

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

THIRTEENTH SESSION

Official Records



779th PLENARY MEETING

Tuesday, 4 November 1958,
at 3 p.m.

NEW YORK

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President: Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon).

AGENDA ITEMS 64, 70 AND 72

Question of disarmament

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REPORT OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE (A/3974
AND CORR.1/REV.1 AND A/3974/ADD.1 AND 2)

1. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly has before it the report of the First Committee [A/3974 and Corr.1/Rev.1, A/3974/Add.1 and 2] on items 64, 70 and 72 of the agenda of this session of the General Assembly. These items deal with several aspects of the question of disarmament.

2. May I inquire, in the light of the provisions of rule 68 of the rules of procedure, whether it is the intention of the General Assembly that this report be opened to discussion?

3. I call on the representative of Panama, on a point of order.

4. Mr. ILLUECA (Panama) (translated from Spanish): The President has just told the General Assembly, that we have before us the report of the First Committee on disarmament items. A few moments ago, I requested a copy of the document in Spanish, which, like English and French, is a working language of the General Assembly. I understand that copies have been circulated in English, French and Russian, but not in Spanish. On a point of order, I would request that the meeting be adjourned to enable the representatives of Spanish-speaking countries to obtain the report and to give them a chance to read it.

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5. The PRESIDENT: I have been informed by the Secretariat that the Spanish text of these documents will be out in a few minutes. It may even be out now, and it may even be in the process of distribution—I do not know. But if the representative of Panama and our other Spanish-speaking friends would permit us to go ahead with the meeting, on the understanding that the documents will be out very shortly in a matter of minutes, I shall be very grateful.

6. I call on the representative of El Salvador on a point of order.

7. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) (translated from Spanish): My delegation is very pleased to support the remarks of the representative of Panama. My delegation also went to the documents distribution centre in this hall and was told that the Spanish translation of the report would not be distributed this afternoon because it was not ready. As the representative of Panama stated, the United Nations has three working languages: Spanish, English and French. The report of the First Committee has been circulated in French, English and Russian, but not in Spanish. In the circumstances, my delegation believes that we should wait until the Spanish-speaking delegations have the text of the report in Spanish.

8. Mr. BOUZA (Uruguay) (translated from Spanish): The Uruguayan delegation also supports the proposal made by the representative of Panama and supported by the representative of El Salvador. There can be no doubt that as Spanish is not only an official language, but a working language of the United Nations, one of the three working languages, we are not in a position to intervene in the proceedings of the General Assembly and in the debate without having examined the Spanish version of the report for that is the document by which we must be guided. The report is just being distributed in Spanish, and we would accordingly request at least a recess to enable us to read through the document in order to enable us to discuss it.

9. The PRESIDENT: I shall suspend this meeting for fifteen minutes only, in order that the Spanish-speaking delegations may have time to look over this document, which is now being distributed, and I hope that we shall then be able to proceed with the affairs of the Assembly for the rest of the afternoon.

The meeting was suspended at 3.25 p.m. and resumed at 4.5 p.m.

10. The PRESIDENT: I understand that all documents are now in the hands of all members in all the working languages. I hope this understanding is correct and that we can proceed with the business of the Assembly.

11. In connexion with these draft resolutions, members will have noted that in addition to those recommended by the First Committee—and there are four of

these—an additional one [A/L.250] is proposed jointly by fourteen members. In their interventions members are of course entitled to address themselves to this draft resolution also and I request them to do so. I now invite the Rapporteur to present the report.

12. Mr. MATSCH (Austria), Rapporteur of the First Committee: I have the honour to present to the General Assembly the report of the First Committee, document A/3974 [and Corr.1/Rev.1 and A/3974/Add.1 and 2]. The report includes four draft resolutions recommended by the First Committee. The debate on the three items 64, 70 and 72, has shown the profound concern of the world public with regard to the continued arms race and universal awareness of the need of disarmament as perhaps a condition of human survival. The debate on the three items was concentrated on the question of discontinuing tests of nuclear weapons on account of the importance of this item.

13. Several reasons were given for the urgency of dealing with this matter, such as the profound concern voiced in all countries regarding these tests, the conclusion of the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation [A/3838], the fact that the report of the Geneva Conference of Experts^{1/} indicated that it is technically practicable to establish such controls as necessary to ensure the observance of a possible agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests and, finally, the fact that a political conference of the three nuclear Powers was to start on 31 October in Geneva^{2/} in order to reach such an agreement. During the debate the dangers involved in the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons were discussed by many representatives and the delegation of Ireland submitted a draft resolution on the subject. A declaratory paragraph of this draft resolution was carried without any negative vote. The proposer withdrew the draft resolution as a whole, having explained that his primary purpose was achieved by placing the Committee on record as recognizing that an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons would aggravate international tensions and the difficulties of maintaining world peace.

14. On the question of the discontinuance of tests, neither the discussion in the Committee nor strenuous efforts, particularly by the delegations of India and Yugoslavia, led to a draft resolution which all members could support. Draft resolution A, which was adopted by the Committee by 49 votes to 9 against, with 23 abstentions, urges that in the negotiations between States that have tested nuclear weapons the parties make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control and further urges the parties involved in these negotiations not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while these negotiations are in progress.

15. In the debates the Powers concerned emphasized more than once their desire to reach the same goal, namely, that no further tests of nuclear weapons will take place. But two different methods of approach were suggested.

^{1/} Conference of Experts of Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests, held at Geneva from 1 July to 21 August 1958.

^{2/} Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, held at Geneva.

16. The representatives of the USSR and of other countries explained that their delegations had to oppose draft resolution A because it did not call upon all States carrying out nuclear tests to stop such tests immediately and unconditionally for all time.

17. The representatives of the two Western nuclear Powers stated their intention to reach, at the Geneva Conference on the suspension of such tests, an agreement which could operate indefinitely if the inspection system was working effectively and adequate progress on real disarmament was being made in due course.

18. The First Committee also recommends draft resolution B, expressing the hope that the present Geneva Conference will lead to an agreement acceptable to all. Further, the parties concerned are requested to report to the General Assembly the agreement that may be the result of their negotiations. Some delegations declared they were unable to support draft resolution B because it was purely procedural and the substance of the matter is not touched upon.

19. Draft resolution C, which the Committee also recommends for adoption by the Assembly, refers to the forthcoming Geneva Conference to study the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack.^{3/} In this resolution the hope is expressed that the widest possible measure of agreement will be reached and that the United Nations will be informed on the progress achieved.

20. Many representatives expressed their regret in the debate that no negotiations on disarmament within the framework of the United Nations were held during the last year. The continuing interest and the responsibility of the United Nations for seeking a solution of this outstanding problem was repeatedly stressed in the debate. In order to overcome the present impasse, the First Committee recommends the adoption of draft resolution D, adopted by seventy-eight votes, deciding that the Disarmament Commission shall, for 1959 and on an *ad hoc* basis, be composed of all the Members of the United Nations, and requests it to submit to the Security Council and to the General Assembly constructive proposals and recommendations in the field of disarmament.

21. I have the honour to present to the General Assembly draft resolutions A to D, recommended by the First Committee.

Pursuant to rule 168 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the First Committee.

22. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly has before it four draft resolutions contained in the First Committee's report [A/3974 and Corr.1/Rev.1 and A/3974/Add.1 and 2], plus the draft resolution submitted by fourteen Powers, contained in document A/L.250. I request members, in their explanations of vote, to address themselves to any or all of these five texts before us.

23. Mr. LALL (India): The delegation of India will be able in this Assembly to support draft resolutions C, and D which it had the honour of co-sponsoring in the First Committee. Both of these resolutions were

^{3/} Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures which might be helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack and for the Preparation of a Report thereon to Governments, which opened in Geneva on 10 November 1958 and adjourned on 18 December.

adopted without any negative votes being cast against them.

24. As the most important matter, certainly the matter which engaged most of the First Committee's time, was that concerning the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests and as, in the opinion of the delegation of India, no resolution is before us in the Committee's report [A/3974 and Corr.1/Rev.1 and A/3974/Add.1 and 2] which expresses a clear stand on this matter, the delegation of India, together with thirteen other delegations, has reintroduced a draft resolution on this subject, which is to be found in document A/L.250.

25. I should say briefly that this draft resolution takes a positive stand on the question of the discontinuance of tests. We who are co-sponsoring this resolution fully understand and appreciate the concern of some members of the General Assembly about two points: first, the matter of effective international controls on this matter the draft resolution which is before the Assembly is abundantly clear. It says that such controls are necessary, are imperative and are urgent; and it urges the Conference at Geneva to establish such controls by agreement on an urgent basis. Nothing could be clearer. It is completely explicit on this point.

26. Then the second concern of some members, which again we fully understand and appreciate, is what is to happen if there is no success in the talks at Geneva. The concept of this draft resolution on this point is that the Geneva talks must succeed. In other words, the Assembly urges the Geneva Conference to succeed. Surely that is better than looking for or providing explicitly for the failure of the Geneva Conference. Surely it is better to urge that Conference to reach agreement on this important matter of the discontinuance of tests under effective control machinery. But if the question remains in anyone's mind as to what happens should success not be achieved, the answer now is fully provided by a resolution which was adopted unanimously by the First Committee and which will certainly be adopted by this Assembly, setting up a continuing United Nations machinery.

27. There is now available to the United Nations a Disarmament Commission on a continuing basis. If there is any unreasonable delay in achieving agreement on the discontinuance of tests under effective international control, the issue can and should be brought before this Commission.

28. Draft resolution D provides further for the convening of a special session of the Assembly if that should be necessary in the opinion of the Commission. It would be easy for the Commission to do this, as it will be composed of all the Members of the Organization. If a majority of the Commission should express a view in favour of convening a special session of the Assembly, there would be no difficulty in doing so.

29. Therefore, whatever may have been the apprehensions in the First Committee on this second point, those apprehensions must be set at rest by the decision of the Assembly itself to establish continuing machinery which will be available to deal with disarmament problems. Since that machinery is to be established today, there is a complete answer to the question "What is to happen if the Geneva Conference fails to reach agreement or if agreement is not

reached in a reasonable time on the question of effective controls for a discontinuance agreement regarding the testing of atomic weapons?"

