

GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

EIGHTH SESSION

Official Records



PLENARY MEETING

Tuesday, 1 December 1953
at 10.30 a.m.

New York

CONTENTS

Page

Question of atrocities committed by the North Korean and Chinese communist forces against United Nations prisoners of war in Korea (<i>continued</i>)	361
---	-----

President: Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi PANDIT (India).

Question of atrocities committed by the North Korean and Chinese communist forces against United Nations prisoners of war in Korea (*continued*)

[Agenda item 74]

Sir Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom), Vice-President, took the Chair.

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): When the item concerning atrocities allegedly committed by the North Korean armed forces and the Chinese People's Volunteers against American and other prisoners of war was put forward in the General Committee by the United States delegation for inclusion in the agenda of the present session, the USSR delegation pointed out that the reports of alleged atrocities were a crude fabrication, filled—like Colonel Hanley's report in 1951—with slanderous and lying references to acts and incidents which in reality never took place.

2. It was clear to everyone who was at all familiar with the history of the question that the United States proposal for the inclusion of this item in the agenda of the eighth session was merely a repetition of the venture tried by United States military circles in 1951. The main purpose pursued by the United States military circles at that time in publishing Colonel Hanley's report was to wreck the armistice negotiations which were then going on at Panmunjom. A secondary purpose was to conduct a propaganda campaign among American soldiers in Korea, in order to counteract the wide-spread desire for peace and for a cessation of the war which existed among American and other servicemen in the ranks of the so-called United Nations armed forces. Colonel Welch, of General Ridgway's staff, openly said at the end of his report that General Van Fleet had thought a propaganda campaign about the "horrors" of communist imprisonment necessary because, as he said, the morale and fighting spirit of the so-called United Nations troops had recently suffered a disastrous decline. Colonel Welch investigated the circumstances of the publication of Colonel Hanley's report and concluded that Colonel Hanley's accusations had absolutely no basis in fact.

3. Mr. President, are you sure that we have a quorum? I do not intend to speak if the meeting is not properly constituted.

4. The PRESIDENT: A quorum is thirty-one members. We will find out whether there are thirty-one delegations here.

The roll was called, and the following delegations responded:

Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Liberia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

5. The PRESIDENT: There are forty-six delegations here, so I think we may proceed.

6. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Thank you, Mr. President.

7. It should also be noted that according to an Associated Press dispatch published in the *New York Herald Tribune* of 16 November 1951, Colonel Hanley stated that he had published his report in order that American soldiers should not be tempted by communist promises of good treatment. Thus, in playing his dirty game Colonel Hanley himself laid all his cards on the table. But his incendiary plot failed; which was only natural, since the colonel, encouraged by his superiors, piled up one lie on another for all the world to see, so that exposure was inevitable. He lied on 14 November 1951 when he stated that 5,500 American prisoners of war had been killed. He lied again when on 16 November he raised the figure to 6,270 Americans and added 7,000 South Koreans and 130 Allied prisoners. He was lying again when he invented the story that the presumed figure of 3,000 American prisoners of war allegedly killed by the North Koreans during the first months of the war, together with the non-Korean casualties, totalled nearly 6,000. He was still lying when he launched the tale that 200 United States Marines had died as a result of "atrocities". He lied again when he declared that the number of civilians killed in South Korea during its occupation by North Korean troops had reached 250,000, for he himself said on the same occasion that the total number had actually never been determined.

8. No wonder that in order to make these lies look better in print—as noted in Murray Schumach's article in *The New York Times* of 21 November 1951—and to conceal the fact that there was absolutely no evidence to support Colonel Hanley's figures, rumours were launched that the evidence on which his figures were based was confidential.

9. Now the same story is being repeated. Once again we are hearing the same old accusations, accusations which when they were first made were disavowed by General Ridgway's own staff as being false and totally unfounded—to quote Colonel Welch, who investigated the affair. That the United States delegation should once again be putting forward this exploded, discredited and shameful document, originally concocted by Colonel Hanley and his henchmen, is of course no accident. One proof of that is the news item which appeared in *The New York Times* of 29 October 1953, announcing the publication by the United States Army of an interim historical report of the Korean War Crimes Division. The paper makes a comment in that connexion which deserves serious attention—I am quoting *The New York Times* of 29 October 1953. It says that “the timing of the release of the report appeared to fit a deliberate pattern . . . devised by psychological warfare experts”.

10. The nature, purposes and methods of this psychological warfare are well known. But the purpose pursued in the preparation of psychological warfare plans, in connexion with the question of the treatment of prisoners of war by the North Korean armed forces and the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the one hand, and with the cease-fire negotiations, on the other, may be judged from a characteristic statement of Colonel Hanley which, while made some time ago, remains fully valid today. The initiation of discussions of war crimes at that time, said Colonel Hanley, would have been dynamite for the peace talks in Korea.

11. These facts fully substantiate and corroborate our assertion that the entire story of the “atrocities” allegedly committed by the North Korean armed forces and the Chinese People's Volunteers is nothing but a propaganda manoeuvre of unparalleled cynicism and perfidy, which can be counted among the most serious crimes against peace and humanity.

12. How cynical and hypocritical, therefore, were the insincere speeches made from this rostrum, urging respect for the dignity and worth of the human person and for international law and insisting on humane and civilized conduct—matters to which Mr. Lodge and other authors of this entire strategem referred to here yesterday [462nd meeting].

13. Mr. Lodge referred in his statement to the material submitted by the United States delegation, published as United Nations document A/2563. He called it documentary material. Yet a glance at this alleged documentary material shows that it cannot possibly be termed documentary. It is no better than waste-paper, and the most cursory examination shows that its authors are not only forgers, but crude and clumsy forgers. Mr. Lodge said that, with a few exceptions, “none of the individual statements in this document have been revised or edited”. But that is not so; indeed, we are told in the so-called historical report that “surplusage” was removed from the files and destroyed. Moreover, according to the same report, definite plans were drawn up for the questioning of repatriated United States and South Korean prisoners of war who might have some information on war atrocities. All these measures show that the old practice of fabricating documents and depositions with the aid of friendly and specially briefed “witnesses” is being continued with renewed zeal.

14. Mr. Lodge's remark that these depositions contained statements of fact was also inaccurate. The mere fact that, as admitted in the so-called historical report issued by the United Nations Command in Korea, “surplusage” was removed from the files and that the material thus removed was destroyed clearly reveals the criminal manner in which the so-called investigation was conducted. The destruction of any documents in investigation proceedings is tantamount to direct falsification of evidence. The so-called editing of records, and especially the removal from the documents of what the investigators consider superfluous—which is what took place during the investigation whose results are now before the General Assembly—indicate a doctoring of the documents which is absolutely inadmissible in any properly conducted investigation, and which can only be called falsification of evidence.

Mrs. Pandit resumed the Chair.

15. The fact that the evidence was falsified is evident from the instructions for the guidance of investigators drawn up by that very same notorious Colonel Hanley who was the initiator of this trumped-up plan of provocation. It is admitted in the report that a special operating procedure to be used in obtaining the necessary information from prisoners of war was worked out for the purpose of compiling material to be used as evidence against the North Korean armed forces and Chinese People's Volunteers, that in obtaining this information the main pressure was exerted on returning South Korean prisoners of war, and that the military investigators were compelled to attend special lectures on “administrative procedures and investigation techniques”. Thus the report itself shows that everything necessary was done to ensure that the United States military authorities obtained the type of information they were interested in.

16. No wonder the report also admits that by means of such measures—to use its own words—“pertinent information” was “extracted” from Navy and Marine prisoners of war. I repeat: “pertinent information” was “extracted”. What reliance can be placed on so-called depositions and statements—for that is what the information amounts to—when, as the authors of the report themselves admit, they are edited by the investigators to suit their superiors, when what is termed “surplusage” is extracted and when the investigators revise them as they see fit? In the circumstances, how is it possible to say, as Mr. Lodge did, that these documents constitute factual evidence? Clearly, there can be no question here of facts. Document A/2563, it should be added, shows that in order to “extract pertinent information”—to use the words of the historical report—constant use was made of leading questions which ensured that the investigators received the kind of reply they wanted. For example, when Private Sutterfield, in one case, tried to give a good account of North Korean prison conditions, and stated that the prisoners were treated well and that the sick and wounded were given medical treatment, the investigator was plainly displeased and, as may be clearly seen from the record of the interrogation, persisted in attempting to elicit the kind of replies he wanted, literally prompting the soldier as to what he should say and how he should put it.

17. The material contained in document A/2563 are the product of forgery and falsification. When we study

the documents carefully, the fact that becomes immediately obvious is that the great majority of the cases and the various charges contained in them are based entirely on the confessions of prisoners of war who were clearly trying to save their own lives by making these depositions. Moreover, the original investigation of these "incidents" or "cases" was carried out by the South Korean police, which, as is well known, used barbarous and brutal investigation methods.

18. It should be noted that in November 1950 the British *Daily Mirror* published a special dispatch from its Seoul correspondent, Don Greenlees, under the headline: "Stop these atrocities". In it, Mr. Greenlees cited numerous cases of arrested persons being beaten into insensibility during interrogation in South Korean police stations, in the process of extorting from them the kind of depositions the investigators wanted.

19. At the same time, the special correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph and Morning Post* at Seoul reported that the methods of interrogation of the South Korean authorities were very cruel, that he had seen police beating prisoners, and that, according to reliable information from official non-Korean sources, there was evidence that even more cruel methods were being employed.

