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President: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

The Conciliation Commission for Palestine and its work in the light of the resolutions of the United Nations: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/2310)

[Agenda item 67]

1. Mr. SALAZAR (Dominican Republic), Rapporteur of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (*translated from Spanish*): As the Assembly is aware, this item was included in the provisional agenda of the session on the proposal of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. In the explanatory memorandum [A/2184] submitted by the sponsors pursuant to rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, it is stated that: "The proposed item transcends the mere aspect of reviewing the reports of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, although such a review is necessary. The object in considering this item should be to have a broad view of the activity of the Conciliation Commission in the light of the United Nations resolutions and the appropriate measures and machinery for giving them effect." The memorandum adds: "None of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations has as yet been implemented. The responsibility of the United Nations with respect to the issues dealt with by these resolutions cannot, therefore, be said to have been fulfilled. The Palestine question is far from being settled."

2. The General Assembly decided to accede to the request for inclusion of this item in the agenda and subsequently referred it to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee for consideration and report.

3. The Committee considered this important item at fifteen meetings, held between 25 November and 11 December; more than forty-four speakers took part in the debate. At the beginning of the discussion the Committee had before it, first, document A/2184, containing the letter requesting the inclusion of the item in the agenda of the seventh session and the explanatory memorandum I have mentioned; and, secondly, documents A/2216 and A/2216/Add.1, containing respectively the twelfth progress report for the period from 1 May to 7 October 1952 submitted by the United Na-

tions Conciliation Commission for Palestine, and a supplement to that report, covering developments up to 24 November 1952, in which it was stated that, having examined the situation as it presented itself following the adoption of resolution 512 (VI) of 26 January 1952, during the sixth session of the General Assembly, the Conciliation Commission "concluded that the most promising way in which it could lend its assistance to the parties would be by further efforts to solve the questions of compensation for the Palestine refugees and the release of bank accounts blocked in Israel" [A/2216, para. 2].

4. The report proceeds to recount the action taken and the progress achieved in dealing with this serious aspect of the situation, following the Israel Government's decision to discuss measures for the gradual release of accounts held by Arab refugees, and in the matter of compensation to refugees for property abandoned in Israel, on which the Commission concentrated its attention, considering that "the progressive elimination of the problems which continue to separate the parties . . . , can, in the opinion of the Commission, transform the present unhappy circumstances of the refugees and encourage a return to normal relations between the countries of the Near East" [A/2216, para. 4]. It is stated further in the report, that "in the absence of a specific request from the parties, the Commission has had no opportunity of exercising its general function of conciliation" [A/2216, para. 19].

5. Furthermore, the President of the Conciliation Commission made a statement to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on 26 November, formally presenting the report and the supplement to which I have referred.

6. At the first meeting at which the subject was discussed, the Committee rejected, by 14 votes to 13, with 20 abstentions, a motion of the representative of Iraq to invite Mr. Izzat Tannous, the representative of the Arab refugees of Palestine, to sit with the Committee during the discussion of the Palestine question. Later, a communication by Mr. Tannous on the political aspects of the Palestine question was circulated as a Committee document (A/AC.61/L.24) at the request of the representative of Iraq.

7. The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had three draft resolutions before it on the subject. The first was sponsored jointly by Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, the Netherlands, Norway and Uruguay, and subsequently by Cuba and Panama; an amendment to it was presented by Chile, another jointly by Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti and Honduras, and a third by Peru. Later, the Norwegian representative, on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution, after consultation with the representatives of the States which had introduced amendments, presented a third revision of the draft resolution, taking into account some of the various amendments. As a result, the representatives of Chile and Peru, and the representative of Costa Rica on his own behalf, and on behalf of Colombia, El Salvador, Haiti and Honduras, withdrew their respective amendments. Finally, at the 38th meeting, on 10 December, the Canadian representative introduced a new revised text of the eight-Power draft resolution which took into account certain suggestions made by the representative of Mexico.

8. The second draft resolution before the Committee on the Palestine question was submitted by Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iran and Pakistan.

9. Lastly, at a meeting on 10 December, the Syrian representative submitted a third draft resolution.

10. In the course of the discussion, Mr. Mohamed Fadil Al-Jamali made a statement in the name of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, after the Chairman of the Committee had read communications to the Secretary-General from the Foreign Minister of Jordan authorizing Mr. Al-Jamali to present the Jordan Government's views on the matter.

11. On completion of its discussion, the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee voted on the three draft resolutions in the order of their submission. First, the Committee rejected, by a roll-call vote of 21 to 13, with 24 abstentions, a proposal by the Syrian representative to give priority in voting to the Syrian draft resolution.

12. The revised eight-Power draft resolution as a whole was adopted by a roll-call vote of 32 to 13, with 13 abstentions. The joint draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iran and Pakistan was rejected by 27 votes to 14, with 13 abstentions, and the Syrian draft resolution was rejected by 26 votes to 13, with 19 abstentions.

13. In accordance with those decisions, I have the honour to recommend, on behalf of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, that the General Assembly should approve the draft resolution reproduced in the report of that Committee (A/2310).

14. The PRESIDENT: At a previous meeting [403rd], the General Assembly decided that there should be a discussion on the item now before us. In view of the fact, however, that fifteen meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee were devoted to this question and that 135 interventions were made, I would hope that the statements in the discussion here might be reasonably brief. Perhaps we might agree on a maximum limit of thirty minutes for each statement. I think I should point out, also, that, although the General Assembly agreed to have a general discussion, it would still be quite in order for representatives to refrain from taking

part in that general discussion and to make their statements in the form of short explanations of vote, with the usual time limit applied to such explanations.

15. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and the draft resolution contained therein [A/2310] are now open to discussion.

16. Mr. DUNCAN (Panama) (*translated from Spanish*): The reasons why the delegation of Panama is among the delegations which originally submitted the present draft resolution on the Palestine question, and why it supports that draft, are based on a number of considerations which I should explain before I deal directly with the draft resolution we are about to consider. For it could be asked what interest a country like Panama can have in a question which concerns peoples so far away from us and which by its nature might have been thought totally unrelated to our own affairs and problems. Yet but rarely has my delegation been so keenly interested in action by this distinguished Assembly as in the present case, where, after six years of discussion, direct negotiations are for the first time recommended as a solution for the problem. It must be admitted that that, perhaps, is the method which should have been employed in the first place.

17. The problem of the maintenance of peace and the pacific settlement of international disputes cannot and should not be the exclusive responsibility of particular countries. These are complex questions which often, on account of their explosive possibilities, may assume dangerous proportions and become catastrophes affecting the whole world. Hence no question of this kind, whatever its magnitude, can be a matter of indifference to any Member State of the United Nations, however small, when once for one reason or another it has been included in the list of questions which must be considered and discussed by this Organization.

18. The attitude of my delegation in the present case will be understood when it is realized that for my country there are few activities open to the United Nations of greater importance and capable of producing more fruitful results than those which tend to promote conciliation among peoples and harmonious relations among nations. It is in this direction that we feel we should concentrate our greatest efforts. What we strive after is a preventive action; if it is carried out in good time, in good faith and with a sincere desire to avoid greater evils, we may yet discover the way which, in the last resort, will lead us to the pacific settlement of the most difficult problems.

19. But this is not the only consideration which explains the position adopted by my delegation in connexion with the Palestine question. Side by side with the general reasons to which I have referred, a special interest prompts my country to help to promote by conciliation a satisfactory understanding between the countries directly concerned.

20. Like all the Latin-American countries, Panama, through Spain, is greatly indebted to the Arab people. We cannot forget the important part played by that people in science, philosophy and the arts, as well as in culture generally; nor can we ever forget the immense benefits which all our Hispanic nations have derived from the great work of civilization accomplished by the Arabs, or the deep imprint which that work has

left on the intellectual formation of the western world. Our debt to the Arab people is great; but we, and the entire world are no less heavily indebted to the Jewish people. Outstanding personalities belonging to that exceptionally gifted race have also left their deep and illuminating influence on science and the various branches of culture; and that is a circumstance which countries that have felt that influence, like our Latin American countries, must needs bear in mind.

21. In the case of my country, there is another reason, a more special one, perhaps, which explains why my delegation is so anxious that the Palestine question should be settled by conciliation. In Panama there is an Arab community and a Jewish community which for many years have devoted themselves chiefly to trade and industry, and whose industriousness and love of order have at all times commanded the greatest respect. Many members of these most valuable communities have become assimilated to our people, adopted our citizenship, and, by their labour, temperance and civic virtues, are contributing to the country's development and growth. Panama has nothing but praise for the high integrity and sense of responsibility displayed by these communities which, as I have said, have associated themselves so closely with our national activities, share our joys and sorrows so intimately and have established on our soil so many model homes which we today regard as an integral part of our nation.

