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President: Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON
(Thailand).

AGENDA ITEM 66

Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly from 1 to 10 November 1956 (continued)

1. Mr. JAMALI (Iraq): Three months ago today, Israel invaded Egypt. That invasion was certainly premeditated and planned. To prepare for it, Mr. Ben Gurion announced in the Knesset twelve days beforehand that he would never take the initiative of starting a war against the Arabs; that "there is no sense in what has been called a preventive war"; that "such a war will not solve the problem of relations with the Arab States"; and that "the third round will come as a result of the second round". That was a very interesting preparation for the war of invasion which Israel launched on Egypt. It was certainly a very good illustration for comparing Israel's words with Israel's deeds. Mr. Ben Gurion says, "No preventive war". He will never launch a war. And, after twelve days, he invades Egypt.

2. But the Arab world is used to this method, and has been facing it and bearing it for years. It is only the world outside that does not know about it. The Arab world knows very well that Mr. Ben Gurion's policy is one of force and aggression. He believes that he can impose peace by force—by war. The only language which he wants to use with the Arabs—his language of peace—is that of attacking and fighting. That is the way he wants peace with the Arabs.

3. Ever since Israel came into being, its aggressions with military force on neighbouring Arab States have been following each other successively. Not a single Arab army attack on Israel has ever been recorded since the armistice was signed. Arab armies have never crossed the armistice boundaries on to the Israel side. On the other hand, we have been used to being attacked by Israel over and over again.

4. I have with me copies of three resolutions adopted by the Security Council on the Palestine question. I should like first to quote from the resolution which the Council adopted on 24 November 1953 [S/3139/Rev. 2]:

"The Security Council,

"1954" that the retaliatory action at Qibya taken by armed forces of Israel on 14-15 October 1953 and all such actions constitute a violation of the cease-fire provisions of the Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948 and are inconsistent with the parties' obligations under the General Armistice Agreement and the Charter;

"Expresses the strongest censure of that action, which can only prejudice the chances of that peaceful settlement which both parties, in accordance with the Charter, are bound to seek, and calls upon Israel to take effective measures to prevent all such actions in the future."

This resolution deals with just one example of an Israel military attack—on Jordan.

5. I shall now quote from a resolution which the Security Council adopted on 29 March 1955, in connexion with Gaza [S/3378]:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions of 15 July 1948, 11 August 1949, 17 November 1950, 18 May 1951 and 24 November 1953,

"Having heard the report of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and statements by the representatives of Egypt and Israel,

"Noting that the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission on 6 March 1955 determined that a 'prearranged and planned attack ordered by Israel authorities' was 'committed by Israel regular army forces against the Egyptian regular army force' in the Gaza strip on 28 February 1955,

"1. Condemns this attack as a violation of the cease-fire provisions of the Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948 and as inconsistent with the obligations of the parties under the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel and under the United Nations Charter"

This is another model of a resolution dealing with a premeditated military attack by Israel—on Egypt.

6. On 19 January 1956, the Security Council adopted another resolution on the Palestine question [S/3538], which read in part as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Noting the report of the Chief of Staff that this Israel action was a deliberate violation of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, including those relating to the demilitarized zone, which was crossed by the Israel forces which entered Syria,

"2. Reminds the Government of Israel that the Council has already condemned military action in breach of the general armistice agreements, whether or not undertaken by way of retaliation, and has called upon Israel to take effective measures to prevent such actions;

"3. *Condemns* the attack of 11 December as a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provisions of its resolution of 15 July 1948, of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, and of Israel's obligations under the Charter."

7. Those were three examples of Security Council resolutions censuring and condemning Israel military attacks on neighbouring Arab States. Can Israel produce a single Security Council resolution condemning an Arab State? Those representatives who come to this rostrum to say that they believe and sympathize with Israel accusations are respectfully requested to examine the records and determine who is really the aggressor, who is really violating the armistice agreements, who is really responsible for the bloodshed on the other side.

8. One of my colleagues yesterday gave this body the number of innocent people who had been killed and wounded by the Israel army forces. Up to last October, until the new invasion and the new massacres, in Gaza and Syria there had been 576 Palestine Arabs killed and 449 wounded. Since then, hundreds of others have been butchered, including Gaza refugees and innocent people inside Israel itself.

9. Israel speaks of Arab aggression and of fearing Arab attacks, but if one searches for the truth one will find that it is only innocent Arabs, infiltrating to their farms and to their homes across the barbed wire, who have been shot by the Israel army. These Arabs are called aggressors, but no Arab State, no Arab army, has invaded Israel at any time since the armistice. I should like the delegation of Israel to read the New Testament. In verse 3 of chapter 7 of Matthew it is stated: "And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?"

10. We are entitled to inquire again into what is the power behind Israel that makes it so aggressive and so arrogant. To begin with, I must say that arms are the immediate cause. There is no doubt that the theory of the balance of armaments between Israel and its Arab neighbours, that Israel should have more arms than all its neighbours combined, has made Israel power-drunk and ready to attack Jordan one day, Syria another day, Egypt another day, taking them by turn. If Israel were given arms in proportion to its population and its area, certainly it would not dare to take up this aggressive attitude.

11. How does Israel get arms? Israel gets arms because it gets money. Where does Israel get money from? Israel gets money from Zionist *internationale*, which sells bonds and raises funds in the name of charity, and these contributions are tax exempt. Where does that money go? It goes to buy arms. That tax-exempt charity money is taken for arms to kill Arabs, and to disturb peace in the Middle East.

12. France is always ready to give arms, with money or without money. That is another factor. France is a sincere ally of Israel in its aggression. A big factor in Israel's continuing to be aggressive is that every time Israel invades, it does so with impunity. Since nothing is done, Israel asks itself, why not do it again, why not gain more power? Why not gain more propaganda in the Press of the world for the power of Israel, and then get more money in order to attack again, and get still more money?