20. At a time when ruthless martial law was being enforced in South Korea and when there was no hesitation in ordering mass punitive measures even against persons merely suspected of acts hostile to the United States armed forces, there could obviously be no guarantee—and there was none—that the investigations would be properly conducted, with even the most elementary fairness. It is established by irrefutable facts that the interrogations were conducted under conditions of unbridled arbitrariness and illegality. That is the most important point. But to that must be added the fact that the so-called investigation contained many very serious fundamental defects and irregularities, which helped to distort the facts and to facilitate forgeries. For example, there was no registration of the graves of the fallen or of the places where bodies were found. That, of course, precluded any possibility of checking and verifying the work of the investigators.

21. It was consequently easy to fabricate figures of casualties among the prisoners of war. That this was in fact done may be seen from the material presented by the United States delegation. Figures were fabricated at will, according to the tastes and requirements of the investigators, or rather, in most cases, of their superiors, who gave them orders on the subject. At the same time, comprehensive arrangements were made for "collecting"—as it is called in the interim historical report, or, in other words, preparing—the "facts" required by the authorities. This is obviously the explanation of the various arrangements to which reference is also made in the report, when it speaks of the "reorientation" of activities connected with the dissemination of information about war crimes.

22. From disconnected observations in the report, some idea may be formed of the aim of the reorientation referred to. That aim, as the report says, was to "organize" the material, that is to say, to arrange it in accordance with the purposes of the investigation. Arrangements were made for the "reinterrogation of selected prisoners", not of all prisoners who had made

depositions, but of "selected" prisoners, who might be suited for the part of false witnesses, bare-faced liars and so forth. All this was done to prove that American prisoners of war had been subjected to brutal treatment. This, in accordance with the psychological warfare plans to which I have already referred, was to justify the attempt to establish false "documents" designed to arouse hatred of the North Koreans and Chinese, to render the Korean negotiations more difficult and to prevent a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. At the same time, it was planned to use the entire affair to increase tension in international relations. That and that alone was the real purpose of the whole business. It is a put-up job.

23. Throughout document A/2563, convincing proof is to be found that the whole business is an act of provocation and merely an episode in the cold war, and that its purpose is the same as that of the cold war. All these facts, all these arrangements, all the plans and the methods which were employed in the conduct of the so-called investigations into the so-called atrocities, cannot be passed over in silence. We cannot ignore all these circumstances revealing the incendiary aims which the so-called material submitted to the General Assembly by the United States delegation is intended to serve.

24. To sum up, we may say that no investigation of the incidents alleged to have taken place in Korea was actually conducted by the United States military authorities; indeed, that was not their purpose. As I have already said, the purpose was quite different, and had no relation whatever to any real effort to establish the truth; it was merely to invent non-existent facts and use them to arouse hostility and hatred for the enemy and to facilitate the further pursuit of a policy contrary to the interests of peace, international co-operation and friendship among nations.

25. I thought it necessary to make these preliminary observations before beginning to examine the material—or at any rate the more important part of it—contained in document A/2563.

26. Let us turn to case No. 67, with which Mr. Lodge began his speech yesterday. The facts of this case, according to Mr. Lodge's statement, are that after several brushes with the enemy, Captain Brewer, an officer in an infantry battalion, took refuge together with his driver in a roadside ditch in which there were already eight or nine United States soldiers. After some time, they surrendered to the enemy and were placed under the guard of North Korean soldiers. Then, it is alleged, the guard, without warning, opened fire on the prisoners, firing many shots, and someone, according to Mr. Lodge, then went round the room kicking the prisoners to make sure that they were all dead. When the North Koreans went away the next morning and the United States armed forces had retaken the position, it is alleged that in the house referred to in the account they found and identified the bodies of six slain American soldiers. Captain Brewer himself and four others, who, in their own words, played dead after the shooting, survived. It was they who told the whole of this story. None of the perpetrators, Mr. Lodge says, was ever identified.

27. If we now turn to the material relating to this event in document A/2563, we shall see that a number of very substantial changes and corrections will have

to be made in Mr. Lodge's account. Mr. Lodge stated, for example, that "none of the perpetrators was ever identified". In the interim historical report, however, it is clearly stated in black and white that a North Korean sergeant was taken prisoner and admitted participation in the shooting. Consequently, Mr. Lodge's statement that none of the perpetrators was ever identified is incorrect.

28. But this leads on to a number of conclusions. If this North Korean sergeant was captured by the United States armed forces and admitted participation in the murders, it would be of some importance to see the record of his interrogation. If he made a confession, it must obviously have been written down somewhere. If it was written down, it must be contained in some record. Where is that record? There is no record of the interrogation of this North Korean sergeant in the material relating to the case, nor is there any mention of him in the depositions of those who were interrogated on this case, namely, Captain Brewer, to whom Mr. Lodge referred, and another witness, Corporal Frederick Herrmann, corporal in the Service Company of the United States Seventh Cavalry Regiment.

29. In addition, the description of this alleged shooting of American prisoners given by Mr. Lodge is not in accordance with Captain Brewer's deposition. Captain Brewer said in his statement that heavy fighting was in progress near the house where he and his companions were being held prisoner.

"We could hear", says Captain Brewer (I am reading from document A/2563), "a 50-cal. and either some of our artillery or our tanks firing into the hills near where we were seated. We were sweating it out in fear that they would hit the house with our artillery . . .".

That is a very important circumstance, which cannot be simply ignored or passed over in silence as though it was a matter of no significance. It appears that at the very time when the shooting of the American prisoners was alleged to be taking place in the house, fierce fighting was going on in the surrounding area and in the vicinity of that very house. Artillery was roaring, machine guns were rattling, tanks were thundering; they were firing into the hills near the house where the American prisoners were being held: those were the circumstances. That inevitably suggests a conclusion quite different from that drawn in the report itself, which has been repeated here without criticism by Mr. Lodge.

30. Let us hear a little more of what Brewer says. Brewer is a captain. That is to say, he is an educated man who understands the meaning of what he says. "Then", he says, "they asked us why our planes came over and bombed them" (i.e., the guard and the American prisoners—all those who were in the house). The North Korean guard, Captain Brewer says, asked why American aircraft had come and bombed the house in which the American prisoners and their North Korean guard were stationed. He goes on to say: "Approximately at 5.30 or 6 o'clock there was a lot of confusion and running in and out of the buildings as the fire fight was continuing outside." And then it is suddenly stated in the account that the guards, without warning, opened fire on the prisoners, who, according to the record, were sitting around the room.

Presumably they were sitting against the walls of the room.

31. All one need do is read this record through carefully—though that has not been very easy, because this mass of material covering nearly 200 pages¹ reached us all only two days before the question was opened for discussion.

32. I feel bound to digress somewhat here, for I cannot pass over this point without expressing my very real indignation. It is preposterous that in so serious a matter, in which such grave charges have been made, not only against those who are at war with the country whose representatives have engineered this whole intrigue, but also against other peace-loving countries, the material should have been made available to delegations only two days before the question came up for discussion—and in a foreign language to boot, for many representatives know neither English nor French, the working languages. We had only Saturday and Sunday in which to read up this entire mass of material. Obviously that was done deliberately — you will forgive my frankness—in order to make it physically impossible for the General Assembly to familiarize itself with all the documents in the proper way. A mere two days in which to study 200 pages without first receiving a translation in one's own language: does not that make a mockery of any serious examination of this matter by the General Assembly? The whole affair is an absolute farce, deliberately engineered to prevent the General Assembly from deliberating calmly and objectively, as befits so important a subject—for that is obviously quite impossible in the circumstances.

33. But to resume: if you nevertheless study this case carefully, you will see quite clearly that the whole account of this alleged massacre is highly improbable. According to the account, the incident took place in a small room, at short range, where to have escaped sustained fire from automatics would have been a sheer miracle, yet five men survived. Miracles do not happen, either in nature or in society, yet here, by some freak, what amounts to a miracle took place. And yet the guard verified the results of their fire—if we are to believe the statement, for instance, of Corporal Herrmann, who was shot but survived; for he says: "I lay under the table . . . Then I felt something on the back of my neck which seemed to me to be the butt of a rifle, which somebody was using to see if I were alive."

34. In these circumstances it is quite absurd to try to represent this whole affair as a massacre of American prisoners of war by the North Korean guard, a massacre which no less than half of the alleged victims survived—with evidence being given by people who were sitting under the table at the time. Of course these are mere details, but, as the French say—and we lawyers know how true it is—he who proves too much proves nothing. That certainly applies to the rubbish piled up in these all but 200 pages of United States "material", which, we are asked to believe, represents genuine documentary evidence. When it is borne in mind that all this was going on while a fierce artillery and machine-gun battle was raging round the house, and that the place was being bombed by American aircraft, then it becomes even more obvious that to

¹ The reference is to the mimeographed document.

represent this as a massacre is utterly false. Of course there was no massacre; that is all fantasy, sheer fabrication.

35. No wonder the following passage may be found, word for word, in the interim historical report, where you can read it yourselves. I am quoting the words of the authors of that report on this very case, one to which they nevertheless attach great significance as proof and evidence. They write:

"Close examination of the evidence leaves some doubt as to whether this case was properly referred, since there seem to be discrepancies between the confession and the survivors' statements".

These are not my words, but those of the authors of the report. What is referred to is the substantial discrepancy between the testimony of Captain Brewer and that of Frederick Herrmann. I cannot go into the matter at greater length now—it would take too long—but I have felt bound to dwell on the case in as much detail as possible, so that you may all convince yourselves that what we are dealing with here is in fact a sham, a counterfeit, a forgery—and a very crude, clumsy and unsuccessful one at that.

36. In the circumstances, one cannot but wonder how it is that the historical report refers expressly to a North Korean sergeant who, it seems, was captured and confessed that he took part in the massacre, while Mr. Lodge said not a word about this sergeant—on the contrary, he said that none of the criminals had been identified. Mr. Lodge really should have read the documents he has submitted to us. On another page of those documents we read that one of the criminals, a North Korean sergeant, was captured and confessed to participation in the crime.

