

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

PLENARY MEETING 592nd

Friday, 23 November 1956,
at 3 p.m.



ELEVENTH SESSION
Official Records

New York

CONTENTS

Page

Agenda item 66:

Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly from 1 to 10 November 1956 (*continued*)..... 263

President: Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON
(Thailand).

AGENDA ITEM 66

Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly from 1 to 10 November 1956 (A/3333, A/3342, A/3370, A/3375 to A/3378, A/3380 to A/3386) (*continued*)

1. **Mr. SHEPILOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*)**: We have received the reports of Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on compliance with General Assembly resolutions 997 (ES-I) and 1002 (ES-I) of 2 and 7 November 1956 [A/3384] and concerning the results of his discussions with the Egyptian Government on basic points for the presence and functioning in Egypt of the United Nations Emergency Force [A/3375] and on arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal [A/3376], as well as the six-Power draft resolution on this question [A/3386]. We also have before us the draft resolution presented by twenty-one Asian and African countries calling for the immediate and complete withdrawal of the United Kingdom, French and Israel forces from Egypt [A/3385].
2. Of the documents before us, those which are the most important and which call for immediate United Nations action are the report on compliance with the General Assembly resolutions of 2 and 7 November and the draft resolution of the twenty-one Asian and African countries.
3. The reports I have mentioned make it clear that, far from complying with the General Assembly's resolutions on the immediate withdrawal of their forces from Egypt, the United Kingdom, France and Israel apparently have no intention of doing so in the immediate future. A study of the aide-mémoires drawn up by the Governments of these three countries in reply to the Secretary-General's request [A/3384, *annexes I to III*] inevitably leads to this conclusion. Instead of withdrawing their forces from Egypt, all three Governments put forward various conditions which would enable them to evade the execution of that task.
4. The United Nations now faces the most urgent task of taking effective measures to put an end to this procrastination and to obtain immediate compliance by

the United Kingdom, France and Israel with the General Assembly's demands for the withdrawal of their forces. Only thus will it be possible to end the aggression against Egypt and to eradicate its consequences. It is no exaggeration to say that the fate of peace in the Near East—and not only in the Near East—largely depends on the fulfilment of this task.

5. The creation of an extremely dangerous hotbed of war in the Near East as a result of the aggression against Egypt by the United Kingdom, France and Israel is one of the most ominous features of the present international situation. Black storm clouds immediately gathered on the political horizon and mankind was faced with the possibility of again being drawn into the maelstrom of a destructive world war.

6. The choice of the place and time for the military action launched by the two strongest colonial Powers—the United Kingdom and France—and also by Israel, which has played a particularly unedifying and I might even say provocative role in the sinister political game of the imperialist forces, cannot of course be attributed to fortuitous causes. There is incontrovertible evidence that this aggression was planned a long time ago and formed an integral part of a comprehensive and far-reaching design. It was with a definite end in view that a strained atmosphere was deliberately fostered in connection with the perfectly legitimate action taken by the Egyptian Government to nationalize the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company. The manoeuvres of the reactionary forces in connexion with this problem have unquestionably been the main source of international tension during the past six months.

7. What is involved here is not merely the fact that the colonial Powers regarded the legitimate decision of the Egyptian Government to nationalize the Suez Canal as a blow to their narrow and selfish interests, although of course this was by no means an insignificant factor. The crux of the matter is that the colonizers decided to give battle in the Egyptian sector in order to preserve their positions in the colonial world as a whole, and if successful, to extend them. At the present time, it is precisely in the North African area of the Near East that the peoples of the Arab world have launched a heroic struggle for their freedom and for the complete liberation of the Arab nations from imperialistic oppression by France, the United Kingdom, and other colonial Powers. The colonizers have become alarmed by the successful offensive against colonialism being waged on a broad front in almost all the countries of the Arab world, and by the just struggle for the national liberation of peoples, which has jeopardized the colossal super-profits of the foreign monopolies and the privileges of every kind enjoyed by the imperialist Powers: as everyone knows, tremendous resources, above all of oil, are concentrated in the Arab East, to which the foreign monopolies are tenaciously clinging. It is a matter of common knowledge that the Near East is

assigned an important, if not a paramount, role in the strategic plans of the imperialist Powers. How dare the Arabs lay claim to be complete masters of their own lands? In particular, how dare Egypt claim the right to operate the Suez Canal, which flows through its territory and was built by Arab hands?

8. The main purpose of the plans secretly worked out long ago in offices in London and Paris was to inflict a sudden and powerful blow on the resurgent nations of the Arab East in order to regain the positions lost by the imperialists and to crush the national liberation movement in that area. Egypt was intended to be the first victim of the aggression. I say "first" because Egypt was the first, but by no means the only, country included in these plans. The imperialistic plan was first to crush Egypt, whose resolute measures in defence of its national sovereignty had won the general respect and sympathy of the entire Arab world, and then to proceed further. The defeat of Egypt was intended by the colonizers to demoralize the other Arab States, and to pave the way for further acts of aggression, for the termination of national independence and the restoration of imperialist domination over the Near and Middle East and North Africa.

9. It is now obvious to everyone that the noisy propaganda set in motion by the ruling circles of the United Kingdom and France in connexion with the Egyptian Government's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company was a special kind of smokescreen, behind which an armed attack on the Republic of Egypt was being prepared. Incontrovertible evidence is now available that, even while international negotiations for the settlement of the Suez question were in progress, even while meetings were taking place in this building in the Security Council and at the London Conference, the three States which had planned aggression were making intensive preparations to carry their scheme into effect.

10. As reported in the United States Press as early as the end of August, in other words, while the London Conference on the Suez Canal question was in progress, French arms, aircraft and tanks were beginning to arrive in Israel. British and French air-borne shock troops were being despatched to Cyprus. British and French fleets were moving into the Eastern Mediterranean. French military vehicles specially painted yellow (to match the desert) were being sent from Marseilles and Algiers to Famagusta, on the island of Cyprus. The commanders of the French formations concentrated in the area were supplied with counterfeit Egyptian pounds printed at Clermont-Ferrand.

11. Attention must also be drawn to the fact that the armed attack on Egypt occurred almost simultaneously with the attempt to stage a fascist *putsch* in Hungary. The aggressors obviously pinned great hopes on public attention being deflected from their operations as a result of the stir created by reactionary propaganda relating to events in Hungary. Those who had prepared the aggression clearly counted on being able to wage a *blitzkrieg*, on completely crushing Egyptian resistance in a few days, thus confronting world public opinion with a *fait accompli*. However, their designs were thwarted by the heroic Egyptian resistance to the aggressors and by the powerful wave of resolute protests against their actions. They became convinced that their plans for a *blitzkrieg* were doomed to failure. The United Kingdom, French and Israel aggression took on the features of a typical colonial war with all its customary barbarous cruelty. The aggressors' air force

rained bombs on peaceful towns and villages, in which there neither were nor could have been any military objectives. The organizers of terror from the air were guided by cold-blooded calculation, believing that their attacks would intimidate the Egyptians, cause them to panic, and compel them to capitulate. The air force bombed residential sections of Ismailia. Destruction was also caused at Alexandria and El-Firdan. But the worst destruction was inflicted on Port Said. It is impossible to remain unmoved on hearing and reading the reports of eyewitnesses, who have seen Port Said devastated by barbarous bombings and littered with the corpses of women and children. It is impossible to look without indignation at the photographs published in the Press of streets in Port Said in ruins and strewn with the corpses of completely innocent men and women. Here, for instance, is what the Swedish journalist Andersson, who visited Port Said after its occupation by the forces of the aggressors, has to say:

"A few hours after the announcement of the cease-fire, I made my way into Port Said and found the town a burning, smoking hell. I saw children in bombed houses searching for their parents among the ruins. I saw thousands of corpses among the smouldering, smoking ruins behind several hospitals, which had survived the bombing. Two hospitals, together with their 900 patients, had been completely wiped out. Can aircraft flights over streets and the machine-gunning of houses and streets be described as police operations? I call this horrifying and murderous."

12. A group of foreign journalists, including correspondents of Italian, Turkish, Swiss, Japanese, Soviet and German newspapers, visited Port Said and had an opportunity of seeing with their own eyes the barbarous and inhuman destruction of the town by the interventionists. Thousands of civilians were buried under the ruined buildings of Port Said. Tens of thousands of the inhabitants were homeless; the wounded were dying for lack of medical attention; children were asking for water but there was nothing to give them to drink, because the water supply in Port Said had been cut off.

13. No sooner had the United Kingdom and French forces forced their way into Port Said than the streets became the scene of indescribable tragedy. The soldiers who broke into the town began looting the warehouses of the Egyptian administration of the Suez Canal, the customs house, shops and Egyptian private homes, and murdered civilians. On 12 November, i.e., a few days after the official announcement of the cease-fire by the United Kingdom and France, twenty foreign correspondents who arrived in Port Said witnessed one of the barbarous acts of violence committed by the occupying forces against the civilians.

14. According to reports published in the Egyptian press on 18 November, British soldiers in Port Said opened fire on an Egyptian ambulance with the result that the officer in charge of the medical unit was killed, as were the seriously wounded persons who were travelling in it.

15. On 20 November, the Egyptian press reported a savage manhunt carried out by three British aircraft. They chased a lorry that was evacuating women and children from Port Said and dropped ten bombs on it. At Rafah and El-Arish, Israel forces resorted to provocative acts of repression, firing on the civilian population and causing a large number of deaths.

16. Having driven the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization observers out of the Gaza area, the

Israel forces perpetrated numerous acts of repression against the refugees, many of whom lost their lives. And after all these heinous deeds, Mr. Lloyd, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, speaking today from this rostrum [591st meeting], said without a trace of embarrassment that the aggressors had sent their forces into Egyptian territory in order, as he put it, to establish peace in that troubled area.

17. The Soviet Union supports Egypt's demands for an investigation of the atrocities committed by the invading forces against the Egyptian people, for an investigation of the destruction caused and the murders committed by the United Kingdom and French forces in Port Said and by the Israel troops in Gaza, Rafah and El-Arish. Egypt is rightly demanding that the aggressors should be punished.

18. The aggression against Egypt has provided fresh confirmation of the time-honoured thesis of Clausewitz that war is a continuation of political relations by other means. How does United Kingdom, French and Israel policy look in the light of the outcome of their aggression against Egypt? What objective results did this policy and, above all, this war achieve? The calculation of the aggressors was that the unleashing of war in the Near and Middle East would enable the colonial Powers to take revenge for the setbacks they had suffered in recent years. However, their plans were destined to misfire. The aggression against Egypt had failed to strengthen colonialism, but, on the contrary, has further loosened its already sapped foundations. In the face of this act of aggression, the peoples of the eastern countries have become even more firmly resolved to wipe out the vestiges of colonialism on their soil as quickly as possible.