30. Thus, the fourteen Powers which have reintroduced their draft resolution [A/L.250] do so fortified by the other decision which has been reached by the First Committee and will be reaffirmed here this afternoon. In these circumstances we feel that the Assembly should have this additional opportunity of taking a definite stand on the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, under effective international control, and with the clear understanding that if such control measures are not speedily achieved, the continuing machinery of the United Nations is available and can and must be used to take up the questions again.

31. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translated from French): The question of disarmament, which was already a focal point in the general debate a month ago, has now come before the General Assembly again, after prolonged discussion in the First Committee, and we have before us the resolutions that have been submitted. What are the inevitable conclusions to be drawn at the end of this discussion, which went on for over three weeks in the Committee? First, the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests is the chief subject of concern to the peoples of the entire world; second, in view of the possibility of organizing effective control, the problem of the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests can easily be isolated from the other disarmament problems and can be dealt with separately; third, the cessation of nuclear weapons tests cannot be effective unless it is accepted as a permanent cessation.

32. It might consequently have been expected that the draft resolutions submitted to the First Committee would take into account this unanimous wish of the peoples to see these atomic experiments brought to an end. The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union was drafted along those lines. It recommended that the States producing nuclear weapons should enter into negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement on the immediate and permanent cessation of tests.

33. The fourteen-Power draft resolution [A/L.250] now before the Assembly is inspired by the same feelings and by the same idea: that of the permanent cessation of tests.

34. Given such unanimity, it would have been natural to find all delegations supporting proposals designed to put an end to nuclear experiments. Yet the draft resolution sponsored by the United States merely urges the States parties to the forthcoming negotiations at Geneva to make every effort to reach agreement on the suspension of tests and not to undertake further tests while the negotiations are in progress. The text of that draft resolution, now draft resolution A clearly reveals a desire to prevent the United Nations from taking a definite stand in favour of the permanent cessation of nuclear experiments. The draft resolution scarcely conceals the opposition of the United States and the United Kingdom to the cessation of tests. Couched in vague terms, it will not serve to mislead public opinion, for a mere exhortation to the negotiators is not enough, especially as the United States and the United Kingdom are obviously determined to continue their experiments with atomic and hydrogen weapons, as in the past. Is not that the object of the

proposals made by those two countries for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests for one year only?

35. During the debate in the First Committee, it became clear that the one-year suspension of tests was in no way related to their permanent discontinuance. When it became obvious that there was no denying that observation, and as several delegations had described the period as absurdly short, the United States representatives began to talk about a period of two years which was to precede the extension of the period of suspension renewed from year to year. The United States, however, made that purely theoretical possibility dependent on such a list of conditions that the whole possibility depended in fact on the goodwill of the United States.

36. Being fully aware of the fact that effective control is quite possible and that, even as things now stand, the Soviet Union, like the United States, is in a position to ascertain the exact number and the approximate locality of tests carried out by other countries, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom are still juggling with words and persistently trying to present matters in a certain light, as if everything depended on the question of control, to such an extent that certain representatives here present have been misled into believing that that question is decisive and that the Soviet Union is opposed to control.

37. The debate has made it clear that the obstacles to the immediate cessation of nuclear weapons tests lie not in control, but in the categorical refusal of the Western Powers. Indeed, to link the extension of the period of the suspension of tests—which is only a year in any case—to progress achieved and agreements reached in other fields connected with disarmament, which, incidentally, the Western Powers are doing their utmost to sabotage, is not that tantamount to an act of refusal?

38. Finally, it is legitimate to wonder who will judge, and who decide, if progress has been achieved in other fields connected with disarmament. Would it not still be the United States and the United Kingdom?

39. What could be expected from acceptance of the one-year period? Would distrust be dispelled? By no means, for nobody would believe that preparations for further experiments had been halted. More countries would be brought into those preparations. The armaments race would spread, and the disarmament problem would grow more and more serious. Mankind would sink further and further into the fear of an atomic war. And what would happen if after one year or two years, for instance, the United States thought that it would be to its advantage to resume tests? Would that not give rise to a serious international crisis and to greater tension in international relations than ever before, with incalculable consequences? That is why the solution proposed by the Soviet Union and supported by all the socialist countries, as well as by the majority of the peoples, should have been adopted as the only solution appropriate to the problem and to the international situation: namely, the immediate and permanent cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.

40. Neither draft resolution A nor draft resolution B, originally submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden, is calculated to advance by one inch the settlement of the disarmament question, particularly the burning ques-

tion of the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. On the contrary, they would create an atmosphere of uneasiness and would enable the United States and the United Kingdom to continue their tergiversations, and to turn a deaf ear to the agonized pleas of the peoples that nuclear weapons tests should end once and for all. In insisting on a vote on those two draft resolutions, the rulers of the United States think that they can use them to conceal their own refusal to discontinue nuclear tests and as a means of allaying the concern felt by world opinion and of assuaging the fears of the peoples, including the American and British people.

41. That, however, shows that they underestimate the determination of peoples all over the world that these tests shall be discontinued. We are convinced that this determination will deter those who are trying to avoid complying with mankind's desire to have atomic and hydrogen weapons tests suspended and thus to set out on the road to disarmament and peace.

42. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom): I want to state briefly the position of the United Kingdom delegation on the proposals that are now before the General Assembly.

43. Let me reaffirm clearly and simply that our position is based on our desire for disarmament. The aim of the United Kingdom is now, as it always has been, to achieve stable and effective agreements on disarmament such as will diminish fear and tension in the world, such as will genuinely increase the security of all countries and such as will assist in the solution of the political disputes which are the real underlying cause of the armaments problem.

44. I wish again to emphasize the point which I made in the First Committee [948th meeting] that in dealing with disarmament the United Nations is dealing with one aspect—a vitally important aspect—of the general problem of world peace and security. If disarmament is effectively to serve the cause of peace and security, then it must be founded upon properly controlled and equitable agreements which have the full consent of the Powers primarily concerned.

45. It is axiomatic that each Power concerned must be able to feel that its security will be genuinely increased by such an agreement. For this purpose, it is equally axiomatic that any agreement must be effectively controlled so that each Power will have the assurance that others are faithfully putting the agreements into effect.

46. Without this, disarmament would merely be a source of more insecurity and more tension in the world. Unless and until disarmament can be achieved on the basis of effectively controlled and equitable agreement, each and every Government is bound to provide for the security of its own people by its own efforts in company with its allies.

47. Our ultimate aim is comprehensive disarmament which would reduce armed forces and armaments throughout the world to no more than the levels needed for the internal defence of each country. This is also the declared aim of the United Nations. The experience of the disarmament talks in past years has led the United Nations to seek this ultimate aim of comprehensive disarmament through an approach by stages. The United Kingdom is in full agreement with this

partial approach, as it is called, and we have joined in the past in putting forward proposals which have commanded a very wide measure of support in this Assembly.

48. But, whether a partial or a comprehensive approach is used, the principle still applies that disarmament must be balanced, equitable and effectively controlled. No Government can negotiate about its own defence on any other basis.

49. In a world rent by political and ideological dispute, even a partial approach has been found to present great difficulties, and over the past year a new opportunity has been presented in the technical approach so successfully adopted at the Geneva Conference of Experts^{4/} on control over a suspension of nuclear weapons tests.

50. I think the present position on disarmament can be summed up by saying that we are at this moment engaged in an attempt to see whether this technical success can be followed up and can open the way to the real goal of disarmament. Because of the initial success achieved with the technical approach to the problem of nuclear weapons tests, the recent debate in the First Committee has largely turned on this subject. Of the proposals now before the Assembly, three are concerned wholly or in part with the political negotiations now in progress at Geneva on the problem of nuclear tests. These negotiations are being conducted in private, and it would, of course, be quite improper for me to make any comment on them here. All I would do is to restate with all emphasis the intention of my Government to make every effort to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion.

51. If there is goodwill on both sides, we believe that such a success is possible. This could mean an agreement between the nuclear testing Powers for the discontinuance of tests under effective international control. More than that, it could create a new atmosphere and a new hope of real measures of disarmament such as could mark the beginning of a genuine increase in world security.

52. My delegation believes that, by adopting draft resolutions A and B now before the Assembly, the First Committee has chosen the best way to encourage these hopes and to facilitate their realization. The three Powers at Geneva are negotiating on matters of vital interest to their security.

53. The Soviet Union has suggested in the First Committee that the discontinuance of nuclear tests is not a matter of vital importance for security. I do not think that this is a tenable view, especially if one looks ahead beyond the immediate future. In any case, the Soviet Government has made it clear that they regard the question of control over disarmament as being intimately bound up with the security of the Soviet Union; and, of course, control is an inseparable part of the problem under negotiation at Geneva. In these circumstances, an agreement reached at Geneva, after full negotiation and with the full consent of the Powers concerned, will be by far the surest and best foundation for further progress.

54. I would, therefore, urge the Assembly to adopt draft resolutions A and B as submitted by the First Committee.

^{4/} See Note 1.

55. My delegation does not feel able to vote for the draft resolution on nuclear tests, submitted by Afghanistan and thirteen other Member States in the First Committee, and which has now been submitted [A/L.250] again to the Assembly. The wording of this draft resolution is such as to call for the discontinuance of nuclear tests until agreement is reached on the controls necessary to ensure that the prohibition on tests is observed. This means that if an agreement on controls were not reached, the prohibition would nevertheless continue to operate. In effect, therefore, this draft resolution calls for a permanent cessation of nuclear weapons tests whether or not agreement is reached on control and regardless of progress in disarmament. A declaration of this kind would be contrary to the principles which should govern any disarmament measure if it is really to contribute to peace and security. It must remain doubtful whether the reconstitution of the Disarmament Commission, as an eighty-one-member body, effectively alters the position.

56. I need say little about draft resolution C submitted by the First Committee, on the subject of expert talks regarding measures against the possibility of surprise attack, which are due to open at Geneva on 10 November 1958. This draft resolution commanded very wide acceptance in the First Committee, and I feel sure it will do so again in the Assembly. Here also we are engaged in seeing whether the technical approach can lead to substantive agreement. An agreement in this case would greatly facilitate the search for real disarmament by reducing the fear of surprise attack by one State upon another, and so enlarging the measure of confidence in the world.

