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**1925**<sup>th</sup> MEETING: 11 JUNE 1976

NEW YORK

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#### NOTE

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## 1925th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 11 June 1976, at 4 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Rashleigh E. JACKSON (Guyana).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Benin, China, France, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Libyan Arab Republic, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1925)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:  
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/12093)

*The meeting was called to order at 5.25 p.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

### The situation in Cyprus:

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/12093)

1. The PRESIDENT: I have today received a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, who requests that Cyprus be invited to participate in the debate and indicates the composition of its delegation. This request for participation is based on Article 31 of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure. In conformity with the usual practice, and with the consent of the Council, I therefore propose to invite the delegation of Cyprus to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Christophides (Cyprus) took a place at the Council table.*

2. The PRESIDENT: I have also received letters, dated 9 and 11 June respectively, from the representatives of Turkey and Greece in which they ask to be invited to participate in the discussion in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and the provisional rules of procedure. In conformity with the usual practice, and with the consent of the Council, I therefore propose to invite these representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Türkmen (Turkey) and Mr. Papoulias (Greece) took places at the Council table.*

3. The PRESIDENT: In addition, I have received a letter dated 11 June from the representative of Turkey in which he requests that Mr. Nail Atalay be permitted to participate in the debate. I should like to propose, if I hear no objection, that in accordance with the practice followed on previous occasions the Council should extend an invitation to Mr. Atalay under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.

*It was so decided.*

4. Before proceeding with the consideration of the item on the agenda, I should like to inform the members of the Council that the Secretary-General is on his way. His plane has been slightly delayed, but he will be here shortly.

5. The first speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, on whom I now call.

6. Mr. CHRISTOPHIDES (Cyprus): Mr. President, may I at the outset offer you my sincere and warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of this august body. We are convinced that your high qualifications, your recognized diplomatic skill and great experience are valuable assets for the proper conduct of the deliberations of the Council. I wish also to pay a tribute to you as the very able representative of Guyana, a small country which plays a leading rôle in the United Nations and the non-aligned movement and with which my country maintains the best of relations, based on common principles and ideals.

7. Further, I should like to express on behalf of my Government our deepest appreciation and warmest feelings of gratitude to the Secretary-General for his untiring and praiseworthy efforts to promote the noble aims of the United Nations in Cyprus and to serve the cause of peace in the world.

8. Our warm thanks and deep appreciation go also to the Under-Secretaries-General Mr. Roberto Guyer and Mr. Brian Urquhart for their dedicated work with regard to Cyprus.

9. We are particularly grateful to Ambassador Pérez de Cuéllar, the Secretary-General's Special Represen-

tative in Cyprus, whose dedication and devotion in the exercise of his duties, which he carries out in an exemplary manner, are recognized by all. We also acknowledge and commend the very valuable contribution of Lieutenant-General Prem Chand, and of the officers and men working under him, to the cause of peace in Cyprus.

10. Finally, I wish to express our profound gratitude to the Governments which make the United Nations operation in Cyprus possible, through their voluntary contributions of personnel and funds, thus enabling the United Nations to continue carrying out its commendable peace-keeping role.

11. It is a sad fact that I am not present in the Council in order to report any progress in the search for a just and peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. On the contrary, my coming here has been necessitated by the agonizing prolongation of the tragedy of the people of Cyprus and by certain ominous developments which have further aggravated the situation and which, if they continue unchecked, can lead to an even worse crisis, with grave dangers to peace in Cyprus and the sensitive region of the Eastern Mediterranean. These developments are, on the one hand, the stalemate reached in the intercommunal talks as a result of the negative Turkish attitude and, on the other, the deliberate creation of *faits accomplis* by Turkey, which, as a prelude to partition, is expelling the remaining Greek Cypriots from the area it occupies and is colonizing that area by the massive importation of tens of thousands of mainland Turks in an obvious effort to change the demographic composition of Cyprus. The combined result is that unless these trends are reversed, any remaining hopes of reaching a negotiated settlement to the Cyprus problem will disappear.

12. In the present worsening conditions, the purpose of my presence here is to protest against the injustice done to Cyprus and its people and to plead before this body that the United Nations, as the repository of the conscience of mankind, take appropriate action in order to remedy a situation which causes immense human suffering and threatens international peace and security.

13. The picture Cyprus presents is grim, and its component elements remain the 200,000 refugees; the thousands of parents and relatives of those killed in cold blood and of those missing and unaccounted for; the international crime of the invasion, the continued occupation of nearly 40 per cent of the territory of Cyprus and the illegal presence in Cyprus of 40,000 Turkish troops, with the untold misery which they cause to the Cypriot people, Greek and Turkish alike. That, in broad lines, constitutes the drama of the Cypriot people, to whom pain, suffering and agony have sadly become a way of life. But beyond the suffering of a people, the situation in Cyprus poses a grave challenge to the effectiveness of the United

Nations and even calls in question the values and the fundamental principles on which the continued existence of the Organization depends.

14. When on 20 November 1975 the General Assembly adopted, by 117 votes to 1—that of Turkey—resolution 3395 (XXX), we had serious grounds for believing, on the basis of past experience, that this resolution too would receive the same ill treatment by Turkey and would suffer the same fate as the previous resolutions on Cyprus. That belief of ours was not based solely on Turkey's negative vote nor on what its representative had stated during the relevant debate on Cyprus in the General Assembly. It was a belief resulting from Turkey's attitude towards the unanimously adopted General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), for which it had voted but which it had chosen to ignore and flagrantly violate.

15. It is our conviction, considering Turkey's record, that whether its vote is negative or positive, Ankara's attitude towards the resolutions on Cyprus is one of contemptuous disregard. If anyone has any proof or even an indication to the contrary, let him come forward. Indeed, I would welcome it. In the meantime, we are entitled to ask: Which United Nations resolutions on Cyprus has Turkey ever respected? What provision of which resolution has Turkey ever implemented? What indication has Turkey ever given even to create the impression that it intends to implement these resolutions?

16. We recall in this respect that, since the Turkish aggression, a total of 15 resolutions on Cyprus have been adopted—12 by the Security Council and three by the General Assembly. None of these resolutions has been implemented by Turkey and none of their provisions has it respected. Fifteen United Nations resolutions have met with the full contempt of Ankara and have been treated by Turkey as scrap paper devoid of any value. If I may paraphrase: never in the history of the United Nations have so many resolutions been trampled upon by a single country within such a short time. But even beyond that, Turkey has chosen a policy by which it does not merely ignore United Nations resolutions but also takes specific and arbitrary action in flagrant violation of those resolutions, thereby creating *faits accomplis* to aggravate the situation further and destroy all hopes for a peaceful settlement.

17. Upon these actions of Turkey's and the recent disquieting developments in the Cyprus problem I should like to dwell somewhat extensively, for I consider it my duty to advise this body which is entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security of the dangerously deteriorating situation in Cyprus.

18. It will be recalled that at the third round of the intercommunal talks, held in Vienna in August 1975, it was agreed [S/11789, annex] that the Turkish

Cypriots who remained in the Government-controlled areas would be allowed to move to the Turkish-held areas, and the Greek Cypriots who remained in the occupied areas would be free to stay there and would be given every facility to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and the practice of their religion, as well as medical care from their own doctors and freedom of movement in the occupied area. It was also agreed that the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) would have free and normal access to the Greek Cypriot villages in the occupied areas. Turkey, having secured the implementation of those provisions of the agreement which were to its advantage, chose to throw by the wayside and violate the rest. Not only did Turkey under various pretexts prohibit teachers, priests and doctors from entering the occupied area, not only did it prevent the Greek Cypriots who remained in the occupied area from moving about freely and leading a normal life and deny to UNFICYP the exercise of its agreed role, it also embarked upon a process of systematically expelling them through tactics of oppression, harassment and brute force. Since August 1975, when the agreement on humanitarian matters was signed in Vienna, and up to 31 May of this year, a total of 1,982 Greek Cypriots have been expelled from the occupied areas—over 1,000 of them during the last three months. Those inhuman expulsions, which are constantly increasing in number, add to the drama of the Cypriot people and enlarge the dimensions of the tragedy.

