article 32 stated that work was an indispensable element in the progress of the indigenous population and consequently allowed the Administration to impose it. According to article 26, compulsory labour could be imposed for failure to pay taxes, etc. Being consistent in their hypocrisy, there too the Portuguese colonialists had not failed to present themselves as humane and tolerant towards the Africans. Although the Portuguese had given the *indigenas* the so-called possibility of freeing themselves by means of "assimilation", which was supposed to be a means whereby the "non-civilized" could join the ranks of the "civilized", the position of the Africans was changed not at all.

96. In any case, it should be noted that the criteria of assimilation were so conceived that there were extremely few Africans who had been or were able really to avail themselves of that opportunity of joining the ranks of the "civilized".

97. Another area in which Africans were subjected to intolerable, not to say inhuman treatment, was that of conditions of work, which had not been substantially improved despite periodic revisions of the labour legislation. The most negative features of that legislation and the practice which

resulted from it, as was indicated by the information coming from the Territories, still remained in effect.

98. Professor James Duffy had said that:

"Angola and Mozambique are still dominated today by the unresolved problems of contract labour. The economic life of the two territories has been founded for too long on the slave trade, domestic slavery, or one form or another of compulsory labour for the white colonists—or even, apparently, colonial planners in Lisbon—to conceive of alternative systems. The sale or misuse of African labour has been an accepted procedure since the sixteenth century... But in spite of humanitarian attacks from abroad, occasionally enlightened legislation by various colonial ministers, and the disturbing spectacle of African communities rent by an indiscriminate labour draft, there has been in recent years no substantial change in native labour codes... The Portuguese argue, much as they did in the seventeenth century, that through the dignity of labour the Africans are civilized... Standing against this rationalization is the reality that the economy of the colonies rests on cheap labour and the best source of cheap labour is forced labour..." (*Portugal's African Territories*).

99. The systematic use of forced labour was one of the essential characteristics of the Portuguese variant of colonialism. It was practised in various forms; the most widespread of which were: (i) compulsory labour, which was imposed by the Government when there were not enough voluntary labourers for public works. In theory, persons under fourteen or over sixty years of age, the sick, the disabled, Africans already employed and women were supposed to be exempt. However, despite the regulations, women and children were very widely used for work on the roads and elsewhere; (ii) contract labour, which was economically the most important form of forced labour in the Portuguese colonies. Any African who could not prove that he had worked at least six months during the past year was liable to forced labour for the State or for private employers. Commenting on the regulations defining which categories of Africans in Angola and Mozambique were liable to contract labour, Perry Anderson, in his book *Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism*, published in Paris, 1963, said that the regulations were so drafted as to embrace practically the entire male African population of the two colonies, in Mozambique alone exposing 95 per cent or more of the peasantry to forced labour; that contract labour was applied indifferently by the State or by private enterprises; that the Administration distributed recruiting licences direct to agents or companies; that the agents drew up the contracts directly, without administrative help or with the assistance of the Administration, which in principle did no more than provide them with names and addresses, but in practice often used intimidation and coercion to fill the quota for which the recruiting officer had a licence. It was clear that that system left the door wide open to universal corruption, violence, malfeasance, etc.

100. The police could also intervene to ensure that there was the necessary number of workers if recruitment appeared to be lagging. In the case of the large companies or plantations, the Government itself undertook to obtain the number of workers they wanted; they had only to inform the Government of their needs.

101. In that way thousands of Africans were torn from their families every year, sent to work hundreds of miles away from their homes and forced to work in generally very unfavourable conditions for wages which, as Perry Anderson said, were never more than nominal.

102. In addition, there was voluntary labour, which meant that the workers signed on directly with their employer instead of being recruited through the Administration. The difference between forced labour and voluntary labour was that the latter was normally performed in the area where the worker lived. In practice, wages for the "volunteers" were often even lower than for contract labour, since the threat of contract labour forced Africans to undertake so-called voluntary labour and to accept conditions which were even less favourable, the sole advantage being that the work was done on the spot.

103. There were still other forms of forced labour which could not be omitted from any account of working conditions for the indigenous population in the Portuguese colonies. One of them was forced cultivation, whereby African farmers were obliged to cultivate a single crop (cotton or rice, for example). The Africans had to sell their crop to the companies at fixed prices, reduced to a level well below that of the free market. Moreover, the whole process was carried out by means of coercion and at no time were the Africans given any choice. Another example was the practice of forced transfer, which in fact was a kind of market in which Africans were treated as goods for barter. Since 1909 there had been a convention known as the "Mozambique-Transvaal" convention which provided for the importation each year of 100,000 Africans from Mozambique for the Transvaal mines, in exchange for which South Africa was required to send 47.5 per cent of the Johannesburg region's entire import traffic by sea through Lourenço Marques and to export 340,000 cases of citrus fruits through that port. Portugal gained other benefits from that "deal", such as, for example, a fixed sum for each recruit, a portion of each worker's wages to be paid to Portugal on his return, etc. The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association had the monopoly of recruitment.

104. A large number of workers from Mozambique were also recruited to work in Southern Rhodesia. It was estimated that almost 400,000 Africans from Mozambique out of approximately 600,000, or two thirds of the male labour force of Mozambique, worked each year outside the colony.

105. Professor James Duffy said that the Mozambique-South African convention was an international extension of contract labour, i.e., forced labour (*Portuguese Africa*, Harvard University Press, 1959).

106. Thus Mozambique had become a part of a South African transportation, economic and labour complex. The same was true of Southern Rhodesia. Those were the links which, over and above political affinities, united Portugal with the racists of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

107. It was no less true of Angola, whose African inhabitants were sent or went "voluntarily" to work in South West Africa, in the Congo, in Southern Rhodesia and elsewhere.

108. Portuguese colonialism had also done very little if anything to alleviate the physical and intellectual poverty of the Africans. Outside the urban centres and a few mission posts, health services were practically non-existent: such hospitals as there were discriminated against Africans. The part played by the small number of nurses throughout the colonies was insignificant and in many regions the infant mortality rate exceeded 50 per cent.

109. The problems of education were no less serious than those of health and hygiene. In accordance with the custom of distinguishing between indigenous and so-called "civilized" elements, there were two school systems: one for white children and assimilated Africans, and another for African children. It went without saying that the two systems were different both in quality and in the educational opportunities which they offered to the children. The result of the division was that the illiteracy rate among the indigenous population exceeded 95 per cent, while among the Whites and the assimilated population it was less than 25 per cent, slightly lower than the 35 to 40 per cent rate in Portugal.

110. Education was a process of selection for the Africans. The number of students who continued their education was small. When African children finished their elementary schooling, many of them were over the age-limit (fourteen) and could not continue their education. Examinations were difficult and all courses were given in Portuguese. Normally the distance from the home to a private or government school was great and the cost of educating a student at a private elementary school would amount to as much as one fifth of his family's annual income. Even more important, children were often forced to begin working at an early age. Higher education was accessible only to the *assimilados*, and the number of those who could attend courses was insignificant.

111. Paragraph 51 of the working paper prepared by the Secretariat on mining in Angola and Mozambique (annex I below) stated that the Overseas Mining Law was silent on

the rights of indigenous inhabitants to prospect for, and exploit, mineral deposits. The indigenous inhabitants, governed by customary law and usage, could not acquire any legal rights in mining. As they did not and could not own land they did not have the right to prospect without licence. As they did not come under Portuguese civil law, they could not acquire legal title to prospecting licences or mining concessions. And that state of affairs was continuing even after the repeal of the so-called Native Statute as mentioned in paragraph 53 of the working paper, which stated that the participation of Africans in the political and economic life of the Territory did not appear possible so long as they lived in *regedorias*, in which they were governed by customary law and usage.

112. In addition to all that had been said concerning the true situation of the Africans, it must be stressed that they were also subject to effective and often brutal police surveillance. Every male African was obliged to buy and to carry with him a pass bearing his fingerprints, his photograph, his tax statement and other biographical details. He could not travel from one district to another without official authorization and could not be employed unless he presented his pass. In towns and villages a curfew was mandatory and in the urban centres the African quarter was patrolled at night. The local authorities kept a fairly close watch on the activities of the Africans by means of a network of spies.

113. Corporal punishment was frequently the penalty for minor infractions of the law and even for domestic disobedience. In recent years in particular, the colonial police had added execution to its list of methods of persuasion. The power of the Portuguese administrator and his assistants was almost absolute. He was *procureur*, counsel for the defence, magistrate and policeman, recruiting agent for workers, etc.

114. The Portuguese colonies in Africa had all the prerequisites for stable social, economic and political development. Their natural resources were such as to constitute a solid economic basis for their political independence. In 1962, for example, Angola had been the fifth largest producer of diamonds in the world, and it was a large potential producer of petroleum, iron ore, copper, manganese, etc. In 1963, mineral exports had accounted for about 24 per cent by value of Angola's domestic exports while diamonds alone had accounted for 16 per cent (see annex I, para. 1, below).

115. Mozambique also had a great variety of minerals, for example coal, bauxite, copper, iron ore, radio-active minerals, petroleum, diamonds, etc. Particularly since the Second World War, Mozambique had become more and more a field for extensive activity by the Portuguese and by various foreign companies seeking to exploit its natural resources.

116. The Secretariat working paper mentioned that the geological resources of Angola and Mozambique had not been fully surveyed, that surveys of specific areas had been undertaken at various times, and that studies were continuing and important mineral deposits were still being discovered (*ibid.*, para. 2).

117. Portuguese colonial domination, however, had been no less colonialist in that field than in others. In Angola, Mozambique and the other Territories, Portugal had always pursued a policy of economic domination combined with political domination. The character of the economic domination had been determined by the doctrine that colonies must be exploited to the full for the sole benefit of the mother country, that was to say Portugal. Portugal had used all possible means to attain that objective: direct exploitation of the Territories' natural resources—mineral, agricultural and other—either alone or in conjunction with foreign companies; introduction of a special system of preferences to ensure privileged treatment for exports and imports between Portugal and those Territories; rapid colonization of Angola and Mozambique in order to transform them into genuine strongholds of white domination, etc. Although that policy in fact dated from the conquest of the Territories, it was interesting to note that it had been applied with particular vigour since the Second World War. Being unable by itself to finance the large investments which were required for the implementation of such

a policy of intensifying and expanding the exploitation of the wealth of the two Territories, Portugal had increased its efforts to attract a flow of investment capital from various foreign monopolies, already interested in Angola and Mozambique and the opportunities for exploitation that they offered. In that way, Portugal had managed to achieve the two objectives it sought: it had obtained the advantages of increased revenue by sharing in the profits of those companies and, in the event of a revolt by the Africans, it could count on those companies to mobilize public opinion in their respective countries and even, perhaps, to influence the policy of their Governments in favour of Portugal.

118. The results were well known. Foreigners, Portuguese who claimed ownership of the Territories, and other interests of various nationalities and origins, had infiltrated deeply into the African lands of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea, etc., which belonged to the African population alone, ruthlessly exploiting the natural wealth of those Territories.

119. In Angola, for example, four exclusive concessions together produced more than 90 per cent of the minerals exported from the Territory. The well-known Angola Diamond Company, known as DIAMANG, the largest foreign concern in the mining industry, was today, as it had been since its establishment in 1920, the most important single factor in the economic life of Angola, possessing a virtual monopoly of diamond production in Angola and a concession covering practically the whole Territory of Angola.

120. Professor James Duffy had stated: "DIAMANG is a small monopolistic empire in Angola. It is exempt from taxes, pays no import duties on mine machinery and no export duties on diamonds, and has at its exclusive disposal the African work force of the Lunda area. DIAMANG is the largest private employer of African labour in Angola. A new contract negotiated in 1955 extended indefinitely the company's exclusive prospecting rights" (*Portuguese Africa*, Harvard University Press, 1959).

121. Another author, R. Madhu Panikkar, stated in his book: "DIAMANG is the most important monopolist in Angola. It has been rightly called 'Portugal's most notable private enterprise'. It, today, accounts for 12 per cent of all exports. The State, therefore, is extremely lenient towards it. It has the sole right to mine diamonds in Angola; it has a private garrison which has been substantially increased this year. It has also the lowest-paid mine-workers anywhere in Africa" (*Angola in Flames*, Asia Publishing House, 1962, p. 57).

122. DIAMANG was controlled by the Anglo-American Corporation, De Beers and the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga.

123. In Mozambique, it was again the Anglo-American Corporation, through its subsidiary companies De Beers Consolidated Mines and the Companhia dos diamantes de Mocambique, which engaged in diamond prospecting and mining.

124. At the end of 1962, two concessions had dominated the field of oil prospecting and extraction in Angola: the Companhia de petróleos de Angola (PETRANGOL) and the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company. The Belgian oil company, PETROFINA, held a controlling interest in PETRANGOL, with investments amounting to tens of millions of dollars. PETRANGOL's income from its mines and refinery had been 116.7 million escudos in 1963 and the net profits for the year had been 19.8 million escudos. The Cabinda Gulf Oil Company was a subsidiary of the Gulf Oil Company, incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware (United States of America). The working paper (annex I, paras. 191 and 192) gave certain information which showed the very privileged position which the company had been given. No conditions were imposed on the Company as to minimum capital or the share of ownership by the Territory. The Company had "full freedom to produce, save, sell and export any and all substances extracted from the area of the concession". In return for royalties of approximately 12.5 per cent of the sales value which it must pay to the Government of Angola, the Company was exempt from "duties, imports or taxes, whatever their name or nature, whether national, provincial or municipal,

present or future". It was also exempt from present or future taxes on shares, capital and debentures of the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company so long as those remained in the ownership of the parent company, Gulf Oil Corporation, or its affiliates. Moreover, it was not obliged to employ a fixed percentage of Portuguese personnel.

125. The information in paragraph 198 of annex I below was also worthy of attention. It concerned the South African finance company, Federale Mynbou Beperk which, since 1964, had been interested in acquiring a share in the Angolan oil industry, and mentioned the special reasons for South Africa's interest in Angolan oil. By securing Angolan oil, South Africa thought that it would be able to defeat the boycott which the United Nations had voted to impose upon it in order to make it renounce its policy of *apartheid*.

126. In Mozambique, the Mozambique Gulf Oil Co., a subsidiary of the American Gulf Oil Corporation, and Mozambique Pan American Oil Company, a subsidiary of Pan American International Oil Co., were dominant in the prospecting and extraction of oil, the former over an area of 123,590 km² and the latter over an area of 94,860 km². The contract with those two companies was almost identical with that signed with the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company in Angola.

127. Several foreign companies were engaged in mining iron and ferro-manganese in Angola. In that field, the notorious Krupp had a preponderant influence, but French, Japanese, Portuguese and other interests were also involved. The Companhia Mineira de Lobito, for example, was one of these companies. It had an exclusive concession for the prospecting and exploitation of all minerals, except diamonds, petroleum and mineral oils in several regions covering a total area of about 262,000 km², and enjoyed a privileged position and the right to exploit for an unlimited period all minerals discovered with the exception of those mentioned.

128. It would be a very lengthy task to attempt a more detailed assessment of the presence of foreign interests in the economy of Angola and Mozambique, of their number, their privileged positions, etc. The same was true with regard to the interests participating in the prospecting and mining of copper, coal, bauxite, gold and all the other minerals found in Angola and Mozambique. The Portuguese and other foreigners—the British, American, West German, South African, Belgian, French, Japanese and other concession-holders—were exploiting the natural resources of Angola and Mozambique and making profits from them.

129. The situation in the field of agriculture was in no way different. On the one hand, the Portuguese had considerably intensified their efforts, especially during the years since the Second World War, to increase the white population in Angola and Mozambique by means of more rapid colonization and physical transplantation from the Portuguese countryside to Africa. In that way, the idea that the colonies were merely overseas provinces and formed an integral part of the mother country and the so-called civilizing mission of the Portuguese in Africa were to be put into practical effect. That explained, for example, why net immigration to Angola since 1947 had been at the rate of 5,700 a year, with record figures of 10,000 in 1952 and 12,000 in 1956. The figure for Mozambique had reached an average of between 3,000 and 4,000 a year.

130. On the other hand, the granting of concessions had been continuing at the same rate as in other economic fields. Thousands and hundreds of thousands of hectares of the best agricultural land had been reserved for foreign investors. Huge plantations of banana trees, sugar canes, coconut palms, copra, etc., with unlimited cheap African labour at their disposal, had completely covered Mozambique and Angola. The largest banana plantation, for example, was the property of an Anglo-Portuguese concern, Dalagoa Plantations Ltd. It had formerly been British and had owned not only banana, but also lemon plantations.

131. The other important enterprises, particularly the large copra firms—Companhia do Boror, Companhia do Zambézia, Sociedade Agrícola do Madal and Companhia Colonial do Angoche—were all internationally financed. The Boror Company was financed by Germans; the Madal Company was

French and the Seba Sugar Estate was British. The Companhia do Boror, for example, had the largest coconut plantations in the world. Considerable capital had been invested in the plantations, which owned their own narrow-track railway systems, dryers, warehouses, etc. For sisal, too, there were a large number of strongly capitalized companies established with foreign participation.

132. The largest private agricultural enterprise in Angola was the Companhia Geral de Algodão de Angola (COTONANG), a branch of the Fomento Geral de Angola. It had been established for the purpose of growing and exporting cotton.

133. Today, however, the actual growing of cotton was done by Africans on their farms. COTONANG only bought the cotton. It did so at times and places fixed by it, at prices set by the Government. The African had no say in the running of the industry and merely grew the cotton. The price given to the growers was extremely low.

134. That was the situation today in the Portuguese colonies in Africa. On the one hand, the African masses with no rights, subjected to discrimination, humiliation, persecution and massacre; on the other hand, complete political and economic domination by the Portuguese colonialists and other foreign interests of various origins. On the one hand, the Africans who were trying to change their present position and gain freedom and independence, and, on the other hand, the Portuguese colonialists who, assisted directly or indirectly by the monopolies and certain other foreign circles, were striving to preserve the *status quo* in their colonies. Without that support which had been and still was being given to it, Portugal would certainly not be able so stubbornly to resist the strong wave of the decolonization process which had transformed the African continent, in the space of a few years, into a continent of free and independent States and to continue crushing under its colonial domination the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea, etc.

135. Weak and incompetent itself, Portugal had known that it would not be able to retain its colonial empire unless it enrolled on its side more powerful elements which would share its interest in maintaining the present colonial status in the Territories and which would also be able to help strengthen the economic basis and the material and military potential of the Portuguese State and its colonial administration. It was interesting to note, in that connexion, that in the present period of accelerated decolonization Portugal had opened wide the doors of its colonies to the monopolies and other foreign interests, establishing with them a kind of political and economic condominium as the best means of mutual protection.

136. The contribution of foreign investments to the maintenance of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and their responsibility for the continuance of the political, economic and social enslavement of the African population in Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea, etc., were undeniable.

137. Those monopolies and their investments had helped to strengthen the economic basis of Portugal's political domination in its colonies and to increase the exploitation of their resources, which were the natural property of the Africans alone. With contributions made voluntarily or imposed by legislation, they had contributed directly to the strengthening of Portugal's military potential by enabling it to conduct military operations and wage war against the liberation struggle to which the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea had been forced to resort, as the last means at their disposal of showing Portugal and the whole world that they too were entitled to independence, self-determination and freedom. Paragraph 132 of the Secretariat Working Paper (annex I below) stated that under the provisions of the 1906 Overseas Mining Law, concessionaires holding mining rights were required to give support to the Government for the maintenance of peace and order and that in 1961 and 1962 the Angola Diamond Company (DIAMANG), for example, had included in the fixed assets, reported as depreciated, military barracks and guard posts. Table 2 of the Working Paper showed that the balance sheet of DIAMANG as at 31 December 1962 contained an item of 88,636,447 escudos for the defence of Angola. In addition, since 1961, the Company

had each year paid the Angolan Government a contribution for the defence of national property. The sums paid had been 14,111,768 escudos in 1961; 16,960,983 escudos in 1962 and 16,910,206 escudos in 1963, for a total of some 48 million escudos. It had already been noted that DIAMANG also had its own garrison, as the other foreign companies or plantations might well have too.

138. The foreign companies had accepted a system of legal, political, economic and social discrimination against the Africans. They took advantage of that system to employ African workers who had neither the opportunity nor the right to negotiate conditions of work and had no right to share in the ownership or exploitation of the natural resources of their own country. The activities of the foreign companies did nothing or almost nothing to help improve the economic, social and cultural situation or the welfare of the Africans.

139. The petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee in Africa had laid particular stress on the question of the encouragement which the foreign investments gave to Portugal, the assistance which the companies owning those investments gave directly or indirectly to the Portuguese colonialists, their contribution to the maintenance of the colonial régime, the aid which Portugal received from some of its allies in the Atlantic Alliance and, lastly, the danger for the future of Angola and Mozambique and for peace and security in that part of the world of the birth of political, economic and military alliances between the Portuguese colonialists and the colonialists in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. One could see why all the petitioners so strongly urged that all the countries with which Portugal was allied or maintained relations should refrain from giving military or other assistance to Portugal until it abandoned its colonialist attitude and agreed to recognize the right to freedom and independence of the peoples at present under its colonial domination. In addition, the petitioners had asked that foreign companies also should refrain from contributing in any way to the strengthening of the Portuguese colonial régime.

140. The facts given by the petitioners and the requests they had made were reflected in the resolution which the Special Committee had adopted in Africa after considering the situation in the Territories dominated by Portugal. Needless to say, the Sub-Committee and the Special Committee, after considering that particular aspect of the situation in the Portuguese colonies, must take account of that state of affairs and interpret it in their conclusions and recommendations to the General Assembly.

141. The representative of Ethiopia recalled that the United Nations had addressed several requests to the Government of Portugal urging it to comply with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly regarding the African Territories under Portuguese administration. Unfortunately, the appeals had been in vain. The Organization of African Unity had solemnly warned that Portugal's refusal to abide by the decisions of the United Nations would result in tragic consequences. Accordingly, it had urged the allies of Portugal to persuade it to implement the United Nations resolutions. The African peoples in Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea were struggling for the restoration of their legitimate rights, but Portugal had not moved an inch from its adamant position of colonial overlordship.

142. It was well known that Portugal was not a rich country, nor was it a military power in the strict sense of the term. It might therefore be asked how it was that Portugal was able to carry on a bloody war against a people which was demanding self-rule, and why Portugal was so much interested in the three African Territories.

143. Angola was one of the largest coffee- and diamond-producing countries in the world. Coffee alone was said to account for about 35 per cent, and diamonds about 16 per cent of Angola's exports. Those were among Portugal's most important sources of foreign exchange. Iron ore, petroleum, fish and other mineral and agricultural products were also found in quantity in Angola. Mozambique did not at present have great mineral resources, but the prospects were good. However, it exported copra, cotton, sugar, nuts, tea and sisal.

144. In addition Angola and Mozambique were strategically of the greatest importance both to Portugal and to its allies to the south. South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, together with Portugal, formed the so-called "unholy alliance". No one underestimated the military value of Angola's and Mozambique's air and sea ports for Salazar, Verwoerd and Smith. Portugal used those and other strategic facilities for illicit purposes. The ports served as springboards for the perpetration of genocidal crimes not only in the Territories under Portuguese domination, but also in South West Africa, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and other dependent Territories. It was beyond doubt that the colonies offered much to Portugal, but nothing to the overwhelming majority of the people inhabiting them.

145. If Portugal was so poor economically, it might be asked what forces were aiding it to continue its hopeless struggle against the irresistible forces of African nationalism.

146. The fact that the activities of foreign economic and other interests were impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was quite clear. The Sub-Committee's task was to explore the types and forms of such activities, with particular reference to the Territories under Portuguese domination, and its report to the Special Committee should be prepared accordingly.

147. He thanked the Secretariat for producing initial documents containing facts about those Territories, and expressed the hope that it would intensify the search for further information which would help the Sub-Committee in carrying out its mandate. His delegation also appreciated the important statements on the same subject made by the Tanzanian, USSR and Yugoslav representatives, which would prove useful in the preparation of the Sub-Committee's final report.

148. The major factors used to maintain the *status quo* in dependent Territories lay in the areas of labour, farming, financial and investment interests. An analysis of the conditions prevailing in the Portuguese Territories would inevitably reveal the role those factors played in the subjugation of the overwhelming majority of the indigenous population. An objective examination of the situation there would have to begin with a discussion of the policies and practices of the Government of Portugal in its colonies.

149. Although the intensity and the degree of colonial administration had differed from time to time, the policies of Portugal throughout its colonial rule had been motivated by the desire to exploit the resources of its colonial Territories at the expense and to the detriment of the population concerned. Portugal's record in Africa, along with that of South Africa, was unsurpassed by any other colonial Power. The chief architect of Portugal's colonial policies was Mr. Salazar himself, who had developed a curious combination of administrative and legislative rules and regulations unparalleled in their oppressive, cruel and degrading nature. The constitutions, legislations and other Portuguese legal enactments vis-à-vis its African colonies were couched in terms calculated to confuse world opinion. As Homer A. Jack put it in his book, *Angola: Repression and Revolt in Portuguese Africa*, "The Portuguese have always used lofty phrases in dealing with their colonies: 'dignity of labour,' 'civilization through work,' 'spiritual assimilation,' and 'cultural evolution.'" Those are intended, of course, to conceal the most cynical policies.

150. Turning to a review of Portuguese land policies, settlement, occupation and concessions concerning land, he said there was no doubt that, for the African, land was a primary consideration. He had fought for his land in the past, he was fighting for it now, and he would continue to do so until every inch was regained. The question arose as to who owned the land in Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea as they were presently governed, and what was the African share in their production. The land situation in Mozambique, for example, had been well summarized by Mr. Muthemba, of FRELIMO, in his testimony before the Special Committee at Dar es Salaam:

"Since the Second World War the Portuguese Government had been sending thousands of Portuguese white families to Africa, chiefly for settlement in rural areas as farmers.

The African population had been encouraged to open up new and difficult areas for farming, with government aid, but once the hard work had been done, the areas were allocated for European settlement and the Africans were dispossessed of the fruit of their work. Anyone who protested was punished as a black nationalist or a communist" (see para. 223 of the present chapter, above).

It would be recalled that, in 1901, all land in the so-called overseas territories which, according to Portuguese authorities, had not at that time constituted private property under Portuguese law, had been declared State domain. Thus, the Portuguese authorities, by effectively utilizing their own laws, had begun to alienate the lands of the African population.

151. Companies and individuals foreign to the Territories had been given generous land concessions. The African had been least considered in any of those laws. To suit present circumstances, in 1961 the Government of Portugal had proclaimed Degree No. 43,894, under which it had granted thousands of hectares in concession, to the great disadvantage of the Africans. The African lot, in that particular respect, was an intolerable one.

152. In describing the situation, Anders Ehnmark and Per Vastberg, in their book *Angola and Mozambique*, wrote:

"In certain districts the Africans are allowed to cultivate their soil. But it is rare for them to own it. Even where they do, it can be taken away from them in the public interest. The public interest is the most elastic concept. It can be a coffee plantation, for instance. Either the African is told to move away, or else he has to stay on the plantation as a labourer."

Thus, the African was systematically uprooted from his own land and transferred to another area, obviously one that was much less productive and not suitable for farming. His land could be given away to settlers of European extraction. Armed forces personnel from Portugal were included for the purpose of settlement schemes in Angola. It was paradoxical that the settlers were offered attractive rewards for settling in the fertile areas of Angola.

153. The African could not sell even at normal prices whatever he produced in his assigned area. He was compelled, according to reliable information, to sell his produce, cattle or grain to European prospectors. As Mr. Muthemba had stated:

"Europeans formed so-called 'producers' co-operatives' which, in fact, purchased produce at low prices from the African farmers and sold it at great profit on the European market."

154. Those were the facts about land ownership and use in the Portuguese Territories, and it was for the development of such a scheme that Portugal looked to its allies for financial and other assistance. In fact, it was through such assistance, *inter alia*, that Portugal was able to maintain the *status quo* in its Territories and carry on its oppressive measures there.

155. Africa was one of the richest continents in minerals: gold, uranium, copper, iron ore and many more other minerals were found there in abundance. The southern part of Africa led in mineral exports. Along with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, Portugal was one of the major exploiters of African minerals by virtue of false and fraudulent ownership of African lands. It had engineered legislation to enable it to invite prospective investors from selected countries which, at the same time, guaranteed the existing equilibrium of power in the Territories.

156. As Mr. Panikkar correctly noted in his book, *Angola in Flames*, the principal objective of Portugal was "... to get the large firms which are able to influence Governments and their countries, like the Tanganyika Concessions (British), the American oil companies (both the Standard Oil Company and the Gulf Oil Company have acquired interests in Angola and Mozambique recently) to invest heavily in Portuguese Territories. Portugal would then derive the advantage not only of increased revenue by sharing in the profits of these enterprises, but can, in the event of an uprising by the Africans, count on these firms to mobilize public opinion on its behalf in their respective countries."

157. There was a tendency among certain writers to think that Mozambique was less well endowed with minerals, but given a proper survey, authorities indicated that gold, copper, coal and other minerals did occur in the Territory.

158. In his testimony before the Special Committee in Africa, one of the petitioners had asserted that large companies operating in Mozambique belonged to the British, Belgians and Americans, who ran them with the help of the Portuguese Government, using cheap labour from Mozambique. The Government of Portugal, by granting attractive concessions to financial interests in Western Europe and North America, was desperately trying to maintain its holdings in its overseas Territories. Its investment brokers on the two continents were busily endeavouring to bring prospective investors and financiers into Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea to help implement what was called the "transitional development plan".

159. As reported in *Africa Today*, Dillon, Read and Company, investment brokers, for example, in addition to their functions as representatives of the Government of South Africa in their Wall Street dealings, had taken it upon themselves to explore the possibility of loans for use in the Territories under Portuguese domination.

160. The war which the Government of Portugal was waging against the people of Africa in the Territories of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea was providing economic advantages to that Government. According to *The New York Times* of 23 August 1965:

"The African war has proved something of an economic blessing for metropolitan Portugal, although this view is not voiced officially. Portugal has seen her industry grow on the basis of military orders, ranging from munitions to food and textiles. The remittances of pay by soldiers overseas to their families at home have injected new money into the economy."

161. Another newspaper, the *Tribune de Lausanne*, had reported on 27 June 1965 that Swiss businessmen had gone to Lisbon to conclude negotiations for a loan of a million *contos* (one conto equals 1,000 escudos) to pay the expenses of the war in Angola. At the same time, the French Ambassador in Lisbon had left for Luanda to study the conditions for possible economic assistance from French capitalists to maintain the cost of the war.

162. South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were of course the pillars of the tri-partite scheme in that part of Africa. As recently announced, for example, the South African régime had agreed to finance the building of a £2.5 million dam on the Cunene River in Angola, in return for which the Portuguese colonial régime would supply power to South West Africa (reported by the *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg). The Government of Portugal and the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia had indicated identical objectives in their economic and social operations in the Territories under their domination and it followed, therefore, that their military, economic, political and social programmes were devised with mutual understanding and close co-operation. According to *Africa Diary* of 12-22 January 1965, for example, the powerful South African financial company, the Mynbou Society, had announced its interest, in collaboration with other concerns, in investing money to develop oil fields in Angola.

163. Negotiations had been going on with the Portuguese authorities in Angola and with the Belgian firm PETROFINA. In Angola, PETRANGOL, which was 60 per cent Belgian-owned—the remainder being controlled by the Portuguese Government and private firms—played a negative role as far as the legitimate aspirations for independence of the people of Angola were concerned.

164. The Union Minière du Haut Katanga was also one of the most important mining companies affecting, *inter alia*, the African people under Portuguese administration. The Wankie Colliery Company, of Southern Rhodesian origin and financed by British capital, was yet another financial concern established in the Territories under Portuguese administration adversely affecting the struggle of the people of Angola and Mozambique to attain their legitimate aims.

165. A careful analysis of all those facts led to the conclusion that the economic interests which participated in the Territories under Portuguese administration had an obligation to comply with the regulations and policies of the Government of Portugal, in accordance with the cynical arrangements devised to perpetuate the *status quo* in Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea.

166. Apart from such economic and political arrangements for the maintenance of the prevailing system, Portugal pursued additional measures to safeguard its repugnant policies in the African Territories. One of those measures was the systematic exploitation of the African as a source of cheap labour. As Mr. Homer Jack had reported in his book, the basis of the economy in Angola and the cause of many of its social problems was forced labour. Although Portugal had signed the Slavery Convention in 1926 limiting the use of forced labour to public purposes, it had not signed the Forced Labour Convention of 1930 or the Recruitment of Indigenous Workers Convention of 1936.

167. The writers Anders Ehnmark and Per Wastberg, in their book *Angola and Mozambique*, concluded that the key to all Portugal's oppressive actions lay in the inhuman and cruel exploitation of the African labourer. The two writers remarked: "Portuguese authorities deny that forced labour still exists in Angola. Everything is said to be done voluntarily, contracts are signed, to the satisfaction of both parties. But this does not prevent the Angolans telling stories about the slave hunts in the interior. People, they say, are forcibly taken away from hearth and home. For a year, maybe two years, they live in fenced-in camps, or plantations, or factories. They earn a salary for ten or twelve hours' work a day, but its payment is held back so that it can accumulate during the year. However, deductions for food, lodging and taxes make it shrink almost as rapidly as it grows, and what is left over at the end of the year is said often to be no more than an amount just enough to pay for their journey home."

168. Similarly, Richard Hammond, in his study *Portugal's African Problem: Some Economic Facets*, wrote: "...but within the Territories there also exists, or has existed, a measure of compulsory labour recruitment, ostensibly only for public purposes such as road-building, but in practice and despite formal legal enactments to the contrary, for private enterprises as well."

169. A vast reservoir of manpower in Mozambique and Angola served Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, mainly in the mines. Thousands of African labourers spent many months every year in the mines of South Africa, earning a fraction of what they deserved and having to submit to inhuman degradation and racial discrimination.

170. The labour situation fell within the tri-partite arrangements described above; that was to say, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had to have a constant flow of cheap labour from the northern colonies for their economic advantage. West European and North American companies in southern Africa accommodated the wishes of the host Governments, in that they collaborated in the exploitation of the wealth and toil of the African, thus achieving their own narrow ends.

171. The President of the African-American Institute, Mr. Nielsen, writing for the Council on Foreign Relations, made a pertinent remark in *African Battleline*: "Compulsory and contract labour has provided hundreds of thousands of workers at extremely low cost for the mines, farms, and factories of Angola and Mozambique, as well as tens of thousands more for the farms and mines of South Africa. In the recruitment of workers, collusion between officials, local chiefs and private companies was common, and the mistreatment of workers was widespread. The harshness of the system is suggested by the fact that to escape its requirements more than a million Angolans and Mozambiquans fled to work and reside in adjoining countries."

172. Such was the situation in regard to labour in the Portuguese Territories. It was clear that labour constituted one of the major instruments used by Portugal to dominate the African populations.

173. Militarily, Portugal was doing everything possible to frustrate the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the

people in its Territories. Along with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, Portugal was armed to suppress the people and thereby maintain the extremely dangerous situation that prevailed in its Territories. According to *The New York Times* of 23 August 1965, Portugal had:

"...forged strong new military and political links with France and West Germany, both of which welcome this country's recent dislike of Atlantic arrangements.

"Operating on the theory that 'we help those who help us', Portugal has granted a large air force base to West Germany in the south and has agreed to let France build a missile-tracking station on Flores Island in the Azores.

"Although nothing has been said publicly, it is understood that in exchange for the base at Beja, where German jet pilots will have a major training centre, West Germany may sell Portugal at least sixty modern jet fighters for tactical operations in Africa.

"Apparently in exchange for the tracking facilities in the Azores, France is building four submarines and four frigates for Portugal on favourable credit terms. Alouette helicopters, sold by France to Portugal, are used in the African operations."

174. Portugal's military alliance with the United Kingdom and the United States of America could not, of course, be ignored. As petitioners had informed the Special Committee during its recent session in Africa, there was concrete evidence that Portugal was using NATO-supplied arms to crush the uprisings in its African colonies. In fact, as some of the petitioners had stated, were it not for the supply of arms by virtue of its membership in NATO, and of other alliances in the Western world, Portugal's efforts to maintain its colonies in Africa would have crumbled long since.

175. The situation in the Portuguese African Territories was thus becoming worse than ever, and his delegation hoped that the Portuguese authorities realized the inevitability of such an outcome. As *The New York Times* had correctly remarked:

"The foreign tourists who have again invaded Portugal this summer to visit the churches and castles of old Lisbon and sun themselves on the fashionable beaches of the Costa do Sol near here can thus remain unaware of the extent of this nation's commitment to the African war.

"In this lovely and peaceful city, it is hard to visualize that Portugal expends nearly 40 per cent of her annual budget on the war and keeps more than two thirds of her army of 115,000 men tied down in Africa."

176. At a time when awareness of the fast deteriorating situation seemed to prevail in all quarters, it was unthinkable that encouragement of Portuguese plans and policies in Angola and Mozambique should be considered. He hoped that Portugal and its supporters now understood that the immigration of Europeans into those African Territories, the exploitation of African labour and materials and inhuman suppression of the indigenous population could not solve the problem. Instead, strict adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and the many resolutions of the General Assembly and respect for world opinion would lead to fruitful results without waste of human lives and material resources.

177. It should, of course, be understood that his delegation was not against investment as such. Many nations, including his own, were in favour of genuine investment. His delegation's opposition was to investment in the prevailing political circumstances in colonies such as Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea, which was impeding the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the peoples of those Territories for self-government and independence. His present statement should be interpreted along those lines.

178. Since foreign monopolies and financiers in the Territories under Portuguese domination had proved to be among the impeding factors, in the political circumstances prevailing in those Territories, his delegation felt that the Sub-Committee should assess those factors in formulating its report to the Special Committee. It would collaborate with the other members of the Sub-Committee in carrying out that important task.

179. The representative of Tunisia said that, in conformity with operative paragraph 7 of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 277th meeting (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V para. 352), the Secretariat had provided the Sub-Committee with several reports and studies about the activities of foreign economic and other interests which were impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration. The excerpts of statements made and communications submitted by petitioners from Territories under Portuguese administration had been of great assistance to the Sub-Committee, giving it a full picture of the alarming social and economic conditions prevailing in those Territories and helping it to understand what were the real financial interests behind Portugal which were enabling that country to resist the wind of change in Africa. Additional detailed information had been provided by members of the Sub-Committee.

180. His delegation did not wish to be repetitious or to dwell on details or information which, in the final analysis, pointed to an inescapable and well-known fact. All the discussions of the Sub-Committee had led to the conclusion that the colonialist exploitation was primarily supported and encouraged outside Portugal by financial groups which were taking full advantage of the inhuman social and economic conditions of the African people in the Portuguese Territories. In every respect, the Africans were being exploited in order to increase the profit margin of foreign companies, for the sole benefit of those companies and of the Government of Portugal. Both the information available to his delegation and the official data provided by the Government of Portugal indicated that such exploitation had been constantly increasing in recent years. In spite of the uneasy conditions resulting from the wars of liberation launched in those Territories, it had been reported that investment conditions were not discouraging.

181. His delegation considered that the Sub-Committee should not dwell any longer on the intricacies of the conditions of foreign investment and financial interests in Portuguese Territories. The Sub-Committee had clear and ample evidence that the substantial build-up of economic potential by Portugal in Angola and Mozambique was the result of the foreign financial aid given by certain financial groups and supported by the allies of Portugal and that it constituted one of the main obstacles impeding the liberation of the Portuguese Territories from colonial rule. Nor should it be forgotten that, apart from external support, Portugal was strengthening its ties within Africa with the racists of Southern Africa. Indeed, it seemed that the alliance between Mr. Salazar, Mr. Verwoerd and Mr. Smith was now becoming a more formal treaty. An article in *Le Monde* of 14 September 1965 had said that, according to information from diplomatic sources in Lisbon, a secret agreement had been concluded between Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa for the defence of white Africa, i.e., the entire southern portion of the African continent where European domination persisted. According to the article, the agreement—which they preferred to call an "understanding"—was designed to organize the joint defence of Southern Africa against "communist or nationalist subversion". That was additional proof, if proof were needed, of the collusion between the forces of evil in Southern Africa.

182. In his view, the time had come to make a full report to the Special Committee. Since it had been agreed at the previous meeting that discussion on the report should begin at the present meeting, his delegation considered that a comprehensive report which would be as detailed as possible should be made to the Special Committee on the basis of the information provided by the Secretariat and including the detailed accounts submitted by various members of the Sub-Committee.

183. With regard to recommendations, his delegation would support any recommendation to the Special Committee along the lines which the representative of Tanzania had proposed at the Sub-Committee's eighteenth meeting.

184. The representative of Syria said that the members of the Sub-Committee had by now gained a comprehensive picture of the nefarious role played by foreign economic and financial interests in the African territories which Por-

tugal still dominated by means of sheer force, inhuman treatment and the backing of powerful reactionary forces. The revelations made by the representatives of Tanzania and the Soviet Union, the elaborate comparisons of the representative of Yugoslavia and the eloquent plea made by the representative of Ethiopia did not leave much unsaid, but a few points would bear repetition.

185. The administering Power, in violation of international law, felt free to allot concession after concession to foreign companies for the exploitation of natural resources which were not its to give but which belonged to the people of Mozambique, Angola and so-called "Portuguese" Guinea. The African himself was subjected to the worst forms of exploitation as a cheap source of labour and was deprived of all his natural and legitimate rights. Forced labour, nominal wages that were far below the minimum subsistence level recognized internationally, the denial to the African worker of every decent opportunity for advancement, his subjection to constant discrimination, incrimination and forced separation from his land and family—all those and countless other devices were used with impunity as a means to one end; the perpetuation of conquest, the drawing of maximum benefit at the expense of African suffering and the obstruction of the emergence and development of the African personality.

186. That sinister state of mind and behaviour suited the bulk of foreign companies very well. They found it extremely lucrative to expand their activity as long as they were offered cheap labour, powerful protection and encouragement to ignore the rights of the true and authentic inhabitants of those Territories. They thrived on such opportunities, found it convenient to ignore human hardships and concentrated on gaining the maximum illicit profit. Sensing the revolt against those atrocious conditions, they were now assisting the tyrant in every way. Some of them went even further and set themselves up as little States within the Territories. They feared no retaliation from the Portuguese authorities, since they had a common goal: to suppress every movement for the emancipation of Africans under their subjection. Originally usurpers, having acquired illicit concessions in respect of resources belonging to a third party, those companies were now becoming oppressors in order to consolidate their illegal possessions. At home, they were exerting pressure on their respective Governments to support the Portuguese régime, to extend military, financial, economic and trade relations with that country and to equip it with arms for self-defence against an imaginary enemy but in reality for the defence of that régime against the Portuguese people and against the liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique and so-called "Portuguese" Guinea. The argument usually heard from quarters which should face the responsibility for allowing their arms to be used contrary to their originally professed purposes was that military alliance with Portugal was solely for the defence of Europe. He failed to see, however, what guarantees could be given that arms delivered for that purpose would not be used in Africa. That question had been raised by the representatives of liberation movements and remained unanswered. If responsible Governments were asked what steps they had taken to check the practices of their companies, they replied that their was nothing wrong with investment. When asked whether they would like investment to be an instrument for denying people their rights and their liberty, the reply was that they had no jurisdiction over those companies. That argument was nothing more than an admission that narrow economic interests came before due respect for international law. It was a lack of consideration for world opinion and an encouragement to violations of international law.

187. The more the role of economic interests in African Territories under Portuguese domination became apparent—a role which effectively consolidated colonialism and ran counter to African aspirations—the more the conclusions became evident. The African countries, backed by other freedom-loving nations, should make it clear that foreign companies allying themselves with the tyranny of Salazar would have no place in Africa and that Governments condoning the oppression, directly or indirectly, could not claim the friendship of Africa and should see to it that liberation movements were supported in their struggle not only morally but also materially. Words

alone were not enough to dissuade the forces of oppression from continuing their merciless domination of lands and peoples.

188. The representative of Denmark, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, pointed out that NATO arms could not be used in Africa. Denmark did not export any arms to Portugal and similar assurances had been received from other members of NATO.

189. The representative of Denmark said that his delegation could not but express its sincere appreciation of the working papers prepared by the Secretariat on mining activities and settlement in the Portuguese colonies and the summary of statements made by the petitioners during the Special Committee's session in Africa. His delegation had carefully studied those documents. It had also carefully studied the statements made by previous speakers in the debate. There was no doubt that the Sub-Committee had very comprehensive and, in many respects, very interesting material to hand.

190. The question, however, was what conclusions could be drawn from that material. He was afraid that in that respect his delegation disagreed with the previous speakers. All were aware that, under the mandate entrusted to it by the Special Committee, the Sub-Committee was to study the activities of foreign economic and other interests which were impeding the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the Territories under Portuguese administration. From the information available to the Sub-Committee, it was evident that various foreign interests were involved in most sectors of the economy of the Portuguese Territories in Africa, but that did not mean that those interests *ipso facto* were impeding the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV), i.e., standing in the way of the aspirations of the peoples of those Territories. That had to be proved, and his delegation did not think that that had been done so far.

191. He would cite, for instance, the article in *The New York Times* of 23 August 1965 which had been mentioned by the Ethiopian representative at a recent meeting. The article suggested that it was not the economic activities in Portugal and its colonies which had made possible the Portuguese war against the population in its African Territories but that, on the contrary, that war was a stimulating factor in the economic life of Portugal and its colonies; in other words, it was not the fighting which was stimulated by the economy, but the other way round.

192. The Sub-Committee also knew that some parts of the Portuguese Territories in Africa were very rich in natural resources. Quite a number of those were easily accessible, which was a further indication that, although the activities of foreign economic interests in the Portuguese Territories added to their economic development, they were not of decisive importance for the upholding of Portuguese rule.

193. Frankly speaking, his delegation considered that the only conclusions to be drawn from the material so far available were that the economic and social legislation and the conditions prevailing in the Portuguese Territories were far below generally accepted standards and that the population was receiving far too small a share of the profits from the exploitation of the natural resources of their countries. That, however, was not due to the activities of foreign interests; it was due to the colonial policies of Portugal, to which, as was well known, his delegation was strongly opposed, and it seemed to his delegation that in the end the Sub-Committee would realize that it had only been studying once again one of the many aspects of Portugal's colonial policies.

194. Against that background, his delegation would have preferred the Sub-Committee simply to pass on to the Special Committee the comprehensive and interesting material which had been compiled so far and to inform it that it had not arrived at any conclusions on whether the activities of foreign economic and other interests in the Portuguese Territories were impeding the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) in those Territories in any substantial way.

195. The statements of the other members of the Sub-Committee, however, clearly indicated that the majority of the members found that conclusions could be drawn and should

be presented to the Special Committee. If they insisted on that position, his delegation would request that the points of view he had expressed at the present meeting should be summarized in a dissenting conclusion.

196. The representative of Mali said that his delegation wished to thank the Secretariat for the working paper on mining in Angola and Mozambique which it had submitted for the Sub-Committee's consideration (annex I below). It fully appreciated the efforts made to compile the information available on the activities of foreign economic and other interests in the Territories under Portuguese administration. It was aware of the difficulties involved in seeking and compiling accurate information and figures on economic activities in the Portuguese colonies, in view of Portugal's attitude towards the Special Committee.

197. The document which the Sub-Committee was now studying and the statements made by the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee during its visit to Africa constituted a serious indictment of the colonial system, which unfortunately still existed on the African continent. After reading the working paper, it was easy to see why Portugal, which had been installed in Angola since 1482, was trying to maintain itself there against the will of the African population. In order to perpetuate its domination, the Portuguese Government had proceeded in stages: to begin with, the conquered African countries had become colonies of settlement and then they had been proclaimed Overseas Provinces or Departments, although the indigenous people did not enjoy the civic rights granted to Portuguese citizens.

198. Under cover of laws enacted in Lisbon for the sole purpose of stimulating the Portuguese economy, mineral resources and other natural resources had been declared not to "form part of the 'patrimony' of the Overseas Territories" (Organic Law of the Portuguese Overseas Provinces, 1963, article LII, para. II). The report also stated that "The Overseas Mining Law, on the other hand, provides that ownership of all deposits of metal and metallic ores is vested in the State..." (annex I, para. 13, below). It was easy to see what State was meant: certainly not the real owner, the State of Angola, which had not even been allowed the time to set itself up.

199. These resources were cynically exploited and exported to Portugal or other European countries which, through the Portuguese Government, had acquired mining concessions with the right of life and death over the peaceful African people. Thus the indigenous inhabitants, defrauded of their lands, were reduced to a state of slavery by settlers brought from Portugal to Africa. That racial minority, which was the beneficiary of all the laws, had systematically divided up the colonized Territories, where they grew crops which in no way served African interests or simply exploited the resources of the soil for the exclusive benefit of European industries.

200. Various European companies had banded together to pillage the resources of the Angolan sub-soil: in Portugal, the Banco Nacional Ultramarino and the Maison Henry Burnay; in Belgium, the Société générale de Belgique and the Mutualité coloniale; in France, the Banque de l'Union Parisienne; in the United States, the financiers Ryan and Guggenheim. In 1917 that group had founded the Angola Diamond Company which, with substantial capital assets and labour which was either cheap or simply requisitioned by the Portuguese administration, had been able to make enormous profits in the world diamond market. The political aspect of that exploitation was obvious: it brought the Portuguese Government substantial returns, spared it social disturbances and opened up markets for it in Europe and the United States of America. Paragraph 89 of the Secretariat Working Paper (annex I below) gave some useful information about the board of directors of the company in 1963 and the company's balance sheet appeared in table 2. Both the company's capital and its profits were increasing. It might therefore be asked what return was being made to the legitimate owners and whether they were benefiting from those investments and the exploitation of their resources.

201. The reply to those questions was obvious. It could be summed up in a few words: the growing pauperization

of the black population. The colonial administration, which was collecting part of the income from diamond mining, did nothing to alleviate the poverty of the Africans. No serious reforms were attempted; no solid infra-structure was planned for any kind of development of the country; the education provided was deliberately confined to a few rudiments of the Portuguese language. The intention remained the same: to keep the black population in total darkness the better to exploit them, and to force them to abandon subsistence farming in order to make them more dependent on the new structures imposed upon them as a result of the working of the diamond mines and the extraction of iron and petroleum.

202. The Angola Diamond Company alone employed over 80 per cent of the workers engaged in mining in Angola, as was pointed out in paragraph 145 of the working paper. Thus the foreign companies, which were impeding the development of an independent agriculture in the country, were keeping the economically active population in a state of slavery, for the Angolan Administration's Decree of 1947 made it virtually impossible for a worker to choose his own occupation.

203. As far as petroleum was concerned, there was not only Portuguese capital but a whole network of trusts: the Companhia de Petróleos de Angola (ANGOIL), which was associated with the Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corporation and Belgian interests. There again, Western Europe was not acting alone; United States oil companies—in particular, the Cabinda Gulf Oil Co., a subsidiary of the Gulf Oil Corporation, had in 1957 been granted concessions for prospecting for and working petroleum deposits.

204. It was certainly odd that those companies had become interested in petroleum extraction only when the national liberation movements had begun the struggle for the liberation of their countries. It might be thought that Portugal, left to itself, would have neither the resources nor the necessary economic potential to withstand for so long the movement of revolt that was sweeping the countries still under Portuguese domination.

205. The United Kingdom was not without its share in petroleum exploitation. Angola Holdings Ltd., of London, had interests in the Companhia de Combustíveis de Lobito (see annex I, para. 178).

206. A standard contract, signed with the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, stipulated that the company would have "full freedom to produce, save, sell and export any and all substances extracted from the area of the concession", but it was not authorized to establish a refinery (*ibid.*, para. 191). That clause of the contract showed the intention of the Portuguese Government not to undertake anything in Africa which might bring any change whatever in the living conditions of the African people. The establishment of a refinery would necessarily imply the opening of new markets for the Africans and more advanced training in petrochemistry, geology and the like, thus opening the door to scientific advancement, which would hasten the end of Portuguese domination in that part of Africa. Foreign companies which accepted that clause bore the same responsibility as Portugal for the continuance of the state of subservience in which the Angolans lived.

207. In the other mining sectors—mining of iron, coal, gold, etc.—the same companies, organized as a monopoly, were engaged in exploitation, allowing the Portuguese Government a good share of the profits. Granting concessions for fifty years with the possibility of extension, it was entitled to 10 per cent of the capital shares and was to receive a maximum of about 55 per cent of the profits (*ibid.*, para. 208).

208. Also in that area were the Sociedade Mineira do Lombigo and the Companhia Mineira do Lobito, under the control of João Sousa de Machado. Again, those companies, having no competition, had been able in record time to multiply the profits exportable to Portugal.

209. Those few examples showed why the Portuguese Government was stubbornly fighting to remain in the African countries. Not only did those Territories constitute a source of considerable income, but the revenue from the foreign companies enabled the Portuguese Government to finance the repression and the genocidal war it was waging in Angola, Mozambique and elsewhere.

210. The accounts of the petitioners agreed in their description of the treatment of African workers. In Angola, the Africans had always been treated like beasts of burden. They could be beaten unmercifully and compelled to do forced labour. That was why, fleeing their homes, more than a million Angolans had taken refuge in the Congo, some 500,000 in Zambia, and many other neighbouring countries.

211. In order to help the SAGAL Company, the Government prohibited African farmers from cultivating anything other than the cotton needed for Portuguese factories. If by chance a farmer grew rice or millet for his own use, he was liable to imprisonment. Thus, in order to feed his family the farmer was compelled to steal his food, not being allowed to grow any grain.

212. Lastly, in order to devastate those Territories, and fearing the insurrectionist movement which was making its pressure felt more and more, the Portuguese Government had signed a manpower agreement with South Africa under which Mozambique was to provide a certain number of workers each year for the South African mining industry. That transaction—according to the statements of petitioners—enabled the Portuguese Government to receive the equivalent of \$US6 per worker for all the workers employed and 50 per cent of the wages for the first four months, in gold bullion. It was nothing less than the slave-trade; the slave-traders of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had not outdone the Portuguese Government.

213. His delegation therefore invited the foreign Powers whose companies invested in Angola, Mozambique and elsewhere to discontinue those investments. It was clear that those transactions were against the interests of the black people.

214. The Africans of the Territories under Portuguese domination were demanding independence and had taken up arms in order to regain their freedom. The delegation of Mali considered that, until such time as the resources of those Territories were in the hands of their rightful owners, all agreements signed between Portugal and foreign companies should be regarded as illegal, since the consent of those owners had not been obtained. Once independence had been attained in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the foreign companies would be able, if they still wished to invest, to conclude agreements with the legitimate Governments of Angola or Mozambique.

215. The representative of Ethiopia said that he wished to make a few comments with regard to the Danish representative's statement. That representative had referred to an article in *The New York Times* of 23 August 1965, which he himself had quoted at the 19th meeting of the Sub-Committee. He had quoted that article at length because it drew attention to the cruel and inadmissible military operations which Portugal was conducting in its colonies. The article mentioned the close military and political ties which France and the Federal Republic of Germany had just established with Portugal, referred to the war which Portugal was waging in Africa and pointed out that foreign tourists visiting Lisbon were no doubt unaware that 40 per cent of Portugal's annual budget was devoted to military expenses and that two thirds of the Portuguese army of 115,000 men were engaged in military operations in Africa. The article went on to give details of the economic aspects of that war.

216. He did not propose to give a detailed description of the way in which budgets were prepared but it was generally known that a large part of the income included in the Portuguese budget, and no doubt in those of other countries too, came from the exploitation of the mineral and other resources of the Portuguese African colonies, at the expense of the people of those Territories.

Statements by petitioners

General information

217. Mr. L. M. Muliata, representing Angolan refugees in Zambia, said:

"... The Portuguese colonized Angola in 1482. Their presence today is still characterized by deliberate repression and determined exploitation of the African people. The Por-

tuguese rule cannot in any way be compared with that of other European colonial governments in Africa. In South Africa or Southern Rhodesia, where the governments are known to be evil and oppressive, the Africans still have, however, limited freedom of political expression. But in Angola the case is completely different. Africans there are entirely denied the freedom of political expression, hence there have been no political reforms in the administration of Africans since the Portuguese took over the colony. Direct and oppressive rule has existed up to this day. It can be noted from the evidence of the military build-up in the colony. There is a military camp in every Administrative centre to stamp out any political reforms in the villages. The movements of the people are restricted. People in their own country are not allowed to move from one district to another without permission.

"It has always been extremely difficult for us Angolans to organize and fight for our freedom within our country, as has happened in other countries. Once an African is reported as or suspected of talking politics he is arrested and disappears for good. Some are shot on the spot in public. This is the situation which has forced and will still force nationalists to organize and fight from outside Angola."

218. Mr. Zarica J. Sakupwanya, Secretary, Comité Preparatório do Congresso Constitucional do Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO), stated that for over 450 years Portugal had held on to Mozambique and had ruthlessly suppressed the indigenous inhabitants of the colony, not only subjugating and exploiting them economically but endeavouring to wreck their culture and reduce them to a position of inferiority. COREMO was anxious that the facts should be brought before the Security Council so as to divert the tide of popular uprising which had become the only solution if the oppressed people of Mozambique were to regain their human dignity within the present generation.

219. In spite of Portugal's insistence that Mozambique was an extension of Portugal, that never was and never would be true. The very phrase "overseas province" reflected political-administrative discrimination, and was geographically meaningless. The African had never had access to the higher positions in the legislative or executive branches of Portuguese public administrations.

220. Mr. Mateus Muthemba, Member of the Central Committee, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), said:

"... It is obvious from the above why the Portuguese colonialist Government has no wish to let the African people rule themselves. In order to maintain colonialism, the Portuguese Government, like all colonial powers, has for years prohibited all expressions of political consciousness, using every fascist method known to man. Lately, since the establishment of FRELIMO, these methods have been intensified. In the cities, the Government has established a tight network of spies, PIDE, who live exclusively on listening to what their fellow countrymen say or do against the colonialist régime, and reporting to their white masters. There are members of PIDE in every institution in Mozambique, be it a church, a school, a commercial enterprise, etc., wherever there are a few people who might be able to form a plot against the *status quo*. Those African nationalists who are caught saying anything resembling criticism of government policy, or anything in any way critical of the European's privileged position in Africa, are arrested and kept incommunicado for months, sometimes for years, without even a court action to prefer charges against them. Anyone who is found listening to radio programmes other than the Portuguese ones is arrested on suspicion of being a nationalist; people who are found reading articles in Portuguese papers dealing with world affairs, especially African affairs, are in danger of being arrested and charged with being nationalists. Since the beginning of the armed struggle in Mozambique, the Government has instituted strict measures curtailing the movements of millions of Mozambican black men, in order to check the spread of war to the main cities. The Government keeps telling the public that all the fighting that is going on in the country is directed from outside, from foreign countries who wish to conquer the colony."

221. Mr. Agostinho Neto, President, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), said:

"...Scores of Angolans have been sentenced by the special courts and deported to the concentration camps in the Cape Verde Islands. Hundreds of others, without even appearing before a court, have been put into prison in Angola. The PIDE, the Portuguese political police, has already killed off thousands by torture and ill-treatment. The colonial army and the settlers' militia and the administration have co-operated in these measures of repression, which are more severe in those regions where the fighting has occurred."

Utilization of resources

222. Mr. L. M. Muliata, representing Angolan refugees in Zambia, stated that economically Angola had rich natural resources which the Portuguese had failed to exploit because Portugal itself was economically a very poor country. In addition, the Portuguese feared that if other countries invested money in Angola, it would lead to the rapid advancement of Africans and consequently to political reforms. In more than 400 years the Portuguese had done practically nothing to develop Angola and its people. Instead they had imposed high taxes and failed to provide employment. No African was allowed to conduct a business; the African existed solely for purposes of exploitation.

Financial assistance and investments

223. Mr. Zarica J. Sakupwanya, Secretary, Comité Preparatório do Congresso Constitucional do Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO), said that the large companies operating in Mozambique belonged to the British, Belgians and Americans, who ran them with the help of the Portuguese Government, using cheap labour from Mozambique. The Mozambique Convention of 11 September 1928, which allowed agents of the mining companies to recruit up to 800,000 Africans annually, and established that 47.5 per cent of the sea traffic to and from the Transvaal should pass through the port of Lourenço Marques, brought a highly profitable business to the colonial Government of Portugal, but at the same time it brought misery, suffering and exploitation to the African people in their own country.

224. Mr. Anibal de Melo, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), said that Portugal's accomplices were the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium, all of which wanted to profit from wealth so easily acquired. In order to remain in Africa and to go on stealing the gold, diamonds, petroleum and iron of the Africans, Mr. Salazar had formed an alliance with the racists of southern Africa and had purchased the complicity of the above-mentioned great Powers. With regard to the funds Portugal had obtained, it had succeeded in its recently floated loan in procuring the following amounts: the Federal Republic of Germany had lent 1,000 million, a United States bank 2,000 million, the French Foreign Trade Bank nearly 1,000 million, a consortium of United States banks almost 1,000 million and another United States bank 500 million. Moreover, in a recent speech in the Portuguese National Assembly, a member of the Portuguese Army had boasted of receiving money from NATO.

225. Mr. Eduardo C. Mondlane, President, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), stated that between 1951 and 1961 the United States had contributed 500 million dollars to Portugal in the form of weapons. There was nothing to indicate that such aid had since ceased. The Federal Republic of Germany not only sold weapons to Portugal but had established a military base in Portugal where training was given to the armed forces of the NATO Powers. The Federal Republic had recently purchased sixty war planes from Canada to supply to Portugal and had increased its economic aid to that country. Several German companies were establishing factories in Portugal's African colonies. For instance, Krupp was setting up an iron and steel plant in Angola. The Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany had recently held discussions with the Portuguese Ministry of Defence. United States investors were also interested in the Portuguese colonies. A high official of the

Inter-American Capital Corporation had assured the authorities in Mozambique that the United States would invest not less than \$1,000 million in the country. Loans worth several million dollars had been raised by the Portuguese Government in London. Those investments helped to meet the expenses of Portugal's colonial wars. France had concluded an agreement with Portugal to establish a base in the Azores, in return for which it would build 120 ships of various kinds for Portugal. A Portuguese officer who had deserted had informed the nationalist movement that the Portuguese forces in Mozambique were equipped with United States helicopters, French jet planes, United Kingdom frigates and weapons from the Federal Republic of Germany.

226. Mr. Mondlane pointed out that Portugal was a very poor country. Consequently, although Mozambique was relatively rich in natural and human resources, the capital required to exploit those resources did not exist. Portugal itself was a colony subject to outside economic forces. The major Portuguese industries were financed and managed by foreign interests, and economic control of the Portuguese territories was in the hands of those same interests. Thus, most of Mozambique's industry was subsidiary to parent industries in neighbouring Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, and most of the territory's labour force was exported to those countries. The Committee was no doubt familiar with the "interlocking directorates" of Western-financed monopolies which controlled the economy of southern Africa from the Cape to Katanga, and understood that the determination to maintain white supremacy in that region was not sentimental but economic in origin. Mozambique was not an independent economic unit; it was an integral part of the vast apparatus of exploitation set up by Portugal and its Western allies. The disparity between the wages paid to African and European workers was so great that the indigenous inhabitants were virtually a slave population. The profits derived from that merciless exploitation were enjoyed by Portugal and by all those Western countries which had investments in Mozambique. Recent reports indicated that the flow of foreign capital to southern Africa was increasing; unable to retain economic control in the many newly independent States in the region, foreign investors were seeking refuge in the few remaining areas where they could continue to exploit the African populations without hindrance.

227. Mr. Mondlane said that the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, among other countries, had been continuing to give financial and economic aid to Portugal in Africa. The inescapable conclusion was that those funds were being used to strengthen Portugal's position in the suppression of the African population.

228. Loans from United States and international financing institutions over the past ten years had been used mainly to finance the settlement of European Portuguese in Africa. Loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in particular, had mostly gone into the purchase of farming equipment for such settlers. It had been Portugal's long-standing policy to build up the white population in Mozambique to a proportion comparable with that obtaining in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, with the object of creating a situation which would allow for an appeal to European sentiment in their interest. European and American banking corporations were aiding those nefarious plans by granting loans purporting to be for the support of economic development. In fact, however, such loans were an instrument for further exploiting the Africans by displacing genuine African farmers and jeopardizing the marketing outlets of others.

229. Mr. Mondlane believed that one element accounting for the continued Western support of Portugal was undoubtedly that the Western people still regarded the African as outside the pale of humanity. Secondly, the NATO Powers directly contributing were precisely those with large vested interests in the still subjugated African territories. Whenever their Governments might be moved by humanitarian considerations, the first advice sought was from the key figures in the exploiting monopolies—the very persons who would strongly oppose any action calculated to affect their own financial interests. A case in point was Charles Englehart, a

United States multi-millionaire with large interests in South African mining. That acknowledged supporter of South African policy was now an important adviser on African problems to the United States Government. And who could doubt that he would certainly look after his own interests, which would be jeopardized by the granting of independence to Mozambique, since Mozambican workers formed a large and important part of the mining labour force in South Africa. Similar examples of economic imperialists could be found in all the countries concerned.

230. Mr. Mondlane informed the Special Committee that in March 1965, a group of United States companies had invested \$6 million in the Portuguese national airline serving Mozambique and Angola, to help defray the cost of the boycott imposed on that airline by the African States. In January 1965, the United States Government had lent \$20 million to Portugal, the second loan in a year. The Inter-American Trust Company had just announced its intention of investing 500 million dollars in the Portuguese colonies. In 1963, a group of New York banks had made a loan of \$15 million to Portugal and in the same year, the Federal Republic of Germany had lent 150 million DM to Portugal. In November 1963, a group of European banks had advanced a loan of \$30 million to Portugal. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development had given Portugal \$12.5 million for hydroelectric development in Angola and Mozambique. In April 1964, France had given Portugal a long-term loan of \$125 million for naval construction, in exchange for facilities for the establishment of military bases in the Azores. In February 1963, a group of French financiers had loaned \$10.5 million to sugar companies in Mozambique. In 1964, a Netherlands group had invested \$12.5 million in the Portuguese colonies. In April 1963, the Pan-American International Oil Corporation had been granted oil concessions in Mozambique. A United Kingdom firm had signed a contract to furnish irrigation equipment to that Territory.

231. Those were just a few of the sources from which Portugal derived the assistance required to maintain its position in Africa. Moreover, foreign companies had been induced to invest in the Territories, despite the colonial wars in progress there, by means of a 50 per cent reduction in the licence fees.

European settlement

232. Mr. Mateus Muthemba, Member of the Central Committee, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), said that since the Second World War the Portuguese Government had been sending thousands of Portuguese white families to Africa, chiefly for settlement in rural areas as farmers. The African population had been encouraged to open up new and difficult areas for farming, with government aid; but once the hard work had been done the areas were allocated for European settlement and the Africans were dispossessed of the fruit of their work. Anyone who protested was punished as a black nationalist or a communist.

233. Mr. Eduardo C. Mondlane, President, FRELIMO, stated that the political implications of the land settlement policy were adequately explained by the statement just quoted by the Polish representative.^c What was really amazing was that Portugal dared announce its intentions so openly. Portugal's intention was to build up the white population in its Territories so that when the time came it would be able, like the Governments of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, to point to a large settler population as an obstacle to African

^c The representative of Poland had referred to a discussion of Portuguese land policy in the National Assembly, during which it had been stated that its purpose was to absorb surplus population and to strengthen the political structure of the provinces by promoting "national unity". In the Plan for the Development of Overseas Territories, it was stated that the intention was not just to civilize the African, but to make him Portuguese; there was therefore need for settlement by Europeans, because only thus could Portuguese sovereignty be ensured and the Portuguese way of life promoted. There was also a scheme afoot to settle Portuguese soldiers in Africa as farmers. He asked whether that scheme was being carried out in Mozambique, and what were its implications for the freedom struggle of the Mozambicans.

rule. By thus confusing the situation, it hoped to prevent their Western allies from taking a strong position. The Government was having little success, however; in 1965, the white population, including 45,000 soldiers, had amounted to no more than 100,000 out of a population of 7 million.

234. The Portuguese being brought to Africa were themselves ordinary peasants. Portugal was already losing 1 millica people a year through emigration, and simply could not afford to send its exiguous middle class to settle in the colonies. Since the Portuguese peasants were themselves poor and oppressed, there was no reason why they should not fit into a free Mozambique. It was a huge country, and they would be welcome to stay if they wished.

African farming

235. Mr. Mateus Muthemba, member of the Central Committee, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), said that for an African farmer there was the additional problem of marketing. The Mozambique farmer, like all East Africans, was a cattle breeder. In a population of about 7 million, over 8 million head of cattle were reared, mostly by African peasants. The colonial law provided that cattle owned by white settlers automatically fetched higher prices in the open market than cattle owned by Africans, on the pretence that the former were better cared for and therefore of better quality. In fact, European farmers bought African cattle at government-imposed prices for resale at a profit. The African farmer was forbidden to sell direct to the butcher and remained as a breeder for the white farmer. In Mozambique an African was not allowed to compete with a European or an Asian; yet he had to pay the same taxes and the same prices for medical services, education, rent, clothing and all his other needs.

236. Co-operatives in Mozambique produced wheat, maize, rice, beans and cotton. In the production of rice, for example, the African farmer would work for six to seven months to prepare a plot of land for sowing. The Government would then provide seeds which he would plant and look after until the crop was ready. In order to ensure maximum yields, the farmer was obliged to concentrate all his activities on a single crop. No help was given against natural hazards such as drought and disease, so the farmer might find that his efforts had been wasted. When the time came for harvesting, a European supervisor would estimate the number of bags a given lot should produce. Those estimates had to be fulfilled, otherwise the farmer was severely beaten. Since he had not been allowed to produce any other crop, he had to steal his own rice in order to feed his family. After harvesting, the rice was taken to special markets where European or Asian-owned companies had exclusive purchasing rights. The farmer was obliged to accept a miserable price for his produce, which bore no relation to the cost of production or to his family's needs. Naturally, the farmer would run away from the co-operative.

237. A similar situation prevailed with regard to wheat and cattle. Europeans formed so-called "producers' co-operatives" which in fact purchased produce at low prices from the African farmers and sold it at great profit on the European market. The result was that Africans worked like slaves in order to support European farmers.

238. Mr. Lazaro Kavandame, member of the Central Committee, FRELIMO, stated that in 1957 he had presented a petition to the Portuguese authorities with the object of alleviating the lot of the local people ruthlessly forced to work on European and Asian farms, and in other colonialist enterprises. At the outset, he had believed that the root of the trouble lay in the people's poverty and ignorance, so that he had asked permission to institute instruction to eliminate illiteracy and improve methods of cultivation, in the hope that by producing better work results the constant whippings, imprisonments and fines would cease.

239. He had tried to impress upon the Portuguese authorities that the farm labourer's monthly pay of 60 escudos (\$U.S.2) was wholly inadequate for subsistence. The head tax alone amounted to 120 escudos a year. Eventually, they had authorized him to institute an educational programme

in his district and to establish a farming co-operative, on the understanding that so long as each peasant family produced its quota of cotton it could cultivate as much land as it wished. The local Portuguese administrator had vainly tried to discourage the venture by maintaining that illiterate people were unteachable and that the only means of making the "lazy blacks" work was the whip. Nevertheless, the co-operative had been established with an original membership of 500. Sorghum, groundnuts and maize had been cultivated in addition to the fixed four hectares of cotton per peasant farmer. Permission had been requested to set up a special fund for the purchase of certain equipment and the problem of marketing had been tackled.

240. The success of the venture had led the Portuguese authorities to the conclusion that he was secretly being paid for his efforts by some unknown source and they had tried to suborn him by offering him highly remunerated work with the concessionary cotton company, SAGAL. The offer had been refused, for it would have been treason to desert the people whose welfare he had at heart and who trusted in him.

241. By 1958, the co-operative had grown to more than 1,000 members and by mid-1959 to 1,500, the attractions being the greater production achieved by working together and the release from the oppressive supervision of the Whites. A government ban was then imposed, at the instigation of the SAGAL company, on further extension of membership. The edict was that henceforward all African Mozambicans must work for the company. But the measure had failed to satisfy SAGAL and with government authority it had instituted direct harassment of the co-operative's members by sending out visiting inspection teams which had ordered the destruction of all fruit trees on the farms on the ground that they were detrimental to the production of good cotton. Planting of crops other than cotton was made subject to imprisonment and soon thereafter many co-operative members had been arrested, on the charge of having failed to fulfil the official cotton quota, and removed to sisal or cotton plantations elsewhere. Thus it was obvious to everyone that the Portuguese Government had no real interest in the welfare of the African people and, indeed, was opposed to freedom for the black man and the betterment of his living conditions.

242. Meanwhile, he had persuaded the co-operative members to build roads to ease the transport of produce to the main market centres. That had led to his arrest on the pretext that he had not sought prior government authorization. He had been kept in prison without trial for two years, during which time the co-operative had been dissolved by government order and many other leaders were also arrested. On release in 1961, he had been confined to house arrest and questioned at the administrative post on his future plans. The proposal had been made that he should establish another co-operative, under direct government control and with a restricted membership of not more than twenty-five. Having no alternative, he had been forced to accept the proposal and in the following two years the new co-operative had worked strenuously, trying to rebuild what had been lost. Rice, sesame plant, potatoes, castor-oil plant and maize had been put into cultivation, and to facilitate expansion of tilling, a tractor had been bought out of co-operative funds. The delivery of the tractor had been celebrated by a feast attended by practically all the people of the Mueda region. He had seized the occasion to explain to the people the significance of the tractor purchase: that there were no grounds for the charge of laziness and that organizing among themselves and learning better ways of farming was all that was needed for prosperity.

243. The Portuguese authorities had taken exception to his speech, and soon co-operative members began to be arrested on a variety of charges. He himself had been questioned about his knowledge of events in Tanganyika and about a new political movement called FRELIMO. Despite his denial of any knowledge or connexion with that movement, he had been brought in almost immediately for further questioning, the object being quite plain: to put him in fear of his life. His only chance of salvation had been to escape into the forest, in the hope of maintaining contact with the African people from there. Subsequently, after police efforts to find him had been given up, he had arranged for a meeting of the people's leaders

in the forest, to discuss what could be done to regain freedom and rid the country of the Portuguese oppressors. The conclusion had been that the Makonde people alone could not succeed in getting rid of the enemy and that it must link forces with the Mozambicans elsewhere in the country.

244. In 1935, while living in Tanganyika, he had worked on the land and realized that it could produce wealth for the African. He had gone home in 1947 with the intention of starting to farm on his own account. The local administrator had granted him permission and from 1947 to 1957 he had been a farmer. Africans like himself were obliged to work plots of land and to sell their produce to Europeans. They could be arrested and beaten at the whim of their supervisors. Many were sent to work on the sisal estates. If they managed to escape to Tanzania, they were not allowed to return to their families. Realizing the wastefulness of the system, he had approached the local administrator and asked for permission to work as a team with his friends. He had also asked for an instructor. At first his requests had been rejected. The administrator had told him that it was impossible to teach anything to an African. Finally, however, he had been permitted to start the co-operative. The Government provided land and seed, and 500 people had set to work under four supervisors, including himself. The first harvest had been most successful; by the second year the co-operative had over 1,000 members, and in the third year 1,500. The success of the scheme had aroused the Government's suspicions. He had been questioned and then offered a post with a foreign cotton company, which he had refused. Eventually he had returned to his co-operative and persuaded his colleagues to build roads in order to facilitate the transport of their produce. The following year he had been accused of disobedience and of making clandestine visits to Tanganyika. The authorities had deduced that the reason why the co-operative farmers worked so hard was that they were in the pay of outsiders. As a result he had been arrested and imprisoned for two years without trial. He had been released in 1961. At the time of his escape to Tanzania, his three fellow-supervisors were still in prison.

245. Mr. Eduardo C. Mondlane, President, FRELIMO, said that the attitude of the Portuguese Government towards agricultural co-operatives reflected its general ambivalent attitude towards its colonial territories and peoples. On the one hand, Portugal maintained a façade of respectability with regard to the outside world, and on the other carried out a policy of exploitation within its colonies. Over the past twenty-five years various co-operative programmes had been allowed to start in Mozambique with the encouragement of the local authorities. Eventually, as a result of exploitation by European settlers, they had failed. In the south of Mozambique, for instance, several attempts had been made to set up co-operatives. The Portuguese administrators had encouraged the local people to start co-operatives under their own paternal guidance. The aim of those projects had been to "tame the bush" in preparation for European settlement. Africans were provided with tools and seeds. With official help they would clear and drain a previously uncultivated area and produce crops for a couple of seasons. The Portuguese Government would then declare the area suitable for "civilized" settlement. "Civilized" people were of course White, Asian or assimilated Africans. The United States Government had provided Portugal with funds for such projects. He felt sure that it had done so in good faith, accepting at their face value Portugal's claims concerning the use of those funds. The truth was that those resources were used to bring large numbers of illiterate peasants from Portugal to Africa. The crops produced by co-operatives were disposed of in the way indicated by Mr. Kavandame.

Labour conditions

246. Mr. L. M. Muliata, representing Angolan refugees in Zambia, said that in Angola Africans had always been treated like beasts of burden. They could be beaten mercilessly and driven into forced labour. As a result millions of Angolans had sought refuge in neighbouring countries. More than 1 million had fled to the Congo and about 500,000 to Zambia, Rhodesia, Bechuanaland and South West Africa. In addition, 250,000 had been slain by the armed forces. Massacres and atrocities were everyday events.

247. Mr. Mateus Muthemba, member of the Central Committee, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), stated that, with regard to the economic situation, the people of Mozambique were known in Central, East and Southern Africa for their industry, and were employed all over sub-tropical Africa. It was estimated that 1 million were working outside their country in gold and copper mining, cotton, sugar, sisal and tobacco plantations and also in harbour, railway and road work in South Africa, Zimbabwé, Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. In Mozambique they worked in all the country's industries and services as unskilled labour. They were regarded as imaginative, resourceful and tireless workers.

248. Thus the Portuguese had exploited the Africans, who were made to work for the Portuguese economy and for industrialists outside Mozambique at wages below the survival rate, without any limit on hours of work, and in bad living conditions. The few who had acquired sufficient education to train as skilled workers remained at the same salary, while their European counterparts with the same qualifications were rapidly promoted. The highest position attainable for an African was that of assistant officer. The minimum wage for an African skilled worker was about 500 escudos a month (\$U.S.17) compared with 2,000 escudos (\$U.S.67) for a European. The situation for unskilled workers was much worse. Between 1949 and 1960 it had been illegal for any employer to pay an African domestic worker more than 150 escudos (\$U.S.5) a month; and although the rule had now been abolished, there was no minimum wage for African unskilled workers. Another system of exploitation prevailed in farming, of which he could speak at first hand, having owned a farm in a region where European wheat farmers employed large numbers of African labourers. In the Limpopo valley in southern Mozambique the average white farmer owned 250 acres of farmland and employed an average of eight Africans a year, paying an average of 300 escudos (\$U.S.10) per month to each labourer. In that region, 250 acres could easily produce an average of four tons of wheat per year, which would fetch about 300,000 escudos (\$U.S.10,000) on the southern African market, with only 10 per cent labour costs.

249. That and other examples showed what it meant to be a Mozambican worker under Portuguese colonial control, and how profitable it was to be a Portuguese colonial settler in Mozambique. The countries investing in Mozambique through the Portuguese colonial system were no doubt getting a handsome share of the profits, and it was not surprising that international economic journals were reporting an unusual flow of capital into Portuguese colonies from the United Kingdom, France, the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Switzerland.

250. Another case was the African who wished to become self-employed, for example as a carpenter or mason, a farmer or a trader. The Portuguese law defining a self-employed African was highly restrictive, in order that the maximum number of people would be available as cheap labour for government and settler concerns and for export to South Africa, Rhodesia and elsewhere. The very few self-employed Africans were hampered in every way possible, to limit competition with European settlers. A carpenter, for example, would be refused loans by the banks and be obliged to pay cash for his tools; he would be refused government licences to buy tools for cutting his own wood from the forests and thus forced to buy wood from European companies at exorbitant prices.

251. Mr. Eduardo C. Mondlane, President, FRELIMO, stated that Portuguese labour legislation was based on the thesis that Africans were lazy and had to be forced to work if their countries were to be developed. During the past seventy-five years, the principal period of colonizing in Africa, a series of laws had been passed, the most important being the Vagrancy Act, under which all able-bodied men between the ages of fifteen and fifty-five were classified as unemployed if they were not engaged in economic activity. Economic activity was defined as producing marketable goods—goods saleable to Europeans or Asians as opposed to goods for barter and local consumption; or employment in an institution or economic enterprise directly controlled by a "civilized person"—i.e., a European or Asian. Exemption was only for those who could

prove that what they produced was of economic value to the country. Thus, in 1955, according to the latest available statistics, only 10,000 Africans out of a population of approximately 6 million qualified as self-employed, or capable of producing goods of economic value; the remainder were liable to penalty for vagrancy. Anyone not classified as self-employed was obliged to submit proof every six months that he was employed by a "civilized person", failing which he would be arrested and forced either to be made available as a voluntary worker for contract work or directed into work on government projects. The Vagrancy Act and low wages were responsible for the great prosperity of private enterprises during the past twenty-five years. All men between the ages of fifteen and fifty-five or even more—since age was judged by appearance and Africans rarely looked their age—were forced to seek employment at any wage for fear of the consequences.

252. Over one million persons worked in other countries partly because Mozambique, being a non-industrial country with a European population of about 100,000, could not possibly absorb a labour force of millions and partly because they felt safer in other countries where there was less pressure from the law.

253. The laws had another purpose. Under a labour agreement between South Africa and Portugal, Mozambique had to provide a specific number of workers annually for the South African mining industry. The arrangement was a financial deal under which the Portuguese Government was paid the equivalent of six United States dollars a head in gold bullion for all labourers signed on for work, and 50 per cent of wages for the first four months, also in gold bullion.

254. The justification was that the African was repaying money spent by the Portuguese Government on his upbringing. For the last part of the contract, the South African Government deducted 50 per cent of the wages, which was placed, in South African banks for the account of the Portuguese Government and paid in escudos when the worker was back in Mozambique.

255. The Portuguese authorities forced Mozambicans to seek work in South Africa by making conditions so difficult in their own country that they had no alternative. The flow of labour to South African mines was regulated by an agreement dating back to the nineteenth century and renewed every ten years. As he had described in his initial submission to the Special Committee, a rail connexion had been established between South Africa and Mozambique, and an agreed percentage of South African imports and exports was conveyed to and from Lourenço Marques in exchange for the flow of labour. Furthermore, South African companies were entitled to establish recruiting centres in Mozambique. The South African Government deposited \$U.S.6 to Portugal's account for each Mozambican labourer who went to South Africa; it also made large deductions from their wages, which it turned over to Portugal. The whole system was tantamount to exploitation and slavery.

256. The Portuguese Government opposed the creation of independent labour unions, even in Portugal. The only labour organization that was allowed to exist was State-sponsored. It was worth pointing out that although NATO claimed to be defending democracy in the West, one of its members—Portugal—was dedicated to the suppression of freedom. In Portugal's African colonies labour unions had been prohibited under the terms of the official definition of the population. The so-called "civilized" people were permitted to join the State union, while the remainder—the so-called "aborigines"—numbering approximately 7 million, were refused membership. That was still the case although the entire population was now supposed to enjoy citizen status. It should be made clear that the advantages enjoyed by those who qualified for membership of the State union came solely from their privileged status in society and not from their union membership.

257. Mr. Lazaro Kavandame, member of the Central Committee, FRELIMO, said that under the current system in Mozambique, people were arrested by the local head man or chief and handed over to the Portuguese authorities for assignment to various kinds of work such as road construction

or building. No contract was given: the employee had to accept whatever wage was offered. In 1959 road workers had been paid the equivalent of fourteen shillings a month; but employees were not expected to keep account of their working time, and the employers often paid them that amount for two or three months' work. Farm workers were paid only at the end of their term of work; they were given nothing during the intervening period. If a farm worker was short of clothing, he was obliged to send a message to his wife, who might have to sell a chicken in order to buy and send whatever was required.

258. When political activities began to be organized in 1961 outside Mozambique—political organization was prohibited in the territory—the Portuguese Government had advised employers to pay a minimum of twenty-eight or thirty shillings a month. There was no choice of work; employers informed the Government how many people they needed, and the Government ordered the police to round up and deliver the requisite numbers.

259. Mr. Agostinho Neto, President, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), said:

"... the majority of the population of Angola... is still subject to forced labour. Forced labour (contract labour) is maintained under a different name. About 500,000 Angolans are subjected to this form of slavery. The wages of each one of these 'contratados' does not exceed 1,200 escudos, or 200 NF, about £15 sterling."

Conclusions

260. In its study of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in the Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa, the Sub-Committee considered that in order to make a full assessment it was necessary to take into account the nature of the Portuguese colonial system, which has always denied, and continues to deny, economic, social and political rights to the Africans, as well as their aspirations to freedom and independence.

261. In the Territories it administers in Africa, Portugal continues to impose a discriminatory status on the indigenous inhabitants. As a result, in practice, the great majority of Africans are deprived of the political rights and liberties enjoyed by Portuguese settlers and they cannot participate equally in the government of the Territory. They are subject to oppressive working conditions, unjust wages and to practices which amount to forced labour. They have no right to form trade unions, nor do they have any social insurance, health insurance or old age pensions. Because of years of neglect, continued shortage of public health facilities and inadequate water supplies, especially in the rural areas, ill-health and high infant mortality rates prevail. Illiteracy rates continue to be among the highest in the world; though there have been some token changes, there is a desperate shortage of schools, and the whole educational system in the Territories under Portuguese administration remains wholly unsatisfactory because it is based on discriminatory practices and does not meet the aspirations of the inhabitants.

262. The Portuguese colonial system continues to deny Africans the freedom to choose their own identity and destiny; Africans must accept the Portuguese way of life, be ruled by Portuguese civil law and speak Portuguese if they are to enjoy rights of citizenship in their own country. In the opinion of the petitioners from Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea, the Portuguese régime in these Territories remains characterized by the worst form of domination, deliberate oppression and determined exploitation of the African peoples.

263. The information provided to the Sub-Committee by its members, by petitioners from Africa and by the Secretariat working papers on the mining industry and on concession, occupation and settlement of land in Angola and Mozambique (annexes I and II below) show that foreign investments have been encouraged by the Portuguese colonial policy and that the investments have in turn supported and strengthened Portugal's hold on the Territories. It is significant that Portugal's policy of increasing foreign investments in the Territories under Portuguese administration has coincided precisely with the

growth of national liberation movements in Africa. The purpose of this premeditated policy, as experience has shown, has been to gain the financial, material and other support of foreign interests which would help it to continue its exploitation of the human and natural resources, as well as its repression of the growing political aspirations of the peoples in the Territories under its administration.

264. By claiming Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea as its "national" Territory, Portugal has assumed ownership of the very considerable mineral wealth which these Territories possess, including, in Angola, diamonds (of which the Territory was the fifth largest world producer in 1962), important deposits of iron, petroleum and manganese, and in Mozambique coal, beryllium, columbo-tantalite and other minerals. In violation of the people's sovereign rights over their natural resources, the Government of Portugal reserves to itself the right to issue prospecting licences and to grant concessions, without restriction as to the number of claims, which may include the whole Territory, and may give exclusive rights in regard to any or all minerals.

265. In Angola, where the principal area of foreign investment is in the mining industry, foreign owned or partly foreign owned companies hold exclusive rights to prospect for and exploit diamonds, petroleum and iron ore and more recently, bauxite. The Angola Diamond Company has exclusive rights over more than one million square kilometres to prospect for and mine diamonds until 1971 and thereafter may retain claims up to a total of 50,000 square kilometres. Exclusive rights to prospect for and mine petroleum are held by PETRANGOL over several large areas in Angola including part of the continental shelf, and by the United States owned Cabinda Gulf Company over part of Cabinda. PETRANGOL also has exclusive rights to refine petroleum. The areas with the largest iron deposits are held under exclusive concession by the Lobito and Lombige companies which have obtained financial assistance from a consortium in which Fried Krupp (Essen) of the Federal Republic of Germany and Jojgaad and Schultz A/S (Copenhagen) participate.

266. In Mozambique there are also large foreign investments in mining. The Belgian and Portuguese owned Companhia Carbonifera de Moçambique, S.A.R.L., for instance, has a mining concession over coal deposits estimated at 400 million tons. Exclusive petroleum prospecting and mining rights over large areas of the Territory are held by the United States owned Mozambique Gulf Oil Company and the Mozambique Pan American Oil Company.

267. The Portuguese and foreign interests in Angola and Mozambique are closely linked with other international companies which control various economic activities in these and other Territories. These influential companies include the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, and its subsidiary De Beers Corporation, the Société Générale de Belgique, Forminière of Belgium, the Banco Burnay, the privately owned Banco Nacional Ultramarina of Portugal, the United States Gulf Oil Corporation, the French Péchiney trust and Fried Krupp of the Federal Republic of Germany. The growing influence of South Africa in the Territories under Portuguese administration was particularly evident in the interest of the South African finance company Federale Mynbou Beperk, which is linked with the Anglo-American Corporation in acquiring a share in the Angolan oil industry and the establishment of a company by the Anglo-American Corporation, through its subsidiary De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd., to prospect for diamonds in Mozambique.

268. The interests of foreign economic activities and of the Portuguese Government are linked by a system of mutual benefits. On the one hand, the mining companies enjoy cheap labour, often provided through government assistance, and they are exempt from all or nearly all taxes and permitted to export the raw mineral products overseas: to the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States of America, France and Portugal and other countries. On the other hand, the revenues and profits paid by the mining companies to the Government help Portugal to continue its control over the Territories and to finance its repressive measures and military operations against the African inhabitants. The annual

reports of the Angola Diamond Company 1961 and 1962, for instance, showed that it had contributed towards building military barracks and guard posts. The Company's balance sheet for the year ended 31 December 1962 contained an item of 88.6 million escudos for the defence of Angola. Since 1961, the Angolan Government has also received contributions and loans from the foreign-owned companies for the purpose of what Portugal calls the "defence of national patrimony". The contributions made by the Angola Diamond Company for this purpose averaged some 16 million escudos a year, reaching a total of about 48 million escudos by the end of 1963.

269. Under the Portuguese colonial system, Africans are deprived of their sovereign rights over the natural resources of their respective Territories. Africans, governed by customary law and usage, do not have any legal rights in mining, and they do not have any voice in the disposition of this wealth. Nor do the African inhabitants receive any share in the profits from the mining industries.

270. The information before the Sub-Committee shows that Portuguese and foreign economic interests also control the occupation and use of land, which is one of the major sources of wealth of the African Territories under Portuguese administration. Among the large concessions made to Portuguese and other interests which are active in Angola are the Companhia de Açúcar de Angola, the Companhia Angolena do Agricultura (CADA), Sociedade Agrícola do Cassequel, Companhia de África Ocidental Portuguesa, Companhia de Cabinda and the Companhia Geral dos Algodões de Angola (COTTONANG). In Mozambique, where the principal area of foreign investment is in agriculture and allied industries, the most important companies with large land concessions received many years ago include the British owned Sena Sugar Estates Ltd.; the Companhia de Moçambique, which owns a 30 per cent interest in the Companhia Carbonífera de Moçambique, S.A.R.L. and interests in many other sectors of the economy; the Sociedade Agrícola do Madal, S.A.R.L., originally French owned but which in 1960 was controlled by stockholders of Norwegian nationality; the Companhia de Zambézia; the mainly German owned Companhia do Boror; and the Companhia Colonial do Buzi.

271. Since the end of the Second World War, Portugal has intensified its efforts to increase European settlement in both Angola and Mozambique by opening up new areas of fertile land for concessions to Portuguese farmers. In Angola, the rise in prices for coffee and sisal led to increased demands for land concessions in areas suitable for these crops, as a result of which Africans were expropriated or moved from the areas they had previously occupied.

272. Subsequent to the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 1542 (XV) and the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, Portugal's policy, which had previously concentrated on the "permanent settlement of European Portuguese in the lands of Africa" had adopted a new emphasis on "the implantation overseas by new Portuguese tropical civilizations" as "the sole buttress of the national presence of those lands".

273. New legislation introduced in 1961 enables the Portuguese Overseas Minister to grant to Portuguese or other foreign interests special land concessions in the Territories up to 100,000 hectares under his own authority, and up to a quarter of a million hectares with the approval of the Council of Ministers. To secure its occupation of Angola, Portugal has introduced a network of new settlements in key areas of the Territory and has embarked on a scheme to regroup the rural population "to establish a natural hierarchy of classes in accordance with their general culture and their professional training" (see annex II, para. 173 below) and to establish communities with what it considers to be "the most desirable ethnic compositions". There has however been little change in the land rights of the indigenous population.

274. One of the results of such a policy of Portugal and of the predominance of the foreign companies which have taken over the best lands has been the dispossession of the indigenous population. The great majority of the peasants have thus been forced to become the tenant-farmers of the European

landowners or of foreign companies. The conditions under which they live are reminiscent of serfdom.

275. Recapitulating the points made above, the Sub-Committee finds that:

(a) Portugal has granted concessions to foreign investors without the consent of the African inhabitants, who are the only rightful owners of the Territories' natural resources;

(b) Foreign economic and other interests are directly or indirectly supporting Portuguese colonialism, which makes it possible for them to exploit the human and natural resources of the Territories and to enjoy the profits therefrom;

(c) The foreign economic and other interests in the Territories under Portuguese administration, together with the Government of Portugal, bear the responsibility for the sufferings of the people of these Territories;

(d) By sharing their profits with Portugal, by providing financial and material assistance, these foreign interests are helping Portugal to wage war against the national liberation movements in the Territories and are strengthening Portugal's control over the African inhabitants;

(e) Foreign capital holds a dominant position in all sectors of the economic life of the Territories, fostering exploitation of the basic resources without regard to balanced economic development, and reinforcing Portuguese policy, which denies the peoples of the Territories their rightful participation in economic and political life;

(f) These foreign interests are therefore impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration.

276. The Sub-Committee feels it necessary to state that it is precisely among those States whose nationals own companies and have financial interests in the Territories under Portuguese administration, that are to be found the States from which Portugal derives its greatest support, direct or indirect, which encourages its continued non-compliance with the Charter and the numerous resolutions of the United Nations concerning the question of the Territories under its administration.

277. The Sub-Committee considers that the study of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in the Territories under Portuguese administration fully confirms the urgency of the need to grant and ensure the independence of these Territories. Only when independence has been attained will the people of these Territories fully enjoy the right to dispose of and develop the Territories' human and material resources in the interests of the Territories and all their people.

278. The working papers prepared by the Secretariat on the mining industry and land situation in Angola and Mozambique are annexed to the present report. In order to enable it to have a more comprehensive view of the effects of foreign economic and other activities in the other major sectors of the economic life of the Territories under Portuguese administration, the Sub-Committee has asked the Secretariat to prepare background papers on the agricultural and allied industries, foreign owned railways and the economic relations of Mozambique with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. After the Sub-Committee has reviewed the additional information, it will report to the Special Committee and submit such further observations, conclusions and recommendations as may be necessary.

279. On the basis of its study completed in 1965, the Sub-Committee submits for the immediate consideration of the Special Committee the recommendations set out below.

Recommendations

280. The Sub-Committee considers that the Special Committee should recommend to the General Assembly that it:

(a) Reaffirm the right of the inhabitants of the Territories under Portuguese administration to self-determination and independence and recognize the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve the rights laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

(b) Strongly condemn the colonial policy of Portugal, which denies to the African inhabitants of the Territories under its administration the sovereign rights over their natural resources;

(c) Strongly condemn the Government of Portugal for its policy of promoting the activities of foreign and other interests in the Territories under its administration, which exploit the natural and human resources of these Territories to the detriment of the African inhabitants, and for its participation in such exploitation;

(d) Draw the attention of the Government of Portugal to the fact that its support of and active participation in the activities of foreign economic and other interests, in disregard of the interests of the population of these Territories, run counter to the resolutions of the United Nations with regard to the Territories under Portuguese administration and are a violation of Article 73 of the Charter, which affirms the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories are paramount;

(e) Call upon Portugal to put a stop to its efforts to establish new settlements of European immigrant groups in the Territories under its administration for the purpose of further increasing its control over the Territories, which is repugnant to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly;

(f) Strongly condemn the present activities and operating methods of the foreign economic and other interests in the Territories under Portuguese administration, which are detrimental to the interests of the African inhabitants, and declare that these activities are contrary to the principles of the Charter and the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and are impeding their implementation in the Territories under Portuguese administration;

(g) Consider that foreign economic and other interests are directly or indirectly assisting Portugal by supplying it with financial, material and technical resources which enable it to carry out its colonial policy;

(h) Appeal to the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Powers to exert their influence on those of their nationals who own and operate enterprises in the Territories under Portuguese administration in order to induce them to put an end to their activities in the Territories which under present conditions are detrimental to the interests of the peoples of the Territories;

(i) Appeal to all States and, in particular, to the military allies of Portugal within the framework of NATO to refrain from supplying that country with arms and munitions and all other forms of assistance so long as the Portuguese Government fails to renounce its policy of colonial domination;

(j) Appeal to all the specialized agencies of the United Nations and in particular the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association and the International Monetary Fund, and requests them to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance so long as the Portuguese Government fails to renounce its colonial policy, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations;

(k) Recommend to the Security Council that it consider putting into effect against Portugal the appropriate measures laid down in the Charter to ensure that Portugal immediately implements the Declaration on the granting of independence in the Territories under its administration, and other decisions of the United Nations, including the resolutions of the Security Council concerning these Territories;

(l) Request the Secretary-General to take all possible measures to give wide publicity to the contents of this report and to the decisions of the United Nations on this question.

Reservations of the delegation of Denmark

281. The representative of Denmark expressed the wish that his opinion as to the conclusions and recommendations should be recorded separately.

282. His delegation considered that the only conclusions that could be drawn from the materials so far available were that, owing to Portugal's colonial policy, the economic and social legislation and the conditions prevailing in the Portuguese Territories were far below generally accepted standards and that the population was receiving far too small a share of the profits from the exploitation of the natural resources of their countries. In the opinion of his delegation, the information before the Sub-Committee showed that various foreign interests were involved in most sectors of the economy of the African Territories under Portuguese administration, but it had not been proved to the satisfaction of his delegation that those interests were impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

283. The draft recommendations contained in sub-paragraphs (f), (g), (h), (i), (j) and (k) of paragraph 280 above were not supported by the Danish delegation. The views of the Danish delegation with regard to these sub-paragraphs are reflected in the Danish representative's statement at the Sub-Committee's meeting on 12 October 1965 (see A/AC.109/SC.2/SR.22).

Annex I

*Mining in Angola and Mozambique**

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

CONTENTS

| | <i>Paragraphs</i> |
|--|-------------------|
| INTRODUCTION | 1-5 |
| MINING LEGISLATION | 6-53 |
| MINING IN ANGOLA | |
| A. Mineral resources of the Territory | 54-83 |
| B. Diamond mining | 84-166 |
| C. Petroleum extraction | 167-199 |
| D. Other mining activities | 200-233 |
| MINING IN MOZAMBIQUE | |
| A. Mineral resources of the Territory | 234-258 |
| B. Mining and prospecting activities | 259-290 |
| <i>Tables</i> | |
| | <i>Page</i> |
| 1. Mines and mining concessions in Angola | 246 |
| 2. Angola Diamond Company: balance sheet | 247 |
| 3. Angola Diamond Company: status of loans in the Territory | 248 |
| 4. Mines and mining concessions in Mozambique ... | 254 |
| 5. Principal mineral production of Angola and Mozambique in relation to total African and world output in 1959 | 254 |
| 6. Angola: mineral production and value of exports | 255 |
| 7. Mozambique: mineral production and value of exports | 255 |
| * * * | |
| MAPS | 256-258 |
| SELECTED SOURCES | 258 |

INTRODUCTION

1. Mining constitutes the best publicized area of commercial investment in the African Territories under Portuguese administration. Most of the mineral wealth discovered so far, however, is in Angola, which in 1962 was the fifth largest producer of diamonds in the world and an important potential producer of other minerals, including iron, petroleum and manganese. In 1963, mineral exports accounted for about 24 per cent by value of Angola's domestic exports, while diamonds alone accounted for more than 16 per cent. Mozambique, in contrast, appears to be less well-endowed with mineral deposits; mineral exports accounted for only 1 to

* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.257/Add.1.

1.5 per cent of the value of domestic exports during 1963-1964 and consisted mainly of beryllium and columbo-tantalite, for which there is currently a strong demand in world markets. Table 5 below shows the output of each Territory in relation to world production.

2. In neither Territory have the geological resources been fully surveyed. Surveys of specific areas have been undertaken at various times, the most recent, in the case of Angola, being in 1952 and covering the southern and eastern parts of the Territory. In Mozambique there have been several surveys, the last in 1953-1954, covering the Tete and Zambézia districts and parts of the districts of Manica e Sofala and Niassa. Studies are continuing, and important mineral deposits are still being discovered. Since 1964, prospecting, especially for diamonds, has been intensified and a continuing search for petroleum is being made in Mozambique.

3. At the present time, the most important mining activity, and the largest single foreign undertaking, is represented by the Angola Diamond Company which, until the opening of hitherto reserved areas for prospecting by other companies in 1964, exercised a virtual monopoly of diamond production in Angola. In view of its importance, an effort has been made to include a full account of the activities of this Company. Nearly all the other important mining activities are carried out also by companies holding large concessions with exclusive rights granted by the Portuguese Government on terms which usually entitle them to exploit the mineral deposits for not less than forty to fifty years. The share of the profits which the Territorial Governments receive in exchange for the mining rights varies in each case and with the privileges enjoyed by the concessionaire. Generally, the Territorial Government concerned receives free, and fully paid up, a proportion of the capital shares of the exploiting company, a share in the profits, and the priority right to purchase a part of the mineral production. In many cases, the State also benefits from the foreign exchange earned by the mining operations.

4. It will be noted from the information presented in this working paper that a special feature of the mining concessions granted in the Territories under Portuguese administration is the control exercised by the Portuguese Government. The concession contracts generally fix the amount that must be spent annually in prospecting, the minimum capital of the exploiting company and the percentage that must be Portuguese owned, whether Government or private, the rate at which investments may be amortized, the way in which statutory liquid profits are to be determined, and the distribution of the profits. Furthermore, the Government always retains the right to revoke the concession if contract conditions are not met, and to nationalize the mines with compensation under special circumstances.

5. Nevertheless, the large concessions are a major field of foreign investment and the principal one in the case of Angola, where four of the exclusive concessions together produce over 90 per cent of Angola's mineral exports. Of the concessions described in this paper, two are held directly by American interests—one in Angola and one in Mozambique—and several of the others have direct or close foreign relations, the extent of which cannot always be readily ascertained from published information. No information has been included on Portuguese Guinea because the mining concessions which have so far been granted in that Territory are for prospecting only and the Territory has no significant mineral production.

MINING LEGISLATION

Constitutional provisions

6. Article 35 of the Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic contains the statement that "Property, capital and labour have a social function in the field of economic co-operation and common interest, and the law may determine the conditions of their use or exploitation in accordance with the community aim in view".^a From this basic principle flow the limitations on the use of the public domain which are defined in various laws.

^a *Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic* (SNI, Lisbon, 1957).

7. The Constitution provides (in article 49) that mineral deposits, medical mineral springs and other natural wealth below the surface (excluding rocks, common earths and commonly used building materials) are part of the public domain of the Portuguese State; the use of the public domain by citizens shall be governed by law and by the international conventions concluded by Portugal, without prejudice to the prior rights of the State and the acquired private rights of individuals. Such rights, however, are subject to expropriation as may be determined by the public interest and upon payment of reasonable indemnity.

8. As part of the public domain of the Portuguese State, the mineral resources and natural wealth below the surface therefore do not form part of the "patrimony" of the Overseas Territories.^b Furthermore, the Overseas Organic Law of 1963 (article LXXV) provides that the utilization and exploitation of the public domain in the overseas Territories shall be considered of collective interest, and subject to special systems of administration, competition, supervision or control by the State, through the Overseas Ministry or Governments of the overseas Territories in legal terms, according to the requirements of public safety, national defence, and economic and social interests.

Basic mining legislation

General

9. Separate legislation exists for Portugal and for the overseas Territories as concerns mining of the subsoil. In addition, there is also special legislation regulating the exploitation of the continental shelf, which applies to Portugal and the overseas Territories (see para. 15 below).

10. For Portugal, the mining legislation in force was codified in Decree Law No. 18,713 of 1 August 1930, while for the overseas Territories the basic mining law is the decree of 20 September 1906 with subsequent amendments. There are some important differences between the metropolitan and overseas legislation which are briefly summarized below.

11. In the first place, under the Overseas Mining Law, authority may be exercised either by the Territorial Governments or by the Central Government. Whereas mining activities are generally subject to the Territorial Government concerned, special powers are reserved to the Central Government which enable it to suspend prospecting activities (article 18) and to grant special mining concessions (article 19). Most of the large concessions in the overseas Territories have been granted by the Central Government under these reserved powers (see paras. 35-40 below on exclusive licences and concessions). A second marked difference between the two sets of legislation is that the Overseas Mining Law deals in much greater detail with the obligations which prospectors and mining concessionaires must fulfil. These obligations are outlined in the following sub-sections.

12. There are also other differences. Thus, the mining law of Portugal provides that the right of ownership of deposits of "useful minerals" belongs to the State (article 1). Mineral deposits for which concessions must be obtained are divided into three classes, as follows: (a) metallic minerals (in sections, veins, beds, massive or alluvial deposits); (b) non-metallic minerals (graphite, anthracite, soft coal (*hulha*), lignite, peat, asbestos, talc, rock salt, potassium, phosphates, nitrates, kaolin and "tripoli"); and (c) hydrocarbons and bituminous substances. Ferriferous soils not used in the steel industry and stone quarries may be worked in accordance with special provisions.

13. The Overseas Mining Law, on the other hand, provides that ownership of all deposits of metals and metallic ores,

^b See *Overseas Organic Law*, 1963, article LII, para. II.:

"Belonging to the patrimony of each overseas province are such vacant tracts of land as have not definitely come under the system of private or public property, escheatable inheritances and other immovable or movable property not belonging to other parties, within the boundaries of its territory, and those acquired or legally belonging to it, even outside the Territory including shares in profits or of any other nature that may be assigned to it." (English text: "Organic Law of the Portuguese Overseas Provinces", *Agência Geral do Ultramar*, Lisbon, 1963.)

including deposits of bismutite, arsenic and antimony, sulphur, graphite, mineral fuels (excepting peat), bituminous substances and mineral oils, precious stones, salts, phosphorites, mica, and asbestos, is vested in the State. No one may prospect for, or work, such deposits without a licence or concession from the Government. Since 1944 (Decree No. 33,722 of 19 June 1944), the Overseas Mining Law has been extended to cover also non-metallic ores and minerals in alluvial deposits capable of industrial use, including abrasives, such as semi-precious stones used for optical work.

14. A further comparison of the two laws reveals that some minerals, as for instance mica, which may be freely exploited in Portugal, are subject to control in the overseas Territories. When the classification of mica was discussed in Portugal, it was decided that concessions were not necessary for its exploitation except when it occurred in large sheets, as is the case in the overseas Territories^c (see paras. 76-78 below on mica deposits in Angola). Among other minerals which are specifically excluded from control in Portugal are limestone, and free iron (*ferro nativo*), which in any case is rare.

15. Legislation regulating the exploitation of the continental shelf is contained in Decree Law No. 2,080 of 31 March 1956. According to this decree, which applies to all Portuguese territories alike, both the sea bed and the subsoil of the continental shelf adjoining Portuguese territory belong to the public domain. Concessions for the exploitation of the natural resources of the continental shelf, as well as the transfer of any rights conceded, require the consent of the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, unless otherwise provided by special legislation, concessions may not be granted beyond a depth of 200 metres and all exploration is subject to the conditions imposed by international law.

Prospecting

16. In the overseas Territories prospecting is subject to licence. Any person, Portuguese^d or alien, who wishes to prospect for minerals covered by the mining law, must be in possession of a licence. The surface owner of a property, however, may freely prospect his subsoil. No distinction is made between Portuguese nationals and aliens, except that the latter must renounce recourse to their national courts and place themselves under the jurisdiction of Portuguese law. In Portugal, on the other hand, prospecting licences have been abolished and prospecting rights are obtained upon registration of a claim.

17. Two types of prospecting licences may be issued by the authorities in the Territories. The difference between the two types of licences is mainly a matter of the area involved and the number of claims that may be pegged. An "ordinary" licence, which may be granted at a nominal fee by the district governor or administrator in the area of his own jurisdiction, permits the holder to prospect anywhere inside that district and to submit one notification pegging a limited number of claims. The permissible area of each claim (article 6) is as follows:

Precious stones: a square of 10 metres each side; in the case of alluvial deposits, an area not exceeding 2,500 ha. (decree 720);

Precious metals: a square of 100 metres;

Dredging claim: a rectangle with a maximum area of 2,500 ha., no side of which may exceed 5,000 metres;

All other minerals: a rectangle not exceeding 100 ha. on any side.

18. A special licence is granted by the Governor-General or by district governors with special authority. Such a licence may be refused by the authority concerned if it is considered that the prospector does not have sufficient facilities to utilize it fully. The cost is ten times that of an ordinary licence and entitles the holder to engage in active work in a larger area (2,850 metres radius as compared with 750 metres) and to file fifty times as many claims for precious metals, and five

times as many for other minerals, as in the case of an ordinary licence.

19. Notice of prospecting licences granted have to be published in the official gazette of the Territory. Licences are generally for a period not exceeding two to four years, depending on the type of mineral, but may be renewed. They are not transferable and whatever the type, the licence itself does not confer on the prospector ownership rights of the minerals discovered. Until a mining concession is granted, all minerals discovered are the property of the State and the prospector may use only such amounts as are necessary for his work.

Concessions

20. In the overseas Territories, as in Portugal, the discovery of the existence of mineral deposits virtually guarantees that a mining concession (for the purpose of extracting minerals) will be granted, provided that the deposits are officially confirmed and that there is no prior claim or concession.

21. The first step in the normal procedure is the posting of a notice of discovery and the filing and registration of a notification of claim with the competent authority. After a statutory waiting period, the mineral deposits must be officially "recognized" and confirmed before a concession for mining is granted. Concessions for precious stones and metals are made by the district governor and all others by the governor of the Territory. Under the law, mining concessions, once granted, are for an unlimited period so long as the concessionaire fulfils all the legal requirements (article 88). Non-fulfilment of the requirements, on the other hand, is punishable by fines and may lead to the concession being revoked (article 34). In actual practice, most of the large mining concessions in the overseas Territories have been granted on a contractual basis and subject to special conditions (see paras. 35-40 below).

22. The normal procedures for obtaining a mining concession in the Territories apply to Portuguese nationals and aliens alike. However, when the party requesting a concession is an incorporated company, proof must be submitted that it has been established and organized in accordance with the provisions of Portuguese law (see Decree No. 7,076 of 20 October 1920).

23. The mining title, or deed of concession, confers the right to the mineral deposits. It also gives the concessionaire priority in the use of state lands, water and forest resources for specific purposes and a prior claim to the establishment of public utilities. In the overseas Territories, the concessionaire must begin the extraction of the minerals within six months after publication of the mining title and must complete a specified minimum amount of work each year. In the case of precious metals and precious stones, the work must amount to at least 3 metres per claim, and in the case of all other deposits, it must amount to at least 200 metres; alternatively, the sum spent on development must be at least 10,000 escudos per claim of alluvial deposits, and 25,000 escudos per dredging claim (article 98). In Portugal, the requirements are much less stringent; work must be started within a specified time and the mine must be kept operative; the minimum amount of work required is not specified.

24. Concessions which have been abandoned for special reasons, such as lack of funds, may be declared free land or, if they are of special importance, either because of the nature of the deposits, or because of the work already undertaken, they may be put up for public bidding (article 33).

Transfer of mining rights

25. Under the normal régime, prospecting licences are not transferable. A certificate of claim (*título do manifesto*) may be transferred with the approval of the competent authority, and a mining concession may be transferred, but only by public deed (*escritura pública*) (articles 119-122).

Mining taxes

26. In addition to the fees for the various licences, mining operations are subject to two forms of annual tax: a "fixed tax" based on the area of the concession and a "proportional tax" on the annual production. Open mines worked by the claimant are exempt from all taxation. Also exempt are all

^c Serrano, J. de P. M., *Legislação Mineira da Metrópole e do Ultramar* (actualizada e anotada), Porto, 1959, p. 26.

^d For discussion of the rights of the indigenous inhabitants under the Mining Law see paras. 47-53 below.

coal and iron mines (article 130). During the first two years of operation, all mines are exempt from the proportional tax on production.

27. The fixed tax (on area) in the overseas Territories is 5,000 escudos per hectare for concessions which are not for precious stones or metals; 25 escudos per claim for minerals and non-precious stones and 1,000 escudos per dredging claim. Special rates apply to petroleum.

28. By Decree No. 720 of 1914 (*Diário do Governo*, Nos. 132 and 136, Series I, 1914), the provisions governing alluvial deposits of precious stones were modified. The area of each claim was set at 2,500 hectares, the fixed tax was set at 100 escudos per claim, and the proportional tax was replaced by a 5 per cent participation of the Government in the capital. When the mining is undertaken by an incorporated company the percentage applies to all shares issued, but when it is by an individual, the proportion is based on the amount of capital specified at the time the concession is awarded. So far these provisions have had little application in the overseas Territories, as the only important alluvial deposits or precious stones are the diamonds in Angola and under its contract the Angola Diamond Company is exempt from all mining taxes (see para. 93 below).

29. The annual proportional tax is one half of 1 per cent of the value at the mine for minerals which are not precious stones, and 2 per cent of the value for precious stones and metals.

30. In addition to the above mining taxes, there are special export taxes on minerals. Mineral ore of precious stones and precious metals not processed (treated) in the Territory where they are extracted are subject to an export duty of 5 per cent of the gross value; if processed, precious stones and precious metals are subject to an export duty of one half of 1 per cent of the gross value. Other minerals exported are subject to a statistical tax of 1 mil. (i.e. 1/1000) of gross value.

Rights of property owners and the use of State property

31. Neither a prospecting licence nor a concession of a mineral deposit implies rights of ownership to the surface of the land; they involve, however, reciprocal rights and obligations for the concessionaire and the surface owner in accordance with the provisions of the law. (The rights and obligations of the surface owner are set out in greater detail in the mining law of Portugal than in the mining law of the overseas Territories, where only a small percentage of the total area is privately owned.)

32. The use by concessionaires of State-owned water and timber, as well as their right to trade in precious metals and precious stones, are governed by separated regulations, issued under the law (articles 15 and 34).

Special provisions

33. The Overseas Mining Law also contains special provisions relating to the use of indigenous labour. Prospectors, claimants, concessionaires and lessees, whether individuals or corporations, may not hire indigenous labour for any purpose whatsoever without submitting an employment agreement or work contract to the competent authorities for their approval (articles 9 and 29). All wages owed to persons employed in mining work must be paid in currency^e and it is specifically prohibited to pay any kind of manual labour in unmined metal or uncut precious stones (articles 25 and 26).

34. Any person engaged in mining, when officially notified, must assist the authorities in the maintenance of law and order. If he commits, or attempts to commit, encourages or in any way assists sedition or rebellion, or "resists the instructions (*intimações*) of the authorities" in addition to incurring general penalties, he shall lose all the mining rights he has obtained.

Exclusive licences and concessions

35. Article 19 of the Overseas Mining Law reserves to the Government of Portugal the right to issue prospecting licences and to grant mining concessions in the Territories, without any restriction on the number of claims, for the pur-

^e See, however, the special provisions contained in the contracts of the Angola Diamond Company (para. 154 below).

pose of large-scale mining operations. As defined in later legislation (Decree No. 81 of 21 August 1913), licences and concessions granted under article 19 may include the whole area of a Territory and may give exclusive rights in regard to all or any minerals.

36. These exclusive prospecting licences are granted against the deposit of a financial guarantee by the prospector. They may be transferred with the approval of the Government or refused if the Government considers that the prospector has insufficient funds. The sum of the guarantee, or caution money, may be a proportion of, or equal to, the amount which the prospector undertakes to spend during the entire period of the licence. This period is usually not less than two and not more than five years. In its original form, the deposit was set between 20,000 and 100,000 escudos (\$U.S.700-3,000). Over the years, various amendments have been made to this provision and under Legislative Decree No. 32251 of 9 September 1942, the amount of caution money is now freely fixed by the central Government.

37. Concessions for extensive prospecting and exploitation granted by the central Government in exercise of its reserved rights are generally drawn up in the form of a contract with the party concerned. In practice, as will be seen in the following sections, the contracts usually grant exclusive prospecting rights for three to five years, specify the minimum amount that has to be spent in this period, and define the rights and conditions of exploitation, which may be limited to claims in active exploitation or include all claims marked and may be for a fixed period of 40 to 50 years or for an unlimited time. If exploitation rights are for a fixed period, the contract may also provide that all mining equipment and installations revert to the State upon expiration.

38. The contracts also generally specify the minimum capital of the company responsible for the mining operations and the Government's share in the capital and the profits. In most cases the Government has required that it be freely given a percentage (varying from 5 to 33 per cent) of the capital shares, with all rights to participate in general meetings of shareholders and to vote. The Government's share in the profits varies in different cases and ranges up to 55 per cent.

39. In order to safeguard national interests, the special prospecting licences and mining concessions are granted only to Portuguese nationals or companies formed in accordance with Portuguese law. As a further safeguard of Portuguese sovereignty, the contracts usually also include the conditions under which the Government may take over the activities involved and the rate of compensation to be paid.

40. The right is also reserved to the central Government to suspend prospecting in a part or the whole area of a Territory (article 18). The suspension may be for a few months or for a period of years and may include all or only certain minerals. In the past, prospecting rights in some areas have been suspended to enable the Government to carry out geological surveys or to prevent too many small operators from pegging claims which they might not be able to develop. The Government has also, as in the case of diamonds in Angola, used this right to protect the interests of the exclusive concessionaire (see foot-note ^k). The provision has likewise been used to prohibit private prospecting of certain radioactive minerals in Angola and Mozambique, which since 1954 have been placed under the control of the Nuclear Energy Board (established under Decree Nos. 39,580 and 39,581, amended by Decree Law No. 41,995 of 5 December 1958).

Petroleum extraction

41. The general provisions of the Overseas Mining Law of 1906 apply also to petroleum extraction, with some modifications. The most important subsidiary legislation is contained in the Decree of 9 December 1909, and Decrees Nos. 41,356 and 41,357 of 11 November 1957, together with the relevant regulations made thereunder.

42. An ordinary petroleum prospecting licence authorizes prospecting in an area up to 1,600 metres radius (as compared with a rectangular area of not more than 100 hectares—10,000 square metres—for all minerals other than precious metals and precious stones). A petroleum prospecting licence may not be

transferred, and upon discovery of petroleum deposits the owner of the licence may immediately request a petroleum sales permit. The area of each claim may not exceed 500 hectares (compared with 100 hectares for other non-precious minerals) and must be within the original area granted in the prospecting licence. The fixed tax for petroleum concessions is 500 escudos per hectare and the proportional tax is at the rate of ¼ per cent of the values of the production at the mine.^f

43. As defined in the 1957 petroleum extraction regulations (Decree No. 41,356), the term "crude petroleum" includes all solid, liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, including naphtha, ozoterite, natural gases and asphalt, as well as sulphur, helium, carbon dioxide and saline substances. Such concessions are subject to a duty (*taxa dos direitos de concessão*) of 12.5 per cent of the production either in kind or in value, unless a different percentage is agreed upon in the contract. In cases where this payment is not in kind, the currency must be that realized in the actual sales. A special income tax of 50 per cent is levied on profits from oil operations (Decree No. 41,357). This income tax applies to the liquid profits as officially determined^g from exploration, development, production, warehousing, sales, exports, transport and treatment; it also applies to wholesale and other activities relating to crude petroleum which are not commercial or industrial.

Radio-active minerals

44. Until 1954, radio-active minerals were not subject to any special controls other than those contained in the general provisions of the basic mining legislation^h outlined above. In 1954 legislation was enacted (Decree Laws Nos. 39,580 and 39,581 of 29 March 1954) creating a Nuclear Energy Board for the purpose of supervising all aspects of research and development in the field of atomic energy. Among the functions entrusted to the Board was that of supervising "the concession or transfer of concessions of deposits of radio-active and related minerals in Portuguese Territory, as well as the sale and export of such minerals, their concentrates or substances extracted from them" (Decree Law No. 39,580, article 2 (j)). By a dispatch of 4 June 1954, the term "related minerals" was stated to include beryl, tantalite and zirconium. A further dispatch of 12 June 1956, specified that deposits of beryl and zirconium were to be considered as "related minerals" only when their average content of tantalum-columbite (in terms of total oxides) was not less than 300 grams per ton in the case of alluvial deposits, and 1,000 grams per ton in the case of primary deposits. In respect of such "related minerals", the Nuclear Energy Board was to exercise control over the granting of concessions and the issue or transfer of shares, and have the prior right to purchase all or part of the produce at world prices.

45. The above legislation was applied to the overseas Territories by a ministerial order dated 23 April 1957 (*Portaria* 16,267). The order also provided that thereafter prospecting and mining of radio-active minerals and "related minerals" should be subject to either special concessions issued by the Portuguese Government under its reserved powers (see paras. 35-40 above), or contracts containing special provisions. Either form would provide for supervision by the Nuclear Energy Board, limit the quantity of minerals exportable and reserve to the State the prior right of purchase of all the minerals concerned.

46. Decree Laws 39,580 and 39,581 were substantially amended by Decree Law Nos. 41,995 and 41,996 of 5 December 1958. The changes did not, however, alter the powers of the Board in respect of mineral concessions, except to specify that where production has been suspended, the concessionaire may not undertake any new work without the Board's authorization (article 41 of Decree Law No. 41,995). It should also

be noted that the Board is itself empowered to acquire and operate mineral concessions (article 3 (q)).

Indigenous rights in mining

47. The Overseas Mining Law of 1906 makes no reference to indigenous rights, nor does it contain any special provisions prohibiting prospecting or mining in areas occupied by indigenous inhabitants. Until 1961, when the Native Statute¹ was replaced, indigenous inhabitants were subject to a special status with *capitis diminutio* in relation to institutions established under Portuguese law. The general rule established by the 1954 Statute was:

"Unless otherwise prescribed by law, indigenous persons shall be governed by the usages and customs pertaining to their respective societies" (article 3 of the Native Statute).

48. As regards property rights, article 143 of the Constitution provides that:

"The natives are guaranteed, in accordance with the law, in their property and in the possession of their lands and crops and this principle shall be respected in all concessions made by the State."

49. This guarantee, as further elaborated in the Native Statute, was limited to "the joint use and enjoyment, in the manner prescribed by customary law, of the land necessary for their settlement and for the growing of their crops and the grazing of their cattle".

50. The laws regulating the granting of land concessions contained similar provisions. In effect, the indigenous inhabitant was guaranteed the use of some land: if he was moved, he was to be compensated for his house and movable goods and to be given an equal area of land. Although the mining legislation is silent on indigenous land rights, it may be reasonably presumed that the same guarantee was understood to apply. To what extent this has been observed is not known and none of the mining concession contracts studied to date place any obligation on the concessionaire such as is provided in the land concession legislation.

51. The Overseas Mining Law is also silent on the rights of indigenous inhabitants to prospect for, and exploit, mineral deposits. From the provisions cited above, it follows that indigenous inhabitants governed by customary law and usage could not acquire any legal rights in mining. As they did not, and could not, own land, they did not have the right to prospect without licence; and as they did not come under Portuguese civil law, they could not acquire legal title to prospecting licences or mining concessions for minerals covered by the Overseas Mining Law.

52. In regard to mineral deposits not covered by the Mining Law, their rights were less clear. On the one hand, the Native Statute limited the rights of the *indigenas* to occupation of land and its use for growing crops and grazing cattle, while the land itself and the real rights over it remained part of the public domain. On the other hand, provision was made for the establishment of special régimes in favour of the indigenous inhabitants in recognition of *de facto* situations in which they had acquired rights, as for instance where they had planted coffee and palm trees. Indigenous mining of stone quarries and salt probably could also have been recognized though there is no information on the existence of such indigenous activities.

53. Since the repeal of the Native Statute, the indigenous inhabitants no longer have a special status but their full participation in the political and economic life of the Territory does not appear possible so long as they live in *regedorias*, in which they are governed by customary law and usage. It also has to be pointed out that, whereas in the past in some territories

^f So far not applied to Angola's petroleum concessions.

^g The legislation lays down both the expenses which may and may not be deducted from the gross profits in determining the liquid profits. For each enterprise the determination is made by a special committee comprising the Financial Secretary, as President, an assistant designated by the Financial and Accounting Services and a representative of the enterprise concerned.

^h In 1950, however, all rights to prospect for uranium and thorium in Angola and Mozambique were suspended and vested in the Governor-General (*Portaria* 13,337 of 20 October 1950).

¹ Portugal, *Estatuto dos Indígenas Portugueses das Províncias da Guiné, Angola e Moçambique*, Decree Law No. 39,666, 1954.

This was merely in the last of a series of similar legislative enactments dating back to the turn of the century. The 1954 Statute, which is used here as the basis of discussion, is considered to have introduced new principles over the previous statutes of 1926 and 1929 by guaranteeing principles concerning "the natural and unconditional rights of the native... and... the gradual fulfilment of his moral and legal obligations to work, to be educated, and to improve himself...".

land and mineral rights were vested in the Native Authorities, the *regedorias* in the Territories under Portuguese administration do not have such rights. Unlike the non-indigenous local government bodies such as the municipal and parish councils, the *regedorias* are not juridical personalities³ and cannot enter into legal relationships envisaged in the Mining Law.

MINING IN ANGOLA

A. MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE TERRITORY

General

54. Prior to the early 1950's, diamonds were the only known mineral resource of major economic importance in Angola.

³ See A. Moreira, *A propriedade no Ultramar*, from *Ensaios, Estudos de Ciências Políticas e Sociais*, No. 34, Lisbon, 1963, p. 185.

Since then, extensive deposits of iron and manganese ore as well as petroleum have been found and are being exploited, although production of these minerals is still in the early stage. There is some active mining of copper, zinc, gold, mica and rock asphalt (and recovery of sea salt). In 1960, new deposits of copper and asbestos were discovered. Surveys have shown the existence of commercially exploitable deposits of titaniferous iron ore, ilmenite and zirconium. There are also reported occurrences of wolfram, rare earths and thorium oxide, vanadium-bearing ores, barite, bauxite and columbite. No important deposits of radio-active minerals have been reported, though traces of uranium and thorium have been found.

55. In 1963 minerals made up 23.9 per cent of Angola's exports by value. The most important are shown in the following table:

| Mineral product | Principal countries of destination | Value in contos | Percentage of total exports by value |
|-----------------|---|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| Diamonds | United Kingdom | 767,830 | 16.2 |
| Iron ore | Federal Republic of Germany and France | 136,655 | 2.9 |
| Petroleum | Portugal | 126,244 | 2.7 |
| Copper | Portugal | 2,349 | 0.05 |
| Manganese | United States and Federal Republic of Germany | 1,818 | 0.04 ^b |

^a One conto equals 1,000 escudos (one escudo equals 3.5 cents; \$US1 equals 28.5 escudos).

^b The value of manganese exported has dropped sharply since 1959 (para. 69 below).

Diamonds

56. The diamond deposits in Angola form part of the alluvial diamond fields which extend from the Kasai River Basin in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Leopoldville) and cover a total area of 150,000 km². Diamonds were discovered in Angola in 1907 and prospecting began in 1912. In 1917, the first diamonds were produced, totalling 4,110 carats, and four years later, in May 1921, the right to prospect for and exploit diamonds, alluvial and others, in Angola was granted to the Angola Diamond Company (DIAMANG). The area of the concession covered nearly the whole Territory and, although actual mining operations are limited to a small area in the Lunda district, gave the company a virtual monopoly over the prospecting and mining of diamonds in the Territory, a position which it still held at the end of 1963. In 1964, however, a number of new diamond prospecting licences were granted in an area which had hitherto been reserved by the Angola Government (see paras. 162-166 below).

57. During the period 1959-1963, production of diamonds has been close to, or exceeded, one million carats annually.

An average of 70 per cent of this output consisted of gem stones.

Iron ore

58. Prospecting for iron ore began only in 1950. It is now thought that deposits of good quality exist in many parts of the Territory, but principally within a band running parallel to, and between 150 to 300 km from the coast. The most important known deposits are located in two main zones. In the northern zone, the principal deposits are at Quissama, in the Luanda district, and at M'Bassa, Saia and Jangada, in the Cuanza Norte district. In the southern zone, the major deposits are at Cassinga in Huila district, Cuima and Bailundo in Huambo district, and Andulo in the Bié district.

59. The iron ore deposits are perhaps the best surveyed so far. It is estimated that the total reserves are probably between 300 million and 500 million metric tons. Proved reserves amount to 138 million tons (with a ferrous content of 62-64 per cent). Probable reserves (with a ferrous content of 42-45 per cent) are estimated to amount to 318 million tons.

IRON ORE RESERVES*

| Location (mine) | Production in 1961 (metric tons) | Reserves (million metric tons) | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|---------------|
| | | Certain | Probable | Total |
| <i>Southern central districts</i> | | | | |
| Cassinga, Huila district | 121,816 | 98 ^a | 200 ^b | 298 |
| Cuima, Huambo | 372,344 | 10 | 25 | 35 |
| Bailundo, Huambo | 41,085 | 5 | 15 | 20 |
| Andulo, Bié | 44,481 | 16.5 | 10 | 26.5 |
| <i>Northern districts</i> | | | | |
| M'Bassa, Cuanza Norte | 23,322 | 2.5 | 4.38 | 6.88 |
| Quissama, Luanda | — | — | — | — |
| Saia, Cuanza Norte | 209,090 | 6 | 14 | 20 |
| Jangada, Canza Norte | — | — | 50 | 50 |
| | 812,138 | 138.0 | 318.38 | 456.38 |

*Compiled from: João Antonio Martins, *Iron Ores in Angola*, Luanda, 1962, *passim*; Alberto Dingo, *Rumo à industrialização de Angola*, Luanda, 1963, p. 71.

^a Another estimate gives 50 million tons.

^b Marginal reserves placed at hundreds of millions of tons.

60. The principal mining companies are: (a) Companhia Mineira de Lobito, with mines at Adulo, Cuima and Bailundo; (b) Sociedade Mineira de Lombige, with its principal mine at Cassinga; (c) Companhia do Manganês de Angola, with mines at Saia; and (d) Companhia Mineira de Mombassa, operating in M'Bassa.

61. The first two fields to begin operation were those at Cuima in 1957, and Bailundo in 1959. Exports of iron ore have been limited by the lack of rail transportation, and new links are being built to existing railways. The first such link from Cuima, in Central Angola, to the Benguela Railway came into operation in 1960. More recently, large investments have been made for the development of the Cassinga mines. These mining operations are described in greater detail in paragraphs 200-290 below.

Petroleum

62. Petroleum was first discovered in 1955 in the Luanda area. A number of deposits have been found, the most important of which are those at Tobias (near Luanda), discovered in 1961, where the known reserves are estimated to exceed 20 million metric tons. In 1964, there were reports of the discovery of an important new field in Cabinda.

63. The Companhia de Combustíveis de Lobito (known as PURFINA) holds the most important petroleum concession. The exploration and mining of petroleum is carried out by the Companhia de Petróleos de Angola (PETRANGOL), which is partly financed by the Belgium petroleum company PETROFINA. The principal producing area is Tobias, sixty miles from Luanda, where the known reserves are estimated at 3,000 million barrels, of which 65 million are reported to be recoverable.

64. The other important petroleum concessionaire is Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, whose 6,166 km² concession lies in Cabinda district. In 1964 the Portuguese company SACOR (Sociedade Anónima Concessionária de Refinação de Petróleos em Portugal) and a French company, Société des pétroles d'Aquitaine, both obtained petroleum concessions in Angola. That of SACOR is in the south and that of Aquitaine in the north. None of these three companies have yet found oil.

Copper

65. Copper was one of the first minerals discovered in Angola. There are deposits in various parts of the Territory but most of these have not turned out to be worth commercial exploitation. The three best known deposits are (a) near Cuma, west of Nova Lisboa; (b) at Bembe, about 150 miles north-east of Luanda; and (c) near Quibocolo, about 75 miles north-east of Bembe. Some copper deposits are known to exist on the concession of the Companhia Mineira do Lobito in the Moçamedes region and these deposits were studied by two French geologists in 1960. Recent surveys have also revealed the existence of large deposits, with a 65 per cent copper content, in the Quilengues region of the Benguela district.

66. Between 1858 and 1861, several concessions were granted in respect of mine deposits in the Chela mountains (Moçamedes district) and in the district of Benguela. From 1918 onwards, copper was exploited by a company called Sociedades das Minas do Bembe which later became the Companhia das Minas do Cobre de Bembe. Production proved disappointing, however, and in 1937 the Portuguese Government dispatched a special mission to Angola to survey the known copper deposits in the Territory. Following this mission, prospecting began at Mavoio, in the Congo district, where União Fabril obtained an exclusive concession in 1944-1945. The concession was subsequently transferred to the Empresa do Cobre de Angola (see paras. 220-221 below). Production has remained small, averaging only about 1,500 tons annually during the years 1950-1959 and dropping to 108 tons in 1963.

Manganese

67. Manganese was discovered in Angola in 1916. The main known deposits are located in the Cuanza Norte and Malange districts in an area some 100 km in length lying be-

tween Calungo Alto in the north-west and Pungo Andongo in the south-east. No information is available on the estimated reserves of this area. Other deposits of manganese have been found at Chivanda to the south-west of the main area. In 1964, it was reported that important new deposits of manganese had been discovered in Cabinda, where the established ore reserve was estimated at 80-100 million tons.

68. In 1919, the Companhia de Pesquisas Mineiras de Angola began prospecting for manganese at Quicanhe in the Cuanza Norte district. After 1943, the exploitation of these mines were taken over by J. Fernandes, Lda. In 1949 the Companhia do Manganês de Angola was established and opened up a new mine at Quitota in the Malange district. Another company, the Sociedade Mineira do Malange was set up in 1953. At the end of 1961 these were the two only companies mining manganese. The Companhia do Manganês de Angola had two mining concessions of 500 ha. each and the other company had an area of 99 ha. According to a newspaper article of 25 January 1965, French interests have been licensed to exploit the newly discovered manganese deposits in the Cabinda district.

69. Annual production of manganese in Angola was only a few thousand tons a year up to 1948, but expanded rapidly in the next few years and reached a peak of 66,000 tons in 1953. During this period, most of the manganese exports went to the United States of America. Since 1960, production has been affected by the drop in world prices and only 1,188 tons were exported in 1963. The development of the manganese mines in Angola is now being linked with that of the iron ore industry and the combined annual ore output is expected to reach 5 to 6 million tons in the next few years, with an anticipated export value of over \$U.S. 38 million.

Coal

70. There are deposits of bituminous materials in the sedimentary (cretaceous) formations along the coast of Angola between Maiombe, in Cabinda district, and a point south of Moçamedes. Coal lignites have also been found in Moxico district, near Luso, on the Benguela Railway. These last deposits contain reserves estimated at 500 million tons.

71. Much of the coal discovered so far has an average content of 76 per cent carbon and 20 per cent asphalt, which makes it more suitable for oil extraction. It was at one time thought that there were sufficiently large coal deposits in Angola to justify the establishment of a multi-purpose processing plant.

72. Mining of coal has not been very productive, and from 1916 onwards a number of concessions for exploitation were annulled after the mines had been abandoned. Since the discovery of oil, interest in coal mining has waned further. The Companhia Mineira do Lobito holds an exclusive concession for coal prospecting in the Moxico region with an area of 173,500 km².

Gold

73. Although they are of relatively minor importance, there are some alluvial gold deposits in Angola. The main deposits are located at Maiombe, in the Cabinda enclave, but there are also many smaller deposits and most of Angola's rivers have some gold in their beds.

74. Since 1868 a number of concessions for prospecting and mining gold have been granted to companies with either Portuguese or British and South African capital. Among the companies which were active in gold mining in Angola at one time or another were the Companhia de Moçamedes (which transferred its rights to a subsidiary of the South African Company, Ltd.) the Companhia de Pesquisas Mineiras de Angola (active in 1922) and the Sociedade Mineira do Lombige, Lda. The last-named company was established in 1941 and in 1961 still held two concessions for gold mining.

75. Increased interest in gold mining in the late 1930's led to a rise in production from 51,926 grams in 1939 to 92,503 grams in 1940. On 4 December 1940, the Governor of Angola issued an order (*Portaria* 3,570) forbidding illicit prospecting and exploitation of gold. Production reached a peak figure

of 128,847 grams in 1943, but declined steadily thereafter. In 1961, only one gold mine, Macende, which consists of a 250 ha. concession, was in active operation, and its production for the year was 1,494 grams. During 1961, two new concessions were granted, one comprising 12,267 ha. to the Sociedade Mineira de Huila, Lda, and the other, comprising 2,500 ha., to the Companhia Mineira de Lobito.

Mica

76. Mica-bearing pegmatites are distributed over a large area of Angola. Many of the deposits are known but not fully prospected. Because of the strategic importance of mica during the Second World War, the United States Foreign Economic Administration in 1944 sent a mission to Angola to make a technical study. A purchasing programme was later established which gave an impetus to mica mining in the Territory.

77. The commercially exploitable deposits are mostly located along the Dandi river, near Quicabo, north-east of Luanda. Production of mica reached a peak of 28,676 tons, valued at 3,728 contos, in 1952, when there were nineteen concessions in operation. By 1954, the number of deposits being worked had dropped to five and the production of sheet mica dropped to 9,187 tons. In 1965, a number of new claims were pegged, but out of the five concessions only three were in operation during the year. Since then, some of the concessions are reported to have changed hands.

78. The mica exported from Angola is of good quality and commands a good price. However, shortage of trained labour and lack of transportation are factors in preventing the full exploitation of the existing deposits.

Rock asphalt

79. Rock asphalt is found at Libolo and in the Calucala, Zenza de Itombe and Quilungo regions. Since 1940, rock asphalt has been mined for industrial use in the Territory. Production was 35,949 tons in 1962.

80. The Companhia dos Asfaltos de Angola holds several small concessions for mining of asphalt and other bituminous substances. The total area amounts to 3,352 ha. It is estimated that the reserves in this concession include some 8 million tons of "libolites".

Bauxite (Aluminium)

81. Active prospecting of bauxite began in 1957, when a concession with exclusive rights was granted to a Dutch company, N. V. Billiton Maatschappij. It appears that this company's concession was allowed to lapse. In 1961, Alumínio Português (Angola) received a one-year exclusive concession to survey any part of the Territory for bauxite. In spite of various reports of bauxite deposits, it appears that none of commercial value has yet been found. Nevertheless, Alumínio is reported to be preparing to build a bauxite refinery at Dondo to use the electricity produced by the Cambambe Dam.

Other minerals

82. Angola produces both sea salt and rock salt. In 1961, production of salt amounted to 67 metric tons, of which 25 tons (valued at 10.6 million escudos) were exported. In 1964, large new deposits of rock salt were discovered during petroleum prospecting. Some of these new deposits are reported to be suitable for open-cast mining.

83. Recent surveys have revealed the existence of phosphate deposits, mainly in the Cabinda enclave. There is also sulphur which occurs in association with gypsum, at Cabo Ledo and Dombe Grande. Finally, small amounts of zinc are produced as a by-product of copper.

B. DIAMOND MINING

General

84. In 1962, Angola ranked fifth as a world producer of diamonds, preceded by the Democratic Republic of the Congo

South Africa, Ghana and Sierra Leone. Its production, which is only slightly larger than that of South West Africa, amounted to approximately 1,081,000 carats, of which about 701,000 were gem diamonds, and about 380,000 were industrial diamonds. After coffee, diamonds are the Territory's most important export.

85. From 1921 until 1964, the industry was virtually monopolized by the Angola Diamond Company, whose exclusive concession covers most of the Territory. In 1964, however, the Government of Angola opened up to diamond prospecting an area of 221,000 km² over which it had previously reserved mining rights. During 1964, six new concessions were granted, two within this new area and four in the coastal waters of the continental shelf. These recent developments are described in paragraphs 162-166 below.

Angola Diamond Company

History and description

86. The Angola Diamond Company (DIAMANG) is a Portuguese enterprise with headquarters in Lisbon. Its real ownership, however, is difficult to ascertain accurately, as the actual distribution of shares is not known. From the information available, it may be deduced that the major interests by nationality are Belgian, Portuguese and South African.

87. The original parent body of DIAMANG was the Companhia de Pesquisas Mineiras de Angola, which was established in 1912. This company, known as PEMA, first acquired a mining concession in Angola in 1913 with rights to prospect and exploit various minerals. In 1917 it formed DIAMANG, to which it transferred mining rights in diamonds only. PEMA, after renewing its mining concession in 1918, continued actively in mining, including gold and manganese, in the Territory for many years. Though the company is no longer engaged in active mining, it retains a place on the Board of Directors of DIAMANG.

88. At the time of its creation in 1917, major interests in DIAMANG were held by the following: in Portugal, the Banco Nacional Ultramarino and the firm Henry Burnay; in Belgium, the Société Générale de Belgique and Mutualité coloniale; in France, the Banque de l'Union Parisienne; and in the United States, the financiers Ryan and Guggenheim.

89. In 1963, the Board of Directors consisted of the following individuals or company representatives: E. de Vilhena (Chairman and Managing Director), Banco Burnay (Vice-Chairman), Baron P. Bonvoisin, J. Leite de Castro (Technical Director), Comte M. de Fernig, R. A. Callens, V. L. de Castro, Companhia de Pesquisas Mineiras de Angola, E. Empis, H. J. Joel, G. Regnier, R. de Sá Caneiro, A. E. Thiele, J. de Vilhena (Administrative Director), A. A. Ryan, H. F. Oppenheimer, V. L. Alves, J. M. de Noronha Feyo (see paras. 108-111 below).

90. The Company's registered capital is 294,100,000 escudos, represented by 1,730,000 share warrants payable to bearer of 170 escudos each. The original capital of the Company was £2 million in 1921. This was successively reduced by cancellation of shares held by the Company to £1,750,000 in 1941 and to £1,630,000 (179,300,000 escudos) in 1942. In 1955, the Company's capital was increased to 294,100,000 escudos by raising the nominal value of the existing shares from 110 escudos to 170 escudos (paid for from profits payable to shareholders) and by creating 100,000 new shares of 170 escudos each (for which 17 million escudos were withdrawn from reserves).

91. At the end of 1963, the Company's total assets amounted to approximately \$U.S. 100 million (29,000 million escudos). This figure represents the sum of reported assets, totalling 1,500 million escudos, and amortized fixed assets, which were valued at 1,400 million escudos. The Company's balance sheet for 1962 is reproduced in table 2. The following table shows the Company's financial situation in 1961 to 1963:

ANGOLA DIAMOND COMPANY

Mining income, profits available for distribution and dividends paid (in escudos)

| | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Gross mining income | 291,784,125 | 254,925,347 | 303,254,775 |
| Other income | 63,973,244 | 34,636,421 | 36,191,933 |
| TOTAL, gross income | 355,757,369 | 289,561,768 | 339,446,708 |
| Transfer to legal reserve | 16,006,405 | 8,240,983 | 15,156,843 |
| National defence | 14,111,768 | 16,960,365 | 16,910,206 |
| Share of Angolan Government of 50 per cent of profits | 142,937,195 | 73,591,982 | 135,350,604 |
| Special tax (under appeal) | — | 88,636,447 | — |
| Profits available for distribution | 142,937,195 | 73,994,161 | 135,361,366 |
| Dividends paid | 102,070,000 | 72,660,000 | 134,940,000 |
| Unappropriated profits carried forward | 7,322,179 | 1,334,161 | 421,366 |

Terms of the concession

92. The Angola Diamond Company holds an exclusive concession to prospect for and exploit diamonds under contract with the Portuguese Government. A provisional contract was signed in 1920 in Brussels between the Portuguese High Commissioner for Angola (Alto Comissário da República en Angola) and the Angola Diamond Company. The decree setting out the terms of the concession was enacted in 1921 and the basic contract was signed on 18 May 1921. This contract was modified in 1922, 1937, 1946 and 1954.

93. Under the 1921 contract, DIAMANG received exclusive diamond mining rights for thirty years over the whole of the Territory lying north of the Benguela Railway and east of longitude 15° E; also the area south of the railway line and east of 14° E and, when it became vacant, the concession formerly granted to the Companhia de Mossamedes in 1894. This area was to be extended to include the rest of the Territory within five years. The Company was to be exempt from all taxes and in return undertook to increase the rate of prospecting and extracting of diamonds, and to give the Government of Angola in fully paid-up shares 5 per cent of all capital issued or to be issued and annually 40 per cent of the net income (liquid profits).

94. Of the original capital, which was to be raised to 800,000 shares, 100,000 were surrendered to the Government. The shares had each a value of 4.5 gold escudos (equal to £1 sterling, 25 Belgian francs or \$U.S. 5.00). The Government's share in the profits was to be calculated on the basis of 40 per cent of the net income after certain deductions. These deductions, which together amounted to approximately 30 per cent of the gross liquid profits, were (a) 5 per cent for the statutory legal reserve; (b) 6 per cent for payment of dividends; and (c) 10 per cent of the remainder to be paid as compensation to the Board of Directors.

95. In addition, the Government of Angola obtained from the Diamond Company a commitment to make available to it each year a loan in foreign currency (pounds sterling or Belgian francs) equal to half the Territory's share of the profits in the previous year. The known diamond reserves were to be used to secure the loan, the limit of which was set at £1 sterling for each two carats of confirmed diamond deposits. This loan was fixed at £400,000 for the first two years. Up to 1935, the Company also undertook voluntarily, and as far as possible, to bring the income of the Territory from diamonds to be used for development to a total of £300,000 each year, by making up the difference in the form of a voluntary loan. The interest on the loan was to be not more than 1 per cent more than the bank discount rate in the country in which the loan was made. Both interest and principal were

to be repaid in gold escudos at the fixed exchange rate of 4.5 gold escudos to £1 sterling.

96. According to the then High Commissioner for Angola, it was also agreed in 1921 that the Company itself had to undertake the actual work of exploitation and not employ as agent any other national or foreign concern; the diamonds produced could be exported only through sea ports designated by the Government and not across the land frontiers; the Company was obliged to purchase its foodstuffs and supplies in Angola, or from Portugal if not available locally, and to use Portuguese ships for transportation as far as possible. The Company further undertook to proceed with active prospecting and mining of diamonds and, in the region of the diamond deposits, to improve the material conditions of the rural population by providing medical services, schools and scientific missions in all fields and by furnishing all services necessary for the welfare of the indigenous inhabitants.

97. Most of these basic provisions are still in force, although some of the details and procedures have been modified by supplementary contracts. The changes made are summarized below.

98. The area over which the Diamond Company holds exclusive prospecting and exploitation rights until 1971 is now 1,025,700 km², and includes the area defined in the 1922 agreement and the area previously conceded to the Companhia de Mossamedes. Upon termination of the concession in 1971, the total area of claims pegged may not exceed 50,000 km², and no claim may be larger than 2,500 km². Under the terms of the Overseas Mining Law of 1906, the Company will retain the right to continue to work for an unlimited time all claims pegged before the expiration of the contract.

99. Since 1921, the Angola Government's share of the capital and profits has increased. The Government now owns 200,000 shares (out of the total of 1,730,000) given to it free and fully paid up, and receives one half of the statutory annual liquid profits.¹

100. The Angola Diamond Company, in return, is exempt from all taxes, licences, fees, rents and other charges, property, industrial, complementary and consumption taxes in force or imposed in the future by the central or local government in-

¹ The formula for calculating the liquid profits was modified in 1954, when new provisions were included establishing reserve funds for (a) interest and dividend stabilization with a ceiling of 1 million escudos; (b) renewal of equipment and payment of goods and commodities with a ceiling of 100 million escudos; (c) staff provident fund with a ceiling of 4.5 million and (d) native welfare and public works in the Lunda district with a ceiling of 10 million escudos. The ordinary annual liquid profits are distributed after deduction of operational, management and other general expenses and sums required for reserve and amortization funds; of the ordinary profits so determined, 6 per cent is paid to the directors of the Company, and the remainder equally divided between the Angolan Government and the shareholders.

² General prospecting for diamonds in Angola had first been prohibited by Decree No. 9 of 6 May 1921.

situations. It is exempt from export duties and import duties on scheduled equipment as well as any taxes levied on corporations or business concerns. European and other (*equiparado*) employees are, however, subject to income taxes, though they were previously exempt under the 1922 contract.

101. In areas where it is prospecting or has mining operations, DIAMANG may use the land on a temporary basis without specifically receiving land concession rights, to build houses, plants, etc. needed for its work. The Company is responsible for the wages, food, clothing and housing of its workers; it must provide the local inhabitants with medical assistance and schools and in a general way promote the betterment of their material and moral conditions.

102. Under the 1922 and 1937 contracts the Angola Government has a special responsibility to help the Angola Diamond Company in obtaining labour, by encouraging indigenous inhabitants from other districts to settle in Lunda, and by reducing and simplifying procedures for the recruitment of labour. The 1954 contract provides that "the Governor General of Angola shall, in accordance with the legislation at present in force or which may come into force in the future, take such action as may be necessary" to fulfil that obligation (see paras. 146-151 below).

103. The Angola Diamond Company must give preference to Portuguese nationals and goods. Among the Company's personnel, the following must be Portuguese nationals: at least 70 per cent of the European or *equiparado* staff, the representative of the Company in Angola and his deputy; regional representatives of the Company; medical personnel and nurses; the recruiting agent and persons dealing with indigenous labour and the technical director of mines, who may, however, be an alien temporarily if no suitable Portuguese can be found. In making purchases, the Company must give preference to local products and those sold in the Territory, especially Portuguese manufactures, so long as the price is not more than 5 per cent higher than the cost of imported foreign goods.

104. There are special provisions in regard to the foreign currencies earned by the Company. The 1937 contract provided that the Government could ask that 25 per cent of the foreign exchange earned by the Company should be retained in the Territory's exchange institution and accounts were settled every three years. The Company was further required to meet from the remaining foreign exchange not only its contractual payments to the Territory in sterling, but also all its foreign exchange liabilities, and any additional such liabilities that might be incurred in the future. Neither the Company nor its personnel were to have recourse to foreign exchange through territorial institutions. In 1954, the procedures were altered to require foreign bills of exchange to be handed over by the Company every year and in the proportion in which the sales were made.

Mining operations

105. Although the Angola Diamond Company's concession covers an area of over one million square kilometres, actual mining has been limited to the Chitao *concelho* (45,483 km², population 100,000) in the Lunda district. Even this area has not been completely surveyed, and prospecting and inventory work continues. In 1961 kimberlite deposits of various types were found, covering an area of some 25 hectares on the banks of the Chipaca River. Of these deposits, 3 hectares are considered to be economically exploitable. Some twenty-four other kimberlite deposits were found subsequently, as well as a deposit of high yielding gravel containing an estimated 90,000 carats. It appears, however, that because of limitation on its production and sales, only a small number of these deposits are being exploited.

106. In 1963, the Company had forty-eight pans in operation. Since the late 1950's, the Company has intensified its programme of mechanization and whereas in 1957 over 30 per cent of the work was still done by hand, by 1963 manual labour accounted for only 12.2 per cent of the total. With the increased mechanization, the average number of carats produced per man-year rose from 39.75 in 1957 to 42.52 in 1961, but has since dropped to below the 1957 level.

DIAMOND MINING

production per man/month*

| Year | Average monthly number of indigenous workers | European workers at 31 December | | Annual production (carats) | No. of carats per man-year |
|-----------|--|---------------------------------|--------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | | Total | | | |
| 1955..... | 19,736 | 393 | 20,129 | 743,377 | 36.93 |
| 1956..... | 20,205 | 440 | 20,645 | 740,035 | 35.85 |
| 1957..... | 21,310 | 485 | 21,795 | 864,372 | 39.75 |
| 1958..... | 23,529 | 510 | 24,059 | 1,001,236 | 41.62 |
| 1959..... | 23,903 | 533 | 24,436 | 1,015,688 | 41.57 |
| 1960..... | 24,254 | 568 | 24,822 | 1,056,827 | 42.58 |
| 1961..... | 26,378 | 608 | 26,986 | 1,147,539 | 42.52 |
| 1962..... | 27,052 | 638 | 27,690 | 1,081,104 | 39.03 |
| 1963..... | 27,909 | 671 | 28,580 | 1,083,571 | 37.91 |

* SOURCE: *Actividade Económica de Angola*. No. 64, Sept.-Dec. 1962, p. 28. Figures for 1962 and 1963 calculated from the Company's reports for those years.

107. The diamonds produced in Angola have an average size of between 3 and 5 carats and over 60 per cent are of gem quality. Since 1958, the Angola Diamond Company has produced over 1 million carats yearly. In 1963, production was 1,083,571 carats, and the value of exports was 768 million escudos (see table 6 below).

Relationship of DIAMANG with other foreign interests

108. Several of the members of the Board of Directors of the Angola Diamond Company in 1963 also had other interests, as follows:

- Baron Pierre Bonvoisin (Belgian): President of the Banque de la Société Générale de Belgique and President of the Banque Belge;
- Harry F. Oppenheimer (South African): President and Director of over fifty companies, including the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd., Diamond Producers Assn., Diamond Trading Company Ltd., and Tanganyika Concessions;
- Ernesto Jardim de Vilhena (Portuguese): formerly Naval Governor of the Territories under the Niassa Company; Governor of the Districts of Zambezia and Lourenço Marques; Minister of Colonies 1908, 1915; Vice-Governor of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino; President of the Banco Burnay; organized and directed also Companhia Geral dos Algodões de Angola and the Companhia de Pesquisas Mineiras de Angola);
- H. J. Joel (South African): also Director of some twenty-seven other companies; including: De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd., Diamond Producers Association, Diamond Trading Company Ltd., Ferreira Estate Company Ltd., Witwatersrand Gold Mining Co. Ltd., Western Areas Gold Mining Co. Ltd.;
- R. A. Callens: also Managing Director of Banco Burnay.

109. According to one source,^m Belgian interests in the Angola Diamond Company include 7 per cent ownership by the Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo (FORMINIÈRE) and 12 per cent by the Société Générale.

110. The relationship of the Angola Diamond Company to the South African mining interests goes back to the end of the First World War. In 1919, the combined production of the South African and South West African diamond mines represented 91.7 per cent of world production. When production in Angola and the Belgian Congo began to increase, the major South African producers drew up an agreement which divided the world diamond trade among themselves on a fixed quota basis "less such volume as was produced by the outsiders". At the same time negotiations were opened with the Angola Diamond

^m Joye, P. and Lewis, R. *Les Trusts au Congo*, Société populaire d'Éditions, Brussels, 1961, p. 228.

Company to bring its diamond sales under control (see document A/5840, paras. 93ff).

111. In 1923, the Anglo-American Corporation, together with Barnato Brothers "acquired an interest" in the Angola Diamond Company, and Mr. E. Oppenheimer joined its Board of Directors to represent the Anglo-American Corporation. In the following year, it was reported that the Corporation, "having acquired an 8 per cent interest in the Diamond Syndicate, retained a 16 per cent interest in Angola Diamonds". A contract was subsequently entered into between the Diamond Syndicate and DIAMANG whereby the former agreed to purchase diamonds produced by DIAMANG and the latter agreed to a limitation on its output.

112. Between May 1926 and March 1927 a further agreement was entered into between DIAMANG and Dunkelsbuhler and Company and Barnato Brothers, in which the Anglo-American Corporation was associated. In 1934, the contract was renewed. Although details are not available, it is reported that:

"Clause 3 of the Angola contract gives the (Diamond) Syndicate the right to buy all diamonds produced by the (Angola Diamond) Company in excess of those to be delivered in satisfaction of firm sales prescribed by the contract... The clause does, however, provide that diamonds produced in excess of the agreed amounts must be offered to the Syndicate, the effect of which is to place the Syndicate in a position to prevent the Angola Company disposing of diamonds outside the Syndicate...."^a

113. This contract appears to have differed from some others in which the Syndicate merely undertook to buy a maximum value of diamonds each year, while the producers bound themselves not to sell to any other outside parties. It seems that the Portuguese were in a position to drive a hard bargain, since they were considered to be the "principal and most dangerous competitors among all the foreign (non-South African) producers". Not only were costs of production less in Angola, so that the diamonds could be sold abroad with a profit at a lower price, but production had been kept low and could easily be doubled. Furthermore, the Angola diamonds were of a much better quality than those produced in the Congo.

114. Up to 1956, the Angola Diamond Company sold exclusively through the Central Selling Organization, and, it appears, accepted a production quota. From 1950 up to and including 1956, annual production averaged constantly about 740,000 carats. Since 1958, it has increased to over one million carats annually (see table 6 below).

115. This increase coincided with a change in marketing practice whereby part of the diamonds produced are now sold to the Portuguese Diamond Cutting Company (see paras. 134-136 below). The current contract with the Diamond Corporation Ltd., which was signed in 1960, continues to guarantee a minimum annual purchase—which may be increased by 20 per cent over the previous contract figure—but from which the value of the diamonds sold to the Portuguese Cutting Company will be deducted.

116. The actual prices at which DIAMANG at present sells its diamonds to the Portuguese Cutting Company and to the Central Selling Organization are not known. In 1956, as reported to the annual general meeting,^b the actual average selling price to the Diamond Corporation was 461.10 escudos per carat, though, according to international quotations, the world market price was 1,303.48 escudos per carat, the difference amounting to a loss of 626,668 contos. While it was clear that had the Company been free to sell its diamonds directly, it would have earned that much more, part of the loss was offset by the Company's share in the profits of the diamond marketing enterprises, which amounted to 81,228 contos. The actual loss was therefore 545,440 contos, or approximately \$U.S. 18 million.

