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President: Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand).

AGENDA ITEM 56

Question of amending the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter, to increase the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council and the number of votes required for decisions of the Council (continued)

1. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria): An increase in the number of members of the Security Council, like an increase in the number of members of the Economic and Social Council and of the International Court of Justice, would call for an amendment of the Charter. In our view, the Charter, on the whole, is a good instrument, but one which can be rightly amended. We do not hold that the Charter is sacrosanct. We hold, however, that it should be fully implemented as it stands, until it has been duly amended. The deficiency is not so much in the Charter itself, but more in the way it has been applied in respect of the geographical distribution of the seats in the Security Council and other bodies.

2. As we all know, an amendment of the Charter would require the unanimous agreement of the five Powers which have permanent seats in the Security Council. Whether we like it or not, that is one of the provisions of the Charter, and each and every one of the five permanent members has the recognized and established right to agree or to disagree with regard to an amendment. Therefore it would be most advisable to see such an agreement among the five big Powers initiated before the General Assembly takes a final decision recommending an amendment of the Charter.

3. Therefore, for the time being, the Syrian delegation reserves its final opinion on this matter. We should, however, like to indicate our views on this question.

4. The real issue before us is not that of an increase in the number of members of the Security Council, good as an increase might be. The real issue is to arrive at a representation on the Security Council and on the other two bodies that reflects the present realities in the world situation and the changes that have taken place since the Charter was signed at San Francisco.

5. New Members have joined the United Nations, mainly from Asia and Africa, and new States have emerged since the San Francisco Conference, including five Arab States. This represents a change, both in the world situation and in the United Nations, and that change has not been adequately taken into account in the present distribution of seats.

6. Whether the number of non-permanent seats in the Security Council remains at six or whether it is increased to eight or nine, the issue of representation remains the essential question. The primary question to be considered is that of representation, and geographical distribution precedes in importance the question of an increase in membership.

7. The following facts should be noted in this respect. Western Europe is too heavily represented, and this at the expense of Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. The Commonwealth countries always get a seat. We do not always find it easy to locate geographically where the Commonwealth is. Geography sometimes can lose some of its real meaning. For example, at one time Turkey sat in the Security Council as a country from Eastern Europe, and at another time as a country belonging to the Middle East; at least, that is how its election was understood. Perhaps its election could also be understood as that of a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, since the North Atlantic—if not geographically, at least in other respects—has been extended far and wide to cover the Taurus mountains north of Syria.

8. If a good basis is laid for an equitable geographical distribution, one that will become really applicable, it might be of use to increase the number of members. An increase could also help to facilitate a better geographical distribution. We favour an increase in the number of members, with these provisions to which I have referred.

9. This being the case, the Syrian delegation would like to reserve its right at a later stage to present a proposal to the effect that this matter should be referred for further study and consideration to a small committee of this Assembly. In the meantime, the five big Powers would have ample time to try to work out an agreement among themselves, which is essential if a decision of the Assembly is to have fruitful results. On all other matters, the agreement of the five big Powers can well help to bring fruitful results to our deliberations. That would be not only a practical way of looking at things but, in our view, a judicious way.

10. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translated from French): The proposal put forward by a number of delegations that the membership of some of the Organization's permanent organs should be increased, in view of the increase in the membership of the United Nations, raises problems that call for the Assembly's attention. These questions deserve careful study because they have an important bearing on the smooth working of the Organization itself.

11. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria believes that the fundamental principles of the Charter, as they stand, are appropriate to the present stage of development of the international situation and meet the need for peaceful coexistence among States and peoples. If all States adhered strictly to the requirements of the Charter, it would be possible to find a just and equitable solution for all the problems confronting the Organization and to correct situations which threaten to degenerate into conflict.

12. If the fundamental principles of the Charter are applicable to the present situation, and are not challenged, consideration might be given to certain technical amendments, the more so as they are of direct interest to new Members of the Organization and to some of the older Members.

13. As a new Member, Bulgaria has a special interest in this question, because it believes that an increase in the membership of the permanent organs of the United Nations would permit broader participation in the discussion and solution of the important problems before them, and that this would in turn lead to an improvement in the work of the organs concerned and of the United Nations itself.

14. However, the Bulgarian delegation does not see how such a solution can be found in the present situation, since there is a prior question to be considered. How can we discuss the problem of improving the Security Council and giving it a more representative character when one of its permanent members continues to be excluded from it? It is impossible to solve a problem without the participation of one of the most important members of the Security Council, the People's Republic of China, which represents almost one-fourth of the world's population. No one can persuade us that the persons now occupying the seat which rightfully belongs to the representatives of the great Chinese people are really speaking in the name of a State with 600 million citizens. At most, they represent those who, contrary to the fundamental principles of the Charter, are intervening in the domestic affairs of China and whose armed forces have occupied a small part of that great country, where they are maintaining a fallen dictator and his clique.

15. The United Nations, which was founded on the principle of universality, was created as an institution to safeguard peace among nations and to promote co-operation among States and peoples in the economic, cultural and social fields. However, some States are doing everything in their power to transform the Organization into a willing tool of their own policy and are trying to drag it down the slippery slope of Charter violation. For to prevent the People's Republic of China from taking its place in our world Organization is a flagrant violation of the Charter.

16. We believe that the nations of the whole world will be greatly heartened and relieved when the People's Republic of China takes its place in the United Nations, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter. Peace will be strengthened and international co-operation facilitated.