19. The aggressors further counted on the attack on Egypt enabling them to occupy the whole of the Suez Canal zone, to take over its administration and reconvert it into a source of wealth for British and French millionaires. What was the result, however? To begin with, the aggressors suffered a military defeat. They did not succeed in seizing the Canal. They merely put it out of commission by their bombing, thus inflicting serious damage primarily on their own economic interests. Trade relations between European and Asian countries have been disrupted, as have arrangements for the supply of oil to the Western European countries. Oil imports by these countries from the area of the Near and Middle East amounted to approximately 100 million tons a year.

20. This has inevitably brought about a deterioration in the economic position of such countries as the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Sweden and others, because they obtain 60 to 96 per cent of the oil they use from areas of the Near East. It is no accident that restrictions on the use of oil and oil products for industrial and private purposes have already been introduced in a number of these countries.

21. It goes without saying that the resulting situation is undermining the ability of United Kingdom, French and other West European monopolies to compete with United States monopolistic capital, which is on the offensive. The latter is exploiting the present situation and is intensively draining the gold and dollar reserves of the Western European countries by supplying them with expensive oil from the Western hemisphere.

22. The aggression against Egypt, which was the outcome of previous United Kingdom and French policy, resulted in a serious crisis for that policy. Despite that

fact, the main feature of the new stage in the Suez problem which began with the enforced cease-fire, is the renewed attempt being made by the ruling circles of the United Kingdom and France to implement that very same policy which has already suffered a serious defeat.

23. This is reflected, first of all, in their efforts to maintain their forces in Egyptian territory under any pretext. Three weeks have elapsed since the United Nations adopted a resolution which for the second time called upon the United Kingdom and France to withdraw their troops immediately from Egyptian territory and upon Israel to withdraw its troops behind the armistice line previously established by a United Nations decision.

24. The impression is being given that the United Kingdom, France and Israel do not intend to withdraw their forces. What, in effect, is the significance of the replies, which have been circulated to us, of these three States to Mr. Hammarskjöld's letter? They merely contain vague promises to effect a partial withdrawal of some military units as an indication of goodwill. Mr. Lloyd touched on this today in vague terms, mentioning a single battalion.

25. In addition, a whole series of completely unacceptable conditions are being put forward, as if the United Kingdom, France and Israel are in Egypt by right and as if the United Nations was in the position of a petitioner. While this correspondence is in progress, the aggressors are strengthening the positions they have occupied in Egyptian territory.

26. It may well be asked whether the decision of the United Kingdom and France to cease hostilities against Egypt is not a stratagem designed to gain time, to obtain a respite in order to amass forces with a view to a resumption of aggressive war not only against Egypt but also against certain other countries of the Arab East.

27. No delay can be tolerated in the matter of the withdrawal from Egyptian territory of the armed forces that have invaded it. To continue the occupation of Egyptian territory is to continue the war against Egypt. Until the armed forces that have invaded Egypt have been completely withdrawn from Egyptian territory, the threat to peace in the Near East cannot be said to have diminished in the slightest. Their withdrawal is becoming increasingly urgent, because it has recently become apparent that reactionary forces are intensifying their intrigues in countries adjacent to Egypt. They are attempting to bring about domestic difficulties in these countries so that, having artificially produced a tense situation on Egypt's frontiers, they can resume aggression on an even broader scale.

28. In the last few days, as we know, the United Kingdom, French and Israel air forces have increased their incursions into the air space of the Arab States and, in particular, of Syria and Jordan. The base being used for aggressive operations is still the island of Cyprus.

29. In speaking during the general debate [589th Meeting], I have already had occasion to point out that the Soviet Union bases its stand on the fact that the Egyptian Government has consented to the temporary presence of the United Nations international Force in Egypt. I should like to repeat in this connexion that we regard it as an important point of principle that the Security Council's inalienable right to decide in each specific case on the formation and use of United Nations forces should be strictly observed. It is, however, necessary that we should be absolutely clear on where the

United Nations armed forces are to be stationed, how long they are to remain there, and what their functions are to be.

30. The Soviet Government supports Egypt's position in this matter. When United Kingdom and French forces have been withdrawn from Port Said, United Nations units should not be assigned any functions either in Port Said or in the Canal zone in general. Units of the international Force that disembarked at Port Said on 21 November should remain there only until the evacuation of the United Kingdom and French forces has been completed. They should then leave Port Said immediately and join the detachments of the international Force to be stationed along the demarcation line separating Egyptian and Israel forces in accordance with the well-known Armistice Agreement. But even in this area their stay should not exceed the period considered necessary by Egypt.

31. It is noteworthy, however, that the ruling circles of those countries that launched the aggression against Egypt are only too ready to place a completely distorted construction on the purpose and functions of the United Nations Force. Thus, for example, an idea has gained currency in these countries that the United Nations Force is a kind of substitute for the occupation forces of the United Kingdom, France and Israel. At the same time, increasingly frequent assertions are being made to the effect that United Kingdom and French forces should remain in those areas of Egyptian territory seized by them until the idea of the so-called "internationalization of the Canal" has become a reality. Mr. Lloyd, in particular, hinted at this today in speaking from this rostrum when he said that the presence of troops on Egyptian territory was connected with the settlement of the question of freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal and other matters.

32. In this light—and I should like to emphasize this point—it was no coincidence that the United Kingdom and French troops who landed on Egyptian territory brought with them in their train a large number of officials of the former Suez Canal Company, apparently in order to resume control of the administration of the Canal.

33. The task of restoring navigation on the Suez Canal is undoubtedly an urgent and pressing matter, now that the cease-fire has been achieved. It is quite obvious, however, that certain people would like to turn even the solution of this technical problem to their own political ends. That is precisely why attempts are now being made to draw an artificial connexion between this question and that of the presence of United Nations forces in the Canal zone.

34. As Mr. Hammarskjöld has informed us, the Egyptian Government considers that the work of clearing the Canal should begin immediately after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian armed forces from Port Said and from the Canal zone and that it is for Egypt to conclude contracts with the appropriate firms. The contribution of the United Nations to the solution of this important problem should be to assist Egypt in the matter. It would be strange, to say the least, if, as is now being proposed in certain quarters, the United Nations itself began to undertake operations in the Suez Canal area, and act almost as if it were its lessee.

35. The attempts to create an artificial link between the question of the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt and that of the administration of the Suez Canal reflect the plans of those circles

in the United Kingdom and France, which cannot reconcile themselves to the fact that the Canal is the inalienable property of Egypt and are trying to restore the old order.

36. In this connexion, reference must be made to the extensive plans for re-drawing the map of the Arab East now being discussed by circles close to influential imperialist monopolies. The theory advanced in justification of these plans is that in our time a political rearrangement in the Near East has followed upon the heels of every war and that the present time is auspicious for such changes in this area.

37. Thus, the advocates of these plans put forward the following specific ideas in opposing plans for the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* in the Arab East.

38. First, they propose neither more nor less than that an entire country of the Arab world—Jordan—should be liquidated for recalcitrance and that its territory should be given to Iraq, which in return must agree to conclude peace with Israel and become the agent for the execution of a specific policy in this area.

39. Secondly, they propose that the Gaza Strip and the islands of Tiran and Sinafir in the Gulf of Aqaba, which have been captured by Israel, should not be returned to Egypt but should be internationalized and be left under United Nations control.

40. Thirdly, they recommend that Egypt should be forced to give the Western Powers the guarantees they desire in connexion with the Suez Canal question, in other words, to renounce its sovereign rights and accept plans for international control of the Canal.

41. Fourthly, they propose that the United States should join the Baghdad Pact. According to the authors of this proposal, the object of United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact would be to legalize United States interference in the affairs of the Near and Middle East. In this connexion a significant comparison is even being drawn between the Baghdad Pact and the Mutual Defense Treaty concluded by the United States with the Chiang Kai-shek group which is entrenched on the island of Taiwan.

42. All this is convincing proof that certain expansionist groups are hatching new colonialist plots fraught with real danger to the vital interests of the Arab peoples and the cause of peace.

43. It should be noted, however, that the authors of plans of this kind are failing to reckon with facts. The Egyptian people, like the other peoples of the Arab East, relying on the moral support of all peace-loving nations, are firmly resolved to defend their sovereign rights. In these circumstances, the only rational course open to the United Kingdom, France and Israel is to withdraw their troops from Egypt forthwith.

44. Attempts to revive the plan for the internationalization of the Canal on the basis of the so-called "eighteen-State platform", the Dulles plan, and to link it with the question of the purpose and functions of United Nations armed forces are completely futile.

45. First, all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Egypt before the Suez problem can be settled.

46. Secondly, this problem can be settled only through negotiations based on respect for the inalienable sovereign rights of Egypt; the use of any foreign armed forces as a means of exerting pressure on Egypt is inadmissible.

47. Logically then, the question of the United Nations Force cannot have any bearing on the eventual settlement of the Suez problem. The United Nations would be making a grave mistake if it allowed the presence of its Emergency Force in Egypt to be used to conceal the implementation of the aforementioned plans.

48. The United Nations should categorically repudiate these plans not only because their authors disregard the sovereignty of Egypt and other Arab nations, but also because they are seeking to convert the United Nations into an instrument for promoting the selfish interests of colonialist forces, bent upon restoring their own position in the Arab countries.

49. Recent events in the Near East have shown that aggressive groups in certain States are prepared, for the sake of their own narrow interests, to plunge the world into the abyss of further military conflicts fraught with grave consequences for mankind. These events have also clearly shown the strength of the forces concerned to maintain peace and firmly resolved to curb the aggressors.

50. In the present tense situation we cannot but feel deeply alarmed at the attempts being made by certain circles to divert the General Assembly's attention from the main, the crucial question, that of ensuring the immediate and complete withdrawal of the troops of the interventionists from Egyptian territory, and to steer it towards certain organizational and technical questions. We are faced by the fact, the quite indisputable fact, that the aggressors have not yet complied with and do not wish to comply with the recommendations for the immediate withdrawal of their troops from Egypt. Mr. Lloyd's statement on this question today did not inspire any particular optimism. Not even today, when he spoke from this rostrum at the previous meeting, did he give a direct answer to the General Assembly on the question whether the United Kingdom, France and Israel intend to comply with repeated General Assembly resolutions on the immediate and complete withdrawal of occupation troops from Egyptian territory. He merely gave a very general and ambiguous answer, namely, that the troops of the aggressors would be withdrawn from Egyptian territory "as soon as possible"—to use a felicitous phrase.

