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President: Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon).

AGENDA ITEM 69

The situation in Hungary (concluded)**SPECIAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY (A/3849) (concluded)**

1. Mr. GEORGES-PICOT (France) (translated from French): Once again this year, sixty-one delegations have supported [752nd meeting] the inclusion of the item entitled "The situation in Hungary" in the agenda of the General Assembly. It is significant that, apart from the Soviet Union and its traditional escort, no delegation voted against the inclusion of this item. We are therefore justified in assuming that the overwhelming majority of Member States continue to believe that the situation in Hungary deserves to be examined and discussed at the thirteenth session.

2. The reasons why this discussion is still necessary have already been stated here. It is therefore unnecessary to repeat them. Moreover, the General Assembly has before it a new report [A/3849] of the Committee which it instructed to investigate the situation in Hungary. The French delegation wishes on this occasion to pay a tribute to this body, to the Secretary-General and to the Acting Rapporteur for the valuable work they carried out under difficult conditions, and for the devotion which they have consistently shown to the cause of the United Nations.

3. All the information which reaches us on Hungary, and especially information from local sources, shows that the Soviet Union, perhaps less obviously than in the past, but none the less effectively, continues to govern the country, either directly or through intermediaries, and that it has no intention whatsoever of changing that policy. Although the facts are unfortunately irrefutable, the Soviet Union and its friends are still trying to deny them, distort them, or conceal them under various pretexts. We are told that this is a purely domestic matter; we are also assured that a resumption of the debate would merely serve to aggravate the cold war. Is it really necessary to dwell on these objections? The best reply that can be made to them is to point out that sixty-one delegations, in voting for the inclusion of the item, showed that they did not believe in this reversal of roles and this falsification of history. To whom did the armed forces which intervened in Hungary in 1956 belong? Who,

despite solemn promises and international undertakings, arrested, imprisoned and then murdered Mr. Nagy, General Maléter and countless Hungarian patriots? These acts should indeed be dwelt on, since they are particularly characteristic of the persistence of the Soviet Union's interference in what it calls, using a kind of double-talk, the domestic affairs of Hungary.

4. The news of the murder of Imre Nagy and his companions was made known throughout the world by a communiqué issued simultaneously at Moscow and at Budapest on 17 June 1958. The Hungarian White-book subsequently specified the crimes of which these patriots were alleged to be guilty. But the scribes of the Kremlin naturally remained silent concerning the origins of the matter. United Nations documents are fortunately more explicit. During the debates of November 1956, first in the Security Council and then in the General Assembly meeting in special session, it was established without any doubt that General Maléter had been appointed by the last legal Government of Hungary to negotiate with representatives of the Soviet command on the terms of an agreement for the evacuation of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory. Indeed, was it not the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union who made the following statement on 3 November 1956 in the Security Council:

"I have been asked to comment on the report that negotiations are being conducted between Hungarian and Soviet representatives concerning the Soviet troops in Hungary. I can confirm that such negotiations are going on."^{1/}

5. The representative of Hungary, a certain Mr. Szabó, made the following statement to the Council at the same meeting:

"... I should like to inform the Council with satisfaction of the following promising information received from Budapest today: The leaders of the Hungarian and Soviet armies met today at noon, and both parties expressed their views on the technical questions, involved in withdrawing the Soviet troops. They agreed that they would study each other's proposals and they they would meet again at 10 o'clock tonight, Budapest time. According to the Soviet proposal, no more troops will cross the border until an agreement is reached."^{2/}

6. According to this information, the authenticity of which nobody will deny, negotiations took place and the Hungarian representatives were undoubtedly acting as plenipotentiaries. Now, what did in fact happen? According to the information which was published by the Committee of Five in its previous report [A/3592] and was never denied by the authorities at Budapest,

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Eleventh Year, 753rd meeting, para. 132.

^{2/} Ibid., para. 62.

the Hungarian military delegation was arrested while it was negotiating with the Soviet plenipotentiaries led by the notorious General Serov, whose sinister career, recently recapitulated in the press, will undoubtedly end in the same way as those of his predecessors.

7. As soon as these facts became known, they were announced in the General Assembly. I do not think it superfluous to recall that, at the meeting held on the afternoon of Sunday, 4 November 1956, the French representative made the following statement:

"... Yesterday, it [the Soviet Government] announced and confirmed through its permanent representative to the United Nations that negotiations were going on between its representatives and those of the Hungarian Government on conditions for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. A meeting on the subject was to be held. Hungarian representatives went to that meeting, and while Mr. Sobolev was informing the Security Council of the progress being achieved, the Hungarian representatives were not allowed to hold conversations, but were arrested, taken prisoner, perhaps deported or eliminated.

"That is what Mr. Sobolev calls progress in the negotiations. That, presumably, is what is meant by negotiation in the Soviet Union." [564th meeting, paras. 230 and 231]

We do not think that these facts call for any comment.

8. The circumstances in which Imre Nagy and his group were arrested are, if possible, even more striking. We know how, on the morning of 4 November 1956, when it became obvious that the Soviet attack on Budapest could not be contained, Imre Nagy and some of his companions requested and obtained asylum at the Yugoslav Embassy at Budapest. Following conversations between the Hungarian leaders and the Yugoslav Government, on 21 November that Government received a letter from Mr. Kádár, reading as follows:

"... [the Hungarian Government]... hereby confirms in writing its verbal declaration that it does not desire to apply sanctions against Imre Nagy and the members of his group for their past activities. We take note that the asylum extended to the group will hereby come to an end and that they themselves will leave the Yugoslav Embassy and proceed freely to their homes." [A/3592 para. 634].

9. Despite these assurances from the head of the Hungarian authorities, Imre Nagy and his group were arrested on 22 November 1956 and taken away by Soviet forces as soon as they left the Embassy premises. This is how the facts are described in the newspaper Borba, of Belgrade, in the issue of 23 November 1956:

"Yesterday, on 22 November, at 6.30 p.m., Imre Nagy and his friends were put into a bus which was made available to them by the Hungarian authorities and which was to drive them to their homes. In front of the Embassy building, at the corner of Heroes' Square and the former Stalin Avenue, a Soviet officer entered the bus. One car of the Soviet security service drew up beside the bus and another behind it. Shortly afterwards, all these vehicles proceeded towards the Soviet headquarters in Gorki Street. The two Yugoslav diplomats who were in the bus, and who protested against this attitude on the part of the Soviet services, were simply ejected

from the bus in front of the headquarters. The two police cars were then replaced by two armoured cars, and Imre Nagy and his companions were taken away to an unknown destination."

10. The following day, 23 November 1956, apparently with a view to appeasing the popular feeling that had been aroused in Hungary, the Budapest radio station issued the following communiqué:

"As is well known, Imre Nagy, the former President of the Council, and some of his companions requested and obtained at the Yugoslav Embassy at Budapest right of asylum which expired on 22 November. Over two weeks ago, Nagy and his companions requested the Hungarian Government's authorization to leave the Hungarian People's Republic for some other socialist country. The Government of the Romanian People's Republic agreed to this and Imre Nagy and his companions left Hungary on 23 November for the Romanian People's Republic."