17. In trying to exclude one-fourth of the world's population by various subterfuges—which incidentally deceive no one—certain States are indulging in an exuberant flight of fancy which, at the present time, operates to the detriment both of the United Nations and the nations represented in it. Do they not realize that it would be much easier to take up and solve all

the problems of Asia—and, incidentally, not only of Asia—if the representatives of the great Chinese people were present among us? Do they not realize that it would be much easier to work for co-operation among the nations of the whole world, in all fields of human endeavour?

18. Those who direct these schemes against the Chinese people may hope to derive some profit from the artificial and bizarre situation which they are creating in the world by keeping the People's Republic of China out of the United Nations a little longer, but do not those who lend themselves to such schemes realize the great danger to peace that this entails? Do they not realize the great responsibility which they incur before their respective peoples and before history by allowing themselves to be exploited in this way? If the vote in the Security Council which properly belongs to the People's Republic of China is abused for the purpose of preventing the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic—something which even countries that are not anxious to see Mongolia enter the Organization are reluctant to do—that in itself creates an intolerable situation. Such violations of the Charter are a real danger for the future work of the United Nations and for its very existence.

19. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is of the opinion that it is impossible to deal with the question of amending the United Nations Charter so long as the People's Republic of China is not represented in the United Nations. In spite of its real interest in increasing the membership of the permanent organs of the United Nations, it believes that it would be contrary to the Charter to amend it in the absence of one of the Organization's most representative Members, especially when that absence is wholly unjustifiable and the result of an obvious plot. This situation ought to be corrected; we would then be able properly to deal with the question of making such amendments to the Charter as are necessary to adapt it to new situations. This situation is an intolerable one for the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, and the sooner we decide to put an end to it, the better it will be for the Organization itself, as well as for the interests of world peace.

20. There is another problem of no less importance, which was also artificially contrived and which, in the opinion of the Bulgarian delegation, constitutes a serious obstacle to any practical solution of the question of increasing the membership of the permanent organs of the United Nations. Article 23 of the Charter expressly provides that the non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected with due regard for "equitable geographical distribution". This principle was reflected in a gentleman's agreement among the five great Powers in London in 1946. Under this agreement, the non-permanent seats in the Security Council are allocated to the various geographical areas of the world as follows: two seats for Latin America, one seat for the British Commonwealth, one seat for the Near and Middle East, one for the countries of Western Europe and one for the countries of Eastern Europe.

21. While the provisions of the Charter and the agreements have always been respected in regard to other geographical areas, attempts have been made since the second session of the General Assembly to violate them in so far as the non-permanent seat belonging to Eastern Europe was concerned. There is no doubt that, under the principle of equitable geographical distribu-

tion, all countries, whatever their political and social systems, are entitled to participate in the work of the permanent organs of the United Nations and to cooperate in the work of safeguarding peace among nations. If they participate in this way, the work of the United Nations as an organization designed to seek suitable means of preventing and eliminating dangers to peace, halting acts of aggression, and settling disputes between nations in a pacific manner, will be greatly facilitated.

22. If the Organization adheres to the principle of the equitable geographical distribution of the non-permanent seats in the Security Council, as sanctioned by the London agreement, then the election by the General Assembly on 7 December [612th meeting] of the Philippines as a non-permanent member of the Security Council instead of Yugoslavia must undoubtedly be regarded as constituting a violation of Article 23 of the Charter and of the gentleman's agreement. The objection that another gentleman's agreement to elect the Philippines was made last autumn carries no weight, for such an agreement would be contrary to the Charter and a violation of the London agreement of 1946. No one has a right to conclude agreements that are contrary to the provisions of the Charter and in violation of other existing agreements.

23. We have a high regard for the Philippines as an independent State, and for its representative in the United Nations. However, the Bulgarian delegation does not see how the Philippines, a country several thousand miles from Eastern Europe, with a system of government entirely different from that of the countries of Eastern Europe, and with different international relationships and interests, could represent the interests and aspirations of the countries of Eastern Europe in the Security Council. This election can but create fresh misunderstandings between nations and is contrary to the interests of international co-operation and, consequently, to those of the United Nations.

24. This situation is the more intolerable because the countries of Eastern Europe have been deprived of their non-permanent seat at a time when four more countries of that geographical area—Albania, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria—have just been admitted to the United Nations.

25. Did those who sponsored the candidacy of the Philippines last year fail to realize that they were creating an attitude of discrimination within the Organization which might gravely affect its future work? If that was their aim, it is most regrettable that such a state of mind can exist in this Organization.

26. If any attempt is made to transform the United Nations into an organization of States having the same political systems and to exclude those whose political systems are unpopular in certain quarters, or to place them in an inferior position and to deprive them of the rights that are theirs under the Charter, our world Organization must inevitably be weakened and the universality to which it so rightly aspires must inevitably be diminished.

27. There is a very dangerous tendency afoot of favoring certain States having political systems which are acceptable in certain quarters and of placing other States, which have different political systems and are unpopular in those quarters, in a disadvantageous position. This tendency is tantamount to an attempt to transform the United Nations into an alliance among certain States and to apply, in an Organization based

essentially on the collaboration of sovereign countries, the principle of rule by majority stockholders which governs joint-stock companies. We are opposed to such a tendency and to such machinations, because, if they proved successful, the Organization would lose its universal character and that spirit of co-operation among States which is—or at least ought to be—the very essence of our Organization would no longer exist.

28. The policy of excluding the People's Republic of China from the United Nations—obviously to the detriment of the Organization and of international co-operation—and of depriving the countries of Eastern Europe of their seat in the Security Council, are both contrary to the United Nations Charter. Both have the same goal: to transform the United Nations into a political tool for certain circles which are desirous of using the Organization for purposes diametrically opposed to those prescribed in the Charter. The strict observance of the Charter is essential to safeguard the interests and rights of all States and all peoples. Everything necessary should be done to ensure that the Charter is rigidly adhered to.