37. Again, what accounts for the discrepancy, which the report itself points out, between the confession and the testimony of the survivors? What is the explanation of such discrepancies? There has been no thought of any inquiry into this question; it would be an awkward matter to explain. Yet this is a very important point, because until we clear it up we cannot judge whether the investigators in this case conducted themselves conscientiously, and what credence can be given to the account of this episode. And that is particularly necessary because this is perhaps one of the most important and weighty charges contained in the entire material.

38. Thirdly, it would be highly useful to learn what justification there can be for including this case among the authentic documents, when everything I have just said shows clearly that it cannot by any stretch of the imagination be called authentic. It is not impossible that the slain prisoners of war were the victims of the American air bombardment of their place of custody, or that they were killed by the artillery and machine-gun fire described by Captain Brewer in his deposition.

39. An analysis of this and many other cases shows that no reliance can be placed on such material, and that all the other documents of the same kind are nothing but forgeries and inventions. Let us now pass to examine some of the other cases.

40. Let us take case No. 16, for instance. In section IV of the historical report, which contains an account of this case, known as "case No. 16, hill 303", it is stated baldly that communist prisoners of war had

confessed to participation in this crime. The case seems clear: certain communist prisoners of war confessed to participation in this crime. The impression is thus created that certain persons perpetrated this crime and later admitted to it. But if you turn to the account of this case in the material contained in document A/2563, you will find an entirely different story. According to this document, two North Koreans, Kim Kwong Taek and Chong Myong Dok, were captured by an American patrol. And these same two North Koreans appear to be the main source of the evidence on which the whole charge of massacre is based.

41. What do we find? These documents say it was established that Kim Kwong Taek was present when the shooting of the American prisoners of war took place, and that Chong Myong Dok was not only present but actually took part in the shooting. You may read this for yourselves in black and white in the material submitted on this case. But at the same time document A/2563—and this too you may read for yourselves—says both these North Koreans claimed that they had been "mess boys for the North Korean soldiers and that they were not present at the scene of the massacre". Yet earlier in the same document it is stated that these men were not only present but actually took part in the massacre (or one of them, at any rate), even though we have their categorical statement that they were in the kitchen, mess-hall, or wherever they worked, and were not present. If they were not present, then they could not have taken part. Now one or the other of these statements must be false; two contradictory statements cannot both be true. On one occasion or the other they must have lied. That being so, it should have been ascertained why they should have lied on the first occasion, and whether they were telling the truth on the second. Or perhaps they lied in the second instance and not in the first. That should be for the investigator to find out; it should be the duty of the prosecuting authority in charge of the case, if he has any intention of carrying out his task honestly and conscientiously. But if he has no such intention—and that was evidently the case in all these charges—then of course the answers to all these questions will never be found in the documents. There is an obvious contradiction here, one that was not solved in the course of the investigation.

42. We have no right—we who are called upon here to be the judges in this case—to evade our duty to resolve and remove this contradiction; for a case built on an unresolved contradiction cannot have any legal value, or value as evidence. In such circumstances the case is a fraud.

43. If we turn to the testimony recorded in document A/2563, we shall see that all we have is the statement of Kim Kwong Taek, that is, of a man who denied being present at the shooting, who declared that he was in the kitchen or looking after the mess-rooms and was not there at all. Let us examine this statement of Kim Kwong Taek. What do we find? Let me warn you first that this Kim is a very suspicious character, for it appears, by his own admission, that he knew neither the first name nor the surname of his commanding officer, nor the name of a single man in his unit. That is highly unlikely. Imagine a soldier not knowing the name of his neighbour in the ranks. Imagine a soldier not knowing the name of his com-

standing officer. Yet Kim himself testified that he knew neither his commanding officer nor any of the men in his unit. He says that is because he had only just joined the unit. But, however recently he had arrived in the unit, he must have known at least one of his comrades—or at least his commanding officer. That is an elementary requirement of military discipline and regulations.

44. Kim testified that his whole company of fifty men, including himself, had taken part in the shooting of the American prisoners of war. But how can this be reconciled with his first statement that he was a mess-boy for the North Koreans and did not take part in the shootings? What is the explanation of this discrepancy? The official record gives one version of the case. The statement of Kim Kwong Taek gives a detailed account of the shooting, in which he himself is alleged to have taken part. But nowhere in all this material is there any record or document containing Kim Kwong Taek's statement that he did not take part in or even witness these shootings. The record containing his confession of complicity gives a full account of the incident; but there is no record containing his denial of participation. Is that normal? Surely, it justifies the charge of falsification of documents. Indeed, the falsification is only too obvious.

45. Some light might have been shed on this case by the statement of the other North Korean captured with Kim, Chong Myong Dok; but Chong Myong Dok's deposition also is not to be found among the documents. It is as though Chong Myong Dok did not exist, or at any rate had nothing to do with this incident. But in that case why should there be any reference to him in the documents submitted by the United States delegation?

46. Thus we have the following situation. Two North Koreans are accused. One of them, Kim Kwong Taek, makes two contradictory statements, one of which is missing from the records. The other witness, Chong Myong Dok, whom Kim names, is also accused, but there is not a sign of him in our documents; no statement, no record; nothing. If Chong Myong Dok was in fact captured with Kim, why, we are entitled to ask, is there no statement from him? Why was he not questioned? It is clear from the document that he is in custody and consequently could have been interrogated about the incident. Why, then, are there no records containing a general statement about the incident in the words of this second witness, Chong Myong Dok, and indicating the part he himself played in it? No such record exists. There is absolutely no trace of all this in the documents.

47. There is another very important point: the sudden appearance in the case of an entirely new witness, Heo Chang Keun. If one turns to the statement of this unexpected "witness", one sees that gives a completely different account of the events of 17 August from that given in the other documents. For instance, whereas Kim says that a whole company of fifty men took part in the shooting, Heo Chang Keun says that only nineteen men took part—and he suddenly adds that four tanks operators also participated. If one reads through all the documents, one finds that this is the first mention of any tank operators. Kim Kwong Taek does not mention any tanks or tank operators around hill No. 303, where he is supposed to have been and where, it is alleged, all these events occurred.

48. Thus the "investigation" has obviously failed to tie up all the loose ends. The whole case is clearly a pure invention, and a clumsy, though impudent, one at that.

49. Let us now proceed to case No. 28 A, which Mr. Lodge also mentioned. The scene of the incident was Taejon. The first thing that one notices is the discrepancies in the numbers of alleged victims. The historical report says that between 5,000 and 7,500 men were killed, whereas document A/2563 mentions a figure of 1,000 to 5,000 soldiers and civilians. In connexion with the alleged shooting of forty-two American prisoners of war, we read in document A/2563 that two of those prisoners—Sergeant Weinell and Private Ralph Peters—were found alive on the next day by a Korean named Kim Hong Kee. But, in this case also, the documents are not complete: Kim Hong Kee's deposition is missing. Hence, the circumstances in which the two men were found are not known. Did Kim Hong Kee actually find them? In what state did he find them? We do not know. We are told that the day after the shooting Kim Hong Kee found these two American prisoners of war who had been shot but had survived. But Kim Hong Kee's deposition is not available, and we therefore do not know on what evidence the allegation is based. The question naturally arises why there is no relevant record or statement. Surely, if Kim Hong Kee found these American prisoners of war who had so miraculously survived the shooting, he is a very important person in the case and must have been far more thoroughly interrogated than anyone else.

50. But, as in case No. 16—and this is a characteristic feature—there suddenly appears a new witness, namely Song Hong Bom, of whom there is no previous mention either in the historical report or in document A/2563, submitted by the United States delegation. Where, then, does this Song Hong Bom come from? And why was nothing heard of him before, particularly during the investigation, when, it seems to me, a much clearer picture of the incident could have been obtained; when the events were still recent, and not, as now, one and a half to two years old. The documents submitted do not explain how Song Hong Bom, a simple private in the North Korean army, managed to appear at the police station at Taejon after the North Koreans had evacuated that town. Thus this man, who was an eye-witness of all these atrocities, stayed behind when the North Koreans forces were abandoning Taejon, although he was a private in the North Korean army. And it is this man—clearly a traitor and an *agent provocateur*—who now appears before the police to give evidence! I ask you to bear these circumstances in mind.

51. In view of certain observations contained in the documents on this case, however, we have every reason to assert that Song Hong Bom had already been connected with the South Korean police. He does not deny that, nor does he deny having been in contact with the captain investigating war crimes. Thus there can be no doubt that Song Hong Bom's part in all these investigations was that of an *agent provocateur*; that this deserter and traitor was probably sent from South Korea, with appropriate instructions, and infiltrated the ranks of the North Korean army. And now this individual makes his appearance in the proceedings! Incidentally, it is impossible to understand

how he can appear in this case, when there were actually only two witnesses: those whom I have already mentioned. Thus there can be no doubt that the whole incident was pure invention.

52. There there is the testimony of Sergeant Weinel, which deserves attention. There are many reasons why Sergeant Weinel's deposition cannot be simply ignored.

53. Firstly, it is worthy of note that during the period when, it is alleged, these prisoners of war were massacred by the North Koreans, the prisoners at the command post where Weinel was being held and where this alleged bloody incident occurred were being treated very well, according to Weinel's own statement. Weinel twice emphasized that the prisoners were treated very well. True, it appears that the translation is not very accurate at this point. The translation I have says "very well"—but even if the word "very" is deleted, the word "well" remains.

54. Secondly, Weinel said that at that time American aircraft were intensifying their attacks, and that they strafed the building where the American prisoners, including a number of wounded, were being held.

55. Thirdly, Weinel testified that American aircraft bombed the prison where the American prisoners, including himself, were being held; and, again, some of these prisoners were wounded men. His testimony also indicates that, at the time, Taejon was under heavy fire from American artillery.