51. Mr. Lloyd tried to conceal the unwillingness of the Powers responsible for the aggression against Egypt to comply with the Assembly's decisions by stating that the United Kingdom wanted to be sure that the United Nations Force would be a credit to the United Nations and that it (i.e., the United Nations Force) needed time to organize command arrangements and to integrate a sufficient body of its units in Egypt, because, in Mr. Lloyd's words "We do not want this Force to be laughed at" [591st meeting, para. 92]. The completely fallacious and—if I may say so—ridiculous nature of this kind of argument must be clear to all.

52. Instead of calling on the United Kingdom, France and Israel to withdraw their armed forces unconditionally and immediately from Egyptian territory, it is suggested that we should first examine a number of technical problems. These problems are certainly not unimportant and the General Assembly will, of course, have to deal with them. For our part, we are prepared to do everything we can to ensure a proper settlement of the question on the disposal and functions of United Nations police forces and the question of clearing the Canal. The main emphasis, however, should be placed on the basic question of the immediate and complete

withdrawal of the troops of the aggressors from Egyptian territory.

53. I need scarcely dwell on the fact that some of the technical, administrative and financial problems which are being raised at the present time by various delegations as a matter of priority are being presented in a completely incorrect or, to say the least, an extremely controversial manner. It is proposed, for example, that the cost of maintaining the United Nations Emergency Force should be borne by all Members of the United Nations, in proportion to their contribution to the budget, whereas logic demands that these costs should be borne by the States that unleashed the unprovoked aggression against Egypt. Any attempt to relieve them of financial responsibility for the maintenance of the United Nations Emergency Force would mean encouraging aggressors. This applies with even greater force to the cost of clearing the Canal. We may well ask why the cost of clearing the Canal should be borne, not by the aggressors which damaged it, but by other States.

54. All these problems must, of course, be given due consideration and I do not intend to go into them in detail. What is clear is that so long as the interventionists remain on Egyptian territory all schemes and plans for the clearing of the Canal are illusory. The hulk of a ship sunk by British and French bombs and impeding navigation can be raised from the bottom of the Canal tomorrow, but if hostilities are resumed, dozens of other vessels might be sent to the bottom of the Canal the very next day. These fears are all the more justified because reports being received from the Middle East indicate that new forces are being concentrated in the area. The situation remains tense and this tension can be reduced only if the interventionists leave Egypt without delay.

55. The Soviet delegation fully supports the joint draft resolution submitted by the twenty-one Asian and African countries [A/3385] and considers it necessary to request the General Assembly to reaffirm its request for the immediate and complete withdrawal of United Kingdom, French and Israel forces from Egypt in the strongest possible terms.

56. Mr. PEARSON (Canada): I do not propose to follow the representative of the Soviet Union, who has preceded me, into the tangled underbrush of propaganda, exaggeration and fabrication into which he has just led the General Assembly. Such speeches ceased to impress the great majority of the members of the Assembly many years ago, though they no doubt have some value to those who make them. They constitute a kind of verbal aggression against the truth against which, I am afraid, we shall never be able to bring about a cease-fire. But they have nothing to do with finding a solution to the serious problems which are facing us. Quite the contrary.

57. There are two draft resolutions before the Assembly, one of which my delegation has the honour to sponsor, along with the delegations of Columbia, India, Norway, the United States and Yugoslavia [A/3386]. But, before saying a few words about that draft resolution, I should like to comment on the draft resolution contained in document A/3385, which deals with compliance with previous resolutions which have been passed by the Assembly on the question of the withdrawal of forces from Egypt.

58. It seems to me that this draft resolution, at the present time—and I emphasize the words "at the present time"—is unnecessary because steps are being taken

to bring about the withdrawal in question. Indeed, that withdrawal has begun; we believe that it will soon be completed, and we expect that to be done. We believe also that one way of expediting that process which has begun would be to do our work here quickly and satisfactorily in setting up a United Nations Force, with functions which are agreed on, under the authority of the United Nations and of the United Nations only—a matter which is dealt with in the six-Power draft resolution, which I hope will receive, and very quickly receive, the endorsement of the General Assembly.

59. The withdrawal, as we see it, has begun. Now, resolutions reiterating previous resolutions are, I think, useful and often necessary when the original resolution of the Assembly has been treated with contempt and has been defied, as is the case with the United Nations resolution on Hungary. But when a resolution deals with a matter on which action has begun in compliance with a former resolution, and when that compliance is under United Nations supervision, then I do not think, myself, that reference to the former resolution is positively helpful in achieving the objective which we have in mind. Indeed, it often merely takes up the time of the Assembly which, as in this case, could be surely used for the task of bringing about a settlement, creating an atmosphere within which progress could be made to such a settlement, and expediting the solution of practical problems, such as the clearing of the Suez Canal and the maintenance there of freedom and security for navigation for all countries.

60. It seems to me that the draft resolution which we have the honour to sponsor with five other delegations [A/3386] is designed for this purpose. It "*notes with approval* the contents of the aide-mémoire on the basis for the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, as annexed to the report of the Secretary-General"—and I hope that we can give that approval to the aide-mémoire. It is important, however, in giving that approval, to know what we are approving.

61. What are the functions of this United Nations Emergency Force? Those functions and the task—and it is a very difficult task indeed which confronts the Force—have been laid down by resolutions of the General Assembly, and they are found also in the Secretary-General's second and final report [A/3302], which has been approved by the Assembly. The basic resolution for these purposes is 1000 (ES-I), which we adopted on 5 November and which states that the function of this Force is "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all"—and I emphasize the word "all"—"the terms of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956". In the latter resolution, as representatives will remember, provision is made for a cease-fire, for a prompt withdrawal of forces, and also—and this is no time to forget this provision—"that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution". And in paragraph 4 of that resolution we have the provision that, upon the cease-fire being effective, steps are to be taken "to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation."

62. Later, by resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November, the Assembly approved certain principles for the organization and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force, and those principles were stated in

certain paragraphs of the Secretary-General's report which was linked to the resolution [A/3302].

63. There is very strong, enthusiastic support in my country for this Force, but only as a United Nations Force, under United Nations control, and as an effective and organized Force which can do the job that has been given to it and which, if it can do that job, may be the beginning of something bigger and more permanent in the history of our Organization, something which we have talked about at United Nations meetings for many years, namely, the organization of the peace through international action. Therefore, it is important that this Force should be so constituted and so organized that it will be able to do the work that it has been given to do and thereby set a precedent for the future.

64. It is also important that the principles on which the Force is to operate should be sound. What are these principles? They have been laid down for us in the Secretary-General's report. In regard to its functions and its composition, the Force must be fully independent, of the political situation of any single member. The United Nations alone controls it and is responsible for it.

65. I agree, of course, that the Force—I am not talking about individual elements in the Force, but of the Force as such—in the circumstances and on the basis on which it was set up, could not operate in the territory of a country without the consent of that country. That is why we are happy that Egypt has given that consent in principle, and I am sure that we all agree that, in giving that consent to this constructive and helpful move, no infringement of sovereignty is involved. It is rather an example of using national sovereignty to bring about peace, security and a political settlement through United Nations action.

66. The control of this Force, then, is in the hands of the United Nations and must remain there. Otherwise it would be not a United Nations Force, but merely a collection of national forces, each under the control of its own Government and serving in another country with the consent of and under conditions laid down by that country. That, I am sure, would be unacceptable to most of the Governments represented in the Assembly.

67. Having said that, however, I do agree that the Secretary-General should certainly consult with the Government of the country in which the Force is serving on all matters of any importance that affect it; also, as we understand it, the Force is to remain in the area until its task is completed, and that would surely be for the determination of the United Nations itself. It operates, according to the principles as we understand them, where it is necessary to operate in order to accomplish its task, certainly between the opposing Powers to prevent conflict from recurring. As the Secretary-General has said in his report, its functions can be assumed to cover an area extending roughly from the Suez Canal to the armistice demarcation lines and in that area to facilitate and aid the establishing and securing of peaceful conditions, as an indispensable prerequisite to a just and agreed political settlement.

68. Surely we must not for one moment lose sight of that objective. It seems to me that it is high time that we began the process of achieving it through United Nations action, because at best the achievement is going to be a long and difficult undertaking. So I venture to repeat that we should without unnecessary delay get

on with the business before us, the constitution and the functioning of this Force, which has been made possible by the cessation of hostilities, and the clearance of the Canal.

69. In paragraph 2, of the six-Power draft resolution, the General Assembly

"Notes with approval the progress so far made by the Secretary-General in connexion with arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal as set forth in his report."

We cannot make much more progress unless we pass this draft resolution.

70. Paragraph 3, of that draft reads as follows:

"Authorizes the Secretary-General to proceed with the exploration of practical arrangement and negotiation of agreements so that the clearing operations may speedily and effectively be undertaken."

That paragraph is, of course, without prejudice to the allocation of costs and, of course, it is without prejudice to the normal procedures of the United Nations in dealing with expenditures.

71. I suggest therefore that our immediate task, now that the process of withdrawal has begun, is to back up the Secretary-General in the terrific undertaking we have imposed on him. His industry and his intelligence deserve our full support. We have faith in him, as he has faith in the good faith of those with whom he is dealing. We hope, therefore, that we can help him with his work, that we can get ahead with that work in the Assembly instead of having to listen to long, distorted propaganda diatribes such as the one to which we have just had to listen—speeches which we have already heard three or four times and which do not improve but, indeed, deteriorate with age.

72. However, this is not a time for recrimination among those who are anxious to find a solution for the problems with which we are faced. It is not a time for recrimination between delegations who are anxious to get ahead with this work, it is a time for restoration. First, it is a time for the restoration of the sovereign rights of Egypt over all of its territory by the withdrawal of foreign forces from that territory. It is a time for the restoration of free passage for all through the Suez Canal. It is a time, above all, not for the restoration of the situation which, because of the failure of all of us at the United Nations and elsewhere, has brought about this critical situation, but for the restoration of peace, security and decent conditions of life in an area of the world which has not seen such conditions for many years.

73. Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (*translated from French*): The Polish delegation defined its attitude towards the attack on Egypt, during the first emergency special session of the Assembly [562nd meeting]. My Government also set forth its position on this matter in its statement, when it condemned the brutal attack on Egypt by the three States, and expressed its deep sympathy with the Egyptian people now fighting for their freedom and national independence. My comments today, therefore, will concern more recent developments in the situation confronting the United Nations.