19. The explanation given by the Turkish Cypriot leadership as to the expulsions, that the expelled signed so-called voluntary applications asking for their transfer to the Government-controlled areas, is, to say the least, an offence against the integrity of hundreds of neutral observers and an unconvincing attempt to underestimate human intelligence. Ankara can no longer conceal from the world the inhuman methods used by the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the Turkish troops to secure the so-called voluntary exodus of Greek Cypriots from the occupied areas.

20. Restrictions of movement, deprivations, intimidations, continuous harassment and increasing threats against their lives give a grim picture of the living conditions of these people under the Turkish occupation. Under such humiliation and physical dangers, the forced decisions of some to leave their homes and property and save their lives are being described by the invaders as "voluntary" departures. But who would wish to abandon his ancestral home and the fruits of long labour without serious reasons connected with his very existence? Who would ever decide freely to abandon his land and property in order to go and live under subhuman conditions in a refugee camp? The bleak reality is that these wholesale expulsions have been resorted to by Turkey for the purpose of "homogenizing the Turkish region", as it calls it, and with a view to facilitating its perpetuation of yet another repugnant international crime, that of the colonization of the occupied areas.

21. It was soon after the invasion and occupation of the northern part of Cyprus by the Turkish army that the importation of Turks from Turkey was organized. This form of colonization has recently been intensified and has assumed the dimensions of a mass population transfer for the purpose of furthering Ankara's insidious partitionist aims through changes in the demographic character of Cyprus. In order to facilitate the transfer of those "settlers" to Cyprus, the Turkish Government has established offices in Ankara and Mersin which have in fact become centres for the distribution of other people's houses and properties. Crowds of idle and illiterate persons from the depths of Turkey daily converge in front of these offices, anxious to snatch the loot of war.

22. In an effort to mislead world public opinion, Turkey at first alleged that those settlers were seasonal workers and technical experts. With the increase of their number, and given that 25 per cent of the Turkish Cypriot work force have remained unemployed in the occupied area since the invasion, Ankara realized that the myth regarding seasonal workers and experts was no longer tenable. The version had to be changed and a new story invented. The "settlers", whose number is now nearing 45,000 and is constantly increasing, it was then alleged, were Turkish Cypriots who had been forced in the past by the Government of Cyprus to emigrate abroad. In its effort to present such false allegations, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership resorted to a falsification of figures. Mr. Denktaş stated on 4 October 1975 that during the 1954-1959 period 30,000 Turkish Cypriots had had to leave the island. This was in the Turkish "Special News Bulletin" of 4 October 1975. In accordance with the official statistics, which date back to the period of the British administration—and the British are well known for the accuracy of their statistics—the number of Turkish Cypriots who emigrated during that period was in fact 10,625. Similarly, Mr. Çelik alleged, on 2 February 1976, that in the period 1963-1974, 25,000 Turkish Cypriots had emigrated abroad. In fact, the number of Turkish Cypriot emigrants during that time was 6,481, of whom only 302 went to Turkey. Incidentally, and for the sake of comparison, the number of Greek Cypriots who emigrated from 1955 to July 1975 was 79,185. These statistics are at the disposal of anyone for scrutiny. Ankara's attempt purposely to inflate the figures is but a piece of mathematical alchemy performed in an effort to cover its sinister designs against Cyprus, which it is carrying out at the expense of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. For indeed it should not be overlooked that the latter are also victims of this influx of alien population and are discriminated against in relation to the settlers, as a result of the policy followed by the occupying forces.

23. The purpose of the expulsions and colonization is only too obvious. Turkey is, as I have already mentioned, trying to "homogenize" the occupied area and bring about changes in the demographic character of Cyprus, with a view to paving the way for the

partition of Cyprus and the *de facto* annexation by Turkey of the occupied area. At the same time, the creation of these new *faits accomplis* enables Turkey to repeat *ad nauseam* its favourite tune of "new realities" in an effort to avert international pressures for the return of the refugees to their homes and lands, and for the just settlement of the territorial aspect of the problem.

24. Turkey's policy in Cyprus consists in the creation by the use of force of *faits accomplis* which it tries to justify to the world by false pretences and misrepresentations. Turkey calls such *faits accomplis* "new realities" and asks the Greek Cypriots and the world to accept them. The original *faits accomplis* are followed by others, and the original "realities" become "newer realities", supported by new false justifications and lame excuses. The policy of the step-by-step solution of international problems is in fact used by Turkey in reverse: not for the peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem but for the forced dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus.

25. The participation of the Turkish side in the intercommunal talks should also be viewed in the light of the constant objective of Turkey regarding Cyprus—that of partition. Turkey's attitude in the talks has been one of procrastination and dilatoriness, and the Turkish presence at the negotiating table is not motivated by any desire for the achievement of a just solution to the Cyprus problem. Ankara, in fact, uses the time of the talks for the purpose of consolidating its position in the occupied area and for shaking off the pressures of the international community and of individual countries. Whenever Turkey is given friendly advice to make concessions in Cyprus, it always leans back on the comfort of the intercommunal talks and remains idle, doing nothing. And so does the Turkish Cypriot representative at the talks, whose instructions are strict and unequivocal: to prevent any progress in the talks, and by any means to lead them to stagnation—even by the breach of promises or agreements, and even by the sheer negation of truth.

26. It is by such conduct that Turkey has rendered devoid of any substance or meaning the intercommunal talks which commenced in January 1975. I will not take up the Council's time by going into the details of the intercommunal talks which were held last year in Vienna and New York, as you had occasion to be informed of these details at previous meetings of the Council at which the Cyprus problem was debated. Suffice it to say that, owing to the attitude of Turkey that prevented any meaningful negotiations, those talks produced no results at all, notwithstanding the untiring efforts of the Secretary-General.

27. As everyone knows, the abortive talks of 1975 were resumed, and in February 1976 at the fifth round of the intercommunal talks held in Vienna, as a result of the commendable efforts of the Secretary-General,

it was agreed that the two sides should, within a fixed time-limit, exchange concrete proposals on all aspects of the Cyprus problem. This the Greek Cypriot side considered an encouraging development, and, faithful to its undertaking, it submitted within the prescribed period concrete and constructive proposals on all aspects of the Cyprus problem: namely, those of territory, federation and the powers and functions of the central Government. In formulating its proposals the Greek Cypriot side had as its main objective that Cyprus should remain an independent, sovereign, territorially integral and non-aligned State, and was guided by its desire to build the future of Cyprus on sound foundations which would ensure for the people of Cyprus—Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot alike—lasting peace, progress and economic development.

28. To the Greek Cypriot proposals, Mr. Denktas replied in a provocative and unacceptable manner. He returned that part of the proposals which referred to the territorial aspect, for the simple reason that it was linked to the procedural suggestion made by the Secretary-General in Vienna, and asked for the submission of other proposals in a form more to his liking. Such unbecoming conduct confirmed once again the intransigence and bad faith of the Turkish side, which sought on various pretexts to avoid submitting proposals on the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem. As expected, Mr. Denktas failed to include in his side's proposals, which he subsequently submitted, any concrete proposals on territory. Instead, he chose to put forward generalities and bizarre conceptions which he described as "criteria". When studying these "criteria" one may wonder whether the whole of the island of Cyprus would be enough to satisfy the Turkish demands. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot proposals on the constitutional aspect of the problem are such as to leave no doubt that the Turkish side does not aim at a genuine and viable federation but at the creation of two separate States connected in such a loose and fragile manner as to lead unavoidably to the disintegration of the Republic of Cyprus.

29. In this respect, the contents of the recent letter dated 25 May, which the Turkish Cypriot representative at the intercommunal talks sent to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General [S/12093, annex VI] is very revealing of the Turkish intentions. In his letter, the Turkish Cypriot negotiator puts forward certain conditions and principles for the solution of the Cyprus problem, the acceptance of which would be tantamount to the partition of Cyprus, if not worse. From the letter it is abundantly clear that the Turkish side is aiming at the abolition of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent, sovereign and territorially integral State. For how can one explain the conditions put by the Turkish side that the Turkish and Greek regions of Cyprus, as it calls them, shall be homogeneous, both demographically and geographically and that each region shall be solely

responsible for its own defence? The Turkish position, evidently, provides no basis for constructive negotiations and is flagrantly contrary to the fundamental concept of the relevant United Nations resolutions according to which Cyprus should remain an independent, sovereign, territorially integral and non-aligned State.