13. That is the tragedy of the Middle East. That is the basis of the threat to the peace in that area. With Zionist *internationale* arms and money, with no action taken by the United Nations or by any other Power

in the world against Israel aggression, certainly Israel will continue to defy the whole world, to defy the United Nations and to attack the Arabs.

14. Certainly Israel has shown its defiance in the last three months. For three months, Israel has defied the whole world. Seventy-four Member States decided that Israel must withdraw behind the armistice line, but Israel does not yield. Israel is confident in its power to face and defy the whole world, and this is not the first time that Israel has defied the whole world and the United Nations.

15. Israel has defied United Nations resolutions on Palestine ever since the armistice. Israel got what was given to it by the 1947 resolution [181 (II)] of the General Assembly, and then went beyond that. Israel got Arab territories and turned Jerusalem into its capital. Israel refused to let the refugees go back to their homes, in defiance of United Nations resolutions. Then, Israel defied the truce supervision bodies of the United Nations. They were not permitted to see and observe what they wished to see and observe. Israel now defies the armistice agreements. To Israel, they do not exist, they are to be liquidated. Now Israel again defies the United Nations, which did not condone its aggression and which said that Israel troops must withdraw unconditionally.

16. This attitude of Israel is not conducive to peace in the Middle East. Trouble will continue in that area, and this Organization will continue to be undermined by Israel's attitude unless the General Assembly takes measures to put Israel in its place, to make it abandon its arrogance and defiance. Unless that is done, we cannot expect peace in the Middle East.

17. We are grateful to the Secretary-General for the objective report which he has made to us after his hard labours with Israel. We certainly sympathize with him in the strain which he must have undergone in dealing with the Israel delegation. Reading the *aide-mémoire* of Israel [4/3511] and the report of the Secretary-General [4/3512], we can very well appreciate the efforts of the Secretary-General. We feel that he deserves our gratitude for his relative impartiality, for his neutrality, for his objectivity. We may not agree with all that he proposes or with all his arguments. But we cannot help commending the fine spirit of impartiality and neutrality, the outlook, the peaceful objective which he has held before himself in preparing his report.

18. Of course, we are not surprised that the Secretary-General should be attacked and should be defied, that his report should be described as "unconstructive" and "unrealistic". We are used to Israel attacks on fair-minded people. We hope that our Secretary-General will be preserved to us, will be safe. Whenever I think of the integrity of the Secretary-General, I remember the late Count Bernadotte. He was another great Swede who worked for peace, and he wanted peace for the Middle East. But I hope that our Secretary-General will remain alive, will remain safe, will remain energetic and active in the field of international peace.

19. I often think of how the great General Bennike, of Denmark, who was the head of the Truce Supervision Organization, had to relinquish his duties. I also think of Commander Hutchison, of the United States Navy, and how he had to relinquish his duties. All these impartial, honest figures had to relinquish their duties because Israel found that their reports and their attitudes were not in line with its interests and ambitions.

20. This, of course, makes me think more and more that the Secretary-General's report should be given due weight. And I wish to express my agreement with the Secretary-General when he states his firm position that nothing can be done before a complete withdrawal of the invading armies is achieved. I think the Secretary-General is absolutely right. Nothing can be done for the Middle East, nothing should be talked about—nothing can be talked about—before the complete withdrawal of the Israel army behind the armistice lines is unconditionally effected.

21. We also agree with the Secretary-General that, pending a settlement, the truce and the armistice agreements must be faithfully observed by all parties.

22. Furthermore, we agree with the Secretary-General that the United Nations Emergency Force must be stationed in the demilitarized zone—and, if it is to be stationed on the armistice lines, we say it must be put astride, on both sides of the armistice lines.

23. We agree with the Secretary-General that UNEF should never be turned into an occupying force. The United Nations did not go to the Middle East to occupy the territory of countries or States. It went to perform a very specific duty: to see to it that the withdrawal of the invading armies was effected peacefully.

24. We now come to Israel's arguments. We read the *aide-mémoire*, and we listened to the speech by Mr. Eban [645th meeting]—more than twenty pages—and we heard nothing new. There are two basic arguments. The first is that of security. The Israelis say that they invaded Egypt and that they want to hold Gaza in order to keep Gaza out of Egyptian hands—for the sake of security, because they are afraid that Egypt might attack them.

25. It is our submission that this argument is untenable. Egypt never attacked Israel, never took the initiative in attacking Israel. The Security Council record is clear: it is Israel that attacked Egypt. The attack has always been more from the Israel side, and the Egyptians have always had to defend themselves when attacked. It is only Israel that goes ahead and occupies land that does not belong to it, that enters the demilitarized zone and occupies it. The Egyptians have not moved one inch to occupy territory not under their control. Therefore, the argument about security as an excuse for invasion is quite unjustified. If we were to apply that argument, it should have been Egypt that invaded Israel in order to guarantee Egyptian security, and not *vice versa*.

26. We have also heard a good deal about the people of Gaza, the refugees in Gaza. Both Mrs. Meir and Mr. Eban shed crocodile tears on behalf of the refugees in Gaza. The Israelis want to have their police, their education, their irrigation, their electricity, their water system, their health services—everything—for the people of Gaza. They say that these poor people have been neglected, and that it is time for the civilizing influence of Israel to come to deliver them from their backward condition.

27. This is the language which we have been hearing for more than a century from the colonial Powers when they want to invade, when they want to conquer. This is the language of colonialism; this is the first step toward domination. We know this tactic. All of us, especially the nations of Asia and Africa, are very familiar with this kind of argument. Israel now wants Gaza in order to educate and raise the standard of living of the Gaza people. And tomorrow it can occupy Iraq in order to do the same thing, in order to raise the standard of

living of the Iraqi people—and then it can invade Syria in order to do the same thing, and invade Jordan in order to do the same thing.