22. These considerations explain why my delegation appears today as one of the delegations proposing and supporting the draft we are considering; and they also explain why every possible effort has been made to ensure that the draft is couched in the most conciliatory spirit possible.

23. The essential points of the amendments proposed by various Latin-American delegations were incorporated in the original draft, and a half-way position, so to say, was adopted between the points of view of the Arab States and Israel. For, while the draft recommends direct negotiations taking into account the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on matters concerning the refugees, compensation and frontiers, it is also felt that, if fresh negotiations are to be started, it is not possible, as was so eloquently stated by the distinguished representative of Ecuador in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, that they should be restricted to the rigid limits of a literal interpretation of past resolutions, for that would really be tantamount to creating a situation in which one of the parties would approach the negotiations with a pre-determined settlement in mind, which would make it quite unnecessary to negotiate.

24. My delegation was greatly interested in the Philippine amendment [A/L.134] to the draft resolution under discussion. My delegation appreciates the motives which caused the distinguished delegation of the Philippines to submit the amendment. We know that, like us, that delegation is animated by the best motives and that, together with us, it is also seeking peace and the agreement both of the Arab States and of Israel. Nevertheless, I must point out that, at this advanced stage of the discussion, which has gone on for so long, we ought to accept only those amendments which are likely to be acceptable to the two parties to the controversy. My delegation does not think any

practical purpose would be served by adopting here, on this matter, amendments which are not aimed at bringing about agreement between Israel and the Arab States. And, unless I am mistaken, the amendment submitted by the delegation of the Philippines does not seem to me to be of that kind.

25. On the other hand, I may say that some of the important points appearing in the amendment have been incorporated in the draft we are considering here, since that draft makes provision for the religious interests of third parties, a point to which our Latin-American delegations attach particular importance. Hence, in the opinion of my delegation, the main points of the amendment are already covered by the draft we are discussing.

26. Furthermore, it would hardly be very wise on the part of the sponsors of the draft resolution—a draft which, as I have said, seeks to produce harmony and understanding between the prospective negotiators—to propose that this round-table conference should discuss definite and, so to speak, explosive issues, which we know might, instead of becoming the subject of harmonious discussion, lead to acrimonious and violent debate. It might almost be said that such a course would be tantamount to introducing dynamite into a round-table conference in which we all desire that harmony and understanding should prevail.

27. At all events, my delegation has the satisfaction of having acted, with regard to this problem, in a spirit of great impartiality and with the greatest respect for the points of view of both parties to the dispute.

28. In explaining the attitude my delegation has adopted, and our reasons, I should like to say that we entertain the hope that this effort will not have been made in vain, and that the draft resolution we have submitted, and which the Committee now submits to us in its report, will meet with the approval of this Assembly and contribute to mutual respect and peace between two peoples for whom my delegation has the greatest esteem and feels the greatest sympathy.

29. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq): The issue of Palestine which is now before the General Assembly is not a new issue. We have already heard many of the arguments and a great deal of debate here. I wish only to present the point of view of my delegation on this matter in brief.

30. The delegation of Iraq believes that the issue of Palestine constitutes the barometer of the human conscience. It is also the barometer of the relationship between East and West and the barometer of the application of the principles of the Charter.

31. We are bound here, as an association, by certain basic principles of the Charter. We are also bound by fundamental declarations concerning human rights. Are these basic principles and these human rights respected in the case of the Arabs of Palestine and in the case of the Palestine question as a whole, or are they being violated by the influence of certain pressure groups and by the influence of power politics? In the view of my delegation, the future of the world and the future of peace depend upon the recognition of basic principles and basic values. I would ask the General Assembly to consider seriously the dark future

which faces the world if these principles and values are ignored.

32. The situation in Palestine is quite simple. Palestine is a country which for thousands of years had been inhabited by a certain peace-loving people. Those people were living peacefully in their homes: they interfered with no one; they usurped nobody's rights. Now they are homeless and destitute, and the very question of their right to their homes is left in the air. That is the situation of Palestine today. One million Arabs have been rendered homeless, and their right to their own homes, established by the Charter and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is left in the air by the eight-Power draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

33. The United Nations adopted, in 1947, a resolution which was a great calamity for the Arab world, and which disturbed peace and stability. This resolution [181 (II)] partitioned Palestine into three zones—a Jewish, an Arab and an international zone. That tragic situation led, as we had anticipated, to the Arabs undertaking the sacred defence of their own homes. It led to a struggle. Now the Arabs are told: "your rights are to be negotiated. They are not clear. Your rights to your own homes need to be negotiated". And it is here that a new calamity and a new blow is directed at the Arab world. Whatever was left of the Arabs' rights in the 1947 resolution is now to become the subject of negotiation, as if it were not already established by the resolution itself.

34. The Zionists argue that they came to Palestine because they have religious connexions with Palestine, because they have historical connexions with Palestine, because the Arabs have vast areas and could evacuate Palestine, and, last but not least, because they want to develop the Arab countries and help the Arabs to develop their own countries. These arguments cannot diminish or whittle down the Arab rights to their own homes.

35. The Jews have historical connexions with Palestine; but many other nations have historical connexions in many parts of the world, and such connexions do not entitle them to occupy those areas. The Jews have spiritual connexions with Palestine. That is true, but the Moslems and Christians also have similar connexions with Palestine. It is argued that the Jews have no home, but we do not admit this fact, because we believe that the Jews, wherever they are, are citizens of the country in which they live, and that country is their home. To say that the Jews have no home would mean uprooting the allegiance and loyalty of the Jews everywhere. The statement that Palestine is but a small portion of the Arab world and that the Arabs can do without it is flatly rejected by every Arab, for Palestine is a part of the Arab body. Palestine is the eye of the Arab body, it is the most precious part of the Arab body, and the Arabs are as deeply attached to Palestine, spiritually, physically and materially, as any person is attached to his own home. They are, in fact, even more deeply attached, since Palestine has a spiritual significance which is not found in any other part of the world. Palestine is too precious to be given up by the Arabs, who are its rightful owners.

36. We must face the truth and the facts. We must read history and we must study geography. The Arabs

cannot abandon their rights to their homes in Palestine. This should be regarded as an established fact, and no matter what power politics dictate, no matter what Zionist propaganda does in the world, that truth remains established. We have only to read history to learn that Arab relations with Palestine are not a passing phase, that they are not temporary and not changeable. Arab relations with Palestine are permanent, and this is a permanent factor and a permanent element in the politics of the Middle East.

37. Now we are faced with a Zionist peace campaign. The Zionists want peace with the Arab world; but peace on what basis? The Zionists want peace, but for what and for whom? Certainly, the Arabs are peace-loving people. The Arabs also want peace, but they want peace on the basis of the recognition of mutual rights. But that is not the basis on which the Zionists want peace. They want peace on the basis that the Arabs should stay out of their homes, should give up their homes and go. Then there could be peace and co-operation in the realm of economics, culture, irrigation, etc.

38. Such a peace can never be visualized by the Arabs and can never be accepted. The Arabs recognize the expansionist views of the Zionists. The Arabs know full well how Zionism started as a spiritual movement. Then it turned towards a national home, and then towards a State. That State accepted partition, but now it has gone beyond partition. It wants to go one further step and to possess the area which it took beyond the limits of the partition and incorporate it in its own area. After that, it wants to go on to the next stage, to consolidate what it has and to open up the Arab markets and the Arab potentials so that the Zionists in the United States and elsewhere can stop paying money to Israel.

39. Israel is in economic difficulties, and that is why it wants peace. It does not want peace because it recognizes Arab rights in Palestine; it wants peace because it wants markets and economic development. Such a peace can never be attained. No Arab would be ready to meet the Zionists on that basis.

40. We believe that Mr. Ben-Gurion, in his recent statement to the correspondent of *The New York Times*, gave the whole world a very clear and frank declaration of Zionist intentions. These intentions are very clear. The Zionists do not want to negotiate about Palestine. For them, the Palestine issue is closed, for the Palestine issue consists of three parts: territorial adjustment, return of the refugees, and Jerusalem. When Mr. Ben-Gurion was asked what Tel Aviv was prepared to do to foster peace, he said they were ready to help to settle Arab refugees, both financially and with the aid of their experience. He said that this would not under any conditions include the return of the Arab emigrants to Israel. That was the first principle. The natural rights of the Arabs, the human rights recognized under the Charter, are flatly and frankly denied to them. When asked whether Israel would make any territorial concessions, Mr. Ben-Gurion said there could be no such concessions, but there could be minor adjustments and exchanges of pieces of land in order to straighten out the frontier. That was the answer of Mr. Ben-Gurion with regard to territory. Regarding Jerusalem, Mr. Ben-Gurion said that for the Israelis

the future of that city was as much settled as that of Washington or London.