11. This information in itself was extraordinary. It is incredible that Imre Nagy, who had had ample opportunity to experience the merits of the system, would have asked of his own accord to proceed to the Romanian People's Republic. In fact, no account whatsoever was taken of his wishes, any more than of the assurances officially given to the Yugoslav Government, and it was as a result of negotiations held at Budapest with a large delegation of the Romanian Government that the Romanian leaders agreed to shoulder their part of the responsibility for the abduction of Imre Nagy. With a view to reassuring a legitimately anxious public opinion, the Romanian representative to the eleventh session made an interesting statement at the meeting of the General Assembly held on 3 December 1956. On that occasion, Mr. Preoteasa spoke as follows:

"...the Romanian Government gave the assurance that the stay of the group in Romania would be marked by all the rules of hospitality and that all necessary steps would be taken to guarantee the personal safety of Mr. Nagy and his friends. Similarly, the Romanian Government gave the assurance that it would observe the international rules relating to political asylum.

"This arrangement is of a temporary nature. In these circumstances, Mr. Nagy and his group have been in Romanian territory since 23 November, where they enjoy all the rights attaching to political exile. I can state that the persons in question are grateful to the Romanian Government for the hospitality which is being offered to them." [605th meeting, paragraphs 202 and 203].

12. These statements are particularly instructive. Now that we know the outcome of this "hospitality" and the manner in which the Romanian Government, to use its own expression, observed the international rules relating to political asylum, the General Assembly is entitled to ask it for some explanations. Indeed, no explanation has ever been given of how Imre Nagy and his companions, who should still have been rusticated in Romania, ultimately appeared, until their murder, in a Hungarian prison, and we hope that the Romanian delegation will take the opportunity thus offered to it to give the Assembly and, through it, the world at large, the explanations which we expect.

13. With regard to the trial of Imre Nagy and his

group, what we know of it from an official Hungarian source clearly shows of what the persons concerned were found guilty. The question is not, as we are supposed to believe, one of crimes against the Hungarian People's Republic, but of crimes against the USSR. And this is an unpardonable crime within the Communist system. This leads us to the very essence of this debate, namely, to the fact that the Soviet Union intends to maintain an invincible régime in one half of Europe, by force and against the will of the people.

14. The sentences which I have just recalled are illustrations of this policy—but not the only ones. What is their full significance from the two-fold point of view of dialectics and the interests of the Soviet Union? Their purpose was simply to give a spectacular warning not only to the Hungarian people and its present and future leaders but also to other peoples and their leaders in the peoples' democracies who are in the same position. It is not perhaps by chance that the announcement of the execution of Imre Nagy and his companions coincided with the anniversary of the uprising of the workers in East Germany who on 17 June 1953 were mowed down by shots fired from Russian tanks, as was to happen to the Hungarian insurgents in 1956.

15. There can be no doubt that in spite of all the oppressive measures adopted in Hungary, in spite of police reprisals, preventive arrests and sentences, in spite of the Government's censorship of the Press, the radio and communications, to say nothing of the army, the police and the security services, the present régime would not last long if it were left to its own resources. It is only able to remain in power because of the ever-present and constantly repeated threat of large-scale, ruthless intervention by Soviet troops in Hungary should its position be jeopardized by a national rising or even simply by localized unrest.

16. Mr. Khrushchev himself confirmed the accuracy of this view again this year. During his visit to Hungary last spring he urged the ruling circles to be more vigilant and to take steps—and everyone knows what that means—to ensure that events such as those of 1956 should not occur. It is true that he began by saying at Sztalinvaros, on 5 April 1958: "Next time you will have to get out of your difficulties by yourselves", but he quickly corrected himself and three days later, on 8 April, he was declaring at Tatabánya:

"We must warn those who like stirring up trouble of all kinds that we do not advise the enemies of the working class to try our patience and make fresh mischief. I tell you that should fresh trouble be stirred up against any socialist country whatsoever the instigators would have to deal with all the countries in the socialist camp, and that the Soviet Union is always ready to go to the help of its friends and to strike back against the enemies of socialism".

17. To show just how far a Soviet Head of Government can go in debasing international relations, I think I should remind you that Mr. Khrushchev said at the beginning of April in Hungary—and I am quoting his actual words—that he "recommended the imperialists not to try to put their pigs snouts into the Socialist orchard".

18. Such statements, which were far from being the first of the kind, do more than falsify the facts: they

completely reverse the roles, making the Western Powers appear as the perpetrators of the attack on the Hungarian people in 1956. They confirm once again the USSR's policy of claiming a permanent right of intervention in the internal affairs of the peoples' democracies. The free world must recognize henceforth that wherever a Communist régime is set up it becomes a permanent fixture, however clearly popular dislike of it is demonstrated, because at all times troops of the Soviet and other Communist Governments have the right to cross the frontiers in order to afford it assistance and protection. To Mr. Khrushchev this policy is only a natural aspect of what Marxist and Leninist doctrine calls the principle of proletarian internationalism. The question however arises whether those Member States which do not accept the tenets of Moscow are also prepared to see therein a new principle of international law which modifies the traditional concept of aggression.

19. It has rightly been asked how this very strange interpretation of the dogma of proletarian internationalism could be reconciled with the other principles which the USSR has undertaken to recognize, and in particular with those of the Charter, of respect for territorial sovereignty and integrity and of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.

20. The Soviet Union may propose the withdrawal of its forces from this or that sector of Eastern Europe, but it will always do so with the explicit or tacit reservation that it has the right to bring them back at any time in order to strengthen or re-establish a régime it has installed. The events in Hungary and other earlier events have taught it that, if it were to renounce that escape clause now, the whole system it established after the war would collapse like a house of cards.

21. Be that as it may, the General Assembly must not give the impression that it in any way recognizes the principle that peoples living under any political régime cannot change or abolish that régime if they are not satisfied with it. That is why it is the Assembly's duty to keep the Hungarian question on its agenda and do everything it can to ensure that the sacrifices made by the Hungarian patriots for more than two years shall not have been in vain.

22. In that spirit and by way of conclusion, the French delegation thinks it can do no better, in order to express the state of mind of public opinion, than to read from the foreword to a work recently published in France, which is entitled *La vérité sur l'affaire Nagy*. That foreword, which was written by the famous writer Albert Camus, who is not exactly considered a reactionary, an imperialist or a colonialist, seems admirably suited to the present debate. However, since our agenda still contains many items I shall not read it all, but will confine myself to quoting the last few paragraphs. This is what Albert Camus wrote:

"... If the cowardice or complacency of the world has helped the murderers to feel that their hands are free, then we must strain every nerve to ensure that they shall feel a little less free the next time. There are still men in Hungarian prisons today expecting the worst, and we must fight, so far as we are able, to wrest them from the executioners. We must not allow others to believe, however fleetingly, that the hanging of Nagy and his friends was proper.

It was an atrocious crime of which even the most forgetful must retain the memory.