28. This Israel argument is certainly shocking to any freedom-loving anti-colonialist here. The Arab people, the people of Gaza, do not want Israel water or electricity. Nor do they want Israel schools or doctors. They are not in need of that. They are in need of enjoying their own freedom in their own country; they are in need of enjoying their own independence.

29. Gaza is only one portion of the land of Palestine which was divided up by this General Assembly, and this portion, with other portions which are under Israel occupation, these lands belong to the Arabs of Palestine. The Arabs of Palestine have not disappeared out of existence; they exist and they have their rights. Their rights are not obliterated; they cannot be obliterated. And if Israel wishes to liquidate the Arabs and their rights to their own country, it is mistaken; it is declaring war in the Middle East.

30. The sooner Israel changes its mentality and recognizes the right of the Arabs of Palestine to their own homes, the sooner Israel comes down to earth and respects other people's rights, the sooner we will have peace. We are very familiar with this attitude; we know this approach in the name of humanity.

31. Then Gaza, of course, is the source of the *fedayeen*; that is why Gaza should not be Arab, it should be either Israeli or under United Nations supervision! This is another misleading statement which should be exploded. Who are the *fedayeen*? The *fedayeen* are young Arabs who, frustrated by the injustices imposed upon them, want to fight back in revenge. And I think the *fedayeen* must acknowledge their indebtedness for the lessons they learned from the Zionists themselves, and Israel should be gratified that after all the Arab world did produce *fedayeen*, because it is Zionism which started the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern group, to massacre and to assassinate. Who killed Lord Moyne? It was the Irgun Zvai Leumi. Who assassinated Count Bernadotte? The Irgun Zvai Leumi. Who annihilated the village of Deir Yassin—an Arab village—with its men, women and children, and mutilated their bodies? It was the Irgun Zvai Leumi—today you call them the Heruth. And if you have these groups, why do you condemn the Arabs if they have a few *fedayeen*? They learned the lesson from you.

32. The fallacy of the argument is that once Gaza is occupied there will be no more *fedayeen*, and that is absurd. I am afraid that if justice is not done to the Arabs, there will be *fedayeen* all over the Arab world. The *fedayeen* are not controlled by the Government. Every Arab young man might turn into a *fedayeen* in Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon or anywhere else. The occupation of Gaza will not remedy the question of the *fedayeen*. You are mistaken, Mrs. Meir, if you think that by occupying Gaza you will be saved from the *fedayeen*. What will save you is your decision to recognize Arab rights and to live in peace in the Middle East and give up your arrogance and your aggressive policies.

33. According to the Israelis, the invasion must continue because of security, because they want to do charity for the refugees, because there are *fedayeen*—all these arguments are invoked. The truth is that the occupation of Gaza by non-Arabs, taking it away from the Arabs, will reduce security rather than increase it, and I hope that my words will be taken at their true worth.

34. Then we come to the question of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran and the occupation of Sharm El Sheikh. Israel does not withdraw from Sharm El Sheikh because it wants the Gulf of Aqaba, it wants to be able to pass through the Straits of Tiran, because it wants freedom of navigation. Yesterday we heard a good deal from Mr. Eban in defence of freedom of navigation. But here there is a state of war and injustice. When Israel fights the Arabs, it cannot expect the Arabs not to fight back. As I said in my previous address before this Assembly [639th meeting], freedom of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Suez Canal, the boycotting of Israel, the stopping of oil to Haifa, the *fedayeen* and a hundred and one other things are all due to Israel action and Arab reaction to Israel action.

35. If you block the rights of the refugees to go back to their own homes, why should not the Arabs block the passage of your ships? As I said, Israel has taken Arab lands; it has occupied lands which do not belong to it. By decision of this General Assembly, land was allotted to the Arabs; the best parts of Palestine, which were allotted to the Arabs, have been occupied by Israel. The refugees have been denied the right to be in their own homes, to enjoy their lands and their farms. No compensation has been paid. Jerusalem, which was supposed to be internationalized, has been turned into an Israel capital.

36. There are some rights which you want to see, such as freedom of navigation, and that right should not be violated; but there are human rights for the Arabs that also should not be violated. If you want the violation of free passage to be stopped, you should stop the violation of human rights, of individual rights. You cannot have it both ways. You cannot get what you want and claim it as a right and forget that the other party has its rights also.

37. Therefore the argument that Sharm El Sheikh should be occupied in order to guarantee freedom of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran does not hold water. If you want freedom of passage, you should certainly take away the blockade against the Arab people and let them go back to their homes and learn to live with them in peace. If you cannot live with them, you have no place in the Middle East. You should either learn to live with the Arabs in the Middle East, Mrs. Meir, or pack your bags and go back to Milwaukee. Mr. Eban can go back to South Africa or England, if he pleases. There is no doubt that the permanence of peace in the Middle East depends on the ability of Israel to live with the Arabs and to recognize their rights. If Israel cannot do that, it is not entitled to stay in the area.

38. We want peace for the area and for the world. The whole world should not be set on fire because of Israel arrogance and aggression. You can never have peace unless you learn to live in peace with the Arabs, and you cannot live in peace with the Arabs until you recognize their fundamental human rights.

39. Yesterday, Mr. Eban spoke a good deal about the Security Council resolution with respect to the Suez Canal and the right of free passage through it. The Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aqaba and that resolution are all tied to the state of war. If there were no state of war, the freedom of passage would certainly be guaranteed. But there is a state of war because the rights of the Arabs of Palestine have been denied.