41. Those were the answers given by the responsible head of Israel; but those answers were not news to us. Therefore to think that there is any possibility of negotiations for peace unless the Zionists change their souls and their minds, change their principles and give up their possessive expansionist attitude, is to be mistaken. There can be no negotiations, and there can be no peace on that basis. We want this to be established in the mind of everyone here; there should be no misunderstanding.

42. We believe that the Zionists now want to conclude their first act, the consolidation of Palestine, and then to start on their second act, that of bringing pressure to bear on the Arabs to open their markets and their countries for a new type of colonialism. That is very well understood and appreciated by the Arab world. We believe that the eight-Power draft resolution, however well-intentioned, does not face the realities of the situation and is not based on a real understanding of Arab feelings and Arab thoughts with respect to Palestine. It purports to be impartial, but, from the Arab point of view, it is very partial.

43. We were amazed to hear the representative of Panama, who spoke just before me, say that he would reject the amendment presented by the Philippine delegation because it was not accepted by one party and that would make it partial. How can he describe his own draft resolution as impartial, when it has been rejected by the other party? The argument of impartiality is not accepted by us.

44. We believe, as I mentioned before, that this new draft resolution strikes a new blow to the Arab world. It is intended to make the rights of the Arabs, which rights were established by past resolutions of the General Assembly, subject to argument, debate and negotiation. The General Assembly cannot so easily undermine rights which have already been established and subject them to argumentation. This is a blow, not only to the Arabs, but also to the United Nations itself. It undermines United Nations prestige. In our opinion, this resolution will not contribute to conciliation because, as I have said, the Arabs, being aware of the Zionist attitude and Zionist thought, are not now and never will be ready to discuss matters with the Zionists until they observe a change of mind and heart on the part of the Zionists. And we see no evidence of that as yet.

45. The eight-Power draft resolution does not take into consideration the real attitude of the Zionists. The document was drafted before Mr. Ben-Gurion made his statement, although we had been fully aware of his policy and had expressed our knowledge of it. But our words were not considered to be impartial. Now the words come from the mouth of the first responsible man of the State of Israel. Therefore, I say, the eight-Power draft resolution is not realistic; it does not approach the situation in the true perspective. As I have said, this draft resolution will not lead to peace or conciliation. That is understood. It will not lead to negotiation. My Government has already instructed me on that point. No negotiations will take place; no conciliation is possible on the basis of this draft resolution.

46. But the basic tragedy concerning this draft resolution is that it questions and leaves in the air rights that have already been established by previous resolutions. Upon the decision to be taken by the General Assembly, much depends in the Middle East.

47. Stability in the Middle East today is a question of great importance, and we believe that the adoption of the eight-Power draft resolution would impair that stability and contribute to unrest. The Middle East needs to have confidence in the United Nations, confidence in those Powers which are behind the United Nations, and I am afraid that this draft resolution would not contribute to that confidence. Unfortunately, on the other hand, it would weaken the confidence of the people of the Middle East.

48. The Arab world feels that if there is such a thing as human rights in the world, they should apply to everyone. The Arabs are as human as other people. The Arab refugees are just as human as the prisoners of war in Korea. A great deal of time has been spent in debating the rights of those prisoners, particularly their right not to be detained by force, and I cannot see how the same principles can be ignored when it comes to the consideration of the Arab refugees and their right to return to their homes.

49. We are told that Palestine has no space for the Arab refugees. But let us note what Mr. Ben-Gurion said in his statement. He said that he thought "the present population of 1,600,000 could be increased to 4 million in a decade, largely through immigration of Jews from such areas as French North Africa". Mr. Ben-Gurion said further: "The present boundaries could support a population of 6 million". These are the words of Mr. Ben-Gurion. Israel can find a place for 6 million people, and yet the rights of 850,000 Arab refugees are to be disregarded because the Arabs have vast territories. What has that to do with the right of the refugees to return to their homes? What has it to do with their human rights? I ask every representative here to understand why the Arabs feel that they are being treated unjustly. I sincerely hope that the United Nations will not put on record a further blow to Arab rights, a further blow to the United Nations Charter and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I hope that every representative will vote against the eight-Power draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

50. Mr. MOSTAFA (Egypt) (*translated from French*). At this crucial moment, when the General Assembly is called upon to take a decision fraught with serious consequences, I do not propose to reopen the debate on the Palestine question. I wish merely to impress upon the Assembly the far-reaching nature of the decision which it is about to take. It is a decision on which the restoration of peace in Palestine will depend; which will decide whether the rights of a million people to their homeland and their property are to be respected or whether the present tragic situation in Palestine is to be perpetuated and the rights of the Arab refugees ignored.

51. The draft resolution now before the Assembly contains two basic elements. The first is an invitation to the parties concerned to enter into direct negotia-

tions with a view to solving the Palestine dispute. My delegation has always maintained that direct negotiations are a procedure likely to achieve no positive results unless the parties to the dispute agree as to the actual point at issue. Hence the second element in the draft resolution before the Assembly.

52. Since the beginning of the Palestine dispute and of United Nations intervention to solve it, the organs of the United Nations have adopted a series of resolutions providing for a solution. My delegation abides by these resolutions. It demands, as in the past, that they should be implemented and applied. Israel refuses to give effect to them and takes its stand on the present *de facto* situation. The Israel delegation has repeatedly stated in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee that its Government regards the resolutions as a dead letter. On 15 December, *The New York Times* reported an interview with the Prime Minister of Israel in which the latter clarified his Government's position on the basic issues constituting the Palestine dispute. Asked whether Israel agreed to the return of the Arab refugees to their homes, to a cession of territory and to the internationalization of Jerusalem, the Prime Minister of Israel replied by a categorical negative. That is nothing more nor less than the negation of the United Nations resolutions which afford a solution of the problem. It is a challenge to the United Nations.

53. Yet the draft resolution before us appears to ignore these resolutions and gives the impression of encouraging Israel to go ahead with its policy. That being so, it would be quite pointless as it stands. It ignores the existing resolutions of the General Assembly, yet it calls on the parties to undertake direct negotiations, despite the fact that one of the parties concerned has already had its say and has stated that it does not intend to respect the recommendations of the United Nations. This means that the draft resolution calls on one party to submit to the law of the other, which is tantamount to condemning in advance the negotiations which the draft resolution calls on the parties to undertake. The draft resolution as it stands would serve no useful purpose. On the contrary, it has the effect of confirming a *fait accompli*, in defiance of the law of the United Nations.

54. If the draft resolution is not amended so as to reaffirm and respect the existing United Nations resolutions on the Palestine question, my delegation will be compelled to vote against it. The Egyptian delegation repeats that the adoption of the draft resolution as it stands would constitute a denial of the existing resolutions and of a people's right to live in their homeland; it would indeed mean the suppression of that right. The adoption of the draft resolution would certainly not contribute to the restoration of peace in Palestine or to a just and equitable solution of the tragic refugee problem.

55. My delegation has studied the amendment [A/L.134] submitted by the Philippine delegation. I should like to pay tribute to the spirit of conciliation which moved the Philippine delegation to submit its amendment, which undoubtedly represents an improvement on the original text. If this amendment is adopted by the General Assembly, my delegation will have no objection in principle to voting for the draft resolution so amended.

56. Mr. RODRIGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay) (*translated from Spanish*): We have before us today the report and draft resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee presented to us by our colleague from the Dominican Republic.

57. We are about to adopt a resolution which, as has just been stated from this rostrum, deals with one of the basic items in our agenda. It is one of our basic items because it implies the possibility of making peace between two equally esteemed, equally admired and equally beloved communities: the community of the Arab countries and the community of Israel. They have had their fight, they are now in the difficult period of truce. We all hope that they will achieve peace. In an attempt to create a definite chance of this peace, four Latin-American countries—Cuba, Ecuador, Panama and Uruguay—associated themselves with four other countries—Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. By what means? By the simplest, which has not always been the easiest means, that is, by direct negotiation and direct understanding between the parties to this dispute. For this purpose, these eight countries submitted for consideration by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee a draft resolution which is perhaps the simplest and most straightforward of all.

58. The draft resolution merely provides that the Assembly, holding this moment timely, considering the item which had been placed on the Assembly's agenda by the Powers mentioned by the rapporteur of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, and bearing in mind the whole background of the problem, should urge the parties to seek a direct understanding between themselves and, after raising all the aspects of the problem, should agree among themselves and work out the peace which is indispensable in that magnificent region of the world where both communities live, and indispensable for the future of their children and their peoples.