29. Although the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is in favour of increasing the membership of some of the permanent organs of the United Nations, so that those organs may have a more representative character, it is of the opinion that it is difficult, if not impossible, to give serious consideration to this question and to arrive at any positive solution until such time as the Charter is strictly applied, until the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations are restored, and until decisive steps have been taken to guarantee the equitable representation of all geographical areas and of all States—irrespective of their political systems—in the United Nations.

30. Mr. TSIANG (China): We have on the agenda of the present session of the General Assembly three important questions which call for amendments to the Charter of the United Nations. One question deals with an increase in the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council and the number of votes required for decisions in that Council; the second with an increase in the membership of the Economic and Social Council; and the third with an increase in the number of judges of the International Court of Justice. The three organs affected are all important organs of this Organization. The procedure proposed is by amendment of the Charter. In these circumstances, it is only natural that the Members should proceed very carefully. My Government has given much thought to these questions, and will continue to examine them with all the care which they deserve. Up to the present moment, my delegation is in a position to make only a preliminary statement.

31. We regard the desire to increase the membership of these three bodies to be natural and reasonable. The draft resolution relating to the Security Council proposed by twenty Powers [A/3446] appears to my delegation to be moderate, realistic and well considered. Our attitude towards this draft resolution is therefore very sympathetic.

32. We have, however, a suggestion of a technical nature which we should like to make to the co-sponsors. The draft resolution, among other things, proposes that a new paragraph 3 should be inserted in Article 23 of the Charter, relating to the first term of service of the two additional non-permanent members. It appears to my delegation that that paragraph does not have

to be incorporated in the Charter. Its purpose is good and can be achieved, it seems to us, by way of a resolution of the General Assembly. This, however, is a suggestion of a minor nature, and is an entirely technical one.

33. Let me turn now to the more important political issues involved. This morning, in the course of his statement here, the Soviet representative tried to link this question with the wholly unrelated question of a seat for the Chinese Communists. In doing this, the USSR is again subjecting the United Nations to blackmail, as it did in connexion with the admission of new Members. We do not believe that the United Nations should pay blackmail to any Member State, no matter how powerful.

34. Then there has been much talk about the phrase in the first paragraph of Article 23 of the Charter, "equitable geographical distribution". I wish to call the attention of my fellow representatives to the entire sentence in Article 23, of which this phrase forms only a part:

"The General Assembly shall elect six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution."

We cannot sacrifice the principle enunciated in the first part of this sentence in order to implement some mechanical formula for equitable geographical distribution. The Charter obviously regards contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security as more important than any scheme of geographical distribution.

35. If this draft resolution is to be implemented as it stands, my delegation will support it. If it is changed or amended, formally or informally, by an understanding whereby the satellite States of Eastern Europe would be assured of a seat in the Security Council, my delegation would have to reconsider its attitude. We regard these satellite States as not being really independent and free. We doubt whether they can make any contribution whatsoever to the maintenance of peace and security.

36. Last year, in the debate on the admission of new Members, my delegation expressed its doubts on the qualifications of these satellite States for membership in the United Nations. We naturally question still more their qualifications for a seat in the Security Council. Any understanding which would give these satellite States a seat in the Security Council, whether written or oral, would arouse considerable opposition.

37. The process of Charter amendment requires not only a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly, but also ratification by Member States. Ratification in many countries means the consent and agreement of legislative bodies. To assign one seat to the satellite States of Eastern Europe would diminish the chances of ratification in many legislative bodies, including the legislature of my country. In a word, the draft resolution as it stands has the support of my delegation. Any addition or amendment in favour of the satellite States of Eastern Europe would make it unacceptable to my delegation.

38. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): The General Assembly has before it specifically an item to amend

the Charter so as to increase the strength of the Security Council. But in the course of the discussion, the whole question of the increase in the size of the other organs has been mentioned, and there is little doubt that there is a close relationship between these two problems, although there are specific circumstances and very important considerations attaching to the draft resolution that is now before us.

39. My delegation, before addressing itself to the various aspects of this matter and communicating to the Assembly its own ideas on the problem as a whole, would like to express to the sponsors of the draft resolution before us its appreciation of the fact that they have thought it necessary to bring this matter before the General Assembly. There is little doubt that the Assembly, by an overwhelming majority, if not unanimously, would consider that some changes in the strength of these bodies, and perhaps in their constitution, are necessary.

40. It is necessary from many points of view. We may not subscribe to the fact, as I shall point out later, that this strength is necessary only because there is an increase in the membership of the United Nations. It is important that there should be some other considerations in our minds.

41. The Security Council came into existence as a result of the decisions taken in San Francisco in 1945 on the basis of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals; and those proposals provided for the present five permanent members, as well as for six others. Later, in London, there was what is called the London agreement—which is not in writing—with regard to the allocation of these non-permanent seats to different geographical areas of the world.

42. We are now faced with several problems. First of all, I will take the one that is referred to in the draft resolution; that is to say, the enlarged membership of the United Nations.

43. In this matter it is not sufficient to think of the twenty Members that have been recently admitted. Since the Security Council was established at San Francisco, there have been twenty-nine new entrants into the United Nations, twenty of which, anticipating the admission of Japan tomorrow, have come in in the course of the last twelve months. Therefore, even before the recent admissions, there was a case for the enlargement of this body.