74. Exactly three weeks have elapsed since the General Assembly at its first emergency special session, by an overwhelming majority—sixty-four votes—adopted resolution 997 (ES-I) urging the parties to agree to a cease-fire and to halt the movement of arms into the area

of hostilities. Nevertheless, after that resolution was adopted, Franco-British armed forces landed in the Suez Canal area. We have just received the reports presented to the Assembly by the Secretary-General when he returned from Egypt. They show that the success achieved by the United Nations in this matter is only partial. So far only one party—the victim of the attack—has complied with the Assembly's decisions. The most important task of the United Nations, namely to oblige the States which have trespassed on Egyptian territory to respect its decisions, has so far not been accomplished. The establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force is not an abstract decision, nor an end in itself. It is the direct outcome of the recommendation aimed at the withdrawal of the foreign armed forces which invaded Egypt. The first point in resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November clearly links the establishment of the Command of the United Nations Emergency Force with resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November, which not only called for a cease-fire in Egypt, but also asked the parties to the 1949 General Armistice Agreement to withdraw their forces behind the armistice lines. This recommendation was renewed in resolution 999 (ES-I) of 4 November. Lastly, resolution 1002 (ES-I) of 7 November, referring to the establishment of the United Nations Command, called upon Israel, as well as the United Kingdom and France, immediately to withdraw their forces.

75. A fortnight has elapsed since this resolution was adopted, and it is a week since the first detachments of the United Nations Emergency Force landed on Egyptian soil. Yet no move has been made by the aggressor States to comply with the Assembly's decisions. Their troops are still occupying Egyptian territory and their Governments are inventing fresh arguments and pretexts to delay their withdrawal.

76. The stationing of international armed forces on the territory of one of the United Nations Members is, in itself, neither desirable nor indispensable. It is perhaps a necessary evil—though a strictly transitory one—as a means of restoring peace in the Near East, of re-establishing the situation which existed before the British-French-Israel attack on Egypt, and as a step to be taken only with the agreement of the Government which exercises its sovereign rights over that territory. Obviously, immediately the British-French-Israel armed forces have departed, the units of the international police force must be withdrawn from the Canal Zone to the Israel-Egyptian armistice line and must remain there during a transitional period. In no circumstances can we allow the United Nations action to become an additional burden on the victim of the aggression, while other Member States which have violated their solemn commitments under the Charter and resorted to armed force, bombarding towns and villages and killing thousands of innocent men, women and children, are allowed to go scot-free. The continued occupation of Egypt by the armies of the United Kingdom, France and Israel, the information supplied by the Syrian Government that further Israel troops are concentrated on the frontiers of Syria and Jordan and the reign of terror against the civilian occupation of Port Said, are proof enough of guilt. The whole situation makes it imperative for the United Nations to take a firm decision.

77. The Polish delegation wishes to draw attention to another important aspect of the question, in which it is deeply interested—the economic side of the picture. Poland, as a sea-going nation specially interested in

developing its trade relations with the Asian and Far Eastern countries, cannot remain indifferent to the problem of free navigation through the Suez Canal. It was for this reason that in the first weeks following the nationalization of the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company by Egypt, the Polish Government made a statement expressing its satisfaction with the guarantee given by the Egyptian Government concerning freedom of navigation through the Canal, in accordance with article 1 of the Constantinople Convention,¹ and welcoming the news that since the Company was nationalized, shipping through the Canal had been perfectly normal.

78. The Polish Government watched anxiously the military preparations being made by the United Kingdom and France in the eastern Mediterranean region, rightly considering from the outset that they were a danger to freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and a threat to peace. But despite Franco-British military preparations and other attempts to paralyse navigation through the Canal, the latter was operating normally, under Egyptian management, until the date of the concentrated attack on Egypt by the British, French and Israel forces. Thus it is the United Kingdom, France and Israel, and not Egypt, which have stopped free navigation through the Canal.

79. The economy of Poland, and indeed world economy, is being seriously harmed by the immobilization, following the attack on Egypt, of this vitally important waterway, which according to the Secretary-General's report [A/3376] has itself been badly damaged. In the same report we read that the work of repairing the Canal should begin immediately the non-Egyptian forces have withdrawn from Port Said and the Canal zone. It is clear from the report that every day's delay in complying with the United Nations decisions on the withdrawal of armed forces from Egyptian territory means a further delay in the restoration of this international waterway and thus causes serious damage to the economies of all countries.

80. To sum up, the Polish delegation considers that: first, the armed forces of the United Kingdom, France and Israel must be immediately withdrawn from Egyptian territory, for every day they remain in Egypt not only is an affront to the prestige of the United Nations and its decisions, but also increases tension in the Middle East and the world as a whole; secondly, with the consent and agreement of Egypt, the essential measures to free the Suez Canal must be undertaken, so that it can be reopened to navigation as early as possible; thirdly, the units of the United Nations Emergency Force must be withdrawn to the Israel-Egyptian frontier as soon as the British, French and Israel troops have left, staying there only during a transitional period sufficient to ensure a peaceful return to normal relations in that region, and in any case leaving whenever the Egyptian Government so demands.

81. It is self-evident that the cost of freeing the Canal, which has been immobilized by the British-French attack, as well as the other expenses linked with the return of the Near Eastern situation to normal, cannot be borne by all the Member States of the United Nations, but must be borne by the Governments which committed the aggression.

82. It is the Polish delegation's hope that the Assembly will take firm decisions, in keeping with the spirit of

the Charter. That much is expected of us by the Egyptian people, which in its fervent desire for freedom refused to be terrorized by bombs and, notwithstanding all threats, valiantly defended the flag of freedom and human dignity. That much, too, is demanded by the conscience of the peoples of the world, deeply shocked as they are by acts unworthy of our times.

83. Begum IKRAMULLAH (Pakistan): Pakistan has once again co-sponsored a draft resolution [A/3385] demanding the immediate withdrawal of the invading forces from Egypt. It is imperative that this should be done immediately to restore the shattered confidence of the world in the principles of the Charter. The attack on Egypt has destroyed the belief that has been laboriously built up that the era of aggressive force is on the wane. The shock has been greater because one of the parties to this aggression has been the United Kingdom, which since the last war has been one of the foremost countries that had worked for a new morality in international affairs and which, by gracefully accepting the liquidation of an empire and welcoming in its stead the free co-operation of like-minded nations which is the Commonwealth, seemed to have abjured force. Therefore, it is imperative and in the interest of the United Kingdom, that this unfortunate reversion to imperialistic tactics be rectified immediately and that the United Kingdom, together with France and Israel, withdraw their troops forthwith from Egypt. And it is incumbent upon the United Nations to see that this is done. The United Nations has, by overwhelming majorities on 2 and 7 November, directed that this should take place. If the United Nations declarations are to have any force and meaning in the world, the Organization should see that its decisions are implemented and complied with.

84. For the last few years a feeling of disillusion had been growing amongst the smaller nations of the world regarding the United Nations. They had begun to feel that this Organization that came into being with such high hopes and such faith, born out of bitter suffering and great trial, was after all nothing better than holy alliances for the unholy purposes of the past and that it was almost futile to hope that justice regardless of power politics could be had at the hands of the United Nations; but by taking at last a bold and prompt action in the case of Israel and British-French aggression, the United Nations has redeemed itself. It has restored the faith of the small peoples of the world in its integrity. That the United Nations could condemn the action not only of its protégé Israel, but of two of the permanent members of the Security Council, has generated a new wave of hope, and peoples and nations have once again begun to look to it for justice.

85. If now the United Nations fails to see that its resolutions are complied with, it would lose its new-found strength. It must see that its resolutions do not join the archives with the other unimplemented resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The time has come when it must make clear that the United Nations resolutions are not mere pious declarations, but are meant to be obeyed and applied without fear or favour.

86. My delegation has co-sponsored a draft resolution asking for withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt because we are against all foreign troops and troops of occupation anywhere, under any pretext by anybody. We condemn aggression and suppression of liberty equally in Egypt and in Hungary, and in Algeria and in Kashmir. We are opposed to the last-ditch stand of the

¹ Convention respecting the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, signed at Constantinople on 29 October 1888.

waning imperialism of Europe and are equally determined to oppose the nascent rise of imperialism in Asia. As we have said before from this rostrum [565th meeting], we are against imperialism of all types and colours, white or red, black or brown. Our objection to imperialism is deep and sincere and real, and springs out of a genuine hatred of domination and a genuine love of liberty, out of faith and determination that all small nations of the world have the right, and shall have the right to exercise the right, to decide their fate and determine the destiny of their own country according to their own choice. Our condemnation of aggression is not determined by any "isms". It is not coloured by other considerations except those of abstract and absolute justice and morality.

87. Mr. IAMALI (Iraq): We have before us three reports of the Secretary-General. We wish to join other delegations in expressing our thanks and admiration to the Secretary-General for untiring work, for his sincerity, and for his devotion to peace in the Middle East.

88. Before discussing the issue, I wish to make some remarks on what the representative of the Soviet Union referred to as to the designs of some colonialist quarters, vis-à-vis Iraq and the liquidation of Jordan. That representative may wish to cast aspersions on the Baghdad Pact. That is a well-known Communist policy. I have nothing to say against that. The Communists can go ahead with their own thinking. But I wish to state from this rostrum that Iraq will never take part in any machinations against any sister Arab State. Iraq was, is, and shall always be a champion of Arab liberation and Arab federation. We are members of the Pact of the League of Arab States; we have signed the Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty concluded between the Arab States; and we stand wholeheartedly behind these Pacts as a loyal member. The Baghdad Pact was never intended to diminish our loyalty to our Arab national feelings and aspirations. The Baghdad Pact came as a defensive, peaceful instrument for the Middle East.

89. Now let me turn to the main subject. It is because we are loyal members of the League of Arab States, because we have Arab brotherhood at heart, that the treatment of Egypt, the aggression against Egypt, was so deeply felt by every Iraqi. As I said here before [581st meeting], Iraq considers aggression against Egypt aggression against itself. We deplore the use of force against Egypt. The violation of Egyptian sovereignty is tantamount to the violation of the sovereignty of Iraq.

90. We saw no justification at all for the use of force against Egypt. The Suez Canal issue could have been solved without force. The six principles agreed upon by the Security Council in its resolution of 13 October 1956 [S/3675] could very well have formed a basis for negotiation. The remarks made by the representative of the United Kingdom at the 591st meeting did not justify the use of force against Egypt. He said that the United Nations had done nothing in the past few years to settle the affairs of the Middle East. Are we not all responsible for that? Are not the two permanent members of the Security Council concerned responsible for the fact that the United Nations has done nothing for the Middle East in the past seven years? And what is there to be done in the Middle East? What has to be done in the Middle East is quite clear and simple: to restore their legitimate rights to the Arabs of Palestine. Did the restoration of Arab rights in Palestine require the use of force against Egypt?