59. The proposal is simple. It is as simple as the very word which inspired it—"peace". There is nothing simpler than to say it. In my language it is only a monosyllable, a three-letter word: *paç*. But it stands for justice and joy in the home of man. In this dramatic case it would mean above all joy, peaceful joy in the hearts of the Arab mothers who have seen and suffered the bloodshed and consequences of this fight; peace and joy, finally, in the hearts of the Jewish mothers, who would no longer awaken in the night, filled with anguish at the thought that, because of the discrimination against them, their children may again be persecuted and discriminated against by society. That is what peace means to us.

60. This simple word was brought before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee in a proposal which was itself, at the beginning, perfectly simple. Subsequently, however, the proposal was complicated, and the complications were not always easy to settle. The Committee met day after day, as its report states, and as our rapporteur has said. The Committee met on 25 November and completed its business two weeks later. Its work consisted not only of study in committee, in debates which were at times somewhat violent, but also in work outside the Committee, when representatives met—and I had the honour to be among them—to search anxiously for the sentence, the word, the verb, the expression,

the article, the addition, the amendment, which might bring us the possibility of that peace which was and is the only object of the eight nations, among them the four Latin-American nations, that sponsored the original draft resolution and supported it in the form in which it is now submitted to the Assembly. The most complex part of the draft resolution is paragraph 4 of the operative part, which urges the governments concerned to enter at an early date, without prejudice to their respective rights and claims, into direct negotiations for the establishment of a settlement, bearing in mind the resolutions as well as the principal objectives of the United Nations on the Palestine question, including the religious interests of third parties.

61. My delegation took great pains to secure the inclusion of the final provision of the paragraph I have just read: "including the religious interests of third parties". That means, fundamentally, lest there be any misunderstanding as to the interpretation of the phrase as we supported it, the religious interests and rights of the Christian world.

62. We maintained—and when I say "we" I mean my delegation and my Government—that the Christian world also has very special rights in the Palestine question; these rights are directly connected with the use of the Holy Places in Palestine. The Holy Places must receive the status and consideration which will allow of the development and implementation of the religious rights and interests of all, so that the forms and rites of their faith may be carried out and the hopes of their belief and love realized in those Holy Places. We did not go further than that in previous debates, nor shall we go further in this one, because for us that is the fundamental factor in the statement and solution of this problem, which embraces the extremely important and delicate problem of religion itself.

63. The ancient land of Palestine—as I have had the honour to tell the Assembly from this same rostrum on another occasion—has witnessed events other than those of the everyday drama of human life. Where the voice of the prophets of old was heard, there the modern world should, in the name of the venerable faith that lives in everyone's heart, secure respect for interests and rights so that, in that land of hallowed memories, peoples who seem so disunited and whom we wish to see united in the name of human progress may at last live together.

64. In this same Assembly there have been occasions when the delegations of the Arab countries and that of Israel have discussed and voted together, and have jointly contributed the results of their thought, intelligence and faith; for example, in the matter of the adoption of Spanish as a working language of the Economic and Social Council. On that occasion Arabs and Israelis were on the same side, speaking of Spanish with the same enthusiastic affection, which filled us with so much faith and optimism, calling it, as we do, "our language". Why? Our colleague from Panama, speaking at the beginning of the meeting with great clarity of thought, was able to explain why the Latin-American delegations had united to seek the possibility of peace provided by this draft resolution. Nothing pertaining to the Arab or to the Jewish community can be alien to us. These communities, which have in our days opposed each other in this struggle to which

we wish to put an end, formerly lived together on the ancestral, eternal and sacred soil of Spain, where Jewish poets, architects, discoverers and scholars, the philosophers of the Hebrew language, gave expression to their noblest thought, whose lustre will not be dimmed by time. When we name one of them, Maimonides, do we not refer to values which belong equally to the three cultures of the Spanish fatherland? Maimonides embodies the Jewish and Arab contribution to the people and land of Spain, a treasure which was brought to us across the ocean that Spanish ships crossed to bring to our America the forms of the progress, learning and faith of their country.

65. We must also mention the Arab architects, engineers and sculptors who built alhambras, giralidas and mosques, and brought to the breathtakingly romantic Andalusian night the song of the mountain streams which filled with music the gardens of Spain and the history of its people.

66. Excuse me for conjuring up the past in this way, but it is an expression of love, the expression of love whereby the peoples of Latin America wish to help to bring that possibility of peace between the two communities which confront one another on the soil of Palestine to fruition.

67. In the mean time, the delegation of the Philippines has submitted an amendment. I take the liberty of saying, with all the respect and consideration which the Philippine delegation merits from us—the consideration which leads a Latin-American to see in the Philippine representative, not a stranger but his very self, not a foreigner but his neighbour, not one separated in thought, space and history, but one bound to us by the same heroic adventure which defies the centuries—I take the liberty, humbly and respectfully, of pointing out to the Philippine representative that it might perhaps have been possible to discuss this amendment during the debate in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. We were together there for many days, from the 25th to the 39th meeting, that is, from 25 November to 11 December, as the report says. The sixty delegations on the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee were together anxiously seeking this formula which has finally been brought before the General Assembly as offering a possibility of peace between peoples and nations who belong to this international Organization. Then, it might perhaps have been possible to discuss this point; but, as the representative of Panama has already said, does this point, whether proposed in committee or directly submitted in the Assembly, offer any greater possibility of peace? Will it be an advantage to amend the proposed resolution in this way? Will it enhance the chances of peace between Arabs and Israelis if we here introduce an amendment saying that they, who must make their own peace and avoid bloodshed between future generations of their children, should take into consideration, not what they consider to be the elements of the problem, but those which we dictate to them here? Would the chances of peace increase because we told them that they must strive for peace, for peace among their peoples, only if they take into account the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem? It seems to me that this would complicate the problem somewhat, and first of all the decision of the Assembly itself.

68. My delegation which, in the matter of the Holy Places, argued for religious rights, and against internationalization, would have to alter its views on the matter considerably before it could vote for a resolution including that point, for it is not possible to introduce in a resolution a problem which is a constant source of arduous and difficult debate, and is one of the causes of discord between the two communities between whom we want peace to be re-established.

69. It is not difficult to reach the conclusion that this amendment will not advance the cause of peace. It will not persuade the parties to this strife to seek peace through more earnest and diligent consultations. It will not provide a short-cut to peace. It does not offer any fresh chance for the final termination of that conflict. It does not even lead to understanding among the delegations in this Assembly which are outside that dispute; it even sets delegation against delegation in this Assembly. Is this, then, a time, when we are seeking peace, to incorporate elements which may so amend the substance that the aim of the proposal will be radically changed?

70. I respectfully suggest to the Philippine representative that we should consider this point more carefully and recognize once and for all that the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee is at least an expression of the Assembly's hope, without imposing anything, that the communities which are still fighting should negotiate and reach a peaceful settlement.

71. It would be quite another matter if, once Arabs and Israelis were finally happily sitting round the same table, they remembered the passage in the resolution which says "including the religious interests of third parties" and the passage which says "bearing in mind the resolutions as well as the principal objectives of the United Nations on the Palestine question", and themselves brought up this question and made it one of the principles on which their peace was to be based. Then, and only then, will they express their views and will they arrive at their own truth. But it cannot be imposed from outside.

72. It is such a delicate matter to deal with the fate of contending communities and this problem is so delicate and so fraught with hope, that my delegation believes we have gone as far as we can in the draft resolution before us. Let us bring the Arab and Israel communities together so that their representatives may speak to each other; let the voice of the Arab and Jewish mothers be heard in their words. That voice is not only of this time and of this struggle but centuries old; it was raised in our time when an inhuman system of discrimination insulted, in the children of Israel, all the values of the human conscience. Let all the values of their history and all their tradition of greatness speak through the Arab and Israel representatives; and may Arabs and Jews reach the peace we wish for them, the peace which we wish them from the heart of our America, with all its hope and all its faith in justice and in peace.

73. Mr. EBAN (Israel): I rise at this stage on a point of clarification, reserving the occasion at a later stage to comment more substantively on the draft resolution which comes to us from the *Ad Hoc* Political

Committee, which we support, and on the amendment proposed by the Philippines, which we oppose. At this stage of the debate, however, I should like to confine my remarks to a reflection on the observations made by the representatives of Iraq and Egypt concerning the views of the Prime Minister of Israel on the methods and procedures whereby peace and conciliation should be secured between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States.