56. Weinel testifies that he saw a group of men shot before his eyes and that he himself was wounded but miraculously escaped and was saved. This testimony is highly improbable. Indeed, many of these cases are highly improbable: persons are shot but survive and then turn up as witnesses to recount in full detail everything the investigator wants to hear about certain alleged incidents—incidents which in reality never took place.

57. In the present case, one fact that is obvious and cannot be ignored is that, despite the investigator's attempt to make Weinel testify that he had witnessed the shooting of the groups preceding his own, Weinel replied:

"Well, I didn't actually see them shot. I didn't dare move myself; however, I knew darn well they threw them in the ditch."

But how could he have known? In any event, he was not required to state his beliefs. A witness is required to tell what he saw and what he did not see, what happened and what did not happen. A witness is not an expert; a witness must state the facts. And, so far as the "facts" are concerned, Weinel said quite definitely that only one group had been shot before his eyes; that he had seen no others shot. Another peculiar fact is that, in testifying that he had been one of a group of Americans who had been shot, Weinel stated that the men who had done the shooting had not been in uniform. Weinel's own words were: "They didn't have uniforms on." He also said he did not know to which unit they had belonged or where they had come from. He even emphasized that only two out of every thirty of them had been armed. If that was so, it is clear that the group was not a military unit or part of the North Korean army or Chinese volunteer forces.

58. There is no doubt that this case, too, is a fabrication. Weinel quite suddenly brings up this "shooting"

after saying he had been well—even very well—treated. Everything was going well and then, suddenly . . . But during all that time fighting was going on and there was shooting and bombing—and of course it was this bombing that caused the death of the men in question.

59. Let us turn to case No. 28 B, which also concerns Taejon. The whole case rests on the testimony of Moon Byong Ho, who claims that he participated in the shooting of no fewer than 360 policemen and political prisoners at the Taejon prison on 25 September 1950. According to the record, Moon Byong Ho testified that he could lead his interrogator to the very scene of the execution. Presumably, then, the interrogator should have gone there to ascertain the facts; and then he should have drawn up a report and called in a medical commission. Incidentally, nothing is said anywhere in the 200 pages of the report about any autopsies by doctors to ascertain whether or how the prisoners were shot. Perhaps some evidence in that respect is still available. Mr. Lodge says that there would be a mountain of evidence if it were all submitted. To be sure, all the material is not required; we might even be crushed under its weight. But at least the most important material, particularly that supporting the charges made here, should have been submitted. One cannot simply say that since there is a large amount of material it cannot all be submitted. To give that as a reason for submitting practically no material apart from documents containing unconfirmed and completely unfounded charges is quite unjustifiable.

60. The available material does not show whether Moon Byong Ho led the investigators to the scene of the execution, nor does it contain any evidence to support his testimony. It is significant that he said he had killed the unidentified young man under the bridge because the latter had refused to show him the proper road to take. In the first place, nothing is known about this unidentified young man. We do not know what relation he had to the prisoners of war—either from the United States or from the other countries which, with the United States, intervened in Korea. Moon Byong Ho met this young man and, without any warning, shot him. He must therefore be a criminal or a bandit—or perhaps a madman. Nevertheless, he turns up here as the key witness, saying: "I killed one unidentified young man . . . because he didn't show us the road." Perhaps he killed a North Korean. At any rate, nothing is known about it. He offered to lead the investigator to the place where the murder had been committed, to the place where, he alleged, this young man had been "executed". Here again, there is no record showing whether or not the interrogator accepted Moon Byong Ho's offer. For the second time, Moon Byong Ho asked the interrogator to accompany him to the place where this "atrocious" was said to have been committed and where the material evidence could be found, but the investigator obstinately refused to go.

61. Nor is this all. It appears that this Moon Byong Ho had killed another man. And when had that happened? On 17 July 1950 near Su Won, during an American air raid, when, in his own words, "we saw one unidentified young man firing at us with a rifle". What nonsense! American aircraft are carrying out a raid, and suddenly, from a bridge, a young man begins firing at his fellow Koreans with a rifle. So,

to quote Moon Byong Ho's own words, he shoots this young man. When questioned, he once again offers to lead the interrogator to the place where the man is buried; and, in this case, also, the available material does not say whether or not the interrogator accepted the offer.

62. In other words, Moon Byong Ho commits three murders; three times he asks the investigator to accompany him to the place where those murders were committed and where the evidence may be seen; and three times the investigator refuses to go, merely writing down what this half-lunatic—or plain bandit—tells him. This bandit perhaps fools the investigator—and probably is well paid for his testimony, as was already said yesterday. The relation of this whole case, if it did occur as recounted by Moon Byong Ho, to these "atrocities" committed on prisoners of war is quite incomprehensible. In fact, there is no relation whatever between them. It seems to me that it requires only simple common sense to understand that we must deal with such a witness cautiously, to say the least, and must not rely on his testimony, which is not based on objective facts.

63. But Moon Byong Ho is not the only witness presented here. There is another: Eun Ok Tong, who testifies that no fewer than 4,500 men were shot at Taejon. And the authors of the report duly take note of that statement—to use a common expression. But one has only to examine the testimony of Eun Ok Tong, contained in document A/2563, to realize that it is obviously absurd.

64. For instance, Eun Ok Tong says that a group of 1,500 men was taken from the Taejon prison and led to a place several miles away to be shot. He says that he was one of those men, but that he managed to survive because he was not noticed among the dead bodies—another case of a miraculous escape.

65. I should like first of all to ask the following questions. Why were 1,500 men taken from the Taejon prison to a place several miles away? If these men were really shot, how could Eun Ok Tong have remained unobserved when, according to his own testimony, the bodies were carefully checked and even counted after the shooting? How could he have seen all this when, as he himself says, he was severely wounded—and wounded in the face, at that? Also, how can one reconcile his statement that he was sitting with the other prisoners of war at the foot of the mountain with his later statement that, when the shooting began, he "rolled down the mountain"? How could he have rolled down when he was already sitting at the foot of the mountain? This is obviously an illiterate concoction—and it was used by the eminent doctors and scientists who were supposed to verify all these inventions presented as evidence. I would also add that this same Eun Ok Tong said that he was wounded on 25 September 1950—and, as we know, wounded in the face. How, then, was he able to turn up at the police station on 27 September, that is, two days later, and offer to indicate the place where the South Korean and American prisoners were buried?

66. And now for my final question. If Eun Ok Tong saw everything that happened, how can one reconcile his statement that the events in question occurred on 25 September with the fact that, since 27 June, he had been in a prison cell in Taejon, unable to leave?

On 27 June, the man was sitting in prison, unable to leave his cell, and yet he knows all about a shooting which took place somewhere else. He had a severe facial wound—and you can imagine how serious such a wound was—but, in spite of this, he went to the police station two days later. This is completely incomprehensible. A miracle must have occurred. Indeed, the whole story is miraculous. To present such data as serious evidence is simply an affront to our common sense. I think we are all being taken for very simple-minded, naïve people, without any experience or common sense.

67. There is the strange case of Moon Byong Ho. He himself was present at the executions. Now, imagine this man going to the police and "confessing". Nobody ordered him to go or summoned him; he appeared before the police on his own initiative and said: "Gentlemen, you need a man who was present at the executions: here I am. I was present at the executions, and we killed no fewer than 360 men. Moreover, I can tell you where it happened." But any investigator with a grain of sense would have said: "My friend, how can you know all this when you were in prison at the time? How could you know this, how could you have been present at the executions, when you had been in prison, had spent two days at large in the town and were very seriously wounded? Why are you voluntarily risking your neck? Who put you up to it?" It would have been most important to find that out. But no information in that respect is given. All that is clear is that this witness was very well-informed: a fact which is highly suspect. No conscientious person could place any reliance on such a witness. But he excellently meets the requirements of specialists in falsification and fact-juggling.

68. It is upon evidence like that of Moon Byong Ho and Eun Ok Tong that this whole case is built.

69. The historical report on this case mentions that some of the prisoners were killed in a church-yard and a basement. Document A/2563, however, contains the affidavit of Captain Robert Shultice, an American, in which he says that he was unable to find the bodies either of the missionaries or of the American soldiers who were supposed to have been killed there.

70. The report also states that many bodies, some thrown in ditches, were found in various parts of Taejon. Mr. Lodge also referred to this yesterday. Now Captain Shultice testifies that there really was a trench behind the courtyard of the police station, and that—as we shall soon see—corpses really were found in it. But, according to the evidence of Captain Shultice of the United States Army, the trench had served as an air-raid shelter. Mr. Lodge shuts his eyes to this fact. Acting as if he were unaware of this passage in Captain Shultice's affidavit, he says: "Open trenches were used as both execution ground and burial site." Mr. Lodge pretends he does not know that, throughout the summer and autumn of 1950, Taejon was brutally bombed by United States aircraft and that hundreds and thousands of people taking shelter in ditches were killed by the bombs.

71. When these brutal raids by the United States Air Force occurred, they were reported in *The New York Times*. I have taken pains during the last two days to verify this fact: the raids actually were reported in *The New York Times*. It is not surprising that there was a large number of dead bodies in Taejon

when the North Korean forces were evacuating the city: but the bodies were those of people who had been killed by the American bombers. Let me remind the Assembly that the raids by the United States Air Force were carried out on a mass scale—the town was blitzed from the air by B-26 bombers and F-80 and F-51 fighters. The raids occurred by day and by night. On 8 and 9 August 1950, for example, B-26 aircraft bombed Taejon day and night for forty-eight hours without interruption. Taejon was completely destroyed by these violent, barbaric air raids. The following report of a correspondent of one of the newspapers of the Sinhwa agency was therefore well founded:

“Taejon was a large, modern town with 200,000 inhabitants. Today there is practically nothing left of it. There is nothing left to bomb. Nevertheless, American aircraft are coming over every day, dropping bombs and strafing the town with savage cruelty, trying to blot out all traces of its existence.”