91. The representative of the United Kingdom could not justify the failure to come to the General Assembly in the past few years in order to ensure that the issues in the Middle East, for which those Powers are partly responsible, were settled in a just manner. The argument that the United Kingdom and France took the law into their own hands because the United Nations had not acted does not hold water. We are also told that the United Kingdom and France intervened to provide a shield between Egypt and Israel. But it is not a shield of protection; it is a shield of fire and blood. They brought a sword, not a shield. And even if it were a shield, it should not have been brought to the Suez Canal: it should have been put on the armistice lines, this shield which entailed the bombing of Egypt and the impairment of its sovereignty.

92. Then we were told that the action of those Powers brought matters to a head. I humbly submit that that argument is a very dangerous one. If each nation is going to bring matters to a head by its own decision, where are we to draw the line? How can we guarantee that any issue that is brought to a crucial point will not lead the whole world into catastrophe? Thus I regret very much to have to say that my delegation deplores, and cannot see any justification for, the use of force against Egypt.

93. The representative of the United Kingdom went on to say that that country did not instigate Israel, and I am sure that he would say that there was no collusion between his country and Israel. Israel does not need anybody to instigate it. There I am inclined to agree with the representative of the United Kingdom, for Israel needs no instigation. Israel aggression is something well known to us; it is recurrent.

94. When it comes to collusion, if we have no definite proof of collusion between the United Kingdom and Israel, we certainly do have substantial proof of collusion between France and Israel. Just this morning, on page 17 of *The New York Times* of 23 November we read:

"TEL AVIV . . . — Limited details of the presence of French pilots and planes in Israel during the Sinai offensive were allowed to pass the Israeli censorship tonight.

"French pilots who flew here with an undisclosed number of Mystère jet fighters before the start of the invasion told a Reuters correspondent they had been flying 'patrols'.

"An Israeli communiqué — the only mention of French pilots hitherto allowed to pass the censors—limited itself to denying that French pilots had taken part in the Sinai campaign.

"Stories by the pilots, however, are in contradiction. Some of the fliers say they strafed Egyptian tank columns in Sinai and others tell of piloting French 'flying boxcars' in paratroop operations.

" . . .
"French officers who told of taking part did not furnish any corroboration.

"Officials here have persistently refused to acknowledge the presence of the French. In one case a correspondent who produced a notebook with ranks and names was described as 'a liar'.

"French pilots and planes were first seen by the correspondent at an airfield 'somewhere in Israel'. When he saw the planes a few days later the French markings had been removed and the Israeli Star of

David painted on. During the time the correspondent was on the airfield he did not, however, see any French pilots actually take off in planes.

"After the Sinai campaign Israeli Air Force officers gave a 'victory party' in a Tel Aviv hotel. It was attended by the Israeli Chief of Staff, Gen. Moshe Dayan. French Air Force officers also were present.

"The correspondent spoke with one lieutenant who said he had been flying air patrols along the Syrian and Jordan frontiers and also had helped to provide an 'air umbrella' over Tel Aviv in case of Egyptian bombing.

"Another French officer then started to give the reported details of another action, but was restrained by an Israeli who told him: 'Be careful'.

"A few days after this, all French airmen disappeared from sight—at least from the sight of reporters and a ban on any mention of their presence was imposed by the Israeli Government."

That is definite proof of alliance, of co-operation, of collusion between France and Israel.

95. We are not surprised that France takes that attitude. France is butchering Algerians every day. We know that. We are not surprised that Israel should carry out an invasion. That, also is not a surprise to the Arabs. What is surprising is that the United Kingdom—that friend of the Arabs, with traditions and with a new ideology and politics—should join this unholy alliance of three.

96. It is high time that we called a spade a spade. It is high time for us to face facts and to come down to earth. The continued presence of the occupation troops in Egypt represents a great danger to the Middle East. The Middle East is in a state of very high and dangerous fever. We cannot do anything here before that fever is reduced. It cannot be reduced unless all invasion troops are withdrawn, and withdrawn immediately. The longer they remain, the higher will the fever be. The fever is rising from day to day, and the danger to the peace of the world is very great indeed.

97. To begin with there is some reason to believe that another conflagration will start if occupation troops continue to stay where they are. Feelings are running high; atrocities are committed in Gaza on a large scale; Arab refugees are being butchered indiscriminately and shot in Port Said. Victims are falling, especially, we are told, by French bayonets. I cannot see how Egypt could be blamed if it moves against the occupation forces. Egypt certainly is entitled under Article 51 of the Charter to defend itself. Thus Egypt's restraint deserves our admiration. We wish that occupation troops would disappear from the scene as soon as possible. Not only is suffering inflicted upon Egypt, but the whole Middle East, the whole Arab world is suffering today and paying a high cost in terms of peace, stability and lives.

98. Demonstrations in every Arab capital, protests, destruction of life, and disorder are taking place all because of the continued occupation of Egypt and the breach of its sovereignty. The sooner that is attended to, the better. Then think of the great economic losses incurred. I think all the nations here whose commerce uses the Suez Canal are losing heavily. Iraq, whose commerce goes via the Suez Canal to Basra, is suffering because of the closing of the Suez Canal. Moreover, Iraq is suffering a special loss by the destruction of the oil-pumping engines. The pumps of Iraqi oil at the Mediterranean have been destroyed in protest against

the United Kingdom and France. This destruction, which we are told cannot be repaired within six months, causes my country to lose some £50 million sterling or \$150 million. Thus my country is in the forefront as far as sacrifice and suffering are concerned because of the British and French invasion of Egypt.

99. Continued occupation of Egypt is certainly a grave danger to world peace. If I understood the representative of the United Kingdom correctly at the 591st meeting, he wishes the British and French forces to stay on and on until the the United Nations Force becomes effective—and I do not know what are the definitions and what are the criteria of effectiveness, or who is going to decide them—but if we have to wait, I am afraid that an invitation to other forces, to volunteers, to come in will be issued, and no one appreciates the danger of the coming of the volunteers as we do.

100. Last but not least, there is the prestige of this Organization. Two founding Members of this Organization—two permanent members of the Security Council—must have the prestige of the Organization at heart and must see that the Assembly's resolutions are carried out immediately. It has been nearly twenty days, and I think the forces could withdraw from Egypt as quickly as they came in. There is no justification for the delay. Their delay in withdrawing will not help clear the Suez Canal. It will not help repair the oil pumps of Iraq. It will not bring peace to the Middle East. As I said, before making any constructive effort, before settling the affairs of the Middle East, withdrawal must be effected, and effected as quickly as possible—if possible, tonight. I hope those Powers can do something tonight. The withdrawal of one battalion is not enough; they could withdraw more in one night. They should trust the United Nations now that the United Nations has the issue before it. The United Kingdom and France have nothing to do with the handling of the situation on their own; they must leave the issue to the United Nations.

101. I wish to ask the representative of Canada who came here to the rostrum and said that withdrawal is taking place: has he really come here after having talked to the Israel delegation? Has he the assurance that the Israelis really intend to withdraw behind the armistice lines? So far we have had no such evidence. All the evidence we have had so far is to the contrary. I wish I could be as optimistic as the representative of Canada.

102. I have no reason to doubt the word of the United Kingdom delegation when they said they intend to withdraw. But I do put a question mark on the intentions, on the good will, of the Israel delegation. Israel's record is one of continued aggression, of continued opposition to resolutions of the United Nations.

103. I wish everyone here would feel that the world is one today, and the situation in the Middle East is not far away, and would unite in urging the United Kingdom, France and Israel to abide forthwith with the General Assembly's resolutions. That is why I appeal to all representatives to support the draft resolution which my delegation has the honour to join in sponsoring with regard to withdrawal [A/3385].

104. Mr. EBAN (Israel): On 1 November [562nd meeting], I informed the General Assembly of the circumstances in which Israel had arisen to defend its life and its future against the perils threatening its existence from every side. Today, as the work of the Assembly reaches an important stage, it seems appropriate for me to give a precise account of Israel's position on the

matters discussed in the reports and draft resolutions now before us.

105. At every stage in this debate, attention has been concentrated on the problem of the initial justification of Israel's military action. The central fact of history in this context is that, for eight years, Egypt has conducted its relations with Israel outside and against the régime of the Charter. It has, indeed, refused to recognize Israel as a subject for Charter relationships. Bound by the Charter to practise tolerance and live in peace with Israel as a good neighbour, Egypt has practised intolerance and has governed its relationships by the concept of war. Committed by the Charter to respect Israel's territorial integrity and political independence, Egypt and other Arab States have not recognized the existence of that integrity or of that independence. Pledged by a solemn bilateral agreement to recognize Israel's right to security and freedom from attack, Egypt and the other Arab States have maintained against Israel a purposeful and all-pervading belligerency for which there is no precedent in the modern history of nations.

106. In a previous address to the General Assembly [562nd meeting], I endeavoured to describe something of the impact of this hostility upon Israel's daily life. Hundreds of our people have fallen, through illicit encroachments upon our territory. More recently, the organization of *fedayeen* groups has spread terror and havoc throughout Israel's countryside and centres of civilian population. And, looming ominously over this turbulent scene was the open, admitted, proudly declared and avowed aim to destroy the State of Israel, using for that purpose the superiority of weapons and equipment which had been obtained from outside and which had resulted in the catastrophic overthrow of the equilibrium of forces between us.

107. All of these elements of Egyptian hostility had been aggravated during the tenure of rule of the Nasser dictatorship. Israel ships had been seized in international waterways. Israel ports had been blockaded. More recently, Egypt had moved its offensive power right up to our narrow frontier. It had concerted an alliance with two other States, to our north and to our east, with the avowed objective of swamping us in a torrent of violence from three sides.

108. In these circumstances, an inferno of insecurity had raged through large parts of our country. The danger of physical violence hovered over the land and cast its shadow over every peaceful home.

109. The Government of Israel, having followed this discussion with deep and attentive interest, finds no reason to revise its view that the action which we took on 29 October was the only alternative to our being destroyed at an early date by the concerted aggressive action of Egypt and its neighbours. We have taken seriously the proclaimed policy heard in broadcasts from Cairo, which stated: "We shall fix the time and the place of Israel's destruction".

110. I shall leave this subject with one observation. Many delegations have ascended this rostrum and have spoken with sympathy and understanding of the unique and fearful siege by which we were surrounded. There has been a broadening recognition of the fact that the events of the past few weeks were nothing but a point of explosion in what the Minister of State for External Affairs of Australia has caused a long, slow-motion aggression. These expressions of comprehension by world opinion have sustained our courage and reinforced our spirit. World opinion has come to know something of

the character of the dictatorship whose purposeful aggression we have resisted. The aim of that dictatorship is the destruction of Israel, hegemony in the Arab world and in a large part of Asia, expansion in Africa, and domination of Europe through the seizure of its economic jugular vein. In all of these objectives, the Nasser dictatorship made successful attempts to secure external great-Power assistance and to convert the Middle East into an arena of perilous great-Power rivalry.