74. Since the views of the Prime Minister have been quoted in the context of newspaper clippings, I am authorized and instructed to say that the Prime Minister has made no statement of any kind reflecting his authorized and formulated views to any representative of the Press within recent weeks. He has had a luncheon party which was attended by representatives of the Press, among other guests. The Prime Minister is always pleased to offer the hospitality of his table to foreign visitors, including representatives of the Press who, in the pursuit of their avocation, are entitled to publish their own interpretations of his frame of mind. He does, however, feel very strongly, as the head of the Government of a Member State of the United Nations, that only the official and formulated views of that government's leaders and representatives can have official status in a discussion before the highest international organs.

75. On one matter of the most profound and reverent international interest, the Prime Minister himself has, within recent days, issued an official formulation of his viewpoint, a formulation which is a proper subject for international discussion, whether in support or criticism. That statement reads:

"In clarification and amplification of Israel's position on Jerusalem and the Holy Places, the Ambassador of Israel has been authorized to issue the following communication from the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. David Ben-Gurion, dated 15 December 1952. The communication states:

"With regard to the attitude of the Government of Israel on the question of Jerusalem and its Holy Places, I should like to confirm that the declarations made by Ambassador Eban on 1 December and 9 December 1952 before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee of the United Nations expressing our reverent concern for the Holy Places and religious interests in Jerusalem and elsewhere in the country fully represent our established and immutable policy. Statements are published on different occasions on the subject of Jerusalem, which in the varying circumstances of the context cannot contain a full and exhaustive formulation of Israel's attitude to all aspects of the Jerusalem problem. Such statements cannot possibly be construed in any way as detracting from or modifying our basic policy with regard to the Holy Places and religious interests in the Holy Land, in whose protection and accessibility Israel is willing to show a co-operative attitude at all times. We are resolved to hold these sacred interests inviolate."

76. Thus the Prime Minister's statement of 15 December 1952 rests upon observations which were made on my Government's behalf in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on 1 and 9 December. The statement of 1 December reads:

"The Government of Israel has always shown a serious attitude to whatever proposals appeared able at any given time to express and fulfil the interests of the international community in the protection of holy shrines and free access to them. This earnestness and constructive spirit represents our constant and reverent concern for the sacred associations which hover over Jerusalem and the Holy Land."¹

77. Further, on 9 December 1952, on instructions from my Government and in response and tribute to an amendment introduced into the Committee's draft resolution concerning the religious interests of third parties, I said:

"I have already accepted and I now repeat my Government's view that the passage in the resolution which confirms the religious rights of third parties is a valuable addition to any resolution which will bring about negotiation between Israel and the Arab States. And I reiterate our willingness, indeed our earnest desire, to have that sacred consideration constantly before our eyes."²

78. On the same occasion, in illustration of the general attitude and viewpoints which these statements embody and express, I referred to the last and most recent official document of the United Nations on this problem, namely, the report of the President of the Trusteeship Council to the General Assembly in 1950. On that occasion, the President of the Trusteeship Council paid a tribute to what he called the Government of Israel's "spirit of conciliation which led it to submit to the Trusteeship Council certain new proposals which, although . . . removed from the terms of the General Assembly resolution [303 (IV)] of 9 December 1949 . . . nevertheless represent a considerable advance towards a settlement of the various aspects of the problem of Jerusalem and the Holy Places in comparison with the proposals" previously "submitted to the General Assembly". The report of the President of the Trusteeship Council concludes:

"I regret my inability to obtain more concrete results from the two States" in Jerusalem; "but at least there is still ground for hope that the understanding and benevolent attitude of one of the two governments"—Israel—"concerned towards the legitimate demands of all the parties concerned for a just and therefore a lasting solution of the difficult problem . . . will finally persuade the other government"—Jordan—"which possesses virtually all the Holy Places, to take the wishes of the United Nations into consideration and to collaborate loyally with it in ensuring justice, peace and permanent security in the City of Jerusalem, as well as the protection of and free access to the Holy Places."³

79. As far as is known to my Government, no change has come about in the attitude of either of these two governments, as expressed and reflected in this report by the President of the Trusteeship Council.

80. In making this clarification on a particular matter which has been quoted from a newspaper article, I

¹ For a summary of this statement, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 29th meeting.*

² *Ibid.*, 37th meeting.

³ *Ibid.*, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 9, annex III.

should not like it to be understood that my Government regards as accurate, complete or exhaustive other formulations which constitute the writer's interpretation of the Prime Minister's own point of view. I should like to repeat that the official statements of the Government of Israel, through its accredited representatives, including the public statement which I have read into the record, are statements for which the Government of Israel accepts full responsibility, and they are open to the scrutiny, the appraisal or, if need be, the criticism of the General Assembly. It would, however, I suggest, not be in keeping with the usual procedures of international relations to describe the viewpoints of governments in terms other than those which such governments have officially authorized.

81. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria): I also reserve the right of my delegation to intervene at a later stage to explain fully its attitude towards the various draft resolutions and amendments now before the General Assembly. At this stage, I shall simply confine myself to replying to the observations of the representative of Israel.

82. In a nutshell, the delegation of Israel has refuted the statement that appeared in *The New York Times* on 15 December 1952. It is, of course, its right to reject or to accept at its discretion the statements appearing in the newspapers. I do not quarrel with Mr. Eban in this regard. I agree with him that Israel should be held responsible for only the official statements and views expressed by its accredited representatives.

83. Let us now see to what extent the policy of Israel on the major questions of Palestine has been expressed through the accredited representatives of Israel. You all know that *The New York Times*, on 15 December, emphasized the three major problems of the Palestine question: first, the Jerusalem question, secondly, the territorial question, and thirdly, the refugee question.

84. With regard to the Jerusalem question, Mr. Ben-Gurion was alleged to have said in effect: "Jerusalem is our capital. To us, Jerusalem is our London and our Washington. There can be no issue for negotiation of the question of Jerusalem".

85. With regard to the refugee question, Mr. Ben-Gurion was alleged to have said that not one refugee could be permitted to be repatriated to his former homeland, and again, there is no issue for negotiation.

86. On the territorial question, Mr. Ben-Gurion was alleged by *The New York Times* to have said that from the territory they held, there can be no cession, no retreat, no withdrawal or relinquishment. So again there is no issue for negotiation.

87. In a word, he has allegedly told the world through *The New York Times* that, on the question of the refugees, there is no repatriation; with regard to Jerusalem, there is no internationalization; and with regard to territory, they hold what they have and are not prepared to retreat one inch from the present demarcation line. Mr. Ben-Gurion, from the very beginning, closes the door to negotiation. He hopes for negotiation, but with no repatriation, no internationalization and no discussion of the territorial aspects of the situation.

88. I would simply now ask Mr. Eban: what remains to be negotiated? I would address the same question to

any representative in this Assembly who supports the eight-Power draft resolution submitted to the Assembly by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, which calls for direct negotiations, and ask him to instruct me and to familiarize me with the items that could be discussed at the proposed conference.

89. That draft resolution urges the parties to enter into direct negotiations. This is an international procedure. We do not hate or dislike it; we would certainly encourage and support it. It is a normal procedure and a means of pacific settlement of every international dispute. But tell me with all sincerity and with all honesty, what are the questions that could be solved or resolved when there is no internationalization, no repatriation and no discussion as to territory? Can any representative here, with logic, reason and sound judgment, answer my question? Can Mr. Eban tell the Assembly from this rostrum what are the subjects of negotiation, so that all the world may hear, since, from the very beginning, even before we go to the conference, he brushes aside, he negates, he denies all the items that should be discussed?

90. But let us agree for a moment with Mr. Eban that *The New York Times* has produced a false story. Let us assume that, with all due respect to that newspaper, Mr. Eban has asked the Assembly to hold Israel responsible only for official views. I agree with him. Let us see, therefore, what are the official views of Israel on the three major questions with respect to Palestine.

91. We can begin with Jerusalem. What is the official view of Israel on Jerusalem? Could there be a higher authority than the Prime Minister? Could there be a more official view than the official view of Mr. Ben-Gurion? What if I told you, Mr. Eban, that Mr. Ben-Gurion, on 13 December 1949, in the Knesset—that is your Parliament—made the following statement of policy for the State of Israel, from which I quote in part:

“As you know, the General Assembly of the United Nations has in the mean time, by a large majority, decided to place Jerusalem under an international régime as a separate entity. This decision is utterly incapable of implementation—if only for the determined, unalterable, opposition of the inhabitants of Jerusalem themselves.”