30. In their pursuit of a prolongation of the Cyprus crisis, in the all too apparent efforts of Ankara to consolidate its position in the occupied area, there develops between Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership a game of transfer of responsibility for the failure of the Turkish side to submit concrete proposals on the territorial aspect of the problem. Mr. Denktas whispers about the political difficulties of Ankara, whilst Ankara makes veiled references to the uncompromising attitude of the Turkish Cypriot leaders. If, indeed, the present Turkish Government is unable, because of internal difficulties, to make the decisions required for a just settlement, then the utility of the continuance of the intercommunal talks becomes questionable since they are turned into a monologue—as has, indeed, been the case until now. As to the attempt to mislead public opinion by shifting responsibilities, no one should be hoodwinked. The presence in Cyprus of 40,000 Turkish troops places Ankara in a position of dominance and this fact speaks eloquently for itself.

31. It is by such conduct as I have described that Ankara has turned the intercommunal talks into a travesty, and it is by the creation of such *faits accomplis* as I have exposed that it is trying to implement its partitionist plans on Cyprus and the *de facto* annexation to Turkey of the occupied area. No denials on Ankara's part, however vociferous they may be, can conceal its real intentions, for its actions in Cyprus speak louder than its words.

32. The stalemate in the negotiations seems to have been inevitable, by reason of the respective attitudes of the two sides towards the talks. The Greek Cypriot side views the negotiations as a constructive dialogue through which the way can be opened towards a just and lasting solution of the problem. By good will and a positive approach, opposing views can be reconciled in the course of a dialogue and differences resolved. Contrastingly different, however, has been the Turkish approach to the talks. Turkey looks at the talks as a suitable forum in which to allow time to pass undisturbed, while it hastens to use that time to expel the Greek Cypriots from the occupied area and to colonize it in furtherance of its partitionist plans.

33. Indicative of Turkey's attitude in the talks is its stand towards the humanitarian agreement reached in Vienna in August 1975, which was hailed at the time as a major success. That agreement, as I have already mentioned, was fully implemented by my Government in so far as its undertakings were concerned. Turkey's position towards the agreement,

however, has been one of bad faith and broken promises, and this is unmistakably borne out in the Secretary-General's report which is before us.

34. The Government of Cyprus continues to regard the intercommunal talks as the best means for the achievement of a peaceful and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. We consider, however, that the talks must be meaningful and productive, and so does the Secretary-General, as is evident from paragraph 69 of his report. In order to achieve this, not only must good will be shown, but each side must also honour all commitments undertaken by it during the talks, including the humanitarian agreement reached at the third round of the talks held in Vienna and the procedural agreement of the fifth round of the talks, regarding the submission of concrete proposals by both sides on all aspects of the Cyprus problem, including the territorial aspect [S/11993 of 24 February 1976, annex]. At the same time, all unilateral actions contrary to these agreements and the relevant resolutions should immediately cease and steps be taken for their reversal.

35. I very much regret to say that Turkey has adopted the same stand of arbitrariness and complete lack of co-operation even on the purely humanitarian problem of the more than 2,000 missing Greek Cypriot civilians and unaccounted-for prisoners of war.

36. It is a well-known fact that despite General Assembly resolution 3450 (XXX) and Human Rights Commission resolution 4 (XXXI), the Turkish military authorities have until now bluntly refused to co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross and have repeatedly denied to representatives of that Committee the request permission for access to the occupied areas for the purpose of carrying out searches or of collecting and verifying information as to the fate of the missing persons.

37. It is needless to stress the dimensions of the agonizing drama and the ordeal of the families of the missing persons who, for almost two years now, have not known whether their loved ones are still alive or have been killed. It is my fervent hope that Turkey will at last show understanding and decide to co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross and furnish the Secretary-General with all the necessary information, as provided by the aforementioned resolution 3450 (XXX), thus putting an end to the anguish of the parents and relatives of the missing persons.

38. The picture which I have presented shows the "new realities"—as Ankara calls them—in Cyprus. I have spoken the truth to the Council, and if anyone doubts the accuracy of my statement, I am certain that I would be vindicated if he were to read the Secretary-General's report that is before us, which, as *The New York Times* in its edition of 9 June states in an editorial, though clothed in diplomatic language... makes grim reading.

39. Thus, in paragraph 10 of his report, the Secretary-General says:

“UNFICYP continues to attempt to discharge its functions with regard to the security, welfare, and well-being of the Greek Cypriots living in the Turkish-controlled part of the Island, as it did for Turkish Cypriots in the past. However, UNFICYP access to that area remains restricted and has become more so since my last report. As a result it has only been possible to carry out humanitarian work on a limited basis.”

I believe that this, as well as the following, conveys the intended meaning clearly, if in understated simplicity. Paragraph 23 of the report reads as follows:

“As a result of these restrictions”—which are set out in paragraph 22—“UNFICYP has been unable to contribute in any effective way to the welfare, well-being and security of the Greek Cypriots in the north except for the supply of material items and distribution of social welfare benefits. There is a continued outflow of these people to the south”.

In paragraph 26 it is stated that:

“In the Turkish-controlled areas UNFICYP has no greater freedom of movement than the UNFICYP military contingents... Contacts with [the] Greek Cypriots designed to obtain information about their security and well-being [are] monitored by the Turkish Cypriot authorities, usually Turkish Cypriot police, who generally discourage such inquiries.”

In paragraph 29 it is stated that

“UNFICYP has continued to receive complaints that Greek Cypriots in the north are being subjected to pressure to move to the south and that their property is subject to confiscation. The Greek Cypriots complain that they are coerced into signing applications to leave the region with warnings that those who do not do so will be moved anyway, but without their personal possessions... The agreed procedure for screening applications for transfer does not appear to function effectively. UNFICYP has no possibility of verifying whether people wish to leave.”

I shall now read from paragraph 30:

“Greek Cypriots in the north cannot leave the environs of their own villages without permission from the Turkish Cypriot authorities. ... the number of teachers continues to be inadequate. ... No secondary schools are open in the region.”

And now, from paragraph 31:

“The Greek Cypriot population in the Kyrenia area declined from 917 in December 1975 to 177

on 3 June 1976, and in the Karpas region from 7,890 to 7,194. Altogether 1,401 Greek Cypriots moved to the south in the last six months. The present rate of evacuations to the south is averaging some 20 persons a day. On the basis of information available to UNFICYP, there are no wholly Greek Cypriot villages left in the Karpas, as either Turkish Cypriots or Turkish nationals have been resettled in varying numbers in each of them.”

40. I have cited those excerpts from the report without making any comments as they eloquently speak for themselves. They also confirm, I think, my exposition of the situation in Cyprus.

41. It is on account of the gravity of the situation that persists in my country that I am appearing today before this Council to seek its support for our struggle for survival as an independent country. I am appealing to the Council to take such appropriate action as is warranted by the present circumstances. It would of course be inconceivable to us that the Council should confine itself only to the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP. The issues raised by the expulsions, the colonization, the stalemate in the talks and the missing persons are some of the specific aspects on which the Council is called upon to take appropriate and effective action. At the same time, the Council must not overlook the wider issues dealt with in the earlier General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, which should be effectively implemented.

42. The positive response of the Council to our plea is a vital necessity to the people of Cyprus, but I also believe that for the Council, which is entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security, such a response is a compelling duty.

43. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Turkey, upon whom I now call.

44. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): Mr. President, I should like to offer you my congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of June.