117. Relating these prices to the number of carats produced per man/month (see the table in para. 106), it will be seen that in 1956, for instance, when the production per man/month

was 39.75 carats, the value of production per man/year was 16,402 escudos, based on the selling price, and 46,375 escudos, based on the market price.

118. In 1963, the Angola Diamond Company held the following investments in diamond selling enterprises:

| | <i>Escudos</i> |
|--|----------------------|
| Industrial distributors (1946) Ltd. | 2,505,312.50 |
| The Diamond Trading Company Ltd. | 20,350,261.93 |
| The Diamond Purchasing and Trading Company Ltd. | 23,797,820.05 |
| TOTAL | 46,653,394.48 |

Relationship of DIAMANG with the Government of Angola and Portugal

119. Since the very early years, the exclusive concession granted to the Angola Diamond Company has come under criticism in the Territory. These criticisms have been levelled both at Portugal for conceding one of the Territory's major national resources to "foreign interests" and at the company for the way in which it carried out the exploitation and distributed the profits.^c For its part, the Government of Angola, as revealed by the contracts, has persistently sought to obtain a larger share of the income from the Angola Diamond Company, both through participation in profits and dividends and in the form of long-term low-interest loans to finance projects of development not within the means of the Territory's ordinary revenue. The Angola Government has also sought to ensure that the activities of the company would make a direct contribution to the economy of the Territory by requiring it to buy local goods whenever possible. In addition, the Government of Portugal has been interested in the foreign exchange earned by the diamond exports. The extent to which these different, but not conflicting, interests have been met by the company is reflected in the various changes introduced into the original contract of 1921.

120. According to an account by Norton de Matos, then High Commissioner of Angola, the company prior to 1921 had already received, under decrees issued by the Government of Portugal, important exclusive diamond rights which enabled it to peg as many claims as it wished up to 1926. These rights had been granted and later extended before expiration date, with almost no requirement for State participation. The negotiations between the Angola Diamond Company and the High Commissioner of Angola which resulted in the first contract of 1921 set the basis for the Government's participation in the profits of the Company.

(a) Profits and dividends

121. According to one of the company's reports, the Angola Government's share from diamond mining up to 30 June 1936 amounted to £902,475 in profits and £78,750 in dividends. The Angola Government's share at the end of 1960 and in the following years is shown below:

ACCUMULATED RECEIPTS OF THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT FROM DIAMOND MINING, 1921-1963

(In pounds sterling)

| | 1921-1960 | To 1961 | To 1962 | To 1963 |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Participation in profits | 16,722,559 | 18,498,176 | 19,412,362 | 21,530,750 |
| Participation in dividends | 1,461,728 | 1,658,001 | 1,814,523 | 1,971,293 |
| TOTAL | 18,184,287 | 20,156,177 | 21,226,885 | 23,502,043 |

^a Gregory, Theodore, *Ernest Oppenheimer and the Economic Development of Southern Africa*, London, 1962, p. 235.

^b Referred to in *Actividade Económica de Angola*, No. 59/60, p. 90.

^c See paragraph 94 above. One of the complaints, for instance, concerned the 10 per cent share of the profits paid to the members of the Board of Directors. This share has been reduced to 6 per cent.

122. The Territory's share in the proceeds from diamond mining in 1962 was the fourth largest source of ordinary revenue; it was exceeded only by import duties (285.7 million escudos); export duties (241.5 million escudos); and the general minimum tax (271.1 million escudos). In 1963, it ranked fifth and was exceeded also by the stamp tax (136.3 million escudos).^a

PROCEEDS FROM DIAMOND MINING CONTRIBUTION
TO THE TERRITORIAL BUDGET^a

(In million escudos)

| | Profits | Dividends | Total | Ordinary revenue | Total as percentage of ordinary revenue |
|----------|---------|-----------|-------|---------------------|--|
| 1959 ... | 88 | 2.1 | 90.1 | 1,852 | 4.9 |
| 1960 ... | 106 | 3.8 | 109.8 | 1,967 | 5.6 |
| 1961 ... | 137 | 1.7 | 138.7 | 2,036 | 6.8 |
| 1962 ... | 143 | 2.5 | 145.5 | 2,460 | 5.9 |
| 1963 ... | 109 | 2.7 | 111.7 | — | — |

^a Profits and dividends relate to the previous calendar year.

(b) Loans

123. Under the Portuguese fiscal policy, each Territory has its own budget and must finance its own development. In Angola, the Diamond Company has been one of the main sources of low interest loans which the Territorial Government has used for such projects. Under the provisions of the first contract of May 1921 (see para. 95) the Territory received two loans of £200,000 each in the first two years, and subsequently other loans, so that at the end of 1936 the Angola Government's unpaid loan balance was £797,630.^r Under the new contract negotiated in 1937, a further loan of £250,000 was made to the Angolan Government at the same low rate of interest and the period of repayment of the unpaid loan balance was extended. In 1946, another loan of £1 million was made in connexion with the establishment of a development fund for the Five-Year Development Plan of Angola.

124. The contract signed under the terms of Decree 39,920 of 22 November 1954 provided for the opening in 1955 of a credit of 208,424,938.52 escudos in favour of the Angolan Government. Of this, the sum of 108,424,938.52 escudos was to be used to write off the outstanding debt of the Territory with the Company and 100 million escudos was to be in the form of a loan at 1 per cent per annum payable in yearly instalments up to 1971. The repayment was to be deducted from the Territory's share in the company's profits and dividends; if insufficient, the remainder was to be drawn from the Territory's general revenue.

125. In 1961, following the uprising, the Angolan Government sought to raise one million contos in loans from the various locally established enterprises, to be used for defence and development of the Territory. In January 1962, the Angola Diamond Company agreed to a loan amounting to 105,500 contos (consisting of \$3 million in United States currency and 20 million escudos). The term of the loan was for twenty years at 1 per cent, the first payment to begin on 1 July 1963.

126. In June 1963, another loan of 150 million escudos was made to the Territorial Government on substantially the same terms, namely repayment of the principal in twenty annual instalments over the period 1964-1984, together with interest at the rate of 1 per cent.

127. At the end of 1963, the Angola Government's unpaid loan balance was 300,590,476.20 escudos (see table 3 below).

(c) Foreign exchange

128. Since 1937, the Angola Diamond Company has been under contractual obligation to hand over to the Territorial Government a fixed portion of the foreign exchange it earned. In 1954 these provisions were changed and the company was

required to make its contribution in different currencies in proportion to the actual sales.

129. From 1 January 1955 to 31 December 1963 the foreign currencies handed over to the Government were as follows:

| | |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|
| United States dollars | 39,650,000 |
| Pounds sterling | 2,395,950 |
| Portuguese escudos ^a | 103,000,000 |

^a The local currency has not always been convertible with the Portuguese escudo and has been subject to a discount.

130. The Company reported that from 1 January 1931 to 31 December 1963, moneys (including dividends and profits, loans and foreign exchange) which it had placed at the disposal of the Angolan Government for external payments amounted to £52,031,561, or an average of £129,432 per month.

(d) Taxes and contribution to national defence

131. Under its contract, the Angola Diamond Company is exempt from all taxes and charges, licence fees, import/export duties, income, corporation and other taxes that may be imposed in the Territory. Dividends paid in Portugal are, however, subject to taxation. The taxes paid to the Portuguese Treasury amounted to 66,195 contos in 1961; 42,450 contos in 1962 and 48,189 contos in 1963.

132. Under the provisions of the 1906 Overseas Mining Law, concessionaires holding mining rights are required to give support to the Government for the maintenance of peace and order. In 1961 and 1962, the Angola Diamond Company included in the fixed assets, reported as depreciated, military barracks and guard posts. In addition, since 1961, the company has each year paid the Angolan Government a contribution for the defence of national property (complicação de defesa do Património Nacional). The amounts paid were 14,111,768 escudos in 1961; 16,960,983.39 in 1962; and 16,910,206.24 escudos in 1963, making a total of some 48 million escudos.

133. In 1962, the Angola Diamond Company was also assessed in the amount of 88.6 million escudos for the extraordinary defence tax. Following litigation, it appears that the company was exempted from such payment, as the amount no longer appears in the 1963 statement of assets and liabilities.

(e) Export of diamonds to Portugal

134. In 1957, Portugal moved to stop the direct export of diamonds overseas and took steps to enter the diamond cutting and processing industries. Under the terms of Decree No. 41,004 of 15 February 1957, it required diamond producers in the overseas Territories (the only one being the Angola Diamond Company) to establish sorting and appraisal services in Lisbon and to support the establishment of a Portuguese diamond cutting enterprise known as the Sociedade Portuguesa de Lapidação de Diamantes. Once the sorting and appraisal services had come into operation, all diamonds produced in the Overseas Territories were to be exported directly to Lisbon before re-export to foreign countries. The national diamond cutting enterprise was guaranteed the supply of those diamonds from the overseas Territories which it could work. Contracts for the sale of diamonds to foreign enterprises were made subject to these enterprises agreeing to supply the Portuguese Diamond Cutting Company with stones which it could work economically.

135. The Sociedade Portuguesa de Lapidação de Diamantes was organized in 1957 and has its headquarters in Lisbon. Its registered capital is 150 million escudos, divided into 150,000 shares of 1,000 escudos each. At least 60 per cent of the registered capital must be Portuguese. According to the original articles of incorporation of the company (*Diário do Governo*, Series III, 11 January 1958), the distribution of the share capital was as follows: Government of Portugal, 15 million escudos; Government of Angola, 15 million escudos; the Bank of Angola, 20 million escudos; Banco Fonsecas, Santos e Vianna, 20 million escudos; Banco José Henriques Totta, 20 million escudos; the Angola Diamond Company, 24.6 million escudos; Diamond Corporation, Ltd., 20 million escudos; Banco Burnay, 15 million escudos, Ernesto de Vilhena, 200,000

^r Bank of Angola, *Relatório e Contas, Exercício de 1963*, Lisbon, 1964, p. 143.

^r Annual report of the Angola Diamond Company for 1936.

escudos; and Vasco Luis de Castro, 200,000 escudos. Ten per cent of the capital was paid up in the first year. At the end of 1963, 40 million escudos had been paid up, of which 19.8 million was subscribed by the Banco de Angola and 7.3 million by the Angola Diamond Company. Its fixed assets were reported at 24 million escudos and current assets 13 million escudos. As it had not yet come into full operation, it reported a loss of 1.2 million escudos in 1963.

136. The Portuguese Diamond Cutting Company is classified as a "national" industry and the import and export of diamonds to or from Portugal are therefore exempt from customs duties.

Economic and social consequences of the diamond mining operations in Angola

(a) Use of loans for development projects

137. In the foregoing section on the relationship of the Angola Diamond Company with the Governments of Portugal and Angola, it was shown that, in effect, the Angolan Government has shared in the income resulting from diamond mining. As the Angolan Government's share in the profits and dividends are paid into the Territory's regular budget, it is impossible to assess the effect of this money on the economy of the Territory as a whole. Little more is known on the way in which the loans have been spent, for, even when they have been made for the purpose of implementing "development plans", they form only part of the total resources used for this purpose.

138. In the period 1938-1944, for instance, expenditure under the Angola Development Fund amounted to 122,500 contos, of which 26,400 contos (or about one fifth of the total) was from the Angola Diamond Company loan of 1937 (see para. 123 above). Among the other sources used to finance development in the Territory at that time were a 1.5 per cent *ad valorem* import duty. (A loan at 4.5 per cent interest, which was to have been obtained from the Caixa Geral de Depósitos in Portugal, was never realized).

139. The projects which were to be financed from the development fund in 1938-1944 included work on ports (32 per cent), communications (15 per cent), schools (18 per cent), railways (24 per cent). Projects conceived specifically to furnish assistance to the indigenous people amounted to less than 2 per cent of the total.

140. Similarly, the 1946 loan of £1 million, or 100 million escudos at the officially established rate of exchange, constituted one third of the development fund of 300 million escudos established that year. The main projects to be financed by this fund were for improvement of energy sources (10 per cent); public health (11.3 per cent); communications (47 per cent); agriculture, forestry, livestock and mining (11 per cent); local improvements (11.6 per cent); construction of schools (8.4 per cent); and other projects (5 per cent).

141. Loans from the Angola Diamond Company have played a less important role in the subsequent development plans of Angola for 1953-1953 and 1959-1964 which were drawn up as an integral part of the first and second National Development Plans of Portugal and its overseas Territories. Although local Angolan resources financed 95 per cent of the 1953-1958 plan, there was less reliance on loans due to the fact that new resources had been created through special taxes and funds provided by marketing boards. In the 1959-1964 plan, it was intended that a smaller proportion of development expenditure would be financed from Angolan resources, as special loans from Portugal were to be increased.

142. Since the events of 1961, development expenditure in Angola has been more closely linked with defence expenditure, making it even more difficult to ascertain the purposes for which specific funds are used.

(b) Purchase of supplies

143. Under the terms of its contract, the Angola Diamond Company is required to purchase its foodstuffs and supplies in Angola, or from Portugal if not available locally. It is also required to use Portuguese ships for transportation of its supplies as far as possible. In 1963, its total purchases of supplies amounted to 320 million escudos, of which 130

million (or over 40 per cent) was spent in Angola; 45 million (14 per cent) in Portugal; 58.5 million (18.2 per cent) in the United States; and 32 million (10 per cent) in the United Kingdom.

144. Of the purchases made in Angola, 107,000 escudos were spent on local products, including fuels, 33,000 contos; dried fish, maize, palm oil and other foodstuffs, 28,000 contos; cement, 11,000 contos; livestock, 9,000 contos; beer and soft drinks, 7,000 contos.

(c) Employment

145. The Angola Diamond Company employs over 80 per cent of the workers engaged in mining in Angola and is the largest single employer in the Territory. In 1963, its work force consisted of 671 persons from Portugal, of whom 23 were engaged in non-mining activities, and 27,909 indigenous workers. Of the latter, 16,908 were recruited locally in the Lunda district and 8,887 were contract workers from other parts of Angola. The total number of man/months worked was 303,819, of which 31 per cent was used in removing the overburden and transporting and treating the deposits, 8.9 per cent in prospecting and 0.59 per cent in selecting diamonds. All other labour was engaged in maintenance and supplies, health, education and transportation services or other general work. The annual amounts spent on salaries and remuneration, during the years 1958-1962, averaged £950,000, or about 76 million escudos.

146. There are special provisions in the Company's contract relating to its labour supply. Although the wording of these provisions has been changed by successive amendments to the 1921 contract, their effect is to make the Government responsible for taking special measures, in accordance with the labour legislation in force, to assist the Company in obtaining the indigenous labour which it needs.

147. Under the terms of the various contracts the Government undertook to assist indigenous inhabitants from other parts of the Territory to settle in the mining area, to take special measures to help the Company recruit workers from outside the region, and to reduce and simplify the formalities involved in recruiting.

148. Encouragement of indigenous inhabitants to settle permanently in the Lunda district does not seem to have been successful, and this provision, which appeared in the 1921 and 1937 contracts, was no longer included after 1946.

149. As regards the special assistance referred to in paragraph 147 above, although the contracts specify that any measures to assist the Company in obtaining workers shall be in accordance with the labour legislation in force, a number of anomalous situations were permitted to develop which were described euphemistically by a former Governor-General of Angola as somewhat illegal (*menos legal*).⁸

150. Among measures taken to assist the Company was, for instance, an order by the Angolan Government issued in 1947 reserving all labour in the Lunda district for "enterprises operating there" (*Portaria*, 5,889 of 9 April 1947). As the Angola Diamond Company was at that time the only large enterprise in the district, the order in effect gave it a monopoly over local recruitment and denied local workers the freedom to offer their services elsewhere.

151. The system of recruitment with government assistance was examined by the Commission of the International Labour Organisation which investigated labour conditions in the Territories under Portuguese administration in 1961. The Commission's report⁹ confirmed that the Angola Diamond Company had recruited labour through the intermediary of administrative officials and indigenous chiefs for the previous forty years until the practice was changed by a decision of the Governor-General of Angola in July 1961, supplemented by a decision

⁸ Sá Viana Rebelo, H. de, *Angola na África deste tempo*, Lisbon 1961, p. 95.

⁹ International Labour Organisation, *Report of the Commission appointed under article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation to examine the complaint filed by the Government of Ghana concerning the observance by the Government of Portugal of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105)*, Geneva 1962, paras. 273 and 518-538.

of the Governor of Lunda district on 28 October 1961, directing the Company to establish its own system of recruiting without recourse to the administrative authorities. Although the Commission did not find that there had been forced labour prior to 1961, it noted that the system of recruitment previously in force was liable to involve compulsion and it recommended that the Government review the position at a later date to ensure that the Governor-General's decision had been fully carried out. The Commission observed that the relations between the Angolan Government and the Angola Diamond Company in the latter's concession areas presented many of the problems which arise in other countries in which a large industrial concern virtually exercises the functions of government in a large area, but that this phenomenon did not in itself involve, though it might make more difficult, the detection and suppression of any element of forced labour.

152. Company reports show that, despite the introduction in 1956 of a statutory minimum wage (Angola, Decree Law No. 2,797 of 31 December 1956),^u cash wages paid by the Company remained substantially below the minimum and workers recruited locally in the Lunda district received only about three-quarters of the cash wage paid to workers from the Songo circumscription of the Malange district. Although the mining legislation requires that all workers be paid in cash, an exception was made permitting the Company to take into account, in determining its wage rates, the special services which it provides. It may be noted that in 1960, the Company increased the wages of contracted labourers from Songo and the Lunda district and in 1961 the wage rates were completely revised and new classifications were established.

153. The basis for the Company's labour policy was explained in a report which it published in 1963, as follows:

"Every organization dealing with a country's wealth in terms of manpower must work on these broad principles: it must improve the living conditions of the natives, it must constantly care for their welfare, and it must raise them in both social and economic scales of values.

"The Africans serving the Company have therefore to be considered under these heads:

"(a) What stage have they reached in their social evolution?

"(b) How far are they trained for the work?

"(c) What are their terms of employment?

"The first—the only one that calls for any special comment—relates to a scale that ranges from zero point (though even here useful service can be rendered if it is directed) to the point where his environment is identical with that of the European employee."

154. The actual terms of employment vary according to whether the worker is from the local area or not. In the past, as has been shown above, wage scales differed according to the district from which the worker came. Differences are also made according to whether the worker is from the *concelho* of Chitato or a different part of the Lunda district. The Company considers the former group more privileged because of their closer contact with the civilizing influence exerted by the Company and the material and other assistance available to them. Workers from outside the *concelho* therefore receive, in addition to their wages, food, clothing and housing. (In 1958, for instance, the Company spent a total of 19,142 contos on its 8,086 contract workers from other regions, and of this amount, 9,853 contos was for wages, 1,250 for rations, 7,379 for transport and other recruitment and repatriation expenses, and 660 contos for hospitalization.)

155. With the coming into force in 1963 of the Rural Labour Code and the regulations enacted thereunder, the Angola Diamond Company made an exhaustive study in order to adapt its labour structure to the new provisions. There is as yet no information concerning the changes made.

^u This decree established minimum wages for agricultural workers as follows: 57 escudos plus rations, or 150 escudos if no rations provided, for workers hired within the administrative district; 70 to 225 escudos for workers recruited from outside the district and from 84 to 300 escudos for other workers (article 197, No. 3, of the Indigenous Labour Code).

(d) Other activities

156. As explained above, the Angola Diamond Company is responsible for the health, education and welfare of the inhabitants of Chitato, which has an area of 45,483 km² with a population of about 100,000. It also maintains agricultural and livestock services.

157. In 1962, the Company had one doctor per 5,000 people; one nurse for 2,500 and for every 100 persons it had one assistant nurse, one first-year nurse, or one ward maid. In all, it maintained 2 central hospitals, 4 other hospitals, 7 hospital dispensaries, 4 maternity hospitals, 1 dispensary, 6 public health stations and 74 first-aid posts.

158. The Company maintains primary and secondary schools and *escolas de adaptação*, with a total enrolment in 1962 of 2,259 pupils. As part of its cultural activities, the Company also maintains a library, a museum, a zoo and research laboratories and publishes articles on cultural and scientific matters relating to Angola.

159. In the agricultural field, it had in 1962, 14 agricultural stations and 1,079 hectares under cultivation. The Company's agricultural service distributes fertilizers and provides technical assistance to local farmers. There is a livestock development scheme covering 80,000 ha. with over 20,240 cattle.

160. According to the 1962 report, the Company spent 25 million escudos (£312,500) each year on the maintenance of roads and bridges. In addition to its statutory obligations, it makes grants to various cultural and social organizations in Angola and Portugal, the sums of which, in an average year, exceed £100,000 or 8 million escudos.

161. According to data published in the 1962 report, the Company also paid an average of some £2.4 million each year to Territorial and Portuguese concerns. For the most recent five-year period, the total payments were as follows:

(a) To the local population:

| | £ |
|---|-----------|
| Salaries and other remuneration | 4,745,850 |
| Purchase of surplus crops grown locally | 320,800 |
| TOTAL | 5,066,650 |

(b) To commerce, industry and transport companies in Angola:

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------|
| Purchases | 5,545,800 |
| Freight charges | 798,312 |
| TOTAL | 6,344,112 |

(c) Portuguese steamship companies, maritime and air travel lines:

| | |
|----------------------------|---------|
| Freight and passages | 485,175 |
|----------------------------|---------|

Recent developments

162. In April 1964, the Government of Angola opened up to diamond prospecting the 221,000 km² over which it had reserved mining rights since 1928. This area consists of the part of Angola west of meridian 15° north of the Benguela Railway and the area west of meridian 14° south of the Benguela Railway to parallel 16° south and a small coastal area from Moçamedes down to Foz do Kunene.

163. In order to facilitate development, the whole area has been divided into 352 blocks of about 750 km² each. For the first five prospecting rights will be granted for two years to persons having adequate financial and technical resources. Provisionally, the deposit has been set at 250,000 escudos for each block, as the diamond resources are not yet adequately known.

164. As the release of this area coincides with the growing interests in off-shore diamonds, by the end of 1964 many requests had been filed for the new area released as well as for the continental shelf from parallel 15° southwards. Among those requesting the new exclusive concessions were: Cunene Exploration (Pty.), Ltd., for part of the continental shelf; Nuno Monteiro de Casto Soromenho, for the continental

shelf from the Kunene River northwards to parallel 15°; Reginald Lionel von Musits, for 28 lots of 750 km² each and the continental shelf 11°-14° and 15° south to the Foz do Kunene; Sociedade Mineira do Kunene, S.A.R.L.,^v which was established in May 1964 with a registered share capital of one million escudos, applied for 90 lots.

165. In September an exclusive prospecting licence for diamonds and other precious stones was granted to the Angola Exploration Company (Pty.), Ltd., with headquarters in Johannesburg, South Africa (*Portaria* 20,782). The concession comprised 108 lots with a total area of approximately 64,000 km².

166. In November 1964, a similar concession comprising 13 lots was granted to Joao Antonio Veiga, an industrialist resident in Luanda (*Portaria* 20,907). These diamond concessions are for an initial period of two years, subject to one or two renewals of an equal period. Contrary to the terms of concessions granted previously, the terms of the concession provide that the concessionaire must relinquish at least 25 per cent of the total area at the end of each period of two years. The concessionaire must, within 60 days of the publication of the Government order granting the licence, submit a plan of prospecting involving the expenditure of at least 700 escudos per square kilometre.

C. PETROLEUM EXTRACTION

General

167. Following the publication in 1909 of the special petroleum extraction legislation (see paras. 41-43 above), a number of companies obtained exclusive rights to prospect for petroleum in Angola. Among them was the Companhia de Petróleos de Angola (ANGOIL), which was associated with Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corporation and with Belgian interests. This company obtained extensive concessions in the northern part of Angola in 1916 and 1922. The Portuguese interests in the company included those of Ernesto de Vilhena (see para. 108 above) and the Banco Nacional Ultramarino. The capital of ANGOIL in 1929 was 5.8 million escudos. Another company was the Companhia Mineira de Moçambique, which obtained exclusive petroleum prospecting rights in the whole of Angola south of the Benguela Railway. Although considerable sums were spent, no oil was found and these concessions were apparently allowed to lapse.

168. In the 1950's, interest in petroleum revived and new concessions were granted. According to the latest report of the Angola Department of Geological Surveys and Mines, at the end of 1962 there were only two concessions with exclusive petroleum prospecting and exploiting rights, namely one held by ANGOIL and the other by the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, a subsidiary of Gulf Oil Corporation.

Companhia de Petróleos de Angola

169. At the end of 1962 the Companhia de Petróleos de Angola, S.A.R.L. (PETRANGOL) held concessions totalling 28,596 km². The Company has its headquarters in Luanda, Angola. Its registered capital is 150 million escudos, divided into 150,000 shares of 1,000 escudos each. In accordance with Law No. 1,994 of 13 April 1943, the statutes of the Company provide that 55 per cent of the share capital must be held by Portuguese enterprises and transfers of shares to foreign enterprises must remain within this limit.

170. The present concession held by PETRANGOL was originally granted in 1952 to the Companhia de Combustíveis do Lobito (CARBONANG). Decree No. 38,832 of 18 July 1952 authorized the establishment for the prospecting of petroleum of "a special régime that will afford guarantees" not provided in the legislation then in force (i.e., the Overseas Mining Law of 1906 and the Decree of 9 December 1909).

171. The concession comprises two areas, one in the Congo district and one in the Cuanza district (see para. 177 below). The concession conferred the exclusive right to prospect for and exploit, deposits of solid, liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, including petroleum, naphtha, ozokerite, and natural gas, as

well as sulphur, helium, carbon dioxide and saline substances. Specifically excluded were those substances (asphalt and bituminous coal) over which mining rights had already been granted to the Companhia dos Betuminosos de Angola.^w The right to prospect for and exploit sulphur, helium, carbon dioxide and saline substances is automatically forfeited if the Company does not take such action within a period of 120 days.

172. Exclusive prospecting rights were for three years, which could be extended if the Company carried out "intensive" prospecting by spending a minimum of 40 million escudos in this period.^x The Company was given the right to mark as many claims as it wished, without the limitation on the area of the claim specified in the Decree of 1909 (see para. 42 above), and to exploit these areas for an initial period of fifty years with a possible extension for a further twenty years.

173. The Company was also given the right, subject to the approval of the Government, to establish refineries for processing the substances extracted from the concession or imported from abroad.

174. The Government retained the right to purchase 50 per cent of the annual output of crude petroleum and its products, by-products, derivatives and residues.

175. The terms of the concession made it mandatory for the concessionaire to transfer its exploitation rights to a company established in accordance with Portuguese law and with a minimum capital of 50 million escudos. One third of the shares of the new company were to be given freely to Angola "as a compensation" for the privileges and exemptions granted under the concession and, in addition, one third of the capital had to be subscribed by Portuguese enterprises to which CARBONANG could transfer, with the right to indemnation, "all the relevant rights and obligations which are not exclusive to CARBONANG". Transfers of shares to aliens in excess of the proportion specified was to be invalid unless specially approved by the Government.

176. The concessionaire was exempted from the following taxes and duties:

(a) The proportional mining tax and the fixed tax contained in the Overseas Mining Law of 1906 (see para. 26 above);

(b) Defence and profits taxes (*imposto de defesa e de rendimento*) or other taxes levied on capital investment;

(c) Export duties and any general or local taxes levied on mining products exported either raw or processed, but not on the stamp duty;

(d) Building tax and other duties pertaining to immovable property and buildings necessary for the exercise of the rights of the concession.

177. Before the expiration of the first three-year term of its concession, the Companhia de Combustíveis do Lobito discovered oil near Luanda. A new contract was signed by the Overseas Minister with the Companhia de Combustíveis do Lobito under the authorization of Decree No. 40,416 of 3 December 1955. The exclusive prospecting rights were extended for another period of three years and to the original concession was added the coastal area between the Congo and the Cuanza basins and the Benguela and Moçamedes basins (it was stated that the new areas "may include" the adjacent parts of the continental shelf, provided that the legal formalities required are complied with).

178. The new terms of the concession required that the exploiting company provided for in the previous contract should have a minimum capital of 900 million escudos, of which 55 per cent, including the shares owned by the Government of Angola, must be Portuguese-owned. The Companhia de Combustíveis do Lobito, S.A.R.L., either by itself or together with the Companhia Industrial do Lobito, S.A.R.L., was required to subscribe to at least 11.67 per cent of the shares and to offer for public subscription an equal number of shares. Details of ownership and distribution of the shares of these companies is not known. *The Stock Exchange Annual* for 1964, however, lists Angola Holdings, Ltd., of London, as having interests in the Companhia de Combustíveis do Lobito.

^v The term "Sociedade anónima de responsabilidade limitada" (S.A.R.L.) is equivalent to the English "limited (liability) company".

^w By decree No. 33,989 of 29 September 1944.

^x Of this, 12.5 per cent must be spent in the first year and 43.75 per cent in each of the next two years.

179. The exploiting company, known as PETRANGOL,⁷ was authorized to sign a contract with the Compagnie Financière Belge des Pétroles (PETROFINA), a Belgian company, for the provision of technical, commercial and financial assistance. This was to include all the financing necessary for the operation and development of PETRANGOL for which other means had not been authorized by the Government and for which the Company did not wish to have recourse to bank loans. PETROFINA was allocated 18.7 per cent of the liquid profits (compared with 21.25 per cent allocated to the Government of Angola)⁸ but was specifically excluded from acting in "Portuguese Territory either in its own name or as a representative of the company (PETRANGOL)".

180. In 1957, Decree No. 41,295 of 25 September extended the exclusive prospecting rights to 1962 and the exploiting company (PETRANGOL) was authorized to establish a refinery. Of the 900 million escudos minimum capital originally specified, the Company was allowed initially to raise only 150 million escudos. The refinery, which was later set up near Luanda, was authorized to refine not only all the local crude oil production but also imported oil, and to engage in trading of the refined products, but not direct sales in the Territory, the exclusive rights over which are held by a subsidiary of SACOR (Sociedade Anónima Concessionária de Refinação de Petróleos em Portugal). PETRANGOL also became subject to the foreign exchange regulations in force in the Territory (article 8 of Decree No. 41,295).

181. The concession of the Companhia de Combustíveis do Lobito (now commonly known as PURFINA), which was renewed in October 1962, will expire in 1967 when all areas not demarcated or under exploitation will become free and the petroleum rights will revert to the Government. It may be pointed out that, as provided in the original contract of 1952, both FURFINA and PETRANGOL remain exempt from the 50 per cent income tax on petroleum operations which was introduced in 1957. The terms of this concession are therefore more favourable than those of the concession later granted to the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (which is described in paras. 188-194 below).

Operations and production

182. The most important petroleum deposits discovered so far are at Luanda, Benfica, Cacuaco, Galinda and Tobias, all of which, with the exception of the first, lie within a distance of 42 to 120 km from Luanda.

183. Before oil was discovered, Angola annually imported petroleum products valued at some 60 million escudos. In the first year after PETRANGOL began operations, Angola became self-sufficient in crude oil, and by 1963 had become an exporter of refined petroleum.

184. It is estimated that from the deposits so far discovered, PETRANGOL can produce easily an average of some 4,000 cubic metres daily, i.e. over 1.2 million metric tons annually. In 1963 PETRANGOL completed the necessary technical work and installations for this higher output. However, as decided by the Minister for Economy of Portugal, the Luanda refinery was originally authorized to process only 450,000 tons and of the remaining crude oil production in Angola 400,000 tons is allocated for refining in "national territory" (with SACOR in Portugal receiving 350,000 tons and SONAREP in Mozambique receiving 50,000 tons); 200,000 tons is to be sold on the international market with the help of enterprises in Portugal, and 150,000 tons is to be marketed by PETROFINA.

185. PETRANGOL, which PETROFINA lists as one of its subsidiaries, in effect, owns and operates the oil wells and

⁷ In the Statutes of the exploiting company set up in 1956, the name is Companhia Concessionária de Petróleos de Angola (COPA), S.A.R.L.

⁸ The liquid profits are distributed as follows: 5 per cent to legal reserve; of the remainder, 50 per cent to shareholders, and of the other 50 per cent, one half to the Government of Angola, 44 per cent to PETROFINA and the last 6 per cent to be distributed by decision of the General Assembly. In terms of the total liquid profits, PETROFINA's share is 18.7 per cent and that of Angola 21.25 per cent.

the refinery. Of its registered capital, one-third is owned by Belgian and one-third by Portuguese private interests and the remaining third by the Portuguese Government. According to newspaper reports, however, PETROFINA's investment in PETRANGOL is estimated variously at \$U.S. 44 million and £107 million. The latter's balance sheet for the year ending 31 December 1963 shows its total liabilities at that time to have been 1,203 million escudos. These included long-term liabilities amounting to 324.9 million escudos, of which share capital accounted for 150 million, amortizations 172 million, and legal reserves 3 million. Current liabilities were 235 million escudos, including debts to PETROFINA totalling 176 million escudos, debts to others amounting to 49 million escudos and dividends payable, for which a sum of 255,600 escudos had been allocated. The credit account held on behalf of PETROFINA for prospecting was 615 million escudos.

186. PETRANGOL's income from mining and refining activities amounted to 116.7 million escudos in 1963 and net profits for the year were 19.8 million escudos. The profits were distributed in accordance with the terms of its concession contract, as follows:

| | Escudos |
|--|-------------------|
| Statutory legal reserve, at 5 per cent | 989,188 |
| Shareholder's dividend at 6 per cent | 9,000,000 |
| Share of profits to Angola | 4,500,000 |
| Share of profits to PETROFINA | 3,960,000 |
| For distribution by the General Assembly.... | 540,000 |
| Undistributed profits | 794,568 |
| TOTAL | 19,783,756 |

187. No recent data are available on the amount of foreign exchange that PETRANGOL has earned for Angola. The escudo value of the foreign exchange earned was 86 million in 1958, 43 million in 1959 and 38 million in 1960.

Cabinda Gulf Oil Company

188. In 1957, the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, which is incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware, United States of America, and which has its headquarters in Wilmington, Delaware, obtained a petroleum concession in the Cabinda enclave of Angola. This concession includes part of the continental shelf of Angola, and although the terms of the concession follow the general pattern of that of the Companhia de Combustíveis do Lobito, the financial clauses are different.

189. The original area of the concession granted to the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company in July 1957 comprised almost the whole of the western half of the Cabinda enclave, and the area was some 8,000 km². In November of the same year, the terms of the concession were modified to include an annual surface rent and at the same time the delimitation of the area of the concession was slightly modified. The actual area held by the Company extends into the Atlantic to a depth of 30 metres. In 1960 the area was reported by the Serviços de Geologia e Minas as 7,270 km² and in 1961 as 6,166 km². The reason for this decrease is unexplained.

190. The Company's exclusive prospecting rights, which were originally granted for three years, have been renewed and now expire in November 1966. Under its 1957 contract, the Company was required to spend on prospecting each year not less than 4,000 escudos per square kilometre. Total expenditure was to be not less than 6.8 million escudos in the first year and 39.1 million escudos in each of the next two years (i.e. approximately \$U.S. 3 million over the three-year period). On renewal of the contract for two years, the Company was required to spend a minimum of 92 million escudos in prospecting. In addition, the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company pays a surface rent of 629.2 escudos per square kilometre.

191. The terms of the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company's contract for exploiting petroleum deposits also differ from those of PETRANGOL. It has the right to exploit for fifty years, with a twenty-year extension, all areas over which demarca-

tion has been requested within six months after the expiration of the prospecting licence. No conditions are imposed on the exploiting Company as to minimum capital or the share of ownership by the Territory. The Company has "full freedom to produce, save, sell and export any and all substances extracted from the area of the concession", but it has not been authorized to establish a refinery. The Government of Angola receives a royalty of 12.5 per cent of the sales value and has the right to purchase a maximum of 37.5 per cent of the quantity of crude oil produced each year.

192. In return for the payment of royalties, the Company is exempt from "duties, imports or taxes, whatever their name or nature, whether national, provincial or municipal, present or future" with the exception of the 50 per cent income tax on profits from oil operations, the statistical tax of one mil *ad valorem* and the stamp tax on customs clearance documents. It is also exempt from present or future taxes on shares, capital and debentures of the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company so long as these remain in the ownership of the parent company, Gulf Oil Corporation, or its affiliates.

193. Most of the other terms of the Cabinda Gulf Oil contract are similar to those of PETRANGOL. It has the same privileges as regards use of the public domain, duty-free import of goods and machinery, facilities of entry into and exit from Portuguese territory for its personnel, etc., except that there is no obligation to employ a fixed percentage of Portuguese personnel. The Cabinda Gulf Oil Company is also subject to the exchange control measures of the Territory.

Operations

194. On 31 December 1963, the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company had a share capital of 42.9 million escudos (\$U.S. 1.5 million). Expenditure incurred on prospecting and development over the period 1958-1961 totalled 239 million escudos (\$U.S. 80.5 million). In 1962 the Company spent another 12.7 million escudos (\$U.S. 445,000) on prospecting. Its long-term loan from the Gulf Oil Corporation in the United States totalled 218 million escudos. The foreign currency paid into the Angola exchange control by the Company amounted to 9 million escudos in 1958, 20 million escudos in 1959 and 23 million escudos in 1960.

Recent developments

195. Angola's crude oil production reached 800,000 tons in 1963. Exports totalled 317,715 tons, of which 230,725 went to Portugal and the remainder, 86,988 tons, went to the Netherlands. In 1964, production reached about one million tons and some of the exports went to the Canary Islands (Spain) and Canada.

196. In 1964, PETRANGOL was reported to have taken over Cabinda Gulf Oil Company's operations and to have struck oil 20 km from the port town of Cabinda. There is no information on any plans to exploit these deposits and some sources have begun to doubt the actual petroleum potential of Angola. There were earlier reports that PETROFINA was reluctant to develop Angolan oil because of the world surplus, with the result that Portugal was negotiating with other sources over possible concessions.

197. One new petroleum concession was granted to SACOR, which has a refinery in Portugal. This concession is in the vicinity of Moçamedes Bay. In September 1964 the *Diário de Luanda*, an Angolan newspaper, reported that a French company Société nationale des pétroles d'Aquitaine, with headquarters in Paris, had requested a petroleum concession with exclusive prospecting and mining rights. The concession requested was to include areas around Novo Redondo and Ambrizete.

198. Since the middle of 1964, Federale Mynbou Beperk of South Africa has been interested in acquiring a share in the Angolan oil industry. Negotiations are reported to be in process with the Portuguese Government and the Portuguese-Belgian interests in PETRANGOL. The Chairman of Federale Mynbou is reported to have said that his Company was seeking an interest in Angolan oil, not only for economic reasons but also because of the "vital strategic value (of petroleum) to South Africa"; and that "if it is known we can get oil from the Portuguese, it would be a great factor in influencing boycotters not to boycott South Africa seriously".^{an}

199. Federale Mynbou Beperk is a mining finance company with interests mainly in coal in South Africa. In 1963, it had an authorized capital of R7 million, with R5,999,964 issued. The Chairman of its Board of Directors is W. B. Coetzer. In early 1965, Federale Mynbou took over effective control of the General Mining and Finance Corporation, Ltd., after having passed on to the latter virtually all of its own mining assets. (In '63, General Mining and Finance Corporation had an authorized capital of R8.5 million, with paid up shares in the amount of R6,422,832.) Under the terms of the agreement General Mining and Finance Corporation, Ltd., will issue two million additional ordinary shares of £1 each, of which Federale Mynbou will acquire a further 1,343,190 shares and 775,000 are to go to Mainstaat Beleggings Beperk, a holding company owned jointly by Federale Mynbou and the Anglo-American Corporation group. The new merger is reported to be an important development in Mr. H. Oppenheimer's policy of "building up an African stature in the South African mining industry".

D. OTHER MINING ACTIVITIES

Iron and manganese mining

General

200. At the end of 1961, there were four companies actively mining iron and ferro-manganese. These were the Companhia Mineira do Lobito, with mines in Cuima, Bailundo and Andulo; the Sociedade Mineira do Lombige, with mines at Cassinga; the Companhia do Manganês de Angola, with mines at Saia; and the Companhia Mineira de Mombassa, at M'bassa. The production of these companies during the years 1959-1961 is shown below:

^{an} For South Africa's petroleum imports, see document S/AC.14/3. South Africa consumes 4-5 million tons of refined petroleum products a year. Local production of oil from coal supplies no more than one tenth of domestic requirements. (Source: Stephen Enke, "What would sanctions involve?", *Optima* (December 1964), p. 185).

IRON ORE PRODUCTION (thousand metric tons)

| Company | Mine | 1959 | 1960 | 1961 |
|---------------------------------------|----------|------|------|------|
| Companhia Mineira de Mombassa | M'Bassa | — | 5 | 23 |
| Companhia de Manganês de Angola | Saia | 86 | 155 | 209 |
| Companhia Mineira do Lobito | Andulo | — | — | 44 |
| | Bailundo | — | 38 | 41 |
| | Cuima | 263 | 461 | 372 |
| Sociedade Mineira do Lombige | Cassinga | — | — | 122 |

The Companhia Mineira do Lobito and the Sociedade Mineira do Lombige

201. The Companhia Mineira do Lobito was established in 1929 by João Sousa de Machado. At the end of 1964 it held the following concessions:

| | Area (km ²) |
|--|-------------------------|
| (a) Exclusive concession for prospecting and exploitation of all minerals, except diamonds, petroleum and mineral oils (granted in 1949).... | 49,000 |
| (b) Exclusive concession for prospecting of all minerals with the exception of diamonds, petroleum and mineral oils; | |
| Area of Moçamedes (<i>Portaria</i> 17,036 of 11 February 1959) | 21,800 |
| Area of Andulo (<i>Portaria</i> 17,088 of 28 March 1959) | 18,000 |
| (c) Exclusive concession for the prospecting of coal Area of Moxico (<i>Portaria</i> 15,961, of 5 September 1956) | 173,500 |
| | 262,300 |
| | 262,300 |
| (d) Concessions for exploitation only; | Ha. |
| Alluvial gold | 2,500 |
| Mica | 100 |

202. The Company's principal activity is the mining of iron ore at Cuima, Bailundo and Andulo. It also mines some manganese at Cassalengues.

203. The Company has its headquarters in Luanda. Its registered capital was originally 100 million escudos, but was raised to 500 million escudos in November 1962. No financial statements or reports are available.

204. The first concession, comprising 49,000 km², was granted in 1949 (by Decree No. 37,677). This concession lies between parallels south 12° and 14° and meridians 14° 30' and 16° 30' E. and is traversed by the Benguela Railway. The area includes Bailundo in the north and Cuima, 80 km to the south. Both mines are in the District of Huambo.

205. The Company was granted exclusive prospecting rights for three years for all minerals except diamonds, petroleum substances and hydrocarbon gases associated with them. The concessionaire was required to spend a minimum of 3 million escudos during this period, and was given the right, subject to the above limitation, to exploit all minerals discovered for an unlimited period. The Company was exempted from paying the fixed and proportional mining taxes, defence and income taxes, export duties on minerals produced, import duties on materials and equipment for mining activities, and property taxes in whatever form on the buildings used by it. In return, the Angolan Government was to receive a proportion of the profits, to be determined later, and obtained the right to purchase 50 per cent, at least, of any precious metals or radioactive materials produced. In 1964, the Government of Angola owned 500,000 shares of 100 escudos each.

206. In 1959, as shown above, the Company obtained two other exclusive concessions in Andulo and Moçamedes regions, bringing the total area of its exclusive prospecting concessions (for all minerals with the exception of diamonds and petroleum) to almost 100,000 km². These rights will expire in 1969. The ore reserves of the three main deposits are estimated to be about 80 million metric tons and even if the prospecting concessions lapse, the Company will still retain the right to exploit these deposits for an unlimited period.

207. The Sociedade Mineira do Lombige holds the concession of the Cassinga mine where there are proved ore reserves of over 100 million metric tons. The Sociedade received the concession in 1953. The concession comprises an area of some 55,000 km² in the Huila district and extends from the parallel 14° 0.1' south to the Kunene River, and from the Cubango River in the east to the Kunene River in the west. The Company has exclusive prospecting rights until 1969 for

all minerals except diamonds, petroleum mineral oils, solid bituminous substances and hydrocarbon gases.

208. Exploitation rights are for fifty years, with a possible twenty-year extension. The Government of Angola is entitled to 10 per cent of the capital shares and is to receive approximately 55 per cent (but not more) of the liquid profits. In 1964, the Angola Government had 1,300 shares of 1,000 escudos each. The contract gives it the same right to purchase any precious minerals or radioactive minerals as does the contract of the Companhia Mineira do Lobito.

209. The exact relationship between the Sociedade Mineira do Lombige and the Companhia Mineira do Lobito is not known. Both are reported to be controlled by João Sousa de Machado. Since 1961, interest in these two companies has centred on the financial assistance which they have received to enable them to increase their output.

210. For the Cassinga mine, the Sociedade Mineira do Lombige has obtained financial assistance enabling it to undertake work costing 1,300 million escudos (£16,250,000) involving the construction of a new railway link and the provision of new rolling stock and mineral handling facilities at the port of Moçamedes. The funds have been provided by a consortium comprising Fried, Krupp (of Essen, Germany), Jørgaard and Schultz A/S (of Copenhagen), and the Sociedade de Empreitadas e Trabalhos Hidráulicos, Lda. (of Lisbon and Luanda). Details of the agreement are not available. According to a report,^{bb} the final contract provided for the amortization of the rail equipment in seven years on the basis of an annual export of 1.5 million tons of ore, most of which will be supplied to Krupp, and the remainder to French and Japanese steel producers. The Territorial Government will finance the port facilities and other construction work related to the Cassinga project with a loan of 300 million escudos from the Banco de Angola to be provided in three instalments as follows: 80 million escudos in 1964; 145 million in 1965; and 75 million in 1966 (Legislative Decree No. 45,651 of 9 April 1964). In June 1965 it was announced that Krupp had signed an agreement with the Companhia Mineira do Lobito to spend 1,500 million escudos (approximately \$U.S. 52 million) in connexion with the Cassinga mine, to supply the mine with machinery, locomotives and wagons for transporting minerals.

211. For the Cuima mine, the Companhia Mineira do Lobito signed an agreement with the Benguela Railway in 1961 whereby the latter will build a rail link to the main line. The Government authorized (Decree No. 43,601 of 14 April 1961) the grant to the Railway of an additional concession for this purpose, on terms similar to the original concession issued to the Benguela Railway in 1902. (A working paper describing the Benguela Railway will be issued later.)

Companhia do Manganês de Angola

212. This Company produces both iron and manganese. Established in 1950, it has its headquarters in Luanda, Angola. The Company holds exclusive prospecting rights originally granted in 1954 (*Portaria* 14,966 of 28 July 1954) in an area of 32,200 km² in the Malange and Cuanza Norte districts for all minerals except diamonds, petroleum substances, bitumens and radioactive minerals. Its principal iron mine is at Saia and it holds two manganese mining concessions of 500 hectares each, one at Lucala, Cazengo *concelho*, Cuanza Norte district, and the other at Pungo Andongo, Cacusos *concelho*, Malange district.

213. In 1960, the Company had a capital of 60 million escudos. At the end of the year, according to its financial statement,^{cc} the Company's fixed assets were valued at 56 million escudos and it had realizable assets of 65 million escudos. Receipts from mining operations during 1960 totalled 10.9 million escudos, of which 6.4 million were reported as liquid profits. In February 1965, the Company's capital was increased to 70 million escudos entirely paid up; it is divided into 70,000 shares of 1,000 escudos each.

214. According to reports, it is planned to construct a new rail link to connect Saia with the Luanda Railway

^{bb} Rebello, *Angola na Africa deste tempo*, pages 229 ff.

^{cc} Portugal, *Diário do Governo*, series III, 9 September 1961.

in order to facilitate the evacuation of iron and manganese from this region. In 1964, 1,800 tons of ore were carried daily by rail from Camona to Luanda. The Angolan Government is also planning to increase the ore handling facilities at the port of Luanda from the present capacity of 24,000 tons daily to 2,000 tons per hour and to provide deep water berths (15 metres) for ships of up to 60,000 tons. The improvement of the ore loading facilities, it is estimated, will cost 180 million escudos.

215. In 1964, the Company employed 2,000 workers recruited from the nearby regions. The Company maintains its own schools and hospitals.

Companhia Mineira de Mombassa, S.A.R.L.

216. There is very little information on this Company. It has a registered capital of 300,000 escudos and holds a mining concession of 300 hectares at M'Bassa in the region of Zenza do Itombe. In September 1960, the Company entered into a barter contract with Metalimex Strojexport of Czechoslovakia for delivery of ore, but no sales were made. Although several workers were employed, production amounted to only 5,000 tons of ore in 1960 and 23,000 tons in 1961. The Company is reported to have difficulty in increasing its capital and to suffer the disadvantage that the ore from the mine is not sufficiently known on the international market, and is said to have a high titanium content.

217. The Company was reported in 1961 to be seeking the collaboration of Sr. Manuel Rodrigues of the Sociedade Técnica e Industrial de Construção (TECNIL).

Other companies

218. In 1959, Mrs. Teresa Berman, who is reported to be the main shareholder in the Companhia de Manganés de Angola, constituted another company to prospect for and exploit iron and other metal deposits. The new company, A. Bermanit-Quissama, Lda., has a capital of 20 million escudos and its headquarters are in Luanda, Angola. Mrs. Berman owns 19,999,900 escudos of the capital, the remaining 100 escudos being owned by A. Pastoril, Lda., a company with headquarters at Luche, in the Benguela *concelho*. Mrs. Berman is the sole director and has full control of the Company.^{dd} There is no recent information on the Company's activities.

219. The only other company, apart from the three mentioned above, which is actively mining manganese, is the Sociedade Mineira de Malange, Lda. At the end of 1961, this company held a mining concession of 100 hectares at Quiluco, in the Malange district. It acquired this property, together with previously registered mining claims, in 1958. Production amounted to 23.3 thousand tons in 1960, decreasing to 20.6 thousand tons in 1961. All of its production in 1961, together with some stock held over from the previous year, was exported, the total value amounting to less than 15,000 escudos. It may be noted that, under the terms of the concession, the concessionaire is required to work a minimum amount each year.

220. In 1961, a number of new manganese claims were registered and many requests for concessions made by the Sociedade Mineira de Angola and the Companhia de Manganés de Angola were pending. Owing, however, to a slump in world prices of manganese, production decreased in 1962 and was virtually paralysed in 1963, when exports consisted of only 4,400 tons drawn from existing stocks.

Copper mining

Empresa do Cobre de Angola, S.A.R.L.

221. In 1944, the Companhia União Fabril (CUF), one of the largest industrial enterprises in Portugal with various interests, received an exclusive concession for five years to prospect and exploit all minerals, with the exception of diamonds, petroleum and mineral oils, bitumens and hydrocarbon gases, in the north-western part of Angola, between meridian 14° and 15° 30' and from the Congo border to the parallel 8° 30' south.

222. The Company was required to spend 5 million escudos in this period and was granted exploitation rights for an unlimited time over any deposits manifested and marked. It was required to repay the Government for the expense incurred by the Technical Survey Missions of 1937-1939. The concession contract also required that the Company raise its capital to 10 million escudos in two years, and that at least the chairman and half of the members of the board of directors should be Portuguese.

223. No provisions were made for Government participation either in the profits or in the share capital of the Company. The priority right was, however, reserved to the Government of Angola to purchase, at world prices, all precious metals won.

224. In 1945, the Empresa do Cobre de Angola succeeded to the União Fabril's concession, which totalled some 44,670 km². When these exclusive prospecting rights expired at the end of 1959, the Company had manifested claims covering an area of 44,000 hectares, including important deposits at Mavoio in the Congo district. In 1960, the Empresa do Cobre received another concession covering an area of some 55,000 km² for prospecting of all mineral deposits except diamonds, petroleum products, bitumens and hydrocarbon gases. In 1964, the Government of Angola owned 1,000 share of 1,000 escudos each. No further details are available.

225. The exact relationship of the Empresa do Cobre to the União Fabril is not known. Until 1964, the Empresa do Cobre had its headquarters in Lisbon and was represented in Angola by the Companhia Fabril e Comercial do Ultramar, which is also the agent for the Companhia União Fabril. The Empresa do Cobre now has its headquarters in Luanda. It has a registered capital of 10 million escudos and employs about 1,000 workers. Since the drop in world price of copper in 1957, the Company has suffered financially. In 1957, its losses amounted to 4 million escudos. In 1958 it lost a further 1.8 million escudos and was obliged to have recourse to a loan of 10 million escudos from the Banco Burnay.

226. On 31 December 1959, the Company's fixed assets in Angola were 24.5 million and its inventory 18.4 million escudos. Accounts receivable in Lisbon totalled 18.2 million escudos; its accounts payable were 45.6 million in Lisbon and 3.5 million in Angola. The Company's operating loss for 1959 was only 16,874 escudos, but its total debt stood at 6 million escudos. The Company estimated its investments to amount to 153 million escudos, representing the amount spent on actual prospecting, excluding expenditures on technical and administrative organization.

227. Over the period 1950-1959, annual production of copper from the Mavoio mine has averaged about 1,500 metric tons (with the exception of 1955, when only 950 tons were produced because of the fall in world prices). In 1961, operations were suspended because of the disturbances, but mining was resumed the following year. In 1963, however, production dropped sharply to 108 tons, owing apparently to the exhaustion of the deposit. As a result, the mine was closed for some part of the year and was the only mine to report a loss during the year. The Company has now begun exploration work at the Tetelo deposits.

Mica, rock asphalt and bauxite

Mica

228. At the end of 1961, there were several small companies mining mica. These were the União de Micas, Lda., with two concessions totalling 198 hectares; the Empresa Mineira do Quicabo, Lda., with one concession of 100 hectares; Mota and Iraão, with 300 hectares; and Maria Gabriela Fernandes, with 100 hectares. The Companhia Mineira do Lobito and the Companhia do Manganés each also had a mica concession of 100 hectares. All these concessions, totalling 900 hectares, are in the Dande *concelho* of the Lunda district.

229. Production has continued to decline since the mid 1950's and in 1961 exports, all of which went to the United States of America, comprised only 1,926 tons of prepared mica, 3,390 tons of semi-prepared mica and 1,660 tons of mica residue. The value of the exports was 254,000 escudos.

^{dd} Angola, *Boletim Oficial*, Serie III, 12 October 1960, p. 1049.

Rock asphalt

230. The only company actively mining rock asphalt in 1961 was the Companhia dos Asfaltos de Angola. Little is known of the origin of this company. In 1957, it took over two concessions for mining rock asphalt in Ambrizite in the Congo district, one of 469 hectares, and the other of 500 hectares, both of which had been registered in 1945. The exploitation of these deposits is subject to the regulations established under the Overseas Mining Law of 1906, which require, among other conditions, that at least 200 metres of work be done each year. The Company is also required to supply its production to industries in Portuguese Territories at officially determined prices.^{ee} At the end of 1961, the Company had an authorized capital of 5 million escudos. It owned six rock asphalt mines, totalling 3,352 hectares in area four of which were not in production. Output from the two active mines at Libongos and Lembe amounted to 22,783 tons, all of which was used in Angola.

231. At one time, the Companhia dos Betuminosos de Angola, S.A.R.L., which has a registered capital of 10 million escudos, also mined rock asphalt, but there is no information on its recent activities. The Company's concession for exclusive prospecting of coal and rock asphalt, originally granted to the Empresa Carbonífera do Douro, Lda. (Decree No. 33,989 of 29 September 1944) and comprising two areas, one between the Loge and Cuanza Rivers and the other between the Loge and Cuvu Rivers, was listed as a reserved area in the report of the Direcção dos Serviços de Geologia e Minas for the year ending 31 December 1961. Several requests for registration of claims were made by the Company, however, during the year. The budgetary estimates for the Territory show that in 1964 the Government of Angola had 1,000 of its shares valued at 1,000 escudos each, and the estimated income from the Companhia dos Betuminosos de Angola was 50,000 escudos.

Bauxite

232. In 1957, an exclusive concession to prospect for aluminium was granted to the N. V. Billiton Maatschappij Company for a period of three years. The area of the concession covered the entire district of Cabinda (6,900 km²) and an area south of parallel 13° 20', between meridians 12° 40' and 15° 20' E (120,000 km²). This concession has since lapsed and no claims have been pegged. The Second National Development Plan for Angola (1958-1964) had envisaged the establishment of an aluminium industry which would utilize the hydro-electric power developed at the Cambambe Dam on the Cuanza River. In 1958, a new company, the Alumínio Português (Angola), S.A.R.L., was established in close association with Pechiney-Compagnie de Chimique et Electrometal Allurgique de Paris. Alumínio Português has a registered capital of 10 million escudos divided into 20,000 shares. Its authorized capital is 500 million escudos. The Company's activities may include the exploitation of aluminium deposits and the sale and manufacture of aluminium goods. The Company may also establish other enterprises or may join with existing enterprises in accordance with the law.

233. Although there are reports of the discovery of bauxite deposits, no significant claims had been registered by the end of 1961.

^{ee} *Diário do Governo*, Series II, No. 49, 4 December 1957, pp. 1958-1959.

TABLE 1. MINES AND MINING CONCESSIONS IN ANGOLA

| A. Exclusive mining concessions* (on 31 December 1961) | | |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | 1961 (km ²) | 1962 (km ²) |
| I. Exclusive concessions for prospecting and exploitation | | |
| Diamonds | | |
| Angola Diamond Company | 1,025,700 | 1,025,700 |
| All minerals with some exceptions ^a | | |
| Companhia Mineira do Lobito | 49,000 | 49,000 |
| Sociedade Mineira do Lombige | 55,000 | 55,000 |

TABLE 1 (continued)

| | 1961 (km ²) | 1962 (km ²) |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Hydro-carbons | | |
| Companhia de Petróleos de Angola | 26,280 | 26,280 |
| Cabinda Gulf Oil Company | 6,166 | 7,270 |
| II. Exclusive concessions for prospecting | | |
| All minerals with some exceptions ^a | | |
| Companhia do Manganés de Angola (area of Malanje e Cuanza-Norte) | 32,200 | 32,200 |
| Companhia Mineira do Lobito (area of Moçâmedes) | 21,800 | 21,800 |
| Companhia Mineira do Lobito (area of Andulo) | 18,400 | 18,400 |
| Armando Manuel Ferreira Patricio (area of Alto Zambeze) | 8,100 | — |
| Coal | | |
| Companhia Mineira do Lobito (area of Moxico) | — | 173,500 |
| B. Mining concessions for exploitation (31 December 1961) | | |
| Alluvial gold | | |
| Carlos Marques dos Santos | | Hectares 1,784 |
| Diogo Maria de Lemos Seixas Castelo Branco | | 4,365 |
| João Augusto de Carvalho | | 252 |
| Sociedade Mineira da Huíla, Lda. | | 12,267 ^b |
| Companhia Mineira do Lobito | | 2,500 ^b |
| Sociedade Mineira do Lombige | | 13,335 ^b |
| Herdeiros de Eduardo Texeira Padrão | | 355 |
| Copper | | |
| João de Sousa Machado | | 500 ^b |
| Iron | | |
| Companhia Mineira de Mombassa | | 304 |
| Manganese | | |
| Companhia do Manganés de Angola | | 1,000 |
| Sociedade Mineira de Malange, Lda. | | 100 |
| Mica | | |
| União de Micas, Lda. | | 200 |
| Companhia Mineira do Lobito | | 100 |
| Companhia do Manganés de Angola | | 100 ^d |
| Mota e Irmão | | 300 ^b |
| Maria Gabriela Fernandes | | 100 ^b |
| Empresa Mineira do Quicabo, Lda. | | 100 |
| Bituminous substances | | |
| Companhia dos Asfaltos de Angola | | 3,352 |
| C. Active mines (31 December 1961) | | |

| Mineral and name of company | Location |
|----------------------------------|----------------|
| Diamonds | |
| Angola Diamond Company | Lunda District |
| Gold | |
| João Augusto de Carvalho | Macende |
| Copper | |
| Empresa do Cobre de Angola | Mavoio |
| Iron | |
| Companhia Mineira de Mombassa .. | M'bassa |
| Companhia do Manganés de Angola | Saia |

TABLE 1 (continued)

| Mineral and name of company | Location | Mineral and name of company | Location |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|--|
| Companhia Mineira do Lobito | Cuima, Bailundo, Andulo | Petroleum | |
| Sociedade Mineira do Lombige | Cassinga | Companhia de Petróleos de Angola | Luanda, Cacuáco, Benfica, Galinda, Tobias, Nacongo |
| Ferro-manganese | | Bituminous substances | |
| Companhia do Manganés de Angola | Quitota | Companhia dos Asfaltos de Angola | Libongos |
| Manganese | | Companhia dos Betuminosos de Angola | Massera Norte |
| Companhia do Manganés de Angola | Quitota, Quiceuinho, Quiaponte, Cungungo, Quiculo, Serra Be | | |
| Sociedade Mineira de Malange | Quiluce II | | |
| Mica | | | |
| Companhia Mineira do Lobito | Cassalengues | | |
| União de Micas, Lda. | Quizambilo II | | |
| Sociedade Angolana de Minas, Lda. | Muxexe | | |

* SOURCE: Serviços de Geologia e Minas, *Boletim*, No. 4, July-Dec. 1961, pp. 70-71.

^aExcepting diamonds and hydro-carbons on which exclusive rights have already been granted. For details of exceptions, see paras. 98 and 171.

^b Concession granted during 1961.

^c Of which 2,198 ha. were granted in 1961.

^d Concession granted in 1960.

TABLE 2, ANGOLA DIAMOND COMPANY—BALANCE SHEET, 31 DECEMBER 1962

| ASSETS | | | |
|---|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | | Escudos | Escudos |
| Premises, concession and mining rights | | | 21,712,114.53 |
| Fixed assets: | | | |
| Mining and other facilities | 1,041,367,879.11 | | |
| Hydroelectric plant on the River Luachimo | 189,720,388.37 | | |
| | | 1,231,088,267.48 | |
| Depreciation | 1,231,088,267.48 | | |
| Equipment, goods and products | | | 348,142,521.86 |
| Cash on hand and in banks | | | 631,659,901.06 |
| Holdings in diamond marketing enterprises | | | 46,653,394.48 |
| Capital invested in the Sociedade Portuguesa de Lapi- dação de Diamantes | | | 4,880,000.00 |
| Portfolio | | | 8,497,351.29 |
| Accounts receivable: | | | |
| Province of Angola (loans) | 161,870,000.00 | | |
| Sundry accounts | 36,723,870.19 | | 198,593,870.19 |
| Exchange loss on the conversion into escudos of loans to the Province of Angola | | | 3,692,020.23 |
| | | | 1,263,831,173.64 |
| Deposit for payment of the special tax for the defence of Angola, pending appeal | | | 88,636,447.00 |
| Capital subscribed to the Sociedade Portuguesa de Lapi- dação de Diamantes | | | 19,520,000.00 |
| Securities deposited | | | 1,530,000.00 |
| | | | 1,373,517,620.64 |
| | TOTAL | | |
| LIABILITIES | | | |
| | | Escudos | Escudos |
| Capital (1,730,000 shares) | | | 294,100,000.00 |
| Statutory reserve | | | 201,746,031.36 |
| Reserve fund for assistance to the indigenous population and for public works in Lunda | | | 6,735,088.54 |
| Reserves for exchange losses, other reserves and miscellaneous funds | | | 218,617,478.27 |
| Accounts payable: | | | |
| Province of Angola (share of profits) | 73,591,981.70 | | |
| Dividends payable | 2,694,268.47 | | |
| Banco de Angola, Luanda: utilization of open credit No. 1428 | 88,636,447.00 | | |
| Sundry accounts | 130,011,445.84 | | 294,934,143.01 |
| Sale of diamonds to be effected | | | 173,704,271.40 |

TABLE 2. (continued)

| | <i>Escudos</i> | <i>Escudos</i> |
|--|----------------|-------------------------|
| Profits: | | |
| Carried forward from previous financial year | 402,179.36 | |
| For current financial year | 73,591,981.70 | 73,994,161.06 |
| | | 1,263,831,173.64 |
| Special tax for the defence of Angola, pending our appeal Capital subscribed to the Sociedade Portuguesa de Lapi- dação de Diamantes | | 88,636,447.00 |
| Depositors of securities | | 19,520,000.00 |
| | | 1,530,000.00 |
| TOTAL | | 1,373,517,620.64 |

Lisbon, 11 June 1963—Chairman and Managing Director, Ernesto de Velhena, Head of Accounting Department, Alberto Henrique de Sousa

PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT

| | <i>Escudos</i> | <i>Escudos</i> |
|---|----------------|-----------------------|
| <i>Debit</i> | | |
| Dividend for 1961 (paid on 23 January and 17 July 1962) | | 143,590,000.00 |
| Statutory reserve | | 8,240,983.39 |
| Contribution for protection of national property | | 16,960,364.63 |
| Special tax for the defence of Angola (appeal pending) | | 88,636,447.00 |
| General, statutory and contractual expenditure | | 102,131,990.66 |
| Profits: | | |
| Balance of profit carried forward from previous financial year | 402,179.36 | |
| Profit for 1962 | 73,591,981.70 | 73,994,161.06 |
| TOTAL | | 433,553,946.74 |
| <i>Credit</i> | | |
| Balance from 1961 | | 143,992,179.36 |
| Gross profit from mining operations | | 254,925,346.81 |
| From financial operations | | 34,636,420.57 |
| TOTAL | | 433,553,946.74 |

TABLE 3. ANGOLA DIAMOND COMPANY—STATUS OF LOANS IN THE TERRITORY, 31 DECEMBER 1963

| <i>Date of loan and legislative authority</i> | <i>Amount</i> | <i>Terms of loan</i> | <i>Amount outstanding at 31 December 1963</i> |
|---|---------------------|--|---|
| 12 May 1921 | £200,000 | a | £797,360 written off in 1937 |
| | £200,000 | | |
| | £397,360 | | |
| Decree No. 27,898 of 28 July 1937 | £250,000 | b | 108,424,938.52 escudos written off in 1955 |
| Decree No. 35,668 of 28 May 1946 | £1,000,000 | c | |
| Decree No. 39,920 of 22 November 1954 | 100,000,000 escudos | | 50,000,000 escudos |
| Decree Law 44,084 of 12 December 1961 | 105,500,000 escudos | 1963-1983 at (\$U.S. 3 million plus 20 million escudos) | 100,590,476.20 escudos |
| Decree No. 45,062 of 5 June 1963 | 150,000,000 escudos | 1964-1984, 1% | 150,000,000 escudos |
| TOTAL | | | 300,590,476.20^a escudos |

^aAt an interest rate of not more than 1 per cent higher than the bank discount rate in the country of origin of the currency of the loan. In 1920, the discount rate of the Banque Nationale de Bruxelles was 5½ per cent.

^bInterest rate reduced to 2 per cent.

^cAt 2 per cent interest; repayment by annual instalments from 1948 to 1971 inclusive; exchange rate at 100 escudos per pound sterling and 0.57 escudos per Belgian franc. The exchange losses incurred by the company in this loan shall be amortized in the same manner as specified in the contract of 31 July 1937.

MINING IN MOZAMBIQUE

A. MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE TERRITORY

General

234. Mining does not play a major role in the economy of Mozambique, as it does in Angola. Although the Territory of Mozambique possesses a variety of mineral deposits, few of those discovered so far fulfil all the necessary conditions of quality, quantity or convenient location to justify large-scale economic exploitation, in the light of prevailing world prices. The principal minerals currently being mined are coal, which has been mined since 1932, and beryl, columbo-tantalite and microlite which attained importance after 1950 owing to scarcity of world supplies and an upsurge in world prices. There is some small-scale mining of bauxite, asbestos, bismutite, lepidolite, ilmenite, gold, copper, mica, and other minerals including the rare earths, cuxenite and monazite, but their

value is not significant. Deposits of uranium (with an average content of 8 per cent uranium oxide) are known to exist in the districts of Tete and Zambézia, but the quantities mined, if any, and the estimated reserves are not revealed. Apart from the mining of coal, beryl, columbo-tantalite and microlite, perhaps the most important activity connected with mining is the prospecting for petroleum which has been carried on intensively since 1948, but which has so far not revealed the presence of any oil deposits. The recent discovery of alluvial diamonds in Southern Rhodesia led in 1964 to the grant of an extensive concession for prospecting in the adjacent area of Mozambique, but so far there does not appear to be any other evidence to suggest the existence of diamonds in the Territory.

235. In 1961, the latest year for which detailed information is available, minerals made up 1.6 per cent of the Territory's exports by value. Production and exports of the most important minerals are shown in the following table:

| <i>Mineral product</i> | <i>Production</i> | <i>Exports (tons)</i> | <i>Principal countries of destination</i> | <i>Value in contos</i> |
|------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---|------------------------|
| Columbo-tantalite | 138 | 148 | United States of America and United Kingdom | 28,761 |
| Beryl | 978 | 972 | United States and United Kingdom | 9,991 |
| Coal | 320,859 ^a | 60,879 | Southern Rhodesia and Madagascar | 9,762 |
| Microlite | 3 | 34 | United States | 7,563 |
| Bismutite | 22 | 23 | United States and United Kingdom | 1,344 |
| Bauxite | 4,671 | 4,147 | Southern Rhodesia | 276 |

^a Most of the coal is sold on the domestic market.

Beryl, columbo-tantalite and microlite

236. These minerals are found in pegmatites and their alluvial and eluvial deposits scattered throughout the Alto-Lingonha-Macuba region in the centre of the Zambézia district. Because the deposits are dispersed in small isolated pockets, they are not easily located and, when mined, are rapidly exhausted. From 1934 onwards, the pegmatites attracted attention from numerous individual prospectors and groups of miners, but mining on any larger scale was considered uneconomic. It was not until after 1950 that an upsurge in world demand for the metals beryllium, columbium and tantalite, which are used in the manufacture of fatigue-resisting metal alloys, led to a sharp rise in prices and a consequent increase in mining activity.

237. World supplies of these minerals are very limited and, although the output of Mozambique is small, it nevertheless ranks high among producing countries. In 1960, production of beryl amounted to 1,496 metric tons and exports were valued at 13.8 million escudos. During the same year, production of columbo-tantalite amounted to 160.18 tons, and exports to a value of 23.4 million escudos. The principal market is the United States of America, with the United Kingdom purchasing about one-quarter of the output of columbo-tantalite.

238. In 1960, there were seventeen companies mining these minerals. Sixty-nine per cent of the total output was produced by three companies: the *Empresa Mineira do Alto Lingonha, Lda.*, *Monteminas, Lda.* and the *Sociedade Mineira de Marropino, Lda.*

Coal

239. Deposits of coal exist at several locations in the districts of Tete, Niassa and Manica e Sofala. Owing to difficulties of transportation, only one of these deposits, at Moatize near Tete, is at present being exploited. The coal reserves in this area were estimated in 1951 to be about 400 million tons, of which between 200 million and 300 million tons were capable of being mined. The size of the deposits in the other areas has not yet been fully assessed, but they are believed

to be substantial, especially those in the district of Niassa, north of Vila Cabral, and in the Zambezi Valley, between Chicoca and Zumbo.

240. The deposits at Moatize were discovered in 1835, and from 1876 to 1940 exclusive prospecting and mining rights were held by the *Companhia da Zambézia*. In 1920, a sub-concession was granted to a Belgian company, the *Société Minière et Géologique du Zambéze*. Mining did not begin, however, until 1932 and, owing to lack of adequate transportation, was on a very small scale. The completion of the railway line from Beira to Moatize in 1949 made possible larger scale production and to exploit the possibilities thus presented a new company was formed, the *Companhia Carbonífera de Moçambique, S.A.R.L.*

241. Although the Moatize deposits are sufficient to satisfy the domestic needs of the Territory, high transportation costs prevent the coal from being marketed at Lourenço Marques at prices which can compete with imports from South Africa. Consequently, of a total output of 282,807 tons in 1963, about 60,000 tons were exported, going mainly to Southern Rhodesia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Madagascar. In 1964, it was reported in the Press that the possible development of newly discovered deposits in the Zambezi valley, near the border of Zambia, might permit the mining of an additional 2 million tons per year. According to reports, this new deposit extends along the river valley for 180 km with a width of between 5 to 20 km and is believed to contain very large reserves of good coking coal.

Bauxite

242. Fairly good deposits of bauxite (with 59 to 65 per cent alumina content) exist in the district of Manica e Sofala near the Rhodesian frontier. Since 1938, these have been mined on a very small scale by a Rhodesian company, the *Wankie Colliery Co. Ltd.*, which in 1961 produced a total of 4,671 tons. Because of a high silica content, amounting to as much as 15 per cent, the bauxite is not suitable for the extraction of aluminium, virtually all the output being ex-

ported by the company either to its own smelting works in Southern Rhodesia, where it is used in the manufacture of refractory bricks, or to the aluminium sulphate industries in South Africa. Exports in 1961 were valued at only 276 contos.

Copper

243. Although no copper has been mined in Mozambique for many years, it is believed that sizable deposits exist in the area between Tete and the border of Zambia. In this area, near Manica, open-pit mining was carried out by a British company from 1905 until 1921, when falling world prices for copper led to the abandonment of the mine. At present, little is known of the extent or value of the Territory's copper reserves. In 1959, two companies, one of them a subsidiary of the Central Mining Company of Johannesburg, obtained small concessions in the area, but later abandoned them before fully investigating the mineral prospects. In December 1964, it was announced that copper ore of a high metal content had been found at the site of the former mine and that a South African company, Edmundian Investments, Ltd. had received a concession to re-open it. It was anticipated that the mine would produce an average of 300 tons per month.

Iron

244. Very large deposits of magnetite are known to exist at Muende in the district of Tete, close to the Moatize coal mine in an area where, since 1961, the Companhia de Urânio de Moçambique has held an exclusive prospecting concession. The known reserves are estimated at over 3 million tons, with possibly a further 3 million tons at lower depths. The ore, however, has a high titanium oxide content (50 per cent iron and 18-20 per cent titanium oxide) and has been considered unsuitable for ferrous metallurgy.

245. Other iron deposits of greater purity have been found in the vicinity of Milange (Zambezia), Umkonde and Metove (Manica e Sofala) and near Vila Cabral (Niassa), but they are dispersed over a wide area in pockets considered too small for economic exploitation.

Asbestos

246. Asbestos is found only in the districts of Manica e Sofala and Tete, the latter deposits being of low quality and too far from existing transportation to be mined at present. In the district of Manica e Sofala, beginning in 1954, mining has been carried out on a small scale by the Sociedade Mineira de Mavita, Lda. which, however, produced only 147 tons in 1961, most of which was exported to the United Kingdom.

Radio-active minerals

247. Radio-active minerals including uranium and certain of the rare earths (semarskite, monazite, allanite and euxenite) have been encountered in small quantities in widely scattered areas. The first discovery of uranium in pegmatites was made in 1934 at Ribaué (Niassa district) and in the north east of the Alto Ligonha region (Zambezia district). In 1947, a mineral similar to Australian davidite (with an average content of 8 per cent uranium oxide) was discovered at Mavudzi, (about thirty miles north of Tete) and in the following year, a small deposit of pitchblende (possessing a high uranium content of between 41 and 82.7 per cent) was revealed in the nearby valley of Nhaoundi, south east of Mavudzi. The initial discovery at Mavudzi was sufficiently rich at the surface to attract widespread attention, and a year later more than 300 claims, each a kilometre in radius, had been staked for uranium. Options on the main properties were taken up jointly by three British companies, the British South Africa Company, New Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd., and Gold Fields Rhodesian Development Co. Ltd. Exploration led to the conclusion, however, that the extent and importance of the deposits had been greatly exaggerated. Most of the claims were found to contain no more than surface traces of davidite and the principal deposit at Mavudzi was found to extend to a depth of only 100 feet. An investigation completed in 1948 indicated that the reserves of economically workable ore were not significant and as a consequence the British companies

abandoned their concession in August 1948. Between 1948 and 1950, about 100 tons of davidite were produced by Portuguese operators at a high cost, principally from float and hand-cobbed surface ore.

248. In October 1950, the Government suspended prospecting rights for uranium in the whole of the Territory (*Portaria* 13,337 of 23 October) and in 1954 all prospecting and mining of radio-active minerals came under the control of the Nuclear Energy Board of Portugal, which does not normally reveal the quantities mined or the estimated reserves. In 1956, however, it was reported that 36 tons of uranium (davidite) were produced from the Mavudzi deposits and exported to France.

249. There is no information to indicate whether or not there is any production of uranium at the present time. In 1960, an exclusive concession to prospect for radio-active and related minerals, covering an area of 4,117 km² in the Moatize area, was granted (*Portaria* 18,034 of 2 November 1960) to the Companhia de Urânio de Moçambique, a company formed for the purpose by Entrepósito Comercial, which is a subsidiary of the Companhia de Moçambique. Since this company is also engaged in the prospecting of iron ore (see para. 244 above) there is no evidence that it is producing uranium, although in 1961 it employed a labour force of 209 manual workers. Small mining concessions for radio-active minerals in the Mavudzi area are also held by two private concerns, Minas do Catipo, Lda. (700 hectares) and Sr. Virgílio Hipólito (100 hectares).

Gold

250. Gold is the oldest known mineral resource in Mozambique. As early as the fifteenth century, small quantities were produced and were traded as far as the Middle East. Investigations have revealed, however, that though gold is encountered in widely scattered areas, the deposits are very small and are mostly alluvial. The oldest known occurrences are in the vicinity of Manica (district of Manica e Sofala) and at Missale and Chifumbazi, as well as in the bed of the Luenha River (district of Tete). More recently, in 1936 and 1943-1946, gold was found in the pegmatites of the Alto Ligonha region, in the vicinity of Alto Molocué (Zambezia). The deposits are mostly alluvial, although some small veins of primary ore have been encountered in the areas of Manica and Alto Molocué.

251. Gold has been mined, mainly by individuals or small groups, since the latter part of the nineteenth century. Production, however, has always been on a very limited scale, totalling only 9.95 tons between 1900 and 1958, with an estimated value of 298 million escudos. Annual production since 1951 has not exceeded 62 kilogrammes; by 1960, it had dropped to 7 kilogrammes. Apart from two individuals with mining licences covering ten hectares each in the Tete district, the only company actively engaged in mining gold was the *Empresa do Alto Ligonha*, which holds a gold mining concession covering 201 hectares at Naculé in the vicinity of Alto Molocué. This company produced no gold in 1960 or 1961.

Petroleum

252. The possibility that petroleum may exist in Mozambique has been argued by geologists for many years. Prospecting began in 1899 and was carried on sporadically until 1936 but, although numerous indications were found, especially near Inhambane, no strikes of any economic value were reported. Since 1948, large-scale prospecting has been carried out, first in the area south of the Save River, and currently between Inhambane and Quelimane. The concession, which expires in 1967, is held jointly by Mozambique Gulf Oil Company and Mozambique Pan-American Oil Company.

253. Between 1948 and 1963, these two companies together spent a total of 540 million escudos on prospecting. The only discovery so far, however, has been a deposit of natural butane gas at Buzi, on the Pungué River.

Diamonds

254. It was reported in the press on 10 October 1964, that the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, through its subsidiary De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd., had formed a company, with headquarters in Lisbon, to prospect for

diamonds in the area of Pafurri, near the border of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The reason for this interest in diamond prospecting is apparently the recent discovery of an extensive field of alluvial diamonds in Southern Rhodesia.

255. Three months prior to the press report, in July 1964, an exclusive concession to prospect for diamonds in this area was granted to two residents of Lisbon, A. P. Gouveia and J. da Veiga Lima. The concession covers an area of 33,000 km² and is for a three-year period, with provision for conversion into a mining concession of fifty years' duration. The concessionaires were required to organize a public company with an initial capital of not less than twelve million escudos, and to incur not less than nine million escudos in operational expenditures in Mozambique and Portugal. In September 1964, Companhia dos Diamantes de Moçambique, S.A.R.L. was formed to operate the concession. It was subsequently reported to be negotiating with the Anglo-American Corporation to obtain financial participation and technical assistance.

Bismutite

256. This mineral is found in the same pegmatites of the Alto-Ligonha Mocuba region as the beryl and columbo-tantalite, but has not been extensively exploited because of an insufficient market. Production varied between 0.4 tons and 17 tons from 1956 to 1960, with exports going mainly to the United States of America. Eight companies mine this mineral, the leading producers being Monteminas Lda. and the Empresa Mineira do Alto Ligonha.

Ilmenite

257. Ilmenite is found in association with zircon and monazite in the sands along the coast. The principal deposit is at Pebane (Zambézia) where mining has been carried on since 1958 by a small private company, Minerais Básicos de Mocambique, Lda., formed by British, South African and Portuguese interests. Production attained 10,342 tons in 1959 but dropped to 711 tons in 1960 owing to low market prices for the mineral and to inadequate transportation facilities, which made large-scale production uneconomic at prevailing prices.

Other minerals

258. Small quantities of kaolin, graphite, mica, columbite, corundum, cassiterite, tantalite, feldspar, tourmaline and salt are found in Mozambique, but in isolated deposits of little economic value. There is some small-scale mining but it is sporadic and not on an economically significant scale.

B. MINING AND PROSPECTING ACTIVITIES

General

259. As has already been shown, mining plays a very small role in the economy of Mozambique. Although there were 139 mining enterprises registered at the end of 1960, with a total capital investment of 145 million escudos, only 29 appear to have been active and, of those, only 7 employed more than 100 workers. After 1960, there was some increase in the number of concessions, but the volume of mining activity remained substantially unchanged up to the end of 1964. Recent press reports indicate, however, a renewed interest in the mineral field. Notable among these recent developments were the formation in September 1964 of the Companhia dos Diamantes de Moçambique to prospect for diamonds in the south-west of the Territory and the reopening in early 1965 of the former Ednuindian copper mine by a South African company.

260. Apart from petroleum prospecting (see below), the only mining companies operating on any large scale in Mozambique up to the end of 1964 were the Companhia Carbonífera de Moçambique, and three companies engaged in exploiting the minerals (mainly beryl and columbo-tantalite) found in the scattered pegmatite formations in the Alto Ligonha region of central Zambézia. These three companies are important mainly for the value of their product, the actual mining

operations consisting of a number of small separate mines. Other mining operations were very small and for the most part were owned privately or by limited-liability companies consisting of several partners. Information on the more important enterprises follows.

Companhia Carbonífera de Moçambique

261. The Companhia Carbonífera de Moçambique, S.A.R.L. was created in 1949 to furnish the additional capital needed to increase the output of the Moatize coal mine (see para, 239 above), then being operated by a small Belgian enterprise, the Société minière et géologique du Zambéze. The Company's issued share capital is 40 million escudos, 60 per cent of which is held by Belgian interests, 30 per cent by the Companhia de Moçambique, a company with various interests which has its headquarters in Beira, Mozambique and 10 per cent by the Portuguese Government. The principal Belgian interests are the Société minière et géologique du Zambéze, the former owner of the mine, and the Société de recherche minière du Sud-Katakanga, a subsidiary of Union minière du Haut-Katanga. There is no information as to the size of each company's holdings.

262. The area of the mining concession is 3,076 hectares and the coal reserves were estimated in 1951 at 400 million tons, of which about half to two thirds is believed to be exploitable. Under the terms of a Government order of 14 July 1949, the Company was required to supply part of its output (approximately 5,000 tons) free to the Beira Railway. According to Company reports, production is limited by high transport costs which prevent it from either competing with South African coal in southern Mozambique, or greatly expanding its exports. Hence, although the Company has a production capacity of 450,000 tons annually, output has not exceeded 300,000 tons. Actual production and sales were as follows:

| Year | Production (tons) | Sales (tons) |
|------|-------------------|--------------|
| 1950 | 55,000 | — |
| 1955 | 172,546 | 188,939 |
| 1960 | 269,926 | 264,508 |
| 1961 | 320,854 | 277,490 |
| 1962 | 297,603 | 259,965 |
| 1963 | 282,807 | 262,808 |

The main consumers of the coal include the Trans-Zambézia and Nyasaland railways, the Sena Sugar Estates, the Companhia de Cimentos de Moçambique, and the various shipping lines. Part of the output has also been sold to the Union minière and the Chemin de Fer du Bas Congo.

263. In 1960, the Company employed a labour force of 44 skilled and 897 unskilled workers. Its total payroll amounted to 7.4 million escudos, with an additional 4.1 million escudos paid in respect of food, clothing and medical services. The average daily wage of unskilled workers was 14 escudos. The company maintains a hospital and furnishes free medical services both to its local employees and their families, who numbered nearly 1,500 persons in 1963, and to nearby communities. It reported in 1963 that its total expenditures in wages and other benefits to its personnel amounted to 10,756 contos during the year, distributed as follows:

| | Escudos |
|-----------------------------|-----------|
| Medical and health services | 1,524,000 |
| Retirement insurance | 422,000 |
| Paid leave to Portugal | 887,000 |
| Wages | 7,923,000 |

264. Under the terms of article 130 of the Overseas Mining Law of 1906, the Company is exempt from both the fixed annual tax on the area of the concession and the proportional tax on production. Its total investments in 1963 exceeded 60 million escudos. Financial results of its operations in recent years (in contos) were as follows:

| | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 |
|--------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| Receipts from operations | 6,031 | 6,521 | 6,795 | 6,040 | 6,193 | 4,453 |
| Net profit | 2,353 | 2,642 | 1,741 | 1,650 | 1,722 | (-198) |
| Dividend | 2,000 | 1,600 | 1,600 | 1,600 | 1,600 | — |
| (rate) | (5%) | (4%) | (4%) | (4%) | (4%) | — |

265. In 1961, the Company obtained a further exclusive concession to prospect for and mine coal within an adjacent area of approximately 420 km² situated between the Moatize River and Nharenga River (*Portaria* 18,353 of 23 March 1961). The concession was for two years, renewable for a further three years if the concessionaire fulfilled the conditions of intensive prospecting, which required *inter alia* the expenditure of not less than 800 contos in each year. In the event that coal was discovered, the Company obligated itself to supply coal to local industries in quantities and at prices to be determined in agreement with the Government. In fact, the Company spent over 5 million escudos on prospecting from 1954 to 1962, of which 1,158 million was spent in 1961. In November 1963, the exclusive prospecting concession was renewed until 1966 (*Portaria* 18,353).

Other mining activities

Beryl and columbo-tantalite

266. In 1960, there were seventeen enterprises engaged in exploiting the scattered pegmatite formation in the Alto Ligonha region of the Zambézia district. The majority of these were extremely small undertakings, usually owned and operated by a single individual or a group of partners. About 69 per cent of the total output was produced by three companies which are described below.

267. The Empresa Mineira do Alto Ligonha was formed in 1946 by a group of individuals who owned and operated small mining concessions in the region. The group combined their individual operations and obtained an exclusive concession to prospect for and exploit all minerals, except petroleum and hydrocarbons, within an area of 2,640 km², including most of the *concelho* of Alto Molocué (Decree 36,021 of 9 December 1946). The exclusive concession was twice extended, in 1957 (Decree 41,334) and in 1959 (Decree 42,732), the last concession, valid until 1962, requiring that the Company surrender at the end of each successive year one third of the area on which no claims had been pegged.

268. At the end of 1960, the Company held mining rights in eleven localities covering a total of 1,110 hectares (all within the *concelho* of Alto Molocué) as follows:

| Mine and mineral | Area of concession in ha. |
|---|------------------------------|
| Naipa | |
| Mica, tourmalines and bismuth | 100 |
| Muiane | |
| Columbite, lepidolite, cassiterite, bismuth, kaolin and gold | 200 |
| Nahia | |
| Columbite, monazite, apatite and tourmalines | 25 |
| Naculué | |
| Gold | 201 |
| Nahaji | |
| Beryl and columbite | 50 |
| Nanro | |
| Beryl, columbite, fluorite and lepidolite ... | 20 |
| Murrapane | |
| Mica | 20 |
| Marige | |
| Beryl, columbite and bismuth | 51 |
| Piteia | |
| Mica, Beryl, topaz and bismuth | 52 |
| Muhano | |
| Beryl, columbite and bismuth | 218 |
| Nacuchaia | |
| Beryl, columbite, tantalite, bismuth, lepidolite and mica | 172 |

269. Under the terms of its contract (*Boletim Oficial*, Series II, 25 January 1947) the Company enjoyed exemption from both the fixed annual tax on its concession area and the proportional tax on production, in return for which it undertook to transfer to the Portuguese Government 10 per cent of its capital shares in the event that it transformed itself from a private company, which it then was, into a public company. The Government also retained the right to purchase at world market prices any precious metals or radio-active minerals mined by the Company. It may be added that this right now extends also to beryl and columbo-tantalite under the terms of the legislation relating to radio-active and related minerals (see paras. 44-45 above).

270. The Company remained a limited liability company until 1961, when it was incorporated and increased its share capital to 40 million escudos, 51 per cent of which must, under the terms of its statute, be held by Portuguese nationals. In 1960, it employed 30 skilled and 1,102 unskilled workers and produced 419.7 tons of beryl, 15.3 tons of columbo-tantalite and smaller quantities of bismutite and mica, total exports being valued at 4.9 million escudos. Information concerning its financial operations is not available.

271. The second largest company, Monteminas, Lda., holds an exclusive concession for prospecting only covering 2,480 km² in an area between Alto Molocué, Mocuba and Gile. The concession covers all minerals except petroleum and hydrocarbons. In addition the company holds mining rights in a concession area of 101 hectares in the vicinity of Alto Molocué and at the end of 1960 had filed ten additional claims to deposits mainly of ilmenite, columbite, beryl and mica.

272. Established in 1957, Monteminas, Lda. is a private company with a registered capital of 2 million escudos. The majority of its capital was subscribed by a local commercial firm, Monteiro e Giro, Lda. In 1960, it employed 23 skilled and 545 unskilled workers and produced 406.6 tons of beryllium, 8 tons of bismuth, 14.4 tons of columbo-tantalite and 1.5 tons of euxenite. Its exports of beryl, columbo-tantalite and bismutite were valued at 4.4 million escudos. There is no information on the Company's finances.

273. The Sociedade Mineira do Marropino, Lda., established in 1957 and owned entirely by one individual, Sr. P. A. Cabral, holds three mining concessions covering 492 hectares in the area of Pabane and Ile (Zambézia). The Company has a total investment of 25 million escudos and in 1964 employed 800 workers. In 1960, it exported 179 tons of beryl and 77 tons of columbo-tantalite, with a combined value of 17.1 million escudos.

Bauxite

274. The Wankie Colliery Co. Ltd. of Southern Rhodesia owns two small bauxite mines in the vicinity of Manica, close to the frontier of Southern Rhodesia. The concessions were granted in 1935 and 1936 respectively and cover an area of 150 hectares. The Company, in which the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa has substantial interests, operates collieries in the western part of Southern Rhodesia, to which the bauxite mined in Mozambique is exported for use in the manufacture of refractory bricks.

275. Mining has been carried on since 1938, but on such a limited scale that it receives no mention in the Company's annual reports. In 1960, the labour force in Mozambique totalled only 40 workers and output amounted to 4,840 tons, valued at 267 contos. Mining is carried on by open-pit methods and involves a very small capital investment.

Petroleum prospecting

276. Petroleum prospecting has been carried on sporadically in Mozambique since 1899, but for the most part on a restricted

scale and with limited resources. In 1938, a company formed by British interests, the Companhia de Petróleos de Moçambique, Lda., obtained an exclusive concession to prospect for petroleum and hydrocarbons in the area south of Inhambane. The contract was for a period of five years, during which time the Company undertook to spend a minimum of £50,000 (40 million escudos) on its operational costs. The Company subsequently abandoned its concession without success, although it was reported to have found some traces of oil in the vicinity of Inhambane.

277. In May 1948, the Mozambique Gulf Oil Co., a subsidiary of Gulf Oil Corporation, with headquarters in Wilmington, Delaware, United States of America, obtained an exclusive concession (Decreets Nos. 36,841 and 38,276) to prospect for and exploit deposits of solid, liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, including petroleum and other allied substances, within a large area totalling 123,590 km² and extending from the Save River southward to a parallel passing through the mouth of the Incomati River and including tidal waters.

278. The contract (*Boletim Oficial*, Series II, 26 June 1948 and 30 May 1953) governing this concession preceded the enactment in 1957 of Decreets Nos. 41,356 and 41,357 (see paras. 41-43) and therefore differed in certain respects from later contracts. The duration of the concession was for an initial period of five years, to be extended for a further five years subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions, the most important of which was an obligation upon the company to expend not less than \$U.S. 600,000 (17.2 million escudos) in each five-year period. In the event of a strike, the concessionaire would have the right to exploit the deposits for a period of forty years. Exploitation must be carried out, however, by a company established in accordance with Portuguese law and having its headquarters in Portuguese territory. The contract further specified that, out of five directors of the exploiting company, two must be nominated by the Portuguese Government and that one third of the company's share capital (\$U.S. 800,000) must be given freely to the Government of Mozambique as compensation for the privileges and exemptions granted under the concession.

279. In July 1956, the area of the concession was changed (Decree No. 40,707) to cover most of the territory north of Inhambane to Murraca on the Zambezi River. During the term of the concession, 1948-1958, Mozambique Gulf Oil Co. expended a total of 200 million escudos on prospecting and sank 155 boreholes to depths up to 3,000 metres. No petroleum was discovered.

280. In August 1958, upon the expiration of the first concession, a new exclusive concession was granted (Decree No. 41,766) jointly to Mozambique Gulf Oil Company and Mozambique Pan American Oil Company, a subsidiary of Pan American International Oil Company. The new concession was for a duration of three years, renewable for a further two years provided the companies fulfilled the obligations of their contract. The area conceded was approximately the same as that previously conceded in 1956, with the exception that it included the marine zone from the coastline to the thirty-metre submarine contour. The total area was 94,860 km².

281. The new contract (*Boletim Oficial*, Series II, No. 299, 24 December 1958) was framed in accordance with the legislation enacted in 1957 and is almost identical with the contract entered into with Cabinda Gulf Oil Company in Angola (see paras. 191-193). Instead of providing, as previously, that the Portuguese Government would become a shareholder in any company established to exploit the claims of the concessionaires, it imposed more detailed financial obligations on the concessionary companies themselves. Whereas the 1948 contract had required that they expend only 17.2 million escudos on prospecting during each five-year period of the concession, the new contract called for an expenditure of 85.8 million escudos during the first three years, and 57.2 million escudos during the two-year extension (expenditure incurred outside Portuguese territories could be included only up to 20 per cent of each total). In addition, the concessionaires were required to pay a surface rent of 2.86 million escudos annually, a royalty of 12.5 per cent on any production and a profits tax of 50 per cent. Other details of the contract were identical with that entered into with Cabinda Gulf Oil Company. To ensure gov-

ernment participation in the administration of both Mozambique Gulf Oil Company and Mozambique Pan American Oil Company, their statutes were modified to provide that in each case three out of five directors would be Portuguese nationals, one of them nominated by the Government of Mozambique, and that the Government would have voting rights equal to 20 per cent of the stock.

282. In 1963, by which time expenditure on prospecting since 1948 had amounted to a total of 540 million escudos, the concession was extended until 1965 with option to a further extension until 1967 on condition that the companies expended a further 57.2 million escudos during each two-year period (Decree No. 44,178 of 8 February 1962). So far, no discovery of petroleum has been reported, although large deposits of natural butane gas were found at Pande and at Buzi on the Pungué River, not far from Beira. The latter deposit is estimated to amount to 140 million cubic metres and a study is being made of the possibilities of exporting it for sale in South Africa.

283. The petroleum concession does not include the right to establish a refinery. Under Decree 45,200 of 19 August 1963 an exclusive concession for this purpose, valid for ten years, was granted to the existing refinery SONAREP in order to enable it to attain optimum capacity.

Diamond prospecting

284. On 21 May 1964 (Decree No. 45,726), following the discovery of alluvial diamonds in Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese Government authorized the grant of an exclusive concession to prospect for and exploit alluvial and other diamond deposits within an extensive area covering 33,000 km² around Pafurri on the border of Southern Rhodesia. The concession extends between parallel 20° in the north and 24° in the south, and from meridian 33° westward to the frontiers of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

285. The concession was granted to Srs. A. P. Gouveia and J. de Veiga Lima, both residents of Lisbon, and was for a duration of three years, renewable for a further two years provided the concessionaires fulfilled the terms of their contract.

286. The contract, signed on 22 June 1964 (*Diário do Governo*, No. 167, Series II, 17 July 1964), required the concessionaires to establish a public company within ninety days of the date of the concession and to transfer to it all rights and obligations arising out of the contract. The company must have its headquarters in Mozambique, have a minimum share capital of 12 million escudos, and make a deposit of 3 million escudos in the form of a guarantee. The chairman and half of the other members of the Board of Directors, including their alternates, must be Portuguese nationals, of whom one or two may be nominated by the Governor of Mozambique, the number depending on whether there are five or more directors.

287. The company is required to spend in Mozambique or Portugal a minimum of 9 million escudos on wages, equipment and other expenses connected with prospecting during the period of three years, and not less than 3 million escudos during the first year, or 6 million escudos during the first two years. Certain expenses incurred outside Portuguese territory may, however, be included up to a maximum not exceeding 20 per cent of the expenditure in Mozambique and Portugal. In the event that the concession is extended for a further two years, the company must spend an additional 6 million escudos as above. During the period of the concession and within six months after its expiration, the company may register an unlimited number of claims, to which it shall have exploitation rights for a period of fifty years.

288. During the period of the concession, the company is exempt from all taxes, licences and other fees, as well as customs duties on the export of diamonds, and on the import of materials and supplies, except the fiscal tax of one mil (1/1,000) *ad valorem* and the stamp duty. In return for this exemption, the Government of Mozambique shall receive 50 per cent of the liquid profits. It must also receive free of charge, 10 per cent of the company's shares and 50 per cent of the receipts from any sales of diamonds won during prospecting.

289. In accordance with the terms of the contract, it was announced in the Press that a company, Companhia dos Dia-

mantes de Moçambique, S.A.R.L., had been formed in September 1964 to operate the concession.

290. In the following month (10 October 1964), an announcement appeared in a Portuguese newspaper, to the effect that the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, through its subsidiary De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd., had formed a company in Portugal to prospect for diamonds in the vicinity of Pafurri. This report appears to have been premature, however, for it was subsequently reported in another newspaper on 18 April 1965, that the company was negotiating with the Anglo-American Corporation with a view to the possibility of the latter's financial participation and to obtaining South African technicians to undertake the work of prospecting. The newspaper report indicated that the Anglo-American Corporation had agreed to participate in the venture.

TABLE 4. MINES AND MINING CONCESSIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE

| A. Exclusive concessions (on 31 December 1960, except where otherwise specified)* | | Area (km ²) |
|--|--------|----------------------------|
| I. Exclusive concessions for prospecting and exploitation | | |
| <i>All minerals, with certain exceptions^a</i> | | |
| Empresa Mineira do Alto Ligonha | 2,640 | |
| Companhia Carbonifera de Moçambique ^b | 420 | |
| <i>Hydrocarbons</i> | | |
| Mozambique Gulf Oil and Mozambique Pan American Oil ^c | 94,860 | |
| <i>Diamonds</i> | | |
| A. P. Gouveia and J. da Veiga Lima ^d (Companhia dos Diamantes de Moçambique) | 33,000 | |
| II. Exclusive concessions for prospecting | | |
| <i>All minerals with certain exceptions^a</i> | | |
| Monteminas Lda. | 2,480 | |
| Maria Alaina Simão ^e | 1,990 | |
| Calisto Freira | 165 | |
| Francisco Pereira Soares | 85 | |
| Minas do Lice, Lda. ^f | 470 | |
| <i>Radio-active minerals</i> | | |
| Companhia do Urânio de Moçambique ^g | 4,117 | |

TABLE 4 (continued)
B. Mining concessions for exploitation
(31 December 1960)

| | Area (hectares) |
|--|--------------------|
| <i>Beryl, columbo-tantalite, bismutite, columbite and mica</i> | |
| Empresa Mineira do Alto Ligonha | 909 |
| Sociedade Mineira da Zambézia | 789 |
| Sociedade Mineira de Mutala | 662 |
| Adília Santa Rita de Lima (Herdeiros) | 100 |
| <i>Coal</i> | |
| Companhia Carbonifera de Moçambique | 3,076 |
| <i>Gold</i> | |
| Empresa Mineira do Alto Ligonha | 201 |
| Bernardino Lourenço Casal | 10 |
| Irene Augusta dos Santos Lopes | 10 |
| <i>Radio-active minerals</i> | |
| Vicente Ribeiro e Castro | 1,120 |
| Virgílio Hipólito | 100 |
| Entrepósito Comercial | 200 |
| Minas do Catipo | 707 |
| <i>Perlite</i> | |
| Joaquim Fernandes Moinhos | 282 |
| <i>Graphite</i> | |
| Sociedade Mineira do Itotone | 200 |
| Grafitos de Moçambique | 196 |
| <i>Copper</i> | |
| Francesco Gibelino | 230 |
| <i>Rutile</i> | |
| Antonio Augusto Cardoso e Castro | 200 |
| <i>Kaolin</i> | |
| Sociedade Mineira e Industrial | 195 |

* SOURCE: Portugal, *Diário do Governo*; Mozambique, *Boletim Oficial*.

^a Excluding petroleum, hydrocarbons and allied substances.

^b Renewed in 1961 and 1963.

^c Renewed in 1963.

^d Granted in July 1964.

^e Revoked in 1961.

^f All minerals, excluding petroleum, hydrocarbons and allied substances and radio-active minerals.

^g New concessions for ferrous metals added in 1961.

TABLE 5. PRINCIPAL MINERAL PRODUCTION OF ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE IN RELATION TO TOTAL AFRICAN AND WORLD OUTPUT IN 1959*

| Mineral | Angola | Mozambique | Africa | World |
|---|------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Asbestos (thousand tons) | — | ^a | 304 | 1,960 |
| Bauxite (thousand tons) | — | 4 | 457 | 22,500 |
| Beryllium (tons) | — | 1,405 | 3,215 ^b | 6,600 ^b |
| Coal and lignites (million tons) | — | 256 | 42,100 | 2,506,000 |
| Cement (thousand tons) | 166 ^c | 167 ^d | 7,709 ^e | 262,000 |
| Columbium and tantalum (tons) | — | 169.2 | 1,344.3 | 2,250 |
| <i>Diamonds (kg)</i> | | | | |
| Gem | 118.67 | — | — | — |
| Industrial | 81,481 | — | 5,361,730 | 5,440,000 ^f |
| Iron (thousand long tons) | 349 | — | 12,400 | 436,000 |
| Manganese (tons) | 35,600 | — | 2,570,000 | 18,850,000 |
| Gypsum (thousand tons) | 10 ^e | — | 1,380 ^e | 33,200 |
| Hydrocarbons, reserves (million tons) | 3.4 | — | 721.0 | 37,000 |
| Gold (kg) | 1 | 22 | 687,000 | 1,020,080 |
| Salt (thousand tons) | 70 ^e | — | 1,480 | 74,000 |
| Vanadium (tons) | 18 ^e | — | 724 | 3,830 |

* SOURCE: compiled from: Woodtli, R., *L'Europe et l'Afrique, le potentiel minéral africain*, Lausanne, 1961.

^a Production was 0.2 in 1956; 0.1 in 1957 and 1958.

^b World production was 11,750 metric tons in 1956, 10,250 in 1957 and 6,700 in 1958. African production was 5,170 in 1957, 3,240 in 1958.

^c 1958.

^d 1957.

^e 1958; but production in 1956 was 20,000 tons.

^f World production equalled 27 million carats.

TABLE 6. ANGOLA

MINERAL PRODUCTION AND VALUE OF EXPORTS*

(values of exports in thousand escudos)

| Mineral | 1957 | | 1958 | | 1959 | | 1960 | | 1961 | |
|--------------------------------|------------|--------------------|------------|--------------------|------------|---------------------|------------|---------------------|------------|------------------|
| | Production | Value | Production | Value | Production | Value | Production | Value | Production | Value |
| Diamonds (carats) | 864,372 | 427,157 | 1,001,236 | 548,759 | 1,015,688 | 596,405 | 1,056,827 | 496,168 | 1,147,531 | 666,055 |
| Iron (tons) | 105,600 | 32,875 | 287,200 | 77,006 | 348,982 | 90,586 | 658,954 | 151,553 | 812,138 | 143,301 |
| Petroleum (tons) | 10,042 | — | 50,633 | — | 50,219 | 20,538 ^a | 66,850 | 26,550 ^a | 104,429 | 51,483 |
| Manganese (tons) | 21,335 | 29,113 | 34,926 | 10,184 | 35,665 | 25,266 | 23,340 | 22,863 | 20,589 | 13,674 |
| Copper (tons) ... | 16,631 | 26,439 | 15,005 | 15,416 | 16,988 | 17,215 | 17,423 | 21,400 | 825 | 9,721 |
| Salt ^b (tons) | 52,321 | 10,333 | 69,144 | 9,018 | 69,230 | 9,259 | 57,817 | 9,349 | 66,809 | 10,626 |
| Asphalt ^c (tons) .. | 21,521 | 1,076 | 34,723 | 1,736 | 27,900 | 1,311 | 25,783 | 1,290 | 22,783 | 1,140 |
| Mica (prepared) (kg.) | 21,198 | 3,520 ^d | 21,401 | 4,327 ^d | 9,189 | 1,686 ^d | 388 | 1,940 ^d | 23 | 113 ^d |
| Mica (tons) | 383 | | 325,200 | | 173,900 | | 33 | | 1,320 | |
| Gold ^e (grammes) | — | — | 820 | 21 | 1,316 | 33 | 1,320 | 33 | 1,494 | 37 ^e |

* SOURCE: *Anuário Estatístico*, 1957-1961.

NOTE: The value of exports does not correspond to the value of production, except for diamonds, all of which are exported.

^a Value of fuel oil produced.^b Partially exported; the value of production is generally at least double that of exports.^c Not exported; the value is that at the mine.^d No information whether exported; the value is that at the mine.

TABLE 7. MOZAMBIQUE

MINERAL PRODUCTION AND VALUE OF EXPORTS*


(values of exports in thousand escudos)

| Mineral | 1957 | | 1958 | | 1959 | | 1960 | | 1961 | |
|--------------------------------------|------------|---------------------|------------|---------------------|------------|---------------------|------------|---------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| | Production | Value | Production | Value | Production | Value | Production | Value | Production | Value |
| Columbo- tantallite (tons) ... | 130.86 | 6,357 | 171.87 | 27,050 | 145.16 | 13,952 | 160.18 | 23,347 | 137.56 | 28,761 |
| Eeryl (tons) | 1,697 | 12,733 | 1,059 | 8,233 | 1,414 | 13,237 | 1,496 | 13,834 | 978 | 9,991 |
| Coal (tons) | 269,974 | 28,077 ^a | 247,584 | 29,091 ^a | 256,622 | 28,998 ^a | 269,626 | 31,007 ^a | 320,859 | 36,980 ^a |
| Microlite (tons) ^b .. | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 3 ^b | 7,563 |
| Bismutite (tons) .. | 3.55 | — | 1.10 | 41 | 12.51 | 689 | 17.26 | 698 | 22.05 | 1,344 |
| Bauxite (tons) ... | 5,043 | 272 | 4,747 | 177 | 4,284 | 347 | 4,840 | 267 | 4,671 | 276 |
| Asbestos (tons) ... | 138 | 671 | 238 | 532 | 33 | 315 | 20 | 142 | 147 | 236 |
| Tourmalines (kilo- grammes) | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 289 | 266 |
| Gold (grammes) | 33,604 | 569 | 21,616 | 1,081 | 9,164 | 129 | 6,999 | 180 ^c | 3,261 | — |
| Ilmenite (tons) ... | — | — | — | — | 10,342 | 1,752 | 711 | 826 | 495 ^d | 93 |
| Lepidolite (tons) ... | 343 | 28 ^e | 87 | 94 ^f | 90 | — | — | — | 153 | 150 |
| Mica (tons) | 30 | 49 | 2 | — | 5 | 68 | 1.1 | 18 | 1.5 | 28 |


* SOURCE: Mozambique, *Direcção dos Serviços de Geologia e Minas: Actividade nos minas e pedreiras*, 1958-1962.


NOTE: The value of exports does not correspond with the value of production, except for bauxite, all of which is exported.

^a Value of production; only about 1/5th of the coal produced is exported (60,879 tons in 1961).^b Previously included with columbo-tantalite; exports in 1961 amounted to 34 tons.^c Value of production, no exports.^d Exports only.^e Only 50 tons exported in 1957.^f 160 tons exported in 1958.



1. The Mandated Territory of South West Africa is under the Administration of South Africa.





Concessions of the Companhia Mineira do Lobito and the Sociedade Mineira do Lombigue

SELECTED SOURCES

The following is a selected list of the principal legislation and other sources consulted by the Secretariat in preparing the present working paper. Other sources are referred to, where appropriate, in the text.

I. MINING LEGISLATION

| Legislation | Date | Subject |
|-------------------------|-------------------|---|
| A. GENERAL | | |
| Decree | 20 September 1906 | Basic overseas mining legislation |
| Decree | 9 December 1909 | Petroleum mining |
| Decree 81 | 21 August 1913 | Exclusive concessions |
| Decree 720 | 3 August 1914 | Prospecting of precious stones |
| Decree Law 18 713 | 1 August 1930 | Basic mining law of Portugal |
| Law 1939 | 27 March 1936 | Renewal of exclusive concessions |
| Decree 32 251 | 9 September 1942 | Mining taxes |
| Decree 33 722 | 19 June 1944 | Extension of mining law to non-metallic minerals |
| Portaria 13 337 | 23 October 1950 | Suspension of prospecting of radioactive minerals in Angola and Mozambique |
| Decree Law 39 580 | 29 March 1954 | Establishment of Atomic Energy Board |
| Decree Law 39 581 | 29 March 1954 | Functions and powers of the Atomic Energy Board |
| Decree 40 069 | 23 February 1955 | Radio-active minerals in existing concessions placed under control of the Atomic Energy Board |
| Law 2080 | 21 March 1956 | Continental shelf |
| Portaria 16 267 | 23 April 1957 | Prospecting of radio-active minerals |
| Decree 41 356 | 11 November 1957 | Petroleum mining |
| Decree 41 357 | 11 November 1957 | Income tax on petroleum operations |
| Decree Law 41 995 | 5 December 1958 | Revokes and replaces Decree Law 39 580 on the establishment of the Atomic Energy Board |
| Decree Law 41 996 | 5 December 1958 | Revokes and replaces Decree Law 39 581 on the functions and powers of the Atomic Energy Board |

| <i>Legislation</i> | <i>Date</i> | <i>Subject</i> |
|---|-------------------|---|
| B. ANGOLA | | |
| <i>Diamonds</i> | | |
| Decree 9 of the High Commissioner | 6 May 1921 | Suspending diamond prospecting in the whole Territory |
| Decree 11 of the High Commissioner | 12 May 1921 | DIAMANG. Authorizing contract dated 18 May 1921 granting exclusive concession: provisional contract 4 December 1920 |
| Decree 176 of the High Commissioner | 4 July 1922 | DIAMANG. Authorizing contract dated 8 July 1922 |
| Decree Law 27 898 | 28 July 1937 | DIAMANG. Authorizing contract dated 31 July 1937 extending exclusive rights to 1971 |
| Decree 35 668 | 28 May 1946 } | DIAMANG. Authorizing contract dated 24 June 1946 and establishing a Development Fund |
| Decree 35 669 | 28 May 1946 } | |
| Decree Law 39 920 | 22 November 1954 | DIAMANG. Authorizing contract dated 10 February 1955 relating to increase in capital |
| Decree 44 084 | 12 December 1961 | DIAMANG. Authorizing contract dated 5 January 1962 providing loan of 105.5 million escudos to the Government of Angola |
| Decree Law 45 061 | 5 June 1963 | DIAMANG. Authorizing contract dated 26 June 1963 providing loan of 150 million escudos to the Government of Angola |
| Announcement | 23 April 1964 | Releasing previously reserved areas for diamond prospecting |
| Portaria 20 907 | 13 November 1964 | João Antonio Veiga. Granting exclusive diamond prospecting licence |
| Portaria 20 782 | 2 September 1964 | Angola Exploration Company Pty. Granting exclusive diamond prospecting licence |
| <i>Petroleum</i> | | |
| Decree 38 832 | 18 July 1952 | CARBONANG. Authorizing original exclusive concession and contract dated 24 March 1953 |
| Decree 40 416 | 3 December 1955 | PURFINA — (CARBONANG). Authorizing increase in area and extension of period of concession; also authorizing co-operation with PETROFINA. Contract dated 3 December 1955 |
| Decree 41 180 | 9 July 1957 | Cabinda Gulf Oil Co. Authorizing original exclusive concession |
| Decree 41 295 | 25 September 1957 | PURFINA. Authorizing establishment of PETRANGOL refinery, and extending period of concession; contract dated 17 October 1957 |
| Decree 41 374 | 18 November 1957 | Cabinda Gulf Oil Co. Amending concession area with surface rent clause; contract dated 22 November 1957 |
| Decree 44 380 | 1 June 1962 | Cabinda Gulf Oil Co. Authorizing extension of period of concession to 1966; revised contract dated 9 July 1964 |
| Decree 44 613 | 3 October 1962 | PURFINA. Authorizing extension of period of concession to 1967 |
| <i>Iron and manganese</i> | | |
| Decree 37 677 | 22 December 1949 | Companhia Mineira do Lobito. Granting exclusive concession for all minerals with some exceptions. Contract dated 1 March 1950 |

| Legislation | Date | Subject |
|------------------------------|-------------------|---|
| B. ANGOLA (continued) | | |
| Decree 39 246 | 16 June 1953 | Companhia Mineira do Lombige. Granting exclusive concession for all minerals with some exceptions. Contract dated 23 July 1953 |
| Portaria 14 966 | 28 July 1954 | Companhia do Manganés de Angola. Granting exclusive concession for all minerals with some exceptions |
| Portaria 15 961 | 5 September 1956 | LOBITO. Granting exclusive concession for coal and other solid hydrocarbons |
| Portaria 17 036 | 11 February 1959 | LOBITO. Granting exclusive concession for all minerals with some exceptions |
| Portaria 17 088 | 28 March 1959 | LOBITO. Granting exclusive concession for all minerals with some exceptions |
| Portaria 18 745 | 27 November 1961 | Armando Manuel Ferreira Patrício. Granting exclusive concession for all minerals with some exceptions |
| Decree 46 017 | 10 November 1964 | LOBITO. Authorizing extension of contract concession to 1969 |
| Decree 46 022 | 11 November 1964 | LOMBIGE. Authorizing extension of concession to 1969 |
| Portaria 20 482 | 31 March 1964 } | José Pereira Chaves |
| Portaria 20 664 | 7 July 1964 } | Exclusive concession for all minerals with some exceptions |
| <i>Other minerals</i> | | |
| Decree 33 992 | 30 September 1944 | União Fabril-Empresa do Cobre. Granting exclusive concession. Contract dated 6 February 1945 |
| Decree 33 989 | 29 September 1944 | Companhia dos Betuminosos de Angola. Granting exclusive concession which was expired 13 December 1955 |
| C. MOZAMBIQUE | | |
| <i>Coal</i> | | |
| Portaria 18 353 | 23 March 1961 | Companhia Carbonífera de Moçambique. Granting exclusive prospecting licence |
| Portaria 20 176 | 19 November 1963 | Modifying area and authorizing extension of the above to 1966 |
| <i>Petroleum</i> | | |
| Decree Law 29 166 | 22 November 1938 | Companhia de Petróleos de Moçambique. Granting exclusive prospecting concession. Expired 1948 |
| Decree 36 841 | 20 March 1948 | Mozambique Gulf Oil Co. Granting exclusive prospecting concession. Authorizing contract of 7 May 1948 |
| Decree 38 276 | 30 May 1951 | Modifying area of concession and authorizing extension of period |
| Decree 40 707 | 30 July 1956 | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| Decree 41 586 | 15 April 1958 | Authorizing extension of period |
| Decree 41 766 | 31 July 1958 | Mozambique Gulf Oil Co. and Mozambique Pan American Oil Co. Authorizing new exclusive prospecting and mining concession. Contract dated 5 August 1958 |
| Decree 43 790 | 29 July 1961 | Amending contract with Mozambique Pan American Oil Co. |
| Decree 44 178 | 8 February 1962 | Modifying area of concession and authorizing extension of period to 1967 |
| <i>Diamonds</i> | | |
| Portaria 19 247 | 25 June 1962 | Suspending prospecting in a special area |

| Legislation | Date | Subject |
|----------------------------------|------------------|--|
| C. MOZAMBIQUE (continued) | | |
| Decree 45 726 | 21 May 1964 | Srs. A. P. Gouveia and J. de Veiga Lima. Granting exclusive prospecting concession for diamonds. Contract 22 June 1964. Formed Companhia dos Diamantes de Moçambique |
| <i>Radio-active minerals</i> | | |
| Portaria 16 434 | 26 October 1957 | Entrepoto Comercial de Moçambique. Granting exclusive prospecting licence. Formed Companhia de Urânio de Moçambique |
| Portaria 18 034 | 2 November 1960 | Authorizing extension of period of concession |
| Portaria 18 920 | 28 December 1961 | Amending contract |
| <i>Other minerals</i> | | |
| Decree 36 021 | 9 December 1946 | Empresa Mineira do Alto Ligonha. Granting exclusive prospecting concession. Contract 25 January 1947 |
| Decree 39 784 | 24 August 1954 | Ake Viking Lillas (Subsidiary of Boliden Gruvaktiebolag, Sweden). Granting exclusive prospecting concession which expired October 1957. Contract 28 October 1954 |
| Decree 40 576 | 12 May 1956 | Central Mining and Investments Corporation. Granting exclusive concession, which was abandoned 1958. Contract 27 August 1956. Formed Companhia Geral Mineira do Chidué |
| Portaria 16 386 | 19 August 1957 | Manuel Pinto Monteiro. Granting exclusive prospecting licence. Formed Minas do Lice, Lda |
| Portaria 16 438 | 2 November 1957 | <i>Ibid.</i> Amending licence |
| Portaria 16 439 | 2 November 1957 | Aquiles Figueiredo Vasco. Granting exclusive concession |
| Decree 41 334 | 9 November 1957 | Empresa Mineira do Alto Ligonha. Authorizes extension of exclusive concession to December 1959 |
| Portaria 17 138 | 27 April 1959 | Monteminas Lda. Granting exclusive prospecting concession |
| Portaria 18 033 | 2 November 1960 | Sociedade Mineira da Zambézia. Granting exclusive prospecting licence |
| Portaria 18 033 | 2 November 1960 | Maria Alzina Simão. Granting exclusive prospecting licence. Revoked by Portaria 19 100 of 28 March 1962 |
| Portaria 18 033 | 2 November 1960 | Calisto Freira. Granting exclusive prospecting licence |
| Portaria 18 033 | 2 November 1960 | Francisco Perez Soares. Granting exclusive prospecting licence |
| Portaria 18 195 | 28 January 1961 | Manuel Rodrigues Lagos. Granting exclusive prospecting licence. Revoked by Portaria 19 046 of 23 February 1962 |
| Portaria 18 268 | 15 February 1961 | Minas do Lice, Lda. Authorizes extension of exclusive prospecting licence to 1963 |
| Portaria 18 920 | 28 December 1961 | Companhia de Urânio de Moçambique. Grants exclusive prospecting licence for iron and other minerals, excluding petrol, coal, hydrocarbons and radio-active minerals |
| Portaria 21 054 | 2 January 1965 | Janez Kapnek. Granting exclusive prospecting licence |
| Portaria 21 101 | 10 February 1965 | Companhia de Urânio de Moçambique. Extending exclusive licence for iron and other minerals to 1967 |

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Annex II

Concession, occupation and settlement of land in Angola and Mozambique

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

CONTENTS

| GENERAL LEGISLATION AND POLICY | Paragraphs |
|---|------------|
| A. Introduction | 1-7 |
| B. Constitutional provisions | 8-9 |
| C. Present legislation regulating the occupation and concession of land in the overseas Territories . | 10-38 |

CONTENTS (continued)

Paragraphs

AFRICAN LAND RIGHTS

| | |
|---|-------|
| A. Introduction | 39 |
| B. African land rights, 1901-1961 | 40-46 |
| C. Present constitutional and legal rights of Africans in respect of land in the overseas Territories | 47-57 |

CONCESSION, OCCUPATION AND SETTLEMENT OF LAND IN ANGOLA

| | |
|---|---------|
| A. General | 58-61 |
| B. Land concessions | 62-86 |
| C. Settlement schemes prior to 1961 | 87-157 |
| D. Settlement and reorganization of the rural population since 1961 | 158-198 |

CONCESSION, OCCUPATION AND SETTLEMENT OF LAND IN MOZAMBIQUE

| | |
|-----------------------------|---------|
| A. General | 199-209 |
| B. Land concessions | 210-257 |
| C. Settlement schemes | 258-330 |

Tables

Angola

| | Page |
|--|------|
| 1. Relative European and African population, 1900-1960 | 269 |
| 2. Population density, 1960 and distribution of European population by district, 1950 and 1960 | 269 |
| 3. Total area of land concessions by district as at 31 December 1956 and 1960-1962 | 280 |
| 4. A. Total concessions of rural land by district | 280 |
| B. Provisional <i>aforamento</i> concessions of rural land by district | 281 |
| C. Definitive <i>aforamento</i> concessions of rural land by district | 281 |
| 5. Relative population distribution by district ... | 282 |

Mozambique

| | |
|---|-----|
| 6. Population, 1940, 1950, 1960 | 283 |
| 7. Population distribution and population density by district—1960 | 283 |
| 8. Total area of land concessions by district as at 31 December 1909, 1918, 1938 and 1939 | 293 |
| 9. Annual concessions of urban, suburban and rural land (1917-1963) | 294 |
| 10. Rural land concessions: | |
| A. Annual concessions of rural land by district (1955-1963) | 294 |
| B. Juridical status of agricultural holdings (1950-1960) | 295 |
| C. Concessions of rural land by <i>aforamento</i> and <i>arrendamento</i> (1956-1963) | 295 |
| D. Number of farms (<i>empresas</i>) and area of land under agricultural occupation (1955-1962) | 295 |

| | |
|------------------------|---------|
| MAPS | 296-297 |
| SELECTED SOURCES | 298 |

GENERAL LEGISLATION AND POLICY

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Traditionally, the main objectives of Portuguese land policy in Africa have been to settle European population from Portugal and to exploit the land resources, while at the same time ensuring to the indigenous inhabitants the right to use the land habitually occupied by them. As Angola and Mozambique both have low population densities and together have 22 times the land area of Portugal, it is in these two Territories that the greatest efforts have been made, and continue to be made, to implement this policy.

2. In the past, land alienation to non-indigenous interests has followed different patterns in the different Territories. In Mozambique, for instance, up to the end of the nineteenth century Portuguese occupation was based on the system of

prazos de coroa, which later gave way to development through non-Portuguese chartered companies.¹ In Angola, on the other hand, chartered companies have not played an important role. Instead, numerous Government schemes have been tried in an effort to establish peasant-farmer settler colonies of Portuguese from Europe.²

3. In 1901 all land in the Overseas Territories which did not at that date constitute private property under Portuguese law was declared State domain. This was a first step in placing under Portuguese law and State control the occupation and concession of land in the Territories, including the lands on which the indigenous inhabitants lived.

4. The 1901 legislation placed reliance primarily on Portuguese citizens and European agriculture,³ and made a basic distinction in the granting of concessions between land already cultivated and uncultivated land. Thus while cultivated land, or land in European population centres or to be used for construction could be alienated by sale, uncultivated land could not be permanently alienated except by concessions made conditional upon a minimum degree of development within a given period of time. In all concessions, the State retained the right to revoke them if the required conditions were not fulfilled.

5. Apart from permanent alienation by sale, the 1901 law provided for concessions (a) under a system of *emphyteusis* known in Portuguese as *aforamento*; (b) by leasehold (*arrendamento*); and (c) in certain specified areas (excluding Angola) by a modified form of crown grant or *prazos da coroa* as laid down in 1889.

6. For Portuguese citizens, the prerequisite for obtaining a land concession was the possession of contractual rights; in effect, this excluded all Africans except *assimilados*. Aliens were additionally required to enter into an undertaking to accept the jurisdiction of Portuguese courts. Companies could obtain land concessions, provided they had been constituted under Portuguese law and had their headquarters in Portuguese Territory. This applied to companies constituted with domestic or foreign capital, but in the latter case, the shareholders had also to agree not to transfer their rights to a third party without the prior approval of the Portuguese Government.

7. From 1901 onwards, several changes were introduced in the regulations governing the granting of land concessions in Angola and Mozambique. The most important legislation for Angola was Decree No. 5,847-C of 21 May 1919 and for Mozambique Decree No. 3,983 of 16 March 1918. These remained in effect until they were replaced by the present regulations introduced in 1961 (Decree No. 43,894 of 6 September). An important feature of the decrees of 1918 and 1919 was the establishment for the first time of reserved areas for the indigenous inhabitants. In general, however, the basic principles of the 1901 legislation were retained. Paragraphs 10-38 below contain a brief summary of the present regulations on the granting of concessions in Angola and Mozambique.

B. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

8. Article 29 of the Political Constitution of Portugal states that "the economic organization of the nation must provide the maximum production and wealth for the benefit of society, and shall create a collective existence from which shall flow power to the State and justice to all citizens". It is the right and duty of the State to co-ordinate and control economic and social life, "to establish a proper balance of the population, of professions, of occupations, of capital and of labour", and "to develop the settlement of the national Territories, to protect emigrants and to regulate emigration" (article 31).

9. According to the Constitution, the economic organization of the overseas Territories "shall form part of the general economic organization of the Portuguese nation and shall thereby take its place in the world economy" (article 158). In effect, the economic life of the Territories is subordinated to the overriding interests of the nation as a whole. Specifically, "concessions granted by the State or by the local autonomous bodies in the sphere of their competence are to be always subject to conditions which ensure the national interest and

¹ See paras. 199-330 below.

² See paras. 58-198 below.

³ Indigenous land rights are described in paras. 39-57 below.

other requirements of the national economy even when they are to be effected with the aid of foreign capital". A further restriction is that in the overseas Territories, private or collective enterprises may not be granted the "possession of land... with the right of sub-lease to other enterprises".

C. PRESENT LEGISLATION REGULATING THE OCCUPATION AND CON- CESSION OF LAND IN THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES

General provisions

10. The principal legislation regulating the occupation and concession of land in Angola and Mozambique at present is Decree No. 43,894 of 6 September 1961. This decree authorizes the Overseas Minister to grant special large concessions of up to a quarter of a million of hectares (see para. 19 below), retains *aforamento*⁴ as a form of land concession, introduces new provisions relating to indigenous rights and strengthens measures to ensure the development of concessions after they have been granted.

11. As provided in article 167 of the political Constitution, land in the overseas Territories comes under three régimes: the public domain of the State, private property and vacant lands.

12. Land belonging to the public domain is not concessionable except under special conditions and procedures. Included in the public domain of the State are the continental shelf, mineral deposits and other natural wealth below the surface, sea waters and other shores; lakes, lagoons and water sources; Territorial areas reserved for military defence; and other reserves established from the vacant lands for specific purposes. These may, for instance, include frontier areas; reserves for conservation, scientific exploration and public services; game reserves, areas for population centres (*provoações*); and reserves for settlement (*povoamento*). Land for indigenous use, however, is no longer included in these special reserves, but is separately classified.

13. Private property, for the purpose of the land concession regulations, includes land over which there is either a complete property right (*direito de propriedade perpétua*) or an incomplete property right in respect of concessions that have become definitive (see para. 21 below).

14. Vacant lands are defined as those areas which do not form part of the public domain of the State and which have not become private property under Portuguese law (article LI of the Overseas Organic Law 1963). However, as Angola and Mozambique are constitutionally overseas provinces of Portugal and an integral part of the Portuguese nation, they do not have full property rights (*domínio do proprietário*) over their vacant lands. The right they can exercise is considered to be one of eminent domain (see A/4978, para. 327). Under the 1961 regulations, the rights of the Territories over vacant lands are as follows (article 39):

(a) To dispose thereof as provided in the legislation regulating the occupation and concessions of land and other special legislation;

(b) To cause the land to be used for public services;

(c) To utilize the products of the land subject to the regulations governing various forms of utilization.

15. Vacant lands are divided into three classes: classified population centres (*povoações*) and their surrounding areas constitute class one; land demarcated for the purpose of being granted to indigenous population groups on a collective basis so that it may be used by them in harmony with their usage and custom constitutes class two; all vacant land not included in class one or class two constitutes class three.

16. In order to ensure better use of the land, requests for concessions of over 100 ha.⁵ must be accompanied by a statement of the purpose for which the land is to be used, a plan for its development, and proof of both technical and financial

⁴ The various forms of land concessions are described in paras. 19-28 below.

⁵ The original provisional text, as it appears in A/AC.108/L.5/Add.1, page 11, gave the figure as 250 ha. It appears that this was an error, as the versions published later in the Angola and Mozambique *Boletim Oficiais*, for instance, give it as 100 ha. One hundred ha. equals one square kilometre (1 ha. equals 2.47 acres).

ability to carry out the work. Special provisions are included to encourage small farmers with modest resources: persons requesting concessions of not more than 100 ha. are not required to submit proof of financial capacity or operating plans.

17. Portuguese and foreign nationals and companies may obtain land concessions under certain conditions (article 61). For Portuguese nationals, the 1961 regulations no longer specify that they must possess contractual rights, but retain a general provision which brings all matters relating to land concessions by *aforamento* under the regulation of the Civil Code (article 107). In addition, national and foreign bodies in the public sector may also obtain concessions. All foreign individuals, companies or institutions must agree to jurisdiction by Portuguese courts and the concessions must be used for the special purpose for which they were requested (article 61).

18. In April 1965, Portugal introduced new legislation to encourage foreign investments. This decree (No. 46,312 of 28 April 1965), although removing many of the previous restrictions on foreign capital, retains the requirement that foreign companies must have the prior authorization of the overseas Ministry before they may acquire or exploit land concessions as provided in Decree No. 28,228 of 13 April 1943, which remains in force. Furthermore, at least half the capital of such companies must be owned by Portuguese nationals with the shares in the owner's name; in no case may the shares be changed to bearer shares. However, the Overseas Minister has the discretion to grant exceptions.

Forms of concession

19. The right to grant large concessions of class three "vacant land" is vested in the Overseas Minister (article 54). In Angola and Mozambique he has the authority to grant concessions of land over 5,000 ha. if they are by *aforamento* and concessions exceeding 25,000 ha. if they are by leasehold and for the purpose of cattle raising or exploitation of forestry products. As before, he also has the right to grant special concessions of land that are held under direct contracts with the Portuguese Government (see para. 31 below).

20. In Angola and Mozambique the Governor-General has the authority to sell land in accordance with the terms of the legislation, to grant concessions of class one land, to approve the demarcation of class two land occupied by indigenous inhabitants, and to grant concessions of class three land not exceeding 5,000 ha. in area. He must, however, consult the appropriate advisory council⁶ before the alienating of land by sale, before granting *aforamento* concessions exceeding 2,000 ha. and before granting leasehold concessions exceeding 5,000 ha. for livestock or forestry exploitation (articles 57 and 59). District governors may grant concessions of class three land up to 1,000 ha. on a provisional basis, but only the Governor-General can approve concessions on a definitive basis.

21. Rights over vacant lands may not be acquired by prescription or accession (article 48), but only by concessions granted under the law in force. The form of land holding varies according to the class of land and the use for which the land is intended. Class one land (i.e., classified population centres and their surrounding areas) may be acquired by purchase or by a leasehold concession. If the land already has buildings on it, or if it is intended for construction of new buildings, it may be acquired by purchase; but if it is land in the outskirts of population centres and intended for agricultural purposes, it may be acquired by *aforamento* only.

22. Class two land, comprising land marked out for communal use by the indigenous African population, is not concessionable (article 52). The special rules governing communal or individual use of class two land by Africans is discussed below (see paras. 49-56). Class three vacant land, which comprises all other land, when intended for agricultural purposes, may be granted as *aforamento* (*emphyteusis*) concessions, and when intended for livestock raising and allied industries or forestry exploitation, may be granted as leasehold concessions.

⁶ The original decree required the Governor-General to consult the Government Council. Since then, the Government Council in Angola and Mozambique has been replaced by an Economic and Social Council.

23. In Angola and Mozambique, land intended for agricultural purposes is generally granted in the form of *aforamento* concessions. *Aforamento* is a form of land holding (sometimes described in English as a system of quit rent) under which perpetual or long-term rights of *domínio útil* are granted on the condition that the land is improved or kept under cultivation and a yearly payment of a fixed sum per hectare (*foro*) to the Government is required. The amount of *foro* is usually low and now varies from less than one escudo (\$U.S.0.03) to 10 escudos per hectare, depending on the type and class of land. An *aforamento* concession is held under contract, and matters relating to such concessions, except where special regulations exist, are covered by the Portuguese civil code.

24. *Aforamento* concessions are generally granted provisionally (or conditionally) for a period of five years. The rights in a provisional concession may not be inherited but may be conveyed between parties by public deed (article 205). If during the provisional period the specified conditions relating to the utilization of the land are fulfilled, the concession is granted on a definitive basis and the concessionaire receives a formal title to it (article 98) with the right to sell, convey or bequeath the concession unless the concession had been granted free of charge (see para. 35 below).

25. The main characteristic of an *aforamento* concession is that, until the land has been used or developed to meet the conditions required in the contract, the concessionaire remains under the obligation to pay the *foro* and the Government retains the right to withdraw the concession. In cases of rural land granted by *aforamento* for agricultural purposes, as a general rule, the concessionaire may request the remission of *foro* when stipulations regarding the use of the land in his contract have been met. The cessation of the payment of *foro* does not appear *ipso facto* to grant full property rights in the land, and until such rights are granted, the right of the concessionaire remains theoretically, at least, that of *domínio útil*.⁷ What rights the concessionaire can eventually obtain may be specified in each individual case at the time the original provisional concession is made. However, in practice there seems to be little difference so long as the land is kept developed.⁸

26. Under the 1919 regulations for Angola, the minimum conditions with regard to development of the land during the provisional period of five years were expressed in terms of the expenditure made. The concessionaire was required to spend each year an amount equal to ten times the *foro*. Subsequently, after having spent not less than two hundred times the annual *foro* on the development of the land, and if he was not in arrears on the *foro* due, the concessionaire had the right to obtain *domínio directo*⁹ over the land. A concessionaire of land held under *aforamento* in areas surrounding population centres could request the remission of *foro* upon payment of 20 times that amount after having improved the land to the standard required. Since this did not ensure the utilization of the land in Angola, new measures were introduced in 1923 (Decree No. 360 of 12 September 1923) requiring that at least one tenth of the concessioned land had to be used. This requirement appears to have been in force in Angola up to 1961.

27. Under the present regulations contained in Decree No. 43,894, the minimum conditions to be met by the concessionaire are no longer based on expenditure but on the actual utilization made of the land. For concessions of over 100 ha., the minimum amount of work to be carried out has to be set out in the utilization plan, which has to be submitted at the time of the application for the concession. For concessions of less than 100 ha. intended for farming, the concessionaire must put under cultivation at least one third of the

area in the first five years, in order to obtain the concession on a definitive basis. No extension of time is allowed except where circumstances of an exceptional nature have prevented such development. If he has not been able to meet the requirement at the end of five years, a concessionaire may request the reduction of the area of the concession and receive on a definitive basis twice the area he has cultivated (previously he received five times the area cultivated). To prevent absentee ownership of land for speculative purposes, once land is granted on a definitive basis the minimum area of cultivation has to be maintained and may not be suspended for more than three years (article 101).

28. In general, remission of the *foro* may be granted only after the land has been completely utilized (*completamente aproveitado*) or if buildings have been erected which are indispensable to the specified form of exploitation (article 110). Complete utilization is defined as the maximum use of the land in accordance with the purpose for which the concession was requested (article 100).

29. Concessions of land by the State under leasehold (*arrendamento*) are regulated by provisions relating to leasehold of rural buildings (*arrendamentos de prédios rústicos*) depending on the use to which they are to be put. The rent, which is to be calculated according to the regulations, may be adjusted upwards every ten years. Leasehold concessions acquired for the purpose of livestock development were previously granted for a period of seventy years; they are now granted for an initial period of twenty years, renewable for periods of five years each up to a maximum of fifty years. At the end of the period of the lease, the lessee may obtain an *aforamento* concession of the land on which he has established permanent annual crops, but the maximum area is limited to that permitted under such contracts. The regulations also set out in detail the conditions which must be met by the lessee of land for livestock development (including the number of livestock per hectare), and the conditions under which the lessee will be dispossessed (articles 130-132).

30. Leasehold concessions for commercial purposes—including the establishment of small industries—are made for one year, with the right to renewal up to twenty years. The renewal of the lease after the third year is conditional upon proof of development.

Special concessions

Concessions awarded under contract by the Overseas Minister

31. As noted above, the Overseas Minister retains the authority to grant very large concessions of land to be held under special contract with the Portuguese Government. The Overseas Minister may, on his own authority, approve concessions up to 100,000 ha.; concessions up to 250,000 ha. have to be approved by the Council of Ministers (the largest area that could be granted to Angola under previous legislation was 50,000 ha.). This provision (article 54, sub-para. 3) is intended to open the way for large-scale capital investment. These special concessions may be by *aforamento* contract or leasehold contract and additional conditions¹⁰ may be included so long as these are not contrary to the particular type of contract. The concession may be of a definitive character from the start without the usual waiting period and without minimum development conditions.

Free concessions

32. Free concessions may be granted to (a) settlers in zones allocated to the agricultural settlement boards or other zones defined by law;¹¹ (b) administrative bodies or corporations; (c) national welfare, philanthropic, sporting, scientific or educational bodies; (d) national Catholic missions, and (e) corporate bodies of workers (article 62).

⁷ Moreira, Adriano, *Ensaio, Estudos de Ciências Políticas e Sociais*, No. 34, Lisbon, 1963, p. 178. As stated below in para. 34, settlers who have received free concessions may request full property rights two years after they have completely developed the land.

⁸ In fact many writers, including A. Correia de Araújo (*Aspectos do desenvolvimento económico e social de Angola*, p. 78) considers that, when an *aforamento* concession becomes definitive, the right conferred is "*propriedade plena*."

⁹ Various writers use this term to imply full property rights.

¹⁰ For instance, in Angola in the 1920's, concessions above 1,000 ha. had to be made by special contract which in most cases provided either for direct State participation in the income of the concession or required the development of areas of settlement and improvement of conditions of the indigenous inhabitants.

¹¹ Special areas for settlement may be reserved by the Portuguese Government. See para. 12 above.

33. Free concessions are granted by special contract which may be either *aforamento* or leasehold, depending on the purpose for which the land is intended (article 145). Holders of free concessions may not alienate or convey their rights without the approval of the relevant authority (*autoridade concedente*) (article 147). In general, full rights of ownership of the land may be obtained, subject to approval by the Governor-General, after fifteen years of occupancy and upon payment of the moneys that normally would have been due plus the price of determining the boundaries (article 148).

34. Special provisions regulate free concessions to settlers. They must develop the land according to the plan of the particular project of which their concessions form a part. The concession is void if at any time the concessionaire and his family cease to live on the land, or the development of the land is interrupted for more than one consecutive year for inadequate reasons. The rights of the concessionaire in a free concession may be assigned in favour of the State or a credit institution (article 150). In general, the regulations provide that two years after the land has been put to full use according to plan the settler concessionaire may request full property rights in the land. Full title shall also be granted if the concession has been held for twenty years and the development is complete. Specific conditions under which settlers may obtain title to farmsteads granted in the Ceta and Limpopo schemes are described in paragraphs 111-123 and 275-285 below.

35. Other free concessions are not transferable and lapse as soon as they are no longer put to the use for which they were originally intended (article 151).

Concession procedures

36. The procedures for obtaining a concession of land by *aforamento* for agricultural purposes involves three phases: (a) surveying of the land and boundary marking; (b) provisional concession and authorization of occupation; and (c) definitive concession upon proof of utilization to the extent required.

37. Owing to the lengthy and complicated procedures required under the regulations and the burdens these imposed on the administrative staff, requests for land concessions in the late nineteen fifties began to accumulate. In Angola, in some cases, it was several years before the land could be officially demarcated and concessions made definitive, while in Mozambique, for various reasons, the number of concessions granted in any given year was often only one tenth of the requests received. As a result there were cases in which land occupation took place illegally (see paras. 76-77 below).

38. To correct this situation, the 1961 legislation created special boundary marking teams to speed up the process and to eliminate disputes arising from unofficially marked boundaries. The classification of land as class two was made subject only to boundary demarcation and the procedures governing application for, and granting of, land concessions were simplified. Despite the changes, the main procedures still involve sixteen steps (article 156 *Do processo comum*) and delays are still the most frequent cause of complaint. On the other hand, both the concessions granted on a provisional basis and those made definitive increased substantially in Angola in 1962 (see tables 4B and 4C below). These and other results arising from the implementation of the 1961 regulations on the occupation and granting of land concessions are discussed in paragraphs 81-86 below.

AFRICAN LAND RIGHTS

A. INTRODUCTION

39. According to the Portuguese Government, "the guiding principle in all Portuguese land legislation has been the uncompromising defence of the interests and rights of the inhabitants with regard to lands occupied or exploited by them" (see A/AC.108/L.5/Add.1). In the Government's opinion there is no "land problem" due to alienation in Angola and the other African Territories under its administration, the only difficulty being one of "utilizing the available land in the most effective manner" (A/4978, para. 319).

B. AFRICAN LAND RIGHTS, 1901-1961

40. The form of the central Government's "uncompromising" defence of the African's interests and rights to land has under-

gone some changes over the years. In the 1901 land concession regulations, article 2 provided that "the right of the *indigenas* to possess the land habitually cultivated by them and occupied by their dwellings is recognized". All concessions were to be without prejudice to this right of Africans. This safeguard applied only to the joint use by Africans of "the lands occupied or exploited by them" and did not include the recognition of the Africans' traditional grazing lands for their cattle. Occupation was necessary to ensure the recognition of this right. If unoccupied for more than one year, the land reverted to the concessionaire upon approval by the Government authorities. Within the area occupied by the Africans, land was to be regulated according to custom and usage, including the right to succession. No provision existed for the recognition of individual rights to land and any right over land occupied could not be conveyed to a non-indigenous person.

41. The 1918 legislation for Mozambique and the 1919 legislation for Angola no longer contained a general guarantee of undisturbed occupation. Instead, reserves were to be set aside exclusively for the indigenous inhabitants. Within these reserves, Africans were permitted to occupy any area, but occupation did not, in any case, give them property rights. As before, African land rights in these reserves were to be regulated according to custom and usage. The law did not prohibit them, however, from living outside these reserves where recognition was given to their right to occupy uncultivated land that had not been divided into officially demarcated concessions. Such occupation was limited to the building of huts for family use and to the land cultivated or used for cattle. If land concessions granted in accordance with the law included areas occupied by Africans, they had the right to choose to remain on the land or to be dispossessed in return for compensation and land of equal value in the reserves. If they did not wish to be dispossessed, an area adequate for their subsistence had to be demarcated and set aside for their use and this was deducted from the concession when it was granted on a definitive basis. They could, however, be moved off the actual area of land they occupied provided they were allocated an equivalent area within the concession and that it was suitable for their cultivation and for cattle grazing.

42. The envisaged reserves were to be established by the Governor-General of each Territory on the proposal of the district governor. Each reserve was to be delimited by natural boundaries in so far as possible, and the land chosen was to be suitable for the needs of the indigenous inhabitants. In actual practice, however, abuses developed, including the occupation of African lands by concessionaires (see paras. 73-78 below).

43. Among the innovations introduced by the legislation of 1918 and 1919 was a provision for granting special title to indigenous persons in respect of individual rights over land permanently cultivated within the *regedorias*. These special titles were not subject to registration and they were not negotiable under Portuguese law; they did not really grant full property rights and could not be conveyed to a non-indigenous person, but could only be inherited or transmitted in accordance with indigenous customs and usage.

44. Within the areas of their competence, the Territorial Governments have also from time to time taken steps to supplement the central Government's legislation. In Angola, for instance, a decree was enacted in 1923 which prohibited the removal of Africans from the actual area of land they occupied and required that five times that area should be kept free for their use. In 1927, the conditions for the recognition of Africans as farmers and the granting to them of the special individual titles were redefined in Provincial Order No. 88 (of 30 April). It provided that an *indigena* could acquire individual title to a piece of land if (a) it had been planted with permanent crops; (b) the land was kept permanently cleared and the person holding the title continued the cultivation, and gathered all fruits on the land; and (c) the owner progressively transformed spontaneous growths into systematically cultivated crops by replanting with proper spacing. The size of the area to which a person could obtain title was always limited to that actually cultivated by the title holder and his family.

45. The land concession legislation of 1918 and 1919 was intended to be a forward step in developing individual ownership among Africans, but it appears that few Africans were able to qualify. According to a report of the Angola Survey Department in 1933, 160,472 ha. were in the hands of Africans of this area, only 5,916 ha. were held under individual title.⁴² It appears from various Portuguese sources that the policy of encouraging Africans to own land has always been offset by the even more urgent need to secure labour. The 1926 and 1929 versions of the Native Statute and the Labour Regulations of 1928 all established the principle of the obligation of the African to work (and to pay taxes often amounting to three or four months' wages). An African who individually owned land had to be able to qualify also for exemption under the labour regulations, as otherwise he could lose his right to the land if he went away to work. Although later legislation (the Mozambique Indigenous Farmers Statute, Decree Law 919 of 1944, the Native Statute of 1954 and the Angola Labour regulations of 1956) specifically exempted registered qualified African farmers from labour recruitment for public services, the conditions were such that very few Africans could qualify.

46. Under the Native Statute relating to Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea, which came into effect in 1954, all the previous provisions relating to African land rights were brought together in one document and restated. The conditions it established under which Africans could occupy and own land were examined by the Sub-Committee's report in paragraphs 319-342. Paragraphs 47-57 below summarize African land rights since the repeal of the Native Statute and as provided for under present legislation.

C. PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL RIGHTS OF AFRICANS IN RESPECT OF LAND IN THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES

47. Although with the repeal of the Native Statute the indigenous inhabitants of the overseas Territories became Portuguese citizens, the Constitution has not been amended and continues to distinguish, in the special section relating to the overseas Territories, between "nationals and foreigners" and "native inhabitants" of these Territories. Thus, while article 137 of the Constitution states: "The rights, liberties and individual guarantees enshrined in the Constitution are assured to nationals and foreigners alike... within the terms of the law...", article 138 provides that:

"Regard shall be had in the overseas Territories to the state of development of the native inhabitants. To this end and where necessary there shall be established, by special statutes, in the spirit of Portuguese public and private law, systems in keeping with native usage and customs, provided that these are not incompatible with morality, the dictates of humanity or the free exercise of Portuguese sovereignty".

48. The retention of this constitutional provision is of interest, as it previously provided the basis for the Native Statute and is apparently the basis whereby Portugal retains in its overseas Territories separate "systems in keeping with native usage and customs", and different land rights for Africans.

49. Referring to Portugal's "uncompromising defence of African rights to occupy land", the preamble to the 1961 decree governing the occupation and granting of land concessions in the overseas Territories (Decree No. 43,894 of 6 September 1961) explains the changes introduced as follows: "The new draft establishes even more firmly this uncompromising position *vis à vis* new applicants and concessionaires, classifying as second-class land—land which may not be granted to anyone other than an inhabitant of the *regedoria* concerned—five times the area occupied by *regedorias* within provisional demarcation lines and prohibiting, subject to penalties, the removal of the inhabitants to lands other than those they are occupying, for the purpose of including their original lands, in whole or in part, within the provisional demarcation lines" (quoted from document A/AC.108/L.5/Add.1, page 10).

50. Out of the total of 273 articles, the 1961 regulations devote twenty articles (articles 224-243 inclusive) especially to

"the occupation of land by the *regedorias* and their *visinhos*⁴³ (inhabitants). Three of these twenty articles relate to the joint occupation of land by indigenous inhabitants, and the remaining seventeen articles relate to the "individual occupation of land" by Africans.

51. While continuing to provide for the joint occupation of land by Africans, the regulations reaffirm the principle that this occupation is to be regulated in accordance with custom and usage and does not confer individual property rights. In cases where indigenous inhabitants occupy land within the area requested as a concession, they may no longer be moved. Irrespective of the area or the type of economic activities to which the land is put, the new regulations require that five times the area occupied by the indigenous inhabitants, including their dwellings, livestock and crops is to be demarcated for their use. Upon demarcation of the boundaries, the area involved becomes class two land (article 88) and thereafter the classification may not be changed except by a legislative decree of the Territorial Government, which must specify the reasons for the change and its effects on the lives of the inhabitants occupying the land (article 43). Class two land may only be occupied, used and enjoyed jointly by indigenous persons in accordance with traditional customs and usage (article 224); any other persons who occupy or exploit class two land in bad faith become punishable under article 445 of the Penal Code. Thus it would appear that class two land has all the characteristics of the former African reserves.

52. As regards individual rights of Africans over land, the 1961 regulations continue to make a distinction between persons who come under Portuguese civil law and those who do not. This differentiation, as pointed out above, derives from article 138 of the Constitution. When the Native Statute was repealed in 1961, special legislation (Decree No. 43,897) simplified the procedures whereby an African could choose to be governed by Portuguese law. Africans who have opted for Portuguese civil law may acquire rights over vacant lands under the general provisions for granting land concessions described above. Africans who have not opted for Portuguese law may also acquire rights over vacant land (Article 227). A *visinho das regedorias* may freely occupy uncultivated and vacant land (*incultos e devolutos*) to establish his dwellings and his crops and to graze cattle. *Visinhos* may hold *aforamento* or leasehold (*arrendamento*) contracts in respect of class one land and class three land with the same rights and obligations laid down in the general provisions, except that leasehold concessions may be granted only by the Territorial Government. As under the Native Statute, Africans may obtain *aforamento* concessions by authority of the Territorial Government, under contract with an individual or by *bona fide*, peaceful and continued possession during ten years of previously vacant or abandoned land, on which permanent trees or crops have been established. An indigenous person may now acquire a concession up to 50 ha. For areas above this size, he must submit proof of financial and other ability to carry out the work planned in connexion with the development of the land (Article 231).

53. The procedure for granting concessions to *visinhos* are different from the general procedures and there is no provisional boundary demarcation. An African concessionaire must keep all the land permanently cleared (*permanentemente limpa*), keep the fruits picked, and progressively replace the primitive crops by systematically planted crops. No reference is made in the 1961 law to labour obligations, since these have been abolished. The special *aforamento* concessions to Africans may be revoked during a period of ten years: (a) if the land ceases to be made use of (*desde que não faça o aproveitamento*); (b) if it has been abandoned; (c) if it has ceased to be cultivated during two years; or (d) if the concessionaire is expelled from the special settlement project in which he holds the land.

⁴³ Following the repeal of the Native Statute, indigenous inhabitants living in traditional societies are now referred to in Portuguese legislation as *visinhos* which may mean neighbours, tenants, lodgers or inhabitants. Used in the phrase *regedorias e seus visinhos*, the word *visinhos* has more the sense of "members". When the sense "inhabitants" is intended the phrase more often used is *populacoes das regedorias*.

⁴² Quoted by Hailey in *An African Survey*, London, 1946, p. 796.

54. The special title given to Africans is restrictive. It grants rights of *dominio útil* which may be conveyed in whole or in part only to other Africans who are *vizinhos of regedorias* and subject to the approval of the Governor-General. An African is not granted a remission of the *foro* and cannot obtain full title of the land unless he chooses to be governed by Portuguese law. The fact that these titles are different from those granted under the general provisions is made clear in the regulations by the requirement of a separate registry.

55. The land held by Africans may not be mortgaged or pledged except to institutions established by law for their benefit. Although this provision is intended to protect Africans from unscrupulous money lenders, it also makes them dependent for credit on the rather meagre funds available from Government schemes.

56. In effect, therefore, as was observed by the Sub-Committee on the Situation in Angola, the repeal of the Native Statute and the introduction of new legislation have not basically changed African rights to occupy and own land (see A/4978, paras. 319-342). Since 1961, the factor determining an African's rights to hold and occupy land has become his status in private law. He has two clear choices. If he has opted to be governed in his private life by Portuguese

civil law, he may own property and obtain land concessions in accordance with the general provisions. If, however, he has not opted for Portuguese civil law, his land rights are limited. If he lives in a *regedoria*, his right to occupy land jointly in that *regedoria* is guaranteed, and under special circumstances he may appropriate on an individual basis land in the *regedoria*. Alternately he may acquire individual rights over land outside the *regedoria* with a special title separately registered, but so long as he does not opt for Portuguese civil law he cannot obtain full property rights.

57. The legislation in force makes it clear that the Portuguese Government regards the African way of life as a transitory stage in the process of building a Portuguese community in each overseas Territory. The provisions regarding land commonly or jointly used by Africans do not encourage the persistence of the traditional way of life. By the very act of boundary demarcation, African villages which happen to be located on a piece of land to be concessioned will henceforth become isolated reserves. Theoretically, the African has a free choice between two modes of living but in practice there is a price in terms of the difference in rights he may enjoy, including his rights to occupy and own land. These differences are set out below.

RIGHTS TO OCCUPY AND OWN LAND UNDER THE 1961 LAND CONCESSION REGULATIONS

Differences between the rights of persons coming under civil law and those under African customs and usage

| | <i>Persons coming under Portuguese civil law</i> | <i>Persons coming under African customs and usage</i> |
|--|---|---|
| Maximum area that can be held | | |
| (a) Generally | 50,000 ha. | 50 ha. |
| (b) Under special contract | 250,000 ha. | No provisions |
| Right to free occupation of land | Occupy only by special "free" concessions | Have the right to free and joint use by <i>regedorias</i> of five times the area occupied |
| Minimum requirements during first five years | Must use and develop one third of the land | Must keep all land cleared and under progressive development |
| Conditions for obtaining full land rights | Must show evidence of complete utilization | Cannot obtain full ownership without opting for Portuguese civil law |
| Right to dispose of a concession which has become definitive | Do not require official approval except for concessions granted <i>gratis</i> | Require official approval and the land may not be transferred to non-indigenous persons |
| Final title | Enjoy full property rights | Exercise <i>dominio útil</i> only |

CONCESSION, OCCUPATION AND SETTLEMENT OF LAND IN ANGOLA

A. GENERAL

Factors affecting European occupation and settlement

58. Angola lies between 4° 22' and 18° 02' South, and 24° 05' and 11° 41' East. It has an area of 1,240,700 km² (481,226 square miles), which is about fourteen times the area of Portugal. The greater part of Angola lies more than 3,000 feet above sea-level. The coastal plain has elevations up to 1,300 feet and is from 12-100 miles in width, with the widest part at the lower Cuanza Valley. The transitional lands and escarpment rise between 1,300 and 3,300 feet. In the north, the rise to the main plateau is gradual; in the central and southern part it is sudden. Most of the plateau land is between 3,300 feet and 5,000 feet above sea-level. The highlands, which

are estimated to comprise some 400,000 square miles have been the main focus for European settlement.

59. The rainfall pattern varies from north to south: in the tropical rainy region of most of northern Angola and Cabinda, the annual rainfall averages 60"; in the tropical highland savannah in the central region, the average is 40"-60"; and the highland steppe in the south has an average rainfall of 25"-40". Owing, however, to the interior elevation and the effects of the Benguela stream, most of the Territory has a moderate climate. Its varied rainfall pattern makes Angola suitable for growing both tropical and temperate zone crops. The northern plateau is particularly suitable for tropical crops, the most important of which are coffee, oil palm and cotton. On the Benguela-Bié plateau, inland from Lobito, about half way down the coast, corn, peanuts, and sisal are the major

crops. The southern Huíla plateau is mostly cattle country. Extreme aridity is found only along the southern border with South West Africa and where the Kalahari desert extends along the coast.

Population

60. At the 1960 census, the total population was 4,830,449, which included 172,529 Europeans. As is shown in table 1 below, the number of Europeans increased substantially between 1950 and 1960. Data for subsequent years are not available but it is estimated that the European population at the end of 1964 was at least around 250,000.¹⁴ In 1961 there were 1,214 aliens resident in the Territory, of whom there were 350 Germans, 107 Spaniards, 103 French and 110 Italians. Of the Germans, 119 were resident in Benguela district, 66 in Cuanza South, 55 in Luanda, and 39 in Huambo. The average population density of the Territory is four inhabitants per square kilometre, but there is a wide variation from district to district (see table 2 below). In fact, almost 80 per cent of the population is located in the western half of the Territory and the eastern half is not only very scantily populated but almost undeveloped.

61. In recent years, there has been some movement from the rural areas to the towns. In 1960, about 15 per cent of the

¹⁴ According to figures contained in *Angola na África deste tempo* by Horácio de Sá Viana Rebelo, Lisbon, 1961, the European population in Angola at the end of 1959 was 208,541.

people were in the 29 urban areas and 85 per cent in rural areas.¹⁵ The European population is concentrated in a few districts. These are, in descending order of concentration: Luanda, Benguela, Huíla, Huambo, Cuanza South, Cuanza North and Malange. Almost one third of the European population is located in the Luanda district.

TABLE 1. RELATIVE EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN POPULATION, 1900-1960

| Year | Europeans | Africans | Number of Europeans per 10,000 Africans |
|------|-----------|-----------|---|
| 1900 | 9,198 | 2,700,000 | 34 |
| 1910 | 12,000 | 2,900,000 | 41 |
| 1920 | 20,700 | 3,100,000 | 67 |
| 1930 | 30,000 | 3,300,000 | 90 |
| 1940 | 44,083 | 3,665,687 | 120 |
| 1950 | 78,826 | 4,036,687 | 195 |
| 1960 | 172,529 | 4,604,362 | 375 |

¹⁵ Since 1961, a plan for regrouping the rural population has been introduced, partly to prevent uncontrolled exodus from the rural areas by fixing the African to the land, and partly for policy reasons. This regrouping scheme is described in greater detail in paras. 168-174.