72. The documents submitted by the United States delegation say nothing about these truly brutal crimes committed by American military aircraft. Neither did Mr. Lodge when, with a long face, he made an appeal here yesterday to our humanitarian feelings.

73. In his affidavit, Shultice testifies about murders that are supposed to have been committed in the Taejon prison. But it seems that his information in this respect is based entirely on what he was told by certain unknown persons who were not interrogated: he is not describing what he himself saw, for the very reason that he knows nothing about the matter. He obtained his information, as he himself says, from people he happened to meet in the street, people who of course could not be interrogated. Shultice's informants were two men he did not know: a South Korean soldier and a South Korean policeman. The first witness, according to Shultice's affidavit, was confused and vague. The South Korean policeman whom he interviewed spoke of various cases where there had been bloodshed and stated, to quote Captain Shultice's own words, that he thought it unlikely that the people who had killed the prisoners of war in the Taejon courtyard had been North Korean soldiers. That is the whole of the so-called evidence in this case. How, then, could Mr. Lodge cite the case as one of the main proofs in support of these provocative and slanderous charges against the North Korean armed forces and the Chinese People's Volunteers?

74. Mr. Lodge also invoked case No. 32 to prove that many South Koreans had been burnt to death in the prison at Sochon. Let us consider the material on this case contained in document A/2563. It appears from the material that, out of a total of thirty-two bodies discovered, twenty-nine had been found in a charred condition outside the prison, simply in its vicinity. If there were only thirty-two charred bodies, what grounds are there to believe the reports that 280 men died in the prison? Yet that was the figure Mr. Lodge unjustifiably cited here, without subjecting it to critical analysis.

75. It also appears from the document that the prison was burnt down on 27 September 1950, and that on 28 September it was opened and the families of the victims removed the bodies. The historical report describes how this jail was burnt down; it was surrounded with packing cases and other combustibles, drenched in gasoline and set afire. But the material

given in document A/2563 does not so much as refer to what the historical report describes. Even Yun Kap Tuck, the Chief of Security, in his evidence on the burning of the jail, nowhere mentions that it was surrounded with combustibles and burnt by the North Koreans. Neither is anything said by the other witness in the case, Rim Wan Sun, a policeman at Sochon. He says nothing about the jail being burnt by the North Koreans. Nor does the third witness, the American Colonel Ellis, say anything about it. He states that the jail was burnt. But by whom? In what circumstances? He does not know, and is silent on the subject. He also states that in addition a building adjacent to the jail had its roof burnt off. Why was the roof burnt? It was not set alight from inside, there were no signs of that. Evidently it too was fired from the air. This is rendered the more probable by the fact that Sochon was in the battle area and was systematically bombed by United States aircraft, so that it would have been quite natural for the jail to have been burnt down in one of the raids. Advantage was then taken of the occurrence to throw the blame for the barbaric bombing on the North Korean forces.

76. One could go on and on analysing these so-called cases given in the documentary material contained in document A/2563. Reference has already been made, here, to the provocative and fraudulent nature of a number of other cases. So I do not think I need go on with this analysis.

77. Yet I cannot refrain from referring to a few of the cases. Take, for instance, case No. 125. The report of the War Crimes Division itself, describing this whole execution incident, says: “It is doubtful that this case should be considered as an atrocity.”

78. Again, in case No. 29, it is seriously reported that two North Korean officer prisoners “confessed” they had killed 2,000 so-called anti-Communists. According to the historical report on this case, a check showed that approximately eighty were slain. In one place, 2,000 men, in another eighty! Let us turn, now, to the evidence of two survivors of this execution. (I have to emphasize once again that it is curious that there is at least one survivor for every execution; one man escapes in order that he may be able to appear afterwards as an important witness. That, too, is suspect.) I repeat, according to the evidence of these two survivors, there were not even eighty men in this group, but only sixteen and these two witnesses say that death of those sixteen men resulted from beatings at the hands of the mob. That, of course, was a crime, but was it a crime committed by the North Korean armed forces? What has this to do with war crimes?

79. Then there is case No. 90, which relates how thirty-six political prisoners were killed and how two prisoners of war confessed to having taken part in the crime. But it is interesting to find the following phenomenon: each of the prisoners accused the other of committing the crime. Now, if each acknowledged the fact of the crime and said that he had not done it, but that the other had, and the other confessed to the crime and likewise accused the first, can it be said that they both confessed to the crime? They did not confess, but incriminated one another.

80. Mr. Lodge endeavoured to represent cases of prisoners of war dying on the marches that took

place in the autumn of 1950 as war crimes. Even the sick and wounded, he complained, were obliged to go on foot with little food and no medical assistance. But with the towns and villages of North Korea lying devastated thanks to incessant air raids, with no one spared, neither the old nor women nor children, neither the sick nor the wounded, neither friend nor foe; with United States aircraft destroying crops and food stores, the privations the prisoners of war suffered on the march were inevitable. The United States Air Force was destroying everything in sight. It burned down peaceful towns, including hospitals crowded with sick and wounded, who died along with the doctors and other medical staff in the fires started by the United States aircraft. And after all that, people complain about inadequate medical assistance! Who was there to give such assistance, when doctors, nurses and dressers had been killed, when medical supplies had been demolished and food stores burnt and destroyed? In such circumstances complaints of the kind we have heard from the United States representative are pharisaical and hypocritical in the extreme.

81. In concluding this analysis of the material submitted by the United States delegation, I think there is little need for me to prove, after all I have said, that it consists entirely of invented "facts", which never were real facts, but were based on forgeries, lies and slander for criminal political ends. These inventions speak for themselves. They also reveal the attempts made by reactionary circles in the United States, by bringing false charges against the heroic North Korean forces that were defending their country's independence and the valiant Chinese People's Volunteers who came to their aid in their hour of need, to hide their own crimes, their cruelty and brutality, which were not exceeded by the crimes and brutality of the Hitlerite barbarians.

82. It was quite clear from the moment the question of the alleged atrocities committed by the North Korean armed forces and the Chinese People's Volunteers arose that those accusations were entirely unfounded and were dictated by criminal political considerations without any connexion with the truth, and that the truth was being sacrificed to the plans and aspirations of the United States reactionaries who, it may well be, are anxious not only to maintain but actually to increase the present international tension, and have not the slightest wish for a pacific settlement of the Korean question.

83. The cynicism and offensiveness of such actions are the more glaring in that it is the United States authorities themselves that are shamelessly flouting all the rules and principles of international law relating to the protection of prisoners of war. There is abundant evidence of inhuman and truly brutal treatment of North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war in the United States camps. In very many cases, United States armed forces, acting under the United Nations flag, barbarously exterminated peaceful civilian communities.

84. This appears from such evidence as the letter dated 18 December 1950 from the delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in South Korea to Syngman Rhee, signed by two members of the International Red Cross, de Reynier and Fred Bieri. The letter gives an account of the situation in

two prisons in Seoul. The writers say that they found 9,200 prisoners there dying of starvation and without any medical care, although there were innumerable cases of tuberculosis, dysentery and influenza and of maladies resulting from undernourishment. De Reynier reported that on one of his morning visits to one of these prisons he saw with his own eyes about fifty dead bodies of men, women and children. According to statements made to him by the governors of the prisons and the prison doctors themselves, the daily rate of deaths due to starvation alone was about 100. Such is the testimony of members of the International Committee of the Red Cross in South Korea.

85. This is how the Associated Press correspondent, Mr. Boyle, described the barbaric raids by United States aircraft on Yungdon in 1950: he said that at dusk the hills and villages near Yungdon had been wrapped in flames. Yungdon, he said, looked like Nagasaki after the explosion of the atomic bomb. He wrote, further, that Yungdon had suffered very severe damage from the incessant raids by United States Army and Navy aircraft. He could see a thin wisp of smoke rising from the ruins of the town—the rest was a flat desert.

86. A United Press correspondent in Taejon—the self-same Taejon that you have referred to here—reported in July 1950 that information had been received from an official South Korean source that nearly 100 prominent Communists had been murdered by the South Korean authorities before the latter's withdrawal from Seoul.

87. Mr. Poats, a United Press correspondent, reported on the same occasion that he personally had seen two lorries filled with kneeling people beaten to death by the South Korean police, who then, before his eyes, threw the bodies out of the vehicles. They called these people "partisans".

88. An Associated Press correspondent has confirmed that many villages where there were supposed to be enemy forces were burnt to ashes. It is not known, says the correspondent, how many people perished in their homes during these operations.

89. A United Press correspondent reported, on the basis of information obtained from reliable United Nations sources, that in a single week of December 1950, 800 political prisoners, including women and children, had been executed at Seoul, and that on a single day, 11 December 1950, South Korean firing squads had shot 578 political prisoners in the northern suburbs of Seoul.

90. The *Chicago Tribune* reported that a ban had been placed on the disclosure of such information—for the United States command subsequently prohibited the publication of such news in the Press—because of the embarrassment felt by the United States military authorities.

91. According to incomplete data, the number of members of the Korean People's Army taken prisoner, killed, wounded or mutilated by the forces of the United States or of Syngman Rhee runs into tens of thousands. The report of the Commission of the Central Committee of the North Korean United Democratic Fatherland Front shows that prisoners of war belonging to the Korean People's Army were stabbed with bayonets, crushed under tanks, thrown into cauldrons of boiling water, drowned, beaten, starved or frozen to death.

92. The nature of the atrocities to which Korean and Chinese war prisoners were subjected in the camps at Koje, Cheju and elsewhere, of which I must remind you, may be judged from the appeal sent out by over 6,000 prisoners of war from Koje Island, where scores of prisoners perished daily in iron cells and under the machine guns, flame-throwers and tanks of the United States troops, which the camp executioners used ruthlessly, and entirely without cause, to wreak their rage on the captured officers and men of the Korean People's Army.