"Then let us use the disgust that fills us all in the service of a certain stubbornness. In the face of the Hungarian tragedy we have been and are still reduced to a kind of impotence. But that impotence is not total. The rejection of the fait accompli, the alert to the heart and mind, the decision to bar the lie of free passage, the refusal to abandon innocence, even after it has been strangled—these are the lines of action we can follow. Inadequate, no doubt, but necessary in its turn, and with a necessity that answers the other, the ignoble necessity called historic, that answers it, yes, and will always answer it, that opposes it in any case, sometimes neutralizes it, in the long run destroys it and thus imperceptibly advances the real history of mankind." ^{3/}

23. It is in that spirit of stubbornness and rejection of the fait accompli to which Albert Camus summons us that the French delegation appeals to all those Member States which are not satellites of the Soviet Union to support the draft resolution submitted by thirty-seven Powers [A/L.255].

24. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Romania, who wishes to reply briefly to the representative of France.

25. Mr. MAGHERU (Romania) (translated from French): The representative of France, instead of being present at this very moment in the First Committee, and making his contribution to the peaceful solution of the painful Algerian problem, has thought it necessary to come here and take part in this debate on the Hungarian question, which, by its very existence, serves only to heighten international tension.

26. The French representative has seen fit to refer to the statement made in 1956 in the General Assembly [605th meeting] by the former Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning Imre Nagy's stay in our country before receiving the just punishment for his crimes.

27. In this connexion I wish to make the following clarification. The Romanian Government acceded to the Hungarian Government's request and authorized the stay of Imre Nagy and his accomplices in the territory of the People's Republic of Romania until the time when the Hungarian Government requested their extradition as a result of the investigation made by its judicial organs—an investigation which uncovered criminal facts unknown at the time of the arrival of Nagy and his accomplices in Romania.

28. The Government of the People's Republic of Romania complied with that request by virtue of the provisions of article 2 of the extradition treaty concluded between the People's Republic of Romania and the People's Republic of Hungary on 28 August 1948, as well as by virtue of the principles of law recognized in the matter, which call for the punishment, in accordance with the law, of criminals guilty of actions contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

29. Mr. JORDAN (Union of South Africa): It will be recalled that when the situation in Hungary first came

before the Second Emergency Special Session in 1956, the South African delegation supported the inclusion of the item in the agenda although the Soviet Government and the Soviet representative had invoked Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, which prohibits interference in the domestic affairs of Member States.

30. The South African representative pointed out [564th meeting] that, in view of the numerous occasions on which South Africa had had to protest against what we regard as intervention in the domestic affairs of South Africa, our delegation was, as a matter of principle, most careful before deciding to lend its support to any motion which might seem contrary to the principles which we have consistently applied since the inception of the United Nations, even when it was a most unpopular course to follow. In 1946, for example, South Africa was one of the very few countries which declined to support the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the relations of Member States with Franco Spain [resolution 32 (I)].

31. It was with this background that the Union Government considered its position in 1956 and decided, because it was satisfied that Article 2, paragraph 7, did not apply, to support inscription of the item on the agenda.

32. I should like to explain very briefly again how we arrived at this conclusion. The South African representative stressed in 1956 that the Union regretted that the item had been designated "situation in Hungary". We felt that it would have been more appropriate to describe it as "external intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary".

33. I emphasize this fact since in our opinion the crux of the situation today still flows from foreign intervention in Hungary. Consequently, in 1956, we based our support of the right of the General Assembly to deal with the matter on Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.

34. Past events have demonstrated clearly that the situation in Hungary has been caused by foreign intervention, as was accepted in the Assembly's resolution 1004 (ES-II). There can be little doubt that this situation continues.

35. Finally, the request for United Nations action by the Nagy Government, which had been recognized as the legitimate Government of Hungary, is still before the Assembly [see A/3251]. No cognizance, therefore, can now be taken of the invocation of Article 2, paragraph 7, by a Government which has no recognized status.

36. It is in these circumstances that the South African Government will vote for the draft resolution [A/L.255] before the Assembly.

37. Mr. OCAMPO (Bolivia) (translated from Spanish): The Bolivian delegation, which is one of the thirty-seven co-sponsors of the draft resolution [A/L.255] submitted to this Assembly, wishes to express its gratitude to the members of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary for the well-documented and incontrovertible report [A/3849] which it has produced on the tragic situation of one of the States Members of the United Nations. Today, when the Assembly has once more to deal with the Hungarian situation, we have before us fresh evidence, additional to that which provided grounds for the adoption of the previous reso-

^{3/} La vérité sur l'affaire Nagy ("Les documents de tribune libre", Paris Librairie Plon, 1958), p. v.

lutions—evidence which entitles us to refer expressly in the draft resolution to the world-wide condemnation of the execution of Imre Nagy and other Hungarian patriots and to the indignation felt by the civilized world at the oppression and violence visited on Hungary by the army of occupation of the Soviet Union.

38. At yesterday's three meetings we heard more than one speaker express at length a number of views diametrically opposed to those contained in the Special Committee's report. Those speakers represented the events which took place in Hungary as a result of the popular uprising of November 1956 in a totally different light. Instead of undertaking the impossible task of justifying Soviet aggression against a defenceless people, some of those representatives took the opportunity to level accusations in their turn from this rostrum against the States sponsoring the draft resolution, on the surprising and paradoxical pretext that the purpose of the resolution was to bring pressure to bear on the United Nations to interfere in the internal affairs of Member States.

39. That State which was the aggressor; that State which hastened to intervene with tanks, bombs and guns, at the request of a Government of the most doubtful legality, in order to drown in blood a popular rising in a defenceless country; that State which two years later is still in military occupation of an alien territory; that same State, either directly or through intermediaries, raises an admonitory finger to accuse the majority of this Assembly of wishing to interfere in the domestic affairs of Member States.

40. This debate has also been used for purposes which have nothing whatever to do with the subject before us. Some representatives have taken advantage of this rostrum to refer to colonialism, military bases, inter-planetary space and other subjects which have no direct connexion with Hungary. On the subject at issue, they said only that the popular rising of 1956 was part of a sinister international plot to destroy Hungary, and that the harsh persecution which has prevailed from the time of the massacre until now is the most appropriate, legitimate and suitable method for banishing this danger.

41. Such an arbitrary interpretation of the events which took place and continue to take place in Hungary as a result of the 1956 rising is completely ruled out by the Special Committee's objective and frank report—which is, moreover, supported by material from official Hungarian sources. We learn from this new report that the reign of terror continues; that Soviet troops are still in military occupation of foreign territory in order to support a Government which is manifestly unpopular; that executions and sentences to life imprisonment or to long terms continue to form part of daily life in Hungary; and that there is a continued denial of legal rights. At least thirty people were condemned to death and executed in the year ended July 1958, after trial by special tribunals, the members of which in most cases were persons who had no connexion with the judicature. None of the reasons adduced to justify these occurrences will meet with any approval in this Assembly. The significant way in which the Hungarian authorities have changed the terms in which they describe the events of November 1956 and their failure to fulfil the official undertakings which they gave to other Governments in the form of State papers arouses marked distrust of those

who claim to represent the Hungarian people in this Assembly.