45. At this stage of the discussion I will confine my remarks to underlining three points.

46. First, as the Greek Cypriot representative presumed to speak on behalf of the so-called Government of Cyprus, I feel compelled to repeat our basic position in this respect. At the present time, when there are two separate administrations representing their respective national communities in Cyprus, that claim is utterly irrelevant, devoid of any legal basis and unrealistic. This situation will persist as long as the Turkish and Greek communities cannot agree on a provisional or permanent solution that will enable them to speak with one voice on external matters.

47. Secondly, the pernicious and false allegations proffered by the Greek Cypriot representative this



afternoon certainly call for an answer, but it is not incumbent upon me to address myself to his statement. The representative of the Turkish Cypriot community will, I am sure, do just that.

48. Last but not least, I must also say that I am rather uncertain about the nature and scope of the present discussion. At previous meetings of a similar nature, the pattern followed was different. Consultations started at an early stage on a draft resolution concerning the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP. It was of course assumed that there would be no modification in the Council's political concept that has underlain the presence of UNFICYP on the island since 1964. As the Council will realize, this is a very delicate matter. But we do not know where we stand now. Under these circumstances, as far as the Government of Turkey is concerned, we cannot take a position on any draft resolution which might be presented before we see clearly the trend and the outcome of the Council's discussion.

49. I have no further points to make at this stage.

50. The PRESIDENT: I call upon the representative of Greece.

51. Mr. PAPOULIAS (Greece): Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure to extend to you my warmest and sincere congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. Your wide experience of United Nations matters, and particularly of the question on our agenda, your authority and prestige and your high qualifications assure us that the debate on this important item will be concluded successfully. It is also gratifying to my delegation that you, Sir, represent a country which has the friendliest of relations with Greece. Further, I am particularly thankful to you, Mr. President, and to the members of the Council for having made it possible for me to participate in the discussion.

52. The Council has before it the proposal of the Secretary-General for the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months. That proposal, to which the Government of Cyprus has agreed, is supported by my Government. We cannot but concur with the statement contained in paragraph 71 of the Secretary-General's report that the continued presence of UNFICYP in Cyprus is essential not only in order to maintain the cease-fire called for in the previous resolutions of the Council but also in order to facilitate and promote the search for a peaceful settlement, which is long overdue.

53. I avail myself of this opportunity to express on behalf of the Greek Government profound appreciation and gratitude to the States Members that have placed their contingents at the service of the United Nations and the service of peace, as well as to the Governments that are making voluntary contributions for

the maintenance of the Force. We are also grateful to the representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Ambassador Pérez de Cuéllar, and to the Commander of the Force, Lieutenant-General Prem Chand, and to his officers and men, who are carrying out their peaceful and humanitarian task under the most difficult conditions.

54. In considering the report of the Secretary-General, the Council, apart from renewing the mandate of UNFICYP, has followed the practice of addressing itself to the wider implications and aspects of the Cyprus problem. This has been done so ably and so convincingly by the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Mr. Christophides, that I do not think it necessary for me to be repetitious. I shall therefore proceed with an examination of the Secretary-General's report and revert to the matter later in order to make some general observations.

55. During the debate in the Council on the same item last December 13 [*1863rd meeting*], my delegation drew the Council's attention to the very disturbing indications contained in the Secretary-General's report dated 8 December 1975 [*S/11900*] concerning the restrictions imposed on the freedom of movement of UNFICYP in the occupied area of the Republic of Cyprus, the violations of the agreement reached at the third round of the Vienna talks held under the auspices of the Secretary-General, and the disrespect shown by the occupying Power for the elementary human rights of the inhabitants of the Greek Cypriot villages in the north. We also pointed out that in the last six months of the past year not only had there not been any progress with regard to the question of the Greek Cypriot refugees—refugees in their own country—but there had been a deterioration, since their number had increased by 1,000, bringing the total number of refugees on 8 December 1975 to 183,000. I do not need to recall here today that during that debate, the members of the Council voiced their concern at the lack of application of the very important provisions of the agreement reached at the third round of the inter-communal talks, and at the absence of any progress towards the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 3212 (XXIX) and 3395 (XXX), as well as of Security Council resolutions 365 (1974), 367 (1975) and 370 (1975).

56. Six months later, the new report of the Secretary-General makes grim reading indeed. Although I realize that the members of the Council are already familiar with the report, I consider it necessary, with your permission, Mr. President, to draw the attention of the Council to some of the report's most striking points, while avoiding, as far as possible, commenting on what is self-explanatory.

57. I quote first from paragraph 10:

“UNFICYP continues to attempt to discharge its functions with regard to the security, welfare and

well-being of the Greek Cypriots living in the Turkish-controlled part of the island, as it did for Turkish Cypriots in the past. However, UNFICYP access to that area remains restricted and has become more so since my last report. As a result it has only been possible to carry out humanitarian work on a limited basis."

Paragraph 22 reads:

"At the third round of the Vienna talks, it was agreed that UNFICYP would have 'free and normal access to Greek Cypriot villages and habitations in the north'. UNFICYP freedom of movement in the northern part of Cyprus is still restricted.... Weekly visits are carried out by UNFICYP liaison teams to the Greek Cypriot villages in the Kyrenia area, and these are likewise accompanied by Turkish Cypriot police, who are present during meetings with the villagers."

I now quote paragraph 23:

"As a result of these restrictions, UNFICYP has been unable to contribute in any effective way to the welfare, well-being and security of the Greek Cypriots in the north except for the supply of material items and distribution of social welfare benefits. There is a continued outflow of these people to the south."

And this is from paragraph 26:

"In the Turkish-controlled areas UNCIVPOL has no greater freedom of movement than the UNFICYP military contingents. ... Contacts with [the] Greek Cypriots designed to obtain information about their security and well-being [are] monitored by the Turkish Cypriot authorities, usually Turkish Cypriot police, who generally discourage such inquiries."

Paragraph 29 reads:

"UNCIVPOL has continued to receive complaints that Greek Cypriots in the north are being subjected to pressure to move to the south and that their property is subject to confiscation. The Greek Cypriots complain that they are coerced into signing applications to leave the region with warnings that those who do not do so will be moved anyway, but without their personal possessions. Because of the existing restrictions, UNCIVPOL has been able to do little to investigate such complaints. The Turkish Cypriot side maintains that all Greek Cypriots moving to the south do so of their own free will without any pressure and that complaints are often made both to discredit the Turkish Cypriot side and to secure displaced person benefits in the south. The agreed procedure for screening applications for transfer does not appear to function effectively. UNFICYP has no possibility of verifying whether people wish to leave."

58. In this respect I believe it would be useful for me to read from an article published in *The New York Times* on 22 April last:

"The Turks have now stepped up their campaign to expel the Greek Cypriots remaining in the north and to create a purely Turkish state. Only about 8,000 Greeks are left in the area, mostly in the remote Karpas Peninsula, and their numbers are dwindling daily.

"The Turkish tactic, diplomatic sources report, is to call in the leaders of an ethnic Greek community and give them a choice: leave immediately and take nothing with you, or sign an official request to leave and take your belongings. Once the leaders yield to this pressure, the rest usually follow, and the Turks can say that everyone left voluntarily.

"The ethnic Turks were only 20 per cent of Cyprus before the invasion, and afterward they found themselves with far more land than they could colonize. Accordingly, the Denktas administration has been encouraging families like the Kekliks to immigrate from Turkey and increase the Turkish population.

"Turkish Cypriot officials insist that the only newcomers in the north are either Turkish Cypriots who had left years ago, seasonal workers needed for the harvest or technicians imported for specific jobs. But interviews with Mr. Keklik and at least half a dozen other settlers belie that claim. Diplomats estimate that 15,000 people from the mainland are already here, and some groups of settlers are clearly organized and encouraged in Turkey.

59. I continue quoting from the Secretary-General's report. Paragraph 30 reads:

"Greek Cypriots in the north cannot leave the environs of their own villages without permission from the Turkish Cypriot authorities. ... the number of teachers continues to be inadequate. ... No secondary schools are open in the region, and as a result a considerable number of students of secondary-school age have moved to the south."