TABLE 2. POPULATION DENSITY, 1960 AND DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN POPULATION BY DISTRICT, 1950 AND 1960

| District | Area of district (hectares) | Average 1960 population density (per km ²) | European population | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------|--|---------------------|---------|---------------------|
| | | | 1950 | 1960 | Percentage increase |
| Luanda | 3,070,900 | 10 | 22,422 | 58,256 | 159 |
| Cabinda | 727,000 | 8 | 734 | 1,992 | 171 |
| Congo ^a | 9,594,800 | 5 | 1,493 | | |
| Zaire | | | | 883 | |
| Uíge | | | | 5,966 | |
| Cuanza North | 2,710,600 | 10 | 2,263 | 7,480 | 230 |
| Cuanza South | 5,274,700 | 8 | 3,538 | 11,002 | 211 |
| Malange | 11,062,900 | 4 | 2,832 | 5,794 | 105 |
| Lunda | 16,778,600 | 1.4 | 996 | 1,807 | 81 |
| Benguela | 3,864,800 | 13 | 12,213 | 26,731 | 119 |
| Huambo | 2,982,700 | 16 | 9,955 | 18,665 | 87.5 |
| Bié Cuando ^a | 26,394,900 | 2 | 4,211 | | |
| Bié | | | | 5,065 | |
| Cuando | | | | 314 | |
| Moxico | 19,978,600 | 1.4 | 1,742 | 3,432 | 97 |
| Moçamedes | 5,594,700 | 8 | 5,248 | 6,905 | 32 |
| Huíla | 16,634,800 | 3.5 | 11,159 | 18,236 | 63 |
| TOTAL | 124,670,000 | 4 | 78,806 | 172,529 | 119 |

^a District divided into two in 1960.

B. LAND CONCESSIONS

Developments up to 1940

62. From the earliest days of its occupation of Angola, Portugal has looked to the large unoccupied areas of land for development and settlement of Portuguese population. Government measures to colonize the Territory have included both directed settlement schemes and the encouragement of voluntary settlement by the offer of special privileges and land concessions to national and foreign individuals and enterprises.

63. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the practice was to grant land under the *donataria* system with the stipulation that the holders should bring settlers from Portugal.

In the late nineteenth century and early in the first quarter of the twentieth century, some of the large concessions which still exist today were granted. These included concessions for mining (DIAMANG), railways (the Benguela Railway) and agriculture and settlement. In this period, it was still common for concessions to be made of extensive areas identified only by familiar landmarks. Typical of such concessions was that to Sousa Lara e Companhia, which in 1910 claimed all land between the points 195 and 320 kilometres along the railway to the frontier. Among the agricultural enterprises which were established during this period were many of the sugar plantations which became part of the Companhia Agrícola de Angola in 1920; the concession of the Companhia da Africa Ocidental Portuguesa (CAOP); and some of the original concessions

of the Sociedade Agrícola da Ganda and of the Loge Sugar Co. which in 1927 were incorporated into the Sociedade Agrícola do Cassequel.

64. Norton de Matos, who was the High Commissioner of Portugal for Angola during the periods 1912-1915 and 1921-1923, expressed the opinion that while the 1919 land legislation (see paras. 41-43) gave some recognition to the *de facto* occupation of land by Africans, it was really retrogressive in other aspects. He records that after this legislation came into effect a wave of land fever developed because the provisions (in articles 165-169) permitted the forcible removal of Africans from areas granted to European concessionaires. To put a stop to the expropriation of African land, he issued a decree dated 26 July 1921 (Decree No. 30) revoking the part of the 1919 decree which made this possible and providing that "land occupied by indigenous inhabitants may in no case be the subject of concessions or included therein; such land may only be expropriated for public purposes". At the same time it was required that an African holding land in his own name had to keep it under cultivation, failing which the land reverted to the State.¹⁶

65. Another decree (Decree No. 360), dated 12 September 1923, of the High Commissioner provided that "in no case may land occupied and cultivated by the *indigena* be the object of concessions of land; five times the area on which there are signs of occupation and cultivation is to be set aside as indigenous reserves". Norton de Matos also made it a rule that in cases of doubt, concessions of land were not to be granted, as he considered it wiser not to favour the Europeans at the expense of Africans.

66. In spite of the large concessions made to various companies, European settlement of Angola was slow before 1920. From various accounts it appears that relatively few individual farming concessions were made during this period,¹⁷ except on the Benguela-Bié plateau and in the Huambo area. The land legislation of 1919, however, was followed by a wave of European settlers and the European population more than doubled during the years 1920-1940 (see table 1 above).

67. Apart from direct government encouragement in the form of legislation or land settlement schemes, the demand for land concessions was also influenced by fluctuations in the world prices for tropical agricultural products. At one time, favourable world sisal prices led to the development of European sisal plantations in the southern part of Angola, with a predominance of German holdings. The German predominance ended after the Second World War. Detailed information on the area of concessions granted during this period, however, is not available.

The period 1941-1961

68. After 1940, coffee became Angola's leading export and rising world prices led to a rapid increase in both the number of European coffee growers and the area of the European coffee farms. The total area under coffee (both European and African), which was 42,860 ha. in 1940, increased almost threefold to 126,251 ha. by 1950, 197,517 ha. by 1955, and 266,185 ha. by 1959. The number of European growers increased from 597 in 1955 to 2,012 in 1959.

69. In the 1950's, as land alienation increased, a number of new indigenous reserves were created. Between August 1954 and May 1955, for instance, five new reserves were established in the Cuanza North, Luanda and Malange districts. The reserve established in August 1954 at Bango in the Cazengo *concelho* of the Cuanza North district made available only 4,100 ha. for 5,300 Africans who were to be settled in 10 *sanzalas* (Angola, Order No. 8,610, 4 August 1954). In October 1954, two reserves, one of 4,000 ha. and one of 7,000 ha., were established in the Malange district (Angola, Order Nos. 8,711 and 8,712, 20 October 1954). Two more reserves for large

groups of Africans were established in 1955. The Lunga Reserve of 11,450 ha. was established in Nambuanguo in the Ambriz *concelho* of the Luanda district, "to safeguard and benefit" (*para salvaguarda e beneficio*) the Quizengueta, Quipemba, Quimbamba, Quizel and Lunga peoples (Angola, Order No. 8,962, 4 May 1955), and the Ambuila reserve, comprising 2,600 ha., was established in the Bembe *concelho* of the Longo district for the Inga, Bango and Sanda Quina people (Angola, Order No. 8,963, 4 May 1955).

70. The land concession figures from 1955 onwards show how the interest in coffee resulted in increased European occupation in the major coffee producing districts. Table 3 below shows the area of concessions in force and the percentage of land alienation by districts for 1956 and 1960-1962. Although, for the Territory as a whole, the total area of land under concession in 1962 was less than 3 per cent (column 10), the proportion of land under concession varied widely from district to district, from less than one tenth of one per cent in Moxico district to 92 per cent in Cabinda. In Cuanza North, the main coffee growing district, the concessions already exceeded 16 per cent of the total area in 1956 (column 4). They had reached 19 per cent by 1961 and 22 per cent by 1962. If the African population had been evenly distributed at the average density of 10 persons per square kilometre (1 square kilometre equals 100 hectares), it is evident that no less than 60,000 persons would have to be moved to enable the Europeans to obtain the area of nearly 600,000 ha. under concessions.

71. Accelerated alienation of land has occurred since 1956 mainly in those districts which already had more than 5 per cent of the total area under European concession at that time. From table 3 below, it is seen that between 1956 and 1962 the area conceded increased from 11.4 per cent to nearly 15 per cent in Luanda district, which has approximately 30 per cent of the total European population. Other districts which registered substantial increases in land concessions were Cuanza South, Benguela, Huambo and Uíge (which until 1961 was part of the Congo district). These four districts, together with Luanda district and Cuanza North district, accounted for two thirds of the total land alienated by concessions.

72. Tables 4A, B, and C below show the year-by-year concessions under different forms of land holding. From 1957 to 1960 there was a steady increase in the area of concessions granted on a provisional basis, from 51,000 in 1957 to 74,000 ha. in 1960. With the outbreak of the fighting in 1961, the number of provisional concessions dropped. A similar trend is seen in the definitive concessions made between 1957 and 1960, which increased from only 9,000 ha. to just under 40,000 ha.

73. Describing the situation in Angola in this period, a former High Commissioner, Horácio de Sá Viana Rebelo,¹⁸ records that the land concession regulations had worked reasonably well before 1945. There were not too many requests for concessions in that period; the administrative personnel were able to process all applications received; and the requirement that 10 per cent of the land had to be utilized helped to stimulate the development of the Territory. In the late 1940's, rising prices of sisal and coffee created a serious rush to obtain land concessions. Land suitable for coffee became so valuable that it was often occupied by force, leading to complicated litigations; these were not only disputes between parties claiming the land and marking their own boundaries, but also disputes involving African land rights. These disputes occupied a great deal of the attention of the administrative personnel, for although it was the policy to concede land to persons who could fully exploit it, it was the Government's responsibility to enforce the regulations. In many instances, it was necessary for government officials to intervene to see that justice was done. In other cases, it was necessary for the courts to hand down an order for compliance.

74. According to the same source, the increased requests for concessions and the growing number of disputes over land rights led to delays in the final approval of concessions on a definitive basis, pending official certification that the minimum utilization clause had been fulfilled. As a result, the require-

¹⁶ Norton de Matos, José M. R., *A Província de Angola*, Oporto, 1926, p. 255.

¹⁷ Some Portuguese authors consider that the large concessions granted to companies (as, for instance, the Sousa Lara concession of 1910 and the Benguela Railway agricultural concession) made it difficult for the small farmer without capital to compete.

¹⁸ Rebelo, Horácio de Sá Viana, *Angola na África deste tempo*, Lisbon, 1961, pp. 75-78.

ment that at least one tenth of the land had to be utilized, instead of being a stimulus, became an obstacle to further development; the best lands were quickly marked out and concessioned, but remained 90 per cent undeveloped. Thus, even though only a small portion of the land of the whole Territory was in fact occupied by concessions, in some areas it became difficult for newcomers to find enough good land on which to base a request for a new concession. On the other hand, the government services could not handle the ten-fold increase in the number of requests and provisional concessions were often delayed five years or more. As the administrative machinery was no longer able to meet the needs of the times, inevitably it was by-passed, resulting by 1956 in an anomalous situation in which Angola reached a high degree of prosperity largely based on illegal occupation of land.

75. The delays in granting land concessions were more serious in some areas than in others. In the Congo district, for instance, during the period 1954-1957 (at which time it comprised the present districts of Uíge and Zaire) 989 requests were received for concessions totalling 110,968 ha., but only 53 provisional concessions were actually granted, covering a total area of 21,671 ha. (see "A demarcação de Terrenos do Estado no Distrito do Congo", *Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, March 1959, pp. 63-70). Because of the delays involved in fulfilling the procedures, occupation of land was often permitted before the authorities could grant concessions even on a provisional basis.

76. The *Boletim Oficial de Angola* of 1956 confirms the breakdown of the established procedures. In 1956, the Angolan Government attempted to bring the situation under control by allowing two years during which illegally occupied land could be registered without a fine. The introduction to Legislative Instrument No. 2,733, 15 February 1956, explained the need for these measures as follows:

"In spite of the fact that the State has reserved to itself the ownership of vacant lands and has prohibited claims to ownership based on mere occupancy, such provisions have clearly not prevented another procedure, besides that of concessions granted by State authorities, from emerging and spreading, whereby ownership is apparently constituted."

77. One of the main difficulties in this period was the influx of Europeans into Angola to grow coffee. Many were small landowners who could not afford to wait for government procedures to obtain concessions. In 1958, the Government of Angola introduced new measures giving those who before 1956 had illegally acquired lands of less than 50 ha. the right to register them (Angola, Legislative Instrument No. 2,942, 26 November 1958).

78. During this period, government notices granting provisional concessions no longer contained specific clauses safeguarding the right of the indigenous inhabitants to occupy land. Despite the fact that Order No. 88 of 25 April 1927 clearly excluded from concessions areas individually cultivated by Africans, there is evidence that the Africans' right of occupancy was not always observed, even when the concession had been officially granted on a provisional basis. An Order (No. 9,478 of 3 October 1956) shows that more than 500 ha. of land, belonging to Africans under the terms of Order No. 88 of 1927, had been illegally included in a provisional concession of 2,000 ha. The Africans in this case reported to the special commission on indigenous land claims and a Government order was later issued to excise the Africans' land from the concession and restore it to them.

79. There are no data on the annual numbers of Africans who were able to obtain the certificate (*Modelo J*) certifying their right to land individually cultivated as provided in Order No. 88 of 1927. According to a Portuguese source ("A Demarcação de Terrenos do Estado no Distrito do Congo", *Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, March 1959, pp. 63-70) in the Uíge district headquarters, for instance, only 10 such certificates were approved in 1955, 13 in 1956 and 110 in 1957.

80. The data on the concessions granted annually in Angola show that from 1959 to 1961 the rate of alienation remained substantially the same. No substantial changes were made in the regulations until the enactment of Decree No. 43,894 in 1961. As explained in the preamble to the new decree (see

document A/AC.108/L.5/Add.1, p. 12) many of the changes introduced in the new regulations were intended to remedy the unsatisfactory situation and particularly to give more encouragement to, and facilitate, the settlement of the European farmer.

The situation since 1962

81. Within a month after the new land concession law was introduced, Ministerial Legislative Instrument No. 92 of 28 October 1961 (*Boletim Oficial de Angola*, Series I, No. 43, Supplement 2, 1961), authorized the granting of a definitive title to concessionaires holding provisional concessions pending cadastral surveys, provided only that the land had been made use of in accordance with the terms of Decree No. 43,894, and that the rights of third parties had been safeguarded.¹⁹ The Geographical and Cadastral Services were required, however, to complete the surveys of such concessions within a period of ten years and in each case to replace the title with one including details of the land survey. Counter-claims against the boundaries established by official survey were to be permitted only within the thirty-day period following the completion.

82. The land concession statistics for the years 1961 and 1962 (see tables 4A, B, C below) show the effect of the new measures introduced. Total concessions increased from 106,423 ha. in 1961 to 333,752 in 1962 (table 4A) and provisional concessions from 68,422 to 140,031 ha. (table 4B). The government notices on provisional concessions of vacant land now specifically refer to the 1961 regulations and draw attention to the requirement that at least one third of the land must be brought under cultivation within five years. This may include areas of fallow land, provided they have not been fallow for more than three years. Each notice also states that five times the area occupied by *visinhos de regedorias* may not form part of the concession (see, for instance, *Boletim Oficial*, Series III, No. 21, 23 May 1962).

83. The statistics of definitive concessions granted in 1962 show even more clearly the overriding importance that has been given to permanent settlement of European farmers in Angola. In this one year, 179,185 ha. in total were made definitive concessions, compared with 27,545 ha. in 1961 and a total of 120,000 ha. for the period 1957-1961 (table 4C). In Cuanza North, 60,000 ha. were made definitive concessions in 1962; 39,000 ha. (also coffee growing) in Uíge; 39,000 ha. in Luanda; and 25,000 ha. in Benguela. In most cases, these areas were greater than the total areas granted as provisional concessions during the previous three years.

84. Though the Ministerial Legislative Instrument No. 92 of 6 October 1961 appeared to be a temporary measure, it was still in effect at the end of 1964, thus making it possible to maintain an accelerated pace of converting provisional concessions to a definitive basis. In a series of notices published in the Angola *Boletim Oficial* of 5 December 1964, for instance, 2,200 ha. of provisional concessions were made definitive. Of these concessions, 1,000 ha. were in Cuanza South and 1,200 ha. in the Uíge district.

85. No statistics are available for 1963-1964 showing the actual occupation of land by class of land, ethnic group, or activity. There can be little doubt, however, that concessions are still being granted at an accelerated rate. Through these concessions and government sponsored settlement schemes, as well as rural population regrouping schemes (see paras. 168-176 below), the pattern of land occupation is changing rapidly. In areas of known mineral wealth and areas suitable for export cash crops, such as coffee, sisal and tobacco, known in Portuguese as *culturas ricas*, increasingly more land is being granted to Europeans and only a small number of Africans have been able to acquire title to land.

86. Although Portuguese writers invariably stress the sparse population in Angola as justifying the need for increased European settlement, it can be seen that the low population density areas are also those of fewer Europeans. What is perhaps more significant is the relative proportion of Europeans to Africans. It is to be noted that the relative increase

¹⁹ This presumably refers to the posting of notices as required under the regulations.

of European population was greatest during the period 1950-1960. In almost all districts the ratio of the number of Europeans per 1,000 Africans²⁰ doubled, or more than doubled over this same period (see table 5 below). In Luanda district, the European population increased from 9 per 1,000 Africans in 1950 to 213 in 1960 and in Cuanza North from 10 to 30. There are no later figures available, but it seems certain that the rate of increase has become more rapid during the last five years.

C. SETTLEMENT SCHEMES PRIOR TO 1961

Historical development

87. In the history of Portugal's settlement of Angola, 1961 is a major landmark. Up to that time, plans for settlement were mainly based on encouraging immigrant population from Portugal to practice European-type agriculture. After 1961, the term "settlement" assumed a new meaning in Angola and for this reason is discussed in a separate section below (paras. 158-198).

88. From the early days, Portugal's military occupation of Angola was accompanied by sporadic schemes for increasing European settlement. Even in the sixteenth century, for instance, some of the crown grants of land (known in Angola as *donatárias*) were made conditional upon the recipient introducing and settling additional Portuguese families from the Peninsula.²¹ Up to the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, however, there were only small European populations in Angola and Mozambique, which were considered primarily as sources of African labour for the exploitation and settlement of Brazil.²²

89. It was only after the independence of Brazil in 1822 that Portuguese efforts began to concentrate on the settlement of the two large territories in Africa. From 1840 on, various schemes were drawn up. These included the establishment of penal colonies, consisting of prisoners who were allowed to work off their sentences and acquire rights to land, as in Moçamedes where a group was settled in 1840; and the settlement of peasant farmers from Portugal and of European soldiers who had completed military services, as was done in the Huíla region.²³

90. For convenience, the settlement of Angola is considered in two phases: from 1840-1940 and from 1941-1961.

1840-1940

91. During the hundred years between 1840 and 1940, interest in large-scale European settlement recurs as a main theme in Portugal's relations with Angola. The keynote in this period was colonization in its classical sense, the aim being to populate Angola and Mozambique with Portuguese families from Europe. The plan was always for settlement of non-African immigrants to practice European-type agriculture with the family farm as the basic unit. Millions of escudos were spent on the transport of Portuguese families overseas and on the establishment of farming communities similar to those in Portugal which would act as the nuclei of larger settlements and as centres from which Portuguese influence would spread to transform Angola and Mozambique.

92. Probably the earliest large-scale settlement scheme of Portuguese peasants was proposed in the Overseas Council in 1855. A draft bill was introduced to appropriate funds for the establishment of 5,434 settlers in Angola and Mozambique. In addition to free transport, the settlers were to be given

²⁰ The use of this ratio follows the practice of various Portuguese writers in discussing the success of Portuguese European settlement in the overseas Territories.

²¹ The *donatária* was a crown grant similar to the system introduced in Brazil. The concession granted to Paulo Dias de Novais in 1574, for instance, required him to settle some 350 families within fifteen years.

²² Duarte, Teófilo, *Estudos Coloniais*, Lisbon, 1942, p. 3.

²³ Amaral, Ilídio do, "Aspectos do Povoamento Branco de Angola", *Estudos, ensaios e documentos*, No. 74, pp. 16-18 (Lisbon, Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, 1960).

a house, free land, farm tools, seeds and a subsidy during the first year.²⁴

93. Following the arrival of some 300 Boers from South Africa who settled in the Huíla area in 1880, the settlement of Portuguese nationals in Angola became increasingly regarded as a means of securing Portuguese sovereignty in Africa. Under the provisions of the *Carta de Lei* of 28 March 1877, a group of Portuguese settlers was sent to Huíla in 1881 with a view to neutralizing the Boer influence.

94. Finally, in 1899, detailed regulations were drawn up for the establishment of agricultural settlements in the overseas Territories. The Governor of each Territory was to set up teams to determine the most suitable regions for such settlements, each of which was to comprise fifty families. Each settler was to receive a daily subsidy for the first two years and a subsidy for each African servant up to the limit of five. The settler was obligated to stay in the Territory for ten years, after which he received a free passage home. If he did not use the land after two years, he forfeited his plot and his right to free passage.

95. By 1900, the large sums spent had resulted in a European population of 9,000 in Angola.

96. In addition to directed settlement, large land concessions were also offered as a means of attracting new settlers and foreign capital. Most of the largest land concessions in Angola date back to the period before the mid 1920's (see para. 63 above).

97. In the early 1920's, the High Commissioner of Angola, Norton de Matos, envisaged settling 950 Portuguese families at nucleus points throughout the Territory. To achieve this, private companies were granted large concessions of land on the condition that they transport and settle Portuguese families in Angola. Among the companies which were given such concessions in 1920-1922 were the Empresa de Fomento e Colonização de Africa Occidental, and the Empresa de Colonização de Africa, Lda. The latter company was to settle 3,500 families within a period of fifteen years. These companies were, however, unsuccessful.

98. Among other steps taken by Norton de Matos was the approval of measures under which cattle ranching concessions up to 250,000 ha. could be granted. As a result of the various measures and the rush that developed for concessions after 1919, the European population increased to over 36,000 by 1924. The cost, however, had been high; according to one source, Norton de Matos spent some £10,000 sterling on these projects, which at the rate of exchange at that time amounted to over 1 million contos.

99. Analysing the meagre results of the various settlement projects of the period, Portuguese writers²⁵ attribute the failure mainly to the lack of long-term planning by the Government and to the lack of funds and detailed studies of the soils and climate. Settlers were often established in areas that had been incompletely studied from the point of view of soils and agricultural possibilities, the settlers themselves were not adequately trained for their new tasks and there was insufficient government financial and technical assistance available to them.

100. From 1922 onwards, extensive areas of land were set aside as State reserves for the purpose of Government-directed European settlements. The reserved areas included the whole of the district of Huíla, and selected regions in the Bié-Benguela plateau, especially around Huambo (now known as Nova Lisboa), Bailundo and Ganda (*Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, January 1958, p. 164).

101. Between 1927 and 1929, under a new High Commissioner, Vicente Ferreira, various measures were introduced in Angola to organize new settlements and to improve the lot of the settler once he had arrived. A credit fund for settler farmers was established (*Crédito Agrícola de Colonização*, Angola, Leg. Inst. 592, 13 July 1927) and a loan of

²⁴ Albuquerque Felner, Alfredo de, *Angola, Apontamentos sobre a colonização dos planaltos e litoral do Sul de Angola* (Lisbon, 1945), vol. III, pp. 9-13.

²⁵ Araújo, A. Correia de, *Aspectos do desenvolvimento económico e social de Angola* (Lisbon, 1964), p. 41.

million escudos was approved for settlement schemes. A special administrative unit (*Serviços de Colonização*, Angola, Leg. Inst. 704, 9 March 1928) was set up to recruit suitable Portuguese families which were to be settled in zones, with up to 70 families in each. New studies were launched concerning the use of soldier settlements and penal colonies (Angola, Leg. Inst. 592, 13 July 1927), and attention again turned to the use of private companies as a medium for European settlement. It was envisaged that the Angolan Government would participate by contributing up to 50 per cent of the capital of such private companies (*empresas de colonização*) and would guarantee them an income over a period of years or pay them a direct subsidy. The Government would also guarantee to these companies an area of land equal to twice the amount they had been able to assign to settler families, who were to receive not more than 100 ha. each.

102. These new measures were short-lived. Owing to world economic crises and government changes in Lisbon, most of the projects were abandoned by 1930. Though direct government intervention was temporarily suspended, attempts continued to be made to foster settlement through land concessions to private companies. The Benguela Railway company participated in such a scheme in 1935. The plan was to establish, in the zone of influence of the Benguela Railway, lots of approximately 200 ha. each, at least 60 ha. of which would be suitable for growing crops, the remainder to be used for forest products or cattle grazing. These lots were to be offered to European settlers. The details of this settlement scheme were set out in Decree No. 25,027 of 9 February 1935 (*Diário do Governo*, Series I, No. 32). The company was to assume responsibility for clearing the land, transporting and establishing the settlers, and purchasing that part of their produce which they could not sell. The settlers were to pay the company a percentage of their produce, increasing from 5 per cent in the first year to 10 per cent in the fourth and remaining years of the eleven-year period.

103. In spite of the Benguela Railway settlement scheme, the net increase of Portuguese in Angola over the period 1930-1940 averaged only a little more than 1,500 persons per year.

1941-1961

104. As has been reported in paragraph 68 above, rising prices of sisal and coffee after 1940 led to an accelerated influx of Europeans into Angola. Moreover, the changing political situation in the post-war period reawakened Portuguese interest in promoting directed European settlements in Africa, which were increasingly regarded by Portugal as an important element in the development plans for both Angola and Mozambique. A new emphasis was given to agricultural settlements of European immigrants, especially in areas to be brought into use either by irrigation or by drainage. Although African agriculture receives no mention in the development plans, for the first time a few African agricultural settlements were established as well, aimed at "fixing" the African on the land, and changing the pattern of African agriculture towards a more systematic and economic use of the soil.

105. Special funds were created, partly supported by budgetary surpluses and partly by special taxes, to finance the settlement schemes, and government machinery was established to co-ordinate and assume responsibility for their implementation. In 1945, for example, an allocation of 300,000 contos was made (Decree No. 38,200, 27 March) to provide free passages for settlers, to give them the necessary training to establish themselves in the new environment, and to finance studies necessary for the preparation of settlement schemes. Subsequently in 1952 a settlement and development fund (*Fundo de Fomento e Povoamento*, Decree No. 38,704, 29 March 1952) was established, partly financed by special taxes, including a portion of the *sobrevalorização* (surtax) on products exported to hard currency areas, which for Angola included coffee, sisal, cotton seed and manganese and for Mozambique, copra, sisal, cashew and cotton seed.

106. The first post-war European settlement was started at Cela under Angola's Second Development Plan, 1946-1950. In the 1950's plans were also drawn up for European settlements based on irrigation and drainage in the Cuanza and

Cunene River Valleys. A study entitled "*A Água na Valorização do Ultramar*" (Trigo de Morais, Lisbon, 1951) set out the main outline for these settlements.

107. The original plan for the Cuanza Valley was for the establishment of a European settlement between the Cuanza and its tributary the Lucala. It was envisaged that about 100,000 hectares would be brought into use by irrigation for the settlement of 33,000 families, each receiving 3 ha. of irrigated land and 27 ha. of dry land. The cost was estimated at 65,000 escudos for each family brought from Portugal and settled in Angola, plus 8,000 escudos for each hectare irrigated. The Cunene Valley plan called for the development of 420,000 ha., which would provide for the settlement of 15,000 families and grazing for 1 million head of cattle. As in the Cuanza Valley, each family was to receive 3 ha. of irrigated land and 27 ha. of un-irrigated land; the cost per unit was to be the same.

108. The Cunene Valley scheme was the only settlement plan included in the First National Development Plan, 1953-1958, for Angola. The expected total expenditure was to be 469 million escudos for irrigation and drainage of the Cunene Valley, plus 511 million escudos for preparing the land for occupation. In addition, separate allocations were included for necessary hydroelectric works: 179 million escudos for the Matala station on the Cunene; 136 million escudos for the hydroelectric project at Biópio; and 107 million escudos for the one at Mabubas. Another 10 million escudos were provided for a preliminary study in connexion with irrigation and settlement in the Cuanza Valley.²⁶

109. By August 1957, many of the allocations had been revised upwards. Otherwise, except for the Cuanza Valley study, not all the anticipated expenditures had been made,²⁷ and the settlement of European families progressed slowly (see below).

110. Much greater importance was given to European settlement schemes in the Second National Development Plan, 1959-1963. According to the introduction to the Plan, all the projects in Angola were related directly or indirectly to such settlement.²⁸ The sums apportioned to actual schemes were (a) 85 million escudos for continuation of the colonization of the Cunene Valley and the construction of works for irrigation; (b) 450 million escudos (250 million for irrigation and 200 million for actual settlement) for development of the Cela settlement; and (c) 550 million escudos for irrigation and settlement of the Cuanza and Bengo Valleys. Details of these settlement schemes and the progress made in their implementation are summarized below.

European settlements

(a) The Cela settlement

111. The Cela settlement is located inland from Novo Redondo on the Amboim plateau (altitude 1,300 metres) in the well-watered valley of the Cussoi in the *concelho* of Cela. Work was begun in 1951 to prepare the land. The settlement was originally based on the family as a unit, recruited exclusively from the farming regions of Portugal. According to the regulations approved in 1954 (Angola, Legislative Instrument No. 2,550, 5 May 1954) the families are selected for physical and mental qualities most likely to enable them to succeed; priority is given to families with experience in farming and with a large number of children. Families are transported overseas with their own agricultural implements and equipment for home industries so that they can re-establish in Africa a peasant-farmer society similar to the one they have left behind. Once at Cela the families are grouped in villages, preferably composed of families recruited from the same region in Portugal (the first group of twenty-six families, for instance, was from Alto Beira).

112. Each farmer-family arriving from Portugal is provided with a plot of land, part of which has been prepared for use.

²⁶ Portugal, Presidência do Conselho, *Plano de Fomento (Lei 2058)*; *revisão de 1955 (Lei 2077)*, (Lisbon, 1955), pp. 58-59.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, *Relatório Final Preparatório do II Plano de Fomento (IX Ultramar, Lisbon, 1958)*, p. 103.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

It also receives a house and furniture, cattle necessary to the type of farming to be done, seed and agricultural implements. The costs incurred by the Government for the preparation of the land and for other items must be reimbursed; the method of repayment is set out in the contract which is signed by the head of the household.

113. As provided in the land concession regulations (see para. 34 above), the settlers receive their land free, but are given a definitive title to the land only after they have paid back all the installation costs financed by the State. After completing all repayments on the first farm, settlers may acquire a second farm, using the first one as security.

114. Under the terms of the 1954 regulations, the settler families were obliged to farm their land either unaided or with the help of persons who had migrated with them from Portugal. They were not allowed to use indigenous labour. They had to farm the land according to the general plan of the settlement and had to belong to the co-operative bodies that would be established. These early farms were generally of between 16 and 20 ha.

115. Since 1958, the Cela settlement has been under the direction of the specially established Agricultural Settlement Board of Cela (*Junta de Povoamento Agrário de Cela*).²⁹ As the central administrative authority, the Board helps in clearing the land and establishing water supplies, constructs warehouses, and provides loans to farmers which are repayable in agricultural produce. In addition to the family-type farms, there are now also two types of larger farms for those with some capital: a 50 ha. farm requiring an initial deposit of 100,000 escudos and a 120 ha. farm requiring an initial deposit of 250,000 escudos. It was originally intended that neither the family-type farms nor the medium-sized farms were to be permitted to use indigenous labour. The larger farms are permitted to recruit workers from Portugal.

116. The 50 ha. units include 10 ha. of irrigated land. The Government provides on a reimbursable basis the necessary farm buildings, agricultural equipment, together with 15 milk cows and 40 full-grown pigs, and it prepares the land, including 5 ha. of citrus fruits and coffee, at a total cost of 700,000 escudos for each farm. When fully developed, these farms are expected to bring in an income of 200,000 escudos a year. The 120 ha. farms, which are intended for the production of milk, meat, fruit, coffee, and vegetables as well, have 20 ha. of irrigated land and 20 ha. of citrus and coffee, 30 milk cows and 40 pigs. When fully developed, the farm is expected to have 60 cows and 80 pigs and to yield an annual income of 500,000 escudos. In both cases, repayment for the cost of preparing the land and the buildings is spread over a twenty-five-year period at 2.5 per cent annual interest. The repayment for the livestock and equipment is spread over ten years at 5 per cent interest.

117. At the end of 1959, there were 350 families established in thirteen villages divided into two zones. In one zone, the average holding was 17 ha. per family, and in the other the average holding was 19 ha.; in both zones, the average area cultivated was 15 ha. per family. The total area cultivated was 5,789 ha., of which 1,792 ha. were irrigated. Each village also had 1,000 ha. of grazing land.

118. Until 1958, the main products were maize, rice, potatoes and beans. The total value of production was 13.7 million escudos in 1958, yielding an average gross income of approximately 40,000 escudos per family (equivalent to about \$U.S. 1,200).

119. The Second Development Plan, 1959-1964, provided for (a) settlement of a further 1,700 families, (b) increase of the area under cultivation by 45,000 ha., (c) irrigation of an additional 7,600 ha., and (d) creation of 300 new farms of 50 ha. each and 230 new farms of 100 ha. each. The irrigation work was to be undertaken in three phases and the total allocation for this work was 263 million escudos. On the basis of a detailed technical study completed in 1960, it was decided to begin by irrigating 5,000 ha. at an estimated cost

of 209 million escudos. (*Boletim Geral*, December 1960, pp. 85-126).

120. Owing to increased costs of land preparation, the whole economic basis of the settlement had subsequently to be reviewed. In 1961, it was decided that the immediate target should be limited to the irrigation of 2,300 ha. of land and the creation of twenty new farms of 50 ha. each and fifty new farms of 120 ha. each.³⁰

121. Although it is claimed to be the most successful example of Portuguese European settlement in Africa, Cela has frequently been criticized as being the most expensive project in terms of cost per family unit. Estimates of the costs actually incurred vary considerably. For example, the former Governor-General Rebelo estimated that up to 1959 the average cost per family unit was 400 contos (approximately \$U.S. 12,500), of which about half was eventually repaid by the settler. On the assumption that the average family unit consists of seven persons, he estimated the *per capita* cost to the Government to be about forty contos (or \$U.S. 1,300). On the other hand, a more recent source,³¹ using data contained in a report of the Inter-ministerial Committee on the Development Plan (*Comissão Inter-Ministerial do Plano de Fomento*), calculated the average cost per person at not less than 137 contos.

122. Some data on the annual cost of the Cela project is contained in the report of the National Assembly on the Overseas Accounts for 1960.³² Although the total allocation under the Second National Development Plan for the period 1959-1964 for the whole Cela project was only 450,000 contos, the operating expenses of the settlement alone amounted to 102,947 contos in 1960. The sources of the operating funds were: budget surpluses, 32,781 contos; *sobrevalorização* tax, 28,678 contos; and receipts from the *Fundo de Fomento*, 40,488 contos.

123. According to official statements that have been published, the *colonato* is a success primarily because it is said to have proved the feasibility of the Portuguese policy of white settlement in Africa, and because the settlers have not only survived, but are earning a higher income than they ever had before, while the income per family is still rising as a result of the introduction of co-operative farm industries. More important, however, according to these official statements is the fact that the settlement represents an ever-growing source of new generations which will continue to link Angola with Portugal.³³

(b) *The Cunene Valley settlement scheme*

124. The Cunene Valley settlement is to Angola what the Limpopo settlement is to Mozambique: a major project in Portugal's First and Second National Development Plans, originally intended to absorb some of the "surplus" population.

125. According to the introduction to the First National Development Plan, 1953-1958, Portugal's population "surplus" was at that time between 80,000 and 90,000 a year. Although the two river valley settlement schemes were not expected to absorb all the population surplus, it was hoped to settle some 8,000 Portuguese families, with a total of 32,000 persons, in the Cunene Valley and 3,000 families, comprising 12,000 persons, in the Limpopo Valley over a period of six years. It was also hoped that these projects would establish a basis for progressively increasing "migration from Portugal to Angola and Mozambique to establish new white population centres which would contribute to the nationalization of the Territory."³⁴

126. The draft of the First Development Plan proposed an investment of 980 million escudos for the settlement in the Cunene Valley. Of this amount, 469 million escudos were for irrigation and drainage and 511 million escudos for transport and establishment of the settlers, including the cost of the

²⁹ Martins, Alfonso A., "O Colonato Europeu da Cela em Angola", *Boletim Geral do Ultramar* (February, 1961), pp. 261-288.

³⁰ Pereira, João (Neto) *Angola, meio século de integração*.

³¹ Portugal, Assembléia Nacional, *Parere sobre as contas gerais do Estado de 1960* (Ultramar, Lisbon, 1962), pp. 335-336.

³² Rebelo, H. de Sá Viana, *Angola na Africa desde tempo*.

³³ Portugal, Ministério da Economia e do Ultramar, *Plano de Fomento* (Lisbon, 1953) vol. I, pages 409-410, 411.

²⁹ Pereira, João (Neto), *Angola, meio século de integração* (Lisbon, Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Política Ultramarina), pp. 207-216.

initial preparation of the land. Two areas on the right bank of the Cunene River were to be irrigated and drained: one area of 3,000 ha. in Matala-Capelongo, and the other of 21,000 ha. in Quiteve-Humbe. In addition, 179 million escudos were allocated for the hydroelectric installations at Matala.

127. In 1953, a technical team of twenty-six persons was established to supervise and organize the work, and in 1955, 296,300 ha. of unirrigated land were set aside for the Cunene settlement scheme (*Portaria* No. 8,991, 22 June 1955).

128. By 1958, 69 million escudos had been spent on the irrigation, 44 million escudos on land preparation and 282 million on the hydroelectric works. In all, some 200 families from Portugal had been settled in four villages in the Matala area.⁵⁵

129. Under the Second Development Plan, which allocated 85 million escudos for the completion of the projects, 11 million escudos were earmarked for expenditure during 1959 and 1960 and 74 million escudos for the establishment of 403 European families.

130. Land allotment is similar to that in the Limpopo and other settlements based on irrigated farming. Each family receives 30 ha. of unirrigated land for cattle, half a hectare of irrigated land incorporated into the common meadow of the settlement for growing alfalfa for the milk cows, and a plot of irrigated land comprising five ha. for a family with two children, with an additional hectare per child, up to a maximum of ten ha. Each family is also provided with a three-roomed house with the necessary sanitary facilities, auxiliary buildings for the livestock and tool storage, seeds, tools and a subsidy during the first year.

131. Repayment to the State for the cost of irrigation, house and installations is at the rate of one sixth of the annual production of the farm. Repayment for the cattle is separate. When all the reimbursable expenditures for tools, seeds, insecticides and the food subsidy have been repaid, the settler receives title to the land on a definitive basis.

132. The main crops grown in the settlement are light tobacco, maize, beans and potatoes. Livestock is also an important source of income.

133. The Cunene settlement, which had originally been intended for European families from Portugal, was later opened to *assimilados*, and at the end of 1960 there were ten *assimilado* and 281 European families (*Angola, Meio século de integração*, p. 220).

134. As already reported (A/AC.109/L.192, para. 66-68), the Cunene development has been expanded following an agreement with South Africa for the co-operative use of the water of the Cunene River (agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Portugal signed at Lisbon on 13 October 1964 (South Africa, Treaty Series No. 7/1964)). The agreement provides that in order to supply water from the Cunene River to South West Africa for irrigation purposes, Portugal will, during the first phase of the project, increase the generating capacity and storage capacity at the Matala dam in the upper part of the Cunene River. The increased expenses are being financed partly by South Africa. A hydroelectric power generating station is to be built at Ruacana on the South West Africa side of the Cunene.

135. Particular interest is attached to the plans for the use of the Cunene waters because the area in Angola known as the Lower Cunene is chronically arid. The shortage of water has caused a great deal of migration across the borders. In 1960, the total population of the Lower Cunene was 103,834, including only 47,331 men, of whom only 14,390 had families. A sample survey conducted by a Portuguese administrator revealed that among the Cuanhamas (numbering approximately 75,000 in 1957) the women spend an average of 2.54 hours per day in the dry season in supplying their households with water and sometimes up to 6 or 7 hours are required for this purpose. The administrator estimated that in the five months of the dry season, the Cuanhama people altogether spend a total of 58,000 man-hours daily in obtaining water. (Pereira, J. (Neto), *O Baixo Cunene* (Lisbon, 1963), pp. 128-130).

(c) *The Cuanza and Bengo Valley settlement scheme*

136. This settlement scheme ranks third in importance after the Cela and Cunene settlements. Located in the region lying between the Bengo and the Cuanza Rivers, it covers an area of some 300,000 ha. of cultivable land, of which 200,000 ha. can be irrigated. The present scheme is based on a study made by a United States firm, the Hydrotechnic Corporation, which recommended the development of 100,000 ha. in the area to supply the Luanda market with produce and to supply Portugal with primary materials, such as cotton, sugar and tobacco.

137. In 1956 (*Portaria* No. 9,471, 19 September 1956), 1,080 ha. of land were expropriated by the State to establish an experimental farm at Funda, about 15 km. from Luanda. The Bengo Valley Settlement Board was established in 1958 and settlement regulations were approved at the end of the year (Legislative Instrument No. 2,933, 12 November 1958). Following the example of the Cela scheme, provision was made for small family-type farms, independent medium-sized farms, and large plantation-type farms. In each case, the area of land to be allocated, the type of farming to be carried out and the crops to be grown are determined by the Bengo Settlement Board. The family-type farms are for settlers with little or no capital and the farmers are settled in villages. The medium-sized farms are for settlers with sufficient financial resources to cover the expenses of the farm in accordance with the plans drawn up by the Settlement Board. The plantation-type farms are for investment.

138. In the case of the plantation-type farms, the Settlement Board decides on the type of crops to be grown, the conditions of the concession, including the minimum capital required, the installation of industries and the technical personnel to be employed. These plantations are usually set out in areas not yet irrigated and may be put up to public bidding; other factors being equal, preference is given to settlers already located in the region.

139. An allocation of 550 million escudos was made under the second six-year Development Plan and of this, 60 million was to be spent in 1961. The estimates have since been revised and no final figures are available. According to a published report, expenditures by the end of 1961 were as follows:

| | <i>Million escudos</i> |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|
| Surveys | 3.0 |
| Studies for building dams | 9.6 |
| Flood control | 4.2 |
| Experimental farm at Funda | 3.9 |
| Land preparation | 15.3 |
| Administrative expenses | 20.0 |
| Other | 4.0 |
| TOTAL | 60.0 |

140. As recommended by the Hydrotechnic Corporation, the first phase of work consists of preparing villages located so that each family will be not more than 2.5 km from the land it is to cultivate.

(d) *Other European settlements*

141. In addition to the three major Government settlement schemes described above, several smaller ones came into existence before 1960. Among these is the settlement at Chicomba (also spelled Quicomba) which was organized by the Sociedade de Colonização Missionária.

142. The company was authorized to establish a settlement at Chicomba in 1955, and 16,396 ha. were set aside for this purpose in the plateau area between Nova Lisboa and Sá da Bandeira. The general administration was to follow the pattern of the Cela settlement.

African settlements (colonatos aborígenes)

143. The original purpose of establishing African settlements in Angola was mainly to change the pattern of shifting agriculture, to encourage Africans to adopt soil conservation techniques, and to help to increase their production.

⁵⁵ Portugal, *Plano de Fomento*, Revisão 1955, page 59.

144. In Angola, the first African settlement was started in 1949 on an experimental basis at Caconda in the south. After encouraging results had been obtained from this settlement, legislation was introduced (Legislative Instrument No. 260, 5 July 1950) setting up the legal framework for the establishment of other *colonatos aborígenes* in the Territory. According to a report,³⁶ this legislation aimed not only at increasing agricultural production but also at promoting the "constitution and defence of the family" and private ownership of property.

145. The family unit was to be based on the married couple. Each family was to be housed in a hygienic building with sanitary facilities, and was to be given, in addition, an area of farming land plus a vegetable garden. The size of each farm was to be determined according to the physical, economic and social conditions of the location. There were to be a minimum of fifty families in each group who would share common cattle sheds, a common compost area and eventually a common storage area for agricultural material.

146. In 1955, under the auspices of the Junta dos Cereais, a campaign was started for the stabilization of African agriculture. As part of this campaign, a number of African villages were established, where the Government services co-operated to introduce anti-soil erosion works and improved farming techniques. It was reported in 1959 that several African villages had already been established in the Huambo, Huíla and Bié districts, including one at Caconda and another in the Queve Valley.

(a) The Caconda settlement

147. Since the nineteenth century, the region of Caconda had been settled with Europeans from Portugal. The African settlement was begun in 1949 with an initial group of 25 families. By 1950, there were already 800 families. At that time, the settlement had the use of 250,000 ha., of which part was under intensive farming, part under pasture and part consisted of natural forest reserves (*reserva de mata natural*).

148. At the end of 1956 there were 8 centres, comprising 42 villages, with a total of 3,654 Africans. In 1957 the population increased by 31 men, 29 women and 194 children, bringing the total to 3,908 (742 men, 730 women and 2,436 children). From the Portuguese point of view³⁷ these figures are particularly satisfactory, as the almost equal number of men and women is a significant proof of *acasalamentos* (the establishment of families based on the married couple); the large number of children is considered to be a stabilizing factor for the future.

149. The total area reserved to the settlement in 1957 was almost 300,000 ha., of which 2,577 were under cultivation. The average area cultivated per family was 3.5 ha. Over 113 kilometres of drainage ditches and 33 kilometres of irrigation canals had been built and there were over 4,000 head of cattle, 1,600 pigs and 1,550 goats. In addition to maize and beans the settlement also produced a considerable amount of wheat. There are, however, no recent figures as to the annual production and income per family.

(b) The Queve Valley settlement

150. Of the African villages which were to have been established under the Junta dos Cereais as part of its campaign to stabilize African agriculture, details are available only on the Queve Valley settlement, where 90 African families were to be located. Each family was to be given a block of land between 5 and 10 ha. in area, depending on the fertility of the soil and the number of "units of labour" in the family.

151. In the first phase of work, anti-soil erosion works were built. In addition to food crops, perennial crops such as coffee, oil palms and fruit trees were planted as a further attraction to keep the Africans on the land. It was intended that in the second stage cattle farming would be introduced to provide fertilizer for the soil.

³⁶ Pereira, João (Neto), "Deverá o desenvolvimento agrícola ter prioridade no desenvolvimento económico da África ao Sul do Saara?" *Estudos Ultramarinos*, 1961, No. 4, *Temas Políticos e Económicos* (Lisbon, 1961), p. 137.

³⁷ Portugal, *Boletim Geral do Ultramar* (May 1958), pp. 153-158.

152. There is no recent information concerning the progress of this African settlement or how it is related to the extension of the Cela scheme described above.

(c) The Damba settlement

153. The Damba settlement was begun in September 1950. It was originally intended for the settlement of Angolan Africans who had returned from the former Belgian Congo. Some 3,000 ha. were allocated for this scheme. By 1951, about one quarter of the cultivable land had been planted with crops and 245 families settled. According to one report, "there were no flourishes about the place, no elaborate administrative offices and the simplest accommodation was provided for the European staff".³⁸

(d) The Loge Valley settlement

154. This settlement was started under the auspices of the Coffee Export Board (Junta de Exportação do Café) in the Loge Valley in the Congo district where it was intended to replace spontaneous coffee bushes with cultivated ones. Among the first group established were 108 families and some single persons. In the early years, except for individual vegetable gardens, all work was done on a collective basis (*em regime de propriedade colectiva*); it was reported, however, that the intention was to encourage individual farming, keeping only the coffee growing on a collective basis. There is no recent information on the success of this scheme.

(e) Other African settlements

155. Decree Law No. 39,997 of 29 December 1954 established three types of prisons for *indigenas*. These were: the penal colony, the correction colony and the correction farm (*granja*).

156. In the penal colonies, prisoners who had completed one third of their sentences "and who showed themselves capable of adapting to an honest life" were established in villages where they were to live monogamously as a family unit (article 14). They were trained in and employed on European-type farm work and were given compulsory religious and Portuguese language instruction. At the end of their sentences, those who were considered suitable were to be relocated in African settlements (*colonatos indigenas*).

157. In the 1950's, one such *colonato* was established near Malange.³⁹ Since 1961, others have been established, including one at Tiger Bay.

D. SETTLEMENT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE RURAL POPULATION SINCE 1961

Provincial Settlement Boards

158. After the events which occurred in Angola during early 1961, settlement of the overseas Territories assumed a new meaning and a new urgency for the Portuguese Government. Official policy, which had previously stressed the "permanent settlement of the European Portuguese in the lands of Africa" (A/AC.108/L.5/Add.1, p. 16), began to emphasize the need for "the creation of multiracial communities and the implantation overseas of new Portuguese tropical civilizations" as "the sole buttress of the national presence in those lands and a factor for peace..." (*ibid.*, p. 21).

159. According to a Portuguese official source, the change in emphasis given to the settlement of Africa did not reflect a new policy, but was merely a recognition of the fact that there was greater reason for pursuing what had always been Portugal's policy, namely to build integrated multiracial societies in its overseas Territories. (Moreira, speech of 28 August 1961, Oporto, A/AC.108/L.5/Add.1, annex, pp. 3-4). Other Portuguese writers have argued that the new urgency was due to problems arising from the growing rural exodus and urbanization of Africans (João Pereira (Neto), "Política de Integração em Angola e Moçambique", *Estudos Ultramarinos*, 1962, No. 2, pp. 100-103). The first step taken to deal with settlement problems in Angola was the establishment of the necessary administrative machinery.

³⁸ Egerton, F. Clement, *Angola in Perspective* (London, 1957), p. 173.

³⁹ Egerton, op. cit., pp. 173-174

160. In September 1961, new Provincial Settlement Boards were established in Angola and Mozambique (Decree No. 43,895 of 6 September) as the "superior" public administrative authorities responsible for supervising, determining and co-ordinating all activities relating to settlement of their respective Territories. For the first time, in addition to "European Portuguese", settlement was to include: (a) persons born (*naturais* or *originários*) in Portuguese territories; (b) soldiers "who have defended Portugal's sovereignty"; and (c) indigenous persons (*autóctonos*).

161. In each Territory, the Provincial Settlement Board was "to observe, guide and rule on any matter connected with *aborigines* or *originários* of any other Portuguese Territory, and to stimulate, supervise or carry out action necessary to accelerate such settlement to the maximum possible by available resources and rational utilization thereof, always bearing in mind the supreme national objective of racial and cultural symbiosis in fully integrated societies" (article 3, para. 19).

162. Other responsibilities and functions of the Board are (article 3):

"To draw up and keep registers of the needs and openings for skilled and unskilled labour and to determine which have to be filled by immigration (1-7);

"To supervise the flow of spontaneous immigration, especially with respect to personnel intended for agricultural, industrial and commercial establishments and enterprises (8);

"To rule on the importance of any industrial or commercial enterprises as factors in settlement, for the purpose of granting any legal advantages on that account (9);

"To evaluate from the psychological, ethnological and socio-political standpoints plans of provincial development or regional development of whatever kind and of public works, as well as plans for population centres or sectors thereof and plans for the solution of housing problems (10);

"To examine from the same standpoints any applications for land grants or concessions to work agricultural, forest, pasture or fishery resources..., to evaluate... the advantages and disadvantages of any concessions already granted as regards complying with obligations relating to settlement, and to propose whatever measures it may deem appropriate (11);

"To study the most desirable ethnic combinations, according to the nature and location of the communities for the formation of smoothly integrated and stable multi-racial communities (18);

"To study or co-ordinate provincial agrarian programmes for the indigenous or other communities already settled or to be settled or transferred, and to propose the establishment of regional teams to carry out the approved programmes (article 5 (15))."

163. The Angola Provincial Settlement Board, which was constituted by Legislative Instrument No. 3,222 of 21 February 1962, has the structure and composition of an independent authority. It has a plenary council, an executive commission, and six special departments: information, settlers (*colonos*), social welfare, agricultural settlement (*Povoamento Agrário*), economic studies, and a secretariat. The plenary council, which is the highest policy body on settlement in the Territory, is composed of representatives of (a) all the Government departments, (b) the Catholic missions, (c) each of the branches of the armed forces, (d) the Farmers Association, (e) the Industrial Association, (f) the Commercial Associations, (g) each of the economic co-ordinating bodies, (h) the syndicates and (i) the Caixa de Crédito Agro-Pecuário (a farm credit institution).

164. The settlement Board includes six heads of department, 115 technical staff, 84 administrative personnel and 120 *operários*.

165. The importance attached to the work of the Angola Provincial Settlement Board is reflected in the large sums of money placed at its disposal. In October 1961, as a first measure, the Settlement Board was authorized to raise loans of up to 200 million escudos to carry out its work (Angola, Ministerial Legislative Instrument No. 90, *Boletim Oficial de*

Angola, 28 October 1961, Series I, No. 43, Supplement No. 2). In 1962, under another special measure (Decree No. 44,456 of 7 July) the Settlement Board was authorized to purchase agricultural equipment up to a value of 200 million escudos.

166. In order to raise funds to finance the work of the Settlement Board, a special stamp tax was imposed in March 1962 (Legislative Instrument No. 3,230, 2 March) and consumption taxes on certain items, including locally produced beer and private cars, were increased. With these additional funds, the Settlement Board's ordinary budget for 1963 was set at 337 million escudos. This represented just over one tenth of the Territory's estimated ordinary budget of 3,289 million escudos. It was anticipated that the special stamp tax would yield 42 million escudos and the added consumption taxes 95 million escudos.

167. No comprehensive figures are available to show the Board's total budget in 1964, as the original allocation of 140 million escudos (Angola, Order No. 13,061, *Boletim Oficial de Angola*, Series I, 28 December 1963) was subsequently increased by supplementary budgets. However, the above information would seem to indicate that, since its establishment to the end of 1964, the Settlement Board had at its disposal nearly 1,000 million escudos.

Rural regrouping plan

168. In May 1962, legislation was introduced in Angola to regulate the rural regrouping of the population (Legislative Instrument No. 3,237, 2 May 1962). As set out in the preamble to the legislative instrument,

"The object of this regrouping will be to remedy the excessive dispersion and nomadic tendencies of the rural (indigenous) population, and bring them together in population centres sufficiently large and settled to be served by assistance agencies which are essential for their social and economic progress.

"It is also recognized that the presence of, and contact with, more evolved population groups is a highly important factor in accelerating the desired evolution. Taking into account the large unoccupied areas existing in the Province, it is not only advantageous from the economic point of view as providing a new productive source of wealth but also necessary in social and human terms for the settlement of these unoccupied areas to be effected simultaneously with such regrouping, thus creating a network of mutual influences, as a result of which rural life may be expected to proceed harmoniously."

169. Under the rural regrouping plan, the Angola Provincial Settlement Board is to divide the Territory into rural zones, establishing the boundaries of each zone on the basis of ethnic groups of similar characteristics and customs, the agricultural and climatic nature of the region, and economic factors which may affect production.

170. Each zone (*zona de reordenamento*) is to be under the technical direction of a special Regrouping Commission, composed of representatives of the administrative authority, the agricultural and fisheries services, and the rural population. It may include, either on a permanent or temporary basis, representatives of the educational, health, social welfare and public works services, the Catholic Church and the military authority.

171. The general plan for regrouping in each zone includes: (a) the division of the zone into *freguesias* (parishes)—since the parish is considered to be the best possible area for effective influence of the administrative centre over the population surrounding it; (b) the division of each parish into sub-areas corresponding to the *regedorias*; and (c) a plan for the transfer, establishment and settlement of population groups in order to promote the rational and economically desirable occupation of the zone (article 5).

172. Four pilot zones were immediately established in the Cuanza South, Huambo, Huíla and Moxico districts. Once the zones became established, community development schemes were to be initiated.

173. At the time the rural regrouping plan was being formulated in 1962, the Governor-General explained that the

object was "to establish a natural hierarchy of classes in accordance with their general culture and their professional training. Artisans with special skills would be integrated in the industrial centres and agricultural workers would remain as permanent cultivators on the farms".⁴⁰

174. It can be seen from the above that under the legislation of 1961 and 1962, the ethnic factor is one of the basic considerations in all settlement schemes. Although this was not formally stated in the past, and indeed Portugal's official position is that it has always aimed at establishing a multi-racial society in Angola, in practice the pre-1962 settlement schemes for Africans and Europeans were entirely separate and distinct. In fact, some well-known Portuguese authorities have expressed personal views in support of the separation of the races.

175. One advocate of such separation was Vicente Ferreira, a former High Commissioner of Angola. In a study published in 1955 by the official Agência Geral do Ultramar⁴¹ he developed a plan for the settlement of Angola on an ethnic basis. He suggested that Europeans from Portugal should be settled in the areas in Angola with climate and altitude comparable to those in Portugal, and that the Africans should be "slowly relegated to zones of tropical climate, where labour is scarce and where, by chance, they will find a more suitable environment in which to live, multiply and become civilized".

176. To achieve this separation without abrupt segregation, he suggested that it would be sufficient to (a) refrain from offering employment to Africans in the white settlement zones; (b) pay more to African labour in tropical zones; (c) induce the African chiefs (*sobas*) to transfer their villages outside the white settlement area; and (d) gather together in villages, under a special juridical status, the semi-civilized *indígenas*, especially those who had been educated by religious missions.

Settlements since 1962

177. In the three and a half years since it was established, the Angola Provincial Settlement Board has contributed towards the establishment of a new network of small settlements of Cape Verde farmers throughout the coastal districts; it has moved large groups of Africans from one area to another and stabilized some others, and it has intensified European settlement both in established areas and in less populated districts. It has also begun on an experimental basis four "pilot projects" under the rural regrouping plan, which it is hoped will ensure a more balanced population between Europeans and non-Europeans.

Cape Verde settlers

178. In January 1962 a new plan was introduced for the establishment in Angola of settlers from Cape Verde. As reported (*Boletim Geral*, Nov.-Dec. 1962, p. 233) it was agreed between the Governments of Angola and Cape Verde that in principle the settlers from Cape Verde should be chosen from rural workers with special aptitude for farming. The arrangements for their settlement in Angola are different from those for families migrating from Portugal. The Cape Verde heads of family must not be more than forty-five years old and they must go to Angola in groups under the leadership of a *cabo chefe*. They are to be followed by their children who are over fourteen years of age and able to work, the rest of the family migrating to Angola only after conditions have been established for their installation. The Angola Provincial Settlement Board pays the passage to the locality of work and provides them with an initial subsidy. A subsidy is also paid to the family left behind.

179. It appears that these settlers are not all intended as peasant farmers; some are intended as agricultural workers. The first 330 persons were chosen from the islands of Fogo,

Brava and S. Nicolau.⁴² They arrived in Angola in 1962. Of these, 100 were settled at Damba where they will grow food-stuffs, maize, peanuts, mandioc and sweet potatoes. Two groups are to be settled to grow cotton, one in the Bengo region and the other in the zone of Icau and Tentativa.⁴³ Another 100 families from Brava are to be settled in the Cuanza region to grow sugar cane and subsistence foodstuffs. It may be noted that none of these immigrant groups from Cape Verde are settled in regions growing wheat, tobacco or coffee.

180. Subsequently, more Cape Verde settlers were established in smaller groups in mixed communities. There are no recent data regarding the total number settled.

Soldier-settlers

181. As has been reported above, some of the first government-directed settlement schemes in Angola were of soldier-settlers (see paras. 89-101 above). The reintroduction of this form of settlement was first announced in a speech by the Overseas Minister made in Oporto on 28 August 1961.

182. Details of the conditions of settlement of armed forces personnel as farmers were published in 1963 (*Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, March 1963, p. 115). Through the Angola Provincial Settlement Board each soldier farmer (*soldado-agricultor*) receives free of charge an area of land, varying from 10 to 35 ha., depending on the region and the type of farming to be done. He is expected to build his own house within two years of settlement, with help provided by the Junta. Although soldier-farmers may choose their own settlement zone, they are advised to settle in groups and preferably not too far from "machine-parks". Except if they choose to grow coffee, part of the land (not exceeding 5 ha.) will be cleared for them in the first year and they will also receive a reimbursable establishment subsidy for the first two years. The value of the subsidy in the first year may not exceed 18,000 escudos, or 1,500 escudos per month, and in the second year not more than 12,000 escudos, or 1,000 escudos a month. The Settlement Board undertakes to bring the family of the soldier-settler from Portugal without charge but assumes no further responsibility for it after arrival. The soldier-settlers may be freely repatriated during the first two years but they must pay the costs of transporting their families. Once the soldier-settler has repaid the expenses incurred on his behalf, he may freely dispose of his land and other goods. If he has not paid back what he owes, all the land and goods revert to the Settlement Board.

183. Some of the soldier-settlers have been established at Chitado, in the district of Huíla, on the border between Angola and South West Africa. This is a region for cattle raising. In 1963, 35 soldier-settlers were each given 5,000 ha. of land in this area to be developed in a joint project (*Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, April-May 1963, p. 223).

New network of settlements

184. Recently published information shows that since 1962 government-directed settlement is no longer concentrated only in the river valley and other settlement areas where schemes were established in the 1950's. Instead an effort has been made to introduce small, mainly Portuguese or other non-Angolan (*alienígena*) settlements throughout the Territory, as part of a "plan of occupation".

185. According to a report (Rodrigues Júnior, *Angola, Terra de Portugal*, Lourenço Marques 1964, pp. 306 ff.), the first major zone of occupation of this kind includes large areas in the direction of Catofe—Nova Lisboa and General Machado, served by the Benguela Railway and its associated roads, and between Nova Lisboa and Sá da Bandeira, with emphasis on Caconda. The main centre of this zone will be Nova Lisboa, the headquarters of one of the regional settlement brigades with machine parks, groups of motorized equipment, and technical and other assistance. There are new settlements extending from Uíge and Cuanza North down through the districts of Luanda, Huambo and Huíla and also eastwards along the

⁴⁰ "Social progress of Natives in Angola", *Diário de Notícias*, 29 March 1962, quoted in the report of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration (document A/5160, paras. 341-342).

⁴¹ Ferreira, Vicente, *Estudos Ultramarinos*, Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1955.

⁴² For information on Cape Verde, see document A/AC.108/L.7.

⁴³ *Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, Nos. 449-450 (Lisbon, Nov.-Dec. 1962), p. 234.

railway line in the districts of Bié and Moxico. In addition, there are special settlements, including a prison settlement at S. Nicolau in the Moçamedes desert comprising some 300 African prisoners and their families, and there are new African communities in the north established since 1961, partly for security reasons.

186. In northern Angola, much of the African population in the areas involved in the events of 1961 has been regrouped and reorganized. In Carmona, for instance, it is reported that some 237,000 Africans were settled in 119 villages during 1963. In this type of scheme, Africans build their own houses within allocated areas and the Government provides schools, clinics, water and other facilities (Hugh Kay, "The Portuguese Way in Africa", *Fortune Magazine*, January 1964). This wholly African settlement is different from another new community being established at 31 de Janeiro. In contrast to Carmona, the plan at 31 de Janeiro is to establish a small African community and to settle 1,000 Europeans from Portugal to grow rich crops—coffee, oil seeds and fibres—but in a different pattern from that at the Cela and Cunene settlements, where no African labour may be employed. In 1964 it was reported (William A. Hance, *The Geography of Modern Africa*, p. 491) that 1,150 Africans, of whom 185 were heads of family, had cleared 500 ha. out of the 2,000 ha. to be cultivated.

187. *Cuanza North District*. In this district the centres for settlement are at Banga, where a group of 85 Cape Verde families have been settled, and at Bolongongo.

188. *Luanda district*. In the Luanda district there are settlements at Buia, Cabiri, Viana and Quicuxe. The settlement at Buia is under the direction of the Cotton Institute. It consists of 67 parcels of land prepared for families from Cape Verde. The settlement at Cabiri in the Icola and Bengo *concelho* is located in one of the main cotton-growing areas. Following the abolition of compulsory cotton growing, the Government in December 1961 (Order No. 11,959 of 6 December 1961) established a reserve of 950 ha. with a view to dividing it into small properties for cotton growing. To create this reserve, some land held under concession by Lagos e Irmão had to be expropriated with compensation, a measure which was justified in the Government order as leading towards a fuller utilization of human and natural resources. The plan was to attract settlers who would be able to take over and consolidate the cotton areas previously assigned to *vizinhos das regedorias* or to grow crops of their own preference. By 1964, there were already 21 families from Cape Verde settled there and houses were being built to accommodate 40 more.

189. At Viana, the Angola Provincial Settlement Board began in 1962 to settle some 80 *familias nativas* which had previously been scattered. Plots of 10 ha. each are available to the families but the settlement had no water supply at the end of 1962 except for that brought in by tank-trucks. As part of the settlement scheme, the authorities planned to provide a water supply, a school and other amenities to raise the standard of living (*Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, Nov.-Dec. 1962, pp. 234-235). In 1964 another entire *regedoria* was being established there as an indigenous population centre.

190. At Quicuxe (also spelled Quicuche) 23,324 ha., which at one time had been held under concession by the Companhia da África Ocidental Portuguesa, had been made into a State reserve in 1955 (Angola, Order No. 8,990, 22 June 1955). In 1964, this area was being divided into lots of 200 ha. each for new settlement.

191. *Cuanza South district*. The major settlement scheme at Cela has now been expanded to accommodate more farmers and stretches from Catofe to the Queve River. New settlers are to be given parcels of from 60-100 ha. for mixed farming. Twenty farms will be developed at first and the rest of the land kept in reserve for later use.

192. Around Pambangala and Menga, also in the Cuanza South district, preliminary studies have already resulted in the selection of about 15,000 ha. of good land, and other areas in the Cuchem basin between Nhio and Catofe are being considered with a view to the selection of an additional 35,000 ha. for new settlements. Pambangala is the site of a mixed settlement pilot project (*colonato misto*). In early 1964 there were already 30 settlers, including soldier-settlers, with their families and 4 indigenous farmers (*autóctones*). Ten more ex-soldiers and their families were scheduled to arrive before long. Each family has a house, stables and warehouse; 2 ha. of land for coffee, one for tobacco and enough land to grow 500 kilos of potatoes, 100 kilos of peanuts, 35 kilos of beans and 2,000 pineapple palms. Each family has 8 cows, a pair of bullocks, fruit trees and a vegetable garden (*Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, Jan.-Feb. 1964, p. 151).

193. *Huambo and Bié districts*. The plateau regions of the Huambo and Bié districts are the targets for more small settlements, especially of settlers from Cape Verde. There are to be 100 Cape Verde families established at Benfica, and at the agricultural training centre at Saulala thirty new houses have been built for settlers. Work was begun in 1959 to establish 500 families in villages at Chicava. This settlement was to have 800 ha. of land irrigated from the Cacuita River. At the last report, Chicava was being developed as a mixed settlement and in 1964 had 82 non-Angolan (*alienigenas*) farmers and 70 indigenous farmers (*autóctones*).

194. Some of the former *granjas* are being used for new settlers: four farms, each of 15 ha., will be established at the Granja do Bailundo; two farms, of 25 ha. each, at the Granja Mungo; and twenty farms, of 50 ha. each, at the Granja Bela Vista. There are to be new settlers at Cachaca, Luvemba and Missene; between Cuima and Catete there are to be 50 farmers, with 20 ha. each; at the nucleus between Chinguar and Silva Porto 50 farmers, with 24 ha. each; and at the nucleus between Chinguar and Silva Porto 50 farmers, with 24 ha. each; and at the nucleus between General Machado and Andulo 50 farmers, with 15 ha. each.

195. *Huíla district*. The district of Huíla has three spheres of settlement activities. In the south, along the border, the area of Chitado, where some ex-soldiers have already been settled, will be made the basis for livestock farming with up to 5,000 ha. per family (see para. 180). Secondly, there are to be dispersed settlements in this region utilizing old farms. According to the District Governor's proposals, a start is to be made with the installation of 30 families. The third area of activity is based on the already established settlement in the *concelho* of Caconda, which is being developed into a mixed settlement. In 1964 there were already eight villages established there and 120 more families of non-Angolan (*alienigenas*) farmers were being settled in this region. The new settlers will receive 40 ha. each, although the indigenous families already settled there received on an average only 3.5 ha. each (see para. 149).

196. *Moxico district*. In this district, new settlements are being established along the Benguela railway. In 1964, new settlements had been established at Luso and at Teixeira de Sousa on the eastern frontier.

197. Most of the new settlements in this network, regardless of their organization and composition, are small and are intended primarily to serve as nuclei from which larger settlements are to grow.

198. The information on the new settlements since 1961 shows that while there has been a change in the ethnic composition of some of the settlements, relatively few Africans are involved in each case, and even fewer are really integrated in the non-African farming communities. The lavish expenditures and intensive activities continue to be directed mainly towards achieving an increase in immigrant settlement rather than to measures which would benefit the African population.

TABLE 3. ANGOLA

Total area of land concessions* by district as at 31 December 1956 and 1960-1962

| Districts | Total area of districts (ha.) | 1956 | | 1960 | | 1961 | | 1962 | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| | | Total area conceded (ha.) | Percentage of total area | Total area conceded (ha.) | Percentage of total area | Total area conceded (ha.) | Percentage of total area | Total area conceded (ha.) | Percentage of total area |
| Luanda | 3,070,900 | 351,006 | 11.43 | 414,916 | 13.51 | 420,374 | 13.69 | 459,334 | 14.96 |
| Cabinda | 727,000 | 639,252 | 87.93 | 666,439 | 91.67 | 669,443 | 92.08 | 669,955 | 92.15 |
| Congo ^a (Uíge, Zaire) | 9,594,800 | 291,998 | 3.09 | 347,858 | 3.62 | 369,721 | 3.85 | 438,237 | 4.57 |
| Cuanza-North | 2,710,600 | 439,849 | 16.22 | 497,765 | 18.36 | 518,936 | 19.14 | 596,658 | 22.02 |
| Cuanza-South | 5,274,700 | 271,409 | 5.14 | 312,431 | 5.92 | 330,931 | 6.27 | 384,122 | 7.28 |
| Malanje | 11,062,900 | 135,251 | 1.22 | 149,804 | 1.35 | 151,489 | 1.37 | 171,395 | 1.55 |
| Lunda | 16,778,600 | 71,589 | 0.43 | 71,590 | 0.43 | 71,591 | 0.43 | 71,991 | 0.43 |
| Benguela | 3,864,800 | 194,318 | 5.03 | 247,211 | 6.39 | 264,356 | 6.84 | 315,810 | 8.17 |
| Huambo | 2,982,700 | 182,406 | 6.11 | 197,091 | 6.61 | 207,839 | 6.97 | 218,721 | 7.33 |
| Eiê-Cuando-Cubango ^b | 26,394,900 | 299,350 | 1.13 | 300,102 | 1.14 | 302,746 | 1.15 | 306,486 | 1.16 |
| Moxico | 19,978,600 | 13,347 | 0.067 | 13,350 | 0.067 | 13,351 | 0.067 | 13,352 | 0.067 |
| Moçâmedes | 5,594,700 | 72,373 | 1.29 | 78,855 | 1.41 | 78,965 | 1.41 | 78,965 | 1.41 |
| Huíla | 16,634,800 | 73,469 | 0.44 | 89,235 | 0.54 | 96,374 | 0.58 | 104,990 | 0.63 |
| TOTAL | 124,670,000 | 3,035,619 | 2.43 | 3,379,293 | 2.71 | 3,485,716 | 2.80 | 3,722,659 | 2.99 |

* Includes rural and all other categories of land.

^aThe Congo district was divided into the districts of Uíge and Zaire in 1961.^bUp to 1961, Bié-Cuando-Cubango formed one district.

TABLE 4. ANGOLA

A. TOTAL CONCESSIONS OF RURAL LAND BY DISTRICT
(In hectares)

| District | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | Increase 1961/1962 (percentage) |
|-----------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|---------------------------------|
| Benguela | 8,381 | 12,974 | 8,876 | 23,132 | 17,134 | 51,430 | 200 |
| Bié | a | a | a | a | 2,642 | 3,725 | 4.1 |
| Cabinda | c | c | c | 12 | 4 | 512 | 1,180 |
| Congo | 11,501 | 11,563 | 16,298 | 27,186 | b | b | b |
| Cuanza-North .. | 10,910 | 11,410 | 18,493 | 18,798 | 21,171 | 77,720 | 267 |
| Cuanza-South .. | 4,802 | 7,853 | 13,968 | 14,382 | 18,479 | 53,181 | 188 |
| Cuando-Cubango | a | a | a | a | 0.1 | 0.4 | 300 |
| Huambo | 1,070 | 2,377 | 3,477 | 8,205 | 10,742 | 10,863 | 1 |
| Huíla | 2,442 | 3,432 | 8,166 | 7,017 | 7,139 | 8,616 | 21 |
| Luanda | 8,760 | 26,082 | 29,940 | 19,535 | 5,452 | 38,883 | 613 |
| Lunda | c | c | c | c | c | 400 | — |
| Malanje | 2,001 | 2,539 | 4,318 | 5,696 | 1,684 | 19,905 | 1,082 |
| Moçâmedes | 10,000 | c | 606 | 861 | 110 | c | — |
| Moxico | c | 0.5 | c | c | c | 0.6 | — |
| Uíge | b | b | b | b | 21,861 | 67,712 | 209 |
| Zaire | b | b | b | b | c | 793 | — |
| TOTAL | 59,867 | 80,752 | 104,641 | 125,580 | 106,423 | 333,752 | 213 |

^aUp to 1961, Bié-Cuando-Cubango formed one district.^bThe Congo district was divided into the districts of Uíge and Zaire in 1961.^cNil or insignificant.

(Table continues)

TABLE 4. ANGOLA (Continued)

| B. PROVISIONAL <i>aforamento</i> CONCESSIONS OF RURAL LAND BY DISTRICT | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------------------------------------|
| (In hectares) | | | | | | | |
| District | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | Increase 1961/1962 (percentage) |
| Benguela | 7,842 | 9,402 | 7,185 | 14,469 | 12,926 | 23,422 | 81 |
| Bié | a | a | a | a | 766 | 2,112 | 175 |
| Cabinda | c | c | c | 12 | 4 | 0.1 | — |
| Congo | 9,200 | 8,548 | 7,743 | 15,115 | b | b | b |
| Cuanza-North . | 7,340 | 8,074 | 7,014 | 9,117 | 9,003 | 17,783 | 97 |
| Cuanza-South . | 4,000 | 7,020 | 11,684 | 4,112 | 10,621 | 44,907 | 323 |
| Cuando-Cubango | a | a | a | a | 0.1 | 0.4 | 300 |
| Huambo | 1,070 | 2,377 | 2,560 | 4,839 | 4,337 | 5,421 | 25 |
| Huíla | 1,971 | 3,334 | 7,238 | 6,408 | 6,037 | 2,931 | -51 |
| Luanda | 7,250 | 23,493 | 25,881 | 15,155 | 4,450 | 8,286 | 86 |
| Lunda | c | c | c | c | c | 400 | — |
| Malanje | 1,971 | 2,300 | 3,436 | 3,577 | 1,664 | 6,094 | 266 |
| Moçâmedes | 10,000 | c | 287 | 861 | 100 | c | — |
| Moxico | c | c | c | c | c | 0.4 | — |
| Uíge | b | b | b | b | 18,527 | 28,378 | 53 |
| Zaire | b | b | b | b | d | 293 | — |
| TOTAL | 50,644 | 65,048 | 73,028 | 74,420 | 68,422 | 140,031 | 104 |

a Up to 1961, Bié-Cuando-Cubango formed one district.

b The Congo district was divided into the districts of Uíge and Zaire in 1961.

c Nil or insignificant.

d No information available.

C. DEFINITIVE *aforamento* CONCESSIONS OF RURAL LAND BY DISTRICT

(In hectares)

| District | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | Increase 1961/1962 (percentage) |
|----------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------------------------------------|
| Benguela | d | 3,572 | 1,621 | 8,464 | 4,208 | 24,507 | 482 |
| Bié | a | a | a | a | 1,876 | 1,613 | -14 |
| Cabinda | c | c | c | c | c | 12 | — |
| Congo | 2,301 | 3,015 | 8,555 | 12,071 | b | b | b |
| Cuanza-North . | d | 3,336 | 11,479 | 9,681 | 12,082 | 59,937 | 396 |
| Cuanza-South . | d | 833 | 2,284 | 5,270 | 3,903 | 7,774 | 99 |
| Cuando-Cubango | a | a | a | a | c | c | — |
| Huambo | c | c | 917 | 1,866 | c | 4,142 | 122 (60/61) |
| Huíla | c | 98 | 896 | 609 | 1,101 | 5,685 | 416 |
| Luanda | 1,510 | 2,589 | 4,059 | 1,380 | 1,001 | 29,097 | 2,806 |
| Malanje | c | 238 | 882 | 30 | 38 | 6,575 | 17,202 |
| Moçâmedes | c | c | 309 | c | c | c | — |
| Moxico | c | 0.5 | c | c | c | 0.1 | — |
| Uíge | b | b | b | b | 3,333 | 39,341 | 1,080 |
| Zaire | b | b | b | b | c | 500 | — |
| Lunda | c | c | c | c | c | c | — |
| TOTAL | 9,223 | 13,703 | 31,002 | 39,371 | 27,545 | 179,185 | 550 |

a Up to 1961, Bié-Cuando-Cubango formed one district.

b The Congo district was divided into the districts of Uíge and Zaire in 1961.

c Nil or insignificant.

d No information available.

TABLE 5. ANGOLA
Relative population distribution by district

| Districts | Average density 1960 | 1950 | | | 1960 | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|-----------|-----------|--|-----------|-----------|--|
| | | Europeans | Africans | Number of Europeans per 1,000 Africans | Europeans | Africans | Number of Europeans per 1,000 Africans |
| Cabinda | 8 | 734 | 49,112 | 15 | 1,992 | 55,919 | 36 |
| Congo | — | 1,493 | 398,087 | 4 | — | — | — |
| Zaire ^a | 5 | — | — | — | 883 | 102,277 | 8 |
| Uíge ^a | — | — | — | — | 5,966 | 392,063 | 15 |
| Luanda | 10 | 22,442 | 248,301 | 9 | 58,256 | 273,732 | 213 |
| Cuanza-North | 10 | 2,263 | 212,608 | 10 | 7,480 | 252,560 | 30 |
| Cuanza-South | 8 | 3,538 | 290,253 | 12 | 11,002 | 389,174 | 28 |
| Malanje | 4 | 2,832 | 457,256 | 6 | 5,794 | 442,900 | 13 |
| Lunda | 1.4 | 996 | 264,760 | 4 | 1,807 | 244,940 | 7 |
| Benguela | 13 | 12,213 | 313,945 | 39 | 26,731 | 453,834 | 59 |
| Huambo | 16 | 9,955 | 554,035 | 18 | 18,666 | 571,299 | 33 |
| Bié-Cuando-Cubango | — | 4,211 | 470,199 | 9 | 5,065 | 445,127 | 11 |
| Bié-Cuando-Cubango ^b | — | — | — | — | 314 | 112,622 | 3 |
| Moxico | 1.4 | 1,742 | 249,399 | 7 | 3,432 | 261,749 | 13 |
| Moçâmedes | 8 | 5,248 | 38,895 | 14 | 6,905 | 34,468 | 20 |
| Huíla | 3.5 | 11,159 | 489,837 | 23 | 18,236 | 571,198 | 32 |
| Territory as a whole | 4 | 78,826 | 4,036,687 | 19 | 172,529 | 4,604,362 | 37 |

^a Congo Province in 1950.

^b Bié-Cuando-Cubango Province in 1950.

CONCESSION, OCCUPATION AND SETTLEMENT OF LAND IN MOZAMBIQUE

A. GENERAL

Factors affecting European settlement

199. Mozambique lies south of the Equator between latitude 10° 30' and 27°. It is bounded on the north by Tanzania, on the west by Lake Nyasa, Malawi, Zambia and Southern Rhodesia, on the south by South Africa and Swaziland and on the east by the Indian Ocean. It has a total area of 771,125 km² (297,654 square miles) which is seven times the size of Portugal.

200. Physically, Mozambique is divided into three zones. The low-lying coastal zone, which is one of the largest in Africa and which is narrow in the north and widens in the south, covers about 42 per cent of the total area. The transitional zone, which comprises hills and low plateaux with altitudes of about 500 to 2,000 feet above sea-level, makes up about 29 per cent of the area and the remainder consists of the highlands plateau region, on the Rhodesian border, with average elevations of 3,300 feet, composed mainly of granite and gneissic rocks.

201. The rainfall pattern varies from north to south. In the north, at the higher elevations, the rainfall is the heaviest and there are two seasons. Most of the rest of the country is classified as tropical savannah, though the south and the Zambezi Valley are more steppe-like.

202. Apart from the river valleys with rich alluvials, the soils in the east of the Territory are relatively poor. In terms of land use, the Territory may be considered as consisting of three main areas, divided by the Zambezi and the Save Rivers. The area north of the Zambezi, comprising Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Moçambique and Zambézia districts, is the main agricultural region producing copra, sisal, cotton, some tobacco, tea and cashew. The Niassa district, however, despite considerable agricultural potential, has a low population density, owing mainly to the fact that, until recently, it lacked adequate transportation. Many of the large companies which produce

an important part of Mozambique's agricultural exports are located in this region.

203. The central area inland from Beira and between the Zambezi and Save Rivers comprises the Manica e Sofala and Tete districts and, like the northern area, is largely infested by the tsetse fly. Two of the important river valley development schemes—the Revuê scheme and the proposed Zambézia scheme—are located in this area. This is the main mining and forestry region and the most important sugar producing area, with two large sugar companies, the British-owned Sena Sugar Estates located at Chinde and the Búzi Company located near Beira.⁴⁴ The plateau lands towards the west are considered to have an estimated 6 million hectares (15 million acres) of land suitable for European agricultural settlement, especially around Chimoio (Manica e Sofala district).

204. The area lying south of the Save River contains some of the most arid regions of the Territory but is almost free from the tsetse fly. The most fertile land is in the valleys of the Limpopo, Incomáti and Umbelúzi Rivers. The major crop are rice, sugar (the third largest sugar plantation is located on the Incomáti River at Xinavane) and citrus. There is also dairy farming and market gardening and plantations of pine, cypress, and eucalyptus are being developed.

Population

205. The final results of the 1960 population census of Mozambique are not yet available. Provisional figures published in the *Anuário Estatístico, 1963* give the total population as 6,578,604, comprising 97,268 Europeans (*Branços*), 17,243 Indians (*Indianos*), 2,098 Chinese (*Amarelos*) and 31,465 *Mistos*. There is no later information available. Table 6 below shows the changes in the population at the 1940, 1950 and 1960 censuses, and the percentage increase over the previous decade. The European population, which more than doubled between 1950 and 1960, is thought to be still increasing and is now unofficially estimated at 150,000.

⁴⁴ The role of these companies will be described in a subsequent working paper.

TABLE 6. MOZAMBIQUE
Population, 1940, 1950, 1960*

| | 1940 | 1950 | 1960 | Percentage increase 1950-1960 |
|----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|
| African | 5,031,955 | 5,651,306 | 6,430,530 | 13.8 |
| Chinese | 1,449 | 1,613 | 2,098 | 30.0 |
| European | 27,438 | 48,213 | 97,268 | 101.7 |
| Indian | 9,147 | 12,630 | 17,243 | 3.0 |
| "Mistos" | 15,641 | 25,149 | 31,465 | 25.1 |
| TOTAL | 5,085,630 | 5,738,911 | 6,578,604 | |

* SOURCE: Mozambique, *Anuário Estatístico*, 1963.

206. Mozambique has a larger non-Portuguese alien population than Angola. There were 4,947 aliens resident in the Territory in 1963, including 1,753 Pakistanis, 721 British, 655 Chinese, 395 Italians and 337 South Africans. About one

quarter of the aliens were resident in the Lourenço Marques district; the next largest groups were 664 in Manica e Sofala, 257 in Zambézia and 206 in Moçambique district. The average population density of the Territory in 1960 was 8.4 persons per square kilometre, which is double that of Angola. The population density is greatest along the coastal areas and drops off towards the interior. Some of the most densely populated regions are the coastal area between the Lourenço Marques Bay and the Inhambane Bay, the coastal areas of the Beira *concelho*, and the Zambézia and Moçambique districts. Other heavily populated areas include the Incomati, Umbeluzi, Inharrime and Lower Limpopo valleys and the Angónia *circunscrição*. Among the least populated areas are the Upper Limpopo and the interior of Niassa district, especially Marrupa and Maniamba. The three districts with the highest average population densities are Lourenço Marques with 27.64, Moçambique with 18.39, and Zambézia with 13.32. Table 7 below shows that these districts are also those with relatively larger European populations (more than half of the Europeans are located in Lourenço Marques). Because the districts have been changed since 1955, it is not possible to make any detailed comparisons of population increase.

TABLE 7. MOZAMBIQUE
Population distribution and population density by district—1960*

| District | Total | Average population density per km ² | European | African | Chinese | Indian | Mixed |
|---------------------|------------------|--|---------------|------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|
| Lourenço Marques .. | 441,363 | 27.6 | 48,182 | 374,966 | 992 | 7,592 | 9,631 |
| Gaza | 675,150 | 8.1 | 7,422 | 664,566 | 3 | 483 | 2,676 |
| Inhambane | 583,722 | 8.5 | 1,913 | 577,495 | 47 | 752 | 3,565 |
| Manica e Sofala ... | 781,070 | 6.0 | 19,668 | 751,491 | 1,027 | 3,734 | 5,150 |
| Tete | 470,100 | 4.7 | 2,169 | 465,766 | 3 | 356 | 1,806 |
| Zambézia | 1,363,619 | 13.2 | 7,436 | 1,350,513 | 8 | 1,325 | 4,337 |
| Moçambique | 1,444,555 | 18.4 | 8,074 | 1,431,701 | 8 | 2,179 | 2,593 |
| Cabo Delgado | 542,165 | 7.0 | 1,482 | 538,532 | 10 | 683 | 1,746 |
| Niassa | 276,810 | 2.3 | 992 | 275,500 | — | 139 | 249 |
| TOTAL | 6,578,604 | 8.4 | 97,268 | 6,430,530 | 2,098 | 17,243 | 31,465 |

* SOURCE: Mozambique, *Anuário Estatístico* 1963; population density figures are from the *Anuário Estatístico* 1962.

207. The average population densities give only a very rough idea of the population distribution; there are many areas with much higher than average densities. As will be shown below, it is often in these areas that the most land has been alienated and in some cases it has been necessary in the past to establish special reserves for the protection of the indigenous inhabitants (see para 244).

208. In Mozambique, the areas considered to be suitable for European occupation are fewer than in Angola. One Portuguese author, Oliveira Boléo,⁴⁵ estimated in 1950 that there were over 20,000 km² suitable for European settlement, located as follows:

| Locality | Area in km ² | |
|---|--|----------------------------------|
| | More than 1,400 metres above sea-level | 800-1,400 metres above sea-level |
| Angónia (Tete district) | 3,500 | 4,000 |
| Maniamba and Vila Cabral (Niassa district) | 1,500 | 5,000 |
| Manica and Chimoio (Manica e Sofala district) | 750 | 2,700 |
| Gorongosa (Manica e Sofala district) | 600 | 1,200 |
| Mossurize (Manica e Sofala district) | 300 | 600 |
| TOTAL | 6,650 | 13,500 |

⁴⁵ Boléo, Oliveira, *Moçambique* (Lisbon, Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1951).

209. Other areas considered to be suitable are Guruê and Milange in the Zambézia district, Ribauê and Malema in the Moçambique district, and Macanga in the Tete district (see sect. c on settlement schemes, below), (see O. Boléo, op. cit., pp. 310-312 and 320-321).

B. LAND CONCESSIONS

The *prazo* system

210. Historically, the concession, settlement and occupation of land by the Portuguese has been less intensive in Mozambique than in Angola, owing to the geographical difference between the two Territories. Mozambique lies between 5° and 10° further south than Angola, and while the greater part of Angola lies above 3,300 feet, only a small part of Mozambique reaches this height. In contrast to Angola's elevation and cooler temperatures, Mozambique, influenced by warm air masses from the Indian Ocean and with a greater prevalence of tsetse fly, has always been less favoured as a location for Portuguese settlement.

211. In the early part of the seventeenth century, crown grants—known as *prazos de coroa*—were made of large tracts of land to persons from Portugal for the purpose of encouraging development and settlement in Mozambique. The crown grants varied in size from a few to several hundred square kilometres; some were hereditary and others were for two or three generations. The *prazo* holder not only had the right to exploit the land, but also had authority over the local population, for whose welfare he was theoretically respon-

sible. According to some accounts, most of the *prazo* holders lived on the slave trade and taxes imposed on the Africans, many were absentee landlords and little was done in this period to develop agriculture.

212. In order to stabilize Portuguese settlement in the Territory, the Government at one time decided to permit inheritance of the *prazos* through the eldest daughter, with the condition that she would retain the rights over the *prazo* only if she married a Portuguese.

213. Although effective in establishing some form of Portuguese suzerainty in the interior, the *prazo* system had many of the characteristics of a semi-feudal régime. The Africans were often ruthlessly exploited and the hereditary *prazo* holders had little or no regard for the authority of the Portuguese Government. The system was strongly criticized both in Portugal and elsewhere, but once firmly established, it was difficult to eradicate. During the mid-nineteenth century, the Portuguese Government made various endeavours to abolish the system though without practical result; from 1880 to 1890 it assumed control over and attempted to administer the *prazos* directly. The attempt, however, did not prove successful and in 1890 it was decided to reintroduce the *prazo* system with some important modifications. The grants would no longer be hereditary but would be for a specified period of twenty-five years. In order to ensure that the *prazos* were developed economically, they would be auctioned to the highest bidder who would, as before, be given the right to collect taxes but would have to pay to the Government a substantial portion (about 30 per cent) of the revenue thus collected. In addition, the *prazo* holders were required to put a fixed proportion of the land under cultivation. At the end of the nineteenth century there were over a hundred *prazos* in Mozambique. The *prazo* system was eventually replaced, as the grants expired, by land concessions under the legislation of 1901 and 1918 (see paras. 3-7 above).

The chartered companies⁴⁶

214. At the same time as it took steps to eliminate the hereditary *prazo* holders, the Portuguese Government began to encourage the formation of concessionary companies, with a view to stimulating the economic development of the Territory. The establishment of the British South Africa Company in what is now Southern Rhodesia set an example, for both political and economic reasons, which the Portuguese Government was quick to emulate. Whereas previously, under the *prazo* system, land concessions had been granted only to Portuguese nationals the form of the joint stock company made it possible to supplement Portuguese by foreign investment capital, while the company remained legally Portuguese and under Portuguese direction. Following the precedent created by the British South Africa Company, enormous concessions, covering more than two thirds of the area of Mozambique, were granted to three companies. The first of these was the Moçambique Company (first incorporated in 1888) which in 1891 received a royal charter from the Portuguese Government giving it rights over an area of 62,000 square miles, comprising the present district of Manica e Sofala. In the same year, a similar charter was given to the Niassa Company granting it rights over all lands north of the Lúrio River, comprising the present districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado and in 1892, the Zambézia Company was formed with a concession of 80,000 square miles covering the present districts of Zambézia and Tete. In all three companies, foreign investment capital played a significant role. In the case of the Niassa Company, the principal source of capital was British, while in the case of the other two the initial stockholdings were more diversified, including South African, French, German and British interests.

215. The Moçambique and Niassa companies were more than mere land concessionaires. By the terms of their charters they were also made responsible for the internal administration of their respective territories in practically all except judicial matters; these administrative responsibilities were not given

to the Zambézia Company. The effect was that only a part of Mozambique remained under the direct administration of the Governor-General, namely, the areas directly south of the Moçambique Company's concession including the districts now known as Lourenço Marques, Inhambane and Gaza; the area north of the Company's concession, including the upper part of the Zambezi River basin; and the area around Quelimane.

216. The Moçambique Company grew out of a mining exploration concession granted in 1888 within the area comprised in the hydrographical basins of the Púnguè and Búzi Rivers. Under the royal charter granted in 1891, and subsequent amendments, it received exclusive rights within the area of its concession⁴⁷ to exploit all natural resources (including mineral and navigation rights, coastal fishing and elephant hunting), to levy taxes (consistent with prevailing Portuguese policy), conduct trade and to reserve to itself the monopoly of any branch of industry. The Company was to be considered Portuguese, with headquarters in Lisbon and a majority of its directors had to be Portuguese nationals. Its concession was limited to fifty years but could be rescinded sooner under certain conditions described below (see para. 220).

217. For the duration of its concession, the Company was granted dominion over all land, including that belonging to the State, within the concession area, with the exception of existing *prazos*. It also had the right to acquire land and to keep all land acquired by "any legitimate means" (*por qualquer meio legítimo*)⁴⁸ both inside and outside the area of its concession. The Company could grant rights over vacant land by sub-concessions to individuals and other companies, provided that if they were non-Portuguese they agreed to submit to Portuguese law and Portuguese courts. To acquire perpetual rights (*para que o domínio se torne perpétuo*) sub-concessionaires had to pay a *foro* to the Company, and upon expiration of the Company's concession, continue payment of the *foro* to the State. However, Government approval was required for the granting of any sub-concession exceeding 5,000 ha. in one continuous block (articles 21 and 23 of the Decree of 11 February 1891, *Boletim da Companhia de Moçambique*, 1892, No. 2).

218. The Company could exploit any *prazos* within its boundaries in accordance with the special terms governing their operations; it was required to respect the rights over any privately owned property and "to leave to the *indigenas* land necessary for the growing of their food crops" (*ibid.*, article 23).

219. In return for the rights and privileges it received, the Company, among other responsibilities, undertook to build a railway from the bay of Púnguè (where Beira is now located) to the western border in the district of Manica. It was also required, within five years of its establishment, to settle within its territory up to 1,000 Portuguese families, or Portuguese descendants. The transportation for these families was to be provided by the Government. As in other government settlement schemes described below, each family was to receive a house, land and tools, the value of which was to be reimbursed to the Company. Settlements to be undertaken by the Company were to be regulated by separate legislation (Article 10).

220. Under Article 38 of the Decree, the Government could rescind the contract without indemnification if the Company failed to fulfil the stipulations therein, if it did not exercise the authority conferred on it in the public interest, if it did not fulfil the terms of agreements with foreign Powers or in-

⁴⁷ The area was delimited on the north by the Zambezi River and on the south by 22° parallel from the coast to the meridian 33° east and thence south-west to the Limpopo River.

⁴⁸ From the phrasing of this clause, it appears that while the Company had "dominion" over all land in its territory during the term of its contract, it could only acquire perpetual rights over land by procedures set out in the legislation in force. For this reason, the statistics for Mozambique showing the area of land concessioned up to 1909 and 1918, for instance, do not include the areas granted to chartered companies since, except for those areas permanently alienated, the Company's holdings were to revert to the State upon expiration of their contracts (see para. 223 below).

⁴⁶ Details of the chartered companies and other agricultural enterprises will be contained in a separate working paper on agricultural activities.

digenous chiefs, or if it abandoned its agricultural, mining, commercial and industrial undertakings (*explorações*).

221. Details of the concessions of the Niassa and Zambézia companies are not available. According to authoritative sources,⁴⁹ the terms of the charter conferred on the Niassa Company were practically identical with those of the one conferred on the Moçambique Company, except that the concession was for a period of thirty-five years (reckoned from 16 March 1893, the date of the definitive contract) and the Portuguese Government reserved to itself the right to rescind the concession if the Company revolted against the authority of the State, failed to fulfil the stipulations agreed upon, or neglected to make use of the agricultural, mining, commercial and industrial rights conferred on it.

222. The Zambézia Company, like the Moçambique Company, grew out of a mining-exploration concession within the hydrographic basin of the Zambezi River. The area, which it acquired by the initial and subsequent concessions, consisted of two blocks in what are now the Tete and Zambézia districts, including some of the richest lands of the Territory. Much of the area consisted of *prazos* which were taken over by the Company and let as sub-concessions.

223. The charter of the Niassa Company expired in 1929, the Zambézia Company's concession in 1940 and the Moçambique Company's charter in 1942. As a result, the territories allocated to them reverted to the Government of Mozambique, with the exception of land concessions received of a perpetual nature. However, Decree No. 16,767 of 20 April 1929, which made provision for the cessation of the Niassa Company, made it clear that the Government could annul any of the "perpetual" concessions if it were proven that the title had been granted illegally, or the conditions of the concession had not been fulfilled (see para. 253).

224. Of the three, the Niassa Company was the least successful, because the area of its concession was relatively poor in mineral and other natural resources and because the failure to build a railroad into the interior discouraged settlement. The Niassa Company was consequently dissolved, having accomplished little beyond the development of Porto Amélia. The Moçambique and Zambézia companies continued to exist, however, although in a much modified form and primarily as trading and investment companies. The Moçambique Company now holds forestry concessions (the area of which is not known) in Manica e Sofala while the Zambézia Company owns three large coconut plantations at Angoase, Andone and Bajone, in the vicinity of Quelimane, with a total of nearly 800,000 palm trees in 1963 and, in addition, some 1,500 ha. in the *circunscricao* of Gurue, Zambézia district, devoted to the growing of tea and alleurites.

225. During the period of their large concessions, the Moçambique and Zambézia companies granted several important sub-concessions. Among the sub-concessions granted by the Moçambique Company were those to the Companhia Colonial do Búzi (now the Companhia Agrícola do Búzi), the Beira Illovo Sugar Estates (now extinct) and some areas to the Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd. The Zambézia Company granted sub-concessions to the Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd., the Companhia do Boror and the Société du Madal (now the Sociedade Agrícola do Madal).

226. Details of the activities of these companies will be contained in a subsequent paper. The following information relates only to the terms of their concessions and the extent of their land-holdings.

227. The Companhia Colonial do Búzi, which was established by a Portuguese firm, Arriaga e Commandita to undertake agricultural, mining and industrial activities, received an original concession of 312,500 ha. extending from the mouth of the Búzi River up to and including the lands of the chiefs (*régulos*) Mexamaja and Guruja. Under the terms of its contract, the Company could acquire land by *aforamento* from the Moçambique Company on condition that in each six-year period (see the amended text of Article 4) it put into use (*aproveitar*) at least one fifth of each of the separate areas

it received. Any area where the land in use was less than the minimum required reverted to the Moçambique Company without any compensation. Within eight years, the Company had to put into use not less than 5,000 ha. and to do its best to promote and to achieve the settlement of at least sixty Portuguese families "of the white race" (Articles 4 and 10, Contract between the Companhia de Moçambique and the Companhia Colonial do Búzi, *Boletim da Companhia de Moçambique*, No. 127, 1 December 1898).

228. In areas not conceded on an *aforamento* basis, both the Government and the Companhia de Moçambique retained rights to use freely land for fortifications, military posts and judicial personnel as well as for any other public use. The Búzi Company could, with the approval of the Moçambique Company, alienate land which it had acquired under its contract if the land was without crops or other developments (Article 5). The Company was required to respect the crops of the *indigenas*, to leave them the necessary free land for their sustenance, and to give them water and firewood without charge.

229. There is little information as to the extent of the area which remains of the original concession. In 1958-1959, the Company's sugar plantations, in which it pursues its main activity, included 8,261 ha. actually planted with sugar cane. In addition, it controls forestry concessions and land devoted to cattle ranching.

230. The Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd., which was originally a sub-concessionary of both the Moçambique and Zambézia companies, is a predominantly British concern. Details of its original contracts are not available, but in 1964 it was reported to hold an area of 76,079 ha., of which about one fourth was being used for sugar production. Although its main product is sugar, of which it is the largest producer in Mozambique, it also has some land devoted to copra and forestry products.

231. The Companhia do Boror, which was originally largely financed in Germany, has coconut plantations near Quelimane and also engages in sisal production and ranching. Information on the total extent of its land-holdings is not available, but in 1961 it had 27,000 ha. planted with coconuts, and 20,000 ha. under sisal. Its plantations are located at Namacurra, Maganja da Costa, Pebane, Quelimane and Mocuba, in Zambézia district, and at Moma and António Enes, in Moçambique district.

232. The Sociedade Agrícola do Madal, originally the Société du Madal, formed with French, Swiss, Norwegian and Portuguese capital, obtained a sub-concession in 1912 of about 280,000 ha., including four former *prazos* in the district of Quelimane (now district of Zambézia). In 1940, however, its holdings were reported to amount to only 21,078 ha. Together with the companies of Boror and Zambézia, it is one of the largest producers of copra in the world, with plantations at Quelimane, Chinde and Maganja da Costa, and it also engages in cattle ranching and tea production (750 ha. in 1960).

Land concession up to the end of 1939

233. The large areas of land held under the *prazo* system and the even greater areas concessioned to the three land companies do not appear to be reflected in the land concession statistics for the period 1909-1939 as published in the *Anuário de Moçambique* of 1940. The reason for this seems to be that both the *prazos* and the concessions of the land companies were granted for fixed terms, and implied no permanent land rights except over areas actually brought into use or formally granted under the land concession legislation.

234. For Mozambique, as mentioned above (see para. 7), the legislation in effect was first that of 1901 and then Decree No. 3,983 of 16 March 1918, which remained in force until 1961. Both of these main decrees were supplemented by local legislation issued by the Mozambique Government. As noted in paragraph 65 above, the 1919 legislation for Angola resulted in a rush for concessions and local legislation was introduced to try to safeguard the rights of Africans. In Mozambique, after the 1918 legislation came into effect, land concessions granted also increased more than twofold (see table 9 below). In 1920 the Mozambique Government issued a decree (No. 7,151 of 19 November 1920) to prohibit the expropriation of land occupied by Africans, except for public use.

⁴⁹ *A Manual of Portuguese East Africa* (British Admiralty, H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1920), p. 168; James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa*, p. 92.

235. It has not been possible to trace all the past local legislation on land concessions. Measures taken during the period 1919-1939 included the opening of all unoccupied land in the former Gaza district to *aforamento* concessions (Decree No. 15,491 of 18 May 1928) and the opening of the lower Manica area, where the land previously reserved for "*colonização Portuguesa*" was divided into blocks for concessioning (*Portaria* No. 3,197, 10 November 1917). In 1938 regulations were issued governing the occupation of land by *indigenas* on private property (*Portaria* No. 3,286, 19 January 1938, *Boletim Oficial de Moçambique*, No. 3, 1938).

236. These regulations provided that Africans occupying land not especially reserved for them on any private property or any concession, had to pay rent only when a contract had been signed to that effect and the contract had been authorized by the local administration. They did not need to pay rent if they were already occupying the land at the time the concession was granted, or the property transacted, or if in the preceding ten months they had been occupying the land without payment of rent. The landowner was "prohibited" by the regulations from exacting labour instead of the rent, and in areas where there existed natural forestry or other products, if the contract so provided, the Africans could be asked to pay their rent by collecting these products in the areas not rented to them.

237. Table 8 below shows the areas of land actually alienated up to 1909, and during the periods 1909-1918 and 1919-1939. It will be noted that almost half of the land concessions before 1939 were granted during the period 1909-1918. More than half of the land alienated during this period went to non-Portuguese nationals, as is reflected in the rapid increase of acreage under sugar (which doubled between 1911 and 1920) and the growth of foreign-owned copra and sisal plantations.

238. During the period 1918-1939, land alienation was still extensive but was more concentrated in Portuguese ownership. By the end of 1939, of the 1.3 million hectares that had been concessioned, three quarters were in the hands of Portuguese nationals. There is no information on the area held by individual Africans under the provisions of the land concession legislation.

Land concession, 1949-1963

239. As a result of the extensive concessions, by the early 1940's it was found necessary in certain areas to create native reserves. A Mozambique Government Order (No. 4,640 of 28 January 1942), for instance, created four additional reserve areas, totalling 6,104 ha., in the *circunscrição* of Marracuene, located south-east of the Lourenço Marques-Ressano Garcia Railway, where, as a result of the large number of concessions granted, there had begun to be a shortage of land for the Africans.

240. Table 9 below shows the total areas of land (urban, suburban and rural) concessioned each year since 1917. By comparing the total area conceded over five-year periods, it can be seen that very intensive land concession activities occurred in the decade 1946-1955, when over half a million hectares were granted as concessions. Yet as at 31 December 1954, according to government statistics, the total concessioned area, 1,737,000 ha., represented an increase of only some 550,000 ha. over the area of concessions in effect at the end of 1939. As seen from the data in table 8, the apparent reason for this is that each year a considerable area of the concessions reverts to the State, either because the concessionaires lack the funds necessary to put the land into use or because the land has been abandoned or for other reasons.

241. During the period 1956-1960, the area of concessions granted was only about 60 per cent of that granted during the previous period, and dropped even lower in 1961. By 1963, however, as a result of the simplified procedures under the new land concession regulations (Decree No. 43,894, which has been summarized above) and the Government's policy of opening up new land to attract settlements, the area granted in that year was larger than the annual average in any of the previous five-year periods.

242. Table 10A below shows the annual concession of rural land by district for the period 1955-1963. It can be seen from the following summary table that, as in Angola, non-African

land occupation in Mozambique is the highest in those areas which are already most densely populated, and few concessions are granted in the low density districts:

| District | Average population density per km ² | Total area conceded 1955-1963 (ha.) |
|------------------|--|-------------------------------------|
| Lourenço Marques | 27.6 | 72,827 |
| Gaza | 8.5 | 63,394 |
| Moçambique | 18.4 | 80,872 |
| Zambézia | 13.2 | 66,712 |
| Manica e Sofala | 6.0 | 19,875 |
| Cabo Delgado | 7.0 | 23,459 |
| Tete | 4.7 | 7,404 |
| Niassa | 2.3 | 6,939 |
| Inhambane | 8.5 | 1,112 |

The three districts with the highest population densities, together with Gaza, account for almost 85 per cent of the total. The increased concessions in Tete and Niassa possibly reflect the result of government efforts to attract settlers to those districts.

243. The data in table 10A below also show how the area of concessions increased after the introduction of the new regulations. In 1963, a total of 20,000 ha. was concessioned in Gaza, 13,000 ha. in Moçambique district and 16,500 ha. in Zambézia district. In each case these areas were at least double those granted in the previous year.

244. As in Angola, intensified land alienation has necessitated the creation of special reserves for the indigenous inhabitants, either to prevent them from being made homeless, or to free for other use land previously reserved to the State for their benefit. Among reserves established in 1960 especially for the use of the *indigenas* were a reserve of 3,600 ha. at Catuane, in the *circunscrição* of Maputo, in the Lourenço Marques district (Order No. 14,051 of 18 June 1960); 550 ha. at Quila, in the *concelho* of António Enes, Moçambique district (Order No. 14,208 of 13 August 1960); 410 ha. at Marracuene in Lourenço Marques district (Order No. 13,644 of 17 September 1960), where large areas are to be concessioned for sugar growing; and 708 ha. at Machavala, *Homoine circunscrição*, Inhambane district (Order No. 14,503 of 3 December 1960). In another Order (No. 14,395 of 22 October 1960), special regulations were introduced to regulate the sale of land to Africans by private owners around cities where State land was insufficient for the housing needs of Africans.

245. More reserves were established in 1961: 1,000 ha. at Maputo on the right bank of the Tembe River in the region of Porto Henrique and 2,340 ha. at Zavala, Inhambane district, to be used by the Brigada de Fixação de Populações Rurais.

246. There is no recent information on the total area of land under concession in Mozambique. The only comparable data are for the total area of agricultural holdings. Of the 1,737,000 ha. concessioned as at 31 December 1954, 1,735,105 ha. was rural land, and 1,799 ha. was urban and suburban land. Some 80 per cent of the rural concessions (1,364,427 ha.) consisted of non-African agricultural holdings (*explorações*). Information on the total amount of land covered by such holdings in 1960-1961 shows that their total area was 1,703,720 ha., representing an increase of 339,293 ha., or 26 per cent, over 1954.

247. Table 10B below shows the juridical status of agricultural holdings of Mozambique during the period 1950/1951-1960/1961. The eight classifications are: (a) *alodial* (free title); (b) *aforamento*; (c) uncertain title (*concessão a título precário*); (d) provisional concession; (e) definitive boundary demarcation; (f) provisional boundary demarcation; (g) simple occupation;⁵⁰ and (h) State reserves. It will be noted from this table that, at the end of 1961, of the 1,703,720 ha. of agricultural holdings, about 25 per cent was held by free title, and almost 75 per cent by *aforamento*. The decrease after 1956 of the area held under free title is not explained, although it seems likely that during this period some owners may have

⁵⁰ The land concession legislation which has been summarized in paras. 1-38 above does not contain provisions for "simple occupation", and in fact occupation of land by prescription is prohibited.

abandoned their concessions. The figures for simple occupation show that between 1949-1950 and 1956-1957 the area held under this form of occupation varied between 36,000 ha. and over 58,000 ha. In fact, the area thus occupied was greater than the State reserved areas. Thereafter, the area under simple occupation declined rapidly to only 8,580 ha. in 1959-1960 while, as is shown in the last column of the table, the area of State reserves increased from 30,000 ha. in 1954-1955 to 60,000 ha. in 1959-1960.

248. As has been indicated above (para. 234), the land concession legislation of 1919 for Angola and of 1918 for Mozambique made it possible in both Territories for large areas of land to be acquired as concessions without any specific obligation on the holder to use and develop it. It can be seen from table 10C below, which shows how requests for land concessions were processed in the period 1956-1963, that over the greater part of this period the average concession requested in Mozambique was around 1,000 hectares or more, or about 2,500 acres. The number of requests for concessions increased each year from 1958 onwards. In 1963, 784 requests were received, which was more than twice the number received in 1961. The total area of land alienated each year also increased, from some 26,000 ha. in 1956 to 65,500 ha. in 1963, an increase of approximately 150 per cent.

249. As in Angola, the number of concession holders has grown rapidly since the early 1950's and almost doubled in the five-year period 1955-1956 to 1960-1961. Statistics for the year 1950-1951 (Rui Martins dos Santos, p. 162) show that, of 1,395 holdings, about 25 per cent were under 15 ha. each and 50 per cent were under 50 ha.; among the larger holdings, one was classified as being between 7,500 and 10,000 ha., five were between 2,500 and 5,000 ha. and twenty-eight were between 1,000-2,500 ha. There are no comparable figures for 1960-1961. In that year, the average size of holdings was 270 ha. for the Territory as a whole. However, in the Manica e Sofala district the average holding was 1,750 ha., and in the Zambézia and Moçambique districts the averages were 1,500 ha. and 770 ha. respectively.

250. Non-African agriculture has traditionally been concentrated in the districts of Manica e Sofala, Zambézia and Moçambique. In 1950-1951, these three districts accounted for 80 per cent of the agricultural concessions by area and about 80 per cent of the number of holdings. These districts still had the greatest areas of land actually under occupation in 1959-1960; the total area of agricultural holdings in these three districts was 1,092,738 ha., or 68 per cent of the total area. In the district of Manica e Sofala, non-African agricultural holdings occupied just under half a million hectares.

251. In 1960-1961, of the 2,423 agricultural holdings of land concessions, 2,246 were Portuguese-owned (including those of public bodies such as the Agricultural Services, etc.), 32 German, 14 British, 30 Chinese, 26 Greek, 45 Indian, 7 Italian, 11 Pakistani, 5 Swiss and 7 others. Of the 177 non-Portuguese holdings, 69 (40 per cent) were in the Lourenço Marques district and 54 (32 per cent) in the district of Manica e Sofala.

252. The foregoing discussion of the statistics can only be regarded as an attempt at an over-all assessment of the general trends of land concessions. In order to have a complete picture of the actual situation as regards the occupation of land by non-Africans, it would be necessary to have more complete statistical series and to know on what basis the statistics are compiled. If, for instance, the statistics on the juridical status of the agricultural holdings are based on the land registry, it is difficult to see how the Government would know what areas are occupied without legal title. Because of shortage of personnel and the increased requests for land concessions, it seems likely that the land statistics may be based on outdated records, and that accurate and up-to-date statistics could only be obtained by a land census.

253. In the three months before the new land concession decree came into force in 1961, the Companhia de Moçambique posted notices of the loss of a number of land titles with rights over some 30,000 ha. in Manica e Sofala district, most of which it had granted before the 1920's. It seems that the Company, anticipating stricter enforcement as regards the juridical status of land rights, found it necessary to safeguard its occupation of the land to which it no longer had the titles. Of the total holdings involved, about two thirds were in Chimoio and others in Marroneu and Dondo (all of which are now targets of new settlements) and the titles were generally for *aforamento* holdings of 2,000 ha. each (*Boletim Oficial de Moçambique*, Series III, 1961, July-September). Without any further information, it is difficult to know whether these lands had been classified in the official statistics, and if so under what status.

254. Very little information is available on the size of the land holdings of the various large companies active in agricultural production and allied industries, which in Mozambique constitute the major field of foreign investment. The most important companies are listed below:⁵¹

⁵¹ In addition, three new sugar companies received large land concessions but have not yet begun operations (see paras. 327-330). The companies are the Açucarreira de Moçambique, with 15,000 ha., Marracuene Agrícola Açucarreira, with 6,000 ha., and the Portuguese Development Corporation, with 100,000 ha.

MAJOR COMPANIES WITH LARGE LAND CONCESSIONS

| Name of company | Nationality and ownership, area of holding and activities |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| Companhia de Moçambique | Nationality of ownership and total present area of holding unknown; has a 30 per cent interest in Companhia Carbonífera de Moçambique (see annex I above on mining in Angola and Mozambique, paras. 261-265) |
| Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd. | British owned. Reported to own 75,000 hectares (188,000 acres) freehold on both sides of the Zambezi River |
| Sociedade Agrícola do Madal, SARL | Originally French-owned, but in 1960 reported to be Norwegian-controlled. Original concession comprised 280,000 hectares (700,000 acres) in Quelimane district, but present area of holding is unknown. Assets include 13,400 head of cattle, 1.5 million coconut palms |
| Companhia de Zambézia, SARL | Nationality of ownership and present land holding unknown. Assets in 1960 included 1 million coconut palms, 1,000 ha. of tea plantations and 6,500 head of cattle |
| Companhia do Boror | Originally German-owned (present nationality uncertain). Largest producer of copra, with more than 27,000 ha. of coconut palms; also has over 20,000 ha. of sisal and 22,000 head of cattle (1960) |
| Companhia Agrícola do Búzi | Nationality of ownership and present land-holding unknown |

255. No information is available on the area of land occupied by Africans either according to traditional patterns or individually held. Even though provisions existed in the 1918 land concession legislation for the granting of special titles to Africans outside the *regedorias* there are no indications that the Government took any steps to encourage such holdings until 1944, when the statute of indigenous farmers was adopted (Mozambique, Decree Law No. 919 of 5 August 1944). This statute, which laid down government policy towards African agriculture and which will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent study, also established the procedures by which Africans could individually hold land as registered African farmers.

256. To be registered as a farmer, an African had to cultivate permanently one or more plots of land which fulfilled any of the following conditions: (a) the land had been acquired under article 165 of Decree No. 3,983 of 16 March 1918; (b) the plot or plots were registered in his name with the local land registry office (*conservatória da comarca*); (c) the land had been distributed to him as part of a government plan for agricultural settlement; (d) seasonal crops had been grown on the plots by the *indigena*, or the predecessors from whom he inherited the plots, for at least five years if the land was located in the indigenous reserves and for eight years in other areas (the plots may have been rented to him by a non-indigenous person).

257. The only recent information available on African holdings is that in respect of government-sponsored African settlement schemes, which are described below (paras. 313-325).

C. SETTLEMENT SCHEMES

Historical development

258. As noted above, Portugal at first relied less heavily on government-directed settlement schemes in Mozambique than in Angola. Instead, private individuals and companies who received large areas of land were supposed to help to settle Portuguese families in the Territory.

259. Prior to 1936, it appears that government-directed schemes to establish European settlers in Mozambique were limited to a few sporadic efforts. These included the settlement of a group of orphans from the Casa Pia in 1838 and the establishment of a second-class agricultural penal settlement in 1869 and a military agricultural penal settlement in the Gaza district in 1896 ("*Ação colonizadora do Estado*", *Boletim Geral das Colónias*, April 1940, No. 178).

Government plans

260. The first area chosen by the Government for directed development seems to have been the Limpopo Valley. In 1936 (Decree No. 25,499 of 24 March 1936), a technical commission was set up to study the potential economic development of the Limpopo, Umbelúzi and Incomátí Valleys, and to survey the Quelimane district and the region of the Mozambique Railway with a view to establishing European and African settlements. In 1940, the Posto de Culturas Regadas do Vale do Limpopo, an experimental station of 100 ha., on the right bank of the river near Guijá, was directed to study the feasibility of growing maize, rice, wheat, cotton and fodder in the area. At the same time, the technical commission was charged with studying the best régime for indigenous settlements (*colonata indigena*) based on irrigated land, and with initiating pilot projects comprising indigenous families. Nearly a decade later, when the first provincial Development Fund was established for Mozambique with a loan of one million contos (approximately \$U.S. 30 million), (Decree No. 36,446 of 31 July 1947), 800 indigenous families had already been established in the Lower Limpopo area.

261. Part of the 1947 Development Fund was allocated for the purpose of surveying resources and drawing up plans for future action. An agricultural team (*Missão agrícola*) was established "to protect and promote" already established European farmer-settlement, to draw up plans for future European settlement, and to find a way to ensure "that indigenous crops should not be prejudiced by the requirements of the concessionary zones".

262. An anthropological team (*Missão antropológica*) was set up to study possible ways of reorganizing the rural population, including the establishment of compact groups of Africans around industrial or agricultural centres. The team was also to try to find ways of diverting the labour migrating to South Africa to such centres; it was further to suggest ways for improving the existing conditions of European settler-farmers in the Territory, for attracting new groups of European farmers from Portugal, and for stabilizing Africans on the land.

263. The first settlement plan actually to be put into operation in Mozambique was the Limpopo Development Plan, located on the right bank of the Limpopo River near Guijá. The plan received Government approval by a Decree of 22 May 1951, which also established the Brigada Técnica de Fomento e Povoamento do Limpopo as the body responsible for carrying out the project. Irrigation and land preparation were begun in 1953 and settlement of European tenants was begun in 1954.

264. On the basis of the work of the experimental station established in 1936, it was originally proposed⁶² that the Limpopo Valley scheme should include 28,812 ha. of irrigated land at a total cost of 225 million escudos or 8 contos per hectare (an estimate which was greatly exceeded by actual costs, see paras. 266 and 277 ff.). It was envisaged that 9,500 families from Portugal could be settled, each family receiving 3 ha. of irrigated land and 27 ha. of non-irrigated land. The plan envisaged the use of the irrigated land as follows: wheat, 12,000 ha.; sugar, 3,500 ha.; alfalfa, 1,500 ha.; garden vegetables, 500 ha.; fruit orchards, 500 ha.; rice, 5,000 ha.; long staple cotton, 3,500 ha.; and maize, 2,312 ha.

265. For Mozambique, the First Six-Year National Development Plan for 1953-1958 included sizable allocations for this government-directed settlement scheme in the Limpopo Valley; most of the other projects were concerned with the improvement of existing areas and the opening up of new lands to attract individual settlers from Portugal.

266. A total of 684 million escudos (approximately \$U.S. 22 million) was allocated to the Limpopo Valley settlement scheme: 464 million escudos were to be used for drainage and irrigation and 220 million escudos for expropriation (indemnities) and preparation of land for settlers from Portugal, their transportation and installation costs, as well as technical and financial assistance to them (Portugal, Ministerios da Economia e do Ultramar, *Plano de Fomento*, vol. I (Lisbon, 1953), pp. 453-455). Although it was at first intended to irrigate 9,000 ha. of land during the six years covered by the Plan, and to settle 3,000 families from Portugal, because of the many problems to be solved before the Portuguese settlers could be established there—including the delicate problem of what to do with the indigenous families already located there—it was finally estimated that at most 1,000 Portuguese families, or approximately 4,000 persons, from Portugal could be settled by 1958.

267. The Incomátí Valley, in the Gaza district, was also included as a potential development region. As a first stage towards opening up this area for European farming, 470 million escudos were allocated under the First Six-Year Development Plan for a hydroelectric station on the Incomátí River. It was intended eventually to irrigate 30,000 ha. of the fertile areas along the banks of the Incomátí between Magude and Manhiça where, it was thought, 10,000 families from Portugal could be settled. However, when it was found that completion of the scheme would require almost double the amount allocated, the whole project was dropped in 1955 and the unspent funds were used for other projects.

268. Although the above-mentioned allocations were the only ones concerned directly with European settlement from Portugal, the discussions accompanying the introduction of the First Six-Year National Development Plan show that the improvement of the Territory's infra-structure—especially the schemes to increase power production (as for instance that at Vila Pery on the Revuè) and the new railway links—were basically oriented towards opening up new areas for mining and European farming. The Mozambique Railway link to

⁶² Morais, *A Agua no Valorização do Ultramar*, p. 34.

Guijá was related to the Limpopo Valley settlement and the railway from Vila Luísa to Manhiça was related to the opening up of the fertile lands of the Incomati Valley. The 100 km extension of the Tete Railway (originally built to transport coal from Moatize to Beira), was intended to open up the regions of Angónia, Macanga and Marávia, which are most suitable for European farm settlements. Similarly, the Niassa Railway, which was to be built from Nacala to Nova Freixo and which was to be the longest railway in the Territory, was to facilitate the transportation of cotton, sisal, maize, tobacco and tea from the interior and to attract further white settlement, mining and ranching in the region around Lake Nyasa and up to Vila Cabral (*ibid.*, pp. 462-463).

269. With a view to intensifying European settlement, a number of special teams were appointed between 1954 and 1958 to study and recommend the best areas for settlements based on irrigated farming or on specific high-income-yielding crops. The first team, appointed in February 1954, was to study the economic factors relating to tea and the areas to be reserved for European tea growing (Order No. 14,763). In April of the same year, a commission was appointed to study among other things conditions for introducing irrigated farming in the Revuê, Lucite and Búzi Valleys (Order No. 14,830 of 8 April 1954). Another team was appointed in 1957 to make an appraisal of and formulate plans for settlements in the Zambezi River basin.

270. On the basis of these studies, the Second Six-Year National Development Plan, 1959-1964, substantially increased the allocations for general agricultural development and European settlement.

271. Out of a total of 163 million escudos allocated under the Plan for agricultural, livestock and forestry development, 100 million escudos was set aside for swamp reclamation projects with a view to stabilizing African farming in those areas (see paras. 313-325 below). In addition, 20 million escudos were allocated for tsetse fly eradication, 15 million escudos to establish new areas both for Africans and for European ranchers in Chimoio, and another 18 million escudos to study and plan ranching settlements in the Maputo *circum-crição* and the Alto Limpopo region.

272. Under the general heading of "settlement", 925 million escudos were allocated as follows: (a) continuation of the Limpopo irrigation and settlement scheme, 400 million escudos; (b) irrigation and settlement in the Revuê Valley, 400 million escudos; (c) settlements based on tea plantation, 75 million escudos; and (d) settlements based on tobacco plantation, 50 million escudos (Portugal, Presidência do Conselho, *Projecto de Plano de Fomento, para 1959-1964* (Lisbon, 1958), pp. 192-206).

273. Reviewing the development of Portugal's settlement policy in Mozambique up to 1959, it can be seen that the settlement schemes fall into three major categories: government-directed river valley settlements, mainly for European families from Portugal, undirected settlements on government prepared land and African rural population stabilization schemes. The evolution of these settlements is described briefly below.

Evolution of settlement schemes

Government-directed river valley settlements

274. In Mozambique, government-directed European settlement has so far been mainly in connexion with the various river valley development schemes. European settlements have already been established in the upper Limpopo Valley and the Revuê Valley, and plans have been drawn up for settlement in the Zambezi Valley. These are described in the following paragraphs. Settlements for Africans in the lower Limpopo Valley are described separately in paragraphs 115-127 above.

(a) The Limpopo Valley settlement

275. Plans to develop the Limpopo Valley date back to 1924-1925, when it was intended to irrigate between 20,000 and 29,000 ha. for sugar plantations. By 1940, attention had turned to the development of the region for individual family-size farm holdings based on crops best adapted to the area.

276. As noted above, the total allocations made under the First and Second Development Plans totalled 1,084 million escudos, and it was envisaged that by the end of 1965 2,750 European families and 1,910 African families⁵³ would be installed.

277. The allocations for the Limpopo Valley scheme have since been revised. According to figures published in 1964 (*Estudos Políticos e Sociais 1964*, vol. II, No. 2, pp. 477-498), the total investment up to 1970 will be 1,484 million escudos. Of this amount, 445.6 million escudos were spent under the First Development Plan for 1953-1958, and 540.3 million escudos under the Second Development Plan for 1959-1964. Allocations under the Transitional Development Plan will amount to 465.1 million escudos (31.4 per cent of the total), to be spent as follows: irrigation, 124 million escudos; settlement, 323.3 million escudos; and administration, 17.8 million escudos.

278. The scheme is administered by the Technical Brigade for Development and Settlement, which was established in 1951. By 31 December 1964, a total of 1,614 European families had been admitted to the Limpopo colony, of which 130 families in all (8.3 per cent) had left, leaving 1,484 in residence at the end of 1964. The majority of settlers arrived after 1959; between 1960 and 1964, the number of families admitted more than tripled (from 560 to 1,614), but the pace of settlement slowed (1960-291 admissions; 1961-344; 1962-301; 1963-262; 1964-157).

279. Of approximately 31,000 ha. now considered to be irrigable, 11,412 ha. had been irrigated by 31 December 1964. The settlement is based on the family-size farm. Each family receives about 31.5 ha. of land, of which an average of 7.5 ha. are irrigated, compared with 3 ha. as originally planned (see para. 264 above). The irrigated land comprises 5.5 ha. for crops, and 2 ha. of communal holdings for dairy cattle grazing and alfalfa, which are administered by the *associações de regantes*, which also turn over fodder and milk to the *Cooperativa Agrícola* for processing. The 24 ha. of unirrigated grazing land given to each family lies in a common pasture. Usually, forty families share such a pasture, which is therefore about 960 ha. in size.

280. The assistance which the State provides to the settlers is similar to that furnished under the Cela Scheme in Angola. Each family receives free transportation from Portugal to Mozambique; a house with three rooms, bath, stables, chicken houses and silo; one pair of working oxen, five heifers and one cow; farm tools and equipment, seeds, and insecticides. In addition, one hectare of land is planted before the settlers arrive and they receive a subsidy for the first year.

281. Under the terms of their contracts with the State, the settlers are required to repay the State for the costs of irrigation, afforestation, drainage and stocking of fishponds as well as of the house, farm tools, seeds and equipment. Repayment is at the rate of 1/6th of the value of the annual crop production. Repayment of cattle is in kind. By December 1964, 17,442 contos had been repaid. It was expected that an additional 10,000 contos would be repaid in 1965.

282. Settlers receive full title to their house and property when the State has been repaid the cost of livestock, furniture, agricultural equipment, and the first year's food allowance. Fifty-four settlers had received full title by 1963.

283. Although, as indicated above, the Limpopo Valley scheme was originally intended for European settlement from Portugal, recent accounts generally refer to it as the first joint European and African settlement. It seems that as there were already Africans in the area reserved for European settlement, some of whom had to be expropriated (see para. 266 above), a large number of Africans were selected to receive land in the settlement area. Up to 1958, although both the Europeans and Africans were supervised by the *Brigada*, official information shows that they lived apart in parallel communities.

⁵³ The First Six-Year Development Plan referred only to European settlers. The figures cited are contained in the Second Development Plan. For conditions relating to African settlers, see paras. 283-285.

284. The land allotted to each African family is about half that granted to Europeans, i.e., 2 ha. of irrigated land and 12 ha. of pasturage.

285. In 1961 there were 1,494 African families established in the Limpopo Settlement, in areas reserved for Africans living in the traditional manner. In addition, 17 African families were settled in European villages, "having shown themselves capable of living in the European way and having made the decision to do so". By 1962, the number of families of *assimilados* living in villages had increased to 97 (*Boletim Geral*, January 1962), and by 1963, 27 African families had received *titulos de propriedade*.

(b) *The Revuè Valley settlement*

286. The area selected for settlement comprises 290,000 ha. located at the confluence of the Zonué, Sussundenga and Revuè Rivers at the foot of the Rhodesian escarpment in the district of Manica e Sofala. It is adjacent to the Chimioio plateau, a major European settlement region and near to the textile mill of the Sociedade Algodoeira do Fomento Colonial at Vila Pery.

287. From the outset, the plans for the settlement were drawn up on a different basis from those at Cela in Angola and in the Limpopo Valley. Both those schemes were originally intended for the settlement of families from Portugal who were to work their own farms without the use of African labour. The original study made in 1954 of the Revuè Valley, on the other hand, proposed the establishment of commercial farming with the settlement of only 200 European families and 3,450 African families in order to provide each European farmer with seventeen units of labour (Order No. 14,830, April 1954). The target is now to establish 623 European and 24,946 African families, the latter to be divided into 293 villages. The total cost of the project is estimated at 1,342 million escudos, of which 672 million will be for irrigation, 496 million for installation of settlers, 85 million for afforestation and 89 million for continued studies.

288. For purposes of development, the Valley has been divided, according to geographical characteristics, into four blocks which will function as independent units: the Chimezi-Zonué; the Zonué-Mussopa; the Sussundenga and the Vandúzi (*Boletim Geral*, December 1960, p. 578). Altogether there are 114,000 ha. of agricultural land (60,000 ha. to be irrigated and 54,000 ha. non-irrigated), as well as 76,000 ha. of pasture and 85,000 ha. of good forest land in the Zonué-Mussopa and Sussundenga areas. The first two blocks to be developed have been the Sussundenga (in 1959) and the Chimezi-Zonué, the former covering some 30,000 ha. and the latter 70,000 ha. The principal crops of the Sussundenga will be dark tobacco, kenaf, castor beans, maize and legumes, while the Chimezi-Zonué will produce light tobacco primarily. Other crops will be citrus, coffee, maize, garden vegetables, wheat, peanuts, sunflowers, and silage.

289. Farms are to be of two sizes, depending on whether they are for *colonos evolucionados* (experienced settlers) or for others. *Colonos evolucionados* will receive 300 ha. of land (*média propriedade*), consisting of 100 ha. of arable land and 200 ha. of pasture. The average annual income from such a farm is expected to be 120 contos annually in contrast to the 15,000-90,000 escudos income at Limpopo. According to the *Boletim Geral do Ultramar* of December 1960, these 300 ha. farms will be awarded without distinction as to colour or race, but require a minimum knowledge of agriculture or at least the potentiality of acquiring it. Though the farms are to be mechanized, hired labour is permitted. The concessions are not considered final; and if one farmer cannot develop all his land, the undeveloped portion will be given to someone else.

290. Less experienced settlers (*colonos menos evolucionados*), primarily Africans, will receive smaller farms (of what size is not specified). It is hoped they will provide at least part of the labour requirements of the larger farms. Consideration was given also to the possibility of bringing a number of workers from Portugal to provide additional manpower. They would receive a salary, in addition to their small holdings, which would gradually be increased until they formed properties

of sufficient size to allow them to lead an independent life. African farms could also be increased in the same way.

291. Plans call for the demarcation of 120 *herdades* and 1,650 smaller holdings in the Sussundenga block and 80 *herdades* and 1,800 smaller holdings in the Chimezi-Zonué block.

292. The total number of families that have been settled under the Revuè scheme is not known. By 1961, 17 European families, comprising 83 persons, had been established there. A 1963 report mentioned that in the Sussundenga Development technical assistance was being given to 18 *colonos evolucionados* and to 1,049 Africans, and that in the Chimezi-Zonué area, 3 *colonos evolucionados*, 4 *colonos jornaleiros* (European farm workers) and 5 Africans were receiving assistance.

(c) *The Zambezi Valley settlement scheme*

293. The hydroelectric, mineral and agricultural potential of the Zambezi Valley has been under study since the early 1950's, and this study was continued under the First and Second National Development Plans. The hydroelectric work—the Cahora Bassa Dam—is expected to be started under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967.

294. According to Portuguese reports, 120,000 ha. will be opened up for use, of which 90,000 ha. are to be irrigated and 70,000 settlers are to be established there. The total area can provide 1.7 million hectares of irrigated land, and once begun, settlement is expected to take several decades to complete.

295. The main crops are to be sugar, cotton, tobacco, citrus, corn and rice. In addition, there are large stands of pine, eucalyptus, acacia and other exploitable trees. The cost of irrigation, drainage and settlement is estimated at 420,000 contos.

Government development of land for European farming concessions

296. In addition to the supervised settlement schemes described in the preceding section, government activities have also included land preparation schemes for the purpose of opening up new areas for European farming concessions. Since the mid-1950's, there has been a marked increase in this type of government activity, probably because it is less costly than the supervised settlements. The usual practice has been first to set up a special team to study the region and make recommendations as regards land utilization and settlement. Once a suitable area has been chosen, the Government issues an order reserving the land to the State. Hydrotechnical or agricultural technicians are then sent into the area to prepare the land, and finally the land is divided into plots for occupation. The following are the principal areas which have been, or are being, opened for settlement by schemes of this nature.

(a) *Maputo Valley*

297. One of the first land development schemes was in the sparsely inhabited Maputo River Valley, which is near Lourenço Marques and has very fertile soils. The area is considered to be particularly suitable for rice growing and cattle ranching. Studies of the area's potentialities were begun in 1946.

298. In 1953, 1,200 ha. were turned over to the trypanosomiasis team concerned with tsetse fly eradication (Order No. 10,119 of 12 December 1953). Later, in 1955 (Order No. 10,869 of 12 March 1955), the rest of the area was divided into over 100 plots, of which 13 were reserved for the indigenous inhabitants of the area, the remainder being available for concession to Europeans. By 1961, it was reported that the Maputo Valley was almost entirely occupied (*Boletim Geral*, March 1961, p. 200). In 1963 (Order No. 17,239 of 2 November 1963) the 1,200 ha. which had been assigned to the trypanosomiasis team was also opened for concession to Europeans.

(b) *Lower Limpopo*

299. As described below (paras. 313-325) the swap areas in the lower reaches of the Limpopo River are being reclaimed for farming by Africans, but other parts of the region, with rich alluvial soils and permanent water supplies, are considered to be suitable for intensive mechanized farming by European small-holders. About 90,000 ha. on both sides of the Limpopo River have been reserved for European occupation. The main work required is to reclaim the land by constructing drainage

canals; in addition, on the left bank of the river, which is subject to flooding, a dike is to be built, extending from Chibuto to the sea.

300. Reclamation work is to be carried out in four stages, the first three involving areas on the left bank of the river and the fourth involving the entire right bank. The four areas of development are:

- (i) The area between Vila de João Belo and Magula;
- (ii) The area between Vila de João Belo and Chelaulene;
- (iii) The remainder of the left bank of the river from Chelaulene to the sea;
- (iv) The right bank of the river from Chibuto to the sea.

301. The first area to be developed, between Vila de João Belo and Magula, consists of about 4,900 ha. close to Lake Inhamitanga. The information available does not indicate whether the development has been completed. Nevertheless, by 1961, a total of 2,500 ha. had already been conceded to Europeans and it was reported that the remainder would be divided into 23 farms of 70 to 90 ha. each and 10 farms of from 25 to 35 ha. each.

302. Subsequently, in 1963, the Government decided (Order No. 17,203 of 19 October 1963) to release only 27 plots for occupation. Of these, 2 were reserved for the use of the Lower Limpopo Agricultural Settlement Board (*Junta Autónoma de Povoamento Agrário de Baixo Limpopo*), 7 were reserved for local Africans (*vizinhos das regedorias*) and 18 were to be granted as farming concessions.

(c) Incomati Valley

303. Although the original plan for large-scale European settlement in the Incomati Valley was abandoned in 1955 (see para. 267), the success of the drainage and flood protection schemes in the lower Limpopo Valley caused the Government to adopt the same methods for reclaiming the Incomati region. In 1962, after some land had been reclaimed, the Government opened up the right bank of the Incomati River in the Sabié *circunscrição* for European farming concessions. Altogether, 116 parcels of land were laid out, varying from 75 to 400 ha. each. Of these, 15 were reserved for Government use, 5 for the establishment of commercial centres and 54 were classified as second-class land for the use of the indigenous inhabitants, leaving 39 parcels to be granted as concessions for agricultural or livestock farming.

304. In August 1963 (Order No. 17,105 of 24 August 1963), an additional area of 165 ha. on the right bank of the Incomati River, in the Manhiça *concelho*, was placed under the authority of the Provincial Settlement Board to be parcelled for occupation by the inhabitants of the *concelho*.

(d) Matola Valley

305. The Matola River runs into the Incomati River, and development of both valleys was envisaged in the original plan for settlement of the Incomati, which was abandoned in 1955.

306. In 1961 a large area, known as the Matola River allotments (*parcelamentos*), was divided into 169 lots of about 50 ha. each to be concessioned to small farmers. Of these lots, 4 were designated as leasehold (*arrendamento*) concessions for farming or livestock raising and the others as *aforamento* concessions. In 1962 (Order No. 16,260 of 13 August 1962) 9,716 ha. were reserved for persons of limited means (*economicamente débil*).

(e) Upper Limpopo region

307. In 1962 (Order No. 15,861 of 3 March 1962), 85 plots were parcelled out in the Upper Limpopo region, in the Gaza district, in sizes of 1,000 ha., 5,000 ha. and 10,000 ha., for farming and cattle raising. The concessions were to be granted with provisional titles for a maximum period of 5 years, after which the concessionaire could receive a definitive title if he had fulfilled all the requirements of minimum development under the land concession legislation (Article 98 of Decree No. 43,894 of 6 September 1961). The local government of the Gaza district was to safeguard the agricultural and pastoral rights of the indigenous inhabitants (*vizinhos das regedorias*)

in the area by demarcating their lands as class two land (see para. 49 above).

308. In October of the same year (Order No. 16,433 of 20 October 1962), the Government decided to reserve another area of 24,700 ha. between Mapai and Mepuze in the same region for a livestock experimental farm. No mention is made in this Order of the rights of the indigenous inhabitants in the area.

(f) Tea and tobacco areas

309. Following the creation of a special team (*Brigada*) to recommend areas to be reserved for tea growing settlements (see para. 269), an experimental project was set up at Gurúé comprising 10 families (9 European and 1 African). Each European family was allocated 50 ha. of which 20 ha. were for tea cultivation and the rest for food crops, pasturage and timber requirements. The African family received 4 ha. and it was hoped that other indigenous farmers would also become interested. European farmers were expected to earn an income of about 70,000 escudos a year.

310. There are no official reports on this pilot project. According to one source, however, the results were unsatisfactory, mainly because it was found necessary to furnish financial support to the farmers during the five-year waiting period between planting and the harvesting of the first crop of tea. It was therefore decided, according to the same source, that tea growing would be left to individual concession holders and companies who possessed capital, which could be supplemented by loans from the Government. Expenditure on the investigations by the special team amounted to over 14 million escudos between 1959 and 1962 and an additional appropriation of 5,000 contos was made for this purpose in 1963.

311. It was also intended at one time to establish settlements based on tobacco growing. Several thousand hectares of land in the vicinity of Ribaué and Malena (Moçambique district) and Chimoio (Manica e Sofala district), where tobacco is already being grown, were considered as potential areas for settlement. Under the Second Six-Year Development Plan, an allocation of 50,000 contos was made for investigations which are apparently still continuing, although no official reports are available.

(g) Areas reserved for future settlement

312. In addition to the areas already opened for settlement, the Government has reserved other areas and placed them under the authority of the Provincial Settlement Board or other technical bodies which are to prepare plans for their future settlement. These areas are described below.

(i) In 1962 (Order No. 16,332 of 15 September 1962) the Government reserved the entire area of Lourenço Marques district together with the Magude *circunscrição* and part of Bilene *concelho* in the Gaza district. The area was placed under the authority of the Provincial Settlement Board, which was requested to draw up plans for land utilization and settlement by the end of 1964. This measure is presumably intended to ensure the planned development of the Lourenço Marques hinterland.

(ii) In 1963 (Order No. 16,393 of 13 October 1963) the Government authorized the Brigada Técnica de Fomento e Povoamento do Revuê to draw up plans for the development and settlement of the Chimoio and Manica *concelhos*, in the highlands above the Revuê Valley settlement scheme (see para. 88). No information is yet available on the recommendations of the *Brigada* but notices in the *Boletim Oficial* during 1964 and 1965 showed that a number of concessions were being granted in these areas.

(iii) A large area in the districts of Inhambane and Manica e Sofala has been reserved and placed under the authority of the Provincial Settlement Board. The area reserved extends from latitude 21° 40' south to 20° 50' south and from 34° 00' west to the sea. The Board was required to complete and submit plans for settlement of this area by the end of 1967, failing which the area would no longer be reserved.

African rural population stabilization and settlement plans

313. As indicated above (para. 262), studies were initiated under the First National Development Plan to determine the best way to stabilize Africans on the land and to reorganize them around industrial or agricultural centres. The first schemes involved the resettlement of Africans in reclaimed swamp areas (*machongos*) in the lower river valleys or in river estuaries where the soil is fertile but not considered to be suitable for intensive mechanized European farming.

314. Drainage of the *machongos* was first undertaken in 1951 in the Lower Limpopo Valley (district of Gaza), close to the town of Vila de João Belo, some 230 km from Lourenço Marques. The first *machongo* to be cleared was the Marrângua (518 ha.), followed by the Inhamissa (1,022 ha.), the Saia (784 ha.), the Sotuiné (420 ha.), the Bué (156 ha.), and the Inhacutze (389 ha.). By 1957 a total of 3,289 ha. had been reclaimed and settled by 4,268 families.

315. Following the approval of the Second National Development Plan, which included an allocation of 100 million escudos for agricultural development and stabilization of the African population, a special team was set up to carry out the swamp reclamation work. This team (Brigada Técnica de Fomento Hidroagrícola) was instructed to draw up detailed plans for the improvement of the Lower Incomati and the Lower Limpopo, to continue the swamp drainage works in the Sul do Save and to study the possibility of reclamation of the land around Quelimane.

316. The Inhamissa *machongo*, among the first to be reclaimed, was opened to settlement in 1952. In that year, 614 African families were settled and by 1957, the last year for which information is available, the population had increased to 1,667 families.

317. Of the total area, 882 ha. are used for agriculture and 140 ha. for general purposes. The agricultural land comprises two kinds of soil: 692 ha. are pure *machongo* and 190 ha. are relatively less fertile soil, predominantly clay. Families receive either 1.5 ha. of *machongo* or 2 ha. of the less fertile land. In addition, each family receives 4 ha. in the surrounding highlands for growing food crops, such as beans, manioc and peanuts. In 1963, it was reported that allotments of farm land might be increased by 2 ha. per family.

318. Africans may live in traditional style houses or they acquire, under contract with the State, a European style house. These houses consist of two bedrooms, a combination kitchen-dining room, a large porch, bathroom with shower and a separate storage house for agricultural products. The houses were originally financed by loans from the Fundo de Algodão, repayable over fifteen years at 2½ per cent interest. For building to begin, a 5,000 escudo down payment had to be made. Repayments were at the rate of 2,617 escudos annually. By 1962, only six houses had been constructed.

319. In 1962 the loans from the Fundo de Algodão were replaced by a special government fund for housing construction (Decree Law 2,263 of 28 July 1962). Africans who acquire houses from this fund are considered to be lessees (*locatários adquirentes*) and their property is therefore inalienable. The repayment terms are the same.

320. The government agency in charge of the settlement provides seed, technical assistance and makes available agricultural equipment. It is also responsible for upkeep of the irrigation works and marketing of the produce.

321. The Government intends to organize the members of this settlement in a co-operative. In 1963 it was reported that statutes had been drawn up for the Cooperativa dos Machambeiros do Inhamissa, which would assume responsibility for administering the settlement and making it financially independent.

322. The principal crops of the settlement vary depending on whether the soil is *machongo* or clay. By practising crop rotation, rice, maize, beans, garden vegetables and bananas are grown on the former, and wheat, rice and maize on the latter. The Government estimates that the maximum value obtainable from the land is 5,625 escudos per ha. of *machongo* and 4,362 escudos per ha. of clay and that from his 4 ha. plot in the surrounding highlands an African could earn an additional in-

come of 2,700 escudos per year. It appears, however, that the actual results have been less than anticipated, for according to statistics published in 1957 by a Portuguese administrator in Mozambique, Rita Ferreira, the average annual income per family from the sale of crops was only 1,500 escudos.

323. According to Portuguese Government sources, the total cost of the Inhamissa scheme was 1.6 million escudos, or an average of 1,578 escudos per hectare of land, while the total value of crops produced from 1952-1957 averaged almost 2 million escudos annually, despite crop failures in 1953 due to flooding.

324. In addition to draining the *machongos*, the Government has been engaged in reclaiming large areas of land from infestation by the tsetse fly in order to make them safe for intensive African settlement. The work was initially financed with funds allocated under the Second National Development Plan and was concentrated in the *circunscriçãe* of Govuro (Inhambane district) with long-range plans calling for the eventual reclamation and settlement of the entire south bank of the Save River. In 1961, it was reported that several thousand square kilometres in the Mutuáli region of Moçambique district had also been cleared as well, and in 1962 plans were drawn up to clear a large region to the north of the Save River near Machanga, as well as the banks of the Púnguè River (both in the district of Manica e Sofala).

325. Detailed information is available only in respect of the progress made in the Govuro *circunscriçãe*. By 1961, large areas had been cleared of tsetse fly and the Government was already engaged in regrouping the local indigenous population into permanent settlements (*ruralatos*) and in attempting to attract new population groups from outside the area. According to a government despatch published in 1963, steps were being taken to establish a *colono* of Govuro and the Government envisaged the eventual creation of a team for the development and settlement of the Save (Brigada de Fomento de Povoamento do Save) which would develop long-range plans for the entire region.

Settlement by sugar companies

326. In 1955 the Companhia Agrícola do Búzi for the first time introduced the outgrower system into sugar production by allocating a portion of the land under its control to ten settler farmers. The extent of the land area is not known but in 1964 these ten farmers were responsible for nearly half of the company's sugar cane crop of 208,912 tons. Under the outgrower system, the farmers are presumably sub-concessionaires under contract to sell their sugar crop to the Company. Since the price of sugar and the amount to be exported to Portugal is controlled by the Government, the outgrowers as well as the companies have an assured income. In 1965, it was reported that the Búzi Company planned to instal an additional twenty settlers.

327. The example set by the Búzi Company is being followed by three new sugar companies which were established during the 1960's but which have not yet begun operations. The first of these is the Açucareira de Moçambique, which was formed in 1964 and received a 15,000 ha. concession on the Púnguè River about 35 km from Beira. The Company plans to allocate its entire concession among 150 settlers (90 of whom are expected to be Mozambique residents) with preference being given to Mozambique families experienced in sugar growing and to young ex-soldiers. Each family will receive sufficient land to produce 3,000 tons of sugar cane annually and the cost of land preparation and installation, including buildings and equipment, will be financed by the Company, to be repaid by the settler from the sale of his crop. Once repayment is complete, the land, installations and equipment will become the property of the settler.

328. According to the most recent information (May 1965) the Company had not yet completed its financial structure. It is the explicit intention of the Company to sell as many of its shares as possible in Mozambique at prices accessible to small investors. The French firm of COM.PADEC (Compagnie pour l'étude et le développement des échanges commerciaux) was reported to have expressed interest in subscribing a minority

holding but to be waiting until the Company has raised the necessary Portuguese capital.

329. The second of the recently formed sugar companies is the Marracuene Agrícola Açucareira (Marragra) which was formed by the Marracuene Agrícola e Comercial, Lda, with the aid of a loan of 220,000 contos from the Banco de Fomento Nacional and the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa. The company received a land concession of 6,000 ha. at Manhiça in the Incomati Valley. Of this total, 3,200 ha. will be cultivated by settlers already located in the area. The Provincial Settlement Board will be in charge of land drainage and the screening of applications from settlers. Sugar production is expected to begin in 1966.

330. The third company is the Portuguese Development Corporation, a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, which in 1964 obtained a concession of 100,000 ha. on the banks of the Cúcuca River in the lower valley of the Zambezi River. The concession will be the largest sugar producing area in any Territory under Portuguese administration, producing an estimated 1 million tons of sugar cane annually. Half of the concession will be allocated to 500 settlers, each receiving 100 ha., while the remaining 50,000 ha. will be exploited by the Company itself. The land to be distributed to the settlers will be prepared beforehand by the Company, which will also render technical assistance to the settlers. Sugar production is expected to begin in 1966 or 1967.

TABLE 8. MOZAMBIQUE

TOTAL AREA OF LAND CONCESSIONS BY DISTRICT AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1909, 1918, 1938 AND 1939

(In hectares)

| District | To 1909 | 1909-1918 | 1918-1938 | Total to 1939 | Reverted to the State to 1939 | Total in effect | Total conceded as percentage of total area |
|-----------------------------|---------|-----------|-----------|---------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|--|
| Lourenço Marques | | | | | | | |
| Nationals | 54,363 | 107,976 | 141,035 | 306,226 | | | |
| Aliens | 10,928 | 65,899 | 34,424 | 111,252 | | | |
| TOTAL | 65,291 | 173,875 | 175,460 | 417,480 | 44,626 | 372,853 | 4.7 |
| Inhambane | | | | | | | |
| Nationals | 3,443 | 84,434 | 54,183 | 142,246 | | | |
| Aliens | 287 | 153,832 | 29,710 | 183,829 | | | |
| TOTAL | 3,730 | 238,266 | 83,894 | 326,075 | 600 | 325,475 | 6.1 |
| Quelimane (Zambésia) | | | | | | | |
| Nationals | 44,615 | 51,523 | 196,881 | 293,476 | | | |
| Aliens | 1,173 | 680 | 24,305 | 26,159 | | | |
| TOTAL | 45,788 | 52,203 | 221,187 | 319,636 | 53,287 | 266,350 | 2.7 |
| Moçambique | | | | | | | |
| Nationals | 127 | 4,494 | 90,849 | 97,655 | | | |
| Aliens | 2 | 49,988 | 7,502 | 57,493 | | | |
| TOTAL | 129 | 54,482 | 98,351 | 155,148 | 17,373 | 137,775 | 0.7 |
| Tete | | | | | | | |
| Nationals | 4,626 | 17,557 | 14,878 | 37,601 | | | |
| Aliens | 1,000 | 86 | 1,230 | 2,316 | | | |
| TOTAL | 5,626 | 17,642 | 16,109 | 39,917 | 14,524 | 24,853 | 0.2 |
| Porto Amélia | | | | | | | |
| Nationals | 1,089 | 4,939 | 43,387 | 48,417 | | | |
| Aliens | — | 6,816 | 9,170 | 15,987 | | | |
| TOTAL | 1,089 | 11,755 | 51,558 | 64,404 | 11,851 | 52,552 | 0.7 |
| Territory Total | | | | | | | |
| Nationals | 108,262 | 270,925 | 540,217 | 925,083 | | | |
| Aliens | 13,390 | 277,302 | 106,343 | 397,038 | | | |
| TOTAL | 121,653 | 548,227 | 646,560 | 1,322,122 | 142,262 | 1,179,859 | 1.9 |

TABLE 9. MOZAMBIQUE
ANNUAL CONCESSIONS OF URBAN, SUBURBAN AND RURAL LAND (1917-1963)*

| Year | Number of concessions | Area (ha.) | Five-year total (ha.) | Year | Number of concessions | Area (ha.) | Five-year total (ha.) |
|------|-----------------------|------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------|-----------------------|
| 1917 | 115 | 25,696 | | 1941 | 56 | 14,605 | |
| 1918 | 45 | 18,093 | | 1942 | 166 | 8,924 | |
| 1919 | 61 | 55,096 | | 1943 | 128 | 12,045 | |
| 1920 | 34 | 28,434 | — | 1944 | 77 | 16,446 | |
| 1921 | 60 | 18,722 | | 1945 | 75 | 29,981 | 82,001 |
| 1922 | 44 | 24,854 | | 1946 ^a | 70 | 36,477 | |
| 1923 | 53 | 6,400 | | 1947 ^a | 104 | 72,171 | |
| 1924 | 61 | 13,537 | | 1948 ^a | 99 | 46,108 | |
| 1925 | 75 | 66,106 | 129,519 | 1949 ^a | 145 | 58,279 | |
| 1926 | 94 | 56,211 | | 1950 ^a | 114 | 50,226 | 263,261 |
| 1927 | 119 | 67,329 | | 1951 | 596 | 81,386 | |
| 1928 | 64 | 41,258 | | 1952 | 625 | 61,759 | |
| 1929 | 62 | 58,246 | | 1953 | 378 | 40,818 | |
| 1930 | 67 | 40,793 | 263,837 | 1954 | 552 | 40,892 | |
| 1931 | 65 | 55,418 | | 1955 | 636 | 51,558 | 276,413 |
| 1932 | 128 | 32,726 | | 1956 | 569 | 26,148 | |
| 1933 | 102 | 17,817 | | 1957 | 504 | 17,732 | |
| 1934 | 61 | 7,713 | | 1958 | 518 | 48,094 | |
| 1935 | 114 | 17,167 | 130,841 | 1959 | 577 | 38,375 | |
| 1936 | 73 | 4,616 | | 1960 | 691 | 50,079 | 180,428 |
| 1937 | 76 | 28,650 | | 1961 | 409 | 19,313 | |
| 1938 | 67 | 3,997 | | 1962 | 583 | 34,218 | |
| 1939 | 63 | 5,681 | | 1963 | 681 | 65,763 | |
| 1940 | 84 | 19,965 | 62,909 | | | | |

* N.B.: The total area of land under concession in any given year is not the sum of the concessions granted in previous years, since considerable areas revert to the State each year.

^a Rural land only.

TABLE 10. MOZAMBIQUE

A. ANNUAL CONCESSIONS OF RURAL LAND BY DISTRICT (1955-1963)*

(in Hectares)

| District | Area of district (ha.) | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | Total 1955-1963 ^a |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|------------------------------|
| Lourenço Marques | 1,618,400 | 12,391 | 3,847 | 1,708 | 4,531 | 13,231 | 14,819 | 7,358 | 8,012 | 6,930 | 72,827 |
| Gaza | 8,313,300 | 12,789 | 1,142 | — | 642 | 5,606 | 14,317 | 2,938 | 5,976 | 19,984 | 63,394 |
| Moçambique | 7,826,500 | 8,926 | 6,649 | 6,278 | 27,233 | 3,261 | 7,071 | 2,419 | 6,442 | 12,593 | 80,872 |
| Zambézia | 10,288,000 | 6,329 | 6,073 | 8,822 | 9,103 | 6,285 | 6,711 | 1,917 | 4,978 | 16,494 | 66,712 |
| Manica e Sofala | 12,985,400 | 3,520 | 1,234 | — | 2,922 | 2,921 | 2,883 | 1,067 | 3,550 | 1,778 | 19,875 |
| Cabo Delgado | 7,837,400 | 5,553 | 6,030 | 615 | 1,203 | 671 | 1,991 | 3,053 | 3,499 | 844 | 23,459 |
| Tete | 10,071,400 | 690 | — | — | — | — | 1,715 | 108 | 802 | 4,089 | 7,404 |
| Niassa | 12,013,500 | 50 | 807 | — | 2,022 | — | 299 | 355 | 660 | 2,746 | 6,939 |
| Inhambane | 6,847,000 | 1,005 | 45 | 10 | — | — | 10 | 3 | — | 39 | 1,112 |
| OFFICIAL TOTAL ^b | 77,800,900 ^c | 51,257 | 25,831 | 17,434 | 47,840 | 38,177 | 49,855 | 19,221 | 33,902 | 65,500 | 342,594 |

* SOURCE: *Anuário Estatístico*, chapter IX.

^a Calculated.

^b There are slight discrepancies in the officially published

totals and the added totals.

^c Excludes area of Lake Nyasa.