42. The name of Imre Nagy has inevitably been referred to, and in this connexion I would point to a paradox. Nagy took refuge in a foreign embassy where he was safe from the prevailing madness, but left his place of asylum following on an official promise that no harm would befall him and his companions. Those who gave that promise betrayed the trust of the country which had sheltered Nagy and his companions, and betrayed the hopes of civilized mankind by handing them over, possibly to a court—we cannot be sure about this—and subsequently to a firing-squad. What is so staggering, so inadmissible, is that this man who had been doubly betrayed should have been executed as a traitor.

43. This world-wide Organization, which was set up to maintain peace and to ensure that its Member States fulfil their obligations, must view with alarm the events which have been taking place in Hungary. Annex IV of the Special Committee's report mentions persons who were condemned to death and executed for such crimes as organizing manifestations, having the intent to start riots, or maintaining illegal contacts with the West. In such circumstances, no effort must be spared to put an end to this state of affairs; an attitude of "permanent vigilance", as one speaker described it yesterday, must be maintained; and we must continue as far as possible our appeals to the Hungarian authorities to stop once and for all this bloody repression.

44. The Committee's report has the additional advantage of throwing some light on details of life in Hungary. The presence in considerable numbers of Soviet armed forces which control the life of a foreign people, the all-too-frequent news given to the population about persons shot or sentenced to imprisonment, and the rigid censorship, help us to understand the facts described to us yesterday with such enthusiasm and pride both by Mr. János Péter and by other representatives [784th meeting]. Such evidence helps those of us who follow normal methods of reasoning to understand the well-disciplined and suspicious unanimity which marked the last Hungarian elections.

45. The Bolivian delegation wishes to state that it is in complete agreement with the terms of the draft resolution laid before the Assembly by thirty-seven nations, headed by Argentina. The draft resolution places the problem of Hungary in the proper perspective, endorses the Special Committee's report, and clearly expresses the feelings of the sponsors on the existing situation in Hungary. The proposal contained in the draft resolution to appoint Sir Leslie Munro to represent the United Nations in matters connected with this question gives great satisfaction to the Bolivian delegation, which acknowledges Sir Leslie's exceptional qualities and integrity and deems it fortunate that he has agreed to assist us.

46. In conclusion, I should merely like to add a warm expression of faith in the future of the Hungarian people, and to voice the hope that, in response to the world-wide clamour for an ending of the reign of terror imposed on Hungary, those at present in authority there will put a stop to the deeds of oppression and cruelty which have been brought to our notice.

47. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal): It is not because of a lack of interest in the question of Hungary that we did not

take part in the debate earlier. Our stand on the question of Hungary is too well known to need any reiteration here.

48. What happened to the people of Hungary in the fall of 1956 may happen to the people of a small country anywhere in the world. The question of Hungary to us involves a vital moral principle which is basic to any accepted code of international conduct, be it the United Nations Charter, or the Five Principles (*pancha-shila*), or the Bandung declaration. This is something which, in our opinion, is basically contained in the question of Hungary, and this accounts for our continued interest in the subject.

49. Though the question of Hungary for all practical purposes has now become a part of the bigger issues in the world, and might even at times tend to be treated more or less as a "cold war" issue itself; in our opinion the basic character of the events in Hungary in the fall of 1956 remains unchanged with the passage of time.

50. It has been said that the discussion of this question at the present juncture might create international tensions and might poison the atmosphere for peace. We realize as well as others that the debates which have taken place here and the resolutions that might be passed on the subject might not immediately help the situation in Hungary in any way. But to us a basic question is whether the kind of foreign armed intervention that took place against the manifest will of the people and the Government of the day—and I emphasize "against the manifest will of the people and the Government of the day"—in Hungary in the fall of 1956 will not be taken as a precedent for such action by any interested parties in the future in case the United Nations refuses even to seize itself of the problem in the face of the opposition of one of the Members, however powerful and influential that Member may be.

51. The uprising in Hungary was a spontaneous nationalist uprising, the entire episode being a great human tragedy. This was the considered opinion on the subject of a highly detached and impartial observer of world affairs, of no less a man than Prime Minister Nehru of India, whose words carry weight with people everywhere. The report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary points in the same direction. What I said in the course of my statement in the general debate at the twelfth session of the General Assembly bears repetition in this connexion, and I should like to quote what I said then:

"To those who were inclined from the beginning to believe that the Assembly's action on Hungary would be altogether futile, may I pose a simple and direct question: If the Assembly had passed over in silence the intolerable situation that occurred in Hungary last fall as a result of foreign armed intervention, would it have redounded to the credit of the United Nations in any way? Would such a course of action have better served the cause of peace, humanity and the freedom of smaller nations? In my opinion, such an attitude of timidity or inaction on the part of the United Nations would have seriously damaged its reputation as an organization pledged primarily to secure the freedom and rights of every Member nation.

"Because we have failed ... to evolve a military arrangement for collective security, must we also desist from the unhindered expression of collective opinion and also from the limited exercise of collective influence and authority in the exclusively moral sphere of judgement and faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter?

"It is true that international politics does not always operate on the basis of morality" (But there are standards even in international politics below which one cannot go.) "Individual countries, in spite of their profession of high principles, may still in practice be affected by considerations of fear and gain in their assessment of international issues. But it will be a sad day indeed for the believers in the freedom of the smaller nations and the peace of the world if the United Nations, representing as it does the collective moral judgement of the world, feels compelled, for whatever reasons, to accept, without demur, the sacrifice of the freedom of a small Member nation as a pawn in the devilish chess game of international politics which has of late been played, without restraint or shame, out of selfish interests, by various blocs groups, acting and reacting on each other." [698th meeting, paras. 57-59].

52. In the present case, I hope, in view of the explanation I have given, we shall not be accused of fanning a "cold war" issue if we vote for the draft resolution [A/L.255] which is before the Assembly. Our record here in the United Nations would make it clear to everybody that we have always sought to abide by the same moral standards of judgement in assessing international issues everywhere in the world, be they in the Middle East or in Eastern Europe. There has of late been a good deal of talk about double standards, and we strongly feel that those who accuse others of double standards should set better examples themselves in their conduct. As far as we are concerned, we have as much respect for the freedom and rights of the people of Hungary as we have for the rights and independence of the people of Algeria, and we hope that those who accuse the uncommitted nations of Africa and Asia of double standards will show equal concern and respect for the rights and freedom of people everywhere in the world, especially in Africa and Asia.

53. In our opinion, the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution does not contain anything for which we have not voted in the past. Moreover, the execution of Mr. Imre Nagy and General Pál Maléter and others, to which reference is made, has already been rightly deplored by world public opinion. The draft resolution recommends all that the Assembly can do in the situation, even in the face of the determined opposition of one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

54. We shall vote in favour of the draft resolution in the hope that the moral pressure of the Assembly's opinion and the impact of world public opinion in general will make itself felt on the parties concerned in due course, and that the outlook will eventually change for the better for the people of Hungary.