93. Those are the true facts concerning brutal crimes committed against North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war by the United States armed forces, acting on the direct orders of their command.

94. The Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea made numerous appeals to the United Nations, urging that the Security Council should take steps to put an end to these atrocities. Thus, in an appeal addressed to the Security Council by the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic in August 1950 [S/1674], reference was made to numerous instances of the use of inhuman methods of war by the United States armed forces in Korea. The United States Air Force, the appeal stated, was carrying out barbarous raids on undefended Korean towns where there had never been any military objectives, destroying schools and hospitals. The appeal drew attention to the massacre of peaceful inhabitants, and to cases where peasants working in the fields, passenger trains and passenger steamers, had been fired on. The barbarous crimes of the United States Air Force had reached such a pitch that United States aircraft were firing on women washing clothes and children bathing in the streams. On 7 September 1950 [S/1778/Rev.1], the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea again demanded that the Security Council should take prompt steps to put an end to the criminal activities of the United States armed forces. But, to the shame of the United Nations, all these appeals were vain.

95. In the following years, the misdeeds of the Americans and of Syngman Rhee's butchers continued with ever-increasing violence, despite the protests of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, despite the intervention and the protests of international organizations, and the insistence of wide sections of the public and of democratic organizations on the observance of the Hague Convention of 1907; it is obvious from the facts I have adduced that that convention was deliberately violated by the United States armed forces, which turned Korean towns into heaps of ruins.

96. And now, five delegations, those of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey and Australia, supporting the United States delegation's malicious and slanderous charges against the North Korean armed forces and the Chinese People's Volunteers, are preaching in the draft resolution they have submitted about the need for observance of what they call the basic legal requirements set forth in the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949 relating to the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilians in time of war. But it is a little late for these five delegations to be talking about the conventions; for more than three years they have been involved

in the barbarous massacres of prisoners of war and of peaceful civilian.

97. We have seen who were the real perpetrators of atrocities committed in violation of the conventions and of the fundamental standards of international law; they try to cover up their actions by hurling slanderous and mendacious charges at the North Korean armed forces and the Chinese volunteers, and by presenting draft resolutions such as the one which the Assembly now has before it. This draft resolution does not contain a single paragraph which could be adopted and supported by genuinely peace-loving and honourable people. There is not a single paragraph in it for which any man striving for international co-operation and the strengthening of peace and international security could vote. It is impossible, in my opinion, to vote even for the second and third paragraphs of the preamble, which refer to quite undisputed matters, namely, the provisions of the Geneva conventions, because they appear in a context which determines the whole meaning and nature of the draft resolution; this draft amounts to a blatant calumny of the North Korean armed forces, the North Korean people, and the Chinese People's Volunteers, a calumny which also affects other peace-loving peoples.

98. In this matter, the General Assembly cannot and must not serve as the instrument of the policy of reactionary forces in the United States and certain other countries. The General Assembly must reject the solicitations of those reactionary circles, which are striving to prevent the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and to frustrate the efforts of the peace-loving countries to reduce and remove international tension and to promote international co-operation and the peace and security of the nations.

99. By forcing the General Assembly to consider the question of the alleged violation of the principles and standards of international law by the North Korean armed forces and the Chinese People's Volunteers, the United States is simply pursuing its foreign policy, which is to prevent the relaxation of international tension and to enable it freely to continue the armaments race and to prepare a new world war. That is why the reactionary circles in the United States have found it necessary, at this very time, when the USSR Government is making every effort to bring about a reduction in international tension and to secure the settlement of outstanding international problems, to try to place fresh obstacles in the way of such an outcome, which corresponds to the vital interests of all peace-loving peoples.

100. Evidence of that may be found in the speech the United States representative made yesterday morning [461st meeting], in which he did not hesitate to engage in outright slander of the Soviet Union. I cannot of course let that slander pass.

101. Mr. Lodge dared to say, with reference to our criticism of the agreement concluded by the United States with Franco, that it was strange that such charges should emanate from the representative of a Power which in 1939 had concluded with Hitler a pact which, he said, left Hitler free to launch his outrageous and destructive aggression against Western Europe. By such outrageous slander of the Soviet Union, Mr. Lodge displayed what may, to put it mildly, be described as a regrettable lack of knowledge,

not to say ignorance, of the matter to which he was referring. The incontrovertible facts are known, and they show that the hitlerite aggression became possible and led to the Second World War precisely because the United States had helped Hitler to create the military and economic basis for German aggression, thus arming the aggressor. That is a process which is even now being repeated in the case of Western Germany and the Adenauer Government.

102. It is also common knowledge that if the United States had not financed the heavy industry of hitlerite Germany, and if the United Kingdom and France had not at that time withdrawn from the collective security system, as they did, but on the contrary had organized collective resistance to German aggression, together with the Soviet Union, as the Soviet Union was then urging, then the hitlerite policy of aggression would have failed. That that did not happen was due only to the disastrous policy pursued by the United States, the United Kingdom and France throughout the pre-war period. It was their fault that the Hitlerites were able to unleash the Second World War, which lasted for almost six years and destroyed millions of human lives.

103. As for the Soviet-German Pact of 1939, it is necessary, if the profound historic importance of that wise measure of Soviet foreign policy is to be properly understood, to know the true facts of the case. And the facts were these. Despite all the Soviet Union's attempts to reach agreement with the United Kingdom and France on mutual assistance against the aggressor on a basis of equality, those two countries, and particularly the United Kingdom, plotted behind its back with a view to isolating it, thus making it possible for Hitler to attack the USSR without danger of resistance from the United Kingdom and France. At that time the British were conducting backstairs negotiations with Germany, in spite of the fact that they were simultaneously engaged in negotiations in Moscow also—though they did not attach the same importance to these negotiations as to their talks with the Germans, the Hitlerites. It is obvious from the whole policy of the United Kingdom—I am speaking, of course, of 1939—that the rulers of the United Kingdom were prepared to surrender Poland to Hitler.

104. In those circumstances, the Soviet Union was faced with a choice. One alternative was to accept, in self-defence, Germany's proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty, thereby gaining a further period of peace which it could use to increase its preparedness against aggression. The other alternative was to reject Hitler's proposal for a non-aggression pact, thereby enabling the war-mongers to involve the Soviet Union in an armed conflict with Germany in circumstances which, owing to the fact that the United States, the United Kingdom and France were pursuing a policy designed to isolate the Soviet Union, were thoroughly unfavourable to my country. Mr. Lodge should understand that in those circumstances the Soviet Union had only one choice—to conclude the non-aggression pact with Germany.

105. It has evidently not occurred to Mr. Lodge that it was precisely by deciding on that course of action that the Soviet Union actually gained the time to create an eastern front against the hitlerite aggression—to the great displeasure, of course, of the anti-Soviet forces in the West. For the sake of objectivity, however, it

must be said that even in the West at that time there were statesmen perspicacious enough to understand the logic of the Soviet policy, and to applaud the measures of defence which the Soviet Government was taking, measures such as the establishment of an eastern front. It is no coincidence that in October 1939 Mr. Churchill, who at that time was still First Lord of the Admiralty, stated that in the face of those measures, in the face of that policy on the part of the Soviet Government, nazi Germany would not dare to attack. It is perfectly obvious that when the Soviet Union concluded its non-aggression pact with Germany in August 1939, it did not for a moment doubt that sooner or later Hitler would launch his attack against it. It was necessary to gain time. The Soviet Union was able to use the whole of the succeeding period to build up its defences against a possible aggression, and, when the time came, it repelled the aggressor. The tactics and the policy pursued were thus fully justified.

106. The Soviet Union was able to break the power of the hitlerite war machine, which penetrated as far as the walls of Stalingrad; it was able to drive back the hitlerite hordes and to raise its flag of victory over Berlin, and thus liberate Europe and the whole of mankind from the horrors of hitlerite fascism.

107. When Mr. Lodge indulged in his unworthy attacks on the Soviet Union yesterday, he obviously forgot such things as the offensive launched by 150 Soviet divisions on a broad front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians at the end of December 1944 and in January 1945, when the Anglo-American forces were in difficulties in the Ardennes. In a letter to Stalin dated 17 January 1945, Mr. Churchill expressed gratitude on behalf of the British Government and congratulated the Soviet Government on the gigantic advance which the Soviet forces had begun on the eastern front in an effort to liberate the Anglo-American armed forces from the iron claws of the German fascist troops. The result of that advance was to break up the German's winter offensive in the west, which was aimed at the seizure of Belgian and Alsace, and to give the armies of our allies a chance to go over to the offensive against the Germans in their turn, and thereby, as stated in the order which Stalin, then Commander-in-Chief, issued to the Soviet forces, to co-ordinate their offensive operations in the west with the Red Army's offensive operations in the east.

108. Such is the key to the understanding of the events beginning with the conclusion of the non-aggression pact with Germany in 1939 and culminating in the decisive victory over Germany in 1945.

109. I cannot conceal the fact that I feel somewhat ashamed for people who dare to speak of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939 as did the United States representative in this chamber. It is embarrassing to listen to such remarks when one remembers the events which followed, which brought all wise statesmen to a proper appreciation of the measures adopted by the Soviet Union in the interests of the common struggle against hitlerite fascism. Statements such as those made here yesterday by Mr. Lodge obviously fit into the general pattern of United States foreign policy. That policy involves activities designed to achieve purposes which bear no relation to the task of promoting the reduction of international tension and the strengthening of international co-operation.

110. In that connexion, I cannot refrain from referring to yet another episode, about which I would have been glad to remain silent.