(Table continues)

TABLE 10. MOZAMBIQUE (continued)

B. JURIDICAL STATUS OF AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS (1959-1960)

(in thousand hectares)

| | Total area | Alodial | Aforamento | Precarious title | Provisional concession | Definitive demarcation | Provisional demarcation | Simple occupation | State reserves |
|-----------------|------------|---------|------------|------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|----------------|
| 1949-1950 | 1,308 | 355.8 | 811.4 | 0.18 | 3.1 | 9.2 | 51.7 | 40.0 | 36.5 |
| 1950-1951 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 1951-1952 | 1,318 | 368 | 843 | — | 2.6 | — | 33.5 | 36.0 | 33.3 |
| 1952-1953 | 1,364 | 397 | 844 | 0.18 | 7.8 | 2 | 32 | 46 | 34.7 |
| 1953-1954 | 1,411.5 | 404.6 | 867 | — | 11.7 | 0.8 | 30 | 58.5 | 38.8 |
| 1954-1955 | 1,430 | 404.5 | 887 | 0.2 | 15.4 | — | 38.2 | 51.2 | 30.2 |
| 1955-1956 | 1,459 | 530 | 792.2 | — | 13.2 | 0.9 | 30.5 | 54.7 | 37.7 |
| 1956-1957 | 1,475 | 373.9 | 956 | 4.5 | 44.3 | 4.7 | 17 | 38 | 36.8 |
| 1957-1958 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 1958-1959 | 1,621.5 | 395.7 | 1,056 | 2.1 | 97.4 | 1.2 | 9 | 10.0 | 49.8 |
| 1959-1960 | 1,616 | 438 | 978.7 | 2.1 | 121.96 | 0.8 | 5.8 | 8.58 | 60.1 |


C. CONCESSIONS OF RURAL LAND BY *aforamento* AND *arrendamento* (1956-1963)

| | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 |
|---------------------------------------|---------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Total number of requests | 200 | 45 | 179 | 299 | 310 | 288 | 677 | 784 |
| Total number granted | 94 | 78 | 118 | 104 | 137 | 63 | 159 | 240 |
| Total area requested (hectares) | 181,528 | 21,393 | 274,654 | 374,214 | 363,407 | 203,428 | 324,305 | 258,551 |
| Total area granted | 25,831 | 17,435 | 47,940 | 38,177 | 49,855 | 19,222 | 33,902 | 65,500 |
| Of which: | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Aforamento</i> | 8,102 | 13,424 | 31,780 | 12,905 | 18,211 | 13,196 | 16,939 | 10,904 |
| Provisional | 16,834 | 3,256 | 15,507 | 14,734 | 9,018 | 5,201 | 16,971 | 22,852 |
| <i>Arrendamento</i> | 894 | 754 | 552 | 10,537 | 22,624 | 824 | — | 31,744 |
| Average area requested | 900 | 475 | 1,500 | 1,300 | 1,200 | 706 | 480 | 330 |
| Average area granted | 250 | 224 | 400 | 380 | 360 | 305 | 210 | 270 |


D. NUMBER OF FARMS (*empresas*) AND AREA OF LAND UNDER AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATION (1955-1962)*

| District | 1955/1956 | | 1956/1957 | | 1957/1958 | | 1958/1959 | | 1960/1961 | | 1961/1962 | |
|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | Number | Hectares | Number | Hectares | Number | Hectares | Number | Hectares | Number | Hectares | Number | Hectares |
| Lourenço Marques | 313 | 121,441 | 313 | 126,728 | 310 | 143,684 | 330 | 191,284 | 302 | 183,789 | 400 | 201,439 |
| Gaza | 116 | 123,820 | 198 | 135,043 | 317 | 115,241 | 398 | 119,779 | 727 | 145,978 | 801 | 171,282 |
| Inhambane | 126 | 118,289 | 132 | 121,415 | 137 | 119,971 | 137 | 118,291 | 133 | 117,532 | 145 | 112,829 |
| Manica e Sofala . | 254 | 418,265 | 263 | 421,364 | 282 | 496,370 | 271 | 514,970 | 267 | 495,545 | 305 | 526,918 |
| Tete | 15 | 5,194 | 18 | 5,193 | 17 | 4,651 | 16 | 4,599 | 16 | 4,270 | 30 | 7,445 |
| Zambézia | 197 | 332,303 | 209 | 325,927 | 215 | 328,174 | 219 | 332,273 | 207 | 313,199 | 211 | 315,209 |
| Moçambique | 252 | 268,341 | 264 | 269,185 | 307 | 270,744 | 300 | 280,451 | 314 | 283,994 | 395 | 303,948 |
| Cabo Delgado | 70 | 57,508 | 71 | 55,113 | 69 | 52,163 | 69 | 52,489 | 74 | 47,781 | 88 | 47,448 |
| Niassa | 11 | 13,995 | 13 | 15,195 | 14 | 17,090 | 16 | 17,389 | 23 | 18,059 | 88 | 17,198 |
| TOTAL | 1,354 | 1,459,159 | 1,481 | 1,475,166 | 1,668 | 1,548,091 | 1,756 | 1,621,522 | 2,063 | 1,610,147 | 2,423 | 1,703,720 |

SOURCE: Moçambique, *Anuário Estatístico*, chap. 6.



1. The Mandated Territory of South West Africa is under the Administration of Africa.



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CHAPTER VI

ADEN

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

GENERAL

1. The Territory of Aden consists of the Colony of Aden, now known as Aden State and twenty Protectorates known as the Protectorate of South Arabia. Sixteen of the Protectorate States are joined with Aden State in the Federation of South Arabia, three having joined at the beginning of 1965. Of the four States outside the Federation, one, Upper Yafai, is in what is known as the Western Protectorate, while the other three, Q'aiti, Kathiri and Mahra, make up what is known as the Eastern Protectorate. Also included in the Territory are Perim Island, the Kuria Muria Islands and Kamaran Island. Perim Island is part of the Colony of Aden but is administered separately by the High Commissioner. The Kuria Muria Islands are also part of the Colony of Aden but are administered by the British Political Office in the Persian Gulf. Kamaran Island is not part of the Colony of Aden but is administered separately by the High Commissioner.

2. Information concerning Aden, as well as an account of action taken in respect of the Territory, is already contained in the previous reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly (see A/5446/Rev.1, chap. V; A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VI, and Annex). Supplementary information on recent political and constitutional developments and on economic, social and educational conditions is set out below.¹

POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Results of elections held in October 1964

3. Elections were held for the sixteen elected seats in the Aden Legislative Council on 16 October 1964, when 6,079 of the 8,345 registered voters went to the polls to elect sixteen members from forty-eight candidates. Mr. Zain Abdu Baharoon, the former Chief Minister was re-elected along with nine other former

members. The largest vote in any district went to Mr. Khalifa Abdulla Hasson Khalifa. Mr. Khalifa had been arrested after the grenade incident at the Aden Airport in December 1963, and at the time of the election was still detained under the emergency powers. Following the election, fourteen of the newly elected Council members informed the High Commissioner that they would not accept ministerial office unless Mr. Khalifa was released and ten of them asked that he be made Chief Minister. On 26 October, Mr. Khalifa's release was secured and Mr. Baharoon was asked by the High Commissioner to form a Government.

4. On 30 October 1964, following the nomination of the five members to complete the Legislative Council, Mr. Zain Abdu Baharoon was re-appointed Chief Minister, and on 31 October the following members of the Legislative Council were appointed as Ministers:

- Chief Minister:* Mr. Zain Abdu Baharoon
Minister of State: Mr. Hussein 'Ali Bayoomi
Minister of Public Works and Water: Mr. Hasson Ismail Khudabux Khan
Minister of Finance: Mr. Abdo Hussein Sulaiman Adhal
Minister of State for Constitutional Affairs: Mr. Saeed Hasson Sohbi
Minister for Endowment (Waqf): Mr. Saeed Hasson Maddi
Minister of Labour and Welfare: Mr. Abdul Rahim Kassim Muhammed
Minister for Local Government: Mr. Mustafa Abdilla Abdo
Minister for Lands and Antiquities: Mr. Ahmed Salem Matari

5. The new Aden Legislative Council met on 23 November 1964. At this meeting, the Chief Minister, Mr. Baharoon, was reported to have stated that his Government was determined "to push the wheel forward and, in particular, to move Aden and the South towards independence, freedom and social justice." He also said that the present Government felt that many of the country's problems could be solved only by root changes

¹The information presented in this paper has been derived from published reports, and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter, on 28 October 1964.

in the Constitution and that the next London Conference on the Federation of South Arabia would discuss the ending of colonial rule in Aden.

6. On 25 November 1964, opposition members of the Aden State Legislative Council decided to put proposals for a single parliament for the whole of South Arabia to the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Anthony Greenwood. Speaking for the Opposition, Mr. Abdul Qawi Mackawee said that this would mean a single parliament for Aden Colony and the South Arabia Protectorates, including the Protectorate States which were not members of the Federation. The parliament would be elected by universal suffrage under United Nations supervision, within two years. Meanwhile, the Aden State Legislative Council would be dissolved and a government formed from all parties after the lifting of the state of emergency, the return of political exiles and the restoration of public freedoms. The interim government's main task would be the preparation for elections. Mr. Mackawee added that the Opposition hoped Mr. Baharoon's Government would accept their proposals and make a joint approach to Mr. Greenwood.

Visit of the United Kingdom Colonial Secretary to Aden

7. On 12 November 1964, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Anthony Greenwood, made the following statement in the House of Commons:

"Now that the elections in Aden have been held and a Government has been formed there, we shall proceed as soon as possible with the further constitutional conference envisaged in paragraph 32 of the report of the South Arabian Conference held in June and July (Cmnd.2414).

"I hope to visit South Arabia later this month in order to become better acquainted with the problems of the area. I shall have talks with the political leaders and one of the matters I propose to discuss is the date of the constitutional conference. Meanwhile I am having general discussions with the High Commissioner, who is at present in this country."

8. Mr. Greenwood arrived in Aden on 26 November 1964 for a ten-day visit to study the political situation preparatory to holding a new constitutional conference. During his visit, Mr. Greenwood held meetings with Ministers of the Aden Government and of the Federation Government and with representatives of organizations in Aden such as the Peoples Socialist Party and the South Arabian League. The Colonial Secretary had talks with the ruler of Fadhli State, Sultan Nasser bin Abdullah, and members of the Fadhli Legislative Council. He also visited military installations in Aden and the frontier area.

9. At a press conference held before leaving Aden on 7 December 1964, Mr. Greenwood read a joint statement issued by the ministers of Aden and of the Federation of South Arabia. According to the statement, the Governments of the Federation and of the other States in the Federation had agreed on the following:

(a) The creation of a unitary, sovereign State comprising all the States of South Arabia and "enjoying full powers and responsibilities that are enjoyed by other unitary, sovereign States";

(b) The establishment of such a State on "a sound democratic basis and the recognition of human rights and independent equitable justice";

(c) Discussion of a sound basis for the State at the next London conference.

The sponsors of this statement said that they intended to consult the Governments still outside the Federation immediately.

10. In answering questions, the Colonial Secretary stated that the unitary state concept "was a big step forward" for South Arabia, which he attributed to a change of attitude of the Governments and parties concerned. He also said that independence had been promised not later than 1968 and that if the date could be brought forward, "that would be better". He did not think that forming a unitary State instead of a federation would delay independence. Mr. Greenwood added that he hoped the conference would take place about the first week in March 1965. He said that it was still to be decided whether all groups in Aden and the Federation would be invited to be present, but the basis of the decision at the conference "must be as representative as possible".

11. The Colonial Secretary was reported to have had "no enthusiasm" for the idea put to him by the Peoples Socialist Party in Aden for a United Nations presence in the area to supervise a preliminary election before independence and for a referendum on joining Yemen, which the party proposed. He said that supervision of an election was the responsibility not only of the United Kingdom, but also of the people of South Arabia, and that no one need doubt that an election would be conducted without interference.

12. Mr. Greenwood was also questioned concerning the British military base at Aden. He stated that the question had been raised, during his visit, of the United Kingdom paying rent for the military base, now that its intention of retaining the base had been stated at Westminster. In this connexion, it may be noted that in answer to a question in Parliament on 30 November 1964, Mr. Denis Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, speaking for the Government, said: "The Government's policy is to retain the base in agreement with the Government of the Federation of South Arabia for so long as it is required to serve the interests which we have in common."

13. On his return, the Secretary of State for the Colonies made a statement in the House of Commons on 11 December concerning his visit to Aden. Part of this statement reads as follows:

"... I made clear that the questions of independence and constitutional advance were essentially matters for free discussion and that Her Majesty's Government would not be deterred from such free discussion by the use of violence originating either within or outside the Federation.

"I also made clear that it remained the policy of Her Majesty's Government that there should be, not later than 1968, an independent Arab State in South Arabia and that the steps towards this end should be worked out in a way which would command the widest measure of support obtainable. I emphasized that Her Majesty's Government would do everything in their power to help in this.

"I was encouraged by the fact that on the last day of my visit a joint statement on constitutional objectives was issued by the Federal Supreme Council and the Aden Council of Ministers. This statement, which had my full approval, called for the creation of a unitary state on a sound democratic

basis, and for the recognition of human rights. A joint committee of Ministers of the Federal and Aden State Governments will continue to study the means of giving practical effect to these objectives in preparation for the next conference which we agreed should begin in early March."

14. Acts of violence were reported in Aden during the visit of the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies. Within forty-eight hours of his arrival, two British servicemen were killed and several injured in bomb explosions. Among the total of thirty injured were a European civilian and several Arabs. A window of the Legislative Council was destroyed by a shell fired from a bazooka. Mr. Greenwood described the bomb attacks as "brutal and useless".

15. The National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen has claimed responsibility for a number of these acts. On 24 November 1964, the party issued a statement on Mr. Greenwood's visit condemning both the British Labour and the Conservative Government's policy on Aden, and describing both the political parties and the traditional authorities in Aden as "renegades from the popular will". The statement continued:

"The Front proclaims its non-recognition of any negotiations which take place between the political parties or the Sultans and the British Government. The Front also proclaims its determination to continue the revolution until Britain yields unconditionally to the just demands of the people."

16. Speaking in Cairo before Mr. Greenwood's visit, Mr. A. Al-Asnag, on behalf of the Peoples Socialist Party, made the following statement:

"We do not refuse to meet anybody in connexion with our cause. It is clear that the British Administration in Aden hid many facts from London. It is not in the interest either of the country or the people to boycott Secretary Greenwood. What is more important than boycotting is to submit the people's demands regarding independence and stability."

Reorganization of the Supreme Council of the Federation

17. On 12 December 1964, twenty-three Adenis were appointed to represent Aden State on the Federal Council, in accordance with the terms of the merger agreement. On 16 December, four of the Aden representatives, all of whom were members of the Aden Legislative Council, were elected as ministers to the Federal Supreme Council. On 17 December, the Supreme Council was reorganized. Two of the Aden members who had previously been ministers retained their posts, namely, Mr. Abdul Rahman Girgrah, Minister for Education and Acting Minister of National Guidance and Information, and Mr. Abdullah Salem Basindawa, Minister of Finance. The two other Aden members were Mr. Ali Muhammed Lugman, Secretary-General of the Peoples Congress Party, who became Minister of Civil Aviation, and Mr. Hasson Ismail Khudabux Khan who took over as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. Sultan Faisal bin Serour al Haushabi, became Minister of State. Sheikh Husaim bin Mansour, ruler of Dathina State, was appointed Minister of State and Sultan Nasser bin Abdullah al Fadhli was reappointed Minister of Justice.

18. On 25 January 1965, Sir Richard Turnbull, formerly Governor-General in Tanganyika and who

succeeded Sir Kennedy Trevaskis as High Commissioner, arrived in Aden to take up his appointment.

Events leading to the postponement of the London Constitutional Conference

19. Mr. A. Al Asnag, President of the Peoples Socialist Party, was reported to have said on 15 February that his party's participation in the London conference would be "conditional". Mr. Al Asnag explained that his party wanted to deal with basic issues in detail before attending the conference. Therefore, he demanded a specific agenda and guarantees to enable national organizations in Aden "to convince public opinion that the London conference was not another colonialist political game".

20. A spokesman for the South Arabian League was reported to have said that a representative of the League would not attend the conference if it was between "master and servant". It supported the idea of a unitary State, however.

21. On 16 February, an article in *El Tahrir*, the National Liberation Front's bulletin, stated that the "National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen" would kill anyone attending the March London conference. It was reported that copies of *El Tahrir* had been sent to some government and public leaders in Aden.

22. On 20 February, the High Commissioner invited the Peoples Socialist Party, the United National Party, the Peoples Congress Party and the South Arabian League to nominate representatives and observers to the Conference.

23. On the same day, the Aden Legislative Council concluded a discussion of the question, in the course of which two members of the Council resigned. Opposition members were reported to have demanded a postponement of the conference to enable the Government and all political parties to agree on a common policy towards the United Kingdom. According to reports, the reason for the resignation of one of the members, Mr. Hasham Omer Ismail, was the Aden Government's insistence on attending the London conference. On 8 March, Mr. Ismail was reported as having joined the National Liberation Front in Taiz, Yemen.

24. On 21 February, sixteen States of the Federation announced that their presence at the conference would be conditional on "a full participation" of Q'aiti, Kathiri and Mahra States. The federal Foreign Minister declared that without the participation of the Eastern Aden Protectorate States the conference would be "useless". This announcement followed a meeting held in the federal capital, at which Aden State was not represented, during which the federal representatives unanimously adhered to the idea of realizing a unitary State for South Arabia on the basis of the joint statement issued in December 1964, but emphasized their unwillingness to attend the London conference unless all the Federal States, including Aden, and the Eastern Aden States as well as all political parties, were appropriately represented.

25. On the same day, the leaders of Kathiri and Q'aiti States were reported to have said that their representatives would attend the conference as observers.

26. On 23 February, talks took place between the Aden Government and the High Commissioner concerning the publication of the Aden Government's reply to the statement issued by sixteen States of

the Federation on 21 February. During these talks four ministers resigned in protest against the High Commissioner's "refusal to allow publication of Aden's reply". On the same day, the Chief Minister submitted his Government's resignation to the High Commissioner. In his letter of resignation, the Chief Minister, Mr. Baharoon, stated that the direct cause of his resignation was the High Commissioner's "objection and refusal" to allow the publication of the Aden Government's statement. Another basic issue was the present constitutional position "which was unsatisfactory". Mr. Baharoon said that, from the beginning, his Government had found that the Constitutions of the South Arabian Federation and Aden State did not conform with the hopes and aspirations of the people of Aden. Although they had always supported the idea of Aden's merger, they did not approve of the conditions and the way the merger was effected. Mr. Baharoon said that his Government had resisted the limited constitutional development proposals which did not meet its declared requirements and that it hoped for a conference which all the Governments, political parties and organizations concerned would attend as full participants, to realize unity, democracy and freedom for South Arabia. He added: "We now fear that recent developments which prevented the holding of such a conference will continue to fetter Aden with a Constitution which no one supports. Therefore I and my Government see no use in continuing in power . . .".

27. On 25 February, the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Anthony Greenwood, announced that the conference had been postponed. Mr. Greenwood said that he hoped that the questions which were supposed to be debated at the conference would meanwhile be discussed locally and that such discussions "will result in agreement that the conference shall be held at an early date".

Developments since the postponement of the Constitutional Conference

28. On 3 March 1965, the High Commissioner called upon Mr. Abdul Qawee Mackawee to be Chief Minister. The High Commissioner's action followed a letter from eleven members of the Legislative Council conveying their support of Mr. Mackawee. The new Cabinet, which was sworn in on 7 March, included five elected and two nominated members of the Legislative Council as follows:

- Mr. Abdul Qawee Mackawee (*Chief Minister*)
- Mr. Saeed Hasson Sohbi (*Minister of State for Constitutional Affairs, Labour and Immigration*)
- Mr. Saeed Hasson Maddi (*Minister for Waqf and Tourism*)
- Mr. Saeed Mohammed Hasson (*Minister for Local Government*)
- Mr. Ahmed Salem Matari (*Minister for Lands and Housing*)
- Mr. Hasson Ismail Khudabux Khan (*Minister for Works, Water and Electricity*)
- Mr. Khalifa Abdulla Hasson Khalifa (*Minister for Finance*)

Mr. Khalifa spent ten months in detention on suspicion of having thrown a bomb at Aden airport in December 1963.

29. Following the swearing-in of the new Cabinet, the Chief Minister made a statement. In this statement Mr. Mackawee said that his Government's first step would be to work for complete change of the present (Aden) Constitution into one acceptable to all. He

wanted his country freed from colonialism and to obtain for it genuine independence and unity based on democratic foundations, restoration of general liberties and termination of the era of arrests and deportation of nationalists. "Colonialists do us or our country no honour", he said, and added that the present legislature was not fully representative, the country was in a chaotic and unstable state, and the people were resentful because of the big gap separating British policy from the violent currents existing among the people. Mr. Mackawee also said: "We are not antagonistic towards anybody, but we want to do our best to clear the atmosphere and make a united effort to stand in one line to realize the people's wishes in every part of the Territory and move in line with the policy of the Arabs and Arab nationalism in which I and every Arab strongly believe".

30. On 16 March, Mr. Abdullah Al-Asnag of the Peoples Socialist Party was reported to have said that while the National Liberation Front for the Occupied South of Yemen maintains that armed struggle is the only means to be used, his party maintains that the national struggle is political and armed. When asked if he opposed the grenade-throwing in Aden, Mr. Al-Asnag replied: "We cannot stop the violence. As I explained to the High Commissioner, we cannot denounce violence until a political situation exists that is worth defending. No such situation exists now". He also added: "Britain must not wait too long; the initiative is with her. Everybody is just watching each other—the agenda for the London Conference which did not take place was so vague that the conference promised only to be a picnic. We had the unitary idea when Mr. Greenwood, Secretary of State for the Colonies, was in Aden, but some of those who declared for the idea had second thoughts soon after. There must be a starting point now, and it is for Britain to decide this and specify her needs."

31. On 17 March, Mr. Abdullah Al-Asnag, representative of the Peoples Socialist Party, Mr. Faysal Abdal-Latif, head of the National Front's political bureau, representatives of the South Arabian League and five sultans and sheikhs, among them the deposed sultans of Fadhli, Lahej and Aulaqi, issued a statement in Cairo dealing with the political situation in Aden and the Protectorates. It is reported that the statement included a demand that the United Kingdom recognize in advance their stand on topics such as the evacuation of the British base in Aden, self-determination and the agreements existing with some of the protectorate rulers. The statement is also reported to have condemned air attacks against "villages and plantations", called for a unified effort against "Imperialism in the Occupied South" and reaffirmed that a political and armed struggle should be maintained. According to another report, the participants opposed responding to any conference which might be convened by the United Kingdom, except on the basis of prior undertaking by the United Kingdom to abide by the United Nations resolutions and the humanitarian principles they set out; to evacuate the base; and to allow the people to determine their future in freedom.

32. Sir Richard Turnbull, High Commissioner in Aden, flew to London on 20 March 1965 for discussions with the Colonial Secretary. On 1 April, the Colonial Secretary gave the following reply to a question in Parliament concerning the measures being taken by the Government to negotiate a political solution to the conflict in South Arabia:

"I appreciate that it is a problem which calls for a political solution and in the course of an intensive and most useful review of the situation, I have discussed with the High Commissioner proposals designed to further political and constitutional progress in the area and to promote co-operation between the Governments of the territory and the political parties. I hope to be in a position to make a further statement before long."

33. On 30 March, the Aden Government announced its decision to repeal the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1960, which had been described by the trade unions as banning the right to strike. The Aden Trades Union Congress had never recognized this ordinance or the industrial court set up under it.

34. On 19 April, Mr. Abdul Qawee Mackawee, the Chief Minister of Aden, was reported to have made a statement in the Legislative Council calling on Britain to implement the United Nations resolutions for a political settlement of the problems of South Arabia. Mr. Mackawee said the Aden Constitution, which was drawn up in London and forced on the people of Aden, limited in a most undesirable manner the powers of the Chief Minister. He said Aden had been forced into the Federation in a manner which the people had time and again rejected, and that the British Government had also imposed on them a treaty allowing itself to give advice which could not be refused. He said:

"I must now put it on record with every confidence in my power and in the clearest possible manner . . . that my Ministers and I refuse, and shall always refuse, any kind or form of false or falsified independence.

"We are fully determined to make a firm stand in the face of any attempt to ignore the true aims of the people or any endeavour to dictate terms for an independence of the kind to which I have referred. In this stand . . . we are in full agreement with major political organizations of the country."

While warning Britain against delay in fulfilling the people's aspirations, Mr. Mackawee said that the only solution open to the British Government was to implement the United Nations resolutions under which the people could choose with complete freedom their central government and central parliament. Mr. Mackawee also said that he would be introducing the motions before the Council, one calling for implementation of the United Nations resolutions, and the other demanding the lifting of the state of emergency, restoration of public freedoms, release of political detainees and return of all political exiles.

Incidents in Aden

35. Many incidents involving the use of firearms and explosives have been reported in Aden during the last months. The National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen has claimed responsibility for many of these acts; others have been described by the Front as provocative acts committed by the British authorities themselves. Hand grenades have been thrown at British patrol cars and in places where British servicemen gather, killing some persons and injuring several others. Twice explosions occurred in buildings where British servicemen's families live. An Adeni member of the Special Branch of the Aden Police and the Arab Commissioner of Aden Prison were shot at.

Several Adenis have been killed or injured in explosions. Bazooka shells have been fired at British military depots, the Aden Legislative Council buildings, the Office of the Assistant High Commissioner, a secondary school and at the Federal Government Secretariat building at Al Itihad. Other explosions have damaged the transmission station of the Aden Radio, the transformer of an RAF base and pipelines carrying bunker oil from the refinery to the harbour.

36. It has been reported that arbitrary arrests, summary searches and other actions restricting public freedoms are still being carried out under the state of emergency. On 23 February it was reported that about sixty persons were at that time under arrest on suspicion of being members of the National Front.

37. Following a shooting incident which occurred on 30 March, a daily curfew was imposed in the Crater area of Aden. A statement was issued saying that the purpose of the curfew was to protect the public from terrorist attacks. Commenting on the curfew, Aden's Chief Minister, Mr. Abdul Qawee Mackawee, declared that "The Aden Ministers wish to make it clear that the decision to impose a curfew in the Crater was made by the High Commissioner entirely on his own responsibility. The Aden Ministers have nothing whatever to do with the imposition of the curfew or with the decision taken by the High Commissioner". On 2 April the curfew was lifted. A security official was reported to have said that no incidents occurred during the two nights the curfew was in force.

Military operations in the Territory

38. In December 1964, it was reported in the British Press that there were 2,000 British troops in Radfan and according to British officials, the majority of tribesmen in the area had made their peace and were being allowed back to attend to their land. However, incidents continue to be reported, particularly around Dhala and Mukeiras, and on 31 December 1964, a land mine exploded in the Radfan area, killing one British soldier and wounding two others. According to communiqués issued by the National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen, attacks continued to be launched against British military posts in Radfan during the months of February and March 1965. On 7 March it was reported that fighting took place at Wadi Yeramis in Fadli State between federal guards and persons wearing uniforms of the National Front.

39. It was announced on 1 March 1965 that Mr. Andre Rochat, the Delegate General of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the Yemen, had made a two-week visit to the Federation of South Arabia. It was stated that because of the inaccessible nature of the terrain the federal authorities had arranged for Mr. Rochat to fly over the Radfan area by helicopter. He was also able to see the organization of medical care in federal territory including Aden. Mr. Rochat's report on his visit was to be made to the International Committee of the Red Cross.

40. Military operations and incidents have continued along the border with Yemen. In connexion with these incidents, ten communications have been addressed to the Secretary-General between 9 December 1964 and 12 April 1965 (see S/6094, S/6105, S/6124, S/6252, S/6258, S/6259, S/6265, S/6272, S/6276 and S/6283) by the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and of Yemen.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

General

41. The port of Aden is the main centre of economic activity in the Territory. It is said to be the busiest oil-bunkering port in the world. It has a large *entrepôt* trade, and its status as a free port gives rise to a substantial trade in duty-free consumer goods. There is a large oil refinery with an annual capacity of some 6 million tons, which produces petroleum products from imported crude oil. Aden is also the site of the United Kingdom military base. In addition, the trade of the hinterland, including that of the States of the Western Protectorate and much of that of the States of the Eastern Protectorate, passes through the port of Aden.

42. Apart from economic activities connected with the port, the State of Aden produces salt for export and has a number of small manufacturing industries and a small fishing industry which serve local needs.

43. In the Protectorate, about 90 per cent of the population is said to live by farming. Production is mostly for subsistence, although cash and export crops are being developed. Livestock, mainly sheep and goats, are kept for local needs and there is a fishing industry based on Mukalla and Shihr in Q'aiti State.

Trade

44. The value of goods imported through the port of Aden in 1962 rose from £82,886,404 to £86,113,692 while the value of exports and re-exports rose from £64,920,298 to £68,770,418. It is estimated that petroleum products accounted for about 60 per cent of the total value of trade. The value of *entrepôt* trades in hides, skins, gums, grain, coffee, textiles and cotton amounted in 1962 to £16,530,000.

45. During 1963, the port of Aden was used by 6,206 ships and 1,400 dhows with a total tonnage of over 30 million tons and 133,500 tons respectively. In 1962-1963 over 3,600,000 tons of fuel oil were supplied to 4,797 bunkering at Aden.

46. The Commission appointed by the Aden Government in 1963 to examine the present and future position of the port of Aden presented its report in March 1964. It recommended that the port should be run as a commercial enterprise, free of government control over both its day-to-day activities and its long-term development and finance. The Commission also recommended that the Aden Port Trust be converted into a port authority with members drawn from the Government and users of the port, and that further modernization should be undertaken.

47. The main ports in the Protectorate are Mukalla and Shihr, in Q'aiti State. The latest figures available are for 1961 and, in that year, Mukalla handled 89 ships and 462 dhows. In the same year, the value of imports into Q'aiti State amounted to just over £2 million, while exports amounted to £276,000.

Public finance

48. Since 1951, the legal currency in both Aden and the Protectorates has been the East African shilling.² A new South Arabian currency is expected to be introduced during 1965. This will be the South Arabian dinar, which will be issued at parity with the £1 sterling and will be divided into 1,000 fils.

² Twenty East African shillings equal £1 sterling.

49. Each of the States in the Territory has its own budget. In addition, the Federal Government has its own budget.

50. The Federal Government's revenue is raised from direct taxation and duties, contributions by member States, and grants by the United Kingdom Government. Federal revenue from 1 April 1963 to 29 February 1964 amounted to £6,993,158, which included a grant from the United Kingdom of £3,949,000, £49,000 from direct taxes and £1,918,000 from indirect taxes. Expenditure for the same period amounted to £5,501,271, including £1,311,000 for the Federal Regular Army; £990,000 for the Federal Guards and £736,000 for rural and urban education and £651,000 for health. Budget estimates for 1964-1965 provide for an expenditure of £12,300,000 including contributions by the United Kingdom for development and other purposes amounting to £8,400,000.

51. The revenue of Aden State for the period 1 April 1963 to the end of February 1964 amounted to £2,830,000 of which £1,476,000 was derived from direct taxes. Expenditure for the same period was £3,061,000, the principal items being for police, pensions, public works and payments to the township authorities. Budget estimates for 1964-1965 provide for an expenditure of £3,983,000 including contributions by the United Kingdom for development and other purposes amounting to £982,000.

52. The revenue and expenditure of other States in the Federation for the year 1963-1964, including the amount of grants from the United Kingdom, are set out below:

| State ^a | United Kingdom grant-in-aid and subsidies | | |
|----------------------------------|---|-------------|---------|
| | Revenue (in pounds sterling) | Expenditure | |
| Amirate of Beihan | 54,283 | 44,500 | 54,476 |
| Upper Aulaqi Sheikhdom | 51,676 | 44,400 | 45,638 |
| Audhali Sultanate | 90,314 | 45,400 | 86,928 |
| Amirate of Dhala | 68,338 | 44,400 | 70,058 |
| Lower Yafai Sultanate | 125,317 | 40,000 | 115,515 |
| Fadhli Sultanate | 256,519 | 40,000 | 263,827 |
| Abdali Sultanate | 283,345 | 40,000 | 252,020 |
| Aqrabi Sheikhdom | 11,153 | 2,000 | 10,085 |
| Lower Aulaqi Sultanate | 50,775 | 32,200 | 49,595 |
| Dathina State | 53,955 | 28,800 | 52,780 |
| Wahidi Sultanate | 55,335 | 31,164 | 54,716 |
| Shaibi Sheikhdom | 22,879 | 14,000 | 21,835 |
| Haushabi Sultanate | 60,486 | 21,900 | 44,356 |

^a The States listed do not include the Sheikdoms of Alawi and Muflahi and the Sultanate of Upper Aulaqi, which joined the Federation in 1965.

53. The budget figures for States outside the Federation are only available for Q'aiti and Kathiri. Estimated revenue for Q'aiti for the year 1963-1964 was £794,000, of which more than half was to be raised from customs duties. Estimated expenditure amounted to £787,000, the principal items being education, £141,000; military, £121,000; armed constabulary, £99,000; public works, £87,000; and health, £54,000.

54. The estimated revenue in Kathiri for the same year was £72,000 of which £31,000 was to come from customs duties and £16,000 from United Kingdom grants and loans. Estimated expenditure was £70,000, the principal items being armed constabulary, £15,700; education, £9,400; and health, £8,500.

Development plans

55. Economic development is a federal responsibility which is exercised by the federal Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development. The Federal Government is reported to be preparing a development plan which will cover education, agriculture, fisheries, communications, health, marketing and information services. The Federation is an administering authority for Colonial Development and Welfare schemes and was allocated £1,125,000 from Colonial Development and Welfare funds for 1963-64. No details of how this money was to be spent are available.

56. It has also been reported that the United Kingdom will make grants to the Federation totalling £2,300,000 for development in the period to March 1966. No details are available.

57. British-assisted development activity outside the Federation is co-ordinated through the Eastern Aden Protectorate Development Plan, 1963-1968. This plan is financed mainly from Colonial Development and Welfare funds although the States have made contributions of from £5,000 to £10,000. Under the plan, a total of £1,090,000 has been made available. Of this, £369,712 is committed to schemes already in existence or to projects awaiting approval, £475,027 is for the continuation of existing schemes, £225,700 is for new projects, and there is an unallocated balance of some £20,000. Of the expenditure under this plan in 1963-1964, 34 per cent was for education, 18.8 per cent for health, 18.5 per cent for agriculture, 11.4 per cent for roads, and 8 per cent for co-operation and marketing.

58. In addition, Q'aiti State has its own development programme which is financed from its own resources. This programme, which was put into operation in 1961, with funds totalling £350,000, covers education, health, roads, water supply, electricity supply and fisheries. At the end of March 1964, the balance in the Q'aiti Development Fund was £167,100.

59. The administering Power has stated that the principal variation in relative expenditure in the Eastern Protectorate, as compared with previous years, is a marked increase in expenditure on education. It has also noted that substantial contributions to development are being made by the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the fields of social services, and by the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance in the economic field.

Agriculture

60. The administering Power has stated that, except in a few favoured mountainous areas in the west, crops can only be grown with the aid of irrigation. Measures to improve and modernize agriculture have been directed towards extending and improving irrigation, diversifying production, encouraging the growing of cash as well as subsistence crops, improving the marketing system and improving the quality of both crops and livestock.

61. One of the principal means of promoting agricultural development has been through the organization of farmers' co-operatives which undertake irrigation works, own and operate agricultural machinery, and organize the marketing of members' produce. Cotton was introduced as an export crop at Abyan in 1949

and in Lahej in 1954, through organizations of this kind. Five other cotton producers' associations have been established in the Federation, which, in 1962, had 8,000 members and handled a crop valued at £400,000. In 1963, the total cotton production of the Territory amounted to 37,700 bales, an increase of about 30 per cent over the previous year.

62. The growing of fruit and vegetable for sale in Aden has also been organized on a co-operative basis. Production in 1962 amounted to 15,000 tons, valued at £500,000. Among other activities designed to improve agriculture and livestock, research is being carried out on soil conditions, pest control and the improvement of animal husbandry. A pilot poultry centre was established near Mukalla in 1963.

Fisheries

63. Fishing takes place all along the southern coast but is based principally on the ports of Aden, Mukalla and Shihr. The fishing industry is increasing in importance and, in recent years, funds have been made available to promote its development. Under the Aden Development Plan, 1960-1964, assistance was given through a co-operative society, as a result of which engines have been fitted to 170 vessels, and improved gear has been introduced. In 1963, the catch landed at Aden totalled 54,465 tons. The types of fish caught include tunny, sardine, anchovy, kingfish and Indian mackerel. Supplies of other marine products such as crayfish and green turtle are also being developed. Commercial activities are reported to have increased rapidly in 1963 and international fishing companies were expected to begin operations in the area in 1964.

64. The Aden Fisheries Department has been assisted by experts provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). One expert advised on types of fishing boats and another carried out extensive work on the introduction of tunny long-line fishing. Training for fisheries staff and fishermen has also been provided locally and, under the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, at Malta.

65. Responsibility for the development of fisheries within the Federation of South Arabia is now exercised by the Federal Fisheries Department which also provides advice and assistance to the Eastern Protectorate States. The Department's budget in 1963 amounted to £35,682.

66. The United Nations Special Fund was reported to have planned to begin a fisheries development project in the Federation of South Arabia in 1964. This project would entail the analysis of oceanographical information obtained by International Indian Ocean Expedition, the chartering of Japanese long-line tunny fishing vessels for trials in the Gulf, and the establishment of a Fisheries Training School for local crews.

67. There are no local fisheries departments in the maritime States of the Eastern Protectorate, but assistance and advice is provided by a United Kingdom Fisheries Officer and by the Co-operative and Marketing Department at Mukalla. A recent survey of crayfish resources, conducted with United Nations assistance, has indicated that an annual production of 500,000 pounds could be reached within the next few years.

Mining

68. The Pan-American Hadhramaut Oil Company (a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey) has

held a twenty-year oil prospecting concession in Q'aiti and Kathiri since 1961 and in Mahra since 1962. These concessions cover 70,000 square miles. Prospecting results are reported to have been encouraging and drilling has started near Thamud, in Q'aiti.

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Labour

69. Employment opportunities exist only in Aden State where the total labour force was estimated at 78,053 in December 1963. The distribution was as follows:

| | |
|---|--------|
| Port workers | 7,487 |
| Building and construction | 12,352 |
| Industrial undertakings | 13,004 |
| Retail and wholesale trades | 10,335 |
| Government police forces and other services | 16,655 |
| Domestic servants | 17,000 |
| Miscellaneous | 1,220 |
| TOTAL | 78,053 |

70. The Ministry of Labour conducts an employment exchange which in 1963 recorded 4,944 placements, a substantial increase over the previous year. In December 1963, the number of persons registered as unemployed was 3,621. It is estimated that 60 per cent of the labour force is migrant in character, mainly from the neighbouring areas and Yemen.

71. In 1963, there were twenty registered employees' trade unions in Aden, with a total membership of 22,235. There were also five employers' organizations. In addition, there is the Aden Confederation of Employers and the Aden Trades Union Congress.

72. Labour legislation covers such matters as wages, hours, conditions and labour relations. It has recently been announced that the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1960, which had been ignored by the trade union movement and attacked politically, is to be repealed (see para. 33 above).

Public health

73. The Permanent Secretary of the federal Ministry of Health is the professional and executive head of health services in the Federation. He also advises federated and non-federated state Governments on public health matters. In general, medical services are a federal responsibility and public health and preventive services are a state responsibility.

74. In Aden State, public health and preventive services are provided by the Municipality of Aden and the two township authorities. Public health services in other States of the Federation are reported to vary from "non-existence to fairly satisfactory, the more progressive states making some efforts to improve matters".

75. In 1963, the medical and health staff of the Federation (almost exclusively located in Aden State) was as follows:

| | Government | Missions | Private | Companies |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|---------|-----------|
| Registered physicians | 44 | 4 | 16 | 12 |
| Licensed physician | 1 | | | |
| Nurses of senior training | 70 | 8 | | 24 |
| Certified nurses | 21 | | | 2 |
| Partially trained nurses | | 15 | | |
| Midwives of senior training | 45 | 8 | | 17 |
| Certified midwives | 3 | | | |
| Partially trained midwives | 2 | | | 2 |
| Health inspectors | 6 | | 5 | |
| Sanitary inspectors | 11 | | 3 | |
| Laboratory and X-ray technicians .. | 20 + 23 | in training | | |
| Pharmacists | 1 | | 9 | 6 |
| Medical auxiliaries | 401 + 17 | 14 | 7 | 117 |
| | in training | | | |

76. In Aden State, the Health Ministry maintains one general hospital (495 beds), one maternity clinic (80 beds), five dispensaries (one of which has 10 beds) and three small special hospitals (38 beds). There is also a mission hospital (40 beds) and a private hospital (124 beds). In other States of the Federation there are three rural hospitals, one in Makhzan (80 beds), one in Lodar (35 beds) and one in Lahej (40 beds). Approximately forty rural health units operate from these hospitals bringing medical assistance to the remote areas of the Federation.

77. Actual expenditure by the Federal Ministry of Health for the eleven-month period to the end of February 1964 was £651,000. Recurrent expenditure in Aden State in the previous year was £824,240, while

capital expenditure was £383,000. This expenditure represented 13.26 per cent of the total government expenditure. Expenditure on public health by the Aden Municipality for the same year amounted to £254,459, or 40.4 per cent of the total expenditure.

78. Vital statistics are available only for Aden State. Based on an estimated population in 1963 of 225,000, the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births was 86.54, while the death-rate per 1,000 was 8.40.

79. In the unfederated States, the United Kingdom Government provides advisory staff to assist the States in running their health services, and pays for a Senior Public Health Inspector, who advises on all aspects of public health work. As stated above, the Health

Ministry provides advisory medical services (see para. 73).

80. In Q'aiti, there is a Senior Medical Officer who, with four doctors runs a hospital and training centre (70 beds) at Mukalla. There are also three small district hospitals, each run by a doctor, at Shihir, Du'an and Shibani.

81. In Kathiri, the Senior Medical Officer is stationed at Saium, where a new hospital (40 beds) has recently been completed. There is also a small hospital at Tarim.

82. In these two States there are twenty rural health units staffed by locally trained health assistants. A three-year training course for health assistants is provided at Mukalla.

83. The infant mortality-rate was estimated at 50 per cent in 1963.

84. The estimated expenditure on medical and public health services for 1963-1964 was: £53,938 for Q'aiti and £8,564 for Kathiri.

EDUCATIONAL CONDITIONS

85. Responsibility for primary, intermediate and secondary education throughout the whole Federation now rests with the Federal Ministry of Education. The administering Power states that, as a result of this change, there has been no loss to the integrity of the educational system in Aden State, which had reached a much higher standard than that of the surrounding area, and that steps have been taken to improve the standards in the other States.

86. Within the Federation, in 1963, there were 161 government primary schools (26,743 pupils) and sixteen private primary schools (3,599 pupils). Intermediate standard education was provided by thirty-four government schools (7,337 pupils) and fifteen private schools (2,801 pupils).

87. In the same year, there were fifteen government secondary schools (2,289 pupils) and eight private secondary schools (1,002 pupils).

88. Estimates of expenditure by the Federation for 1963-1964 were: recurrent £1,118,700 and capital £97,000.

89. The Federal Ministry has prepared two educational development plans, one for Aden State, the other for the rural States. The plan for the rural States sets the following aims for the period 1963-1966:

(a) To increase facilities for boys' primary education by providing eighty additional schools covering the majority of the settled areas;

(b) To provide intermediate education for about 40 per cent of the primary output. This is the same percentage as before;

(c) To provide secondary places for about 25 per cent of the output of the intermediate schools. This is also the same percentage as before;

(d) To provide "A" level places and subsequent scholarships at overseas universities, for pupils of

proven ability and capacity, in accordance with the needs of the Federation;

(e) To provide additional primary and intermediate schools for girls in areas where it is known they will be successful;

(f) To provide facilities for technical and trade training.

90. The plan for the State of Aden is for the years 1964-1969 and sets the following aims:

(a) To provide adequate facilities for boys' and girls' primary education for every 7-year-old child or less;

(b) To provide sufficient accommodation at boys' and girls' intermediate schools to accept every child leaving the primary school;

(c) To increase facilities for boys' and girls' secondary education by building three secondary schools for boys and three for girls;

(d) To provide for a co-educational university college catering to a total of 240 students (including 120 boarders) and offering three-year courses leading to the degrees of Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Science;

(e) To extend the present Men's Teacher Training Centre and Women's Teacher Centre to provide for a three-year course;

(f) To build two separate schools for handicapped children to provide separately for a seven-year primary-cum-intermediate course for 280 boys and 280 girls.

91. In 1963 there were sixty-two scholarships awarded for study overseas. Of these, forty-seven were for study in the United Kingdom.

92. In the unfederated States education is the responsibility of the States. The United Kingdom maintains an Education Adviser in the Protectorate through whom it provides assistance in staffing and capital development.

93. The States seek to provide primary education for all children between the ages of eight and twelve. This aim is said to have been attained for boys in the urban and settled rural areas, but difficulties have been encountered in extending education to Beduin (nomad) children, and girls in general. There are three Beduin primary boarding schools at Mukalla, where both tuition and board are free. Four new Beduin day schools were to be opened in tribal centres during 1963 and 1964.

94. Q'aiti State provides intermediate education for 40 per cent of pupils leaving primary schools. While expansion and the attainment of higher standards is hoped for, it is stated that the present finances of the States, even with the assistance given by the United Kingdom, are unable to bear the costs of expansion.

95. The first secondary school in the Eastern Protectorate was opened at Mukalla in 1962. It has 105 students, all of whom are boys. Scholarships are provided for secondary education in the Sudan, and in Aden.

96. The number of schools, pupils and teachers in Q'aiti and Kathiri is set out below:

| | Schools | Primary | | | Teachers |
|--------------------------|-----------|---------------|--------------|---------------|------------|
| | | Pupils | | | |
| | | Male | Female | Total | |
| Government: | | | | | |
| Q'aiti | 60 | 7,200 | 1,500 | 8,700 | 168 |
| Kathiri | 4 | 793 | 207 | 1,000 | 16 |
| Government-aided: | | | | | |
| Q'aiti | 5 | 305 | 158 | 463 | 6 |
| Kathiri | 16 | 1,355 | 383 | 1,738 | 53 |
| Private: | | | | | |
| Q'aiti | 7 | 313 | 197 | 510 | 15 |
| Kathiri | 2 | 169 | — | 169 | 6 |
| TOTAL | 94 | 10,135 | 2,445 | 12,580 | 264 |

| | Schools | Intermediate | | | Teachers |
|--------------------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|
| | | Pupils | | | |
| | | Male | Female | Total | |
| Government: | | | | | |
| Q'aiti | 6 | 1,119 | 70 | 1,189 | 45 |
| Kathiri | 2 | 285 | — | 285 | 10 |
| Government-aided: | | | | | |
| Kathiri | 1 | 27 | — | 27 | 12 |
| Private: | 5 | 218 | — | 218 | 9 |
| TOTAL | 14 | 1,649 | 70 | 1,719 | 76 |

97. Most primary school buildings and equipment are regarded as inadequate. In contrast, the intermediate schools and the new secondary school are described as modern buildings, with most of the essential requirements.

98. Estimates of recurrent expenditure on education for 1963-1964 in Q'aiti amounted to £140,995 or 34 per cent of the total. In addition, capital expenditure was estimated at £1,650. In Kathiri, recurrent expenditure was estimated at £9,428.

B. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

99. The Special Committee considered the question of Aden at its 329th to 338th meetings between 27 April and 17 May 1965 and at its 370th meeting on 16 June 1965.³ The Special Committee had before it the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden (see appendix I below). The report was introduced by the representative of Cambodia speaking as Chairman of the Sub-Committee at the 329th meeting of the Special Committee on 27 April 1965.

100. By letter dated 3 May 1965 (A/AC.109/115) the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic asked to participate in the discussion of the Special Committee on the question of Aden. At its 331st meeting on 4 May 1965, the Committee decided, without objection, to grant this request.

Written petitions and hearings

101. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Aden:⁴

³ See sect. D below for an account of the discussion on Aden which took place at the 386th Meeting of the Special Committee on 16 September 1965.

⁴ See also the written petitions in sect. D of this chapter.

| Petitioner | Document No. |
|---|------------------------|
| Three petitions from the Peoples Socialist Party (PSP) and the Aden Trades Union Congress (ATUC)..... | A/AC.109/PET.183/Add.7 |
| Two petitions from the Peoples Socialist Party (PSP) and the Aden Trades Union Congress (ATUC)..... | A/AC.109/PET.183/Add.8 |
| Messrs. A. K. Farawi and Ali A. Razaak..... | A/AC.109/PET.191/Add.2 |
| Members of the Aden Legislative Council and others..... | A/AC.109/PET.201 |
| Mr. A. Q. Mackawee, member of Aden Legislative Council.. | A/AC.109/PET.201/Add.1 |
| Mr. A. Q. Mackawee, member of the Aden Legislative Council and others..... | A/AC.109/PET.201/Add.2 |
| Mr. Qahtan Shaabi on behalf of the National Liberation Front of the Occupied South of Yemen..... | A/AC.109/PET.281/Add.1 |
| Two petitions from Mr. Salah Aldebbani and others from Hadhramaut | A/AC.109/PET.293 |
| Mr. Umer A. A. Shihab, member of Aden Legislative Council | A/AC.109/PET.294 |
| Mr. Ahmed Abdulla Fadhli, Sultan of Fadhli State..... | A/AC.109/PET.295 |
| Mr. Hussein Salim Bin Rabbaa on behalf of the Peoples Demands Pursuance Committee, Hadhramaut..... | A/AC.109/PET.333 |
| Mr. Abdalla Baatwa, Secretary of the Hadhramy League of East Africa..... | A/AC.109/PET.334 |
| Mr. A. K. Farawi, Arab Unitarian Party..... | A/AC.109/PET.335 |
| Mr. Salmeen Almaargi..... | A/AC.109/PET.336 |

| Petitioner | Document No. |
|---|----------------------------|
| Mr. Omar Salem Ba-Abbad, President of the Peoples Congress in Hadhramaut..... | A/AC.109/PET.379 |
| Secretary and Members of the Dhala Peoples Association.. | A/AC.109/PET.380 |
| Two petitions from Mr. Qahtan Shaabi on behalf of the National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen..... | A/AC.109/PET.381 and Add.1 |
| Messrs. Abdo Hussein Adhal, Zain Baharoon, Salem Ahmed Naiqa and Mahmood Mohamed Suleiman | A/AC.109/PET.386 |
| "Sons of the Occupied Zone in South Arabia who immigrated to the United States of America" | A/AC.109/PET.387 |

102. At its 370th meeting, held in Addis Ababa on 16 June 1965, the Special Committee heard Mr. Qahtan Shaabi and Mr. Saif Dhalee, representatives of the National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen concerning Aden.⁵

103. Mr. Shaabi said that, at that very moment, thousands of his countrymen were being bombed out of their homes by British forces. Political detainees were being tortured and denied the right of trial and recent legislation legalized summary arrest and confiscation of property. The National Front had itself been declared a terrorist organization.

104. He outlined the history of the Territory, where British imperialism had sought to enslave the people and to drain the riches of the country, leaving it poor and ignorant, with few schools, no real hospitals and no proper roads.

105. British colonialism was determined to hold out in occupied South Yemen for the protection of its manifold interests—the exploitation of the oil, cotton and other agricultural resources; the protection of the huge and profitable oil refineries; the development of an extensive consumer market for the distribution of British products in the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa; and the maintenance of a strategic post at the mouth of the Red Sea for the protection of imperialist economic interests in Africa and parts of Asia. Aden was also one of Britain's main bases for the storage of atomic and hydrogen bombs.

106. Prior to the revolution, national resistance to colonialism had taken two forms: standard peaceful political activities in Aden and unrelated tribal movements in the emirates. The United Kingdom had resorted to various illegal means in the effort to secure its colonial position in what was a strategic area, such as bribery, the brutal suppression of democratic freedoms and the establishment of a puppet State, the so-called Federation of Southern Arabia, with which it could conclude treaties and thus give a semblance of legitimacy to its nefarious activities.

107. The nature of the 1959 Treaty with the counterfeit Federation offered clear proof of the dangerous scope of British imperialist policy in the area. It provided for the Federation to remain under British protection and conferred full powers on the United King-

dom for the conduct of foreign affairs; acceptance of its advice on any political issue was obligatory. Furthermore, the annex to the Treaty made provision for the granting of full facilities for the operation of British troops in the Territory.

108. It was thus that the United Kingdom, in collusion with the pro-imperialist sultans, sought to mask its true aims under the guise of advances toward nominal independence that were designed to palliate popular discontent and save its face at the international level. The only hope for the peoples had been to unite against British colonialism and that was how the National Front had come into being, composed originally of seven clandestine organizations and subsequently joined by three others. The Front's adoption of the policy of armed struggle to achieve its objectives had been a turning point, restoring to the despairing peoples their self-confidence and giving the necessary impetus to channel all nationalist forces into the fight.

109. At a meeting with the Sub-Committee on Aden in Cairo in June 1964, a representative of the National Front had had the opportunity to recount the story he had told above, and had defined the people's aims and demands. After exhausting peaceful means—which had merely led to the use of force by the United Kingdom, the imposition of unjust laws, deportations and imprisonment for long periods without trial—the people had been forced into a popular uprising, the armed revolution that broke out on 14 October 1963, under the leadership of the National Front. Since that time the National Front had been able to extend its scope, so that the revolution had now spread to eleven regions of the South, as well as to the military base serving the strategic and economic interests of the colonialists. The Liberation Army had been able to make great progress against the British forces and to inflict great losses on all battle fronts. In addition, political victories had been achieved both at home and abroad. On the home front, the people had been effectively mobilized, through the radio and the Press, to break up the plot to hold a constitutional conference in London on 2 March 1965, with the participation of the United Kingdom "stooges" in the counterfeit Federation and in the puppet Aden Government, together with the unrepresentative political parties of Aden that were taking no part in the revolution. At the international level, the National Front had been able to gain solid support for the people's cause, through its recognition as sole representative of the people of South Yemen by the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization.

110. British colonialism in its direct form had begun to falter before the persistent and heroic struggle of his countrymen in Aden. Hence, the recent neo-colonialist plots. But to the National Front, colonialism and neo-colonialism were but one and the same evil, to be fought until victory was achieved. The Special Committee doubtless was informed about the creation of the Aden Legislative Council and the Council of the so-called Federation both of which had made a *volte face* and were now pressing for the application of the pertinent United Nations resolutions. That political manoeuvre was being complemented by the latest United Kingdom announcement that a Commission was to visit the Territory and present a report on the situation, with a view to the drawing up of a more advanced constitution. The National Front had exposed that plot to make improper use of the United Nations resolutions which, as drafted, were inadequate to the present phase

⁵ These petitioners were heard after the Special Committee had adopted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.198) on the question of Aden at its 338th meeting on 17 May 1965.

of the struggle, since they covered but a minute part of the just demands underlying the popular revolution. Those demands were: complete political and economic liberation from colonialism for the whole of South Yemen and the off-shore islands; unconditional liquidation of the British military base in Aden and the sub-bases elsewhere in the Territory and the islands; removal of the reactionary régime of the imperialist lackey sultans; and restoration of the land and of the plundered wealth of the people.

111. To further its aims, the National Front would ask the Special Committee to bring stronger and more effective pressure to bear on the Government of the United Kingdom, to submit to the will of the people by meeting their demands, and to cease immediately all military operations against the people and in particular the massacres in the villages. The United Nations should take the initiative in offering all possible aid to the unfortunate victims, to the homeless and to the families of the martyrs and detainees.

112. In response to questions, Mr. Shaabi said that the United Kingdom had made no progress whatsoever toward carrying out the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 17 May 1965. Far from taking action to introduce independence and to liquidate the military bases, the United Kingdom was sending in more troops to Aden and the emirates, from Cyprus, West Germany and the United Kingdom itself.

113. The main military base at Aden was at present being extended, at an estimated cost according to United Kingdom sources of £11 million. Sub-bases existed in the emirates and were being secretly established on off-shore islands. He had no exact figures but would estimate the strength of the main base at 45,000 officers and men. In addition, some 10,000 troops stationed in the so-called Federation of Southern Arabia were being used against his people. Big aerodromes were being built in Aden and the emirates, to accommodate a modern air force. Furthermore, according to the British Press, Aden was regarded as a strong base of operations in nuclear weapons.

114. Accordingly, Aden, as a military base, was intended to serve as a spring-board of aggression directed against, not only his people, but the Arab, African and Russian world. The continued maintenance of that base was of no interest to his people, which had no desire to join in British aggression; hence the demand for its immediate liquidation. The base was at present being used for preparing British air attacks on the towns of the Yemen Republic, as the General Assembly had no doubt heard. Its continued existence therefore represented a dangerous threat to peace in the area.

115. The military campaigns in the Territory were by no means a novelty, but United Kingdom aggression had recently been expanded to cover the whole country. He gave particulars of the effect of the continuous bombardments carried out by the British Air Force. The fact was that there was a state of war in the Territory and claims voiced by the government of the United Kingdom that only small operations were involved to repel outside aggression were merely designed to deceive world public opinion. There was no outside intervention; the armed struggle now going on was the result of the spontaneous uprising of the people. The revolution would be maintained so long as the United Kingdom refused to recognize their legitimate demands.

116. Referring to United Nations resolutions concerning Aden, he said that it was not enough for these resolutions to speak of the desirability of removing the military base in Aden; what the National Front and the people wanted was its immediate unconditional liquidation. Secondly, no reference had been made to the sub-bases that were being established. Both those points should be covered in any subsequent resolution.

117. The National Front regarded the latest United Kingdom proposal to send a constitutional commission to the Territory as a further move to advance its plot to impose a constitution on the Territory against the people's will, following upon the failure of the earlier plan to convene a constitutional conference in London in March 1965. The commission which was to be composed of three members from the United Kingdom and two from the Commonwealth, would undoubtedly fail in its assigned task, for the National Front and the whole people were determined that any constitution for Aden would reflect their will and not the desires of the United Kingdom. Only a few sultans whose interests were bound up with the British imperialists would co-operate.

118. Mr. Dhalee, the representative of the National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen, said that, in the Protectorates, the United Kingdom was resorting to aerial bombardment to drive the people out of their villages and, men, women and children were being killed daily. In Aden itself, the British Army was applying all modern methods of torture, including the use of electricity, in order to extract information from detained nationalists. After describing some of the methods used, he went on to say that nationalists were being held in prison without trial, some for as long as nine to ten months, and all efforts to get a fair trial had been in vain. The detainees were not allowed to have food brought in from their homes, and pressure for such permission only resulted in beatings and the withholding of all nourishment; moreover, those detainees who went on a hunger strike were given no medical attention whatsoever. In answer to a further question from the Syrian representative, he said that a number of islands which had always been regarded as part of the Territory had been expressly excluded from the 1958 Aden Constitution, with the obvious purpose to keep them for use as military bases. Some smaller islands, of no importance at the moment but of potential value if they were not liberated as part of Aden, had also been excluded.

119. Referring to the United Kingdom Government's reaction to suggestions for the creation of a single State encompassing both Aden and the Protectorate, Mr. Shaabi said that the United Kingdom Government had approached the so-called ministers, the sultans and some local political parties, most political parties having been controlled by the United Kingdom since the armed revolution, but it had ignored the people on the pretext that they were revolutionary elements. The United Kingdom was trying to give the impression of working for Aden's independence. But the people had not been consulted and they were not prepared to negotiate until they were convinced of the United Kingdom's sincere intention to give them full liberty and to withdraw all military bases unconditionally. The people would continue their armed revolt until their legitimate demands had been met.

120. If the Committee could send a group to Aden to see the backwardness and misery that existed after

over 120 years under British colonial rule, they would realize the emptiness of United Kingdom promises to bring the people culture and lead them to independence. There might be a pretence at independence, but the United Kingdom did not want true economic or military independence for Aden, otherwise it would not be flooding the country with armed forces and torturing the people. The United Kingdom had hidden the facts for long enough: the time had come for the Committee, the United Nations and the whole world to know the truth.

Statements by members

121. The representative of Cambodia, speaking as Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Aden, introducing the Sub-Committee's draft report (A/AC.109/L.194 and Corr.1),⁶ stressed its concern at the extremely serious situation in Aden and the Protectorates. Although some changes had taken place, General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, had still not been implemented.

122. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had been glad of the opportunity to meet the Sub-Committee on Aden. It would comment later on the report of the Sub-Committee, which it had only just received, but at first glance there seemed to be points on which it would have some reservations to make.

123. The visit to Aden by the new Colonial Secretary, Mr. Anthony Greenwood, to which the United Kingdom delegation had referred when the Special Committee had last considered the situation in South Arabia, had taken place in November and December 1964. Mr. Greenwood had held talks with a wide section of public opinion and had travelled extensively in the area including visits to areas where aggression and subversion from across the border gave cause for serious concern. He had reaffirmed the United Kingdom Government's determination to carry out its treaty obligations to the full in South Arabia. He had also condemned the brutal, senseless and cowardly terrorism which had been taking place in Aden, but which would not deter the United Kingdom Government from encouraging free discussion on the questions of independence and constitutional advance. He had again stated the fundamental policy of the United Kingdom Government that not later than 1968 there would be an independent Arab State in South Arabia and that the steps towards that objective should be worked out in a way which would command the widest measure of support obtainable.

124. On the last day of Mr. Greenwood's visit a joint statement on constitutional objectives, calling for the creation of a unitary State on a sound democratic basis and for the recognition of human rights, had been issued by the Federal Supreme Council and the Aden Council of Ministers, with Mr. Greenwood's full approval. It had been agreed that the next constitutional conference should begin in early March and the Colonial Secretary had felt that it was important to invite not only official bodies but also political parties, in order to obtain the broadest possible agreement.

125. Upon his arrival on 25 January, the New High Commissioner, Sir Richard Turnbull, had immediately entered into discussions with the Ministers of the Federal and State Governments and leaders of the

political parties on the complex questions regarding the agenda and representation at the conference. On 21 February, the Federal Ministers had published a statement to the effect that they would not be able to attend the conference unless there could be further local consultations to work out a united front and unless representatives of all States, including the States of the Eastern Aden Protectorate, attended the conference as full participants. On 23 February the Aden State Government had resigned, stating as the reason its disagreement with the High Commissioner over a strongly worded counter-statement which some Aden Ministers had wished to issue but which the High Commissioner had thought would be inappropriate in the circumstances.

126. The Colonial Secretary had then reluctantly agreed that the conference would have to be postponed, since some participants essential for full representation were not willing to attend. One of the main tasks of the Colonial Secretary and the High Commissioner since the postponement had been to maintain the momentum of discussion on the next steps of constitutional advance. They had discussed proposals designed to further political and constitutional progress in the area and to promote co-operation between the Governments of the Territory and the political parties. Consultations on those proposals were still actively proceeding between the High Commissioner and Government, State and political leaders, and the Colonial Secretary hoped to make a further statement after their completion.

127. The United Kingdom representative felt bound to draw the Committee's attention to the continued acts of terrorism and criminal violence which had occurred in Aden and other parts of the area and which were aimed at obstructing the progress of the Federation of South Arabia to full independence. He referred in particular to the repeated attacks by armed bands from the Yemen and the recent serious situation in the Federal State of Beihan resulting from attacks by artillery and aircraft. Those attacks, which had been reported in detail in Sir Roger Jackling's letters of 22 March, 5 April and 7 April (S/6252, S/6272 and S/6276), and other acts of aggression were completely contrary to the Security Council's resolution 188 (1964) of 9 April 1964, and to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, inasmuch as they were designed to obstruct progress to independence.

128. Despite differences of view which were only natural in a country of such diversity and at a time of rapid transition, the people of South Arabia were determined to gain full independence and had already made considerable progress towards that end. It was therefore difficult for them to understand why their Arab neighbours were obstructing their progress by promoting violence, murder, threats and subversion. While such acts would not deter the inhabitants of the area from gaining independence, they meant that some of the resources of the Federation had been diverted from economic and social development to defence and security and that might well help to delay constitutional progress.

129. The general aim of the Special Committee, as he understood it, namely to bring about the earliest possible independence of South Arabia in accordance with the wishes of its people and the principle of self-determina-

⁶ For the text of the report see appendix I of this chapter.

tion, coincided with the policy of the United Kingdom Government.

130. While the delegations in the Special Committee could all state, and perhaps agree upon, the long-term aims and objectives in South Arabia, there remained the task of translating them into practical reality. The United Kingdom Government was not committed to any particular constitutional system for South Arabia, and it was surely for the people of South Arabia to decide their future system of government rather than to have a constitutional framework imposed from outside. It was to that end that the dialogue between the United Kingdom Government and the leaders of the Arab peoples in Aden and South Arabia was being carried on. There would naturally be disagreements and setbacks, but the United Kingdom was determined to follow paths which were acceptable to the largest possible majority of the people. The United Kingdom delegation looked to the United Nations for encouragement and understanding in the fulfilment of the United Kingdom's declared intention to grant independence to South Arabia by 1968.

131. The representative of Syria expressed his delegation's gratitude to the Chairman and members of the Sub-Committee on Aden, as also to the Secretariat, for the enlightening report submitted by the Sub-Committee.

132. His delegation found it disturbing that, in his statement at the previous meeting, the United Kingdom representative had slandered Aden's Arab neighbours and had failed to make constructive proposals for withdrawing United Kingdom military forces from Aden, liquidating the military base there and granting Aden immediate and unconditional independence. Instead of suggesting measures for implementing the resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly, in particular General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the United Kingdom representative had given the Committee an account of the visit made by the Colonial Secretary and had spoken of "aggression and subversive activities from across the border". He had quoted the Colonial Secretary as having referred to "brutal, senseless and cowardly terrorism" in Aden. The whole world knew, however, that military operations in the Territory were continuing unabated, that repressive measures were being enacted against political leaders and that innocent civilians were being subjected to bombings.

133. The Special Committee had been told that it was the United Kingdom's policy that there should be an independent Arab State in South Arabia by 1968. The question, however, had already been under discussion in the United Nations for several years and a further delay of three years was unacceptable to the people of Aden. The Colonial Secretary had attributed the postponement of the constitutional conference to the fact that certain persons were unwilling to attend. He had failed to mention that many of the individuals in question were either in detention or in exile, as was indicated in the Sub-Committee's report.

134. The United Kingdom representative had spoken of the exercise of self-determination by the people of Aden, but he had not told the Committee how that could be achieved. In point of fact, the people of Aden were still being denied self-determination and freedom of speech. As the United Kingdom representative himself had informed the Committee, the Aden State Government had resigned on 23 February because of the

High Commissioner's refusal to permit them to issue a certain statement.

135. In a statement at the 314th meeting, he had asked a series of questions concerning the United Kingdom's real aim in Aden, but so far there had been no reply from the United Kingdom representative.

136. His delegation had hoped that the new Labour Government of the United Kingdom would co-operate with the United Nations in granting independence to Aden, but it did not appear to be doing so. He recalled that on 17 June 1964, before becoming Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson had said that the United Kingdom would need Aden "as an essential centre for peace-keeping operations". The Labour Government was apparently adhering to that position, which was at variance with all the resolutions adopted by the Special Committee and the General Assembly.

137. Since, in his statements in the Sub-Committee on Aden and in the Committee itself, the United Kingdom representative had failed to indicate what practical steps his Government would take to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee, the Syrian delegation wished to put the following questions to him:

(1) Why had the year 1968, rather than 1965 or 1966, been chosen for the granting of independence to the Territory?

(2) What kind of constitution would emerge after a further delay of three years?

(3) What kind of independence was the United Kingdom planning to grant to the people of Aden?

(4) What was to be the basis of the unitary State to which the United Kingdom representative had referred?

(5) Could the United Kingdom representative give the Committee more details about the constitutional discussions, such as where they were being conducted, with whom, and in what context? He was certain that the Committee could tolerate no further delay, since five years had passed since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the situation in Aden was growing more critical every day.

(6) Why had the Sub-Committee's request to visit the Territory been denied?

(7) How could Mr. Wilson's statement of 17 June 1964, to which he had just referred, be reconciled with the United Kingdom Government's determination to grant independence to Aden? What had the United Nations peace-keeping operations to do with the question of Aden? Could the Prime Minister impose Aden on the United Nations as "an essential centre for peace-keeping operations"?

(8) When would the political detainees be freed and those in exile be returned to their homeland to participate in shaping its future destiny?

(9) When would the state of emergency be ended and the curfew lifted?

(10) When would the United Kingdom stop its aggression, air bombardments and military operations in Aden?

138. Those questions called for immediate replies and quick action.

139. He went on to quote certain passages from an article by a distinguished Arab scholar, Dr. Faiz Saigh, according to whom the situation in Aden was a reflection of the larger confrontation between Arab

nationalism and British imperialism. Having been ousted from Suez and other military bases, Dr. Saigh wrote, the United Kingdom was now clinging desperately to Aden as a last refuge from which to maintain its influence in the Arab world. Dr. Saigh concluded his article by saying that Arab nationalists were irreconcilably opposed to the existence of United Kingdom military bases on their soil because those bases were an infringement of Arab national sovereignty and were used for aggression against Arab countries, to support reactionary local Arab régimes and to place the Arab world in the United Kingdom's "sphere of influence" and thus involve it in that country's international conflicts and alignments. Dr. Saigh's article reflected the views of the Syrian delegation.

140. His delegation would vote in favour of the adoption of the Sub-Committee's report since it found the report constructive, factual and practical and unreservedly supported its finding and conclusions.

141. He drew attention to the latest developments in Aden, as reported in recent Press dispatches. According to the 27 April issue of *The Times* of London, members of the Aden Legislative Council had expressed suspicion that the British were behind terrorist activities in Aden, and the Council had adopted a motion requesting the High Commissioner to end the state of emergency, release all detainees, permit the return of exiles and restore full public freedom. Mr. Abdul Qawee Mackawee, the Chief Minister, had stated that there could be no peace or stability without a settlement in accordance with the United Nations resolutions and without an end to provocations against the Yemeni Republic and to the aid being given to the Yemeni royalists. According to a Reuters dispatch of 28 April, Mr. Mackawee had called for independence from the United Kingdom and negotiations on the future of the United Kingdom military base at Aden. He had said that Aden no longer had faith in the United Kingdom and he had called for the establishment of a provisional government to negotiate a date for the granting of independence and to arrange for the transfer of power from the colonial Administration. He had also said that a constitutional conference would be of no use at the present time.

142. His delegation felt that, in view of the critical nature of the situation in Aden, the Committee should adopt a resolution calling for the following:

(a) Immediate and full implementation by the United Kingdom Government of all the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee;

(b) Immediate ending of the state of emergency;

(c) Immediate lifting of the curfew;

(d) Cessation of all military and naval operations against the people of Aden and the Protectorates;

(e) Immediate repeal of all laws restricting public freedom;

(f) Advancement of the date of independence;

(g) An early invitation from the United Kingdom Government to the Sub-Committee on Aden to visit the Territory;

(h) Immediate dismantlement of all military and naval bases and withdrawal of all United Kingdom armed forces;

(i) Drawing the Security Council's attention to the critical and explosive situation in the Territory;

(j) Assistance by Member States, the United Nations, the specialized agencies and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent to the civilian population, which had suffered as a result of the military operations;

(k) Constant review of the question by the Sub-Committee on Aden, which would report, as necessary, on any new developments in the Territory.

143. The representative of the United Arab Republic thanked the Special Committee for having granted his request, on behalf of his Government, to address it on the question of Aden. The concern of the United Arab Republic at the unfortunate situation in Aden and the Aden Protectorates had been constantly expressed, both in and outside the United Nations, and its sole purpose in participating in the Committee's deliberations was to contribute to a solution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The United Arab Republic had always followed with great interest the Committee's efforts to fulfil its noble mandate of bringing colonial peoples to independence and had helped in the General Assembly to formulate decisions based on the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee.

144. He would like first to submit a few observations on the discharge by the administering Power of its responsibilities under Article 73 e of the Charter. The United Kingdom Government continued to submit information to the Secretary-General on Aden but had never submitted information on Aden Protectorates, and the Special Committee was only in a position to discuss the situation in the Protectorate because of the existence of a federation comprising Aden itself.

145. General Assembly resolutions 742 (VIII) and 1541 (XV) gave clear definitions of a Non-Self-Governing Territory, and under its mandate the Special Committee was required to study the situation in all Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories. He therefore considered that it was time the Special Committee drew up a comprehensive list of all Territories to which the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applied, so that the people of those Territories could know what was their status and what kind of relations they could enter into with independent countries.

146. With regard to the Special Committee's degree of participation and responsibility in the process whereby Non-Self-Governing Territories developed towards self-government, he wondered whether the populations of those Territories were participating actively in that process. Whereas certain administering Powers accepted observation, and sometimes supervision, of the plebiscites held in the Territories under their administration, others did not even accept a visit by a sub-committee of the Special Committee. It was hard to understand why in certain situations the administering Power was unable to convene a constitutional conference, while in a different situation the same Power imposed agreements, conventions and sometimes constitutions without a proper consultation. Surely all the administering Powers should be guided by the same principles in administering Non-Self-Governing Territories. It was that inconsistency and the systematic flouting by the administering Power of the recommendations of the Special Committee and the General Assembly that accounted for its continuing failure to solve the problem.

147. The failure of the United Kingdom Government to settle the question of Aden was clearly demonstrated

in its resort to the use of force in the Radfan Mountains area. After brutal attacks against the defenceless population, United Kingdom troops had searched the villages and camps for the tribesmen, but had found them completely deserted, their former inhabitants fearing to be murdered by the Power that pretended to protect them. Nothing had been found to substantiate the slanderous claim that those tribesmen were receiving arms and ammunition from abroad.

148. According to a Minister of the so-called Federation of South Arabia, the reasons for the unrest in Radfan were purely economic and a reflection of the widespread dissatisfaction with prevailing conditions. Furthermore, a touchy political issue involving the plans of the former High Commissioner in Aden lay behind the unrest.

149. As the former Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, had conceded in the House of Commons, there had been a long history of resentment and rebellion in that area. Following its seizure of the Port of Aden in 1839, the United Kingdom had occupied the country by force and has continued to remain there by the use of force. The United Kingdom policy in Aden was the fragmentation of the territory and its isolation from the Arab world. Realizing that it could neither stay forever by the use of force nor withstand the overwhelming force of Arab nationalism, the United Kingdom had created a fictitious Federation and in March 1963 had forced Aden to accede to that Federation without any consultation of the people of Aden or of the Aden Protectorate.

150. The question of Aden and the Aden Protectorate had been under constant consideration by the United Nations since 1962, when a number of petitioners had addressed themselves to the Special Committee. In resolutions adopted in May and July 1963, the Special Committee had expressed its deep concern at the critical situation in the Territory as a result of the denial of political rights and the detention of nationalist leaders—a situation that continued to deteriorate and was likely to threaten international peace and security.

151. Following its adoption of resolution 1949 (XVIII), the General Assembly had, on 16 December 1963, adopted resolution 1972 (XVIII) expressing its concern at the situation resulting from the declared state of emergency and at the arrests, detentions and deportations, which constituted a denial of fundamental rights and endangered peace and security in the region. In the two resolutions adopted by the Special Committee on 9 April and 11 May 1964 (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VI, paras. 166 and 202), the Committee had again expressed its deep concern at the continued deterioration of the situation and had reaffirmed that the maintenance of the military base in Aden was prejudicial to peace and security and that its removal was therefore desirable.

152. Despite all those recommendations and resolutions, the Security Council resolution 188 (1964) of 9 April 1964, the United Kingdom Government continued to deploy its forces in Aden and the Aden Protectorate, and even outside the borders, and was pursuing dangerous policies at a time when great efforts were being exerted to lessen international tension. The present United Kingdom Government, like its predecessor, continued to defy United Nations resolutions, as well as the appeals of the League of Arab States and

the Second Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries.

153. World indignation at the policies of suppression in Aden and the Aden Protectorate had been shared by public opinion in the United Kingdom. In a letter published in the *Daily Telegraph* of 9 May 1964, Mr. Bertrand Russell had stated that the attempt to drum up war hysteria in South Arabia was no contribution to peace or to the British national interest and that the sensible thing would be to assist those who would eventually form a government of the population and to contribute to economic welfare in the area, in the interests of peace and international co-operation. He had added that attempts on the part of Western Powers to dominate or undermine the economic and political development of the Afro-Asian world would only result in authoritarianism, suffering and instability.

154. Surely, the United Kingdom Government did not believe that a fake federation would survive and that it could guarantee the functioning of a military base surrounded by hostile peoples.

155. The demands of the overwhelming majority of the population, which had been made abundantly clear on several occasions, were the following: an immediate end to colonial rule; dissolution of the Federation, through which the United Kingdom controlled internal and external affairs, and separated the South from the Northern Yemen; supervised elections or plebiscite with a United Nations presence during a transitional period; evacuation of the military base and other military installations; and unification of the area.

156. The failure of United Kingdom policy in Aden and Aden Protectorate had been clearly demonstrated by various resignations of ministers, the boycott of elections by popular organizations and political parties, and the withdrawal from the constitutional conference convened for June 1964 of the very people whom the United Kingdom had thought would be co-operative but who had found its plans untenable and were now among the strongest of its critics.

157. The situation seemed to have entered a new phase since Mr. Mackawee had become Chief Minister. It was significant that twelve opposition members of the South Arabian Federation Council had given outspoken support to the Chief Minister in his warning to the United Kingdom not to delay the fulfilment of his people's aspirations to independence and his demand for implementation of the United Nations resolutions concerning Aden. Furthermore, a spokesman for the National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen had stated that the Chief Minister's demands coincided with those of the Front. For the first time, therefore, there appeared to be a really "legitimate" opposition to the United Kingdom plans.

158. The non-committal statement of the United Kingdom Colonial Office that its Government wanted to start talks on the future status of South Arabia as quickly as possible did not constitute any advance. The crux of the matter was whether the United Kingdom was willing to allow the area self-determination. The refusal to admit United Nations bodies into the area raised suspicions about the United Kingdom attitude and made it doubtful whether opposition views would be given sufficient expression or consideration at the talks proposed by the United Kingdom.

159. There was no indication that any change had taken place in the British conception of independence,

which embodied only nominal independence while maintaining the area under British influence. Self-determination was the only answer.

160. The United Arab Republic delegation recommended that the Special Committee should again request the United Kingdom Government to implement General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII). It would be necessary for the Special Committee, through its Sub-Committee, to enter into immediate talks with the United Kingdom Government and perhaps fix a target date for their conclusion, when the question could again be considered by the Special Committee. The Special Committee might also deem it necessary to draw the attention of the Security Council to the conditions in the territory, in order to avoid any further deterioration of the situation. The United Kingdom must evacuate its military base in Aden, which was maintained only for aggressive purposes. The situation in that area was ample proof of the dangers created by the presence of foreign military bases. There was no need to convince the members of the Special Committee that the arguments of the United Kingdom Government for maintaining military bases in Aden and elsewhere were unfounded.

161. The representative of Iraq said that the situation in Aden, instead of improving as had been hoped, seemed to be deteriorating. The people were living in intolerable conditions as a result of the continuance of the state of emergency, the suppression of individual freedom, and mass detentions. Yet the people of Aden were more determined than ever to achieve their national goals. A declaration by the principal nationalist organizations and leaders had recently been published in Cairo, in which they had called for the immediate implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Aden. The Chief Minister of Aden had made the same demand in his statement before the Legislative Council, quoted in paragraph 22 of the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden (see appendix I below), where reference was made also to a cable sent to the United Kingdom Colonial Secretary by the Ministers of Aden likewise requesting the implementation of United Nations resolutions.

162. His delegation had hoped that the statement of the United Kingdom representative (see paras. 122-130 above) would be such as to allay the Committee's fears. That statement had, however, been negative in nature. The border incidents on which the United Kingdom representative had dwelt were irrelevant to the Committee's work and outside its terms of reference. With regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the United Kingdom representative's statement that it was his Government's intention to grant independence to the territory by 1968 seemed to lack a sense of urgency.

163. Past United Nations resolutions had called on the administering Power to arrange for the early removal of the military base in Aden, to guarantee basic freedoms, to effect constitutional changes with a view to the establishment of a representative legislative body and of a provisional government, and to co-operate in arranging for a United Nations presence during the elections held for that purpose. Those just demands had now been reiterated by the Chief Minister of Aden. In a cable published by *The Times* of London, the Chief Minister had called for the removal of the base and had asked for an impartial body to be sent by the

United Nations, composed of people from countries without interests in the area, to be present before and during elections based on universal adult suffrage. On the arrival of that body, the United Kingdom should dissolve the Aden and South Arabian federal legislative bodies and abolish the Aden and federal Constitutions, the 1959 Treaty of Friendship and Protection and all similar treaties. The United Kingdom High Commissioner should surrender his supreme power and withdraw all political officers and advisers. A provisional government should then be set up, composed of persons acceptable to all groups. That government, to be guided by an interim constitution, should be in office for only one year, during which it should prepare for and conduct elections for a central parliament. The parliament's first task would be to set up a committee, including Arab legal experts, to prepare a constitution.

164. It was also a matter of concern that the administering Power had not allowed the Sub-Committee on Aden to enter the Territory, obliging it to go to neighbouring countries to hear petitioners. The only possible conclusion was that the administering Power was determined that the world should not know the facts.

165. The deterioration of the situation in Aden was evidenced by petitions and telegrams received by the Special Committee and reports which had appeared in the United Kingdom's own Press. The state of emergency, the curfew, military operations and the detention of patriotic elements of the population had become permanent aspects of Aden life. The only solution lay in the speedy implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII). His delegation appealed to the administering Power to respect the wishes of the people of Aden and Southern Arabia, whose welfare and independence was a matter of concern to the Arab peoples and to all freedom-loving peoples of the world, who would continue to support the struggle for freedom in Southern Arabia.

166. The representative of Ethiopia congratulated the Sub-Committee on Aden on its report on the situation in the Territory. The report showed that, although some progress had been made, the situation was still far from satisfactory.

167. The progress made included the administering Power's acceptance of the concept of a unitary sovereign State comprising all the States of South Arabia, the Aden Government's repeal on 30 March 1965 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, which had seriously interfered with workers' rights, and the visit to the Territory by a representative of the International Red Cross.

168. Unfortunately, despite those few signs of goodwill on the part of the administering Power, the fact remained that United Nations resolutions on Aden were still not being implemented. He deplored, *inter alia*, the postponement of the constitutional conference that was to have been held in London in March 1965, the continuation of the state of emergency, which was helping to create a chaotic situation in Aden State, and the continuation of military operations against the people of the Territory.

169. The Sub-Committee's report gave a very clear picture of the situation and it was now the task of the Special Committee to make recommendations which would facilitate the implementation of the General Assembly's decisions.

170. Recalling his delegation's position on the question, he observed that the problem was to transfer power to the people in accordance with the relevant resolutions, namely, General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII). Hence, even at the present late stage, the United Kingdom should be urged once again to comply with those resolutions and to repeal the laws which restricted public freedoms, to release political prisoners, to allow the return of political exiles and to cease forthwith all repressive action against the people. It should also be urged to convene without delay a constitutional conference at which all segments of public opinion in the Territory were represented.

171. His delegation was prepared to take part in working out recommendations along those lines.

172. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the reason the Special Committee was obliged to resume its consideration of the question of the United Kingdom possessions in Aden and South Arabia was that the administering Power, by continuing the state of emergency, banning political parties and trade unions, depriving the people of their elementary rights and employing terror and arbitrary methods, showed that it was unwilling to give up its rule over the Arab population, a rule which served only the administering Power's own interests. The United Kingdom's refusal to carry out the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee had aroused the indignation of the Arab people and had forced them to take up arms. The situation had deteriorated so greatly that it had become explosive. Yet the statements made by the leaders of the British Labour Party before and immediately after the Party's accession to power had aroused high hopes. For example, Mr. Gordon-Walker, the former Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, had stated that his Government was prepared to establish better relations with the Arab countries and Arab nationalists. Unfortunately, subsequent events had shown that those statements had been made only for propaganda purposes and to win votes for the Labour Party. The new United Kingdom Government was continuing its predecessor's policy and was doing nothing to implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII), in particular; the political prisoners had not been released, the exiles had not been allowed to return to their country, repressive action had not ceased, the laws restricting freedom had not been repealed and the state of emergency had not been terminated. The United Kingdom Government had refused the Sub-Committee on Aden permission to visit the Territory and it not only refused to dismantle its military base but was, in fact, strengthening it. The situation was very tense and constituted a threat to international peace and security.

173. In his statement at the 329th meeting of the Special Committee on 27 April 1965, the United Kingdom representative had set forth his Government's policy in Aden. That statement which had been as disappointing as those made by his predecessors, had been a veritable defence of colonialist policy. The United Kingdom representative had held the Arabs responsible for the criminal acts committed by the United Kingdom authorities, had not stated what his Government intended to do in order to implement General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) and had not made a single specific new proposal. He had merely sought to convince the Committee that his Government, in its efforts to find a solution to the constitutional problem and to

enable the Territory to attain independence in 1968 within the framework of a unitary State, was meeting with opposition from the Arabs. The critical situation in the Territory, he had contended, was caused by the policy of the neighbouring Arab States and the Arab nationalists, who were carrying out acts of sabotage and terror. The United Kingdom representative had made vague promises about independence for the peoples of Aden and about their right of self-determination, but he had not said a word about the powers to be exercised by the future unitary State.

174. The purpose of all that was clear: the United Kingdom was seeking a new type of colonial rule which would permit it to maintain its hegemony in the area. The London Government was said to be making plans to lease the military base at Aden. He recalled in that connexion the United Kingdom Prime Minister's statement on 16 December 1964 that his Government could not give up its world role "east of Suez" and therefore needed all its bases. That policy was not new; it had been inherited from the Conservative Government and was supported by the bankers of the City of London. It was prompted by economic and military considerations: the aim was to protect the interests of the oil companies, Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum, in that region. Moreover, since the evacuation of Suez, Aden had become an important link in the chain of United Kingdom military bases and was being used, *inter alia*, as a relay station for United Kingdom troops on their way to Malaysia. Everyone knew the purpose of those military bases: it was from the United Kingdom island of Ascension that Belgian paratroopers had left in United States aircraft to fight the Congolese rebels at Stanleyville.

175. The United Kingdom representative's efforts to demonstrate the usefulness of establishing a unitary State were deceiving no one and the United Kingdom's policy continued to be based on the old principle of "divide and rule". Despite the manoeuvres being made for the purpose of placating them, the Arab inhabitants were demanding the right of self-determination. The Chief Minister of Aden had rejected the pseudo-independence that the United Kingdom was trying to impose on his country; he had just stated that the constitutional conference to be held in London would be of no use at the present time, and, like the Aden Legislative Council, he was demanding the implementation of the United Nations resolutions and the immediate granting of independence. While there was therefore no question that Aden and South Arabia would attain independence, the price they would have to pay for it depended essentially on the United Kingdom.

176. The Special Committee, for its part, should assist the Arab inhabitants in their fight for independence by demanding that the United Kingdom should withdraw its forces from the Territory and liquidate its military base, and condemning the United Kingdom's present policy urging that the resolutions of the Committee and the General Assembly should be put into effect. The only possible solution to the question of Aden lay in the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

177. His delegation felt that the Committee should request the Security Council to consider the question of the threat to peace and security resulting from the policy of violence and arbitrary action which the administering Power was pursuing in Aden and the Pro-

tectorates. It would support any proposal designed to liquidate colonial rule in Aden and South Arabia.

178. The representative of Yugoslavia recalled that his delegation had stated on a number of occasions that the immediate and unconditional elimination of the last remnants of colonialism was one of the major problems of the day and that its solution was an essential prerequisite to the stabilization of international relations and the maintenance of peace. The solution of the problem must, however, be in accord with the spirit of the Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; it must, in other words, fully respect the rights and interests of the people of the territories in question.

179. The people of Aden and the Protectorates had been fighting for freedom and independence for a long time and had the support of world public opinion. His own country hoped that they would soon join the Arab community and other sovereign peoples in freedom and independence. If the administering Power, the United Kingdom, had taken the aspirations and interests of the indigenous population into account and had implemented the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Committee would not have had to consider the question of Aden.

180. The United Kingdom representative had indeed stated, at the 329th meeting, that "the general aim of the Special Committee, namely to bring about the earliest possible independence of South Arabia in accordance with the wishes of its people and the principle of self-determination, coincided with the policy of the United Kingdom Government", which "was determined to follow paths which were acceptable to the largest possible majority of the people". The facts were, however, quite different, and the situation in Aden must still be regarded as very serious. In the conclusions to its report (see appendix I, para. 25), the Sub-Committee on Aden had deplored the fact that the resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly, in particular General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII), were still not being implemented by the administering Power and that the state of emergency had not been lifted and many of the laws restricting public freedom were still in effect. The Sub-Committee had also noted with concern that the policies being pursued by the administering Power in the Territory continued to give rise to tension in the area, that the United Kingdom was still carrying out military operations against the people of the Territory and that its decision to maintain its military base in Aden added to the aggravation of the state of tension. That was why the Sub-Committee considered that the situation in the area was still critical and even explosive and should be closely followed so that if necessary it could be drawn to the attention of the Security Council (*ibid.*, para. 26).

181. The Aden Ministers and Legislative Council were of the same opinion as the Sub-Committee on Aden. On 19 April 1965, the Chief Minister of Aden had asked the United Kingdom to implement the resolutions of the United Nations and thereby achieve a political settlement of the problems of South Arabia. He had asked for the lifting of the state of emergency, the release of all prisoners, the return of exiles and the full restoration of public freedoms. The United Kingdom alone, he had said, held the key to peace and must realize that there could be no peace or stability until the question had been settled in accordance with

the resolutions of the General Assembly and until the provocations against the Yemen Republic caused by supplying aid to the Yemeni Royalists had been ended. For its part, the Congress of the National Organizations of the Arabian South, which had been held recently at Cairo, had expressed its disapproval of United Kingdom policy in the Territory and had asked for the immediate implementation of the General Assembly resolutions. Furthermore, the many petitions received from the Territory expressed, without exception, the same desire and criticized the United Kingdom's policy.

182. The statement made by the representative of the administering Power with regard to its policy and the way in which that policy was implemented in the Territory did not, however, coincide. It seemed clear that the present United Kingdom Government was continuing to operate according to the colonialist principles which had characterized the policy of its predecessors. It was difficult to see what practical effects could be expected from that policy so long as the indigenous population was not free to express itself on the question of its future or so long as the curfew and the state of emergency were not lifted, repressive military actions were being taken and the United Kingdom insisted on retaining its military bases. That policy was, in fact, diametrically opposed to the wishes of the people and contrary to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII), which, according to the United Kingdom representative, formed the basis of his Government's policy in the area.

183. Any attempt to blame the Yemen Republic and other Arab States for the present situation in Aden and the Protectorates was unjustified, since the situation had been provoked by the United Kingdom's colonial policy, a policy opposed by the people of the Territory who were seeking to obtain freedom and independence without further delay. The administering Power, which continued to defer the granting of independence to Aden and the Protectorates and the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions, was alone responsible. The continuation of the present situation in the Territory and the delay in solving a problem which was becoming ever more acute were a direct threat to the security of the Yemen Republic and neighbouring States. The administering Power's insistence on retaining the Aden base also gave rise to doubts about its intentions. The United Kingdom representative had stated that his country had hoped that it could count on the encouragement and understanding of the United Nations. It could do so, provided that it showed a genuine readiness to join the United Nations in achieving a rapid solution to the question of Aden and the Protectorates in the interests of the people of the Territory. For his delegation, as for the Sub-Committee on Aden, there was only one solution: the immediate and full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and of the resolutions of the General Assembly. The measures set forth in those resolutions were in accord with the wishes of the people and political parties of the Territory and took their interests into account; they were also likely to promote the future relations between the United Kingdom and the Arab world. His delegation would support any proposal based on this principle.

184. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania congratulated the Sub-Committee on Aden on its interesting report but noted with regret that the

statements of the United Kingdom representative had contributed nothing substantially new. The administering Power was trying to divert attention from the real issue by making accusations about subversive activities and incursions into the Territory of Aden. Such accusations were not new; they had been made in Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea with the aim of transforming those Territories into military states and their people into slaves. It was a fact that the people of Aden were struggling to regain their independence and that, despite all the excuses of the administering Power, history was on their side.

185. In any event, the situation in Aden had deteriorated. The United Kingdom representative was trying to absolve his country from responsibility for the disorders in the Territory resulting from the colonialist methods used there. In paragraph 19 of its report (see appendix I below), the Sub-Committee on Aden had noted "that the United Kingdom continues to carry out military operations against the people of the Territory". However, no military force would prevent the people of Aden from triumphing in their struggle for independence; examples of that kind abounded all over the world.

186. The United Kingdom representative had told the Special Committee that his Government intended "to grant independence to South Arabia by 1968", ostensibly through negotiations. It might therefore be asked why so many nationalists struggling for freedom had been imprisoned or exiled and why a state of emergency had been imposed. The United Kingdom representative had added that his Government wanted to bring about the earliest possible independence of South Arabia "in accordance with the wishes of its people and the principle of self-determination". The question then was why the Government in power in Aden had warned the United Kingdom against delay in fulfilling the people's aspirations and had emphasized that the only solution open to the United Kingdom Government was to implement the United Nations resolutions. The United Kingdom representative had said that his Government did not intend to impose a particular constitutional system on South Arabia. The question in that case was why it was imposing colonial domination, which no people could accept. The United Kingdom representative had also said that his Government looked to the United Nations for encouragement and understanding. There again it might be asked why it had refused and was still refusing to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and would not allow the Sub-Committee on Aden to visit the Territory.

187. In the view of his delegation, the Special Committee should seek to prevail upon the United Kingdom Government to lift the state of emergency and repeal the laws restricting the freedom of the individual, to release all the political prisoners and amnesty all exiles, to cease all military and paramilitary activities in the region, to allow the Sub-Committee on Aden to visit the Territory and, above all, to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, particularly General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII).

188. His delegation fully endorsed the conclusions of the Sub-Committee on Aden and hoped that through the understanding of the United Kingdom Government the heroic people of South Arabia would at last be able to enjoy the fruits of their labour and to devote

all their efforts to national reconstruction and progress, in freedom and sovereignty and with the co-operation of all other countries.

189. The representative of Mali congratulated the members of the Sub-Committee on Aden and the Secretariat on the excellent report they had submitted on the situation in Aden, which constituted a permanent threat to neighbouring States.

190. As it had already said in the Special Committee and the General Assembly, Mali considered that Aden and the Protectorates were Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter and that the responsibilities of the United Kingdom towards the inhabitants of those Territories were those defined in that chapter. The situation in Aden and the Protectorates not only had all the appearances of the classical type of colonialism but was also a source of tension throughout the region, particularly along the border with Yemen. Mali, therefore, appreciated the concern of the Arab countries in that region over the existence of a sizable United Kingdom military base in Aden, and it shared their feelings about its removal. Unfortunately, the Labour Government had announced that it intended to keep the base as long as possible, thus showing that it paid no heed to the opinion of the countries of the region or to the resolutions of the Special Committee.

191. His delegation deplored the refusal of the United Kingdom to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to allow the Sub-Committee on Aden to go to the Territory. The United Kingdom sought to justify its presence by the need to protect the people of South Arabia, but the military operations mentioned in the Sub-Committee's report were incompatible with defence of the interests of the indigenous population, who desired independence. Although the United Kingdom Government seemed to have accepted the idea of a unitary State being set up in South Arabia, it had not yet taken any steps in that direction and was, on the contrary, trying to preserve its régime in Aden with the support of ignorant and corrupt tribal chiefs who cared little about the country's economic and social development. The constitutional conference scheduled for 1965 had not been held, and it was not known when and in what conditions it would be able to take place. The political leaders and exiled patriots were therefore forced to resort to violence. The need for the United Kingdom Government to take steps to combat what it called subversion in the country proved, as was also apparent from the evidence gathered by the Sub-Committee on Aden, that its presence was becoming increasingly unpopular. The leaders of the country themselves, including the Chief Minister of Aden, were demanding that the administering Power should implement the resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly.

192. The United Kingdom was intimating that it would grant independence to Aden and the Protectorates in 1968. Mali, for its part, asked the United Kingdom to do so without delay and with no conditions or reservations, in accordance with the wishes of the people, and, to that end, to convene a conference for the purpose of drafting a new constitution, to remove its base from Aden, to restore all individual freedoms and to make all the sheikhdoms into a genuine unitary State with a representative Parliament and Government.

193. His delegation endorsed the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden and appealed to the United Kingdom to implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII), in co-operation with the United Nations. The United Kingdom could bring the people of South Arabia something other than oppression. Sincere co-operation, based not on the exploitation of one country by another but on justice and friendship and on equality and fraternity among States, could and should exist in the region.

194. The representative of Tunisia congratulated the Sub-Committee on Aden on its excellent report and recommended that it should be adopted by the Committee. He nevertheless regretted that, five years after the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the situation in Aden was still giving rise to concern and was endangering the security of the region.

195. Although the changes in the United Kingdom administration had given the people of Aden new hope for speedy liberation, the profound aspirations of the people of South Arabia for freedom and independence were still being ignored. The population was still being denied fundamental rights and freedoms; the army ruled supreme; the repression and persecution of political leaders and nationalist movements were continuing; and thousands of persons were in prison awaiting trial.

196. Not only had the state of emergency not been lifted since 1962, but fresh measures, including the curfew, had recently been taken to enable the army and the police to go about their business unobserved. In addition, twenty-five villages in the Dhala district had been destroyed by United Kingdom aircraft, and further reinforcements of troops and *matériel* were being landed. Such actions and military preparations, combined with the repression and destruction of the population, were extremely alarming because they indicated that the United Kingdom Government intended to perpetuate its presence by force. That was particularly surprising as the new United Kingdom administration might have been expected to pursue a more realistic policy in harmony with the resolutions of the United Nations and the legitimate aspirations of the inhabitants of Aden for sovereignty and independence.

197. His delegation protested against the campaign of terror being waged against the people of South Arabia and strongly denounced the manoeuvres of the administering Power to delay the achievement of independence by Aden and the Protectorates. Any further delay was unjustifiable not only because it was contrary to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the wishes of the population but also because there had never before been better conditions for transferring to a people the responsibility for its future.

198. On 7 December 1964, the Governments of the Federation and of the States belonging to it had agreed to establish a sovereign unitary State of South Arabia on a sound democratic basis. On 19 April 1965, the Chief Minister of Aden had called on the United Kingdom to implement the United Nations resolutions in order to achieve a political settlement of the problems of South Arabia, and he had added that his Government was determined to make a firm stand in the face of any attempt to ignore the true aims of the people, and that it was in full agreement with major political organizations of the country.

199. While all conditions had been fulfilled for hastening the Territory's liberation, the administering Power's reluctance to satisfy the people's aspirations to sovereignty was only too evident. Its pretexts for delay only proved its wish to put obstacles in the way of decolonization. The Committee should be distrustful of manoeuvres intended to sidetrack the debate, and it should turn a deaf ear to the arguments of the administering Power, which cited the alleged designs of an expansionist neighbour of South Arabia only in order to conceal the true problem. It must not be forgotten that the administering Power's essential task was to hasten the enslaved people's liberation and to lead them without delay to their independence. Any arguments that were irrelevant to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII) should be put out of mind.

200. In view of the gravity of the situation, his delegation appealed to the administering Power to give up its dilatory manoeuvres, to carry out the General Assembly resolutions on Aden without delay and to take prompt and practical steps to restore to the people of South Arabia their most legitimate rights of sovereignty and freedom. His delegation would support any action taken with those ends in view.

201. The representative of Chile expressed his delegation's concern at the fact that although the question of Aden had been on the Special Committee's agenda for the last three years, no genuine progress had been made in the Territory.

202. Chile considered that the Sub-Committee's recommendations were pertinent and in keeping with the facts of the situation. The United Kingdom should apply to the Territory the provisions of resolution 1949 (XVIII), and to that end should restore all political and public liberties, stop persecuting the leaders of the Territory, release political detainees and put an end to military operations. When those conditions were fulfilled, it should convene a constitutional conference and hold elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

203. The United Kingdom had announced its intention of granting independence to Aden in 1968; but the Chilean delegation hoped that sufficient progress would be made and that the Territory would be able to achieve complete independence before that date.

204. Chile appealed to the United Kingdom Government to carry out the terms of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII), in co-operation with the Special Committee, and in that way to contribute to the birth of another free and sovereign nation. His delegation would support any proposal aimed at giving the inhabitants of South Arabia the free exercise of all their rights.

205. The representative of Italy congratulated the members of the Sub-Committee on Aden for having presented, in their brief report, a complete picture of a complex and constantly changing situation.

206. In his opinion, four recent developments indicated an improvement in the situation.

207. First, the agreement concluded by the Ministers of Aden and of the Federation of South Arabia and approved by the United Kingdom Government provided for the establishment, on a sound democratic basis, of a sovereign unitary State comprising all the States of South Arabia. That decision was consistent with the spirit and letter of General Assembly reso-

lution 1949 (XVIII), and was encouraging in that it indicated that the Committee's resolutions were not a dead letter, as might sometimes be felt.

208. The second sign of change was the United Kingdom Government's renewed assurance that independence would be granted to a unified State of South Arabia not later than 1968, and that, according to the United Kingdom Colonial Secretary's statement of 11 December 1964, steps would be worked out so as to command the widest measure of support.

209. Thirdly, Mr. Abdul Qawee Mackawee, Chief Minister of Aden, had recently pledged to make a firm stand in the face of any attempt to ignore the true aims of the people. His stand would reassure those who might have feared that the local authorities in Aden and the Federation did not truly represent public opinion in the Territory.

210. Finally, the decision to repeal the Industrial Relations Ordinance was also a move in the right direction, since its aim was to restore the atmosphere of *détente* necessary for the Territory's peaceful progress towards self-determination and independence.

211. It was in the light of those positive elements that the negative elements of the situation, namely, the difficulties which had delayed the convening of a constitutional conference, should be assessed. While sharing the Sub-Committee's view that the administering Power had shown an apparent willingness to widen the representation at the conference, his delegation had not been able to determine precisely the viewpoints of the various political parties in the Territory on that subject. He would only point out that the murder threats published in a newspaper against persons attending the London conference indicated a disturbing division of public opinion as to the best way of moving towards independence and as to the nature and structure of the future independent State. Such a division of opinion was a matter for serious concern, not only because it manifested itself in violent forms, but also because it might delay the granting of independence to the Territory.

212. In the light of those considerations, his delegation considered that the Committee should urge the political parties to settle their differences and agree on the essentials of a common policy for independence. That would make a constitutional conference possible. At the same time, the Committee should appeal to the United Kingdom Government to do its utmost to convene such a conference at an early date and to facilitate the acceptance by the various sectors of the population of a policy which would command the widest possible support. His delegation would support any resolution along those lines, since the Territory's early and peaceful attainment of independence would depend on the response received to those appeals.

213. The representative of the United Kingdom, in a further statement, welcomed the moderation and restraint of the language used in the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden. His delegation did not believe that provocative language would serve the common cause—namely, the search for a peaceful and acceptable solution to the problems of South Arabia—and his aim in making his statement was to see those problems set in the right perspective in the light of the facts. With that aim in view, there was a great deal in the report which his delegation could not accept: aspects of the situation had been misrepresented, facts of crucial importance had been omitted altogether, and effects

had been described and lamented without any reference to their causes.

214. With regard to paragraph 16 of the Sub-Committee's report (see appendix I below), dealing with the question of a unitary state for South Arabia, he had made it clear in an earlier statement (see para. 130 above) that the United Kingdom Government was not committed to any particular constitutional system for South Arabia. His Government would continue to be guided by the wishes of the people of South Arabia and by the principle that whatever solution was adopted should have the widest possible measure of support.

215. His Government's clearly stated policy on the question of the military base in Aden, referred to in paragraph 17 of the Sub-Committee's report, was to retain the base, in agreement with the Government of the Federation of South Arabia, for so long as it was required to serve the common interests of the two Governments. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had made it clear that the security of a base depended on the willingness with which it was accepted by the local population. His Government accordingly intended that the eventual arrangements for the base should be negotiated between the United Kingdom Government and the Government of the new State at the time when South Arabia became independent; that was not a matter for Aden State alone.

216. The essence of the problem in South Arabia was to establish the basic relationship between the wishes and views of the people of the area and a form of representative government able to speak for the majority of the people governed. The constitutional conference planned for March 1965 had been postponed, as reported in paragraph 18 of the Sub-Committee's report, because there was not yet a sufficient consensus in South Arabia about the form of government desired by the people of the Territory. There was a wide measure of agreement about the objectives and long-term constitutional aims, but not on the practical problems involved: qualification for citizenship and for the vote, distribution of powers between the centre and the subordinate units, and so on. His Government shared the Sub-Committee's disappointment and regret at the necessity of postponing the conference, but the delay would not be long and steps were already being taken to speed up constitutional advance.

217. His delegation regretted that the Sub-Committee had once more seen fit to refer, in paragraph 19, to United Kingdom military operations without once referring to the events and activities which had made those operations necessary. Some of those were described in the Secretariat working paper (see paras. 1-98 above). Again, in paragraph 20 of its report, the Sub-Committee on Aden expressed deep concern that the state of emergency and the laws restricting public freedoms were still in force, but made no reference whatsoever to the factors which made such restrictions necessary. Those factors fell into three categories: the situation on the borders of the Federation; incitement to violence from outside the Federation; and acts of terrorism within the Federation.

218. With regard to the situation on the borders of the Federation, he had little to add to his previous statement (see para. 127 above); his Government and the Government of the Federation of South Arabia had done everything possible to respect and implement the Security Council resolution 188 (1964), of 9 April 1964, but the parties concerned outside the Federation

had made no positive response to that resolution or to the constructive proposals put forward by his Government in pursuance of it.

219. As to incitement from outside, inflammatory and provocative broadcasts had been made from Cairo, Sanaa and Baghdad, urging the people of the Federation to engage in acts of violence, to take up arms, and to murder not only British soldiers and officials but their fellow Arabs as well. He quoted one such broadcast which suggested that independence gained by sane and civilized discussion and conciliation was worthless, and that the only genuine independence was won by bloodshed, violence and suffering. His delegation could not believe that such a philosophy was acceptable to the Committee or compatible with United Nations principles or purposes. In marked contrast to those appeals for violence, the United Kingdom Colonial Secretary, in a statement on 2 May 1965, had declared that no British territory had to fight for its independence. He had condemned terrorism as foolish and pointless, and had called for calm and rational discussion and negotiation. In that connexion, the representative of the United Arab Republic had stated that nothing had been found to substantiate the claim that tribesmen in the Radfan Mountains area were receiving arms and ammunition from abroad (see para. 147 above). The facts, unfortunately, were very different. Since early 1963, the United Arab Republic authorities in Yemen had supplied money and war *matériel* to dissident tribesmen of the Federation of South Arabia and had encouraged them to carry out raids on the Federation from Yemen. Groups of Egyptian Intelligence Service Officers had been installed in border towns and had undertaken the recruitment, training and supply of terrorists. The United Arab Republic had organized and supplied the Radfan revolt in 1964 and had tried unsuccessfully to start similar revolts elsewhere. Hundreds of tribesmen had been enticed into Yemen, where they had been provided with weapons and trained in their use. Arms and ammunition manufactured in the United Arab Republic had been captured by Federal and British forces. The widespread terrorist activities in the Federation were designed, not to force the United Kingdom to grant early independence, but to obstruct South Arabia's peaceful development and progress towards independence. The suggestion that the people of South Arabia were waging a national struggle for freedom, on their own initiative and by their own decision, was false. There had of course been political dispute and dissension, but very few local leaders of any standing had been prepared to associate themselves with the campaign of violence. He cited a number of incidents involving aid by the United Arab Republic to armed rebellion in South Arabia and emphasized that there was plenty of evidence, supported by photographs, to substantiate everything his delegation had said about subversion and aggression from outside the Federation.

220. In the light of the facts, it was hardly surprising that emergency restrictions were found to be necessary or that defensive military action by the Federal Army, and by United Kingdom forces in support, had been needed to preserve the integrity of the country and the safety of its inhabitants. To describe such operations, as the Sub-Committee on Aden had done, as repressive action against the people was therefore false and misleading. The Sub-Committee had called for the ending of the state of emergency and of military operations, and the lifting of all associated restrictions;

the prerequisite for those highly desirable measures was the ending of violence and lawlessness. The Special Committee could help by making it clear that it did not condone or approve of violence from any quarter but favoured a peaceful solution by discussion and negotiation in accordance with United Nations principles and General Assembly resolutions.

221. To judge from paragraphs 20 and 22 of its report (see appendix I below), the Sub-Committee on Aden seemed unaware that questions of security affecting the whole of South Arabia were not the exclusive concern of Aden Ministers. Such questions were subject to the authority of the federal Government, under the over-all responsibility of the United Kingdom Government. The Chief Minister of Aden was concerned with matters within the competence of Aden State; his authority did not extend beyond it. Allegations had been made concerning restrictions on freedom of political expression and activity in Aden; the very fact that the Chief Minister had been able to make policy statements of the kind mentioned in paragraph 22, which did not represent the policy of the United Kingdom Government or of the Federal Government of South Arabia demonstrated the falsity of those allegations. The United Kingdom delegation did not consider that the state of emergency unduly hampered political freedom in Aden. The minimal restrictions imposed, under the emergency regulations, for the protection of ordinary people in their every-day lives were kept under constant review and would not be unnecessarily maintained.

222. He welcomed the references in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden to the decision to repeal the Industrial Relations Ordinance and to the visit by a representative of the International Red Cross. The repeal decision had been taken by Aden Ministers, not by the Aden Government. The United Kingdom Government and the High Commissioner agreed in principle with the repeal of that law, provided that there was proper prior consultation with both sides of industry and that legislation was passed to retain the necessary elements of the existing law, such as those relating to the safeguarding of essential services. According to information published by the International Red Cross on 25 March 1965, its representative had observed that a large proportion of the patients of the federal medical service in the Radfan area were Yemenis, who received free medical care and surgical treatment in the same way as the local population. The International Committee for the Red Cross had made it clear that its representative had been given abundant assistance during his visit to South Arabia.

223. A number of charges had been made in Aden, and reported in *The Times*, about the activities of British troops and other authorities. These charges, which had been quoted in the Committee, were inaccurate and tendentious. There was no martial law in Aden. Necessary arrests were made by the civil police, not by British soldiers. The suggestions that British troops or agents threw grenades and went about disguised as Arabs should be rejected with contempt.

224. According to the representative of the United Arab Republic (see para. 144 above), the United Kingdom Government had never transmitted information, under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter, in respect of the Aden Protectorates; but in fact that information had always been transmitted and that

for 1963 was entitled *A Handbook of the Federation and Protectorates of South Arabia prepared in accordance with Article 73 c of the United Nations Charter*, which covered the whole area of South Arabia in respect of which his Government had responsibility for the transmission of information under Chapter XI of the Charter. Indeed, his Government voluntarily went beyond the requirements of the Charter by supplying information on political and constitutional matters in the Territories under United Kingdom administration.

225. The Colonial Secretary had just announced the appointment of a commission to consider, after consultation with the Governments and peoples of South Arabia, the constitutional structure appropriate for a sovereign independent South Arabian State and the necessary interim constitutional arrangements leading to its introduction, and to make recommendations. His Government was convinced that such a commission represented the best means of maintaining and accelerating progress towards the peaceful solution of the various problems which remained to be settled before South Arabia achieved full independence not later than 1968. The Colonial Secretary's proposals were in no way incompatible with the basic constitutional objectives of the United Nations resolutions, and he was confident that they would be generally welcomed by the Special Committee as clear evidence of his Government's determination to secure full independence for South Arabia without delay.

226. The representative of Denmark complimented the Sub-Committee on Aden on having produced an instructive report; however, his delegation disagreed with some of the points made, especially in the conclusions.

227. As decolonization progressed, the proportion of hard-core cases among the Territories discussed in the Special Committee increased; he was therefore happy to learn from the Sub-Committee's report that progress had been made on some vital points in Aden and South Arabia as a whole. First of all, a new and broadly based Government had been formed in Aden. The statements of the Chief Minister, Mr. Mackawee, showed that he and his Government were in a position to take an independent view of the problem now facing Aden and the surrounding territories. Secondly, there was now full agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Ministers of Aden and the Federation of South Arabia that the formation of a unitary State was the goal. According to Mr. Mackawee, his Government's first step in that direction was to set about transforming the present Constitution into one acceptable to all. The United Kingdom Government's statements that independence would be granted in 1968, or if possible earlier, were encouraging; it was to be hoped that a constitutional conference would be convened in the near future and that its composition would be truly representative, so that no major political group or legitimate interest would be excluded and no one invited would obstruct the conference by not participating. In his delegation's view, the cessation of all acts of violence in the area and the lifting of the state of emergency would facilitate the convening of such a conference and make for a positive outcome. The repeal of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and the visit by a representative of the International Red Cross were steps in the right direction.

228. All members of the Committee would doubtless agree with him that the military activity in the area should be brought to an end and that all concerned should do their utmost to make that possible. Any resolution adopted on the subject by the Special Committee should take into account operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Security Council resolution 188 (1964) of 9 April 1964, in order to ensure that the resolution reflected the duties of all parties.

229. The Sub-Committee on Aden had been very pessimistic in the conclusions of its report, and particularly in paragraphs 25, 26, 27 and 29 (see appendix I below). In his delegation's view, considerable political progress had been made, the situation as a whole had not deteriorated, and there was no reason why the political improvement should not influence conditions in the area, given the goodwill of all concerned. He welcomed the United Kingdom representative's announcement that a new Commission was to be formed to investigate conditions on the spot, and he wished the Commission every success. Any resolution on Aden should take into account the positive features of the situation and should encourage the parties to continue, extend and further harmonize their efforts with the constitutional conference as the first objective with independence as the ultimate aim.

230. The representative of Poland said that Aden had been under colonial administration for more than a hundred years; the United Nations had now reached its twentieth anniversary and five years had passed since the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Yet the administering Power intended to postpone granting independence to Aden and the Protectorates until some time in the distant future, in plain disregard of paragraph 3 of the Declaration.

231. The report of the Sub-Committee on Aden left the administering Power no pretext for any delay in granting independence. The view that Aden was ready for independence was supported by John C. Campbell in his book *Defence of the Middle East*. The real reason for the delay, as Bertrand Russell had pointed out, was a matter of "cynical control of people and countries for purposes alien to their requirements". The tragic situation in Aden and the Protectorates was the result of the administering Power's policy of strangling the independence movement. The people of Aden demanded independence and were fighting for it; that fact was confirmed by the Sub-Committee's report and by the United Kingdom representative's statements at the 312th and 329th meetings. However, neither of those statements had explained how the administering Power intended to fulfil the legitimate aspirations of the people and why the grant of independence was being delayed. Instead, the United Kingdom representative had asked the United Nations for encouragement and understanding in the fulfilment of its professed intention to grant independence to South Arabia. There was abundant encouragement in the petitions, circulated by the United Nations, from people representing various social groups and political parties; in the statement by the Chief Minister of Aden that Britain should implement General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII); and in the Declaration adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo, from 5 to 10 October 1964 (A/5763), condemning the continued refusal of the United Kingdom Government to

implement the United Nations resolutions on Aden and the Protectorates. There would be no lack of support and assistance from the Special Committee for the immediate implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII).

232. The main obstacle to self-determination in Aden was the United Kingdom's determination to perpetuate its domination of the Territory as long as possible in order to preserve and safeguard its economic and strategic interests. That aim had been clearly indicated by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on 1 April 1965. The Prime Minister had admitted that a military base could be held only with the agreement of the Government of the country concerned, but the United Kingdom Government was not putting that policy into practice.

233. The only way to solve the problem of Aden was to secure the speedy implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII). His delegation considered the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee on Aden to be constructive, and it fully endorsed and supported them as it would any resolution drawn up on similar lines. It hoped that, if such a resolution was adopted, the administering Power would comply with it so that the people of Aden and the Protectorates might attain independence as soon as possible.

234. He shared the hope expressed by Bertrand Russell that the United Kingdom would not intrigue to foster internal dissension and communal rioting, and that no more people would be slaughtered to preserve oppression and appalling neglect in South Arabia.

235. The representative of Syria, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, noted with interest that the United Kingdom Government intended to establish a Commission to visit Aden. However, the ineffectiveness of similar commissions in Palestine and elsewhere had shown that such an approach was of little value nowadays. If the United Kingdom was sincere in its intention, the new Commission would do well to heed the advice given by Professor Arnold Toynbee in the October 1964 issue of *International Affairs*; namely, that quick action was needed in the area, and that the members of the League of Arab States should be consulted.

236. The United Kingdom had failed to justify to the Special Committee the existence of the military base in Aden. Many delegations had spoken, in the Committee and elsewhere, against the maintenance of military bases in foreign territory. According to Professor Toynbee, it was certain that South Arabia was soon to be evacuated; Arab disunity could not be counted on, and no purpose was served by waiting to be turned out of Aden and Bahrein; it was therefore better to go quietly and to go quickly.

237. The representative of the United Arab Republic, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that, with regard to the allegations made by the United Kingdom representative that his country was inciting tribesmen to violence and supplying them with *matériel* for rebellion, the Special Committee should bear in mind the true situation in the area. The fact was that a war of liberation was in progress, and the Arab people were entitled to every assistance in their struggle for freedom.

238. The United Kingdom representative had stated at an earlier meeting that the general aim of the Special

Committee coincided with the policy of the United Kingdom Government. Unfortunately, the facts belied that contention. The creation of the Federation of South Arabia in 1959 had conformed to the colonialist pattern of imposing treaties on territories and shaping their future without regard to the wishes of the population. In June 1964, the Sub-Committee on Aden had issued a very clear statement (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VI, annex, appendix III, A) regarding the Constitutional Conference convened by the United Kingdom, drawing the attention of the administering Power to the unrepresentative nature of the Conference and urging it to widen representation or postpone the Conference. Despite that appeal, the Conference had taken place without the participation of the main political parties and other organizations in the Territory, and had reached conclusions contrary to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the population.

239. The present United Kingdom Government had planned another constitutional conference for March 1965, but the conference had been postponed for reasons which were well known. The Government of Aden had resigned as a result of the High Commissioner's refusal to allow publication of a Minister's reply to a previous statement; yet the United Kingdom representative still maintained that there was full freedom of speech in the Territory.

240. The United Kingdom representative had told the Special Committee that his Government's policy was to retain the military base in Aden, in agreement with the Government of the Federation of South Arabia, for so long as it was required to serve the common interests of the two Governments. It was noteworthy that the base was retained in agreement with the Government of the Federation, and not the Government of Aden, in whose territory the base was situated. The retention of the base was linked with the existence of the Federation, and in no way accorded with the aspirations of the people.

241. Every time the question of the supply of information to the Committee was raised, the United Kingdom representative said that consultations were still actively proceeding and nothing more could be said at that stage. It was difficult to understand that lack of co-operation. The truth was that the political developments imposed on the area were contrary to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) and to the Special Committee's recommendations. The promotion of political advancement in Non-Self-Governing Territories, which was the obligation of the administering Power, had to be accompanied by economic development, the furtherance of democracy, orderly change and social advancement. None of those features was in evidence in Aden. A petitioner in 1963 had vividly outlined the tragic lack of educational, social, legal and other facilities in the Territory after more than a century of colonial rule.

242. The United Kingdom Press, at least, was frank about the military base in Aden. Three recent articles in *The Economist* had questioned the value of retaining the base, particularly if the United Kingdom-United States plan for a common base in the Indian Ocean was put into effect. The *U. S. News & World Report* had stated on 10 May that the United States was proceeding with the plan to establish a base on Diego Garcia in the Mauritius Group. It was therefore clear that independence in the Territory depended on changes in

strategic military plans, and that the United Kingdom Government considered its base in Aden more important than its obligations to the population.

243. It was now going to the length of enlisting United States support for actions which had been deplored by the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, putting all the blame for the situation on the nationalist leaders, and requesting encouragement and understanding from the United Nations. He was at a loss to understand what more encouragement and understanding could be expected than those nationalist leaders and the United Nations had already given, for their approach was based on the Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The nationalist leaders were not alone in their struggle, and in giving them effective support the Arab world was merely fulfilling its obligation to its Arab brothers in their fight for freedom.

244. The United Kingdom representative had said that, by supplying political information, his Government went beyond its obligations under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter. The only item concerning political advancement that had ever been forthcoming was the announcement of the creation of the Federation of South Arabia in 1959. There were two possible explanations: either there had been no political advancement or, if there had been any, no information regarding it had been supplied.

245. The representative of India said that his delegation, which had participated in the discussions on Aden both in the Special Committee and in the Fourth Committee and had co-sponsored all resolutions relating to the Territory, regretted to have to state once again that the situation had not improved and that General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII) had not yet been implemented by the administering Power. He thanked the Chairman and members of the Sub-Committee on Aden for their report, with which his delegation was in general agreement.

246. The Indian delegation had hoped to hear from the United Kingdom representative of the political and constitutional advancement of the Territory towards independence, but had been disappointed in that expectation. The situation in Aden was disquieting, and violence and political restlessness were increasing. *The Times* of London of 27 April had reported a speech by Mr. Mackawee, the Chief Minister, in the Aden Legislative Council, in which he had said that the United Kingdom had failed to preserve law and order in spite of restrictions and curbing of freedom, that anarchy had increased and that the critical situation required a political solution acceptable to all, not a state of emergency which had deprived people of whatever meagre democratic life they had had. The Indian delegation felt that tension could not be reduced unless the administering Power made a determined effort to implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII). Mutual trust and the restoration of normal conditions in the Territory were essential and they could be achieved if the administering Power heeded the words of the Chilean representative, who had said that it should restore all political and public liberties, stop persecuting the leaders of the Territory, release political detainees and put an end to military operations (see para. 202 above). Colonialism was a discredited creed and the use of force to sustain it was of no assistance.

247. His delegation, which was aware of the complex and difficult situation which the United Kingdom faced in many of its colonial Territories, had been interested in the visit of the Colonial Secretary to Aden in November 1964 and the visits of two United Kingdom Ministers which had followed. The optimism to which the visits had given rise, however, had evaporated with the postponement of the London conference which had been scheduled for March 1965. No new date for the conference had yet been announced, although Mr. Mackawee had made it abundantly clear that he wanted General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) to be implemented.

248. Unlike the United Kingdom Ministers, the Sub-Committee on Aden had been unable to visit the Territory. In his statement of 27 April, the United Kingdom representative had referred to the dialogue going on between the United Kingdom Government and the leaders of the Arab peoples in Aden and South Arabia (see para. 130 above). It would help all concerned if the Sub-Committee on Aden participated in those discussions and was invited to visit Aden. Many members of the Special Committee felt that the Sub-Committee on Aden could give the United Kingdom Government useful assistance in its difficult task of preparing the Territory for independence in conditions of political stability and peace.

249. The Indian delegation welcomed the announcement by the United Kingdom that independence would be granted not later than 1968 but, while it realized that that did not rule out the possibility of an earlier attainment of independence, it felt that the setting of such a distant date was likely to increase the difficulties of the United Kingdom Government and of the people of Aden. The Chief Minister of Aden had recently stated clearly that his Government refused any kind of false independence and would take a firm stand against any attempt to ignore the true aims of the people.

250. He had been interested in the announcement by the United Kingdom representative that a commission was to be appointed to visit South Arabia and that it might include some members from countries other than the United Kingdom (see para. 225 above). He had no intention of prejudging the functions of the commission but would like to stress that it should start its work without delay. The membership of the commission should therefore be announced as soon as possible and he hoped that the Sub-Committee on Aden would be invited to assist the commission in its work. If the commission proved really effective it would be welcomed, but if it functioned in a dilatory manner it would discredit itself in the eyes of the people of South Arabia and of all those who wished to see the end of colonialism.

251. In conclusion, he thanked the representative of the United Arab Republic for the useful information given in his statement of 5 May (see paras. 143-160 above). The Indian delegation, too, appealed to the United Kingdom Government to take urgent steps to implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII).

252. The representative of Iran said that the discussions in the Special Committee on the subject of Aden had given the impression that there was a great gap between the administering Power's policy and objectives and those of the Aden people, but a close study of the Sub-Committee's report on Aden revealed a good deal

of common ground between the two sides. A comparison of the statements by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies (see para. 13 above) and by Mr. Abdul Mackawee, formerly leader of the Opposition in the Aden State Legislative Council and now Chief Minister of Aden (see para. 6 above) showed that the two sides were in agreement on three essential elements: the granting of independence, only two years separating the date demanded by the Adenis and that proposed by the United Kingdom Government; the form of government, namely, a unitary State system; and the basis for such a system of government, namely, a sound democratic basis and the recognition of human rights.

253. As there was agreement on those three fundamental elements, it might have been expected that there would be a lull in the strife in Aden while the antagonists worked out the relevant details. The tragic fact was, however, that the blood of innocent people continued to be shed over the simple questions of procedure and timing. The resulting political tension and discord were likely to threaten peace and security in the area. Moreover, it was difficult to make progress in such an atmosphere of distrust and deep-seated suspicion.

254. The Aden people's distrust of United Kingdom intentions stemmed from a long period of colonial rule rendered all the more intolerable in recent years by the state of emergency, the acts of violence, and the military operations carried out. The United Kingdom Government's refusal to allow the Sub-Committee on Aden to visit the Territory had further increased the Sub-Committee's doubts and suspicions about conditions there. It was therefore essential that, as Mr. Mackawee had suggested, the atmosphere in Aden should be cleared before, rather than after, the election of an Aden Parliament. The recognition of human rights, the abolition of the state of emergency, the release of political detainees, the readmission of political exiles and the repeal of all laws restricting public freedoms were among the steps which must be taken in order to create the necessary conditions for peaceful change and the peaceful establishment of an independent State in South Arabia.

255. At the same time, preparations should be made for the convening of a conference, to be attended by representatives of all sectors of public opinion in the Territory, with a view to establishing a provisional all-party Government with a mandate to hold elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage for a representative organ for the whole of the Territory. In addition, the United Kingdom should try to dispel some of the suspicion attaching to its policies in Aden by co-operating with the Sub-Committee on Aden and admitting that body to the Territory. The United Kingdom Government had recently stated that it was to establish a Royal Commission, which would not be restricted to United Kingdom nationals, to consult the various segments of the population of the Territory. The United Kingdom Government's co-operation with the United Nations, through that Royal Commission or any other agency, in taking immediate steps towards the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) would constitute a concrete contribution towards the easing of tension in the Aden area and the removal of the threat to peace and security.

256. The Iranian delegation would vote in favour of any draft resolution which embodied the above-mentioned points.

257. The representative of Iraq, in a further statement, recalled that in his statement on Aden the United Kingdom representative had mentioned, *inter alia*, Aden's importance to the United Kingdom as a military base and the United Kingdom Government's appointment of a Royal Commission to consider constitutional arrangements for South Arabia.

258. As far as the military base was concerned, operative paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) stated that the maintenance of the military base in Aden was prejudicial to the security of the region and that its early removal was therefore desirable, while the Sub-Committee on Aden had found that the representatives of the people of the region were unanimously opposed to the maintenance of the base. The United Kingdom representative, however, had made no mention of any contemplated removal of the base, but on the contrary had made an impassioned defence of its presence.

259. As far as the Royal Commission was concerned, the reaction to it in South Arabia had been for the nationalist parties to merge together into a new organization known as the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS),⁷ which had categorically rejected the Royal Commission. Moreover, the Chief Minister of Aden had declared that he and all his Ministers rejected the Royal Commission and would boycott it.

260. In the light of the foregoing, the delegation of Iraq was forced to conclude that the Royal Commission was doomed to failure. The United Nations, however, could play a leading part in helping Aden and the Protectorates to achieve independence speedily and smoothly. He therefore appealed to the United Kingdom to facilitate the work of the Sub-Committee on Aden, in which the people of South Arabia had great confidence, to ascertain the wishes of the people in an objective manner and to recognize that only a truly international body like the Sub-Committee could give the people of the area a fair hearing.

261. The representative of Bulgaria noted that the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden contained the conclusion that the situation in Aden and the Protectorates continued to be extremely serious and that the resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly were still not being implemented in Aden and the Protectorates by the administering Power. The report also stated that the decision by the United Kingdom Government to maintain its military base in Aden added to the aggravation of the state of tension in the area.

262. The fact that there had been no change in the United Kingdom Government's attitude to the Aden question was all the more disappointing and regrettable in that world hopes had been raised by statements by Labour Party candidates during the recent electoral campaign in the United Kingdom. Before the General Election, the Labour Party had strongly criticized the Conservative Government's attitude to Aden and had let it be understood that if the Labour Party was elected it would right the wrongs in Aden along lines similar to those advocated by the Special Committee. Unfortunately, it had now become clear that the Labour Party's statements had been nothing but electioneering propaganda and the situation in Aden, far from improving, was now worse than ever and had become, in the

⁷ For a description of OLOS, see appendix II, paras. 17 and 51.

strategic military plans, and that the United Kingdom Government considered its base in Aden more important than its obligations to the population.

243. It was now going to the length of enlisting United States support for actions which had been deplored by the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, putting all the blame for the situation on the nationalist leaders, and requesting encouragement and understanding from the United Nations. He was at a loss to understand what more encouragement and understanding could be expected than those nationalist leaders and the United Nations had already given, for their approach was based on the Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The nationalist leaders were not alone in their struggle, and in giving them effective support the Arab world was merely fulfilling its obligation to its Arab brothers in their fight for freedom.

244. The United Kingdom representative had said that, by supplying political information, his Government went beyond its obligations under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter. The only item concerning political advancement that had ever been forthcoming was the announcement of the creation of the Federation of South Arabia in 1959. There were two possible explanations: either there had been no political advancement or, if there had been any, no information regarding it had been supplied.

245. The representative of India said that his delegation, which had participated in the discussions on Aden both in the Special Committee and in the Fourth Committee and had co-sponsored all resolutions relating to the Territory, regretted to have to state once again that the situation had not improved and that General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII) had not yet been implemented by the administering Power. He thanked the Chairman and members of the Sub-Committee on Aden for their report, with which his delegation was in general agreement.

246. The Indian delegation had hoped to hear from the United Kingdom representative of the political and constitutional advancement of the Territory towards independence, but had been disappointed in that expectation. The situation in Aden was disquieting, and violence and political restlessness were increasing. *The Times* of London of 27 April had reported a speech by Mr. Mackawee, the Chief Minister, in the Aden Legislative Council, in which he had said that the United Kingdom had failed to preserve law and order in spite of restrictions and curbing of freedom, that anarchy had increased and that the critical situation required a political solution acceptable to all, not a state of emergency which had deprived people of whatever meagre democratic life they had had. The Indian delegation felt that tension could not be reduced unless the administering Power made a determined effort to implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII). Mutual trust and the restoration of normal conditions in the Territory were essential and they could be achieved if the administering Power heeded the words of the Chilean representative, who had said that it should restore all political and public liberties, stop persecuting the leaders of the Territory, release political detainees and put an end to military operations (see para. 202 above). Colonialism was a discredited creed and the use of force to sustain it was of no assistance.

247. His delegation, which was aware of the complex and difficult situation which the United Kingdom faced in many of its colonial Territories, had been interested in the visit of the Colonial Secretary to Aden in November 1964 and the visits of two United Kingdom Ministers which had followed. The optimism to which the visits had given rise, however, had evaporated with the postponement of the London conference which had been scheduled for March 1965. No new date for the conference had yet been announced, although Mr. Mackawee had made it abundantly clear that he wanted General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) to be implemented.

248. Unlike the United Kingdom Ministers, the Sub-Committee on Aden had been unable to visit the Territory. In his statement of 27 April, the United Kingdom representative had referred to the dialogue going on between the United Kingdom Government and the leaders of the Arab peoples in Aden and South Arabia (see para. 130 above). It would help all concerned if the Sub-Committee on Aden participated in those discussions and was invited to visit Aden. Many members of the Special Committee felt that the Sub-Committee on Aden could give the United Kingdom Government useful assistance in its difficult task of preparing the Territory for independence in conditions of political stability and peace.

249. The Indian delegation welcomed the announcement by the United Kingdom that independence would be granted not later than 1968 but, while it realized that that did not rule out the possibility of an earlier attainment of independence, it felt that the setting of such a distant date was likely to increase the difficulties of the United Kingdom Government and of the people of Aden. The Chief Minister of Aden had recently stated clearly that his Government refused any kind of false independence and would take a firm stand against any attempt to ignore the true aims of the people.

250. He had been interested in the announcement by the United Kingdom representative that a commission was to be appointed to visit South Arabia and that it might include some members from countries other than the United Kingdom (see para. 225 above). He had no intention of prejudging the functions of the commission but would like to stress that it should start its work without delay. The membership of the commission should therefore be announced as soon as possible and he hoped that the Sub-Committee on Aden would be invited to assist the commission in its work. If the commission proved really effective it would be welcomed, but if it functioned in a dilatory manner it would discredit itself in the eyes of the people of South Arabia and of all those who wished to see the end of colonialism.

251. In conclusion, he thanked the representative of the United Arab Republic for the useful information given in his statement of 5 May (see paras. 143-160 above). The Indian delegation, too, appealed to the United Kingdom Government to take urgent steps to implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII).

252. The representative of Iran said that the discussions in the Special Committee on the subject of Aden had given the impression that there was a great gap between the administering Power's policy and objectives and those of the Aden people, but a close study of the Sub-Committee's report on Aden revealed a good deal

of common ground between the two sides. A comparison of the statements by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies (see para. 13 above) and by Mr. Abdul Mackawee, formerly leader of the Opposition in the Aden State Legislative Council and now Chief Minister of Aden (see para. 6 above) showed that the two sides were in agreement on three essential elements: the granting of independence, only two years separating the date demanded by the Adenis and that proposed by the United Kingdom Government; the form of government, namely, a unitary State system; and the basis for such a system of government, namely, a sound democratic basis and the recognition of human rights.

253. As there was agreement on those three fundamental elements, it might have been expected that there would be a lull in the strife in Aden while the antagonists worked out the relevant details. The tragic fact was, however, that the blood of innocent people continued to be shed over the simple questions of procedure and timing. The resulting political tension and discord were likely to threaten peace and security in the area. Moreover, it was difficult to make progress in such an atmosphere of distrust and deep-seated suspicion.

254. The Aden people's distrust of United Kingdom intentions stemmed from a long period of colonial rule rendered all the more intolerable in recent years by the state of emergency, the acts of violence, and the military operations carried out. The United Kingdom Government's refusal to allow the Sub-Committee on Aden to visit the Territory had further increased the Sub-Committee's doubts and suspicions about conditions there. It was therefore essential that, as Mr. Mackawee had suggested, the atmosphere in Aden should be cleared before, rather than after, the election of an Aden Parliament. The recognition of human rights, the abolition of the state of emergency, the release of political detainees, the readmission of political exiles and the repeal of all laws restricting public freedoms were among the steps which must be taken in order to create the necessary conditions for peaceful change and the peaceful establishment of an independent State in South Arabia.

255. At the same time, preparations should be made for the convening of a conference, to be attended by representatives of all sectors of public opinion in the Territory, with a view to establishing a provisional all-party Government with a mandate to hold elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage for a representative organ for the whole of the Territory. In addition, the United Kingdom should try to dispel some of the suspicion attaching to its policies in Aden by co-operating with the Sub-Committee on Aden and admitting that body to the Territory. The United Kingdom Government had recently stated that it was to establish a Royal Commission, which would not be restricted to United Kingdom nationals, to consult the various segments of the population of the Territory. The United Kingdom Government's co-operation with the United Nations, through that Royal Commission or any other agency, in taking immediate steps towards the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) would constitute a concrete contribution towards the easing of tension in the Aden area and the removal of the threat to peace and security.

256. The Iranian delegation would vote in favour of any draft resolution which embodied the above-mentioned points.

257. The representative of Iraq, in a further statement, recalled that in his statement on Aden the United Kingdom representative had mentioned, *inter alia*, Aden's importance to the United Kingdom as a military base and the United Kingdom Government's appointment of a Royal Commission to consider constitutional arrangements for South Arabia.

258. As far as the military base was concerned, operative paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) stated that the maintenance of the military base in Aden was prejudicial to the security of the region and that its early removal was therefore desirable, while the Sub-Committee on Aden had found that the representatives of the people of the region were unanimously opposed to the maintenance of the base. The United Kingdom representative, however, had made no mention of any contemplated removal of the base, but on the contrary had made an impassioned defence of its presence.

259. As far as the Royal Commission was concerned, the reaction to it in South Arabia had been for the nationalist parties to merge together into a new organization known as the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS),⁷ which had categorically rejected the Royal Commission. Moreover, the Chief Minister of Aden had declared that he and all his Ministers rejected the Royal Commission and would boycott it.

260. In the light of the foregoing, the delegation of Iraq was forced to conclude that the Royal Commission was doomed to failure. The United Nations, however, could play a leading part in helping Aden and the Protectorates to achieve independence speedily and smoothly. He therefore appealed to the United Kingdom to facilitate the work of the Sub-Committee on Aden, in which the people of South Arabia had great confidence, to ascertain the wishes of the people in an objective manner and to recognize that only a truly international body like the Sub-Committee could give the people of the area a fair hearing.

261. The representative of Bulgaria noted that the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden contained the conclusion that the situation in Aden and the Protectorates continued to be extremely serious and that the resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly were still not being implemented in Aden and the Protectorates by the administering Power. The report also stated that the decision by the United Kingdom Government to maintain its military base in Aden added to the aggravation of the state of tension in the area.

262. The fact that there had been no change in the United Kingdom Government's attitude to the Aden question was all the more disappointing and regrettable in that world hopes had been raised by statements by Labour Party candidates during the recent electoral campaign in the United Kingdom. Before the General Election, the Labour Party had strongly criticized the Conservative Government's attitude to Aden and had let it be understood that if the Labour Party was elected it would right the wrongs in Aden along lines similar to those advocated by the Special Committee. Unfortunately, it had now become clear that the Labour Party's statements had been nothing but electioneering propaganda and the situation in Aden, far from improving, was now worse than ever and had become, in the

⁷ For a description of OLOS, see appendix II, paras. 17 and 51.

words of the Sub-Committee on Aden, "critical and explosive".

263. Although the United Kingdom Government had made it clear that its general policies on Aden remained the same, it had been forced, in the face of the heroic struggle of the people of Aden for freedom and human rights, to make several concessions, which included the abandonment of the plan to make Aden and the Protectorates a federation instead of a unitary State, the appointment of Abdul Mackawee as Chief Minister of Aden, and the repeal of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. Before the appointment of Mr. Mackawee as Chief Minister and head of a Cabinet which included several persons equally prominent in the struggle for the independence of Aden, the United Kingdom Government had often used the statements of various members of the former puppet Cabinet as proof of Adeni support for its policies. That was no longer possible, for Mr. Mackawee and his ministers had lost no time in categorically rejecting those policies.

264. One of the principal targets of criticism by Mr. Mackawee and his Cabinet was the military base in Aden. That base was a menace to all the Arab nations, and all who loved peace and justice should support the people of Aden in their attempts to secure its removal. The United Kingdom Government had referred to the Aden base as a vital centre for peace-keeping activities, but past United Kingdom activities in South Arabia had made it abundantly clear what that implied and no one would be deceived by such a transparent disguise for imperialist domination.

265. Recent developments in South Arabia, and particularly in Aden, left no doubt of the rapid deterioration of the situation. The Special Committee must therefore deal with the question urgently and take whatever action was necessary. The United Kingdom's proposal to send a Royal Commission to South Arabia seemed to the Bulgarian delegation to be simply an effort to keep control of the Territory in the hands of the United Kingdom's puppets or, if that proved impossible, a means of postponing the satisfaction of the Adeni people's lawful demands for independence and keeping Aden under the United Kingdom yoke until 1968.

266. In the light of the foregoing, the Bulgarian delegation was willing to support any draft resolution which was in harmony with the aspirations of the people of Aden, whose freedom and independence were vital to the maintenance of the peace and security of the whole Arab world.

267. The representative of the United Arab Republic, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he would like to place the problem in its proper perspective and try to answer some of the accusations which had been directed against his Government. The United Arab Republic was a firm supporter of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, one of which was to ensure the peaceful attainment of independence by colonial peoples. It was the attitude of the colonial Powers that drove those peoples to take up arms to secure their right of self-determination, as many States represented in the Special Committee which had had to make heavy sacrifices to gain independence could testify. The process of liberation was irresistible and irreversible, and it was a mistake to think that liberation movements, which sprang from the people themselves, were instigated by other Governments.

268. The long struggle of the Arab peoples in the Aden Protectorate had always had the support not only

of the Arab world but of all nations aspiring to peace and freedom. As was clear from the resolution of the League of Arab States of 19 May 1964 (A/AC.109/83), the Arab nations had done their best to persuade the United Kingdom Government to reverse its policies and to recognize the right of the people of the Occupied South to self-determination and independence. They were surely not to be blamed when the situation deteriorated and the population resorted to armed resistance. The United Arab Republic had always made its intentions clear to the United Kingdom Government and had in fact played host to many of the nationalist organizations and leaders of the Occupied South.

269. A disturbing element in the question of the United Kingdom military base in Aden was the international peace-keeping role which the United Kingdom Government had arrogated to itself, disregarding the United Nations Charter. He was disappointed at the dangerous new trend of thinking of the United Kingdom Government. At the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, a large number of Governments had condemned the maintenance or future establishment of foreign military bases, particularly in independent territories, which could be used for the maintenance of colonialism. At a time when a number of countries were trying to have foreign bases removed from their territory, the policy of the United Kingdom Government in maintaining its existing bases and seeking to establish new ones was in no way contributing to international understanding and co-operation and would be opposed by a great number of countries.

270. With regard to the Royal Commission which was to visit South Arabia and consult the various interests there, he would point out that those interests, and particularly the political parties and organizations, had already made their positions clear and were demanding the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII). By recognizing and acceding to the valid demands of the people, the United Kingdom Government would prove its goodwill towards a population which was seeking to live in peace and freedom. The United Kingdom could not conceal its real aims behind the familiar façade of constitutional conferences. The granting of so-called independence, dependent on the maintenance of United Kingdom bases, was a well-known manoeuvre which had given rise to many difficulties and crises in the past.

271. The representative of Sierra Leone congratulated the Sub-Committee on Aden on its report. His Government was deeply concerned about the events in the Territory and was anxious to do everything possible to help the people to achieve self-determination and independence. It was clear from the report that the people of Aden had been subject to extreme provocation in their gallant and unrelenting struggle. The position was further complicated by the United Kingdom military base in Aden. The situation had already been fully considered in General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII), but the administering Power consistently refused to implement those resolutions.

272. His delegation fully endorsed the conclusions of the Sub-Committee on Aden and deplored the continuance of military operations in the Territory. It associated itself with those who had called for the abolition of the present state of emergency, the repeal of all laws restricting public freedoms, the release of all political detainees and the withdrawal of all restric-

tions preventing exiled nationals from returning to their country. A fully representative constitutional conference should be convened to work out arrangements for general elections on the basis of "one man, one vote".

273. The United Kingdom had often refused requests by United Nations groups to visit Territories under its administration. In view of the appointment of a Royal Commission to visit South Arabia, he hoped that the United Kingdom Government would now agree to allow the Special Committee to visit the Territory and to ascertain the real conditions there. He also hoped that the United Kingdom Government would agree to an effective United Nations presence in the Territory both before and during the proposed elections.

274. The Sierra Leone delegation welcomed the United Kingdom representative's reassuring statement of his Government's intentions in the Territory, and his reference to the acknowledgement by the Colonial Secretary of the need for a constitutional conference and consultations with all sections of the population. His delegation particularly welcomed the Colonial Secretary's statement that the proposed Commission was to be set up in the light of the wish of the Government and people of South Arabia to achieve independence as soon as possible and the general desire in South Arabia for unity. He hoped that immediate steps would be taken to put the Colonial Secretary's intentions into effect and that full consideration would be given to the recommendations of the Special Committee and the resolution which it hoped to pass on the matter.

275. The Sierra Leone delegation had never failed to acknowledge the dignity with which the United Kingdom Government had relinquished authority in certain parts of the world. He therefore hoped that it would now allow good judgement and fairness to prevail in the case of Aden and would enable the people of Aden and South Arabia to exercise democracy in their own land.

C. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

276. At the 337th meeting, the representative of Syria introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.198), sponsored by Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.

277. In introducing the draft resolution, he stressed the gravity of the situation and appealed to the United Kingdom to take immediate steps in accordance with the draft resolution.

278. The representative of Australia said that, while the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.198) before the Special Committee laid great stress on the troubled situation in Aden and the Aden Protectorates, it completely ignored the causes of that situation. The truth was that the troubles in adjoining areas, where there was no United Kingdom presence and Arabs were at odds with Arabs, overflowed into Aden, which was the target of attempts at "power extension" by States other than the United Kingdom. It was true that the United Kingdom had substantial interests in Aden, but other States also had interests in the area and had much to gain by securing the departure of the United Kingdom.

279. The United Kingdom was continuing its policy of giving Aden as much freedom as the troubled situation there allowed, and the Special Committee had heard the United Kingdom representative's assurances to the

effect that Aden would be granted independence not later than 1968. The Australian delegation was convinced that the United Kingdom Government attached great importance to participation by non-British persons in the work of the Royal Commission which was to be set up to consider Aden's constitutional problems, and felt that the United Kingdom proposals for Aden were meaningful and far-reaching.

280. As for the possible retention by the United Kingdom of the military base in Aden, the Australian delegation wished to point out that it was not a crime to maintain a base on foreign territory. Such matters were for the people of the territory concerned to decide, and it would be quite wrong for any body like the Special Committee to meddle in such decisions. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had stated, before his party's return to power, that his policy would be to maintain United Kingdom bases abroad provided that the country on whose territory they were located was agreeable to their existence, and that was exactly what, in the present case, the United Kingdom was doing.

281. In conclusion, it was a matter of great regret to the Australian delegation that the draft resolution before the Special Committee did not mention the progress made in relations between the United Kingdom Government and the people of Aden, or the many progressive measures recently taken in the Territory. Such omissions did the draft resolution a grave disservice, and could only harm its chances of securing unanimous approval in the Special Committee.

282. The representative of Denmark expressed regret at the failure to mention, in the draft resolution, any of the progressive aspects of the situation in Aden. The draft resolution was in many respects similar to General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII). The Danish delegation had abstained from voting on that resolution, and would likewise abstain from voting on the present draft resolution.

283. The representative of Uruguay said that while the situation in Aden presented more positive aspects at the present time than it had done in the past, the draft resolution before the Special Committee did put into words the concern which his country felt regarding Aden, and his delegation would therefore vote for the draft resolution as a whole. The Uruguayan delegation could not, however, vote for operative paragraph 8 of the draft, as it felt that the decision whether or not to allow the United Kingdom to maintain a base in Aden lay with the people of Aden rather than with a body such as the Special Committee; nor, for the reasons set out in the Uruguayan statement at the Special Committee's 338th meeting, could it vote for the fourth preambular paragraph or for operative paragraph 11. The Uruguayan delegation therefore requested separate votes on those paragraphs.

284. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation likewise requested a separate vote on the fourth preambular paragraph, and also on operative paragraph 8. It would abstain from a vote on those two paragraphs, although it would vote for the draft resolution as a whole.

285. The representative of Madagascar observed that the situation in Aden did seem to have improved recently in some respects; the draft resolution should perhaps have acknowledged that fact. Like several other delegations, the delegation of Madagascar felt that the question of the existence of a United Kingdom military

base in Aden was one for the people of Aden rather than for any outside body to decide; but on the whole the draft resolution merited support, and the delegation of Madagascar would vote for it.

286. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the United Kingdom Government intended to continue with its plans for a Constitutional Commission on Aden's constitutional problems, and hoped that all those in any way concerned with the future of Aden would give their assistance. The United Kingdom Government wished to give South Arabia independence in peace and with order—an objective which was surely compatible with the aims of the Special Committee. While it was for the Constitutional Commission to decide whom it wanted to hear, the United Kingdom Government would certainly place no obstacles in the way of any person or group wishing to appear before the Commission.

287. It would surely not surprise the Special Committee to hear that the United Kingdom delegation would not be voting for the draft resolution. The draft did not mention the Constitutional Commission, but operative paragraphs 3 and 6 seemed to prejudice the latter's work. As a number of representatives had pointed out, operative paragraph 8 went beyond the Special Committee's terms of reference and interfered in a question which it was for the people of Aden alone to decide; and there was no valid reason for bringing the situation in Aden to the attention of the Security Council, as provided for in operative paragraph 11. The United Kingdom delegation would therefore be obliged to vote against the draft resolution.

288. The representative of Syria, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that the Australian representative's references to "Arabs at odds with Arabs" and "power extension" by States were completely irrelevant. The Syrian delegation agreed with the United Kingdom representative that it would be desirable to solve the Aden question with dignity; but that, unfortunately, was impossible. The Syrian delegation had little faith in bodies like the Royal Commission which the United Kingdom Government was to set up; nevertheless, it was prepared to listen attentively to any new ideas which the United Kingdom Government might put forward through that Commission. Finally, the sponsors of the draft resolution agreed to the request by Uruguay and Venezuela for separate votes on certain paragraphs of the draft, and thanked those countries for their support of the draft resolution as a whole.

289. The Special Committee then voted on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.198) at its 338th meeting. The fourth preambular paragraph was adopted by 16 votes to 4, with 3 abstentions; operative paragraph 8 was adopted by 16 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions; operative paragraph 11 was adopted by 16 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions; the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.198), as a whole, was adopted by 19 votes to 3, with 2 abstentions.

290. The representative of the United States of America, speaking in explanation of his vote, said that his Government fully sympathized with the desire of the resolution's co-sponsors to facilitate and speed the progress of the peoples of South Arabia towards independence. His Government's opposition to the resolution had to do, not with opposition to its objectives, but with the means of implementing them. Part of the task of implementing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in-

olved making a careful study of the situation, as the Sub-Committee on Aden had done, making judicious recommendations and encouraging the administering Power to take well-considered steps.

291. His delegation had observed with interest the development of the situation in South Arabia, and took satisfaction in the progress which had been made towards the independence and advancement of the people of that area on a sound democratic basis. Although there appeared to be a growing measure of agreement among all the parties concerned regarding form and objectives, the situation was so complex that certain difficulties remained with respect to the procedures for reaching the objectives agreed upon.

292. In his statement of 11 May, the United Kingdom representative had indicated that his Government was prepared to take what seemed to be a decidedly forward step in the effort to establish a single independent State by 1968. The United States delegation considered that the appointment of a Commission, to include members from countries other than the United Kingdom, would constitute an effective method for dealing with some of the problems of constitutional development; and it hoped that such a Commission would in due course be able to agree with the Governments and peoples of South Arabia on further practical steps towards early independence. His delegation was convinced that the Commission's best hope for significant progress lay in the establishment of an atmosphere of order and goodwill.

293. While he appreciated the desire of the Committee to speed and to facilitate the independence of South Arabia, it was unfortunate that the resolution failed to take account of the general evolution of the situation and the proposal for a Commission.

294. The representative of Italy, speaking in explanation of his vote, said that the resolution just adopted by the Special Commission was very similar to General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII), which had not reflected the situation existing in Aden or in the Aden Protectorates at the end of 1963. In the seventeen months which had elapsed since then, there had been a number of significant political and constitutional developments in the Territory. His delegation had abstained in the vote because it considered that the draft resolution should have mentioned those developments and the proposal to appoint a Constitutional Commission. It felt that the Special Committee, whose task it was to recommend ways and means for the speedy attainment of independence by Non-Self-Governing Territories, should not have ignored a political decision which would have some effect on the progress towards independence of the Territory under consideration.

295. Furthermore, the Italian delegation thought that the placing of entire responsibility for the future of the Territory on the administering Power, and the ignoring of the articulate public opinion which existed in the area, constituted a further example of a tendency, in the Special Committee, to over-stress the role of the administering Power. His delegation believed that public opinion and the political parties in the Territory could play an important role in changing their own future; and it felt that the draft resolution should have addressed an appeal, to all those concerned, to settle their differences and agree on the essential elements of a common policy for independence.

296. In conclusion, he said that his delegation's views regarding the maintenance of the military base in Aden were contained in the summary records of the 156th and 197th meetings of the Special Committee.

297. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that his delegation had abstained in the vote on operative paragraph 8, because it considered that it would be for the people of Aden, when they had been granted their independence, to decide whether or not they wanted to maintain the military base.

298. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that it was difficult to understand the argument of some representatives that they had abstained in the vote because of the constitutional advances made in the Territory, since the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden and the petitions received from the Territory showed that no such advances had taken place. There had been no changes in the federal Legislative Council since the previous year. Nor had there been any free elections based on universal adult suffrage. Moreover, fundamental human rights and freedoms were not respected. It had also been said that the draft resolution made no reference to the political evolution which had taken place in the Territory. However, petitioners from the Territory had pointed out that the political situation had, in the past year, actually deteriorated.

299. In conclusion, he stressed the contradiction between the fact that some representatives had welcomed the United Kingdom proposal to appoint a constitutional commission and had not even mentioned the right of the people of the Territory to give their views on the proposal, and the fact that those representatives had considered that only the people of the Territory were competent to decide the question of the maintenance of the military base in Aden.

300. The resolution (A/AC.109/116) on the question of Aden, adopted by the Special Committee at its 338th meeting on 17 May 1965, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having examined the question of Aden and Aden Protectorate,

"Having heard the statements of the administering Power,

"Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, as well as its own resolutions of 9 April, 11 May and 17 November 1964,

"Deeply concerned at the critical and explosive situation which is threatening peace and security in the area, arising from the policies pursued by the administering Power in the Territory,

"Convinced that the solution to the question of Aden can best be found through the immediate and full implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly, particularly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII),

"1. Reaffirms the right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

"2. Adopts the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden and endorses its conclusions;

"3. Deplores the refusal of the United Kingdom Government to implement General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) on Aden and the recommendations of the Special Committee;

"4. Notes with deep concern that military operations against the people of the Territory are still being carried out by the administering Power;

"5. Urges the United Kingdom to:

"(a) Abolish the state of emergency;

"(b) Repeal all laws restricting public freedoms;

"(c) Cease forthwith all repressive actions against the people of the Territory, in particular military operations;

"(d) Release all political detainees and allow the return of those people who have been exiled or forbidden to reside in the Territory because of political activities;

"6. Calls upon the United Kingdom Government to convene immediately a conference of representatives of all sectors of public opinion of the whole Territory, with a view to deciding on the necessary constitutional measures for the holding of immediate general elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage and with full respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, to be followed by the establishment of representative organs and government for the whole of the Territory and for the granting of immediate independence;

"7. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to arrange for an effective United Nations presence before and during the elections referred to in paragraph 6 above;

"8. Reaffirms that the maintenance of the military base in Aden is prejudicial to peace and security in the region and its early removal is, therefore, desirable;

"9. Urges the United Kingdom Government to enable the Sub-Committee to visit Aden;

"10. Requests the Secretary-General, the specialized agencies and the international relief organizations, in consultation with the administering Power, to assist the civilian population which has suffered from the military operations in Radfan and other regions of the Territory;

"11. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in the Territory;

"12. Decides to maintain the question of Aden on the agenda of the Committee and to request the Sub-Committee on Aden to keep this question under constant review and to report to the Committee as necessary."

301. The text of the resolution, together with the records of the Special Committee's debates on the question, was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 18 May 1965 (S/6368).

D. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

302. The Special Committee gave further consideration to the question of Aden at its 386th meeting on 16 September 1965. The Special Committee had before it a further report (September 1965) by its Sub-Committee on Aden (see appendix II below).

Written petitions

303. The Special Committee had circulated the following written petitions concerning the Territory:

| <i>Petitioner</i> | <i>Document No.</i> |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| Mr. Abdo Hussein Adhal, Member of the Legislative Council of Aden State | A/AC.109/PET.386/Add.1 |
| Ministerial Secretary, Office of the Chief Minister, Aden | A/AC.109/PET.415 |
| Mr. Qahtan Shaabi, Secretary-General of the National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen | A/AC.109/PET.381/Add.2 ^o |
| Aden Municipal Council | A/AC.109/PET.422 ^o |
| Yafai National Congress | A/AC.109/PET.423 ^o |

General statements by members

304. The representative of Iraq, introducing the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden (see appendix II below), in the absence of the Chairman, recalled the terms of reference that the Special Committee had given the Sub-Committee in resolution of 9 April 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VI, para. 166). The present report covered the past four months; chapter I set forth the recent developments in the Territory. The Sub-Committee drew the Special Committee's attention to the resolutions adopted by the Aden Legislative Council in April and May 1965, in which it had fully endorsed General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) and asked for its immediate implementation. The Sub-Committee on Aden then dealt with the proposal of the United Kingdom Government to send a constitutional commission to the Territory and explained why that proposal had not been put into effect and the opposition which it had encountered from the political parties and leaders in the Territory. It went on to refer to the failure of the meetings that had been held in London and drew attention to the continuance of the state of emergency and the military operations in the Territory.

305. Chapter II of the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden dealt with the contacts established with the administering Power. The Sub-Committee had authorized its Chairman to contact the representatives of the United Kingdom to the United Nations and to ask the United Kingdom Government to allow the Sub-Committee to visit the Territory. The United Kingdom Government had replied that it had not changed its attitude on the matter. The Sub-Committee deplored that attitude.

306. Chapter III gave the conclusions of the Sub-Committee on Aden regarding the events of the last four months. The Sub-Committee considered that the situation in Aden was still serious and should be closely followed, so that if necessary it could be brought to the attention of the Security Council. It also felt that the administering Power had not complied with the requirements set forth in General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) and that the position it had taken was calculated to increase tension in the area. It was encouraged to note, however, that the people of the Territory had unanimously endorsed General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) and had demanded that it should be fully implemented.

307. The Sub-Committee on Aden drew attention to the fact that General Assembly resolution 1949

(XVIII) not only stated principles but set forth methods for putting those principles into practice: namely, the holding of elections, with a United Nations presence, and the establishment of a government and a legislative organ for the whole Territory. Although the United Kingdom had informed the Sub-Committee on Aden that it subscribed to the basic principles of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII), it had not yet stated clearly whether it accepted the methods envisaged in the resolution for the attainment of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The Sub-Committee expressed its deep regret that the state of emergency was still in effect and that military operations against the population of the Territory continued unabated.

308. The Sub-Committee on Aden considered that, in view of the seriousness of the situation in Aden, the Special Committee should recommend that the General Assembly should examine the question at its twentieth session, as a matter of urgency.

309. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had not yet had time to study the Sub-Committee's report in detail and that it reserved the right to comment on the report at a later stage.

310. The United Kingdom delegation welcomed the recognition in the report that the efforts which the United Kingdom Government was making to bring independence to South Arabia by 1968 were in harmony with the basic objectives of the United Nations. It could not, however, accept other parts of the Sub-Committee's conclusions, for reasons which had been fully explained on other occasions during the Special Committee's examination of the question of Aden.

311. The United Kingdom Government's policies in regard to South Arabia had been fully described in the statements made by the Colonial Secretary on 7 and 8 August, the texts of which appeared in paragraphs 68 and 69 of the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden (see appendix II below).

312. As it did not wish to hold up the work of the Committee, the United Kingdom delegation would not oppose the adoption of the report; it would, however, reserve its position on the conclusions and recommendations in that report.

313. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recalled that his delegation had always maintained that the decisions taken by the Special Committee in respect of the base in Aden were inadequate. Yet in paragraph 79 of the Sub-Committee's report, in which it defined its attitude on that question, there was once again no explicit statement concerning the necessity of liquidating the base.

314. While his delegation supported the Sub-Committee's conclusions as a whole, it reserved its position with regard to paragraph 79 and requested that that paragraph should be amended in such a way as to make it clear to the administering Power that the Special Committee was calling for the liquidation of the base at Aden. Experience showed that military bases established in colonial Territories were not only strongholds of colonialism but also constituted a threat to peace-loving and freedom-loving peoples and an obstacle to the liberation and independence of Territories and to their future development. For those reasons, the Sub-Committee on Aden should express itself much more categorically, in the interests of the people under colonial domination, and in particular the people of South Arabia.