55. Mr. TSIANG (China): A little over two years ago the United Nations received the urgent and almost desperate appeal of Prime Minister Imre Nagy to prevent the military intervention of the Soviet Union in his country and thereby to save the independence of Hungary and the freedom of the Hungarian people

[see A/3251]. We considered that appeal in an emergency session of the General Assembly. While we debated the question, the Soviet army marched in and shot down the patriots of Hungary.

56. The General Assembly was not able to prevent Soviet military intervention in Hungary. Still less have we been able to undo the tragic consequences of the Soviet military intervention.

57. We should all ponder over this failure of ours to uphold the principles of the Charter and to fulfil our obligations towards a Member State. My delegation believes that the United Nations should and could have done more for the people of Hungary.

58. If the action of the General Assembly so far on this question of Hungary has been ineffectual, the voice of the General Assembly has been clear, and its judgements have been severe but just. Its resolutions on this question tell the story. I need not review these resolutions, as they are fresh in our minds.

59. However, I must recall one particular resolution—that of 14 September 1957 [resolution 1133 (XI)]. That resolution was debated and passed after long and careful study of the report of the Special Committee on Hungary [A/3592]. The report was issued in June 1957. The members of the Special Committee, after collecting the testimony of people who participated in the uprising in Hungary, and after careful study of Hungarian official newspapers and broadcasts, gave us in this report an objective account of the uprising in the fall of 1956. Therefore, the Assembly resolution of 14 September 1957 was not a hurried act done in the midst of tumult and passion. No, it was a deliberate act done after cool and impartial consideration of all the facts and issues involved.

60. Among the judgements pronounced in that resolution are the following:

"(a) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, has deprived Hungary of its liberty and political independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental human rights;

"(b) The present Hungarian régime has been imposed on the Hungarian people by the armed intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

These judgements remain valid today. They have become the common judgement of all civilized mankind. I wish in this connexion to pay a tribute to the members of the Special Committee for their industry, their objectivity and their courage.

61. Now, we have before us a new report [A/3849] of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, issued on 14 July 1958, devoted to subsequent repression in Hungary, particularly to the executions of Prime Minister Imre Nagy, General Maléter and their associates. Much has already been said. I wish only to remark that the execution of these men is a crime against humanity. I wish to add that the manner of their abduction and arrest is sheer black gangsterism.

62. The draft resolution before the Assembly [A/L.255] is the minimum consistent with our Charter obligations. My country is glad to co-sponsor it. Through this resolution the United Nations once more voices clearly the common sentiments of all civilized humanity.

63. U THANT (Burma): Burma's attitude towards the events in Hungary during the fall of 1956 has been repeatedly made clear in the course of the eleventh session and the resumed eleventh session of the General Assembly. The subsequent events have not provided us with any grounds to change that attitude. We remain convinced that what occurred in Hungary was essentially a spontaneous nationalist uprising, though there were undoubtedly other elements which made the most of the national struggle for self-determination to further their own ends. We also continue to hold the view that this nationalist uprising was suppressed by the armed might of the Soviet Union, and that a government not of their choice was imposed on the Hungarian people. That Government remains in power today. My Government believes that the Hungarian people have the inherent right to work out their own destiny free from all external interference.

64. Guided by these basic convictions, my delegation voted for General Assembly resolution 1133 (XI) adopted at the resumed eleventh session of the General Assembly. But my colleagues will remember that Burma voted for that resolution with certain reservations. With your permission, let me quote a few relevant passages from my speech, made in that session.

"In adopting this attitude, my delegation is extremely anxious that this question—indeed, any question which comes before this Assembly—should be considered strictly on its own merits. We think it would be a great tragedy if the Hungarian question were to become an instrument of the cold war, and we must resist any tendency to have it thus utilized. For this reason, my delegation considers that the decision to call this special session so close to the commencement of the twelfth session was unfortunate. Let us look at this matter objectively. The twelfth regular session was due to begin on 17 September 1957. The Hungarian question could have been put on the agenda of that session; indeed that would have been the normal course. We do not see that any useful purpose was served by calling this special session just a week before the commencement of the regular session. In our view, the Algerian question belongs in the same category and is at least as important and urgent as the Hungarian question. In Algeria blood is being shed every day. Why then was no thought given to calling a special session to consider the grave situation in Algeria? We know from bitter experience, from the treatment which the Algerian question has received here, what would have happened had we asked for a special session.

"It is this employment of a double standard which we of the small countries cannot help but deplore. But, however much we may deplore it, we must be careful that we do not fall into the same error ourselves. We cannot permit the employment of this double standard by others to affect our own objectivity. We denounce equally the French policy in Algeria and the Soviet intervention in Hungary because in both cases we feel that the peoples of the countries concerned are being prevented by force from working out their own destiny." [674th meeting, paras. 97 and 98].

65. My delegation still adheres to that view. In our opinion, the Algerian question belongs to the same category as the Hungarian question. We learn from

official French communiqués that the French armed forces are still killing 4,000 Algerians every month. We fail to see the difference between Russian soldiers killing the Hungarian nationalists and French soldiers killing the Algerian nationalists.

66. In considering any question in this Assembly, it is necessary to have certain specific objectives. In considering the Hungarian question, too, my delegation feels that the Assembly should have only one objective. That objective should be the furtherance of the welfare and the satisfaction of the legitimate aspirations of the Hungarian people.

67. Since a tremendous loss of lives and untold misery have been caused to the Hungarian people by Soviet military intervention, we have no option but to denounce the latter. Since our foreign policy is fundamentally a policy of friendship with all countries, it pains us to have to denounce anyone. But it would be immoral, and we would be lacking in the courage of our convictions, if we were to condone such atrocities. Therefore, we do not condone them.

68. Before I conclude, let me touch very briefly on one aspect of the situation in Hungary which has been frequently referred to by several delegations—the absence of fundamental human rights in Hungary. I do not wish to pass any judgement on this aspect, but I hope that I am not exceeding the bounds of propriety or etiquette if I pose this question: Are the fundamental human rights fully enjoyed by all countries on this side of the fence? I do not wish to elaborate on this point. I just want to bring home the facts that, as regards social and economic systems prevailing at present, there is no such thing as absolute good and absolute evil.

69. Let me now come to the draft resolution [A/L.255] of the thirty-seven Powers. In the view of my delegation, this draft resolution reflects the true picture of developments in Hungary and calls for the measures warranted by these developments. My delegation sincerely appreciates the untiring efforts made by His Royal Highness Prince Wan Waithayakon to enter into consultations with the appropriate authorities with a view to achieving the objectives of the previous resolutions passed by the General Assembly, and we are equally appreciative of the Special Committee for its objective and efficient discharge of the tasks entrusted to it.

70. My delegation, like many other delegations, is distressed at the continued refusal of the Government of the USSR and the Government of Hungary to co-operate with the United Nations Special Representative in achieving the objectives of the United Nations. In the context of the previous resolutions passed by this Assembly, my delegation remains unconvinced by the explanation that the execution of Mr. Imre Nagy, General Pál Maléter and other Hungarians is purely of a domestic character, and my delegation cannot be indifferent to the continued defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly.