40. This body has often been told that the issue is between Egypt and Israel. There is nothing between Egypt and Israel, there is nothing between Iraq and

Israel; there is nothing between Lebanon and Israel; and there is nothing between Jordan and Israel. We all stand as Arab States in behalf of the Arabs of Palestine. If you settle the question of the Arabs of Palestine and respect their right to their own homes, there will be no problem. But if you deny them their rights, neither Egypt nor Iraq nor Jordan nor Lebanon nor Syria nor Saudi Arabia can have peace with Israel. We cannot recognize an invader who takes away the homes and property of our brethren in Palestine. After all, Palestine does not belong to the Jews alone. It belongs to the Jews, the Christians and the Moslems alike. To take the Moslems and the Christians out of Palestine and make them refugees is certainly contrary to human decency and to human rights.

41. If you want peace, you must come down to earth and recognize these elementary facts. If you want Egypt to observe the Security Council resolution of 1951 with respect to the Suez Canal, why do you not observe General Assembly resolutions concerning the refugees and their right to return to their homes? Why do you not observe the General Assembly resolutions of 1947, 1948, 1949 and onward with respect to the right of the Arabs to return to their own homes? You cannot respect one resolution and deny the others. You must make one whole package deal and see the other party's point of view.

42. This General Assembly cannot deal only with the issue of Israel and the Suez Canal or only with the issue of Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba. This body should not give Israel an advantage for its aggression. Its aggression should be condemned by all of us here. Aggression is not the way to provide rights.

43. The human rights of the Arabs of Palestine—Arab territory, Arab homes, the return of the refugees, the internationalization of Jerusalem—have all been decided in General Assembly resolutions. These resolutions cannot be forgotten and only one resolution with respect to the passage through the Suez Canal taken in isolation.

44. In bringing the Aqaba and Suez issues here, Israel is certainly evading the issue, because the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal have been closed to Israel ships for the last eight years. That is no excuse for the invasion. Why did Israel invade now? What relation is there between the blockade of the Suez Canal and the invasion of Egypt? What relation is there between the passage of ships through the Gulf of Aqaba and the invasion of Egypt? Israel certainly brought forth the Aqaba and Suez issues in order to confuse the issue, in order to divert world opinion from its dastardly aggression and invasion. It wants the world to forget that it should be condemned for its aggression; therefore it raised the issues of Suez and Aqaba.

45. This is one aspect of a well-known Israel method about which we have also learned from experience. Whenever Israel finds itself in a corner, it begins to fabricate new issues and to evade the real issue. One of these Israel methods is to confuse the issue so that Israel can get by. Israel seeks to muddy the waters. Muddy the waters and you cannot fish. Another Israel method is: if you attack, accuse the other party and complain about him and you will get by. You attack and you complain. In other words, the attacker becomes the victim and the poor victim becomes the attacker. We are also used to that method. Israel always attacks and complains. It repeats its complaint, and by this repetition people begin to believe that there is something. The truth is that there is nothing. It is Israel that has done

this by its own aggression, by its own attack. Israel believes that if you repeat that you are being victimized, the people will believe it.

46. I shall always remember the following statement which I encountered while studying *The Republic* of Plato: the most unjust is the unjust who has to appear to be just, who is known to the world to be just. This is what false propaganda does. Israel is always the aggressor or the attacker, yet many people have been hoodwinked into believing that Israel is being attacked. I sincerely hope that the world will begin to open its eyes and see the truth through the clouds of propaganda.

47. The issue of Palestine is very clear and very simple, and the settlement of the problems of the Middle East is very simple indeed. There is a question of basic rights and the fundamental principles of the Charter. Once this body applies the fundamental principles of human rights to the Arabs of Palestine, and once the principles of the Charter are applied to Palestine, there will be no trouble. We, the Arabs, wish to live in peace. We are a peace-loving people. But so long as the Arab people are denied the right to their own country, their own homes and their own property, there can be no peace in the Middle East. I certainly believe that the defiance by Israel of this body, the fact that we have had so many meetings in which we have called upon Israel to withdraw, which it has not done, is a threat to the peace of the world and undermines this Organization.

48. I am sure that if Israel continues to insist on its occupation and does not make an unconditional withdrawal, we are going to have trouble in the Middle East sooner or later. Therefore this body has before it a grave responsibility. This body must face the issue today. The issue is that of world peace and the prestige and very existence of the United Nations.

49. As I have said, if Israel does not heed this body, we are headed for another war in the Middle East. That war—and I hope it will never come—may set the whole world on fire. Why? Because Mr. Ben Gurion wants it to happen. Perhaps the Zionist international wants a third world war; I do not know. We have it in the Koran that whatever fire they start, God puts out. Let us hope that God puts out this fire also. They want to set fire to the world in a third world war, and I sincerely hope that God will put out this fire.

50. This body must see to it that its will is respected, especially if we want it to be effective in the Middle East in bringing about peace and justice to the people of that area. We certainly think that Israel's defiance of this body should not and cannot continue. This body is being undermined. The peace of the world is being undermined. We must make Israel bow before the will of this body, whether by sanctions, by expulsion or by other measures. We certainly must give this serious consideration and not let matters in the Middle East drift any longer. Israel is responsible for whatever will happen in the Middle East.

51. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The General Assembly is once again constrained to examine the question of the non-compliance of the Government of Israel with the General Assembly's request for the immediate and complete withdrawal of the Israel armed forces which invaded the territory of Egypt and are still occupying part of Egyptian territory.

52. It has already been pointed out that in its resolution [1123 (XI)] of 19 January, the General Assembly noted with regret and concern the failure of Israel to

comply with previously adopted Assembly resolutions calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel troops from Egyptian territory, and requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts for securing the complete withdrawal of Israel armed forces in pursuance of those resolutions, and to report on such completion to the General Assembly within five days.