111. I do owe it to the General Assembly to record some of the evidence which has reached us since I last had the honour of addressing it on this question of the aggressive plans which were frustrated by Israel's action on 29 October [572nd meeting]. I do so because this story has a direct and acute relevance to the plans of the General Assembly for establishing greater stability and peace in the future. The entry of the Israel forces into the Sinai Peninsula has lifted the curtain upon a macabre and dreadful scene.

112. I should like to remind the General Assembly that after 1949, when the General Armistice Agreement was concluded between Israel and Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula was left virtually without military forces or installations, except for a small garrison at El-Arish. This position of virtual demilitarization of Sinai continued until 1953. It is, I think, significant that during this period, when neither Egyptian nor Israel armed forces were in the Sinai Peninsula, relative peace and tranquillity prevailed in the relations between Egypt and Israel under their Armistice Agreement. But, on the ascent to power of the Nasser régime, all this was transformed. An intensive military build-up commenced in the Sinai Peninsula. More than £15 million sterling were invested in the establishment of military installations and the building of military communications. Two airfields for jet planes were established at Bir Gifgafa and Bir Hamma.

113. I should like to give the Assembly a general picture of the military installations which had been established in recent years in the Sinai Peninsula. This account sheds some light on the intentions of the armies arrayed against us across the frontier line.

114. Large advance ammunition depots were found by us at El-Arish and at El-Midan and Abu Aweigila. Other supply depots were in the process of construction at Gebel Libni. Fuel storage tanks were set up at El-Arish, Abu Aweigila and Bir Rôd Sâlim. Supplies of arms and spare-parts depots were set up in El-Arish, in Abu Aweigila and in Nahal Rafa. All these depots were but a short distance from the Israel frontier. The quantities of arms, equipment and ammunition stored up in these installations were sufficient to sustain an all-out attack on Israel by all the existing units of the Egyptian armed forces. The fact that these depots included large quantities of ammunition for the guns of heavy tanks of the Centurion and Stalin types proves that they were intended to serve an attacking force and not a defence army. Road developments which had been carried out in the area were clearly designed solely for military purposes and not for the benefit of the sparse Bedouin population. Thus, a road running parallel to the existing railroad tracks was constructed between Qantara and El-Arish. The Suez-Qusaima road was being covered with asphalt. Wide roads were constructed between El-Arish, Gebel Libni, Bir Hasana, Abu Aweigila, Qusaima, and others. Telephone wiring was set up along the roads. The two airfields to which I have referred were constantly being improved and the runways repeatedly

lengthened to accommodate new and more devastating types of aircraft. Recently, these airfields were specially adapted for the use of jet planes.

115. Egyptian documents captured in the campaign illustrate the transition from the defensive policy prevailing until 1953 to an offensive military objective. These documents include detailed planning for, and reports of, reconnaissance patrols in southern Israel and full intelligence reports on Israel's farming settlements, detailing their defence arrangements and the approaches to them. In Egyptian military education pamphlets found in the area, stress is laid on the aggressive spirit necessary to prepare for the day of revenge.

116. My Government has submitted to the Security Council [S/3742] the effective operation orders in which Egyptian officers in Sinai and the Gaza Strip were bidden by their superiors to regard their objective as being the destruction of the State of Israel by the most brutal and savage means of fighting. The deployment of Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula and in the Gaza Strip was progressively increased, and at the time of the Suez crisis it had risen to three infantry divisions and two armoured brigades. By then, these forces, relying on supplies in advanced depots, were in a position to launch an attack on Israel, if necessary, within less than twenty-four hours. On Sharm el-Sheikh, on the southernmost tip of the Sinai Peninsula, a fortified military base was constructed sufficient to accommodate an infantry battalion. An airfield, jetties and shore batteries were also set up. All this, of course, was for the sole purpose of effectively blocking the Straits of Aqaba, the Straits of Elath, and to complete the maritime blockade a base for torpedo boats was erected on the Red Sea south of the Suez Canal.

117. This, then, is the scene which was revealed to our eyes during the action in the Sinai Peninsula. Here was a wilderness bristling with death, pushing up against Israel's populated centres, and across the other side of the frontier, in Israel's territory, could be seen the targets for this massive rearmament—isolated farm settlements populated by young pioneers with pathetically primitive watchtowers and small-arms defences. Therefore, everything that has come into our hands and into our knowledge since I last addressed the General Assembly has fortified our conviction that the disaster which we prevented was far greater and more drastic than any of the hazards or perils which our limited military action incurred.

118. I must again ask the General Assembly whether it sees any value whatever in a discussion of the present crisis which chooses to begin with 29 October and declines to look beneath the surface of these events to the long and deep and tormenting story of a siege and a campaign of belligerency which no other member of the international community has ever been called upon to endure. It has been regarded as legitimate in this debate to refer not only to our own ideas and perceptions, but also to follow the trend of world opinion. I would therefore like to quote a penetrating formulation in an editorial in *The New York Times* of 22 November 1956. It is, I think, the only passage in that edition of *The New York Times* which has not yet been quoted this afternoon. That editorial comment reads:

“... the crisis in the Middle East is by no means of recent origin; it has been developing over the past eight years... it was the Arab States which, in defiance of the United Nations partition of Palestine which created Israel, attacked that new nation and

have constantly threatened its annihilation. It will be necessary to keep in mind that Egypt, in persistent defiance of the United Nations, established a blockade of Israeli shipping, that it was Colonel Nasser who precipitated the Suez crisis by seizing the canal in disregard of an international treaty and the established international order, and that he called in Soviet Russia to help him in his lawless ambitions. This is, therefore, the original aggression of which the British, French and Israeli actions are a consequence, and it would be folly to reward them for it, or to give them a free hand to resume aggression under United Nations auspices”.

119. “To resume aggression under United Nations auspices”—this is a disquieting phrase. This is the danger which we must bend every effort to avoid. It is clear that the method of implementing our undertakings in the General Assembly resolutions of 2, 5 and 7 November is not a question of mere technical means. It can spell the difference between future peace and an early renewal of the conflict; between regional stability and the revival in full strength and pride and arrogance of the old belligerency, with all its dangers.

120. It is salutary that we should look carefully at the provisions of resolution 997 (ES-I) governing United Nations policy, which was adopted on 2 November 1956. That resolution begins by urging the parties, as a matter of priority, to establish an immediate cease-fire. The General Assembly will recall that my Government gave this recommendation its priority consideration and was amongst the first of the belligerents to grant its consent.

121. There has been a tendency in the course of this discussion to make light of the achievement of the cease-fire and to hold that, because the other provisions of that resolution have not yet been put into full effect, the cease-fire itself is not a valuable and notable achievement. I suggest that we do not take for granted this swift achievement of a cease-fire. Our memory and our experience tell us that it is not a normal and invariable experience for the organs of the United Nations to receive such a swift response to their recommendation for a cease-fire. On 26 May 1948, the present Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt was engaged in explaining to the Security Council a different concept of the duties of a Member State when called upon to cease fire. He said then—and this was after battle had raged against Israel for eleven days against a cease-fire resolution of the Security Council:

“The Egyptian forces have entered Palestine only... to restore security and order in that country, as repeatedly declared by the Egyptian Government.

“Egypt would not, therefore, have hesitated for a single moment in accepting the invitation of the Security Council to cease-fire... should this invitation have realized the lofty and noble aims outlined above. But this invitation, I regret to say, will, under the present circumstances, fulfil none of those aims.”²

It would only result in disadvantageous consequences for the Arabs who had been “forced to resort to arms”.

122. The Egyptian representative went on to say:

“... the fact that the so-called provisional Government [of Israel] has been recognized by certain Powers can in no way change this situation.

“The Egyptian Government regrets that it cannot abide by a recommendation of the Security Council

² *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, No. 74, 305th meeting, p. 44.*

to cease-fire in Palestine which does not take into account these equitable and reasonable factors. Without such considerations, any cease-fire recommendation would bring no more than a temporary respite which would only give rise to greater strife and unrest, and engender fiercer and more bitter terrorism".⁸

123. This, then, is the way that a cease-fire is dealt with when the victim of the fire is Israel and when the party interested in maintaining the fire is Egypt. In the light of that experience, I believe that the General Assembly should congratulate itself on the speed and expedition with which the first part of resolution 997 (ES-I) was put into effect.

124. Beyond the cease-fire, there are other elements in that resolution of 2 November. There is the withdrawal of forces. There is the cessation of raids. There is the provision against the introduction of new military forces. There is the obligation to open and restore secure freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal. There is the call for scrupulous observance of the general armistice system which, in the case of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, in their relations with Israel, is now in full effect, and that system, of course, has provisions against all acts of hostility or all belligerent acts.

125. This, then, is the integral system of objectives which resolution 997 (ES-I) calls upon the parties to achieve. It is only if we carry out all these things without further reservation, if we carry them out in such a way as to vindicate the paramount objective of our Charter, namely, the prevention of a recurrence of hostility, that we will give serious implementation to the desire and the wishes of the international community.

126. The General Assembly will recall that, in response to the resolution of 2 November and the subsequent resolutions, the Government of Israel notified the Secretary-General on 8 November as follows:

"... the Government of Israel will willingly withdraw its forces from Egypt immediately upon the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connexion with the emergency international force". [A/3320.]

127. My Government stands firmly and faithfully upon that declaration, which was rightly regarded at that time as an important contribution to the task of restoring peace and stability in the area. The General Assembly will observe that in our conception the process of withdrawing Israel troops from Egyptian soil is integrated with the plans for the United Nations Force. We believe that this is a legitimate interpretation. Indeed, if we study the jurisprudence under which the United Nations Force was established, we find that it had an accepted relationship to the procedure for effecting the withdrawals. This was clear from the address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, who, as the author of the concept of the United Nations Force in this General Assembly, speaks with a special authority in this as in other matters. There is what he called "a relationship . . . between the withdrawal of the forces . . . and the arrival and the functioning of the United Nations Force" [567th meeting, para. 260].

128. The same concept appears to my delegation to emerge from the report which the Secretary-General has submitted for approval. He wrote:

"... the functions of the United Nations Force would be, when a cease-fire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the

Egyptian Government in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops and to secure compliance with the other terms established in resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956". [A/3302, para. 12.]

The Secretary-General went on to say that the Force should have such functions as are necessary "to secure peaceful conditions on the assumption that the parties to the conflict take all necessary steps for compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly" [*Ibid.*]. He concluded by stating that the locale of the Force would be roughly the area between the armistice boundary and the Suez Canal.