^o Circulated after the Special Committee had completed its consideration of the question of Aden.

315. The representative of Iraq fully endorsed the Soviet Union representative's point of view. He pointed out, however, that the Sub-Committee's report represented a kind of common denominator of the views of its five members. The Sub-Committee on Aden was bound by the decisions of the Special Committee and by General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII), which stated "that the maintenance of the military base in Aden is prejudicial to the security of the region and that its early removal is therefore desirable". Moreover, the Sub-Committee had taken note of the administering Power's statement that "no base is militarily or morally defensible unless it has the support of the people of the Territory in which it is situated" (see appendix II, para. 69). The reports of the Sub-Committee on Aden and the statements of hundreds of petitioners showed that the people of the Territory were almost unanimous in demanding the immediate removal of the base. That being so, in the opinion of the Iraqi Government and the other Arab Governments of the region, the United Kingdom Government should comply with the people's demand without delay.

316. The representative of Yugoslavia said that it would be superfluous to point out the position of his Government with regard to the existence of military bases on foreign soil, especially those in Territories under colonial domination. He would merely repeat once more that his Government had always been opposed to the existence of such bases, and had fought to bring about their liquidation. The position of his Government concerning the base at Aden was that it should be immediately liquidated, without any condition whatsoever, in accord with the expressed will and demand of the people of the Territory. So far as paragraph 79 of the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden was concerned, he confirmed the representative of Iraq's explanation of the circumstances that had led to its adoption by the Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee had intended to express the desire, taking note of the opinion expressed by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies to the effect that no base is militarily or morally defensible without the support of the population of the Territory involved, to see these views put into practice, especially in view of the fact that the population of Aden and the Aden Protectorates had not only once but several times expressed the desire that this be done.

317. The representative of Syria said that his delegation was grateful to the Sub-Committee on Aden for its valuable supplementary report (see appendix II below). His delegation shared the views expressed by the representatives of Iraq, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. It was of course true that paragraph 79 of the report represented the common denominator of the views of the members of the Sub-Committee on Aden, but it was equally true that the report of a sub-committee could always be amended, corrected or supplemented, in accordance with the views of the majority of the members of the plenary Committee. The Syrian delegation, for its part, could not accept the present wording of the paragraph in question. It was in the interests of the United Kingdom itself to make a quick and quiet exit from Aden so that the people would be able to exercise their rights and carry out their constitutional development in whatever manner they desired. So long as the base existed, there was always the danger that the colonial Power might exert some kind of pressure on the people, who were yearning for inde-

pendence and were engaged in a bitter struggle to gain freedom.

318. The Syrian delegation therefore proposed that paragraph 79 of the report should be referred to the Sub-Committee on Aden for redrafting; if the Sub-Committee did not wish to redraft it, his delegation would make a formal proposal amending the paragraph along the lines indicated by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Iraq and Yugoslavia.

319. The representative of Iraq, supported by the representative of Venezuela, said that it was not necessary for the Special Committee to refer the report back to the Sub-Committee; what the Special Committee should do was to take a decision on the report, that is, either to endorse it, reject it or take note of it. The representative of Iraq also said that if the Special Committee endorsed the report, it could be annexed—as it stood—to the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly and, through a resolution or a consensus which would be reflected in that report, the Committee could indicate that the majority of its members considered that the base should be removed immediately.

320. The representative of Syria supported the views expressed by the representative of Iraq.

321. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation could not accept the Iraqi representative's remarks regarding the wishes of the people of the Territory on the subject of the base. It was not through the statements of petitioners or of the representative of the USSR, or even through the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden, that the wishes of the people could be expressed. They could be expressed only through the Government of South Arabia, when the Territory achieved independence. The United Kingdom Government's position, which was supported by a number of delegations, members of the Special Committee and the Sub-Committee on Aden, and which was described by the Sub-Committee in its report, was that the future of any defence facilities should be a matter of negotiation between the United Kingdom and the Government of the new State. If the proposal which had just been made was submitted formally to the Special Committee, the United Kingdom delegation, in the absence of instructions from its Government, would be compelled to oppose it on grounds of both substance and form.

322. The representative of Iraq said that if the Special Committee wished to take a decision concerning the Aden base that went further than what was reflected in General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII), the Iraqi delegation would certainly support such a decision. If, however, it wished to reaffirm the position taken by the General Assembly and by the Special Committee itself on 17 May (see para. 300 above), he did not think that any further action was required.

323. The Chairman said that, as had been recalled by the representative of Iraq, the Special Committee had already expressed its point of view on the question of Aden during its work in 1965. In view of this and taking into consideration that the Committee did not have much more time left, he thought that it should take note of the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden, endorse the conclusions in that report and transmit it to the General Assembly together with the report already prepared for 1965 on the question of Aden. (see sects. A to C above).

324. The representative of Australia said that in view of the short time that had elapsed since the report had been circulated, his delegation would have to reserve its position on the question.

325. The representative of the United States of America reserved the position of his delegation on the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden. The United States welcomed the efforts of the United Kingdom to find a solution acceptable to all parties.

326. The representative of Denmark said that as his delegation had not had time to study the Sub-Committee's conclusions thoroughly, he would like to reserve its position until the Special Committee's report was considered by the General Assembly.

327. The Special Committee decided, without objection, to take note of the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden (see appendix II), endorse the conclusions in that report and transmit it to the General Assembly together with the report already prepared for 1965 on the question of Aden (see sects. A to C above). The Committee also decided that the Sub-Committee on Aden would, in accordance with operative paragraph 12 of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 17 May 1965 (see para. 300 above), keep the question of Aden under constant review and report to the Special Committee as necessary.

APPENDIX I

Report of the Sub-Committee on Aden (April 1965)

CONTENTS

| | <i>Paragraphs</i> |
|---|-------------------|
| Introduction | 1-3 |
| Action taken by the Sub-Committee | 4-24 |
| Conclusions of the Sub-Committee | 25-31 |

Annexes

| | <i>Pages</i> |
|---|--------------|
| I. Letter dated 2 December 1964 from the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Aden, addressed to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations | 335 |
| II. Letter dated 15 January 1965 from the Permanent Representative of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, addressed to the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Aden | 335 |

INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution on Aden adopted on 17 November 1964, the Special Committee, having considered the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VI, annex), reaffirmed General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, and the resolutions adopted by the Special Committee on 9 April and 11 May 1964 and called on the administering Power to implement them without delay. It regretted the refusal of the administering Power to co-operate with the Sub-Committee, endorsed the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations and decided to maintain the Sub-Committee with the same terms of reference as set out in the Special Committee's resolution on Aden of 9 April 1964 (*ibid.*, chap. VI, para. 166). By this resolution the Sub-Committee was requested to:

"(a) Study and keep under constant review the situation in the Territory and to report thereon to the Special Committee;

"(b) Establish contacts with the administering Power at such time and place as may be agreed upon, with a view to implementing resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII);

"(c) Arrange in consultation with the administering Power, for visits to the Territory;

"(d) Make such other visits as may be deemed necessary."

2. The present report is presented in accordance with the Special Committee's request and may be considered as supplementary to the report it has already presented (*ibid.*, annex).

3. At its meeting on 2 April 1965, the Sub-Committee on Aden unanimously elected Mr. Huot Sambath (Cambodia) as Chairman to fill the vacancy brought about by the departure of Mr. Vouensai Sonn (Cambodia). Representation on the Committee is therefore as follows: Mr. Huot Sambath, Chairman (Cambodia); Mr. Adnan Pachachi (Iraq); Mr. Julien Kacou (Ivory Coast); Mr. Leonardo Diaz Gonzalez (Venezuela); Mr. Milos Melovski (Yugoslavia).

ACTION TAKEN BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

Contacts with the administering Power

4. Following the adoption by the Special Committee of its resolution on 17 November 1964, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Aden addressed a letter on 2 December 1964 to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom. In his letter (see annex I below) the Chairman drew attention to the Sub-Committee's continuing functions and to the provision in operative paragraph 7 (b) of the Special Committee's resolution of 9 April 1964 requesting the Sub-Committee to "establish contacts with the administering Power, at such time and place as may be agreed upon, with a view to implementing resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII)" (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VI, para. 166). The Chairman stated that it was the hope of the Sub-Committee, that, in view of the declared desire of the United Kingdom Government to move the Territory towards independence and of the intention to reassess the situation there, early contacts would be established within the context of these resolutions.

5. In his reply (annex II below) dated 15 January 1965, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom drew attention to the recent visit to the Territory by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and stated that it would be understood that his Government would require time before reaching final conclusions about future policy on Aden and the Federation of South Arabia on the basis of the Colonial Secretary's assessment of the situation. Subject to this, he stated, his Government would be glad to enter into contacts with the Sub-Committee on Aden at the appropriate time in whatever manner might be mutually convenient, in accordance with the provision of the Committee's resolution of 9 April 1964 to which the Chairman had referred.

6. At a meeting between the Chairman and the representative of the United Kingdom, arrangements were made for the representative of the United Kingdom to make a statement to the Sub-Committee on Aden on 15 April. The Chairman stated that the Sub-Committee was anxious to hear the administering Power's assessment of recent developments in the Territory and of what steps it intended to take to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly. The Chairman also reiterated the Sub-Committee's request for permission to visit the Territory.

7. The representative of the United Kingdom made a statement to the Sub-Committee on Aden at its meeting on 15 April 1965. In his statement, the representative of the United Kingdom reviewed developments since the visit to the Territory by the Colonial Secretary in December 1964. He drew attention to the statement made by the Federal Supreme Council and the Aden Council of Ministers, which had been made with the Colonial Secretary's full approval, and which called for the creation of a unitary state on a sound democratic basis and for the recognition of human rights in South Arabia. He described the circumstances surrounding the resignation of the Aden State Ministers and the postponement of the constitutional conference that had been scheduled to begin in London in March 1965. Since then, the Colonial Secretary had been examining, with the High Commissioner, ways and means whereby progress could be maintained. On 1 April, the Colonial Secretary had informed the House of Commons that he had discussed with the High Commissioner proposals designed to further political and constitutional progress in the area and to promote co-operation between the Governments of the

Territory and the political parties; he hoped to make a further statement before long.

8. The representative of the United Kingdom referred to the "continued acts of terrorism and criminal violence in the area and, in particular, to 'acts of aggression' against the Territory of the Federation" which, he stated, were contrary to the Security Council's resolution 188 (1964) of 9 April 1964, and, inasmuch as they were designed to obstruct progress to independence, they were also contrary to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. He pointed out that these acts would not deter the inhabitants of the area from gaining their independence, although they might well help to delay constitutional progress in the Federation. His Government looked to the United Nations for encouragement and understanding in fulfilling the declared intention of granting independence to South Arabia by 1968.

9. With regard to the Sub-Committee's request to visit the Territory, the representative of the United Kingdom informed the Sub-Committee that his Government could not accede to this proposal. He said that quite apart from the issues of competence, on which his Government's position was well known, the proposals foreshadowed in the Colonial Secretary's statement of 1 April might not fit in with a visit by the Sub-Committee.

10. In conclusion, he reiterated that it was the intention of his Government to grant the Federation of South Arabia full independence by 1968, or before if possible. His Government hoped that a large measure of agreement on the constitutional matters now under discussion would soon be achieved so that the next step to independence could be taken.

11. In putting questions to the representative of the United Kingdom, a clarification was requested concerning the statement that it was the United Kingdom's intention to grant independence to the Federation of South Arabia by 1968, and the statement by the Colonial Secretary concerning the replacement of the Federation by a unitary state. The representative of the United Kingdom was asked how the United Kingdom intended to establish the unitary state in the place of the Federation and whether the unitary state would be established before or after independence. In reply, the Sub-Committee on Aden was informed that the United Kingdom Government was not committed to any one form of constitution for the area as a whole, and would continue to be guided by the wishes of the people. The question of the timing of the establishment of the unitary state in relation to the date of independence and indeed the question of the unitary state itself had still to be worked out.

12. When asked whether he could give more details about the constitutional discussions that were continuing, such as where they were being conducted, with whom, and in what context, the representative of the United Kingdom said that for more details he would have to await the further statement which the Colonial Secretary hoped to make before long.

13. Asked whether he could give an approximate date for the convening of the constitutional conference which had been postponed, the representative of the United Kingdom said that he could not name a date but that, as he had indicated in his statement, his Government hoped that constitutional progress would be maintained.

Review of the situation in the Territory

14. Throughout the period following the adoption by the Special Committee of its resolution on Aden on 17 November 1964, the members of the Sub-Committee on Aden have closely followed developments in and concerning the Territory. An outline of developments considered by the Sub-Committee is contained in the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-98 above of the present chapter). These developments took place subsequent to those already reviewed by the Sub-Committee in section III of its report to the Special Committee in 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VI, annex).

15. In reviewing these developments the Sub-Committee on Aden wishes to draw attention to the following, to which it attaches particular significance.

Acceptance of the concept of a unitary state for the area

16. The announcement on 7 December 1964 by the Ministers of Aden and the Federation of South Arabia that they had agreed on the creation of a unitary sovereign state comprising all the States of Southern Arabia, and the approval given to this by the United Kingdom Government is welcomed by the Sub-Committee on Aden. In this connexion, the Sub-Committee recalls that its predecessor, the Sub-Committee on Aden of 1963, had noted in its report (A/5446/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix) that one of the principal demands of the people was for the unification of the Territory and for the dissolution of the Federation which they regarded as "false", "a sham" and undemocratic, being designed "to divert the people from realizing their goal of true unity and independence" (*ibid.*, para. 81). Further, basing itself on the expressed wishes of the people of Aden and the Protectorates, the Sub-Committee on Aden stated in its conclusions: "The entire population is also eager for national unity, but the present Federation—which, it should be noted, does not include all the States in the area—represents merely an artificial unity imposed upon them and governed by provisions which ensure United Kingdom control" (*ibid.*, para. 164). Finally, it recommended that the administering Power be asked to take the necessary steps to hold general elections, with a view to establishing a government for the whole of the Territory (*ibid.*, para. 176(3)). This recommendation, along with others made by the Sub-Committee, was subsequently adopted by the Special Committee and by the General Assembly in its resolution 1949 (XVIII). Again, in its report presented in 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VI, annex), this present Sub-Committee recorded wishes expressed to it by the people for a central government for the whole Territory and their opposition to the present Federation. It also reiterated the General Assembly's call for the establishment of a single government for the Territory.

Retention by the United Kingdom of the military base in Aden

17. It is a matter of deep regret to the Sub-Committee on Aden that the new United Kingdom Government has announced that its policy is to retain its military base in Aden. The United Kingdom has stated that the base will be retained in agreement with the Government of the Federation and "for so long as it is required to serve the interests which we have in common". Apart from any other considerations, the question of the maintenance of a base of this kind in the Territory should be decided upon in accordance with the wishes of the people expressed through their own elected representative government. Both this present Sub-Committee on Aden, and its predecessor, have recorded the clearly expressed wish of the people that this base should be evacuated. It has also been clearly shown that the people do not regard the Government of the Federation as representative, and this would seem to have been confirmed by the recent decision to discard the Federation in favour of a unitary state. Moreover, the Special Committee and the General Assembly, in General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII), have stated that the maintenance of the base in Aden is prejudicial to the security of the region and that its early removal is therefore desirable.

Postponement of the constitutional conference that was to be held in March 1965

18. The postponement of the constitutional conference that was to be held in London in March 1965 is a matter of concern, as also are the circumstances that led to it. The Sub-Committee on Aden has been informed by the representative of the United Kingdom that one of the Colonial Secretary's major tasks since then has been "to examine with the High Commissioner ways and means whereby progress can be maintained". The Sub-Committee is disappointed that it was not able to obtain further details of what the United Kingdom Government was doing beyond the statement that the Colonial Secretary had discussed proposals with the High Commissioner and hoped to be able to make a further statement "before long". The Sub-Committee feels that the present state of affairs calls for speedy and positive action lest the situation drift and the initiative be lost.

Continuation of military operations in the Territory

19. The Sub-Committee on Aden notes with serious concern that the United Kingdom continues to carry out military operations against the people of the Territory. Reports indicate that military actions have taken place particularly in the Radfan area, in Fadhlī State and along the border with Yemen. The Sub-Committee recalls that this is contrary to the resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly which have repeatedly called on the administering Power to "cease forthwith all repressive action against the people of the Territory, in particular, military expeditions and the bombing of villages".

Continuation of the state of emergency

20. It is a matter of deep concern to the Sub-Committee on Aden that the state of emergency in the Federation which was declared on 10 December 1963 is still in force. This is a matter of deep regret to the Sub-Committee, and is contrary to the Special Committee's resolution of 9 April 1964. The Sub-Committee also views with concern the Federal decree of 23 February 1965 empowering the States to impose curfews. A curfew was imposed for a short time in Aden State between 30 March and 2 April and again on 22 April. The Sub-Committee notes the statement of the Chief Minister that the decision to impose the curfew was the High Commissioner's and that the Aden Ministers had nothing to do with it.

Declaration by the nationalist parties and leaders at Cairo in March 1965

21. The Sub-Committee on Aden also wishes to draw attention to the declaration by the principal nationalist organizations and leaders in Cairo in which they reaffirmed their full support of the United Nations resolutions on Aden and demanded that they be fully implemented. They also stated that these resolutions should be the basis of any future discussions and negotiations.

Declaration by the Chief Minister of Aden

22. The Sub-Committee on Aden also wishes to draw attention to the important statement made in the Legislative Council on 19 April 1965 by Mr. Abdul Qawee Mackawee, Chief Minister of Aden State, calling on the United Kingdom to implement the United Nations resolutions in order to achieve a political settlement of the problems of South Arabia. In the course of this statement, the Chief Minister said, "We are fully determined to make a firm stand in the face of any attempt to ignore the true aims of the people or any endeavour to dictate terms for an independence of the kind to which I have referred. In this stand... we are in full agreement with major political organizations of the country." He also warned Britain against delay in fulfilling the people's aspirations and said that the only solution open to the British Government was to implement the United Nations resolutions under which the people could choose with complete freedom their central Government and central Parliament. Mr. Mackawee also said that he would be introducing two motions before the Council, one calling for implementation of the United Nations resolutions, and the other demanding the lifting of the state of emergency, restoration of public freedoms, release of political detainees and return of all political exiles. The Sub-Committee also draws attention to the report that on 22 April the Aden Ministers sent a cable to the Colonial Secretary protesting against the imposition of a curfew which they stated "complicates our problems". The cable emphasized the necessity of "a political solution acceptable to the people" and requested the implementation of the United Nations resolutions "which will put an end to all disturbances". The Sub-Committee recalls that the present Chief Minister appeared as a petitioner before the Sub-Committee in 1964, at which time he had stated that the aims of the independent group he represented were identical to those held by all free nationalist parties in Aden.

Decision to repeal the Industrial Relations Ordinance

23. The Sub-Committee on Aden notes with satisfaction the announcement by the Aden Government, on 30 March 1965, that it has decided to repeal the Industrial Relations Ordinance. This ordinance, which has seriously interfered with workers'

rights, is one of the laws restricting public freedoms which the Special Committee and the General Assembly have called on the United Kingdom to repeal.

Visit by a representative of the International Red Cross

24. The Sub-Committee on Aden also notes that a representative of the International Red Cross has visited the Territory. It will be recalled that the present Sub-Committee had recommended that international relief organizations, such as the International Red Cross, should be invited to send representatives to the Territory to assist the civilian population which has suffered from military operations. The Sub-Committee awaits with interest the report of the representative of the International Red Cross.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE

25. The situation in Aden and the Protectorates continues to be extremely serious. The Sub-Committee on Aden deplores the fact that the resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly are still not being implemented in Aden and the Protectorates by the administering Power. Among other things, the Sub-Committee is concerned to note that the state of emergency has not been lifted and many of the laws restricting public freedoms are still in effect.

26. The policies being pursued by the administering Power in the Territory continue to give rise to tension in the area, in particular along the border with Yemen. The Sub-Committee notes with concern that the United Kingdom is still carrying out military operations against the people of the Territory. Moreover, the decision by the United Kingdom Government to maintain its military base in Aden adds to the aggravation of the state of tension in the area. For all these reasons, the Sub-Committee considers that the situation in the area is still critical and explosive and should be closely followed so that if necessary it can be drawn to the attention of the Security Council.

27. The Sub-Committee deeply regrets that the United Kingdom Government is still not willing to permit the Sub-Committee to visit the Territory. It is not necessary here for the Sub-Committee to reiterate the compelling reasons for such a visit. The Sub-Committee remains firmly convinced of the value of such a visit to the Territory.

28. The Sub-Committee notes that there have been signs of a slight change in the attitude of the administering Power, such as its support for the concept of a unitary state for the area, and its apparent willingness to widen the representation at the constitutional conference.

29. The Sub-Committee remains fully convinced that the solution of the question of Aden can best be found through the immediate and full implementation of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the resolutions of the General Assembly concerning Aden, in particular resolution 1949 (XVIII). The measures set out in these resolutions express the wishes of the people and are fully supported by the political parties and the present Aden Ministers, as is shown by the declarations issued recently in Cairo and in Aden respectively.

30. With regard to the political and constitutional negotiations that are at present being carried on, the Sub-Committee believes that if the United Kingdom bases its proposals on the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) containing the Declaration and of resolution 1949 (XVIII), the question will be speedily settled. Further, any constitutional conference that is held should be representative of all sectors of public opinion of the Territory. At this stage, the Sub-Committee feels that a clear-cut statement by the United Kingdom accepting the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII) would be the absolute minimum and would go a long way towards reducing tensions in the area, thus paving the way for the speedy accession of the Territory to independence in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people.

31. In view of all these considerations the Sub-Committee on Aden feels that the situation in Aden and the Protectorates continues to be extremely serious and demands the urgent attention of the Special Committee.

Annex I

LETTER DATED 2 DECEMBER 1964 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON ADEN, ADDRESSED TO THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS

I have the honour to refer to the resolution on Aden adopted on 17 November 1964 by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Under the terms of this resolution, the Sub-Committee on Aden has been maintained with the same terms of reference as before, as contained in operative paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution of 9 April 1964 [188 (1964)]. The composition of the Sub-Committee is the same as when it was originally established. This was confirmed at the 318th meeting of the Special Committee held on 30 November 1964.

On behalf of the Sub-Committee, I would like to reiterate the wish of its members to carry out the mandate entrusted to it in a spirit of co-operation and understanding. I therefore draw the attention of Your Excellency to the provision of the Special Committee's resolution of 9 April requesting the Sub-Committee to "establish contacts with the administering Power at such time and place as may be agreed upon, with a view to implementing resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII)" (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VI, para. 166). It is our hope that, in view of the declared desire of your Government to move the Territory towards independence and of the intention to reassess the situation there, early contacts will be established within the context of the above-mentioned resolutions.

(Signed) Voeunsai SONN
Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Aden

Annex II

LETTER DATED 15 JANUARY 1965 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS, ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON ADEN

I have the honour to refer to your letter number TR 300 ADEN of 2 December 1964, about the resolution on Aden adopted by the Special Committee on 17 November 1964.

I am instructed by my Government to draw Your Excellency's attention to the visit paid to Aden in November and December by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Anthony Greenwood. The United Kingdom representative in the Special Committee informed the Committee of the Colonial Secretary's intention of making this visit in his statement on 17 November at the 314th meeting. I am sure it will be understood that Her Majesty's Government will require time before reaching final conclusions about future policy on Aden and the Federation of South Arabia on the basis of the Colonial Secretary's assessment of the situation during his visit to the territory. Subject to this, Her Majesty's Government will be glad to enter into contacts with the Sub-Committee on Aden at the appropriate time in whatever manner may be mutually convenient, in accordance with the provision of the Special Committee's resolution of 9 April 1964, to which Your Excellency referred in your letter.

(Signed) CARADON

APPENDIX II

Report of the Sub-Committee on Aden (September 1965)*

CONTENTS

| | Paragraphs |
|--|------------|
| Introduction | 1-3 |
| Recent developments concerning the Territory | 4-61 |
| Contacts with the administering power | 62-70 |
| Conclusions | 71-80 |

INTRODUCTION

1. The Sub-Committee on Aden was established by a resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 9 April 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VI, para. 166). The Sub-Committee's terms of reference, as set out in that resolution, are as follows:

"(a) Study and keep under constant review the situation in the Territory and to report thereon to the Special Committee;

"(b) Establish contacts with the administering Power at such time and place as may be agreed upon, with a view to implementing resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII);

"(c) Arrange, in consultation with the administering Power, for visits to the Territory;

"(d) Make such other visits as may be deemed necessary."

2. The Sub-Committee has already presented two reports to the Special Committee. The first (*ibid.*, chap. VI, annex) was presented in November 1964, and the second (see appendix I of the present chapter) was submitted in April 1965. Following the submission of its last report, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on Aden on 17 May 1965, the text of which can be found in paragraph 300 above of the present chapter.

3. This report is submitted in response to the request of the Special Committee contained in the resolution of 17 May 1965 and is supplementary to the Sub-Committee's two previous reports. It was unanimously adopted by the Sub-Committee at its meeting on 9 September 1965.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE TERRITORY

4. The Sub-Committee on Aden has continued to follow closely developments concerning the Territory. In the following paragraphs the Sub-Committee sets out a factual account of recent developments subsequent to those contained in section A of the present chapter on Aden included in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly. The Sub-Committee's comments on these developments appear in the section containing its conclusions (see paras. 71-80 below).

Resolutions adopted by Aden Legislative Council in April-May 1965 concerning United Nations resolutions

5. On 28 April 1965, the Aden Legislative Council adopted the following resolution:

"This Council respectfully requests His Excellency the High Commissioner to take such steps as are necessary to secure the immediate implementation of the public demands for the lifting of the state of emergency, the release of all detainees, the return of all deportees and exiles and the full restoration of public freedom."

6. The resolution, which was introduced by the Chief Minister, Mr. Abdul Qawee Mackawee, was adopted by a vote of 21 to none, with 1 abstention. The abstaining vote was that of the Attorney-General, the only *ex officio* member of the Council.

7. On 4 May 1965, the Aden Legislative Council adopted a further resolution which read as follows:

"This Council resolves that the Aden Government in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 should base its policy on the following principles of the above-mentioned United Nations resolution:

"(1) That the people of South Arabia have the right to exercise their right to self-determination and freedom from colonial rule in accordance with the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples;

"(2) That the people of South Arabia should be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination with regard to their future, the exercise of that right to take the form of a consultation with the whole population to be held as soon as possible on the basis of universal adult suffrage;

"(3) That all laws which restrict public freedom should be repealed;

"(4) That all political prisoners and detainees and persons who have been sentenced following actions of political significance should be released;

* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.243 and Corr.1.

"(5) That the return of all persons who have been exiled or forbidden to reside in the Territory because of political activities should be allowed;

"(6) That all repressive action should cease;

"(7) That the necessary constitutional changes should be introduced to enable the establishment of a representative organ and the setting up of a provisional Government for the whole of South Arabia in accordance with the wishes of the population, such legislative organ and Government to be constituted following general elections to be held on the basis of universal adult suffrage and with full respect for human rights and freedom;

"(8) That an independent impartial body from nations not interested in the area should be invited to be present before and during such elections and to bring about a democratic climate in the area;

"(9) That such elections should be held before the attainment of independence, which will be granted with the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants;

"(10) That after the creation of a Government resulting from such elections, conversations should be opened without delay between that Government and the British Government for the purpose of fixing a date for the granting of independence and the arrangements for the transfer of power, and for the purpose of negotiation regarding the continuance or otherwise of the British base in Aden.

"Provided that nothing in this resolution should be implemented either wholly or in part except after prior consultation with and the complete approval of the main popular political parties in Aden."

8. This resolution, which was also introduced by the Chief Minister, was adopted by the Legislative Council on 4 May by a vote of 15 to none, with 1 abstention; six of the opposition members were absent, and the Attorney-General abstained.

9. In introducing the motion, the Chief Minister said that colonialism wanted to take refuge behind the Council and distort the facts. The facts were that neither Aden nor the Federation had formulated their own Constitutions. The Aden Constitution had been formulated in London by the British in order to consolidate their position. The High Commissioner remained in control of internal security, foreign affairs, defence, the civil service, the police, high financial policy and land matters. The Federal Constitution was bound by an Advisory and Protection Treaty, which, through the system of British Advisers, had made British advice compulsory on the Government of the Federation. By these means, and by issuing Orders-in-Council, Britain had monopolized authority in the country. The situation was dangerous; Britain was the whole constitutional authority and only limited powers remained in the hands of the Ministers. That was why, when issuing statements, he and his colleagues had been careful to emphasize that they were "the Adeni Ministers" and not "the National Government". They did not wish to deceive the people or give the impression to the world that there was a National Government.

10. Continuing, Mr. Mackawee said:

"Now that Britain is talking about its desire to grant independence to the sons of this country, I wish to state explicitly that we no longer have any faith in their goodwill, and that the policy of holding constitutional conferences at this stage is of no avail. Our past experiences have been bitter and there has been no scope up to now for any improvement. There is no satisfactory political solution except the implementation of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) in full, and I repeat, in full. Britain must be speedy about studying positive measures for the implementation of this resolution and it should not hesitate to comply with this popular demand and declare its acceptance, so that it may avoid a situation wherein a political solution would be impossible."

11. Mr. Mackawee also referred to the British White Paper issued in February 1962 which, he said, exposed "the close relationship which colonialism has with the interests of monopolizing petroleum companies and the military base, as

the preservation of these interests in the main basis upon which colonialism stands". He added:

"The situation, therefore, calls for a speedy end to this dangerous affair which will threaten the peace of the world if it continues for long. Britain must understand that her schemes that aim at the preservation of this strategic area that falls in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans have no scope in our country. People here reject any scheme that threatens their full independence and dignity. There shall be no military bases or colonialist interests that can buy our liberty and dignity, and for this we shall struggle whatever the cost may be."

12. The Chief Minister also outlined what he thought should be done. He said that these were merely suggestions and opinions that might be changed. He emphasized that he would not accept any amendment or change in the core of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) and would reject any suggestions or proposals that would weaken it. The Chief Minister's views on what should be done were expressed as follows:

"In response to the demand of the people Britain must, first of all, act speedily to call an international independent body to be sent to the area by the United Nations, whose duty would be to introduce democratic systems in the area to create an atmosphere of liberty which would allow the political organizations to continue their political activities in the area without interference from any foreign influence, thereby guaranteeing public freedom. This body should remain for one year, or a similar period, at the end of which it should supervise free and honest elections throughout the area. Upon the arrival of this United Nations body, Britain should immediately dissolve the Legislative Council and the ministerial councils throughout the area; revoke the Aden and Federal Constitutions as well as the 1959 Treaty and all other advisory and protection treaties. The High Commissioner should give up all his powers in respect of Aden and the rest of South Arabia and should withdraw all political advisers and officers from the area. Thereafter, a temporary central Government should be instituted for the whole of South Arabia, comprised of persons who enjoy the trust of all the people, political organizations and representatives of popular movements in the area. This temporary Government should have a temporary Constitution that should guarantee public freedom, human rights and should receive sovereignty for all affairs in the area with the exception of foreign affairs. It should also shoulder the responsibility of all security and regular forces.

"The Constitution of this temporary Government should provide for the following: that its period of rule should not exceed one year or a similar agreed period and that during this time it should prepare laws regarding persons who qualify for election. It should draft election regulations for the whole of the area so that it may become possible to hold democratic and free elections throughout the Territory; to divide the area into suitable constituencies after reaching an understanding with the United Nations body; to permit all political parties and democratic organizations to act in complete freedom throughout the area, and to hold free and democratic elections in South Arabia for the creation of an elected Parliament.

"At the end of its period, the United Nations body should supervise the holding of elections in a democratic and free manner in the absence of any pressure or influence from any quarter. These elections would result in the setting up of a central Parliament which would be completely elected and therefore representative of the people. The first of this Parliament's duties would be to set up a Constitution Committee which should include Arab men of law such as Syed Al-Badwi for the drafting of a permanent popular Constitution for a new and permanent Government which would arise out of this elected Parliament. The powers of this new Government would include the opening of negotiations with Britain to fix a date for the granting of an unconditional independence, to make arrangements for the complete transfer of sovereignty to the people and the determination of the fate of the base in conformity with the people's will which has already been expressed clearly in this Chamber."

13. During the debate in the Legislative Council, an opposition member, Mr. Zain Abdu Baharoon, said that the proposed motion did not contain the complete text of the United Nations resolution, and that the most important points in that resolution which Britain opposed had been left out. He would have preferred, therefore, not to mention the United Nations resolution unless it was to be accepted in full. When he asked why the Chief Minister had not been able to submit the United Nations resolution in full to the Council, the Speaker of the Council replied that certain paragraphs of the United Nations resolution referred to external affairs which under the Constitution were a matter for the Federal Government. Since, as Speaker, he could not permit any discussion of external affairs in the Aden Legislative Council, he had ruled out of order those paragraphs of the Chief Minister's original motion that had referred to external affairs.

14. After the motion was passed, Mr. Mackawee declared that his Government had decided to submit a demand to the Colonial Office, which he would have all members of the Legislative Council sign, calling for full implementation of the United Nations resolutions. He added:

"If Britain refuses to accept the people's demand for implementation of the United Nations resolutions, the Government and Legislative Council members should make impossible the creation of a Government imposed by Britain."

Proposed constitutional commission for South Arabia

15. On 11 May 1965, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Anthony Greenwood, said that the United Kingdom Government had decided to appoint a constitutional commission for South Arabia. He defined the commission's terms of reference as follows:

"In the light of the wish of the Governments and people of South Arabia to achieve independence as soon as possible, and the general desire in South Arabia for unity, and bearing in mind the declared aspiration of Her Majesty's Government to bring Aden and all the States of the Protectorate of South Arabia, both within and without the Federation, to independence as a single State by 1968, to consider, after consultation with the Governments and peoples of South Arabia, the constitutional structure appropriate for a sovereign independent South Arabian State and the necessary interim constitutional arrangements leading to its introduction, and to make recommendations."

The Special Committee was informed of this decision on the same day.

16. Before this announcement was made, the Federal Government had issued a policy statement which, while reiterating the Government's policy of creating a unitary State for the whole of South Arabia said:

"What is required is to seek, with such outside help as may be appropriate, a way of ascertaining not only our views, but the views of States, political and other organizations, and individuals, and of formulating a constitution which is best for our beloved south and which will help us to achieve real national unity."

17. A statement issued on 11 May by the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS)^a said that the "unconstitutional and unrepresentative" policy statement of the Federal Government appeared to favour an informal suggestion made earlier by the High Commissioner to invite "a pro-British Government Commission" to decide on a suitable constitution. The statement continued: "We reaffirm in this connexion our rejection and boycott of such a phoney commission and warn that OLOS with its affiliate organizations will resist such a move by all means available, including civil disobedience in all the towns of Aden and the Protectorates."

18. On 12 May 1965, Mr. Mackawee was reported as saying that the United Kingdom decision to send a commission to South Arabia was "a mockery". He said that he and his ministers rejected the commission and would boycott it. He

concluded by saying: "We certainly do not want a constitution of the making of a pro-British Government commission. The constitution must be made by the people's representatives in a Government emerging from a central Parliament elected under the United Nations supervision."

19. On the same day, Mr. Ali Luqman, Secretary-General of the Peoples Congress Party, was reported as saying that his party would boycott the commission. Mr. Rahman Girgrah, President of the United National Party, was reported to have said that he did not think his party's attitude would differ from those of the other political parties. Mr. Luqman also resigned as Federal Minister of Civil Aviation and from both the Federal Supreme Council and the Federal Council.

20. On 13 May, twenty-one federal councillors, including twenty from Aden State, walked out of the Federal Council in protest against the dismissal of seven federal councillors by their rulers for having joined Adenis in demanding implementation of United Nations resolutions. The Aden Minister of State for Constitutional Affairs, Mr. Saeed Hasson Sohbi (one of the ministers who walked out) was reported as saying that they were walking out because Aden ministers on the Supreme Council were not consulted in the preparation of the Federal Government policy statement of 10 May which contradicted the United Nations 1963 resolutions, and also because of the Government's agreement with Britain about sending a constitutional commission to South Arabia in spite of the Aden Government's opposition. He said that unless the dismissed members were reinstated, the twenty-one federal councillors would boycott all meetings or the present session.

21. On 19 May the South Arabian Federal Council adopted a motion concerning United Nations resolutions on Aden. The motion, which was unanimously adopted by the fifty-two members present, read, in part, as follows:

"Whereas this Council fully supported the basic principle of the December 1963 United Nations resolutions concerning the right of the people of South Arabia for self-determination and freedom from foreign domination... the Council recommends to the Federal Supreme Council (Cabinet) to urgently arrange a conference within two months of representatives of the Federal Council and all States of South Arabia as well as political parties in the region to study the best ways, including the United Nations resolutions, and to reach agreement and submit recommendations concerning a unified policy for setting up a unitary democratic, sovereign State in South Arabia..."

22. In a statement on behalf of the Federal Government, the Minister of State for Supreme Council Affairs welcomed and accepted the motion. He denied that the Federal Government opposed the United Nations resolutions altogether, and added that the implementation of certain parts of those resolutions in South Arabia was impracticable.

23. On 24 May, Mr. Greenwood announced that Sir Evelyn Hone, formerly Governor of Northern Rhodesia, would be chairman of the constitutional commission for South Arabia. Although the Colonial Secretary did not name the other members, he said he hoped that the commission would contain a member from the Commonwealth and another one from outside the Commonwealth.

24. Further opposition to the constitutional commission was expressed in June by the Aden Ministers. A memorandum was addressed to the United Kingdom Minister of Defence, Mr. Denis Healey, during his visit to Aden, and on 18 June, Mr. Saeed Hasson Sohbi, Aden Minister of State for Constitutional Affairs, was sent to London. Before his departure, he said that he would be explaining South Arabian problems to the Commonwealth leaders to canvas their support, and would emphasize the necessity for carrying out the United Nations resolutions in South Arabia. He would also try to persuade Commonwealth countries not to participate in the constitutional commission.

25. In a statement to the Special Committee on 16 June, Mr. Qahtan Shaabi, who spoke on behalf of the National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen, referred to the *volte face* by the Aden Legislative Council and the Council of the so-called Federation which "were now pressing for the application of the pertinent United Nations resolutions".

^a The formation of OLOS is described in para. 51 below. At the time its affiliate organizations included the Peoples Socialist Party, the South Arabian League and the Committee for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen.

This was a political manoeuvre that was being complemented by the United Kingdom announcement that a constitutional commission was going to be sent to the Territory. Continuing, he said that the National Front had exposed that plot to make improper use of the United Nations resolutions which, as drafted, were inadequate for the present phase of the struggle since they covered but a minute part of the just demands underlying the popular revolution. Those demands were: complete political and economic liberation from colonialism for the whole of South Yemen and the off-shore islands; unconditional liquidation of the British military base in Aden and the sub-bases elsewhere in the Territory and the islands; removal of the reactionary régime of the imperialistic lackey sultans; and restoration of the land of the plundered wealth of the people. Mr. Shaabi said that it was not enough for the United Nations resolutions to speak of the desirability of removing the military base in Aden; what the National Front and the people wanted was its immediate unconditional liquidation. Also there was no reference in these resolutions to the sub-bases that were being established. Both those points should be covered in any subsequent resolution.

26. On 20 June, Mr. Abdullah Abdul Majid Al-Asnag, President of the Peoples Socialist Party, announced that a leading member of the Party, Mr. Muhammad Salem Basendwah, had flown to Saudi Arabia to request King Faisal to ask Pakistan and Malaysia not to take part in the constitutional commission which the United Kingdom planned to send to South Arabia. The Peoples Socialist Party had previously already sent messages to the Pakistan and Malaysian High Commissioners in London asking them to request their respective Governments to boycott the commission.

27. On 17 June, following the decision by the Federal Government to call a constitutional conference of South Arabian leaders to examine the best means of establishing a democratic unitary State for South Arabia (see para. 21 above), it was announced that the Federal Government had set 27 June as the date for the proposed conference. The Federal Minister of National Guidance and Information said that invitations had been sent to representatives of the Federal Council, the federated States and political organizations, as well as to the States of Q'aiti, Kathiri and Mahra.

28. On 23 June, it was reported that the South Arabian Federal Supreme Council had postponed indefinitely the proposed conference. In the announcement it was stated that the conference had been postponed because the Aden Ministers, the political parties and the Eastern Aden Protectorate States of Q'aiti, Kathiri, and Mahra had refused the invitations. This postponement followed a public announcement by the Q'aiti Government aligning itself with the Aden Ministers and political parties in demanding that the United Nations resolutions should be used as a basis for solving the problems of South Arabia. Announcing the refusal of the Aden Ministers to attend this conference, Mr. Mackawee said: "We, as all political parties, have on several occasions clearly expressed our view that the only political solution to all the problems of South Arabia lies in full implementation of the United Nations resolutions."

29. On 15 July, Mr. Greenwood announced that he had appointed Sayyid Muhammad Abu Rannat, a former Chief Justice of Sudan, and Professor Noel Coulson as members of the constitutional commission for South Arabia. The Colonial Secretary added: "The Commission will begin its work as soon as possible and I know that the House will share my hope that all sections of the people of South Arabia will take advantage of the Commission's visit to discuss the constitutional future of the area constructively, and to make their views known to the Commission."

30. In a statement made on 16 July, the chairman of the commission, Sir Evelyn Hone, said that he thought that the talk of a boycott of the commission was based on a misunderstanding of its purpose. His statement continued:

"We should like to emphasize two points. First, we are going out to South Arabia with open minds and with freedom to recommend whatever path to independence we think will be acceptable to all concerned. Second, we can only recommend. We have no authority to impose anything and it will be for the Government to act. We want to hear everyone

who has a legitimate concern in this matter and we sincerely hope they will be ready to talk to us."

Sir Evelyn Hone also said that the commission's sole purpose was to write a report which took fully into account the views of the Governments and peoples of Aden and South Arabia "in reaching the agreed goal of early independence".

31. On 19 July, Mr. Mackawee was reported to have sent two messages to Shaikh Ismail al-Azhari, President of the Sudan Supreme Council, asking him to withdraw Sayyid Muhammad Abu Rannat, the Sudanese member on the constitutional commission. In his messages, Mr. Mackawee was reported to have stated that the proposed constitutional commission was in violation of United Nations and Arab League resolutions concerning South Arabia. A similar message was sent on 18 July by fourteen Federal Councillors, expressing their regret at Sudan's action which, they said, was contrary to the wishes of the people of South Arabia.

32. On 19 July, the Colonial Office announced that Sayyid Muhammad Abu Rannat had withdrawn from the commission.

33. After a meeting held on 18 July between the Aden Ministers and Aden Federal Councillors, Mr. Mackawee announced that sixteen Aden representatives had resigned from the Federal Council, in protest against the United Kingdom's insistence on sending the commission.

34. On 20 July, Mr. Mackawee banned the entry into Aden State of members of the United Kingdom constitutional commission, declaring its members "undesirable immigrants". Referring to this action, a United Kingdom official stated that the High Commissioner was unaware of the constitutional powers invoked by Mr. Mackawee and that the legal position was being studied. Mr. Mackawee said that he had told the Controller of Immigration to apply the same procedure as was applied to the United Nations Sub-Committee on Aden in 1963.

35. On 22 July, it was reported that the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Greenwood, had stated that, following the withdrawal of Sayyid Muhammad Abu Rannat, the constitutional commission for South Arabia, which was to leave London on 21 July, had been forced to postpone its departure. However, the commission had not been disbanded, and the Government would still try to find others to take part in it.

Colonial Secretary's visit to Aden

36. Mr. Greenwood arrived in Aden on 23 July. Before leaving Aden on 25 July, he announced that he had been able to have constructive discussions with the Federal Ministers, the Aden Government and representatives of political parties and other points of view, and he was grateful to all who had helped him in this way. All the talks had been held in the context of the principles of self-determination and independence set out in the United Nations resolution on this area in 1963, and of Britain's declared intention to bring South Arabia to independence not later than 1968. He had proposed that a representative working party be set up "very urgently" to meet in London to prepare an agenda for full-scale constitutional conference later this year. Afterwards, the working party could act as a steering committee sitting in Aden, under the chairmanship of the High Commissioner, for co-ordinating further preparation. The initial response to this proposal had been "sufficiently favourable" for him to hope that by this means real progress would be made soon.

37. The Aden Legislative Council met on 26 July, but adjourned indefinitely because of the United Kingdom proposal that South Arabian representatives should go to London to prepare a constitutional conference agenda. Mr. Mackawee told the Council that a close study of the proposal was required before a final decision could be reached. On the same day, the Aden Ministers and the United Kingdom officials who went to the States of the Eastern Aden Protectorate returned to Aden. Sultan Saleh bin Husain al Audhali, Federal Minister of Internal Security and Acting Minister of Information, who was one of the group, said that the results of the visit "were successful and encouraging for the future of South Arabia".

38. On 28 July, it was reported that the National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South had announced that

it totally rejected Mr. Greenwood's proposal to hold a constitutional conference in London later this year. The leader of the National Front, Mr. Qalhan Shaabi, who issued the statement, pledged himself to combat the idea of a conference "by all methods", and said the National Front would consider any South Arabian citizen partaking in the proposed conference as a "traitor". He reiterated his statement that the United Nations resolutions were inadequate for the present stage of the struggle (see para. 25 above).

39. It was also reported on 28 July that Mr. Al-Asnag, leader of the Peoples Socialist Party, had arrived in Cairo to consult the exiled leaders of Fadli, Audhali and Aulaqi states on the Colonial Secretary's recent proposals. Mr. Al-Asnag declared there that he and other South Arabian leaders agreed with Mr. Greenwood's proposal that a working party representing the various political forces in South Arabia should go to London as soon as possible to discuss an agenda for the constitutional conference.

40. Before his departure for London, Mr. Mackawee is reported to have stated that previous conferences held in London were designed solely to carry out the colonial aims of the United Kingdom and to water down the people's aspirations. The forthcoming constitutional conference had not yet been decided upon. Its convening depended on the agreement of all parties concerned in the working party. He added: "While we appreciate the position taken by the National Front and its faith in an armed revolution, we feel that negotiations are the suitable means to solve the question of the South at this juncture. Our readiness to attend the meetings of the working party does not mean that we are under an obligation to attend the constitutional conference. The Aden Government agrees with all nationalist organizations on the basic aims and principles and our policy stems from the popular will. We feel that what we are asking for is the same as what the National Front is asking for." In reply to a question concerning the attitude of the United Kingdom regarding his Government's demands, Mr. Mackawee replied: "The attitude of the United Kingdom, as explained to us by the Colonial Secretary, is that it would carry out our demands if all parties concerned agreed to them."

London talks

41. The meetings of the working party began in London on 3 August, under the chairmanship of the Colonial Secretary. Representation at the talks was as follows: South Arabian Federal Government, four; Aden Government, three; Q'aiti, Kathiri and Mahra, one each; the Peoples Socialist Party and the South Arabians League, one each. Before the meetings began it was announced that, because of "communications difficulties", the Mahra representative would be unable to attend. The talks continued until 8 August when they were broken off.

42. In a statement issued after the talks had broken off, Mr. Greenwood said that the main obstacle to agreement was "the insistence of certain delegations on 100 per cent acceptance of United Nations General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) of 1963 without qualification". In a further statement, Mr. Greenwood emphasized that it remained the United Kingdom's intention that South Arabia should move on to independence not later than 1968, and that it was hoped all the existing States of the area would be included. On this basis the United Kingdom would renew talks, urgently, at any time. With reference to the state of emergency, Mr. Greenwood offered to consider "any proposals with regard to the state of emergency in Aden which are consistent with the safety of the civilian and service population, Arab and British alike, and the security of the base". The statement also said that discussions were being arranged about the return of the South Arabian leaders who were abroad. In connexion with the base, the statement said: "It has always been and remains our intention that the future of any defence facilities should be a matter of negotiations between ourselves and the new Government of the new State." The statement also said that there must be no avoidable delay in the liberalization of the Constitution of the Territory and welcomed the fact that the Federal, Q'aiti and Kathiri Governments were urgently

considering such "modernization". A "more representative franchise" was also promised in Aden.^b

43. At the conclusion of the talks, Mr. Mackawee was reported to have declared that his delegation had come to London with good intentions and with a desire to reach a just solution. Their adherence to the United Nations resolution was a culmination of the struggle of the people of Aden. They demanded the release of detainees as there should be a favourable climate before convening a constitutional conference, and they believed there were more detainees than Mr. Greenwood admitted. Mr. Mackawee added that the United Nations requirements on the base were the minimum they could accept. They would only consider an agenda based on those requirements "and will not accept any reservations that will defeat their effectiveness". Referring to Mr. Greenwood's attitude, Mr. Mackawee said: "In view of the Colonial Secretary's misinterpretation of our stand, we must declare that the British delegation has smeared the conduct of the talks in such a manner as to waste time and impose its own solutions." Mr. Mackawee concluded by saying that the United Kingdom had chosen to fall back on reaction, and must decide whether to continue to align itself with the "feudal set-up" or win the friendship of the people. Until it adopted a progressive policy, they would not meet again.

44. A statement issued on behalf of the Federation of South Arabia on 8 August said: "We appeal to all concerned not to do or say anything which will make the further progress of South Arabia towards independence more difficult, and we shall always be ready to enter into negotiations to further the interests of our country."

45. On 8 August, Mr. Ali Luqman, leader of the Peoples Congress Party, said that the collapse of the talks was not unexpected. That was why his party had turned down the invitation to take part in them. Mr. Luqman called for the dissolution of the Federation and the immediate implementation of the 1963 United Nations resolutions on Aden.

46. On 11 August, Mr. Al-Asnag, leader of the Peoples Socialist Party, said that Britain was largely responsible for the failure of the London talks because it was still following the policy of bargaining and compromise while the cause was no longer in a bargaining or compromise position. Mr. Al-Asnag said that the leaders of the South went to London on the basis of certain principles represented in the resolutions passed by the United Nations in 1963, which provided for granting the Occupied South complete independence and liquidating the military bases in Aden. He reaffirmed that there had been no intention of entering into detailed negotiations. He went on to say that the representatives of the Occupied South were surprised to find that Britain had reservations with regard to liquidating the military base and was attempting to avoid a general election in the area on the pretence that the population was backward. He added that Britain, by refusing to hold a general election in the area, was trying to keep her traditional friends and agents and to preserve the authority of the sheikhs and sultans who were dependent on Britain. He added that Britain had also refused to release political prisoners and lift the present state of emergency. The leaders of the South, in face of this situation, had no alternative but to walk out of the conference. Only members of the Federal Government composed of sultans and sheikhs had stayed.

47. Speaking about the steps to be taken by leaders of the Arab South to reply to Britain and its agents in the area, Mr. Al-Asnag said that they had warned Mr. Greenwood that if the British Government persisted in this policy, it would create more troubles for itself, for it would not find anyone in the popular organizations to bargain with. He added that they had also warned the sheikhs and sultans who were British agents that they would be considered enemies of the people if they persisted in their co-operation with imperialism. A call had been directed by their leaders to the people of the Occupied South for further solidarity, asking them to close their ranks and redouble their resistance to British schemes as a means of realizing their aspirations. Mr. Al-Asnag also stated that many citizens were being held in prison in Aden

^b For the full text of the two statements, see paras. 68 and 69 below.

and the Protectorates without trial. Moreover, 3,000 citizens, including fifteen leaders of the revolution in the Occupied South, were in exile and were not allowed to return home. Mr. Al-Asnag is also reported to have said that the question should be drawn to the attention of the Security Council.

48. In a further statement on 17 August, Mr. Al-Asnag said that Britain had to make the next move because "she terminated the talks for reasons best known to her; as far as we are concerned, there is no change in our position". He reiterated his demand for the full implementation of the United Nations resolutions and said: "We want straight talk about independence and no bargaining."

49. On the same day, Mr. Shaikh Alhabshi of the South Arabian League said that his party would not take part in any further conference unless Britain adopted a more liberal policy.

50. Following the London talks, Mr. Mackawee and the Aden Minister for Finance, Mr. Khalifa Abdulla Hasson Khalifa, had discussions with the secretariat of the Arab League in Cairo. In a statement issued on 12 August, Dr. Sayed Nofal, Acting Secretary-General of the Arab League, said that Mr. Mackawee had asked the Secretary-General of the Arab League "to convey the viewpoints of the leaders of the national bodies in the Occupied South about the British attitude towards the South to the Government of the Arab countries and the Arab League Council". He also stated that the issue would be submitted to the Arab Foreign Minister's Conference, to be held in Casablanca beginning 9 September.

Merger of political parties

51. In February 1965, following a meeting in Cairo of nationalist parties and leaders sponsored by the Arab League, a new organization was formed, known as the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS). On 7 May, it was reported that after attending a conference in Taiz, the Peoples Socialist Party, the South Arabian League and the Committee for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen had decided that in two months' time they would merge with OLOS to undertake a struggle against British colonialism in South Arabia. The deposed Sultan of Fadhli and other exiled sheikhs were among the 200 persons attending the conference. The conference decided that the Peoples Socialist Party and the South Arabian League should set up a joint committee in Aden to lead the national struggle in the name of OLOS, pending the merger. It was announced that a national council of all South Arabians opposed to the colonialist presence would be formed, and that a committee had been charged with making contact with all tribes and leading persons for the purpose of selecting members of this council. Those attending the conference were reported to have pledged allegiance to OLOS and to have decided to form an interim supreme command of OLOS to mobilize the national forces and organize their efforts. They were also reported to have undertaken to intensify their struggle against British colonialism and its "stooges", and to have sought the help and support of all Arab and friendly countries.

52. On 30 July, Mr. Al-Asnag announced that, in accordance with the agreement reached at the meetings in May, further meetings had been held between 14 and 17 July at Taiz. Attending were Sultan Ahmed bin Abdullah al Fadhli, Sultan Mohammed bin Aideroos, Amir Jabin bin Husayn, and representatives of the South Arabian League, the Committee for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen, and the Peoples Socialist Party. In a statement issued at the conclusion of the meeting, it was announced that at these meetings the representatives of the Peoples Socialist Party and the Committee for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen had agreed to dissolve their organizations and merge them with OLOS. The representative of the South Arabian League stated, however, that his party was not prepared to disband and incorporate itself into OLOS. The membership of the South Arabian League had been suspended for one month "to give it an opportunity to reconsider its attitude". If it had not changed its attitude by the end of that time it would be regarded as expelled from OLOS. Mr. Al-Asnag said that a delegation from OLOS had visited Cairo to make contact with the Secretary-General of the Arab League and with

representatives of Arab States and other friendly countries. This visit had been very successful and OLOS had been assured of support in its struggle.

53. On 4 August, the Executive Council of the Aden Trades Union Congress (ATUC) was reported to have declared that since the Peoples Socialist Party had declared itself dissolved and had thus dissociated itself from ATUC, it wished to inform public opinion and all workers that it no longer gave its support and allegiance to any political organization and had not authorized anyone to speak on its behalf on the political level. It would continue to observe political developments with great attention and should it feel that the interest and future of the country warranted its interference it would do so. Should the trade union movement in Aden feel that any group or organization in the nationalist field was sincere in following the right way to achieve the aims and aspirations of the people it would not hesitate to give this group or organization its support.

State of emergency

54. The state of emergency, which was declared in December 1963, continues in force throughout the Territory. An increase in incidents involving bombs and bazookas has been reported. These attacks have been mainly directed against servicemen and members of the Aden police.

55. On 5 June, the National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen was officially declared by the High Commissioner to be a terrorist organization under Aden emergency regulations. On 6 June, the Aden Ministers, under Mr. Mackawee, issued a statement in which they dissociated themselves totally from Sir Richard Turnbull's action which they felt was a "retrograde step intended to undermine the present Government and perhaps to compel it to resign".

56. On the same day, OLOS issued a statement condemning the regulations as "fascist measures", and accusing the High Commissioner of "formally converting Aden into a closed area no longer open to basic civil rights or public liberties". Continuing, the statement said that no negotiations on the political future of the Territory could ever be conducted in "the present fearful, Nazi-designed atmosphere". World public opinion should appreciate that violence and political unrest were the normal consequences of such an "unwise and arrogant policy". The entire population of Aden was determined to make all the sacrifices necessary to free their country from foreign rule and from the aggressive military base. In conclusion, the OLOS statement said that the situation in Aden and the Protectorates was a threat to the peace and security of the area, and called for United Nations intervention.

57. In a statement issued on the same day, the National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen said that the atrocities committed by Britain in the Occupied South was but a proof of the strength of the revolution, which was inflicting heavy damage on the enemy. The British would have to imprison the entire people of the Occupied South to destroy the revolution.

58. On 7 July, Sheikh Nashir Abdullah Al-Saqladi, ruler of the Sheikdom of Shaib, was shot to death. His Sheikdom, bordering Yemen, had recently joined the Federation. The National Front, which claimed credit for similar actions in Aden, also claimed credit for the assassination of Sheikh Al-Saqladi. In a broadcast on 9 July, a National Front spokesman stated that Sheikh Nashir Abdullah Al-Saqladi had been warned twice to stop his action as a "British agent".

Military operations in the Territory

59. Military activity between British forces and those of the National Front continues. In his statement before the Special Committee on 16 June, Mr. Shaabi of the National Front said that United Kingdom aggression had recently been expanded to cover the whole country. After giving particulars of the effect of the continuous bombardments carried out by the British Air Force, he said that there was in fact a state of war in the Territory, and United Kingdom claims that only small operations were involved in repelling outside aggression were merely designed to deceive world public opinion. There

was no outside intervention; the armed struggle going on was the result of the spontaneous uprising of the people.

60. Incidents have continued to occur along the border with Yemen. In connexion with these incidents, four letters (S/6489, S/6564, S/6591, S/6617) have been addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General in July and August 1965 by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom and of Yemen.

Supplementary treaty between the United Kingdom and the Federation of South Arabia

61. It was announced on 12 August 1965 that the United Kingdom and the Federation of South Arabia had signed a supplementary treaty which was reported to restrict the Federation's obligation to accept British advice to matters concerning external affairs, defence and the Federal Public Service. The report states that this limitation had been agreed to in July 1964 and that, in January 1965, Mr. Greenwood had informed the Federal Government that, until a treaty was signed, the United Kingdom would only exercise its advisory powers in these fields. Before the public announcement was made, Mr. Mackawee, on 20 July, called for the abrogation of the Treaty of Friendship and Protection between the United Kingdom and the South Arabian Federation. Mr. Mackawee said that the treaty was entirely unacceptable to the people of Aden; he therefore demanded its abrogation.

CONTACTS WITH THE ADMINISTERING POWER

62. At its meeting on 23 August 1965, the Sub-Committee on Aden decided to invite the representative of the United Kingdom to make a statement on recent events concerning the Territory and on the steps the United Kingdom had taken to implement the United Nations resolutions. The Sub-Committee also decided once again to request the United Kingdom to permit the Sub-Committee to visit the Territory, in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee. The Chairman was requested to arrange a meeting with the representative of the United Kingdom in order to transmit these requests.

63. At this meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom stated, in answer to the Sub-Committee's request to visit the Territory, that there had been no change in the circumstances in South Arabia which would cause the United Kingdom Government to modify its earlier decisions regarding a visit.

64. The representative of the United Kingdom also informed the Chairman that he would be willing to make a statement to the Sub-Committee but that he would be unable to say very much about recent developments that went beyond the public statements already made by United Kingdom Ministers.

65. The representative of the United Kingdom made his statement to the Sub-Committee on Aden at its meeting on 2 September. He began his statement by referring to the decision by the Colonial Secretary in May 1965 to appoint a constitutional commission which, it was considered, was the best way to help in the process of furthering discussion between the Governments and political parties in South Arabia about the various possibilities of constitutional development. For reasons of which he felt the Sub-Committee would be aware, it was not possible to proceed with that initiative and the commission had to postpone its departure. Because of those difficulties, the Colonial Secretary had decided to visit the Territory himself and had done so between 23 and 25 July.

66. During his visit, the Colonial Secretary had had valuable and constructive discussions with representatives of the Federal Government, the Aden State Government, the Peoples Socialist Party, and the South Arabian League. The Governments of Q'aiti and Kathiri States had also been fully consulted. The discussions had been directed towards finding a procedure through which all the Governments and parties concerned in South Arabia could resume discussion of the pressing constitutional problems and had as their starting point, first, the generally accepted principles of self-determination and independence expressed in General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) and, secondly, the declared intention of the United

Kingdom Government to bring South Arabia to independence not later than 1968. As a result of these discussions, the Colonial Secretary had proposed that a representative working party should be set up to meet in London under his chairmanship in the first week of August in order to prepare the agenda for a constitutional conference to be held in December. He had recognized that such a working party was only a step towards resolving the difficult matters at issue, but it was thought that it should make it possible to identify the area of agreement and the problems which would have to be dealt with at the constitutional conference. It was also the intention that the same body of delegates attending the working party would continue to meet in Aden after it was over to co-ordinate the detailed study of those problems.

67. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that there were three points which the Sub-Committee on Aden might find of particular interest. First, the area of agreement was considerable; it had been agreed that there should be a working party, and that its starting points should be the same as those of the Aden discussions he had already described—two points on which the Sub-Committee was also agreed. Secondly, the object of the working party was to prepare the way for a constitutional conference—which the Special Committee itself had urged his Government to call in its resolution of 17 May 1965. Thirdly, the difficulties were appreciated in advance: there was a great area of detail to be covered by the working party and by the constitutional conference in setting up the machinery on which an independent government embracing the whole area would be able to function, but it was hoped that the working party would be able at least to identify the problems.

68. In connexion with the meetings of the working party and the reasons why it had not succeeded in its objectives, the representative of the United Kingdom read out the following statement made by the Colonial Secretary on 7 August:

"I deeply regret that the South Arabian Working Party has been unable to reach agreement on the agenda for the full scale constitutional conference to be held in London in December. All members of the Working Party recognized what were the main essential items for the agenda if constitutional development was to proceed rapidly enough for the implementation of the British Government's declared intention to bring South Arabia to independence by 1968. Several items, however, were proposed for the agenda in terms which implied acceptance of a particular solution and which could have been held to prejudice the issues involved. The sole purpose for which all delegates agreed to come to London was to prepare the conference agenda. It was not to prejudge the issues, and the Working Party was convened on the understanding that agreement on items in the conference agenda implied no commitment on the part of any delegation to one particular solution or another.

"After five days of intensive study and discussion it has become apparent that the will to agree does not yet exist. I have therefore had to conclude that we can make no further progress in the Working Party until there is a fuller measure of confidence between the Governments and Parties of South Arabia.

"The main obstacle to agreement was the insistence of certain delegations on a hundred per cent acceptance of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) of 1963 without qualification.

"At the outset of the talks I made clear the British Government's whole-hearted acceptance of the principles of self-determination and independence for South Arabia set out in the resolution. It is the declared intention of the British Government to bring South Arabia to independence not later than 1968.

"The meetings also provided an opportunity to state our position with regard to the future of the base. The base is not a constitutional issue. We had declared that such defence interests as we may have in the area after independence can only be maintained with the consent of the people of the area expressed through their legitimate government. We have agreed to negotiate for any defence facilities we may want

in the area with the South Arabian Government at the time of independence.

"Although it lay strictly outside the terms of reference for the Working Party we also had useful discussions about the internal security situation and the means adopted to deal with it. We explained that while terrorism, violence and intimidation continue, and the British Government is ultimately responsible for law and order, emergency measures must be maintained to deal with it. Some of the delegates pressed the Federal Government and ourselves to lift the emergency at once, without any assurance that violence would cease. Both of us offered to arrange further discussions in Aden as to whether any early relaxations were feasible.

"We were also both of us ready to arrange further discussions on the difficult problem of the return of certain South Arabian notables who in the past few years had either fled the country or had been required to leave it.

"All this represented a great step forward and seemed to promise agreement over a wider field. Unfortunately, the Aden Government and delegations of the Peoples Socialist Party felt it necessary to go back to their demand for nothing less than complete and literal acceptance of the United Nations resolution, including the lifting of the state of Emergency, and made clear that they would not continue to participate in the talks unless their other demands in regard to the emergency and so on were made."

69. Turning to the question of the future, the representative of the United Kingdom read out a further statement made by the Colonial Secretary on 8 August. The statement read as follows:

"It remains our firm intention that South Arabia shall move into independence not later than 1968, and we hope and will do our utmost to ensure that all the existing States of South Arabia will form part of the new independent State.

"We are ready at any time to resume talks in preparation for an independence conference and we hope that all Governments and Parties in South Arabia will regard this as a matter of the utmost urgency.

"Meanwhile we will gladly consider any proposals with regard to the state of Emergency in Aden which are consistent with the safety of the civilian and service population, Arab and British alike, and the security of the Base.

"We are arranging discussions between the Governments and Parties concerned about the return of those South Arabian leaders who are now living outside their country.

"It has always been, and remains, our intention that the future of any defence facilities should be a matter for negotiation between ourselves and the Government of the new State. It is the expressed view of Her Majesty's Government that no base is militarily or morally defensible unless it has the support of the people of the territory in which it is situated.

"It is most important that there should be no further avoidable delay in making progress towards liberalization of the constitutions of the territory between now and independence, and we welcome the fact that the Federal Government and the Q'aiti and Kathiri Governments are urgently considering what can be done to modernize present institutions and laws.

"We are also proposing to the Aden Government that steps should be taken to establish a more representative franchise in Aden State.

"It is of the utmost importance that none of the Governments or Parties in South Arabia should say or do anything which would further exacerbate the situation and make the establishment of confidence between them more difficult."

70. In conclusion, the representative of the United Kingdom said that he thought these statements would show that his Government was patiently continuing, in the face of a very difficult set of problems, its efforts towards the objectives of self-determination and the earliest possible independence for South Arabia.

CONCLUSIONS

71. The situation in Aden and the Protectorates continues to be extremely serious. In this connexion, the Sub-Committee on Aden notes with increasing concern that the administering Power has not lifted the state of emergency, which, through the arbitrary powers it confers on police and security forces in such matters as arrest, search and detention without trial, serves to increase tension. The Sub-Committee notes that this policy has been maintained despite repeated demands for the lifting of the state of emergency, not only from the United Nations, but also from the political parties of the Territory and the Aden State Legislature. It also notes with concern that military operations continue to be carried out against the people of the Territory. The Sub-Committee, therefore, reiterates the view expressed in its last report that the situation in the area is still critical and explosive and should be closely followed so that, if necessary, it can be drawn to the attention of the Security Council.

72. The measures and steps taken by the administering Power in the months since May when the Special Committee last considered the question have been inadequate and have fallen short of the minimum requirements set out in General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII). For this reason, the administering Power's attempts to reach agreement with the political leaders have not been successful and have not reduced tension in the area. Indeed, recent events in the area indicate that tension has increased. The Sub-Committee, therefore, maintains its previously expressed belief that the policies being pursued by the administering Power are giving rise to tension in the area.

73. An encouraging development in the Territory over the past months has been the growing number of statements by political leaders and organizations in the Territory in support of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII). The Sub-Committee draws attention, in particular, to the insistence by the political leaders on the full implementation by the administering Power of this resolution, and to the fears that something less than what is contained in that resolution may be offered. It is the Sub-Committee's considered belief that the action called for in that resolution constitutes the absolute minimum that is required and that nothing short of its strict implementation can be accepted.

74. The Sub-Committee notes the attempts made by the Government of the United Kingdom over the past months in pursuit of its declared intention to grant independence to South Arabia by 1968. It also notes the statement by the Colonial Secretary affirming his Government's "whole-hearted acceptance of the principles of self-determination and independence for South Arabia set out in the resolution". It is the Sub-Committee's view, however, that the failure of both the proposed constitutional commission and the London talks held in August can be attributed to the refusal by the Government of the United Kingdom to accept the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) which, it would point out, not only sets out principles but also outlines the methods whereby self-determination and independence may be achieved. As long as the Government of the United Kingdom fails to accept these methods, which have been accepted by the political leaders, and fails to base its approaches and proposals on them, there would seem to be no hope of any progress. The Sub-Committee would further point out that the present wide measure of acceptance of the methods laid down in General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) may not last indefinitely. The patience of the people of South Arabia in the face of the continued delay in freeing them from colonial rule will soon run out, and it is hardly necessary for the Sub-Committee to draw attention to the fact that in some quarters in South Arabia there are those who already feel that the United Nations resolution does not go far enough. The Sub-Committee, therefore, reiterates the belief expressed in its last report that a clear-cut statement by the United Kingdom accepting the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII) would be an absolute minimum and would go a long way towards reducing tension in the area. At this stage, it would emphasize the pressing need for practical steps to be taken without delay to implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution

1949 (XVIII) while the present widespread support for the resolution remains.

75. In this connexion, the Sub-Committee on Aden has closely considered the statement made by the Colonial Secretary on 8 August. It is encouraged that discussions are being arranged concerning the return of South Arabian leaders now living outside their country. It is the Sub-Committee's view that the independence conference contemplated in this statement should not be held until after the general elections have been held, as set out in General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII). The Sub-Committee notes that the United Kingdom will consider any proposals with regard to the state of emergency consistent with the security of the civilian and service population and the security of the base. This, however, falls far short of what is called for, which is nothing less than the complete abolition of the state of emergency.

76. The Sub-Committee also notes with regret that none of the recent statements made on behalf of the United Kingdom Government has contained any clear-cut, unequivocal acceptance of the role that the United Nations itself is called upon to play in the affairs of the people of this Territory, in particular, with regard to the United Nations presence which is called for in General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) before and during the general elections.

77. The Sub-Committee deeply regrets that the Government of the United Kingdom continues to refuse to permit the Sub-Committee to visit the Territory in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee.

78. The Sub-Committee is convinced that the administering Power's immediate objective should be the holding of general elections throughout the Territory and that it should direct all its efforts towards arranging for them without delay. The immediate steps should be those outlined in General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) and in the resolutions of the Special

Committee, namely, the holding of a conference for the purpose of deciding on the necessary constitutional measures for holding such elections and the establishment of the proper atmosphere in which elections could be held through the abolition of the state of emergency, as well as the repeal of all laws restricting public freedom, the cessation of all repressive actions against the people of the Territory, the release of political detainees and the return of exiles. At the same time, the steps outlined in resolution 1949 (XVIII) should be taken to arrange for an effective United Nations presence before and during these elections. After elections have been held and a representative government has been formed, conversations should be opened without delay with that Government for the purpose of fixing the date for the granting of independence and making the arrangements for the transfer of power.

79. The Sub-Committee on Aden reiterates the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) with regard to the military base in Aden. It notes in the reference to the base made in the statement by the Colonial Secretary of 8 August that it was his intention that the future of any defence facilities should be a matter of negotiation between the United Kingdom and the Government of the new State, and that it was the expressed view of his Government that no base is militarily or morally defensible unless it has the support of the people of the Territory in which it is situated.

80. The seriousness of the situation in Aden and the Protectorates and the possibility of a grave deterioration in the situation unless the United Kingdom takes immediate measures to implement General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) leads the Sub-Committee on Aden to believe that the Special Committee should recommend that the question of Aden be examined by the General Assembly at its forthcoming session as a matter of urgency.

CHAPTER VII

BASUTOLAND, BECHUANALAND AND SWAZILAND

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

1. General

1. Information on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland is contained in the reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its seventeenth (A/5238, chap. V), eighteenth (A/5446/Rev.1, chap. IX) and nineteenth (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII) sessions. Supplementary information on recent political developments concerning the Territories and on economic, social and educational conditions is set out below.

Political developments

2. South Africa has long occupied a dominant position in the political and economic life of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, and of recent years has sought to strengthen its hold over them, a matter over which the General Assembly and the Special Committee have expressed deep concern.

3. As noted in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session, covering its work during 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII), Mr. Hendrik F. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa, suggested to the three Territories in 1963 that they would advance more rapidly if his country should replace the United Kingdom as their guardian and guide towards independence and prosperity within the framework of a South African commonwealth. This plan, designed to turn the Territories into "Bantu homelands", was rejected by the United Kingdom and the

African nationalist political parties. However, it was received with varying degrees of enthusiasm by certain elements in the Territories, notably among the European settlers (mostly South Africans) and by the commercial interests in Swaziland.

4. Two months later, after denying that South Africa was interfering in their affairs, as had been suggested by certain African nationalist leaders, Mr. Verwoerd stated that South Africa was prepared to live in good neighbourliness and friendship with these Territories and that its declared policy was non-interference in the internal affairs of any other State.

5. Subsequently, Mr. Verwoerd was reported to have given the highest priority to his plan for positive co-operation between South Africa and the Territories, as well as with Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and certain African States to the north. This plan, which according to reports has since become a major foreign policy objective, stresses the importance of early independence for, and the prosperity of, the three Territories. The plan also envisages, as the next step, an embryo of a commonwealth of States of Southern Africa and, in the economic sphere, a common market of Southern Africa. The reported conclusion of a firm military alliance between South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia in December 1964 was thought to be in line with this plan.

6. Early in 1965, elections were held in Basutoland and Bechuanaland which were won by the Basutoland

National Party and the Bechuanaland Democratic Party respectively.

7. On 4 March 1965, Mr. Verwoerd was reported to have said that he had sent personal congratulations to Mr. Seretse Khama, the leader of the Bechuanaland Democratic Party, on his election victory. The ban on Mr. Khama's entry into South Africa had been lifted in October 1964. This was done, Mr. Verwoerd stated, "when it became clear that Bechuanaland had been placed on the road to independence and after I had indicated on behalf of the South African Government that, since this was in accordance with the policy of separate development, the Republic would desire friendly relations with such a neighbour State". The details of relations with Bechuanaland could, according to him, be negotiated only when independence was achieved. It would not be possible for Mr. Khama to visit South Africa without "mutually acceptable arrangements".

8. On 10 March 1965, Mrs. Eirene White, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the United Kingdom Colonial Office, together with other officials from the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Overseas Development, visited the Territories to study current and long-term problems. Following recent discussions between the United Kingdom Government and the Secretary-General, a team consisting of two nominees of the Secretary-General and one nominee of the United Kingdom was sent to the three Territories during May and June 1965, to investigate and advise upon the scope for additional economic and technical assistance to these Territories.

9. According to reports, a special border commission was to be formed during the last quarter of 1964 by the Governments of South Africa and the three Territories to settle existing territorial disputes along their common frontiers. It was reported that the commission was unlikely to go into major disputes involving sovereignty claimed by these Territories over areas which now form part of South Africa.

Economic conditions

10. South Africa signed a new series of agreements on economic ties with Portugal in October 1964 and a new trade agreement with Southern Rhodesia in the following month. The conclusion of these agreements was believed to represent an important step towards the establishment of a common market of Southern Africa as envisaged by Mr. Verwoerd.

11. It is also believed that another tendency in this direction is the maintenance of the existing arrangements for close economic association between South Africa and the three Territories. An account of these arrangements is given in the last report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII).

12. With the accession to power in 1964 of a traditionalist and European-supported Government in Swaziland, that Territory's economic relations with the Republic were expected to become even closer. Mr. C. F. Todd, elected member of the Imbokodo Party, who, as a member of the Executive Council, is in charge of the portfolio of natural resources, agriculture and mining, has expressed his firm belief that development funds and initiative must in future come mainly from South Africa and that in order to encourage investment from this source, Swazi politics must be sufficiently conservative in nature.

13. Similar views have been expressed by certain political leaders in the other two Territories, whose economies are much weaker and more dependent on South Africa. As in the case of Swaziland, their Governments consist of parties favouring the maintenance of ties with South Africa, which have also declared their intention of seeking development aid from the Republic.

14. Until 1945, the United Kingdom, according to reports, provided no financial or technical aid to the three Territories. Since then, they have received such assistance but it has not been considered sufficient to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa, and their leaders have continued to express dissatisfaction with the pace of economic development.

Educational conditions

15. The University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland was opened at Roma, Basutoland, on 9 October 1964. The University, with forty academic staff members and 200 students, was expected to offer courses leading to a general bachelors degree in arts and in economics, as well as specialized bachelors degrees in administration, economics and law. The curriculum was eventually to be expanded to include specialized five-year courses. Students were to be enrolled regardless of nationality, race, religion or sex. It was anticipated that the University would be expanded to accommodate by 1967 some 300 students drawn primarily, but not exclusively, from the Territories. In this connexion, the United Kingdom Government has recently agreed to provide aid of £475,000 up to 1966 for the University. Of this amount, £150,000 will be provided in direct aid, and over £150,000 by the three Territories out of funds given by the United Kingdom Government in grant-in-aid and Colonial Development and Welfare funds.

2. Basutoland

Political and constitutional developments *New Constitution*

16. As noted in the last report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII), the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated at the 1964 Constitutional Conference that every effort would be made to ensure the holding of the elections for the new National Assembly before the end of 1964.

17. The elections, however, took place on 29 April 1965. Earlier, a number of complaints were made by several political leaders in the Territory about the delay in the holding of these elections and about the organizational arrangements.

18. On 30 April 1965, the new Constitution which was agreed in outline at the 1964 Conference came into operation. Paramount Chief Moshoeshe II took the oath of office as the Queen's Representative in Basutoland, and the present Resident Commissioner became British Government Representative.

19. On 13 May 1965, addressing the first session of Basutoland's new Parliament established after the latest elections, the Paramount Chief said that the Territory would seek closer co-operation with South Africa during the pre-independence period, and would work under the new Constitution "for achievement of independence in the shortest possible time".

Results of the elections

20. All sixty seats in the new National Assembly were contested by the three main parties in the elections. They were: the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), which held thirty of the forty elected seats in the dissolved Legislature; the Basutoland National Party (BNP); and the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MTFP). The elections were also contested by the Marema-Tlou Party (MTP), which put up thirty-seven candidates, and by a few independents. It was reported that on polling day, riot squads stood by in the Territory and that British troops were alerted to move in from Swaziland in the event of an outbreak of violence following the declaration of the election results.

21. Of the sixty seats in the new National Assembly, the BNP won thirty-one, the BCP twenty-five and the MTFP four. The MTFP was expected to line up with the BNP in the Assembly. The main surprise in the elections, fought mainly on the issue of the Territory's relations with South Africa, was considered to be the defeat of Chief Leabua Jonathan, the BNP leader. It was announced that Chief Sekhonyana Maseribane, the deputy leader, would be appointed acting Prime Minister until a safe seat was found for Chief Jonathan.

22. Immediately after the elections, the BNP stated that it would ask for independence within a year, but that Basutoland would remain in the Commonwealth. The BNP also expressed its desire to establish diplomatic relations with the Republic, and to apply for membership of the United Nations as well as the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The party also declared that its main efforts in the economic sphere would be directed towards industrialization and that development aid for this purpose would be invited from South Africa and other industrial countries.

Political parties

23. The Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), led by Mr. Ntsu Mokhehle, is reported to be the oldest political party in the Territory. Mr. Mokhehle has in the past been critical of United Kingdom and South African policies in regard to Basutoland. His party has made it clear that it stands firmly for independence by the end of 1965, despite the postponement of the elections. The party has reportedly threatened to join the boycott movement against South Africa and has undertaken to ensure that after independence the Orange Free State of the Republic is reintegrated into Basutoland. It is also believed that the party intends to reduce the political role of the chieftancy and to discourage missionary activity in the Territory.

24. On the other hand, the BNP is thought to favour closer relations with South Africa. Chief Jonathan formed the party in 1959 in order to "reunite the chiefs with the people". In the 1960 elections, the party was reported to have received heavy support from certain of the local Christian churches, but failed to attract significant support. Recently, according to reports, the party obtained substantial funds from South African interests and made considerable progress in rallying the support of voters. The party has reportedly expressed itself in favour of the integration of Basutoland within the South African "Bantu homelands" system.

25. The Marema-Tlou Freedom Party, headed by Dr. Seth Makotoko, has links with the African National Congress in South Africa and is said to be supported

by the Paramount Chief. After the recent elections, Dr. Makotoko became President of the Senate which had been set up under the new Constitution. Early in 1964, he replaced Chief S. S. Matete as the party's head. Chief Matete has since organized his own political party, the Marema-Tlou Party.

*Economic conditions**General*

26. As stated in the last report of the Special Committee, the economy has depended principally on crop cultivation, the raising of livestock and the earnings of labour employed outside the Territory. Economically important movements of goods and people have occurred primarily between Basutoland and South Africa rather than within Basutoland itself.

27. Since the Territory's economic growth has remained slow, more and more Basuto have found it necessary to seek work abroad. The total population was estimated to have increased from about 700,000 to 1 million between 1961 and 1964, and the number of Basuto residents outside the Territory and mainly dependent on employment in South Africa from some 130,000 to over 220,000 during the same period. The inflow into the Territory of earnings of these workers has grown in importance.

Land, agriculture and livestock

28. Of the total area of nearly 12,000 square miles, perhaps 1,500 are cultivable; much of the remainder is grass land suitable only for grazing. The land is held in trust for the Basuto nation by the Paramount Chief and may not be alienated. Grazing rights are communal, but arable land is allocated to individuals and families by chiefs. There are few non-African settlers in the Territory. The scarcity of arable land has continued to underline the need to increase productivity. In recent years, improvement in farming methods has been hampered by the lack of security of tenure and by the fragmentation perpetuated by the existing system of tenure.

29. The Territory experienced severe drought during the latter half of 1963, thus reducing the prospects of a good maize harvest. Famine existed in certain mountain districts, owing to shortages arising from poor transport facilities.

30. Soil conservation has remained an urgent problem in Basutoland. According to the administering Power, there was a marked deterioration in established maintenance works in 1963, largely because of an inadequacy of professional supervision and a lack of awareness among the people of the serious dangers of soil erosion. To remedy the situation, a Natural Resources Board was formed with the task of ensuring that the conservation requirements of the Territory were met. During the year there was some progress in reclamation work; 9,000 acres were protected by contour plowing and in addition dams were constructed. Work on land-use planning had been held up because of shortage of staff. However, an agro-ecological plan was recently approved by the Government to meet the vital need for increasing agricultural production and conservation of the soil.

31. In 1963, the Progressive Farmers' Scheme, supported by credit facilities, continued to make some progress. The total number of registered farmers increased from 621 in 1962 to 758 in 1963. Some farmers tried to consolidate their holdings but met with opposi-

tion from the people with whom they wished to exchange land. During 1963, four training farms were completed and the Agricultural School was expanded to accommodate 120 male students. While the shortage of teaching staff continued to be a problem, some improvement was made in the staffing position.

32. The Government has continued its policy of fostering co-operative development and of providing funds for credit and marketing services. In 1963, the Co-operative Union of Basutoland was formed in an effort to save the co-operative movement, following the financial collapse of the Basutoland Co-operative Banking Union, a federation of co-operative societies.

33. The improvement of livestock and of marketing facilities for livestock and animal products is a need which has been engaging the attention of the Government. In 1961, a scheme was started for the establishment of thirty-five improvement centres to make livestock and veterinary services available in those areas which had hitherto had no such facilities. It had been hoped that by the end of March 1963 some thirty centres would be erected, staffed and equipped and that further funds would be provided for the completion of the scheme by the end of 1964. However, there were only twenty centres at the end of 1963.

Mining

34. During the first week in April 1963, a team of British geologists arrived in Basutoland to carry out a six months' preliminary mining survey of the Territory. In October 1963, the Government approved the appointment of a committee to investigate diamond prospecting and mining.

Industry

35. Factors hampering industrial development include the traditional system of land tenure, the shortage of persons with industrial skills, the scarcity of local capital, the lack of cheap power and of raw materials suitable for local processing and the centrifugal pattern of road communications. According to the administering Power, the Government has made some effort towards the partial removal of these obstacles. For the first time in 1963, the Basutoland Factory Estates Development Company was granted a fifty-year lease of its industrial site in Maseru under legislation passed by the Legislature. The company in turn was empowered to grant leases to industrialists and to provide such essential services as water, power, drainage and roads. The new company was expected to start work early in 1964, and has already granted leases to three industrial projects. In December 1963, proposals were presented to the Legislature concerning aid for pioneer industries.

Communications

36. The principal lines of communication lie between Basutoland and South Africa. There are 560 miles of main roads, of which about 235 miles bear the heaviest traffic. The main road system is confined almost entirely to the western lowlands. It consists of a principal road running roughly north and south from Maseru, connected on the west with South Africa's road system.

37. The Territory is linked with the railway system of South Africa by a short branch line from Maseru to Marseilles on the Bloemfontein-Natal main line. One mile of this line is in Basutoland. A private airline serves twenty-eight airstrips suitable for light aircraft.

Power

38. The Territory has one power station in Maseru, which was extended in 1963 by the installation of two 1,000 k.W. turbo-alternators. At the beginning of 1965, a small hydroelectric scheme was inaugurated at the village of Matsieng. The Ox-Bow Scheme, one of three larger schemes considered economically feasible, has been investigated in some detail and its total capital cost was estimated at some £16 million. The development of this project would depend on the sale of power and water to neighbouring areas in South Africa. In the past, political differences have prevented Basutoland and the Republic from conducting negotiations on the scheme. More recently, however, the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party, in its election manifesto, has called for a mutually advantageous arrangement with South Africa.

Public finance

39. Revenue and expenditure of the Territory 1963-1964 were each estimated to total £4.2 million. Customs and excise duties payable by South Africa under the Customs Agreement of 1910 accounted for some 37 per cent of the total estimated revenue, grants-in-aid from the United Kingdom for 36 per cent, and grants under the United Kingdom Colonial Development and Welfare Act for about 13 per cent. Of the total estimated expenditure for 1963-1964, education accounted for 16 per cent; public works (recurrent and extraordinary), 14 per cent; Colonial Development and Welfare schemes, 13 per cent; health, 9 per cent; and agricultural and veterinary services, 6 per cent.

Development Plan

40. Apart from a total of £1,823,000 provided by the United Kingdom for development in the period 1963-1966 (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII), contributions for development projects have also been made by the United Nations and the specialized agencies, whose programmes of assistance are described in the report of the Secretary-General (A/AC.109/98) concerning the implementation of operative paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1954 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, and by the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, which has approved a £118,000 programme for 1964-1966, designed to increase the Territory's food production and earning power.

41. A White Paper containing a number of recommendations made by the Economic Planning Council was tabled in the Basutoland National Council during 1963. These recommendations were that: company taxes should be reduced to levels as low as those prevailing in South Africa and in the other two Territories; the Government should grant tax concessions to pioneer industries: sites should be made available on ninety-nine-year leases; factory premises and housing should be made available at low rentals; and the people of the Territory in general, and chiefs and political leaders in particular, should show themselves willing to welcome industry. Early in 1965, these recommendations were still under consideration by the Legislature.

Social conditions

Racial discrimination

42. In 1963, legislative measures were taken for the removal of racial discrimination from the marriage, tax, wheat and wheaten products control laws.

Labour

43. The Department of Labour was created in 1963. Its principal functions include the promotion of trade union development, the fostering of good relations between employers and employees, and the enforcement of labour legislation. During the year, a National Advisory Committee on Labour, composed of equal numbers of employers' and employees' representatives, was established to advise the Government on labour policy and legislation.

44. In 1963, the Department of Labour established an employment exchange service in Maseru. During May-December of that year, 1,799 persons were registered as requiring work, of whom 231 were placed in employment. District Labour Committees, covering five areas, were set up during the year to review changes in wages of government daily paid employees and to hear employees' complaints. The total number of trade unions in the Territory increased from five in 1961 to seven in 1963.

Public health

45. In the years 1961-1963, the number of general hospitals increased from fourteen to fifteen and beds

from 1,148 to 1,271, representing a ratio of sixteen beds to 10,000 persons.

Educational conditions

46. The Education Law No. 6 of 1963 was passed on 18 February 1963, but has not yet been put into effect for lack of financial provision. The law provides for some decentralization of the educational system, which it is hoped will encourage local effort. A section of the law, which is regarded as expressing in general terms the long-term educational policy of the Government is designed to establish a system of free and compulsory education for children between the ages of six years and fourteen years.

47. Public expenditure on education amounted to £621,900 in 1962-1963 as compared to £1,012,000 in 1961-1962. Under the Development Plan for 1963-1966, £204,042 is available to the Department of Education. In 1962-1963, grants for education from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund totalled £103,400 and expenditure by missions £188,096.

48. Enrolment in primary, secondary, teacher-training schools and institutions of higher learning in 1963 was as follows:

| | Schools | Enrolment | Teachers |
|---------------------------|---------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| Primary education | 1,049 | 156,632 | |
| Secondary education | 23 | 2,626 | |
| Teacher training | 7 | 574 | |
| | | | |
| | | <i>Territorial</i> | <i>Extra-Territorial</i> |
| Higher education | 1 | 35 ^a | 87 ^a 30 |

^a All Basuto.

49. In 1964, the Government had already approved the establishment of nineteen higher primary schools. Plans were made to upgrade three of the nineteen existing junior secondary schools to full high school status in 1964-1965. The reorganization of the Lerotholi Artisan Training Centre, the main technical institution, was completed, and the Leloaleng Technical Institution was modernized and expanded as a junior trades school.

50. Results obtained by Basuto students in primary and secondary school leaving examinations in 1963 were as follows:

| | Standard VI | Junior Certificate | Cambridge Overseas School Certificate |
|---------------|-------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Entries | 3,240 | 436 | 108 |
| Passes | 1,826 | 283 | 67 |

*3. Bechuanaland**Political and constitutional developments**New Constitution*

51. The last report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII) contains a summary of the proposals which the United Kingdom substantially accepted in June 1964 as the basis for the revision of the Constitution for Bechuanaland. Subsequently, the Territory was divided into thirty-one single-member constituencies in accordance with the recommendation of a Delimitation Commission set up in July of that year. The Bechuanaland Protectorate (Constitution) Order, 1965, providing for a

new constitution along these lines, came into operation on 30 January 1965.

Results of the elections

52. The elections for the Legislative Assembly established under the new Constitution were held on 1 March 1965. They were contested by the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) led by Mr. Seretse Khama; the Bechuanaland Peoples Party (BPP) led by Mr. Philip Matante; the Botswana Independence Party (BIP) led by Mr. M. K. Mpho. The three parties put up thirty-one, twenty-six and twenty-four candidates respectively. Prior to the elections, Mr. Matante's Party objected to the organizational arrangements and alleged that the Government had used its influence to win support from the voters for the BDP.

53. In the final results, the BDP secured twenty-eight out of the thirty-one elected seats in the new Assembly, the remaining three being won by Mr. Matante's Party (BPP). Of some 190,000 registered electors, comprising an estimated 81 per cent of all qualified voters, 80 per cent cast their votes.

Political parties

54. The Bechuanaland Democratic Party is reported to have stated that it would call for independence in September 1966 but that Bechuanaland would remain in the Commonwealth. The party has also advocated non-racialism and the maintenance of good neighbourly relations with South Africa. The Bechuanaland Peoples Party and the Botswana Independence Party are believed to draw their support from the small

urban population. All the parties are reported to be opposed to any acquiescence in the South African Bantu homeland plan.

Formation of a new Government

55. Following the elections, Mr. Seretse Khama, the leader of the BDP, was appointed the Territory's first Prime Minister. A Deputy Prime Minister and five other ministers were appointed from among the members of his party. In anticipation of the constitutional changes, the Bechuanaland Government in 1964 established an advisory Public Service Commission and recruited experts mainly from the United Kingdom to assist in organizing a ministerial system and to create an effective government machine to be run by a local civil service. The Government headquarters were moved from Mafeking in South Africa to Gaborone within the Territory in February 1965.

56. On 3 March 1965, following his appointment as Prime Minister, Mr. Khama said that although he abhorred apartheid, his country would continue to trade with South Africa and would welcome investment funds from any source, including the Republic. On the same day, Her Majesty's Commissioner was reported to have declared that Bechuanaland would be granted independence as soon as its cabinet had settled down and expressed themselves in favour of complete self-rule for the people. This, according to him, might possibly be during the middle of 1966. After independence the United Kingdom would continue to provide economic aid to the Territory on the scale to which it was accustomed.

Economic conditions

Development Plan

57. Details of the Development Plan for 1963-1968 are contained in the last report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly. Among the projects designed to foster its basic objectives are: the creation of a statistical organization to assist, *inter alia*, in future development planning; the extension and intensification of survey operations so as to assess the development potential of the Territory's human and natural resources; the establishment of a national development bank to make available credit facilities for development in the private sector of the economy; and the encouragement of self-help activities by offering incentives to private enterprise and the stimulation of local initiative by community development.

58. Of the total expenditure of £10 million envisaged under the Plan, over £7 million was expected to be spent during the period 1963-1966. Of this amount, £4.1 million will be provided by the United Kingdom Government and £0.5 million by the Bechuanaland Government. Other contributions expected from external sources include £1,285,750 from the International Development Association (IDA), £166,308 from the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and £10,360 from the United Nations regular programme of technical assistance.

Land, agriculture and livestock

59. Details of the distribution of land in the Territory are given in the last report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly. Of the European blocks, covering 4,400 square miles, an area of about 2,300 square miles is held in perpetuity by the British South Africa Company; the remaining area is owned by the Tati Company. The total area of potential arable

land is about 8 million acres, mostly in the Eastern Protectorate; of this area it is estimated that only 6 per cent is under cultivation.

60. The Development Plan for 1963-1968 envisages an increase in agricultural and livestock production. It is planned to: expand the existing programme of agricultural extension work to increase the number of the progressive farmers from 1,000 to 4,000 during the development period; conduct research and experiment in producing new cash crops; to introduce land use planning in order to eliminate soil erosion; investigate the economic possibilities of peasant farming; and to provide additional credit facilities for both stock and crop production. Other projects include: the expansion of facilities for agricultural and veterinary training; the establishment of a department to encourage the co-operative movement; the opening up of new grazing areas; and the extension of veterinary services to improve disease control. It is also hoped to introduce extension work in animal husbandry, particularly in the Tribal Territories, to improve internal marketing facilities and arrangements for cattle, and to investigate the need to expand and improve *abattoir* facilities.

Mining

61. The total value of mineral exports decreased from £308,000 in 1961 to £221,000 in 1962 and £184,000 in 1963. This decline was due mainly to a marked reduction in the amount and value of exports of manganese ore and to asbestos marketing difficulties, which were experienced in the first quarter of 1963.

62. The Development Plan for 1963-1968 provides for an intensification of the regional reconnaissance geological mapping programme, a more extensive investigation of specific mineral occurrences and the granting of assistance in the exploitation of workable minerals.

Industry and commerce

63. In 1964, a South African company announced plans to build a brewery, a malting plant as well as a seed and grain cleaning plant in Gaborone. Several hunting companies are operating in the Territory, which has game in large numbers.

64. In the Development Plan for 1963-1968, the Bechuanaland Government proposes to encourage the growth of secondary and service industries through: the maximum use of private enterprises in its construction and maintenance programmes; infra-structural development; and the grant of tax concessions and other legislative inducements to attract foreign capital and new industries. The Plan also includes a scheme to assess the potential of the fauna resources of the Territory and stimulate a tourist industry based on the game reserve.

Communications

65. The public road system comprises 1,595 miles of trunk roads and 3,300 miles of other roads. Except for the main north-south trunk road and the roads linking the more important centres of population, the road system remains largely undeveloped. The main railway line from Cape Town and Johannesburg in South Africa to Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia provides rail service for the Eastern Protectorate. The railway within the Territory, 394 miles in length, forms part of the undertakings owned and operated by the Southern Rhodesia Railways.

66. The Development Plan for 1963-1968 contains a programme of action to overcome the inadequacy of communications through the improvement and expansion of roads and telecommunications. Under this programme, it is contemplated to construct or reconstruct three roads, totalling 355 miles in length, as well as to improve the main north-south trunk road and district feeder roads.

Power

67. The Development Plan for 1963-1968 stresses the need to expand electricity supplies and to continue efforts to open up the Territory's coal resources so as to provide cheap electricity at urban centres. Under the Plan it is expected that a surplus of power will exist at Gaberones and that this surplus could be absorbed at several other places including Lobatsi.

Water resources

68. The Development Plan for 1963-1968 recognizes that sustained economic progress in the Territory depends above all on the conservation and development of water supplies. Owing to the shortage of funds, a modest start on hydrological surveys is proposed under the Plan. Efforts would be concentrated on the development of underground water supplies, the construction of small stock dams, the provision of adequate water supplies to Lobatsi and the improvement of storage and reticulation at several other centres.

Public finance

69. It is estimated that revenue and expenditure of the Territory would each amount to £3.1 million in 1963-1964. Actual expenditure for that year amounted to £3.36 million and the estimated revenue was revised to £1.75 million. The major portion of the territorial revenue comes from direct and indirect taxes, which in 1963-1964 accounted for 36 per cent of the total estimated revenue. The Territory is benefited by grants-in-aid from the United Kingdom, amounting in 1963-1964 to 39 per cent of the estimated revenue. Of the total estimated expenditure in 1963-1964, 19 per cent was allocated to public works, 13 per cent to agriculture, 11 per cent to central and district administration, 10 per cent to veterinary services, 9 per cent to health and 8 per cent to education.

70. A basic object of the Development Plan for 1963-1968 is to improve the fiscal position of the Territory by concentrating on schemes likely to lead to an increase in national revenue and control. Moreover, the people will be required to carry the maximum fiscal burden consistent with economic growth and additional tax reforms are therefore receiving attention.

Social conditions

Labour

71. Of a total potential labour force of some 196,000 persons, only 33,500 have regular paid employment, and of these, 23,000 are usually employed in South Africa, mainly in the mining industry. Additional numbers of workers find seasonal employment in the Republic during the harvest months. The remainder of the able-bodied adult population and a considerable proportion of the young men and children of school-going age are engaged in stock-raising or subsistence agriculture. There is a shortage of professional and technical personnel in the Territory.

72. The Development Plan for 1963-1968 describes labour as one of the least developed and least utilized

resources. The educational programmes of the Plan are aimed at the maximum development of human resources. In addition, a preliminary manpower survey, designed, *inter alia*, to ascertain skilled manpower requirements, is proposed under the Plan.

Public health

73. The most prevalent diseases are tuberculosis, which is the Territory's chief health problem, diphtheria, influenza, whooping cough, measles and malaria. The view is expressed in the Development Plan for 1963-1968 that the main factor limiting social advancement is not the physical condition of the people but rather the lack of progressive attitudes. It is therefore concluded that education must clear the way for further general advance in the health services. On the basis of this conclusion, only 5 per cent of the total expenditure during the development period is allocated to public health projects.

4. Swaziland

Political and constitutional developments

Opposition to the present Constitution

74. In July 1964, the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress, led by Mr. A. P. Zwane, the Swaziland Democratic Party, led by Mr. A. M. Nxumalo, and the Swaziland Progressive Party, formed a Joint Council of Swaziland Political Parties to oppose the present Constitution which, they contended, favoured the traditionalist alliance. The Joint Council subsequently made several unsuccessful attempts to secure the annulment of the present Constitution and of the elections held under it. These attempts included the dispatch in August 1964 of a representative in the person of Mr. Nxumalo to make representations to the Secretary of State. The Joint Council's demands were that: the United Kingdom Government should hold without delay a constitutional conference in which representatives of all political parties of the Territory should participate with a view to making constitutional arrangements for independence, on the basis of universal adult suffrage, including the fixing of a specific date for independence and the protection of fundamental human rights; South African influence in the Territory should be eliminated; and the sovereignty of Swaziland should be guaranteed by the United Nations after independence.

75. During his visit to London, Mr. Nxumalo also claimed that the Government had failed to enforce democratic practice in the conduct of the last elections. According to him, the Ngwenyama had ordered the people through the chiefs to vote for the Imbokodo Party under such threats as loss of land rights and jobs. Many European employers had also used threats towards their employees in the interest of the traditionalist alliance.

76. On 1 September 1964, Mr. Dumisa Dlamini, Secretary of the Joint Council, called for the suspension of the first sitting of the Legislative Council until the demands of his organization were met. Eight days later, 500 British troops were reportedly flown into Swaziland from Kenya to join the locally based battalion in two days of military exercises and riot drill. It was officially denied that their arrival had any connexion with the current opening of Swaziland's new Legislative Council. The opening was also the occasion for a protest demonstration by 700 supporters of the Joint Council as well as a gathering of the Ngwenyama's *mabuto* (warrior regiment). There were no incidents.

77. Early in December, Mr. A. P. Zwane, President of the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress, sent a cable to Prime Minister Harold Wilson, asking him to comply with the Joint Council's demands immediately. The cable was timed to coincide with the visit to London of the Commissioner of Swaziland.

The Imbokodo Party's programmes

78. On 14 September 1964, the Legislative Council adopted a motion presented by Prince Makhosini Dlamini, leader of the Imbokodo Party, whereby the Council would take note of the aims and policies of the Imbokodo Party and express the hope that the Government would give early consideration to the possibility of their implementation.

79. In introducing this motion, the Prince stated that the aims of his party were to make Swaziland a modern, non-racial and independent State under the kingship of the Ngwenyama. Emphasizing the importance of the advancement of the Swazi Nation, he was reported to have expressed the view that under colonial rule the Swazi Nation was denied the opportunities of attaining a stage of development comparable to that of the European and that this disparity must be reduced as soon as possible. He also urged that the Ngwenyama should be made King of Swaziland, and that the Swazi tradition and culture should be nurtured and adapted to the modern world.

80. On the question of the future of the Territory, the Prince said that his party would make use of the present Constitution and the Legislative Council to achieve independence at the earliest possible date. His party requested the Government to set up a commission to consider the question of further constitutional advance. Dealing with foreign relations, the Prince said that his party desired to live in peace with all nations of the world and expected them to refrain from interfering in Swaziland's affairs. He denied that his party's policies were designed to deliver the Territory into the hands of the South African Government.

Economic conditions

General

81. As noted in the last report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly, Swaziland is better endowed with such natural resources as mineral deposits, good soil and an abundant supply of water than either Basutoland or Bechuanaland. The economy continues to depend mainly on the production of asbestos, iron, sugar and forest products although the predominant activities over most of the Territory are animal husbandry and traditional farming.

82. In a recent statement of policy, the leader of the Imbokodo Party is reported to have drawn attention to the fact that "there still exists on a large scale economic disparity between the various population groups". Therefore, he said, his party had decided to set up a development corporation to foster the development of the Swazi Nation in all spheres of endeavour. He also stated that his party favoured rapid economic development and the encouragement of capital investment from abroad.

83. In a statement on 17 September 1964, Her Majesty's Commissioner said that although industrial expansion had been rapid and great, the Territory could not afford too great an imbalance between industry and agriculture. He therefore urged that the transformation

of Swazi agriculture from a subsistence to a cash crop basis should be speeded up.

84. Since domestic savings are not adequate for the investment requirements of the Territory, the problem of obtaining external capital is of great importance. In this connexion, Mr. C. F. Todd, member of the Executive Council holding the portfolio of natural resources, agriculture and mining, stated in August 1964 that having regard to Swaziland's contribution to South Africa's foreign exchange reserves, the monetary and banking authorities in the Republic "might agree to a Swaziland National Finance Corporation being regarded as a deposit-receiving institution, thereby qualifying it to accept funds from South Africa". The Corporation "would not only further industrial development—presumably along lines similar to those followed by the South African Industrial Development Corporation—but would also play an active part in financing exports of, say, sugar, tobacco and citrus".

Land

85. Part of the Swazi-owned land consists of land purchased from European holders which is vested in the Ngwenyama on behalf of the Swazi Nation and which includes farms set aside for settlement schemes designed to educate Swazi farmers in the cultivation of cash crops.

86. In reply to a question, the Secretary of State for the Colonies said in the United Kingdom House of Commons on 23 June 1964 that the Swazi National Council had at present no funds available for land purchases. He added that the Swaziland Government was well aware of the importance of agricultural development in the Territory and had already formulated further settlement schemes to be carried out with the financial assistance currently available from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. He indicated that he would not consider a special advance from the Fund.

87. In a recent statement of policy, the leader of the Imbokodo Party is reported to have stated that his party rejected the United Kingdom Government's policy of handing out irreplaceable natural resources of Swaziland, including its land and minerals, to outside interests, "making them masters of our economy with the Swazi as the mere labourer". His party would continue to fight for the restoration to the Swazi Nation of the rights of control and disposal of these resources.

88. Soil erosion is a problem, but except for the Lowveld, the pasturage in Swaziland is less vulnerable to damage than that in either Basutoland or Bechuanaland. None the less, owing to an increase in the numbers of livestock and a reduction of pasturage area caused by the encroachment of arable land, erosion has been increasing.

89. The Department of Agriculture, with the co-operation of the Swazi authorities, has instituted a programme of mechanical soil conservation measures together with regulation of land management practices. There are also a few resettlement schemes, a rotational system for communal grazing has been developed. Responsibility for soil conservation is exercised by the Rural Development Board in African areas and the Natural Resources Board in European areas.

90. On 24 November 1964, the Legislative Council passed a motion calling on the Government to make it statutory for the above-mentioned Boards to operate jointly. Speakers referred to the need for more effective measures concerning soil conservation, and suggested

that the two bodies having common boundaries should operate jointly, with powers to ensure the best usage of land and water resources in the Territory.

Dryland farming

91. The output of dryland crops, particularly maize and cotton, increased considerably in 1963 from the low point reached in the previous year. But the Territory is still not self-sufficient in maize, imports of which amounted to £320,000 in 1962 and £290,000 in 1963. In November 1964, the Legislative Council decided to appoint a Select Committee of five members to investigate the production, marketing and distribution of maize and also the possibility of increasing its production in the Territory.

92. Two of the most important cash crops, cotton and tobacco, are of particular significance to the economy of southern Swaziland. With new techniques of pest control available, an increasing acreage is being planted for cotton under irrigation. Air-cured tobacco leaf is marketed through the Swaziland Tobacco Co-operative in South Africa, where over-production is causing marketing difficulties. In 1964, Swaziland received from the Republic a burley tobacco quota of about 40,000 pounds on an experimental basis.

93. Southern Swaziland has not shared in the general economic expansion that has taken place in the remainder of the Territory. The farmers in this region, both Swazi and European, who are in competition with subsidized farming in the Republic, are of the opinion that their economic future depends mainly on three factors, namely, improved communications with the north and the availability of power and of long-term credit facilities.

94. During his visit to this region in July 1964, Her Majesty's Commissioner said that he was fully conscious of its problems. He believed that an immediate need was for improved communications and hoped that detailed plans for a first-class road linking the south with central Swaziland would soon be drawn up. He considered that some of the measures being taken to foster agricultural development would have a favourable effect on the economy of the southern part of the Territory.

Irrigation farming

95. A rapid growth of large irrigation projects has occurred during the past decade in the Lowveld. There has also been some development of irrigation in the Middleveld. Thus far irrigation farming has played a far more important part in the economy than dryland farming. The principal irrigated crops are sugar (the most important crop), rice and citrus. Other crops such as bananas, tomatoes and garden vegetables are also grown.

96. According to a government estimate, the total area under irrigation will be expanded from 50,000 to 80,000 acres between 1964 and 1966. The latter figure will represent approximately one third of the economically irrigable area of Swaziland, and agriculture will have reached the safe limit for run-of-river schemes. The Government considers that unless there is to be a risk of serious water shortage in drought years, storage on the Territory's major rivers will be essential.

Livestock

97. The livestock industry is briefly described in the last report of the Special Committee (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII, para. 165). A significant development in

1964 affecting this industry, which provides the main wealth of the Swazi, was the establishment of an *abat-toir* and meat-processing factory at Matsapa.

Agricultural services

98. The Government has continued to expand agricultural services. In 1964, work was started on the agricultural college and short course centre at Malkerns; the Research Station there was strengthened by the appointment of a principal research officer and an entomologist as well as by the establishment of a laboratory for the agricultural chemist; and a Co-operative Department was created, the principal objective of which is to assist the farmers to market their produce.

Forestry

99. As described in the last report of the Special Committee (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII, para. 166), three large plantations of pine and eucalyptus have been established in the Territory. During 1962-1963, after the commencement of operations at the Usutu pulp mill, the value of exports of forest products was £2.2 million compared with £0.5 million in the previous year. The role of pine in the forestry industry is expanding. However, owing to world over-production, wattle no longer represents an important contribution to the industry.

Mining

100. As noted in the last report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII, para. 169), mining is a major economic activity in the Territory, the two most important minerals being asbestos and iron. A beginning is being made in turning to account the extensive deposits of coal. Other minerals worked are beryl, barytes, diaspore, kaolin, pyrophyllite, tin, gold and silver, but none is at present being mined in appreciable quantities.

101. Under the present Constitution, Her Majesty's Commissioner is empowered, in the name of and on behalf of the Ngwenyama, to make dispositions conferring rights or interests in respect of minerals or mineral oils in Swaziland. However, this power is not to be exercised except after consultation with the Ngwenyama and the Executive Council.

102. On the subject of mineral rights, the leader of the Imbokodo Party is reported to have said in his recent statement of policy that:

"Whereas private rights and private ownership of properties of Europeans are protected under the constitution, our mineral rights are not protected but are to be administered by Her Majesty's Commissioner. This is a denial of our rights of ownership. We do not accept this condition. The control and disposal of our mineral rights must be restored to Ngwenyama-in-Council."

Industry

103. New sugar marketing arrangements came into force on 1 January 1965, by which South Africa will no longer be required to provide in its local and export markets for the production of sugar in Swaziland. The Swaziland sugar industry will henceforth be free to determine the desirable level of its sugar production and will be responsible for the marketing of its own sugar. Swaziland is also to become a member of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement with an over-all quota of some 110,000 long tons a year.

104. In November 1964, the Development Loan Bill of 1964, the object of which is to raise Exchequer loans

of £345,000 to finance two industrial development projects, was presented to the Legislative Council. The cost of one of these, an industrial area at Matsapa, is approximately £100,000. This project is already stimulating further schemes of territorial significance such as the construction of an *abattoir* and meat processing factory, a cotton ginnery and a brewery.

Communications

105. The Government has sought to quicken the pace of economic development through the expansion and improvement of the communications system. In 1964, a 125-mile, east-west truck route across the Territory was completed, making a total of 1,280 miles of roads with bitumen or gravel surfaces. There are 380 miles of truck routes supplemented by 900 miles of secondary routes. Under the present road development programme, roads in the two sugar areas are to be improved and a first-class road linking the south with central Swaziland is to be built.

106. The establishment of the iron-ore industry provided the decisive impetus for the completion in 1964 of the building and equipping of the first railway line (some 140 miles) at a cost of about £9 million to connect with the port of Lourenço Marques in Mozambique. This railway furnishes a route to the coast for exports of iron ore as well as other principal commodities, such as pulp and sugar, and a cheap route for imports.

Water and power

107. Swaziland is well watered and the principal rivers (the Great Usutu with its three main tributaries, the Komati, Mbuluzi and Ingwavuma) offer good scope for hydroelectric power development. Besides five smaller ones, there is already a large hydroelectric plant (with an initial capacity of some 10,000 k.W.) in operation at Edwaleni, south of Mbabane, using water from the Usutu system.

108. The scheme, inaugurated in September 1964, cost approximately £2.3 million, most of which was raised through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). It has been planned according to high standards of economy and efficiency, and could be developed up to 30,000 k.W. of installed capacity or even further by means of storage dams on the Usutu system. Although it was the iron ore mine at Ngwanya which furnished the impetus for the scheme, the biggest single offtake of power, amounting to one third of the output, is expected to be for irrigation pumping, enabling large tracts of land to be economically developed.

109. The principal rivers of Swaziland involve South Africa or Mozambique or both. The Territory's hydroelectric schemes might be adversely affected by future attempts on the part of any other Government concerned with a large-scale development of these international rivers. Investigations on this matter were initiated late in 1963 with the assistance of the United Nations Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations.

Public finance

110. The estimated revenue and expenditure of the Territory in 1963-1964 each amounted to almost £2.7 million.

111. By far the largest single source of territorial revenue is income tax, which represented 32 per cent of the total in 1963-1964. For income tax and also

mineral tax, the Territory was heavily dependent on the value of its mineral production. Income tax rates for individuals and companies were slightly lower than those in South Africa. This relationship was maintained in the interest of the capital development of the Territory.

112. The second largest source of territorial revenue is customs and excise duties which accounted for 11 per cent of the total in 1963-1964. As in Basutoland and Bechuanaland, Swaziland is subject to a Customs Agreement with South Africa and has virtually no influence over the amount of revenue which accrues.

113. Despite the recent upsurge in economic activities, revenue has continued to fall below expenditure, thus forcing the Territory to rely increasingly on United Kingdom assistance in the form of grants-in-aid. Such grants, which accounted for 26 per cent of the estimated revenue in 1963-1964, have not been sufficient to permit Swaziland to develop fully its economic potential.

114. Of the estimated expenditure for 1963-1964, 17 per cent was allocated to public works, 15 per cent to education, 13 per cent to central and district administration, 10 per cent to agriculture and 7 per cent to health.

Development planning

115. In November 1964, the Legislative Council adopted a motion recommending to Her Majesty's Commissioner the appointment of a panel of experts to assist the Government in drawing up a development plan for Swaziland. Proposing the motion, Mr. J. D. Weir, elected member of the United Swaziland Association, said that development in the Territory was being retarded by basic reductions in its meagre budget and the severe scrutiny to which grants-in-aid provided by the United Kingdom were subjected. Mr. Weir referred to the need for the improvement of administrative, educational and medical services as well as for more effective utilization of the natural resources of the Territory. He suggested that the Government should seek advice from experts in drawing up a well-thought-out development plan on a five-year basis, and make an immediate approach to IBRD for a long-term loan.

Social conditions

Labour

116. Swaziland has been characterized by high rates of unemployment among unskilled labourers and a marked shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers. The expanding industrial development has helped ease somewhat the problem of unemployment. But with the coming to an end in 1964 of the construction work on the railway and hydroelectricity projects, much further improvement could not be expected in the employment situation. With this in mind, the leader of the Imbokodo Party is reported to have said in a recent statement of policy that "we need to provide new fields of employment for our younger generation and to increase their skills".

117. The government and industrial leaders of Swaziland have adopted a number of measures to give effect to this policy. These include: (a) the establishment of an Apprenticeship Board, composed of the Labour Officer as chairman and eleven other members, which has declared that the aim of industrial training is to provide as quickly as possible a flow of skilled workers to satisfy fully the needs of industry; (b) the starting by the Usutu Pulp Company of its own apprenticeship

training programme on a non-racial basis, with five African students from the Swaziland Trade Training Centre being taken as apprentices; (c) the announcement by the newly formed Swaziland Management Institute of its decision to issue soon detailed programmes for training for different levels of management and personnel; and (d) the carrying out by two overseas experts of a preliminary survey of Swaziland's manpower resources and requirements for industry and the Government, which will be followed in 1965 by another to be made by a vocational training expert of the International Labour Organisation.

118. Concerning the trade union movement, the leader of the Imbokodo Party is reported to have said in his policy statement that they believed in the orderly development of trade unions and the Swazi National Council had established a committee to assist trade unions to develop on sound lines. He suggested that the Executive Council should only assist trade union leaders who have the economic interests of workers at heart.

119. The question of equal pay for equal work was raised in the Legislative Council during February 1965. Replying, the Chief Secretary said that persons occupying posts specified in the budget of the Territory were paid the salaries attached to those posts. In the absence of trade testing, some discrimination might still be practised against persons holding posts unspecified in the budget, although that was contrary to the Government's policy.

120. Dealing with industries, the Chief Secretary stated that there was still a considerable gap between the wages paid to unskilled labour, mostly Africans, and those paid to skilled labour, mostly Europeans. In his view, it was extremely difficult to legislate in this matter, nor was it possible to make drastic changes affecting Swaziland's economy. But he gave an assurance that the Government intended to keep up the pressure to ensure that workers were paid according to their value without discrimination between races.

Public health

121. In his recent statement of policy, the leader of the Imbokodo Party is reported to have stated that the average life-expectancy of the Swazi was amongst the lowest in the world. Apart from causes due to malnutrition, there were other contributory factors such as centralization of medical facilities and a complete lack of social services. More clinics and better social amenities must be made available to all.

Educational conditions

122. In an address to Swaziland teachers in August 1964, Her Majesty's Commissioner stated that owing to the shortage of funds, it was necessary to have priorities in the educational field. The first priority was being given to the improvement of the secondary schools to ensure an increase in the number of matriculants to 200 annually within the next few years. It was most important that the educational system should provide a sufficient number of high quality candidates to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.

123. The Commissioner further stated that another very important priority was the raising of standards of technical education. It was hoped that within the next three years the Swaziland Trade Training Centre would be able to accommodate some 130 students in five trades providing industries with over forty apprentices an-

nually. Plans were also being made for the development of primary education, the improvement of teacher and clerical training and the creation of a truly unified teaching service.

124. In his recent statement of policy, the leader of the Imbokodo Party stressed the desire of his party for the provision of better and wider education for the people to enable them to participate fully in the management of their own affairs.

125. In accordance with the Commissioner's decision, announced in December 1964, a Scholarship Selection Board will be set up and consist of the Executive Council Member for Education and Health as Chairman, two *ex officio* members and up to eight other members who will be appointed by the Commissioner to represent local interests. The Board will be responsible for the selection of candidates for all forms of higher education and training above secondary level outside the Territory.

B. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE¹

Introduction

126. The Special Committee considered Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland at its 347th, 357th to 360th, 365th, 368th to 370th and 372nd meetings held in Africa between 28 May and 17 June 1965.

Written petitions and hearings

127. The Special Committee had circulated the following written petitions:

| Petitioner | Document No. |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| <i>Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland</i> | |
| Messrs. A. B. Ngcobo and M. K. Nkula on behalf of the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa (PAC) | A/AC.109/PET.340 and Add.1 |
| Mr. I. B. Tabata, President, All-African Convention (AAC) and Unity Movement of South Africa | A/AC.109/PET.391 and Add.1 |
| Mr. Cato Aall, Secretary, International Refugee Council of Zambia (IRCOZ) | A/AC.109/PET.417 |
| <i>Basutoland</i> | |
| Messrs. Molapo Qhobela Molapo and Ntsu Mokhehle, Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) | A/AC.109/PET.338 |
| Messrs. Bishop Mpeti, R. S. Tsinyane and L. A. Matooane, Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) | A/AC.109/PET.338/Add.1 |
| Mr. Molapo Qhobela Molapo, Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) | A/AC.109/PET.338/Add.2 ² |
| Mr. Charles Malapo, General Secretary, Basutoland National Party (BNP) | A/AC.109/PET.339 |
| Mr. Lipampiri Lefela, Secretary, Lekhotla La Bofo ... | A/AC.109/PET.382 |

¹ See also chapter II, "meetings held in Africa", for an account of the discussions on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 373rd meeting on 18 June 1965 (A/AC.109/128/Rev.1) concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Southern Rhodesia, Territories under Portuguese administration, South West Africa and Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.

| <i>Petitioner</i> | <i>Document No.</i> |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| Messrs. G. M. Kolisang, Secretary, Basutoland Congress Party (BCP); M. Hlekane, Secretary, Marema-Tlou Party (MTP); and J. T. Mokotso, Secretary, Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MTFP) | A/AC.109/PET.383 |
| <i>Bechuanaland</i> | |
| Mr. Phillip G. Matante, President, Bechuanaland Peoples Party (BPP) | A/AC.109/PET.418 |
| <i>Swaziland</i> | |
| Mr. J. J. Nquku, President, Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) | A/AC.109/PET.341 and Add.1 |
| Messrs. J. J. Nquku, President, and A. W. M. Nxumalo, Secretary-General, Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) .. | A/AC.109/PET.341/Add.2 ² |
| Mr. S. Chale, on behalf of the Joint Council of Swaziland Political Parties | A/AC.109/PET.409 |
| 128. The petition indicated above as A/AC.109/PET.409 contained a request for hearing which was approved by the Special Committee at its 358th meeting on 8 June 1965. However, the petitioner, on whose behalf the request was made, has not yet appeared before the Special Committee. | |
| 129. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners: | |
| <i>Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland</i> | |
| Mr. I. B. Tabata, President, All-African Convention (AAC) and Unity Movement of South Africa (A/AC.109/PET.391) | (347th meeting) |
| Messrs. A. B. Ngcobo and Z. B. Molete, representatives, Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa (PAC) (A/AC.109/PET.340/Add.1) ... | (358th and 359th meetings) |
| <i>Basutoland</i> | |
| Messrs. Bishop Mpeti, L. A. Matooane, representatives, Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) (A/AC.109/PET.338/Add.1) | (357th and 358th meetings) |
| <i>Swaziland</i> | |
| Mr. J. J. Nquku, President, Swaziland Progressive Party (A/AC.109/PET.341/Add.1) | (360th meeting) |

130. Mr. Tabata, representing the Unity Movement of South Africa, said that his organization was appearing for the first time before a United Nations body. The All-African Convention had been set up in 1936 during the crisis of the Hertzog Native Bills which abolished the remaining voting rights for non-Whites. Its membership comprised all the existing political, educational, professional, religious, civic and other organizations, and the trade unions, including the African National Committee (ANC), which was one of the founder members but left the Federation in the early 1940's owing to disagreement on policies and principles. The

² Circulated after the Special Committee had completed its consideration of the question of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.

Unity Movement, of which he was President, had been established in 1943 as a result of a conference of federal and national organizations of the oppressed racial groups, called by the All-African Convention.

131. The failure of the League of Nations to live up to its ideals, and acts such as the rape of Abyssinia, the only independent African State at the time, disillusioned the African people and made them suspicious of the United Nations. But the changes that had taken place throughout the world since the Second World War, the disappearance of the old ideas concerning empires and colonies and the rapid emergence of independent States had changed the United Nations and shown the smaller nations that it offered them a forum for registering their protests. They were greatly encouraged by the fact that the Special Committee had decided to carry out its investigations in Africa where it would be able to learn the true situation.

132. The fact that the Committee was limiting its investigations to the problems of the colonies and protectorates, without touching on South Africa, was a serious obstacle. South West Africa was in fact a fifth province of South Africa and would be involved in the policy of Bantustan. Similarly, because of their dependence on South Africa and their geographical position it was difficult to discuss the economic and political situation of the Protectorates without reference to the South African Government's policies.

133. South West Africa had been discussed in the United Nations for some eighteen years and the International Court of Justice was now to pronounce on the legal issues involved. His organization would like to know whether the United Nations had considered how the decision of the International Court could be enforced. If intervention in South West Africa should prove necessary, he would suggest that the countries with vested interests should be excluded from any task force, and that the choice of countries to supply military contingents should be made by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). He also suggested that the OAU should consult the people of South West Africa by means of a referendum on all the issues involved. It was important to take into account the views of the people as well as the decision of the International Court, since it was the task of the United Nations to help the people of South West Africa to achieve full independence.

134. It was common knowledge that Verwoerd's Bantustan Plan envisaged the incorporation of the Protectorates. The South African Government's views were revealed in a letter sent in November 1964, long before the general elections in Basutoland by the Chairman of the Basutoland National Party to the Commissioner General for South Sotho, one of the Afrikaaners in charge of the various tribal groupings. The letter, the text of which he read out, was evidence of the desperate need of the Verwoerd régime to draw the Protectorates within their political and economic ambit.

135. Many people had regarded the policy of Bantustan as an attempt by Verwoerd to counter United Nations criticism, and Verwoerd had lent credence to the view by claiming that he was giving independence to the oppressed people of South Africa. The falsity of such a claim was shown in the Act to establish Bantustan, under which four fifths of the population would be deprived of their right to belong to their country of birth and banished to eroded and poverty-stricken enclaves that constituted less than 13 per cent

of South African territory—an area at present inhabited by one third of the African population living on an average annual income of £21 per family. Furthermore, the South African Government should retain legislative power on all important matters, so that the Bantustan would not have political independence.

136. The Bantustan policy made sense only as a continuation of South Africa's traditional policy of an all-white Government that would establish Native reserves as sources of cheap labour. Verwoerd had come into power at a time of acute labour shortage due to the discovery of new and richer gold mines in the Orange Free States. One of his first acts had been to send experts to the Portuguese Territories to learn how labour problems were handled there. The horrors of the Portuguese system were described in the report of a committee of investigation appointed by Salazar as the result of a world-wide outcry against the atrocities inflicted on the Africans in the so-called Portuguese Territories.

137. Verwoerd had then set about establishing all over the country the "Bantu Authorities" which were the basis of the Bantustan. Unlimited powers were conferred upon puppet chiefs who dominated the so-called Bantustan Parliament and were the tools of the white authorities. *Habeas corpus* was abolished in all the reserves and tribal law was re-established, giving the chiefs complete and arbitrary power over the population.

138. Mr. Tabata explained that he had commented on South Africa's Bantustan policy because it would be applied to the adjacent dependent Territories. He had also wished to show that the Protectorates even when they were given their independence would inevitably be drawn into the orbit of Bantustan policy and would have no economic independence. It was important for the Committee to realize that unless they were enabled to defend themselves, the independence granted them by the United Kingdom would be worthless. The acute shortage of labour, particularly for the mines, had been intensified by events outside South Africa. For many years there had been a standing agreement whereby Portugal supplied South Africa with contract labour amounting to 100,000 able-bodied men a year. Furthermore, South Africa had always depended on the surrounding Territories for labour: in 1962 Basutoland had supplied 150,000 labourers and Swaziland 8,500, while Bechuanaland usually supplied between 15,000 and 30,000 a year. In all 60 per cent of labour in the gold mines, which were the mainstay of the South African economy, came from countries outside South Africa.

139. With the revolt of the people of Mozambique and Angola and the threatened boycott by the liberated African States the labour problem had become acute. Since the mines and agriculture earned the foreign exchange currency needed by industry it was obvious that the crippling of the mines by the withholding of foreign labour would have disastrous effects on the country's whole economy. Verwoerd was aware of the power of the African States to paralyse South Africa's economy and was therefore forced to devise methods of producing the labour from the African population in his own country. Whereas the people who condemned the policy of apartheid failed to see the underlying causes, the international financiers were fully aware of them, and that explained the evasiveness and prevarication of the

investor countries. Verwoerd's problem was in fact the problem of the British and American financial interests who owned most of the mining and industrial concerns in South Africa and controlled the policies in the Protectorates. Thus, whatever the United Kingdom did, the South African economy would see that the Protectorates were drawn into the South African economy because he needed labour. He had also wished to comment on reference made during the afternoon meeting to the connexion between the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa's military build-up.

140. The author of the book entitled *Panser Battles*, a former member of Hitler's military staff who had been sent to South Africa in 1950 on a special mission, had revealed that 2,000 Nazi officers had been given asylum in South Africa after 1945 and that many of them were being used as military instructors. He had also reported evidence of close links between North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

141. It was impossible to discuss the situation of the people of the Protectorates without considering the policy of the South African Government. The letter he had quoted revealed the South African Government's cynicism regarding the proposed independence of the Protectorates and also brought into question the good faith of the British Government which had long been aware of South Africa's eagerness to engulf the Protectorates. His organization supported the granting of independence to the Protectorates but demanded that it should be made real by ensuring them the economic means to defend themselves against the predatory aims of South Africa. The inhabitants of Basutoland and Swaziland could not move without crossing South African or Portuguese territory, and even now the South African Government frequently refused permission to the leaders of those countries to cross its territory.

142. Under the Constitution imposed on Swaziland by the United Kingdom Tory Government, white South Africans resident there could become members of the Legislative Council. About 70 per cent of the white population were Afrikaners and members of Verwoerd's Nationalist Party. As South Africans pledged to the policy of Bantustan, it was their duty to work for legislation consistent with that policy and they were at present agitating for the expulsion of all the freedom fighters who had fled to Basutoland, on the grounds that they were foreigners and did not belong to any of the country's tribes. They were also violently opposed to the granting of asylum to opponents of the South African régime and that of their ally Portugal.

143. He had now explained why it was important for the Special Committee to consider the problem of decolonization in southern Africa in conjunction with the problems of the oppressed people in South Africa. The plight of the refugees was serious: they were deprived of their rights, their homes and their means of support and lived in constant fear of the South African and Portuguese police, who roamed the streets of the Protectorates on the pretext of looking for criminals. Developments on the lines indicated in the letter he had quoted were a further cause for concern, since the expulsion of refugees was one of the subjects discussed in it. He doubted whether the refugees would be safeguarded by the international conventions to which the Powers concerned were partners.

144. He had refrained from dealing at length with any particular country, since the relevant information was either in the Committee's possession or could be obtained from the inhabitants or the representatives of the countries concerned. His object had been to emphasize the connexion between the Protectorates, South West Africa and South Africa, since the Committee, in dealing with individual colonies, was not in a position to view all the problems in their proper perspective. The main source of the difficulties of the Protectorates and South West Africa was South Africa itself and the question of South Africa could not be divorced from those of Central and West Africa. The economic link due to investments from a common source made it impossible to discuss the individual countries in isolation. Investors followed a unified policy to safeguard their interests; and any attempt at political solutions which did not take into account the economic ramifications and particular interests that were largely responsible for the situation was doomed to failure.

145. Mr. Mpeta, representing the Basutoland Congress Party, said that his party's leader was detained at home by political developments. The people of Basutoland were engaged in a relentless struggle against the British colonial domination and exploitation and against Anglo-Boer machinations to incorporate the country into the settler Republic of South Africa.

146. In previous petitions, his party had made abundantly clear the vile nature of the recalcitrant colonial régime in Basutoland, where the British Government was depriving the people of their fundamental human rights, in violation of the United Nations Charter. The British claimed to be the skilled exponents of Western democracy and upholders of the Christian religion, but the truth was that they were hypocrites of the highest order, knowing no law but their own interest.

147. His party had been moved to request a hearing because of the rapid deterioration in its relations with the oppressive British Government which, in furtherance of its financial interests, was deeply engaged in underhand manoeuvres designed to lead to the annexation of Basutoland by its ancient enemy, fascist South Africa.

148. He recounted the various steps—full information on which had been given in his party's earlier petition—that had led up to the holding in 1960 of the first elections in Basutoland, under the retrogressive Constitution of 1958. Of the forty elected seats, his party had won thirty-two, the Marema-Tlou Party, five, the Independents, two, and the Basutoland National Party only one. Yet the last-named was the Party that today had been brought to false victory.

149. Had it not been for British chicanery in foisting that bad Constitution on the people, incorporating all the retrogressive forces responsible for retarding progress, Basutoland would not be in the precarious position it was in today under the British Administering Authority. His party, with the full support of the broad masses of the people, had had a tough struggle to persuade the British Government to abrogate that Constitution and agree to elections based on universal adult suffrage. Constitutional talks had finally been held in London in April 1964 and a pre-independence constitution agreed upon, on the understanding that elections would be held before the end of 1964 and that independence would follow one year later. In the vain hope, however, of thwarting the Basutoland strug-

gle for liberation, the British had maliciously delayed the elections until April 1965, with the object of establishing a puppet régime.

150. A number of incidents that had occurred after the London talks had clearly demonstrated the sinister motives of the British. A case in point had been the ambush of some members of his party on 18 October 1964, while on their way to a political rally at Rothe. The Chief at the instigation of the British colonial administration had set on his thugs. Three members of the party had been shot dead on the spot and one had died later in hospital. What was particularly noteworthy was the failure of the British colonial police present to take any steps to maintain law and order; they had simply stood by and watched. Further evidence of government complicity was the fact that seven of the bullets used had been found to be identical with the ammunition used exclusively by the British administration. No action had been taken to book the culprits until his party's London office had petitioned the Secretary of State for the Colonies. That was but one instance of the many British political intrigues designed to plunge the country into chaos and confusion and thus furnish a pretext for prolonging British administration of the country.

151. Before the 1964 elections, British chicanery, in face of the earlier victory of the Pan-African forces, had been directed to bringing into power the present puppet régime, headed by a notorious traitor and "stooge" of Verwoerd's apartheid régime—Chief Leabua Jonathan, Leader of the Basutoland National Party. A regulation which provided for an absent voter's form (G.E.17) had been introduced and opened the way for corruption and the falsifying of polling results. The British administration, with the co-operation of South Africa and the white Roman Catholic priests, had persuaded voters to make false use of the form and had induced them to vote for members of the Basutoland National Party. His party had petitioned the Secretary of State for the Colonies to revoke the regulation in question; it had mentioned several examples of corruption in the use of the form and pointed out that clearly the plan was to force a false victory for the Basutoland National Party, in the same way as corrupt methods had succeeded in Transkei, Swaziland and Bechuanaland. As a result, the regulation had been revoked but even more subtle tactics had then been resorted to. Army planes and troops had been brought in from as far afield as Rhodesia, on the pretext that the planes would be used to convey ballot boxes from the polling stations to the central headquarters and that the troops would maintain peace and order.

152. His party, well aware of the effect of a similar move in Swaziland and Bechuanaland, had strongly protested against that attempt to scare and stop the people from going freely to the polls. But a deaf ear had been turned, so that it had become clear that the Government's real purpose was to provoke trouble in the country.

153. It had been learned from a reliable source, a few days before the elections, that 25,000 ballot envelopes in the hands of the Chief Electoral Officer had disappeared, but it had been claimed that the conduct of the elections would in no way be prejudiced as the envelopes did not bear the official stamp. Nevertheless, the same envelopes had turned up later in many constituencies, bearing the official stamp, and, in one case, the wife of the local chief had been caught red-handed

issuing them to members of the Basutoland National Party. In another case, his party's candidate had been put in terror of his life by the local chief. Yet no action whatsoever had been taken to correct those abuses.

154. Then, too, information had been received that changes were being surreptitiously introduced into the voters' roll, to increase the number of supporters for the Basutoland National Party and cut out known supporters of his party. After citing specific examples, he claimed that the practice had extended to almost every constituency. Inquiry had elicited a bare denial. There could be no doubt that corruption in the elections had been encouraged and protected by the British administration; partiality had been shown in the appointment of presiding officers, more than 80 per cent of whom had been either members or supporters of the Basutoland National Party.

155. On South African interference in the elections, he cited the fact that, in flagrant violation of Basutoland's territorial integrity, South African registered cars had been seen distributing leaflets vilifying his party and lauding the puppet group. The leader of that group in a secret letter dated 18 November 1964, had thanked the South African Government for its support and had undertaken, if successful in the elections, to place Basutoland and its people in all ways under the wise guidance of the Republic of South Africa. The sinister conspiracy to falsify the elections and bring to power the puppet régime was in fulfilment of the old Anglo-Boer plan going back as far as 1909, to hand the country over to South Africa. For years, the colonial British had been telling the world that relations between South Africa and Basutoland were perfectly amicable. He would challenge the United Kingdom representative to explain that claim in face of the fact that Basutoland citizens returning from abroad were not allowed to pass through South Africa and that the Basutos working in that country were subjected to detention, deportation and every other kind of humiliating and evil treatment.

156. The struggle for political emancipation in Basutoland had to be seen in its true perspective. In the latest elections, it had not been just a question of his popular progressive party fighting against the Basutoland National Party, but of its fighting against the entire imperialist world guarding its financial interests in southern Africa.

157. He appealed to the Committee to declare those elections null and void and to urge colonial Britain to call on the three political parties represented in the National Assembly to form a national government, for the purpose of preparing for immediate elections, free from corruption, and thus of bringing political stability to the country. Last but not least, he appealed to the Committee to urge Britain to stop the settler régime of South Africa from interfering in his country's internal affairs.

158. In response to questions, Mr. Mpetla gave details of the letter which he said was sent by Chief Leabua Jonathan, leader of the Basutoland National Party (BNP), to the Commissioner-General for South Sotho on 18 November 1964. It referred to a meeting with the Commissioner-General at which the latter had promised that the South African Government would return certain territories to Basutoland in the event of BNP winning the elections and confirmed that, in return, Basutoland would be handed over to the South African Government. The writer also mentioned diffi-

culties with the BNP General Secretary over the conditions on which financial aid was to be given, and his own fears of losing the leadership of the Party—for which reason he was following the Commissioner-General's advice not to call an annual general conference. The writer also asked that pressure be put on the Chamber of Mines to secure the miners' vote, in exchange for the written guarantee he had given, and promised that if the Commissioner-General's plan worked and BNP won the elections, he would deal with the communists and refugees who impeded good relations with South Africa. The Commissioner-General's fears concerning the Catholic danger were unfounded: he would deal with the problem when he became head of the Government. Meanwhile, the Catholics were needed in order to win the elections. The letter ended with a request for early payment of part of the R.15,000 promised by the South African Government, to meet election expenses, and a written guarantee to show his supporters.

159. Continuing, Mr. Mpetla said that in June 1962 the first petitioner to appear before the Special Committee on behalf of the Basutoland Congress Party had opposed a proposal by the British National Party that Basutoland should be placed under United Nations trusteeship, since it was feared that such a move would lead to trusteeship under South Africa.

160. The United Kingdom set out to create a good impression before the rest of the world, but ninety-seven years of domination had shown the British to be intriguers and hypocrites. They were responsible for engineering the elections, for the confusion that existed in Basutoland and for inciting the Verwoerd Government to annex the territory. Their attitude was not surprising since the United Kingdom and the United States of America were investing over £1 million a year in South Africa.

161. Before anything could be done Basutoland must be given independence. The United Kingdom professed to be opposed to apartheid, but encouraged Basutoland's incorporation with South Africa, to rid herself of the burden of a poverty-stricken territory. The first essential was to declare the elections null and void and to hold new elections with universal suffrage to give Basutoland political stability.

162. Continuing, Mr. Mpetla wished to make it clear that there was a certain degree of interdependence between Basutoland and South Africa. The United Kingdom had deliberately turned Basutoland into a reserve of cheap labour for the South African mines and plantations in order to strengthen its economic position in South Africa. In South Africa at the present time, there were 150,000 Basutoland workers, without whom the South African economy could not survive. The United Kingdom had never attempted to make Basutoland economically viable. On the contrary, the country had been cruelly exploited. For example, in 1955 a group of Basutoland nationals had been refused mining rights in their own country. Rights had subsequently been granted to a South African, who had removed diamonds worth £1 million from Basutoland. The United Kingdom boasted about the aid it offered to Basutoland, but that aid was always supplied piecemeal and had never fulfilled its purpose. Furthermore, European civil servants had been placed in positions of power in order to prevent Basutoland nationals from running their own country. The purpose of that policy

was obviously to frustrate trained Basutos so that they would leave the country.

163. In response to a question concerning the manifestos of the three main political parties, Mr. Mpeta said that the Basutoland National Party sought good relations with the South African apartheid régime; it promised to put Basutoland under Verwoerd's guidance if the Party won the elections; was opposed to diplomatic relations with socialist and communist countries, in particular the United Arab Republic and Ghana; and refused to co-operate with any other socialist countries. The Marema-Tlou Party intended to perpetuate monarchist rule in Basutoland through the chiefs.

164. Mr. Matooane, representing the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), said that the Party was striving for true independence and co-operation on an equal footing with the other countries of the world. The Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MTFP) was a party of limited vision which tried to persuade the people that without South Africa they would have nothing.

165. He also quoted an account of the three parties which appeared in the *Financial Mail* of 15 April 1965. The BCP was described as the first Party to establish itself, moulded in the classic African nationalist pattern of links with Accra and Cairo and basing its original appeal on anti-colonialism. Signs of United Kingdom anxiety to quit Basutoland had caused the Party to divert some of its fire to the chiefs and missionaries—notably the Catholics. The Party was by far the best organized of the three, having a strong youth league, and a year earlier had seemed certain to form the first Government. The Marema-Tlou Freedom Party, more of a hybrid, was supported by eighteen of the twenty-two principal chiefs who would automatically have seats in the Senate and was believed to be favoured unofficially by the Paramount Chief. An important man behind the scenes was a black South African who was thought to adhere to the Moscow brand of Communism; former members of the Communist Party now belonged to MTFP. The manifesto suggested that the Party was trying to be all things to all men. It was now the weakest of the three major parties, owing to the murder of four BCP men in October 1964, for which a Chief and twenty others were awaiting trial.

166. The Basutoland National Party was a conservative group with strong Catholic support. It advocated good relations with South Africa and received private finance from South Africa and the Federal Republic of Germany. The leader was a popular figure and the Party had been gaining support. It hoped to appeal especially to women, now voting for the first time, who would be more interested in material matters than in ideology.

167. In response to a question regarding the need to safeguard the independence of the three Territories, Mr. Matooane said that he and his colleagues were very much aware of the danger, which was one of the reasons why they were appearing before the Special Committee. Basutoland was the poorest and most barren of the three Territories. The statement made in 1962 to the Special Committee, that Basutoland's problems could be tackled only through independence, still held good since the whole economic system was designed to maintain the supply of cheap labour for the farms, mining and manufacturing industries in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. He would like to know what the Special Committee had done since that time. It was

for the Committee to consider how Basutoland's independence could be guaranteed.

168. Mr. Ngcobo, representing the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa, said that the question of British colonialism in the three High Commission Territories was bound up with South Africa. The South Africa Act (Constitution) 1909 had provided for their incorporation in the Union, and the question had come up at every session of the South African Parliament. Since the South African Government adopted its Bantustan policies, however, the question of incorporation had assumed another form.

169. The Bantustan scheme, which was intended to establish a moral basis for apartheid, was an utter fraud. The root problem in South Africa was that 300 years earlier European invaders had taken the land by intrigue and force of arms. The Africans had been dispossessed, and until that fact of history was reversed the problem would remain unsolved.

170. An examination of the Bantustans in the Transkei would reveal their true nature. The Transkei Constitution provided for a "legislature" composed in such a manner as to ensure that government "stooges" enjoyed a perpetual majority. The Pan-Africanist Congress was against collaboration of any kind with the oppressor, and hoped that even the opposition in that mock parliament would soon realize that their presence there was an advantage to Verwoerd. The "parliament" had very limited jurisdiction, and none at all over the 17,000 whites living in the Transkei; all real power was reserved for the Pretoria authorities.

171. The introduction of the Bantustans had met with serious opposition from the whole people. The "elections" had been held in an atmosphere of terror and repression, and over 900 people had been gaoled in the Transkei alone. Despite such measures, and the proscription of PAC, opposition to the Bantustan policies would continue until all vestiges of foreign control had been expunged.

172. Those policies were now being extended to the so-called British Protectorates, and there was greater danger than ever before of their being incorporated into the Republic. The recent elections there had been won by people who professed admiration for Verwoerd's policies, and they owed their victory to the financial and material support they had received from the South African Government. The elections had been conducted by means of blackmail and threat, with the active connivance of the British authorities.

173. British asylum accorded to political refugees from South Africa had become a sham, and there was a particular vendetta against PAC. Leading members of PAC were facing trial in Basutoland on charges of conspiring, while in the Territory, to overthrow the South African Government by violent means. In that case, the prosecutor had been brought from South Africa. South African police were frequently seen in Basutoland seeking information about the activities of *bona fide* refugees. There had been many cases of discriminatory treatment of African refugees by the Bechuanaland Government; some had actually been deported to South Africa. Most such cases had been reported to the United Kingdom Government, but things continued as before. It was to be wondered why that Government was represented on the Special Committee.

174. The United Kingdom and United States Governments were protecting Verwoerd, and had consist-

ently flouted the United Nations resolutions on South Africa. The United States had declared an embargo on arms to that country, but side-stepped it by supplying men and materials for producing arms on the spot. Previous petitioners had stressed that rocket and missile bases were under construction in South Africa and South West Africa with the help of United States, United Kingdom and German scientists, and poison gases were being developed in South Africa with the aid of Nazi scientists. British military academies still trained South Africa's military men. It had been said that the United Kingdom would continue to honour previous contracts, but for each contract so honoured, thousands of Africans were exposed to extermination. Men laid off after the abandonment of the TSR.2 project were now going to South Africa to work on the maintenance of military aircraft. It also appeared that some squadrons of the United States Air Force were being taught Afrikaans. He would like to know why.

175. The United States had immense sums of money invested in South Africa, and was doing everything possible to stimulate trade with the Republic. Recently, General Motors had inaugurated a \$30 million plant in South Africa, a type of investment which reduced that country's dependence on overseas source of industrial production and advanced it towards partial self-sufficiency. United States investors were also heavily involved in mining activities. Mining was South Africa's backbone, and the most reactionary industry as far as wages were concerned. For seventy years wages in the mines had remained static; hence the 27 per cent dividend paid to the American investors.

176. The submission of PAC was that South Africa was perpetrating the crime of genocide, as defined by the Geneva Convention on Genocide. Like the Nazis who had exterminated over 6 million Jews, the South African rulers regarded themselves as a master race chosen by providence to rule over other peoples. They even quoted the scriptures to justify their racist policies. As in Nazi Germany, thousands upon thousands of innocent people had been tortured and murdered by the authorities. Some cases had been brought before the courts; many more had not, because the perpetrators of the crimes were also those who dispensed justice. Political prisoners were treated with particular brutality. Moreover, South Africa was arming itself to the teeth. Thus, everything indicated that South Africa was actively conspiring to perpetrate the heinous crime of genocide. The South African Government must be brought to justice by the international community before it was too late.

177. Despite the resolute opposition of world public opinion, Verwoerd and his racist henchmen relentlessly pursued their chosen policies. Although ruled by a foreign minority, South Africa was accepted as a full-fledged Member of the United Nations. But the people of South Africa were not self-governing; they were suffering foreign oppression, economic exploitation and social degradation at the hands of a fascist minority. He therefore could not agree with the Special Committee that it was not competent to hear the nationalist leaders of South Africa.

178. It was clear that no amount of talk could induce Verwoerd to see reason. The South African people could not for ever be hewers of wood and drawers of water in the land of their forefathers. There was only one course left for them, and if there should be a blood

bath, the least they asked of men of goodwill everywhere was sympathetic understanding. Yet peace and freedom were indivisible. The struggle of the South African people was the responsibility of all people everywhere, and it must be honourably discharged before it was too late.

179. Mr. Molete, representing the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa, said that most of the petitioners presented to the Committee had emphasized the importance of Verwoerd's apartheid policy and the Bantustan scheme he was trying to impose on the neighbouring territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. His example was being closely followed by Smith in Zimbabwe.

180. From the joint efforts of South Africa and the United Kingdom, during the recent elections in Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, to bolster the moribund system of chieftainship and stir up anti-African nationalist feeling, it was clear that South Africa had not abandoned its long cherished plan to annex the three so-called British Territories. There had merely been a change of tactics. Events during the past two years had shown that in the Verwoerd-Salazar-Smith unholy alliance, the arch-enemy of African salvation and independence was Verwoerd. With his long experience in applying the doctrine of divide and rule, he considered himself the best qualified to take the lead in the political subjugation, economic exploitation and spiritual degradation of the indigenous Africans in the Territories. He was an expert psychologist and understood the "working of the native mind"; he supported the *Herrenvolk* doctrine.

181. The only effective way of tackling the problems of the dependent territories under Verwoerd-Salazar-Smith domination and particularly South West Africa, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland was to put a stop to the Verwoerd racist régime. The Committee could not, therefore, solve the problem of decolonization without hearing the representatives of the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa.

182. In seeking to impose Bantustan in South West Africa and the other Territories, Verwoerd was bolstering up his own small empire and his dreams of South Africa as a colonial Power with the puppet states masquerading as independent South African States. The white industries being set up along the borders of the so-called Bantustan would not only exploit African slave labour, but would increase Afrikaner industrial and financial interests and help to maintain white supremacy and apartheid. Petitioners were bound to touch on the South African situation, if only to prove to the Committee that its work would be easier, if, in dealing with decolonization in southern Africa, it gave some attention to the South African situation and the Verwoerd racist régime.

183. In response to questions, Mr. Ngcobo, representing the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa, said that the original plan for incorporating the three High Commission Territories into the then Union of South Africa was embodied in Section 151 of the South Africa Act (Constitution) 1909. In 1955, the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa, known as the Tomlinson Report, had taken over the plan and proposed the annexation of the Territories as part of South Africa's so-called Bantu homelands. The Tomlinson Report was, in effect, the blueprint of the current Bantustan policies and the threat

of economic subjugation used to force the Territories into annexation. Verwoerd had used his puppets in the Swaziland and Basutoland elections. He had, for example, promised the Basutoland National Party (BNP) to hand over certain neighbouring territories if Basutoland were given to South Africa.

184. Unless the Territories could be given a guarantee, before independence, that they would have free transit facilities and would have their own radio, postal services and currency, South Africa would have powerful means of isolating them from the outside world. The situation was a real danger to the Territories. He urged that the Committee should submit recommendations to the General Assembly and the Security Council for safeguarding the independence and territorial integrity of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.

185. The United Kingdom's pious declarations during ninety-seven years in Basutoland and sixty years in Swaziland had never been fulfilled. The United Kingdom could have helped the Territories to a viable and economic self-sufficiency during the past decade but had failed to do so. The Government was hand in glove with South Africa, and under the pretence of neutrality had intervened against the liberty of South African fugitives; South African police were in league with the police in the Territories. The United Kingdom had given South Africans high administrative posts, such as district Commissioners and public prosecutors. No guarantees could be expected from the British, for they were not protectors but speculators.

186. Mr. Molete, representing the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa, said that during the elections in the three territories, the South African Press and radio had openly attacked the liberation parties—the three African nationalist organizations recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and opposed to the policy of annexation. The South African Government had issued a pamphlet listing the main parties supported by South Africa and circulated it in South West Africa in the four main languages.

187. Mr. Nquku, representing the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP), said that investigation of his Party's just complaints had already brought United Nations observers to Swaziland, and the Swazi people had greatly appreciated their counsel. The SPP had prepared a number of documents for the Committee's attention. The first offered a critical review of Swaziland's constitutional development. In the second, it was demonstrated that the United Kingdom, as the administering Power responsible for Swaziland, had failed to comply with the United Nations Charter. The situation in Swaziland had improved little since SPP had submitted its previous petition in December 1962. The most notable change had been the adoption of a new Constitution, which made for still closer ties between the Swazi Government and the Government of South Africa. Yet there was no reason whatever why the administering Power should not grant Swaziland immediate independence. The third submission consisted of newspaper clippings to corroborate his testimony.

188. Recent developments called for a review of the entire political situation in Swaziland, and the presentation of certain demands on behalf of the Swazi people. The new Constitution was utterly unacceptable; the SPP accordingly demanded that a constitutional conference, to be attended by all genuinely interested parties, should be convened forthwith. The SPP had already protested against irregularities in the elections

to the Legislative Council held in June 1964. It had challenged the Imbokodo Party (King's Party) and the United Swaziland Association (Settlers' Party) and taken their candidates to court. But the hearings had been repeatedly postponed while the United Kingdom Government secretly amended the electoral laws. It had then been suggested that, before criminal proceedings were instituted, petitions against the candidates concerned should be filed with the Swaziland High Court. The Court had then made a series of financial demands which the plaintiffs had finally been unable to meet; as a result, some of the petitioners had been dismissed. The SPP demanded that an inquiry be held, and that future elections be supervised by independent persons. The 1964 elections should be declared null and void.

189. Real power in Swaziland was still vested in the British Crown. The Legislative Council was a one-party Parliament composed entirely of die-hard tribalists, conservatives and reactionary settler representatives. Under such government, the Swazi people had no chance of becoming masters of their fate.

190. Another matter of grave concern was the United Kingdom Government's attempt to form separate urban governments under the control of district commissioners. If municipalities were to be formed, they should be based on a recognized model and be governed by a democratically elected local government, as was the case throughout the world. By appointing district commissioners to fill what should be an elective office, the Administration was not only wasting public funds but helping to entrench European minority rule. The SPP condemned the institution of a qualified franchise in the urban municipalities as undemocratic, and called on the administering Power to withdraw it. Even Europeans were reluctant to take part in that form of urban government, and in some districts so few people had applied for registration on the voters' roll that elections could not be held.

191. The United Nations must induce the United Kingdom Government to grant Swaziland a truly democratic independence immediately, and to safeguard it against annexation by South Africa and encroachments by Portugal. He rejected the contention that the Swazi people were not ready to take over the administration of their own country, or that the threats from without made independence inadvisable. The Swazi people must have their independence, come what may.

192. The Africans of the Territory were victims of inhumane disabilities. The majority were illiterate, for discrimination in education, although theoretically illegal, was nevertheless practised. Excessive school fees denied education to many African children. There were no educational facilities at all for the children of African tenants on European farms, such children being condemned to spend their lives as hewers of wood and drawers of water. Furthermore, South Africa looked upon Swaziland as a British Bantustan with its "Bantu education", and in South Swaziland there was a daily exodus of European children crossing the border to attend schools in the Republic. Such things took place with the connivance of the administering Power. The SPP accordingly demanded free and compulsory education for all and the centralization of education under the Government of the country.

193. The Swazi people appreciated the establishment of the new University of Basutoland, Bechuana-

land and Swaziland, but it must be said that the University fell far short of the required standards.

194. Health facilities in Swaziland were woefully inadequate. In particular, free hospitalization had been withdrawn, which meant closing the hospital door to most Africans. Moreover, the same medical charges were levied on the whole population without regard to the poverty of the African majority. The SPP demanded the reinstatement of free hospitalization and the appointment of a commission of inquiry to investigate hospital facilities and, in particular, the treatment of Africans in Government hospitals.

195. The majority of the Swazis were socially backward, for the British had been reluctant to promote social progress in the sixty-odd years of their administration. Even now, little serious attention was devoted to the problem, and the aim seemed rather to be the separate development of the various communities, along apartheid lines. The administering Power should protect the emerging Swazi nation from socially corrupting influences such as the licensed casino at Ezulwini, which operated with government sanction—the more so as it was just across the border from South Africa, where such activities were forbidden.

196. Racial discrimination continued to be practised in all fields, despite legislation to the contrary. The African was treated as inferior to the European in the matter of personal status, remuneration and welfare services. Discrimination was practised openly in the Police Department, and the really shocking conditions to which Africans were subjected in Swazi gaols had recently been brought to light after some British soldiers had been personally exposed to them. Discrimination was still practised in hotels and clubs, and the Portuguese were allowed to set up exclusively Portuguese clubs. Furthermore, there were two parallel judicial systems—the European courts and the native courts—and there were still laws maintained specifically for Africans. The SPP demanded the abolition of discriminated courts, and the repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation.

197. Refugees in Swaziland lived in constant fear of the white South Africans and Portuguese who were present in the Territory. The administering Power should provide safeguards for such refugees, and the United Nations, too, should assist them in their plight. Repeated protests had been made against the presence of British troops in Swaziland, and SPP insisted on their immediate withdrawal.

198. The land question in Swaziland was a most serious political problem. African tenants on European farms lived in conditions of slavery, and mass evictions were continuing unchecked. The SPP demanded that a commission of inquiry be appointed to investigate the situation.

199. As in the past, SPP looked to the United Nations to curb South African interference in Swaziland's domestic affairs, to protect the Territory from economic integration with South Africa, and to prevent the introduction of South African laws. South Africa was interfering with the political parties in Swaziland, even going so far as to refuse their leaders permission to pass through the Territory of the Republic. He himself had been obliged to travel to Dar es Salaam by air, via Johannesburg, and would have to return the same way. He appealed to the United Nations to intervene.

200. The oppressed peoples of Africa had rejoiced at the Labour Party's electoral victory in the United

Kingdom. The SPP believed that the Labour Government would honour its election promises to emancipate the African peoples as quickly as possible. The United Kingdom faced a difficult situation in Swaziland, but it must be prepared to take a tough line with the die-hard tribalists and reactionary Europeans.

201. It was imperative that the United Nations act at once to protect Swaziland's economic resources from the designs of the South African Government. It should exert all possible influence with the United Kingdom Government to prevent the economic strangulation of the three High Commission Territories by South Africa, and to protect their right to do business with whomever they wished. The United Nations should also take note of SPP's opposition to all agreements undertaken by the administering Power on behalf of Swaziland without Swazi approval. The SPP also protested against the fact that only the north of Swaziland was being developed, while the southern areas remained untouched.

202. British influence in Swaziland was giving way to South African influence. At the last elections, the Swaziland Independent Front, a pro-British Party, had been roundly defeated by a pro-South African Party, the United Swaziland Association. Moreover, South African influence had finally won the support of tribal leaders for the complete expulsion of the British from Swaziland. It was not surprising, therefore, that the tribal leaders, as well as the settlers, were strongly opposed to the development of trade unionism.

203. In response to questions, Mr. Nquku confirmed that the Constitution had been rejected by the entire Swazi people. There had been such concerted opposition to it at the Constitutional Conference in London that the United Kingdom Government had had to submit a modified version to the Swazi people. It had still been unacceptable, however, and it was only as a last resort that the King had agreed to it.

204. The United Kingdom Government had begun to return Crown lands to the Swazi people to a limited extent. Apart from those areas, however, no other land had been distributed. In Swaziland the land was divided into four categories: Swazi areas, land purchased by Swazis, land on freehold lease to Swazis and European farms. At the present time half the available land was in African hands, and half belonged to Europeans. It was therefore obvious that the minority settlers' group had more than their fair share, thus leading to overcrowding among the Swazis. Yet the Europeans owned large tracts of unused land. He therefore wished to request the Committee to call upon the United Nations to set up a court of inquiry into the land situation in Swaziland.

205. Referring to the electoral system, Mr. Nquku said that in theory the elections in Swaziland had been based on the "one-man vote" principle, but in practice such was not the case. For instance, unmarried women were not allowed to vote, regardless of their professional status.

206. With regard to the number of candidates, he pointed out that there had in fact been two general elections, one on an exclusively European roll and the second on a national roll. In the Territory's four constituencies, three candidates had to be elected on the national roll. Of the three candidates, one had to be European. Consequently, the Africans had no choice but to vote for a European whom they did not want.

207. Refugees from South Africa and Mozambique lived in terror of their lives in Swaziland because of the presence of Portuguese and South African nationals. Kidnapping of refugees had taken place in Swaziland, and it was impossible to prevent them since South Africans and Portuguese were freely allowed to enter and leave the country. To the best of his knowledge, refugees in Swaziland received no material assistance, and he wished to appeal to the United Nations on their behalf.

Other statements

208. At the 339th meeting, the Chairman informed the Special Committee of the receipt of a communication from the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) requesting that the Co-ordinating Committee of the OAU for the Liberation of Africa be represented as an observer at the Special Committee's meetings in Africa. At the same meeting, the Special Committee decided without objection to grant this request.