Then, he continues:

“But for the State of Israel”—and here I invite your attention—“there has always been and will be one capital only—Jerusalem, the eternal. So it was three thousand years ago—and so it will be, we believe, until the end of time.”⁴

92. Mr. Ben-Gurion, before the Knesset, made this statement of policy, that Jerusalem would be the eternal capital of Israel. And that is, in effect, what *The New York Times* said in its issue of 15 December 1952, namely, that Jerusalem to them is their Washington, their London and their Paris. Mr. Eban refutes that statement, but Mr. Ben-Gurion, in addressing the Parliament on policy, definitely says that “there . . . will be one capital only—Jerusalem, the eternal. So it was three thousand years ago—and so it will be, we believe,

until the end of time”. This is not a newspaper quotation. I am quoting the statement of Mr. Ben-Gurion.

93. What is even more curious, it was presented as an official document by Mr. Eban himself in a letter which he addressed to the Trusteeship Council in Geneva when it was preparing the Statute for internationalization of Jerusalem. He presented this statement to the Trusteeship Council in order to say in effect: “Your work, the Statute of Jerusalem, cannot be implemented because Jerusalem is our capital.”

94. I ask Mr. Eban now if he can refute that statement. It was certainly his right and within his power to refute the statement in *The New York Times*. However, let me invite him to refute this statement, which he himself introduced to the Trusteeship Council, namely, that Jerusalem shall remain the capital of Israel.

95. Thus it becomes quite clear that *The New York Times* did not produce a false story; it only produced a story which was consistent with the statements and the policies of Israel. This is one point.

96. Let us again search for the official view of Israel to find out what is its attitude in regard to these three main questions. I have before me the third progress report of the Conciliation Commission dated 21 June 1949. This is an official organ created by the General Assembly, and I do not believe that Mr. Eban can say that the statements incorporated in the progress reports of that commission cannot be considered as the opinions of the parties on the questions that have been discussed. I think it is fortunate that, by a coincidence, we have these documents at hand.

97. In paragraph 13 of that progress report of the Conciliation Commission—and I ask those who represent the Conciliation Commission in the General Assembly to refute this statement if they think it is false—we find the following:

“The Commission has not succeeded in achieving the acceptance of this principle”—the principle of the repatriation of the refugees—“by the Government of Israel.”⁵

Here is a statement of fact by the Conciliation Commission, contained in its report to the General Assembly in 1949, saying in black and white that the Commission was unable to achieve the acceptance by the Government of Israel of the principle of the repatriation of the refugees—not of repatriation as a whole, but even of the very principle of the repatriation of the refugees.

98. Mr. Eban has a perfect right to say that *The New York Times* carried a false story, in which Mr. Ben-Gurion was alleged to have said that he would not allow a single refugee to be repatriated to his homeland. However, as we can see, as far back as 1949 the Conciliation Commission reported to the General Assembly that it had failed to obtain the acceptance by Israel of the principle of repatriation.

99. Again let us follow the Conciliation Commission in its reports. I have before me the report of the Conciliation Commission submitted to the General Assembly on 2 September 1950. In that report, mention is made of “the Technical Committee”. This is a sub-organ of

⁴ See *Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Sixth Session, Annex, Vol. I, agenda item 19, document T/431, annex.*

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex, Vol. II, agenda item 18.*

the United Nations appointed by the Conciliation Commission, a committee which went to the country, met the Israel authorities and made its report. We find the following in the report:

"In conversations with the Israel authorities, the Technical Committee was advised that there could be no repatriation"—just imagine, the Israel authorities informing the Technical Committee that there could be no repatriation—"in the sense that Arab refugees would be allowed or assisted to return to their former homes or villages."⁶

100. Again I say to Mr. Eban: I invite you, if you are serious in your refutation, to come to the rostrum and tell the General Assembly that this passage in the report of the Conciliation Commission is a falsehood, a perjury. Nevertheless, we have to seek an official view from Mr. Eban himself. Happily enough, I have here a document, a letter signed and sealed by Mr. Eban himself. I repeat, it is signed by Mr. Eban himself, the very gentleman who stood on this rostrum to deny the story of *The New York Times*. It is a letter dated 27 October 1949. Fortunately, the original is in English, so that Mr. Eban need not suggest the possibility of misinterpretation or mistranslation. This letter was submitted to the Conciliation Commission, the Commission to which was entrusted the task of dealing with the Palestine question.

101. Mr. Eban sent this letter which I hold in my hand, which discussed the various problems of the Palestine question, and which said that there should be no repatriation and no internationalization. But with regard to the territory, I shall now read the following passage:

"The Government of Israel now asserts its title to the territory over which its authority is actually exercised. All that territory had to be fought for . . . for Israel's survival and defence; and all of it is held under valid international agreements. Even within the existing boundaries certain vital areas remain unduly vulnerable, dangerously exposed to potential aggression. Nevertheless, and although some of the invading Arab armies still stand on the soil of Palestine, Israel is not advancing any further territorial claims."

So far so good. Then Mr. Eban continues as follows:

"But of the territory now constituting the State of Israel there can be no cession."

102. Mr. Eban says in his letter that from the territory now held by Israel there can be no cession, and Mr. Ben-Gurion was alleged by *The New York Times* to have said that from the territory they held "there can be no cession". It is a curious coincidence that the words in the letter of Mr. Eban are the very words which appear in *The New York Times*: "there can be no cession".

103. Therefore, on the three major questions, the attitude of Israel is quite obvious, not only through newspaper reports but through official documents appearing in the Conciliation Commission's reports and through the letter addressed to the Conciliation Commission by Mr. Eban himself, and signed by him. What is then left for negotiation? Can there be any answer?

I seriously and honestly invite an answer, if there can be an answer based on logic, reason and sense.

104. These are the three main questions on which we differ. You urge us to negotiate. I bow to your wishes and I say: Gentlemen, I am quite prepared to do so; I am quite prepared for direct negotiation. I have three major problems on which resolutions of the General Assembly have been adopted. Resolutions have been adopted with regard to the territory, with regard to the internationalization of Jerusalem, and with regard to the repatriation of the refugees. With respect to these three main issues, Israel has said "No" on each occasion. Should I go to the conference just to hear Mr. Eban say "No"? Are you really serious that we should go to the conference to hear from Mr. Eban these negations and these denials? What hope could there be for the success of the negotiations if, from the very beginning, we are faced with denials and negations?

105. I think the whole matter could be dealt with quite easily. Let me suggest that *The New York Times* carried a false story. Let me suggest that the Conciliation Commission submitted false reports. Let me suggest that the letter of Mr. Eban was a forgery. Does Mr. Eban deny those attitudes? Does he deny that his Government is not in favour of repatriation? Does he deny that his Government is not in favour of internationalization? And on the question of territory, if he denies his Government's attitude, we are quite prepared to agree and to sit down and talk. Let him come to the General Assembly and tell it that he accepts its resolutions regarding repatriation, internationalization and the territory; then we shall be quite prepared to enter into direct negotiations. If he denies them, let him come and tell us what his attitude is. If he does not deny them, then they are the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

106. Mr. LOPEZ (Philippines): The amendment [A/L.134] proposed by the Philippine delegation has one aim: to make certain that the resolutions and objectives of the United Nations as regards the Palestine question are maintained in their integrity and form the basis of direct negotiations leading to a peaceful settlement between the parties. One of those objectives, embodied in a General Assembly resolution which still exists and is valid, is the internationalization of Jerusalem.

107. It is not necessary to explain the continuing concern which my Government, among others, feels as regards the present and future status of Jerusalem. This concern is shared by peoples of various faiths throughout the world. Having this universal concern in mind, my Government is desirous that the existing United Nations objective in connexion with the status of Jerusalem should be constantly in the forefront of any negotiations which might lead to a long-term peaceful settlement in the region.

108. My delegation is aware of the extreme complexity of the question now before the General Assembly. It is not our desire to render still more difficult the task of conciliation. We have presented our amendment in response to the powerful sentiments which have been evoked in the people of my country by the cloud of uncertainty which seems gradually to have descended upon the problem of the future status of Jerusalem. We

⁶ *Ibid.*, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 18, appendix 4, para. 35.

believe that our amendment can be regarded as inadmissible only if the General Assembly decides to alter or revoke existing resolutions on the question. While these resolutions continue to exist, however, we fail to understand why a reference to them in a resolution on the Palestine question should be regarded as in any way objectionable.

109. In this connexion, my delegation must protect, in a most friendly way, against the statement made by the representative of Panama. The representative of Panama said that our action in submitting the amendment represented an effort to introduce dynamite into the negotiations. The word "dynamite" may perhaps be more properly applied to the Jerusalem question itself. The presence or absence of any reference to that question in the present draft resolution represents merely the difference between placing the question in full view of the parties during the negotiations and keeping it out of sight under the conference table. However that may be, I did not understand the representative of Panama to say that his delegation was opposed to the internationalization of Jerusalem. If, as may be assumed, Panama continues to regard this principle as valid and existing, I would doubt whether it was proper to use the strong word "dynamite" in connexion with our amendment.