57. Lastly, the First Committee has turned its attention to the machinery whereby the United Nations should maintain its consideration of disarmament. I think it proper to place on record here the fact that my delegation has certain doubts about the ability of a Disarmament Commission comprising all eighty-one Member States to deal effectively with day-to-day discussion of the intricate problems of disarmament. But we do recognize that other arrangements have for the time being proved impracticable, and we equally recognize the general sentiment among Member States that the United Nations should no longer be deprived of the opportunity for continuing discussion of disarmament outside the General Assembly itself. We are, therefore, ready to join in the experiment of establishing a Disarmament Commission of the whole, for 1959, on the understanding that this will be subject to review at the fourteenth session and that the Commission will be able to appoint such smaller working bodies as may seem desirable.

58. On this basis we are ready to join with other Member States in adopting the draft resolution D.

59. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): Approval by the General Assembly of the draft resolutions now before it will provide the peoples of the world with clear evidence of the results we have achieved after nearly a month's discussion of disarmament problems in the First Committee.

60. The main criterion governing our assessment of, and consequently our votes on, draft resolutions is the extent to which they further the interests of disarmament. There is no other criterion. From this stand-

point our delegation is deeply disappointed and dissatisfied that the First Committee was unable to adopt any positive draft resolution calling upon the nuclear Powers to stop atomic and hydrogen weapons tests immediately and unconditionally.

61. Attempts to work out a compromise proposal which would have received the unanimous support of all delegations were unfortunately unsuccessful. The reason for this is well known: it lay then, as it does now, in the unwillingness of the United States of America and the United Kingdom to make the necessary declaration that they would interpret the compromise draft resolution as calling upon States to stop tests for all time or until agreement is reached among the States concerned on the complete cessation of nuclear tests, regardless of the outcome of the Geneva Conference, as was proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union.

62. However, two atomic Powers—the United States of America and the United Kingdom—took a rigid and uncompromising stand and thus bear a heavy responsibility before the peoples of the world, who demand the complete and immediate cessation of nuclear weapons tests. This shows once again, as we have already emphasized, that the United States of America and the United Kingdom are set against disarmament.

63. The First Committee rejected the main operative paragraph of the fourteen-Power draft resolution calling for the immediate discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons until agreement was reached by the States concerned. In consequence, the sponsors were obliged to withdraw the resolution, a fact we regret.

64. What is the General Assembly now being asked to approve in its place? Draft resolution A, that is the seventeen-Power draft resolution, incorporating the amendments of the Latin-American countries. The sponsors of this text have, in our opinion, not only disregarded the views of a number of delegations, but have plainly expressed their intention of seeking a fundamental revision of the main provisions of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 January 1946 [resolution 1 (I)] concerning the need for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and a substantial reduction in armed forces. In our opinion, the adoption of this resolution by the General Assembly would in fact be an obstacle to the cessation of nuclear tests and to the solution of disarmament problems as a whole.

65. We are told that the measures provided for in this resolution are positive and far-reaching, in keeping with the obligations of the General Assembly and with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of mankind. But the unwillingness of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to agree to an immediate general and unconditional cessation of nuclear weapons tests—and the draft resolution places this beyond doubt—surely does not meet the wishes of the peoples of the world. In fact this draft resolution embodies an impressive array of reservations, which are highly convenient to the United Kingdom and the United States and with which France also associates itself, although it formally abstained.

66. The desire of the overwhelming majority of mankind is not that tests should be suspended for one year, with their subsequent renewal depending on other complex factors, but that tests should stop immediately and

that the cessation should remain in force not only while the current Geneva negotiations are in progress, as this draft resolution implies, but until the nuclear Powers conclude an agreement on the cessation of tests, regardless of where and when such an agreement is concluded.

67. Moreover, draft resolution A encourages a purely technical approach to the disarmament problem at the expense of the political. In other words, the proposal is that we should adopt, not a policy of seeking agreed political solutions but one of discussing techniques of control, thus evading a substantive settlement of practical disarmament problems.

68. The paragraph in the draft resolution providing that, out of the funds made available as a result of disarmament, the States concerned should devote additional resources to the improvement of living conditions throughout the world and especially in the less developed countries, is a mere repetition of the corresponding paragraph of the resolution adopted on 14 November 1957 [resolution 1148 (XII)]. It contains nothing concrete and makes no practical recommendations. It is therefore manifestly ineffective.

69. For these reasons, the Ukrainian delegation will vote against draft resolution A.

70. The Ukrainian delegation will also vote against draft resolution B, originally submitted by Austria, Sweden and Japan, since under that proposal the General Assembly would not express a definite and clear-cut opinion on the cessation of tests but merely voice the pious wish and hope that the Geneva Conference will be successful. That is not what world public opinion expects from a General Assembly resolution on such a vitally important question as the cessation of nuclear tests. The futility of this unrealistic draft resolution is quite obvious.

71. The General Assembly also has before it the draft resolution sponsored by India and thirteen other countries [A/L.250]. We find that draft resolution acceptable since in our opinion it provides for the most important action the Assembly should take in the matter of nuclear tests, which is to call upon the States conducting such tests to stop them immediately, pending agreement between those States.

72. The Ukrainian delegation intends to vote for this draft resolution which, moreover, basically reflects the substance and spirit of that submitted by the Soviet delegation on the immediate cessation of nuclear weapons tests. We should also like to emphasize that we interpret the draft resolution submitted by India and thirteen other States as an appeal to States to stop tests for all time or until agreement is reached by the States concerned, regardless of when or where such an agreement is concluded.

73. The Ukrainian delegation notes with satisfaction the almost unanimous adoption by the First Committee of draft resolution D, originally submitted by India and Yugoslavia, on United Nations machinery in the matter of disarmament, and the spirit of co-operation shown by the delegations of a number of countries. One reason for this Organization's failure to find a solution to the disarmament problem lies in the fact that its discussion has, to a large extent, been confined to a relatively narrow circle of States, for, although agreement largely depends on States possessing con-

siderable armed forces and armaments including nuclear weapons, all States are interested in finding a positive solution to the disarmament problem. It is therefore natural and necessary that they should take part in the work of the competent United Nations body, where the problem of disarmament would be under the control and scrutiny of all States Members of the United Nations.

74. For these reasons, the Ukrainian delegation will vote for draft resolution D.

75. My delegation will also vote for draft resolution C originally submitted by India and Yugoslavia, which was also adopted almost unanimously by the First Committee, and which expresses the hope that the widest possible measure of agreement will be achieved at the Conference of experts scheduled to meet at Geneva on 10 November 1958 to study the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack.

76. These are the comments the Ukrainian delegation wished to make before voting on the draft resolutions submitted for approval to the General Assembly.

77. Mr. LODGE (United States of America): I wish to explain the position of the United States on the draft resolutions recommended by the First Committee. We welcome the fact that the First Committee endorsed draft resolution A, of which the United States was one of the co-sponsors. This is the principal draft resolution resulting from the long discussion in the Committee, since it covers all the aspects of disarmament considered by the Committee. We think it particularly important that this draft resolution be adopted by the General Assembly because it covers a number of topics which are of vital concern to us all.

78. We are anxious that the participants in the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests should heed the expression of opinion by this body—and I am quoting from the very text of the draft resolution itself—that they should "make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests." If they heed this call of the United Nations they will, by agreeing to a verified stoppage of tests, take an initial step toward disarmament, and then the world will breathe easier.

79. It is vital that an agreement on test suspension provide for effective controls; otherwise it would be a mere paper prohibition without substance—I think the Latin phrase is a "brutum fulmen". Only if the parties concerned can be sure that the agreement is being carried out in good faith will the agreement have any value.

80. Draft resolution B, submitted originally by Austria, Japan and Sweden is also pending. We are grateful for the sincere attempt which the representatives of these countries made to find a formula acceptable to everyone. The expression of good wishes for the success of the Geneva Conference in this draft resolution seems to us eminently reasonable, and we shall vote for it.

81. Draft resolution A also urges the parties involved in the Geneva negotiations not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while the negotiations are in progress. The United States has in fact already suspended its nuclear weapons tests as from last Friday, 31 October 1958—I should like to emphasize that fact—

and has offered to continue this suspension for one year if the Soviet Union does not continue testing. We hope that the Soviet Union will respond to the appeal of the General Assembly not to conduct nuclear weapons tests while the negotiations in Geneva are taking place. We appeal to the Soviet Union to join us in this.

82. Since talks are also about to begin in Geneva on the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack, we think it appropriate for the General Assembly to emphasize that these talks should succeed. We, for our part, intend that they shall, and we hope that they will be followed by negotiations leading to concrete agreement on measures to minimize the dangers from surprise attack. If this is done, we shall establish a substantial measure of mutual confidence. We think that the people of the world will sleep more peacefully if they can be sure that it will be impossible for any nation, suddenly and without warning, to launch a massive surprise attack.

83. We also wish to ensure that the encouraging start which was made last summer in the field of nuclear test suspension, as well as the technical talks on surprise attack—both of which have now been so vigorously advanced by the draft resolution now before the Assembly—shall be carried through until we achieve a balanced and effectively controlled world-wide system of disarmament. We consider that draft resolution A reflects the recommendations of the Secretary-General in his excellent memorandum of 30 September 1958 [A/3936] on the disarmament question.

84. Paragraph 8 of draft resolution A embodies an amendment, introduced by a number of Latin American States calling for the use of part of the funds made available as a result of disarmament for assistance to the less developed countries. This reflects a long-standing hope of the United States Government that a day will come when such progress is made on disarmament that the money now being spent for military purposes can be put to more constructive use.

85. The United States will also support draft resolution D to the effect that the Disarmament Commission shall, for 1959 and on an ad hoc basis be composed of all the Members of the United Nations and that it will begin its activities under rule 162 of the General Assembly's rules of procedure. We regret that the present Disarmament Commission has been paralysed because of the Soviet Union's arbitrary refusal to participate, and we hope that this revision of the Commission's membership will permit the United Nations to resume its rightful place in consideration of the disarmament problem. This is frankly an experiment, and we do not commit ourselves beyond one year.