44. But my delegation also wishes to draw the attention of the Assembly to the fact that, when the United Nations was established, large numbers of States of the world were less concerned with the problems with which we are faced today.

45. There have emerged in the world new countries and, what is more, Asia and Africa have acquired new significance. At the time the United Nations was founded, there were only two Asian countries which were Members of it, namely, China and the Philippines. India was also one of the Members that assisted in the founding of the United Nation, but then it was not independent at the time. It was represented by the then Government of India, and its representation came through what is called the Commonwealth group. Therefore, even taking India into account, there were only three Asian countries. Instead of three Asian countries, today from Asia and Africa we have here seventeen new entrants and probably somewhere around twenty-seven countries belonging to the unrepresented areas.

46. Now, looking at the United Nations as a whole, we find that certain areas of the world are totally neglected, as in the case of Africa, or very much under-represented, as in the case of the whole area of Asia and Africa. Naturally, when certain areas are under-represented, it means, in relation to that position, that certain other areas are over-represented.

47. The considerations governing the composition of the Security Council were in the minds of the framers of the Charter, for when this question of conferring powers on the Security Council was discussed at San Francisco, the Assembly agreed that the Security Council should have wide powers; and one of the reasons adduced was that the non-permanent members were elected by the Assembly and represented the Assembly as a whole. In other words, in the composition of the Security Council, the six non-permanent members were assumed to represent the remainder of the membership of the Assembly, that is, the world as the United Nations then knew it. This of course casts upon us the responsibility of taking into account these considerations.

48. It is well known that when a country is elected to the Security Council, it does not always, and certainly not necessarily, represent the area. There are very well-known instances where the contrary is the case. It is doubtful whether we could totally remedy it, having regard to the sovereign character of our Governments and the necessity for every country casting its vote after consultation with or in accordance with the wishes of its Government. It is, of course, to be argued that the Governments themselves would have to take into account the position that, in view of the intent of this article, and according to the San Francisco discussions and the London agreement, their views should be representative not merely of themselves but of certain groups.

49. It is argued that there are new Members in this Assembly. My delegation wishes to place before the General Assembly not all, but a number of considerations that should go into the composition of the Security Council and its strength.

50. A great many references have been made to geographical representation. From reading Article 23, it is quite plain that geographical representation is not the only factor; but just because it is not the only factor, it cannot be dismissed as merely a factor. It is a very important factor, since the Security Council is concerned with international peace and security, in which geography plays such an important part, and large parts of the world cannot be left unrepresented in this way.

51. The article also takes into account the contributions made by Members to the maintenance of peace and security. That contribution, in the realistic terms of the world as it is, is not to be assessed merely by the positive contributions which they will make, but also by how much world peace and security will be endangered if their co-operation is not forthcoming.

52. Therefore it is unsafe to argue that because members of the Security Council, or certain States, have not contributed recently—or might have done the reverse—for that reason they have to be kept out. In that case we would have a very tragic situation at the present time, with certain permanent members of the Security Council not being available.

53. Therefore it is not merely a question whether they make a positive contribution; it is the weight, the economic, the military, the political and geographical

weight, that comes into the position of a country in relation to the rest of the world that has to be taken into account. We take all these considerations into account when we invite Members to make financial contributions. The financial contributions are judged on capacity to pay, on population, on importance—all kinds of considerations go into it. And we have the countries charged with respective percentages of our total amount.

54. In this draft resolution, it is stated that new Members have come into the Organization and that the Security Council should be enlarged by two members. As I said a while ago, when the Security Council was established, there were 50 Members of the United Nations. Now there are 79 Members. If 11 was considered sufficient for 50 Members, it appears that the addition of two certainly is not a considerable one; it is doubtful whether it is proportionate.

55. When the League of Nations was founded, it had forty-two members. Its strength varied from time to time, because some new members joined and others were expelled or left the League; but its strength varied from 42 to 58 members. And the strength of the League Council varied from 10 to 14 members. Therefore, whether we take the proportionate strength and compare it to the strength of the Members of this Assembly in terms of the history of the United Nations, or in terms of the history of the League of Nations, the present Security Council is much too small for this purpose.

56. It is quite true that at San Francisco, as well as at other places where there was discussion, it was pointed out that the size of the Security Council should not be such as to prevent the urgent dispatch of business. With very great respect, I submit that the lack of urgency in the dispatch of business has not come about so much from the size of the Security Council as from the general nature of political conflict in the world and the irreconcilability of points of view, and perhaps from certain procedural arrangements. So we should not lay too much stress upon the relation of size to expedition. Of course, there is a point that is reached when size becomes a very important factor.

57. I should like next to refer to the suggestion in the draft resolution with regard to the new Members. The implication obviously is to the new entrants, and when the addition of two members is suggested, this draft resolution does not stand merely by the words that are on paper. So much conversation has gone on, so much discussion has taken place, and it is common knowledge that the idea is that there should be one Asian member added—there is no Asian representation now; that is to say, if Asia is regarded as strictly excluding the Middle East and restricted to east, south-east and northern Asia. But, of course, if the Middle East was to be included in the geographical definition of Asia, then it would become necessary to include Eastern Europe in the definition of Europe. It would also be necessary to include Latin America in the definition of America.

58. But, out of the twenty new Members, eleven have come from these areas—the unrepresented areas. Therefore, if there is an enlargement, the whole of this enlargement has to go to that area. On this basis, the purpose of the enlargement is to make the Security Council more representative, reflecting more the membership of the General Assembly. And we say that the Security Council, as at present constituted, is very

ill-balanced, and that the addition of these two members on this basis, instead of correcting that imbalance, will accentuate it. The fact that you add one and one equally at the present time does not offset the fact that there is already a preponderating imbalance existing, and also that the equal seats that are being allocated represent two regions of unequal importance. That is to say, there are more members from Asia and Africa which should be the recipients of this.