111. At the beginning of our present session, it will be remembered, the Australian representative ventured in his speech before this Assembly to make a slanderous attack on the great founder of the Soviet State, Lenin, ascribing to that man of genius, who was our teacher, the statement that war and the killing of human beings were beneficial to the cause of socialism. Lenin never said that, and of course never could have said it. On that occasion we exposed the representative of Australia as guilty of slander and falsification.

112. Now, at the end of our session, a similar attempt has been made by Mr. Lodge, who slanderously ascribed to that great man, Stalin, the statement that terror is the decisive argument in the hands of any State. Stalin never said that, and of course never could have said it, a fact which should be quite obvious to any educated person who understands the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, principles which Stalin developed in so masterly a fashion. It need hardly be said that the statements ascribed to our great teachers, Lenin and Stalin, are not only slanderous but a blatant distortion of Marxism-Leninism, a genuinely scientific doctrine which lights the way ahead for all progressive men and women. Such slanderous attacks can only be considered in the context of the plans of reactionary circles in the United States and its allies, plans which are intended not to reduce tension in international relations and to strengthen peace, but to achieve diametrically opposite purposes.

113. We Soviet people, however, are deeply convinced that such plans must necessarily fail, and that the forces of peace will overcome the dark forces of war, to the benefit of all peace-loving peoples and of all mankind.

114. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): We have listened this morning for a very long time to a speech which, I should have thought, made all those who seek peace very sad. I venture to say that it was a speech which was as irresponsible and as evil as any speech ever made in the General Assembly. It strikes me as extraordinarily unfortunate that, when protestations of peace are so constantly given to the rest of the world, every time we hear from a Soviet representative he speaks of peace and befouls his protestations by the methods by which he presents his arguments.

115. I could have understood the representative of the Soviet Union had he sought objectively to examine the record which was placed before us. I could have understood him if he had desired to examine each case and, in criticism, to suggest to the Assembly that there was no foundation whatever for the charges which have been made and, therefore, no foundation whatever for any action by the Assembly. But I cannot understand, any more than I should hope peace-loving people could forgive, a speech which was dripping with evil accusations against every nation other than the Soviet group and those nations which may happen to support them.

116. We who seek world peace, and have the responsibility thrust upon our shoulders to achieve it, listened for this length of time to accusations which were made against countries, including my own, merely, apparently, because we happen to support a draft resolution which, I believe, represents the mildest

action which could possibly be attempted in the circumstances of this case; and because we do so, we have levelled against us, I say, wickedly, slanderously and evilly, the charge, that we, with others, have deliberately placed this before the General Assembly in order, among other things, to prevent peace being achieved in Korea, to create difficulties in the world, and to advance—so I gather—the cause of capitalist imperialism.

117. How distorted can minds get when this kind of thing can be said from this podium by the representative of the Soviet Union? I have this to say to the representative of the Soviet Union. If he does in truth represent the people of his country, if he in truth, from this podium, was seeking to express the peace-loving purposes of his country, then God help the cause of peace, because, to me, it is an occasion of great sadness that a representative of the Soviet Union can, in this Assembly, make these allegations. Either one of two things can be true, either Mr. Vyshinsky spoke with the full authority of the Soviet Government, in which event I say that the chances for peace are dim, indeed, throughout the world, or he spoke on his own initiative, in which event he was guilty of gross irresponsibility. He can make the choice between the two.

118. At a later stage I shall make some observations without, I hope, stooping to make charges against anyone at all; I shall make some observations upon the criticisms which the representative of the USSR has made of this report. This is a report which, I venture to say, calls for the draft resolution we have put forward; a report which, on the face of it—and that is the only way I propose to ask you to regard it—invites condemnation of such conduct, no matter by whom it may be perpetrated. Let me say to Mr. Vyshinsky something which he was not prepared to say: if cruelty is engaged in in time of war beyond the necessity of war, if there be war crimes committed by anyone, then I am prepared, no matter who may commit them, to condemn them in this Assembly and elsewhere.

119. I wonder whether it will be thought irrelevant if in my opening remarks in this debate I made a few observations about young people. How little they have to do with the events which in the end so greatly control, indeed, in a strict sense, so often determine their lives. How much, even with their youthful, but understandable, cynicism, they rely upon their elders to guide events when once they are committed to battle. How much more they rely upon us, so to conduct ourselves as to avoid the awful destruction of war. And should war come to pass, how much they rely upon us to redress the crimes of war perpetrated against them. There is so much that I could say on this. I do not doubt that these considerations will be thought by some, including the representative of the Soviet Union, to be irrelevant. But my concern for young men who fight our battles is not altogether, I hope, irrelevant. True, the unspeakable barbarity which, on the face of it, the report discloses, is but a drop in the great ocean of man's inhumanity to man. True it is, also, that the chances of punishing those responsible are remote. But shall we, because of that, rest merely upon the reading of the record and the expression of our abhorrence, or is there something more that we can do, or should do?

120. It is only too easy in public life or, if you will, in diplomatic life, to become cynical. "What can you do

about it? It is one of the facts of life. Let us dispose of it by some suitable resolution—or lack of resolution—and pass on to other things and, I suppose, in turn deal with them by other suitable resolutions.” But I hope we will not slide into this easy cynicism. I hope we will take pause to consider sufficiently the obligation which is imposed on each of us, representing, as we do, the moral conscience of the world. And what is that obligation? It is, in the field of war, to reduce the inhumanities of war to the lowest possible level. It is to condemn and, if we can, to prevent cruel and wicked and barbaric and atrocious conduct in war. It is to see that those who outrage our concepts of proper conduct in war, that those whose hands are stained with the blood of victims beyond the awful necessities of war, shall be pursued, if we are able to pursue them, to the ends of the world, that they may be brought ultimately to justice. And if that pursuit is not presently possible, our obligation is not only to record our condemnation and abhorrence, but to assert our determination that if and when the opportunity presents itself, those who were responsible shall be brought to book.

121. In this respect I hoped it would prove possible in this draft resolution—the passing of which is the very least we can do—to go further than we, who are its sponsors, are in fact prepared to go. All war, of course, is terrible; modern war particularly so. But the sadistic and wicked perpetration of gross and revolting acts of cruelty upon defenceless men and women, such as is revealed in this report—taken at its face value—is an entirely different matter. Who is there, upon reading the report, who did not feel that something loathsome and evil had touched him? For my poor part I can only say that I cannot cast from my mind—easy though it appears to Mr. Vyshinsky to cast from his mind—the awful and terrible agonies of the mind, of the spirit and of the flesh that young lives and young bodies have had to endure. I was particularly struck during the course of this debate by Mr. Vyshinsky when, in the course of elaborating an argument, he seemed to get some strange amusement—by the way the smile flickered across his face—in meeting the accusations in this record. All I can say is that it is a strange sense of amusement that a man can be persuaded to exhibit. But the cries of these people go out to us who are here. How little it is, save in words, that we are prepared, perhaps are able, to do!

122. For centuries man has sought, by codes of behaviour, to regulate human relationships. First within families, then in communities and countries and, finally, internationally, so that order and decency might prevail in the world. This is part and parcel of relations based on ethical values towards which man, with periods of temporary and often localized departure from such standards, aspires. For there seems to be something inherent in the human spirit which, when undistorted, strives for good rather than evil, kindness rather than cruelty and peace rather than war. Mankind, as a whole, abhors war and seeks to avoid it. We have not succeeded in so governing our international relationships, or, more properly, our international passions, as to have reached this stage where war is impossible, but perhaps, as is my hope, man is closer to his goal than he dares believe. We will approach much more nearly to it if normal, decent canons of behaviour, a normal respect for the intrinsic value of the human being and the universal determination to respect rather than hate others, are accepted.

123. The world's striving and the world's desire for disarmament is one aspect of this. But how can we disarm when the weak would then be threatened by extinction by the unscrupulous strong? Mankind's attempt to define and regulate and respect the human personality is reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in our Charter itself. But how can we be confident that these rights will be respected when persecution of people, and even persecution of religious beliefs such as that recently shown by the imprisonment of Cardinal Wyszynski, in Poland, are a commonplace? If the right of man to worship God in his own way cannot be respected, if freedom of worship is not to be upheld by all those who are represented here, if the free and sacred relationship between men and his God is prescribed by the State, as it was in the case of Cardinal Wyszynski, is it any wonder that decent ethical and moral standards decline to the odious ebb where such standards are subordinated to the almighty State that communism has erected to depose God and religion?

124. Man's attempt to define and punish war crimes is another example of this striving for a decent world community. But what confidence can we have in the universal acceptance of decent ethical and moral standards when we are faced with the situation which we are discussing now?

125. After the First World War, an attempt was made to define war crimes and to punish those responsible for atrocities not necessarily associated with the awful human wastage of war. Legal considerations, such as the responsibility of a person for carrying out the orders of a superior, and the responsibility of the head of a State for actions committed by agents of the State, frustrated this attempt. These legal barriers were set aside after the war of 1939-1945, and in the Nürnberg and Tokyo trials of war criminals we began to see an international jurisprudence on this matter being built up before our eyes.

126. The determination of the Allied Powers after the last war to move in this direction was the result not only of a normal historical development, but also of a statement incorporated in the Moscow declaration of Marshal Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt, which reflected that development. Their words have been quoted, but they bear repeating. They bear repeating indeed after this morning's performance of Mr. Vyshinsky, if for no other reason than that he evinced little desire to investigate crimes when alleged to be perpetrated by others, and is not prepared to support the declaration made by Stalin on that occasion. These are the words of those three world leaders:

“Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to the accusers in order that justice may be done . . .”

One would have hoped that some similar enthusiasm for justice and for right might have been revealed by Mr. Vyshinsky this morning.