209. The representative of the Co-ordinating Committee of the Organization of African Unity for the Liberation of Africa, speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, said that in connexion with the question of guarantees for Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland on attainment of their independence, he wished to draw the Committee's attention to a resolution passed by the OAU Council of Ministers at its third ordinary session. He requested that the text of the resolution be distributed to the Committee for guidance.

210. The Organization for African Unity was not concerned with political squabbles within the three High Commission Territories. Its chief concern was with their position in regard to South Africa after they had gained their independence. All three Territories relied on South Africa for much of their economic activity. There was a possibility that after independence, more radical Governments than those now in power might be returned. In such an eventuality, the South African Government might be tempted to annex or encroach upon the territorial integrity of the three Territories or to encourage subversion. Even now, Basutoland was at the mercy of South Africa for the right to fly over South African territory. The OAU therefore urged the United Nations to prepare an international convention guaranteeing the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of those Territories and the right to free passage without molestation or restraint.

General statements by members

211. The representative of Yugoslavia recalled that the United Kingdom Government had stated the previous year that it was prepared to grant independence to Basutoland one year after the elections. The United Kingdom Government was also under an obligation to take steps to ensure and guarantee that independence. He considered that those steps should include measures to improve the economic situation of Basutoland, as well as Bechuanaland and Swaziland, and the removal of Afrikaners and white settlers from key positions in the Territories before their accession to independence. Those new economic and administrative measures were indispensable if the independence and sovereignty of Basutoland and also of Bechuanaland and Swaziland were not to be jeopardized. He associated himself with the recommendations made by the representative of the Organization of African Unity and by the Conference of non-aligned countries with regard to their points of

view on the question of guarantees and he assured the petitioners that the Yugoslav delegation to the United Nations would support any step the United Nations might undertake with the view of deciding upon measures providing effective guarantees for those three Territories.

212. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland said that a number of detailed complaints had been made about the conduct of the recent elections in Basutoland. It should be pointed out that there was a readily available procedure for the hearing and investigation of complaints by the High Court of Basutoland. The courts were entirely impartial and not subject to influence either by the United Kingdom or the Basutoland Governments. Contrary to what the petitioners had said, he had been informed that no petitions had been submitted—unless during the last few days—alleging irregularities in the conduct of the elections. If complaints had been made, they were now *sub judice*. In any case, the Committee was not competent in either legal or practical terms to judge complaints of that kind or to ascertain the facts.

213. The petitioners' real complaint seemed to be that they had lost the elections, not that the elections had been improperly conducted. The United Kingdom Government had not rigged the elections in Basutoland. Nor had the Basutoland administration, which enjoyed a reputation for fairness in local political matters which was widely recognized in the Committee. Neither the United Kingdom nor the Basutoland administration had any interest in supporting one party against another. He had no comment to make on the allegation that the party which opposed the petitioners had received outside support, nor for that matter on the possible sources of funds and support for the petitioners' own party.

214. With regard to the statement that the election manifesto of BNP had promised to put Basutoland under Mr. Verwoerd's guidance, he would point out that the manifesto had in fact stated that BNP stood for full Basutoland sovereignty and would not allow any interference in internal affairs, and that it rejected the incorporation of Basutoland in South Africa. In addition, it condemned South Africa's policy of racial discrimination, but in view of Basutoland's geographical and economic situation thought it would be in the interests of the people to co-operate with South Africa on matters of mutual concern. Finally, the manifesto had advocated that Basutoland should join OAU.

215. The petitioner had stated that Basutoland's economic problems would be solved only when independence had been granted and British exploitation had ceased. In fact there was no British exploitation of the Basutoland economy. On the contrary, that economy was heavily dependent on British financial assistance, which consisted almost entirely of straight, free grants. As indicated in the Secretariat working paper (see sect. A above) nearly half the Basutoland budget was financed by the United Kingdom. In addition, the United Kingdom Government was contributing £1,823,000 to the Basutoland three-year development plan. To describe a financial relationship of that kind as exploitation seemed to be at the very least misleading.

216. The petitioner had also spoken of his party's demands and struggle for independence from the United Kingdom colonial yoke. The fact was that the United Kingdom Government had promised independence whenever the Basutoland Parliament wanted it at any

time after March 1966. The petitioners would be better occupied in working out practical policies for the many problems which Basutoland would inevitably face as an independent country than in complaining to the United Nations about the conduct of elections which they had lost or in calling for independence when it was theirs for the asking.

217. With regard to the points raised during the hearing, particularly by the representative of Yugoslavia, his delegation would have something to say when the time came to discuss all three Territories.

218. The representative of the Soviet Union had addressed the Committee on the subject of democratic principles and the conduct of free elections. If such a lecture had been necessary—which it was not—the United Kingdom delegation would have preferred it to come from someone more qualified to speak on such matters. Election meant choice. In the Basutoland elections the people had been offered a choice between candidates from several parties with different policies.

219. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said he had listened carefully to both sides of the argument. The Committee had been given a substantiated account of the rigging of the elections held in Basutoland under United Kingdom supervision. In his reply, with the exception of an insulting attack on the Soviet Union, the representative of the United Kingdom had produced no argument other than the statement that the Committee was not competent to inquire into the conduct of the Basutoland elections. He had claimed that the Basutoland Government, which had been set up by the United Kingdom, was more competent to judge complaints about the misconduct of elections than a United Nations Committee which included several distinguished jurists as well as representatives from all continents and all political and electoral systems. If the facts were made available, the Committee was perfectly competent to assess them. Yet the representative of the United Kingdom had not put forward a single concrete fact to refute the allegations of the petitioners. That being so, the Committee had no choice but to accept the veracity of the petitioners' statements.

220. The representative of the United Kingdom had also declared that his Government had no interest in supporting one party against another. He had then gone on to defend the policy of a particular party, whose policy was the integration of Basutoland in South Africa. The leader of that party was the present Prime Minister of Basutoland and he was acceptable to the South African régime. By defending the party that desired integration with South Africa, the United Kingdom representative had shown where his country's real interests lay. He had said that the United Kingdom provided substantial assistance to Basutoland. The Soviet Union delegation reserved its right to comment on the figures mentioned after closer study of them. It had been stated that half the Basutoland budget was financed by British taxpayers, but no mention had been made of the profits gained by United Kingdom investors from the exploitation of Basutoland.

221. The representative of the United Kingdom in a further statement said that he would deal with the points which had been raised by the petitioners from the Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. The most important question was to establish the policy of the United Kingdom Government for the three Territories and to see how that policy was

being carried out. It would be recalled that the Swaziland Constitutional Conference in 1963 had failed to agree on various important matters; the details had been set out in the earlier documents of the Committee. After the fullest consultation, the British Government had decided to introduce new constitutional arrangements which took account to the greatest possible extent of the views expressed at the conference and went as far as possible to meet them all. The new Constitution had come into effect at the beginning of 1964 and elections had been held under the Constitution in June. The composition of the legislature and the franchise system were fully described in the report of the Special Committee for 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII, paras. 147-151). The election results themselves were set out in paragraph 157 of that document. In August 1964, representatives of one of the political parties had made representations to the United Kingdom Government in which they had complained about certain features of the Constitution and of the elections. Those had been considered at the time and discussed with the Swaziland representatives by United Kingdom Ministers who had pointed out that the election legislation provided machinery for the investigation of complaints about the elections. In fact, a number of complaints had been submitted under that machinery. The Ministers had also replied to the representations made about the Constitution that there was no reason in their view to depart from the decision announced in the Swaziland White Paper that the Constitution should not be further reviewed until 1966.

222. The revisions to the Bechuanaland Constitution which had come into effect on 29 January 1965 had again been the outcome of a long and thorough process of consultation, discussion and conference, which had begun in 1963 and ended with the announcement in June 1964 of the United Kingdom Government's acceptance of the proposals unanimously agreed by all concerned in Bechuanaland. Under the new Constitution Bechuanaland had internal self-government with a full ministerial system. Elections had been held on 1 March 1965 on the basis of universal adult suffrage, and the results had been a victory for the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) with twenty-eight of the thirty-one seats, the Bechuanaland People's Party winning the remaining three. Eighty-one per cent of all qualified voters had been registered and 80 per cent of those had actually voted—a very high proportion. The leader of BDP, Mr. Seretse Khama, had been appointed Bechuanaland's first Prime Minister. Under the Bechuanaland electoral regulations, there was a procedure for investigation by the Courts of complaints about alleged irregularities in the conduct of the elections. No such complaints had been submitted. Only one prosecution had been initiated in connexion with the elections and that had been against BDP for using a public address system on election day.

223. With regard to Basutoland, a process of local discussion about constitutional advance had begun in 1962 and a Conference had taken place in London in 1964 at which full agreement by all concerned had been reached on a new Constitution. The details had been fully described to the Committee in 1964. They included internal self-government and a ministerial system, the abolition of the post of Resident Commissioner and the creation instead of a new post of British Government Representative and constitutional arrangements specifically designed to be incorporated with the minimum necessary changes in the independence con-

stitution itself. It had been announced in the report of the Conference that the British Government had agreed that Basutoland should become fully independent provided that at any time not earlier than one year after the elections, the people of Basutoland were to ask for independence either by resolutions of both Houses of the Basutoland Parliament, or, if the two Houses could not agree, by majority vote in a popular referendum. Elections had taken place in Basutoland under universal adult suffrage on 29 April 1965. The Basutoland National Party (BNP) had won thirty-one seats, the Basutoland Congress Party twenty-five, and the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party the remaining four. The leader of BNP, Chief Leabua Jonathan, had been defeated, and his deputy, Chief Maseribane, had been appointed as Prime Minister until Chief Jonathan was able to enter Parliament.

224. As far as economic developments were concerned, the Basutoland development plan for 1963 provided for expenditure of £8.1 million including £664,000 for the new University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland; large new areas of land had recently been brought under irrigation and six new livestock development centres had been completed in addition to the existing twenty centres. Bechuanaland had suffered a three-year drought, but the cattle industry on which the economy was founded continued to flourish with plans for new exports to their natural markets in Zambia and Rhodesia and an increase in exports to the Congo. The International Development Association had signed a £1.3 million loan agreement for road improvement. Swaziland had a £13.5 million three-year development plan, including £9.5 million for railway and electricity schemes which would benefit all the people of the Territory. The new railway, a new iron ore mine and the hydroelectric power station had been opened in 1964. Twelve million tons of iron ore were to be exported every year via the new railway for shipment from Lourenço Marques to Japan. The power from the hydroelectric scheme would greatly benefit industrial development in Swaziland. The sugar industry was also expanding rapidly with Swaziland's accession to the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.

225. Summing up the United Kingdom's constitutional policy for all three Territories, he said that it was one of full consultation with representatives of all local opinion, leading to major measures of constitutional advance wherever possible on the basis of full agreement with all concerned in the Territories, and where full agreement could not be reached, then on the basis of the widest obtainable measure of agreement. Basutoland could achieve its independence by making a formal request for it at any time after next April. Bechuanaland and Swaziland were free to follow whenever they wished. Basutoland and Bechuanaland enjoyed full self-government and universal adult suffrage. Swaziland remained a step behind in that respect, but had recently undergone major changes in the advances involved in the present Constitution.

226. All three Territories were thus well on the way to independence. But independence, by itself, was not the end of the story. Fears had been expressed both in the Committee and elsewhere about the possibility that when they became independent those three Territories might either be annexed by South Africa or else be so vulnerable to pressures from South Africa that they would become to all intents and purposes subject to the will and policies of the South African Government. The United Kingdom delegation believed that those fears

were to a great extent unfounded. In its recent statements, the South African Government had indicated that it no longer pursued its previous policy of seeking the incorporation of the Territories in South Africa and indeed it had made known that it welcomed their forthcoming independence as African States. The United Kingdom Government, for its own part, had made it clear that there was no question of any transfer of Britain's responsibility for the administration of the Territories to any outside authority, whether South Africa or anyone else, without the agreement of the inhabitants of the Territories. It had been made clear that each Territory in exercising its right to self-determination would at the proper time need to find, through negotiations with South Africa, a basis for the future conduct of its mutual relations.

227. Suggestions that the United Kingdom Government had entered into a secret agreement with the Government of South Africa to bring the Territories to independence in such a way as to put them within South Africa's sphere of influence or even to enable South Africa to annex them were of course quite fantastic. The United Kingdom Government had on many occasions expressed its abhorrence of the policy of apartheid and dissociated itself completely from the racial policies of the South African Government. Apartheid was neither practised nor tolerated in any Territory for which the United Kingdom Government was responsible. There could be no question of any transfer of the three Territories to South Africa without the agreement of their inhabitants. All the major parties in the Territories had for their part emphasized their rejection of South African racial policies and of any proposals for incorporating the Territories in South Africa as Bantustans or in any other way. That applied as much to the parties which had won the elections in all three Territories as to the opposite parties. It had been suggested that all three elections had been won by parties which secretly or openly desired the incorporation of their Territories in South Africa and that those parties had secret agreements with the South African Government. Those suggestions were quite untrue. The BDP manifesto in Bechuanaland had clearly stated that the party looked towards an independent Bechuanaland, free from any form of racial discrimination and belonging to the United Nations and OAU. Mr. Seretse Khama, on his appointment as Prime Minister, had said that he abhorred apartheid although his country would continue to trade with South Africa and would welcome investment funds from any source, including South Africa. The manifesto of Imbokodo in Swaziland had stated that it sought a fully free and independent Swaziland with peaceful coexistence for all groups and races. At the opening of the Legislative Council in September 1964, the Imbokodo leader had declared a policy of maintaining Swaziland as a non-racial State, and had added:

"Neither the Ngwenyama (i.e., the Paramount Chief) nor anyone of Imbokodo has ever been in contact with the Government of the Republic [of South Africa], nor are our policies designed to draw Swaziland into the hands of the Republic, nor are our policies apartheid policies."

He had described any allegations to the contrary as a deliberate calculated lie. The Committee had already been informed of the line taken by the BNP manifesto in Basutoland which condemned South African racial policies, rejecting Basutoland's incorporation in South Africa, emphasizing that it stood for the full sovereignty

of Basutoland and declaring that the party would not allow any interference in its internal affairs by any other State. The manifesto had also said that because of the geography and economic situation of Basutoland it was in the interests of the people to co-operate with South Africa on matters of mutual interest.

228. Those were the policies of the parties now in power in the three Territories. The opposition parties had been even more emphatic in rejecting incorporation with South Africa or the adoption of apartheid policies. One of the petitioners had read out a letter purporting to come from the leader of the majority party in Basutoland and containing various remarks about his wish to put Basutoland under South Africa's guidance and protection. That letter had been unequivocally denounced as a forgery and a political trick designed to discredit the party concerned and to bring electoral advantage to the opposition, and those responsible had privately admitted as much. The fact that the whole trend of the letter was in direct conflict with the clear policy of the party, demonstrated the fraudulent nature of that document.

229. A further aspect of the allegations made about secret intentions to secure the incorporation of the Territories was the accusation that the United Kingdom Government, through the administrations in the Territories, had manipulated the elections to secure success of the parties who were well disposed to the idea of incorporation. The idea that the successful parties were in favour of apartheid or incorporation into South Africa as Bantustans had already been disposed of, so that the whole object of those alleged manipulations became meaningless. But since aspersions had been cast on the fairness of the conduct of the elections, at any rate in Basutoland and Swaziland, the United Kingdom delegation wished to comment briefly on some of the specific complaints. To begin with, it was not for the Special Committee to attempt the judicial task of hearing evidence on those complaints and forming a balanced conclusion about their validity or otherwise. That was a task for the courts, nor for the Committee of the General Assembly. The representative of the Soviet Union had said that there were jurists in the Committee qualified to judge those complaints. That might be so; but the Committee had neither the legal competence nor access to all the evidence to enable it to perform such a task. Nevertheless, since the United Kingdom delegation had been challenged to answer some of those allegations and so that a silence would not be considered as an admission of their validity, he wished to refer to certain complaints in detail.

230. One of the petitioners had suggested that the shooting incident at Rothe in October 1964 had been handled in such a way as to indicate prejudice against one particular political party on the part of the police. In fact the police had taken immediate action, twenty-one persons had been accused: thirteen had been committed for trial on the charge of murder, six had been committed to the High Court on charge of public felonies, and two had been discharged. The cases were due to be heard in the High Court on 21 June 1965. The bullets found were not of a type specially associated with Government sources, as the petitioner had claimed. They were ordinary .303 bullets which could easily be obtained from other sources.

231. It had been suggested that the administration had brought military planes from Southern Rhodesia for the elections for purposes of intimidation. In fact, there had been no military planes from Rhodesia. The

only planes brought in from outside had been two Twin Pioneers: small twin-engined transport planes brought in from United Kingdom sources in Nairobi, Kenya, for use in transporting the civilian police during the election period. There seemed nothing whatever to complain of in that.

232. The petitioner's main point in support of his charges about the rigging of the elections had concerned 25,000 ballot envelopes which—he said—had disappeared and turned up again bearing the official stamp. The fact was that a number of ballot envelopes had been spoilt at the printer's. There was no foundation whatever for the claim that the envelopes had appeared subsequently or that they had later acquired the official stamp. Those official stamps had been kept strictly secret. It was worth pointing out that the petitioner's party, BCP, had now presented four election petitions, but not one of those made any reference to the story of the envelopes. The petitions had not yet been heard by the courts. One concerned the number of ballot envelopes at a polling station; another concerned the time at which a polling station had closed, and the others involved allegations of unlawful meetings, the qualifications of one candidate and a presiding officer's failure to account for certain envelopes issued to him. All those points were *sub judice* and it would not be right to comment on them except to point out that even if all of them were found by the courts to be justified, they would still not support the special charges made by the petitioner about the rigging of the entire elections by the British Government or the Basutoland administration. The elections had not been rigged. They had been properly conducted and the results accurately reflected the decisions and choice of the Basutoland electorate.

233. He turned next to Swaziland. The petitioner from Swaziland had made many complaints and detailed allegations. He had said that medical fees in Swaziland were so high that many Africans could not use public health facilities. It was not so. No one, African or European, had ever been refused treatment in any Swaziland Government hospital because of inability to pay; and fees were in fact very low. At least 25 per cent of the patients received their treatment completely free of charge.

234. The petitioner had said that school fees were so high that many Africans could not afford an education. It was not so. The rates were: £1 a year for secondary schools, 10/-d. a year for primary schools, 4/2d. a year for other schools—low rates by any standards, moreover, there was provision, in this case as well, for exemption in the case of the needy.

235. The petitioner had said that the wage-rates discriminated against Africans. It was not so. Swaziland needed to attract skilled workers for its expanding economy and naturally, like any other country, had to pay salaries and wages at a high enough level to attract the people it needed; vocational training was thus a top priority in Swaziland and it was being energetically carried forward. The general rule throughout Swaziland was that everyone was paid the rate for the job, regardless of race.

236. The petitioner had said that the United Kingdom and Swaziland Governments had closed the borders with South Africa to keep the Swazi people behind barbed wire fences. It was not so. The Government of South Africa had imposed border controls about two and a half years earlier, unilaterally and without

Swaziland or United Kingdom co-operation. In fact the Swaziland Government even now had only two border posts which were both on the border with Mozambique, not with South Africa at all.

237. The petitioner had said that because Europeans owned a disproportionate amount of the land, the Swazi Africans were overcrowded and short of land themselves and that there was some system whereby the best land was reserved for Europeans. It was not so. There was no pressure on land in the Swazi areas, and when land owned by Europeans came up for sale, Africans could and often did buy it. There was discrimination in the reservation of land in Swaziland—discrimination to protect and set aside land for Africans, not the other way round—a safeguard employed in many countries throughout Africa. In fact at the end of 1963, over 2 million acres, or more than half of the total area of Swaziland, had been specifically reserved for the Swazis.

238. The petitioner had said that labour legislation was discriminatory and insufficient to protect African workers. It was not so. Swazi labour legislation, much of it recently overhauled and modernized, was based on accepted international models and ILO Conventions.

239. The petitioner from Swaziland had said that despite the introduction of an elected Legislative Council, the Commissioner continued to make laws by proclamation over the head of the Council. It was not so. There had not been one single law by proclamation since the establishment of the Legislative Council.

240. The petitioner had said that there were separate judicial systems for Africans and Europeans. It was not so. There were special courts to administer Swazi law and custom, just as there were special systems of customary courts in many other parts of Africa, but any Swazi could have recourse to the ordinary magistrates courts. There was of course the usual system of reviews and appeals.

241. It had been suggested by the petitioner that the United Kingdom and the Swaziland Administration had failed to intervene with the South African Government to protect Swazi Africans' transit facilities out of Swaziland through South Africa. It was not so. To quote only two instances: two members of the petitioner's own party, named Nkosi and Sangweni, had been held up in Johannesburg on a journey northward from Swaziland, the Swaziland Government had intervened with the South African Government and only then had the two men been permitted to proceed.

242. The petitioner had implied that there was virtual apartheid in Swaziland. It was not so. The Swaziland Government was completely opposed to all forms of racial discrimination and, in the rare cases of discrimination in public places, the law which specifically forbade it was vigorously applied. Apartheid was not just another word for racial discrimination. It was a doctrine of separate development of the different racial communities along distinct and separate lines. The policy of the United Kingdom Government and of the Swaziland Government was the complete opposite of both discrimination and apartheid. It was a policy of integration of the racial communities, not separation. Swaziland pursued a "non-racial state" policy; to call that apartheid was to deprive words of any meaning.

243. Finally, the elections. The petitioner had said that his party had rejected the franchise and electoral system. In fact the system was very close indeed to

what the petitioner's party had advocated at the Swaziland Conference. He had said that there had been irregularities in the conduct of the 1964 elections. It was not so. There had been no interference by the United Kingdom Government or by the Swaziland Administration, and no attempt to influence the outcome of the elections. If the petitioner's party had had any reasonable ground for complaint about the conduct of the elections, it had been completely free to take its evidence for impartial investigation to the High Court. One such complaint had been investigated and dismissed by the Court; three had been withdrawn by consent, and one application had been refused by the Court. It was perhaps understandable that the petitioner should have felt aggrieved about the elections: of the 2,846 votes cast in his constituency, he had received 56. But the facts just did not bear out his allegations, either about the elections or about the other aspects of policy and the general situation in Swaziland.

244. If he had commented at length on the petitioner's allegations, it was in the hope that his remarks might encourage the Committee to take a rather harder look at some of those complaints and to compare them with the facts as set out in his delegation's statements, and in such objective sources of information as the Secretariat working papers and other works of reference, before jumping to conclusions.

245. There were bound to be problems affecting the relationship between the Territories and South Africa, both now and after independence. One of the greatest was that of refugees from South Africa, South West Africa and the Portuguese Territories. As his delegation had already made clear, in no circumstances were genuine political refugees in the Territories for which his Government was responsible returned to South African or Portuguese authorities. Those refugees were entirely free to leave the Territories as soon as they could find another country which was willing to accept them. In all three Territories certain restrictions were imposed on the refugees, in the interests of the Territories and in full agreement with their elected African leaders. Commenting on the condition imposed on applicants for asylum that they should not indulge in politics, the independent organization "Amnesty International" had concluded that, in view of the delicate political situation in the three Territories, enforcement of the condition was not unreasonable, and that those who complained of such enforcement had no justifiable grounds for complaint.

246. Some of the petitioners, while admitting that the Territories had not handed over refugees to the South Africans or the Portuguese, maintained that the Governments of those Territories allowed the police from South Africa and Mozambique to come and kidnap their refugees, which was just as bad. The suggestion that there had been any collusion between the authorities in the High Commission Territories and the South African or Portuguese authorities designed to enable refugees to be abducted from the Territories was entirely untrue; there had been no such collusion, and the authorities in the Territories had never connived in any way at the act of taking such abductions. In the previous cases of kidnapping which had come to light, the United Kingdom Government had on each occasion made vigorous protests as a result of which the South African Government had always returned the person concerned. It was physically impossible for the Governments of the Territories to keep every single refugee under constant guard; and

because of the length and nature of the borders of the Territories and the resources of the administration, it was impossible to keep detailed control over all persons entering or leaving the Territories. It was therefore impossible to guarantee refugees against the possibility of kidnapping. But wherever kidnappings could be positively established, the United Kingdom Government would always take vigorous action.

247. The other aspect of the Territories' relations with South Africa to which reference had been made was the extent of their economic dependence on that country. It was quite true that the Territories had many economic links and that their economies were closely involved with the economy of South Africa. That simply reflected the geography of the Territories, their resources, and the undeniable fact that the Republic, with its more developed economy, its industrial resources and the large market which it offered to the products of the Territories, inevitably complemented their economies. To ask the United Kingdom Government to bring about the economic independence of the Territories vis-à-vis South Africa was like asking it to transfer them to some other part of the world. The important fact was that economic interdependence need not and did not imply political subjugation. There were few countries in the modern world which were not in a greater or lesser degree economically interdependent; but that did not make their political independence any the less real. It was not true that the economic dependence of the three Territories on South Africa was the result of neglect by the United Kingdom, or that their dependence would be less if the United Kingdom had given them more aid for development; indeed, the reverse might well be true, for if the Territories' economies were more highly developed, they would probably be even more interlinked with the economy of South Africa. The United Kingdom Government had in fact given financial and development aid to all three Territories on a very substantial and ever-growing scale. A mission financed by the United Kingdom Government was currently visiting the three Territories to investigate the possibilities of additional economic and technical assistance; the Secretary-General of the United Nations had accepted a United Kingdom invitation to nominate the Chairman of the three-man team, and had appointed Mr. Chacko, Director of the Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories in the Secretariat, and the former Secretary of the Special Committee.

248. To sum up, all three Territories were well on the way to independence, all had a substantial measure of self-government, and all had the machinery for the full and free expression of the wishes of their people on how they wished to be governed and conduct their relations with their neighbours. The question of their relations with South Africa after independence would thus be a matter for the democratically elected Governments of the Territories to determine; the same applied to any question of a United Nations guarantee, a proposal which had been mentioned in past United Nations resolutions, and again in the course of the Committee's present discussions. There was no conspiracy, no plot, no collusion between the United Kingdom or the Territories and South Africa, to bring about some form of political union or subjugation of the Territories to South Africa contrary to the wishes of their inhabitants. The policies of the United Kingdom Government and of the political parties in the Territories showed clearly that those fears and accusa-

tions were without foundation. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the hard facts which he felt obliged to set out at such length would enable the Committee to approach the question of the Territories with a greater sense of proportion and in better perspective than might otherwise have been the case. He hoped that the Committee, in any resolution on the question, would recognize the great steps forward which all three Territories had taken in recent months, and that it would send its good wishes to the people and Governments of the Territories as they embarked on the final stages of political progress along the path to self-determination and full independence.

249. The representative of Ethiopia said that the inhabitants of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland shared the common misfortune of being economically and politically harassed by a powerful and expansionist neighbour. It was all too obvious that the total economic dependence of the three High Commission Territories on the Republic of South Africa constituted one of the principal obstacles to their political advancement. It was also obvious that the political future of those Territories would depend to a considerable extent on the degree of economic viability they achieved in the near future. The Ethiopian delegation therefore attached great importance to the recent announcement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations that he had been invited by the United Kingdom Government to nominate the Chairman and one member of a three-man team to visit the Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland to investigate and advise upon the scope for additional economic and technical assistance. The Ethiopian delegation greatly appreciated the Secretary-General's nomination of Mr. Chacko as Chairman of the team.

250. The Ethiopian delegation had noted the constitutional development that had taken place in Basutoland since that Territory had last been discussed by the Committee. It was happy at the attainment of self-government by the people of Basutoland, but wished to emphasize the fact that the administering Power had not taken effective steps to carry out fully the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), in particular paragraphs 5 and 6. Despite all that had been done to help the people of Basutoland achieve their independence, they were politically threatened by the Republic of South Africa. The existence of that threat to the territorial integrity of all three Territories had been recognized by the United Nations, when it had warned the Government of the Republic of South Africa in General Assembly resolution 1954 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 that any attempt to annex or encroach upon the territorial integrity of the three Territories would be considered as an act of aggression. Furthermore, the OAU Council of Ministers and the first and second assemblies of African Heads of State and Government had adopted several resolutions to forestall any move on the part of South Africa to annex any of the Territories. They had requested that the United Nations should guarantee their territorial integrity. Precisely the same recommendation had been made in the Declaration by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964 (see A/5763).

251. Despite those recommendations, a tripartite military pact had been concluded in December 1964 between the Government of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia, which was a very grave threat to

the three Territories, above all to Basutoland. The gravity of the situation was clearly borne out by the fact that, although the Verwoerd Government's aspirations to the guardianship of the Territories had been condemned, the Republic of South Africa was secretly preparing for their annexation, beginning with Basutoland. The Government of South Africa hoped to carry out its schemes of economic and financial pressure. Short of open aggression, the threat to Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland lay in their economic and financial dependence on South Africa. Ethiopia and other African countries were seriously concerned lest the Verwoerd Government use its economic hold to weaken the will to independence of the inhabitants of the Territories. That challenge must be met by the United Nations. The Ethiopian delegation therefore wished to propose that, in conjunction with a United Nations guarantee of their territorial integrity, a crash economic programme be launched on behalf of the three Territories. He hoped that the three-man team would be able to explore the feasibility of such a programme. Further, since the unfortunate economic situation in the Territories was to a considerable degree the result of negligence on the part of the administering Power, he hoped that the United Kingdom would be able to take steps to improve the situation.

252. He wished to draw the Committee's attention to the question of the migration of labour from Basutoland and Bechuanaland referred to in the Secretariat working paper. It was stated that, owing to the fertility of the land, the economic difficulties of Swaziland were less acute than those of the other two Territories. Yet constitutional advances in Swaziland seemed to lag behind those in the other Territories. That was regrettable, and he hoped that the administering Power would take appropriate measures to remedy the situation. Nothing stood in the way of the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), provided that the administering Power co-operated to the full. In order to attain lasting independence, however, the Territories must also be helped to achieve economic independence. The Ethiopian delegation therefore appealed to the United Kingdom to do its utmost to assist the Territories and reminded the members of the Committee that vigilance was necessary if South Africa was to be prevented from swallowing them up.

C. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

253. At the 369th meeting, the representative of Ethiopia introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.217) sponsored by Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania, and Yugoslavia.

254. In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of Ethiopia pointed out that it took into account the statements made by the administering Power, the OAU Secretary-General and the petitioners. Generally speaking, the draft resolution reflected the view expressed in the Committee that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples should be applied to the three Territories in its entirety. The co-sponsors sincerely hoped that the draft resolution would be unanimously adopted by the Committee and that the administering Power would as a matter of urgency take steps to carry it out in full.

255. The representative of Chile said that his delegation had studied closely the draft resolution concerning

Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (A/AC.109/L.217). He was in a position to say that his delegation would vote for it, and he hoped its adoption would produce the desired effect and lead to a solution of the problems burdening the African population of the Territories. His delegation was concerned at the policies of the South African Government and its apparent intention of annexing those Territories. Vigorous efforts must be made to prevent such a step, and to enable the populations of those Territories to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. The collaboration of the administering Power was necessary in that regard, in order to protect the Territories from the expansionist ambitions of South Africa and to lead them towards the free exercise of their rights.

256. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, commenting on the statement made by the United Kingdom representative with regard to the Territories (see paras. 221 to 248 above), said that his delegation had duly noted the efforts being made by the administering Power towards granting the Territories independence. At the same time it had been greatly disappointed by the vague answers given to the charges levelled by some of the petitioners; their allegations had been simply dismissed as fantastic and without foundation.

257. The United Kingdom representative had said that the Swaziland Constitutional Conference of 1963, at which all parties had been represented, had failed to reach full agreement. In the next breath he had said that after the fullest consultation, which took ample account of the views expressed at the Conference and went as far as possible to meet them all, a new constitutional arrangement had been introduced. Such statements were contradictory and incoherent.

258. The United Kingdom representative had questioned the competence of the Committee to undertake the judicial task of hearing evidence on petitioners' complaints, which he alleged should be left to the courts. But great as was the Tanzanian delegation's respect for the British legal system in England, when practised in the colonies, it produced a mere mockery of justice. For instance, the distinction between Penal Code law and native customary law ensured that a British colonialist would never be tried by a native court. As for the evidence, what the petitioners had brought to light was conclusive enough. The United Kingdom representative had asserted at one point that no complaints had been submitted; but he had deliberately failed to tell the Committee that the reason was that the people were unable to pay the exorbitant fees charged.

259. With regard to the episode of the planes mentioned by the United Kingdom representative, the petitioners had insisted that they were military planes from South Africa or Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom representative had maintained that they were civilian planes from Kenya. The Tanzanian delegation was inclined to believe the petitioners, since they had no conceivable motive for not telling the truth. There may have been planes from Kenya in Bechuanaland, but the presence of military planes appeared to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. With regard to the rigging of elections, Tanzania had already seen that old colonial practice in operation in Zanzibar, and similar complaints had been made in British Guiana.

260. The United Kingdom representative had denied that wages and salaries were discriminatory, and had argued that the higher salaries paid to Europeans were merely an inducement to attract skill. Yet to quote an

example, the difference in the salaries paid to two Cambridge graduates, of the same qualifications and age, one African and the other European, might be as much as 50 per cent. The representative of a Labour Government should surely not try to justify such practices.

261. On the question of land, the British colonizers had invariably taken the best land for themselves, without payment. What shocked his delegation most was that the colonial settlers were now trying to sell the land back to the African owners at exorbitant prices.

262. Perhaps the most serious charge that could be made was that the United Kingdom Government was acquiescing in the swallowing-up of the High Commission Territories by South Africa. The United Kingdom representative had tried to pass off the charge lightly, yet it was a known fact that most of the civil servants in the Territories—in the police, in administration and even in the courts—were South Africans; and there was evidence of corruption, not to mention the fascist South African Prime Minister's avowed intention of neutralizing African nationalism. Concrete assurances that those matters were being dealt with would be preferable to the mere assertion that all such fears and accusations were without foundation.

263. The United Kingdom delegation had asserted that Basutoland could achieve independence by making a formal request any time after April 1966. It was to be hoped that the expression "formal request" was not yet another instance of colonial tactics for delaying independence.

264. His delegation sincerely hoped that the present Labour Government in the United Kingdom would see its way to revising British policies with regard to the High Commission Territories and granting independence.

265. The draft resolution now before the Committee embodied a consensus of the views of the sponsors, and as such represented a moderate compromise. His delegation would therefore urge all the members of the Committee to support it.

266. The representative of Denmark said that the Committee had been given a clear picture of the situation in the Territories through the statements of the United Kingdom representative and of the petitioners; and the draft resolution did not seem to his delegation to give a fair and complete account of the situation in the Territories or to take account of all the complex aspects of the question. For instance, it made no mention of the progress achieved recently in the constitutional, economic or social fields. Admittedly, much still remained to be done; but the paragraph in the draft resolution expressing regret that the administering Power had not taken steps to fully implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) ignored the established fact that the Territories could not stand on their feet unless they were sufficiently strong economically. The United Kingdom's assurance regarding the time-limit envisaged for the attainment of independence, and the initiative of a joint United Kingdom-United Nations team which would study the possibility of further economic and technical assistance to prevent the High Commission Territories from being swallowed up by South Africa, were satisfactory developments.

267. His delegation, therefore, found itself unable to support the draft and would abstain in the voting.

268. The representative of India said that the able presentation of the draft resolution by the Ethiopian

representative adequately expressed the views of the sponsors, including his own delegation. The Special Committee had discussed the three Territories in 1962, and the Indian delegation had at that time charged the United Kingdom with neglecting the Territories and turning a tolerant eye on abuses committed there. The Committee's discussions since then had made public opinion aware of the unsatisfactory situation. Admittedly, the United Kingdom had more recently taken steps to rectify the position; but even the United Kingdom representative had agreed that conditions in Basutoland left much to be desired, and it was hoped that the resolution would achieve the purpose of ensuring that the constitutional progress of the High Commission Territories was further accelerated.

269. On behalf of the sponsors, he announced that operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution had been revised by the addition of the words "and to the Security Council" after "*Recommends* to the General Assembly".

270. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the picture painted by the petitioners was entirely clear. It was quite obvious that the United Kingdom Government was giving effect neither to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) on the ending of colonialism, nor the resolutions on the granting of independence to Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. To be sure, the United Kingdom representative had explained his own point of view regarding those three Territories, but his statement had not been clear and the Committee was perfectly well aware of the real situation.

271. The Special Committee's discussions and the petitioners' replies to the questions put to them had given the Committee a glimpse of the prospects which colonialism had in store for the three Territories: for them "independence" would mean jumping out of the frying pan into the fire. The absorption of those Territories by South Africa, and the imposition of apartheid, was the goal to which everything was subordinated, whether elections—and the petitioners had shown that they had been neither free nor properly conducted—or constitutions, whose only consequence could be incorporation of the three Territories in South Africa and control, at first *de facto* and later *de jure*, by the South African Government. The representatives of the nationalist organizations were right: such a solution was unacceptable, for it would be contrary to world conscience, the rights of man and the Committee's mandate.

272. It was the Committee's duty to adopt a resolution announcing its desire to see independence granted to Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland and to collaborate in their struggle to that end; it was also the Committee's duty to prevent events which would lead to their incorporation in South Africa. The draft resolution in fact contained what was essential, particularly since the words "and to the Security Council" had been added in operative paragraph 5. He would, therefore, refrain from making more specific proposals, and would vote for the draft resolution.

273. The representative of the Ivory Coast, on behalf of the co-sponsors, said that the sixth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution concerning the three Territories (A/AC.109/L.217), in order to avoid repetition, should be redrafted to read as follows:

"*Noting* the resolutions adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organiza-

tion of African Unity at its first session in July 1964, and the Declaration adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in October 1964 to the effect that the United Nations should guarantee the territorial integrity of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland and should take measures for their speedy accession to independence and for the subsequent safeguarding of their sovereignty."

274. The draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.217), as orally revised by the sponsors, was adopted by a roll-call vote of 17 votes to none, with 5 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Denmark, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

275. The representative of Australia, explaining the vote of his delegation on the draft resolution on the three Territories, said that while his Government shared the Committee's concern for the political and economic independence of the Territories, the resolution failed to take account of developments which had taken place since the adoption of the Committee's resolution of November 1964. Nor was that the present resolution's only failing—the administering Power had gone about its duty in the High Commission Territories in an orderly and honest manner; the United Kingdom representative had given a very convincing refutation of the major charges made; and the resolution was less than fair in not recognizing those facts. His delegation had thus with some reluctance felt obliged to abstain in the voting.

276. The representative of Italy said that he had abstained from voting on the draft resolution because it did not accurately reflect the existing and future problems of the three Territories. Operative paragraph 2, for example, might be valid for Swaziland but not for the other two Territories. As for operative paragraph 3, no clear view on the land problem had ever emerged during his four years as a member of the Special Committee. There was no reason why the three local Parliaments should not adopt their own legislation, particularly in two of the Territories were soon to become independent. The problem would then be solved without the Committee asking the administering Power to take action which might be construed as interference in the internal affairs of the Territories.

277. The task being asked of the General Assembly in operative paragraph 5 was really within the Committee's own competence. There was no reason why the Committee should not attempt practical measures to deal with one of the problems entrusted to it.

278. Lastly, he disagreed with the whole approach to the problem of the three Territories. The resolution called for immediate independence, although everyone was aware that independence would be threatened the moment it became a reality, for a guarantee from the United Nations in its present state would carry very little weight.

279. He had repeatedly appealed to the Special Committee to avoid any hasty decision, but his appeals had been ignored. His plea was particularly relevant now, since a three-man team had been appointed to visit the

Territories. It would have been better to wait for the team's report before adopting a further resolution.

280. The representative of the United States of America said that his delegation had abstained in the voting on the draft resolution on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland because, in its opinion, the resolution failed to recognize the significant constitutional developments that had taken place in those Territories. The representative of the United Kingdom had given the Committee a full and detailed account of recent developments and of the conditions obtaining there, and had described the efforts being made by the United Kingdom Government to ensure that the peoples had as complete economic and political independence as was possible in the circumstances.

281. To cite a few of the facts which testified to the United Kingdom's good faith, there was first the new Constitutions that had been drafted in consultation with representatives of the peoples, guaranteeing full internal self-government and fundamental human rights. Secondly, popular elections had been held in all three Territories and two of them, Basutoland and Bechuanaland, would be in a position to attain independence as from the beginning of 1966. The third, Swaziland, would be ready for independence within two years. Finally, it was his understanding that the United Kingdom continued to provide the major portion of the economic, financial and technical assistance needed by the three Territories, if not all.

282. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation was much obliged to those delegations that had expressed appreciation of the policies of the United Kingdom and of the progress made in the Territories, as described in his earlier statement.

283. On the other hand, his delegation had listened with profound regret to the statement made earlier by the representative of Tanzania. According to his own short experience in the Committee, that statement would seem to be almost without precedent in tone and content. He did not propose to reply to the questions asked by the Tanzanian representative to which he had been proposing to give reasoned answers, until the Tanzanian representative agreed, as it was to be hoped he would on reflection, to withdraw the unwarranted aspersions he had made on the integrity and policies of the United Kingdom Government.

284. It was a matter for regret that the resolution itself, although in several ways an improvement from his Government's standpoint on the Committee's resolution of 2 November 1964 (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII, para. 365) and despite the second preambular paragraph still did not take adequate account of the detailed information given to the Committee in his earlier statement. In particular, the seventh preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 2, 4 and 5 ignored the points made clearly and at length at that time. The resolution took no account of the rapid progress of the three Territories to self-government, self-determination and independence, and it failed to acknowledge the economic and geographical realities of the situation in the three Territories. For instance, the reference in the eighth preambular paragraph to their economic situation seemed unbalanced, since economic conditions there were no more unsatisfactory than in many other parts of Africa and development was proceeding at a rapid pace.

285. With regard to operative paragraph 4 of the resolution, his delegation could not subscribe in advance

to a definition of a hypothetical situation, and there was no evidence of an existing and actual threat being posed to the integrity of the Territories by the existing policies of the South African Government. As to operative paragraph 5, his Government remained fully responsible for the territorial integrity of the Territories so long as they remained in non-self-governing status. After independence, the question of measures required for ensuring their integrity and safeguarding their sovereignty would be a matter for the democratically elected Governments of the Territories themselves.

286. In view of those shortcomings—the resolution's failure to take account of his delegation's statement and its lack of recognition of developments in the Territories, of the achievements of their peoples, or of the policies and actions of the United Kingdom Government—his delegation had abstained in the vote.

287. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said his delegation had been greatly surprised at the malicious interpretation given his earlier statement by the United Kingdom representative. The questions he had posed were on matters on which the Committee required to be further informed. He could only interpret the refusal to answer as confirmation that the United Kingdom representative was not in possession of the facts, and he would appreciate specific correction on any points where he had been wrong or had exaggerated.

288. His delegation and Government were fully prepared to answer for any statements he had made in the Committee, since they were based on thoughtful and careful weighing of the evidence. He therefore felt no call to apologize for his statements. Even at that late stage, he would hope that the United Kingdom representative would find time to furnish the needed information and, if not, would eventually give it to the Committee in New York.

289. The representative of Ethiopia, replying on behalf of the sponsors of the resolution to points raised in the explanations of vote, said that for the moment, he would limit himself to pointing out that the United Kingdom representative had made no comment on operative paragraph 3 of the resolution, which reiterated the Special Committee's request that the administering Power should take immediate steps to return to the indigenous inhabitants all the land taken from them, irrespective of the form or pretext for such alienation. Secondly, his delegation did not subscribe to the Italian view that the matter in question was so complex that it should be left for settlement once the Territories attained independence. It was precisely because they might shortly be granted independence that his delegation was gravely concerned about the land tenure position. He hoped the situation would be remedied before independence, otherwise the consequences might be far-reaching.

290. The representative of the United Kingdom explained in answer to the point made by the Ethiopian representative that he had not commented on the matter in question because it had seemed to him unnecessary to repeat the observations already made by the United Kingdom delegation in regard to similar paragraphs in earlier Special Committee resolutions. Moreover, he had made some factual comments on the question as it related to Swaziland in his previous statement. The whole question of land tenure in the three Territories was extremely complex and his delegation was not qualified to go into detail on it. The situation in the

Territories reflected legal processes and transactions of the past and the United Kingdom Government could not implement the Special Committee's request, in operative paragraph 3 of the resolution, without injustice to present rightful and legal tenants whatever their racial origins might be. In the United Kingdom view, it would not be right to remedy any injustice that might have occurred in the past by committing fresh injustice today.

291. As the representative of Italy had said, there was self-government in two of the Territories and the third would shortly be attaining that status. All three were moving rapidly to independence. And, in the circumstances, the question of land tenure seemed to be a matter for their elected Governments when they came into being. He trusted that that interim answer would be of use to the Ethiopian delegation.

292. The text of the resolution on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (A/AC.109/127) adopted by the Special Committee at its 372nd meeting, on 17 June 1965, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having examined the situation in the Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland,

"Having heard the statements of the administering Power, the petitioners from the Territories and the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling also General Assembly resolutions 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, 1817 (XVII) of 17 December 1962, and 1954 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, and its own resolution of 2 November 1964,

"Noting with concern the preponderant influence of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and certain financial interests in the three Territories,

"Noting the resolutions adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first session in July 1964, and the Declaration adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in October 1964 (see A/5763), to the effect that the United Nations should guarantee the territorial integrity of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland and should take measures for their speedy accession to independence and for the subsequent safeguarding of their sovereignty,

"Regretting that the administering Power has not taken effective and complete steps to fully implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 1817 (XVII) and 1954 (XVIII),

"Being aware of the unsatisfactory economic, financial and social conditions in the three Territories and their imperative need for United Nations assistance.

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland to self-determination and independence;

"2. Invites the administering Power to take immediate steps to fully and completely implement Gen-

eral Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 1817 (XVII) and 1954 (XVIII) in conformity with the freely expressed wishes of the people of the three Territories;

"3. *Reiterates* its request that the administering Power take immediate steps to return to the indigenous inhabitants all the land taken from them, whatever the form or pretext for such alienation;

"4. *Draws the attention* of the Security Council to the threat to the territorial integrity of the Territories posed by the expansionist policy of the Government of the Republic of South Africa;

"5. *Recommends* to the General Assembly and to the Security Council urgently to consider and initiate the measures necessary to ensure the territorial integrity of the Territories and the safeguarding of their sovereignty;

"6. *Requests* the Secretary-General, pending the completion of the study requested in paragraph 5 of its resolution of 2 November 1964, to intensify in co-operation with the specialized agencies the provision of economic, financial and technical assistance commensurate with the special needs of the Territories;

"7. *Decides* to maintain the item of the three Territories on its agenda."

293. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 21 July 1965 (S/6566).

D. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

294. The Special Committee gave further consideration to the question of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland at its 383rd to 387th meetings held between 7 and 20 September 1965. The Special Committee considered the question in the context of a report concerning these Territories submitted on 25 August 1965 by the Secretary-General (A/AC.109/133).

Report of the Secretary-General

295. The Secretary-General's report concerning these Territories was submitted to the Special Committee on 25 August 1965, in accordance with operative paragraph 5 of the Special Committee's resolution of 2 November 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII, para. 365). As requested in that resolution, the report was also submitted to the General Assembly (A/5958). Annexed to the Secretary-General's report was the report of an economic and technical assistance mission which visited the Territories in May and June 1965. This mission, which was established after consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government of the United Kingdom, was composed of three members: the Chairman and one member nominated by the Secretary-General, and one member nominated by the United Kingdom Government. In accordance with the agreement between the Secretary-General and the United Kingdom Government, the mission's report, which was made to the United Kingdom Government, was simultaneously made available to the Secretary-General and to the Governments of the three Territories.

296. In his report, the Secretary-General stated that he had considered the economic and social situation in the three Territories on the basis of the information

available to him, including that contained in the mission's report. Noting that the mission had concluded that considerable funds would have to be made available to the three Territories if they are to be enabled to take steps to develop the various sectors of the economy, the Secretary-General indicated that he would propose for the consideration of the Special Committee and the General Assembly the establishment of a fund for assistance to Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland which would be made available for the economic development of the Territories to supplement the assistance provided by the administering Power and the agencies of the United Nations. Such a fund would be made up of voluntary contributions by Member States and would be administered by the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the Governments of the three Territories and with the co-operation and assistance of the Special Fund, the Technical Assistance Board, the Economic Commission for Africa and the specialized agencies concerned. The Secretary-General also stated that it was his intention to recommend, at the appropriate time, the establishment in each Territory of a United Nations Technical Assistance Office headed by a Resident Representative and staffed by the necessary personnel to expedite and co-ordinate all United Nations assistance to the Territory concerned, including that made available from the proposed fund, if one was established on the basis of his proposals.

General statements by Members

297. The representative of Ethiopia said that the uncertainty surrounding the future of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland was a source of great concern, especially to the African community. Because of that uncertainty, the Territories should be given special treatment if they were to be able to attain true independence. He realized that such special treatment might not be in accordance with the usual practice, but the fact was that there could be no comparison between the three Territories and other dependent Territories which had gained independence. If they were to be able to manage by themselves after independence, they would have to be given the means of survival.

298. His delegation had studied the Secretary-General's report (A/5958) and had been instructed by its Government to present certain ideas. It was accordingly preparing a draft resolution, which it would submit as soon as it had obtained the views of other delegations on the subject.

299. The representative of the United Kingdom thanked the members of the mission which had visited the three Territories for the thorough and constructive work that had gone into the preparation of their report to the United Kingdom Government. He also expressed his Government's gratitude to the Secretary-General for having agreed to nominate the Chairman and one other member of the mission.

300. The United Kingdom Government naturally welcomed any move to invite United Nations agencies and States Members of the United Nations to offer economic and technical assistance to the three Territories to supplement the assistance already being provided by the administering Power and by United Nations agencies. That aid was already very considerable and much the greater part of it was being given by the United Kingdom Government. That was natural and inevitable since the administering Power bore the primary responsibility for both the political and con-

stitutional progress of the three Territories and their economic development and well-being. That applied, in particular, to the period before the Territories attained independence, but after they have become independent the United Kingdom Government's aid would necessarily continue to be bilateral because of its special financial relationship with the Territories. The United Kingdom Government would therefore be unable to contribute additional assistance through a special United Nations fund if such a fund were established along the lines proposed in the Secretary-General's report.

301. Although the Governments of the three Territories had not yet had time to study the report, they had been consulted urgently by his Government and their reactions to the proposals made in the report coincided with the comments he had just made. In addition, they would of course wish to be consulted at an early stage on whatever arrangements might be proposed for special United Nations assistance to them.

302. The statistics of United Kingdom Government aid to the Territories, which was already substantial, showed three noteworthy features. First, the level of aid to those Territories had increased by a very large amount since the last war and had been rising rapidly in the last four or five years. Secondly, the level of aid flowing to the Territories each year was now high. Thirdly, the three Territories received a higher average amount of aid per head of population than any other United Kingdom colonial Territory.

303. From 1945 to 1963 the three Territories had received a total of \$104.4 million in aid, almost entirely in the form of grants, giving a yearly average for all three Territories of \$5.8 million. In the last full financial year, 1964-1965, the total had amounted to about \$23.5 million, comprising budgetary grants-in-aid of \$14.6 million and an average of \$8.9 million in Colonial Development and Welfare grants and Exchequer loans. It could thus be seen that the amount of aid had virtually quadrupled.

304. Over the five-year period 1961-1962 to 1965-1966, the three Territories would have received a total amount of grants-in-aid of approximately \$56 million to meet the annual deficits in their budgets. Thus, the average yearly grant had been just under \$11.2 million. In addition, the three Territories had received some \$19 million in 1964-1966 in the form of Colonial Development and Welfare grants. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1963 permitted an annual expenditure from development-grant funds alone of about \$9.5 million. Those figures did not take account of such additional forms of aid as investments by the Commonwealth Development Corporation from the funds provided by the United Kingdom Government, funds provided under the Overseas Service Aid Scheme, other types of technical assistance, and aid from United Nations sources, to which the United Kingdom was the second largest contributor.

305. Comparing the aid received by the three Territories with that given to other United Kingdom Territories, he pointed out that total aid in the last financial year to all United Kingdom Territories had worked out at about \$12 per head of population, whereas in the case of the three Territories it had been \$14, or 16 per cent higher.

306. The figures he had quoted showed clearly that United Kingdom aid to the Territories had risen steeply since the war; it had reached the substantial figure of \$24 million a year; and it was somewhat

higher than the average for all United Kingdom Territories, though many of them had needs as pressing and urgent as the three Territories under consideration.

307. In questions of aid, it was of course axiomatic that, no matter how much aid was given, there was always a need for more. Unfortunately, however, the money available for aid was limited. His Government's total aid programme, which now ran at an annual rate of nearly \$500 million, was very substantial indeed, especially in view of the economic problems which the United Kingdom had to face. The figures that he had quoted showed that the share of the total aid to Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland was generous and reasonable.

308. If the Special Committee agreed in principle with the Secretary-General's proposal that special consideration should be given to the possibility of a new and additional effort to meet the economic needs of the Territories, the next stage, in his delegation's view, should be discussions between the Secretary-General, the specialized agencies, the United Kingdom Government and the Governments of the three Territories. Those discussions would have to deal with the scope and nature of any new proposals and with ways and means of ensuring that any new arrangements would satisfy the requirement of close co-operation and consultation with the four Governments most closely concerned.

309. The representative of Ethiopia said that his delegation agreed with the analysis and conclusions in the Secretary-General's report on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (A/5958) and appreciated the Secretary-General's wisdom in bringing to the Special Committee's attention the peculiar problems of the Territories together with practical suggestions for their solution. The Committee should endorse the report and recommend that the General Assembly should empower the Secretary-General to proceed with the implementation of the broad plans outlined in the report. The picture presented in the report had convinced his delegation that the salvation of the three Territories lay in the development of their resources through United Nations technical assistance.

310. It was political considerations that led his delegation to endorse the Secretary-General's recommendation that a special procedure should be adopted with regard to the economic development of the three Territories. The geographical situation of the Territories made it abundantly clear that, if they were to enjoy true independence, the United Nations must help them to avoid dependence on a white society which kept over 1 million Africans in bondage; that could best be done through the voluntary fund proposed by the Secretary-General, which could be administered by the Secretary-General himself through the existing technical assistance machinery. That recommendation by the Secretary-General was in accordance with the resolution on the three Territories adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at Cairo in 1964.

311. The Special Committee and the General Assembly had both recognized the peculiar situation of the Territories and there was no doubt that the intention was to provide means of guaranteeing their territorial integrity through economic development and to safeguard them from an enemy which was waiting to seize the first opportunity to make them dependent upon it, in support of its political philosophy of

apartheid. It was the duty of the Committee to do everything in its power to prevent such a tragedy.

312. He felt that, in recommending the establishment of a fund for assistance to the Territories, the Secretary-General had purposely suggested that the contributions of States should be voluntary so that the success of the venture would depend on the goodwill of Member States. There were many States which were willing to extend help to many Africans in southern Africa, but their generosity had hitherto been frustrated, for obvious reasons. He was confident that the Secretary-General's proposal would provide such States with the necessary vehicle to enable them to extend aid.

313. His delegation fully endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation for the establishment in each Territory of a United Nations Technical Assistance Office, headed by a Resident Representative, to administer all United Nations technical assistance.

314. Finally, he announced that the delegations of Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Yugoslavia were co-sponsoring a draft resolution on the question (A/AC.109/L.250).³

315. The representative of the United States of America recalled that in 1964 his delegation had abstained in the vote on the Special Committee's draft resolution on the three Territories because it had had several reservations, one of which had been a doubt regarding the utility of the proposed economic survey. The report now before the Committee showed that doubt to have been unwarranted. Indeed, the considerable value of the report lay in its basic approach as an inquiry into the question of what a United Nations assistance programme might do if it were to approach the entire range of requirements for the development of a particular country.

316. The mission's factual, comprehensive and realistic report and the Secretary-General's recommendations had prompted his Government to reconsider the possibility of a significant expansion of assistance to the Territories. His Government felt, however, that the Secretary-General's proposal required further elaboration and, in particular, answers to the following questions: Was the target of the proposed fund to be \$10 million or \$100 million? Was the fund to be used for capital development, for budgetary subsidies, or for technical assistance? What objectives would the fund have? What would be its relationship to the primary bilateral sources of financial assistance and to other technical assistance provided by the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund? How long would the fund be needed? Would additional regular contributions be needed to maintain the Territory's economic viability in the future? What types of projects and what areas of concentration might prove to be feasible for development? His delegation had raised those questions, not in criticism of the report, for it realized that lack of time and of detailed information had made it impossible for the mission to define its recommendations in terms of their financial implications, but because the nature of the United States Government's processes for considering grants of economic assistance required that such economic parameters should be specified. The same difficulty would

no doubt face other Governments which might participate. Consequently, his Government could not support the Secretary-General's recommendation in its present form.

317. His delegation felt that the recommendation that the administering Power should establish a planning office in each of the Territories would make it possible to obtain the information required to give form to the Secretary-General's proposal. His delegation therefore suggested that the Special Committee should consider requesting the Secretary-General to establish a working group to co-ordinate the efforts of the administering Power, the High Commission Territories and the United Nations agencies concerned with regard to the preparation of comprehensive development plans for the Territories. The working group should be established in consultation with the administering Power and should include representatives of the Secretary-General, the Special Fund, the Technical Assistance Board and possibly the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Its task would be to provide the Special Committee and the General Assembly with the economic parameters for an assistance programme sponsored by the United Nations, including a study of the part in such a programme that existing United Nations agencies could undertake and the part that the administering Power could undertake. A full-scale IBRD economic development survey would also be of immense benefit. Under his delegation's suggestion, development plans would be drawn up by the territorial planning offices under the direction of the administering Power and the territorial Governments, with the assistance of the United Nations agencies represented on the working group. Thus, the effect of the suggestion would be to integrate all forms of United Nations assistance into one programme and to relate that programme to the bilateral aid provided by the administering Power. That would be of particular importance since the assistance provided by the United Nations agencies had in the past two years grown to a significant level. The potential for additional assistance through those agencies was too large to be overlooked. If the Special Committee accepted that suggestion, it would be endorsing the two principles which had made the mission's report a valuable document: a co-operative effort between the administering Power and the United Nations and a comprehensive approach to the development needs of the Territories.

318. The representative of India said that there were many factors which made the economic and social situation of the three Territories under consideration a vital point with respect to their survival as independent sovereign States in the future. It was because the Special Committee and the General Assembly realized that fact that they had laid particular stress, in General Assembly resolution 1954 (XVIII) and in the Special Committee's resolution of 2 November 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII, para. 365), on the need to provide economic, financial and technical assistance through the United Nations and the specialized agencies in order to remedy the deplorable economic and social situation of the Territories. The report before the Committee was a direct result of the Committee's resolution of 2 November 1964, and the delegation of India considered that in modifying its earlier negative attitude to the economic study suggested by the United Nations, the United Kingdom Government had acted not only

³ Subsequently, Sierra Leone joined as a co-sponsor to the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.250/Add.1).

in the best interests of the people of the Territories but also in its own interests. The delegation of India wished to place on record its deep appreciation of the efforts of the Secretary-General and the members of the mission in the matter.

319. The report did not claim to be a comprehensive study. After a careful examination of it, however, the Indian delegation felt that it went to the very core of the problem, bringing out the essential points and presenting the problems and solutions in a simple and direct manner. While the Indian delegation might not be in agreement with everything in the report, it considered that it fulfilled its purpose.

320. The Secretary-General had recommended the establishment of a fund to be made up of voluntary contributions by States Members of the United Nations. His delegation was sure that the Secretary-General did not wish to exclude contributions from other sources; as the fund would be administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Governments of the three Territories and with the co-operation of the specialized agencies and other connected agencies, there was no need for contributions to be restricted to Member States.

321. Even before the fund and the machinery for its administration were set up, however, the implementation of the recommendations in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Secretary-General's report (A/5958) was urgently required. His delegation hoped that the administering Power would establish properly staffed planning machinery in each Territory without delay and that a United Nations Technical Assistance Office headed by a Resident Representative would be set up immediately in each Territory in order both to help the administration of the proposed fund and to assist in channelling the assistance already being made available by the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

322. In conclusion, the delegation of India agreed with the main recommendations of the Secretary-General and suggested that the Special Committee should endorse the report and recommend to the General Assembly the immediate implementation of the proposals made in it.

323. The representative of Ethiopia said that while he proposed to give the statement made by the representative of the United States careful study, he felt compelled to reply immediately to some of the points in that statement.

324. First of all, the United States representative seemed to speak as if the three Territories were going to remain dependent. Yet the exceptional developments taking place in the Territories made it clear that they would be sovereign and independent States very shortly, possibly even within a year. It was therefore necessary to plan not simply for the immediate future but for a number of years ahead. It was not a question of simply extending aid to a dependent Territory, but of helping three States which would soon join the family of independent nations.

325. Secondly, the United States representative had completely ignored the history of southern Africa. He must surely be aware that there was already one dependent country which was under the domination of the Republic of South Africa: namely, South West Africa. If the course suggested by the United States representative were followed, it would simply mean handing over one more country to the Republic of South Africa, whereas the Special Committee's aim

was precisely that of preventing such an occurrence. To carry out more studies or establish another working group would take at least another year, and by that time it might very well be too late.

326. Thirdly, the representative of the United States had spoken of the integration of bilateral aid as a possible problem. There was really no conflict there, for a sovereign State always had the right to receive bilateral aid from any quarter. If a Member State declined to make a voluntary contribution to the Secretary-General's appeal on the grounds that it was already giving bilateral aid, it would be perfectly within its rights to do so. It was quite a different matter to oppose the establishment of a fund on the grounds that some countries might already be giving bilateral aid. As practically all the under-developed countries had received bilateral aid in addition to multilateral aid and technical assistance from the United Nations, he failed to see how there could be any difficulty in that connexion.

327. Lastly, the United States representative had criticized the report on the grounds that it gave no indication of the size of the proposed fund. The Ethiopian delegation could not accept that criticism. All that the United Nations required to know was whether there was a real need for international assistance in the three Territories; the existence of such a need had, he thought, already been accepted by the Special Committee. The report of the Secretary-General simply explained the kind of assistance required and made it abundantly clear that the technical assistance needed had not yet been measured in terms of money. He was sure that, once the principle had been accepted and the machinery set in motion, it could safely be left to the Secretary-General to allocate and administer the assistance in terms of the resources available and the needs to be met.

328. The Ethiopian delegation was convinced that the three Territories under consideration needed assistance and that the best way to provide it was to set up a fund for them, since they were not in a position to compete with the many developing countries already receiving or seeking funds from the United Nations Technical Assistance Board and the Special Fund. Much depended on the generosity of each Member State and the delegation of Ethiopia therefore appealed to all Member States to ensure that action was taken rather than to content themselves with studying the matter.

329. The representative of Tunisia said that it was not so much the political future of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland that gave cause for concern but their economic future. The three Territories now had an ample opportunity to emerge from their colonial status in the near future, but at the economic level they would need to be protected against the attempts of South Africa to dispose of their resources and their land.

330. Both the Special Committee and the General Assembly had already drawn attention to the critical economic and social conditions prevailing in the Territories. It was the view of the Tunisian delegation that the United Kingdom Government should have done more to enable them to avoid the economic dependence now facing them.

331. In response to the requests of the Special Committee and the General Assembly, the Secretary-General had spared no efforts to ensure that the Terri-

teries would receive assistance from the United Nations agencies. In particular, about a year earlier he had undertaken a thorough study, which had now been published (A/5958). The report drew attention to the particular economic aspects of each of the three Territories, outlined objectively the influence of South Africa on their economic life and suggested ways of remedying the situation. In view of the alarming picture given in the study, the Secretary-General had recommended that a fund should be set up for the assistance of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. The Tunisian delegation supported that recommendation, which would have the effect of bolstering United Nations aid and decreasing the economic influence of South Africa. In fact, the Tunisian delegation was one of the sponsors of the draft resolution which had been submitted by the representative of Ethiopia and which had taken up the Secretary-General's proposals.

332. He stressed that the amount of aid and the form it should take had not been defined. In that connexion, he quoted a passage from the Secretary-General's report to the effect that the fund would be made up of voluntary contributions by Member States and would be administered by the Secretary-General in close consultation with the Governments of the three Territories and with the co-operation and assistance of the Special Fund, the Technical Assistance Board, the Economic Commission for Africa and the specialized agencies concerned.

333. The Tunisian delegation hoped that the Special Committee would take rapid and effective steps to enable the General Assembly to endorse the recommendations of the Secretary-General and to launch the assistance programme proposed in his report.

334. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that his delegation had carefully studied the Secretary-General's report. The picture it revealed was indeed distressing, both from the economic point of view and with regard to the political future. It was undoubtedly the defects of the colonial system that were the cause of that situation. Paragraph 2 of the report described how the economy of the three Territories was closely linked to that of South Africa. The South African fascists wanted to take advantage of the situation in order to annex the Territories and impose upon them the system of apartheid.

335. The Tanzanian delegation endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation for the establishment of a fund through which free countries of Africa and other friendly countries would be able to give Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland effective aid without much fanfare. It was certainly necessary to set up a technical assistance office in each of the three Territories to administer the aid extended; it was also advisable to consider possible co-operation between the United Nations and the OAU in the matter. He recalled that in the resolution that it had adopted at Cairo in 1964 the OAU had stated that it would work in consultation with the United Nations.

336. The United Republic of Tanzania would emphatically oppose the participation of the Republic of South Africa in the proposed fund; indeed, it regarded the fund as a means of whittling away the influence of the apartheid régime in the region and of thus responding to the wishes of the inhabitants of the Territories and of the liberated peoples of Africa and other continents.

337. The Tanzanian delegation did not wish for the moment to consider any questions that might be raised in relation to the conclusions and recommendations in the report. What was needed was immediate action to ensure the economic life of the three Territories when they attained independence, which would apparently be within the next year.

338. As a sponsor of the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Ethiopia, the Tanzanian delegation called upon all the members of the Special Committee to give the draft resolution the widest possible support.

339. The representative of Australia complimented the authors of the mission's report on their fine work which was an example of fruitful co-operation between the United Nations and the administering Power; thanks were due also to the latter for its co-operation.

340. Australia had had long experience in the matter of assistance to under-developed countries, and it was not inappropriate to mention the part it had played in setting up the Colombo Plan. In the post-war years, Australia had expended over \$1,000 million on assistance to under-developed areas and to the people of such areas. While the greater part of that financial aid had gone to areas close to Australia, the African countries had nevertheless received a substantial amount. African trainees currently studying in Australia included eight persons from Basutoland, three from Bechuanaland and three from Swaziland. In addition, as reported in the Australian newspaper, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, courses for women teachers from Uganda, financed by the Australian and Ugandan Governments, were currently being held in Australia under the Commonwealth Co-operation in Education Plan. The number of Asian students enrolled in Australian institutions was now approximately 12,000, and the number of African students was constantly increasing.

341. On the basis of its experience in the matter of assistance, Australia was somewhat wary of the creation of funds for special purposes in particular areas; in an age of vast development programmes through such organizations as the United Nations, especially as it was difficult to say whether one particular group should be accorded preferential treatment for the purposes of assistance. Nevertheless, Australia appreciated the humanitarian motives underlying the proposals before the Special Committee.

342. So far as the draft resolution was concerned, his delegation could not accept it in its entirety. In particular, it could not endorse the fourth preambular paragraph, which appeared to attribute to colonial rule the economic and social difficulties in the three Territories, many of which were the result of many other factors. Emperor Haile Selassie, speaking at Zomba, Malawi, on 2 August 1965, had said: "We all recall that colonialists have done bad and also good in a sense. One could not, of course, completely condemn, but the fact is they have left something that should be of common advantage and mutual interest to all of us too. The former colonialists and the Africans now can peacefully co-exist to further the interests for their mutual benefit." The Australian delegation regretted that the sponsors of the draft resolution had viewed matters from a different aspect.

343. South African influence, which was referred to in the fifth preambular paragraph, undeniably existed but, however unfortunate it might be, it was a reality.

344. With regard to operative paragraph 3, Australia regretted that the sponsors had been unable to accept the suggestion which he understood had been made by the representative of the United Kingdom and which provided for consultations and planning as a preliminary to the creation of the fund.

345. Despite those comments, his delegation would support the draft resolution as a whole, since the proposals in the report represented a sincere attempt on the part of the Special Committee and could promote the welfare of the peoples of the three Territories. He wished to make it clear, however, that such support in no way constituted any sort of pledge of a contribution to the proposed fund by Australia.

346. The representative of Mali said that the situation in the three Territories, which were victims of the arbitrary divisions imposed on the African continent by the colonial Powers, had always been a subject of concern to his delegation. Both in the United Nations and at meetings of the OAU, Mali had constantly stressed the need to safeguard the peoples of those Territories against South African attempts at annexation and domination. In the Special Committee, Mali had denounced the close links established by the United Kingdom between the three Territories and South Africa, on which they had become economically dependent.

347. At the first session of the Assembly of Heads of State or Government of the Organization of African Unity, held at Cairo in July 1964, the participating States had asked the United Nations to ensure that the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of the Territories were safeguarded. Mali was glad, therefore, that the Secretary-General had given particular attention to that point and was grateful for his action in sending a mission to the area. The mission's report was a detailed and objective document which placed the emphasis on the problems in the three Territories, resulting from colonial domination.

348. The conclusions of the report largely confirmed the statements made by petitioners. The most urgent of them was that the Territories should be made economically independent of South Africa, and the creation of the special fund suggested by the Secretary-General was a vital step in that process of liberation.

349. Some delegations, of course, might fear that the creation of such a fund would constitute a precedent. There were no grounds for their misgivings, in view of the quite exceptional situation in which the three Territories were placed and the threats to which they were exposed as a result of South Africa's policies.

350. For those reasons, his delegation supported the Secretary-General's conclusions and suggestions. The creation of the fund would not, in the view of his delegation, place any restriction on whatever action the General Assembly might take to help the peoples of the three Territories. Mali was prepared to support any other action the United Nations might take to hasten the economic development of the three Territories.

351. His delegation would therefore support the draft resolution, which it hoped the Special Committee would adopt unanimously.

352. The representative of Denmark congratulated the members of the mission on their report. It would serve as a useful guideline for the economic development of the three Territories, which was urgently

needed if the Territories were to preserve their integrity.

353. With regard to the draft resolution, his country too was unable to subscribe to the fourth preambular paragraph, in view of the substantial contribution made by the United Kingdom to the development of those Territories.

354. Once they had attained independence, the three Territories would be faced with great difficulties and could only survive if they could obtain aid on a suitable scale. They would not, however, wish their economies to be based indefinitely upon substantial grants-in-aid. It was therefore essential to draw up long-term plans for their economies, particularly in agriculture and certain sectors of light industry, and for that purpose to provide adequate assistance in the form of money, machinery and the training of technical staff, which called for the development of education. Despite the great needs in almost all fields, his country was convinced that the problem facing the Territories could be solved, not necessarily all of them before independence, but at least at a satisfactory rate.

355. The Secretary-General had been fully justified in taking up the question of how to provide means for that purpose. While he had not yet received instructions from his Government on that point, he had no doubt that Denmark would be favourably disposed towards an appeal for voluntary contributions. Nevertheless, the proposal to set up an aid fund for the three Territories seemed to him to be premature. It was rather for the General Assembly to consider the question, bearing in mind the existence of other United Nations technical assistance bodies and in the light of further contacts between the relevant United Nations organs, the authorities of the three Territories and the administering Power.

356. For those reasons, he requested a separate vote on operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution. Moreover, he wished to reserve his delegation's position with regard to the fourth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 2 in so far as the latter implied the Special Committee's approval of the proposal to set up a fund.

357. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation welcomed any proposal to increase aid to the three Territories, although for the reasons explained in his earlier statement it could not contribute to a fund if one were set up.

358. His Government could not, however, accept the terms of the fourth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, which implied that the difficulties facing those Territories were the result of colonial rule. As he had said at the 384th meeting of the Committee, the United Kingdom had made considerable efforts for those Territories, to which it had granted financial aid at a rate of some \$24 million a year. With regard to the fifth preambular paragraph, he recalled the statement by the United Kingdom delegation at the 299th meeting that the geographical situation of those Territories inevitably entailed interdependence between them and South Africa. This did not of course imply political independence. In the light of those considerations, his delegation requested a separate vote on the fifth preambular paragraph, which it would vote against.

359. With regard to the setting up of the suggested fund, he would have preferred the resolution to recommend further consultations between the Secretary-

General, his Government, the Governments of the three Territories and the specialized agencies before any decision was taken to that effect. The establishment of such a fund might perhaps be the most suitable measure, but other possible forms of aid should not be neglected. Furthermore, the Secretary-General had himself recognized the need for co-operation between the United Kingdom, the Governments of the Territories and the specialized agencies. In his delegation's view, therefore, it would be preferable to approve the proposals made by the Secretary-General in his report in principle and to leave the final decision to the General Assembly. He reserved his delegation's position on the question in the General Assembly; that position would be determined only after the consultations to which he had referred had taken place.

360. His delegation would therefore have liked the text of the draft resolution to be amended in that sense and it regretted that the sponsors had not been able to agree to such amendments. Operative paragraph 3 in particular seemed to him to be premature and too specific at this stage. His delegation would abstain in the separate vote on that paragraph. With regard to the draft resolution as a whole, his delegation would vote in favour of it, subject to the comments and reservations he had made.

E. FURTHER ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

361. At the 387th meeting, the Special Committee voted on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.250 and Add.1) as follows:

the fifth preambular paragraph was adopted by 18 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions;

operative paragraph 1 was adopted by 19 votes to none, with 3 abstentions;

operative paragraph 2 was adopted by 17 votes to none, with 5 abstentions;

operative paragraph 3 was adopted by 15 votes to none, with 7 abstentions.

The draft resolution as a whole (A/AC.109/L.250 and Add.1) was adopted by 18 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.

362. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation had abstained in the vote on the draft resolution because it considered that the conditions prevailing in the three Territories were such that the establishment of a fund for their economic development would not be effective. The three Territories had been under the rule of a colonial Power for decades and today were entirely dependent, from the economic point of view, on foreign monopolies. If they were to be liberated economically, they must first be freed from colonial domination, i.e.,

be granted political independence. It was only when they had attained that independence and when power had passed into the hands of bodies elected by the people that the conditions for the attainment of economic independence would be met.

363. The representative of the United States of America said that his delegation had abstained on the draft resolution for the reason given in his earlier statement (see paras. 315-317 above). His delegation's reservations were based on its view that further consultations were needed. That did not mean that his delegation thought that the three Territories were not in urgent need of aid; that aid, however, should be provided according to a rational plan and United Nations assistance should be co-ordinated with the aid provided bilaterally by the administering Power.

364. The text of the resolution on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (A/AC.109/141) adopted by the Special Committee at its 387th meeting, on 20 September 1965, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1817 (XVII) of 18 December 1962 and 1954 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963,

"Recalling its resolutions of 7 June 1962, 26 July 1963, and, in particular, of 2 November 1964 and 17 June 1965,

"Having considered the report submitted by the Secretary-General (A/5958) pursuant to operative paragraph 5 of the Special Committee's resolution of 2 November 1964,

"Noting with grave concern the economic and social situation in Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland after several decades of colonial rule,

"Noting with deep concern the predominant influence of the Government of South Africa on the economy of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland,

"Recognizing the particular conditions prevailing in these Territories and their special need for economic, financial and technical assistance on a basis of urgency,

"1. Expresses its satisfaction to the Secretary-General for his efforts and its appreciation to those who have contributed to his valuable report;

"2. Endorses the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General's report;

"3. Recommends to the General Assembly that it take appropriate action urgently to set up a fund for the economic development of these Territories as proposed by the Secretary-General."

CHAPTER VIII

COOK ISLANDS

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

General

1. Information on the Cook Islands is already contained in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1,

chap. XV). Supplementary information on recent developments concerning the Territory is set out below.

2. On the basis of a census conducted on the outer islands in 1963 and the estimated population of the main island of Rarotonga, the population of the Cook Islands totalled 19,214, showing an increase of 836 since the census in 1961.

Political and constitutional developments

3. On 11 August 1964, the Cook Islands Constitutional Bill, which provides a constitution for the Cook Islands after they achieve internal self-government in 1965, was introduced simultaneously in the New Zealand Parliament and the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly. In September 1964, it was passed with some amendments by the Cook Islands Assembly. Originally the High Commissioner was to represent the Queen as the Head of State. This provision was amended to include two Cook Islands representatives, who would be chosen to sit with the New Zealand High Commissioner as a Council of State. They would be appointed for a term of four years and be eligible for reappointment. In October 1964, the Constitution Bill was passed by the New Zealand Parliament.

4. In February 1965, the New Zealand Government welcomed the recommendation to the General Assembly of the Special Committee that the people of the Cook Islands be enabled to express their wishes in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) through well-established democratic processes under United Nations supervision, and requested that an appropriate person or persons be nominated to be present in the Cook Islands on behalf of the United Nations for the election campaign and the election in April 1965, and for the debate and decision upon the draft constitution by the newly elected Legislative Assembly in May 1965 (see A/5880).

5. In its resolution 2005 (XIX) of 18 February 1965, the General Assembly authorized the appointment by the Secretary-General of a United Nations representative to supervise the elections and to observe the proceedings concerning the Constitution in the newly elected Legislative Assembly and to report to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly. Pursuant to this resolution, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Omar A. H. Adeel as United Nations representative.

6. The elections were held on 20 April 1965 and the debate on the draft constitution took place between 10 and 19 May. The Legislative Assembly proposed a number of amendments to the draft constitution. These concerned, *inter alia*, the residential requirements for candidates and electors, the number of ministers in the Cabinet, and a House of *Ariki*s. On 4 June, the New Zealand Parliament enacted the amendments requested by the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly. The Constitution, as amended, was adopted by the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly on 20 July, and was brought into force on 4 August 1965.

7. The report of the United Nations Representative on the conduct of the elections and on the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly (A/5962) was transmitted to the Secretary-General on 30 June 1965.

Economic conditions

8. The economy of the Territory continues to be based principally on agriculture. The chief agricultural exports are copra, citrus fruit and juices, bananas and tomatoes. Most of the Cook Islands trade is with New Zealand. In 1963, the value of exports amounted to £834,777, compared with £710,653 the previous year, an increase of £124,124. Imports increased from £937,273 in 1962 to £1,226,136 in 1963.

9. Revenue, derived mainly from import duties, income tax and stamp sales, is insufficient to balance

the budget and the deficit is met by grants from the New Zealand Government. In 1963-1964, receipts totalled £1,437,610 and consisted of £663,110 in revenue obtained in the Territory and £774,500 in grants from the New Zealand Government. The 1962-1963 figures were £1,267,393, £530,493 and £736,900 respectively. Expenditures amounted to £1,465,505, compared with £1,091,588 in 1962-1963.

*Social conditions**Labour*

10. A special committee appointed to study labour conditions has recommended to the Resident Commissioner that local legislation be passed to cover workers' compensation, minimum wages, hours of work, holidays, safety and health, and the employment of women and children. In 1963, legislation was being drafted to be placed before the Legislative Assembly in 1964.

Public health

11. In 1963, there were 47.06 live births and 8.75 deaths per 1,000 population. The mortality rate for children less than one year old was 27.38 per cent of the total number of deaths. These figures represent slight increases in both the birth rate and death rate over those for 1962.

Educational conditions

12. A junior high school was opened in 1963 and a second one in 1964. A third is to be opened in 1965.

13. At 31 March 1964, a total of 4,979 primary and 534 post-primary pupils were enrolled in government schools and 403 pupils were enrolled in primary mission schools, showing an increase of 113 pupils compared with the previous year. Expenditure on education totalled £276,152, an increase of £43,883 over the previous year.

14. Ninety-three students were studying in New Zealand under the New Zealand Government Scholarship Scheme in 1963-1964. Of this number, forty-nine were studying in secondary schools and four were university students. Thirty-six additional students were in training in Fiji, Western Samoa, New Zealand and Australia.

B. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

15. The Special Committee considered the Cook Islands at its 375th, 376th, and 378th to 382nd meetings, held between 25 August and 1 September 1965.

16. With regard to the recent elections in the Territory and the proceedings concerning the Constitution in the newly elected Legislative Assembly, the Special Committee had before it the report of the United Nations Representative appointed under the provisions of resolution 2005 (XIX). The report (A/5962) was introduced by the United Nations Representative at the 375th meeting of the Special Committee on 23 August 1965.

17. The Special Committee also had before it a note by the Secretary-General (A/5961) which contained a letter, addressed to him by the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations, giving an account of constitutional developments in the Cook

Islands subsequent to those described in the report of the United Nations Representative.

18. At its 375th meeting, on 23 August 1965, the Special Committee decided to grant a request by the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to participate in the discussions of the Committee concerning this item. The Permanent Representative of New Zealand was accompanied by the Premier and Deputy Premier of the Cook Islands.

Written petitions

19. The Special Committee circulated one petition from Mr. G. T. Crummer concerning the Cook Islands (A/AC.109/PET.384).

General statements by members

20. The United Nations Representative for the Supervision of Elections in the Cook Islands, in introducing his report (A/5962), said that it was in some ways unconventional, since the realities of the situation had made it necessary to depart from traditional patterns. The event upon which he was reporting had been one of paramount significance which would go down in history as the Organization's first association with the exercise of self-determination in a Non-Self-Governing Territory.

21. Some of the observations and conclusions in the report might seem unprecedented in the history of United Nations interest in colonial territories; some sections might even appear to be a transgression of the United Nations Representative's terms of reference, as, for example, the statement in paragraph 415 that the suggestion that the people of the Cook Islands were not interested in full independence was not fiction. Those conclusions and observations were, however, based on over seven weeks of close and sobering contact with the realities of the situation as they existed not only in the Territory itself but also in New Zealand. He hoped that the Special Committee would share his conviction that in the operation and the circumstances leading to United Nations association with it could lie the key to future constructive co-operation between the Organization and administering Powers.

22. The report constituted an effort, however inadequate, not merely to set forth conclusions but also to provide the fullest possible information on all matters relevant to the organization and conduct of the elections and to the proceedings concerning the Constitution in the new Legislative Assembly.

23. Throughout his mission, he had not hesitated to level criticism where criticism had been due. He had been anxious that his functions, although supervisory in character, should be carried out in such a way as to ensure the indigenous population of the fullest and most effective benefit of the United Nations presence, but that had not stopped him from praising the former administering Power when he had felt that praise was merited.

24. For the purposes of the report, he had been required to satisfy himself on the following points: that the administrative and physical arrangements for the conduct of the elections were in accordance with the electoral law promulgated by the administering Power; that the electoral officers were impartial; that the people were fully apprised of the significance of the elections and were able to exercise their right of vote in complete freedom; that the voting papers were

properly safeguarded; that the counting of votes was correct and the reporting of the results accurate. His conclusions on those points, as indicated in the report, were generally positive and included any reservations he had considered inevitable.

25. He drew the Special Committee's attention to paragraph 137 of the report, which recorded the views expressed by leading personalities of the Cook Islands Party concerning the possible effect of the presence of the United Nations on the outcome of the elections. Those views were not, and should not be regarded as, a contradiction of his own conclusion that the people of the Cook Islands had been able to exercise their right of vote in complete freedom prior to and during polling, a conclusion that related to the period during which he and his observers had been in the Territory and that was based on scrupulous supervision for twelve days before the elections, on the polling day itself and for at least ten days after the vote. There were, however, valid reasons for including those views in the report. To refrain from doing so could be interpreted as an attempt to pass judgement on their validity. Furthermore, he had no reason to believe that the administering Power would regard the inclusion of those views as a reflection on its good faith, of which he had perceived and recorded abundant evidence. On the contrary, he had considered that the administering Power would welcome it as additional justification of its request for United Nations supervision of the elections. The former administering Power could, indeed, congratulate itself on having succeeded, as a result of its invitation to the United Nations, in dispelling whatever fears of interference might have existed.

26. The second and more complicated phase of his functions had been to observe and report on the proceedings in the new Legislative Assembly concerning the draft Constitution. Although it had not been explicitly stated, that was without doubt a request for a report which would enable the Special Committee and the General Assembly to determine whether or not, in making its decisions, the new Legislative Assembly had acted of its own free will and from its own convictions. He had therefore considered that it would not be a departure from his mandate to include in that part of the report data which could be of assistance in that respect.

27. He drew particular attention to paragraph 357 of the report, which dealt with the decisions of the new Legislative Assembly. It was his considered view that in making those decisions the members had not acted under dictates from any quarter extraneous to the Assembly and the people of the Cook Islands. That view was borne out by the quality of the debate and the tenacity with which both the majority and minority parties had sought to ensure that their will would prevail.

28. Responsibility for settling the crucial question of whether or not an act of self-determination had taken place in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations rested with the Special Committee and the General Assembly. His own role ended with the submission of the report, which covered events from 8 April to 31 May 1965. Information on subsequent developments had been provided by the former administering Power and was incorporated in document A/5961 of 17 August 1965.

29. Recapitulating the most vital factors regarding the situation in the Territory, he said that although

the new Constitution had its flaws, it also had its strong points, in particular article 41, which guaranteed to the people the continuing right to opt for any other status they might wish in the future, including a completely independent sovereign status. Of the twenty-two representatives of the people in the new Assembly, twenty had voted in favour of the new Constitution, while the two negative votes had been cast by members who had favoured complete integration with New Zealand. Secondly, the Assembly itself was the result of an election in which 94 per cent of the Territory's electoral roll had participated effectively and in complete freedom. Thirdly, the people of the Territory had very real and significant ties with New Zealand; they enjoyed an unrestricted right of emigration to New Zealand, unlimited employment opportunities in that country, a guaranteed market for their agricultural products and a yearly cash subsidy which had now been increased to £872,000.

30. The new Constitution, the elections and the proceedings in the Assembly which had prepared the way for the Constitution represented a major step in the political evolution of the people of the Cook Islands. New Zealand had requested United Nations association with the procedure and had thus demonstrated its faith in the quality of its stewardship as administering Power; for that, it deserved the commendation of the Special Committee and the General Assembly. Although in a technical sense New Zealand no longer had any obligation to provide the United Nations with information on the Cook Islands now that the Territory had become self-governing, he hoped that it might be possible to work out a special arrangement whereby the Organization could continue to be informed about developments in the Territory, so that it would be able to play, wherever possible, a more substantial role in the search for solutions to the very real social and economic problems confronting the people of the Cook Islands.

31. The representative of New Zealand paid a tribute to the work of the United Nations Representative and his team. While his delegation might question some of the comments and interpretations included in the report (A/5962), the United Nations Representative's dedication to his task was worthy of respect and admiration.

32. The Cook Islanders now had complete control of their own affairs. The Prime Minister of New Zealand had commented that New Zealanders and Cook Islanders were now partners; that comment expressed the essence of the new relationship. There had been a revival of political activity and awareness in the Cook Islands, thanks in large measure to the work of the Cook Islands Party, led by the new Premier, Mr. Henry; that political revival gave promise of the development of a flourishing economic life and was an important contribution to the renaissance of Polynesia.

33. It was stated in paragraph 2 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)) that all peoples had the right to self-determination and that by virtue of that right they freely determined their political status and freely pursued their economic, social and cultural development. In the exercise of that right, the Legislative Assembly of the Cook Islands had determined the political status of the Territory in its resolution of 26 July 1965, in which it had resolved that the Cook Islands should be self-governing in free

association with New Zealand; requested New Zealand, in consultation with the Government of the Cook Islands, to discharge the responsibilities for the external affairs and defense of the Cook Islands; approved the Constitution of the Cook Islands as amended in accordance with its wishes; and requested that the Constitution should be brought into force on 4 August 1965.

34. The Cook Islands' progress towards self-government under the new Constitution had begun in 1962, when the Legislative Assembly, at New Zealand's invitation, had begun to discuss the islands' future. Debates in the Assembly, talks with constitutional experts and discussions with a Select Committee of the New Zealand Parliament had led over the next two years to the drafting of a new constitution. Since, however, the Assembly had been elected nearly four years earlier and had had no specific mandate for constitutional change, it had been decided that the electors themselves should have the opportunity to register their views through a general election to be held before the Constitution went into force. The future status of the Cook Islands had been a major issue in the electoral campaign, and New Zealand had pledged itself to accept whatever changes might be desired by the new Legislative Assembly.

35. The elections had resulted in the victory of the Cook Islands Party, which had campaigned on a platform accepting the substance of the draft Constitution. The three amendments sought by the new Government had been enacted at once and Mr. Henry had entered the Legislative Assembly and, on the entry into force of the new Constitution in August 1965, had taken his place as Premier. If any doubts had existed earlier concerning the wishes of the Cook Islands people, they had been dispelled by the general election and constitutional debate watched by the United Nations team, and by the Legislative Assembly's decision of 26 July 1965. As the United Nations Representative had testified, the people had had a high degree of awareness of the issues, the elections had been conducted impartially and the majority party had taken effective political action. Although the new Government disagreed radically with its predecessor on some aspects of the political scene, its campaign had made clear its agreement in respect of the relationship between New Zealand and the Cook Islands. Independence as a separate sovereign State was not sought anywhere in the Cook Islands; the only objections to self-government in free association with New Zealand had come from two small islands whose representatives had advocated complete integration with New Zealand.

36. In his delegation's view, there was one key feature of the new Constitution that might be a new contribution to the practice of decolonization. Having worked out their present form of full self-government, in free association with New Zealand, the people of the Cook Islands had retained, in article 41 of the Constitution, the right to decide at any time in the future to adopt full independence, or any other status that might become practicable, by a unilateral act—i.e., an act which New Zealand had denied itself power to countermand.

37. The new status of the Cook Islands was not sovereign independence in the juridical sense, since the Cook Islanders wished to remain New Zealand citizens and in the meantime wished New Zealand, in consultation with them, to discharge their responsibilities in the fields of external affairs and defence, but it

meant that the Cook Islanders had a continuing right to self-determination. Henceforth, however, all legal links between the Cook Islands and New Zealand rested on consent; that was the meaning of free association. In view of the expressed desires of the people of the Cook Islands, his delegation felt that no other arrangement could discharge more fully the obligations which New Zealand had assumed in accepting the Charter of the United Nations and in voting in favour of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

38. External affairs and defence were "entrenched" subjects under the Constitution; whereas other clauses of the Constitution could be changed by a two-thirds vote of the Legislative Assembly, clauses on those subjects could be modified only after a two-thirds vote of the Legislative Assembly and a two-thirds vote of the people in a referendum. So long as the Cook Islands chose to be associated with New Zealand rather than to become a sovereign State or to be associated with some other sovereign State, New Zealand could not disclaim ultimate responsibility for questions of external affairs and defence. Section 5 of the Cook Islands Constitution Act, 1964, simply reflected one of the inherent characteristics of free association. As long as the Cook Islands chose not to be internationally responsible for their own affairs, they recognized New Zealand's continuing responsibility for the matters mentioned in section 5. Another feature of the relationship was that New Zealand relied upon the Cook Islands to use their self-governing powers to fulfil international obligations. New Zealand had no power to take executive action in the Cook Islands, except at the request and with the consent of the authorities within the Cook Islands—nor could it make any change in the law in force in Rarotonga.

39. There was no real incompatibility between section 5 of the 1964 Act and the concept of legislative or executive autonomy. Both were facets of a relationship which could be maintained only by voluntary co-operation between two Governments which were constitutionally equal, although only one bore international responsibility. If the voluntary co-operation should ever break down, it would rest with either to terminate an impossible relationship, but neither would have any right to coerce the other. The Cook Islands and New Zealand had thus worked out a pragmatic method of reconciling the desire of the Cook Islanders to have the maximum power over their own affairs and their wish to retain the advantages of citizenship of another country, while safeguarding their right of self-determination.

40. New Zealand believed that the new relationship was, in the words of resolution 1514 (XV), the "freely expressed will and desire" of the people of the Cook Islands. As recommended by the Special Committee, the choice had been made through "well-established democratic processes". The report of the United Nations Representative (A/5962) was proof of the validity of that act and of the people's freedom of choice. Further authentication of the process of self-determination would be provided by the chosen representatives of the Government and people of the Cook Islands.

41. The Premier of the Cook Islands said that he welcomed the opportunity to explain how the Cook Islanders had determined their status

42. From 1823 to 1888, the Cook Islanders had been under the political and educational control of mis-

sionaries. From 1888 to 1901, they had been under United Kingdom protection. On 11 June 1901, under the Colonial Boundaries Act of 1895, the coast line of New Zealand had been extended by an imaginary boundary line to include the Cook Islands. Within that imaginary boundary, the Islands felt their close relationship to New Zealand and their smallness in the big world. They had carefully considered the possibilities open to them with regard to their status. They did not want to withdraw from their imaginary boundary and be associated with other countries in the Pacific area, because they knew that they belonged within that boundary and they were happy there. Nor, since the islands were scattered over an area of 850,000 square miles of ocean, did they want to eliminate the imaginary boundary altogether. Another possibility had been to join New Zealand and become fully integrated. The Cook Islanders had felt, however, that they were already partly integrated. While as a people they had sometimes criticized the local administration personnel, they were thankful for the principles which had guided the New Zealand administration—the laws prohibiting the sale of land in the Cook Islands, for example—without which the Cook Islanders might no longer have owned any land.

43. There could be no possibility of full sovereign independence unless the Islands could be assured of economic independence. The Cook Islanders considered that they enjoyed advantages within the boundaries of New Zealand's coastline which they would not otherwise enjoy. The Islanders had New Zealand citizenship and could therefore move to New Zealand—a considerable advantage, since the population was increasing rapidly. New Zealand also provided a market for their tropical products.

44. Under the Constitution, the Cook Islanders had the right to move out of the boundary; they also had the right to move closer to New Zealand in the future. They had the opportunity of controlling their own political and administrative affairs, resolving their internal economic problems and trying to readjust to what they felt was the loss of their culture. Most important of all, they had been given the right to retain their pride as a people.

45. The representative of Mali said that his delegation appreciated the detailed and objective report submitted by the United Nations Representative. The New Zealand Government was to be congratulated on having arranged for the United Nations to supervise the elections in the Cook Islands. It was to be hoped that other colonial Powers would follow that example and usher in an era of more dynamic co-operation with the United Nations, for the benefit of the peoples under colonial domination.

46. The supervision by the United Nations Representative had amounted solely to verifying the strict application of the electoral law which had already been drawn up by the administering Power. The delegation of Mali would have preferred the people to decide directly on the constitutional evolution of the Territory by a referendum. It took note, however, of the fact that, by another procedure, the people had expressed their wish to link their destiny with that of New Zealand. The United Nations Representative had noted a lack of understanding of the implications of the election on the part of the population of four of the islands (see A/5962, para. 118). For such an important act, involving the future of an entire people, the authorities

should have done extensive explanatory work so that the people could vote with a full understanding of what they were doing.

47. His delegation had noted the statement by the Premier of the Cook Islands and the wish of the population to be freely associated with New Zealand. It hoped that the choice just made by the House of Assembly would in no way prejudice the sovereignty of the people of the Islands. The statements made by the New Zealand delegation indicated that the administering Power would accept any constitutional change envisaged by the people of the Cook Islands.

48. The representative of Yugoslavia expressed his delegation's thanks to the United Nations Representative for the Supervision of Elections in the Cook Islands, for the report which he had submitted on his mission and for the excellent work he had done. He also thanked the Premier of the Cook Islands and the Permanent Representative of New Zealand for their co-operative attitude and for their statements informing the Special Committee of recent political and constitutional developments in the Territory. In taking note of the report and of the statements mentioned above, he again recalled the position of his delegation. This position was that the principles of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applied to all Non-Self-Governing Territories under foreign colonial domination, regardless of their size, population or economic and social position. The peoples of all those Territories had an inalienable right to self-determination and independence and it was for them alone to decide their political status and their future. In no circumstance could they be deprived of that right, even if, having made their choice, they wished later to reconsider it.

49. The Yugoslav delegation therefore attached special importance to the stipulation in the Constitution of the Cook Islands that the right of the people of the Cook Islands to frame their future political status would remain unimpaired, as also to the commitment of the New Zealand Government in that connexion, which had been mentioned by the New Zealand representative in his letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 13 August 1965 (A/5961) and in his statement to the Special Committee (A/AC.109/SR.375). The suggestion made by the United Nations Representative that there should be continuing liaison between the United Nations and the Cook Islands deserved attention and the General Assembly would perhaps deem it necessary to take decisions along those lines.

50. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recalled that the General Assembly had been unable at its nineteenth session to discuss the Special Committee's recommendations on the Cook Islands (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XV, paras. 111-115). On 9 February 1965, two documents had been submitted to the delegations to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly: a letter from the New Zealand representative (A/5880), expressing agreement to the Special Committee's recommendation that elections should be held in the Cook Islands under United Nations supervision, and a note by the Secretary-General (A/5882), suggesting that the General Assembly should decide to send a United Nations observer to the Islands for that purpose. The Soviet Union delegation had circulated at the nineteenth session a letter (A/5885) stating that the question of the future status of the Cook Islands was a question of principle to be

decided only after the situation in those Islands had been carefully examined in the General Assembly with the participation of representatives of the indigenous population and conditions worked out that would ensure a genuine expression of the will of the population of the Cook Islands, and that it would therefore be wrong automatically to adopt a decision to send a United Nations observer without due consideration of the question in the General Assembly.

51. When the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2005 (XIX) on the supervision of the elections to be held in the Cook Islands, there had been no discussion of the question of the procedure for appointing United Nations observers to supervise elections or any other forms in which a people might express its will on the question of the future status of a colonial territory. There had been no discussion of such an important question as the staff of such observers or the composition of visiting missions to supervise the implementation of measures connected with the settlement of such questions as the future status of any colonial territory.

52. Secondly, the terms of reference of observers or supervisory visiting missions had not been determined, nor had their powers or jurisdiction. That was actually stated in paragraph 328 of the report of the United Nations Representative to the Special Committee (A/5962), which read: "Neither the General Assembly in resolution 2005 (XIX) of 18 February, nor the Secretary-General in his letter appointing me, deemed it necessary to give any directions as to the criteria by which I should be governed in the discharge of this responsibility." Needless to say, such a situation was quite abnormal.

53. A study of the report of the United Nations Representative led to the following conclusions.

54. First, the Constitution of the Cook Islands had been drawn up by the colonial Power, which, as was pointed out in paragraph 169 of the report, "considered that concept of complete independence for the Cook Islands was unrealistic". No further comment was necessary.

55. Secondly, the electoral law had been drafted by the colonial Power and, through the high residence qualification, deprived a considerable section of the population of its right to vote; as a result, part of the population could not express its wishes on the future status of the Islands.

56. Thirdly, the entire organization and conduct of the elections in the Cook Islands had been in the hands of the colonial Power. As was pointed out in paragraphs 106 and 107 of the report, all posts in the electoral machinery, including those of Chief Electoral Officer, his Deputy, the Registrars for the electoral rolls, the Returning Officers and so on, had been held by officials appointed by the colonial Administration. Even the enumerators had been appointed by the Resident Commissioner (see A/5962, para. 96) and not chosen by the electorate.

57. Thus the whole electoral machinery had been subordinate to the colonial Power and not separated from it. The role of the United Nations Representative had been merely to supervise the elections within the framework of the legislation drafted and implemented by the colonial Power itself.

58. Such a method of organizing the elections, especially when the colonial Power had stated that the future status of the Territory would be decided on the

basis of those elections, could in no way be considered democratic.

59. The so-called "public enlightenment programme", too, had been completely subordinate to the interests of the administering Power. It had been carried out by civil servants of the colonial Administration, who had limited their activities to the publication of the voting procedure and had been instructed not to concern themselves with constitutional questions and their consequences for the status of the Islands. The United Nations Representative had come to the conclusion that about 40 per cent of the voters had not been familiar with the implications of their votes for the future status of the Islands. If to them were added the people who had been deprived of the vote because of the registration requirements, it was clear that a considerable portion of the population had not had the opportunity to express their views on the future of their own country.

60. The whole policy of the administering Power was designed to bind the Territory more closely to New Zealand and to continue its exploitation by New Zealand capitalist companies. As stated in the report of the United Nations Representative, the people were given limited information, sometimes deliberately distorted or confused, about the aim of international economic assistance. Thus the whole public enlightenment programme had one purpose: to persuade the people of the Cook Islands that independence would mean economic suicide.

61. The Constitution not only failed to grant independence to the Cook Islands but was actually curtailing their internal self-government. Under a series of provisions of the draft Constitution, which had now become law, the power of legislative authority was delegated to the New Zealand Parliament and to the Governor-General (see A/5962, para. 207). Bills relating, for example, to financial matters could be proceeded with in the Legislative Assembly of the Cook Islands only on the recommendation of the High Commissioner (see A/5962, para. 197). Laws made by the Legislative Assembly became effective only on receiving the assent of the High Commissioner. Only if the Assembly approved the bill again in its original form or with the proposed amendments was the High Commissioner obliged to give his assent to the law becoming effective (see A/5962, para. 206).

62. A similar right was enjoyed by the High Commissioner with regard to decisions of the Cabinet of the Cook Islands (see A/5962, para. 195). Under the new Constitution, the High Commissioner was the highest executive authority. He was appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the New Zealand Minister responsible for matters relating to the Cook Islands.

63. It was not hard to see that the wide powers and authority vested in the High Commissioner concentrated in his hands powerful levers for exerting pressure on decisions both of the Legislative Assembly and of the Cabinet. As the United Nations Representative had stated in his conclusions, "a striking phenomenon regarding the situation in the Cook Islands is the precious little evidence there is of any effective share the indigenous people may have in the administration of the country" (see A/5962, para. 330). The steps taken by the administering Power leading to so-called "self-determination in association with New Zealand" had therefore not decreased the control exerted by New Zealand over the Cook Islands.

64. While it paid due tribute to the United Nations Representative for his work, the Soviet Union delegation was unable to give its approval to his report, for that would mean approval of the steps taken by the administering Power, which were in contradiction to the principles of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

65. Some hotheads in the United States were already planning to hold, in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, a plebiscite, which they were counting on using as a pretext to justify the inclusion of that Territory in the metropolitan country. They were even intending to exploit the United Nations for that purpose.

66. The question of the future status of any colonial territory was one of those questions of principle the settlement of which could not be based solely on formal indications such as the fact that a plebiscite had been held or that elections had taken place to any legislative body in the colonial territory. The determining factor in any approach to the settlement of such questions must be the establishment of conditions which would enable the people of the territory to decide the question of their own future status and State system in complete freedom and without any interference or pressure from outside.

67. The representative of Italy said that his delegation did not intend to make a formal statement on the report of the United Nations Representative but would make a few comments of a procedural nature on the item under discussion.

68. The Italian delegation felt that the Special Committee's deliberations on the Cook Islands were approaching their natural conclusion with the formal submission of the report by the United Nations Representative and the statements by the representative of New Zealand and the Premier of the Cook Islands. He wished to emphasize with satisfaction that that was perhaps one of the instances in which the Special Committee had been more closely associated with the attainment by a former Non-Self-Governing Territory of the goals established in the United Nations Charter and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Elections had now taken place, and the Cook Islands Constitution had been amended and brought into force by an act establishing the Cook Islands as self-governing in free association with New Zealand. The findings of the United Nations Representative and the statement of the Premier of the Cook Islands showed beyond any doubt that the act of self-determination had been free and genuine and that the will expressed by the inhabitants of the Territory during the elections and by their representatives in the Legislative Assembly had really been the will of the majority and not the will of the administering Power or of a minority representing extraneous interests.

69. His delegation did not consider that it was within the competence of the Special Committee to comment on the special status which the people of the Cook Islands had freely chosen for themselves in regard to their international position. Nevertheless, his delegation felt that their choice had been very wise, as had their decision to retain the power to change such status in the future without the intervention of the former administering Power or any other party. The statement made by the Premier of the Cook Islands at the 375th meeting had removed all doubts that might have remained in the Committee's mind. It was clear from the information made available to the Committee that

"the electors were fully aware that their votes would constitute a mandate to the new Legislature to determine the future status of their country" (see A/5962, para. 146), that the Cook Islands were now fully self-governing and that the New Zealand Parliament no longer had any control over the Cook Islands Constitution or any right to interfere in constitutional matters.

70. Some representatives had voiced a few doubts and criticisms and the Soviet Union representative had even challenged the validity and legitimacy of the entire operation, but those were minority views which would be duly reflected in the Special Committee's records.

71. His delegation therefore suggested that a resolution or a statement by the Chairman should be drawn up without further delay, embodying the substance of the Special Committee's conclusions and recommending that the General Assembly should take note with satisfaction of the points indicated and of the consequences deriving therefrom. It should express the Special Committee's deepest appreciation to the United Nations Representative, should thank the administering Power for its co-operation and should express good wishes to the Government and people of the Cook Islands for their future happiness and prosperity.

72. The representative of Syria said that, while there were a few points in the report of the United Nations Representative which were not altogether satisfactory to his delegation, the fact was that the people of the Cook Islands had made their choice and it was not for any delegation to question it.

73. The precedent of the Cook Islands was one which should be given careful consideration. The people of the Cook Islands had expressed their wish to live in free association with New Zealand, but for the sake of the future of other colonial territories, the principles embodied in the Charter and the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) should not be forgotten. The door should always be left open to the people of the Cook Islands and to their legal representatives to become independent if they should choose such a course at a future date.

74. Certain points were clear from the New Zealand representative's statement. The Constitution now in force was beyond the control of the New Zealand Parliament and could be amended only by the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly or, in the case of six entrenched clauses, by popular referendum as well as a vote by the Legislative Assembly. Secondly, the people of the Cook Islands now had sole control over their future, with power to change their present status as they wished. Thirdly, they had complete legislative autonomy. Fourthly, there was no legal barrier to their assumption of sovereign independence except the need for the consent of two thirds of the members of the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly and two thirds of the people as expressed in a referendum. The Special Committee should take note of those facts, which were of great importance.

75. His delegation appreciated the fact that New Zealand was granting a considerable subsidy to the Cook Islands, but it felt that, in order that the Cook Islands might one day become an entirely sovereign and independent State, the United Nations and the specialized agencies should provide financial, economic and technical assistance. He assured the Premier and Deputy Premier of the Cook Islands that the Special Committee and the General Assembly would always be willing to consider requests from them for further aid.

76. The Premier of the Cook Islands said that the attitude of the Special Committee had convinced him that the United Nations could be counted upon to assist the Cook Islands. He was grateful for all the comments that had been made and would like to dissipate some of the doubts that were apparent from certain criticisms voiced by some representatives.

77. The Cook Islands had chosen an independent political status but not sovereign independence because the people felt that it was preferable to advance gradually. Representatives of his Party had visited every island to explain the purpose of the elections and the issues at stake, and representatives of each island had come to Rarotonga to attend meetings and had returned to inform their fellow islanders. He was convinced that the Cook Islanders had been fully aware of what they had been voting for.

78. There had been four courses open to them: complete independence, federation with other Polynesian countries in the Pacific, integration with New Zealand, or self-government within the framework of association with New Zealand. The third alternative would have brought the Cook Islands many social benefits but the islanders were a proud people and wished to retain their national identity. They had therefore freely chosen the fourth alternative, which gave them complete freedom. When the Islands became economically more independent they might consider sovereign independence.

79. There was no limitation upon immigration from New Zealand, for the Cook Islanders did not want to forfeit their right to go to New Zealand whenever they chose. All they needed for that was an exit permit from the Cook Islands authorities which was issued upon the applicant's proving that he had employment awaiting him in New Zealand and a home to go to.

80. Lastly, he pointed out that the requirement of Article 73 e of the Charter that New Zealand should report to the Secretary-General on the Cook Islands seemed to him to be a violation of the political rights of his people; he would prefer the report to be drawn up by the United Nations Regional Representative in the Pacific.

81. The representative of New Zealand, referring to the statement by the representative of the Soviet Union, said that he found it invidious that, whereas countries that had emerged from the colonial experience were generous in their remarks, the representative of a country which had never brought any people to freedom, quite the reverse, should take it upon himself to make criticisms.

82. The Soviet Union representative had stated that the organization of the elections had been completely in the hands of the administering Power, with the implication that the administering Power had thus been attempting to ensure the continuance of its domination over the Cook Islands. In fact, the arrangements for the elections had been perfectly normal and had been dictated by practical, not political, considerations. Although ideally the election might have been organized by an international commission, such a solution would have been expensive and in some ways difficult to put into effect. As it was, the United Nations Representative had testified to the impartiality of the electoral officials in paragraph 112 of his report.

83. The Soviet Union representative had also pointed out that it was stated in paragraph 169 of the report of the United Nations Representative that the Gov-

ernment of New Zealand considered the concept of complete independence for the Cook Islands to be unrealistic. He himself had been unable to trace any such statement by the New Zealand Government, but assuming that that was his Government's view it could legitimately be argued that it would be unrealistic for 20,000 people on an archipelago scattered over 85,000 square miles of sea to become a separate sovereign State. Nevertheless, the administering Power had in fact offered the Cook Islands the choice of complete independence and they could still choose such a solution if they saw fit.

84. The Soviet Union representative had stated that the electoral law had been drawn up by the colonial Power. That was true: it was exactly the same law as that governing elections in New Zealand and had been used for elections in the Cook Islands on two previous occasions. There had never been any complaints about elections from the people of the Cook Islands or of New Zealand; in fact, many people on scholarships or sponsored in various ways by the United Nations had come to New Zealand to observe the electoral law with a view to applying it in other countries.

85. The Soviet Union representative had pointed out that all persons in the polling booths had been chosen by the Administration and not by the electors. That was the normal way to organize elections in most countries, but in every polling booth every candidate had been entitled to have a person of his choice available to challenge any elector. Moreover, United Nations observers had been present in every booth or had moved about among the booths.

86. The Soviet Union representative had said that the electoral law had deprived a number of Cook Islanders of their right of suffrage, no doubt basing that remark upon a passage in the report which mentioned the question of whether Cook Islanders who were resident in New Zealand should have been permitted to vote. On the basis of the 1961 census figures, almost 40 per cent of the Cook Islanders living in New Zealand had been born there, while a further 34 per cent had lived there for more than five years, were entitled to vote in New Zealand elections and could reasonably be regarded as settled there for electoral purposes. It was therefore possible to estimate that only about 600 of the approximately 6,000 Cook Islanders living in New Zealand had been living there for less than five years. There had also been a question whether one year's or three months' residence in the Cook Islands should be required as a qualification for voters: the choice of the longer period had affected only some 200 or so potential voters.

87. The Soviet Union representative's assertion that the programme of education, both about voting rights and about the Constitution, had been carried out by civil servants of the Administration was only partly true; in his delegation's view, the greatest educational factor had been the Cook Islands Party and the election campaign itself. Great interest had been aroused among the voters, many questions had been asked and the Constitution had been explained by the various candidates at electoral meetings. As a secondary form of enlightenment, many broadcasts had been made by officials of the broadcasting service. He himself had made a broadcast, which was reproduced in annex III of the report; members of the Special Committee could read that broadcast and judge for themselves whether New Zealand had been speaking as a Power which

was trying to retain a colonial grip on the Cook Islands. Since the proposed Constitution had been only one of several arrangements open to the people of the Cook Islands, enthusiastic advocacy of that particular arrangement by New Zealand officials would not have been proper; they had put out pamphlets and other informational material that previously explained the Constitution, while advocacy of particular positions had been left to the candidates in the campaign. Copies of the pamphlets could be made available to the members of the Special Committee, if they wished to study them.

88. With regard to the remark that about 40 per cent of the people had not been familiar with the issues in the election, he agreed with the Premier of the Cook Islands that the estimate was probably too high. Discussion of the Constitution had gone on for three years, both in Parliament and throughout the Islands. It was possible that some people in the more remote islands had not understood the details of the Constitution, just as it was natural in almost every country that political awareness was less thorough in remote areas; there had, however, been very few people in the Cook Islands who had not known the issue they had been voting on.

89. It had been suggested by the representative of the Soviet Union that the whole policy of the administering Power was to bind the Cook Islands to New Zealand and to subject it to capitalistic exploitation. If the administering Power had wanted to bind the Cook Islands to New Zealand, it could have campaigned for integration or some other arrangement, but that was exactly what it had not done; instead it had given the people of the Cook Islands freedom of choice. As for exploitation of the Islands, a study of the economic facts would make it clear that not only the total present production of the Islands but even their potential production for the future was minimal in relation to the economic needs of New Zealand, so that attempts to keep the Islands under New Zealand's economic control would be pointless. The people of New Zealand bought produce from the Cook Islands, even though similar produce was at present available more cheaply from other sources, not because they wanted to maintain some kind of colonial control but because they felt a kinship with and an obligation to the people of the Cook Islands.

90. He was unable to understand the comment in paragraph 415 of the United Nations Representative's report to the effect that information given to the Cook Islands people on the post-war efforts of the international community to narrow the gap in the economic well-being of peoples was scanty, deliberately distorted or confusing. There was no censorship of news going into the Cook Islands; all the normal radio broadcasts from New Zealand—which no one, to his knowledge, had ever called distorted—were received in the Cook Islands, and New Zealand itself, as the members of the Special Committee were aware, had a profound respect for the United Nations.

91. With regard to United Nations activities in the South Pacific, it had been New Zealand that had encouraged the United Nations to set up an office of the Special Fund and of the Technical Assistance Board in Samoa; his Government was fostering co-operation between the various territories of the South Pacific and the United Nations and believed that such co-operation would have a beneficial effect. It had not said, as stated in paragraph 415 of the report, that the Cook Islands could not afford the financial obliga-

tions of membership of the Food and Agriculture Organization; what it had done was to inform the Cook Islanders that such obligations existed, in the confidence that they would be fully capable of deciding for themselves, on the basis of the facts, what steps they wished to take.

92. The Cook Islands had full legislative and executive autonomy. New Zealand had no power over the Cook Islands; the New Zealand Parliament could not legislate for the Cook Islands, and the Governor-General of New Zealand could not make regulations for the Cook Islands unless the Government of the Cook Islands so requested. The right to delegate power for specific action to the New Zealand Government was retained by the Cook Islands Government for reasons of its own convenience; for example, if the Cook Islands urgently required a draft of regulations on civil aviation but lacked the necessary technical experts, it could have the regulations drafted in New Zealand for discussion and possible adoption by the Cook Islands Government.

93. The powers of the High Commissioner in the Cook Islands under the Constitution would be similar to those of the Queen in the United Kingdom or the Governor-General in New Zealand: in substantive matters, he would act on advice or in accordance with constitutional provisions, and in those few matters in which he had discretion his powers were formal rather than effective and were bound by convention.

94. The representative of the Soviet Union had suggested, on the basis of certain clauses in the Constitution and certain paragraphs of the United Nations Representative's report, that New Zealand held some sinister control over the Cook Islands through the powers of the High Commissioner, for example in matters of financial legislation. The fact was that the requirement of the High Commissioner's consent for the introduction of financial legislation was purely formal and analogous to the arrangement prevailing in various countries of the British Commonwealth. The High Commissioner could act only on the advice of the Cook Islands Ministers; he had no independent New Zealand power.

95. He left it to the members of the Special Committee to decide whether the Soviet Union representative had been right or wrong in saying that the measures of self-determination adopted in the Cook Islands would not decrease New Zealand control.

96. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the New Zealand representative had insinuated that some countries liberated peoples from colonialism and some did not and that it was not for the Soviet Union representative to criticize the measures adopted in the Cook Islands. He reminded the New Zealand representative that the people of the Soviet Union had themselves established in 1917 the system under which they wished to live and had maintained it by armed resistance against the attempts of fourteen imperialist States to subject them to their will.

97. The representative of New Zealand had endeavoured to rebut the remarks made by the Soviet Union delegation but had in fact confirmed those remarks by acknowledging that the colonial Power had drafted the Constitution, made the legislative arrangements for the election, sent its own representatives to act as election officials and kept the entire electoral campaign in its own hands. The representative of New Zealand had implied that the Soviet Union representa-

tive had not understood what he was talking about in referring to the unjust nature of the residence requirement; he had said that the requirement concerned persons who were living in New Zealand or who had lived there at least five years. The point made by the Soviet Union delegation, however, had been precisely that: the electoral law deprived a large number of Cook Islanders of the right to a voice in deciding the future of the islands; there was some irony in the fact that the present Premier of the Cook Islands had himself been a victim of that law.

98. In reply to the Soviet Union delegation's remarks concerning New Zealand's economic designs on the Cook Islands, the representative of New Zealand had said that the islands were too small and that it was absurd to think that capitalistic companies would take advantage of them for their own purposes. It was a fact, however, that the economy of the Cook Islands was completely dominated by New Zealand companies. Agricultural produce had to be sold through those companies, at very low prices. The representatives of the indigenous population did not participate in the management of the economic life of the islands. There was large-scale emigration to New Zealand and the number of young people and workers had decreased to a dangerous level. In May 1963 a correspondent of the *Auckland Star* had sharply criticized the New Zealand Government and urged it to send a parliamentary commission to the Cook Islands to investigate the economic confusion and disarray prevailing there.

99. Consequently, the New Zealand representative's remarks had totally failed to convince him that any change had taken place in the Cook Islands and that New Zealand's control over the Cook Islands had been relaxed.

100. The representative of New Zealand said that New Zealand had made no attempt to invade the Soviet Union and was perfectly content to see the Soviet people continue to live their lives as they wished. The Soviet Union's record of dealing with its minorities was, however, known to all the world. Alone among the countries which had acquired territory at the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union had placed no territory under the supervision of the United Nations and was pursuing an integrationist policy.

101. With regard to the economy of the Cook Islands, he wished to point out two things. First, Fruit Distributors Limited, the main company dealing with fruit from the Cook Islands, had fully explained its position to the Special Committee in a letter which was on record as a United Nations document (A/AC.109/PET.226); it had neither monopoly control nor any other kind of control over the export of fruit. Secondly, the Government of the Cook Islands had full power to deal with the operations of capitalistic companies and to adopt any regulations and laws it might deem necessary.

102. The United Nations Representative for the Supervision of Elections in the Cook Islands, recalling the statement in paragraph 169 of his report that the Government of New Zealand considered that the concept of complete independence for the Cook Islands was unrealistic, and the discussion which that statement had provoked at the 378th meeting of the Special Committee, pointed out that it had been based on a statement made by the Minister of Island Territories in the New Zealand Parliament on 21 October 1964. On that occasion, the Minister had quoted in its entirety paragraph 5 of resolution 1514 (XV) and, recalling that New

Zealand had voted in favour of that resolution, had continued: "The New Zealand Government considered that [the] concept of complete independence in the Territories of Cook, Niue and Tokelau Islands was unrealistic, but took steps to consult the people about their political future. . ."¹

103. A similar controversy had arisen over the degree of awareness on the part of the people of the Cook Islands regarding the significance and meaning of the elections. He had fully appreciated the difficulty of arriving at a finding on the matter, and had expressed that difficulty in paragraph 125 of his report, in which he had stated that it had been "difficult to make an unqualified assertion on this...matter". In further explanation of the manner in which he had arrived at his conclusions, he said that for Rarotonga and Aitutaki Islands, where 60 per cent of the population of the Cook Islands lived, his findings had been absolutely positive, for the reasons set out in the report. Four of the outer islands which contained 40 per cent of the population had been visited by United Nations observers or by himself. In forming an over-all opinion with regard to the outer islands, he had based his conclusions principally on what it had been possible to ascertain in the four islands which had been visited, and had therefore stated in paragraph 126 of his report that for large sections of the inhabitants of the outer islands, the vote had meant hardly any more than the ordinary election of new members of the Legislative Assembly. Typical of his findings, for instance, had been his experience in the Island of Manihiki, which he had been able to visit, where one of the five candidates for the Assembly had asked him a question which implied that he thought that the United Nations was going to take over administration of the Territory, and another candidate had told him that neither he nor any of the other four candidates had held any public meetings to tell the electors what the vote was about.

104. He had felt that in the seven outer islands which the United Nations observers had not been able to visit, the situation was not likely to be much better than in the four other islands which had been visited. That was a plausible assumption, in view of statements such as that made in the Legislative Assembly of the Cook Islands by the representative of Rakahanga Island. The latter had in fact said during the debate on the Constitution: "I was with my people on my island. The only explanation they were given... was on two types of government, namely, the government of Albert Henry and the government of Dick Brown. It is probably not a mistake of the people that there had not been sufficient explanation of the issues." That statement by the member of Rakahanga had been corroborated by many members of the opposition, who had spoken in similar terms.

105. However, even assuming that the situation in the seven outer islands which had not been visited was not better than in the four islands to which observers had been able to go, he had at no time categorically asserted that 40 per cent of the population was completely ignorant of the significance of the elections. If the relevant sections, namely paragraphs 113 to 128, of the report were read as a whole, it would be found that whenever the 40 per cent figure had been mentioned, his position had never been one of certainty. He had been careful to state, moreover, in paragraph 126, that the percentage of the poll in relation to the number of

registered voters, even in the outer islands, had averaged 95.2 per cent.

106. The representative of Iraq said that, in putting forward the views of his delegation, he wished first of all to pay tribute to the work which the United Nations Representative had accomplished. His selection by the Secretary-General to supervise elections in the Cook Islands had been fully justified by the report which he had submitted to the Special Committee.

107. The supervision of elections in the Cook Islands was an event of great importance in the history of the United Nations. In view of the difficulties which had been encountered in the past, it was in fact a great success for the Organization, and it was to be hoped that the example set by New Zealand in inviting the United Nations to supervise the elections would be followed by the other colonial or administering Powers. The results obtained by the observers fully justified future approaches to the United Nations to facilitate the process of liberation and independence for the Territories still under foreign rule. The initiative for the proposal originally made for the Cook Islands had come from the USSR representative in the Special Committee, and special thanks were due to him for that initiative.

108. The elections which had taken place in the Cook Islands had been no ordinary elections. Their aim had been to determine the future status of the Territory, and for that reason supervision by the United Nations had become a necessity. In the opinion of his delegation, the General Assembly would have to take two separate decisions on the report of the United Nations Representative. It would first have to decide whether the Territory of the Cook Islands had achieved full self-government and, therefore, whether it was no longer subject to the provisions of Article 73 e of the Charter, relating to transmission of information concerning Non-Self-Governing Territories. Secondly, it would have to decide whether it could be concluded from the developments after the elections and the adoption of the new Constitution that the objectives of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had been fully realized.

109. With regard to the first decision, he recalled that in 1953 the General Assembly had adopted resolution 742 (VIII), to which was annexed a list of factors to be taken into account in deciding whether a Territory was or was not a Territory whose people had not yet attained a full measure of self-government. Subsequently, in 1960, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1541 (XV) defining the principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation existed to transmit the information called for under Article 73 e of the Charter. Under Principle VI contained in the annex to that resolution, a Non-Self-Governing Territory could be said to have reached a full measure of self-government by free association with an independent State; that was precisely the case of the Cook Islands. Furthermore, Principle VII of the annex to the same resolution described how that free association should be established in order to be valid. It was therefore the duty of the Special Committee to determine whether the elections which had been held and the constitutional debates regarding the new Constitution of the Islands conformed to the requirements laid down by the General Assembly. The report contained full information concerning the elections. In it, the United Nations Representative spoke of two omissions which had, in his opinion, marred

¹ See *New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)*, 21 October 1964, p. 2829.

the electoral campaign. One was of a legal nature and had been remedied later; the other related to the enlightenment programme for the people. That programme had not been very effective; the report pointed out that one third of the population had not been fully aware of the significance of the elections. Moreover, like Mr. Adeel, he thought that the assistance given to illiterate people constituted an infringement of the basic principle of the secrecy of the ballot. In spite of that, however, the report of the United Nations Representative emphasized that, with the exception of these two imperfections, "the administrative and physical arrangements, concerning the actual conduct of the elections, were in accordance with existing election legislation" (see A/5962, para. 101).

110. The report also indicated that the Cook Islands, and in particular the members of the Cook Islands Party, did not desire full independence, but merely full internal self-government. The conclusion to be drawn from the report and statement by the United Nations Representative was that the United Nations should give New Zealand the right to cease the transmission of information on the Cook Islands. The people of the Territory had freely chosen its political status, and they could still change that status if they so wished. The conditions laid down in the various resolutions of the General Assembly regarding the cessation of the transmission of information had thus been satisfied.

111. However, with regard to the second decision to be taken by the General Assembly, it was less certain whether the recent political developments in the Cook Islands had made it possible to attain the objectives of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It was true that the Declaration itself was not clear in that regard: the expression "all powers" in paragraph 5, the only paragraph relating to the transfer of powers, might give rise to some confusion. Did that expression include the power to determine their own foreign relations and defence? If it did, the present Constitution of the Cook Islands did not conform to the requirements of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Could a colonial people voluntarily limit its sovereignty? There were two conflicting viewpoints in that regard: there were those who said that the freely expressed will of the people should be paramount, but there were others who considered that if that freely expressed will did not involve complete independence, resolution 1514 (XV) should still apply to the Territory. The delegation of Iraq was prepared to accept the first viewpoint, provided that the people could decide at any time to change their status; if that condition was fulfilled, his delegation believed that the objectives of resolution 1514 (XV) would be fully realized. It had been said that the whole thinking in the Cook Islands was in a process of change; in fact, it was for the Cook Islanders to make a decision, provided that the proper guarantees were given and that the decision was made under the United Nations supervision.

112. The Cook Islands, because of their poverty, would need assistance from the United Nations, and particularly from the Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. It was his understanding that the Cook Islands, which desired such assistance, could request it directly from the United Nations representatives in the area—which was one attribute of economic independence—and he hoped that the Cook Islanders would not hesitate at any time to do so.

113. It was not essential for the Special Committee to adopt a resolution on the question; however, before the General Assembly dealt with the matter and took decisions, the Committee should express an opinion by taking note of the report and should state whether it considered that the Cook Islands had achieved a full measure of self-government and whether the objectives of resolution 1514 (XV) had been realized. It was not necessary for the Special Committee to go into detail on the matter, but a general expression along the lines he had indicated would be helpful and would enable the General Assembly to take the proper decisions.

114. The representative of India congratulated the representative of Iraq on the clarity and precision of his statement, and in particular on the way in which he had described the problems connected with the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and Article 73 e of the Charter. He recalled the long and close co-operation between the delegations of Iraq and India on colonial questions and other matters. Iraq and India had been co-authors of resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), which had been adopted in 1960. He recalled the role which Iraq and India had played during the debates in Sub-Committee II in 1964, when the Special Committee had considered the question of the Cook Islands, and he regretted that the General Assembly had had to adopt a resolution under rather unusual circumstances.

115. He congratulated the Secretary-General on having invited Mr. Adeel to supervise the elections. On the whole, the elections had been held under satisfactory conditions, and the Indian delegation believed that the people had expressed their wishes.

116. The Special Committee should pay tribute to the goodwill shown by New Zealand. While all forms of colonialism were bad, it would be unfair to place New Zealand in the same category as certain other colonial Powers. It was New Zealand which had invited the United Nations to supervise the elections, whereas certain administering Powers had refused to allow United Nations sub-committees to visit their Territories.

117. It would be desirable if the Special Committee could make some reference to the assistance which the United Nations should render to the Cook Islands in the economic, health and other sectors. Like the representative of Iraq, he thought that while it was not necessary for the Special Committee to adopt a resolution, it should give its opinion on the report in transmitting it to the General Assembly. The question of the Cook Islands had been dealt with at length both at the sub-committee level and in the Special Committee; the latter had had the benefit of hearing the Premier of the Cook Islands and was conversant with the various aspects of the situation in the Territory as well as the historical background, whereas the General Assembly, because of its heavy agenda, would not be able to devote much time to the matter. The General Assembly had repeatedly requested the Special Committee to find out the best and most expeditious means for the elimination of colonialism; it was therefore for that Committee to say whether or not it was satisfied with what had happened in the Cook Islands and to make recommendations so that the experience acquired in those Islands might be of use in other areas.

118. The representative of Ethiopia expressed appreciation to the United Nations Representative for his thorough and scholarly report and to New Zealand, which had adopted a liberal attitude towards the United

Nations and opened the door to a more realistic implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The Premier of the Cook Islands was to be congratulated on overcoming all the obstacles in his path and achieving a new status for his land by democratic means.

119. The conclusions of the United Nations Representative showed that, with some exceptions, the administering Power had acted correctly and the people of the Cook Islands had made a free choice in electing their representatives. The Cook Islands now had a new Constitution, which had been adopted by the Legislative Assembly. The Special Committee should ask itself whether the new status of the Cook Islands satisfied the conditions for decolonization stipulated in resolution 1514 (XV).

120. It could be seen from the report of the United Nations Representative that the internal self-government in the Cook Islands was not perfect; indeed, in some aspects it was quite defective. That was particularly true with respect to the status and functions of the High Commissioner, the Executive Council and the Governor-General. Apart from abolishing the Council of State, the legislators at the first meeting of the Legislative Assembly did not seem to have shown any concern about those defects. His delegation would welcome an explanation on that subject from the Premier of the Cook Islands.

121. In contrast, the United Nations Representative had indicated that the elections had been free and that the Constitution had been adopted by an overwhelming vote in the new Assembly. In his statement to the Special Committee at the 375th meeting, the United Nations Representative had described the most vital factors regarding the situation in the Territory and the strong points of the new Constitution. In addition, the Premier had described to the Special Committee the advantages which the Cook Islanders derived from their status. It was clear from the testimony of those two speakers that the new status of the Cook Islands reflected the will of the people. Consequently, the Ethiopian delegation could only wish the Islanders success, prosperity and happiness in their new venture.

122. The representative of Uruguay said that his delegation intended to make a final statement on the report of the United Nations Representative at a later meeting. For the moment it would confine itself to a few general comments.

123. It would be only right and fitting for the Special Committee to express its satisfaction that the New Zealand Government had fulfilled its obligation as administering Power of the Cook Islands. New Zealand had acted in accordance with the spirit of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and it was to be hoped that that outstanding example would be followed by other countries.

124. The case of the Cook Islands was a special one, since the Declaration was being applied not through complete independence, as had been the case in other Territories examined by the Special Committee, but through association with the administering Power. General Assembly resolutions 742 (VIII) and 1541 (XV) left no doubt that free association might be one of the ways in which a dependent Territory could attain full self-government, a fact which the Special Committee itself had expressly recognized when it had

adopted the report embodied in chapter XV of document A/5800/Rev.1. Those resolutions, however, set forth five prerequisites for free association.

125. First, association with another State should be the result of free choice. Secondly, the people should be fully aware of the meaning of the decision they were called upon to make. Thirdly, the act of self-determination should be carried out in accordance with democratic procedures, on the basis of universal suffrage. Fourthly, the associated Territory should have the right to determine its internal constitution without outside interference. Lastly, the associated Territory should be free at any time to choose any other political status, including complete independence.

126. In the case of the Cook Islands, it could be said that all those prerequisites had been fulfilled, although it would of course be for the General Assembly to take the final decision. Although some of the procedures employed had not, perhaps, been entirely satisfactory, paragraphs 140, 147 and 149 of the report of the United Nations Representative (A/5962) showed that the act of self-determination by the inhabitants of the Cook Islands had been carried out in accordance with the first three prerequisites. An examination of the constitutional documents and the interpretation of those documents by the New Zealand Government as presented in the New Zealand representative's statements showed that the last two prerequisites, too, had been guaranteed.

127. Moreover, a further element could be noted with satisfaction, which was not included in the various General Assembly provisions covering such situations: namely, the voluntary decision of the administering Power that the process of self-determination should be supervised by the United Nations. Various representatives had indicated their concern that the decision taken by the Cook Islands might establish a precedent. His delegation shared that concern and felt that such cases should be examined carefully since future acts might be affected. In that case, and for the reason previously stated, the intervention of the United Nations was a valuable precedent for similar cases that might arise in the future. If the General Assembly endorsed that procedure, it would establish for the first time, for the protection of dependent peoples, the fact that association between a metropolitan country and a Territory could not be achieved validly without the supervision of the international community, for that was the only practical way of guaranteeing that the people could express themselves freely and that their real wishes would be respected.

128. There were, nevertheless, important problems still pending which would have to be dealt with later. For example, it would be necessary to work out procedures ensuring that Territories which, like the Cook Islands, were technically self-governing and hence would no longer be protected by the safeguards accorded to Non-Self-Governing Territories in the Charter, would be guaranteed the right to change their political status and accede to complete independence if they so desired.

129. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the case of the Cook Islands was one of exceptional importance. It was a small country, virtually isolated from the rest of the international community, and throughout its long history its only association with the outside world had been through the administering Powers. The international community had nevertheless felt that it was its moral duty to

ensure that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was implemented in the Cook Islands. It was also the duty of the administering Power to give the Declaration the widest possible publicity in the most remote areas under its control, and in that connexion he wished to commend the spirit of co-operation shown by New Zealand in the case of the elections in the Cook Islands.

130. The conclusions set forth in the report of the United Nations Representative required serious consideration. His delegation shared the concern expressed in paragraph 404 of the report with regard to the High Commissioner's dual role as the representative of the New Zealand Government and the representative of the Queen as Head of State. The New Zealand representative had stated that the New Zealand Government no longer had any civil power within the Cook Islands. That statement was relatively true in that the present fluid situation concerned two Governments which were constitutionally equal, but it would nevertheless be possible to subject it to analytical criticism. Experience would show how the arrangement worked out in practice. Although his delegation wished to express reservations in that connexion, it derived some consolation from the statement by the Premier to the effect that the people of the Cook Islands were happy to have the opportunity of controlling their own administrative affairs. His delegation was further reassured by the fact that the people of the Cook Islands had the right to opt for independence in the future, should they so choose, thus putting into full practice their right to self-determination.

131. The report of the United Nations Representative showed that the people of the Cook Islands had exercised the right to use their vote without any administrative or physical impediments. It was his delegation's hope that they would now harness all their forces and make full use of their new status for their progress and development. Concern had been shown about the political aspects of the case, but it was equally imperative that careful attention should be paid to the economic aspects. The international community must afford the people of the Cook Islands all the economic assistance possible.

132. His delegation was ready to support any suggestion that due note be taken of the report of the United Nations Representative and that it be submitted to the General Assembly for consideration.

133. The representative of Chile observed that the clear and comprehensive report submitted by the United Nations Representative brought out all the significant aspects of the political transformation which the Cook Islands was now undergoing.

134. When the Cook Islands had been discussed in 1964, his delegation had stated that the inhabitants should be given the opportunity of expressing their wishes with respect to their political future. That view, which had been shared by the other members, had helped the administering Power to hasten the elections for the Legislative Assembly. The presence of a United Nations Representative had undoubtedly been an important factor in ensuring that the people were able to exercise their right to self-determination in full knowledge of the facts. The report confirmed that the elections had been free and that the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) had been respected. His delegation was grateful to the Premier of the Islands for his clear and sincere explanation of the reasons why the people had chosen as they had.

135. It was both important and commendable that the Constitution of the Cook Islands recognized the fact that the inhabitants of the Islands retained the right to change their status in the future if they so wished; that recognition would enable them to choose complete independence if the majority so desired.

136. The full and frank explanations given by the New Zealand representative reflected the co-operative attitude which his country had taken towards the United Nations policy of eliminating colonialism.

137. In conclusion, he expressed to the Premier of the Cook Islands his country's best wishes for the progress and prosperity of his people.

138. The representative of Poland recalled that during the discussion in 1964 his delegation had noted the New Zealand Government's co-operation with the Special Committee but had not hesitated to criticize the administering Power for the lack of progress in various fields and for other instances of negligence. It still shared some of the doubts and reservations voiced by some representatives during the debate.

139. His delegation was happy to note that its intentions had been understood by the Premier of the Cook Islands. It was regrettable, however, that the New Zealand representative had seen fit to make derogatory remarks about some members of the Special Committee; that representative should not be surprised that a number of members were sensitive to all actions by administrative or colonial Powers whose record called for criticism. The policies of the New Zealand Government would always be scrutinized in the light of its attitude towards the aspirations of all Asian peoples in their struggle for liberation and independence.

140. The United Nations Representative had carried out his functions with devotion and impartiality. His report was a milestone in United Nations history, for the United Nations had played an active part in the attainment of self-government by a people who had been deprived of it. He hoped that other administering Powers would take the report as an example of the principles they should follow.

141. In conclusion, he requested the Premier of the Cook Islands to transmit to his people the best wishes of the Polish Government.

142. The Premier of the Cook Islands, replying to the Ethiopian representative's request for an explanation of certain features in the Constitution of the Cook Islands, said that since his country valued its position in the British Commonwealth, it felt that the Queen should be the Head of State. The question was, who should represent the Queen in the Cook Islands. Article 3 of the Constitution stated that a High Commissioner would represent both Her Majesty and the Government of New Zealand. His Cabinet had considered that section of the Constitution very carefully and it retained the right to change the Queen's representative at some future date. One possibility might be to replace the High Commissioner by one or two of the traditional leaders, or *Ariki*. To provide for that possibility, the Constitution had established the House of *Ariki*. If the *Ariki* wished one of their number to represent the Queen, the necessary legislation could be enacted. The question would therefore be left to the House of *Ariki* to decide.

143. At the present time the High Commissioner had power to act only on the advice of the Premier and his Cabinet. Before the proclamation of the Constitu-

tion, the powers of administration had been vested in the New Zealand Minister for Island Territories. Those powers had now been withdrawn and the Minister for Island Territories had no say whatever in the administration of the Cook Islands, which had the right, under the Constitution, to handle their own external affairs through consultation between the Premier of the Islands and the Prime Minister of New Zealand. The Premier and the Cabinet had the right, however, to discuss any matter they wished outside the Territory. For instance, if the country found that it could improve its economic situation by going outside New Zealand, it would first consult New Zealand and, if not satisfied, would make arrangements elsewhere for the type of economic improvements it wanted. The country was moving step by step towards the goal of controlling its own affairs.

144. The High Commissioner was appointed only after discussion with the Premier of the Cook Islands and with his agreement. The Islands had recently submitted a request to New Zealand with respect to the status of the High Commissioner, which he did not wish to discuss at the present time. In any case, the High Commissioner could be changed within six months after the proclamation of self-government. The Cook Islands had gone as far as it dared towards political independence in accordance with United Nations resolution 1514 (XV).

145. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that it could be concluded from the report and the debate that the people of the Cook Islands had freely chosen their new status of association with New Zealand. That decision was fully in compliance with the principle of self-determination which it was the Special Committee's goal to see applied in all colonial territories.

146. It lay, of course, with the General Assembly to endorse the choice made by the Cook Islanders, but since that choice was a free expression of their will, it should be respected and considered to be in conformity with the spirit of resolution 1514 (XV). The choice was proof that the links sometimes existing between former colonies and administering Powers could have a meaning far beyond mere exploitation. His delegation hoped that in their association with New Zealand the people of the Cook Islands would always retain their dignity and freedom.

147. In congratulating the people of the Cook Islands on their decision, the Special Committee should not forget that many Territories were still under foreign domination and had not yet been allowed to exercise the right of self-determination.

148. The representative of Denmark said that his delegation was gratified at the manner in which the Special Committee had discussed the question of the Cook Islands and at recent political developments in the Territory. He wished to congratulate the United Nations Representative, the Government of New Zealand and its representative and to pay a special tribute to the Premier of the Cook Islands and the people he represented.

149. The representative of Iraq and other members of the Committee had expressed the view that the entry into force of the new Constitution of the Cook Islands had fulfilled the conditions laid down in General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV). The Cook Islands had become a self-governing territory and New Zealand was no longer required under

Article 73 e of the Charter to transmit information on the territory to the Secretary-General. The Danish delegation, having carefully read the report of the United Nations Representative and heard his statements and those of the representative of New Zealand and the Premier of the Cook Islands, supported that view. Moreover, he agreed with the representatives of Italy and Syria that the report constituted a whole and should not be judged merely on the basis of short extracts separated from their context.

150. With regard to the powers and prerogatives of the High Commissioner, some delegations had expressed fears that the High Commissioner might exercise undue influence in the Cook Islands. The High Commissioner was the representative of the Head of State and the powers of a Head of State varied considerably from one country to another. In Denmark it was not the King, but the Ministers, who possessed effective power and they had to enjoy the confidence of a parliamentary majority. The position seemed to be the same in the Cook Islands: the High Commissioner could act only on the advice of the Cabinet; he could request revision of a bill before it was promulgated but could not prevent its coming into force.

151. The Special Committee could not but be gratified at what had happened in the Cook Islands: the Territory had achieved self-government, the Committee had heard the freely elected representative of that Territory express his and his people's confidence in their new status and in the country's future and the administering Power had co-operated as fully as possible with the United Nations.

152. The representative of Sierra Leone paid a tribute to the Premier of the Cook Islands, who had given the Special Committee a lengthy explanation of the reasons why his Government and people had chosen the form of association which the Special Committee had been discussing. He also congratulated the United Nations Representative and the officials who had helped him to prepare an outstandingly clear report; and the Government of New Zealand, whose relations with the United Nations had revealed a spirit of co-operation which should serve as a model to other administering Powers. A perusal of the report justified the conclusion that the elections had enabled the Cook Islanders to express their opinions freely and to choose the government they thought suitable, in spite of certain shortcomings mentioned in the report.

153. His delegation had noted the explanations given by the Premier of the Cook Islands of the alternatives open to the people in their relationship with New Zealand and the fact that the Constitution made provision for changing that relationship. Such a guarantee was certainly in the spirit of resolution 1514 (XV) and could be invoked without the consent of New Zealand. As Mr. Henry had hoped, the good relations which existed between the United Nations and the Territory should be strengthened. On behalf of his Government, he congratulated the Cook Islanders on their new status.

154. The representative of Iran said that his delegation had been impressed by the integrity and impartiality shown by the United Nations Representative, the thoroughness and objectivity of his report, the high competence and sincerity of the Premier of the Cook Islands and the co-operative attitude shown by the New Zealand Government in inviting the United

Nations to supervise the elections. The New Zealand Government had set a significant precedent which he hoped other administering Powers would follow.

155. The Special Committee, and later the General Assembly, would have to decide three basic questions: whether the people of the Cook Islands had regained their sovereign rights; if so, to what extent; and if not, whether the administering Power was still obliged to transmit information under Article 73 c of the Charter.

156. There were two views which could be held of the present status of the Territory. The first was that the people of the Cook Islands had regained their sovereignty when, in exercising their right of self-determination, they had been given the freedom to choose one of four alternatives, including that of independence, and that, having thus regained their sovereign rights, they had voluntarily decided to restrict them in certain areas by choosing free association with the metropolitan country. His delegation could not support that view because, while the people had been free to choose independence, no party or political leader had conducted an educational campaign in favour of independence; hence that alternative had not been adequately dealt with during the electoral campaign.

157. The second view, to which his delegation adhered, was that the people of the Cook Islands had not yet completed the full process of self-determination, which might, as in the present case, entail a series of actions. The election of a Legislative Assembly empowered to decide on the future status of the Territory was the first act. That Assembly's decision in favour of internal self-government and a free association with New Zealand was the second act, but it was neither final nor irrevocable, for the people of the Cook Islands retained their right to opt for independence unilaterally at a future date, a decision which their Premier had declared they would take once their economic situation had improved and which the New Zealand Government had denied itself the power to countermand. The full process of the exercise of the right of self-determination would terminate when the people of the Territory decided, on the basis of article 41 of their Constitution, to become an independent sovereign State.

158. Admittedly, despite some imperfections in the conduct of the elections, their present status was the result of a free and voluntary choice expressed through democratic processes. In making that decision, they had attained a full measure of self-government. Indeed, in view of the circumstances of the Territory and the record of enlightened administration of the New Zealand Government, there could be no doubt that their decision had been the result of an expression of genuine desire.

159. Accordingly, he congratulated the people of the Cook Islands on having attained a full measure of self-government and extended to them his country's best wishes for their success in the development of their country towards full prosperity and independence.

160. The representative of Tunisia thanked the United Nations Representative and the Premier and Deputy Premier of the Cook Islands for their valuable contribution to the work of the Special Committee and expressed his best wishes for the happiness and prosperity of the people of the Cook Islands.

161. There was no doubt that, in accordance with the terms of paragraph 5 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and

Peoples, the final objective for colonized territories was independence. It was nevertheless true that that objective remained subject to the freely expressed will of the people concerned. The Special Committee must therefore recognize that in some cases the people might choose another solution. It was, of course, essential that the Committee should have a final, objective assurance concerning the way in which the consultation of the people took place. Whatever methods were used, however, and whatever choice the people made, it was of vital importance that the administering Power should recognize that the people under its administration had the right to self-determination. The information available to the Special Committee in documents and in the statements by the New Zealand representative and by the Premier of the Cook Islands clearly showed that it was open to the people of those Islands to change their status as an associate State unilaterally, without prior consultation with the New Zealand Government. He appealed to those colonial Powers which rejected any form of co-operation with the United Nations to emulate the example of New Zealand.

162. The representative of the United States of America, on behalf of his delegation and his Government, congratulated the Premier, and through him the people of the Cook Islands, for having achieved self-government in association with New Zealand. He also congratulated the Government and the people of New Zealand, through the representative of New Zealand, for having brought the Cook Islands to self-governing status. He thanked the United Nations Representative and his staff for their diligence.

163. The representative of Australia paid tributes to the United Nations Representative for the way in which he had carried out his task, conveyed his good wishes to the people of the Cook Islands, through their Premier, and congratulated the New Zealand Government on the success of their efforts.

164. The representative of India said that his Government also welcomed the accession of the Cook Islands to self-government; he conveyed the best wishes of his delegation to the representatives of the Government of the Territory.

165. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government had followed with the keenest interest the way in which New Zealand had carried out to the full its responsibilities, in close and harmonious co-operation with the United Nations. His delegation also thanked the United Nations Representative and his colleagues for the conscientious way in which they had performed their duties.

166. The United Kingdom particularly welcomed the new constitutional relationship between the Cook Islanders and New Zealand. He conveyed to the people of the Territory, through their Premier, his warmest good wishes. In his delegation's view, New Zealand had fully and finally discharged its obligations under the Charter in respect of the Cook Islands.

C. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

167. At the 381st meeting of the Special Committee, the representative of Ethiopia introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.246 and Add.1) sponsored by Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. The operative part read as follows:

"1. Expresses its satisfaction to the United Nations Representative and the Secretariat personnel for the work they have done;

"2. Expresses its appreciation of the co-operation extended to the Special Committee by the New Zealand Government in the study of the question of the Cook Islands;

"3. Thanks the Government and people of the Cook Islands for their co-operation with the Committee and for the assistance they gave the United Nations commission appointed to supervise the elections;

"4. Takes note of the report of the United Nations Representative for the supervision of the elections in the Cook Islands;

"5. Takes note of the statements made by the Premier of the Cook Islands and by the representative of New Zealand with regard to the future status of the Cook Islands;

"6. Expresses the hope that the General Assembly will recommend that the United Nations, in co-operation with the specialized agencies, endeavour to contribute in every way possible to the development and strengthening of the economy of the Cook Islands."

168. The representative of Ethiopia stated that the contents of the draft resolution were simple: it recalled the General Assembly resolutions on the question, referred to the Special Committee's consideration of the report of the United Nations Representative for the supervision of the elections in the Cook Islands and expresses the Committee's thanks to the United Nations Representative and officials who assisted him, to the New Zealand Government and to the Government and people of the Cook Islands; it mentioned what had already been done in the Cook Islands, took note of the statement made by the Premier of the Cook Islands to the Special Committee and transmitted the report to the General Assembly. The draft resolution was therefore designed to avoid controversy; it satisfied the wishes of the people of the Cook Islands, recognized the progress that has been made in that territory and provided all concerned with an opportunity to judge what further action should be taken on the question in the General Assembly. The sponsors hoped, therefore, that the draft resolution would be unanimously adopted.

169. The representative of Denmark stated that he regretted that the sponsors of the draft resolution had not mentioned the letter (A/5961) in which the representative of New Zealand had provided information on the territory; he would ask them to consider whether that could be done.

170. The representative of Italy said that the draft resolution introduced by the representative of Ethiopia contained nothing that was not acceptable to the Italian delegation. In fact, it reflected some suggestions which he himself had made. However, certain other provisions should be added.

171. The representative of Iraq had defined very precisely the tasks of the Special Committee, from a substantive and a procedural point of view. In his statement at the 379th meeting, the representative of Iraq had said that the Committee would have to take two basic decisions: the first concerned the General Assembly's right to decide whether or not a territory had achieved a full measure of self-government, and,

therefore, whether it was no longer subject to the provisions of Article 73 e of the Charter; the second was concerned with whether the developments in the territory after the elections and the adoption of a new Constitution constituted a full realization of the objectives of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The second decision involved an interpretation of resolution 1514 (XV), which certain delegations might be reluctant to undertake at that late stage of discussion. Nevertheless, in connexion with the first decision, the report of the United Nations Representative and the statements of the Premier of the Cook Islands showed quite clearly that the Territory had achieved a full measure of self-government. Perhaps with one exception, no speaker who had taken part in the debate had challenged that point. Consequently, the Italian delegation proposed that the following paragraph should be included in the draft resolution:

"Notes that the peoples of the Cook Islands, having exercised their right of self-determination, enjoy now a full measure of self-government in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly."

172. He hoped that the co-sponsors would add that paragraph to the text of the draft resolution; if not, that paragraph and his comments would represent the reservations of the Italian delegation on that point.

173. In the second place, the progressive nature of the process of self-determination had been made clear in the statements of the United Nations Representative and of the Premier of the Cook Islands. In that connexion, he was happy to see that operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution noted that the present status of the Cook Islands could still undergo change. Events in the Cook Islands between late May and August 1965—the meeting of the Legislative Assembly, the amendment to the Constitution and its entry into force—had been recorded in an official document (A/5961); they should be recalled in the draft resolution, so that the General Assembly could have a more complete picture of the situation. He therefore suggested that operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution should be completed as follows:

"4. Takes note of the report of the United Nations Representative for the Supervision of Elections in the Cook Islands, as well as of the note by the Secretary-General (A/5961) containing information supplied by the Permanent Mission of New Zealand regarding constitutional developments in the Cook Islands following the events described in the report of the United Nations Representative."

174. He requested the co-sponsors to give their careful attention to the amendment which he had put forward. The constitutional and political situation in the Cook Islands constituted a whole, and, at a time when the General Assembly was about to consider the question, the Special Committee should not suppress any of the facts.

175. The Chairman thanked the Premier of the Cook Islands and his Deputy for their co-operation. The calm and objectivity with which the representatives had examined the report constituted a clear rebuttal of the accusations levelled against the Special Committee by certain colonial Powers. Far from imposing any particular course of action on the colonial peoples, the Special Committee simply wanted them to express themselves quite freely on the political status of their choice. Moreover, the association of a territory with an administer-

ing Power was meaningful only if the people of the territory could freely dissolve that association.

176. Several members of the Special Committee would have liked a visiting mission to be sent to the Territory, but as another method had been used and the elections had taken place in a manner acceptable to the people, the Committee could only take note of the opinion expressed by the democratically elected Government of the Cook Islands. For its part, the Committee would do its utmost to ensure that the United Nations assisted the Cook Islanders to the fullest possible extent.

177. The Premier of the Cook Islands stressed the conscientious way in which the United Nations Representative and his colleagues had carried out the task entrusted to them and the spirit of co-operation which they had shown in all their relations with the population of the Islands. The draft resolution was in full accord with the views of his Government. Finally, he had transmitted to the Secretary-General an invitation from the Cook Islanders, who were counting on the presence of United Nations representatives at the self-government celebrations. Before leaving New York, he wished to thank members of the Special Committee for the friendship which they had always shown to him and to his country, and the assistance which they had given him.

178. The representative of Bulgaria, commenting on the draft resolution, pointed out that the abnormal conditions prevailing during the nineteenth session of the General Assembly had had an unfortunate effect on the problem of the Cook Islands. The Assembly had been unable to discuss the recommendations of the Special Committee or to take a decision based on all the aspects of the problem, one of which was the acceptance by New Zealand of a United Nations mission to supervise the elections through which the people of the Cook Islands were to decide upon their future status. It was certain that in the light of that acceptance the Assembly would have made a detailed study of the conditions of that supervision and would have decided upon the membership, terms of reference and competence of the supervisory mission.

179. Secondly, the lack of any discussion in the Assembly and in the Fourth Committee had left the United Nations Representative without precise instructions. Indeed, he rightly stated in paragraph 328 of his report that neither the Assembly nor the Secretary-General had given him any directions regarding the criteria by which he should be governed in the discharge of his responsibility.

180. Furthermore, as the United Nations Representative stated in paragraph 33 of his report, by the time he had arrived in the Territory the organization of the elections had been virtually completed. Thus, the United Nations Representative had had to overcome many difficulties in carrying out his task. It was clear from the report that the Constitution had been drawn up by the administering Power, that the latter had been responsible for the organization and conduct of the elections and that it had been New Zealand officials who had explained the meaning of the vote to the population. Approximately 40 per cent of those voting had not been fully aware of the consequences of the election for the future of the Territory. In his delegation's view, that was not the best way to hold an election intended to enable the people to exercise their right of self-determination.

181. In view of the abnormal circumstances in which the General Assembly had been obliged to take its decision and of the various inadequacies in the organization of the vote, his delegation felt that the Special Committee should be cautious about coming to premature conclusions. It would not be in the interest of the people of the Cook Islands merely to note that the possibilities offered by resolution 1514 (XV) for the acquisition of independence had been exhausted. His delegation agreed that the people of the Cook Islands should be able to count on the United Nations for assistance with regard to their future political and economic development and it felt that the most satisfactory link between the United Nations and a people which still aspired to independence was resolution 1514 (XV).

182. The representative of Italy recalled that at the previous meeting his delegation had submitted two suggestions regarding the text of the draft resolution. After informal consultations, it had decided not to press for a vote on the first suggestion, for although it still believed that the people of the Cook Islands now enjoyed a full measure of self-government and thought that it was the duty of the Special Committee to recommend formal recognition of that fact by the General Assembly, it felt that the Special Committee was not psychologically prepared to take such a stand and it did not wish to force a difficult decision on any representative.

183. His delegation maintained its second suggestion, however, and formally proposed that operative paragraph 4 should be amended by the addition of the following words: "as well as of the note by the Secretary-General (A/5961) containing information supplied by the Permanent Mission of New Zealand regarding constitutional developments in the Cook Islands following the events described in the report of the United Nations Representative". The note by the Secretary-General (A/5961) constituted an essential supplement to the report of the United Nations Representative, and both documents should be mentioned in the draft resolution.

184. He also proposed that the word "satisfaction" in operative paragraph 1 should be replaced by the word "appreciation", and that the words "with satisfaction" should be inserted in operative paragraph 4 after the words "*Takes note*".

185. The representative of Syria said that his delegation accepted the amendments proposed by the Italian representative and hoped that the other sponsors would do likewise.

186. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics thought that the Italian amendments would make the acceptance of the draft resolution more difficult. The amendments, especially those to operative paragraph 4, changed the substance of the text. The addition of the words "with satisfaction" meant that the Special Committee was approving the report of the United Nations Representative, whereas in fact there were differences of opinion on the matter, while the additional phrase proposed to paragraph 4 would make it take note of and approve what had been submitted by the colonial Power. The Soviet Union delegation had already explained why, in its view, the Special Committee could not approve the United Nations Representative's report. The draft resolution as it stood took note of the report on the understanding that the final decision would be taken by the General Assembly. The report clearly showed that the self-government in the Cook Islands was extremely limited. Careful study was required before a decision could be taken on the manner

in which the Committee should proceed and on whether there had been an act of self-determination and the administering Power could cease to provide information to the United Nations.

187. The representative of Syria said that, since the report was generally satisfactory, he saw no objection to the phrase "*Takes note with satisfaction*", which implied neither approval nor disapproval of the report. It was true that the whole matter would be discussed in the General Assembly. The Special Committee was merely expressing its satisfaction and bringing all the relevant documents before the Assembly. He saw no harm in the addition of a reference to a document in the draft resolution.

188. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania thought that the words "with satisfaction" would be too comprehensive in the context. He hoped that the Italian delegation would not press for the inclusion of those words.

189. The representative of Italy asked the sponsors to consider also the suggestion he had made at the preceding meeting to the effect that the Special Committee should note that the people of the Cook Islands, having exercised their right of self-determination, enjoyed a full measure of self-government in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

190. The representative of Syria announced that, after consultations, the sponsors of the draft resolution accepted the Italian amendment to replace the word "satisfaction" by the word "appreciation" in operative paragraph 1, but they could not accept the amendments to operative paragraph 4, since the Italian representative insisted on the inclusion of the words "with satisfaction".

191. The representative of Italy said that it was the duty of the Special Committee to transmit the report to the General Assembly and to note that it contained something positive. Without the words "with satisfaction", the draft resolution would signify that the Committee had merely read the report and transmitted it to the Assembly without passing any judgement on it. He asked that his amendments to operative paragraph 4 be put to the vote. The Italian amendment to operative paragraph 4 proposing the addition of the words "with satisfaction" after the words "takes note" was rejected by 16 votes to 6, with 1 abstention. The Italian amendment proposing an additional phrase to operative paragraph 4 was rejected by 14 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions. The draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.246 and Add.1) as a whole, as orally revised by the sponsors, was adopted by 20 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.

192. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation had abstained in the vote on the draft resolution. The text had contained a reference to General Assembly resolution 2005 (XIX) on the supervision of the elections to be held in the Cook Islands. The question of the future status of the Cook Islands was one of those questions of principle to be decided only after the situation in those Islands had been carefully examined in the General Assembly with the participation of representatives of the indigenous population and conditions had been worked out that would ensure a genuine expression of the will of the population. It had been wrong to adopt automatically a decision to send a United Nations observer to the Cook Islands without due consideration of the question in the General Assembly. Such an approach might create an unacceptable precedent for the solution of

colonial questions. The Soviet Union delegation had therefore been unable to support the decision to send a United Nations observer to the Cook Islands and it adhered to that position. Since the work of the nineteenth session had been paralysed, that decision had been taken automatically, without any discussion in the Assembly of the membership of the mission or of the criteria to guide the observer in the discharge of his functions.