53. The five-day time limit provided for in this resolution has expired, but Israel forces still remain in the territory of Egypt.

54. The report of the Secretary-General on the results of his negotiations for the withdrawal of Israel forces from Egyptian territory, submitted on 24 January, shows that Israel is continuing its delaying tactics and is advancing further fabricated pretexts and conditions in order to avoid complying with the General Assembly's request. The report states that: "At the expiration of the time limit set by the resolution for the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly, Israel has not fully complied with the requests of the General Assembly for withdrawal." [A/3512, para. 3.] Israel troops are still occupying the Gaza Strip on the Mediterranean coast and the Sharm El Sheikh area on the west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba.

55. An *aide-mémoire* [A/3511] from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, dated 24 January 1957, has also been circulated to delegations. It is worth while dwelling on this *aide-mémoire*. In this document, Israel officially states its conditions *sine qua non* for the withdrawal of its forces from Egyptian territory: the United Nations must consent to having the Gaza Strip placed under Israel administration, including police functions. Moreover, Israel proposes that United Nations forces should occupy Egyptian territory in the area of the Gulf of Aqaba. The aim is to keep United Nations forces there for an indefinite period, and to assign to them quite different functions from those provided for in the General Assembly resolution [1000 (ES-I)] of 5 November 1956.

56. In this connexion, it is worth noting that at the General Assembly meetings of 17 to 19 January, the representatives of the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia and certain other Western Powers in effect came out in favour of the occupation of a part of Egyptian territory in the Gaza Strip and in the area of the Gulf of Aqaba by the United Nations forces.

57. The Australian representative stated [638th meeting] that: "... it is essential ... on the withdrawal of Israel forces from the Gaza Strip and the positions in the Gulf of Aqaba, to ensure that these positions are not directly or indirectly occupied by Egyptian forces ...". He then suggested that "the positions relinquished by Israel troops must ... be occupied effectively by elements of the United Nations Emergency Force, at least for so long as is necessary to establish procedures for the settlement of the problems existing in these areas".

58. It will be readily understood that an attempt is being made, under the cloak of so-called internationalization, to snatch from Egypt a piece of territory which belongs to it, with a view to exercising pressure on the Egyptian Government for the settlement of problems which affect the vital interests of that country. In this connexion, it is worth noting the statement of the New Zealand representative [639th meeting], who said in effect that the plans for the "internationalization" of Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba merely represented a first step in a series of measures against Egypt and,

in particular, would serve as a pattern for the settlement of the Suez Canal problem. That is the meaning of the so-called internationalization of certain areas of Egypt.

59. The United Kingdom representative, in his statement on 18 January [640th meeting], admitted that his Government would support any acceptable formula for the internationalization of Egyptian territory in the area of the Gulf of Aqaba. With regard to the Gaza Strip, he stated that, in the opinion of his Government, "the Gaza Strip might perhaps come under some form of international administration and control".

60. Some representatives went even further. Thus, the Philippine representative alleged on 28 January [645th meeting] that Gaza was no longer the territory of Egypt but a kind of no-man's-land. Thus, he inferred that the United Nations could send its troops there without Egypt's consent and might keep them there as long as it wished.

61. On the same day, the United States representative said that his country deemed it essential that the United Nations Emergency Force should in fact remain on the coast of the Straits of Tiran, in the Gaza area and in the El Auja area until all the outstanding questions between Israel and Egypt were settled.

62. All these statements show quite clearly that, under the pretext of complying with Israel's demands, it is proposed, in violation of Egyptian sovereignty and of the United Nations Charter, that international armed forces should occupy part of Egyptian territory in the Gaza Strip and on the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba. The authors of this plan do not conceal the fact that the proposed occupation of Gaza and of the south-eastern strip of the Sinai peninsula is in practice to continue indefinitely.

63. Thus, we are confronted with a new plan for interference in the internal affairs of Egypt and new attempts to restore in Egypt and other countries of the Near and Middle East the obsolete colonial order rejected by the people, although under a different label. Under these plans, Israel has clearly been assigned the role of inciting and organizing conflict, with a view to increasing tension in that region.

64. It is significant that the initiative for the restoration of the old colonial order in the region of the Near and Middle East emanates not only from those countries which directly unleashed aggression against Egypt in October 1956, but also from the United States, which, taking advantage of the failure of the military adventure and aggression of the United Kingdom and France against Egypt, wishes to replace them in that highly important region. These plans to substitute one colonial hegemony for another have become particularly clear since the proclamation recently of the "Eisenhower doctrine", which provides for crude interference by the United States in the affairs of the Arab nations, even to the extent of armed intervention.

65. In this connexion, we must dwell on the question of the use of United Nations forces in the region of the Near and Middle East. As we know, the United Nations forces referred to in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter may be set up only by a decision of the Security Council and exclusively with a view to protecting a State which has fallen a victim to aggression. But the United Nations Emergency Force which is now in Egyptian territory was set up in violation of the United Nations Charter, by the General

Assembly and without the consent of the Security Council.

66. It follows from the General Assembly's resolution of 5 November 1956 that the United Nations armed forces should not be troops exercising control over the territory in which they are stationed, and are not intended to take measures of coercion against a Member State.

67. However, the intention now is to circumvent the Security Council once again and to entrust this United Nations Emergency Force, temporarily set up for specific and limited purposes, with the occupation of part of Egyptian territory in the area of Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba, in fact, to turn it into a permanent occupation force. The functions which it is now proposed to assign to UNEF are in flagrant contradiction with the Charter and the purposes for which the Force was set up under the General Assembly resolution.