59. There are other considerations also which should be taken into account. My delegation would be the last to argue that we could have political influence in this place, or voting power in this place, or anything else, merely or even preponderatingly on the basis of population. That would be a very fallacious argument, and it would vitiate the foundation of the United Nations, which is that of sovereign equal States. But when we are considering questions of security, when we are considering the functions of the Security Council, just as geography cannot be brushed away, so a large weight of population cannot be brushed away. And if we look at the world as it is, 1,304 million people lived in Asia in 1951 out of a total world population of about 2,300 million.

60. Whatever amendment is brought in is not only for this year and, irrespective of all the votes that can be rallied, no power in the world, if the United Nations is to survive, can keep the real Government of China out of this place for a very long time—I doubt if it can keep it out even for a short time. Therefore, for the present purpose, let us include China as being represented—the representation is not necessarily correct, but our views are well known in this matter. Even then, there is one Asian country—or two, including the Middle Eastern countries, representing fourteen Member States in Asia and ten Member States in the Middle East. Therefore those twenty-four countries are represented in the Security Council by two members at this time. The fact that the Philippines sits for one year, by an arrangement which we made last year in order to make the General Assembly function, contrary to the London agreement, does not alter the situation. These twenty-four Members are represented by two members on the Security Council. If we add one more it will make three against twenty-four.

61. Now, we should like to compare this with other regions. There is Africa, with a population of 200 million, and from which there are today four Members in the United Nations. It is quite true that the Union of South Africa could possibly come in as a member of the Security Council, through the Commonwealth group, but I am afraid that the masses of the African population would not regard representation of them by the Union as the representation of Africa. Add to that what can happen in the next four or five years. There is the Federation of Rhodesia, there is the new State of Ghana which will come about in March 1957, there is Nigeria, there are the countries of East Africa and, irrespective of the desires of the administrators and irrespective of the difficulties, there is Algeria. Now all these countries would become Members of the United Nations within a very short period of time, so that there is a large and increasing number of constituents in Africa, and their representation is nil. Egypt, which geographically is in Africa, comes within the Middle Eastern franchise. That is the position in Africa.

62. Now let us take Western Europe. Western Europe today has three seats: the United Kingdom,

France and one non-permanent seat. It is not sufficient, in fact, it is not correct, in this context to argue that the draft resolution refers only to the non-permanent seats. We are referring to increasing the strength of the Security Council, and therefore the permanent and non-permanent seats come into question. There are three seats for 161 million people: that is, one for 53,600,000 people. We would be the last people in the world to minimize the contribution made by Western Europe to civilization during the last 2,000 years and to material civilization in the last 500 years, but I think it would be very difficult for us to adopt the argument of the nineteenth century that one European is equal to ten others. That is not an argument that should be promoted in this Organization.

63. Now, if you add one more seat to this representation, that would make four seats for 161 million people, but let us look at it the other way, if you like. Let us consider that the permanent seats are taken out of this calculation; then there would be one seat for 77 million people in Western Europe as at present, or, if the new suggestions are carried through, there would be two seats for 77 million people in Western Europe, or twelve countries. That is to say, one seat for six countries, which includes large and small.

64. Now I have with me a table of members elected to the Security Council, and it is of some significance to note that it is only from Western Europe that a country has been able to occupy a non-permanent seat twice. The Netherlands was elected twice, Belgium was elected twice. That is to say, there are more seats there, comparatively speaking, than people to contest them, otherwise no country would be elected twice, where in every other part of the world the difficulty is to make it go around once.

65. Therefore there is this very considerable imbalance, and any change that is made must have for its prime consideration that this imbalance must be corrected. While no mathematical distribution is possible, the Security Council must reflect the conditions of the world—as it is.

66. Asia and Africa, politically and economically, and from the point of view of security and peace, have become tremendously important in the last ten years, and, as recent experience has shown, unless these areas and their views are taken into account in our deliberations, the peace of the world will not be as secure as it otherwise might be. That is to say, in considering whether this agreement is to be honoured—and there is some question as to whether there is an agreement, although there is none in our minds—we must bear in mind the fact which has been brought out, that in the future, if there is an arrangement whereby we take the geographical distribution into account, it will have to be more than a gentleman's agreement—whatever that means. It will have to be an agreement of the Members of the United Nations. I am not suggesting that they do not come into the other category, but either there has been no agreement or there is some question about the other characteristics.

67. There are 319 million people, including the nearly 200 million in the Soviet Union, for whom there are two seats provided. On the continent of America, there are 348 million people and there are three seats, and four when Canada gave a seat to the Commonwealth. So, from the picture I have presented to you, you will see that the representation on the Security Council is very disproportionate.

68. Reference has been made to Commonwealth representation. Now this is part of the historical circumstances which existed at the time when the League of Nations and then the United Nations were founded. My delegation is not prepared at the present moment—for reasons which will come out later—to argue as to whether or not this state of affairs should be retained. We could, however, look at the proportions.

69. There are 505 million people in the Commonwealth nations, for whom there is one seat. That is excluding the United Kingdom seat, which is permanent. If you take the permanent seat it makes two, but even then it is lower in terms of population and in terms of countries, in proportion. There is one seat that is divided amongst seven countries today, but next year it will be eight countries, and some of us hope that, during the next three years, it will be twelve countries.

70. So there is an expanding electorate with restricted representation and, irrespective of whether that representation continues or not, it is a fact that an imbalance exists.