129. There is, therefore, no validity whatever in any criticism of Israel's position on the ground that its plans for carrying out its undertaking of 8 November depend to a very large extent upon the arrival and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force. The expression of concern which appears in one of the draft resolutions on this point consequently has neither validity nor justification.

130. The General Assembly will recall that in its communication of 8 November [A/3320] the Government of Israel welcomed the establishment of this force, which was then about to be dispatched to the area of the Suez Canal. We hold strongly, as I believe most Members of the General Assembly do, that while the presence of this Force depends upon Egypt's agreement, its functions cannot be subordinated to Egypt's desires. Its movements and its composition cannot be the subject of dictation by the host country.

131. If we were to accept one of the proposals made here—namely, that the Force should separate Egyptian and Israel troops for as long as Egypt thought it convenient and should then be withdrawn on Egypt's unilateral request—we would reach a reduction to absurdity. Egypt would then be in a position to build up, behind the screen of this Force, its full military preparations and, when it felt that those military preparations had reached their desired climax, to dismiss the United Nations Emergency Force and to stand again in close contact and proximity with the territory of Israel. This reduction to absurdity proves how impossible it is to accept in any matter affecting the composition or the functions of the Force the policies of the Egyptian Government as the sole or even the decisive criterion.

132. I should like to call the General Assembly quite frankly what is the philosophy which underlies our present approach to this problem of the withdrawal of Israel forces in accordance with our undertaking of 8 November. Many representatives have spoken as if, in their view, the only important consideration is when we withdraw. Of far greater moment is the question: How do we withdraw? What situation will that withdrawal create? What comes in its place? Will the withdrawal become an integral stage in the promotion of peaceful conditions? Or will it pave the way to a return to the previous state of siege and of anarchy? This is perhaps the most fateful practical question which the United Nations now faces in the conduct of its work.

133. There are two possible approaches to this problem of withdrawal. One is a system—which I am certain the General Assembly will instantaneously reject—under which we would carry out the withdrawal without any co-ordination with the movements of the United Nations Force, without any care for the future and without any guarantee of Egypt's future conduct towards Israel. Sinai would then become again a base for Nasser to

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

renew against Israel the deadly menace which I have but briefly described. Once again the peaceful desert would become a source of blood and of peril.

134. Let me again say that an Egyptian military base in the Sinai Peninsula cannot possibly have any other purpose except to sustain an assault against Israel. Armour and weapons would again pour into the peninsula in preparation for the next round. Egypt and Israel would again face each other near Gaza, which Egypt seized by aggression eight years ago. From that position the *fedayeen* commando squads would again roam through the countryside, which has known a blessed tranquillity in the past few weeks. The illicit blockade would again be established on the Gulf of Aqaba, now for the first time an international waterway open today to the ships of all nations without distinction of flag, and thereby another grotesque situation would have been brought about. The United Nations would have been active in restoring to a state of blockade what had hitherto been an open waterway. Egypt has blocked one waterway, the Suez Canal, contrary to the 1888 Convention.

135. Under this system, which I propose that the General Assembly reject, of a reckless and unplanned withdrawal, the United Nations would find itself inadvertently responsible for bringing Egypt back to block the other waterway, so that the protection of blockade would become an international objective. Thus belligerency will be restored, acts of war by sea or land will again arise until they provoke the inevitable explosion, and who knows how far or how much any such explosion will be localized? This is a startling prospect, but it is exactly what will happen if the method of effecting and implementing the withdrawal of troops is not approached with minimum care and precision. This return to the *status quo* of belligerency is precisely what Nasser wants. It is what some delegations quite inadvertently may be proposing when they urge that the withdrawal take place in disregard of what will ensue and in detachment from the plans now under way for defining the tasks of the United Nations Emergency Force now entering the Canal area. This question of a return to the *status quo* of insecurity was frankly discussed in the General Assembly during the first debates on the establishment of the United Nations Force. On that occasion, too, the Canadian representative invited our attention to that problem. He said:

“What then, six months from now? Are we to go through all this again? Are we to return to the *status quo*? Such a return would not be to a position of security, or even to a tolerable position, but would be a return to terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, charges and counter-charges, and ultimately another explosion . . .” [562nd meeting, para. 306.]

These, too, are instructive words, except that one might have a reservation whether peace could endure for six months in an atmosphere of renewed belligerency. It was in order to avoid such a blind procession back to disaster and belligerency that the General Assembly devised machinery in the form of the United Nations Emergency Force.

136. I have, then, portrayed one method of effecting a withdrawal which would contain within it the seeds of a future conflict.

137. But there is another system of withdrawal fully consistent not only with the resolutions of the General Assembly, but also with the purposes and objectives of the United Nations and its Charter. Let me again stress

that the Government of Israel will carry out the undertaking for the withdrawal of its troops from Egypt as defined in its communication of 8 November. We shall do this. But is it essential or wise or permissible that the Sinai Peninsula must again become remilitarized as a base for future assaults? Are there no other alternatives whereby the very emptiness of that historic desert may become a bridge of peace between two countries? There are ways of reconciling Israel's obligation to withdraw with the avoidance of this danger. I will not make detailed proposals at this forum, but we have constructive proposals which would fulfil both of these objectives, the principle of withdrawal and the avoidance of the perils emanating from the re-creation of this base. Similarly, is it essential or wise or permissible that maritime belligerency shall be restored in the Gulf of Aqaba in defiance of United Nations decisions against belligerency and of the international law governing narrow waterways? What shall we have achieved if we leave behind a position at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba in which acts of maritime war can be achieved, evoking in the course of time a natural response and re-creating that vicious circle of violence from which it is our passionate desire to break loose?

138. There are ways of reconciling the resolutions of 2, 5 and 7 November with the creation of such conditions as will preclude that danger, and we shall make proposals accordingly in the proper contexts.

139. There are solutions for Gaza other than the renewal of this Egyptian salient in a position which would make Egyptian-Israel peace impossible.

140. There is the problem of the Suez Canal. This is not affected one way or the other by Israel's policy on the withdrawal of troops from Egypt, but we have a special interest and a special experience. Under the 1888 Convention this waterway was to be opened to the ships of all nations in time of peace and in time of war. Article 4 of the Convention emphasizes that the obligation to keep the Canal open even in time of war rests upon Egypt even when Egypt is a belligerent, and therefore the present situation in which the Canal is blocked is a violation of that Convention.

141. But even before that violation there was another long-established violation through the discriminatory closing of the Canal to Israel's ships and cargoes. The Canal is now closed to all nations. May we not hope that when it is opened it shall be opened to all nations without distinction of flag, in conformity with the Constantinople Convention and the resolutions of the Security Council?

142. This, then, is the summary of Israel's position. We are still convinced of the necessity, the justice, the rectitude of what we had to do for Israel's defence against an open threat to destroy it. This salutary resistance may be written in history as a triumphant assertion that small democracies have a right to live and not only large dictatorships supported by larger Powers.

143. We shall carry out our undertaking of 8 November, but there is a way of carrying it out which might lead to war. There is a way of carrying it out which gives a chance of peace. We choose, urge and advocate the latter course. These problems must be seriously, constructively and rapidly discussed.

144. We invite the United Nations authorities concerned with the implementation of the resolutions of 2, 5 and 7 November to consider with us the proposals which we have conceived and might continue to present for carrying out the agreed principle of withdrawal from

Egypt in a manner conducive to peaceful conditions in the area to be affected by the withdrawal. In the meantime we would urge the necessity of avoiding any increase of tension, including such increase of tension as arises from false reports.

145. I will again repeat the denial which I gave from this rostrum at the 587th meeting of mischievous reports asserting an imminent danger to Syria from troop concentrations in Israel. There is no foundation whatever for those reports, which have unfortunately been transmitted not only by Syria but by other representatives here. We have invited United Nations observers to study the scene on the Israel-Syrian frontier. Their report, which entirely disputes the Syrian contention, has now been made available, and it is the hope of my delegation that the Secretary-General will find means of making it known to all Members of the General Assembly.

146. A final consideration brings us back to the crux of our problem: whether the implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions, is to be succeeded by a state of war. This belligerency, this state of war, is the great paradox of this discussion. A nation claims and exercises a state of war against its neighbour and then complains about the absence of peace. Egypt behaves to Israel as though there is war. Israel is called upon to behave towards Egypt as though there is peace. Egypt comes in full belligerency to the United Nations and says, "I seek your protection; I am only working for Israel's destruction; I am at war with Israel; I wish to send people to Israel to kill and plunder; I will seize Israel's ships in international waterways; I will build up armaments for Israel's destruction; I will concert alliances to bring about Israel's downfall. I ask the United Nations to protect me while I do all of this." The complete incongruity of belligerency with the system of the Charter is the shocking and tragic spectacle that we have seen.

147. In conclusion we seek the understanding and counsel of the General Assembly on the need for carrying out our undertaking of 8 November in conditions which will prevent a recurrence of the conflict. We call for this prudence out of the depths of our hearts because we know what is here at stake. The thousands who fell in our war of independence, the hundreds slain in homes and fields by Nasser and his fellow potentates, the lives lost in the effort to push disaster away a few weeks ago—these are all vividly before us. We speak out of the deep pathos of a people which more than any other has faced the prospect of physical extinction in its journey across history and which during the eight years of its statehood has unreasonably been called upon to live under the dark and dreadful shadow of physical destruction. It is then in the name of that sentiment that we say: Let Sinai become a place of peace and not a base of war. Let the closed waterway of Suez be opened. Let the open waterway of the Gulf of Aqaba not be closed. Let us find means of avoiding that explosive proximity of Egyptian and Israel forces which is fatal for peace.

148. The danger and the opportunity walk here hand in hand. It is within our capacity in a matter of days so to arrange affairs that the recent struggle might be the last page in the chapter of Egyptian-Israel conflict. We cannot solve the long-term political issues in the process of the withdrawal of forces, but we can secure such practical undertakings and arrangements in co-operation with the United Nations as will preclude acts

of war and belligerency by land and by sea. This is our purpose; this is our aim. In our efforts to attain it, we confidently summon the world's conscience to our side.

149. Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (*translated from Russian*): The situation in Egypt is extremely serious and calls for prompt and energetic measures. We share the opinion expressed by many Arab delegations that, until the last soldier of the countries guilty of intervention in Egypt has left that country, until the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Egypt have been fully restored, until peace has been completely re-established on Egypt's borders, until there has been an end to provocations and threats of flagrant intervention in Egypt's internal affairs, peace in the Middle East—and elsewhere as well—will remain seriously endangered.