86. In this connexion, I cannot fail to express some concern at the Soviet statement of 3 November 1958 in the First Committee [971st meeting], rejecting the French amendment calling for the establishment of a small working group within the Disarmament Commission. We all recognize that an eighty-one member group is not practicable for the conduct of the serious negotiations which are necessary to move ahead in this field. We want the eighty-one member Commission to be a business-like, effective organization and not a mere megaphone for propaganda. I trust that the statement of the USSR does not mean that it will refuse to participate in appropriate working groups within the Disarmament Commission.

87. I note that India and several other countries associated with it have reintroduced the draft resolution [A/L.250], which they withdrew in the First Committee after the key paragraph had been defeated. This draft resolution, while calling for controls, also says that there should be a discontinuance of tests even if controls are not agreed upon. The fact that the word "pending" was changed to the word "until" when this draft resolution was revised makes this intention clear. The United States voted against this draft resolution in the Committee and will vote against it now. The idea that there can be an indefinite suspension of tests, even if controls are not agreed upon, is to us both totally impractical and highly dangerous. It would delude the world. It provides the shadow, and not the substance. We hope that the General Assembly will defeat it and record its support for the vital principle of controls contained in draft resolution A, as the Committee has already done in adopting that draft resolution.

88. Mr. THORS (Iceland): We are now approaching the final stage of our annual debate on disposal of the so-called disarmament problem. This year our decisions may give cause for more hope than in many previous years. No less than three items on the agenda of the First Committee refer to the broad and important question of disarmament. They were discussed by the Committee for more than three weeks and we now have the result before the Assembly.

89. The Icelandic delegation did not participate in the debate in the First Committee for various reasons and, therefore, we feel obliged to take this opportunity to explain our attitude in general and our vote in particular with regard to some aspects of this greatest problem of the present time.

90. Some delegations may feel that a small country like Iceland, which has no armed forces, should have no say in the question of disarmament. But is there anyone who dares to suggest that the bombs thrown on Iceland in case of an all-out war would smell any sweeter than those dropped on the United States, on the Soviet Union, or on the British Isles? Is it not clear that if fury is let loose, the damage and destruction inflicted on my country might be as intense and total as anywhere else and thus would be fully comparable to the ruins in Washington, Moscow, Paris, or London? Certainly we would also be the victims of the birds of death and venom, and it is the duty of every spokesman here to warn of the dangers and to devote all his endeavours to the cause of peace and the promotion of friendly understanding and co-operation between nations in order to try to avert the war of doom.

91. In the First Committee we had before us many draft resolutions and amendments which at first seemed to differ fundamentally. However, it became evident during the long debate that most of the delegations were aiming at the same goal and the differences, fortunately, became less unsurmountable than they had appeared at first sight. The most particular characteristic of the debate was the desire expressed by every delegation that the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons should be brought to an immediate halt.

92. The Icelandic delegation felt that the draft resolution presented by the United States and sixteen other Powers, including, for instance, Canada, Brazil, Denmark and Norway was the most comprehensive, and offered suggestions in the widest range of the broad

problem of disarmament. We, therefore, voted in favour of that draft resolution and felt it should be given priority in the voting.

93. Paragraph 1 of this draft resolution, adopted by the First Committee as now draft resolution A, states that the General Assembly urges that in the negotiations between States that have tested nuclear weapons, the parties make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control, and paragraph 2 moreover, urges the parties involved in these negotiations not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while these negotiations are in progress.

94. We cannot close our eyes to the facts of today's world affairs. The lack of confidence between the nuclear Powers is the paramount issue of today, and is the cause of the most serious troubles in the relations between nations. Therefore, any agreement between them is of little avail, and does not create the necessary confidence unless it is substantiated by an effective international control. This vital aspect is provided for in draft resolution A. We shall, therefore, vote for this draft resolution today.

95. As is known, experts from eight countries, including the United States and the USSR, met last summer in Geneva to study the technical possibility of detecting violations of an eventual agreement to suspend nuclear weapons tests. Fortunately, the experts reached unanimous conclusions on what would be needed technically, and in their report [A/3897/Corr.1] expressed the opinion that control over nuclear tests would be possible and feasible. Such a control should, therefore, not constitute any great hindrance.

96. In paragraph 3 of draft resolution A, the General Assembly "calls attention to the importance and urgency of achieving the widest possible measure of agreement in the forthcoming study of the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack."

97. A conference for this purpose will, as we all know, be convened in Geneva on 10 November 1958, and it remains for us only to express the hope that the widest possible measure of agreement will be achieved there, as is so well stated in draft resolution C, originally submitted by India and Yugoslavia, which most of us recently approved, as I hope, we shall again today.

98. Paragraph 8 of draft resolution A, on the suggestion of several Latin American countries, refers to the question of devoting, out of the funds made available as a result of disarmament, additional resources to the improvement of living conditions throughout the world, and especially in the less developed countries.

99. The Icelandic delegation was pleased to vote in favour of the original draft resolution submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden now draft resolution B, expressing the hope that the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, now meeting in Geneva would be successful, and lead to an agreement acceptable to all. This draft resolution was intended to be a compromise solution acceptable to all, but that purpose was not achieved. We shall again vote for this draft resolution here.

100. My delegation was also pleased to vote in favour of the main paragraph of the draft resolution submitted

by Ireland, where attention was called to the danger that an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons might aggravate international tension and the difficulty of maintaining world peace, thus rendering more difficult the attainment of a general disarmament agreement. This is a timely warning, and it is evident that the danger of atomic warfare will be greatly increased if many more countries acquire atomic weapons, as each of them might feel tempted to try to settle its differences with an enemy by threatening to use these deadly weapons.

101. After we had voted for all these draft resolutions, we felt that no further decisions were required at this stage—and I stress "at this stage"—and we therefore abstained from voting on the only paragraph of the fourteen-Power draft resolution that was put to the vote. We shall abstain today from voting on the entire draft resolution contained in document A/L.250.

102. As we are all aware, there has been a complete stalemate in the work of the Disarmament Commission. Last year we increased the membership of this Commission from eleven to twenty-five [resolution 1152 (XII)], in the hope that that would be acceptable to all concerned, and that the Disarmament Commission would resume its work. That failed completely.

103. At the twelfth session, [718th meeting] my delegation expressed doubt that a Commission of eighty-two members would be in a position to deal with the great disarmament problem. We did, however, state the view that the composition of the Commission was not all-important. We are, therefore, happy that an agreement was reached yesterday in the First Committee [971st meeting] upon a new Disarmament Commission, on which all the Members of the United Nations have the right to sit and make their views and wishes known. It is, naturally, within the competence of the Disarmament Commission itself to decide on its own rules of procedure, although it is to be guided by rule 162 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. Furthermore, the Commission has the privilege of deciding, if it finds such procedure opportune and more convenient, to appoint small working committees and to consult groups of experts.

104. It augured well when the amended draft resolution to this effect, submitted by India and Yugoslavia, met with the support of the United States and the Soviet Union, and was subsequently approved by seventy-eight votes. Therefore, once again we have the machinery for disarmament within the United Nations, and it is now up to Member States, and particularly the atomic Powers, to decide and show for what purpose and to what extent they want to avail themselves of this machinery for peaceful purposes. The unanimity attained on these proposals can give new hope to mankind, but it can also be the source of a great and bitter disappointment.

105. On the fate of the Disarmament Commission and its work, on its failure or success, depends the hope of men being allowed in the future to live without constant fear and anguish, and of their being given the freedom to hope for a better and more secure future.

106. As I said before, the paramount issue in present world affairs is the lack of confidence which prevails among the big Powers. If only that mistrust could be gradually swept away and normal relations resumed all over the world, then mankind certainly would face

a bright future in this age of atomic possibilities for great achievements and a better life. Some means must be found to eliminate this mistrust. No nation in the world wants war, because all the people of the world fear and hate it. We must find means to bring the peoples of the world closer together and to make them become better acquainted with each other.

107. I venture to suggest that it might serve a most useful purpose, as regards better relations among nations, if the General Assembly could be invited to convene in Moscow in 1959 or 1960. In that way the people of Eastern Europe would be able to hear the voices of the Western World and of all nations, in the same way as the people of the United States and the Western World are now acquainted with every side of this intolerable situation which had been called the "cold war". Is it not time for us to endeavour to bring this unfortunate situation to a reasonably speedy end? For that purpose we should take every opportunity to create new occasions for all peoples to become better acquainted with each other.

108. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): The debates at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly have demonstrated that the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests is regarded by an overwhelming majority of delegations as the most pressing and vital question on the agenda of this year's session. Both the general debate in plenary meeting at the beginning of our current session, as well as the discussion in the First Committee on the question of disarmament, have shown that the desire for an immediate solution of the problem of a universal and permanent cessation of nuclear weapons tests is gaining ever-broader and definite support among States Members of the United Nations.

109. An agreement on an immediate and permanent discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests as the Czechoslovak delegation has stressed on several occasions, would have far-reaching positive consequences. In the first place, it would prevent the further development and perfecting of the production of ever more destructive types of nuclear weapons and would render more difficult any expansion of the atomic armaments race to additional countries.

110. The permanent cessation of nuclear explosions would prevent any further increase in levels of radiation in the earth's atmosphere and would make it possible to devote the means used for nuclear weapons tests to peaceful purposes. The reaching of an agreement on this question could constitute the first step on the way towards a settlement of further issues, especially with regard to the question of a complete prohibition of atomic weapons. It would help to strengthen confidence among States and contribute to a general improvement in the international situation.