193. Conditions had not been worked out to ensure that the population of the Islands had complete freedom to choose their future status. The elections had been held on the basis of legislation drawn up by the administering Power and the observer had merely supervised them within the framework of that legislation.

194. The "co-operation extended to the Special Committee by the New Zealand Government in the study of the question of the Cook Islands", mentioned in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, had been purely formal in character and limited to the submission of certain information—often distorted—and to statements by the New Zealand representative in the Special Committee.

195. The policy of the New Zealand Government was based on the idea that complete independence for the Cook Islands was unrealistic. The Constitution of the Islands therefore limited their internal self-government to a significant extent and the changes in their status had not diminished the control exercised by New Zealand. That was a clear violation of the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which stipulated that "all powers" should be transferred to the peoples of Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories, without any conditions or reservations.

196. The text of the resolution on the Cook Islands (A/AC.109/136) adopted by the Special Committee at its 382nd meeting on 30 August 1965 reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Reaffirming the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Recalling its recommendations that the inhabitants of the Cook Islands should be enabled to express their wishes in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV),

"Recalling also General Assembly resolution 2005 (XIX) of 18 February 1965 concerning supervision of the elections to be held in the Cook Islands under New Zealand administration,

"Having considered the report of the United Nations Representative for the supervision of the elections in the Cook Islands (A/5962),

"Having heard the statements made by the United Nations Representative, the Premier of the Cook Islands and the representative of New Zealand,

"1. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations Representative and the Secretariat personnel for the work they have done;

"2. Expresses its appreciation of the co-operation extended to the Special Committee by the New Zealand Government in the study of the question of the Cook Islands;

"3. *Thanks* the Government and people of the Cook Islands for their co-operation with the Committee and for the assistance they gave the United Nations commission appointed to supervise the elections;

"4. *Takes note* of the report of the United Nations Representative for the supervision of the elections in the Cook Islands;

"5. *Takes note* of the statements made by the Premier of the Cook Islands and by the representative of New Zealand with regard to the future status of the Cook Islands;

"6. *Expresses the hope* that the General Assembly will recommend that the United Nations, in co-operation with the specialized agencies, endeavour to contribute in every way possible to the development and strengthening of the economy of the Cook Islands."

CHAPTER IX

BRITISH GUIANA

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

Introduction

1. Information on the Territory is to be found in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VII, paras. 9-57). Supplementary information is set out below.¹

Political and constitutional developments

Elections of 7 December 1964

2. Elections were held in the Territory on 7 December 1964. One hundred and ninety-nine candidates representing seven political parties contested elections for fifty-three seats in the single-chamber legislature as follows:

| | <i>Candidates</i> |
|---|-------------------|
| Peoples National Congress (led by Mr. Forbes Burnham) | 53 |
| Peoples Progressive Party (led by Dr. Cheddi Jagan) | 35 ^a |
| United Force (led by Mr. Peter d'Aguiar) | 53 |
| Justice Party (led by Mr. Baham Singh Rai) | 36 |
| Guyana United Muslim Party (led by Mr. Hussain Ghanie) | 14 |
| National Labour Front (led by Mr. Cecil Gray) ... | 6 |
| Peace and Equality Party (led by Mr. Kelvin de Freitas) | 2 |

^a According to reports, the Peoples Progressive Party, in line with its protest against elections under the system of proportional representation, submitted only the number of candidates (35) allowed under the previous electoral arrangements.

3. Out of an estimated total population of 605,000 there were 247,604 registered voters. The results of the voting were as follows:

| <i>Party</i> | <i>Votes cast</i> | <i>Percentage of votes cast</i> | <i>Seats allocated</i> |
|------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|
| Peoples Progressive Party .. | 109,332 | 45.8 | 24 |
| Peoples National Congress .. | 96,657 | 40.5 | 22 |
| United Force | 29,612 | 12.4 | 7 |
| Justice Party | 1,334 | 1.1 | 0 |
| Guyana United Muslim Party | 1,194 | | |
| Peace and Equality Party ... | 224 | | |
| National Labour Front | 177 | | |
| TOTAL, votes cast: | 238,530 | | |
| Total invalid votes: | 1,590 | | |

¹ The information presented in this chapter has been derived from published reports. The information transmitted by the administering Powers under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter on 14 July 1964 was used in the preparation of the chapter on British Guiana in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session.

4. The registration percentages, namely, 45.5 per cent for persons of East Indian descent and 39.3 per cent for persons of African origin, were almost identical with the vote percentages for the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) and the Peoples National Congress (PNC). The election results were therefore said to correspond to the racial alignment in the political situation in British Guiana, with persons of East Indian descent favouring Dr. Cheddi Jagan's Peoples Progressive Party and persons of African descent favouring Mr. Forbes Burnham's Peoples National Congress. Mr. Peter d'Aguiar's United Force gained the greater proportion of its votes from persons of Portuguese descent and from other minority groups. The election was conducted under a system of proportional representation, which was established by the United Kingdom in October 1963.²

Formation of a new Government

5. Following consultations with the leaders of the three main parties, the Governor, Sir Richard Luyt, concluded that Mr. Burnham, as leader of the Peoples National Congress, assured of the support of the United Force, was the member best able to command the confidence of a majority of the House of Assembly, and should, therefore, according to the Constitution, be designated Premier in succession to Dr. Jagan.

6. Dr. Jagan, however, declined to resign on the grounds that since the Constitution provides that the Governor may summon the Assembly only on the advice of the Premier, it was open to the Premier to delay convening that body and facing a vote of confidence. The Governor referred the question to the Colonial Secretary, who, in turn, referred it to the United Kingdom Privy Council for a decision. The Privy Council subsequently issued an Order-in-Council providing that the Premier must vacate his office when the Governor informs him that he is about to reappoint or replace him. On 14 December 1964, the Governor, by virtue of the constitutional powers conferred on him, replaced Dr. Jagan with Mr. Forbes Burnham, as Premier. Mr. Burnham proceeded to form a coalition Government with a fourteen-member Cabinet that included three members of the United Force Party, with Mr. Peter d'Aguiar as Minister of Finance.

7. Following the issuance of an Order-in-Council on 24 March permitting the appointment of an Attorney General from outside the members of the House of Assembly, the Premier, Mr. Burnham, announced the appointment of Mr. Siridat Ramphal as Attorney

² *Ibid.*, chap. VII, paras. 11-15.

General. Mr. Ramphal, a Guianese, was formerly Solicitor-General of the Federation of the West Indies. In announcing the appointment, the Premier said that in the context of Guiana's present circumstances, it was important to keep the post of Attorney General out of the political arena. The new Attorney General was sworn in on 10 May.

Report by Commonwealth Observers on the elections

8. At the request of the United Kingdom Government, eleven Observers drawn from six Commonwealth countries were sent to British Guiana during the elections. The members of the team were from Canada, Ghana, India, Malta, Nigeria and Trinidad and Tobago, with Mr. Justice Tek Chaud of India as Chairman. The terms of reference of the team were to observe the elections in British Guiana and to report to the United Kingdom Government as follows:

(a) Whether the administrative arrangements were conducted in a fair and proper manner. If not, what were the deficiencies?

(b) Whether there was freedom of expression of different points of view through broadcasting, public meetings and the Press. If not, what were the restrictions?

(c) Whether any other matters that came to the notice of the Observers had, in their opinion, affected the fair and free conduct of the elections.

9. According to its report³ the team visited thirty-four of the thirty-five polling districts between 1 and 7 December and over 200 of the 772 polling places scattered throughout the Territory. It also invited the seven political parties to make oral representations, and all the parties, except the Justice Party, availed themselves of the invitation. The team also received written representations.

10. In its report, the team observed that the one provision in the administrative arrangements which seemed open to manipulation was the proxy vote, but it was unable, itself, to observe fraud in the use of proxies.

11. With regard to freedom of expression, the team found that the broadcasting time allocated to the various political parties was substantially the same as that for the elections in 1961, which it considered "not an unreasonable arrangement"; that all the public meetings it attended were held without hindrance and were under the surveillance of members of the security forces; that there was no censorship or interference with the Press although, in this connexion, it remarked that the Press itself was intensely partisan and that the Peoples Progressive Party was handicapped by the opposition of all the daily newspapers.

12. The team also noted that there was considerable discussion in British Guiana on a statement issued by the Governor on 2 December 1964 warning, by virtue of his discretionary powers under article 29 of the Constitution, that the leader of the party polling the highest number of votes would not, in certain circumstances, necessarily be designated as Premier. Commenting on this statement, the team observed that "the Governor may be within his rights to construe the intention and language of this provision but the premature disclosure as to how he would exercise these

discretionary powers in certain circumstances might have the effect of not merely informing the public but also influencing them". The team added that "an indication of such an intention just before the poll could influence voters against casting their votes for the party of their choice".

13. The final conclusion of the team on the conduct of the election was as follows:

"It is difficult to ensure total fairness and freedom in any election. It is our conclusion that this election reflected the political conviction of the Guianese electorate. The election was keenly contested and the extraordinarily high percentage of votes cast bears testimony to the effectiveness of the administrative arrangements which ensured that the electors were not intimidated into keeping away from the polls."

14. In a separate memorandum, one of the Indian observers, Mr. Mirza, drew attention to the "sense of fear" which he stated existed among the voters. He noted as a "curious phenomena" that the governing party (the Peoples Progressive Party) apparently had little control over the police. He also noted that there were hints that the reason for the absence of complaints by the Peoples National Congress was the huge preponderance of "their racial group" in the police force and "the support they seem to possess from the Powers that count". He also made reference to suggestions that the Governor's interpretation of the Constitution before the election "was for the purpose of helping this particular party". In Mr. Mirza's opinion, the electoral system of proportional representation had not added to the people's security; although the system made room for minorities, it also sharpened divisions, created new ones, and as there were two almost equal racial groups, gave rise to an appeal on racial lines. The situation had been further aggravated by treating the whole country as one constituency. Furthermore, the minorities had been wiped out at the election and that had only helped the formation of a weak Government. In conclusion Mr. Mirza stated: "I believe that no election, however well conducted, can be called fair when it leads to division, racial conflict and creates a sense of fear and insecurity."

Boycott of the House of Assembly by the Peoples Progressive Party

15. At various times prior to and after the elections, Dr. Jagan accused the United Kingdom of imposing a "rigged system of voting". He also claimed that the Peoples Progressive Party was "cheated, not defeated". His various demands included the immediate release of the remaining political detainees, changes in the electoral system, including voting at 18 years of age and a new general election; and the reorganization of the police and other security forces to reflect the composition of the population. Dr. Jagan also demanded the removal of the Governor, Sir Richard Luyt, and his replacement by "an impartial member of the British Government". On 8 February 1965, the Guianese Union of Indian Organisations, in a cable to the Queen, supported this demand.

16. When the swearing-in ceremony for the new House of Assembly took place on 1 January 1965, the elected members of the PPP boycotted it.

17. Similarly, when the House of Assembly began its first formal session, the twenty-four members of

³ Colonial No. 359, 11 February 1965 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office).

the PPP did not attend. A statement issued by the party accused the United Kingdom Government of "frequent and shameless manipulations of our Constitution for colonialist political ends".

18. On 8 April, one member of the PPP broke the party boycott and was sworn in. On 18 April, a party congress decided to end the boycott although it was not until 18 May that Dr. Jagan led twenty members of the PPP into the House and took the oath of office. On the following day, nineteen members of the party walked out following a ruling by the Speaker. The party members ended their boycott some days later.

Proposed constitutional conference

19. In February 1965, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Anthony Greenwood, visited the Territory where he had talks with representatives of the Government and political parties. Before departing on 16 February, he said that independence still remained the objective of his Government, but that he would have to consult with his colleagues on whether a Constitutional Conference on British Guiana would be useful at the present stage. He also declared that partition was not the solution for British Guiana.

20. On 1 April, Mr. Greenwood said in the British Parliament that no decision had been taken as to when a constitutional conference would be held. He also stated that the pledge to hold a conference after the elections to fix a date for independence given by the previous United Kingdom Government remained the policy of the present Government.

21. On 19 April, the Premier, Mr. Burnham, told a rally of his party that he would demand independence as early as "this autumn" or not later than "next spring".

22. On 14 May, Dr. Jagan was reported as saying that the timing of a conference to discuss British Guiana's independence would depend on the attitude of the British and the Government of British Guiana to prior demands made by the PPP. Before this transference of power to Guianese hands, he said, the present "police state" must be dismantled, PPP detainees must be released, and new electoral arrangements agreed upon. His other pre-independence demands included new elections with a voting age of eighteen, rejection of proportional representation and a correction of racial imbalances in the security forces.

23. On 27 May, Mr. Greenwood made the following statement in the British Parliament:

"It is the intention of the British Government to hold a conference as early as practicable to discuss, among other things, a programme for independence. Meanwhile we shall be waiting anxiously for the result of the investigation into racial imbalance which the Premier of British Guiana is taking steps to mount."

24. On 1 June, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Harold Wilson, said that he would be disappointed if a conference on British Guiana's constitutional future did not take place by the autumn and that one of its tasks would be to fix a date for independence.

25. The communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held in

London in June 1965 contained the following comment on British Guiana:

"As regards British Guiana, while differing views are held on the constitutional arrangements best suited for the country, the Prime Ministers welcomed the British Government's intention to hold a conference later this year, one of the tasks of which would be to devise a constitution and to fix a date for independence. The Prime Ministers noted the British Government's recognition of the need for adequate machinery to ensure human rights and due judicial processes."

26. In a statement issued after the Conference, Dr. Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, dissociated himself with the decision of the Conference on British Guiana.

27. On 15 July, Mr. Greenwood announced that he had suggested that the constitutional conference begin on 2 November. He also stated:

"We have made it perfectly clear that we are holding this conference at the beginning of November in order to carry out the pledges that we have already given about independence."

State of emergency

28. As previously reported (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VII, para. 36), a state of emergency had been declared on 22 May 1964.

29. On 1 April 1965, Mr. Greenwood informed the House of Commons that the number of detainees had been reduced from forty-one to fourteen. He pointed out that none of the fourteen had exercised the right of appeal to a tribunal against their being kept in detention. In answer to a further question, he said that he thought all fourteen were members of the party in opposition to Mr. Burnham and that twenty-one of the twenty-seven persons released were also members of that same party.

30. On 14 April, the PPP announced that its fourteen members in detention would not appeal to a tribunal set up by the Governor, which was described as a system of arbitrary justice in the hands of the Governor, who was not bound by the tribunal's findings. The statement by Mr. Greenwood that the detainees had the right to appeal to this tribunal was described as an attempt to "whitewash" the system of detention without trial.

31. On 14 April, an Order-in-Council was issued by which the Governor became dependent on the advice of the Ministers in the making of emergency regulations, and in the exercise of other emergency powers. These powers had previously been exercised personally by the Governor.

32. On 18 May, Dr. Jagan introduced a motion in the House of Assembly calling for the lifting of the state of emergency and the release of the remaining detainees. Speaking in the debate on this motion, the Premier, Mr. Burnham, is reported to have made two suggestions as a basis for conciliation: first, that a team of Government and opposition representatives be established to see what revision could be made in the rules relating to detention; and secondly, that the opposition concentrate on bringing about an end to acts of sabotage if it sincerely desired the revoking of the emergency regulations. Mr. Burnham added that he was ready to meet the opposition to discuss methods of achieving these aims.

33. On 20 May, the British Guiana Government reimposed emergency measures allowing magistrates and certain police officers to order the detention of suspects for up to eight days while investigations are being carried out. Under the old regulations, a suspect could be held for only twenty-four hours without being charged.

34. On 9 June, the Premier, Mr. Burnham, addressed a letter to Dr. Jagan in which he said that he was prepared not only to discuss with Dr. Jagan "ways and means of bringing to an end acts of sabotage, but also to discuss national unity".

35. In reply to this letter, Dr. Jagan urged the Premier to ascertain the views of his party on a number of political and economic questions. These views could become a basis for discussion. He added, "Acts of sabotage are being perpetrated by terrorists attached to one or other of the parties forming the coalition with the sole purpose of providing an excuse for the detention of political opponents".

36. On 23 June, the Premier, Mr. Burnham, said that "false allegations" were "no substitute for genuine and honest attempts to resolve critical issues facing the country". Subsequently, 28 June 1965 was fixed as the date for the discussions between the two leaders.

37. On 26 June, three leading members of the PPP were detained by security forces under the emergency regulations. They were Mr. Cedric Nunes, a Senator and former Education Minister; Mr. Joseph Jardim, general manager of the PPP-controlled New Guyana Publishing Company; and Mr. Prakash Persaud, a civil servant. Dr. Jagan protested against the detention of the three men, describing it as "an act of frenzy on the part of an unpopular Government". Dr. Jagan also withdrew from the talks with the Premier in protest against the detentions. Later he was reported to have said that there could be no peace talks until the PPP detainees were released.

Inquiry into racial imbalance

38. In April, the Premier invited the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) to carry out an inquiry into the racial imbalance in the composition of the security forces in government-sponsored land settlement schemes, and in other sectors of the economy and society. On 28 June, the ICJ named the following persons as members: Justice Seamus Henchy, a judge of the High Court of Ireland (Chairman), Professor Felix Ermacora, Austrian representative on the United Nations Human Rights Commission, and Professor Peter A. Papadatos, Greek legal expert and special legal adviser to the Royal Hellenic Ministry of Co-ordination.

39. On 1 July, Dr. Jagan informed the Colonial Secretary that his party could not co-operate with the ICJ in the inquiry, since its terms of reference "completely by-pass the real issue of the present imbalance in the police and security forces and the question of its immediate correction".

40. The inquiry was reported to have begun in August. Its report is expected in October of this year.

Economic conditions

General

41. The latest official information on economic conditions in the Territory submitted by the administering

Power was for the year 1963, of which a summary was contained in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VII, paras. 46-52).

42. As indicated in the above-mentioned report, the economy of the Territory is based mainly on agriculture and mining. The principal crops are sugar and rice, while bauxite is the largest sector of the mining industry. Other major products include diamonds and edible oil. The financial resources available for development purposes are limited and the country depends largely on foreign grants and loans.

External aid

43. In January 1965, it was reported that the United Kingdom would grant British Guiana \$12 million⁴ for completing development projects and other works.

44. It was also announced that the United States Agency for International Development (AID) was preparing to provide about \$5 million in aid. A team of industrialists from the United States also decided to launch a \$26 million project in the Territory. The project would include commercial enterprises, cattle and timber for exports, housing schemes, mining and mineral exploration, and sea, air and road transportation.

45. Under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance for 1965-1966, a project has been approved to provide experts to assist in the establishment of a Central Bank in British Guiana (E/TAC/L.337/Add.22). The operation of the Central Bank is expected to permit effective economic planning, development of a monetary policy and a stable currency.

46. On 26 February 1965, the Minister of Agriculture signed an agreement with the United Nations representative for British Guiana's participation in the United Nations Special Fund's fisheries development project for Caribbean countries. The Special Fund will grant \$U.S. 1.7 million in expert aid and equipment for the project. British Guiana will contribute the equivalent of about \$30,000.

47. The Tapakuma drainage and irrigation scheme, on which work was completed in 1963, was put into operation in 1964. The \$13 million project undertaken by the British Guiana Government is designed to improve drainage and irrigation of 35,000 acres of land. In addition, the scheme will enable another 10,000 acres of virgin swamp land to be brought under cultivation.

Development plans

48. On 8 March 1965, a West Indies "Summit" Conference opened in Georgetown, the capital of the Territory, to discuss the improvement of economic and social conditions in the area, including plans to expand the sugar and banana industries, the training of civil servants, specialist aid and health services.

49. At the opening of the House of Assembly's session on 29 March, the Governor said that preliminary work for a five-year development plan, 1966-1970, had started. A working party headed by Sir Arthur Lewis was expected to complete its task by the end of July. International experts would later be consulted before the plan was finally adopted. The Government regarded co-operatives as vital for the nation's eco-

⁴ The local currency is the West Indian dollar (\$WI) which equals 4s.2d. (sterling) or \$U.S. 0.5833.

conomic reconstruction. In agriculture, greater emphasis was being placed on developing new economic crops and expanding livestock and dairy industries.

Mining

50. In 1963, bauxite accounted for approximately \$26.59 million (or 16.92 per cent) and alumina for \$21.93 million of the Territory's commercial production. The industry was started in 1916 by the Demerara Bauxite Company Ltd., a subsidiary of the Aluminium Company of Canada, Ltd. It is reported that the bulk of the 1.5 million tons of bauxite and the 250,000 tons of alumina shipped from MacKenzie, the centre of the bauxite industry, goes to Canada each year.

51. In February 1965, the American Reynolds Metals Company signed a new 25-year agreement for bauxite mining with the British Guiana Government and paid \$U.S. 500,000 in advance taxes. The company had started mining in 1953, but had not paid income-tax owing to the reported unprofitability of its operations.

Agriculture

52. During 1964, drought and disturbances resulted in the sugar industry producing only 258,378 tons. It was the first time in a decade that the country's sugar production had fallen below 300,000 tons. In 1963, production amounted to 317,000 tons, compared with 323,000 in 1962.

53. Unofficial estimates put the 1964 rice production at a minimum of 160,000 tons, compared with 124,000 tons in 1963. Local annual consumption is 30,000 tons, sales to the Caribbean Islands under United Kingdom administration and to Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago account for 65,000 tons. Rice is also sold to Cuba. In December 1964, a new rice contract with Cuba was reportedly discussed. Under a previous contract 40,000 tons were to have been supplied in 1964, but it was reported that only 18,349 tons were taken.

Caribbean free trade area

54. On 6 July 1965, the Premiers of British Guiana and Barbados, Mr. Burnham and Mr. Barrow, announced that they had agreed to establish a free trade area covering the two Territories. The area would be known as the Caribbean Free Trade Area and the participation of any other Territory in the region would be welcomed. They announced that a working party of officials would be appointed immediately to work out the implications of establishing a full customs union between the Territories within the shortest possible time. The major objective should be a viable economic community and common market within the context of early independence for all the Caribbean Territories which so desired. They also announced that these decisions would be subject to formal approval by the Governments and Legislatures of the two Territories.

55. In a statement made on 7 July, Mr. Burnham was reported as saying that the agreement was a "logical follow-through" to decisions taken at the conference of Commonwealth Caribbean countries held in Georgetown in March 1965.

56. Commenting on the agreement in a statement released on 11 July, Dr. Jagan was reported as saying

that the pact was a limited free-trade manoeuvre which flew in the face of history and West Indian unity. His party had always said that for an independent Guiana to survive, it must work and co-operate within a large grouping, which must have clear-cut objectives, if failure was to be avoided. Neither a customs union nor the broader objective of a Caribbean common market could succeed, if larger Territories such as Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Cuba were excluded. Dr. Jagan added that British Guiana was to be made into an agrarian appendage of an industrialized Barbados, which provided cheap labour and a more favourable climate for the foreign investor.

57. On 17 July, it was announced that the Government of Antigua had expressed its intention to be associated with the Caribbean Free Trade Area.

Compulsory savings levy

58. It will be recalled that in the 1962 budget a compulsory savings levy was introduced. The levy amounted to 5 per cent of a worker's pay and the deductions were placed in a government-controlled fund which totalled \$6.3 million at the end of 1964. The fund was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and by the West Indies Appeal Court. In January 1965, the Minister of Finance, Mr. d'Aguiar, announced that the Government would issue voluntary savings certificates and would begin repaying the National savings levy. The maximum holding of the new issue would be \$5,000. The certificates could be redeemed after three and a half years at 10 per cent interest, after six and a half years at 40 per cent and after nine and a half years at 100 per cent. Foreign investors and domestic companies were reported to have bought more than \$3 million in bonds as of 19 February 1965.

Manpower survey

59. In February 1965, a manpower survey was launched to investigate unemployment and underemployment and also to provide data regarding the size of the labour force and skills and training available. Mr. Burnham, on his visit to the United Kingdom in February 1965, was also reported to have appealed to Guianese *émigrés*, of whom there are about 15,000 in the United Kingdom, and many of whom possess skills that could be used in carrying out development programmes, to return to the Territory.

B. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

60. The Special Committee considered British Guiana at its 386th and 389th meetings on 16 September and 7 October 1965. The Special Committee had before it the report of the Sub-Committee of Good Offices on British Guiana, which is appended to this chapter (see annex below). The report was introduced by the Chairman of the Special Committee, speaking as Chairman of the Sub-Committee of Good Offices, at the 389th meeting on 7 October 1965.

Written petitions and hearings

61. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning British Guiana:

| <i>Petition</i> | <i>Document No.</i> |
|--|------------------------|
| Mr. Cheddi Jagan, Premier, British Guiana | A/AC.109/PET.344 |
| Mr. Cheddi Jagan, Leader, Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) | A/AC.109/PET.344/Add.1 |
| Mr. Felix A. Cummings, Director of Information and Public Relations (PPP) | A/AC.109/PET.344/Add.2 |
| Mr. A. D. Watts | A/AC.109/PET.345 |
| Members and Supporters of the PPP, Progressive Youth Organization (PYO) and Women's Progressive Organization (WPO), Western Leguan ... | A/AC.109/PET.346 |
| Mr. Abdool Drepaul | A/AC.109/PET.347 |
| Mr. Jaikarran | A/AC.109/PET.348 |
| Mr. Sasenarine Willie, on behalf of the people of Enmore | A/AC.109/PET.349 |
| Mr. Mamasjanic, on behalf of the people of East Bank Demerara | A/AC.109/PET.350 |
| Officers and members of the Greenwich Party Group and WPO | A/AC.109/PET.351 |
| Mrs. Mohammed, on behalf of women of Leonora West Coast Demerara | A/AC.109/PET.352 |
| Mr. Robert B. Persaud, on behalf of the Kiltearn-Brighton PYO Group | A/AC.109/PET.353 |
| Mr. Alfred Beekun R. Singh, on behalf of Indians of Abary District | A/AC.109/PET.354 |
| Mr. Arthur Boodram, on behalf of the people of New Road Vreed-en-Hoop and of Best Village | A/AC.109/PET.355 |
| Two petitions from the Peoples National Congress (PNC) ... | A/AC.109/PET.419 |

62. At its 386th meeting, the Special Committee heard as a petitioner Mr. Felix A. Cummings, Director of Information and Public Relations, Peoples Progressive Party.

63. Mr. Cummings said that the question of British Guiana's right to self-determination and genuine independence had engaged the attention of the Special Committee on several occasions. In the past the United Kingdom had denied the Territory those rights on the flimsiest pretexts and it had received such support from the United States that there was sometimes reason to wonder which was the real administering Power—the United States or the United Kingdom. It had been found that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the so-called trade union leaders of the United States had played a significant role in fomenting the riots of 1962 and 1963 in order to create chaos and confusion so that independence should be denied to the country under Dr. Jagan's leadership.

64. Dr. Jagan had been suspected of policies contrary to the doctrine of the State Department of the United States: namely, of leaning towards socialism, of rejecting neo-colonialism and imperialism and, worst of all, of not being anti-communist or anti-Castro. Accordingly, it was natural that the imperialist forces should seek to prevent British Guiana from attaining genuine independence. There was no limit to the acts of cruelty committed by the imperialists, whether it was the attack against the heroic Viet-Nameese people, the mass slaughter of defenceless people, the territorial conquests of which Mexico, Panama and Puerto Rico

had been the victims, or in more recent times attacks against Nicaragua, Guatemala, Colombia and Honduras.

65. It was in 1953, the year in which the democratic Government of Guatemala had been overthrown and replaced by a military dictatorship, that the democratically elected Government of British Guiana had been deposed by United Kingdom troops at the request of President Eisenhower. The victims were, however, growing stronger and the day would come when such aggressions would have to end.

66. The Committee was aware of the anti-imperialist stand of the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) of British Guiana and of its struggle for the independence, self-determination and complete freedom of the Territory. Again and again, the PPP had declared its belief in socialism, and the elections in Guiana, although held under trying circumstances, had proved that the people supported both the party and its teaching.

67. While the PPP, whose attitude was well known, had been teaching the people of British Guiana the virtues of socialism and had obtained a majority of the votes from 1953 to 1964, the imperialists had sought to defeat the people's will and to overthrow the Government of the PPP, which they had managed to do on 9 October 1963. The United Kingdom authorities had promptly enacted repressive measures against the Peoples Progressive Party and its leaders, with the exception of the Party's then Chairman, Mr. Burnham, the present Premier, who had escaped persecution because he was in the service of the United Kingdom. At present the PPP, although it had won a majority of seats in the last elections, was excluded from the Government and 109,000 constituents were thus, in effect, disenfranchised.

68. Although they had criticized their predecessors of the PPP on that score, Mr. Burnham and his colleagues had travelled abroad many times and on their travels had sought to create the impression that all was well in British Guiana. They had carefully refrained from mentioning emergency rule, arbitrary arrests and detention, unemployment and economic depression. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in June 1965, although the question of British Guiana had not been on the agenda, Mr. Williams, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, and Mr. Shastri, the Prime Minister of India, had taken the floor to criticize the system of proportional representation, which was alien to the Commonwealth and was at the root of that unfortunate state of affairs.

69. When it had been in power, the PPP, on the advice of a person who was now a tax adviser of the United Kingdom Government, had introduced tax reforms which were designed to distribute the tax burden more equitably. The Opposition, however, had promptly dubbed the expert a "communist" and had organized riots against the Government, with the support of the so-called trade unionists of the United States, the Free Institute of Labour, the CIA and business circles. Moreover, those provisions had subsequently been abolished. Furthermore, the present Government had granted large concessions and a monopoly of the Territory's bauxite, oil and other wealth to foreign interests, no doubt as a reward for having brought it to power.

70. The present Government of British Guiana, which had come to power illegally, was incompetent and prodigal of the country's resources, endangering its future. Moreover, its actions were contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter. The PPP would continue to strive for independence and it demanded that all detainees should be released and that the state of emergency should be ended forthwith as a *sine qua non* of its participation in the conference on British Guiana. It also demanded the inclusion of the question of proportional representation in the agenda of that conference, the holding of fresh elections before a date was fixed for independence, the equitable representation of all racial groups in the police and security forces, the removal of all foreign troops and of all military bases, particularly the United States base at Atkinson Field, and the restructuring and democratization of governmental institutions dealing with law and order. To grant independence to British Guiana in the present circumstances, before those demands had been met, would be to give independence with conditions and reservations, in violation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and of the United Nations Charter. It would also infringe the human rights of colonial peoples.

71. With regard to the second demand, he explained that the PPP wanted the question of proportional representation to be reconsidered in the light of the new arguments presented at the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers by the Prime Ministers of Trinidad and Tobago and of India.

72. With regard to independence for Guiana, he recalled that Mr. Greenwood, Secretary of State for the Colonies, replying to several questions put to him by Sir P. Agnew and Mr. Duncan Sandys, had said that the conference which was to fix the date for the independence of British Guiana would be held on 2 November for the purpose of drafting the Territory's future constitution, determining the various steps in its accession to independence and deciding when they would each be taken. Mr. Greenwood had explained that the United Kingdom Government intended to hold the conference in November in implementation of its pledges, and had added that, while it was difficult to anticipate the results of the conference, it was to be hoped that maximum agreement could be reached, particularly with regard to the date for independence. In that connexion, he drew the Committee's attention to the section of the final communiqué of the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers dealing with British Guiana and, specifically, to the statement of the United Kingdom on that subject.

73. Turning to another of the PPP's demands, he said that since 1957 his party, in the name of national unity, and citing many examples of abuses in support of its demand, had many times pressed for equitable representation of the various racial groups in the police and security forces. At the present time, only 16.5 per cent of the members of those forces were persons of Indian origin, who constituted 47.8 per cent of the total population, while 75.4 per cent were persons of African origin, who constituted 33 per cent of the total population. The PPP was not advocating the dismissal of the Afro-Guianese members of the police or security forces. It recognized that the situation had been brought about by certain historical circumstances and considered that the balance should be restored by increasing the

number of people in those forces, with Guianese filling as many posts as possible.

74. The United Kingdom Government itself had recognized the dangers inherent in the present imbalance. But it was not enough to recognize the problem; an effort should also be made to correct it. Several solutions had already been proposed. The Commissioner of Police had suggested an increase to 33 per cent in five years of the number of Indo-Guianese in the forces. However, even the Governor had not accepted that plan. The PPP had proposed an increase of the police forces to 1,000 men of all races within one year, with an attempt made to select the new recruits in such a way as to restore racial balance. The Secretary of State for the Colonies had proposed the appointment of a commission to study the question; but the coalition Government had challenged the Colonial Secretary's right to handle the matter, on the pretext that it was a domestic issue entirely within its own purview. Mr. Greenwood should have fulfilled the pledge made by his predecessor, but he had preferred to yield to the present Government and to invite the International Commission of Jurists to hold an inquiry. The PPP had no objection, but felt that the problem was a grave social one requiring urgent solution and that lawyers should not be asked to solve it. It would have been better to assign that task to social scientists from, for example, the University of the West Indies. By agreeing that the problem should be placed in the hands of the International Commission of Jurists, the Secretary of State for the Colonies had actually gone back on the action undertaken by his predecessor. That was all the more disappointing in that it was the action of a Labour Government.

75. The Commission had merely been requested to investigate the procedures for the selection, appointment, promotion and dismissal of members of the police and security forces and to make recommendations for eliminating any imbalance based on racial discrimination. From a purely legalistic point of view, the International Commission of Jurists could find that the present procedures were proper and that there was no racial discrimination. That was why the PPP refused to take part in such a farce, and demanded that the Commission's terms of reference be amended. It demanded that the present state of affairs be corrected without delay, because it was essential for all workers throughout the Territory to have confidence in government institutions. The PPP was very concerned because the police and security forces were being used to suppress the rights and freedoms of the Guianese people and to defend the interests of the colonialists and imperialists. The Guianese could not live in peace under a régime which used the organs of government in order to spread terror. It was essential, above all, to preserve national unity.

76. On that subject, the opinion of a distinguished barrister, Mr. J. T. Clarke, was an authoritative one. Mr. Clarke considered that the police force of British Guiana, except for a few officers and men of proven integrity, was notoriously corrupt and was incapable, as at present constituted, of carrying out its duties impartially or efficiently. The hostility to the police displayed by the population during a number of incidents which had occurred since 9 May 1964 further confirmed that the police were far from competent to carry out their duties. Particularly significant in that regard was the matter of the deductions from the wages of sugar

workers, made without their authorization and paid over to the Manpower Citizens' Association; it was one of the main causes of friction and unrest in the sugar industry. The abuses involved in that procedure had never led to a thorough investigation of the whole system—as it should have once it had been established that the deductions had been made without authorization. Such injustices had in many cases been committed, but the police had no plans to investigate and to prosecute those against whom there might be evidence of fraud. Incidents of that type had of course raised serious doubts about the administration of justice, and it was highly desirable that the competent authorities should take the necessary measures to bring any guilty persons before the courts for trial.

77. Before concluding, he expressed his gratitude to the various statesmen who, by their actions, had focused attention on the question of British Guiana.

Statements by members

78. Introducing the report of the Sub-Committee of Good Offices on British Guiana, the Chairman, speaking as the Chairman of the Sub-Committee, said that as indicated in the report, the Sub-Committee was unable, owing to the negative attitude of the United Kingdom Government, to visit British Guiana and to fulfil the Good Offices mission which had been entrusted to it by the Special Committee. The Sub-Committee however continued to believe that the United Nations should ensure that British Guiana accede to independence without delay in an atmosphere of harmony and peace.

79. He suggested on behalf of the Sub-Committee that the Special Committee should take note of the report of the Sub-Committee and endorse conclusions set out therein. He also suggested that the report of the Sub-Committee should be incorporated in the report to be submitted by the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its twentieth session.

80. The representative of the United Kingdom reserved the position of his Government with regard to the Sub-Committee's conclusions and, in particular, to the proposed reaffirmation of the Special Committee's resolution of 23 June 1964 which his delegation had voted against.

81. The representative of the United States of America reserved the position of his delegation with regard to the conclusions contained in the report of the Sub-Committee.

C. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

82. At its 389th meeting on 7 October 1965, the Special Committee decided to adopt the report of the Sub-Committee of Good Offices on British Guiana, to endorse the conclusions contained therein and to incorporate that report in its own report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session.

83. In deciding to take note of the report of the Sub-Committee and to endorse conclusions contained therein the Special Committee reaffirmed its resolution of 23 June 1964 (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VII, para. 196) and authorized the Sub-Committee to continue to carry out its task.

APPENDIX

Report of the Sub-Committee of Good Offices on British Guiana*

INTRODUCTION

1. The Special Committee established the Sub-Committee of Good Offices on British Guiana by a resolution adopted on 23 June 1964 (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VII, para. 196), operative paragraph 6 of which reads as follows:

"6. *Decides* to establish a Sub-Committee of Good Offices of three members to be appointed by the Chairman; the task of the Sub-Committee will be to visit British Guiana and take any other necessary measures for the implementation of the resolutions on British Guiana of the General Assembly and the Special Committee and report to the Committee as soon as possible."

2. The members of the Sub-Committee of Good Offices appointed by the Chairman are Mr. Sori Coulibaly (Mali), Chairman, Mr. Taieb Slim (Tunisia), and Mr. Carlos María Velazquez (Uruguay).

3. At the 315th meeting of the Special Committee on 17 November 1964, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee submitted an oral report on its work. By taking note of this report, the Special Committee at the same meeting agreed to authorize the Sub-Committee to keep the situation under review and again to offer its good offices, if this was acceptable to the parties concerned, with a view to the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee on British Guiana (*ibid.*, paras. 221-237).

ACTION TAKEN BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

4. At its meetings held during September 1965, the Sub-Committee reviewed the situation in the Territory. It had before it a working paper prepared by the Secretariat containing information on the latest developments concerning British Guiana (see paras. 1-59 of this chapter).

5. In reviewing the situation in British Guiana, the Sub-Committee recalled that, in identical letters dated 25 September 1964, the Chairman had informed Dr. Cheddi Jagan, leader of the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP), and Mr. L. F. S. Burnham, leader of the Peoples National Congress (PNC), of the establishment of the Sub-Committee and had invited their views and proposals as to what positive measures it could take in the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee concerning British Guiana. The Sub-Committee noted that no replies to these letters had been received.

6. The Sub-Committee also noted that the elections held on 7 December 1964 had led to the formation of a new Government with Mr. L. F. S. Burnham as Premier. The Sub-Committee was also aware that the Premier of British Guiana had invited an international commission to inquire into the racial imbalance in the composition of the security forces, in government-sponsored land settlement schemes and in other sectors of the economy and society, the report of which was expected to be published in October 1965. Further, the Sub-Committee took note of the intention of the United Kingdom Government to hold a constitutional conference during November 1965 in order to devise a new constitution and to fix a date for independence.

CONCLUSIONS

7. For the reasons stated in its previous report (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VII, paras. 225-231), the Sub-Committee was unable to visit British Guiana in order to establish contact with the political leaders of the Territory who might assist in the fulfilment of its task. In addition, the views and proposals awaited from Mr. Burnham and Dr. Jagan as to the measures to be taken in the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee concerning

* Originally issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.247.

British Guiana were not available. Consequently the Sub-Committee was not in a position, through the use of its good offices, to effectively discharge its mandate.

8. The Sub-Committee, however, considers that the United Nations should continue its efforts to ensure that British Guiana

accedes to independence without delay and in an atmosphere of harmony, peace and unity. The Sub-Committee accordingly recommends that the Special Committee should reaffirm its resolution of 23 June 1964 and authorize the Sub-Committee to continue to carry out its task.

CHAPTER X

FERNANDO POO, RIO MUNI, IFNI AND SPANISH SAHARA

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

1. Information on these Territories is contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. IX, paras. 3-62). Supplementary information is set out below.¹

1. *Fernando Póo and Río Muni*

Political and constitutional developments

2. Information concerning the elections in 1964 of municipal councils and the *diputaciones* (territorial councils) of Fernando Póo and Río Muni, the subsequent establishment of the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea and the election of the Governing Council is contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session. No constitutional developments have been reported since then.

3. The Governing Council, which consists of a President and eight members, is elected for a term of office of four years. Members of the Council, as constituted in 1964, were the following:

President

Mr. Bonifacio Ondó Edú

Members from Fernando Póo

Mr. Aurelio N. Itoba
Mr. Gustavo Watson Bucko
Mr. Luis J. Maho
Mr. Roman Borico Toichoa

Members from Río Muni

Mr. Luis Rondo Maguga
Mr. Antonio C. Nang
Mr. Francisco Macías Nguema
Mr. Rafael Nsue Nchama

4. The following organizations were reported to have been active during the political campaign prior to the plebiscite held in December 1963: (a) Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE)—President, Mr. Luis J. Maho; (b) Mouvement national de libération de la Guinée équatoriale (MNLGE)—Secretary-General, Mr. Atanasio N'dong; (c) Unión Popular de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (UPGE)—President, Mr. Bonifacio Ondó Edú; (d) Movimiento Nacional de Unión (MNU) led by Mr. Jaime Nseng; and (e) La Cruzada, based in Fernando Póo.

5. A new pattern of nationalist movements emerged in 1964. Early in that year, the UPGE, led by Mr. Bonifacio Ondó Edú, and members of other organizations constituted a new political party, the Movimiento de Unión Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE). The party is pledged to evolution towards independence, the timing of which should be determined in consultation with Spain.

6. In October 1964, members of MNLGE, led by Mr. Atanasio N'dong, and the IPGE formed the Frente

Nacional y Popular de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (FRENAPO), which opposes the MUNGE and is pledged to the immediate independence of Equatorial Guinea. Petitions (A/AC.109/PET.358 and Add.1) have been received from Mr. N'dong from Algiers and from Mr. Jesus Mba Ovono, representative of FRENAPO at Accra, announcing the formation of the new movement, expressing satisfaction at the decision of the Special Committee to call for the speeding up of independence for Equatorial Guinea, claiming that the present régime was a puppet government and calling for immediate independence. In his petition, dated 24 March 1965, Mr. Ovono stated that a referendum was to be held in Equatorial Guinea under Spanish direction in April with a choice between "colonial autonomy for ten years" and immediate independence. He appealed to the Secretary-General to send observers and to negotiate with the Spanish Government to grant an amnesty to refugees so that they could participate in the referendum. No other information about such a referendum is available.

7. A petition (A/AC.109/PET.359) has been received from Mr. Pastor Torao Sikara, writing as President of the MNLGE in Fernando Póo, and a number of local council chairmen in that island, opposing the unification of Fernando Póo and Río Muni and asking for separate independence for Fernando Póo.

Economic conditions

8. The economy of Equatorial Guinea is based principally on agriculture and forestry, and most of the population is engaged in providing subsistence crops and cacao and coffee for export.

9. Expenditure arising from certain general services such as the administration of justice and from the Armed Forces, as well as expenditures of the Office of the Commissioner-General, are met from the general budget of Spain. Other services are provided for in the budget of Equatorial Guinea.

10. The budget of Equatorial Guinea in 1964 amounted to 422 million pesetas.² It included public works and housing and town planning projects to the amount of 159.6 million pesetas, provided for in 1964 under the Development Plan.

11. In the same year, projects envisaged under the Development Plan, which were charged to the general budget of Spain, amounted to 197.1 million pesetas. Also charged to the general budget of Spain were housing projects for the amount of 320 million pesetas. Price supplements to products from Equatorial Guinea, coffee and cacao, amounted to 237 and 313 million pesetas respectively.

12. Public investment for 1965 has been estimated at 593 million pesetas, of which 169 million will be

¹ The information presented in this chapter has been derived from published reports, and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by Spain under Article 73e of the United Nations Charter, on 24 February 1965. The latter information covered only economic conditions in the Territories.

² The local currency unit is the Spanish peseta, which is equal to \$U.S. 0.0168.

charged to the territorial budget of Equatorial Guinea and 414 million to the general budget of Spain. Development of electric power for the amount of 10 million will be financed from other public sources. For the same year, price supplements to tropical products have been estimated at 460 million pesetas.

2. Ifni and Spanish Sahara

13. In Ifni, the budget of the Territory, which in 1963 amounted to 55 million pesetas, rose to 65 million in 1964. The information available shows a public investment for 1964 of 72 million pesetas on harbours, including the wharf of Sidi Ifni. A housing and town planning project has also been started. It includes the construction of houses for 452 families.

14. In the Spanish Sahara, the budget of the Territory in 1963 amounted to 238 million pesetas. This amount included a subsidy of 80 million pesetas provided in the general budget of Spain to supplement local financial sources.

15. In 1964, expenditure was authorized on public works for the amount of 204 million pesetas. An approved housing and town planning project includes

provision for the construction of houses for 2,550 families. Public investment on projects envisaged for 1965 under the Development Plan amounts to 200 million pesetas.

B. PETITIONS

16. The Special Committee circulated the following petitions concerning Fernando Póo and Río Muni:

| Petitioner | Document No. |
|---|------------------------|
| Three petitions from Messrs. Jesus Mba Ovono and Atanasio N'Dong, Frente Nacional y Popular de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (FRENAPO) | A/AC.109/PET.358 |
| Two petitions from Messrs. Jesus Mba Ovono and Atanasio N'Dong, Frente Nacional y Popular de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (FRENAPO) | A/AC.109/PET.358/Add.1 |
| Mr. Pastor Torao Sikara, President General, Mouvement national de libération de la Guinée équatoriale (MNLGE), and leaders of other organizations | A/AC.109/PET.359 |

CHAPTER XI

GIBRALTAR

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY¹

Introduction

1. Information on Gibraltar is contained in the previous reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its eighteenth and nineteenth sessions (A/5466/Rev.1, chap. XII; A/5800/Rev.1, chap. X). Supplementary information is set out below.

General

2. The civilian population of Gibraltar was estimated at 24,287 at the end of 1963, as against 24,075 in 1961. It was composed as follows:

| | |
|---------------------|--------|
| Gibraltarians | 18,432 |
| Other British | 4,012 |
| Aliens | 1,843 |
| TOTAL | 24,287 |

Political and constitutional developments

3. The modifications of the Gibraltar Constitution which had been outlined in the previous report of the Special Committee were implemented in August 1964. In the Legislative Council the only non-elected members are now the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary. The *ex officio* members of the "Gibraltar Council" are the Deputy Fortress Commander, the Chief Secretary, the Attorney General and the Financial Secretary. The Council of Ministers at present consists of the Chief Minister and five ministers who hold the portfolios for housing and economic development, labour and social security, tourism, port and trade, medical services and education. They are collectively responsible to the Legislative Council.

¹ A letter dated 30 August 1965 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain, which refers to the information contained in this section, was circulated in document A/5959.

Elections

4. As already reported during the last session of the Special Committee, the last Gibraltar elections took place on 10 September 1964. The percentage of electors who actually went to the polls was 76 per cent. There were fifteen nominations for the eleven seats of the Legislative Council. Five of the elected members belonged to the Association for the Advancement of Civil Rights and the remaining six were independents; the Opposition in the legislature has been formed under the leadership of Mr. P. J. Isola.

Recent developments

5. It will be recalled that in the consensus on Gibraltar adopted by the Special Committee on 16 October 1964, it noted that "there was a disagreement, or even a dispute, between the United Kingdom and Spain regarding the status and situation of the Territory of Gibraltar". In the circumstances, the Special Committee invited the United Kingdom and Spain to begin talks without delay, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, in order to reach a negotiated solution in conformity with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), giving due account to the opinions expressed by the members of the Committee and bearing in mind the interests of the people of the Territory.

6. On 18 November 1964, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a letter to the British Ambassador in Madrid (see appendix I below),² in which he stated that the Spanish Government was disposed to open negotiations on the dispute over Gibraltar and expressed the view that the dispute should be resolved bilaterally and without delay. In default of

² The letter was read out by the representative of Spain at the 1318th plenary meeting.

such a negotiated solution, the Spanish Government would find itself obliged to revise its policy in regard to Gibraltar.

7. In a note dated 11 January 1965 (see appendix II below),³ the British Embassy complained of delays and restrictions in the passage of the frontier between Gibraltar and Spain first imposed by the Spanish authorities on 17 October 1964 and at the same time informed the Spanish authorities that proposals for conversations to eliminate causes of friction regarding Gibraltar could not be entertained as long as the abnormal situation on the frontier continued.

8. In a note dated 15 January 1965, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated that it was disposed to enter into negotiations and stated that it was awaiting a reply to its letter of 18 November 1964. In a reply dated 22 January 1965, the British Embassy reaffirmed the position taken in its note of 11 January (A/5860).

9. In an exchange of notes dated 10 February, and 22 February 1965 (see appendices III and IV) the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British Embassy at Madrid set out the respective position of their Governments as regards the scope of possible negotiations and the circumstances in which negotiations might be begun.

10. In notes dated 1 March 1965, and 30 March 1965 (see appendices V and VI), the British authorities protested to the Spanish authorities on further restrictions imposed by them in regard to the crossing of the frontier by British subjects residing in the adjacent area in Spain and working in Gibraltar, and to the non-recognition of British passports issued in Gibraltar or on behalf of the Government of Gibraltar.

11. Subsequently, the United Kingdom Government informed the Spanish authorities that it was reissuing the passports without inclusion of a reference to the Gibraltar Government, but without prejudice to its legal position.

12. According to recent reports, the situation remains unchanged.

B. PETITIONS

13. The Special Committee circulated the following petitions concerning Gibraltar:

| <i>Petitioner</i> | <i>Document</i> |
|--|------------------|
| Mr. Miguel de Gomera, Frente Patriótico Nacional (FPN) | A/AC.109/PET.361 |
| Mr. Juan Gil Delgado | A/AC.109/PET.388 |

APPENDIX I

Letter dated 18 November 1964 from the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British Ambassador in Madrid

Mr. Sori Coulibaly, the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, has transmitted to the Spanish Government, through the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations, a letter in which he communicated the consensus on Gibraltar adopted by that Committee at its 291st meeting, on 16 October 1964 (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. X, paras. 204-205). I am enclosing copies of these documents.

According to the terms of this consensus, the aforementioned Committee after noting that there was a disagreement, or even a dispute, between the United Kingdom and Spain

regarding the status and situation of the Territory of Gibraltar, considered that it should be settled without delay by means of negotiations between the Governments of Spain and of Her Britannic Majesty.

The Spanish Government is prepared to open with Her Britannic Majesty's Government the negotiations referred to in the said consensus, which should start as soon as possible in order that the outcome may be reported to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, as also by reason of the special delicacy of the problem of Gibraltar, which has been made more acute by certain measures adopted unilaterally by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, in respect of which Spain has formulated due reservations.

In the interest of the maintenance and strengthening of firm and promising relations between our two countries, of which the Government of Her Britannic Majesty has in recent years shown itself to be in favour, the Government of Spain has so far refrained from adopting the appropriate counter-measures. In so doing it has considered that the problem of Gibraltar could and should be resolved bilaterally in a friendly fashion, whereby it should be possible to find a solution satisfactory to both parties.

Failing this negotiated solution, which is recommended by the consensus of the "Special Committee", the Spanish Government, having no other alternative, would find itself compelled, in defence of its interests, to revise its policy in regard to Gibraltar.

APPENDIX II

Note dated 11 January 1965 from the British Embassy in Madrid to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have the honour to invite the attention of the Ministry to the serious situation obtaining on the frontier between Spain and Gibraltar.

The delays and restrictions on transit of the frontier in both directions began on 17 October 1964, and were first brought to the attention of the Ministry on 6 November. On 9 November, Her Majesty's Ambassador was assured that the customs delays imposed at La Linea were not the results of any deliberate policy on the part of the Spanish Government. The restrictions on the frontier have nevertheless since been continued and intensified, and further requests for their withdrawal were made by Her Majesty's Ambassador in Madrid during November and December.

Despite these representations there has been no improvement in the situation. The Spanish authorities at the frontier have imposed deliberate, unnecessary and discourteous delays in dealing with vehicles crossing the frontier, which have in some cases resulted in certain vehicles having to wait anything up to ten hours before being cleared. The delays caused in this manner to tourist buses have resulted in serious inconveniences to travellers of various nationalities and have imposed consequential delays on the departure from Gibraltar of scheduled air line services. The decision announced without any previous consultation, that as from 23 November the frontier at La Linea would be closed earlier than was formerly the practice, has caused substantial inconvenience. The consequences of all these measures have been to impose hardship on large numbers of residents of Gibraltar and persons in transit.

During their conversation on 10 December, His Excellency the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated to Her Majesty's Ambassador that the restrictions were designed to deal with alleged smuggling across the frontier. But Her Majesty's Government cannot accept that the control of smuggling necessitates the delays and inconveniences which have been imposed and it has, in any case, always expressed its willingness to co-operate with the Spanish authorities in controlling any smuggling which might be taking place. If the Spanish Government regarded any legitimate Spanish interests as likely to be prejudiced by circumstances arising from the situation in Gibraltar, Her Majesty's Government would have expected these matters to be specified and taken up with them through diplomatic channels in accordance with normal inter-

³ The note was annexed to a letter dated 22 January 1965 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; see document A/5860.

national practice. No such approach has been made and instead the Spanish authorities have seen fit to adopt the measures described above. Her Majesty's Government regret that procedures should have been imposed on the frontier with Gibraltar which are altogether different from those in force on Spain's other international frontiers as well as from the normal standards of international practice and which are directly contrary to the present trend throughout Europe of reducing frontier restrictions and formalities to a minimum.

On instructions received from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Embassy has the honour to protest against the restrictions which have been imposed by the Spanish authorities at La Linea and to request that the Spanish Government will cause them to be lifted forthwith.

At the same time the Embassy are under instructions to inform the Ministry, with reference to the consensus of the United Nations Special Committee on 16 October 1964 regarding Gibraltar, that, whilst Her Majesty's Government cannot regard the question of sovereignty as a matter for negotiation, they would normally have been willing to consider proposals by the Spanish Government for discussions of ways in which good relations can be maintained and any causes of friction eliminated. They cannot, however, entertain any proposals for such conversations so long as the present abnormal situation on the frontier continues.

APPENDIX III

Note dated 10 February 1965 from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the British Embassy in Madrid

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy in Madrid and with reference to the conversation between the First Secretary of the Embassy and the Director of European Political Affairs of the Ministry at 6.30 p.m. on 8 February 1965 has pleasure in bringing the following to its attention.

1. The Spanish Government has examined the proposals transmitted by the Foreign Office through the Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of which its understanding is as follows:

(a) Once the situation that existed at the Police and Control Post of La Linea de la Concepción prior to 17 October 1964 was restored, Her Britannic Majesty's Government would be in a position to officially inform the Spanish Government that it was prepared to negotiate with Spain over Gibraltar, without excluding the subject of sovereignty over the Rock from the negotiations in advance;

(b) Her Britannic Majesty's Government recognizes that the constitutional development of Gibraltar is of concern to Spain and would not exclude this matter, either, from the negotiations they may hold with the Spanish Government over Gibraltar.

2. The Spanish Government understands that the only condition on which Her Britannic Majesty's Government insists before giving an affirmative reply to the request for negotiations over Gibraltar which Spain made in pursuance of the United Nations consensus of 16 October 1964 is that the situation that existed at the Police and Control Post of La Linea prior to the said date be re-established.

The Spanish Government officially stated before the "Special Committee of Twenty-Four" that if Her Britannic Majesty's Government did not desist from the unilateral policy of granting self-determination to the civilian inhabitants of Gibraltar who are British subjects, Spain would see no alternative in order to defend its rights but the obligation to adopt, much to its regret, the defensive counter-measures which the delegation of Spain enumerated (A/AC.109/SR.282).

These counter-measures have not yet been adopted, in the hope that Her Britannic Majesty's Government would understand the arguments in support of Spain and would decide to change the direction of its present Gibraltar policy and to negotiate with this country.

The Spanish Government, therefore, concludes that what Her Britannic Majesty's Government is really requesting in

the proposal to which this *note verbale* refers is that the Spanish Government should continue to maintain, as an exception to Spanish legislation, those arrangements which existed in regard to Gibraltar before Her Britannic Majesty's Government decided to grant self-determination to the civilian inhabitants of the Territory.

Thus, the condition which Her Britannic Majesty's Government now lays down, namely, that before negotiations are begun certain counter-measures which have not yet been introduced should be suspended, can only be considered by the Spanish Government as the result of a political necessity to dispel, in order to reach an understanding, an atmosphere of tension artificially created by parliamentary questions and press campaigns for which the Spanish Government does not feel in any way responsible.

3. The Spanish Government, believing that when an *animus negotiandi* really exists between two countries on a specific aspect of their relations and both decide to seek an amicable solution to the question... is prepared to consider the proposal made by the Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to which this note refers and is therefore of the opinion that prior to negotiations the following lines of action should be adopted:

(a) Her Britannic Majesty's Government, for its part, will proceed, in the manner which it considers appropriate and as gradually as circumstances may make advisable, to restore the internal constitutional situation of Gibraltar to what it was before the establishment in the said Territory of a Legislative Council and an Executive Council. The interests of the civilian inhabitants of Gibraltar, which are mentioned specifically in the United Nations consensus and which have to be taken into account by Spain and the United Kingdom in the negotiations in preparation, can be effectively expressed by the City Council of Gibraltar.

(b) If Her Britannic Majesty's Government accepts this *modus operandi*, intended to create a favourable climate for the negotiations, the Spanish Government, for its part, will take steps to ensure that no serious disturbances occur in the civic life or economy of Gibraltar before or during the negotiations.

The Spanish Government, which reiterates once more that it has not yet introduced the defensive counter-measures which the unilateral policy followed by Her Britannic Majesty's Government in Gibraltar makes necessary for the better defence of Spanish rights and interests, believes that the counter-proposals set forth in this Note, if they are accepted, will permit the Governments of Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to exchange officially and publicly the Spanish request for negotiations and the affirmative British reply before the beginning of the next General Assembly of the United Nations. The Spanish Government wishes to express once again its desire to establish the basis for a firm, close and lasting friendship between Spain and the United Kingdom.

APPENDIX IV

Note dated 22 February 1965 from the British Embassy in Madrid to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1. Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, with reference to the Ministry's *note verbale* No. 23, have the honour to state that the description therein of Her Majesty's Government's position seems to be based on a number of misunderstandings.

2. As was made clear in the Embassy's Notes of 11 and 22 January and by the First Secretary of the Embassy, when responding on 8 February to an inquiry by the Director of European Political Affairs at the Ministry, Her Majesty's Government do not regard the question of Britain's sovereignty over Gibraltar as a matter for negotiation. The First Secretary's statement, that her Majesty's Government have at no time wished to insist on preconditions for conversations in a way which would prevent these from starting, was not intended to imply that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to embark on a negotiation about sovereignty over Gibraltar.

3. Having regard to the interest shown by the Spanish Government in constitutional developments in Gibraltar, Her Majesty's Government would not, however, wish to exclude discussion of these developments should the Spanish Government desire to include this among the matters to be considered in any conversations which may be held following the consensus of the United Nations Special Committee.

4. The position of Her Majesty's Government, nevertheless, remains that they cannot agree to entertain any proposals for the holding of discussions of any kind so long as the present abnormal situation on the frontier at La Linea continues. The Embassy is, moreover, under instructions to point out that, although the Spanish Government may not regard the counter-measures referred to by the representative of Spain in the discussions of the Special Committee as having yet been adopted, the measures now in force on the frontier at La Linea began to be imposed immediately after the adoption of the consensus of the Special Committee and do not correspond with the régime prevailing on any other of Spain's international frontiers. Her Majesty's Government cannot, therefore, accept that these measures do not amount to restrictions against Gibraltar. Her Majesty's Government regard the progressive application of these restrictions as a deliberate attempt by the Spanish Government to influence the situation with regard to Gibraltar and therefore as preventing the holding of the conversations envisaged by the Special Committee.

5. As regards the proposals in paragraph 3 (a) of the Ministry's *note verbale*, the Embassy is instructed to point out that the Spanish Government appears to be under a misapprehension about the constitutional position of Gibraltar. Whilst under the present Constitution the people of Gibraltar participate through their elected representatives in the conduct of their own domestic and municipal affairs, this in no way implies any intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to relinquish sovereignty over Gibraltar either to the people of Gibraltar or to any other State. The present situation is entirely in accordance with the retention of sovereignty over Gibraltar by the United Kingdom. It is the belief of Her Majesty's Government that in any conversations which might be held they would be able to show that any apprehension the Spanish Government may at present have about these matters is not well founded.

6. Her Majesty's Government cannot accept the implication in paragraph 3 (b) of the Ministry's *note verbale* that any lifting of the present restrictions on the frontier would be for the period of the conversations only and might be reimposed should these fail to produce a result satisfactory to the Spanish Government. Her Majesty's Government cannot agree to enter into any conversations under duress of this sort.

7. The position of Her Majesty's Government therefore remains that if the Spanish Government will restore the régime prevailing on the frontier to the *status quo ante* of 17 October, Her Majesty's Government will agree to consider any proposals which the Spanish Government may wish to make for the holding of conversations. They share the wish of the Spanish Government that the holding of these conversations should be agreed to before the beginning of the next General Assembly of the United Nations and they hope that the holding of conversations may facilitate the continuance of friendly relations between Spain and Great Britain.

APPENDIX V

Note dated 1 March 1965 from the British Embassy in Madrid to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on the instructions of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to draw the Ministry's attention to a serious situation which is about to arise affecting British subjects resident in the Campo area of the province of Cádiz. According to information reaching the Embassy from the

Ministry and also from local Spanish representatives in the Campo area, it has been decided, with effect from 7 March, to withdraw from all British subjects and other foreigners resident in the Campo area, the workers' passes which enable them to cross daily to Gibraltar to work. It also appears that they will not be allowed to use their passports as a substitute for this purpose. This measure will affect several hundred British subjects.

On the assumption that the foregoing statement of the position is correct, the Embassy is instructed to protest against this measure. Whether or not the previous situation was contrary to Spanish frontier regulations, it was allowed to continue for a great many years and it is unreasonable to discontinue it in an arbitrary manner and without prior consultation. The measures proposed are liable to cause grave hardship to British subjects from whom facilities which they have openly enjoyed for a number of years are to be withdrawn at totally inadequate notice and therefore without affording them any opportunity of making appropriate dispositions to meet the changed situation in which they find themselves.

APPENDIX VI

Note dated 30 March 1965 from the British Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Spanish Ambassador in London

Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Spanish Ambassador and has the honour to draw the Ambassador's attention to the following matter.

Her Majesty's Government have learnt that the Spanish frontier authorities at La Linea and Algeciras have declined to accept the validity of British passports bearing endorsements by Her Majesty's Consuls in Spain showing that they have been issued or renewed "on behalf of the Government of Gibraltar". Her Majesty's Government have been further informed that the same Spanish authorities have refused to accept the validity of British passports issued or renewed in Gibraltar, in exercise of the prerogative powers of the Governor of Gibraltar, from the time when the title of the Colonial Secretary of Gibraltar was altered (in 1963) to that of "Chief Secretary" and (in 1964) to that of "Permanent Secretary to the Government" and in which either of these designations appears.

The constitutional position with regard to the granting or renewal of British passports is that all such passports (including those issued to persons who belong to a British dependent territory) are granted or renewed in the exercise of the Royal Prerogative. This Royal Prerogative is exercised through Her Majesty's Ministers and in particular, but not exclusively, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It is also exercised through Governors of Colonies, British High Commissioners in Commonwealth countries and Her Majesty's Consular Officers acting on the instruction of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

To deny the validity of British passports, as the Spanish authorities have been attempting to do, on the grounds that such passports bear a certain endorsement or the title of a particular office, is in effect to allege that there has been an improper exercise of the Royal Prerogative and constitutes an unwarranted intervention in affairs which are within the domestic jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.

Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs requests the Spanish Ambassador to transmit to his Government the formal protest of Her Majesty's Government at the action of the Spanish authorities concerned in taking it upon themselves to purport to determine the validity of British passports. He further requests that the Spanish Government will forthwith instruct the Spanish frontier authorities to accept as valid all British passports duly issued in the exercise of the Royal Prerogative.

CHAPTER XII

FIJI

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

Introduction

1. Information on Fiji is already contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIII, paras. 3-29). Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.¹

General

2. At the end of 1964 the population was estimated to be 456,390, an increase of 15,089 over the previous year.

Political and constitutional developments

3. On 1 July 1964, a membership system of government adopted earlier in 1964 by the Legislative Council was introduced in Fiji. This has been described in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session. Its purpose is to give unofficial members of the Executive Council experience in the kind of responsibilities which they will have to assume later under a ministerial system. Shortly before the introduction of the new system the Executive Council was reconstituted to include six elected members of the Legislative Council which now form an unofficial majority. At the same time as these changes were made, the size and composition of the Legislative Council was also changed. It now consists of ten official members instead of nineteen, but the unofficial membership remains the same: twelve elected members (four Fijians, four Indians and four Europeans); two Indians and two Europeans appointed by the Governor; and two Fijians elected by the Council of Chiefs.

4. The Constitutional Conference which was to have been held in London at the end of 1964 or early in 1965 was delayed to allow time for the membership system to be established and also at the request of the members of the Legislative Council, in order to allow them more time for informal discussions before the Conference took place. It is now scheduled to open on 26 July 1965, and the eighteen unofficial members of the Legislative Council have been invited to attend and take part in the discussion concerning changes in the Constitution.

Economic conditions

5. Fiji's economy is based on agriculture. The main cash crops, sugar and copra, accounted for approximately 95 per cent of the value of all agricultural exports. The amount of sugar produced in 1964 was a record 307,000 tons, compared with 299,000 tons in 1963, and copra production totalled 41,144 tons, compared with 41,244 tons in 1963. Mining, chiefly gold mining, is the most important non-agricultural industry. The estimated value of minerals in 1964 was £1,829,900 compared with an actual value of £1,899,644 in 1963.²

¹ The information presented in this chapter has been derived from published reports, and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter, on 12 May 1964.

² £111 Fijian equal £100 sterling or approximately \$280.

6. In the past the main secondary industries have been the processing of agricultural products, but now manufacturing industries are being developed and expanded for local needs and for export. The tourist industry is also reported to have shown a substantial increase over 1963 when it was estimated that it produced a total gross income of £2 million.

7. Exports and imports in 1963 were valued at £22,071,847 and £20,207,101 respectively. Exports in the period from January to September 1964 were valued at £18,520,431 and imports at £19,753,384. The total trade for 1964 reached a record figure provisionally set at nearly £53 million, compared with £42.27 million in 1963 and £33.15 million in 1962. The destination of most exports were the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. Most imports came from Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan and New Zealand.

8. A customs tariff is applied to about 250 items which attract varying rates of specific or *ad valorem* duty. Essential foodstuffs from preferential (British) sources may be admitted duty free. Other foodstuffs, not specifically enumerated, attract duty at the rates of 20 per cent (preferential tariff) and 40 per cent (general tariff). Other specified items may be duty free from preferential sources, but attract a 15 per cent duty from other sources. Goods not specifically enumerated attract duties at the rates of 25 per cent (preferential tariff) and 50 per cent (general tariff).

9. Customs duties and dues and an income tax on individuals and companies are the main sources of revenue. In 1963 they amounted to £4,652,934 and £2,011,841 respectively. In 1964 it is estimated that they will amount to £5,923,026 and £2,850,000. Revenue in 1963 from all sources totalled £9,291,805 and it is estimated at £11,300,323 for 1964. Expenditures increased from £8,611,613 in 1963 to an estimated £10,209,760 in 1964. The budget surplus of over £1 million during the year was the largest in the history of Fiji. A record expenditure of over £14 million is proposed for 1965.

10. A decision has been taken to prepare an economic development plan for the period 1966-1970, whose scope will be wider than that of previous development plans and will cover all sectors of the economy, both private and public. The main objective of planning will be to co-ordinate all development activities. In order to do the technical work entailed by this, a Central Planning Office has been set up. Government departments have been engaged in the task of preparing sectoral and departmental plans for the planning period 1966-1970. These plans will be consolidated into an over-all draft plan to be presented to the Government and Legislative Council for approval in 1965.

*Social conditions**Labour*

11. A large proportion of the population is settled on the land or is self-employed. In 1964 the number of wage earners was estimated to have increased by 1,000 and totalled about 24,000. This did not include domestic servants and casual workers such as dockworkers and

Educational conditions

cane cutters. No reliable figures are available concerning unemployment. The Labour Department operates an employment service and provides facilities for persons to register for work, but the annual report states that comparatively few persons register themselves as unemployed, principally because of the few vacancies. More than half of the total labour force is covered by some form of collective bargaining machinery and their terms and conditions of employment are set out in negotiated agreements.

12. The general level of wages for unskilled workers continues to be approximately 1s.10d. per hour, and the average work week is forty-four hours. Sugar mills and mines have a 48-hour work week. Wage differentials are applied to skilled workers and tradesmen.

13. At the end of 1964 there were a total of forty-seven registered industrial associations, but not all were trade unions. Some were formed to promote the sectional interests of employers or producers. However, trade unions existed in most of the larger industries, and it was estimated that approximately half the working population were members of a union in 1964. Unions represented workers employed by the following: Government, municipalities, commerce, sugar mills, the pastoral industry, oil distribution industry, shipping, stevedoring, gold mining, and the international airport.

Public health

14. In addition to the main hospital located at Suva, there are three district hospitals, three special hospitals, and fourteen smaller hospitals, distributed throughout the Territory. In 1964 the medical services were staffed by thirty-five medical and dental officers with overseas qualifications and 143 locally trained officers. The nursing staff consisted of 114 nursing sisters in general hospitals and twenty-three in the special Leprosy Hospital, and 414 locally trained nurses including male nurses.

15. The total expenditure on medical services in 1964 was estimated at £1,040,643, and capital expenditure at £254,600.

16. Education is provided by the Government, missions, and private bodies. In 1964 the total number of schools increased by ten and numbered 660, most of which are maintained by the Fijian Committee and the Indian Committee. Their enrollment rose by 4,857 to 96,725, representing 21.5 per cent of the total mid-year population. They were staffed by 3,024 teachers of whom 82 per cent were classified as trained.

17. Approximately 89 per cent of all schools are registered, i.e., schools whose grounds, buildings and equipment satisfy the requirements of the Education Ordinance and which have been approved by the Director of Education as schools in which registered teachers may be employed. The remaining schools are recognized and are authorized, but the training of their staff and/or their accommodations have not reached the level required for registration.

18. Primary schools had a total enrolment of 88,849 representing 19.8 per cent of the population. Secondary schools (including technical and vocational and teacher training) had a total enrolment of 7,876, or 1.85 per cent of the population. The three teacher-training schools included in secondary schools had a combined roll of 229 trainees. The average number of pupils per teacher in all schools was thirty-one.

19. In 1964 the number of Fijian students attending institutions overseas on scholarships totalled 159, an increase of thirteen over the previous year.

20. The estimated gross expenditure on education in 1964 was £1,600,000 compared with an actual gross expenditure of £1,474,013 in 1963.

B. PETITIONS

21. The Special Committee distributed the following petition concerning Fiji:

| <i>Petitioner</i> | <i>Document No.</i> |
|--|---------------------|
| Mr. Ajodhya Prasad, Secretary of the National Congress of Fiji | A/AC.109/PET.360 |

CHAPTER XIII

MAURITIUS, SEYCHELLES AND ST. HELENA

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

Introduction

1. Information on Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena is contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIV, paras. 1-99). Supplementary information is set out below.¹

1. *Mauritius**General*

2. The population of Mauritius was estimated at 713,381 at the beginning of 1964, as against 681,619 in July 1962. The present population density is estimated

¹ The information presented in this chapter has been derived from published reports, and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter, on 22 June 1964 (Mauritius), 14 September 1964 (Seychelles) and 12 June 1964 (St. Helena).

at over 1,000 per square mile. The high rate of population increase continues to pose a problem for the island.

3. In the past, all persons of Indian origin have been classified in the census statistics as "Indo-Mauritians". Since 1 September 1964, officials have been instructed that this classification is no longer to be applied to Muslims. The population of Indian origin is estimated at half a million, nearly a quarter of whom are Muslims.

Political and constitutional developments

4. As reported by the representative of the United Kingdom during the last session of the Special Committee, the second stage of constitutional advance, planned in 1961, was brought into effect on 12 March 1964. The leader of the majority in the Legislative Assembly, Dr. Ramgoolam of the Labour Party, was designated as Premier. The new Council of Ministers was formed of representatives of all the political parties in the following way: six ministers from the Labour Party (including the Premier); three from the Parti Mauri-

cién Social Démocrate; two from the Independent Forward Bloc; two from the Muslim Committee of Action; and one independent.

5. The date of the next constitutional talks on the political progress of the Territory was discussed during the negotiations on the formation of an all-party Government. It was then agreed that these talks would be held during the third year of the life of the present legislature, namely during the twelve months beginning 22 October 1965.

6. In November 1964, the deputy leader of the Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate, Mr. Gaëtan Duval, reportedly had talks in London with Mr. Anthony Greenwood, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, following which he declared that the date of the future talks on the constitutional development of Mauritius would not be advanced without the agreement of his party. On the other hand, the Premier, Dr. Ramgoolam, proposed to the other ministers in the Government on 30 December that they should immediately begin discussions in order to draw up the main lines of negotiation with the United Kingdom.

7. The Secretary of State for the Colonies visited the Territory from 5 to 11 April 1965, and had talks with Government ministers and leaders of political parties about economic and political problems and the future of the island. On his return to London he expressed the hope that it would be possible to have a conference in London later in 1965 at which all outstanding constitutional problems could be discussed.

8. Large demonstrations and mass rallies were organized by the major political parties during the visit of Mr. Greenwood to the Territory, some in support of integration with the United Kingdom and some for independence. Tension and the threat of public disorder is reported to have led the Police Commissioner, on 16 April, to ban all public processions and meetings for two weeks. On 1 May, clashes occurred between the partisans of the two main political parties in the capital and other areas of the island. On 13 May, it was announced that British troops would be flown into Mauritius to help maintain law and order. The next day a state of emergency was declared by the Governor.

9. It is reported that a round-table conference of leaders of political parties is to be convened shortly by the Governor.

10. The two principal political parties are the Labour Party and the Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate (previously the Parti Mauricien). The Labour Party has expressed its belief that the Territory should become an independent nation within the Commonwealth rather than conclude an association with the United Kingdom or another independent African country. The Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate is the main "Opposition" party, although it has joined in the All-Party Government of Mauritius. While stressing the need to solve the economic and social problems of Mauritius before its final status is decided, the party has favoured "close and effective union" with the United Kingdom in the future.

11. Other political parties include the Independent Forward Bloc, the Muslim Committee of Action (allied to the Labour Party), the Peoples Progressive Party, the Tamil United Party (allied to the Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate) and the Muslim Democratic League.

Economic conditions

12. The total production of sugar in 1963 amounted to 685,500 metric tons, compared with 532,518 tons in 1962 and 553,259 tons in 1961. With the exception of some 26,500 tons consumed locally, the whole of the production was exported, mainly to the United Kingdom. The quota of sugar for Mauritius exportable under the terms of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement amounted to 351,750 tons. The price was £46.0.10d. per long ton.

13. Tea production amounted to 3,256,891 pounds in 1963, compared with 2,799,627 pounds in 1962. In 1961 the Mauritius Government had introduced a five-year tea development programme which aimed at planting 2,500 acres of tea by mid-1965. The total acreage was estimated at 5,600 acres in 1963. A Tea Control Board was set up to regulate the tea industry. Nearly two thirds of the 1963 crop was exported.

14. In 1963, the value of imports amounted to Rs.333,116,292² and that of exports to Rs.427,782,619. Approximately 28 per cent of all imports originated from the United Kingdom (32.4 per cent in 1961) and 69 per cent of exports were directed there (82 per cent in 1961). The principal export items were sugar (574,300 tons), molasses (109,770 tons), rum (326 hectolitres) and tea (987 tons).

15. Ordinary recurrent revenue for the year ended 30 June 1963 was Rs.162,819,688, compared with Rs.154,565,508 in the previous year. Recurrent expenditure amounted to Rs.167,946,018 and Rs.156,045,487 respectively. Capital expenditure in 1963 amounted to Rs.64,109,150.

16. The Reconstruction and Development Programme, 1960-1965, envisaged a total expenditure of Rs.354 million. Actual total expenditure at 30 June 1963 was Rs.161,891,228, of which Rs.64.11 million were spent during 1962-1963, Rs.52.05 million during 1961-1962 and Rs.45.73 million during 1960-1961.

17. In addition to low-cost housing, major projects included the construction of new harbour installations at Port Louis, the development of the international airport at Plaisance, the construction of a new trunk road between Port Louis and Phoenix, improvement of other roads, bridges and sewerage systems and the provision of services such as electricity, irrigation and domestic water supplies. Substantial allocations (Rs.25 million) were also made for loans towards the development of secondary industries and agricultural diversification.

18. Under the Government's declared policy of expanding the tourist industry, a sum of Rs.1,645,560 has been provided in the Capital Expenditure programme for the development of hotels. A Tourist Advisory Board advises the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and External Communications on all matters connected with tourism.

19. Technical assistance reportedly was offered by the Government of India to Mauritius when the Premier and other ministers of Mauritius visited India in January 1965. An Indian expert on the textile industry was to visit the Territory to study the possibility of introducing this industry.

² One Mauritius rupee is equivalent to 1s.6d. sterling; 1 million rupees to £70,000 sterling.

*Social conditions**Labour*

20. Unemployment is a major problem in Mauritius. The census of 1962 showed that over 10,000 wage-earners were unemployed. In addition, the total number of persons above the age of fifteen who had left school but had never worked amounted to approximately 12,600. The number of unemployed in 1964 was reported to be relatively higher owing to a low sugar crop.

21. During the first six months of the year which constitute the intercrop period for the sugar industry, the large sugar estates decrease their labour force by some 4,600 persons. In addition, a large number of agricultural labourers are normally laid off by individual planters at the completion of the harvest. In order partially to offset the effects of seasonal employment in the sugar industry, an ordinance was passed by the Legislative Council in November 1963 whereby persons who have worked with an employer for not less than 80 per cent of his harvest period are entitled to work with that employer on every working day until the following harvest. Workers with between 70 and 80 per cent attendance during that period are entitled to intercrop employment to a proportionate amount.

22. The total number of workers employed by the sugar millers' estates in March 1963 was 35,924 (including administrative, technical, skilled and unskilled labourers); in September the number rose to 42,722.

23. Simultaneously, with the slack period in the sugar industry, a considerable reduction occurs in the labour force employed on the docks and in shipping. The unemployment situation in Mauritius has led to a growing demand for emigration, principally to the United Kingdom. In 1963, a total of 1,007 applications were transmitted by the Employment Service to the Ministry of Labour in the United Kingdom, as against 249 in the previous year. The number of those whose applications for employment in the United Kingdom were granted was 305.

Public health

24. Expenditure on public health for the financial year 1962-1963 amounted to Rs.18,252,206, or roughly 10.8 per cent of the total budget. In the previous year, expenditure on health had amounted to Rs.17,426,996.

25. Deaths from tuberculosis numbered 108 in 1963, compared with 69 in 1962 and 75 in 1961. Infant mortality in 1963 was 59.3 per thousand, compared with 60.1 in 1962, and 62.0 in 1961. This decline in infant mortality started in 1946 and is attributed to improved public health conditions.

Educational conditions

26. The number of children of school age from the ages of five and six to eleven and twelve was estimated at 167,300 in 1963. The number of students enrolled in primary schools increased from 119,160 in 1962 to 120,049 in 1963, although actual attendance decreased from 102,652 to 96,786. This was attributed to the agricultural nature of Mauritian society. The number of students in secondary schools increased from 26,861 in 1962 to 28,134 in 1963. Students in the Teachers' Training College numbered 567 during the school year 1963-1964, against 575 during the previous year. The number of teachers who completed the two-year course in 1963 was 313. There were approximately 1,075

Mauritian students studying abroad in institutions of higher education.

27. The total number of primary schools in 1963 was 325, of which 129 were Government schools, 73 were subsidized and 123 were private schools. Of the secondary schools four were Government schools, thirteen were subsidized and 93 were private. Five new schools were to be opened by the Government at the beginning of 1965, according to unofficial sources. Plans were also being made for the creation of "The University College of Mauritius" from Colonial Development and Welfare Funds.

28. Six scholarships are awarded annually by the Mauritian Government to the best students from secondary schools for higher education overseas. Fifteen scholarships are awarded to Mauritian students under the Commonwealth Scholarship Plan and Teacher Training Scheme. Scholarships are also granted by various foreign Governments and institutions.

29. Actual recurrent expenditure on education amounted to Rs.22,785,860 in the financial year 1962-1963, compared with Rs.20,655,161 during the previous year. Capital expenditure on education amounted to Rs.2,839,664.

*2. Seychelles**General*

30. At 30 June 1963, the population of the Seychelles was estimated at 45,089, compared with 43,748 the year before. With an average density of 450 per square mile, the Territory is beginning to face the problem of over-population. The rate of population increase over the last few years has reached 3.65 per cent.

Political and constitutional developments

31. Unofficial sources indicate that, during the past year or so, the question of the future status of the Seychelles has been widely debated in the Territory, whether in the Legislative Council, in the Press or in public meetings.

32. In February 1964, a motion was adopted by the Legislative Council requesting the Government of the Seychelles to explore with the United Kingdom Government the possibility of an early conference to discuss the future status of the Seychelles, in order to:

(a) Find out what the British Government's feelings are about the question of a Seychelles integration with the United Kingdom, and/or

(b) Seek an unequivocal declaration from the British Government that the Seychelles can remain British.

The motion was carried by a majority of the unofficial and elected members of the Legislative Council, while the official members of the Council abstained from expressing any views on the motion.

33. In October 1964, reports and discussions in the Legislative Council referred to a statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the effect that the British Government had no wish to take the initiative in suggesting any change in the relationship between Britain and the Seychelles. Mr. G. P. Lloyd, a member of the Seychelles Government (Colonial Secretary), said that the British Government had left to Seychelles the initiative in proposing any change in the relationship between the Territory and Britain which the people of Seychelles may in the future want. He went on to say:

"I say 'People of Seychelles' not 'Government of Seychelles' advisedly; for I am well aware that it

may be inappropriate and might appear undemocratic if a Government composed largely of officials, many of whom are expatriates, were to take the lead in a matter of this kind.

"How are the people of Seychelles to express their wishes? In my view, the proper way for them to do so is through the elected members of this Council. For although we do not at present have universal adult suffrage here, the franchise is certainly already so wide that those who are elected have a reasonable claim to represent the people, a claim far better than anyone else.

"Some political parties in the territory may hold different views about constitutional change from the present elected members. The proper course for these parties is to seek the support of the electorate through normal democratic means. The Government will defend their right to do this. But it will countenance no attempts anyone may make to achieve his ends by intimidation, by violence, by sedition. I do not say there have yet been such attempts. I do say that many people fear there may be. I say too that Government is determined to take whatever measures may be necessary to maintain law and order, increasing the strength of the Police Force should it consider an increase is required. And it follows from what the Secretary of State has said that in the maintenance of law and order, as in other fields, the support and assistance of the British Government can be counted on, as in the past, if this is wanted."

On 23 October the Legislative Council unanimously adopted a motion expressing satisfaction with the statement of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

34. At the time of the 1963 elections for the Legislative Council there were two contending parties, the Taxpayers and Producers Association, and the United Party. The former party won two seats, the independents supported by the United Party won two seats and the fifth seat was captured by an independent supported by both groups. The Taxpayers and Producers Association was dissolved in February 1965, and replaced by the Seychelles Farmers Association, which was to devote itself to the interests of planters and farmers.

35. According to information from unofficial sources, the parties now active in the Seychelles are the following:

(a) The Seychelles Islanders United Party, whose President is Mr. R. Jumeau. The party has the general aim of raising the standard of living in the islands;

(b) The Seychelles People's United Party, whose leader is Mr. F. A. René. The party has been in favour of speedy political progress and independence for the Seychelles. It has criticized the British colonial administration for "economic neglect and inefficiency";

(c) The Seychelles Democratic Party, headed by Mr. J. R. Man-Cham, which is opposed to independence;

(d) The Seychelles Archipelago Action Group, whose President is Mr. François Delpech.

Economic conditions

36. The production of copra (the principal export) increased from 5,362 tons in 1962 to 5,703 tons in 1963, the value of which amounted to nearly 5.2 million rupees.³ The 1964 crop of over 7,000 tons was the highest production figure since 1957. In addition, coco-

nuts consumed locally or made into oil or soap were equal to 1,263 tons of copra. Fluctuations in the price of copra (f.o.b.) from 1960 to 1963 were as follows:

| Year | Rs. per ton |
|------------|-------------|
| 1960 | 986 |
| 1961 | 804 |
| 1962 | 786 |
| 1963 | 903 |

Other principal crops were as follows:

| | Quantity (tons) | Value (rupees) |
|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Cinnamon | | |
| Park | 1,007.25 | 725,089 |
| Leaf oil | 66 | 595,839 |
| Quills | 9 | 33,186 |
| Vanilla | 2,056 (kgs.) | 85,917 |
| Patchouli | 33.25 | 109,198 |

37. Expenditure by the Government on agriculture amounted to Rs.1,234,790 in 1963. Under the small-holders scheme, the Government provides land to labourers for cultivation: there were 100 such holdings, mainly five acres in size, by the end of 1963. Tea-growing is another scheme being encouraged by the Government. There is an Agricultural Bank which has been granting loans to planters for development purposes.

38. A new system of land survey and title registration is reportedly being introduced in the Territory.

39. All copra is exported by the Seychelles Copra Association. In 1963, the copra actually exported amounted to 5,279 tons valued at Rs.4,769,628, as against 5,767 tons valued at Rs.4,533,915 in 1962.

40. The total volume of trade for the years 1961 to 1963 is shown in the following table (value in rupees):

| | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 |
|-----------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Total imports | 12,011,349 | 12,781,410 | 14,600,786 |
| Domestic exports | 6,643,394 | 7,301,886 | 6,867,269 |
| Re-exports | 70,960 | 94,500 | — |
| Total exports | 6,714,354 | 7,396,386 | 6,867,269 |
| Volume of trade | 18,725,703 | 20,177,796 | 21,468,055 |

41. Total public revenue in 1963 was estimated at Rs.9,150,535, of which nearly 6.5 million were from local sources, the remainder being from United Kingdom funds. Recurrent ordinary expenditure was Rs.7,863,703, while expenditure on Colonial Development and Welfare schemes amounted to Rs.1,286,832.

42. In 1964, the Seychelles Government was reported to have introduced certain tax reforms such as the reduction of the copra export duty and the adjustment of the income tax rates.

43. Under a new development plan for the year ending 31 March 1966, funds anticipated from the United Kingdom would amount to \$1.5 million and would be apportioned as follows: natural resources 35.6 per cent; social services, 28.9 per cent; works and communications, 28.4 per cent; tourism, 2.8 per cent; miscellaneous, 1.6 per cent; uncommitted balance, 2.7 per cent. A loan not exceeding 1-1/3 million rupees is to be raised locally for development purposes.

Social conditions

Labour

44. In 1963, the employment situation improved owing to increased activity in the building industry. The number of Seychellois who benefited from the

³ One Seychellois rupee is equivalent to 1s.6d.; 1 million rupees to £70,000.

services of the Labour Office in obtaining employment abroad was 450.

45. It was reported in August 1964 that a grant of £10,000 had been approved by the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund towards providing homes for agricultural labourers. Subsidies of up to £100 a house would be paid to estate owners to meet the cost of erecting permanent housing on their estates for agricultural labour.

Public health

46. Expenditure on the medical and health services of the Territory in 1963 amounted to Rs.1,150,192, or 14 per cent of the total budget.

47. In 1965-1966, under the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, the Seychelles will receive assistance in a campaign against venereal diseases. The incidence of venereal diseases has been rising progressively during the last four or five years, and the seriousness of the problem has made it necessary to ask for international help.

48. No other significant developments have been reported in the field of health.

Educational conditions

49. The number of children in all schools increased from 7,745 in 1962 to 8,369 (4,085 boys and 4,284 girls) in 1963. The number of children in primary schools (6,987) constituted 89 per cent of the estimated number of school-age children in the Territory. There were 1,328 students in secondary schools and thirty-one students at the Teachers Training College. The number of pupils at the Technical Woodwork Centre was twenty. The number of students undergoing training abroad was nineteen.

50. The educational system is to be modified in 1965: the primary course will take six years instead of four and will be available to all children; it will be followed by junior secondary schools (two years) and secondary schools (three years) on a restrictive basis.

51. Government expenditure on education amounted to Rs.1,405,510 in 1963 (14.3 per cent of the total budget) of which Rs.135,400 was of a non-recurrent nature.

52. Government expenditure is supplemented by a grant from the United Kingdom Government, by grants for specific development projects from Commonwealth Development and Welfare funds and from fees payable by students following post-primary courses.

3. St. Helena

General

53. The estimated population of St. Helena at the end of 1963 was 4,613, compared with 4,700 in 1961. The number of persons who emigrated from the island in 1963 was 105. No recent figures are available on the populations of Ascension Island and Tristan da Cunha, the two dependencies of St. Helena.

Political and constitutional developments

54. No changes have been reported in the political and constitutional fields since the Special Committee considered St. Helena in 1964.

Economic conditions

55. Some two thirds of the total area of St. Helena (forty-seven square miles) consist of semi-barren land,

the remainder being under pasture, forests, flax and other secondary crops. Efforts have been made recently at reclaiming some of the waste lands. Some of the grazing areas are communally grazed under the control of the Government. The estimated area and production of each crop in 1963 are shown below:

| Crop | Area (acres) | Production (tons) |
|----------------------------|--------------|-------------------|
| Flax (fibre and tow) | 3,350 | 1,015 |
| Potatoes | 100 | 200 |
| Sweet potatoes | 60 | 60 |
| Vegetables | 200 | 400 |
| Cereals | 50 | 20 |
| Fodder (green) | 200 | 600 |

56. Progress has been reported in the field of afforestation. The objectives of afforestation are soil and water conservation, land reclamation and the provision of fuel. The total number of trees planted in 1963 was 10,000.

57. The production of fibre, tow and rope in 1963, compared with that of 1962, was as follows:

| | Tons | Value in pounds |
|----------------------|-----------|-----------------|
| Fibre | 780 (966) | 62,114 (60,658) |
| Tow | 195 (288) | 8,142 (9,298) |
| Rope and twine | 41 (50) | 4,500 (5,308) |

58. The value of St. Helena's exports in 1963 was £88,019, all of which went to four countries: the United Kingdom (54.97 per cent), South Africa (41.24 per cent), Italy (3.34 per cent) and the Netherlands (0.45 per cent). Imports amounted to £279,678.

59. In 1963, total public revenue was estimated at £313,205, of which £185,596 was from United Kingdom sources. Estimated expenditure was £313,205.

60. The Territory has received development grants, mainly from Colonial Development and Welfare funds. In 1963, nearly £15,000 were spent on the development of natural resources and water supplies. The same amount was to be spent each year until 1966, particularly on agriculture, road improvement, electric power distribution, housing and education.

61. A plan for the construction of a harbour at Tristan da Cunha was announced by the United Kingdom Government in November 1964, and work is reported to have already started. The total cost of the project is of the order of £80,000, to be provided from Colonial Development and Welfare funds. According to Press reports, a concession has been granted to a ship-broking firm to build a deep-freeze plant to develop the fishing potential of St. Helena.

Social conditions

Labour

62. Figures relating to the labour force and to unemployment registered only slight changes in 1963. The number of persons receiving unemployment relief in 1964 was ninety-eight. An emigration scheme was introduced several years ago under which young men would obtain jobs in the United Kingdom and part of their fares would be paid. However, requests for this assistance have been scarce and consideration is being given to providing additional financial assistance.

Public health

63. No significant changes have been reported in the field of public health.

Educational conditions

64. The total number of students in 1963 was 1,180, or approximately 26 per cent of the island population.

65. There were sixty-one full-time and five part-time teachers, all of whom were recruited locally. Teachers are trained by the Education Officer and the two Assistant Education Officers. Training includes a one-year course followed by two years of actual teaching. Under a new policy some of the teachers are selected for a three-year overseas course leading to the United Kingdom Certificate in Education. Parallel to this, some of the senior teachers are sent on short courses in the United Kingdom. In 1963, two head teachers returned from such courses. In 1964, there were six teachers with recognized United Kingdom teaching qualifications.

66. There were eight students from St. Helena studying in the United Kingdom in 1964.

67. Educational expenditure was estimated at £20,507 in 1963, or 9.2 per cent of the total government expenditure.

B. PETITIONS

68. The Special Committee circulated the following petitions concerning Mauritius:

| <i>Petitioner</i> | <i>Document</i> |
|---|----------------------------|
| Mr. T. Sibusurum, Secretary-General, The Mauritius Peoples Progressive Party | A/AC.109/PET.378 and Add.1 |
| Mr. G. G. Pillay, Secretary-General of the Mauritius Socialist Organization, London | A/AC.109/PET.420 |

CHAPTER XIV

NIUE AND TOKELAU ISLANDS

INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

Introduction

1. Information on Niue and the Tokelau Islands is already contained in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XV, paras. 30-54). Supplementary information on recent developments concerning the Territories is set out below.¹

1. Niue

General

2. At 31 March 1964 the population of Niue was calculated at 5,044, an increase of 149 over the previous year.

Economic conditions

3. Niue's economy continues to be based on subsistence agriculture and fishing, and the production of a few cash crops and handicraft articles for export. In 1963 exports and imports amounted to £51,185 and £163,443 respectively. The yearly deficit between revenue and expenditure is met by fixed grants for general and capital purposes for three-year periods from the New Zealand Government. The Niue Island Assembly is responsible for the budgeting and appropriation of all expenditure including the grants from New Zealand. In 1963-1964, receipts and expenditures were £194,175 and £382,436 respectively, and the grant contributed by New Zealand amounted to £285,800. The corresponding figures for 1962-1963 were £181,206, £422,462 and £272,000.

*Social conditions**Labour*

4. No labour unions have been registered in Niue. The basic wage rate for unskilled labour is 1s.9d. per hour, and for skilled labour the rate varies.

Public health

5. Expenditure on health services for the year ending 31 March 1964 was £55,424, amounting to

£10.19s.9d. per head of population. In 1963 the birth rate and death rate were 43.05 and 6.33 per 1,000 population. The infant mortality rate was 18 per 1,000 live births.

Educational conditions

6. Education is free and compulsory between the ages of six and fourteen, but most children remain at school until they reach sixteen. At 31 March 1964, 1,376 primary and 154 post-primary pupils were enrolled in the schools. An additional thirty-two students were enrolled in the Teachers' Training Centre, and thirty-three were studying in New Zealand under the New Zealand Government Scholarship Scheme. Educational expenditure totalled £70,090 for the year ending 31 March 1964, as compared with £52,635 the previous year.

2. Tokelau Islands

General

7. An official count of the population on 25 September 1963 showed 1,899 persons, an increase of ninety-nine since 1961.

Economic conditions

8. The annual deficit between revenue and expenditure continues to be met by subsidies by the New Zealand Government. Expenditure during the year under review amounted to £42,732 and was mainly devoted to the cost of administration and the provision of social services. Information is not available concerning revenue.

Social conditions

9. A three-year tuberculosis campaign was completed in 1963 under the direction of WHO, and a five-year follow-up campaign was to be conducted commencing in September 1964.

Educational conditions

10. Government schools are staffed by eighteen Tokelauan teachers. Attendance at all schools is reported to be very close to 100 per cent. At 31 March 1964, seven students were studying in New Zealand under the Government Scholarship Scheme, and twenty-seven students were studying or in training in various schools in Western Samoa and Fiji.

¹ The information presented in this chapter has been derived from published reports, and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by New Zealand under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter, on 29 January 1964, covering the year 1 April 1962-31 March 1963.

CHAPTER XV

AMERICAN SAMOA

INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

Introduction

1. Information on American Samoa is already contained in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XVI, paras. 1-26). Supplementary information is set out below.¹

Political and constitutional developments

2. The Constitution of American Samoa provides for the automatic revision or amendment of the Constitution at the end of five years from its coming into force, namely, in 1965. It is reported that the Constitutional Committee appointed to undertake the review has recently been holding hearings on proposals for the revision of certain sections of the Constitution.

Economic conditions

3. While the economy of the Territory is based on the subsistence growing of crops such as bananas, breadfruit, taro, coconuts, and the like, as well as on fishing and the raising of poultry, there has been a steady shift among Samoans away from agricultural work to wage-earning jobs. Much of American Samoa's food supply now comes from Tonga and Western Samoa. The Department of Agriculture carries active programmes in agricultural extension and the control of animal and plant pests.

4. In 1963, American Samoa entered into the second phase of the development programme put in motion in 1961. The results of the programme were visible in various ways: ship cargo imports through the port of Pago Pago increased from 22,473 to 41,473 tons; exports rose from 13,520 to 20,008 tons. Inbound air cargo rose from 58,184 to 128,688 pounds, outbound from 6,591 to 23,744 pounds after the new International Airport of Pago Pago was opened for regular traffic. The value of exports in all categories increased from \$7,909,351 to \$12,696,205. The increase in exports was due chiefly to major increases in the value of exports from American Samoa's principal industry, tuna fishing and packing. The increase in imports was primarily due to government construction, and materials for new industries. Work was started on the construction of a fish cannery, a can factory and a coconut processing plant which were licensed during the year.

¹ The information presented in this chapter has been derived from published reports, and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United States of America under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter, on 8 December 1964, covering the year ending 30 June 1963.

5. Local revenue totalled \$1,685,209 for the fiscal year 1962-1963, an increase of \$364,209 over the preceding year. Congressional grants and direct appropriations totalled \$13,044,000, an increase of \$3,438,600 over the preceding year.

*Social conditions**Labour*

6. There are no labour organizations in the Territory. The total labour force in 1963 was 3,594, of whom 2,292 were employed by the Government. There is a shortage of both skilled and unskilled labour, due to the heavy demands of the Government's development programme and the growth of new industrial opportunity. In April 1965, the Samoa Legislature reportedly passed a bill whereby the minimum wage would be increased to \$.49 per hour or \$1,018 per year. The effect of the new law will be to raise the salaries of nearly 800 government employees, mainly labourers and semi-skilled workers.

Public health

7. Free medical and dental care is provided to the inhabitants of the Territory. There is a small charge for in-patient hospital care. The total number of hospital beds in 1963 was 194; the number of qualified physicians varied from three to six. In addition, there were eleven Samoan medical practitioners, one dental surgeon and four Samoan dental practitioners. Total expenditures on medical services increased from \$702,201 in 1961-1962, to \$818,891 in 1962-1963.

Educational conditions

8. During 1963, the number of Government schools increased from forty-five to fifty-eight and private schools increased from five to six. The number of pupils in Government schools increased from 5,474 to 6,316 and pupils in private schools increased from 1,287 to 1,408. The total number of children of school age was estimated at 8,008. The three new high school buildings completed at the end of the previous year were in full use, and about 850 high school students were in classrooms. Over 500 new students were admitted during the 1962-1963 school year, and the admission level to high schools more than tripled that of the previous year.

9. New scholarship grants during this period were made by the Government to thirty-one students to study at twenty-two different institutions. Continuing scholarship grants were made to twenty-nine students. In addition to Government scholarship students attending overseas institutions, there were approximately forty other American Samoans attending colleges without Government assistance.

CHAPTER XVI

GUAM

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

Introduction

1. Information on Guam is already contained in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XVII,

paras. 1-18). Supplementary information is set out below.¹

¹ The information presented in this chapter has been derived from published reports, and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United States of America under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter, on 13 November 1964, covering the year ending 30 June 1963.

General

2. The total population of Guam in 1964 was estimated at 67,000.

Economic conditions

3. The economy of Guam still benefits from military and other governmental expenditures. Agriculture is limited to subsistence crops such as coconut and fruit trees; fishing and the raising of poultry are of considerable importance to the Territory.

4. The volume and value, in United States dollars, of Guam's trade over the last three years are shown in the following table:

| <i>Fiscal year</i> | <i>Imports</i> | | <i>Exports</i> | |
|--------------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|--------------------|
| | <i>Tonnage</i> | <i>Value</i> \$ | <i>Tonnage</i> | <i>Value</i> \$ |
| 1962 | 101,487 | 20,717,273 | 37,201 | 6,352,605 |
| 1963 | 139,530 | 30,366,576 | 39,964 | 7,259,662 |
| 1964 | 178,440 | 42,222,765 | 45,622 | 8,827,690 |

Approximately 70 per cent of all imports came from the United States and 77 per cent of all exports went to the United States and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

5. The total public revenue for the fiscal year ended June 1964 was \$22,821,794, compared with \$20,152,000 in 1963. Total expenditure during the same period amounted to \$22,215,542, compared with \$21,195,000.

6. As a result of the two typhoons which hit the island in 1962 and 1963, many Government facilities were destroyed or damaged, thus creating the need for funds for rehabilitation. The immediate financial crisis was solved by reverting to surplus some \$1.5 million previously appropriated for capital improvement projects, and through some \$16 million allocated to Guam by the Federal Office of Emergency Planning. Additional assistance was requested by the United States Congress on a loan basis. With these aids Guam was able to close the fiscal year without a deficit.

7. The ten-year development programme drawn up by the Government after the typhoons provides for the development of the Territory's social and economic potential to a greater level of self-sufficiency. This programme recognizes that, in addition to improving agriculture and fishing, it is necessary to provide for training in new skills and to encourage the establishment of new manufacturing industries in Guam. The programme contemplates an expenditure of approximately \$83 million, including \$45 million in federal loans and grants. Some beginnings were reported in industries such as the manufacture of shirts, the growing of heart of palms, handicrafts and tourism.

*Social conditions**Labour*

8. Due to the shortage of competent local labour to meet the demand for skilled workers, there is still

need to recruit off-island labour. Two projects were initiated in 1964 under the Manpower Development and Training Act, for the training of clerk-typists and automotive mechanics.

9. The civilian labour force totals approximately 14,000 persons. There is virtually full employment and the minimum wage for common labour is \$1.00 an hour, and where the federal minimum wage law applies, the minimum is \$1.25. However, the wages actually paid to even semi-skilled workers are two or three times higher than this legal minimum. Federal social security programmes apply to Guam.

Public health

10. The Department of Medical Services in 1963 had a staff of 425, compared with 409 in 1962. It had a full-time complement of fifteen medical officers and there were 191 positions in the nursing service. The Guam Memorial Hospital had a total of 172 beds; the United States Naval Hospital receives the overflow of patients from the Memorial Hospital. General fund expenditures for the Department of Medical Services in 1963 totalled \$2,261,999, approximately the same as the previous year. Appropriations for medical services in 1964 amounted to \$2,916,756.

Educational conditions

11. In 1962-1963, the public schools of Guam consisted of twenty elementary schools and seven secondary schools. Total enrolment in 1964 was 15,234 students. The number of teachers increased from 775 to 885 between 1961 and 1964.

12. Major capital improvements in the field of education included the completion in September 1962 of a new high school with facilities for 750 students and of an elementary school in 1963 with facilities for 720 students. Under the development and rehabilitation programme, the following were to be built in 1964-1965: one high school, two junior high schools, six elementary schools, a trade and technical school, a college library and a college classroom building.

13. The College of Guam in 1963 was granted accreditation as a four-year institution of higher learning. It had a total enrolment of 316 full-time and 454 part-time students during the fall semester 1963-1964.

14. General fund expenditures for the Department of Education amounted to \$4,374,750 in 1963, approximately 25 per cent of general fund expenditures, or 20 per cent of total government expenditures. In 1964, appropriations amounted to \$4,277,088.

B. PETITIONS

15. The Special Committee circulated the following petition concerning Guam:

| <i>Petitioner</i> | <i>Document No.</i> |
|---|---------------------|
| Mr. C. D. Anderson, President, Guam Chamber of Commerce | A/AC.109/PET.363 |

CHAPTER XVII

TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

Introduction

1. Information on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is already contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth

session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XVIII, paras. 1-19). Supplementary information is set out below.

General

2. At the 30 June 1964 census, the population of the Territory was 88,215 compared with 80,980 two

years previously, showing a rate of increase of nearly 4.5 per cent *per annum* and a population density of approximately 125 to the square mile.

Constitutional development

3. Under the Code of the Trust Territory, the basic law of the land, the executive, legislative and administrative authority of the Government of the Territory is vested in the High Commissioner appointed by the President of the United States and subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Interior of the United States. However, as the Special Committee was informed when last it examined the situation in the Trust Territory, the situation concerning legislation has been modified by Order No. 2882 issued by the Secretary of the Interior on 28 September 1964, which established the Congress of Micronesia with legislative powers in place of the previous Council of Micronesia with purely advisory powers.

4. Under the Order, the first general elections to the Congress of Micronesia were held on 19 January 1965 and the first regular session of the Congress was to be held in July 1965. The Congress of Micronesia is made up of two Houses—the General Assembly and the House of Delegates. The former consists of twenty-one members, called Assemblymen, who are elected from the districts on a population basis. The latter body comprises twelve delegates; each of the six administrative districts elects two delegates.

5. The Order prescribes that all residents of the Trust Territory who are citizens of the Trust Territory and 18 years of age or over are eligible to vote in elections of the Congress of Micronesia. The Congress may prescribe additional qualifications, provided "that no property, language, or income qualification shall ever be imposed or required of any voter, nor shall any discrimination in qualification be made or based upon literacy, tribal custom, or social position, nor upon difference in race, colour, ancestry, sex, or religious belief". General elections are to be held biennially.

6. Any person with the following qualifications is eligible to election as a member of the Congress: (a) a citizen of the Trust Territory for at least five years; (b) twenty-five years of age at the time of his election; and (c) a *bona fide* resident of the district from which he is elected for at least one year preceding his election. During the first four formative years of the Congress, membership will be fully open to district legislators and to persons holding senior positions in the executive and judicial branches of the Trust Territory Government.

7. The Congress of Micronesia has powers on all rightful subjects of legislation, except that no legislation may be inconsistent with the following: (a) treaties or international agreements of the United States; (b) laws of the United States applicable to the Trust Territory; (c) Executive Orders of the President of the United States and orders of the Secretary of the Interior; or (d) sections 1 through 12 (Bill of Rights) of the Code of the Trust Territory. The new Congress will have power to levy taxes and to participate in the preparation of the annual budget of the Trust Territory. Bills passed by the Congress may be vetoed by the High Commissioner; however, legislation twice vetoed by the High Commissioner must be referred to the Secretary of the Interior for further action.

Public Service

8. On 30 June 1964, the Government of the Trust Territory employed 108 Micronesians in senior, professional and executive posts, 1,250 in professional, administrative and protective posts and 1,473 in crafts, domestic work or as labourers, compared with 30, 1,051 and 1,110 respectively two years previously. Over the same period, the number of non-indigenous officials increased from 241 to 319.

9. In all six administrative districts, the second senior administrative posts are now held by Micronesians. All district medical directors, hospital administrators, school superintendents and finance officers are Micronesians, as are a number of senior officials at the Trust Territory headquarters.

Economic conditions

10. Copra continued to be the main cash crop of the Territory. Export revenue for copra in 1963-1964 amounted to \$2,295,448, compared with \$1,922,400 in 1963. In 1964, an American fishing company began constructing a major fishing operations plant in the Palau district under an agreement providing for training Micronesians as tuna fishermen. Exports by the Company in the first year were valued at \$291,761. A Micronesian-owned firm has been established, which will sell its catch to the American company. First steps to promote tourism are being taken in Saipan and in the Palau group. The co-operative and credit union movements are expanding. In April 1965, a contract was signed with a leading economic development consulting firm to undertake a two-year economic development programme for Micronesia.

11. The following table shows public finances:

| | Fiscal years | | | |
|--|--------------|------------------------------|-------------|---------------------|
| | 1962 | 1963 (in million dollars) | 1964 | 1965 (estimated) |
| Local revenue | 1.7 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 |
| Funds appropriated by the United States Congress | 6.3 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 17.5 |
| TOTAL | 8.0 | 16.7 | 15.8 | 18.5 |
| Expenditures | 8.0 | 10.4 | 14.2 | 18.5 |
| Funds carried forward | — | 6.3 | 4.0 | — |
| TOTAL | 8.0 | 16.7 | 18.2 | 18.5 |

In addition, a revolving Economic Development Loan Fund now totalling \$668,000 has been established for loans to small businesses.

Report of the Trusteeship Council in 1965

12. Since the Special Committee considered the situation in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in November 1964 in the conclusions and recommendations of its report (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XVIII, paras. 57-66), the Trusteeship Council has, at its thirty-second session in June 1965, completed its examination

of the annual report of the Administering Authority for the period 1 July 1963 to 30 June 1964 (T/1633).

13. By a letter dated 30 June 1965 (A/AC.109/130), the President of the Trusteeship Council informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that the Council had adopted a report on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for submission to the Security Council (S/6490). The report contains, in addition to the Trusteeship Council's conclusions and recommendations, and the observations of its individual members, detailed information on political, economic, social and educational conditions.

CHAPTER XVIII

TRUST TERRITORY OF NAURU, PAPUA AND TRUST TERRITORY OF NEW GUINEA, AND COCOS (KEELING) ISLANDS

INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

1. *Trust Territory of Nauru*

Introduction

1. Information on Nauru is already contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIX, paras. 1-15). Supplementary information on important recent developments is set out below.

The future of the Nauruan community

2. In 1964, the question of the resettlement of the Nauruan community on Curtis Island (off the Queensland coast of Australia) had been under consideration. Subsequently, the Nauruan leaders turned down the proposals for resettlement because of constitutional difficulties and announced that they had decided to work out their future on their own island.

3. At a conference in Canberra in June 1965, they proposed that a target date of 31 January 1968 should be established for the independence of Nauru. The Administering Authority did not consider it appropriate to establish a target date at that time, but proposed that there should be further discussions regarding the possibility of further political progress after two or three years' experience of the workings of the new Legislative and Executive Councils (i.e., in 1968). The Nauruan delegation maintained that their definite target was practicable.

4. It was agreed that the Administering Authority, in co-operation with Nauruan representatives, would actively pursue any proposals that might give promise of enabling the Nauruan people to resettle on a basis acceptable to them and one which would preserve their national identity.

Constitution

5. During the Canberra conference, the Nauruan representatives proposed the establishment on 31 January 1966, of a Legislative Council consisting of a majority of elected Nauruan members, together with a number of official members appointed by the Administrator, and of an Executive Council composed of the Head Chief and another Nauruan and of two official members. The Administrator would preside over both Councils. The Administering Authority accepted the proposals. It was agreed that defence, external affairs and the phosphate industry would be excluded from the

powers of the Legislative Council and that its ordinances would be subject to disallowance by the Governor-General of Australia.

6. An Advisory Committee with Nauruan and Australian representation would be set up at once to make recommendations to the Nauru Local Government Council and to the Australian Government regarding the details of the constitution and operation of the two Councils.

Public Service

7. During the year 1963-1964, several Australian officers were replaced by Nauruan officers, including the Official Secretary and the head of the Survey Department.

Economic conditions

8. The economy of Nauru continues to be based entirely on the mining of phosphate by the British Phosphate Commissioners. In 1963-1964, phosphate production amounted to 1,665,142 tons valued at £A4,427,072,¹ compared with £A3,981,656 in 1962-1963. At that rate, the deposits would be exhausted in thirty-three years. Royalty payments continued to be at the rate of 3s.8d. per ton, while a further payment of 11s.0d. a ton was paid to the Administration.

9. In discussions with representatives of the British Phosphate Commissioners in 1963 and at Conferences in Canberra in 1964 and 1965, the Nauruans asked for substantial increases in phosphate royalties (up to £1 per ton, or alternatively 55 per cent of the "world price"). They also questioned the right of the British Phosphate Commissioners to mine phosphates in Nauru, opposed the intention of the Commissioners to increase the extraction rate from 1.6 million to 2.5 million tons *per annum* and maintained that the phosphate was being sold to Australian and New Zealand consumers at prices which were below those prevailing on the world market. They sought equal participation in all decisions affecting the future of the industry, while stating that they were prepared to negotiate with the Australian Government for its management of the future mining of the phosphate on behalf of the Nauruan people. Finally they asked that the worked-out phosphate lands should be rehabilitated at the expense of the Administering Authority.

¹ £A125 equals £100 sterling or \$U.S. 280.

10. While maintaining that there was a sound legal basis for the operations of the British Phosphate Commissioners, the Australian delegation at the 1965 conference, considered that in parallel with political advancement there should be progressive changes in the phosphate arrangements, leading to some form of partnership agreement on the broad basis that the Nauruan community would receive 50 per cent of the financial benefit of the phosphate industry.

11. It was agreed that future arrangements for the operation of the industry would be discussed as soon as the Legislative Council was fully established and operating effectively. In the meantime, it was agreed to increase the phosphate royalty rates for 1964-1965 to 13s.6d. and for 1965-1966 to 17s.6d. per ton, and to fix an extraction rate for the latter year of 2 million tons of phosphate. It was also agreed to establish an independent technical committee of experts to examine the question of rehabilitating the worked-out mining land.

Report of the Trusteeship Council in 1965

12. Since the Special Committee considered the situation in Nauru in November 1964 in the conclusions and recommendations of its report (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIX, paras. 139-142 and 152-154) the Trusteeship Council has at its thirty-second session in June 1965 completed its examination of the annual report of the Administering Authority for the year ended 30 June 1964 (A/5935) and of the report of its Mission which visited Nauru in the first half of 1965 (T/1636).

13. By a letter dated 30 June 1965 (A/AC.109/130), the President of the Trusteeship Council informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that the Council had adopted a report on Nauru for inclusion in its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6004). The report contains, in addition to the Council's conclusions and recommendations, and the observations of its individual members, detailed information on political, economic, social and educational conditions.

2. Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea

Introduction

14. Information on Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea is already contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIX, paras. 16-50). Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.²

Constitution

15. The Trust Territory and the neighbouring Territory of Papua are administered jointly by an Administrator assisted by an Administrator's Council. Under the Papua and New Guinea Act, 1963, this Council consists of the Administrator, three official members and seven elected members of the House of Assembly.

² The information presented in this section on Papua has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by Australia under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter on 25 November 1964, covering the period 1 July 1962-30 June 1963. The information on the Trust Territory of New Guinea is derived from information before the Trusteeship Council at its thirty-second session, in particular the report of the Administering Authority for the period 1 July 1963 to 30 June 1964 (A/5936).

16. The main legislative organ is the House of Assembly, also established by the 1963 Act, and consisting of sixty-four members, fifty-four of whom are elected on a common roll by adult suffrage; the remaining ten are official members. Of the elective seats, forty-four are open to candidates of all races and ten are special seats reserved to non-indigenous inhabitants of the Territory. Following elections held in February and March 1964, the House of Assembly met for the first time on 8 June 1964.

17. There is no ministerial system. However, ten indigenous members of the House of Assembly have been appointed as Parliamentary Under-Secretaries, including the five who have been appointed to the Administrator's Council.

18. At its last meeting, the House of Assembly established a Select Committee of ten to take evidence on the need for the development of the principles underlying a constitution for Papua and New Guinea.

Public Service

19. At 30 June 1964 there were 14 (13)³ permanent and 5 (1) temporary, indigenous officers in the Second Division; 158 (100) permanent and 13 (11) temporary indigenous officers in the Third Division, and 1,040 (784) permanent and 164 (144) temporary in the Auxiliary Division. There were 2,631 (2,824) permanent and 1,530 (1,436) temporary expatriate officers and 10 (17) permanent and 182 (221) temporary Asian and mixed race officers.

20. By 30 March 1965, the number of temporary local officers had risen from 182 to 1,025. Permanent appointments are no longer granted to new expatriate officers. An Administrative College has been established as Port Moresby.

Local government

21. In June 1964, there were sixty-one local government councils in the Trust Territory covering a population of 707,500, compared with fifty and 473,772 respectively a year previously. In June 1963, there were twenty-seven such councils in Papua covering a population of 184,726, compared with twenty-two and 155,675 in the previous year. A new local government ordinance expanding the powers of those elective bodies has come into effect and a Commission for Local Government has been appointed.

Economic conditions

22. Primary production is the basis of the economy of both Papua and the Trust Territory. The principal agricultural exports of Papua are copra and rubber; those of New Guinea are copra, cacao and coffee. An important timber industry based on the Trust Territory's extensive forest resources is being developed. Indigenous growers now produce about two fifths of the copra produced in Papua, and one quarter of the copra, about one quarter of the cocoa and over one half of the coffee produced in the Trust Territory. A cattle industry is being developed.

23. The following table shows the public finances of the Territories:

³ The figures in parentheses are the corresponding numbers at 30 June 1963.

In addition, a revolving Economic Development Loan Fund now totalling \$668,000 has been established for loans to small businesses.

Report of the Trusteeship Council in 1965

12. Since the Special Committee considered the situation in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in November 1964 in the conclusions and recommendations of its report (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XVIII, paras. 57-66), the Trusteeship Council has, at its thirty-second session in June 1965, completed its examination

of the annual report of the Administering Authority for the period 1 July 1963 to 30 June 1964 (T/1633).

13. By a letter dated 30 June 1965 (A/AC.109/130), the President of the Trusteeship Council informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that the Council had adopted a report on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for submission to the Security Council (S/6490). The report contains, in addition to the Trusteeship Council's conclusions and recommendations, and the observations of its individual members, detailed information on political, economic, social and educational conditions.

CHAPTER XVIII

TRUST TERRITORY OF NAURU, PAPUA AND TRUST TERRITORY OF NEW GUINEA, AND COCOS (KEELING) ISLANDS

INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

1. *Trust Territory of Nauru*

Introduction

1. Information on Nauru is already contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIX, paras. 1-15). Supplementary information on important recent developments is set out below.

The future of the Nauruan community

2. In 1964, the question of the resettlement of the Nauruan community on Curtis Island (off the Queensland coast of Australia) had been under consideration. Subsequently, the Nauruan leaders turned down the proposals for resettlement because of constitutional difficulties and announced that they had decided to work out their future on their own island.

3. At a conference in Canberra in June 1965, they proposed that a target date of 31 January 1968 should be established for the independence of Nauru. The Administering Authority did not consider it appropriate to establish a target date at that time, but proposed that there should be further discussions regarding the possibility of further political progress after two or three years' experience of the workings of the new Legislative and Executive Councils (i.e., in 1968). The Nauruan delegation maintained that their definite target was practicable.

4. It was agreed that the Administering Authority, in co-operation with Nauruan representatives, would actively pursue any proposals that might give promise of enabling the Nauruan people to settle on a basis acceptable to them and one which would preserve their national identity.

Constitution

5. During the Canberra conference, the Nauruan representatives proposed the establishment on 31 January 1966, of a Legislative Council consisting of a majority of elected Nauruan members, together with a number of official members appointed by the Administrator, and of an Executive Council composed of the Head Chief and another Nauruan and of two official members. The Administrator would preside over both Councils. The Administering Authority accepted the proposals. It was agreed that defence, external affairs and the phosphate industry would be excluded from the

powers of the Legislative Council and that its ordinances would be subject to disallowance by the Governor-General of Australia.

6. An Advisory Committee with Nauruan and Australian representation would be set up at once to make recommendations to the Nauru Local Government Council and to the Australian Government regarding the details of the constitution and operation of the two Councils.

Public Service

7. During the year 1963-1964, several Australian officers were replaced by Nauruan officers, including the Official Secretary and the head of the Survey Department.

Economic conditions

8. The economy of Nauru continues to be based entirely on the mining of phosphate by the British Phosphate Commissioners. In 1963-1964, phosphate production amounted to 1,665,142 tons valued at £A4,427,072,¹ compared with £A3,981,656 in 1962-1963. At that rate, the deposits would be exhausted in thirty-three years. Royalty payments continued to be at the rate of 3s.8d. per ton, while a further payment of 11s.0d. a ton was paid to the Administration.

9. In discussions with representatives of the British Phosphate Commissioners in 1963 and at Conferences in Canberra in 1964 and 1965, the Nauruans asked for substantial increases in phosphate royalties (up to £1 per ton, or alternatively 55 per cent of the "world price"). They also questioned the right of the British Phosphate Commissioners to mine phosphates in Nauru, opposed the intention of the Commissioners to increase the extraction rate from 1.6 million to 2.5 million tons *per annum* and maintained that the phosphate was being sold to Australian and New Zealand consumers at prices which were below those prevailing on the world market. They sought equal participation in all decisions affecting the future of the industry, while stating that they were prepared to negotiate with the Australian Government for its management of the future mining of the phosphate on behalf of the Nauruan people. Finally they asked that the worked-out phosphate lands should be rehabilitated at the expense of the Administering Authority.

¹ £A125 equals £100 sterling or \$U.S. 280.

10. While maintaining that there was a sound legal basis for the operations of the British Phosphate Commissioners, the Australian delegation at the 1965 conference, considered that in parallel with political advancement there should be progressive changes in the phosphate arrangements, leading to some form of partnership agreement on the broad basis that the Nauruan community would receive 50 per cent of the financial benefit of the phosphate industry.

11. It was agreed that future arrangements for the operation of the industry would be discussed as soon as the Legislative Council was fully established and operating effectively. In the meantime, it was agreed to increase the phosphate royalty rates for 1964-1965 to 13s.6d. and for 1965-1966 to 17s.6d. per ton, and to fix an extraction rate for the latter year of 2 million tons of phosphate. It was also agreed to establish an independent technical committee of experts to examine the question of rehabilitating the worked-out mining land.

Report of the Trusteeship Council in 1965

12. Since the Special Committee considered the situation in Nauru in November 1964 in the conclusions and recommendations of its report (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIX, paras. 139-142 and 152-154) the Trusteeship Council has at its thirty-second session in June 1965 completed its examination of the annual report of the Administering Authority for the year ended 30 June 1964 (A/5935) and of the report of its Mission which visited Nauru in the first half of 1965 (T/1636).

13. By a letter dated 30 June 1965 (A/AC.109/130), the President of the Trusteeship Council informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that the Council had adopted a report on Nauru for inclusion in its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6004). The report contains, in addition to the Council's conclusions and recommendations, and the observations of its individual members, detailed information on political, economic, social and educational conditions.

2. Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea

Introduction

14. Information on Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea is already contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIX, paras. 16-50). Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.²

Constitution

15. The Trust Territory and the neighbouring Territory of Papua are administered jointly by an Administrator assisted by an Administrator's Council. Under the Papua and New Guinea Act, 1963, this Council consists of the Administrator, three official members and seven elected members of the House of Assembly.

² The information presented in this section on Papua has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by Australia under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter on 25 November 1964, covering the period 1 July 1962-30 June 1963. The information on the Trust Territory of New Guinea is derived from information before the Trusteeship Council at its thirty-second session, in particular the report of the Administering Authority for the period 1 July 1963 to 30 June 1964 (A/5936).

16. The main legislative organ is the House of Assembly, also established by the 1963 Act, and consisting of sixty-four members, fifty-four of whom are elected on a common roll by adult suffrage; the remaining ten are official members. Of the elective seats, forty-four are open to candidates of all races and ten are special seats reserved to non-indigenous inhabitants of the Territory. Following elections held in February and March 1964, the House of Assembly met for the first time on 8 June 1964.

17. There is no ministerial system. However, ten indigenous members of the House of Assembly have been appointed as Parliamentary Under-Secretaries, including the five who have been appointed to the Administrator's Council.

18. At its last meeting, the House of Assembly established a Select Committee of ten to take evidence on the need for the development of the principles underlying a constitution for Papua and New Guinea.

Public Service

19. At 30 June 1964 there were 14 (13)³ permanent and 5 (1) temporary, indigenous officers in the Second Division; 158 (100) permanent and 13 (11) temporary indigenous officers in the Third Division, and 1,040 (784) permanent and 164 (144) temporary in the Auxiliary Division. There were 2,631 (2,824) permanent and 1,530 (1,436) temporary expatriate officers and 10 (17) permanent and 182 (221) temporary Asian and mixed race officers.

20. By 30 March 1965, the number of temporary local officers had risen from 182 to 1,025. Permanent appointments are no longer granted to new expatriate officers. An Administrative College has been established at Port Moresby.

Local government

21. In June 1964, there were sixty-one local government councils in the Trust Territory covering a population of 707,500, compared with fifty and 473,772 respectively a year previously. In June 1963, there were twenty-seven such councils in Papua covering a population of 184,726, compared with twenty-two and 155,675 in the previous year. A new local government ordinance expanding the powers of those elective bodies has come into effect and a Commission for Local Government has been appointed.

Economic conditions

22. Primary production is the basis of the economy of both Papua and the Trust Territory. The principal agricultural exports of Papua are copra and rubber; those of New Guinea are copra, cacao and coffee. An important timber industry based on the Trust Territory's extensive forest resources is being developed. Indigenous growers now produce about two fifths of the copra produced in Papua, and one quarter of the copra, about one quarter of the cocoa and over one half of the coffee produced in the Trust Territory. A cattle industry is being developed.

23. The following table shows the public finances of the Territories:

³ The figures in parentheses are the corresponding numbers at 30 June 1963.

| | 1961-1962 | | | 1962-1963 (in million Australian pounds) | | | 1963-1964 New Guinea only |
|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---|--------------|--------------|---------------------------------|
| | Papua | New Guinea | Total | Papua | New Guinea | Total | |
| Internal revenue | 3.51 | 4.19 | 7.70 | 4.20 | 4.82 | 9.02 | 6.13 |
| Australian grant | 7.18 | 10.11 | 17.29 | 7.86 | 12.14 | 20.00 | 15.24 |
| TOTAL REVENUE | 10.69 | 14.30 | 24.99 | 12.06 | 16.96 | 29.02 | 21.37 |
| TOTAL EXPENDITURE | 10.90 | 14.60 | 25.50 | 12.46 | 17.48 | 29.94 | 22.43 |

The Australian grant to the combined Territories increased to £A25 million in 1963-1964 and to £A28 million in 1964-1965.

24. Companies active in the combined Territories paid some £2.5 million in dividends and £1.1 million in taxes during 1963-1964 on taxable incomes of £6.9 million earned during 1962-1963. Corresponding figures for the previous year were £1.7 million, £0.9 million and £5.3 million respectively.

25. The Administering Authority has announced that it has accepted the programmes for increased production proposed by the Mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which visited the Territories in 1963 as a working basis for planning. The House of Assembly has also generally endorsed the programmes.

Social conditions in Papua

Labour

26. The number of workers employed by private industry declined from 18,182, including 10,135 plantation workers, on 31 March 1962 to 17,758, including 10,067 plantation workers, on 31 March 1963. The decrease was attributed to a more selective attitude by employers and to a greater interest in cash cropping by the indigenous inhabitants. The majority of workers were casual workers rather than being employed under long-term agreements.

Public health

27. In 1962-1963, recurrent expenditure on health services totalled £A1,243,088 and capital expenditure totalled £A373,616, compared with £A1,166,258 and £A71,703 in 1961-1962.

Educational conditions in Papua

28. At 30 June 1963, there were 156 administration schools and 725 mission schools compared with 147 and 795 respectively in the previous year. The decrease in the number of mission schools was due to the raising of educational standards. The following table gives the numbers of pupils:

| | Administration schools | Mission schools | Total |
|----------------|------------------------|-----------------|--------|
| 1962 | 15,348 | 47,203 | 62,551 |
| 1963 | 17,808 | 50,324 | 68,132 |

Of these pupils, 64,909 were attending primary schools, 948 (all indigenous) junior high schools, 495 (including 337 indigenous students) secondary schools, 679 technical schools, 358 teacher-training institutions and 743 in the Pre-entry and Auxiliary Training Branch. In addition, 529 pupils (including 55 indigenous students) were receiving secondary education in Australia.

29. Three Papuan students are attending courses at Australian universities. A university is to be established at Port Moresby in 1967.

30. Departmental expenditure on education rose from £A913,000 to £A1,166,000 or 9.0 per cent of total government expenditure. This figure included grants-in-aid of £A109,000 to missions. In addition, the expenditures of other departments on education and training increased from £A54,000 to £A328,000, while construction expenditures declined from £A392,000 to £A296,000.

Report of the Trusteeship Council in 1965 on New Guinea

31. Since the Special Committee considered the situation in the Trust Territory of New Guinea in November 1964 (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIX, paras. 135-138 and 147-151), the Trusteeship Council has at its thirty-second session in June 1965, completed its examination of the annual report of the Administering Authority for the year ended 30 June 1964 (A/5936) and of the report of its mission which visited the Trust Territory of New Guinea in the first half of 1965 (T/1635 and Add.1).

32. By a letter dated 30 June 1965 (A/AC.109/130), the President of the Trusteeship Council informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that the Council had adopted a report on the Trust Territory of New Guinea for inclusion in its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6004). The report contains, in addition to the Council's conclusions and recommendations, and the observations of its individual members, detailed information on political, economic, social and educational conditions in the Trust Territory and on institutions common to the two Territories.

3. Cocos (Keeling) Islands

Introduction

33. Information on the Cocos (Keeling) Islands is already contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIX, paras. 51-66). Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.⁴

General

34. At 30 June 1964, the population of the group consisted of 463 Cocos Islanders and of 200 Europeans (the latter connected with the international airport,

⁴ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by Australia under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter on 13 February 1964, covering the period 1 July 1962-30 June 1963, and on 2 February 1965, covering the period 1 July 1963-30 June 1964.

the cable stations and the Administration), compared with 436 and 176 respectively two years previously.

Economic conditions

35. Copra exports, entirely grown on the Clunies-Ross Estate, amounted to 495 tons in 1961-1962, 584 tons in 1962-1963 and 284 tons in 1963-1964 (copra

produced during the latter part of 1963-1964 was shipped after 30 June).

36. Revenue derived from the Territory increased from £A2,291 in 1961-1962 to £A2,658 in 1962-1963 and to £A3,624 in 1963-1964. Expenditure by Australian departments in the group amounted to £A38,483, £A42,230 and £A41,787 over the same periods.

CHAPTER XIX

NEW HEBRIDES, GILBERT AND ELLICE ISLANDS, PITCAIRN AND SOLOMON ISLANDS

INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

Introduction

1. Information on the New Hebrides, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn Island and the Solomon Islands is already contained in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XX, paras. 1-78). Supplementary information on recent developments concerning the four Territories is set out below.¹

1. *New Hebrides*

Economic conditions

2. The Territory's economy is based mainly on agriculture. The main cash crop, copra, accounted for 69 per cent of the value of all exports in 1963. With manganese and frozen fish it made up 95 per cent of the value of all exports. Exports totalled £2,317,712² an increase of 17 per cent over the previous year. The value of imports decreased slightly and amounted to £2,174,207. Approximately 65 per cent of all exports went to France and 50 per cent of all imports came from Australia.

3. Financial assistance is given to the New Hebrides by the Metropolitan Governments under the Joint Development Plan which provides, *inter alia*, for the improvement of communications, assistance to agriculture and social services. In addition, both the British and French Governments give assistance to the Territory through their national development plans from which much of the educational and medical development is financed.

4. The budget of the Joint Administration finances the services that are operated jointly and contributes to the cost of medical and educational services operated separately by the British and French Administrations, which have separate budgets.

5. Revenue and expenditure of the Condominium Government in 1963 totalled £698,549 and £684,354 respectively.

6. Expenditure of the British National Administration in 1962-1963 totalled £A404,130³ of which £A359,131 was financed by the United Kingdom Government.

¹ The information presented in this chapter has been derived from published reports, and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73e of the United Nations Charter on 13 May and 17 and 23 June 1964; and by France on 7 May 1965.

² One pound sterling equals 213.75 New Hebrides francs or £A1.25.

³ One Australian pound equals 171 New Hebrides francs or £0.80.

7. Revenue and expenditure of the French National Administration in 1963 totalled 109,069,000 and 108,398,000 New Hebrides francs respectively.⁴

8. A joint development plan of economic development, estimated to cost £373,829 was drawn up in 1962. This has now been revised and is aimed at increasing the quantity and improving the quality of agricultural production and encouraging the development of animal husbandry. It provides for the expansion and equipping of the Agricultural Department, the recurrent costs of a coconut research station and the training of young New Hebrideans in basic agricultural techniques.

Social conditions

Labour

9. In 1962 a Labour Advisory Committee was set up by joint legislation to advise the Resident Commissioners on labour matters.

10. Modern labour legislation was in a final draft form at the end of 1963. This is to replace provisions in the Anglo-French Protocol of 1914 which are now considered obsolete. This will have the effect of repealing the articles dealing with the recruitment, engagement and employment of indigenous labour (articles 31 to 56) and their replacement by a provision permitting the introduction of a new labour code.

Public health

11. In 1962-1963, recurrent expenditures by the Condominium Government on public health amounted to £60,937 and were approximately 9 per cent of the total recurrent expenditures. Expenditures by the French National Administration totalled 19,481,000 New Hebrides francs and those of the British National Administration were estimated at £A55,500.

12. Tuberculosis is considered to be the major communicable disease of the Territory. A three-year campaign is now under way in which 35,000 persons will be vaccinated with BCG. All known and newly discovered cases of tuberculosis will be given treatment with drugs.

Educational conditions

13. The Condominium Government has no educational service, but makes an annual subsidy to the two National Administrations for education which in 1963 amounted to £34,000, as compared with £30,000 the previous year. Expenditures by the French National Administration on education totalled 29,460,000

⁴ One new (metropolitan) franc equals 22 New Hebrides francs.

New Hebrides francs and those of the British National Administration were estimated at £A29,006.

14. British educational facilities, with few exceptions, are provided by various missions which receive grants-in-aid from the British Administration. The French Administration operates fifteen schools and gives financial assistance to nineteen mission schools. Approximately 11,500 pupils were enrolled in all schools. The number of indigenous children of school age is estimated to total 15,000. There are no secondary schools in the Territory although some secondary instruction is given in a few primary schools. A total of seventy-one students were studying abroad in 1963 in secondary and other schools.

2. Gilbert and Ellice Islands

General

15. A census in 1963 showed a population of 49,879 compared with an estimated population of 47,000 at the end of 1961.

Economic conditions

16. The administering Power states that there appears to be at present little hope for commercial development in the Territory. Repeated endeavours to diversify the economy have met with no major success. It is expected that the deposits of phosphate will be exhausted in the next twenty or twenty-five years.

17. Exports are almost exclusively phosphates and copra, and the principal imports are food-stuffs. All export trade, and more than 80 per cent of the import trade is with Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. There is a preferential customs tariff. On most articles the general *ad valorem* duty is 25 per cent and the preferential rate is 12.5 per cent. An export duty of 25 per cent *ad valorem* is levied on the f.o.b. value of copra.

18. Exports in 1962 were valued at £A1,020,540 compared with £A705,576 in 1961. The value of imports increased from £A1,384,480 to £A1,530,284 between 1961 and 1962. In 1963, exports were valued at £A1,276,122 and imports at £A1,416,092.

19. Ordinary revenue, excluding grants, was £A764,756 in 1962 and estimated at £A718,514 in 1963. Total expenditure was £A833,112 in 1962 and estimated at £A811,215 in 1963.

20. The main sources of revenue are export and import duties and a tax of 23 shillings per ton, which the British Phosphate Commissioners pay on all phosphate exported from Ocean Island. By the payment of this latter tax, they and their employees are exempt from payment of the majority of fees, licences and income tax, and the customs duties on imports liable to the preferential rate of duty.

Social conditions

Labour

21. There is no labour department, but duties concerned with recruitment and labour inspection are performed by administrative officers. The Government employs permanently about 1,165 persons, of whom fifty-three are Europeans. The other chief employers are the British Phosphate Commissioners and several copra plantations. In 1963 a total of 1,423 indigenous persons were engaged in mining phosphates, and about 250 were working on copra plantations.

Public health

22. In 1963, expenditures on public health totalled £A82,740, as compared with £A73,896 the previous year, and amounted to approximately 10.8 per cent of estimated expenditures in 1963 and 8.9 per cent in 1962.

Educational conditions

23. Education is compulsory for all children between the ages of six and sixteen. At the end of 1963, there were 11,598 primary school pupils, most of whom were attending mission schools. In addition to primary schools there were two government and two mission secondary schools with a total of 352 pupils, and one government and three mission teacher-training colleges with a total of seventy-nine trainees. The staff, including education officers, totalled 481 in primary schools and nineteen in secondary schools.

24. There is no university or technical college in the Territory. During 1963 twenty-two students were attending secondary schools abroad or taking teacher-training courses. In addition, eighteen others were abroad taking professional and technical training courses.

25. Expenditures, including grants-in-aid to missions, totalled £A55,444 in 1962 and were estimated at £A74,941 in 1963.

3. Pitcairn Island

General

26. The present population of Pitcairn Island is 79 compared with 86 in 1963. For a generation Pitcairn Islanders have been migrating to New Zealand which permits them free entry. There, jobs are easily available. This migration has resulted in an unbalanced population of the very young and the comparatively old.

Economic conditions

27. No information is available on the value of exports and imports. Revenue in 1963-1964, including a grant of £3,620 from Colonial Development and Welfare funds, totalled £22,194. Expenditure during the same period amounted to £18,574.

Educational conditions

28. There is one school, controlled and financed entirely by the Government. It had an enrolment of thirty-two pupils. The budget for education in 1963 was £3,198 which amounted to 17.2 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure for the Territory.

4. Solomon Islands

General

29. Between December 1963 and December 1964, the total population was estimated to have increased from 441,301 to 456,390.

Political and constitutional developments

30. In June 1964, the Solomon Islands Legislative Council approved proposals for the election of eight of its ten unofficial members. Under these proposals the eight members will represent single member constituencies. The member for Honiara will be elected by secret ballot under adult suffrage, and the other seven will be elected indirectly by the elected members of the local councils of their constituencies. Two un-

official members and the eleven official members will continue to be appointed by the High Commissioner.

31. In September, the administering Power approved this change by the British Solomon Islands Order, 1964. This revoked the Order-in-Council, 1960. In addition to providing for eight elected members for the Legislative Council and the appointment of a new Executive Council after the elections, it contains miscellaneous and transitional provisions.

32. On 7 April 1965, the elections were held. A total of forty-three men and one woman stood for the eight elected seats. The latter won a seat and became the first woman to become a member of the Legislative Council. The Council held its first meeting in June.

Economic conditions

33. The economy of the Territory continues to be based primarily on subsistence agriculture and the production of copra for export. The value of all exports in 1963 was £A1,824,351, compared with £A1,589,184 in 1962. Copra accounted for 91 per cent of the value of all exports, and timber, the second largest, accounted for 4 per cent. Imports were valued at £A2,310,269. The greater part of the Territory's trade is with the United Kingdom and Australia. Preferential (British) and general (foreign) tariff rates are levied on numerous imports. Export duties are imposed on copra at the rate of 15 per cent *ad valorem* f.o.b. and on shell and timber at varying rates.

34. A new development plan for the period 1 January 1963 to 31 March 1966 has been prepared which provides for expenditure estimated to amount to £A3 million. The chief services to which this has been allocated are as follows:

| | <i>Per cent</i> |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|
| Agriculture | 17.2 |
| Other natural resources | 28.1 |
| Medical services | 12.5 |
| Education | 19.6 |

35. Revenue from the Territory amounted to £A1,047,135. With grants-in-aid and transfers from special funds it totalled £A2,351,608 in 1963, compared with £A1,993,953 the previous year. Total expenditure amounted to £A2,238,420, compared with £A2,077,330 the previous year.

Social conditions

Labour

36. The total labour force of the Territory at the end of 1963 was estimated at 8,500. The majority of these were engaged in agricultural work or employed by the Government. The wage rate for all labourers employed by the Government was approximately £A8 per month, and most employers in urban areas paid £A8 as a starting wage. The wage rate on plantations ranged from £A6 to £A8 per month, with a bonus ranging from 10 shillings to £A1 per month. Semi-skilled and skilled workers receive higher rates of pay than that of labourers. Many labourers on plantations and elsewhere also work on a piece-rate basis

and earn from £A8 to £A15 per month. Overtime rates and work on rest days are prescribed at one and a half times the normal rate of pay, and work on public holidays at double the normal rate. The normal work week throughout the Territory is forty-two hours.

37. There are now two trade unions in the Territory. The Copra Workers' Union organizes workers employed on copra plantations and the waterfront and has a membership of 4,004. The newly organized Building and General Workers' Union, with a membership of 355, organizes workers in all other industries. In 1963, it confined its attention to workers employed by Government and industry and commerce in the main urban areas.

38. Apart from government employees, who enjoy pensions or superannuation rights and free medical attention with some paid sick leave, social security in the Territory is confined to free medical attention and hospital treatment for all at work under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance.

Public health

39. The Territory has government hospitals. Hospitals and other medical facilities are maintained by religious missions. The medical and health staff, public and private included eight registered medical practitioners, eighteen registered assistant medical officers, and 222 nurses.

40. In 1963, expenditures totalled £A198,650, an increase of approximately £A53,000 over the preceding year, and amounted to about 9 per cent of all governmental expenditures. No information is available on expenditures by religious missions and other philanthropic organizations.

Educational conditions

41. Primary education is largely in the hands of religious missions. Registered primary schools increased from 370 to 424 during 1963. The number of primary pupils in all schools totalled 20,413. There is one secondary school in the Territory with a total of eighty-four pupils. One teacher-training institution takes in twenty-four students each year for a two-year training course, and some religious missions give courses in teacher training. There were also thirty-six students with scholarships taking teacher-training courses overseas. In addition, there were twelve students receiving scholarships for secondary education overseas, and fifty-four were studying abroad under religious auspices. There are no universities and other institutions of higher education in the Territory.

42. Recurrent expenditure by the Department of Education in 1963 totalled £A85,946, and capital expenditure amounted to £A21,806. In addition, government grants to mission schools and private authorities totalled £A17,087. Recurrent expenditures on education were 3.85 per cent of total recurrent expenditures. Government expenditure on education as a whole, including recurrent and development costs, was estimated at £A229,348 in 1964, or 8.53 per cent of total government expenditure.

CHAPTER XX

BRUNEI

INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

Introduction

1. Information on Brunei is already contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXI, paras. 1-29). Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.¹

Political and constitutional developments

2. The 1959 Brunei Constitution provided for direct elections to the District Councils and for indirect elections for sixteen out of thirty-three seats on the Legislative Council. As previously reported, this Constitution was suspended by the Sultan in December 1962. In 1963 the Executive and Legislative Councils were re-established so as to consist entirely of official and nominated unofficial members.

3. In August 1964, the Sultan's Government submitted proposals for constitutional progress to the Legislative Council which on 26 August adopted a motion approving them. The proposals provided that new elections would be held early in 1965, on the basis of universal adult suffrage, for members of the District and Legislative Councils. As a preliminary step, the Legislative Council would comprise twenty-one members, ten of whom would be elected members, six *ex officio* members and five members nominated by the Sultan. A ministerial system of government was also envisaged.

4. The motion also called for further reconstitution of the Council, in the light of experience, at a later stage. The elected members would then be doubled in number, the nominated members abolished and the number of *ex officio* members reduced to a minimum required for the efficient running of the government machinery. A ministerial system of government was also envisaged.

5. In a communiqué issued by the Commonwealth Relations Office on 23 December 1964, at the conclusion of discussions in London between the Sultan of Brunei and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Bottomley, the Sultan, stated that elections to the District and Legislative Councils would be held in March 1965, followed by the introduction of a ministerial system of government. Elected members of the Legislative Council would be appointed to the Executive Council and associated with executive and administrative responsibilities of the Government. It was also announced that, immediately following the general elections, further consultations would be held between the Sultan and the Commonwealth Secretary to consider the next step towards full parliamentary democracy.

6. The elections took place on 20 March 1965. Nine of the winning candidates were reported to have run as independents while the tenth represented the Brunei People's Alliance Party. Four of the candidates elected were reported to have been former members of the banned Ra'ayat Party. No details of the electoral campaign are available.

¹ The information presented in this chapter has been derived from published reports, and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter, on 30 June 1964.

7. During further talks in London in the latter half of May, the Sultan informed the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations that a ministerial system would be introduced on 7 June. The Sultan would appoint four assistant Ministers, who would include elected members of the Legislative Council.

External relations

8. According to a press statement by the Indonesian Government news agency, Lt. General Djatikusumo acting as "Personal Representative of the President of the Indonesian Republic" had sent a letter to the Sultan of Brunei, suggesting that the time was appropriate for Brunei and Indonesia to recognize each other's sovereignty and "together to enter Maphilindo".

9. In a reply dated 19 October 1964, the Chief Minister of Brunei, on behalf of the Sultan and Government stated that at no time had the State of Brunei had anything to do with Maphilindo and that it had no intention whatsoever of being a party to the proposed Maphilindo. He further stated that the Government of Brunei had from its very inception recognized the formation of the Federation of Malaysia and that it would wish to strengthen the cordial relations with those of its neighbours who formed part of the Federation even more. Deploring "the aggression by the Indonesian Government against the sovereign states of Malaysia", the letter concluded that "His Highness (the Sultan) does not wish to discuss this matter nor pursue the question any further".

Security situation

10. The Brunei Government has taken steps to build up its own security forces. An expansion programme of the police force came into effect in March 1964, designed to increase the current strength by the recruitment of 300 more Malay, Iban, Dusun and Chinese youths. A Marine police section was established to patrol coastal and internal waterways in armed motor-boats and launches.

11. In the debates in the Legislative Council in October 1964, it was also disclosed that the Brunei Government was considering the establishment of a "Territorial (part-time) army" to augment the defence of the country, as well as the expansion of the Special Constabulary. Recruitment of Gurka troops for the reinforcement of the Brunei Police and the Brunei security forces was also being studied.

12. In February 1965, it was reported that two organizations, the Pasukan Perdjuangan Kalimantan Utara (North Borneo Struggle Unit) and the Advanced Youth Party, had been suppressed because of their plans to overthrow the existing Government of Brunei with external aid and that fifty persons had been arrested or detained under "emergency orders" during a four-month period because of their connexion with those organizations.

Public Service

13. The Public Service at the end of 1963 consisted of ten pensionable and thirty-four non-pensionable overseas officers and eighty-eight local and other officers. During 1963, a total of 115 members of the Public

Service was sent overseas for special training, including ninety-eight Malays and twelve Chinese.

14. According to an official announcement by the Government in February 1964, the Brunei Government had dispatched a team of its senior officials to Manila to recruit some twenty expatriate officers from the Philippines for the technical services required under the national development plan. The Territory had already a number of technical personnel, such as physicians and engineers, from the Philippines in a private capacity.

Economic conditions

15. At the beginning of 1963, economic activities were brought almost to a standstill as a result of the rebellion. However, later in the year, when conditions became more settled, economic activity picked up again and planning for further development was resumed, though some projects were not implemented as planned.

16. The production of crude oil in 1963 was 4,213,552 long tons and the exports of crude oil were valued at \$M 175,748,399,² compared with 3,705,767 long tons and \$M 190,060,709, respectively in 1962. Preliminary unofficial figures show 1964 output at 3.5 million tons. To overcome the declining oil production from the existing resources on land, an extensive off-shore drilling was undertaken by the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company during the year, with limited but promising results.

17. A series of new regulations governing oil prospecting, concessions and royalties came into effect in October 1963 with the enactment of a new petroleum mining law, The Petroleum Enactment, 1963, which, *inter alia*, lifted the ban against non-British companies exploring and operating in Brunei. During 1964, a number of oil companies from the United States held negotiations with the Government of Brunei for exploration and production agreements.

18. The production of rubber in 1963 totalled 1,226 tons, valued at \$M 1,756,890, as compared to 1,437 tons, valued at \$M 2,154,190 in 1962. The production of timber in 1963 amounted to 894,982 cubic feet (in round equivalents), valued at some \$M 3.6 million.

19. While the value of all exports, including re-exports, declined from \$M 199,261,384 in 1962 to \$M 182,908,877 in 1963, the value of imports increased from \$M 49,104,827 in 1962 to \$M 66,013,300.

20. Ordinary revenues and expenditures in Malayan dollars are shown in the following tables:

*Ordinary revenue and expenditure
(in Malayan dollars)*

| | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 |
|-------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Revenue | 117,974,642 | 115,286,146 | 114,312,733 |
| Expenditure | 36,366,158 | 37,291,986 | 49,071,497 |

21. Principal items of the revenue account in 1963 consisted of: interest and earnings from investments, \$M 45.4 million; internal revenue, \$M 36.8 million; and mining royalties and rentals of property, \$M 24.1 million. Principal heads of expenditure were the Brunei Malay Regiment \$M 3.8 million, education \$M 6.9 million, the Emergency \$M 6.3 million, medical and health, \$M 3.6 million and public works \$M 8.1 million. The capital expenditure on the development schemes totalled \$M 11.9 million for the year.

22. Preliminary figures for the public accounts in 1964 show that revenues amounted to \$M 129.7 million

and ordinary expenditure to \$M 58 million. Development expenditure amounted to \$M 15 million, out of \$M 47 million appropriated for that purpose. After \$M 76.9 million had been appropriated for development in 1965, \$M 885.7 million remained in the consolidated revenue account.

23. The major development projects currently under way include the establishment of a road network, an electrification scheme and the building of a modern seaport at the mouth of the Brunei River, which according to preliminary estimates will cost £4 million. In June 1964, a fisheries officer was invited from FAO to undertake a survey of Brunei's fishing industry.

Social conditions

Labour

24. Of the total labour force of 6,826 in 1963, 3,414 workers were employed by the Government mainly for the public works, and 1,476 by the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company. There were 245 employees working on rubber estates and 393 in sawmills and related fields. The average rates of pay for government labour range from \$M 4.50 to \$M 9.50 per day, and for the petroleum company from \$M 5.00 for unskilled to \$M 13.00 for skilled workers. Rubber tappers are paid by result and receive on the average between \$M 4.00 to \$M 5.00 per diem together with free accommodation and medical attention.

Public health

25. The total medical expenditure for the year 1963 was \$M 3,676,190, including the capital expenditure of \$M 83,590, compared with \$M 3,556,039 in the previous year. The proportion of public health expenditure was approximately 8 per cent of all expenditures in 1963. In 1963, the Government Medical Services added to its staff a specialist surgeon, an ophthalmologist and a specialist physician and in 1964, a radiologist.

26. The private hospital operated by the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company has 110 beds and is fully equipped for all major medical and surgery work, maternal and child care and radiography and laboratory services. During 1963, the Company expended \$M 248,200 for its medical service programmes.

27. There were 3,521 births and 655 deaths in 1963. The infant mortality rate was 55.10 per 1,000 live births and the general mortality rate was 6.55 per 1,000 population, compared with 50.75 and 6.89 respectively in 1962.

Educational conditions

28. In 1963, Brunei had 77 public primary and kindergarten schools with 13,577 pupils (11,956 pupils in 1962) and twenty-three independent primary and kindergarten schools with 6,506 (6,402 in 1962) pupils. Seven public and eight independent secondary schools had enrolments of 1,274 and 1,219 respectively. The corresponding figures in 1962 were 1,117 and 1,203. One public teacher-training school had 178 students (125 in 1962) and one independent vocational school had over thirty students. Public schools had a staff of 663 teachers and independent schools had 280 teachers.

29. Recurrent expenditure for education amounted to \$M 6,870,008 in 1963, an increase of some \$M 400,000 over the previous year. Capital expenditure was \$M 748,194, a decrease of \$M 330,000 from the previous year. Total educational expenditures were approximately 13 per cent of the territorial budget for 1963.

² One Malayan dollar equals 2s.4d. sterling or \$U.S. 0.327.

CHAPTER XXI

HONG KONG

INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

Introduction

1. Information on Hong Kong is already contained in the Special Committee's report to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXII, paras. 1-29), although the Special Committee did not at that time take action in respect of the Territory. Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.¹

General

2. The population was estimated to be 3,642,500 by the end of 1963, an increase of 116,000 over 1962. Of this increase, 20,500 represented the estimated net balance of migration.

Political and constitutional developments

3. In 1964, the administering Power reported that approval had been given to certain changes in the membership of the Legislative Council and the Urban Council, on the lines of the proposals announced earlier in the year. The number of non-official members of the Legislative Council, all nominated by the Governor, was increased from eight to thirteen, and of official members from nine to twelve. The Governor's powers under the Constitution were not affected by these changes and he retains his original and casting vote.

4. At the same time the membership of the Urban Council was increased by two elected and two nominated non-official members, giving the Council ten elected members, ten members appointed by the Governor, and five official members concerned with urban affairs. Voting remains restricted to persons on the lists of special and common jurors.

5. There are no broadly based political parties in Hong Kong. A new Democratic Self-Government Party was founded in 1963 but was reported not to have received substantial support from the local community.

6. Between 1962 and 1963 the percentage of administrative and professional posts filled by local officers increased from 43.5 per cent to 56 per cent; over the Public Service as a whole, the percentage of overseas officers is 3.1 per cent. During 1963, over 120 local officers were sent abroad for professional training and some \$HK 1.8 million were expended for this purpose.²

Economic conditions

7. Hong Kong's economy is now basically industrial and expanding rapidly. Forty per cent of the labour force is engaged in the manufacturing industry, an estimated 90 per cent of whose production is exported.

8. In 1963, there were 8,348 registered and recorded factories employing 354,394 persons, compared with 7,305 factories employing 297,897 persons in 1962. The textile and garment industry continues to dominate Hong Kong's economy, making up 53 per cent of all domestic exports. Exports in 1963 showed an increase

of 12 per cent over the previous year and were valued at \$HK 3,831 million. (A further increase of \$HK 4,428 million occurred in 1964.) Seventy-four per cent went to the British Commonwealth and the United States of America. The value of re-exports increased by 8 per cent as compared with 1962 to \$HK 1,160 million. Imports increased by approximately 11 per cent to \$HK 7,412 million.

9. Hong Kong continues to be financially self-supporting. In 1962-1963, revenue increased more than 21 per cent over the previous year to \$HK 1,253 million. Expenditures increased more than 16 per cent to \$HK 1,113 million.

Social conditions

10. At the end of 1963, the work force was estimated at 1,400,000 and there was a high level of employment. During 1963, demands for wage increases in numerous industries and occupations resulted in widespread wage adjustments. In a number of industries and occupations the average increase in wages was 7 to 15 per cent. The two leading shipyards granted a flat increase of 33 per cent for labourers and 17.6 per cent for skilled workers. In 1963 there were 313 registered trade unions with 159,211 members, compared with 315 unions and 181,369 members in 1962.

11. The Territory has suffered from severe water shortages which at times restricted the supply of water to four hours every fourth day. The East River Scheme, under which some 15,000 million gallons of water is to be supplied to Hong Kong annually at a reported cost of about £1 million by means of dams and pumping stations constructed by the Chinese authorities in Kwantung, came into operation on 1 March 1965.

12. In 1963, government hospitals and dispensaries had 4,768 and 309 beds respectively, while government-assisted hospitals had 4,709 beds and private hospitals, 1,933. The total number of beds, 11,719 for all purposes, represented an increase of 1,702 from 1962. The government medical staff included 474 medical officers and 46 dental surgeons, compared with 278 and 42 respectively in 1962. The actual expenditures of the Medical and Health Department for 1962-1963, including medical interventions, totalled approximately \$HK 95 million or about 8.5 per cent of all expenditures, an increase of approximately \$HK 6 million over the previous year. In 1963 there were 32.1 live births per 1,000 population and 5.5 deaths. The infant mortality rate was 32.9 per 1,000 live births.

Educational conditions

13. Enrolment in all schools totalled 810,632 in September 1963, an increase of 59,930 over the figure for the previous year. Of that total, 119,511 were studying at government schools, 264,095 at schools receiving government grants or subsidies and 418,811 at private schools. During the year, 78 primary schools and extensions were built, providing 59,800 additional places, and 12 secondary schools and extensions were also built, providing 10,700 additional places.

14. In 1962-1963, the number of students from Hong Kong pursuing further studies in the United Kingdom totalled 568, an increase of 89 over the previous year.

¹ The information presented in this chapter has been derived from published reports, and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter on 10 September 1964.

² One Hong Kong dollar equals 1s.3d. or \$U.S. 0.175.

The year 1963 was remarkable for the establishment of the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

15. Educational expenditures in 1963, including grants and subsidies, totalled \$HK 165,408,602, an increase of more than \$HK 15 million over the previous year.

16. Proposals for the reorganization of primary and secondary education were adopted and placed in operation in September 1963. Under these, the normal age

of entry into government and aided primary schools has been raised from six to seven years, and a new first-year primary course will gradually replace the existing six-year course. As soon as practicable, two years of secondary education will be made available after the primary five-year course in order that pupils may continue their schooling up to the age of fourteen, which is the statutory minimum age for industrial employment. Entry to government and aided secondary schools will continue to be by selective examination.

CHAPTER XXII

FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

Introduction

1. Information on the Territory is contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXIII, paras. 1-25). Information on recent developments is set out below.¹

General

2. On 31 December 1964, the population, excluding that of the Dependencies, was estimated at 2,102, compared with 2,172 at the census in March 1962. With few exceptions, all were of European descent and most were British. The population of the Dependencies (South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands) as at 31 December 1964 was 499.

Political and constitutional developments

3. Elections were held in 1964 when two out of the four elected seats were contested.

4. On 15 May 1964, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies of the United Kingdom stated that since the recent elections in the Colony, the Governor of the Colony had held discussions with the Executive and Legislative Councils and had submitted agreed proposals for changes in the composition of both Councils. By those proposals, the Executive Council, which was previously composed of five non-official members nominated by the Governor and three *ex officio* members, would be composed of two members nominated by the Governor, two elected members of the Legislative Council and two *ex officio* members. The two elected members of the Legislative Council would be chosen by a ballot of the elected and non-official members of the Legislative Council.

5. It was also proposed that the membership of the Legislative Council should be reduced from eleven to eight members by omitting one of the three *ex officio* members and the two nominated official members. The Council would then consist of the Governor and eight members, namely, the Colonial Secretary and the Colonial Treasurer, two nominated non-official members and four elected members.