71. In these circumstances, my delegation will vote in favour of this draft resolution. In so doing, let me take the opportunity of declaring from this rostrum that we are prepared to join in taking similar action against any country which commits acts of aggression or ruthless suppression of national uprisings.

72. Mr. PETER (Hungary): To begin with, I should like to make two general remarks. The first is this: experience has shown that discussion of this question in the General Assembly has not been fruitful. It has only done a great deal of harm to the functioning of this Organization, and we will see the harmful effects of it in the future. For the time being, a great many delegations are not in a position to form a real and genuine opinion about these developments in Hungary. My second remark is this: it is rather instructive to compare the list of speakers in this debate with the list of speakers in the debate on the Algerian question. The overwhelming majority of the speakers who declared themselves in favour of the new draft resolution [A/L.255] did not take part in the debate on the Algerian question. This is a revealing fact.

73. I assume you will appreciate it if I do not reply, as I should do, to all the questions raised in this debate in addition to the questions I dealt with in my statement [784th meeting]. I shall confine myself to answering the most important points, and I will do my best to be as brief as possible. I shall certainly avoid taking up the unqualifiable attacks made in some speeches against my people, against my country, against my Government and against myself personally. I think I am right in saying that such unqualifiable expressions are rather reflections of the mentality of the speakers themselves, and I do not wish to share the mentality of hatred. I take very seriously my moral obligation to eliminate as much of the poisonous ingredients as possible from this debate. You may have seen at the very outset of this debate in the statement of the United States representative [784th meeting] that his intention was just the opposite. In my reply, I shall start with him. I think he did well to come to the rostrum immediately after my intervention to prove that my quotation from their note of 20 November 1958 was correct. His criticism of me for not having quoted the whole context is an attempt at self-defence.

74. I am quite ready to read the whole text to the Assembly if this is so desired. I did not quote more than one sentence because all the other parts of the note were reflected in his intervention, only in less-refined wording. I quoted the sentence which was entirely absent from his speech and to which the spirit of his speech was diametrically opposed. Anyone may check in the record the fact that in his speech there was no indication that the Government of the United States recognizes the necessity of Soviet-Hungarian friendship. In my intervention I gave the reason for this omission.

75. During this debate I have been given some lessons in the history of the Hungarian people by representatives who, before the counter-revolution, probably did not even know where Hungary is. It is rather peculiar that the farther away a country is from Hungary the more expert are its representatives on the Hungarian question. It is rather peculiar. Some of the speakers have challenged the picture I gave of recent and more distant events in Hungary. On this point I should like to appeal to the intelligence and understanding of the representative of New Zealand in explaining to him—and he may find it in the record—that I did not claim that those who listened to me should accept entirely my interpretation of the developments in Central Europe. I even said that those who are not familiar with the complexity of the historical back-

ground of Central Europe are not in a position to visualize the main trends which led to the events in Hungary in the autumn of 1956. I am absolutely sure that what I have said is the truth, nothing but the truth, about these developments. I should not anticipate the agreement of those who do not know what I do know—I who have had experience in the public life of Hungary during the Horthy régime and the Second World War; I who experienced the liberation of Hungary, the liberation of my country, from the bestiality of Hitlerism, and so on. I do not expect that those who know nothing about the past of Central Europe will agree with me. It is not even possible and not even necessary, since the item does not fall within the jurisdiction of the United Nations. So the representative of New Zealand did not grasp the meaning of my statement. I do not expect him to agree with me, but I do insist that, whatever his opinion or the opinion of anyone else about Central Europe, and whatever his opinion or the opinion of anyone else about my Government, the task of the General Assembly, the task of the United Nations should be in this respect to help Hungary extricate itself from being used as a key weapon in the cold war.

76. I have a special word for the representative of Guatemala, since this is the first time that I have officially heard that Cardinal Mindszenty is being harboured in the United States Legation in Budapest. Imagine—the United States Government and the Government of Hungary are in diplomatic relations! Our chargé d'affaires in Washington has spoken several times with officials of the State Department during the last two years. The chargé d'affaires of the United States in Budapest has spoken several times with leading official personalities including, of course, senior officials of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. And can anybody imagine that the United States officials have never mentioned that Cardinal Mindszenty is in their Legation in Budapest—never for two years? I have been told, since I came to New York, that two or three days before the conclave for the election of the new Pope the chargé d'affaires of the United States approached the Hungarian Foreign Ministry with a demand that Cardinal Mindszenty be permitted to leave the country. It was not explained why the Cardinal is there; nothing was asked about the intentions of the Hungarian authorities regarding him; no information was given concerning the status of Cardinal Mindszenty in the United States Legation. It did not even prove his presence there.

77. The representative of Guatemala will certainly have to agree that this is not diplomatic behaviour. I have no personal experience with colonial situations, but I think the Indian delegation, or rather the United Kingdom delegation, could inform us as to whether, at the time of British colonial rule in India in the past, the Governor or High Commissioner of Great Britain conducted himself in such a way. I really do not know. But I do know that the Legation of the United States in Budapest is not a Governor's or High Commissioner's office; it is simply a legation under the rules of diplomatic practice, and American officials will have to adhere to them.

78. One word regarding the statement of the representative of Cuba [785th meeting]. I listened very carefully to his speech. You may imagine how easy it would be for me to criticize him or even to ridicule him in

his special situation. I will refrain from doing so because I have deep knowledge of human suffering and deep compassion for the sufferings of his people. But I do know that if I had a situation such as his at home I would not speak about the domestic affairs of other nations. And, by the way, you may have noticed, or you may see in the record, that in his speech he supported neither the present Government of Cuba nor the rebels; it was entirely and exclusively to the United States that he gave his unconditional support. You can certainly read this in the record.

79. To those who defended the cause of Imre Nagy I wish only to say that I did not treat this question by any means lightly in my intervention. Again, this may be read in the records. To me, all this complexity is really not a cynical game, but I would like to remind those who have appointed themselves to sit in judgement and who have defended Imre Nagy that they are not infallible. We should not forget that Goebbels was a national hero in the eyes of Hitler.

80. One of the most emphasized statements during this debate, against my Government, was that we defy the resolutions of the General Assembly. I must answer this accusation carefully.

81. The crucial point in this issue is the following. On the one hand, what are the legal and moral obligations, and, on the other, what are the legitimate limits of obedience of States Members to resolutions of the General Assembly? This is the crucial point. The Charter itself gives us the necessary guidance about resolutions of the Assembly. It uses the word "recommendations". The Charter states that even when action with regard to any question seems to be necessary, the General Assembly may make recommendations either to the States Members concerned in the matter, or to the Security Council, or both. That is to say, the resolutions of the General Assembly have the character of recommendations.

82. After a resolution has been adopted by the Assembly, great responsibility rests upon the Member State or States concerned to decide whether, according to the Charter, the Assembly was competent or not with regard to the subject matter, and whether the recommendation is a correct implementation of the Charter's provisions or not.