111. This was the aim of the draft resolution submitted to the First Committee by the Soviet Union. This draft resolution proposed that the General Assembly should call upon all States carrying out atomic and hydrogen weapons tests to halt such tests immediately, and to recommend that States possessing nuclear weapons should enter into negotiations with a view to the conclusion of an appropriate agreement between them. As the Chairman of the Soviet Union delegation expressly stated in the First Committee, such an agreement would also include appropriate control measures

according to the recommendations of the Geneva Conference of Experts of eight countries. ^{5/}

112. An expression of the efforts to effect an immediate and lasting cessation of nuclear testing is also to be found in the draft resolution [A/L.250] submitted to the General Assembly today by the delegation of India and thirteen other countries. This draft resolution calls for the immediate discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons until agreement is reached by the States concerned in regard to technical arrangements and controls. It emphasizes the necessity of such an agreement and the undesirability of its postponement. Thus, this draft resolution has as its primary objective an immediate and permanent discontinuance of nuclear tests. The adoption of this draft resolution by the General Assembly would without doubt be a positive contribution and an impetus to the endeavours to seek a successful outcome of the current Geneva talks.

113. Therefore, my delegation will support the fourteen-Power draft resolution submitted today and will vote in favour of it.

114. Against the clear demands for an immediate and permanent cessation of nuclear tests, the United States and the United Kingdom have proposed a temporary suspension of tests for one year and they make any prolongation of this suspension conditional upon various reservations, merely to secure for themselves the possibility of resuming the tests whenever they may find it convenient. A mere temporary suspension, and not a permanent cessation of tests, would mean, first and foremost, that the jeopardy of a resumption of nuclear explosions, with all its dangerous and harmful consequences, would always continue to exist.

115. Apart from that, it is no secret to anyone that a period of one year is the time needed to evaluate the results of previous tests and to make preparations for a fresh series of experimental explosions. The position of the United States and the United Kingdom with regard to the question of nuclear tests, as well as with regard to the entire complex of problems of disarmament in general, is evident from draft resolution A which was adopted by the majority of the First Committee and which has been submitted for approval today to the plenary meeting of the General Assembly. This draft resolution evades the crux of the problem, that is, the complete and universal discontinuance of nuclear tests once and for all. The draft resolution speaks explicitly of a suspension of nuclear tests.

116. Repeated statements by the representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom give not the least reason to doubt that the ambiguous formulation of this draft resolution conceals the intention of the United States and the United Kingdom to suspend these tests only temporarily—namely for one year—with the possibility of a prolongation of the suspension for successive periods of one year provided that—according to the statement of the President of the United States:

"(a) The agreed inspection system is installed and working effectively; and (b) satisfactory progress is being made in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control measures ..." [A/3895].

117. Making the cessation of nuclear tests contingent upon settlement of other and broader issues in connexion with disarmament is merely the expression of an attempt to prevent the execution of this significant partial measure in the field of disarmament and to replace the disarmament issue by the long-discredited concept of arms control. In the spirit of this policy of stepping up the armaments race, the United States in effect wants to put the cart before the horse. Instead of taking complete and effective measures for the reduction of armaments it would like to discuss control of armaments and not controlled disarmament. Instead of negotiation aimed at the introduction of effective measures, the draft resolution lays emphasis on the so-called technical approach to the consideration of disarmament which according to the understanding of the Western Powers and in the form to which they are accustomed, leads to nothing but endless discussions on the lines of the disarmament talks of the notorious League of Nations.

118. The Czechoslovak delegation has already emphasized the view that technical discussions can have a meaning only if the immediate purpose is to pave the way to specific measures for disarmament and if there is some evidence of goodwill in order to carry out such measures. Therefore technical talks cannot be put first, and even less can they take the place of political negotiations and decisions on such specific measures.

119. For all these reasons, draft resolution A cannot be instrumental in advancing the consideration of disarmament issues or in bringing about some progress; on the contrary, it may only harm the deliberations in disarmament.

120. The Czechoslovak delegation will vote against this draft resolution, as it did against the original version in the First Committee. The forcing of the adoption of the draft resolution which was adopted in that Committee by the majority, or slightly more than half of the Members of the United Nations, is but further evidence of the failure of its sponsors to draw a lesson from past experience in the United Nations which has shown that any one-sided enforcement of proposals, profitable only to one party, is not to the benefit but to the detriment of the cause. Real agreement on the issue of disarmament can be reached only on the basis of respect for the views and interests of all parties concerned. It is highly imperative that the General Assembly should not at this session repeat the mistakes of the past, that it should reject any attempts to impose partial resolutions on the question of disarmament and, in particular, on such serious and pressing issues as that of the cessation of nuclear tests.

121. Before concluding, I should like to express the deep regret of the Czechoslovak delegation that the First Committee did not adopt the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union on the reduction of the military budgets of the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France by 10 to 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to under-developed countries. The adoption of this draft, upon which great attention was focused, would have been of considerable importance as a single part of disarmament measures directed to stopping the ever-increasing armaments race. It would have permitted us to raise the standards of living of nations and would have contributed to the recovery and

^{5/} See Note 1.

development of the national economy which, as a result of constant increase in military expenditures, has been so seriously crippled in many countries. The adoption of the resolution of the Soviet Union would have built up confidence among States and would have stabilized international peace and security.

122. To conclude, I would like to say that the Czechoslovak delegation will vote for draft resolution D. This draft resolution opens the way for further deliberations on disarmament in the forum of the United Nations by establishing a new Disarmament Commission composed of all Members of the United Nations. The establishment of such a widely representative commission will make it possible for all States, large and small, to state their positions and suggestions in a specific discussion on the solution of all disarmament issues. The small States are today becoming evermore interested in the settlement of the problems of disarmament, which have as direct a bearing upon the vital interests of these small States as upon those of the larger countries. We believe that the new Disarmament Commission, consisting of all Members of the United Nations, may create favourable conditions for further negotiations and thus bring nearer the prospect of reaching a generally acceptable agreement in the field of disarmament.

123. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A originally submitted by seventeen Powers, because we believe that it clearly and coherently expresses the principal ideas we supported in considering the disarmament question.

124. We shall also vote for draft resolution D, originally submitted by India and Yugoslavia, which increases to eighty-one the membership of the Disarmament Commission, because it is the outcome of efforts to reconstitute a forum in which disarmament and related problems may continue to be studied.

125. At the plenary meeting of 6 October 1958 [771st meeting] and in various interventions in the First Committee, my delegation, through its Minister of Foreign Affairs or through myself, consistently emphasized that one of the most important steps to be taken is to ensure the resumption of the interrupted negotiations between the great Powers within the framework of the United Nations. Towards that end, we emphasized that without the unanimous support of the Powers which bear the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security it will be impossible to guarantee the observance and implementation of any agreements on disarmament that may ultimately be signed.

126. That was the spirit that prompted the Mexican proposal in the First Committee, which received the support of many delegations from all parts of the world.

127. As is known and as stated in the First Committee's [A/3974 and Corr.1/Rev.1 and A/3974/Add.1 and 2] report, my delegation did not consider it necessary to press for a vote on that proposal, because it felt that the main objective of the proposal had already been partly fulfilled. We appreciated the observations made in the Committee by the representatives of Ireland, Iran, El Salvador, Israel and China, who agreed that our proposal was useful and constructive, as well as the remarks of the other representatives who spoke in favour of the proposal earlier. I listened with par-

ticular interest to Mr. Zorin's statement in the First Committee [972nd meeting] that he was not opposed to entering into negotiations on the disarmament question with any Member State whatever, including the Western Powers, to which the invitation in the Mexican proposal was also extended. I was gratified to note that the Soviet representative agrees with the representatives I mentioned earlier regarding the conciliatory and constructive nature of our proposal. My delegation heard with particular interest and appreciation the remarks of the representative of France in the First Committee [964th meeting], who reiterated his intention to take part in any disarmament negotiations that might take place.

128. Let me now refer, once again, to draft resolution D. The second operative paragraph of that text—which we hope the General Assembly will unanimously approve today—states that all the documents, proposals and records of discussion relating to disarmament established by the General Assembly at its thirteenth session should be transmitted to the Disarmament Commission. In that connexion, I should like to recall that the Chairman of my delegation, in his speech in the general debate on 6 October 1958 [771st meeting], mentioned two specific proposals which, in our view, may effectively assist efforts to bring about agreements on disarmament.

129. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico read out the full text of those proposals from this rostrum, I need not repeat them. I should merely like to point out that the value and appropriateness of the two proposals in no way depends on the composition and powers of the Disarmament Commission. We therefore hope that the Commission, to whom the proposals are to be transmitted, will, when the time comes, consider the possibility of appointing a United Nations commissioner for disarmament, in the manner suggested by Mexico, as well as the possibility of making a solemn appeal to the great Powers to resume their negotiations on disarmament.

130. In conclusion, I shall repeat the words spoken by the Chairman of my delegation at the Political Committee's meeting of 13 October 1958:

"World public opinion does not believe that nuclear weapons and the arms race guarantee the independence of small nations, the security of large nations or the maintenance of peace. It believes that they guarantee nothing but the race towards war and destruction.

"The world has watched with great interest the efforts of science and technology to conquer outer space. The world hoped that those efforts to escape to other planets are inspired solely by the desire to benefit mankind. But until those dreams come true, we should devote the efforts of science and of will power to the betterment of the life of all the inhabitants of this earth. We cannot yet escape from this planet. We are all born on it equally defenceless, naked and ignorant, and if we have not yet grown sufficiently in wisdom and nobility to be able to love one another, let us at least share our common dwelling-place without destroying one another."^{6/}

^{6/} Quotation in Spanish. This statement was made at the 946th meeting of the First Committee on 13 October 1958, the official record of which is published only in summary form.

131. Mr. BUDO (Albania) (translated from French): In the course of the general debate in the First Committee on items 64, 70 and 72 of the agenda, the delegation of the People's Republic of Albania briefly stated its views on some of the draft resolutions relating to those items. In view of the importance of these items, however, we wish to explain the reasons for our position on the draft resolutions which will shortly be put to the vote in the Assembly.

132. It is beyond all doubt—and this was confirmed by the general debate in the First Committee—that the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests is the most urgent problem in connexion with disarmament, and, calls for an immediate and radical solution. That is what the people of the world are demanding. In our view, the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union delegation was best calculated to satisfy that demand. The draft resolution went to the root of the matter: it fully and clearly complied with the demand of the peoples that atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, fraught with such danger to the whole of mankind and to our planet, should cease once and for all. The Soviet draft resolution appealed in clear terms to the Powers engaged in nuclear tests to halt them immediately and recommended that they should enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding an agreement to which all States should accede.