71. It is useful to look at the Security Council from the point of view of what it will be in any given year or period of years, and I hope no one will suggest that my delegation is guilty of chauvinism or anything of that sort. Perhaps at this time we could look at India, and I can speak for my own country very much more than for any other.

72. If India were, for example, to seek election through a group of Asian countries, then we would be here, under present calculations, once in twenty-six years. Furthermore, in view of the political changes taking place, in three years' time India would be here once in thirty-six years. We are, of course, hopeful that the United Nations will last much longer than that, but still for any country twenty-six years is quite a long time.

73. Pakistan, our neighbour, with 70 million people and a very strategic position—that country would be here under the same conditions. Now we are elected from the Commonwealth group, we will be here once in fourteen years, next year it would be once in sixteen years, and in the following period once in twenty-four years.

74. I submit that this does not represent the state of the world. It is not sufficient to say that to go from eleven to thirteen is a very considerable advance in correcting this position. First of all, as I say, there is the question of imbalance—disproportion. When you look, not only into the geographical conditions, but into the political alignments, it becomes even more disproportionate, because the Security Council does not function in the way it should function.

75. My delegation therefore regards this problem as one which requires very careful consideration because, once it is amended this year, we cannot come back and amend it next year. The amendment must, therefore, take into account all these factors. We would not be agreeable to any amendment which provided one of the new seats for Asia and the other for Europe, in fact providing one new seat for Italy, Spain and Portugal together. That would not be a correct representation.

76. We cannot sell to our people the idea that it takes twenty other nations to make up for one European nation, which was the theory in days gone by. It is very difficult to sell that today and, what is more, we have no desire to sell it—so that is that.

77. Therefore, to sum up our position, we think that any such amendment should take into account geographical

cal distribution as one of the factors. That taking into account must not be subject to the difficulties which arise from political ideology and, with great respect, this would not apply only to the countries of Eastern Europe. It might apply tomorrow to somebody else. Therefore, if the geographical consideration is there, we think it is safe only if there is some assurance that there is something other than what is called a gentleman's agreement, because there is some difficulty about interpretation. In other words, when does a gentleman's agreement become an agreement?

78. Secondly, we think any changes must correct the present imbalance and maintain the proper balance of populations, not necessarily mathematically, but take this factor into account. I want to be clear: countries with small populations are as important to the United Nations as the very big countries, but we are in this particular matter, where the maintenance of international peace and security is concerned, taking into account the weight in terms of the peoples as one factor.

79. Thirdly, it is necessary that countries which, by and large, can be said to be able to express the views or the sentiments of groups of countries, or through which those sentiments can be channelled—should be represented on the Security Council, and that is why I told you that, if a large country could sit but once in twenty-six years, the Security Council would be rather out of touch with its constituents. And that is why, when an important problem arises, it shifts from the Security Council either to diplomatic discussions outside, or to the General Assembly. And since the General Assembly is not built for this purpose, we are having plenty of difficulties because the General Assembly has now taken on certain functions, for example, in regard to the Emergency Force and so on, for which it was not equipped.

80. Fourthly, the existing representation, which ignores the 525 millions of China, has to be rectified. By the way, I do not place as much insistence upon it in this particular context, because I believe it will be in any case, and we are now discussing the question of seats in relation to countries. So far as we are concerned, China is a Member of the United Nations. The only question is, who sits in the Chinese seats—and that has to be corrected.

81. Last year the Assembly appointed a committee of the whole [resolution 992 (X)] for the amendment of the Charter. We believe that this problem is part of the issues of the amendment of the Charter. Therefore this problem must receive consideration either by that committee, with the request that it should receive priority, or the Assembly should appoint some other representative group to go into the whole of this question. Because, as I said, there is not one consideration; there are large numbers of considerations. And a resolution that is put in this way, so that its provisions would require the ratification of two-thirds of the States, including, what is more, the five permanent members, is subject to the danger that nothing very much may happen.

82. My delegation wants to throw out this suggestion, and this suggestion is not one for postponement. We share with everybody the view that this is not a matter to be shelved. It is a matter to be considered; but mere consideration is not enough, it must result in a remedy that is adequate. Therefore—and I do not put this in specific terms; I only express these ideas, and I hope the many countries interested will take it up and see what can be done as a matter of common consent—

either the Assembly might appoint a small committee representative of all the various interests and groups, or alternately, it might refer it to the committee appointed last year for this purpose, with instructions that this item should receive prior consideration. Then it will be possible to reconcile all these points of view and produce a plan for the Security Council which really represents the world as it is, as best as we can do.

83. Now this was more or less done in regard to the governing body of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Advisory Committee has dealt with this matter, and its recommendations will come before the General Assembly, as they had been before the world conference. They were faced with the same problem. And while the solution is not ideal, they certainly produced a governing body which is far more representative of the world and is capable of more effective functioning than the Security Council itself.

84. My delegation, having brought the attention of the Assembly to various considerations that it has taken into account, reserves its position with regard to this draft resolution as it stands, and, with regard to any other proposal that is made, it also reserves its position. We do not think any attempt to rush the matter in this way, without knowing what the consequences may be, and certainly with the idea that there is one seat for Asia and one seat for Europe, is something that will gain acceptance. It will not get the necessary two-thirds majority or the other requirements. But, apart from the requirements, it will not meet the purposes of this draft resolution as set out in the preamble, in order to provide for greater representation. The greater representation comes very largely from one part of the world; and it is no way of correcting something to add to the incorrectness that already exists.

85. Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand): In this approach to this item, my delegation has felt it desirable to pay regard to the past history of the composition of the Security Council. To us, two points have seemed to be of special importance.

86. In the first place, the terms of the Charter provisions governing composition of the Council have not been strictly applied. In our view, the emphasis of Article 23 is unmistakable. In electing non-permanent members of the Council, the General Assembly is required in the first instance—and I emphasize that—to pay special regard to the contribution of United Nations Members to the maintenance of international peace and security and the other purposes of the Organization. It is required also, and the emphasis is clearly a secondary one, to pay regard to equitable geographical distribution. However, in actual practice the special emphasis of this article has been reversed. In general, the political and practical device of allocating seats according to the group system has been, I think, satisfactory.

87. However, the procedure has had three notable deficiencies. It has involved the apparently indefinite exclusion of certain countries which do not fall within an identifiable grouping. Secondly, it has provided inadequate numerical representation for one of the most important areas of the world. Thirdly, disagreements have arisen which have resulted in deadlocks damaging to the prestige of the Assembly. Clearly, in considering the future composition of the Security Council, we should seek to eliminate or at least to reduce these deficiencies.

88. It is with these thoughts in mind that my delegation has studied the draft resolution submitted by the nineteen Latin American States and Spain [A/3446]. I

should like to say at the outset, however, that while I attach great weight to the arguments which have been advanced in favour of the proposals, I do not regard those arguments as completely decisive. It has been explained, for instance, that expansion of the Security Council is given special importance and urgency by the recent increases which have taken place in General Assembly membership. I do not in fact dissent from the view that the dramatic nature of this increase does create special circumstances and does have special implications for this Organization. But I do not believe that increases in membership even as sweeping as those we witnessed last year automatically call for changes and expansion in all constituent organs of the United Nations.

89. The records of the San Francisco Conference, and indeed the text of the Charter itself, clearly show that, when the size of the Security Council and other bodies was determined, it was foreseen that the membership of the United Nations would increase in the future, and this factor was taken into account. Furthermore, my own recent experience in the Security Council has convinced me that special and possibly paramount importance should attach to the practical working efficiency of that very important body.

90. I have no doubt, in view of the special procedures employed in the Council and of the serious responsibilities which it is called upon to discharge, that the Council should be as compact as possible. Subject to these qualifications, I agree that the problem before us has a special character owing to the recent increase in the representation of both Asia and Europe. I believe that when these circumstances are set against what I have said concerning the practical efficiency of the Council and the intentions of the first San Francisco Conference, there remains on the whole a balance of advantage in favour of increased non-permanent membership in the Council. The limits of that increase and the procedures by which it should be accomplished have, I feel, been satisfactorily outlined in the proposals submitted to the Assembly.

91. My delegation is in principle prepared to support these proposals. I wish to make it clear, however, that we do not regard them as based merely on an arithmetical relationship to the changes in General Assembly membership and as therefore open to reconsideration when further increases have taken place. We regard them as taking adequate account of changes which have occurred and will occur in the near future. We do not regard them as a stop-gap. At the very least, we feel they should be accepted as setting the limits of Security Council membership for a good many years to come.

92. For this reason, we feel there is great weight in the arguments advanced here in favour of a firm understanding concerning the basis upon which the non-permanent membership of the Council should be determined each year. The special interpretation that in past years has been placed by this Assembly in the application of Article 23 of the Charter is not one with which my delegation would quarrel, nor do we have any objection to the elaboration of a further agreement concerning the distribution of non-permanent seats in favour of geographical and other groupings. Clearly, however, if such an agreement is to prevail and be effective, it must not be subject to the imprecisions and varying interpretations which have caused so many difficulties in the past.

93. It must be such as to win the firm adherence of the permanent members of the Security Council, upon

whose approval depends the passage of the twenty-Power draft, or indeed of any other proposals affecting the composition of the Security Council. It must, we believe, pay due regard to the groups favoured by the existing convention. It must take account of the sound claims for the wider representation of Asia. It must meet the standard of precision in defining the basis of representation for Eastern and Western Europe. And it should, in our belief, be related in a formal and overt manner to the resolution ultimately adopted by the Assembly.

94. We believe that, without causing undue loss of efficiency, the proposals before us will serve the important functions of extending the scope of representation in the Council and of modifying in some degree that position of special favour enjoyed by the permanent members. We consider that earnest efforts should be made to reach agreement upon the conditions which will give the proposals before us their full meaning and will enable this Assembly to adopt them as soon as possible. Delay in this matter, we think, confers no advantages, but will merely impart new elements of difficulty to a problem in which I am bound to say the elements of complexity are inherent.

95. In particular, and in conclusion, we are opposed to any attempt such as that made by the Soviet representative to link the question before us with another question, a question which, as the representative of India has pointed out, is not before us and is in fact a completely separate issue.

96. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcomes the initiative of the twenty Governments whose delegations have sponsored the draft resolution before us [A/3446].

97. We all know how much work and thought went into the drafting of the Charter. We all know that many, if not all of its provisions represent a synthesis of differing points of view. To amend the Charter in any respect is a very serious matter. This is certainly true of any amendment whose effect is to enlarge the Security Council. If the Security Council has not been able to fulfil the functions entrusted to it under the Charter—and we must, I think, admit that this has in many ways been the case—we should to my mind seek the cause for its shortcomings not in the provisions of the Charter, but in the international tensions which were not foreseen or at least not fully understood when this world Organization was founded.