60. The result of the deliberate action of the Turkish authorities in the occupied area, as described in the foregoing paragraphs I have cited, is given in paragraphs 31, 32 and 36 of the Secretary-General's report. I quote first from paragraph 31:

"The Greek Cypriot population in the Kyrenia area declined from 917 in December 1975 to 177 on 3 June 1976"—a mere 177—"and in the Karpas region from 7,890 to 7,194. Altogether 1,401 Greek Cypriots moved to the south in the last six months. The present rate of evacuations to the south is averaging some 20 persons a day. On the basis of information available to UNFICYP, there are no

wholly Greek Cypriot villages left in the Karpas, as either Turkish Cypriots or Turkish nationals"—and I emphasize this—"have been resettled in varying numbers in each of them. The Greek Cypriot authorities have given an estimate of 44,000 emigrants from Turkey into the area of Cyprus under Turkish control. The Turkish side has not given any definite figures to UNFICYP, but maintains that the majority of the Turkish nationals are either experts or seasonal workers and are in the island only temporarily."

I now quote from paragraph 32:

"In the Famagusta area, much merchandise and other movable properties are reported to have been removed from business and other premises owned by Greek Cypriots."

Paragraph 36 reads, in part:

"On 30 April 1976, government statistics showed a total of 184,143 Greek Cypriots as displaced and now living in the south. This figure reflects an increase of 1,143 persons since my report of 8 December 1975, and is again mainly due to the continuing transfer of Greek Cypriots from the north to the south."

61. From a reading of the Secretary-General's report, it emerges clearly that the Security Council and the international community are confronted with a specific plan, carefully worked out and applied systematically, a plan which, on the basis of the evidence available, seems to be directed to the complete eradication of all traces of the Greek Cypriot population in the north of Cyprus and to the colonization of that part of the island with "Turkish nationals", despite the provision of paragraph 6 of resolution 3395 (XXX), urging all parties to refrain from unilateral actions in contravention of resolution 3212 (XXIX), including changes in the demographic structure of Cyprus.

62. The homes and other private property of these new refugees, as in the case of the previous ones, are being usurped and the fruits of the work and the toil of an indigenous population going back over hundreds and thousands of years are simply being taken from the hands of their rightful owners, who are being thrown out. Houses, factories, orchards and huge investments in the tourist industry made in an area representing, as everybody knows, 70 per cent of the total wealth of the island are being confiscated in order to be given to Turkish Cypriots or "Turkish nationals", as indicated in paragraph 31 of the Secretary-General's report.

63. The wholesale eradication of an entire indigenous population and the confiscation of all its property are contrary not only to specific provisions of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, to provi-

sions of international treaties like the fourth Geneva Convention<sup>1</sup> regarding the treatment of the inhabitants of occupied territories, and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but they are, I submit, flagrantly contrary to the Charter and to everything the United Nations stands for.

64. Coming back now to the more general aspects of the Cyprus problem, we are once again bound to note that the situation in and around Cyprus, far from improving, rather shows signs of aggravation. Indeed, instead of the speedy withdrawal of the foreign troops from Cyprus and the cessation of foreign interference in its affairs, as demanded by United Nations resolutions, we have to bear witness to the fact that, two years after the two successive Turkish invasions of Cyprus in July and August 1974, a substantial part, namely, nearly 40 per cent of the territory of the non-aligned Republic of Cyprus, continues to be under military occupation in the name of the minority community representing 18 per cent of the total population of the island; and, further, that no serious indication is given as regards the termination of this state of affairs, which is contrary to General Assembly resolutions 3212 (XXIX) and 3395 (XXX), Security Council resolutions 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 370 (1975) and 383 (1975), contrary to the provisions of the Charter, contrary to the provisions of resolution 2625 (XXV), which contains the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, contrary to the provisions of resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 on the Definition of aggression, and contrary to the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.

65. Further, instead of progress on the very important question of the refugees, who represent one third of the island's total population, we have to register a continued deterioration, again despite the provisions of the Charter and of the relevant United Nations resolutions and the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

66. All those principles and provisions are flouted in the case of Cyprus. We trust that the Council will see to it that these principles and provisions are applied with the utmost urgency. It is of paramount importance that the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus should be respected and maintained.

67. As on past occasions, the section of the Secretary-General's report—section V—which deals with his good offices is disappointing and worrying, as it makes it obvious once again that after five rounds of inter-communal talks stretching over a period of one and a half years, the negotiations have still to enter the phase of substance. The reason is quite easy to explain. Whenever the Greek Cypriot side tries to discuss the substance, it is confronted with procedure; and when it tries to tackle procedure, it is faced

with "preconditions" or with other preliminary obstacles that frustrate the most assiduous efforts to go forward.

68. I do not think that any excuse can be found for this lack of progress. The General Assembly, in its resolutions 3212 (XXIX) and 3395 (XXX), and the Security Council, in its resolutions 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 370 (1975) and 383 (1975), have laid down the framework for a just and peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem. They have also entrusted the Secretary-General with undertaking a mission of good offices in order to bring about, through meaningful and constructive negotiations between the representatives of the two communities to be conducted freely and on an equal footing, an agreement based on their fundamental and legitimate rights.

69. In this regard, I wish to state that the Greek Government, which has since the beginning of the Cyprus crisis shown the greatest restraint, good will and a spirit of conciliation in its desire to see the problem solved peacefully, lends its full support to the Secretary-General's mission and will continue to do so in the future, as it has done in the past.

70. I take this opportunity to declare that my Government is extremely grateful to the Secretary-General for his untiring and painstaking efforts in seeking a peaceful solution for Cyprus. We extend to him and to his distinguished collaborators—the Under-Secretaries General Mr. Guyer and Mr. Urquhart, and their assistants—our deepest appreciation and sincere thanks.

71. We fully agree with the Secretary-General's statement in paragraph 70 of his report that, despite all the difficulties, the best hope of achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem is through negotiations between the representatives of the two communities. We welcome and support the Secretary-General's readiness, expressed in paragraph 69 of his report, to continue, together with his Special representative in Cyprus, his efforts to remove the various obstacles in the way of a resumption of the negotiating process. And we could not agree more with him when he states in the same paragraph that, before reconvening the talks, it is necessary to have reasonable assurances that they will be meaningful and productive. This is indeed a crucial point.

72. May I be permitted to refer in this context to my delegation's statement before the Council on 13 June 1975 [1830th meeting]. We then asked, in exactly the same terms, that the negotiations should be conducted in good faith and that they should be meaningful, and we drew the Council's attention to the necessity of not using the negotiating process as a delaying tactic in order to perpetuate *faits accomplis* and to create so-called "irreversible situations". I feel—and I am sure that the members of the Council share this view—that the Secretary-General's

report substantiates our fears. A full year later, not only do we fail to register any progress but we are also faced with the statement contained in paragraph 65 of the Secretary-General's report:

"The situation of Greek Cypriots in the north is also a matter of serious concern, not only on purely humanitarian grounds, but also because it increases tension between the two communities and tends adversely to affect the efforts towards a just and lasting peace in Cyprus."

It is equally eloquent that the Secretary-General has to say in paragraph 70 that "agreements reached at previous rounds should be respected and carried out".

73. In conclusion, I wish to repeat that a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem can be found only through serious, sincere and meaningful negotiations, in conformity with the basic principles of the Charter and with General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Cyprus. The finding of such a settlement has become more urgent than ever. For it is only thus that the tension and the danger created by the prolongation of the present state of affairs in Cyprus can be eliminated.

74. The PRESIDENT: I should like to refer now to the Council's earlier decision to extend an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Atalay. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to address the Council.

75. Mr. ATALAY: Mr. President, I should like to thank you and, through you, all the members of the Council for having given me the opportunity to speak today in order to present to the Council the Turkish Cypriot views on the current state of the Cyprus problem.

76. At the very beginning, I should like to inform the Council of a letter dated 9 June from Mr. Denktas, addressed to you, Mr. President, in connexion with the representation of Cyprus at this meeting:

*[The speaker read out the text of the letter contained in the annex to document S/12094.]*

77. I should like also to express on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community our sincere admiration and gratitude to the Secretary-General, to his Special Representative in Cyprus, Ambassador Pérez de Cuéllar; to the Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Prem Chand; to the officers and the men of UNFICYP; and to the members of the Secretariat. I should like also to express our gratitude to the countries which have contributed men and funds to UNFICYP.