68. In the light of these attempts by aggressive circles in Israel and certain Western countries, I should like to refer to the report of the Secretary-General which is now under discussion. The Secretary-General notes that Israel's demands for a change in the status of Gaza and for the occupation of Egyptian territory in the area of the Gulf of Aqaba are absolutely unjustified and unlawful. He also rightly points out that the United Nations cannot condone a change in the *status juris* of any part of Egyptian territory, and that any attempt so to change it would represent a violation of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement and would also be contrary to the Charter. He refers to this in paragraphs 5 (a) and 13 of his report.

69. The Secretary-General also draws attention to the fact that the use of military force by the United Nations for any purpose requires the consent of the States in which the force is to operate.

70. It should be noted, however, that the part of the report where the Secretary-General refers to proposals concerning the possible use of the United Nations Force for purposes other than those provided for in the resolution of 5 November 1956 is not formulated with sufficient precision. That fact has given some of the representatives who spoke here a pretext for using this part of the report in support of their unlawful plans to turn the United Nations Force into what would in effect be a permanent occupation force, stationed in key areas of Egyptian territory.

71. The General Assembly must reject any attempt to use United Nations forces for the purpose of exercising pressure on Egypt with a view to restoring the colonial order in the Middle and Near East.

72. The Secretary-General's report reiterates the indisputable fact that Israel has no grounds for delaying the withdrawal of its troops from Egyptian territory. Still less has Israel any moral right to impose the transfer of the Gaza Strip to Israel administration as a condition for the withdrawal of its troops from Egypt or to demand the occupation of Egyptian territory in the area of the Gulf of Aqaba by United Nations military forces.

73. Any demand made by Israel as a precondition for the withdrawal of Israel troops from Egyptian territory must be rejected. Compliance with Israel's claims would be tantamount to rewarding the aggressor for his invasion of Egypt and encouraging him to commit further violations.

74. It is also inadmissible to make the urgent problem of the withdrawal of Israel troops from Egyptian territory contingent on the settlement of the whole Palestine problem, as some of the representatives who spoke here have done. The claims of Israel and its supporters must be decisively rejected, as they would cause the United Nations to commit a flagrant violation of the Charter and to assume functions it did not possess.

75. If the United Nations complied with Israel's claims and adopted the proposal for the so-called internationalization of a part of the territory of Egypt, a dangerous precedent of interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign State would have been created and irreparable harm would be done to the Organization.

76. The United Nations is in duty bound to take resolute steps to terminate Israel's continuing aggression against Egypt. It should raise its voice against new plans for the violation of Egypt's sovereignty and for interference in the domestic affairs of the Arab States.

77. Mr. QUIROGA GALDO (Bolivia) (translated from Spanish): Israel's persistence in continuing its control of the eastern coast of the Sinai peninsula until freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba is fully guaranteed and its claim to maintain its own police force and administration in the Gaza Strip force the United Nations for the fifth time to choose between two alternatives: we must find appropriate means of enforcing the General Assembly's decisions or abdicate morally, juridically and politically, and admit that the Organization is powerless to discharge the function entrusted to it.

78. It is not going too far to say that the Israel position raises a new problem, which closely touches the very existence of the United Nations. The mere possibility that Mr. Ben Gurion's argument might be accepted would mean the rehabilitation of the use of force as a means of settling international disputes and the repudiation of the legal principles for the settlement of disputes laid down in the Charter. In that event, civilization would return to the dark days which saw the end of the League of Nations, and the United Nations Charter would suffer the same fate as the League Covenant.

79. Bolivia has no material interest in the Near East. Its opposition to aggression is exclusively founded on its inflexible determination to safeguard the legal and moral principles which are the basis of peaceful relations among all the peoples of the earth. Therefore, without love or hate, without the slightest shadow of partiality, we repudiate on this occasion, as we have done in the past, any attempt to set aside the General Assembly's resolutions, which call for the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Egyptian soil, making it quite clear that the invading Israel army must withdraw behind the lines established by the 1949 Armistice Agreement.

80. Mr. Ben Gurion's statements concerning Gaza and Aqaba now have a most unfortunate corollary: his attacks on the report made by the Secretary-General pursuant to the instructions of the General Assembly. We wish to point out that such public attacks are without precedent in the ten years of the United Nations existence. Even when the "cold war" was at its height, the Secretary-General was always considered with the deference warranted by the difficulty of the functions he performs in defence of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and, therefore, of world peace.

81. In my delegation's view, the Secretary-General's report is a clear summary of the background of the dispute and a scrupulously impartial and honest statement of the legal considerations in the light of which the General Assembly's decision to re-establish the *status quo* existing before the attack on Egypt is fully justified. Any other approach would have meant that the Secretary-General had forgotten or woefully misconstrued the rôle he has to play in the Organization.

82. As we see it, the object of the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force in the theatre of aggression is to restore Egyptian sovereignty throughout Egyptian national territory, whose boundaries with Israel are those established by the 1949 Armistice Agreement. It was and is the intention and the will of the General Assembly to eliminate every trace of the invasion by the three aggressor States and to restore the *status quo ante*. The Secretary-General's report is therefore simply an able restatement of principles, and any attack on it by an interested party is wholly unfounded.

83. There can be no doubt that the United Nations has a rôle to play in the settlement of the grave and complex problems that beset the Near East. It would be neither reasonable nor right for us to ignore the major problems which are at the very heart of the conflict.

84. Peace must be restored in what used to be Palestine so that the States which are now enemies may live together as neighbours. To that end it is urgent to find a just and humane solution for the hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees who are now living as outcasts. Finally, the consent of the coastal States should be obtained to ensure innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba.