127. I draw the attention of the General Assembly also to the words of Mr. Joseph B. Keenan, Chief of Counsel for the United States in the Nürnberg trials, which are reproduced in the extract of the interim

historical report which has been made available by the United States Government. These are his words:

"But the prosecution never lost sight of the fact that the goal of punishing the accused was relatively unimportant, when compared with the grander and wider aim of the trial, i.e., to advance the cause of peace and right notions of international law."

The report itself states accurately, in my view, the relationship of these developments to the problems which we now have before us. I quote the words:

"The ultimate purpose of these trials was to establish an international jurisprudence that might be built upon and serve as a deterrent for those inclined to initiate aggressive wars or commit atrocities. As a similar pattern is revealed in Korea, the opportunity is afforded to follow the legal precedent established, and continue to build the law aimed toward humane conduct and the preservation of peace."

128. The background set out in the report shows clearly what steps were taken by the United Nations Command to ascertain, check and verify alleged atrocities in Korea. By the processes thus set out, and the confessions which were made by officers and men of the Chinese and North Korean forces, and thanks to the care which has clearly been shown by the War Crimes Division of the Judge Advocate Section of the United States Army, an over-all *prima facie* case has been established that atrocities did take place. Further investigation may be required to establish the precise instances of atrocities, but an overwhelming general *prima facie* case has been set before us.

129. I hope that all representatives have read this report. It traces the techniques common in the treatment of prisoners of war and in some cases of innocent civilians. The details of these cases are utterly revolting and no one could fail to be affected by a reading of them. Forced marches, exposure, lack of water, food and clothing and acts of violence are a commonplace of the report, and the details of some of the atrocities pass belief. Execution was the rule when the physical condition of any prisoner interfered in any way with enemy operations. I would particularly draw the attention of the representatives to the details set out on page 22 of the extract of the interim historical report, on the Suncheon tunnel massacre and, on page 24, on the use of prisoners of war for bayonet practice.

130. The draft resolution which Australia has co-sponsored is, in the light of the facts before us, mild indeed. It reflects, I feel, a hope among us—ill-founded though it may prove to be—that what has manifestly taken place in Korea is but a degrading aberration in the progress of mankind towards international decency. It reflects, I believe, the striving towards a binding set of moral and ethical international standards to which I have referred. It is indeed difficult to see how it can meet with any objection on the part of anyone, except perhaps on the ground that it does not go far enough. It accuses no one and seeks to avoid the reopening of old wounds and the fanning of international distrust and hatred by digging over old ground. As one of the countries sponsoring this draft resolution, I know that that was our purpose. Our purpose was to find a wording which would not, upon the face of it, give offence. Yet in this debate we have been subjected to a tirade of abuse because Australia was one of the nations which was prepared to put it forward. My only

regret, in the light of this morning's performance, is that the draft resolution was not stronger.

131. There are a few observations which I would like to make upon this subject. Mr. Vyshinsky engaged in what is a common performance or manoeuvre among trial lawyers—and I speak as one who has had some experience on it. It is easy enough for any lawyer, certainly a man with the great forensic ability of Mr. Vyshinsky, to take the record, to examine the cases and to point out inconsistencies. This is a manoeuvre as old as legal history itself. You point out the inconsistencies and therefore you say, "the case is worth nothing at all, throw it aside". Or you say, "there is no inconsistency and therefore it has been faked, since it is far too perfect". So you win whichever way you go. So it is that in this particular document I would expect, it being a human document, that you could find inconsistencies. I am able to find them myself, even without the aid of Mr. Vyshinsky. But he picked out a number of cases for the purpose of establishing that there was no case whatever to examine in the record before us.

132. What is it that the draft resolution asks in the operative part? It "expresses its grave concern at reports"—it reaches no conclusion, mark you—"and information that North Korean and Chinese communist forces have, in a large number of instances, employed inhuman practices against the heroic soldiers of forces under the United Nations Command in Korea and against the civilian population of Korea". I repeat, it reaches no definitive conclusion. It expresses grave concern at reports and information. And here, even upon Mr. Vyshinsky's own showing, you have reports, you have information. The words chosen were neutral enough, in all conscience. But what Mr. Vyshinsky did was to pick out two or three cases for the purpose of argument and then say, in effect: "By my criticism of them, I suggest to you that the report is not worth looking at at all; there is nothing to be gravely concerned about." All that the performance this morning was designed to achieve was to lead our minds away from cases which unquestionably call for the most careful scrutiny and examination, cases, if established—as I believe they could in many cases be established—of terrible cruelty.

133. I noticed indeed that Mr. Vyshinsky did not look at some of the photographs, and I want to put this to him and I want to put it to the Assembly. If one looks at the photographs which are at the back of the interim historical report, then one of two initial premises must be assumed. Either the photographs are false, in which event of course there has been a wicked international conspiracy to present this case to the Assembly—and not one person here, even Mr. Vyshinsky, believes that—or else the photographs are true. If they are true, then does Mr. Vyshinsky say, speaking on behalf of his great country, that there is no cause for concern in looking at these documents?

134. I would ask the members of the Assembly to turn to page 61 of the interim historical report. There they will see a photograph bearing the caption: "Remains of the thirty-four victims of hill 303 massacre, shown in the receiving station where they were brought for identification." In that photograph, we see men who, on the face of it, were shot to death, or killed in some other way, while their hands were tied behind their backs.

135. I would say this to Mr. Vyshinsky: if this photograph has not been "faked"—and I do not think he would be prepared to say that it had been, since he knows that representatives here would never believe such a statement—is the scene depicted therein of no concern to him? I shall read out the description of this particular incident—listed as Korean war crime No. 16—which is contained on page 20 of the interim historical report: "For two days, they [these men] were kept hidden in ravines during the day and forced to march at night . . ." I would remind the Assembly that I do not state that this is an allegation which has been conclusively established; it is an allegation which has been made, and I state that, *prima facie*, it should cause us concern. The report continues:

"Suddenly, on the afternoon of 17 August 1950, without warning, their North Korean guards opened fire upon these bound victims and then left the scene.

"Thirty-four American soldiers were slaughtered in this massacre. However, there were four survivors. Later the same day these men were rescued by a United Nations patrol, who also recovered the bodies, took photographs and captured two enemy soldiers. Since this time, confessions have been obtained . . ."

136. As I have said, I do not state that every word of the quotation I have just read out must be taken as true or as conclusively proved. If one looks at the draft resolution which we have submitted, one will see that it is designed to avoid stating any conclusions. All we say is that we have information on these cases, that we have pitifully sad documents which are supported by photographs such as those to be seen in the interim historical report at pages 61 to 65, inclusive; each of those photographs shows men—the one on page 61 shows a large number of men—who died in the full blush of their youth, with their arms tied behind their backs. But Mr. Vyshinsky says: "There is no cause for any concern. The documents before us are 'faked'. All this is a wicked conspiracy against the gallant soldiers of North Korea." I would ask the Assembly: how factious can an argument become?

137. I should like to refer to another case described in the interim historical report. The relevant photograph, exhibit H, is to be found on page 74 of the report. The description of the case—listed as Korean war crime No. 1670—is to be found on page 30 of the report. We read there the following extract from a lieutenant's affidavit—and, again, I do not state that every word of this affidavit must be taken as true; I only say that, on the face of it, it should cause concern to any civilized person:

"One of the boys had no head. It seemed to have been mashed or beaten and was lying all over the road. Both of his feet had been cut off about half way between the knee and the ankle. It appeared as though they had been chopped off with a dull instrument. He had no means of identification on him. I searched him for dogtags, clothing markings, belt markings, shoes, ID tags, and personal effects in his pockets, but nothing was to be found.

"The other GI had his eyes gouged out, and nothing remained where his eyes were except holes.

He had been bayoneted all over the body with the upper part of his legs completely laid open to the bone. He also had no marks of identification on him."

138. I ask representatives—and particularly Mr. Vyshinsky—to look at the photograph on page 74 of the report. If this is not a "faked" photograph, I cannot imagine how anyone could look at it without a feeling of utter revulsion that any man could have committed the gross cruelty which is pictured there. The caption under the photograph states:

"This body was a ROKA soldier who was supporting an American artillery observation post when captured. His head had been mashed to a pulp, the right forearm severed with a dull instrument, the legs flayed with a bayonet . . ."

and the man had other unspeakable injuries.

139. Let us take another example, Korean war crime No. 28. The photographs in this case appear on pages 77 and 78 of the interim historical report. There, we see men lying in open graves, obviously dug by bulldozers. On page 77, we see men lying with their arms tied behind their backs. But Mr. Vyshinsky, speaking on behalf of a great country, says: "This is no concern to us."

140. I shall say no more in that respect. One could develop this matter in great detail, but I do not propose to detain the Assembly any longer. I would only say this: in the light of the allegations made, in the light of the photographs which have been submitted, who in this Assembly can truthfully say that there is no cause for expressing our grave concern at the reports and information before us?

141. I gather that Mr. Vyshinsky intends to vote against the entire draft resolution, including the following operative paragraph:

"2. *Condemns* the commission by any governments or authorities of murder, mutilation, torture, and other atrocious acts against captured military personnel or civilian populations, as a violation of rules of international law and basic standards of conduct and morality and as affronting human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person."

I would ask Mr. Vyshinsky to tell us, and the world, what objection he has to supporting the part of the draft resolution which I have just read out.

142. I believe that the draft resolution before the Assembly reflects the acceptance by the United Nations of the fact that the conscience of mankind rebels violently against the wickedness which the report discloses, and reflects not only our deep distress at what has happened, but also our anxiety and hope that these things should never happen again. But we must not remain satisfied with the mere passing of this temperate draft resolution. Lest posterity should judge us as having cynically washed our hands of a dreadful chapter in human history, we should record by what each of us here says our determination not to let this matter rest, but to remain constantly alert for any opportunity to call to justice those upon whose heads rests the heavy burden of this bestial criminality.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.