78. I have listened carefully to the statement of Mr. Christophides, the representative of the Greek Cypriot administration. My community strongly disagrees with practically everything he said. I should

like to address myself to his statement in detail at a subsequent meeting if the Council would allow me to speak. At this stage I will explain the views of the Turkish Cypriot side.

79. As the Council meets to discuss the Cyprus problem for yet another time, many questions immediately come to mind. Why does the Cyprus problem still remain unresolved? What is a realistic solution for the Cyprus problem? Do the Greek Cypriots in fact sincerely desire the establishment of an independent Cyprus State based on the equality of the two communities, in which the Greek Cypriots will not again have the opportunity to reimpose themselves on the Turkish Cypriot community? In the course of my speech I shall try to answer these and other questions in order to enlighten the members of the Council about the true state of affairs regarding the Cyprus problem.

80. Since the last meeting of the Council on the situation in Cyprus, the most significant event contributing to the peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem has been the Brussels agreement signed by Turkey and Greece on 12 December 1975. As a result of that agreement, the intercommunal talks were reactivated in Vienna on 17 February 1976. The sincere belief and desire of the Turkish side at the time was that a political settlement acceptable to all the parties involved could be found through the procedures agreed upon in Brussels and through the invaluable contributions of the Secretary-General. However, the good will and determination of the Turkish side alone is not sufficient for reaching a settlement, unless the Greek side reciprocates in a similar manner.

81. Unfortunately, it seems that the Greek side is not sincere in its desire to reach a peaceful and lasting solution for Cyprus. All its efforts during the past few months have been aimed at undermining the Brussels agreement and the Vienna agreement, and at postponing their implementation through the creation of an artificial crisis. The purpose is to force the intercommunal talks into a deadlock and to shift the responsibility for this on to the Turkish side. Why? In order to mislead world public opinion into believing that the Cyprus problem is an issue of international urgency which threatens world peace, and thus to gain support in order to further their own ends. This will be more apparent if we briefly examine the policy pursued by the Greek Cypriots in relation to the implementation of the aforesaid agreements.

82. At the fifth round of the intercommunal talks, an exchange of proposals for a Cyprus settlement by the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots was agreed upon within the framework of the Brussels agreement. Under the Brussels agreement, the Greek Cypriot side was to submit proposals to the Turkish Cypriot side on all aspects of the Cyprus problem, including the territorial issue, and the Turkish Cypriot side was to hand over its reply within 10 days. In

spite of this clear and specific agreement, however, under pressure from Makarios in furtherance of his object to create an artificial crisis, the Greek Cypriot side denied the existence of the Vienna agreement with a view to sabotaging the talks and submitted "embargoed" proposals 10 days after their deadline. This led President Denktas to call upon the Secretary-General to release the tape recordings made at the talks and, faced with such an embarrassing situation, the Greek Cypriots gave their proposals to the Turkish side in accordance with the agreement reached in Vienna.

83. Apparently, however, the Greek Cypriot side was determined not to cease its efforts to create a deadlock in the intercommunal talks, and thereby to undermine peace talks. Mr. Glafcos Clerides was made to resign following an artificial crisis created in relation to the handing over of the proposals. In this way, the withdrawal of the only moderate Greek Cypriot leader and the leading Greek Cypriot negotiator in the intercommunal talks for the past nine years was secured. This constituted another blow to the successful continuation of the intercommunal talks. It was later announced that Mr. Clerides would be replaced by Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos. The Greek Cypriot side in various ways prevented the fulfilment of the Brussels agreement and the undertakings at Vienna. It attempted to undermine the intercommunal talks by withdrawing the Greek Cypriot negotiator of long standing, Mr. Clerides, and continued to employ malicious tactics in pursuance of its aim to create a crisis. Through these means, the Greek Cypriot side tried to make the world believe that Cyprus was heading for a crisis.

84. This time the Greek Cypriot side tried to exploit the name of the Secretary-General. The part of its proposals relating to the territorial aspects of the problem was presented as though it had been suggested by the Secretary-General. The Greek Cypriots have been propagating this view, both through their press and through their contacts with foreign diplomats, since the fifth round of the Vienna talks. The object of these manoeuvres was to force us into a position where we would appear to be bargaining over the territorial question with Mr. Waldheim, bringing all the moral pressure of the United Nations to bear upon us and giving the impression that we were the party which was being intransigent. Obviously one cannot accept this position. Principles which are based on untruth cannot provide a basis for negotiations. As to the exploitation of Mr. Waldheim's name, not only was it improper, but, if allowed to continue, it would also completely destroy the Secretary-General's function at the talks. As is well known, the Greek Cypriot allegation was officially refuted by the United Nations Information Centre in Athens on instructions from United Nations Headquarters, and then in New York on 13 April 1976. In spite of Mr. Waldheim's specific call to the Greek Cypriot administration not to implicate him in its proposals,

the Greek Cypriot side has not refrained from abusing the position of Mr. Waldheim for its own purposes. Is this good faith? Is it compatible with a desire to achieve a peaceful solution?

85. This latest incident proves beyond a doubt that the Makarios administration does not want a realistic and peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. As a whole, the Greek Cypriot proposals lack vision and are far from the reality in Cyprus. They do not take into account the events of the years between 1963 and 1974, during which time the Turkish Cypriots were subjected to armed attacks, oppression and every kind of discrimination. They completely ignore the past and try to present the Cyprus problem as having started in 1974.

86. The Greeks cannot accept the reality that they will never again be able to impose their will on their Turkish Cypriot co-partners in Cyprus whom they have been trying to destroy for 12 years. The Turkish Cypriots are now gathered in one zone and are determined to preserve this situation so that they can no longer be treated as mere hostages, to be eliminated at will.

87. It is worth noting here that the following resolution of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives which was passed unanimously on 26 June 1967 is still in force:

“Interpreting the age-long aspirations of the Greek Cypriots, the House declares that despite every adverse circumstance, it will not suspend the struggle being conducted with the support of all Greeks until this struggle ends in success through the union of the whole and undivided Cyprus with the motherland, without any intermediary stage.”

In view of this clear and unequivocal statement, is it really possible for the Turks to believe that the Greeks have given up their ideals and now believe in an independent Cyprus?

88. However, the real anxiety of the Turkish community does not only concern the objective that is expressed in the aforementioned resolution. It concerns the fact that it has for no less than 25 years experienced countless incidents reflecting such an aim in its economic, social and political life. Unfortunately, there has been no positive change in the Greek Cypriot attitude today.

89. As to the Greek Cypriot proposals in relation to land, apart from the fact that they exploit the name of Mr. Waldheim, they do not reflect the true distribution of immovable property in Cyprus. A detailed discussion on this aspect of the Cyprus problem will take place subsequently in accordance with the fifth round of the Vienna talks. Suffice it to say here that, contrary to Greek propaganda today, the Turks own 32.8 per cent of all private land in Cyprus. In addition

to this, the Turks have the right to their share of State lands, which amounts to an additional 25 per cent. However, this property, like the Turkish population, was scattered in small pockets throughout Cyprus. The distribution of property and population in this manner facilitated the activities of the Greek Cypriots in oppressing the Turkish Cypriots in order eventually to eliminate them from Cyprus. What has materialized in Cyprus today is no more than the concentration of Turkish lands for the Security of property and the bringing together of the Turkish population for the security of life.

90. The real area of the territory under Turkish control today is 32.8 per cent. In trying to show that the territory under Turkish control constitutes 40 per cent of the Island, however, Greek propaganda is including in this percentage areas which are no man's land or the operational field of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force. In short, contrary to what the Greek-Cypriot administration alleges today, the Turks do not have in their hands any Greek immovable property for which compensation has not been paid. The Turkish Cypriots who were transferred from the south in 1975 and those who were forced to leave their villages in 1963 abandoned more land to the Greeks than the amount of Greek land at present under Turkish Cypriot control.