85. But such measures can be achieved only through painstaking negotiations within the United Nations, and negotiations will be feasible only when Egyptian sovereignty has been restored over the Gaza Strip and the area round the Straits of Tiran.

86. We must repeat that Israel's insistence on maintaining control of the Gaza Strip through an Israel civilian police force and administration, far from facilitating the solution of these problems, further complicates the situation in the Middle East.

87. We are convinced that the General Assembly should set its face against this idea, and even more against the proposal that the United Nations should co-operate with the Israel authorities in the administration and policing of the Gaza Strip.

88. Finally, we must ask a difficult question: what will the United Nations do if Israel turns a deaf ear to another call to reason? The head of my delegation has specifically instructed me to suggest that the Security Council should, at the appropriate moment, order the United Nations Emergency Force to advance through the Sinai desert as far as the lines established by the 1949 Armistice Agreement. But he also asks those concerned: Will you use force to resist the peaceful advance of the United Nations Force? Will you open fire on the blue flag of the United Nations and the Charter, on the whole of the civilized world?

89. Mr. PEARSON (Canada): I should like to say a few brief words on the problem that we have been discussing and, at the same time, to reserve my right to speak again when, perhaps, we shall have a draft resolution before us which deals with this subject.

90. The problem with which we have been dealing is coming to a head with consequences of vital importance to us all, and perhaps even to peace. As I see it, it is a problem not only of the completion of the withdrawal of Israel forces—although that is first in order of priority—not only of making arrangements for security in the unsettled border areas concerned or for free navigation, but of making, I hope, such arrangements here which will be agreed on in this Assembly, but which will take effect only after Israel has accepted the decision of the United Nations to withdraw.

91. If we take the position that the United Nations cannot even consider these related questions, these questions of arrangements along the lines that I have just indicated, until after withdrawal has been completed, if we cannot even take a decision on them at, or immediately after, the time when we have taken a decision here on withdrawal—even if that decision is not to be implemented until after withdrawal itself—then I believe that certain delegations will have great difficulty in accepting that position in regard to the relationship, or non-relationship, between these two problems.

92. If, on the other hand, Israel does not agree to complete and immediate withdrawal and to a proposal for a reasonable solution of the related problems which would be acceptable to this Assembly, then also there will be no peaceful settlement of these problems, and Israel will be in the position of having taken the responsibility for rejecting decisions of the United Nations and remaining where it is, without any international support and, indeed, in the face of an international decision.

93. I suggest that we must do our best to avoid both these negative results by rejecting both these extreme positions; and I believe that we should take this—if I may call it that—middle position, not in the interests of any one State, and certainly not to reward or approve any action by any State which we have already condemned, but in the interests of peace and security. Certainly Israel has no right to attach conditions to the withdrawal of its forces. But, as delegations to the United Nations General Assembly, we have, I think, the right and, indeed, even the duty, to relate these two matters: withdrawal and proposals which may make impossible the kind of situation in the future which we have been facing during the last two or three months. And I believe that, as delegations, we have the right to say that our attitude towards one problem must be influenced by the attitude of the General Assembly towards the other problem.

94. Failure to agree on a middle course of this type means possible—indeed, probable—failure to agree on any course; and that would mean deadlock and a return not only to the unhappy conditions of yesterday, but also to conditions that might be even worse and even more dangerous to international peace and security. It would mean also a demonstration of futility on the part of this Organization which might have far-reaching effect. And I know that we all agree that it is our responsibility to do what we can to avoid this disastrous result, which, surely, no one wants.

95. In our view, the Secretary-General's report shows the way out of this deadlock. The Secretary-General has given his views—sane and reasonable views—on the steps which should be taken after withdrawal, but which perhaps we can approve now. Those steps must be taken within the limits fixed by previous resolu-

tions and decisions of the United Nations which, until we alter them—if we have the power to alter them, as Assembly decisions—remain in effect. His report emphasizes, I think rightly, that actions through the recommendations of this Assembly, as contrasted with decisions of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, require for their implementation the consent of the parties concerned.

96. The main argument of the Secretary-General's report is that we must return to the full implementation of the Armistice Agreement—but that this should be joined with United Nations action to secure and supervise such implementation, something that has been absent in recent years, and that, if we cannot take that kind of complementary action for implementation, the mere injunction on the parties concerned to observe the armistice in its entirety may not prove to be very effective. The Secretary-General says in paragraph 15 of his report:

“... There is universal recognition that the condition of affairs of which this deterioration formed a part should not be permitted to return. The renewed full implementation of the clauses of the Armistice Agreement obviously presumes such an attitude on the part of the Governments concerned, and such supporting measures as would guarantee a return to the state of affairs envisaged in the Armistice Agreement, and avoidance of the state of affairs into which conditions, due to a lack of compliance with the Agreement, progressively deteriorated.”

97. Compliance with the Armistice Agreement is, in our view, as important as compliance with recent resolutions on withdrawal, and other types of resolutions, although any effort to bring about this larger compliance should, I repeat, be subsequent to our decision on withdrawal. But that compliance, as I have said, should be with all the provisions of the Armistice Agreement—article I as well as articles VI, VII and VIII.

98. Such full implementation, supervised and secured by the United Nations, would, the Secretary-General tells us, have an important and a positive bearing on other problems in the region, and I certainly agree with that. Therefore I venture to suggest that we might consider proceeding as follows: that we discuss and decide on a resolution reaffirming that the withdrawal of Israel forces must be completed and immediate, and regretting that this has not already taken place, and then that we should immediately discuss and decide on a recommendation based on the principle that the withdrawal of those forces must be followed immediately by action which would represent real progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions in the region.

99. As regards the action necessary to accomplish that essential result, I suggest for the consideration of the Assembly certain ideas that might be worthy of inclusion in any resolution that we may be discussing.