98. At the end of the most terrible conflict in human history, a spirit of hope and optimism prevailed. That was, in itself a good thing, and although we cannot afford to lose contact with realities we must not for one moment regret that the Charter is an idealistic document. Our aim must be to realize the hopes on which the Charter is based. That will be a long process at best, and changes in our constitution will not in themselves accelerate it. Certainly an increase in the size of the Security Council will not in itself increase its effectiveness. On the contrary, it seems to me essential for the exercise of its functions that the Security Council shall remain a small, compact body.

99. In the language of Article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council acts on behalf of the Member States as a whole in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, and Members of the United Nations confer on it primary responsibility in this field "in order to ensure prompt and effective

action". Its size was of course carefully considered when the Charter was being drawn up. There were weighty reasons which led to the decision that it should have eleven members only, and in many ways it would be preferable that there should be no increase at all in its size. If, for instance, the great increase that has taken place since the United Nations was first founded had come more or less equally from all parts of the world, it seems to me that, even with eighty Members, we should have been well advised to keep to the eleven-member Security Council with which the United Nations started out when it had not much more than half its present number of Members.

100. However, such has not been the case. The pattern of membership is not now what it was eleven years ago, and the admission to our ranks in the last twelve months of nineteen additional Members—by tomorrow, I am glad to say, the figure will surely have risen to twenty—all this brings to a head a problem which was already making itself clearly felt.

101. Quite simply stated, the problem is as follows: with only six non-permanent members on the Security Council, it has been getting more and more difficult for us all, in electing them, to pay due regard to "equitable geographical distribution", as Article 23 of the Charter tells us among other things to do. We all remember with discomfort the protracted difficulties with which we met at the tenth session in filling one of the non-permanent seats on the Security Council. That was an unpleasant experience and led to much criticism of the United Nations. But it seemed to me at the time that the criticism was not quite fair, for it tended to ignore what lay behind the difficulties, what made it so hard to break the deadlock and why so unusual a solution was proposed by our wise President, my friend Mr. Maza.

102. Of course we do not want anything of the kind to happen again. However, I believe that it probably will unless some remedial action is taken. And conceivably the difficulties that have in the past applied to only one of the non-permanent seats might spill over to others of them. That is a very disquieting prospect. And that is why I applaud the initiative taken by the sponsors of the twenty-Power draft resolution and not only their initiative, but also the concrete proposal contained in their draft resolution for an increase by two in the number of non-permanent seats on the Security Council.

103. I am glad to be able to say that my Government accepts this proposal. It does so for two reasons. In the first place, it believes that, if the number of non-permanent seats in the Security Council is increased from six to eight, disputed elections can be avoided in the future. With the two additional seats, the principle of equitable geographical distribution can be complied with to an extent that has become increasingly difficult, and without upsetting any of the existing conventions in regard to the distribution of seats.

104. In the second place—and this is a point to which my Government attaches very great importance—the increase in the size of the Security Council is kept within limits which should not hamper its effectiveness. In fact, my Government believes that the twenty-Power draft resolution is not only an acceptable solution but the right one, the only one that in all the complicated circumstances of the case could go through and become a reality. We are therefore all the more indebted to the sponsors of the draft, and I commend the proposal to all my colleagues.

105. I know it has been argued that a mere increase in the number of the non-permanent members of the Security Council is not enough, and that such a measure must be complemented by a formal agreement as to the distribution of seats. I am not myself of that opinion. I believe that if the number of non-permanent seats is increased to eight, there will in fact be no difficulty about their allocation, just as there has hitherto been no difficulty about the allocation of five of the six existing non-permanent seats. There have been certain quite informal conventions in regard to these seats which were not the less effective for being informal.

106. I believe that, if the number of non-permanent seats is increased to eight, informal conventions of an equally effective character will see to it that the one existing seat which has given rise to difficulties and the two new seats will in fact be distributed without causing any friction or trouble. It is clear in my own mind how this should be done in order to comply with the terms of Article 23 of the Charter, and I believe that the same pattern of allocation is clear not only to the sponsors of the twenty-Power draft resolution, but also to all delegations.

107. My own inclination, therefore, would be to stop where the twenty-Power draft resolution stops so far as formal action by the General Assembly is concerned, leaving it to the informal processes which operate in every human organization to make sure that the purpose of the draft resolution is not frustrated by further disputes. This conviction of mine is all the stronger because I believe that, given the composition of the General Assembly as it is now, any attempt to upset in later years the pattern of allocation that lies behind the twenty-Power draft resolution could not succeed; and

since it could not, in my view, succeed I do not see why it should ever begin.

108. However, the demand for some sort of guarantees has been made, and my delegation was quite willing to see what could be worked out. We have had discussions with certain other delegations, and I feel confident that a satisfactory arrangement could be made on that score—satisfactory to the sponsors of the twenty-Power draft resolution and to the rest of us.

109. But now we have heard from the representative of the Soviet Union [621st meeting] that the whole question of expansion cannot even be discussed here in the Assembly without the representative of the People's Republic of China. He has used the word "inadmissible" in this connexion, and has made it quite clear that, in his view, the representative of the People's Republic of China must be seated here as a prior condition to further discussion of the subject.

110. This injection of the question of Chinese representation is, to my mind, quite unjustified. It is a separate question which, at the beginning of this session [580th meeting], it was decided not to consider. To raise it in the context of our present discussion seems to me very much like sabotage, and I hope that Mr. Kuznetsov will modify his stand. He will incur a heavy responsibility if he does not do so.

111. Nothing that the representative of the Soviet Union has said has shaken me in my belief that the twenty delegations which have sponsored the draft resolution have pointed to the right road ahead in the interests of the United Nations and of harmonious relationships between countries. I hope that we shall take it.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.