110. We agree with the sound principles of peaceful settlement which underlie the resolution now before the General Assembly. We fervently hope that both parties will heed the General Assembly's counsel. Feeling as we do, we must repeat that our amendment cannot in any way be interpreted as an attempt to weight the scales in favour of one side or the other. Our amendment represents an honest and sincere effort by a party outside the dispute to make sure that the legitimate interests of third parties, which include a substantial portion of the membership of the United Nations and the peoples of the world, should be taken into account by the parties during the course of their negotiations. We hope that such a request, based on accepted principles and coming from a third party in the General Assembly, will not be regarded as excessive. It cannot be regarded as excessive for us, the third parties, to ask the two parties concerned to come together in peaceful negotiations and to tell them: "Gentlemen, in settling your dispute, please be so kind as to consider our interests also—particularly our desires in connexion with the future status of Jerusalem."

111. I shall conclude by addressing a few friendly words to the representative of Uruguay. Most warmly, we acknowledge and reciprocate his generous sentiments as regards the historic ties of culture and civilization which bind our two countries together. We beg to assure the representative of Uruguay, however, that our amendment is based precisely on the fact that we, in the Philippines, continue to treasure one of the enduring elements of the cultural heritage which we share with Uruguay.

112. Mr. PATIJN (Netherlands): The delegation of the Netherlands would like, in a few words, to explain its position as regards the Philippine amendment.

113. It is clear from the declaration made a few moments ago by Mr. Eban that Israel does not accept the Philippine amendment. We have strong reasons to believe that Jordan, which has no representative present

here, would not accept the latter part of the amendment, relating to the internationalization of Jerusalem.

114. In our view, therefore, the amendment has two defects: first, it will not be accepted by both parties and, secondly, the restatement of the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem will be opposed by the two States most concerned. We believe that the amendment will be rejected by both parties on the scene. In these circumstances, my delegation will vote against the amendment.

115. As one of the sponsors in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, of the draft resolution before the Assembly, I should like now to explain to the General Assembly my further reasons for opposing the Philippine amendment.

116. First, I shall try to explain why my delegation opposes the wording "on the basis of" the past resolutions of the General Assembly instead of our wording, "bearing in mind" those resolutions. There is a clear difference of intention and of accent here. According to the Philippines text, the past resolutions of the General Assembly would be the basis, the starting point, the framework and the only firm ground of the negotiations, and would limit the freedom of negotiation by dictating the exact scope of the negotiations themselves. The amendment would impose limits upon the negotiations; the negotiators could work only on the basis of the past resolutions. Everything which falls outside that context and which is not covered by those resolutions of 1947 and 1948 would be brushed aside and would be taboo. That is a severe limitation in the present circumstances.

117. The representative of Syria has asked, "What are the items of discussion if they be not the resolutions of the General Assembly? What can we discuss in that case?" I might remind the General Assembly of what the Conciliation Commission for Palestine tried to do last year. A year ago, that commission presented a number of proposals which, in our view, contained the outlines of a possible settlement between the parties. Those proposals, although partially rejected by the governments concerned, were so reasonable and so well considered that they would be of great help in any future negotiations.

118. Although the Conciliation Commission did not succeed in bringing the parties together on the basis of its proposals, my delegation feels that its report may still serve this purpose in more favourable circumstances. The Commission's proposals still stand, and in our view they open the only realistic way out of the deadlock. The Commission was able to produce such interesting proposals because it tried to fulfil the mediatory functions which were given to it by the General Assembly in its resolution 194 (III) of December 1948. No Conciliation Commission could carry out its task in that part of the world without the freedom to mediate and without taking into account the actual situation and the changes which have taken place in Palestine since 1948. Therefore the Conciliation Commission rightly took that liberty, and I submit that it can remain useful only if it has the same liberty of action in the future.

119. For this reason, we cannot bind the hands of the Conciliation Commission in its mediatory task, nor the hands of the parties themselves. What we need is such freedom of discussion as would make possible a real

meeting of minds. By adopting the wording "on the basis of", we should depart from that freedom of action which the Conciliation Commission for Palestine has felt to be essential in its mediation. Let us not, therefore, bind the hands of the parties too much; let them bear the resolutions in mind, but do not let those resolutions bind their hands.

120. I come now to the second part of the amendment, the restating of the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem. I believe that the General Assembly, in accepting this amendment, would put the clock back to 1948 without, again, making any provision as to how such a decision should be carried out. I might point out here that both the parties most concerned are against it. Thus, if it is desired to impose the internationalization of the territory of Jerusalem, it will be necessary to send an army there, since neither of the parties on the spot will do it.

121. In paragraph 4 of the draft resolution approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the General Assembly will see the wording regarding the religious interests of third parties. We feel that that covers the essential point. The interests of the Christian churches in Jerusalem—Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Nestorian, Armenian—are all taken care of. There can be no doubt about the will of the General Assembly that these interests should be respected. In the past few years the General Assembly has deemed it justifiable in regard to Palestine to decide again and again on a course of action without, at the same time, taking any responsibility for the way in which such a decision should be put into effect. It is dangerous for the United Nations to ignore the question of implementation and to turn its back on the crucial question as to whether it is politically possible to realise what it repeatedly and solemnly proclaims as a sacred formula. There is little merit in merely stating general principles in political situations where the only wisdom and the interest of all the parties concerned would be to proceed along the way of compromise and give-and-take, as has been proposed several times by the Conciliation Commission for Palestine.

122. My delegation does not deny for a moment that serious questions of right and justice are involved in the Palestine case, but we doubt very strongly whether the General Assembly could render any useful service to the cause of peace and justice if it were to refuse to face the realities of the problem squarely. Most certainly the General Assembly should not expose to the world the inability of the United Nations to perform any effective work of conciliation by binding the hands of the Conciliation Commission and the parties concerned.

123. For these reasons my delegation feels that it is necessary to vote against the amendment submitted by the delegation of the Philippines.

124. The PRESIDENT: I suggest that the general discussion on this item should be considered as closed and that subsequent statements should be devoted to explanations of vote limited to seven minutes' duration.

It was so decided.

125. Mr. SOURDIS (Colombia) (*translated from Spanish*): If the attitude of the Colombian delegation whenever the General Assembly of the United Nations

has had to deal with the problem of Palestine and Israel is considered, more specifically with regard to the City of Jerusalem, it will be found, as soon as reference is made to the documents, that Colombia has been absolutely consistent in urging respect for the resolutions of the General Assembly on the internationalization of Jerusalem, on the establishment of a *corpus separatum*.

126. Colombia has spared no effort to solve this question in a manner satisfactory to the various interests involved, and it accordingly voted in committee for the draft resolution that is now being discussed. When the vote was taken, the representative of Colombia expressly stated that his country was voting for the draft on the clear understanding that it would in no way imply the relinquishment by the United Nations of the undertakings it had entered into in connexion with the resolutions previously adopted.

127. I understand the delicacy of this problem, and in explaining my vote I should like to address myself directly to the representatives of the Jewish people, with whom I have many ties.

128. In 1947, when I represented Colombia at the United Nations, I had the honour to vote for the establishment of the State of Israel. Afterwards, when Colombia was a member of the Security Council, one of the five votes in favour of the admission of Israel to the United Nations was that of Colombia.⁷ And later, when this matter was discussed in the General Assembly, Colombia spoke emphatically for the admission of Israel. This was merely a consequence of the attitude Colombia had adopted towards the establishment of Israel. We could not oppose the admission to the United Nations of a State established by the United Nations. Colombia remembers this with pride, and has no reason to repent of its decision. It considers that not only is Israel one of the States which are doing credit to the United Nations, but also that the Jewish people is providing in Israel an excellent example which should certainly be imitated by many other nations.

129. I am making these preliminary remarks in order to avoid Colombia's explanation of its vote being interpreted as a kind of turning away from a nation which enjoys all our admiration and with which Colombia has ties which may be recalled and recognized in the same way as was done here by the representative of Panama. Now that the Philippine amendment has been submitted, however, Colombia has no choice but to vote for it. And it will vote for it because in doing so it will be acting in accordance with its understanding of the proposal under discussion, in accordance with Colombia's general attitude, and because for the Government of Colombia the content of a resolution on Palestine involves a sacred duty, a duty which our country regards as highly as its religious sentiments. I do not understand how anyone could vote against that proposal. I do not understand how the Assembly could bar a proposal of that kind. Since the tenor of the discussion in the Committee was precisely that the United Nations should not in any way recede from the position it had adopted in its previous resolutions, and since the Philippine amendment says just that, only a little more explicitly, we must vote for it. I think the amendment need not have been submitted, but once submitted there is no

⁷ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, No. 130, 386th meeting.*

alternative but to vote for it. That is Colombia's view on this point.

