Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Working paper submitted by Libya to the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

- 1. Libya affirms that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the basis of efforts to end the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, eventually, achieve complete nuclear disarmament when nuclear-weapon States eliminate their nuclear arsenals in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. That can only come about through universal accession to the Treaty, full compliance with its provisions, and placing all nuclear facilities and activities under the Comprehensive Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
- 2. The future credibility of NPT can only be ensured by the commitment of all States Parties to full implementation of its provisions. In particular, nuclear-weapon States Parties are obliged under article I of the Treaty not in any way to assist or encourage any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or gain control over such weapons or explosive devices.
- 3. Libya stresses that the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System is the proper framework for ensuring that States fulfil their commitments under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty and affirms that IAEA is the only agency that is authorized to verify compliance of States Parties with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements which they have concluded with IAEA. However, attempts by certain nuclear-weapon States to wilfully misinterpret that System for political purposes with a view to curtailing the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon Parties to acquire and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is a clear violation of the commitments and obligations provided for in article III, paragraph 1.
- 4. The protection of that inalienable right, provided for in article IV, is one of the basic goals of the Treaty. Libya rejects any attempt by any State Party to use the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, in violation of the IAEA Statute. It also affirms that developed States have a responsibility to assist developing States in benefiting from peaceful uses of atomic energy in their development programmes by facilitating the acquisition by developing States of nuclear equipment and materials and the relevant scientific and technological expertise.





- 5. Libya greatly appreciates both past and ongoing IAEA efforts to support States in the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology in their development programmes through technical cooperation programmes administered by the Agency, and calls for IAEA to be supported in continuing to enhance its technical cooperation programmes alongside its monitoring functions, and for the strengthening of IAEA safeguards not to adversely affect the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation.
- 6. Libya expresses concern over the policy, adopted in respect of other States by certain States with nuclear capacities, of imposing limits on the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and of amending their laws concerning the export of technical equipment, thereby limiting the ability of importing countries to make use of technology in their development programmes, which constitutes a violation of article IV of the Treaty and undermines the technical cooperation programme, the administration of which is one of the most essential functions of IAEA.
- 7. Libya stresses the need for compliance with article VI of the Treaty, as affirmed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which called for an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. That commitment was reaffirmed by the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
- 8. Libya calls for non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to NPT to be given security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The only assurance against that is the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. It also calls on nuclear-weapon States Parties to provide assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties against the use or any threat of use of such weapons. It stresses that efforts should continue to conclude an unconditional and legally binding international instrument on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.
- 9. Libya stresses that security and stability in the Middle East will not be achieved as long as Israel possesses nuclear weapons. On 11 December 2006, the Prime Minister of Israel admitted that his country possesses nuclear weapons. Israel is the only State in the Middle East that has neither acceded to nor announced its intention to accede to NPT. With a view to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, the international community and its institutions must bring pressure to bear on Israel to accede to the Treaty without delay as a non-nuclear-weapon Party, place all its nuclear facilities and activities under the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System, and renounce its nuclear weapons in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981). Until such time as Israel complies with international demands to accede to the Treaty and places its nuclear facilities under the Comprehensive Safeguards System, States Parties to the Treaty are obliged to fulfil their commitments under article IV of the Treaty.
- 10. Libya recalls that over the past few years the United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly adopted by consensus a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and continues to adopt the resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. In its resolution 63/84, the General Assembly expressed concern that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region of the Middle East would pose a serious threat to international peace and security, noted that Israel remains the only

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State in the Middle East that has not yet become party to the Treaty and reaffirmed the importance of placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA.

11. Libya stresses that the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference undertook to strengthen and universalize the Treaty and to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. Both the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences reaffirmed that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved. Libya calls on all Parties to intensify efforts to ensure that the 2012 conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East, which will be convened in 2012, takes practical steps to implement the resolution on the Middle East that was adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. It should be noted that the resolution on the Middle East was an essential element of the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

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