6. The proposals were approved and the new constitutional arrangements came into operation on 21 September 1964.²

Economic conditions

7. The economy of the Territory continues to depend almost entirely on the wool industry.

8. The external trade figures over the last few years are as follows:

| Year | Domestic exports | Wool exports (in thousand pounds) | Imports |
|------------|------------------|--------------------------------------|---------|
| 1961 | 978 | 908 | 468 |
| 1962 | 940 | 913 | 413 |
| 1963 | 1,078 | 1,054 | 503 |
| 1964 | 1,050 | 1,024 | 545 |

9. Public revenue is derived mainly from income tax, custom duties and the sale of postage stamps. The following table gives the revenue and expenditure over the past few years for the Falkland Islands, excluding the Dependencies:

| Year | Revenue (in thousand pounds) | Expenditure (in thousand pounds) |
|-----------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1961-1962 | 258 | 278 |
| 1962-1963 | 294 | 302 |
| 1963-1964 | 287 | 350 |

10. Assistance to the Territory through Colonial Development and Welfare Fund schemes amounted to £180 in 1963 and £497 in 1964, compared with £11,657 in 1962.

11. The United Kingdom Department for Technical Co-operation has, since the beginning of 1963, filled four appointments in the medical services, nine in education and one in the administration. It is also trying to fill thirteen other posts including one agricultural post.

Social conditions

Labour

12. The supply of labour continued to be adversely affected by the net loss of population through emigration. In 1963, 381 persons left the Territory and 353 arrived, compared with 411 and 368 respectively in 1962.

² See the Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Order, 1964, and The Falkland Islands Additional Instructions, 1964.

¹ The following information transmitted by the administering Power has been taken into account in the preparation of this chapter: information under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter for the year ending 31 December 1963, transmitted on 23 June 1964, and also for the year ending 31 December 1964, transmitted on 2 July 1965.

Public health

13. No significant changes occurred in the field of public health in 1963. Total expenditure in 1963-1964 was £35,590, compared with £34,973 in 1962-1963, and £36,169 in 1961-1962, which included special expenditure. The recurrent medical expenditure in 1964 represented 11.21 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure of the Territory, compared with 12.22 per cent in 1963 and 12.68 per cent in 1962.

Educational conditions

14. In 1963-1964, the number of children receiving education in the Territory was 333, compared with 328 in 1962-1963 and 314 in 1961-1962. In 1962-1963 the number of teachers employed rose from 33 to 35.

15. The Colony awards up to two scholarships annually to boarding grammar schools in the United Kingdom. In 1962-1963, there were eight students from the Territory attending schools in the United Kingdom under this scheme.

16. Recurrent expenditure on education in 1962-1963 was £39,534, representing 13.1 per cent, and in 1963-1964 was £44,204, representing 13.97 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure, compared with £39,552, or 14.24 per cent of the total expenditure in 1961-1962.

B. PETITIONS

17. The Special Committee circulated the following petitions concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas):

| <i>Petitioner</i> | <i>Document No.</i> |
|--|---------------------|
| Six petitions concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) | A/AC.109/PET.357 |
| Miss Cristina B. Miró | |
| Miss María Cristina Tenoglia | |
| Miss Elida Susana Oviedo | |
| Mr. Roberto Heredia | |
| Messrs. Constantino Brandariz, Vice-President, and Hugo Jorge Pacheco, Secretary-General, Universidad Nacional de la Plata | |
| Messrs. Alfredo Palacios, Alberto Candiotti and Leonidas Barletta | |
| | |
| | |
| | |

APPENDIX

Letter dated 20 April 1964 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations, addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee^a

I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency certain comments that my Government wishes to make on document A/AC.109/L.98/Add.2, submitted by the Secretariat to the

^a Included as an appendix to this chapter in accordance with the decision of the Special Committee at the 389th meeting on 7 October 1965.

Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

These comments refer to chapter II, on the Malvinas Islands, and in particular to the part intended to inform the Committee on the "status" of this territory (A/AC.109/L.98/Add.2, chap. II, paras. 4-8).

My Government notes that in dealing with the status of the Malvinas Islands the document leaves out certain fundamental historical facts and legal considerations, thus in our opinion, obscuring the right of the Argentine Republic to this Territory. I shall indicate briefly the most important omissions found by my Government:

- (1) There is no mention of the fact that in 1767 Spain formally took possession of the Malvinas Islands and proceeded to occupy them.
- (2) It is not made clear that in 1770 the British were expelled by the Governor of Buenos Aires.
- (3) There is no reference to the important activities of Spain and Argentina in the period after 1774.
- (4) In particular, it should be made clear that effective occupation of the whole Territory lasted until 1810, when full sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands and adjacent seas passed from Spain to the Argentine Government.
- (5) From then until 1833, the Islands were in fact under Argentine sovereignty and officials appointed by Argentina carried out their functions in the territory.
- (6) It is not made clear that in 1833 the last Argentine administration in the Malvinas Islands was forcibly expelled by British naval units.
- (7) It should also be stated in the document that the Argentine Government protested to Great Britain in 1833 against this occupation of our territory by force and that this protest has since been repeated on many occasions, reservations having been made not only in the United Nations, but in all international organizations to which my country belongs.

In paragraph 3 of the introduction to document A/AC.109/L.98/Add., it is stated that the document was prepared on the basis of official information as well as information available from other published sources.

My Government cannot but note that references to be found in innumerable publications have been left out of the part of the report dealt with in the foregoing paragraphs, which contain a brief account of the historical facts.

In the circumstances, the Argentine Government is obliged to express its concern at finding that, in a case as delicate as that of a disputed territory, there has not been a more thorough treatment of the historical background so as to provide a balanced and complete account that would contribute to the enlightenment of the members of the Committee.

Accordingly, we would respectfully ask Your Excellency to inform the United Nations Secretariat of the Argentine Government's strong desire that appropriate corrections should be made in document A/AC.109/L.98/Add.2, so that it will at least include the information provided in this letter.

The result of this will be that the United Nations will have a more balanced view of the historical aspects of the question, and the information available to the members of the Committee for their consideration of the status of the Malvinas Islands will be more accurate.

CHAPTER XXIII

BERMUDA, BAHAMAS, TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS AND CAYMAN ISLANDS

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

Introduction

1. Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the Cayman Islands, all under United King-

dom administration, were jointly considered by the Special Committee at the second of its two sessions in 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXIV paras. 1-96).

2. Such information as became available on further developments is set out below.

1. *Bermuda*¹*General*

3. In 1963, the estimated total resident civil population was 47,230, compared with 45,491 in 1961. About two thirds of the population is of African or mixed descent and the remainder is of European origin.

Political and constitutional developments

4. The Constitution described in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (*ibid.*, paras. 3-8) remained in effect during 1963-1964. The Governor, appointed by the Queen, is advised by an Executive Council consisting of three official and six unofficial members nominated by the Governor. The six unofficial members are drawn from the lower house of the Legislature, the House of Assembly.

5. The Legislature consists of the Governor, a nominated Legislative Council (Upper House) of eleven members and an elected House of Assembly of thirty-six members. Apart from three officials, the nominated members of the Legislative Council are drawn mainly from ex-members of the lower house, but persons prominent in other spheres of public life are sometimes appointed.

6. The powers of the Legislative Council are theoretically extensive; it reviews legislation passed by the House of Assembly and may itself initiate legislation, except a money bill, but real power rests with the House of Assembly which has full control over finance and which normally initiates legislation. The Governor has power to dissolve the House of Assembly, and the British Crown the power to disallow acts of the colonial Parliament. This power has not been used in recent years.

7. Prior to 1963, the franchise was limited to persons owning freehold property worth £60 or more. In 1963, under the Parliamentary Election Act, the right to vote was extended to all Bermudians and all British subjects over twenty-five years of age who had resided in the Territory for three or more years. A second vote was also granted to persons who owned 2,000 square feet of land or more.

8. The first elections to be held under the new Parliamentary Elections Act took place in the Spring of 1963. Six of the thirty-six seats in the House of Assembly were won by the Progressive Labour Party which was formed in 1963 and which was the only political party existing at the time.

9. The Progressive Labour Party supports proposals for further changes in the Constitution leading towards the formation of "responsible Government" on more conventional lines. They also favour reducing the voting age from twenty-five to twenty-one years and the establishment of an orthodox ministerial system. These proposals have been referred for consideration to the Joint Select Committee of both Houses which was established in 1963 to consider constitutional changes generally.

10. In August 1964, the United Bermuda Party was formed by some twenty-five of the thirty independent members elected to the House of Assembly in 1963, and now commands a majority in the House.

¹ The following information transmitted by the administering Power has been taken into account in the preparation of this section: information under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter for the year ending 31 December 1963, transmitted on 13 October 1964.

The United Bermuda Party also favours reduction of the voting age to twenty-one.

Economic conditions

11. Bermuda's economy continued during the period under review to be based primarily on the tourist industry. Other sources of income and employment include banking and financial institutions, and the activities associated with the registration of many international companies in Bermuda (which has no income tax) and with the operation of the free port and some minor industrial and agricultural activities.

12. Such industries as exist include the manufacture of cosmetics, concentrated essences, and drugs and medicines. Agriculture is confined to the growing of bananas, citrus fruits, potatoes and vegetables for domestic consumption. Milk, eggs and meat are also produced for local consumption. There is a small fishing industry. The Territory has neither forests nor mines.

13. Apart from the small local production of food-stuffs, Bermuda is dependent on imported produce and the cost of living is consequently high.

14. In 1963, imports into the Territory were valued at £19,719,932. Domestic exports were valued at £831,429, and total recorded re-exports at £12,908,897. Imports are mainly made up of food, clothing, fuels, electrical supplies and automobiles. Exports consist of concentrated essences, pharmaceutical products and cosmetics.

15. Although the visible balance of trade continued to be adverse, substantial revenue was derived, as in previous years, from invisible items such as the tourist business, estimated at £12,500,000; repairs to shipping sustaining damage on the neighbouring seas; accommodation, goods and services supplied to the United States bases in Bermuda and estimated to be worth several million pounds annually; considerable investments at generally low rates of interest of United Kingdom capital in Bermudian enterprises; the establishment in large numbers in Bermuda of international companies which, in addition to paying a Government fee of £200 *per annum*, involve substantial legal, banking and accountants fees and other local expenses.

16. The operation of the free port also earned revenue for the Territory, so that, all in all, the true balance of trade was favourable. Imports into the Territory in 1963 came mainly from the United States (£9.2 million) the United Kingdom (£3.8 million) and Canada (£1.9 million).

17. Revenue and expenditure for the years 1961, 1962 and 1963 were as follows:

| | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 |
|-------------------|----------------------|-------|-------|
| | (in thousand pounds) | | |
| Revenue | 5,148 | 5,602 | 5,711 |
| Expenditure | 5,115 | 5,691 | 6,342 |

18. Bermuda is fiscally self-supporting and has been able to finance its development in recent years entirely from its own revenue.

*Social conditions**Labour*

19. The number of those employed at the census in 1960, which are the most recent figures available, was 19,498 (12,737 men and 6,761 women), representing 45.73 per cent of the population. The number of those declaring themselves unemployed was 463 (182 men and 281 women).

20. Early in 1963, a Labour Relations Advisory Committee was appointed consisting of equal numbers of representatives of employers and workers. Its main function is to advise the Governor on labour policy and legislation.

21. In 1963, there were seven unions registered under the Trade Union and Trade Disputes Act, 1946. There is also a Civil Service Association.

22. During early February 1965, a strike was called by the Bermuda Industrial Union at the Bermuda Electric Light Company. The union leaders reportedly demanded that they should be recognized as agents for the company workers. The company in turn allegedly replied that if 52 per cent of all the hourly paid workers voted for the union in a secret ballot, they would accord recognition. The strike led to rioting outside the company premises when pickets reportedly tried to prevent workers from entering and to a wave of sympathy strikes in which dockers, construction workers, garbage collectors, printers, movie house employees and the island's main bakery employees, among others, were involved. A force of the Bermuda Militia Artillery and the Bermuda Rifles of about 400 men was called up after the rioting, as well as some eighty members of the reserve constabulary.

23. By 11 February, following negotiations in which the Governor, Lord Martonmere, government officials, representatives of the electric light company and the union participated, and after a visit of Mr. George Faggon, Labour Adviser to the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development, the strike was settled.

24. The Special Committee was informed of the strike by the Bermuda Industrial Union in a petition dated 4 February 1965 (A/AC.109/PET.343).

25. Dr. Barbara Ball, Secretary-General of the Bermuda Industrial Union, who appeared before the Special Committee at its 286th meeting on 5 October 1964, was arrested in connexion with her activities during the strike. One of the six charges against her was reportedly for taking part in a riot arising out of picketing of the Bermuda Electric Light Company. The first hearing was reportedly stopped when Sir Miles Abbott, the Chief Justice, discharged the jury and ordered a new trial. She went on trial for the second time in the Supreme Court on 22 June 1965.

Public health

26. The administrative organization primarily responsible for governmental activities in respect of public health and sanitation is the Medical and Health Department.

27. Recurrent expenditure on health amounted to £712,732 in 1963, this being 11.24 per cent of the total government expenditure for the year, compared with £383,511, or approximately 6.7 per cent of the total expenditure in 1962. In addition, the Public Works Department spent £784,029 and £21,716 respectively on new hospital buildings and the mental hospital.

28. There are four hospitals: King Edward VII Memorial Hospital (360 beds), the mental hospital and leprosarium, Prospect Hospital and Lefroy House. Baby clinics and women's clinics are also supported by the Medical and Health Services.

29. The only institution available for the training of auxiliary personnel is the King Edward Hospital.

Other medical personnel obtain their training in either the United Kingdom or Canada.

30. In 1963, the death-rate was 7.2 per thousand. The infant mortality rate was 27.0 per thousand live births.

31. Because of the high standard of living as a whole, dietary conditions are satisfactory, although conditions of sub-nutrition are found in small numbers.

Educational conditions

32. Education is free and compulsory for all children over 7 and under 13 years of age. The estimated number of children in this age group at the end of 1963 was 6,328. Of these 6,095 were enrolled in schools and 233 were not attending school owing to mental or physical disability. There were 2,789 pupils under seven years of age and 2,787 over thirteen also enrolled in the schools.

33. Public schools are classified as "vested" or "non-vested". The former are managed by local committees, the latter are directly administered by the Board of Education. In addition, children also attend private schools at which fees are charged varying from £5 to £105 *per annum*.

34. The distribution of schools and pupils in Bermuda on 31 December 1963 was as follows:

| Category of school | No. of schools | No. of pupils | | Total pupils |
|---|----------------|---------------|--------|--------------|
| | | Male | Female | |
| Government primary | 18 | 2,876 | 2,812 | 5,688 |
| Government-aided primary .. | 9 | 883 | 718 | 1,601 |
| Government-aided secondary | 11 | 877 | 1,111 | 1,988 |
| Government-aided technical and vocational | 8 | 192 | 126 | 318 |
| Unaided primary | 28 | 688 | 998 | 1,686 |
| Unaided secondary | 4 | 107 | 219 | 326 |
| Unaided technical and vocational | 1 | 26 | 38 | 64 |
| TOTAL | 79 | 5,649 | 6,022 | 11,671 |

35. Expenditure on education in 1963 was £1,081,789, representing 17.1 per cent of total government expenditure, as compared with £647,197, or approximately 12.9 per cent in 1962.

36. There is no university in Bermuda. One Rhodes scholarship is allotted to the Territory every year. In addition, a maximum of six scholarships are offered annually, tenable for three years, at approved institutions of higher education abroad. There are no teacher-training colleges in Bermuda and a number of scholarships are also provided for teacher-training abroad.

37. In 1963, seven scholarships tenable in England for 1963-1966 and three scholarships tenable in Canada for 1963-1965 were awarded. The sum of £7,561 was expended on scholarships during the year.

2. Bahamas²

Political and constitutional developments

38. The new Constitution which came into force on 7 January 1964 continued in effect during the period under review. This Constitution, replacing one which

² The following information transmitted by the administering Power has been taken into account in the preparation of this section: information under Article 73e of the United Nations Charter for the year ending 31 December 1963, transmitted on 28 October 1964.

had subsisted in much the same form since 1729, followed upon the Constitutional Conference held in London in May 1963. It provided for a ministerial system of Government with a bicameral legislature consisting of a Senate (formerly the Legislative Council) and a House of Assembly.

39. Subject to the assent of the Governor who is appointed by the Queen and exercises executive authority on behalf of the Queen, the Legislature may make "laws for the peace, order and good government of the Bahama Islands". However, reserved powers are retained in respect of external affairs, defence, internal security and control of the police, to be exercised by the Governor in his discretion. Power to enact legislation involving taxation or expenditure of public money is also restricted and normally such legislation can be introduced only on the recommendation, or with the consent, of the Governor, acting on the advice of the ministers.

40. The Cabinet consists of the Premier and at least eight ministers appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Premier. The Premier is a member of the House of Assembly who, in the Governor's judgement, is best able to command the confidence of a majority of its members. Up to three ministers are chosen from the Senate and the remainder from the House of Assembly. The present Cabinet is headed by Sir Roland Symonette, leader of the United Bahamian Party. Generally, the Governor is required to obtain and act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet which has general direction and control of the government of the Territory. However, it has no responsibility with regard to courts and criminal proceedings, the audit of the Territory's accounts or the Public Service.

41. The Senate, which has limited powers of delaying legislation passed by the Lower House, is composed of fifteen members, of whom eight are appointed by the Governor after consultation with the Premier and any such other persons as he may decide to consult, five by the Governor on the advice of the Premier and two by the Governor on the advice of the leader of the opposition.

42. The present House of Assembly was elected in December 1962 on the basis of the electoral laws of 1959, as amended in 1962 to extend the franchise to women. These laws provided for adult suffrage and a limited second vote in respect of ownership and/or rental of real property in a constituency other than that in which the elector resided.

43. As constituted at present, the House of Assembly is composed of thirty-three members as follows:

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------|
| United Bahamian Party | 24 seats |
| Progressive Liberal Party | 7 seats |
| Independents | 1 seat |
| Labour Party | 1 seat |

44. After the next general election which is due to be held sometime before December 1967, the House of Assembly will consist, under the new Constitution, of thirty-eight members elected by universal adult suffrage, the second vote having been abolished.

45. In petitions dated 22, 23 and 28 April 1965 (A/AC.109/PET.377 and Add.1), Mr. Lynden O. Pindling, leader of the Progressive Liberal Party, requested United Nations investigation into the question of representation in the House of Assembly. He stated that a riot had been narrowly averted when demonstrations were held outside the House and that the United

Bahamian Party Government had passed an "unfair boundaries draft order". His party was determined not to accept the proposed order "distributing assembly seats in the country".

Economic conditions

46. The tourist industry continues to be the basis of the Territory's prosperity and the chief source of revenue. Intensive publicity of the Ministry of Tourism, particularly in the United States and Canada, resulted in a further increase in the number of visitors to the Islands in 1963—namely 546,404 as against totals of 444,870, 368,211 and 341,977 for the three previous years. Unemployment remained low in 1963 and the building boom continued. Permits worth over \$16.8 million were issued during the year, \$2.8 million more than in the previous year.

47. On the whole, the soil of the islands is shallow and unsuitable for large-scale farming. Arable land under cultivation is estimated at 35,000 acres. The bulk of the farming is done by individual farmers, although there are six large-scale agricultural enterprises producing tomatoes and cucumbers for export to the United States and Canada. Principal crops for local consumption and export are seasonal vegetables, onions, tomatoes, cucumbers, pineapples, citrus fruits, bananas, pigeon peas and beans. The area of improved pasture land is approximately 3,200 acres and the total area of forest land is estimated at slightly less than 800,000 acres. Livestock includes poultry, pigs, goats, sheep, cattle and horses. The bulk of the livestock, other than poultry, is owned by small farmers. Approximately half the poultry is owned by Eleuthera Limited, Hatchet Bay, Eleuthera.

48. There are a number of small industries, including canneries, fish processing, boat building and the production of mineral waters. Some oil exploration activity continued in 1963 but there was no prospecting nor mining.

49. A port is being developed for industrial, commercial and residential purposes on 155,000 acres of land on Grand Bahama by private capital from the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. In addition, educational, medical and other services are to be provided. At October 1964, licences to operate in the area had been issued to over eighty firms, the largest of which was a cement works in which the initial capital investment amounted to some \$60-\$70 million. A \$2 million hormones preparations plant was also planned. One of the largest off-shore bunkering terminals in the world and a number of light industries were already in operation, as of October 1964, as were several hotels.

50. The main domestic exports from the Bahamas are pulpwood, crawfish, salt, sponges, and canned tomatoes, pineapples and cucumbers which were valued at £1,634,960 in 1963, compared with £2,013,778 in 1962. The principal buyers of the Territory's exports are the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States and the British West Indies. The value of imports during 1963 amounted to £28,264,936, chiefly supplied by the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Aruba, compared with £24,524,492 in 1962. The adverse balance of visible trade is offset mainly by the tourist industry and capital investment from overseas, chiefly from the United Kingdom and the United States.

51. The total revenue of the Territory continued to rise in 1963 to £9.6 million, compared with £8.69

million in 1962 and £8.56 million in 1961. Expenditure amounted to £9.8 million. Apart from a real property tax there is no direct taxation. The death duty of 4 per cent on personal property was repealed by the House of Assembly in December 1964. Customs duties (£5.98 million in 1963) and receipts from fees and public utilities are the main source of revenue. The Bahamas are entirely self-supporting financially, including public development.

Social conditions

Labour

52. The tourist industry is the chief source of employment. Other employers of labour in Nassau are the growing numbers of firms supplying banking investments and commercial services and in construction and in the distributive trades. In recent years, a growing demand for labour in the other islands for construction work, for the two large salt works and for lumber work has been partly filled by migrants from elsewhere in the West Indies particularly from the Turks and Caicos Islands. Agricultural work in the United States provides employment for an average of 1,300 unskilled labourers whose earnings in 1961 amounted to more than \$2.5 million. Unemployment in the Territory is almost negligible.

53. In 1963, there were a total of seventeen registered trade unions and four employers' associations. There was one labour dispute involving a small section of workers on strike for five days. The average wage is £5 per week.

Public health

54. Medical and health services are the responsibility of the Ministry for Health. There are three main government hospitals: Princess Margaret Hospital (500 beds), the Sandilands Mental Hospital (200 beds) and a hospital for geriatrics and spastics (100 beds).

55. There are also clinics on every main island, cottage hospitals at Eleuthera and Irangua and a small leprosarium on New Providence.

56. The death-rate in the Territory is 7.83 per thousand. The principal diseases are tuberculosis, respiratory complaints, general abdominal complaints, hypertension and malnutrition.

57. Medical and health staff in 1963 included 68 registered physicians (24 private), one private licensed physician, 4 private sub-assistant surgeons, 236 nurses (95 private), 98 government partially trained nurses, 236 midwives (95 private), 80 partially trained midwives (63 private), 4 government sanitary inspectors, 16 laboratory and X-ray technicians (2 private) and 86 pharmacists (80 private). In 1961, the medical and health staff included 69 registered physicians (29 private), 4 private sub-assistant surgeons, 243 nurses (95 private), 71 government partially trained nurses, 208 midwives (95 private), 74 partially trained midwives (63 private), 4 government sanitary inspectors, 15 government laboratory and X-ray technicians and 87 pharmacists (80 private).

58. Capital and recurrent expenditure by the Government on health services amounted to £1,126,358 during 1963, compared with £972,066 in 1962.

Educational conditions

59. Education is administered under the Education Act, 1962, and is the responsibility of the Ministry for

Education. Education is free and compulsory between the ages of five and fourteen.

60. The number of schools in the Territory in 1963 was as follows:

| | Primary | Secondary and post-primary | Post-secondary |
|-----------------------|------------------|----------------------------|----------------|
| Government | 148 ^a | 5 | 2 |
| Local authority | — | — | — |
| Aided | — | 4 | — |
| Unaided | 43 | 5 | — |
| TOTAL | 191 | 14^b | 2 |

^a Includes 115 all-age schools.

^b Four of these have their own primary departments.

61. Primary school enrolment in 1963 numbered 27,435. Some 5,192 pupils were enrolled in secondary or post-primary schools.

62. In 1962, a Technical Institute offering courses in engineering, building construction and commerce was established. There is also a Teachers' Training College.

63. No local provision is made at present for higher education for which students go overseas with the aid, in appropriate cases, of government scholarships. Precise figures of those studying abroad are not available, but some 277 students were studying abroad in 1963 in the United Kingdom (96), Canada (16) and the United States (165). The Bahamas recently became affiliated with the University of the West Indies.

64. Government expenditure on education in 1963 amounted to £1,044,400, compared with £900,814 in 1962.

3. Turks and Caicos Islands³

General

65. The estimated population at 31 December 1962 was 6,035, compared with an estimated 6,100 in the previous year.

Political and constitutional developments

66. As previously reported, in August 1962, when Jamaica attained its independence, the Turks and Caicos Islands became a Crown Colony directly administered by the United Kingdom. At the end of 1963, the Government of Turks and Caicos Islands expressed an interest in joining the Bahamas, and the Bahamas Government agreed to discuss the matter. This was considered in June 1964, by a Working Party composed of representatives of the three Governments concerned, to which that group submitted its recommendations. At the meeting held on that occasion, it was decided that the Bahamas Government, while sympathizing with the desire of the Turks and Caicos Islands to join a larger grouping, could not, for the time being, offer a merger. A proposal was made for a looser form of association patterned after the former association of the Turks and Caicos with Jamaica, which would have the object of "testing in practice the feasibility of realizing the present hopes of the people of the Turks and Caicos for an ultimate merger". The Working Party recognized that "before any final decision could be taken, even if successful effect were given to the present proposals for association, it would be necessary to determine the

³ The following information transmitted by the administering Power has been taken into account in the preparation of this section: information under Article 73e of the United Nations Charter for the year ending 31 December 1963, transmitted on 2 November 1964.

wishes of the people of both the Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos Islands". This proposal is being studied by the three Governments.

Public Service

67. In 1963, the number of overseas officers fell from seventeen to fifteen, of whom one was pensionable, while the number of local and other officers rose from 152 to 177. Training for members of the Public Service continues to be provided outside the Territory. During 1963, one member of the Service was sent on a course in the United Kingdom, while three others attended courses in Jamaica.

Economic conditions

68. For many years the government-owned salt industry has relied upon government subsidies of the order of £27,000-£30,000 a year to meet annual recurrent costs. Faced with the need for increasingly large annual subsidies and capital expenditure amounting to some £650,000, it has been decided that the industry should be closed. Production ceased at two of the three main centres in December 1964 and the third is expected to close in due course. The employees will be provided with either a pension or a gratuity, depending on length of service, and it is hoped to provide alternative employment for the redundant workers in the fishing and tourist industries.

69. In 1963, imports were valued at £300,000 and exports at £73,000. The principal items imported are food, drink, tobacco and manufactured goods. The principal exports are salt, valued at £37,000 in 1963; crawfish, £28,000; sisal, £3,000; conchs and conch shells.

70. The principal sources of local revenue continue to be customs duties and the sale of stamps. There is no direct taxation in the islands. The islands are heavily dependent on grants from the British Government. The grant-in-aid for 1963 was £139,483. The revised total grant-in-aid figure for 1964 was £159,116, while local revenue in 1964 was estimated at about £58,000.

71. Under the Commonwealth Development Act and earlier legislation the United Kingdom allocated some £268,000 for development during the period 1958 to 1966. Of that allocation £144,000 had, by the end of 1963, been spent. A fairly large proportion of those funds have been committed in recent years for the re-equipping and running of the salt industry, which is wholly owned by the Government. There has also been expenditure on water storage schemes, hospital improvements, a government launch, training schemes and on assistance for development in the Caicos settlements.

72. The current development plan for 1964-1966 puts particular emphasis on the improvement of communications in the Territory, the provision of water storage facilities and of an electricity supply for Grand Turk, training facilities (including technical education) and on the development of the Territory's fishing and tourist industries. The plan provides for expenditure of £109,000 from Colonial Development and Welfare funds in the three-year period up to March 1966. During 1965, a government-run guest house was opened at Grand Turk and efforts were being made to recruit a fisheries officer to advise on the development of a fisheries co-operative. With the assistance from Colonial Development and Welfare funds, the sisal crop in the Caicos Islands, which was ruined by a hurricane, has

been replaced, and it is expected that in the years to come there will be a considerable increase in population.

Social conditions

Labour

73. Until 1964, the Turks Islands Salt Company Limited was the chief employer of labour (with an average employment of 200). Other sources of employment are the United States bases, the fishing industry and a shell factory. In addition, many men from these islands find employment in the Bahamas and their remittances are a regular source of income for their families.

Public health

74. The average death-rate in the islands was 10.1 per thousand in 1963. Gastro-intestinal diseases are the most common diseases in the islands due to the difficulty of ensuring that the water supply is kept pure, and the presence of flies. The United States Department of Agriculture has initiated a fly eradication programme in Grand Turk Island which has led to the almost complete disappearance of house flies. There are two government medical officers, one stationed in Grand Turk, where there is a twenty-five bed hospital, and the other in South Caicos. Government recurrent expenditure on public health amounted to £27,409 in 1963 (9.5 per cent of total expenditure) and £20,727 in 1962 (8.0 per cent of total expenditure). Two Turks and Caicos Islanders are undergoing training in medicine and dentistry, respectively, with funds provided under Colonial Development and Welfare schemes. Women from the Turks and Caicos Islands are also given nurses' training in Jamaica, at the expense of the Turks and Caicos Islands Government.

Educational conditions

75. In 1963, there were thirteen schools. The school at Grand Turk is divided into junior and secondary sections. In the secondary school, the pupils are prepared for the Cambridge University Joint School Certificate and General Certificate of Education Examination, or the London University General Certificate of Education Examination. In 1963 the average enrolment was 1,449. Education is free, and in addition, thirteen government scholarships worth £30 *per annum* were awarded to pupils from the out islands attending the secondary section of the Grand Turk School. Four other scholarships are also awarded by private sources.

76. Recurrent expenditure on education was £21,604, or about 7.5 per cent of the total budget in 1963, and £20,905, or 8 per cent of total government expenditure in 1962.

4. Cayman Islands⁴

Political and constitutional developments

77. The political and constitutional situation, according to the information available, remained basically the same during 1963-1964, as described in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXIV, paras. 77-88).

⁴ The following information transmitted by the administering Power has been taken into account in the preparation of this section: information under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter for the year ending 31 December 1963, transmitted on 9 October 1964.

Economic conditions

78. The economic mainstay of the islands continues to be the employment of Caymanian seamen on American owned ships registered outside the United States. Upward of 1,000 seamen are so employed, and a great majority make regular dollar remittances to their families in the islands. Another significant factor in the islands' economic development is the expansion of the tourist trade. An estimated 2,553 tourists visited the islands in 1963, compared with 2,120 in 1962.

79. The principal items of import are food-stuffs, textiles and fuel oil. The principal exports are turtles and turtle products, rope and shark skins. The value to the islands of exports of turtles, turtle skin, turtle shell and turtle meat amounted to £21,385 in 1963. Coconuts are grown in Cayman Brac and Little Cayman. Approximately two thirds of the trade of the islands is with the United States. Sugar, coffee, cement, liquor, kerosene and condensed milk are imported exclusively from Jamaica. In 1963, imports were £838,886 and exports £34,490, compared with £758,888 and £27,532 in 1962.

80. The principal sources of government revenue continue to be the sale of postage stamps and import duty as there is no income tax, estate duty or excise duty. In 1963, revenue was £258,375 and expenditure £242,503, compared with £241,628 and £231,889 in 1962.

81. The British Government has allocated, under the Commonwealth Development Act and earlier colonial development and welfare legislation, a total of £207,000 for development in the islands during the period 1953 to 1966. Of this allocation, £107,000 had, up to the end of 1963, been spent with social services (education and health) accounting for 46 per cent, and economic projects (such as road construction and electricity) for the rest.

*Social conditions**Labour*

82. As the majority of the able-bodied men are away at sea most of the time, there is a shortage of labour in the islands. One trade union is registered

in the Cayman Islands, with a total membership of some 5,665, of whom about one third are Cayman Islanders.

Public health

83. During the year under review a medical officer from the Jamaican Government Medical Service was seconded to the islands. There is also a government-subsidized private medical practitioner in Grand Cayman. In 1963, a government-subsidized private medical practitioner was appointed to replace the doctor who resigned in 1962 at Cayman Brac. The health officer, who had previously undergone a course of training at the Public Health School in Jamaica, supervised a campaign of improved public health measures and mosquito control. The average death-rate in 1963 in the islands was 7.5 per thousand. Expenditure on public health amounted to £34,973 in 1963, representing 14.4 per cent of total government expenditure, compared with £32,847, representing 13.6 per cent of total government expenditure, in 1962.

Educational conditions

84. In 1963 there were ten government primary schools in operation. In addition, there are a number of church-sponsored schools, the principal of which is the Cayman High School, heavily subsidized by a government grant-in-aid. There is also a church-sponsored private high school operated on American lines. Enrolment in all schools in 1962 was 1,200, of which 138 were receiving post-primary education. Many of the teachers are recruited from Jamaica. In addition, scholarships have been awarded from Colonial Development and Welfare funds to two Caymanians to undertake degree courses at the University of the West Indies on the condition that they return to teach in the Cayman Islands for a specified period at the end of their training. Recurrent expenditure on education in 1963 was £33,833, representing 14.7 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure, compared with £29,744, representing 12.3 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure, in 1962.

B. WRITTEN PETITIONS AND HEARINGS

85. The Special Committee circulated the following petitions concerning Bermuda and the Bahamas.

| <i>Territory</i> | <i>Petitioner</i> | <i>Document</i> |
|------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| Bermuda | Mr. W. G. Brown, General Secretary, Bermuda Constitutional Conference | A/AC.109/PET.342 and Add.1 and 2 |
| Bermuda | Bermuda Industrial Union | A/AC.109/PET.343 |
| Bahamas | Mr. L. O. Pindling, Leader of the Opposition and of the Progressive Liberal Party | A/AC.109/PET.377 and Add.1 |

86. At its 376th and 377th meetings on 23 and 24 August 1965, the Special Committee heard Mr. L. O. Pindling, Leader of the Opposition and of the Progressive Liberal Party, as a petitioner. Mr. Pindling was accompanied by Mr. C. W. Whitfield, Mr. C. A. Bai., Mr. M. B. Butler, Mr. A. D. Hanna, Mr. A. A. Foulkes, Mrs. D. Johnson and Mr. H. W. Brown.

87. Mr. Pindling (Leader of the Opposition and of the Progressive Liberal Party of the Bahamas) expressed his compatriots' confidence in the United Nations. In April, the people of the Bahama Islands had submitted a petition (A/AC.109/PET.377) to the Special Committee with the object of informing it

of the great disquiet they felt about the explosive situation in the country and in the hope of bringing about a victory for the ideals of peace and democracy which the Committee had so long upheld. Another petition had been submitted at the same time to the Secretary of State for the Colonies of the United Kingdom Government. The Secretary of State had replied, through the Governor of the Bahamas, that he was "unable to intervene". He believed that if the tragic situation which existed in the Bahamas on 27 April had taken a serious turn, the Secretary for the Colonies would have been only too happy to intervene—by calling in British troops.

88. The Special Committee's Sub-Committee III had already considered the question of the Bahamas at its 31st, 32nd, 38th and 39th meetings in September and October 1964. At that time it had formulated the specific conclusions and recommendations reproduced in paragraphs 133 to 134 of chapter twenty-four of document A/5800/Rev.1, from which he would quote. The United Kingdom had done nothing to implement them. Since the information previously made available to the Committee was incomplete and in many respects incorrect, he wished to give a full picture of the political, economic and social situation in his country.

89. The petitioners had not come to seek independence for the Bahamas, for, under the present conditions, independence would be meaningless. For the last three centuries a powerful ethnic minority had, with the support of the United Kingdom Government, controlled the political, economic and social life of the country, and silenced opposition. The Bahamas, which had been under the domination of European Powers since the landing of Christopher Columbus in 1492, were often represented as a tourists' paradise: they were anything but a paradise for the indigenous population.

90. According to a 1964 report by the Ministry of Labour, there was a work force of 51,948 persons in the islands; those workers had not been able to establish a dynamic trade union movement because they were hampered by coercive and restrictive legislation. There were about seventeen trade unions in the Bahamas. The United Bahamian Party, which was at present in power, had prohibited the formation of a single national union, and sympathy strikes were prohibited. Those measures had been taken under the Trade Union and Industrial Conciliation Act of 1958, which it had proved impossible to amend. That Act appeared to contravene at least one ILO Convention, Convention 98, which had been ratified by the United Kingdom Government and which made provision, in article 4, for the development and utilization of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers' and workers' organizations. Under the Trade Union and Industrial Conciliation Act, each industry had to have a separate union, which meant that the unions were all small. Their effective operating size was further reduced by the need to establish branches in remote islands scattered over some 500 miles. The Act also made it illegal for an employer or employers' organization and a trade union or federation of trade unions to agree to any system whereby union dues could be deducted from employees' wages at the time of payment. That provision definitely restricted the freedom of the union to negotiate agreements in the best interests of the workers. Similarly, the Act made it illegal for union and employer to agree to establish a union shop in any place of employment. Those legal and geographical restrictions placed definite limitations on the organization and operation of the trade union movement. Workers in the Bahamas had on many occasions protested against the situation in which they were placed. In 1942, a dispute in connexion with unsatisfactory wages and working conditions had led to a riot. In 1958, a mass protest which had begun in the transport industry developed into the country's first general strike. Although the strikers had not committed a single act of violence, the British Government had kept troops in the country for a long period at the expense of the population. It was as a result of that strike that the Secretary of State for the Colonies had visited the Bahamas in order to propose certain political changes and urge the Gov-

ernment to make certain improvements in the country's labour legislation: the result of those improvements had been the 1958 Act. There had been other strikes since then, including one at Andros, where the workers had demanded improvements in wages from the contractors for the Atlantic Underwater Evaluation Testing Centre.

91. On Grand Bahama the Government had handed over local government powers to a private company which was responsible only to its shareholders.

92. In the field of social planning, the United Kingdom had never urged the Bahamas Government to implement the provisions of ILO Convention No. 63, and the country had no department of statistics. The building of schools and hospitals was carried out haphazardly and on the basis of personal preferences.

93. Trade unions had no say in the planning of public services which directly affected the people, such as housing, health services or social services; they were not represented on advisory bodies; they were not consulted about immigration and the Bahamas were being inundated by foreigners, many unskilled workers, who overcrowded the labour market. These workers came from Malta, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, the West Indies, Haiti and other countries. Present regulations required application to be made to the Department of Immigration for the employment of all persons other than native-born Bahamians or their children. On many occasions, however, persons were brought in over the objections of the trade-union movement. The Bahamian labour force possessed many of the skills required, for example, in the hotel and building industries and could be trained in other skills; the trade unions in those industries, however, did not receive adequate co-operation from the Department of Labour and the Department of Immigration with regard to the employment or training of Bahamians in preference to imported labour.

94. Under the special Act creating the Grand Bahama Port Authority, even those regulations on labour which applied in the rest of the Bahamas did not apply in Freeport. Workers were imported without previous application to the Department of Immigration; construction companies and hotel operators had refused to recognize trade unions and were victimizing persons who tried to organize and lead trade unions. Since the imported workers were subject to deportation and return to their homeland at any time, they were chary of joining the Bahamian trade-union movement and thus hampered its growth.

95. The importation of labour also had a political effect since workers from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, the West Indies and other parts of the British Commonwealth tended to vote to protect the *status quo* and their own employment but not necessarily the best interests of the Bahamas. Continued immigration would mean that the balance of population—at present about 80 per cent black and 20 per cent white—would be changed in the foreseeable future.

96. Foreign investment could enter the Bahamas through the immigration of an individual businessman, the formation of a Bahamian company by a foreign individual, or the registration of a foreign company under the Foreign Companies Act. Some control was exercised over the type of business in which foreign investment was permitted; the bulk of foreign capital came from North America and, to a lesser extent, from the United Kingdom. No distinction was made

between a locally financed company and a company financed from abroad.

97. Although the people had long been asking for improved social conditions, no low-cost housing programme had been started and the lack of hospital facilities and a sewerage system had been responsible for the reappearance of communicable diseases in the populous district of New Providence.

98. All ministers in the Bahamian Cabinet were Bahamian born, with the exception of one who had now been granted status roughly equivalent to that of being Bahamian born. They all belonged to the merchant oligarchy, which had been in control since 1729 and was of European extraction. The ministers owned large shares in the majority of local enterprises and benefited from government contracts, all with the tacit approval of the United Kingdom Government. For example, the Prime Minister was perhaps the biggest road-builder in the country. The Minister of Maritime Affairs was a major supplier of lumber and hardware goods to the Government and perhaps the biggest shipowner in the country. The Minister of Agriculture had large farming interests and supplied air-conditioning material to the Government as did the Minister of Electricity. The Minister of Finance and Tourism was head of a food chain, an insurance company and a law firm which often represented his Ministry and his clients at the same time. That state of affairs had always existed. Before ministerial government had been introduced, executive government had been shared by public boards, whose chairmen and members had acted in the same manner as the present ministers. At the time of the 1963 Constitutional Conference in London the point had been raised by the representatives of the Progressive Liberal Party and the Labour Party. The United Kingdom representatives had been fully apprised of the situation but although they had agreed that such conduct was not entirely satisfactory, they had considered that in the circumstances it might be advisable to leave things as they were. The matter of conflict of interests had also been discussed in great detail in the House of Assembly after ministerial government had been introduced in January 1964, but no action had been taken.

99. Every single member of the Government was engaged in business and received lucrative government contracts at the same time. The United Kingdom was aware of that and the system was such that it was easy to imagine the abuse and corruption to which it might give rise. While the ruling group had accumulated great wealth, it was maintaining an iniquitous method of taxation and the wealthy were by no means bearing their fair share of the tax burden. There was no income tax and very little direct taxation in the Bahamas. The greater part of the revenue was gathered from customs duties and *ad valorem* stamp taxes which were passed on ultimately to the consumer; that was one of the reasons why the cost of living in the islands was abnormally high. The over-all picture of the present situation in the Bahamas was that the country was economically and financially in the very same hands that exercised political control. Moreover, for three centuries, the British had never introduced any development plan for the islands to improve the situation of the people both socially and economically and in the field of education, and the Territory was now paying for centuries of neglect.

100. In the field of education, it was immediately obvious that the present system was inadequate for

present needs and even more so for future needs. Less than 6 per cent of the school population was receiving grammar school education. The system was antiquated and classes were overcrowded. Moreover, almost three quarters of the teaching staff of the lower grades were untrained and a substantial proportion of those were barely literate. That was again clear evidence of absolute neglect. The result was that in 1964, out of 300 Out Island children who sat for the grammar-school entrance examination, only thirteen had qualified to enter. A crash programme for training teachers was thus an absolute necessity. The reason why it was not mentioned in official statements was that the children of the ruling minority did not suffer from the deplorable state of education since they generally attended a racially segregated school in Nassau. This school was a privately owned school which was racially and economically segregated. It included primary and grammar-school grades and was operated by a private company; no child could attend the school unless his parents were shareholders or unless he was recommended by a shareholder. He did not know the exact fees charged by the school, but they were much higher than those prevailing in the secondary schools maintained by the Government or by religious organizations. No segregated schools were maintained by the Bahamian Government.

101. With regard to the average earnings of Bahamians, compared with the fees charged by Government-controlled schools, according to a recent survey made by a foreign agency, the average yearly income of a Bahamian was about £200, which did not go very far when the high cost of living was taken into account. The Government High School charged a low annual fee of £10.10.0, which included tuition and books, and was now attended by more than 500 children. The fees in the Anglican and Methodist secondary schools were approximately four times those of the Government High School and the fees in the boys' Roman Catholic secondary school were somewhat higher, but that might be accounted for by the fact that the Roman Catholic secondary school gave a more comprehensive type of education, including some practical training. There were just under 100 seats available at the Government High School every year. The present school population was approaching 30,000.

102. With regard to the right to vote, it was necessary to distinguish between principles and their application. After the general strike in January 1958, the franchise had been extended to all males, and plural voting had been limited to some degree. Later, in 1961, the vote was granted to women. However, in practice, there was great inequality in representation. Before 1930, the bulk of the population of the Bahamas had lived in the Out Islands. Subsequently, however, large shifts of population had occurred so that in 1962, only one third lived in the Out Islands and two thirds in Nassau. Nevertheless, representation had continued to be based on the old figures. In the 1962 elections, the delimitation of constituencies had been such that the Progressive Liberal Party, which had polled 44 per cent of the total vote, had secured just 24.3 per cent of the representation, while the United Bahamian Party, with 36.6 per cent of the votes polled, had secured 57.6 per cent of the representation. Thus, the voice of the people had been muffled.

103. The Constitutional Conference, which had been held after the 1962 elections, failed to establish a system to meet the two basic requirements: majority rule and

the right of each citizen to have his vote counted at equal value. The distribution of seats which had been embodied in the report on the Constitution had been presented to the participants of the Conferences on a "take it or leave it" basis and it had not been possible to discuss it. Moreover, since the coming into force of the Constitution, the United Bahamian Party had seemed determined not to abide by the spirit of that Constitution and the result was even more glaring inequality of electoral representation. The ruling team seemed to have even abandoned any pretence of upholding the principles of majority rule and equality in voting. Although the Constitution called for the distribution of voters and seats to be made in the most equitable manner practicable, on 27 April 1965 the Government had adopted electoral provisions under which Harbour Island, for example, which had a population of only 3,236 was given two seats which was as many as Grand Bahama and Bimini which had a population of 9,882.

104. Since 1964, there had been a Constituencies Commission, provision for which had been made in the Constitution that had come into force in January 1964. The Commission had made certain recommendations, but in the opinion of his party, those recommendations still did not establish equal representation. The present Order on Constituencies contained gross inequalities and did not provide for majority rule; that was the most pressing issue which had prompted the petitioners to appeal to the Special Committee and had given rise to demonstrations by thousands of people all over the island of New Providence. The Government had been adamant in opposing the repeal of the Order on Constituencies, since that Order in its present form still left the political control of the islands in the hands of a small minority of the people; by "small minority" he meant not only the ethnic minority which governed the country but the minority which might elect a majority of the representatives.

105. He pointed out that the Constitution provided for a fixed basis of representation for the next general election. There would be seventeen seats for the island of New Providence and twenty-one seats for the remainder of the islands. According to the Constitution and the general directions given to the Constituencies Commission, the representation for each member was supposed to be as nearly equal as was reasonably practical. His party objected to the present Constituencies Order because the constituencies in areas of mass population in New Providence numbered more voters than constituencies in well-to-do areas. In trying to establish their case for the Bahamas Legislature, his party had sent out survey teams. The Constituencies Commission had arrived at a mean of 1,600 voters per constituency in New Providence, but the survey had shown that in the mass population areas the average was 2,400 and in the more well-to-do areas, 1,250. In the Out Islands, where the twenty-one remaining seats were to have been distributed as equally as possible, no attempt had been made to justify the principle. The only changes made had been the addition of one seat in the Andros constituency and one seat in the Grand Bahama constituency. That, in his party's opinion, still left a grossly inequitable representation system in the Out Islands, particularly with respect to the representation given to Grand Bahama and Bimini, Andros and Berry Islands, Abaco, Eleuthera, Exuma, Harbour Island and Cat Island. He had deliberately omitted Acklins, Inagua and San Salvador. Provision

was made in the Constitution for those three special areas, although his party had expressed its disagreement and reservations in that regard at the time of the Constitutional Conference.

106. In such circumstances, the Opposition could no longer fulfil its functions. It could not lend itself to what was in fact nothing more than a dictatorship disguised as a democracy. In order to have a fair evaluation and distribution of the seats the present Order should be revoked *in toto* and new recommendations should be made, based upon the principle of majority rule. His party's programme of electoral reform had been embodied in a memorandum submitted to the Colonial Office of the administering Power at the time of the Constitutional Conference in May 1963. The following reforms had been requested: there must be no equivocations with regard to the principle of majority rule; specific instructions, not vague and general instructions such as those now embodied in the Constitution, must be given to the Constituencies Commission, which must ensure that representation was of the people and not of land areas; single-member constituencies must be created, since in his party's opinion that was the best way of ensuring that the will of the people would be expressed.

107. He himself had been advised the previous week that the Secretary of State, during his visit in October, wished to discuss with him the difficulties that had arisen in connexion with the delimitation of constituencies. However, since the Secretary of State had at the same time stated that he was unable to intervene in the matter, he failed to see the purpose of the proposed discussions.

108. The situation was such that he wondered how much longer the United Kingdom Government would continue to close its eyes and ignore the recommendations of the Special Committee. The people of the Bahamas hoped that the Committee would use its good offices to induce the United Kingdom to establish on the islands a system by which the voice of the majority could be heard and the principle of majority rule observed. The Committee should also use its good offices to see that a positive programme was implemented with the greatest possible dispatch to improve the level of education of Bahamians so that they could assume responsibility for their own affairs at the top level. The petitioners would like to see the immediate implementation of all applicable recommendations on the Bahamas made by Sub-Committee III, with particular emphasis on the following: the recommendation confirming that the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples were fully applicable to the Bahamas and should be applied by the administering Power in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people; the recommendation that the administering Power should be invited to take concrete measures without delay to enable the people of the Bahamas to discuss their views on their political future freely, in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration; and, most important, the recommendation that the Special Committee should consider the possibility of sending a visiting mission to the Territory to obtain additional information on the situation there. His delegation specifically invited the Special Committee to send a visiting mission to the Bahamas, if only to verify the accuracy or inaccuracy of the reports and information they had given. There should be nothing to hide in the Bahamas and they hoped that the United Kingdom

delegation would see fit to withdraw whatever reservations it might have on the subject.

109. His delegation would also like the Special Committee to recommend that the administering Power should repeal the legislation which at present limited the right of trade unions to negotiate freely with employers and employers' organizations and prevented them from forming whatever type of organization the people felt was best able to achieve their aims.

110. Thirdly, his delegation would like the Special Committee to recommend to the administering Power that in the interests of the Bahamian people, United Nations specialized agencies such as UNESCO, FAO and WHO should play an important part in preparing the Bahamas for self-determination.

111. Lastly, his delegation would like the Special Committee to recommend the revocation of the existing Constituencies Order, which impeded the free expression of the majority will of the Bahamian people and denied them their right to self-determination.

C. STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

112. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that, although a long time had passed since the adoption of recommendations by the Special Committee in 1964, it was clear from Mr. Pindling's statements that the United Kingdom Government had not taken and did not intend to take any steps for the prompt implementation in the Bahama Islands of the principles of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It was characteristic of that Government's position that the Colonial Secretary had rejected the Bahamian Opposition Party's request that he should investigate the potentially explosive situation in the Territory, on the ground that he could not interfere in the internal affairs of a colony. Such reservations were voiced by the United Kingdom Government whenever it was called upon to implement resolutions of the Special Committee or the General Assembly designed to achieve the goals of the Declaration. On the other hand, where it saw its own interests threatened, it did not hesitate to launch punitive expeditions and suppress the striving of peoples for freedom and independence. Such a hypocritical attitude deserved severe condemnation by the Special Committee.

113. In the case of the Bahamas, as in other cases, the United Kingdom Government had failed to implement the decisions of the Special Committee, although it was evident that the situation in that Territory could become explosive unless there was prompt action to implement the Special Committee's decisions and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The Bahamian people were being exploited and oppressed, the trade-union movement was being persecuted and the democratic rights of the people were being violated. Yet, despite the exploitation of the people by a financial oligarchy, the Colonial Secretary of the United Kingdom Government said he could not interfere in the affairs of a colony.

114. His delegation fully supported the requests made by the petitioner including those for the dispatch of a special visiting mission and the formulation of recommendations by the Special Committee. The United Kingdom Government would be given the opportunity to demonstrate by deeds and not by words its readiness to co-operate with the Special Committee and the

United Nations in drawing up specific measures for liquidating the remnants of colonialism. The Soviet Union maintained, as it had in the past, that the principles of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples were applicable to all colonial Territories, large and small, including the Bahamas, and the task of the Special Committee was to work out measures which would ensure that those Territories achieved genuine, not illusory, independence.

115. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the prime concern of the Bahamian people, and particularly of the Progressive Liberal Party, was obviously the constituency boundaries. The picture of loaded constituencies in the Bahamas was a reflection of the practices of the shameful system of colonialism. Those practices were further reflected in the Bahamas in the importation of foreign labour, which denied the Bahamian people employment and many rights that would help them to develop towards national sovereignty. His delegation therefore fully supported the petitioners' request and asked the Special Committee to find a way whereby it could study those practices in the Bahamas.

116. The representative of Syria said that it was the duty of the Special Committee, in co-operation with the administering Power, to see that the Bahamians received their lawful rights as quickly as possible. He assured the petitioner that his delegation would do everything in its power to help the Bahamian people to achieve the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) and of the recommendations of Sub-Committee III.

117. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the existing constitutional arrangements in the Bahamas and those which were to be introduced at the next elections, represented the outcome of the Bahamas Constitutional Conference held in London in May 1963. The petitioner's party, the Progressive Liberal Party, had been represented at the Conference and had participated actively in the elaboration of those arrangements. It had entered reservations on only three points: the tenure and method of appointment of certain senators; the proposed maximum and minimum representation figures for New Providence and the Out Islands; and the absence of the provision for single-member constituencies.

118. Many of the matters raised in the Special Committee's discussion were the subject of controversy between the two main parties in the Bahamas. It was wrong to take sides in the internal politics of a territory which, in any case, already enjoyed full internal self-government. Those were matters to be discussed and settled by the well-established democratic process of representative Government within the Territory.

119. With regard to the Constituencies Commission, it should be recalled that the composition of the Commission and the procedure for giving effect to its recommendations on the delimitation of constituencies had all been agreed upon at the 1963 Constitutional Conference. The petitioner's party had not made reservations about any of those matters at that time. Under the Constitution, the Governor was bound to put the recommendations into effect once they had been approved with or without amendment by the House of Assembly. In the case of the Commission's recent report, the petitioner had made representations to the Colonial Secretary about certain points. After careful consideration, the Colonial Secretary had replied that he saw

no reason to accept certain of the conclusions and that two of the petitioner's main objections hinged on the interpretation of the Constitution, which was a function of the courts. For those reasons, the Colonial Secretary had felt unable to intervene but he had declared his willingness to discuss with government and opposition leaders in the Bahamas the difficulties connected with the delimitation of the constituencies.

120. Reference had been made to the fact that ministers in the Bahamas were associated with firms and companies which might be involved in government contracts. It should be remembered that the ministers had been elected by the people and that the large majority of them were not in any way representative of commercial or business interests in the Islands. On 16 April 1964, the petitioner had asked in the House of Assembly what conditions governed the relationship of ministers with firms and companies that obtained and were likely to obtain official contracts and what safeguards had been taken to ensure that in the conduct of their public affairs no conflict arose or appeared to arise between ministers' private interests and their public duties. In reply, the Premier had set out certain basic principles, the first of which was that no minister should permit his private interests to conflict with his public duties or place himself in such a position that a conflict might appear to occur. In the event of such a conflict unavoidably arising, the minister concerned was required to declare his personal interest to his colleagues and entirely detach himself from the consideration of that business in the Cabinet. Further, a minister was not permitted to use privileged information to which he had access by virtue of his official position for his personal pecuniary gain or other private advantage. The application of those principles was the

personal responsibility of each minister but, in any case of doubt, the Premier was the final judge.

121. He reminded the members of the Committee that the Territory of the Bahamas was internally self-governing and had universal adult suffrage. The additional property vote had been abolished; the figures and discrepancies mentioned by the petitioner referred to the 1962 election, when the property vote had still been in effect. In view of the geographical circumstances, it was not practicable for each constituency to have exactly the same voting strength. The 1963 Constitutional Conference had decided that each of the former electoral districts, some of which consisted of a single small island, should continue to be represented by at least one member. Subject to that condition, however, the Constitution specified that constituencies should be as nearly equal as possible.

122. His delegation could not therefore agree that the Constitution of the Bahamas was undemocratic or that many of the fears and complaints expressed by the petitioner were justified. In its view, those matters should be considered under the existing constitutional machinery.

123. The representative of Syria thought that the principles regarding conflicts of interest were unrealistic and that the petitioner had been justified in drawing attention to the unusual practice of allowing a minister to be a businessman at the same time.

124. The representative of India agreed with the Syrian representative. There seemed to be no machinery for examining the distinction between public and private interests; the matter was left very much to the individual.

CHAPTER XXIV

UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS, ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, GRENADA, MONTSERRAT, ST. KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA, ST. LUCIA, ST. VINCENT AND BARBADOS

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

1. *United States Virgin Islands*

Introduction

1. Information on the Territory is contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXV, paras. 1-31). Information on recent developments is set out below.¹

General

2. On 30 June 1963, the population was estimated at 35,000, compared with 32,099 at the census in 1960.

Political and constitutional developments

3. The representative of the United States of America informed the Special Committee in 1964 that the Legislature of the Virgin Islands had passed and the

Governor had signed, on 2 April 1964, legislation which enabled a Constitutional Convention to be convened in December 1964. The Convention would be empowered to draft a complete revision of the existing 1964 Organic Act. Delegates to the Convention would be chosen by the electorate of the Virgin Islands by secret ballot and by universal adult franchise. The thirty-three delegates had been directed by the Legislature to consider matters fundamental to the political future of the Virgin Islands, including a Bill of Rights, a new framework of government, new procedures for future amendment of the revised act, an elected governor, increased power for the territorial Legislature, reappointment of legislative seats, and a delegate to the United States Congress.

4. Pursuant to its directive from the Virgin Islands Legislature, the Convention would submit directly to the United States executive and legislative branches its proposals for a revision of the Organic Act.

5. It is reported that the Constitutional Convention met in St. Thomas in five sessions lasting from December 1964 to February 1965, and approved various amendments to the Organic Act for submission to the United States Congress. Information on the proceedings of the Convention is not available.

¹ The information presented in section 1 of this chapter has been derived from published reports, and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United States of America under Article 73e of the United Nations Charter, on 13 November 1964, covering the year ended 30 June 1963.

Economic conditions

6. Tourism, agriculture and small manufacturing concerns continue to be the main commercial factors in the economy. Expenditure by tourists in 1963 amounted to \$41,070,000, an increase of 17 per cent over the 1962 figure of \$35,145,000, and ten times the tourist expenditure in the island in 1952. Eight new manufacturing industries were established in 1963 making a total of twenty new industries for the past two years. On the other hand there was a decline in agriculture due mainly to the depressed state of the sugar industry. The sugar operations of the Virgin Islands Corporation, a body established with federal funds, have been running at a loss and 17,000 acres of its land have been offered for sale for other agricultural uses. The export market for new agricultural products is being explored.

7. Total imports in 1962 reached \$61,803,509, representing an increase of \$11,052,483 or 26 per cent over the previous year. Exports in 1962 amounted to \$20,064,920 as compared with \$9,133,124 in 1961, or an increase of 116 per cent. Of this total, exports valued at \$19,118,646 were shipped to the United States. Textile processing accounted for 46 per cent of exports to the United States and watches and watch movements for 13.5 per cent.

8. Total revenues for the general and matching funds in 1963 amounted to \$19,670,156 of which \$11,987,627, or 60 per cent, were for the account of the general fund, and \$7,682,528, or 39 per cent, were for the account of the matching fund. In 1962, revenues from the Territory's own resources amounted to \$11.1 million and, in addition, it received \$6.3 million in matching funds, bringing the total to \$17.4 million. Total expenditures in 1963 amounted to \$17,867,582 of which \$13,003,635, or 72 per cent, were from the general fund and \$4,863,947, or 27 per cent, were from the matching fund and which included \$1.7 million for special projects. General fund expenditures showed an increase of 25.8 per cent and matching fund expenditures an increase of 6.8 per cent over the previous year.

9. With the expansion of tourism and industry, the economic infra-structure has to be correspondingly expanded. Thus, the new jet air strip is being extended to accommodate larger jets. Dredging of the main harbour in St. Thomas has been completed, thereby improving the channel for cruise ships. At Christiansted, a new million dollar dock has been constructed and put into service. A salt water distillation plant, producing 275,000 gallons of fresh water daily, is now in operation to supplement the total water supply, which now equals 1.27 million gallons daily. A corresponding demand for power is being met by installation of steam and diesel generators. Finally, the Territory is issuing general obligation bonds to finance construction of public housing, water systems, and sewage disposal plants.

Social conditions

Labour

10. The labour force of non-agricultural workers in 1963 showed an increase of approximately 10 per cent over the 12,000 persons employed in 1962, the largest increase occurring in the unskilled category in the private sector, followed by the skilled and services categories; and in the government sector the largest

increase was shown in education followed by health and finance.

11. During this period, the construction industry, which attained a peak employment of 783 on 15 April 1962, fell sharply to a level of 377 by 15 April 1963, this being mainly due to the completion of two housing projects for low-income families in St. Thomas and St. Croix. There was a slight decline in employment in the textile industry, owing to the inactivity of one firm. In contrast, employment in the jewellery, pen, thermometer, industrial belting and watch industries jumped from 168 in April 1961 to 329 during the same period in 1963.

Public health

12. The state of health in 1963 was generally good, except for a short-lived epidemic of diarrhoea affecting about 130 children in St. Thomas during February and March. There were no other serious outbreaks of any kind. There was an increase in live births from 1,194 in 1961 to 1,375 in 1962, raising the birth-rate from 34.7 to 38.8 per thousand while the death-rate fell to a new low of 9 per thousand. Services were expanded as new specialist staff was added.

13. Multimillion dollar health centres are now being planned for St. Thomas and St. Croix, while existing hospitals and clinical facilities were improved during 1963.

Educational conditions

14. The number of pupils in the public schools increased from 7,624 in 1962 to 8,201 in 1963, a rise of 7.57 per cent. It is estimated that there will be an increase of 35 per cent by 1968.

15. In 1962-1963, expenditure on education was \$5 million or 16.2 per cent of the total expenditure, compared with \$2.8 million for 1961-1962.

16. The College of the Virgin Islands was opened on 1 July 1963 and by early 1964 had a total of 314 students. The present two-year liberal arts programme is being extended to a four-year curriculum in certain subjects.

2. British Virgin Islands

Introduction

17. Information on the Territories is contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session. (See A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXV, paras. 32-57.) Information on recent developments is set out below.²

Public service

18. Plans were formulated to introduce formal local training courses during 1964. In 1963, a number of senior officers were pursuing degree courses at universities overseas. In 1963, there were five overseas officers in the Public Service and thirteen local officers who filled posts of a status and grade comparable to posts filled by overseas officers.

Economic conditions

19. The economy of the Territory continues to be closely interrelated with that of the adjacent United

² The information presented in section 2 of this chapter has been derived from published reports, and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter, for the year ending 31 December 1963, transmitted on 9 October 1964.

States Virgin Islands and with Puerto Rico. The continued rapid economic expansion in these islands has in many ways affected the economy of the British Virgin Islands, particularly in drawing away labour and forcing up local wage rates. New tourist projects were initiated or under examination at the end of 1963.

20. Government revenue and expenditure over the last few years were as follows:

| Year | Revenue (in United States dollars) | Expenditure |
|------------|---------------------------------------|-------------|
| 1961 | 243,684 | 818,406 |
| 1962 | 343,617 | 899,011 |
| 1963 | 574,212 | 947,347 |

The main sources of revenue continue to be derived from import duties, taxes on income and property, annual licence fees and estate duties.

21. Stock raising, fishing and subsistence farming continue to be the major occupations in the economy of the Territory. The principal crops are fruits and nuts, coconuts, potatoes and bananas which had a total export value of approximately \$10,876³ in 1963, compared with \$18,000 in 1962, \$12,500 in 1961, and \$24,000 in 1960. At the end of 1963, there was an estimated livestock population of some 4,000 cattle, 2,500 sheep, 6,000 goats and 4,000 pigs in the Territory. Of these, a total of 2,013 were exported in 1963 with a value amounting to \$84,733, compared with \$90,000 in 1962, \$104,500 in 1961 and \$127,000 in 1960. Exports of rum to the United States Virgin Islands declined in 1963 as a result of a United States requirement that rum exported should be labelled and proofed; no facilities existed locally for complying with this requirement. Furthermore, since imported rum could be purchased on the local market cheaply, consumption of the local rum had also declined.

22. In 1963, total domestic exports were valued at \$134,606 and imports at \$2,291,337, compared with \$150,697 and \$1,980,780 respectively in 1962. The bulk of the Territory's foodstuff is imported from the United States, Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands. The United States Virgin Islands continue to be the principal importer of local produce.

23. The representative of the United Kingdom stated before the Special Committee that Her Majesty's Government each year had given considerable financial assistance to the British Virgin Islands in respect of ordinary expenditure, which amounted to over \$500,000 in 1963. In addition to this grant-in-aid of Administration, funds have been made available from the United Kingdom for development projects in the economic and social field and a further sum of just under \$500,000 was made available to the Territory for the five-year period ending 31 March 1964. An expert inquiry into the economic potential, fiscal structure and capital requirements of the Territory was undertaken in 1961 by Dr. O'Loughlin, of the University of the West Indies. Her report was published in 1962 and a local Advisory Committee was set up in the following year, which allocated priorities in the light of the report and produced a three-year development plan. Under the 1963 Commonwealth Development Act, a total of \$694,400 would be available for the Virgin Islands in

the period 1963-1966 permitting an average annual expenditure of \$231,500 which was practically double the amount available for the preceding five-year period. The revised development plan concentrated on improvement of the Territory's infra-structure including roads, electricity, water supplies and waterfront reclamation, the balance being devoted to social service projects.

Social conditions

Labour

24. The main source of employment for British Virgin Islanders continued to be mostly in the tourist trade of Saint Thomas in the United States Virgin Islands; some 10 per cent of the total population of the British Virgin Islands is employed in St. Thomas at any given time. In 1963, some 226 persons were employed in the civil and educational services, compared with 250 in 1962.

Public health

25. The Medical and Health Department is primarily responsible for governmental activities in public health and sanitation. The medical staff in 1963 included a Superintendent of Medical Services, one medical officer, one laboratory technician/dispenser, one assistant laboratory technician/dispenser, one public health officer, one matron, one assistant matron, three staff nurses, two district nurses and seven student nurses. In March, the medical officer resigned and it was not possible to fill this vacancy during the year. Difficulty was also experienced in filling posts for district nurses, four being vacant during the year. There is one government hospital with a total of thirty-two beds. There were 667 admissions to the hospital during the year.

26. Government expenditure on medical and health services in 1963 was \$79,187, compared with \$74,416, or 8.28 per cent of the total ordinary expenditure in 1962.

Educational conditions

27. All education is free and compulsory up to 15 years of age.

28. Government expenditure on education, including subventions to institutions outside the Territory, amounted to \$155,265 in 1963, or 15.65 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure, compared with \$140,699 in 1962.

29. A new post of Superintendent of Education has been created to make possible more regular inspection of schools and a corresponding improvement in standards.

3. Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent

Introduction

30. According to the information which became available, the constitutional status and general political situation in each of the seven Territories listed above remained basically the same during 1963-1964 as described in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session. (See A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXV, paras. 58-73, 75-81, 93-99, 111-121, 133-138, 150-155, 168-172 and 187-193.)

31. Further information became available, however, concerning the proposed Federation of Barbados and six of the Territories above, namely Antigua, Dominica,

³ The Territory has no currency of its own but the currencies of both the West Indies and the United States of America are legal tender. The United States currency, which had been the *de facto* currency in general circulation for almost two decades, became legal tender in 1959, and is the only currency now used in practice.

Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent as referred to in paragraphs 34 to 52 below.

32. Further information on the possible association of Grenada with Trinidad and Tobago also became available as referred to in paragraphs 53 to 59 below.

33. Such information as became available concerning the economic, social and educational situation in Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent is summarized in the relevant territorial sections which follow.

Proposed Federation of Antigua, Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Barbados

34. Following a series of conferences and discussions on the possible establishment of a Federation of the East Caribbean Territories in 1962, 1963 and 1964 and surveys of the fiscal and economic needs of the Territories, as well as a report of the Civil Service Commission, the Regional Council of Ministers consisting of the Premier of Barbados and the Chief Ministers of the other Territories, held its ninth Conference in Barbados in October and December 1964. At this Conference the Regional Council of Ministers accepted, with minor reservations, a revised draft scheme⁴ for the federation of the seven Territories.

35. The draft scheme envisaged that the Federation should be called the "West Indies Federation" and that the federal capital should be in Barbados. A Governor-General would be appointed for the Federation and there would be a bicameral Federal Legislature consisting of an appointed Senate and an elected House of Representatives. The Federal Cabinet would consist of a Prime Minister and such number of other ministers as the Prime Minister might decide.

36. The Federal Legislature would have the power to legislate on all matters contained in an exclusive legislative list and a concurrent list. Unit Governments would have the power to legislate on matters contained in the concurrent list, or not contained on either list.

37. The administration of income tax would be a federal responsibility and control over external borrowing would be on the exclusive list. The Federal Government would have the power to appoint a commission of inquiry to investigate any matter tending to undermine financial stability and good government in any part of the Federation. It would establish a Federal Economic Development Council and would be responsible for customs and excise and for establishing a common external tariff.

38. The Federal Government would pay the unit Governments 65 per cent of the revenue accruing from import duties, and all revenues accruing to the Federation, unless otherwise provided by law, would form one consolidated fund.

39. The draft scheme also recommended that a committee of establishments, officers and financial secretaries should be appointed without delay to work out the details of a unified service for administrative, professional and technical officers.

40. The Regional Council of Ministers noted that the United Kingdom Government had stated in a communication of 26 February 1964, that it would supply

aid to the proposed Federation for a period of five years which would not be less than the aggregate assistance given in the area in the past five years. The Council of Ministers did not consider this offer satisfactory but was willing to negotiate a satisfactory settlement with the United Kingdom Government. A settlement would not be considered adequate which did not satisfy the legitimate demands of the people and was not in conformity with the principles promulgated by the United Nations for adequate assistance by former colonial Powers to colonies on attaining independence.

41. In conclusion, the Council of Ministers noted differences of opinion among the unit Governments and the United Kingdom Government as to the steps to be taken for the establishment of the Federation and suggested that this matter should be left for discussion at the next conference.

42. Reservations on various parts of the draft scheme were made by the Governments of Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Antigua.

43. In a dispatch dated 22 March 1965, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Arthur Greenwood, transmitted the views of his Government to the Governor of Barbados, the Administrators of the other Territories and to the Chairman of the Regional Council of Ministers on the proposed draft federal scheme.

44. The Colonial Secretary agreed that federation, if it could be brought about on satisfactory terms, offered the best prospect for a solution to the constitutional problems on the area and could make a substantial contribution to their economic well-being.

45. Among other things, he noted that the division of powers between the Federal and unit Governments was still open for negotiation. While he was satisfied that the division of powers in the exclusive and concurrent lists afforded a basis for negotiation, it would be essential to provide that, in general, the executive authority of the Federation should extend to those matters on which the Federal Legislature was for the time being, empowered to make laws.

46. He also noted that the unit Governments were not entirely in agreement regarding the exact method by which public revenue was to be divided between the Federal and the unit Governments. The Federal Government should have its own sources of finance and he suggested that further consideration might be given to the possibility that, from the outset, the Federal Government might derive some of its revenue from income tax.

47. The Colonial Secretary considered that a serious defect in the proposals was that the draft scheme, while giving the Federal Government the power to set up commissions of inquiry into serious mismanagement or financial maladministration in one part of the Federation, did not provide the Federal Government with any powers to deal with the situation after a commission of inquiry had reported.

48. The Colonial Secretary proposed 1 July as the date for a further conference at which the exact stages by which the Federal Constitution would be brought fully into force and the Federation would become independent, as well as the stages by which the units would obtain internal self-government within the federal framework, would be for negotiation. The United Kingdom Government would be prepared to discuss at the

⁴ *Proposals for a Federation of East Caribbean Territories*, Colonial No. 359, 1965 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office).

conference, the question of financial assistance to the Federation if it were set up.

49. The principal opposition parties with seats in each legislature would be invited to attend the conference, as well as Government representatives.

50. On 12 April, Sir Stephen Luke, former Interim Commissioner for the West Indies, was appointed as special representative of the United Kingdom Colonial Office to take part in preliminary talks with the Governments concerned and to assist generally with further preparatory work necessary in advance of the suggested conference.

51. On 22 April it was reported that Antigua's Chief Minister, Mr. Vere Bird, had by private letter informed the United Kingdom Colonial Secretary that Antigua would not join the Federation.

52. The Regional Council of Ministers, except for the Chief Minister of Antigua, met briefly in Barbados on 30 April but adjourned after they had agreed to postpone further discussions on the draft federation scheme and the dispatch of 22 March until a day to be announced.

Possible association of Grenada with Trinidad and Tobago

53. The possible association of Grenada with Trinidad and Tobago, or, on the other hand, its possible entry into the proposed "West Indies Federation" continued during 1963-1964 to be a principal issue between the ruling political party, the Grenada National Party (GNP) and the opposition party, the United Labour Party (ULP).

54. It will be recalled that Grenada originally participated in the 1962 Conference on the proposed Federation. Following the elections on 13 September 1962, however, in which the GNP won six of the ten elective seats in the Legislative Council and the ULP four seats, the Grenada Government, headed by Mr. Herbert Blaize of the GNP, withdrew from further participation in the discussions and, with the agreement of the United Kingdom, entered into discussions for an association with Trinidad and Tobago as an alternative to joining the proposed "federation". At a conference held in Port of Spain in December 1962, between the representatives of Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada, it was agreed to establish a number of expert groups to study in detail the constitutional, economic and fiscal aspects of the proposed association.

55. Early in 1965, the Government released four reports of the expert groups dealing respectively with legal and constitutional aspects of a unitary state,⁵ the integration of the Public Services of the two Territories,⁶ economic matters,⁷ and a draft Five-Year Development Plan for Grenada.⁸

56. The Legal and Constitutional Commission envisaged a type of association whereby Grenada would, by formal agreement between the Governments of Trinidad and Tobago and the United Kingdom, be ceded to Trinidad and Tobago. This would entail the

abolition of the Constitution of Grenada and all organs, offices, commissions etc., existing thereunder; the extension to Grenada of the existing laws of Trinidad and Tobago; and the extension of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Trinidad and Tobago to include Grenada. Persons domiciled in Grenada would become citizens of Trinidad and Tobago and provision would be made for representation of Grenada in the Trinidad and Tobago Parliament.

57. The basic recommendation of the Economic Commission was that there should be instituted a programme of phased economic integration, with certain clearly defined goals which would be consonant with unitary statehood. The cost of the Five-year Development Plan for Grenada was estimated at \$WI 31 million,⁹ the main part of which would be met from external aid.

58. Mr. Eric Gairy, the Opposition leader, is reportedly firmly opposed to the association of Grenada with Trinidad and Tobago, supporting instead Grenada's entry into the proposed "West Indies Federation". In November 1964 and February 1965, he called for new general elections to decide the issue, claiming on the latter occasion that general elections were now due since the Government's election pledge of unitary statehood in two years was almost five months overdue already.

59. In early February 1965, Mr. Arthur Greenwood, United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, visited Grenada. Subsequently, in March 1965, he reportedly stated that the United Kingdom would not force or even "guide" Grenada into unitary statehood with Trinidad and Tobago. He said: "It is a matter for the people of Grenada to decide for themselves. All along we have made it clear that we do not propose to bring pressure to bear on any course of action for them." He added that, if and when a unitary statehood plan were prepared, the United Kingdom would "consider it in the light of the wishes of the people of Grenada".

Antigua¹⁰

Economic conditions

60. The economy of the Territory is based mainly on agriculture, with sugar, and to a lesser extent, cotton as the principal exports. The tourist trade, which has been expanding, showed further development during 1963 and arrivals totalled 43,272, compared with 35,101 in 1962. Secondary industries include soap, cigarettes, cotton seed, arrowroot factories and a distillery. There is also a \$WI 40 million oil refinery on which construction began in 1963 and which will have a capacity of 10 million gallons when completed. There is some fishing for local consumption.

61. The Territory is dependent on imports for many of its food-stuffs and fuel. In 1963, imports were valued at \$WI 23 million, compared with \$WI 21 million in 1962, and exports at \$WI 7.1 million, compared with \$WI 4.3 million in 1962. Sugar exports were 24,273 tons valued at \$WI 5.4 million, compared with \$WI 3.8 million in 1962. Cotton exports were 186,584

⁵ *Interim and Second Reports of the Legal and Constitutional Commission on the Question of Unitary Statehood of Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago.*

⁶ *Report of the Fact Finding Commission on the Grenada Public Service.*

⁷ *Report of the Economic Commission appointed to examine Proposals for Association within the framework of a Unitary State of Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago, January 1965.*

⁸ *Grenada Five-Year Development Plan, 1964-1968: Report of the Development Programme Commission.*

⁹ The local currency in Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Barbados is the West Indian dollar (\$WI) which equals 4s.2d. (sterling) or \$U.S. 0.5833.

¹⁰ The following information transmitted by the administering Power has been taken into account in the preparation of this section: information under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter for the year ending 31 December 1963, transmitted on 14 September 1964.

pounds valued at \$WI 233,362, compared with \$WI 303,000 in 1962.

62. In 1963, estimated local revenue, derived mainly from customs duties and internal revenue taxes, amounted to \$WI 9.8 million. In addition, the Territory received from the United Kingdom \$WI 1.3 million, including funds provided under the Commonwealth Development Act, \$WI 472,050 from the United States Agency for International Development (AID), bringing the total estimated revenue to \$WI 11.6 million, compared with \$WI 10.7 million in 1962.

63. It was reported in early 1965 that the Administrator was seeking a \$WI 1 million loan in the United Kingdom which would be used to relieve difficulties caused by the drought that hit the island's sugar crop in 1964.

64. Estimated recurrent expenditure in 1963 was \$WI 9.7 million, compared with \$WI 6.98 million in 1962. Total estimated expenditure in 1963 was \$WI 11.5 million.

Social conditions

Labour

65. During 1963, there were 10,634 wage earners (8,309 men and 2,325 women) in various industries and services of whom 5,108 were employed in the sugar and cotton industries, 1,999 in government departments, 1,515 in building and 1,417 in the retail distributive, hotel and minor industries. Statistics are not available for under employment and unemployment. Seasonal employment mainly affects the agricultural and hotel industries.

66. In 1963, there were three organizations registered under the Trade Union Act: the Antigua Trades and Labour Union, the Antigua United Port Seaman and General Workers Union and the Antigua Employers' Federation. Labour legislation covers such matters as workman's compensation, the recruitment of workers for employment outside the island, the employment of women and young persons, safety in factories and public service pensions.

Public health

67. The health of the Territory is reportedly good with a very high birth-rate (32.5 per thousand) and a crude death-rate (2.4 per thousand) lower than that of the United Kingdom, and an annual natural increase of the population of 2.3 per cent. The main causes of death are cardio-vascular diseases, gastro-enteritis, cancer, and diseases of early infancy.

68. The government medical services in 1963 consisted of 15 registered physicians, 4 senior nurses, 2 senior midwives, 64 certified midwives, 20 sanitary inspectors, 3 technicians and 5 pharmacists. There was one private physician and 12 private certified midwives. There was one general hospital with 180 beds, a cottage hospital with 150 beds and a mental hospital with 200 beds, and 16 dispensaries. Medical personnel are trained in the United Kingdom and at the University College of the West Indies. There is a nursing school at the general hospital.

69. During 1963, the United Nations Children's Fund continued to assist in the supplementary milk feeding programme for infants and mothers.

70. Expenditure on public health in 1963 amounted to \$WI 1,540,807, representing 13 per cent of the Territory's total expenditure, compared with \$WI 1,204,457 in 1961.

Educational conditions

71. The educational services continued during 1963 to be under the direction of the Minister of Social Services. Attendance of pupils between the ages of 5 and 14 is compulsory except in two schools where overcrowding prevents its enforcement.

72. In 1963, there were 16,434 pupils (8,320 girls and 8,114 boys) out of 16,534 children of school age enrolled in the Territory's schools compared with 16,641 in 1962. Of the 1963 total, 13,450 were in primary schools (11,832 in 33 government schools and 1,618 in 8 private schools) and 2,984 were in secondary schools (546 in two government schools and 2,438 in 8 private schools). Fifteen students were enrolled in a teacher-training centre.

73. Estimated expenditure on education in 1963 was \$WI 860,382, representing 9 per cent of the Territory's total expenditure for the year. Estimated expenditure on education in 1961 was \$WI 636,000.

Dominica¹¹

Economic conditions

74. During 1963, the island suffered from the effects of three hurricanes—"Edith", "Helena" and "Flora" which caused extensive damage to agriculture and roads. Destruction to bananas, the island's principal crop, was more than 80 per cent and estimated at a loss of about \$WI 4 million. Besides bananas, other main products for export are citrus fruits, copra and cocoa.

75. The Territory has no significant secondary industries except for the processing of lime juice. Legislation has, however, been enacted providing for substantial tax relief and concessions to those establishing "pioneer" industries, and by the end of 1963 fourteen operations had been declared as such.

76. The latest figures available on imports and exports are those for 1961. It will be recalled that in that year imports were valued at \$WI 10.6 million and exports at \$WI 7.2 million.

77. Public revenue, derived mainly from customs and excise duties, amounted to \$WI 4,112,579 in 1963, an increase of \$WI 227,532 over the 1962 figure. In addition, the sum of \$WI 373,727 was received from Colonial Development and Welfare funds, \$WI 7,440 under the Overseas Service Aid Scheme and \$WI 1,338,784 in respect of a grant-in-aid of Administration, making a total provisional revenue of \$WI 5,832,530.

78. Total provisional expenditure in 1963 amounted to \$WI 6,026,466, including \$WI 920,960 on development schemes, compared with \$WI 6.23 million in 1962.

¹¹ The following information has been taken into account in the preparation of this section: information under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter for the year ending 31 December 1963, transmitted on 21 August 1964.

*Social conditions**Labour*

79. Statistics of employment were not available for 1963. Agriculture, however, remained the principal source of employment. There were five registered organizations in the Territory: the Dominica Trade Union, the Dominica Employers' Union, the Dominica Union of Teachers (formerly Dominica Teachers' Union), the Technical, Clerical and Commercial Workers' Union (formerly Dominica Banana Employees Association) and the Civil Service Association. There were no major disputes during the year. Migration of workers overseas continued to drop during 1963. One hundred and eighty workers migrated to the United Kingdom whilst 630 returned. In 1960 2,072 workers migrated to the United Kingdom.

Public health

80. During 1963, there was a severe epidemic of whooping cough affecting 4,732 persons and producing fifty-five deaths. This was followed by a lesser epidemic of measles towards the end of the year. The chief causes of death in the Territory continued to be gastro-enteritis, diseases of the respiratory system, avitaminosis and other deficiency states (malnutrition).

81. The birth-rate during the year was 40.2 per thousand, compared with 42.0 in 1962 and the death-rate 13.2 per thousand, compared with 10.8 in 1962. There are seven government hospitals, including a mental hospital and a leper home, with a total of 323 beds, compared with 245 beds in 1962.

82. Services offered under the Maternal, Child Hygiene and School Health Service include antenatal clinics, child welfare clinics for children of pre-school age, advice and assistance in the field of nutrition, immunization against smallpox and whooping cough and school physical examinations and health education.

83. Government medical staff in 1963 included two medical officers, a surgeon, two dentists, sixteen health inspectors, thirty-one district nurses and midwives, seven health visitors, ten dispensers and two laboratory technicians.

84. Ordinary public health expenditure amounted to \$WI 609,573 in 1963 as compared with \$WI 648,267 in 1962. In addition, \$WI 24,510 was spent from Colonial Development and Welfare funds.

Educational conditions

85. Primary education is provided free for all children between the ages of 5 and 15. Compulsory school attendance continued in effect in 1963 in fourteen areas.

86. In 1963, there were forty-eight government and three private primary schools with a total enrolment of 15,439, compared with 14,883 enrolled in 1962. There were four secondary schools (one government and three private) with an enrolment of 1,203. In 1962, 1,216 children were enrolled in the four secondary schools. Short training courses for teachers continued to be conducted locally by the Department of Education. Students from the Territory also attend a one-year training course in Antigua or a two-year course in Barbados. There are no vocational schools nor higher education facilities in the Territory.

87. The total estimated educational expenditure by the Government amounted to \$WI 768,326. In 1962, \$WI 733,811 was spent on education.

Grenada¹²*Economic conditions*

88. Grenada, with an area of 120 square miles, is the most southerly of the Windward Islands group. It is also the smallest and with a population of over 88,700 has the highest population density (739 per square mile).

89. The economy is based on agriculture, and of the approximately 51,000 acres suitable for agriculture, there is little that is not utilized. About half the cultivable land in the estates and half in peasant holdings. There are no known economic minerals and few utilizable locally available raw materials. The principal export crops are cocoa, nutmeg and bananas. Relatively small acreages are under citrus, limes, improved grassland, spices other than nutmegs, bluggoes, food crops, and corn and peas. Manufacturing activity is confined principally to the simple processing of some of the agricultural commodities and sugar, rum, citrus juices, copra products and, recently, beer are now being produced on factory scale. Emigrants' remittances provide a source of finance for imports; between 1956 and 1962 such remittances sent through the post-office increased from \$WI 534,000 to \$WI 1,993,000. The tourist industry also makes a contribution in the provision of jobs and in foreign exchange earnings. Between 1955 and 1962 the number of tourists increased from 2,800 to 8,200 and the number of cruise ship passengers from 800 to 13,400. Since 1958 official grants-in-aid to the Government which finance a share of its current services and capital works programme have also been an important source of revenue as well as of foreign exchange. An agricultural credit bank has recently been set up with the aid of a small Colonial Development and Welfare grant and some local loan money.

90. Food-stuffs, manufactured goods, clothing and foot-wear continued during 1963 to account for the major part of the imports which were valued at \$WI 15,128,993, compared with \$WI 16 million in 1961. Exports were valued at \$WI 7,854,832 in 1963, compared with exports amounting to \$WI 6.0 million in 1961. The main exports in 1963 were cocoa beans (\$WI 3.5 million), bananas (\$WI 1.7 million) and nutmeg (\$WI 1.5 million).

91. Total revenue, including a Colonial Development and Welfare grant of \$WI 1,342,000 and a United Kingdom grant-in-aid of \$WI 1,602,000, amounted to \$WI 9,947,000 in 1963, compared with \$WI 6,620,000 in 1962. Apart from the grants, the main sources of revenue in 1963 were customs duties amounting to \$WI 3,194,000 and taxes totalling \$WI 1,436,000. Total expenditure in 1963 equalled revenue at \$WI 19,947,000, compared with \$WI 8,030,000 in 1962. The main heads of expenditure were Colonial Development and Welfare schemes (\$WI 1,827,000), public works (\$WI 1,887,000), education (\$WI 1,347,000) and medical (\$WI 1,248,000).

*Social conditions**Labour*

92. Agriculture provides the main source of employment in Grenada. It will be recalled that at the

¹² The following information transmitted by the administering Power has been taken into account in the preparation of this section: information under Article 73e of the United Nations Charter for the year ending 31 December 1963, transmitted on 10 September 1964.

1960 census, out of total population of 88,700, the labour force comprised 25,170 persons, of whom 10,895 were employed in agriculture, 4,663 in services, 2,963 in commerce, 2,907 in construction and 2,600 in manufacturing. In describing the employment situation, the Economic Commission stated (see para. 55 above) that in common with other under-developed countries, Grenada showed unmistakable signs of high levels of unemployment and even higher levels of under employment. It also emphasized the shortage of lucrative employment opportunities in the Grenada economy.

93. The Labour Department continued during 1963 to supervise labour and employment conditions. There were sixteen registered organizations in Grenada in 1963, including thirteen trade unions, a civil service association and an employers' federation. There were twenty-seven labour disputes during the year of which eleven led to strike action. Daily wage-rates during 1962 ranged from \$WI 1.80 for male agricultural workers to \$WI 7.50 for artisan foremen.

94. Four hundred and sixty-nine persons left the island in 1963 for the United Kingdom of whom at least one third were children. The remainder went in search of employment. One hundred and forty-three workers were also recruited locally for work on farms in the United States. It was estimated by the Economic Commission that about 6,800 Grenadians would be likely to emigrate to Trinidad and Tobago if there was freedom of movement between the Territories.

Public health

95. Information on the public health services for 1963 was not available. In 1962, however, there were three general hospitals and, according to information contained in the five-year development plan for Grenada (see para. 57 above) there were 280 public hospital beds or 3.1 per thousand of population. In addition, there were 200 beds for mental patients, 20 beds for isolation cases and 137 beds for geriatrics. On the other hand, the health service was somewhat deficient in specialist accommodation, making it necessary for Grenadians in search of specialist treatment to go to Trinidad. There were only two very small private hospitals, one for maternity and the other for surgical cases. The total number of doctors in 1962 was twenty-one, of whom seventeen were employed by the Government and four were in private practice.

96. There were also five district curative health services served by a health visitors team of five, and twenty-eight visiting stations each staffed by a resident nurse-midwife.

97. During the past few years public expenditure on curative and preventive medicine in Grenada has absorbed approximately 12 per cent of the total current and capital expenditure. Expenditure in 1961, 1962 and 1963 amounted to \$WI 1,009,999, \$WI 1,256,000 and \$WI 1,248,000, respectively.

Educational conditions

98. During 1963, a teacher-training college began its first year of operation, designed to offer free pre-service professional training to teachers. Otherwise the educational facilities remained the same as in 1962 and consisted of fifty-six primary schools and six secondary schools. Eleven primary schools, one secondary school and the teacher-training college are run by the Govern-

ment. The remaining primary and secondary schools are grant-aided by denominational schools.

99. Primary education is free but not compulsory. Secondary education is neither free nor compulsory except for pupils to whom government scholarships have been awarded. The secondary schools prepare students for the Cambridge School and Higher Certificate examinations.

100. In 1963, there were 25,676 children enrolled in the primary schools and 1,846 in the secondary schools, compared with 24,074 and 1,777 respectively in 1962. In 1963, there were eighteen students in the teacher-training college.

101. Except for the teacher-training college, there are no other facilities for higher education in Grenada. However, the Territory makes a financial contribution towards the upkeep of the University College of the West Indies.

102. Expenditure on education in 1963, including the sum of \$WI 109,642 obtained from a Colonial Development and Welfare grant, amounted to \$WI 1,392,007.

Montserrat¹³

Economic conditions

103. Although the main emphasis continued to be on agriculture during 1963, real estate development and tourism assisted in improved economic conditions. Efforts were made to increase agricultural production and to secure markets for the island's produce. Small-scale industries include a government ginnery and a small factory for the manufacture of edible oil, cotton seed meal and cake for stock feed and fertilizer from cotton seed, a sugar mill, a tomato processing plant and a small meat processing plant.

104. Cotton continued to be the Territory's principal money crop although the 1962-1963 production was not up to expectations and the 1,075 acres planted yielded only 333 bales of clean cotton valued at \$WI 160,960. Banana production increased, total exports being 21,453 stems valued at approximately \$WI 16,874 and production of fruit and vegetables for export was expanded. The value of the main exports for the year was \$WI 210,809. In 1961, total exports were valued at \$WI 377,000. The Territory imports various food stuffs including flour, sugar, dried fish and rice. Other main imports include manufactured goods such as motor cars, electrical equipment and boots and shoes, as well as cotton and rayon piece goods, cement and medicine and drugs. The value of the main imports during the year was \$WI 967,496. In 1961, the value of the total imports was \$WI 2,538,000.

105. In 1963, according to the revised estimates, total territorial revenue was \$WI 999,792, derived mainly from customs duties (\$WI 353,200) and from excise taxes and internal revenue (\$WI 316,488). In addition, the Territory received grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom totalling \$WI 1,086,027, bringing the total revenue to \$WI 2,085,819. Total expenditure was \$WI 1,992,786. In 1962, territorial revenue amounted to \$WI 1,203,964 and the grant-in-aid to \$WI 1,036,144. Total local expenditure was \$WI 1,941,999.

¹³ The following information has been taken into account in the preparation of this section: information under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter for the year ending 31 December 1963, transmitted on 20 August 1964.

*Social conditions**Labour*

106. During 1963, there was reduced activity on the agricultural estates, resulting in a decreased demand for labour. Agriculture remained, however, the chief occupation for the gainfully employed. There was a reported increase in employment opportunities in the building and construction trades.

107. There were three registered trade unions of employees with a total paid up membership of 620. Prevailing wage rates for men ranged from \$WI 1.57 per day for unskilled agricultural labour to \$WI 5.50 per day for foremen in government employ. In industry, unskilled workers received 31 to 40 cents per hour, skilled workers 69 to 81 cents per hour.

Public health

108. The health of the Territory was reportedly well maintained during 1963. In view of a recent poliomyelitis outbreak in the Caribbean, an immunization campaign for children from 4 months to 5 years of age was carried out. The distribution of skimmed milk powder provided by UNICEF to mothers and pre-school age children continued during 1963. The principal causes of death among adults were vascular lesions and heart diseases; amongst infants they were gastro-enteritis and malnutrition.

109. The island continued to be divided into three medical districts under the responsibility of three medical officers. The health services comprise a general hospital with sixty-nine beds, three health centres and seven outposts, and a midwifery service. Medical and health personnel may be selected for special courses in the United Kingdom or in the Caribbean area.

110. The mean mid-year population was estimated at 13,012. The birth rate was 26.2 per thousand and the death rate 8.9 per thousand.

111. According to the revised estimates, expenditures on the medical and health services amounted to \$WI 240,793, compared with \$WI 229,734 in 1962.

Educational conditions

112. In 1963, there were fifteen co-educational schools in the Territory, twelve of which were government schools and the others a Roman Catholic school, a Seventh Day Adventist School and a private school. There is one government secondary school. There were 3,283 children enrolled in the schools during 1963, including 3,066 in primary schools and 217 in the secondary school. In 1962, 3,225 children were attending primary school and 186 secondary school.

113. Primary education is free for all children between the ages of 5 and 15 years. It is compulsory from 5 to 13 years. The secondary school, which is a fee-paying institution, accepts children from the age of 10. The Montserrat Government awarded seven scholarships to the secondary school in 1963 and at the end of the year there were thirty scholarship holders at the school. The facilities of the school were extended during the year to provide training in certain aspects of technical and commercial education.

114. Scholarships and bursaries are awarded to the University College of the West Indies and Universities in Canada, the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries.

115. The recurrent expenditure on primary education for 1963 was \$WI 209,427, and that on secondary

education was \$WI 62,685 representing 14.23 per cent of the recurrent expenditure for the Territory. In 1962, recurrent expenditure on education was \$WI 254,850, representing 12.8 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure.

*St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla¹⁴**Economic conditions*

116. The main economic activities vary in the three islands. In St. Kitts, there is a well-developed sugar industry based on large estate cultivation. In Nevis, most of the population is engaged in mixed farming and cotton mainly for export. In Anguilla, the main activities are stock raising, salt production and fishing. Industries are limited to the processing of cotton, sugar, maize and cotton seed. Tourism is developing.

117. The total value of the imports in 1963 for the islands was \$WI 12.2 million, compared with \$WI 12.4 million in 1961. The main imports during 1963, as previously, were food-stuffs such as flour (\$WI 721,908), meat (\$WI 596,753) and fish (\$WI 358,347), gasoline and kerosene (\$WI 452,046) and wood and timber (\$WI 413,737), fertilizers (\$WI 356,737), apparel (\$WI 340,208) and motor cars (\$WI 302,592). The imported goods come mainly from the United Kingdom (\$WI 3,590,000), Canada (\$WI 1,990,000) and the United States (\$WI 1,621,000).

118. The total value of the exports from the Territories in 1963 was \$WI 8.3 million, compared with \$WI 9.8 million in 1961. The main exports continued to be sugar (\$WI 7,305,000), molasses (\$WI 384,000), cotton lint (\$WI 131,000) and salt (\$WI 22,000). Of the exports, \$WI 4,601,000 went to the United Kingdom, and \$WI 2,464,000 to Canada.

119. The latest figures available for actual revenue and expenditures were for the year 1962. In 1962, local revenue, which continued to be derived mainly from import duties (\$WI 1.87 million) and income tax (\$WI 1.38 million) amounted to \$WI 5,500,999, compared with \$WI 4,963,000 in 1961. In 1962, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla also received \$WI 1,976,005 in Colonial Development and Welfare grants. Expenditure amounted to \$WI 5,581,533 as compared with \$WI 6,100,119 in 1961. The main items of expenditure in 1962 were for education (\$WI 925,672), public health (\$WI 904,237), administration (\$WI 324,666) and electricity (\$WI 316,341).

*Social conditions**Labour*

120. The Department of Labour, consisting of a Labour Commissioner and a staff of five, continued during 1963 to supervise and review conditions of the various forms of employment in the Territory. The chief source of employment is the sugar industry and the period of greatest unemployment coincides with the "out of crop" season in St. Kitts. The position is not so readily assessable in Nevis and Anguilla where there is a low proportion of persons entirely dependent upon a weekly wage and where the problem is more affected by that of underemployment. Each year a number of workers from the Territory migrate overseas.

¹⁴ The following information has been taken into account in the preparation of this section: information under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter for the year ending 31 December 1963, transmitted on 30 October 1964.

121. In 1960, out of a population of 32,023 persons over 14 years of age there were 11,446 men and 7,545 women in the labour force. Forty-five per cent of the total labour force were engaged in agriculture, 13 per cent of the men in manufacturing, 13 per cent in construction and 20 per cent in commerce, transportation and services. About 34 per cent of the women were in services.

122. The St. Kitts-Nevis Trades and Labour Union continued during 1963 to be the principal organization registered under the Trade Union Act, 1939. It is a general workers union with a membership of 4,773. There are also two teachers' unions, a civil servants' association and a sugar producers' association.

Public health

123. No substantive changes were reported in the medical services during 1963. There are two general hospitals, one in St. Kitts with 117 beds and one in Nevis with 46 beds, and two cottage hospitals, one in St. Kitts with 11 beds and the other in Anguilla with 9 beds. There are also 19 health centres and outposts.

124. The estimates of the Territory allowed for nine government doctors but the quota has not been filled for a number of years and there were only eight doctors in 1963. Four district medical officers cared for the patients in St. Kitts and the others were in charge of clinics in various parts of St. Kitts. A retired doctor performed the duties of medical officer in Anguilla. No information was available concerning Nevis except that the hospital was "satisfactorily served".

125. The two general hospitals are centres for the teaching and training of student nurses but the shortage of teaching staff continued during 1963. Ante-natal clinics functioned as in previous years and talks and demonstrations were given by the public health nurses. Supplies of UNICEF milk were received during the year and distributions were made at clinics of infants and expectant mothers.

126. The most common causes of death are heart diseases, diseases of early infancy, apoplexy and respiratory diseases. In 1963, the birth rate was 33.2 per thousand, infant mortality was 72.1 per thousand live births and the death-rate was 9.3 per thousand.

Educational conditions

127. The Department of Education comes under the direction of the Minister of Social Services whose chief adviser is the Chief Education Officer. Other executive officers are two inspectors of schools, three assistant inspectors and the heads of four government secondary schools.

128. Primary education is free and compulsory for children between the ages of 5 and 13 and in practice three out of four pupils remain in school for one or more years of post-primary education. The population pressure continued to be severe in 1963 and the reportedly inadequate school buildings are forced to contain larger numbers of pupils each year.

129. Although shortage of places, lack of teaching facilities and shortage of teachers continued to prevent spectacular advance, progress was reported in 1963 in broadening the primary school curriculum, in the pro-

vision of more text books and in the increase of trained teachers in service.

130. In 1963, there were 35 government primary schools with an enrolment of 14,797 pupils and a teaching staff of 416 (including 90 pupil teachers). In 1961, enrolment in the 35 primary schools was 13,700. There were also in 1963 three senior or post-primary schools and two secondary schools which also had post-primary departments. Courses in the two secondary schools lead to the Overseas School Certificate Examination of Cambridge University.

131. The Territory contributes to the cost of the University College of the West Indies and students make use of the facilities there. The Territory also contributes to the Leeward Islands Teacher Training College in Antigua where its primary school teachers receive training. In addition, there is a programme based on a Colonial Development and Welfare scheme which provides for the training of a number of teachers at the Erdiston Teacher Training College in Barbados. In July 1963, seven teachers graduated from Leeward Islands College and three from Erdiston.

132. Expenditure on education in 1962 was \$WI 925,672 compared with \$WI 1,031,131 in 1961.

St. Lucia¹⁵

Economic conditions

133. The economy of the Territory reportedly continued to show progress in 1963 despite an estimated 60 per cent destruction of banana cultivation by hurricane "Edith" during September. Recovery was made possible through a rehabilitation grant from the United Kingdom Government. Banana exports for the year were 53,303 tons valued at \$WI 6,141,000, exceeding the previous year by over \$WI 500,000.

134. The other principal crops for export are sugar cane, coconut oil, crops and cocoa. Owing to the conversion of sugar plantations to banana cultivation, the production of sugar fell from 3,880 tons in 1962 to 3,279 tons in 1963 valued at \$WI 101,000. Production of coconut oil was 2,309,000 pounds valued at \$WI 613,000; copra, 4,289 tons valued at \$WI 552,000; and cocoa, 263 tons valued at \$WI 284,000.

135. Total domestic exports from the Territory in 1963 were valued at \$WI 7,820,816. Principal imports were valued at \$WI 5,735,915 in 1962 (figures for 1963 were not available). They included a wide range of goods such as flour (\$WI 902,993), chemical manure (\$WI 769,507), motor cars (\$WI 653,324) and boots and shoes (\$WI 436,786).

136. Livestock production is mainly for domestic consumption. Industries are limited mainly to those processing agricultural produce and small concerns engaged in the production of mineral water, preserves and the making of fibre glass chairs, boats and household items. There are also some local handicrafts.

137. The main heads of revenue continued in 1962 (1963 figures not available) to be derived from customs and excise duties (\$WI 3,353,028) and from income tax (\$WI 901,220). Estimated revenue for 1963 was \$WI 6,242,616. In addition, the Territory received a

¹⁵ The following information has been taken into account in the preparation of this section: information under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter for the year ending 31 December 1963, transmitted on 23 November 1964.

grant-in-aid (administration) of \$WI 978,032, a rehabilitation grant of \$WI 275,803, a Colonial Development and Welfare grant of \$WI 839,734 and an Overseas Service Aid grant of \$WI 50,524 bringing the total estimated revenue to \$WI 8,473,000.

Social conditions

Labour

138. Little change was reported in labour conditions during 1963. Agriculture continued to be the main source of employment although there was a decline in employment in the sugar industry as all sugar estates were being converted to the production of bananas which provides year-round employment for a large number of persons both on the estates and in the loading of ships.

139. The latest figures available on employment were taken at the 1960 census. Agriculture, fishery and lumbering gave employment to 15,144 persons, services to 3,977, the manufacturing industries to 3,468, commerce to 2,478 and transport and communications to 1,156. The extent of employment in 1960 was about 2 to 3 per cent.

140. During 1963, 1,006 persons emigrated from St. Lucia, compared with 2,500 in 1960. Of the 1963 number, 331 went to the United Kingdom, 325 to the United States Virgin Islands, 181 to the United States, 153 to Antigua and 16 to Canada.

141. There were ten workers' organizations registered in the Territory, one of which, the St. Lucia Truckers Association, was registered in 1963. Five of the workers' organizations are affiliated to International Trade Union Organizations. There is also an employers' organization—the St. Lucia Employers' Federation. Membership of the principal organizations was about 6,000.

Public health

142. The Public Health Service continued to be administered during 1963 by the Chief Medical Officer who is responsible to the Minister of Education, Health and Social Affairs for the general working of the Medical Department and to the Administrator for matters affecting personnel.

143. No changes were reported in the number of hospitals in the Territory which consisted in 1962 of a general hospital at Castries with 170 beds, three other hospitals with 64 beds, a mental hospital with 140 beds and a home for the aged with 120 beds. During 1963 the medical and health staff comprised 12 medical officers (11 government and 1 private practitioner), 4 dentists (2 government and 2 private), 110 government sanitarians and 96 government nurses.

144. The most prevalent diseases are diseases of the heart, of early infancy, tuberculosis, syphilis and helminthiasis diseases. Between 1960 and 1962 the population rose from 94,718 to 96,841. The birth-rate in 1962 was 41.1 per thousand, compared with 45.0 per thousand in 1960 and the death-rate was 12.4 per thousand compared with 13.6 in 1960. In 1962, there were 407 persons per square mile compared with 396 in 1960.

145. The malaria eradication programme, assisted by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) continued during 1963 and the disease was stated to have been virtually eliminated. The five-year environmental sanitation programme started in 1959, also assisted by WHO and UNICEF, continued in 1963. The aim of the programme is to provide safe excreta disposal systems and water supplies in the rural areas of the island.

146. Expenditure on public health was \$WI 866,871 in 1963, representing 12 per cent of the local expenditure, compared with \$WI 823,076 in 1962, representing 10 per cent. In addition, \$WI 148,192 was granted in 1963 from Colonial Development and Welfare funds.

Educational conditions

147. Education continued during 1963 to be administered by the education department and educational policy to be the concern of the Minister of Education, Health and Social Affairs.

148. In the primary and infant schools education is free. There is provision for compulsory attendance for children 6 to 12 years of age but as of 1963 the law had not been enforced.

149. There were 58 officially recognized grant-aided primary and infant schools in 1963 (51 Roman Catholic, 3 Anglican, 3 Methodist and 1 government), compared with 51 such schools in 1962, of which one was a government school. The schools employed 617 teachers in 1963 of whom 87 were trained and 530 untrained. The schools were attended by 23,034 pupils compared with 21,117 in 1962.

150. There were three secondary schools in 1963, two of which were fee-paying and assisted by government grants and the third run by the Government. The fees are paid by term and vary from \$WI 16 to \$WI 19. The three secondary schools employed 39 teachers of whom 15 were trained and 24 untrained and were attended by 932 pupils, compared with 462 pupils attending secondary schools in 1962. The schools prepare pupils for the General Certificate of Education, the Cambridge School Certificate and the Higher School Certificate examinations. Scholarships from the primary to the secondary schools are provided annually by the Government, the Castries Town Council (a local authority), producers' associations, and other philanthropic bodies. The island is about 95 per cent Roman Catholic and the system of education is almost completely denominational.

151. There is one technical school where training in woodwork and metalwork is undertaken. There is also a teacher-training institution from which forty teachers graduated in 1963 after the first year of operation. In 1963, 14 teachers were also receiving training abroad (5 in the United Kingdom, 1 in Jamaica and 8 in Barbados).

152. There are no institutions of higher education in the Territory but some scholarships are provided for overseas study.

153. Recurrent expenditures on education in 1963 amounted to \$WI 1,056,152, representing 12 per cent of the local budget, compared with \$WI 926,452 in 1962, or 11 per cent of the budget. In addition, capital expenditure in 1963 was \$WI 55,313 and financial assistance from the United Kingdom amounted to \$WI 54,156. The local authorities also spent \$WI 6,276.

St. Vincent¹⁶*Economic conditions*

154. Bananas and arrowroot continued during 1963 to be the main crops produced for export. Banana production increased, in spite of hurricanes which destroyed about 25 per cent of the crop, from 21,579 tons valued at \$WI 2,529,988 in 1962 to 25,237 tons valued at \$WI 3,006,935. The upward trend in the production of arrowroot starch also continued. The crop for 1961-1962 was 37,357 barrels (200 pounds each), and the estimated crop for 1962-1963 was 50,317 barrels. The increased production was, however, reportedly offset by a serious drop in prices resulting in little improvement in net earnings.

155. The cotton ginnyery was not rebuilt and stagnation persisted but through assistance with pest control and fertilizer needs, and an upturn in price, there was a slight increase in interest and acreage. In 1961-1962, 617 acres were planted, in 1962-1963, 319 acres and in 1963-1964, 635 acres were sown.

156. The acreage under cocoa continued to grow. A further 113 acres were planted bringing the total to 735 acres. Exports rose to 24.3 tons in 1963 as against 14.8 tons in 1962 and 5.1 tons in 1961. Local demands at present absorb the bulk of increase in production.

157. Copra production rose slightly to 2,409 tons in 1963 as against 2,323 tons in 1962 and 2,773 tons in 1961. Exports of coconuts increased from 401,244 nuts in 1962 to 433,615 nuts in 1963. In 1961, only 72,729 nuts were exported.

158. Eight Colonial Development and Welfare schemes for agriculture were in operation in 1963 with a total expenditure up to 31 December 1963 of \$WI 61,411. The Marketing Board established under these funds dealing with the external marketing of starchy root crops continued to function and business transacted in 1963 amounted to some \$WI 500,000. Demarcation of Crown lands for forestry conservation through the funds available also continued in 1963 after the recruitment of a forest supervisor in 1962.

159. Complete statistics of imports and exports by quantity and value showing chief groups of articles and direction of trade were not available. Between 1959 and 1962, however, the value of imports remained almost constant at between \$WI 12.5 and \$WI 13 million. They included food-stuffs, textiles, footwear, lumber, cement, metal manufactures and machinery. Exports also remained almost constant and were valued at \$WI 5.7 million in 1962 with bananas amounting for almost half the value, arrowroot about 25 per cent and copra about 16 per cent.

160. Total revenue amounted to \$WI 5,496,774 in 1963, compared with \$WI 5,763,000 in 1962.

161. Ordinary revenue, of which over half was derived from customs and excise duties, amounted to \$WI 4,194,416 in 1963 compared with \$WI 3,956,000 in 1962. In addition, the Territory received \$WI 1,302,358 from a United Kingdom grant-in-aid (\$WI 979,883), Colonial Development and Welfare funds (\$WI 300,520) and Overseas Service Aid (\$WI 21,955) compared with total grants of \$WI 1,783,000 in 1962.

162. Total expenditure in 1963 was \$WI 5,748,846, compared with \$WI 5,672,000 in 1962. Ordinary expenditure in 1963 amounted to \$WI 5,330,399, Colonial Development and Welfare expenditure to \$WI 383,991 and that from Overseas Services Aid, \$WI 34,456.

*Social conditions**Labour*

163. The Labour Department headed by a Labour Commissioner and a staff of four continued to advise the Government on labour matters. At 31 December 1963, the total population of St. Vincent was estimated at 85,000 and the working population between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five was estimated at 30,000. The working population is being replenished by young entrants at the rate of 1,000 *per annum*. As St. Vincent is an agricultural community, employment is seasonal. The majority of agricultural and industrial workers are underemployed during the slack period from June to November.

164. At the end of 1963 registered organizations included: the Federated Industrial and Agricultural Workers Union; two teachers' unions; a civil service association; the Planters' Association; two chambers of commerce and a commercial technical and allied workers union. During 1963, 451 workers returned from the United States, the United States Virgin Islands and Antigua and 436 workers were recruited for work abroad.

Public health

165. The organization of the Medical Department, under the control of a senior Medical Officer, remained unchanged during 1963. Medical facilities comprised a general hospital with 208 beds, three cottage hospitals with 20 beds and 22 out-patient dispensaries. There are also maternity and child welfare clinics at the general hospital and the dispensaries. A health-welfare child centre was near completion on behalf of the "Save the Children Fund", estimated at a cost of \$WI 65,000. Increases in the medical staff during 1963 included 3 doctors, 8 nurses, and 4 midwives, and consisted of 13 doctors, including 2 private doctors, 141 nurses including 23 private nurses, 137 midwives, including 62 private midwives, and 49 technicians and others.

166. In 1963 the birth-rate was 43.1 per thousand as against 45.1 in 1962, and the death-rate was 11.9 per thousand, compared with 11.6 in 1962. The infant mortality rate rose from 91.8 per thousand to 96.7 in 1963. Gastro-enteritis is responsible for over 50 per cent of the deaths of children under the age of two years. Other causes of death are malnutrition, cardiac failure, broncho-pneumonia and senility.

Educational conditions

167. Responsibility for educational policy continued in 1963 to be exercised by the elected Minister for Social Services and under him the Education Officer. Primary education continued to be free, but not compulsory, for children between five and fifteen years of age at fifty-five government primary schools. In addition, there was a junior fee-paying school and three private primary schools. Secondary education is provided at fee-paying schools of which two were government schools and three private schools in 1963. A new grammar-school, financed from Colonial Development and Welfare funds, was under construction in 1963. The secondary schools prepare candidates for the

¹⁶ The following information has been taken into account in the preparation of this section: information under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter for the year ending 31 December 1963, transmitted on 10 September 1964.

Cambridge School Certificate and the General Certificate of Education, and one school prepares candidates for the Higher School Certificate. The fifty-five government primary schools were attended by 24,009 children in 1963 as compared with 22,966 in 1962, and 1,334 children attended the two government secondary schools. Figures for those attending the private secondary schools were not available.

168. There are four government teacher-training centres which offer a two-year course.

169. There are no technical or vocational schools or institutions of higher education in the Territory. Figures were not available for those attending such institutions abroad.

170. In 1963, recurrent expenditure on education was approximately \$WI 1.06 million, compared with \$WI 1.1 million in 1962.

4. Barbados¹⁷

Introduction

171. The constitutional status and general political situation in Barbados, according to the information which became available, remained basically the same during 1963-1964 as described in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXV, paras. 206-222).

172. The Premier of Barbados participated in the ninth Conference of the Regional Council of Ministers in 1964 concerning the proposed "West Indies Federation" as described in paragraphs 34 to 52 above.

173. Such information as became available concerning the economic, social and educational situation in the Territory is summarized below.

Economic conditions

174. The production of sugar and its by-products, rum and molasses, continued in 1963-1964 to dominate the island's economy, accounting for about 92 per cent of the total domestic exports. Of the total arable land area of 68,563 acres, 46,227 were under sugar cane. Other crops included green vegetables and cereals.

175. Apart from sugar, the tourist trade continued to grow and Barbadians working overseas also continued to contribute to the revenue by sending remittances home.

176. During 1963, the Industrial Development (Export Industries) Act, designed to attract industries manufacturing for export only, was passed. Industries operating under this Act will be eligible for a ten-year, tax-free period and will be granted customs concessions in respect of the raw materials used. The Barbados Development Board, in addition to undertaking promotion and providing loans to industry and hotels, also operates two fully serviced industrial estates. These factories may be leased or rented to industrialists. Industrialists may also lease land and erect their own factories.

177. Imports for 1963 were provisionally valued at \$WI 98,896,025, compared with \$WI 89,097,487 in 1962. The increase of \$WI 9,798,538 occurred mainly in items of food, mineral fuels and manufactured goods.

Imported goods come mainly from the United Kingdom (\$WI 30.1 million in 1963), the United States (\$WI 13 million), Canada (\$WI 11.1 million) and other Commonwealth countries (\$WI 8.5 million).

178. The total value of exports excluding in-transit trade was provisionally placed at \$WI 70.0 million in 1963, compared with \$WI 50.2 million in 1962. The adverse balance of trade is partly offset by interest on capital investment abroad and, as noted above, by remittances from Barbadians abroad, and the tourist trade. Remittances sent through the Post Office in the first quarter of 1964 amounted to \$WI 1,267,693 compared with \$WI 1,205,240 in the first quarter of 1963 and in 1963-1964, the tourist trade brought in an estimated \$WI 21.1 million. In an economic survey carried out in 1964, it was estimated that the value of total exports rose by 39.3 per cent in 1963 and the value of domestic exports by 44.9 per cent. The value of sugar exports increased by 52 per cent.

179. Barbados had a favourable balance of trade with the United Kingdom in 1963 of \$WI 4.6 million and adverse balances of \$WI 5.5 million with the United States, \$WI 5.7 million with Canada, \$WI 8.7 million with the European Economic Community, \$WI 2.4 million with the West Indies (including Jamaica and Trinidad) and \$WI 1.8 million with British Guiana. The deficit on the visible balance of trade was \$WI 28.9 million, or \$WI 10 million less than in 1962.

180. The main items of revenue are derived from customs and excise duties and from taxation, including income tax. The following figures show actual revenue and expenditure for 1961-1962 and revised estimates for 1962-1963 and 1963-1964.

| <i>Revenue</i> | | |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <i>(in thousand West Indian dollars)</i> | | |
| <i>1961-1962</i> | <i>1962-1963</i> | <i>1963-1964</i> |
| <i>(actual)</i> | <i>(revised est.)</i> | <i>(revised est.)</i> |
| 26,209 | 28,107 | 31,950 |
| <i>Expenditure</i> | | |
| 27,157 | 28,361 | 30,446 |

Capital expenditure for 1963-1964 totalled \$WI 9,553,178 compared with \$WI 7,930,184 in the previous year. Capital expenditure is financed from loan funds (\$WI 7,939,250), general revenue balance (\$WI 464,762), Colonial Development and Welfare funds (\$WI 159,481) and labour welfare funds (\$WI 989,684).

181. The island's public debt in 1963-1964 was over \$WI 40 million.

182. During 1964, an economic commission carried out a survey in the Territory. Among the recommendations of the commission were that the Price Stabilization Fund for sugar, which stood at \$WI 7 million in July 1962 and which had so far been unused, except in connexion with a bulk sugar loading installation, might be used in part to stimulate agricultural diversification and public investment in commercial agriculture, including more modern factories.

183. The commission was somewhat critical of the system of land-holding in the Territory. It noted that about 45 per cent of the sugar estates, of which there were 240, were held by companies and that 17 per cent of these estates belonged to absentee owners. As an agricultural country, the commission considered it was in the long-term interest of Barbados to take all steps

¹⁷ The following information has been taken into account in the preparation of this section: information under Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter for the year ending 31 December 1963, transmitted on 20 October 1964.

to discourage the growth of and if possible to eradicate absenteeism.

184. The commission noted that about 29,000 small holders were operating farmlets varying in size from one quarter of an acre upwards. Most of the units were too small to support a farm family and although they supplied 16 per cent of the sugar cane, the small holders were also wage-earners on estates. The commission considered that the holdings, which amounted to about 12,000 acres, should be consolidated with a view to creating co-operatives estates with a minimum size of 100 acres. The commission felt that there was a certain rigidity in the present system of land-holding which might increasingly become a source of friction as the bulk of the population demanded economic and social status in keeping with the growth of political power which they now had. This state of affairs added greater weight to the urgency for a long-term plan of agrarian reform coupled with credit facilities which would enable the trained agriculturalist to own and manage a farm irrespective of his race.

185. The commission also considered that it would be wise for Barbados not to allow sugar production to expand beyond the present limits during the coming decade.

Social conditions

Labour

186. The main labour problem confronting Barbados continued to be the manpower surplus. There are more people than can be gainfully employed the year round and consequently, many men and women are unemployed or underemployed for most of the year. Another complicating factor is the rapid increase of approximately 4,000 persons per year in the already large population of 240,000 people in an island of 166 square miles.

187. To meet the problem, the Government is encouraging the development of secondary industries and tourism and is exploring avenues for migration of

workers to the United Kingdom, the United States and elsewhere. The Government has, since 1954, provided funds to assist by loans any person producing satisfactory evidence of his being able to procure employment overseas. Five hundred and thirty-three (533) loans amounting to \$WI 216,717 were made during 1963, compared with 1,106 loans totalling \$WI 421,758 in 1962. From 1954 to 1963, \$WI 2,883,875 has been loaned to 8,384 persons.

188. A total of 1,971 workers emigrated to the United Kingdom, compared with 3,700 in 1962, and 1,052 workers were engaged for short-term contracts in the United States.

189. The majority of the gainfully occupied population continued to be engaged in the cultivation and harvesting of sugar cane and the processing of the cane into sugar and molasses. Approximately 19,500 workers were engaged during the peak of the reaping season (January-June) and 13,000 during the out-of-crop season (July to December). Other workers continued to be employed in domestic service, the retail trade and construction work.

190. The Labour Department, headed by the Labour Commissioner continued to assist in collective bargaining and in the settlement of labour disputes. Twenty conciliation meetings were held during the year.

191. Under the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, the Barbados Government in 1962 obtained the services of an ILO expert in training-within-industry.

Public health

192. As in 1962, medical facilities in 1963 comprised one general hospital (453 beds), one mental hospital (801 beds), one maternity hospital (20 beds), one leprosarium (40 beds), one district hospital, three health centres and a number of infant clinics and parish infirmaries for the aged and poor.

193. The following figures as far as they are available show the medical personnel in Barbados in 1962 and 1963:

| Medical personnel | Government | | Private | |
|-----------------------------|------------|---------|------------|---------------|
| | Government | Private | Government | Private |
| Registered physicians | 24 | 53 | 30 | 35 |
| Trained nurses | 375 | 70 | 46 | ... |
| | | | 257 | ... |
| | | | 353 | ... |
| Public health nurses | 19 | — | | |
| Sanitary inspectors | 94 | — | 106 | — |
| Midwives | 50 | — | 25 | Not available |

194. At the end of 1963 the population was 238,097, giving a density of 1,434 persons per square mile. The birth-rate in 1963 was 28.6 per thousand and the death-rate 8.0 per thousand. Recurrent and capital expenditure on the medical services in 1963 amounted to \$WI 3,210,897 and \$WI 3,370,343 respectively, representing 15.4 per cent of the total budget as compared with

\$WI 3,027,762 and \$WI 1,205,171 respectively, representing 12.5 per cent of the budget in 1962.

Educational conditions

195. The following table shows the number of schools in the Territory in 1962 and 1963:

| | 1962 | | | 1963 | | |
|--|---------|-------------------|--------------------|---------|-------------------|--------------------|
| | Schools | Enrolment Boys | Enrolment Girls | Schools | Enrolment Boys | Enrolment Girls |
| Primary | 116 | 40,834 | | 117 | 40,732 | |
| Secondary: | | | | | | |
| Government-aided grammar-schools | 10 | 2,580 | 1,745 | 10 | 2,609 | 1,825 |
| Government-owned comprehensive schools (secondary modern) | 5 | 2,320 | 2,316 | 5 | 3,075 | 2,895 |

196. The primary school age is from 5 to 14 years. Three of the grammar-schools lead to university scholarship standard and the others prepare students to the standard of the General Certificate of Education. The comprehensive schools teach practical courses in woodwork, metal-work, bookbinding, home economics, agriculture and animal husbandry. Selected pupils are retained in these schools beyond the school-leaving age of fourteen for a two-year course leading to external examinations such as those given by the London Chamber of Commerce.

197. The Barbados Technical Institute continued to provide courses in mechanical engineering, electrical installation, plumbing and welding, radio servicing etc., and was attended by 602 students in 1963 compared with 520 in 1962. There are also a number of other technical and vocational institutions.

198. Teacher training continued to be provided at Erdiston College and scholarships provided for training abroad. Thirty-one such scholarships were granted in 1962, and thirty were granted in 1963.

199. Higher education is provided at Codrington College, a theological college affiliated to the University of Durham in Britain, and at a college of arts and sciences which has recently been opened and is a part of the University of the West Indies. During 1963, thirty-one Government scholarships were provided for study abroad as compared with thirty in 1962.

200. Estimated Government expenditure on education amounted to \$WI 6,092,434 and capital expenditure to \$WI 1,052,234 in 1963. The corresponding figures for 1962 were \$WI 4,358,550 and \$WI 255,923.

B. PETITIONS

201. The Special Committee circulated the following petition concerning Grenada:

| <i>Petitioner</i> | <i>Document No.</i> |
|------------------------|----------------------------|
| Mr. M. A. Caesar | A/AC.109/PET.362 and Add.1 |

CHAPTER XXV

BRITISH HONDURAS

INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

Introduction

1. Information on British Honduras is already contained in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXVI, paras. 1-66), although the Special Committee did not at that time take action in respect of the Territory. Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.¹

Political and constitutional developments

2. As noted previously, a Constitutional Conference held in London in June 1963 resulted in a new Constitution, under which a wide measure of self-government by a Government responsible to the Legislature was introduced in January 1964. The 1963 Constitution provided also for a new bicameral legislature to be called the National Assembly, consisting of a nominated Senate and a wholly elected House of Representatives. It was agreed, however, that the Senate should not be established until after the next general elections were held. Universal adult suffrage has been in effect since 1953.

3. The first general elections under the 1963 Constitution were held on 1 March 1965. A total of thirty-eight candidates were nominated to contest the eighteen seats. The ruling Peoples United Party and the National Independence Party nominated eighteen candidates each and two candidates contested seats as independents.

4. During the election campaign, both parties advocated independence for the Territory, the only difference between them being the question of timing. On the one hand, the Peoples United Party, led by

Mr. George Price, pressed for complete independence within a period of two or three years. On the other hand, the National Independency Party, now led by Mr. Phillip Goldson, contended that independence should be held off until such time as the Territory could achieve greater economic stability and independence.

5. It is estimated that some 80 to 85 per cent of the 40,000 registered voters participated in the elections. The Peoples United Party won sixteen out of the eighteen seats and the National Independence Party the remaining two seats.

6. In accordance with the terms of the Constitution, the Governor invited Mr. George Price to form a Government. The following are the members of the new Cabinet: Mr. George C. Price, Premier and Minister of Finance and Economic Development; Mr. Albert Cattouse, Minister for Local Government and Social Development; Mr. Alexander Albert Hunter, Minister for Natural Resources and Trade; Mr. Carl L. B. Rogers, Minister for Internal Affairs and Health; Mr. David L. McKoy, Minister of Labour; Mr. Hector D. Silva, Minister of Public Utilities and Communication; Mrs. Gwendolyne Lizarraga, Minister of Education and Housing. The Premier and the other six ministers of the new Government were sworn in by the Governor on 3 March 1965. The eight members of the Senate were subsequently appointed by the Governor, five on the advice of the Premier, two on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition and one after consultations with other persons, as prescribed by the Constitution.

7. In his speech from the Throne at the opening of the new Parliament, the Governor, enunciating government policy, stated:

"Now that the first general election under the new Constitution has been held and the Senators appointed to the Senate, all the self-government arrangements agreed to in London in July 1963, have now been implemented ...

¹ The information presented in this chapter has been derived from published reports, and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73e of the United Nations Charter, on 22 June 1964.

"The Government recognizes the vital role of the Civil Service in our march to independence... The Government will press on vigorously with its training programme for public officers with a view of achieving a wholly Belizian service at the earliest possible.

"Government seeks the independence of Belize and the friendship of all nations. It will continue to uphold the country's sovereignty and to strive for international peace and prosperity with due respect for the rights of all...

"Government realizes that as the country moves forward to independence the creation of an identity of its own is of paramount importance... The Government, realizing the dignity of creating a personality of its own for the country and of possessing tangible symbols of that personality, will take steps to confirm the acceptance of a Belizian flag, the name of Belize for the country, and a Belizian anthem..."

8. It has been reported that both parties have agreed that after independence British Honduras should remain within the Commonwealth, and should be renamed Belize. Mr. George Price, and other leaders of the Peoples United Party, throughout the election campaign, emphasized their determination to create closer ties between British Honduras and the Central American countries. It is also reported that membership in the Organization of American States and integration within the Latin American sphere of interest is viewed with favour by the Party. It may be noted that British Honduras has been an associate member of the Economic Commission for Latin America since 1961.

Economic conditions

9. Timber and other forest products which have played a prominent role in the economy of the Territory are now yielding place to a developing agriculture, in particular through the expansion of citrus and sugar production. Having recovered from the effects of the 1961 hurricane, citrus production increased to over 1 million boxes of oranges and grapefruit in 1963, compared with fewer than 400,000 boxes in 1962. Exports of citrus products in 1963 were valued at \$BH 3.6 million² compared with \$BH 1.4 million in the previous year. An estimated 13,000 acres of sugar cane were harvested, yielding 210,362 tons from cane from which 27,840 tons of sugar and 843,133 gallons of molasses were produced. Sugar exports were valued at \$BH 5.1 million, compared with \$BH 3.9 million in 1962.

10. The total trade figures for 1963 show a significant reduction in imports and a substantial increase in exports:

| Year | Imports | Domestic exports (in British Honduras dollars) | Re-exports |
|------|------------|---|------------|
| 1961 | 22,517,922 | 11,186,538 | 1,215,769 |
| 1962 | 31,202,647 | 8,251,986 | 2,912,765 |
| 1963 | 26,500,000 | 15,400,000 | 3,000,000 |

11. The locally derived revenue and the expenditure of the Territory for the period 1962-1964 have been as follows:

| | Revenue (in British Honduras dollars) | Expenditure (in British Honduras dollars) |
|-----------------|--|--|
| 1962 (actual) | 9,217,702 | 11,958,069 |
| 1963 (estimate) | 8,148,000 | 15,637,569 |
| 1964 (estimate) | 8,348,075 | 15,262,888 |

12. The gap between locally derived revenue and expenditure is being met by funds made available by the United Kingdom Government, mainly in the form of grant-in-aid (\$BH 700,000 in both 1963 and 1964), grants for development and welfare projects (\$BH 325,000 approved for 1964 compared with \$BH 635,000 in actual expenditure for 1963) and loans and grants for hurricane rehabilitation (\$BH 5.7 million in 1964 compared with \$BH 5.9 million in 1963).

13. Of the 1964 estimated expenditures, \$BH 8,855,394 were classified as recurrent and \$BH 6,407,494 as on capital account.

14. According to the Governor's speech at the opening of the new Parliament, the Government intends to press on speedily with the implementation of its seven-year development plan, which calls for a total expenditure of about \$BH 53 million. It hopes that friendly Governments and international institutions will provide help for individual projects. The Government has also stated that capital from abroad is welcome in the Territory.

15. A Development Finance Corporation with an authorized share capital of \$BH 4 million was launched in November 1963 with a view to financing housing, agriculture, industry and general development. It is at present run by a five-man temporary board of directors appointed by the Government. Its profits and dividends are exempt from income tax for fifteen years. The Government has announced its intent of assisting the Corporation in attracting capital from at home and abroad.

Social conditions

16. In the labour field, the Government's policy is to give high priority to the problems of under-employment and unemployment, to raise the living standards of the workers and their families and to promote legislation and measures that will strengthen the position of trade unions, improve working conditions and improve the employer-employee relationship. At the end of 1963 there were nine labour unions with a membership of 3,507 compared with six unions and a membership of 2,803 at the end of 1961. The Government Workers Rules, 1964, improved the conditions of employment of the workers concerned in such matters as classification of jobs, wage rates, hours of work, overtime, holidays with pay and other fringe benefits.

17. In the field of medicine and health, the death-rate in 1963 decreased to 7.1 per thousand (8.9 in 1962) and the infant mortality rate to 52.3 per thousand live births (68.6 in 1962). The number of doctors employed by the Government increased from 14 to 16, nurses from 114 to 122, midwives from 98 to 119 and public health inspectors from 12 to 14, while the number of government-employed pharmacists decreased from 13 to 11. The Government proposes that continued co-operation with such organizations as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) will be undertaken to eradicate malaria, tuberculosis and to provide environmental sanitation programmes.

² The unit of currency is the British Honduras dollar, which is equivalent to 5 shillings sterling, and \$U.S. 0.70.

18. Unsatisfactory housing, particularly in Belize City, has always been considered a serious problem. The hurricane of 1961 has worsened the situation. During 1963, the Reconstruction and Development Corporation approved 2,413 applications for housing reconstruction at an approximate value of \$BH 1,386,898 of which sum \$BH 563,405 was free grants, the remainder being loans. The 1964 estimates provide \$BH 322,000 for housing grants and \$BH 3 million for housing loans. The Government plans to continue the improvement of the standard of housing in urban and rural sectors and the clearing of slum areas.

19. The Government proposes to press on with its plan to begin the construction of a new capital for the Territory in the quickest possible time. It will be built on a less exposed site about fifty miles inland.

Educational conditions

20. The Education Ordinance, No. 3 of 1962, which came into operation in February 1963, abolished the payment of school fees and made primary education free for all children of school age (5-16 years). The Ordinance also provided for more effective enforcement of compulsory education for primary school pupils between the ages of six and fourteen years.

21. In 1963, there were 26,449 pupils attending primary schools, compared with 25,893 in the previous year; 2,186 attending secondary schools (2,099 in 1962); and 85 attending a vocational school (98 in 1962).

22. There is still a high ratio of pupils to teachers (in the primary schools 1 qualified teacher to 70 pupils) although there are a considerable number of probationers and pupil teachers employed. Attempts to fill the gap in the number of trained teachers are being undertaken.

23. In January 1963, the Intermediate Training Centre was inaugurated for the purpose of providing in-service training for eighty teachers each year. Extensions to the St. George's Teachers Training College were completed to enable a larger intake of students in 1964.

24. The Government has announced its intention of ensuring that educational policy is geared to the needs of the country's development. It will sustain the Church-State school system. It will aim at improving the quality of education at all levels and at extending secondary education. Where the Church-State system is unable to provide technical and vocational training, the Government proposes to provide that service.

CHAPTER XXVI

INFORMATION ON NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 e OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND RELATED QUESTIONS

1. By its resolution 1970 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963, the General Assembly dissolved the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and, *inter alia*, requested the Special Committee to study the information transmitted to the Secretary-General in accordance with Article 73 e of the Charter and to take it fully into account in examining the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

2. It will be recalled that in a note (A/AC.109/L.97) dated 14 February 1964, the Secretary-General drew the attention of the Special Committee to the above-mentioned resolution and made suggestions concerning the procedures which the Special Committee might wish to follow. The procedures set out in the note were approved by the Special Committee at its 315th meeting on 17 November 1964.

3. In compliance with the provisions of operative paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1970 (XVIII) and in accordance with the procedures approved by the Special Committee at its 315th meeting, the latest information transmitted by the Administering Members under Article 73 e of the Charter was used in the preparation of the working papers by the Secretariat on most of the Territories for the Special Committee. This information was taken into account by the Committee in its consideration of the Territories concerned and is reflected in the chapter of the Special Committee's report dealing with each of these Territories.

4. At its 383rd and 385th meetings, held on 7 and 15 September 1965, the Special Committee considered a report by the Secretary-General (see appendix to

this chapter) on the information which had been transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter up to 7 September 1965¹ and on the action which had been taken in implementation of General Assembly resolution 1970 (XVIII).

5. In the course of the debate at the 383rd meeting on 7 September 1965, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said he wished once again to voice his strong disapproval of the continued failure of the United Kingdom to transmit information on Southern Rhodesia under Article 73 e of the Charter. He expressed disappointment at the United Kingdom explanation that in its view Southern Rhodesia was not a Non-Self-Governing Territory. This attitude showed a complete disregard of world opinion and of the opinion of the Special Committee. He hoped that the United Kingdom delegation would transmit the required information very soon.

6. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that a thorough knowledge of the political, constitutional, economic, social and cultural conditions in the Non-Self-Governing Territories, made possible by the transmission of objective, specific and up-to-date information, enabled the members of the Committee, and all States Members of the United Nations, to help towards the attainment of independence by all colonial countries and peoples. He was compelled to note with great regret, however, that some administering Powers were violating the provision of the Charter which required all colonial Powers to transmit

¹ Information regarding the latest constitutional developments in the Cook Islands was transmitted by the Government of New Zealand on 13 August 1965 (A/5961) and taken into account by the Special Committee in its consideration of the Territory (see chap. VIII above).

information on conditions in the Non-Self-Governing Territories under their administration. Portugal was a case in point: it continued to blatantly violate General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV) and the numerous other United Nations decisions on the question of the Portuguese colonies. It was waging a savage colonial war against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea with the political, economic and military assistance of its NATO allies. The same was true of the United Kingdom, which, as the representative of Tanzania had just pointed out, refused to transmit information on the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Southern Rhodesia, in violation of General Assembly resolution 1747 (XVI). It was the duty of the Special Committee to draw attention to those violations of the United Nations Charter and to appeal once again to those colonial Powers to submit the required information on the Territories under their administration.

7. Furthermore, an analysis of the information on the political and constitutional development of the Non-Self-Governing Territories that had been transmitted in recent years showed that the administering Powers were placing every possible restraint on the process of political development in those Territories, in contravention of the principles of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The information gave no indication of the specific steps, the dates and methods contemplated for bringing a Territory to independence, whereas not only the Special Committee but above all the people concerned were entitled to know those facts.

8. The sections dealing with economic conditions in the Non-Self-Governing Territories were also unsatisfactory: they included no data on the actual standard of living of the indigenous population, on salaries and purchasing power, on the steps the administering Power proposed to take in order to raise the standards of living, on the enormous profits made by foreign monopolies through the exploitation of the indigenous population or on unemployment and measures to eliminate it. The Special Committee should take a decisive stand against this inadmissible practice and should request the administering Powers to transmit information which would enable a definite idea to be formed of the standard of living of the people, their participation in the economic life of the country and the steps taken by the administering Power to raise the country's economic level.

9. Similarly, the information on social conditions, health and education lacked objectivity and was designed to conceal from the members of the Special Committee the real conditions in the Territories. This had been demonstrated on many occasions, the most recent example being that of the petitioners from the Bahamas, who described the deplorable educational conditions, so different from the optimistic picture painted by the United Kingdom.

10. Thus, the picture of conditions in the Non-Self-Governing Territories was distorted and important details were left out, with the result that the members of the Committee were misinformed and unable to assess the situation objectively. In that connexion, he referred to the information transmitted by the United Kingdom on the elections held in November 1962 for the House of Assembly of the Bahamas and the details given by the petitioners, which had cast a very different light on the results of those elections.

11. The Soviet Union delegation wished to point out that the information transmitted by the colonial Powers constituted virtually the only source of information made available to the members of the Special Committee by the United Nations Secretariat. It was obvious that, in so far as the information provided by the colonial Powers did not provide a comprehensive and objective picture of conditions in the Non-Self-Governing Territories, the data provided by the Secretariat suffered from the same defect. In order to correct that serious defect, the Secretariat could and should draw liberally on other sources of information such as the statements of petitioners, written petitions, economic and social studies, surveys and similar material.

12. At its 385th meeting on 13 September 1965, the Special Committee took note of the report of the Secretary-General which it decided to include in its report to the General Assembly. This document appears as an appendix to the present chapter.

13. At the same meeting, the Special Committee decided without objection to transmit to the General Assembly the information contained in the working papers prepared by the Secretariat on the Territories which it might be unable to consider before the closing of its meetings in 1965. This information, which is included in separate chapters of the present report, was to be considered as supplementary to the relevant chapters of the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly covering its work during 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1).

APPENDIX*

Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General

TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION UNDER ARTICLE 73 e OF THE CHARTER

1. The Secretary-General's previous report on this subject (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. II, appendix II) listed the dates on which information was transmitted to the Secretary-General under Article 73 e of the Charter up to 30 November 1964. The table at the end of the present report shows the dates on which such information was transmitted in respect of the years 1963 and 1964.

2. The information transmitted under Article 73 e follows in general the standard form approved by the General Assembly and includes information on geography, history, population, economic, social and educational conditions. In the case of Territories under the administration of Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America, the annual reports of the Territories, which also include information on constitutional matters, were transmitted. Additional information on political and constitutional developments in Territories under their administration was also given by the representatives of Australia, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States of America during meetings of the Special Committee.

3. No information has been transmitted to the Secretary-General concerning Territories under Portuguese administration, which, by resolution 1542 (XV) of 15 December 1960, the General Assembly considered were Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter. Nor has the Secretary-General received information concerning Southern Rhodesia which, the Assembly affirmed by resolution 1747 (XVI) of 28 June 1962, was a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter.

* Originally issued under the symbol A/AC.109/131 and Add.1 and 2.

STUDY OF THE INFORMATION TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 e
OF THE CHARTER

4. In compliance with the provisions of operative paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1970 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963, which requested the Special Committee to study

the information transmitted under Article 73 e, and in accordance with the procedure approved by the Special Committee in 1964, the Secretariat has continued to use the information transmitted in the preparation of working papers on each Territory for the Special Committee.

Table. Dates of transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter for 1963 and 1964

This table includes all Territories listed in annex II of the report of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories to the General Assembly at its eighteenth session^a with the exception of the Gambia, Jamaica, Kenya, Malta, North Borneo, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Sarawak, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda and Zanzibar.

| | Date of transmission | |
|--|----------------------|------------------|
| | 1963 | 1964 |
| Australia (1 July-30 June): ^b | | |
| Cocos (Keeling) Islands | 13 February 1964 | 2 February 1965 |
| Papua | 25 November 1964 | 28 July 1965 |
| France (calendar year): | | |
| Comoro Archipelago ^c | — | |
| French Somaliland ^c | — | |
| New Hebrides | 7 May 1965 | |
| New Zealand (1 April-31 March): | | |
| Cook Islands | 27 November 1964 | |
| Niue Island | 27 November 1964 | |
| Tokelau Islands | 27 November 1964 | |
| Portugal: | | |
| Angoia | — | |
| Cape Verde Archipelago | — | |
| Guinea (Portuguese) | — | |
| Macau and dependencies | — | |
| Mozambique | — | |
| São Tomé and Príncipe and dependencies | — | |
| Timor (Portuguese) and dependencies | — | |
| Spain (calendar year): | | |
| Fernando Póo | 29 June 1964 | 24 February 1965 |
| Ifni | 29 June 1964 | 24 February 1965 |
| Río Muni | 29 June 1964 | 24 February 1965 |
| Spanish Sahara | 29 June 1964 | 24 February 1965 |
| United Kingdom (calendar year): | | |
| Aden | 28 October 1964 | 31 August 1965 |
| Antigua | 14 September 1964 | 20 August 1965 |
| Bahamas | 28 October 1964 | 31 August 1965 |
| Barbados | 20 October 1964 | 24 August 1965 |
| Basutoland | 10 November 1964 | |
| Bechuanaland | 20 August 1964 | 1 June 1965 |
| Bermuda | 13 October 1964 | 2 September 1965 |
| British Guiana | 14 July 1964 | 7 September 1965 |
| British Honduras | 22 June 1964 | 16 July 1965 |
| British Virgin Islands | 9 October 1964 | 24 August 1965 |
| Brunei | 30 June 1964 | 26 July 1965 |
| Cayman Islands | 9 October 1964 | |
| Dominica | 21 August 1964 | 2 July 1965 |
| Falkland Islands | 23 June 1964 | 2 July 1965 |
| Fiji | 12 May 1964 | 9 June 1965 |
| Gibraltar | 13 October 1964 | |
| Gilbert and Ellice Islands | 17 June 1964 | 2 September 1965 |
| Grenada | 10 September 1964 | 7 July 1965 |
| Hong Kong | 30 October 1964 | 7 June 1965 |
| Mauritius | 22 June 1964 | 26 July 1965 |
| Montserrat | 20 August 1964 | |
| New Hebrides | 23 June 1964 | 1 September 1965 |
| Pitcairn Island | 13 May 1964 | 7 June 1965 |
| St. Helena | 12 June 1964 | 28 July 1965 |
| St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla | 30 October 1964 | |
| St. Lucia | 23 November 1964 | 2 September 1965 |
| St. Vincent | 10 September 1964 | 30 August 1965 |
| Seychelles | 14 September 1964 | 23 July 1965 |
| Solomon Islands | 23 June 1964 | 14 June 1965 |
| Southern Rhodesia | — | |

Table (continued)

| | Date of transmission | |
|---|----------------------|------------------|
| | 1963 | 1964 |
| Swaziland | 30 November 1964 | |
| Turks and Caicos Islands | 2 November 1964 | 2 September 1965 |
| United States of America (1 July-30 June): ^b | | |
| American Samoa | 8 December 1964 | |
| Guam | 13 November 1964 | 31 August 1965 |
| United States Virgin Islands | 13 November 1964 | 31 August 1965 |

^a See A/5514, part I, annex II.

^b Period extends from 1 July of previous year to 30 June of year listed.

^c On 27 March 1959, the Government of France notified the Secretary-General that this Territory had attained internal autonomy and, consequently, the transmission of information thereon had ceased as from 1957.

ANNEXES

Annex I

LETTER DATED 26 AUGUST 1965 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

I have the honour to enclose a calendar of constitutional advance covering the main developments in the United Kingdom dependent Territories from November 1964 to July 1965.

This calendar brings up to date the calendar enclosed with Mr. King's letter of 20 October 1964, reproduced as annex I to the report to the General Assembly of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/5800/Rev.1).

The calendar again provides a record of continued constitutional progress in the Territories for which the United Kingdom is responsible. In particular, the Gambia, with a population of about 316,000 achieved full independence in February 1965.

I have the honour to request that this letter and the enclosed calendar be circulated to members of the Committee as a Committee document, and also that they form part of our further report to the General Assembly.

(Signed) F. D. W. BROWN

Calendar of Constitutional Advance, November 1964-July 1965

Ministers of the Federation of South Arabia and Aden announced their support for a unitary State during a visit by the Colonial Secretary.

December 1964

At the British Guiana elections, Mr. Burnham's Peoples National Congress (PNC) won 22 seats, Dr. Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP), 24 and the United Force (UF) 7. Mr. Burnham was appointed Premier of a PNC-UF Government.

The meeting of the Regional Council of Ministers of the Caribbean Territories in Barbados established committees to prepare a Federal Constitution.

The Sultan of Brunei and the Commonwealth Secretary had talks in London and agreed on constitutional measures for advance towards full parliamentary democracy.

The sections of the Swaziland Constitution relating to the position of the Ngwenyama came into effect.

January 1965

New constitutions for Basutoland and Bechuanaland were made by Order in Council.

February 1965

The Gambia became independent.

The Colonial Secretary visited the West Indies and British Guiana.

The new constitutional arrangements for the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, approved in October, came fully into force.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Colonial Office, visited Gibraltar.

March 1965

Mr. Mackawee was appointed Chief Minister of Aden.

At the British Honduras elections, Mr. George Price's Peoples United Party won 16 seats and the National Independence Party 2. Mr. Price continued in office as Premier. Following the elections the Senate was established.

At the Brunei Legislative Council elections, 9 seats were won by Independents and 1 by the Brunei People's Alliance.

At the Bechuanaland elections, Mr. Seretse Khama's Bechuanaland Democratic Party won 28 seats, and the Bechuanaland People's Party 3. Mr. Seretse Khama was appointed Prime Minister.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Colonial Office, visited Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.

April 1965

At the Basutoland elections, Chief Leabua Jonathan's Basutoland National Party won 31 seats, Basutoland Congress Party 25, and the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party 4. Chief Jonathan was defeated and Chief Maseribane was appointed Prime Minister.

The Hong Kong Urban Council was increased by 4 non-official seats, 2 elective and 2 nominated.

In British Guiana emergency powers were transferred from the Governor to Ministers.

The Colonial Secretary visited Mauritius.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Colonial Office, visited Fiji.

May 1965

At further talks in London between the Sultan of Brunei and the Commonwealth Secretary, it was agreed that when the ministerial system was satisfactorily established, a representative constitutional conference would be held.

June 1965

The first stage of a ministerial system in Brunei introduced with the appointment of 4 assistant ministers.

July 1965

In Basutoland, Chief Leabua Jonathan won a by-election and was appointed Prime Minister.

The Gibraltar independent members of the Legislative Council joined a coalition Government, Mr. Isola becoming Deputy Chief Minister.

British and French Ministers held talks on the New Hebrides in Paris and agreed on measures of reform to bring the administration up to date.

The Colonial Secretary proposed that the British Guiana Constitutional Conference should begin on 2 November.

The Fiji Constitutional Conference opened in London.

In Eermuda, a Joint Select Committee considering constitutional change submitted an interim report recommending changes in the franchise and promised a further report later this year.

The Colonial Secretary visited Aden where it was agreed that a representative working party should meet in London in early August to consider the agenda for a Constitutional Conference to be held later in the year.

It was agreed that a constitutional conference on Mauritius should be held in London in September.

Annex II

LIST OF DELEGATIONS

AUSTRALIA

Representative

H.E. Mr. Patrick Shaw, C.B.E.

Alternate Representative

Mr. Dudley McCarthy, M.B.E.

Advisers

Mr. B. B. Hickey

Mr. A. C. Wilson

BULGARIA

Representatives

H.E. Mr. Milko Tarabanov

Mr. Matey Karasimeonov

Mr. Barouch M. Grinberg

Mr. Ivan Peinirdjiev

CAMBODIA

Representative

H.E. Mr. Huot Sambath

Alternate Representatives

Mr. Thoutch Vutthi

Mr. Chhuan Sambor

CHILE

Representative

Mr. Javier Illanes

Alternate Representative

Mr. Hernán Sánchez

DENMARK

Representative

H.E. Mr. Hans R. Tabor

Alternate Representative

Mr. Skjold G. Melbin

Adviser

Mr. Martin Kofod

ETHIOPIA

Representative

H.E. Mr. Tesfaye Gebre-Egzy

Alternate Representatives

Mr. Girma Abebe

Mr. Ayelework Abebe

INDIA

Representative

H.E. Mr. G. Parthasarathi

Alternate Representatives

Mr. Brajesh C. Mishra

Mr. K. Natwar Singh

Adviser

Mr. J. J. Therattil

IRAN

Representative

H.E. Mr. Mehdi Vakil

Alternate Representative

Mr. Mohsen S. Esfandiary

Adviser

Mr. Saeed Goudarznia

IRAQ

Representative

H.E. Mr. Adnan Pachachi

Alternate Representatives

Mr. Ala'Uddin H. Aljubouri

Mr. S. Saleem

ITALY

Representative

H.E. Mr. Piero Vinci

Alternate Representatives

Mr. Ludovico Carducci Arsenio

Mr. Vincenzo Zito

IVORY COAST

Representative

H.E. Mr. Arsène Assouan Usher

Alternate Representatives

Mr. Moïse Aka

Mr. Julien Kacou

MADAGASCAR

Representative

H.E. Mr. Louis Rakotomalala

Alternate Representative

Mr. Gabriel Rakotoniaina

MALI

Representatives

H.E. Mr. Sori Coulibaly

Mr. Mamadou Moctar Thiam

Mrs. Jeanne Rousseau

POLAND

Representative

H.E. Mr. Eohdan Lewandowski

Alternate Representative

Mr. Jan Slowikowski

SIERRA LEONE

Representative

H.E. Mr. G. B. O. Collier

Alternate Representatives

Mr. George Coleridge-Taylor

Mr. G. E. O. Williams

Adviser

Mr. Frank P. Karefa-Smart

SYRIA

Representative

H.E. Mr. Rafik Asha

Alternate Representatives

Mr. Adnan Nachabe

Mr. Rafic Jouéjati

Adviser

Mr. Adnan Omran

TUNISIA

Representatives

H.E. Mr. Taïeb Slim
Mr. Sadek Bouzayen
Mr. Mohamed Gherib

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Representative

H.E. Dr. Nikolai Trofimovich Fedorenko

Alternate Representative

Mr. Pavel Fedorovich Shakhov

Advisers

Mr. Yury Evgenyevich Fotin (until July 1965)
Mr. Anatoli Vasilievich Grodsky

Expert

Mr. V. I. Gapon

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Representative

H.E. The Rt. Hon. Lord Caradon, G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.

Alternate Representative

Mr. F. D. W. Brown

Advisers

Mr. D. J. Swan
Mr. B. L. Barder
Mr. J. A. Scott
Mr. P. A. H. Hodgson

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

Representatives

H.E. Mr. J. W. S. Malecela
Mr. Mohammad Ali Foum
Mr. A. B. C. Danieli
Mr. E. P. Mwaluko

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Representatives

H.E. Mrs. Marietta P. Tree
H.E. Mrs. Eugenie M. Anderson

Alternate Representatives

Mr. Dwight Dickinson
Mr. Christopher Thoron

Advisers

Mr. John M. Cates, Jr.
Mr. Ernest C. Grigg, III

URUGUAY

Representative

H.E. Mr. Carlos María Velázquez

Alternate Representative

Mr. Mateo Marques-Seré

VENEZUELA

Representative

H.E. Mr. Carlos Sosa-Rodríguez

Alternate Representative

Mr. Leonardo Díaz González

YUGOSLAVIA

Representative

H.E. Mr. Danilo Lekić

Alternate Representative

Mr. Miloš Melovski

Adviser

Mr. Rade Maksimović

*Specialized agencies**International Labour Organisation*

Mr. Philippe Blamont
Mr. F. M. Abdel-Rahman

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Mr. Joseph L. Orr
Mr. Morris A. Green

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

Mr. Arthur F. Gagliotti
Miss Ruth Barrett

World Health Organization

Dr. Rodolphe L. Coigny
Mrs. Sylvia Meagher

CHECK LIST OF DOCUMENTS

| <i>Document No.</i> | <i>Title</i> | <i>Observations and references</i> |
|------------------------|--|---|
| A/4978 | Report of the Sub-Committee on the Situation in Angola | <i>Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 16</i> |
| A/5124 | Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples | <i>Ibid., Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 97</i> |
| A/5160 and Add.1 and 2 | Report of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration | <i>Ibid., Seventeenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 54</i> |
| A/5238 | Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples | <i>Ibid., addendum to agenda item 25</i> |
| A/5446/Rev.1 | Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples | <i>Ibid., Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23</i> |
| A/5514 | Report of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories | <i>Ibid., Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 14</i> |
| A/5523 | Dissemination of information in the Non-Self-Governing Territories on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Secretary-General | <i>Ibid., Eighteenth Session, Annexes, agenda items 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54</i> |
| A/5690 and Add.1 | Note by the Secretary-General and replies from Governments | <i>Ibid., Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 15</i> |

| Document No. | Title | Observations and references |
|------------------------|--|--|
| A/5763 | Letter dated 28 October 1964 from the representative of the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General, transmitting the text of the Declaration entitled "Programme for Peace and International Co-operation" adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo from 5 to 10 October 1964 | Mimeographed |
| A/5800/ Rev.1 | Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples | <i>Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I)</i> |
| A/5840 | Implications of the activities of the mining industry and of the other international companies having interests in South West Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples | <i>Ibid.</i> , annex No. 15 |
| A/5860 | Letter dated 22 January 1965 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting two notes from the British Embassy in Madrid to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain | <i>Ibid.</i> , annex No. 3 |
| A/5880 | Letter dated 2 February 1965 from the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General | <i>Ibid.</i> , annex No. 8 (part II) |
| A/5882 | Note by the Secretary-General | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| A/5884 | Status of the agenda of the nineteenth session: note by the President of the General Assembly | <i>Ibid.</i> , <i>Annexes</i> , annex No. 2 |
| A/5885 | Letter dated 16 February 1965 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly | <i>Ibid.</i> , annex No. 8 (part II) |
| A/5935 | Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Commonwealth of Australia on the administration of the Trust Territory of Nauru for the period from 1 July 1963 to 30 June 1964 | Mimeographed |
| A/5936 | Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Commonwealth of Australia on the administration of the Trust Territory of New Guinea for the period from 1 July 1963 to 30 June 1964 | Ditto |
| A/5958 | Report of the Secretary-General on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland | <i>Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 23</i> |
| A/5959 | Letter dated 30 August 1965 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General | <i>Ibid.</i> , agenda items 23 and 24 |
| A/5961 | Note by the Secretary-General transmitting a letter dated 13 August 1965 from the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| A/5962 | Report of the United Nations Representative for the Supervision of the Elections in the Cook Islands | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| A/6004 | Report of the Trusteeship Council (30 June 1964-30 June 1965) | <i>Ibid.</i> , <i>Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 4</i> |
| A/AC.108/... | Documents of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration | Documents in this series are mimeographed |
| A/AC.109/... | Documents of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples | <i>Idem</i> |
| E/4024 | Report of the Commission on Human Rights on its twenty-first session (22 March-15 April 1965) | <i>Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 8</i> |
| E/TAC/L.337/ Add.22 | The Expanded Programme of technical assistance: the Programme for 1965-1966—Long term project descriptions: British Guiana | Mimeographed |
| S/5448 | Report by the Secretary-General in pursuance of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 31 July 1963 | <i>Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1963</i> |
| S/6094 | Letter dated 8 December 1964 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council | <i>Ibid.</i> , <i>Nineteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1964</i> |
| S/6105 | Letter dated 11 December 1964 from the representative of Yemen to the President of the Security Council | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6124 | Letter dated 23 December 1964 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6252 | Letter dated 22 March 1965 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General | <i>Ibid.</i> , <i>Twentieth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1965</i> |
| S/6258 | Note <i>verbale</i> dated 17 March 1965 from the Permanent Mission of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6259 | Letter dated 25 March 1965 from the representative of Yemen to the Secretary-General | <i>Ibid.</i> |

| Document No. | Title | Observations and references |
|---------------------|--|---|
| S/6265 | Letter dated 30 March 1965 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6272 | Letter dated 5 April 1965 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General | <i>Ibid.</i> , <i>Supplement for April, May and June 1965</i> |
| S/6276 | Letter dated 7 April 1965 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6283 | Letter dated 12 April 1965 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6294 and Add.1 | Letter dated 21 April 1965 to the President of the Security Council from the representatives of Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Zambia | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6300 | Letter dated 23 April 1965 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples addressed to the President of the Security Council | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6368 | Letter dated 18 May 1965 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples addressed to the President of the Security Council | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6412 | Letter dated 2 June 1965 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples addressed to the President of the Security Council | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6416 | Letter dated 5 June 1965 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6460 | Telegram dated 17 June 1965 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples addressed to the President of the Security Council | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6489 | Letter dated 30 June 1965 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6490 | Report of the Trusteeship Council to the Security Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands covering the period from 30 June 1964 to 30 June 1965 | <i>Ibid.</i> , <i>Special Supplement No. 1</i> |
| S/6564 | Letter dated 26 July 1965 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council | <i>Ibid.</i> , <i>Supplement for July, August and September 1965</i> |
| S/6565 | Letter dated 21 July 1965 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples addressed to the President of the Security Council | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6566 | Letter dated 21 July 1965 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples addressed to the President of the Security Council | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6567 | Letter dated 21 July 1965 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples addressed to the President of the Security Council | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6591 | Letter dated 30 July 1965 from the representative of Yemen to the President of the Security Council | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/6617 | Letter dated 13 August 1965 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General | <i>Ibid.</i> |
| S/AC.14/3 T/1633 | A note on uses of petroleum imports in South Africa Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Government of the United States of America on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands from 1 July 1963 to 30 June 1964 | Mimeographed Mimeographed |
| T/1635 and Add.1 | Report on New Guinea submitted by the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea, 1965 | See <i>Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 3</i> |
| T/1636 | Report on Nauru submitted by the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea, 1965 | <i>Ibid.</i> , <i>Supplement No. 2</i> |