130. After the explanations which have just been given by the representative of the Netherlands, Colombia will be the more justified in voting for the amendment than it was before. I shall quote part of what the Netherlands representative said from the simultaneous interpretation, and my quotation will therefore be subject to any excuse or correction that may be necessary if the translation I am about to read is not exactly in accordance with the expressions used in the speech. Referring to the negotiators, the representative of the Netherlands said: "Let them bear the resolutions of the Assembly in mind, but do not let those resolutions bind their hands". In that case, why should they have to be borne in mind since the hands of the negotiators must be free to conclude any kind of treaty?

131. Furthermore, although some corrections have been made here, the statement by Mr. Ben-Gurion, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, does not leave the slightest doubt in the mind of anyone who analyses the situation impartially that Jerusalem represents a separate problem, a problem as separate and distinct as would be that of Washington or London. My object in saying this is not to prejudge the attitude of any delegation, but merely to explain the vote of the Colombian delegation. If the representative of Colombia—as is apparent from the documents and record of the Committee which discussed this matter—clearly stated that he was voting for the proposal on the understanding that the previous resolutions on Jerusalem would be respected, how can we now vote in the same way if this reasoning, this subjective element which the Colombian delegation brought to bear in voting for the resolution, is now belied by so high an authority as a Minister for Foreign Affairs, and, what is more serious, if the same interpretation is adopted by the representative of the Netherlands, which played so active a part in the Committee? Hence the fact of the matter is that my country has been deprived of one of the criteria which it employed when it voted for the resolution in a spirit of conciliation.

132. I believe that if we wish to get out of this impasse, there is no other course than to adopt the Philippine amendment, and, when that amendment has been adopted, to vote for the joint draft approved by the First Committee, as thus amended.

133. I am therefore confronted with a dilemma: either the Assembly considers it must respect its previous position with regard to Palestine and Jerusalem and its previous resolutions, and in that case there is no reason why we should refrain from voting for this proposal; or it does not wish to respect its previous position, and in that case we must say in all frankness that the United Nations is retreating, relinquishing what was for it a sacred undertaking. For a city like Jerusalem—and I say this without any desire to belittle the Arabs or the Jews—cannot be regarded as the property of those who live in it. Jerusalem is the moral centre of gravity of the human race. It belongs, not to its inhabitants, but to the millions of the faithful distributed throughout the world. In this sense, Colombia has maintained a consistent attitude since the problem first came under discussion.

134. For those reasons, I give notice that Colombia will vote for the Philippine amendment, and I would ask my colleagues to give great attention to what I have just said, because it would be an extremely serious matter if, through misunderstanding, we relinquished a traditional attitude which involves the prestige of the United Nations.

135. Mr. ORDONNEAU (France) (*translated from French*): So many different or contradictory statements have been made in this Assembly or in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee concerning the sense of the draft resolution now before us, that the French delegation thinks it desirable to indicate briefly how it interprets the provisions of this draft and to state what it finds and—perhaps even more important—what it does not find or expect to find in them.

136. The draft resolution approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee is the outcome of its discussions on the Assembly agenda item entitled "The Conciliation Commission for Palestine and its work in the light of the resolutions of the United Nations". Hence the subject under consideration was the conciliation policy applied by the United Nations in Palestine in 1948 and the work of the Conciliation Commission.

137. Quite properly, therefore, the draft resolution, in keeping with the limits so defined, goes no further than, first, to appraise the past work of the Commission; secondly, to recognize the obvious truth that conciliation cannot be effective unless the parties are willing to cooperate, and to stress the need for direct negotiations between the parties; and, lastly, to recommend that the Conciliation Commission should continue its efforts.

138. That is all there is in the draft resolution, the adoption of which, since it is designed solely and entirely to ensure the application of well-known procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes, could in no way prejudge in favour of either party the substance of the general problem of Palestine or that of any of the particular questions connected with that problem.

139. If we bear in mind the essential fact that the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee did not, and indeed could not, under its very terms of reference, seek to settle the Palestine issues in substance, it will be obvious how unfounded are the criticisms which have been levelled against the draft resolution. These criticisms fall into two main categories, which I shall consider in succession.

140. In the first place, paragraph 4 of the draft resolution "urges the governments concerned to enter at an early date, without prejudice to their respective rights and claims, into direct negotiations for the establishment of such a settlement, bearing in mind the resolutions as well as the principal objectives of the United Nations on the Palestine question, including the religious interests of third parties". Because it does not use such expressions as "in keeping with the resolutions" or "in accordance with the resolutions", this provision has been regarded by some as constituting a repudiation of the General Assembly's previous action in this matter. That is certainly not the case. The Assembly's previous resolutions exist and have never ceased to exist; they constitute an important element in the situation on which the parties will have to negotiate. On the assumption,

however, that these negotiations were to take place, the majority of delegations in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, including the French delegation, considered that it was altogether unwise to define their scope too narrowly. The parties will have to bear the General Assembly resolutions in mind, but it is their own interests, the rights and claims expressly reserved in the resolution, that they will be defending in the negotiations. The Assembly did not want its previous resolutions to hinder the achievement of those rights by mutual agreement, or, by paralysing direct negotiations, as they have done hitherto, risk preventing an agreement between the parties or the final restoration of peace in the Middle East.

141. The draft resolution recognizes that the parties have the primary responsibility for advancing their claims and negotiating between themselves, but only with a view to "reaching a settlement of their outstanding differences", as stated in paragraph 3. This excludes from the scope of the resolution everything but the disputes between the parties, everything which does not lie within their exclusive competence. The French delegation considers that it excludes in particular the question of the status of Jerusalem and that of the Holy Places.

142. Admittedly paragraph 4 calls on the parties in their negotiations to bear in mind "the religious interests of third parties". This is a useful reminder, since negotiations involving Palestine, the cradle of so many religions, may affect the religious interests of third parties in many ways. These interests must be safeguarded, but the phrase in question does not mean that the General Assembly recognizes the right of the parties to settle either the problem of the Holy Places or that of the status of Jerusalem. The parties can negotiate only on matters within their jurisdiction. The question of the Holy Places concerns the United Nations as a whole, as well as many nations not yet Members of the Organization, and can therefore be settled only on a purely international basis. The French delegation's position during the previous discussions is well known, and its stand on this point is entirely consistent with the arguments it has advanced before. It will accordingly vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee as a whole.

143. As regards the Philippine amendment [A/L.134], the French delegation is surprised that after a month's discussion in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee it has been possible to discover a new point. It regrets that this new point makes its appearance at such a late hour and thus has the appearance of a last-minute manoeuvre. My delegation is confirmed in this impression by the specious wording of the paragraph; it actually contains two ideas which do not necessarily go together and whose combination would appear to be

designed solely to compel many delegations to accept the idea they do not want in order to gain acceptance for the one they are unwilling to oppose.

144. The Philippine amendment calls on the parties to enter into negotiations on the basis of the previous resolutions of the General Assembly. I have already said that my delegation considered it unreasonable and even unrealistic to ask the parties to negotiate after binding them to the specific provisions of the Assembly's resolutions. The purpose of negotiation is to bring together parties which have different starting points for their arguments. They meet half way, or closer to or further from one or other point of departure. It is useless to ask two parties to negotiate on an identical basis: no negotiation is possible in such circumstances. The French delegation is therefore unable to accept the words "on the basis of".

145. It is unable to do so even to ensure the inclusion in the resolution of the words "and, in particular, the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem". I admit that I have already said that my delegation is among those which strongly desires the establishment of the best possible system of protecting the Holy Places. It supported the 1948 resolution [194 (III)] concerning internationalization, and it has no intention of reversing its stand by its vote today. Nevertheless, it also considers that in a resolution calling on the parties to open direct negotiations with a view to settling their differences, the question of protecting the Holy Places would be out of place. That question does not arise as the result of a dispute between Arabs and Israelis; it is an international problem, the solution of which does not rest with Arabs or Israelis. We must therefore make this clear and call on the parties to respect the religious interests of third parties. The whole problem of the Holy Places is reserved in the draft resolution adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

146. Having thus clarified its position, the French delegation will vote against the Philippine amendment, since it contains an unacceptable formula which would tie the hands of the negotiators at the very outset.

147. After this brief explanation, it remains for me to say with regard to the resolution itself that a text which recommends direct negotiations, with or without the assistance of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, cannot justly be charged with partiality.

148. The French delegation sincerely hopes that the parties will overcome their passions and bitterness, will not try to see more in the draft resolution before them than it actually contains, and will not evade the appeal which the General Assembly is making to them.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.