150. Despite the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its first emergency special session calling for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Egypt, the aggression against the Egyptian people still continues. While no actual warfare is going on at present, armed forces of the three Powers are still there and, what is worse, there is every indication that they are in no hurry to leave, but are trying to temporize in order to remain on Egyptian soil as long as possible.

151. Again and again, new pretexts have been found for circumventing the resolutions of the General Assembly. At first, the aggressors declared that they would not withdraw their armed forces until the United Nations Emergency Force reached Egypt. It has now been several days since detachments of the United Nations Force arrived in Egypt but the aggressors wish now to explain to them the purposes and functions of that Force.

152. The representatives of the United Kingdom, France and Israel are setting one new condition after another. They now want assurances that the United Nations Force will remain in the Canal zone until some sort of guarantees are given as regards the final settlement of both the Suez Canal and the Palestine questions. It is common knowledge, however, that controversial issues between Egypt and Israel have been outstanding for eight years. Furthermore, the final settlement of the Suez question may take a long time. Hence, according to the aggressors, their armed forces should remain in Egypt for a long time to come. Does this mean that the General Assembly resolutions adopted by an overwhelming majority are to remain scraps of paper to which they attach no importance?

153. There are grounds for believing that this is precisely the position of the United Kingdom, France and Israel. As we all know, the Secretary-General had to ask the Foreign Ministers of these three countries the other day how the withdrawal of their armed forces was progressing and whether they intended to withdraw their forces from Egypt at all, in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions. We believe that these questions call for an immediate, clear and complete answer. The numerous Press reports in recent days offer no ground for optimism concerning a speedy withdrawal of the interventionist troops, and there is even less ground for such optimism in the statements made from this rostrum by the representatives of the interventionists in question.

154. Some of them continue to assert that the armed forces of the United Kingdom and France will remain in

Egypt until they have been clearly apprised of the task of the United Nations Force and that they will leave Egyptian territory only "gradually", "in stages". What such pronouncements really mean is that the aggressors are playing for time, and have no serious intention of withdrawing their armed forces from Egypt.

155. General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November unambiguously states that the armed forces of the parties to the Armistice Agreements should be withdrawn behind the armistice lines and that the provisions of the Armistice Agreements should be scrupulously observed. The Egyptian Government, as we all know, fully accepted the terms of that resolution. As regards the Israel Government, we can cite repeated statements by its official representatives to the effect that Israel does not intend to abide by the Armistice Agreements and, consequently, the General Assembly resolution. After declaring the Armistice Agreement a "fiction" the representatives of Israel flatly declared their intention of keeping the Gaza Strip, which their forces had seized. I hardly need point out that Israel has no right whatever to the Gaza Strip and that its refusal to evacuate that region is only evidence of the land-grabbing policy behind Israel's invasion of Egypt, despite the repeated claims by Israel representatives that the attack was launched as a legitimate act of self-defence.

156. It is obvious that Israel could never have undertaken such an ambitious project without the support of those under whose guidance and with whose active assistance it launched its attack on Egypt.

157. We all are familiar with the statement made by the Syrian Government on 20 November [A/3378] to the effect that it has evidence that the armed forces of the United Kingdom and France co-operated with those of Israel in the conduct of military operations in the Sinai Peninsula, Rafah and Gaza. It appears that United Kingdom and French forces landed in Haifa on 23 October; that United Kingdom forces took part in the attack on Rafah; that the United Kingdom fleet attacked Gaza at dawn on 2 November and that United Kingdom and French forces occupied the town five hours before the arrival of Israel troops. The participation of United Kingdom and French forces in the first phase of the aggressive action by Israel cleared the way for further operations in the invasion of Egypt by those three countries. On 20 November *The Manchester Guardian* referred to the important and possibly decisive role of the French air force in Israel's invasion of the Sinai Peninsula. It should be recalled that the United Kingdom, France and Israel, which are now attempting to refute these facts, were equally zealous and equally categorical in their efforts to refute the fact that they were preparing an attack on Egypt.

158. All this clearly points to the existence of a plan of aggression against Egypt prepared jointly long in advance by the United Kingdom and France, with Israel setting off the fuse. The adoption of such a policy by the Israel Government, a policy sponsored by the extremist elements of the country, can hardly contribute towards the establishment of friendly relations between the people of Israel and the peoples of the great Arab world surrounding them.

159. Steps must be taken to render impossible any repetition by Israel of acts of aggression against the Arab countries—acts which have for ten years been a source of unrest, disturbance and tension and a threat to peace in that part of the world.

160. The armed attack by the United Kingdom, France and Israel against Egypt, whose purpose was to force the Egyptian people to bow to their ultimatums, is another link in the long chain of actions by the British-French imperialists who are bent upon regaining their former position in the Middle East. We have all witnessed the disgraceful manoeuvres, incompatible with the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter, to which the leaders of the United Kingdom and France have resorted in the past few months in order to ignore the legitimate rights of the Egyptian people and to provide a pretext for their long-planned aggression against Egypt.

161. Immediately after the nationalization of the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company by the Egyptian Government, the Governments of the United Kingdom and France adopted a position that was not only incompatible with the principles of international law and obviously contrary to the provisions of basic instruments establishing Egypt's incontestable right to ownership of the Suez Canal, but was also incompatible with their own positions in the past when they had a final say in the operation of the Canal.

162. Now the United Kingdom and France are insisting on the internationalization of the Suez Canal, alleging that the operation of the Canal and the question of navigation through it cannot be left to the discretion of one State alone—that is, Egypt. May I recall that, when the internationalization of the Suez Canal was proposed at the Peace Conference in 1919, it was none other than the representative of the United Kingdom who objected strenuously on the ground that internationalization would infringe, and be wholly incompatible with, Egypt's sovereignty.

163. The United Kingdom and France assert that Egypt is unable to ensure unrestricted, normal navigation through the Suez Canal. The facts, however, have fully refuted this assertion. Throughout the period from the nationalization of the Canal to the beginning of the acts of aggression against Egypt, Egypt not only ensured free and normal navigation through the Canal, but did so in a greater measure than had been the case previously. The fact that there is no navigation through the Canal now is due wholly to the British-French military operations against Egypt.

164. The United Kingdom and French Governments are not content with having, by their actions, faced the United Nations with a *fait accompli* and flagrantly violated its principles and its Charter; they now wish to make use of the United Nations force in order to achieve one of their original objectives: the internationalization of the Canal. This is the only possible explanation of the demands of certain circles in the United Kingdom and France that the tasks and functions of the United Nations Force should be altered to make it a force of occupation rather than control—a new army of occupation which would achieve under the flag of the United Nations what they have been unable to achieve by means of threats, pressure and overt aggression.

165. The whole policy of the United Kingdom and France on the Suez Canal question in recent months clearly shows that from the outset they were bent on achieving their imperialist aims at any cost; they did not shrink from flouting the sovereign rights of Egypt, flagrantly violating the United Nations Charter, causing bloodshed and wanton destruction, and even creating a serious threat to world peace and security.

166. Now, as at the first emergency special session of the General Assembly [563rd meeting], the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria expresses its deep concern over the tense situation that has arisen in the Middle East as a result of the attack on Egypt by the United Kingdom, France and Israel. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria stresses the necessity for the unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Egyptian territory and the peaceful settlement of the Suez problem by negotiation and without any interference in the domestic affairs of that country.

167. In view of the fact that the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its first emergency special session, or at least their essential parts, have not been carried out, the Bulgarian delegation considers that the General Assembly must do everything within its power to compel the United Kingdom, France and Israel to comply with these resolutions without excuses and delays. It is the duty of the United Nations not to allow any further violations of Egypt's sovereignty and territorial integrity, no matter how they may be disguised.

168. Accordingly, the Bulgarian delegation believes that the General Assembly should: first, demand the immediate withdrawal from Egypt of all United Kingdom, French and Israel forces as proposed in the twenty-one Power draft resolution [A/3385]; secondly, give firm instructions to the United Nations Emergency Force to occupy positions along the armistice line after the withdrawal of the interventionist troops; thirdly, in agreement with the Egyptian Government, determine how long and under what conditions the United Nations Force will remain in Egyptian territory; fourthly, call upon the aggressor States to compensate Egypt for the damage caused by their attack; fifthly, urge the speediest possible restoration of normal navigation through the Suez Canal, all expenses in connexion with the clearing of the Canal and the repairs of its installations to be paid by the aggressors; sixthly, take vigorous measures to put a halt to the repressive acts of the United Kingdom, French and Israel forces in the occupied areas of Egypt; seventhly, adopt the proposal of the Egyptian Government for an investigation of the atrocities and cruelties perpetrated by the aggressors against the Egyptian population.

169. In connexion with the documents before us we have the following additional observations to offer. The Bulgarian delegation considers that the speediest possible clearing of the Suez Canal and its opening for normal navigation is indeed an urgent task, and the Secretary-General's anxiety in this regard is understandable. We note, however, that in his report on arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal Mr. Ham-

markjold proposes that he should be authorized "to enter into the financial commitments that are unavoidable" [A/3376, Para. 7], but says nothing about where the necessary funds will come from. Where our country is concerned, we cannot consent to pay for the damage caused because someone took a notion to commit aggression, resulting in the closing of the Canal, which before that action had been kept in proper operating condition by Egypt. The matter should be made clear from the outset.

170. As I have already stated, in our opinion all expenditure for the clearing of the Canal and the restoration of its installations should be charged to the aggressors. We make the same reservation with regard to the six-Power draft resolution [A/3386]; we assume that the sponsors do not intend to make all Member States of the United Nations pay for the misdeeds of disturbers of the peace.

171. There is all the more reason for our observation that the draft resolution, on administrative and financial measures relating to the United Nations Emergency Force [A/3383 annex], proposes that all Member States of the United Nations should pay for the fact that a United Nations Force had to be set up to put an end to aggressive action which had been condemned by the whole world. Naturally we cannot acquiesce in such a proposal.

172. It is the paramount duty of the United Nations to take vigorous measures for the restoration of peace in the Near East and for the re-establishment of the situation that existed along Egypt's borders before the aggression took place, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement. The first and most important requirement is the withdrawal of the armed forces of the aggressors from Egyptian territory.

173. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is confident that the speedy restoration of peace in the Near East will be a major contribution towards maintaining and strengthening peace throughout the world. The United Nations bears special responsibility in this regard. Using all the powers and means provided for by its Charter, it must take effective action to bring about a peaceful settlement of the controversial issues in the Near East at the earliest possible moment, with due regard to the interests of the independent Arab States. In this way, and only in this way, can the United Nations successfully discharge its paramount duty as an international organization created in order to maintain international peace and security.

The meeting rose at 6:10 p.m.