83. The resolutions in connexion with Hungary fall precisely within the category of those recommendations which need not be carried out because of the obligations of Member States under the Charter.

84. To make this point clearer, I wish to mention that not only was it a misunderstanding of events in Hungary and misrepresentation of the Charter to inscribe the matter on the agenda, but the resolutions themselves were drawn up without taking into due consideration the provisions of the Charter.

85. I really would not like to offend any delegation which voted in favour of these resolutions in good faith and, therefore, I shall formulate as carefully as I can what I have to say in this respect. I have to say this. Even had the General Assembly been competent to deal with this question, the resolutions themselves went beyond the authority vested in it by the Charter. If representatives will study them again carefully, objectively, with open minds, they will observe that they are not, properly speaking, recommendations;

they are full of prejudice, and they reflect, not the spirit of the Charter, but the embittered atmosphere of the cold war. All I can say is that even those who drafted those resolutions could scarcely have imagined for a moment that such belligerent language would be heeded by those to whom they appeared to be addressed.

86. Furthermore, the provisions of the resolutions have no real meaning whatever. What do I mean? The resolutions express some kind of demand for the withdrawal of the Soviet armed units from Hungary and for respect for fundamental human rights. What is the meaning of these demands? As to the first demand, anybody who knows anything about the nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of the Treaty of Warsaw—the latter having been established long after the former—will not be astonished to note that NATO members would welcome the withdrawal of the Soviet troops not only from Hungary, but also from the German Democratic Republic and from Poland. On the other hand, any objective observer may be astonished to see that a resolution of this world organization is being utilized for the benefit of the one-sided objective of a regional organization. The fact must be clear that Soviet units are stationed in Hungary under a regional arrangement envisaged by the Charter itself. It is a matter of course that representatives of the NATO countries cannot agree officially with me on the point which I am going to make.

87. The Soviet armed units are, and will remain, in Hungary solely for defence against the aggressive intentions of certain NATO circles, intentions reflected in the presence of the United States military bases on the territory of Italy and in the Federal Republic of Germany. To those who claim the defensive character of these bases, I would like to recommend once again that they read the October 1957 issue of the General Military Review. Since the official character of this Review has been questioned, I should like to read out the names of some of the members of the Comité de Patronage of this periodical: General Norstad, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe; Lieutenant-General Hans Speidel, Commander of the Ground Forces of Central Europe; General de Renzi, Commander of the NATO Defence College. And there are twenty-two other names of a similar character.

88. If those gentlemen are not officials of NATO, then the periodical in question is not an official one.

89. This periodical was careless enough to publish an article about the military experiences of the counter-revolution in Hungary. The judgement made in the article was that coups d'état are cheaper and more successful than civil wars. The article gave the following practical advice:

"In the attack phase, it is only necessary to neutralize those whose freedom would actually hinder that phase. The neutralization of Government leaders may be achieved in one of two ways: either by death or by capture".

and the article concluded:

"Of these, death is generally the easier and the more reliable, as it is certainly the more final."

I do not think that any comment is necessary. Those words speak for themselves. They show not only some

of the intentions of NATO, but also the morality of those intentions.

90. The Treaty of Warsaw was concluded—whether the ruling circles of the West agree or not, whether they are pleased or not—for the defensive purposes of the East, for the maintenance of international peace and security. The presence of Soviet units in Hungary has no connexion at all with the counter-revolution, no connexion at all with any aspect of the domestic affairs of Hungary. The presence of those units is necessary for the time being exclusively for the safety of Eastern Europe, for the maintenance of peace. The units will certainly be withdrawn if the NATO Powers change their policy to one of peace. But they may be withdrawn—as they were withdrawn from Romania—if the members of the Warsaw Treaty deem that possible from the point of view of the international situation.

91. In this respect, I wish to remind the General Assembly that at the very time when Soviet units were withdrawn from Romania, new United States military bases were established in Italy.

92. In any case, the presence or withdrawal of Soviet units does not fall within the competence of any international organization except the community of States members of the Warsaw Treaty. Hence, it was meaningless to speak in General Assembly resolutions about a demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

93. I wish now to refer to the second demand: the appeal for the respect of fundamental human rights, addressed in the Assembly's previous resolutions to "the present authorities in Hungary".

94. I do not wish to be misunderstood. My Government has no desire to reprimand anyone for using the term "régime" or "present authorities in Hungary" instead of the proper term: "the Hungarian Government". No, we do not wish to reprimand anyone for that, because we know the moral qualities from which these expressions were derived and the intentions behind them. Again, I do not want to offend those who voted for the resolutions in good faith.

95. Nevertheless, before entering into the merits of this particular question, I would ask the General Assembly to take note of the fact that the leaders of the Hungarian people have suffered for the human rights—all the fundamental human rights—of the Hungarian people for many long years, in danger of death, in earlier decades, and they are not to be given lectures about human rights by those who have never sacrificed anything, to say the least, for the human rights of large masses of their own people. I had to mention this in passing.

96. I turn now to the merits of the question of the respect for fundamental human rights. After my previous statement [784th meeting], I wish only to say, with all firmness, that these fundamental human rights were threatened by the counter-revolution itself, and were restored through the liquidation of the dangers of the counter-revolution. I must state with all firmness that not a single person was indicted for the sole reason that he took part in the events of the autumn of 1956. Court action was restricted to crimes that would be so defined even if a counter-revolution had not taken place. And all these investigations and procedures were completed a long time ago.

97. In conclusion, I should like to say a special word about why we gave no assistance to those who were given one kind of commission or another by the General Assembly in connexion with the case of Hungary. I am referring to the members of the Special Committee and, in addition, His Royal Highness Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand. Here, I should like to clarify our invitation to the Secretary-General to visit Hungary. From a strictly practical point of view, it would have been useful for us to give assistance to the representatives carrying out the commissions of these resolutions. Had we done so, their reports to the General Assembly would have been much less one-sided. During the past two years—and the same thing is true of the present moment—any member of any delegation to the General Assembly, even a member of the United States delegation—and I stress: even a member of the United States delegation—would have been welcome in Hungary, provided the visit was not connected in any way with resolutions on Hungary adopted by the General Assembly. There are representatives present in this hall who were in Hungary recently, and others who are going to Hungary in the near future to find out what they want to know. But these visits have been arranged quite independently of the resolutions.

98. The fine distinctions in this question may be seen best in the invitation extended in the name of my Government to the Secretary-General. Upon the invitation of my Government, the Secretary-General would have been and would still be welcome at any time in Hungary. He would have had, and he would have, the fullest opportunity to talk and negotiate about any subject deemed appropriate by him, and he would have had any chance to hear the sincerest views of those he had chosen to meet. But a legal and moral barrier arose, however, as soon as it became evident that he had decided to confine the evident object of his visit to certain matters connected with the resolutions of the General Assembly, thereby making any possible visit appear like a tour of inspection. I only wish he could agree with us on this point in the near future.

99. I wish to emphasize again that, from a purely practical point of view, any assistance given by us to representatives appointed by the Assembly would have been in our interest, but we would have had to make a compromise on a basic principle at the expense of the Hungarian people, the only competent arbiter in all these questions. We think that this firmness on our part was and is necessary.