133. The adoption of such a resolution by the General Assembly would have constituted a tangible result of great significance which would have done much to exert a favourable influence on the current negotiations at the Geneva Conference between the three Powers which possess nuclear weapons. It is a matter for regret that owing to the attitude adopted by the Western Powers in the First Committee the Soviet delegation was obliged to withdraw its draft resolution.

134. The draft resolution submitted by the United States of America and sixteen other States, adopted by the First Committee as draft resolution A, deliberately confuses the problem of nuclear tests with other aspects of disarmament. The question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests, the importance and urgency of which has been recognized by the great majority of delegations, is ignored: it merely expresses a desire for an agreement on temporary and conditional suspension. The adoption of such a draft resolution would not only fail to contribute to the solution of the disturbing problem of the discontinuance of tests but would play into the hands of the United States, which seeks to dull the vigilance of the peoples by giving the impression that an agreement has been reached within the United Nations. Temporary and conditional suspension, if only for the duration of the Geneva negotiations or for a one-year period, is merely a subterfuge resorted to by the Western Powers in order to mislead world opinion and to be free to resume nuclear weapons tests on any pretext and whenever it suits them. We deem it our duty on this occasion to remind the United Nations of its great responsibility in this matter.

135. Moreover the United States draft resolution, instead of advocating a settlement of the substance of the disarmament problem, tends to divert negotiations from the political to the technical level. In other words, instead of advocating the adoption of concerted measures for the solution of the disarmament problem, the sponsors of the draft resolution propose the

launching of interminable technical studies. Among other things, the last paragraph of the preamble, relating to the openness of information concerning technologies and armaments, shows clearly that it is armament rather than disarmament to which the United States attaches importance. The United States draft resolution faithfully reflects the policy of positions of strength pursued by that country, which is against any disarmament measure and regards the nuclear weapon as the best calculated to serve that policy.

136. For all these reasons my delegation finds draft resolution A unacceptable and will vote against it.

137. It will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by India and thirteen other delegations [A/L.250], primarily because it calls for the immediate discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests.

138. While my delegation does not question the good intentions by which the sponsors of draft resolution B originally submitted by Japan, Sweden and Austria were animated, we feel that the General Assembly should do more than adopt a draft resolution which merely expresses a general hope without going into any detail or touching upon the substance of the question of the discontinuance of tests. In our view the General Assembly cannot shirk its responsibility in so grave a matter, which is causing concern to the whole of mankind. On the contrary, it is the duty of the Assembly to state its position on the problem clearly.

139. The adoption of a draft resolution of this kind in the present situation not only would lead to no progress but would be useless and dangerous, for by giving the impression that something has been achieved—which is not the case—it would further the aim of the Western Powers to mislead world opinion. That is why my delegation will vote against draft resolution B.

140. One of the very important measures in connexion with the solution of the disarmament problem was that proposed in the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union delegation concerning the reduction of the military budgets of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France by 10 to 15 per cent. It was a proposal of great political significance, that would have directly affected the reduction of armaments and international economic co-operation through assistance to the under-developed countries.

141. Because it took into account the background of the disarmament negotiations, particularly the various objections and artificial obstacles raised by the Western Powers to a comprehensive settlement of the disarmament problem, the proposal contained in the draft resolution in question was both practical and feasible as a partial measure.

142. During the general debate in the First Committee, many delegations emphasized the danger of the present armaments race and the huge expenditure in material, financial and intellectual resources that it entails. The proposed reduction would not only have been an important and genuine step on the road to disarmament but would at the same time have helped to lessen the burden of military expenditure for the countries concerned and make it possible for some of the money saved to be devoted to the economic development of the under-developed countries.

143. The adoption of a draft resolution of this kind by the General Assembly would have been consistent

with the Charter and in complete conformity with the purposes of the United Nations. The negative attitude of the United States to this draft resolution is all the more difficult to understand in that that country has in the past expressed itself in favour of such a reduction of military budgets. It should be noted, however, that the same thing happens repeatedly: whenever the Soviet Union meets the suggestions and proposals made earlier by the United States, the latter draws back. The only explanation for this attitude is the positions of strength policy and the armaments race stubbornly pursued by the United States. We regret that the First Committee was unable to adopt this draft resolution.

144. We support and shall vote in favour of draft resolution D, on the composition of the Disarmament Commission. That draft resolution proposes that the Disarmament Commission shall be composed of all the Members of the United Nations. We feel that every Member State, large or small, should have the opportunity to participate on a permanent basis in the solution of the disarmament problem. They would thus be in a position to give their views and to contribute to the best of their ability to the adoption of concerted measures and the conclusion of agreements relating to disarmament. Although the draft resolution provides for what we think is an unnecessary time-limit, its adoption by the General Assembly would, in our view, break the deadlock on the disarmament problem created by the obstructive attitude adopted by the Western Powers at the twelfth session of the General Assembly.

145. These are the few remarks our delegation wished to make concerning the draft resolutions I have mentioned.

146. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal): In view of the lateness of the hour, I shall be very brief. As I did not explain my votes on the various draft resolutions in the First Committee, I wish to take this opportunity to do so.

147. It has been the considered opinion of my delegation that there can be no disarmament without agreement between the principal parties concerned in the matter. We should very much have liked to have a resolution on the question of disarmament acceptable to both parties. That is why we regret the failure of the First Committee to recommend for adoption by the General Assembly any draft resolution on which the principal parties are agreed. I should now like to explain my votes on the various draft resolutions.

148. There were several features in the seventeen-Power draft resolution, now listed as draft resolution A, that were quite acceptable to us. As a matter of fact, this draft resolution was all-embracing and covered all the aspects of the disarmament question. We could not vote for it and had to abstain on it, only because we were sponsors of another draft resolution and because this seventeen-Power draft resolution did not lay as much emphasis on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests as it should have laid in view of the urgency of the matter and in the light of world public opinion on this point.

149. As far as the Soviet draft resolutions submitted to the First Committee were concerned, we were not able to vote for them, because in our opinion the first draft resolution referring to the halting of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, had several shortcomings, the

most important of which were that there was no reference to the Geneva Conference that began on 31 October 1958^{7/} and no mention of an inspection system; and we were unable to vote for the USSR draft resolution recommending that the Governments of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States assume an undertaking to reduce their military budgets, because as I said in the Committee, the adoption of such a draft resolution would in our opinion presuppose the establishment of some technical body to go into the feasibility of examining the budgets of the various countries in relation to their expenditures.

150. We voted very gladly for the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution, now draft resolution D, because we felt that this draft resolution would at least have the effect of allowing this United Nations body, that is, the Disarmament Commission, to function for 1959 and it would enable the disarmament negotiations to be conducted in a realistic manner.

151. At the twelfth session, when an eighty-two member Disarmament Commission was proposed, we could not support that proposal, because we felt that such a body would be too large and cumbersome for the conduct of negotiations on the subject of disarmament, which were bound to be of a technical character. But this time we voted for the draft resolution submitted by India and Yugoslavia on the same subject, in the hope that it would at least enable the disarmament negotiations to be continued inside the framework of the United Nations.

152. We could not vote in favour of the three-Power draft resolution, which became draft resolution B, primarily because we were co-sponsors of another draft resolution in which we tried to pronounce more specifically on the question of the discontinuance of tests, that is, on the substance of that question, although we did not find anything in it against which one could vote, because the three-Power draft resolution is to us the expression of the pious hope that the Geneva Conference will succeed.

153. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): The Byelorussian delegation would also like to put forward its views on the draft resolutions on disarmament which we have before us.

154. Representatives of seventy-two of the eighty-one Member States of the United Nations have spoken in the general debate of the General Assembly. The delegates taking the floor in the general debate have spoken mainly on the question of disarmament. That is natural, since disarmament is the main item on our agenda. The question has also been actively discussed in the First Committee, which shows that disarmament is regarded as the most serious problem of the post-war period. We have actually discussed three issues in connexion with the general question of disarmament—the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, the reduction of military budgets and the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.

155. It is clear to all that the deadlock in the field of disarmament must be broken in the very near future. The peace-loving peoples expect us to take decisions making it possible to overcome the deadlock in this problem. Will the resolution submitted by seventeen

^{7/} See Note 2.

delegations, led by the United States of America and the United Kingdom and adopted by a majority in the First Committee as draft resolution A, break the deadlock in the disarmament question? No, it will not. The resolution is intended to tie all questions of disarmament more tightly into a single knot and to prevent thereby the adoption of any measures which would overcome that deadlock.

156. Two of the sponsors of the seventeen-Power resolution—the United States of America and the United Kingdom—show not the slightest desire to agree to the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. In view of the unanimous demand by world public opinion for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests once and for all, they have been forced to hide their plans and, I would say, manoeuvre. The stand they have taken, just as last year, remains unchanged; by using various stratagems they intend to prevent the adoption of a decision on discontinuing nuclear tests.

157. The statements made by the United States [A/3895] and the United Kingdom [A/3896 and Corr.1 and Rev.1] delegations that their Governments are willing to refrain from further tests of atomic weapons for a year with effect from the beginning of the Geneva talks, i.e. from 31 October 1958, and would be prepared to extend the agreement reached for successive periods of one year, mean nothing in essence and solve nothing—they are useless. The statements are hedged about with reservations and conditions which give the United States and the United Kingdom the right to renew tests at any time they think fit.

158. Our delegation fully supports the Soviet Government's statement of 31 October 1958 [A/3973] to the effect that the temporary suspension of tests for a year does not in actual fact mean the discontinuance of tests, and that to agree to such proposals would mean to join in deceiving the peoples who want the Governments to put an end to the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons once and for all.

159. Draft resolution A makes no mention at all of discontinuing tests but merely of suspending nuclear tests. This is an attempt to foist upon the General Assembly a resolution in which the United States and the United Kingdom actually want to obtain the blessing of the General Assembly on further nuclear weapons tests.

160. The delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic finds the draft resolution completely unacceptable. We simply regard it as the latest attempt by the United States to gain the approval of the General Assembly for its obstructionist policy on the question of discontinuing nuclear weapons tests. For the above-mentioned reasons our delegation will vote against this draft resolution.