100. I think that the two parties concerned, Egypt and Israel, should be called upon by this Assembly scrupulously to observe all the provisions of the 1949 Armistice Agreement and to refrain from all acts of hostility, including the exercise by either party of any claim to belligerent rights.

101. I think that the Secretary-General might be instructed, after consultation with the parties concerned, to make arrangements for the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force on both sides of the armistice demarcation line and in the Gaza Strip in order

that that Force, which is our own creation and which is functioning so effectively in the interest of peace and security already, might assume the supervisory duties of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and prevent incursions and raids across the demarcation line and maintain peaceful conditions along that line, and that Egypt and Israel, to assist in this essential work of the Force, should be requested to remove their military forces from or limit them in these areas of deployment which remain to be delimited.

102. I think that the United Nations should be associated with steps to replace the present civil administration of the Gaza Strip and to ensure that that area is not in the future used as a base or as a target for raids or retaliation. I believe that it would be wise to take appropriate steps to determine the legal position of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran, but that, pending that determination, the parties should be called upon to give assurances that they will not assert or exercise any belligerent rights in those waters or interfere with freedom of navigation in them.

103. Then I think that the Secretary-General, on whom we seem to be placing great burdens or responsibility these days, should be authorized to arrange for units, or a unit, of the United Nations Emergency Force, after the withdrawal of Israel forces, to be stationed at some spot on the gulf to assist in the establishment and maintenance of peaceful conditions in that area. In that connexion may I quote—because I think they are of importance, and because I agree with them entirely—a few words from what the United States representative said yesterday on this immediate problem? Mr. Lodge said:

"We believe it is essential that units of the United Nations Emergency Force be stationed at the Straits of Tiran in order to achieve there the separation of Egyptian and Israel land and sea forces. This separation is essential until it is clear that the non-exercise of any claim to belligerent rights has established in practice the peaceful conditions which must govern navigation in waters having such an international interest. All of this, of course, would be without prejudice to any ultimate determination which might be made of any legal questions concerning the Gulf of Aqaba." [645th meeting, para. 4.]

That, as I say is a quotation from Mr. Lodge's statement with which my delegation entirely agrees.

104. I hope that an agreed solution can be reached along these lines. The alternative non-agreement is so threatening to peace and security that we are bound to put forward every effort, with sincerity and determination and good will, to reach an honourable, peaceful and agreed settlement.

105. Mr. BEN-ABOUD (Morocco) (*translated from French*): I wish to make a brief statement on my delegation's position concerning the attitude of Israel with respect to the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly after the tripartite attack on Egypt.

106. The Secretary-General's report states that Israel has not fully complied with the requests of the General Assembly for withdrawal.

107. During the debate on the Hungarian question, and in connexion with the twenty-four-Power draft resolution [A/3487 and Rev. 1]¹ in particular, my delegation consistently opposed all armed intervention, all aggression and every measure or attitude likely

to lower the prestige of the United Nations, and it consistently voted to that effect. We said [635th meeting]—and this is the essential idea behind all our interventions—that the value of human life was the same in every continent, that we deplored the inconsistency which marred some of our work and that the policy that should be applied by decision of the General Assembly to the aggression in Hungary should also be applied to the Israel aggression.

108. We said, too, that the same measures should be taken, especially when certain Member States either ignored United Nations resolutions or refused to carry them out except on certain conditions.

109. Lastly, we said that if the United Nations was continually swayed by circumstances or considerations likely to render it inconsistent or restrict the scope of its principles, its prestige would be endangered.

110. The policy of force must inevitably have recourse to the tactics of the conqueror. Whether a country is founding an empire or encroaching upon the territory of another, the phenomenon is the same, however great or small the conquest.

111. Sir Percy Spender, the Australian representative, said during the debate on the Korean question in the First Committee [818th meeting]:

"Now the Communist tactics are to say: 'Since we refuse to accept the views of the United Nations expressed in the resolutions of past years, you now make new proposals'. What the minority really want us to do is to move closer to their views and their objectives and, having done so, to compel us later, if they can, by similar arguments, to move closer still, until they bring us, they hope, to their own point of view and to the objectives which clearly they have in mind—a Communist State in the whole of Korea . . ."²

These tactics are not peculiar to the Communists. As an analysis of history will show, they have been used in every conquest which spreads gradually and encroaches little by little on neighbouring countries.

112. That is exactly what happened in the case of the latest Israel attack. The Zionists had already taken the land, the dwellings and the property of nearly one million poor refugees. Next, they appropriated almost one-third of the territory which today they occupy illegally and in violation of United Nations resolutions. Now they want to take possession of more lands, such as the Gaza Strip and others.

113. The Moroccan delegation is more particularly concerned with the question of principle, i.e.; whether the United Nations is going to sanction the right of conquest and convert premeditated aggression into a profitable undertaking, or whether it will lay down as a principle that every aggression must be contained and repulsed.

114. If the aggressor wins the day and gathers the fruits and the benefits he anticipated, there will be nothing to prevent any country from invading another for the purpose of destroying town and strategic points, populations and their possessions, and collecting booty and imposing conditions, with nothing to fear from the United Nations but a resolution or a series of resolutions inviting it to return home in peace.

115. Israel's latest *aide-mémoire* already sounds a note of colonialist paternalism, when it deplores the situation of the refugees at Gaza.

¹ Subsequently adopted as resolution 1132 (XI) of the General Assembly.

² Quoted from the provisional verbatim record, which appears in mimeographed form only.

116. If the United Nations shows a lack of firmness, small countries like ours will, with good reason, no longer feel themselves protected against any combined or premeditated aggression. Hence the position taken

by the General Assembly will be of the highest historic significance and will have far-reaching consequences, for good or ill.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.