91. The population ratio of Cyprus is another aspect of the Cyprus problem which is frequently brought up by the Greeks. The present population ratio of the island has been brought about through deliberate Greek policies and through the oppression of the Turkish Cypriot community for many years.

92. In any case, the population ratio of the island at a given time is not relevant in discussing a constitutional settlement of the Cyprus problem. After all, at one time the Turks of Cyprus were in the majority. Indeed, at present, many Turks who had left the island as a result of years of Greek oppression are now returning not only from Turkey but also from Britain, Australia and other countries. The criterion, as in most federal republics, is not the population ratio but the principle of equal representation of the two communities which will make up the two States at the central government level. The present population ratio of Cyprus is an irrelevancy brought in by the Greek Cypriots to disguise their true aims.

93. Why are the Greek Cypriots still not accepting the reality? Unfortunately, at the root of this is the recognition Makarios receives as Head of State. The world community, having condoned the *fait accompli* created in 1963, and having recognized the Greek Cypriot administration as the legitimate Government of Cyprus, led Makarios to believe that he could achieve his goal through a series of *faits accomplis* and that no one would be able to hinder him in any way. Thus his arrogance increased. The support given Makarios today will create the same result and will

serve no purpose other than continuation of his intransigence. If, however, the world really does want a peaceful and lasting solution for Cyprus, it must place its weight and support behind the cause which is right. In other words, it must support the establishment of a biregional federation in Cyprus on the basis of the equality of the two communities. It must also give equal recognition to the Turkish Cypriot community in all international forums. If Makarios is made to realize that Cyprus is not a Greek island, that will facilitate the peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem.

94. Concerning Turkish Cypriot efforts for a settlement, to begin with, on 18 July 1975 the Turkish side made a very constructive proposal for the establishment of a transitional joint Government. It was hoped by the Turkish side that establishment of such a Government would serve the common interests of both communities and would without further delay ensure a degree of co-operation between the two national communities. That desire was expressed in our proposal as follows:

“The peaceful co-existence of the two national communities, who shall have equal rights and powers in every respect, living side by side in close co-operation within one federal State, necessarily requires, as a first step, the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and mutual trust, which would serve not only the well-being and prosperity of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities but also the enhancement of peace in the region. With these objectives in mind, and without prejudice to the final political settlement, the establishment of a transitional joint federal Government, and to this effect, a joint declaration by the leaders of the two national communities, incorporating their formal agreement on the following basic principles, will pave the way, as early as possible, for a just and lasting political settlement.

“The transitional joint federal Government shall undertake to comply with the following basic principles:

“1. The Republic of Cyprus, which was originally founded on the basis of the partnership of the two national communities, shall be an independent, territorially integral and bi-regional federal State. The two national communities shall have equal rights and powers in all spheres and in every respect.

“2. Under no circumstances shall Cyprus, in whole or in part, be united with any other State in any form whatsoever.

“3. The Federal Republic of Cyprus, following a policy of non-alignment, shall take its place along with the non-aligned States.

“4. All necessary measures shall be taken to prevent the island of Cyprus from becoming

involved, directly or indirectly, in any activity endangering the peace and security of the region.

“5. The two national communities shall be fully free to observe and promote their respective religions, cultures and traditions in a democratic manner. Religion shall be kept strictly outside the sphere of the federal State.

“6. All kinds of hostile activities of the two communities against each other in the international arena shall be strictly prohibited, while internally every effort shall be made to enhance the climate of peace, reconciliation and co-operation between the two communities.” [S/11770, annex.]

Unfortunately, however, this constructive proposal was not accepted by the Greek Cypriot side, no doubt because it would have made a realistic settlement of the problem more probable and that would not have served their ulterior aims. It would have also put an end to the unconstitutional monopoly of the Greek Cypriot administration in the foreign affairs of the country, and would have stifled their smear campaign against the Turkish side.

95. In spite of this Greek intransigence and lack of good faith, in recent months the Turkish side has expended every effort for the achievement of a just and lasting solution for the Cyprus problem, and our latest proposals reflect our desire for the establishment of an independent Cyprus State which would guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the island as well as the security of life and property of the two constituent communities.

96. At this point, it would be appropriate to state our proposals, together with the reasons underlying them, and to allow the members to judge our sincerity and good faith.

97. The Greek side has been accusing us of being intransigent. In fact, while it is not clear what the Greeks desire for Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot policy is clear. We stand for an independent, non-aligned and sovereign Republic of Cyprus based on a bi-regional federation and on the equality of the two national communities. The events and bitter experience of the past 20 years, together with the reality which exists in Cyprus today, make imperative the establishment of a bi-regional federation, and this solution is the only practical, and realistic one left open for the establishment of peaceful co-existence between the two communities in Cyprus.

98. On this question of the need for a bi-regional federation I cannot do better than summarize the points made in this connexion by the Turkish Cypriot members of the expert committee set up on 28 April 1975, at the first round of Vienna intercommunal talks on Cyprus, to examine the constitutional aspects of the Cyprus problem.



“With the establishment of an independent Republic of Cyprus on 16 August 1960, the experiment of functional Federation (based on autonomy for the two national communities in communal affairs and partnership in the administration of governmental affairs), as provided under the Zurich and London agreements was tried until December 1963 and proved to be totally inadequate as far as the security of life and property of the Turkish Cypriots was concerned. The armed onslaught of the Greek Cypriots on the Turkish community in December 1963 forced 24,000 Turkish Cypriots to move from their homes to safer areas, thus establishing what came to be known as the Turkish Cypriot enclaves or regions all over Cyprus.

“During the period between December 1963 and July 1974, the existence of such a multiregional administration, whereby the Turkish Cypriots had their own enclaves or regions which they administered themselves, also proved to be inadequate. The bitter experiences of this experiment and the various events during this period—the highlights of which were the attacks on the Turkish sector of Nicosia in 1963, on the Kokkina (Erenköy) area in 1964, and on Kophinou (Geçitkale) and Ayios Theodōros in November 1967, and the ensuing massacres of inhabitants of whole villages and the discovery of the victims in mass graves, for example in Ayios Vasilios in 1964; Aloa, and Maratha (Murataga), Sándallaris, Tokhni, and so forth, in July-August 1974—proved the inadequacy and dangers of this experiment. In all instances, armed attack, wilful murder, mass killings were perpetrated by the armed elements of the Greek-Cypriot administration, who described themselves as the ‘Security Forces of the State’. It will thus be seen that a multiregional or cantonal system is totally unworkable in Cyprus and would leave the inhabitants of the Turkish Cypriot cantons as virtual hostages at the whim and mercy of the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots.

“The past experiments have been very costly in human lives and property to the Turkish Cypriots, and it is an indisputable fact that since the EOKA terrorist campaign started in 1955, nearly 30,000 Turkish Cypriots have been refugees three times over. Furthermore, a mass movement of populations has now taken place, with the Turkish Cypriots living in the north and the Greek Cypriots living in the south. This concentration of populations into two regions makes a multiregional or cantonal solution impracticable. The main consideration of the Turkish Cypriot side is to achieve a political settlement which will ensure the security of life and property of the Turkish Cypriots and enable them to coexist, side by side and in peace and security, with the Greek Cypriots.

“In the light of the foregoing, it would be wrong, unfair and unrealistic to expect the Turkish Cypriot

community to risk yet another dangerous experiment. The minimum form of government which can effectively guarantee full security of life and property to the Turkish Cypriots is a bi-regional federation in which the two communities would administer their own regions in peace and security.”

99. In fact the basis for such a settlement already exists, and a just and lasting solution for the Cyprus problem could be reached were it not for Greek intransigency and denial of agreements already reached during the intercommunal talks held freely and under the auspices of the Secretary-General.

100. The agreements reached in principle can be summarized as follows: first, a bizonal federation; secondly, a central government with limited but delineated powers; thirdly, participation of the two communities in the central government on the basis of equality. Unfortunately, however, in furtherance of Greek Cypriot aims to undermine the intercommunal talks, the above-mentioned agreements have been denied and no attempt has been made to implement them.

101. We have seen that a bi-regional federation is essential for the protection of an independent Cyprus State, and it is imperative for the security of the life, land and property of the two communities.