161. With regard to draft resolution B, originally submitted by the delegations of Japan, Sweden and Austria, our delegation considers that this draft resolution too is absolutely unsatisfactory. First of all, it does not voice the wish of the peoples who demand the immediate and general discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests for ever. The resolution ignores the appeal by the majority of States Members of the United Nations for the discontinuance of these tests.

162. The Byelorussian delegation cannot support a draft resolution that could be used as a screen by the

United States and the United Kingdom, which are putting every obstacle in the way of the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests.

163. The General Assembly has no right to shirk responsibility and it must clearly and unequivocally support proposals for the immediate and unconditional discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The discontinuance of nuclear tests would be the first important step towards the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and would effectively bar the way to constructing new and more effective weapons of mass destruction. For the above-mentioned reasons our delegation will vote against this draft resolution as well.

164. Our delegation notes that the United States of America and the United Kingdom have rejected the draft resolution [A/L.250] put forward by India and thirteen other countries of Asia and Africa providing for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. They have thus shown that they do not intend to end the atomic arms race.

165. The Soviet Government's proposals for the discontinuance of nuclear tests, the reduction of the military budgets of the four great Powers and also the proposals contained in the memorandum of the Soviet Government on measures in the field of disarmament of 18 September 1958 [A/3929] are inspired by a sincere desire to reach agreement on some measures at any rate to solve the important problems of disarmament.

166. The United States and the United Kingdom, however, have in effect opposed these Soviet proposals, which are of exceptional importance to world peace. The three-week debate in the First Committee has clearly shown that the United States and the United Kingdom do not want to discontinue nuclear tests or settle the other problems of disarmament.

167. By means of the long-established voting machinery the United States has been able to obtain approval of the draft resolution it wants. This is harmful to the authority of the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance and strengthening of peace.

168. By coming out openly against the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests the United States and the United Kingdom have again revealed themselves to be enemies of peace and disarmament. Nevertheless, the draft resolution foisted upon the First Committee by the United States of America and its partners in the aggressive blocs cannot prevent the movement of the peoples who demand the cessation of the arms race and the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests for all time.

169. We are sure that this demand by all the peoples will be carried out despite the intrigues of the ruling circles of the United States and United Kingdom.

170. If it is to make a positive contribution to disarmament, the General Assembly should reject draft resolution A before us, since it does not call for the immediate and unconditional discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. The delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic calls upon members of the General Assembly to vote against the draft resolution recommended to us.

171. Mr. AIKEN (Ireland): My delegation wishes to comment, very briefly, concerning the draft resolution submitted by Ireland to the First Committee, which dealt with the question of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

172. At our request the key clause, paragraph 2 of that draft resolution, was put to the vote. It was carried by 37 votes to none, with 44 abstentions. By this vote the First Committee acknowledged the existence of the danger of an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons; and affirmed that such an increase would aggravate international tension and the difficulty of maintaining world peace, and would thus render more difficult the attainment of an effective general disarmament agreement.

173. Following this favourable vote, we withdrew our draft resolution, as a whole. We did so for the following reasons: first, because the primary purpose of our initiative had been attained by the placing on record of the declaration of principle recognizing the danger of disseminating nuclear weapons; secondly, because we believed, that having secured the adoption of the non-dissemination principle it would have been wrong to create an artificial division by forcing a vote on a mere question of machinery—that of how the matter should be further studied and reported on. Had we forced such a vote, we should have run the risk of creating the false impression that representatives who did not agree that an ad hoc committee was the proper machinery to pursue the matter, were indifferent to the question of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

174. The correctness of this decision not to force such a vote was, in our view, borne out after the roll-call vote in the First Committee by the interventions of the representatives of Australia [970th meeting] and Norway [971st meeting], who emphasized that the abstention of their delegations in the voting on the declaratory clause in no way signified any lack of appreciation of the reality of the danger. We believe that several other representatives were in a similar position.

175. The third reason that we did not put the whole draft resolution to the vote was that it appeared probable, as has now happened, that a new Disarmament Commission would be set up and seized of all the proposals and suggestions made in the First Committee. We propose to ask the Disarmament Commission to deal as early as possible with the grave danger of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, which is one of the matters which the First Committee has requested it to consider.

176. The fourth reason we did not press our draft resolution as a whole was that we realized that most Governments had not had time to study the matter since we introduced our proposals. Like all questions relating to disarmament, this vital question of preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons is a complex one, requiring careful consideration by all Governments. It is therefore a matter in which it is necessary to proceed cautiously, getting at each stage the maximum of agreement and arousing the minimum of opposition. We are very glad that the first stage, that of the recognition and characterization of the danger, has been passed without contention or a single negative vote. We hope that the presence of the

great common danger thus acknowledged by the First Committee may encourage the nuclear Powers at Geneva or elsewhere to negotiate an agreement among themselves not to give nuclear weapons to non-nuclear Powers. If such an agreement can be arrived at by the nuclear Powers I feel sure that the non-nuclear Powers will match it by an agreement not to manufacture nuclear weapons. The indications to this effect given in the First Committee by the Foreign Minister of Sweden [946th meeting] are in keeping with the noble tradition of his country.

177. May I in conclusion express the gratitude of the Irish delegation to all the other delegations which by their interventions and otherwise, co-operated in this endeavour to save us all from the dangers involved in wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

178. Mr. GAMBOA (Philippines): The Philippine delegation abstained on paragraph 1 of the operative part of the fourteen-Power resolution in the First Committee. In the view of my delegation some parts of the new draft resolution [A/L.250] are commendable; for instance, the general principle of the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests is acceptable to our delegation. But we cannot agree with the sponsors with respect to certain aspects of this draft resolution. It has been asserted here that it is abundantly clear that this draft resolution provides for a practicable system of controls. We beg to differ from this point of view. Let us examine the pertinent provisions of this draft resolution.

179. The third preambular paragraph reads as follows:

"Welcoming the Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests ... which indicates that it is technically and scientifically practicable to establish the arrangements and controls necessary to ensure the observance of an agreement on the discontinuance of such tests" [A/L.250].

"Indicates" is the word used. In our opinion, merely to indicate that something is practicable is not the same as providing specifically for that thing. It is true that paragraph 1 of the operative part also mentions controls, but this provision places control after the discontinuance of tests, when by all rules of logic and objectivity, the agreement on supervision and control should come first and the agreement on the discontinuance of tests should follow. We submit that the course of action contemplated by this draft resolution is tantamount to placing the cart before the horse.

180. The question of the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests is a very complex subject, no matter how simple it may appear on the surface. It is not as simple as "two plus two equals four", because there is an unknown quantity involved in the equation, namely, the element of supervision and control. It is the view of the Philippine delegation that an agreement for the discontinuance of tests alone, not preceded by an agreement on control, may only give the world a false sense of security. It might lull us into believing that we are absolutely safe and secure from the dangers of atomic and hydrogen warfare when in reality there is no adequate guarantee against such hazards. We cannot we must not, over-simplify a complex matter that is so fraught with danger.

181. Furthermore, it was demonstrated in the First Committee that the majority of Member States did not support the fourteen-Power draft resolution. We feel besides that the problem of the discontinuance of tests is already covered by paragraphs 1 and 2 of draft resolution A.

182. Therefore, my delegation will vote in favour of draft resolutions A to D. It regrets, however, that it will be unable to support the fourteen-Power draft resolution in its present form.

183. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on the General Assembly to vote on the four draft resolutions, A to D, contained in the report of the First Committee (A/3974 and Corr.1/Rev.1 and A/3974/Add.1 and 2). The United States has asked for a roll call vote on draft resolution A. I shall put this draft resolution to the vote first.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Canada, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil.

Against: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Abstaining: Ceylon, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Austria, Burma, Cambodia.

Draft resolution A was adopted by 49 votes to 9, with 22 abstentions.

184. The PRESIDENT: I shall now put to the vote draft resolutions B to D.

Draft resolution B was adopted by 55 votes to 9, with 12 abstentions.

Draft resolution C was adopted by 75 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

Draft resolution D was adopted by 75 votes to none, with 3 abstentions. 8/

185. The PRESIDENT: We now turn to document A/L.250, which is a draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Nepal, United Arab Republic, Yemen and Yugoslavia. The representative of the United States has asked for a roll call vote on this draft resolution.

A vote was taken by roll call.

8/ The delegation of Saudi Arabia subsequently informed the President that it wished to be put on record as having cast its vote in favour of the draft resolution. See paragraph 216 below.

Czechoslovakia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon.

Against: Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Italy, Laos, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba.

Abstaining: Federation of Malaya, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden, Tunisia, Austria.

The draft resolution was rejected by 41 votes to 27, with 13 abstentions.

186. The PRESIDENT: I call now on the representatives who wish to explain their votes.

187. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to explain its votes on the draft resolutions discussed in the First Committee and at the present meeting of the General Assembly.

188. The discussion on disarmament in the First Committee, which lasted three weeks, clearly showed the present approach of the various States to the most acute and urgent problems of disarmament and the positions of Governments regarding the solution of these problems. It was quite clear from this discussion and from the draft resolutions submitted to the First Committee, that the Governments of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the majority of Asian and African countries and some neutral countries in Europe are in favour of taking the first major steps toward disarmament and of finding a positive solution in the first place to the vital problem of the complete and unconditional cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

189. As you know, the Soviet delegation submitted at the current session a draft resolution which proposed that the General Assembly should clearly and unequivocally call for the immediate cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests and for the early conclusion of an agreement on that issue, the intention being that international control would also be instituted in accordance with the relevant conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts. 9/

190. The delegations of India and thirteen other States, mainly Asian and African, submitted a draft resolution on the same subject, also urging the immediate discontinuance of tests pending agreement on the institution of the necessary control.

191. This policy, aimed at a speedy, complete and unconditional discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests,

9/ See Note 1.

has been countered at this Assembly by refusal, a refusal which has been camouflaged by declarations on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the suspension of tests for a short period. The unwillingness of the United States and the United Kingdom to stop atomic and hydrogen weapons tests was demonstrated both during the discussion in the Committee and by the text of the draft resolution which they submitted jointly with the representatives of certain other countries associated with them in military blocs of the Western Powers.