100. If anybody wishes to know what our attitude will be with respect to the new draft resolution if passed, I would only like to ask him to compare this new draft resolution with the previous one and see whether there is any difference between them.

101. With all respect to this Organization and to the Charter, we are of the opinion that the time will come when our opinion about these resolutions will be the majority view in this Assembly, and with the easing of world tension—I emphasize, with the easing of world tension—the General Assembly will be in a position to withdraw all these resolutions. We wish it and we will work for it, not only for the sake of the Hungarian people, but also in the interest of terminating the cold war and improving international contacts.

102. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of France to exercise his right of reply.

103. Mr. GEORGES-PICOT (France) (translated from French): I thank the President for allowing me to reply to those representatives who referred to me; three of them took advantage of the fact that we are dealing with the item on the situation in Hungary to refer to the Algerian problem. That, however, is not the matter which we are at present discussing, and I trust that those same representatives will have noted that I myself did not take advantage of the debate on the Algerian problem in order to speak about the situation in Hungary.

104. The information given by the Romanian representative does not contain any reply to a question which we raised. Nothing in what he said furnishes any answer to the statement which we made on the basis of Mr. Preoteasa's declaration [605th meeting], namely, that the Romanian Government had given an assurance that it would observe the international rules on political asylum where the stay in Romania of Imre Nagy and his friends was concerned. The Romanian Government had stated that Imre Nagy and his friends would have the full benefit of the right of political asylum, and that they would be grateful to the Government of Romania for the hospitality which had been extended to them.

105. The representative of Romania said, however, that his Government had been obliged to hand over Imre Nagy and his companions to the Hungarian Government in compliance with the extradition treaty between Romania and Hungary. What this means is that he is returning the ball to Mr. Kádár, and that he is trying to make us believe that Imre Nagy and his friends were sentenced for ordinary crimes and not for political reasons.

106. Yet Mr. Kádár declared on several occasions, and in particular in his letter of 21 November 1956 to the Yugoslav Embassy, that "[the Hungarian Government did not] desire to apply sanctions against Imre Nagy and the members of his group for their past activities" [A/3592, para. 634]. Mr. Kádár repeated that statement in an important speech which was broadcast on 27 November 1956, and from which I take the following words:

"We have promised that we will take no judicial action against Imre Nagy and his friends on account of past crimes, even if they themselves acknowledge them later. We shall keep our promise."

107. Again, on 7 April 1958, Mr. Kádár said that Imre Nagy was living at a summer holiday resort in a place which he had chosen himself.

108. A few weeks later, the news of the verdict and of Imre Nagy's execution burst upon us like a thunder-clap. That was on 17 June 1958; on 30 June, Mr. Kádár said:

"There are some who say that we have not kept our promises where Imre Nagy is concerned. That is a lie. Who could have known on 23 October what this man Imre Nagy really wanted? At that time, he made not the smallest reference to what he had written in January 1956, namely that Hungary should withdraw from the Warsaw Treaty, that the coalition parties should be re-established, and that a Government should be set up which included them. He never breathed a word about all that."

But are those ordinary criminal offences?

109. The representative of Burma referred to two different standards which are apparently applied according to whether a great or a small country is concerned. It is my belief that, if these two standards exist, they fall within the definition given by Albert Camus, whose preface to a book on Imre Nagy's execution I have already quoted. This is what Albert Camus has to say: "Law, the United Nations has declared, is binding only on those who respect it; for everyone else, it is optional. To which the historical school of thought replies 'That suits us, as we do not respect it.'" ⁴

110. Speaking of a double standard of values, it is amusing to find that those representatives who stated during the debate on Cyprus that it was impossible to entertain a solution which did not give satisfaction to both the Greek and Turkish communities in the island make no reference at all today, when we are discussing Algeria, to that part of the Algerian community which is of French race; yet that is the crux of the whole problem.

111. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Cuba to exercise his right of reply.

112. Mr. NUÑEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): I should like to reply briefly to two remarks made by the representative of the Hungarian régime.

113. The first of these was addressed indirectly to all representatives; he said that we knew nothing whatever about the problems of Hungary and of that part of Europe. But he himself admitted here that he did not know that His Eminence Cardinal Mindszenty had for the last two years been in the United States Legation at Budapest. That is a fact which we all knew, yet he did not know it. That does not suggest that he knows much about the problems of Hungary.

114. He also said, with the far from priestly intention of causing misunderstandings between me and my Government, that I did not defend either the Government or the rebels. The fundamental difference between his outlook and mine is that I, who am a layman, say over and over again that I grieve for the loss of life both among the Government supporters and the rebels in my country. He, an ecclesiastic, takes this to mean that I did not defend my Government. In other words, he would like me to come here and say, as he did, that my Government approves the violent death of 60,000 Hungarians.

115. The PRESIDENT: I call upon the representative of Yugoslavia, who wishes to explain his vote.

116. Mr. BELOVSKI (Yugoslavia): At the beginning of this session [752nd meeting] the Yugoslav delegation stated that it was against the inclusion of the item "The situation in Hungary" in the agenda of the General Assembly. On that occasion my delegation also set forth the reasons which prompted it to adopt this attitude. The consideration of this item here confirms this attitude of ours.

117. We remain convinced that the debate which has taken place on this question, coupled with accusations and counter-accusations, as well as the draft resolution which has been submitted [A/L.255], will not con-

tribute to the relaxation of tension nor to the improvement of international relations generally.

118. With all this in mind, and in conformity with the position hitherto adopted by my Government on this question, which is I am sure well known to the members of the Assembly, my delegation will not support the draft resolution.

119. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly will now vote on the draft resolution [A/L.255] submitted by Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, the Federation of Malaya, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Laos, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Panama, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan.

Against: Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary.

Abstaining: Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Republic, Afghanistan, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco.

The draft resolution was adopted by 54 votes to 10, with 15 abstentions.

120. Prince Wan WATHAYAKON (Thailand): I am grateful to the General Assembly for its expression of appreciation for my efforts. I also thank the representatives who mentioned me by name.

121. As I stated at the time, I accepted my assignment as special representative in a spirit of service. I promised to do my best and I did. But I sincerely regret that my best was not good enough to penetrate the iron curtain of non-co-operation.

122. I welcome the new approach in the resolution just adopted, and I extend to Sir Leslie Munro, in whose abilities and resourcefulness I have complete confidence, my best wishes for his success, for the freedom of the Hungarian people is truly a noble cause which deserves the unfailing support of the United Nations until it finally prevails.

123. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Lebanon who wishes to explain his vote.

124. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) (translated from French)
In the past, the Lebanese delegation has voted in favour of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the situation in Hungary. It still maintains that those resolutions should be respected and put into effect, and it accordingly supports the objectives of the resolution which has just been adopted. Nevertheless, we abstained from voting on this resolution with

a view to leaving the way open for Hungary and the Soviet Union to approve the objectives of the earlier resolutions, thus enabling those countries to take, on their own initiative, the necessary measures for putting them into effect.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.