102. As to the question of refugees and the withdrawal of the Turkish armed forces, this is a matter which has been made the subject of Greek propaganda. Ever since 20 July 1974 the Greek Cypriot side has approached the problem in its typical way and has demanded the settlement of the refugee problem and the withdrawal of Turkish troops as a precondition to the solution of the Cyprus problem. The answer of the Turkish side to this has been to the effect that a political solution should come first. Once an agreement in this respect had been reached, the question of refugees and of Turkish troops could be discussed within the framework of the political solution. The argument that Makarios would accept a bi-regional solution on condition that the 200,000 refugees returned to their homes is purely Greek propaganda aimed at misleading world public opinion. Incidentally, the Greeks have exaggerated the number of Greek Cypriots who left the Turkish areas. As admitted in their own documents, the true figure is around 90,000.

103. It is obvious to anyone who is familiar with the social structure of Cyprus that this precondition merely demonstrates the Greek side's bad faith. In insisting on the return of the Greek displaced persons to the Turkish areas today, although the problem has been effectively solved through the voluntary exchange of populations under the third Vienna agreement [S/11789, annex.], of August 1975, they have two objectives in mind: first, the breaking up of Turkish lands and of the Turkish population in order to weaken the Turkish community and thereby eliminate it from



being an obstacle to *enosis*; and, secondly, the establishment of important bases, hideouts and support for Greek Cypriot guerrillas during the coming phase of the conflict created by the Greek Cypriot leadership's call for a "long-term struggle".

104. In order for an agreement to be reached in Cyprus, we invite the Greek Cypriot administration to surrender its traditional objectives and adopt a realistic approach to the Cyprus problem. That is the only way in which they could contribute to the establishment of a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem.

105. I wish to reiterate once more that the Turkish Cypriot side believes that the only way in which a peaceful solution can be reached is through the intercommunal talks, conducted in good faith and with a sincere desire for the establishment of an independent Federal Cyprus Republic based on a bi-regional structure and on the equality of the two communities.

106. The Turkish side expects a reciprocal response to its goodwill and realistic proposals. If that is not forthcoming, the responsibility for prolonging the Cyprus problem will fall on the Greek side, which still refuses to accept the present realities in Cyprus.

107. In conclusion, we hope that the Greek side will see the realities and realize that the dissemination of false propaganda accusations against the Turkish side with a view to deceiving world public opinion, as well as their call for a long struggle, can in no way help to bring about a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem.

108. We, as the Turkish side, continue to believe that the intercommunal talks held within the framework of the Brussels agreement is the only way to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, and we continue to wait to receive reasonable and realistic proposals from the Greek side.

109. We hope that the parties concerned will show equal readiness and good faith so that a peaceful, just and lasting settlement in Cyprus may be attained without further delay.

110. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Greece.

111. Mr. PAPOULIAS (Greece): I am glad that Mr. Atalay, speaking as he said, for the Turkish side, referred to the *procès-verbal* signed at Brussels on 12 December 1975 by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey. That gives me the opportunity to read out, with your permission, Mr. President, the entire text of the *procès-verbal*—which has already been made public at the request of my Government—in order to put an end to misinterpretations propagated by Turkish sources.

The original French text of the Brussels *procès-verbal* reads as follows:

"The two Ministers meeting at Brussels on 12 December 1975 have agreed on the following:

"1. To ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appeal to the representatives of the two communities to continue their talks without prior conditions with a view to arriving at a package deal on an agenda containing the following subjects: territorial issues, federal structure, powers of a central Government.

"2. Details of these subjects to be examined by two committees. If necessary, experts to be invited from Greece and Turkey to take part in the work of the sub-committees to the extent that would be required.

"3. The two Ministers would encourage the representatives of the two communities to respond positively to the appeal of the Secretary-General and accept the earliest possible date for the first meeting under him.

"4. Until the talks were completed all the parties concerned would avoid revealing the content of the points on which there might be provisional agreement, since that would be contrary to the principle of a package agreement. The parties would also abstain from statements which could jeopardize the progress already made. Therefore each party would be reserved the right to deny statements or leakages which would be contrary to the present agreement."\*

112. If I understood him correctly, Mr. Atalay said that the Greek Cypriot side has not respected the Brussels agreement, which provided that the Greek Cypriot side should submit its territorial proposals 10 days before the Turkish side and so on. Nothing of the sort is to be found in the text that I have just read. I leave it to the Council to pass judgement on this.

113. And while I am addressing the Council, I feel that the opportunity should not be lost to make absolutely clear what the exact situation is. I wish to make the following absolutely clear.

114. This agreement is of a purely procedural nature, since it suggests a negotiating method, namely, the package-deal approach. I need not tell the members of the Council what a package-deal negotiation is; we all know that it is an intensive, concentrated negotiation encompassing various aspects on which an integrated solution must be found. And that is exactly the meaning of the agreement.

\* Quoted in French by the speaker.

115. The agreement provides in paragraph 2 that the details—I emphasize “details”—of the three aspects of the Cyprus problem could be examined by two committees. It is consistent with elementary logic that an agreed basis must first be reached through the process of the package deal before any “details” can be dealt with in the committees. This has been categorically confirmed by the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the fifth round of the intercommunal talks in Vienna, which says:

“The representatives of the two communities will meet again under the auspices of the Secretary-General in Vienna in May with a view to establishing a common basis prior to referring the matter to mixed committees in Cyprus.” [S/11993 of 24 February 1976, annex.]

It would be absurd and contradictory to maintain the opposite of what the communiqué states.

116. The Brussels agreement sought to encourage the representatives of the two communities to resume, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, the intercommunal talks which had reached an impasse. It is absolutely clear as it stands in the Brussels agreement.

117. In view of all that, we fail to grasp how that agreement could be linked to any matter of substance or any other matter lying outside it. Therefore, we reject any tendentious misinterpretations of the Brussels agreement.

118. And, since the Turkish side has touched upon the subject, I feel justified in pointing out how little it has respected the provision stating that the representatives of the two communities should continue their talks without preconditions. As can be seen from annex VI to the Secretary-General’s report, the letter dated 25 May 1976 from the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community to the Special Representative of Secretary-General contains in its paragraph 3 (a) to (e) nothing but enormous preconditions.

119. The PRESIDENT: I now call on those representatives who have asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

120. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): I should like to reply very briefly to the representative of Greece. He read

out the text of the Brussels agreement and I will not, of course, quarrel with him about what that text says. I have an English text and it is the same as the French text. There is nothing in this text which says that the Greek Cypriot side would first submit its proposals, but that was our understanding at the discussions between the two Ministers in Brussels.

121. At any rate I think that, whether or not that agreement existed, it has been overtaken by what happened in Vienna during the fifth round of intercommunal talks. There it was clearly decided that the Greek Cypriots would submit their proposals first and that 10 days later the Turkish Cypriots would submit their own proposals. This is what created a procedural wrangle in Nicosia when the two negotiators returned, and this was the cause of Mr. Clerides’ resignation. If we have correctly understood what happened during the upheaval, Mr. Clerides made a statement to the press saying that he had withheld that information from his leader; and, when he had to admit that that was true, he was forced to resign. So whether or not this agreement exists in the Brussels text is irrelevant because it existed in Vienna.

122. Mr. PAPOULIAS (Greece): I thank the representative of Turkey for what he has said; and, indeed, my point is that we should not mix different things. Whatever happened in Vienna must be quoted in the context of Vienna. We cannot refer in a responsible manner to the Brussels or other agreements for no reason at all. I think one should be careful in these matters and I was therefore justified in putting in the right context what happened in Vienna and what is stated in the Brussels agreement.

123. Mr. CHRISTOPHIDES (Cyprus): I should like to say, on behalf of my Government, that we attach great importance to what was agreed in Vienna and that we are very much prepared to stick to the agreement. However, the point is that we have submitted our concrete proposals but, unfortunately, the Turkish side has failed so far to submit its concrete proposals.

*The meeting rose at 7.30 p.m.*

*Note*

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, p. 287.



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