192. The United States and the United Kingdom made it unmistakably clear that they make the cessation of tests contingent on the attainment of agreement on a number of other disarmament issues. Since the Western Powers are obstructing any form of agreement on practical disarmament measures, it is evident that they are postponing the discontinuance of tests indefinitely.

193. Under resolution A, tests would merely be suspended temporarily, in fact, only for the duration of the Geneva negotiations, a proposal which, far from contributing to a positive solution of the problem of the discontinuance of tests, would obviously delay such a solution. Moreover, this draft resolution seeks to treat the solution of all other disarmament issues purely in terms of a so-called technical approach, thus following in the path of the ill-starred League of Nations which, instead of solving disarmament problems, engaged in innumerable technical discussions which, as we know, yielded no tangible results in the field of disarmament.

194. The Soviet delegation gave a detailed criticism of this resolution, its general conclusion being that the proposal could make no contribution to a positive settlement of any of the practical disarmament issues and would merely obstruct progress in that field. The Soviet delegation accordingly voted against the resolution and regards its adoption as a retrograde step in the matter of disarmament. That resolution, which was adopted under United States and United Kingdom pressure, largely by the votes of countries belonging to the military blocs of the Western Powers, cannot fail to undermine the prestige of the United Nations, to which the peoples of the world look for practical measures in the disarmament field, not support for the armaments race policy pursued by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other Western Powers.

195. There can be no doubt that the resolution, which has been adopted and which is patently contrary to the interests of strengthening peace, will remain another of those paper resolutions, of which, unfortunately, too many have been adopted in the United Nations under pressure from the United States and against the will of the peoples. It will have no practical effect.

196. The Soviet delegation also voted against resolution B, which does not even mention the problem of halting atomic weapons tests and might give the impression that the General Assembly is taking some sort of action to promote the success of the Geneva Conference of the three atomic Powers. We are against the spreading of such illusions; we want to tell the nations the truth and therefore cannot vote for resolutions of this kind which contribute nothing to progress in disarmament.

197. The Soviet delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the fourteen Asian and African States, [A/L.250] which expresses the common desire, not only of the peoples of those countries, but of other peace-loving peoples for an immediate discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, with the establishment of the necessary international control to ensure that such a discontinuance is maintained. In so doing, the Soviet delegation had regard to the interpretation placed on this resolution by the Chairman of the Indian delegation in the First Committee [952nd meeting]; and was guided by the considerations set out in the Soviet Government's statement on 27 October 1958 [A/3973]. As this fourteen-Power draft resolution embodied the main points in the Soviet resolution on the immediate and unconditional discontinuance of tests, the Soviet delegation voted for it, thus expressing the Soviet Union's determination to end nuclear weapons tests once and for all and to stop the nuclear armaments race.

198. The USSR delegation also voted for resolution D on the establishment of a new United Nations Disarmament Commission composed of all the Members of the United Nations. A proposal for a Commission with such a membership was, as you know, submitted by the Soviet Union at the twelfth session of the General Assembly,^{10/} but owing to the opposition of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and other Western Powers, the proposal was not then adopted. It was a full year before the Western Powers finally reached the only reasonable conclusion that the views of the Soviet Union and other States must be considered and a broadly-based Disarmament Commission set up, in which all States Members of the United Nations, large and small alike, would be able to participate.

199. The Soviet delegation regards the adoption of this resolution as a wise step by the General Assembly and hopes that the new United Nations Disarmament Commission with its wide membership will tackle the fundamental practical problems of disarmament and will break the deadlock reached in this matter as a result of the policy of the Western Powers.

200. Paragraph 2 of this resolution, concerning the transmission to the Commission of all the proposals relating to disarmament discussed in the First Committee, including the Soviet Union's memorandum on measures in the field of disarmament [A/3929] and its resolution on the reduction of the military budgets of the United States of America, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France by 10 to 15 per cent and the use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries, will, in our opinion, enable the Commission to take long-overdue practical action, if only in regard to partial disarmament measures.

201. I need hardly say that resolution A which I have just analysed, cannot serve as a basis for the Commission's work, since it militates against a positive solution to the more pressing disarmament problems.

202. The Soviet delegation considers that the discussion of disarmament problems at this session of the General Assembly has clearly revealed the desire of

^{10/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, Annexes, agenda item 12, document A/C.1/797.

the majority of States to break the deadlock over disarmament and make real practical progress, if only in regard to partial disarmament measures, towards ending the armaments race, easing tension and securing the peaceful coexistence and co-operation of States.

203. In its unswerving adherence to its policy of peace and co-operation among nations, the Soviet Union will continue to strive for a positive solution to these problems in the interests of peace and the security of the peoples.

204. Mr. VIDIC (Yugoslavia): In connexion with the vote which has just taken place I would like to explain briefly the attitude of my delegation. I would first like to emphasize that in the opinion of my delegation useful and important work has been done. I have in mind both the prominence given to the question of disarmament in the General Assembly debate, with the Chairmen of delegations participating, as well as the broad and comprehensive consideration of this question by the First Committee.

205. This is all the more noteworthy as the deliberations within the United Nations come after a period in which endeavours in the field of disarmament have taken place largely outside the framework of the United Nations. We had hoped that through common efforts in the General Assembly we should have been able to contribute to the materialization of that degree of progress which has been made during the course of this year on certain aspects of the problem of disarmament.

206. Many delegations, including my own, debated solutions which would have provided the impetus to further progress in the field of disarmament and above all to the present Geneva negotiations on the discontinuance of tests, as well as to the coming talks on measures against the possibility of surprise attacks. Considerable efforts were also devoted to the revival of United Nations activities in the field of disarmament. However, the endeavours made in the First Committee to achieve a generally acceptable solution on the discontinuance of tests have not been successful.

207. Under these circumstances my delegation, in order to express its position clearly, decided to become a co-sponsor of the thirteen-Power resolution. Regardless, however, of the outcome of the voting on this and other draft resolutions, my delegation is convinced that the discontinuance of tests has become a matter of the utmost urgency and priority. We therefore reiterate our belief that the three Powers which have already commenced negotiations on this question in Geneva will, by showing that they are aware of their responsibilities towards mankind and by taking into account the views expressed during consideration of this problem in the General Assembly, endeavour to reach an early agreement on the discontinuance of tests, irrespective of the position which they have held here.

208. My delegation has had the honour to sponsor, together with the delegation of India, two other resolutions—one on the forthcoming conference on measures against the possibility of surprise attack and the other on the United Nations machinery for disarmament. I take satisfaction in noting that these resolutions were unanimously adopted in the First Committee and in the General Assembly.

209. Our discussions have shown that the revival of United Nations activities in the field of disarmament

and the creation of adequate machinery to this end was given special emphasis and was strongly supported in the First Committee. Resolution D, unanimously adopted in the First Committee and here in the General Assembly, makes it possible to establish the United Nations Disarmament Commission, although only on an ad hoc basis, thus enabling all the United Nations Member States to engage actively in seeking and accomplishing progress in this matter of vital importance. We hope that the Commission set up along these lines will parallel the negotiations now in progress in Geneva as well as those to follow shortly, and take steps for consideration of other current aspects of disarmament which may, under the circumstances, offer the best immediate prospects for progress, even though only initial and modest progress.

210. I have no wish to maintain unrealistic hopes or to voice undue optimism but I am nonetheless convinced that the resolution re-establishing the Disarmament Commission on a broad basis expresses the general feeling which prevails among the Governments of the States Members of the United Nations and that this fact in itself holds the promise of new and positive steps, which may well lead to welcome results from the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

211. Mr. OCAMPO (Bolivia) (translated from Spanish): For accidental reasons beyond my control, I was unable to arrive in time for the voting on the first draft resolutions before the General Assembly. However, I should like to be placed on record that Bolivia supports the resolutions A, B and C.

212. Mr. LODGE (United States): I realize the hour is getting late and I shall take only a minute or two, but I am prompted to speak because of a statement made by the Soviet representative that the United States had used pressure and I thought he also said "improper manoeuvres" to bring about the large vote supporting the stoppage of nuclear tests.

213. This statement of the Soviet representative is not a reflection on the United States because of course it is totally untrue and not one scintilla of proof has been or can be provided of such a statement—he has produced none and he can produce none. Furthermore, his statement is no reflection on the nations who voted for resolution A, whose independence is well-known and who were simply expressing, as they had every right to do, their judgement as to what is best for them in the light of the Soviet threat to world peace. So, while his statement does not reflect on us or on those who voted for resolution A, I think it is a very grave reflection on the Soviet Union, because it throws a very blinding light on how impossible it is for Soviet representatives to think of persons and of nations as equals. Apparently they can conceive only of a world in which there are masters and slaves, because that is the way their own society is organized. We can but hope that one day they will understand the idea of human equality; that day will be a good day for the Russian people, it will be a good day for the unfortunate people who are being ground down in the satellite States and it will be a good day for the whole world.

214. Then he said that the United States was unwilling—that was the adjective he used—to have a discontinuance of nuclear tests. It should not be necessary for me to repeat here once again that the United States wants a sure, a certain, a verified stoppage of tests,

and that is what we are engaged in right now, as compared with the Soviet position, which is for a mere unenforced paper prohibition.

215. There is something very ominous and very bitter and very melancholy about the fact that the Soviet Union, now that the United States policy has evolved, refuses to go along with us in a verified stoppage of nuclear tests.

216. The PRESIDENT: I am asked to make a correction, namely, that Saudi Arabia by mistake voted to abstain on resolution D when it really wanted to vote in favour of that resolution. Therefore, this correction of the Saudi Arabian vote will be noted in the verbatim record.

217. We have exhausted the agenda for today. I want to call the attention of representatives to one matter before we adjourn, namely, that item 19 on the agenda of the General Assembly entitled "Appointment of members of the Disarmament Commission", which was assigned to the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, by reason of the decision taken today on the constitution of a new Disarmament Commission, is obviously already taken care of by the General Assembly. I therefore declare that item 19 has already been dealt with by the General Assembly.

The meeting rose at 7.20 p.m.