

that portion of the resolution that it now found itself powerless to enforce.

187. The General Assembly was pretending to adhere to what, in its wisdom, it had done earlier. Yet it was, in fact, doing something quite different, alleging that it was necessary for the support of the authority and prestige of the United Nations. Apparently, the authority and prestige of the United Nations could be maintained only by continuing to do what the most recalcitrant Member concerned with any particular matter might be willing to do. If the challenge that had, from the very beginning and again and again, been flung at the authority of the United Nations was not taken up, then by its actions the Assembly would be confirming, not only with regard to Palestine and the question of Jerusalem, but with regard to every problem that might come before the United Nations, the fact that a State had only to be obdurate enough to say that it would not do what the General Assembly wanted it to do for that State to be allowed to go its own way.

188. If the Assembly did not at least record a decision that the General Assembly desired effective internationalization of Jerusalem, what, in fact, was the alternative? The General Assembly would pass some other resolution. But if it had already confessed, as an argument against one resolution, that the mere passage of a resolution really did not matter very much, how could it expect the other resolution to be maintained and to be implemented? Those who did not like the resolution would defy it.

189. The actual situation, which would continue, was the following: the State of Israel was in possession of the outer city and Jordan was in possession of the inner city. There they would remain, like two armed camps, glaring at each other, with all the possibilities of a conflict always there.

190. He personally was of the opinion that the problem of Palestine had been with mankind for two thousand years and would continue with mankind for another two thousand years. That was his personal feeling, because at the only time when the United Nations had had the chance to come to

a fair, just and equitable solution of that very difficult problem, it had, contrary to the warnings of sober-minded but far-seeing Zionists themselves, taken a course to which it had been impelled by considerations that had had nothing whatever to do with the merits of the case, nothing whatever to do with Palestine and nothing whatever to do with the Middle East. Impelled by those considerations, it had recorded a decision because at that time it had been necessary to adopt a decision on the lines of partition. After that major mistaken decision, it was useless to expect any minor decisions to be reasonable and balanced.

191. It might, however, be possible, even at the existing stage, to persist in the course which the General Assembly had adopted, if the necessary majority of the States were of the view that such was the course of wisdom, fairness and justice. If so, every effort must be put forward to see that that decision should be carried into effect. If there were to be defiance, either there must be means of overcoming it or, if there were no means to overcome it, whatever resolution was adopted would not be implemented.

192. That was the problem before the General Assembly, and he appealed to it to save the honour, the dignity and the pledged word of the United Nations by doing at least what it had proclaimed to the world only two years earlier that it would do.

193. For those reasons, the Pakistani delegation would continue on the course which it had clearly submitted to the General Assembly in the speech Sir Mohammad himself had made during the general debate at the opening of the current session.¹ He had said then that Pakistan was of the opinion that a régime for the effective internationalization of Jerusalem must be adopted and put into effect. The Pakistani delegation still adhered to that view and would therefore vote in favour of the resolution which had been recommended to the Assembly by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

194. The PRESIDENT adjourned the discussion to the next meeting.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Friday, 9 December 1949, at 2.45 p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Later: Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

Palestine (concluded)

PROPOSALS FOR A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL RÉGIME FOR THE JERUSALEM AREA, AND FOR PROTECTION OF THE HOLY PLACES: REPORT OF THE *Ad Hoc* POLITICAL COMMITTEE (A/1222 AND A/1222/Add.1); REPORT OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE (A/1234) (concluded)

1. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said his delegation had repeatedly opposed the partition resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 which had been

a source of trouble and misery to nearly one million Arab people of Palestine and had disturbed peace and stability in Palestine and in the Middle East as a whole. As far as could be seen, that unstable and disturbed condition would continue until right and justice were restored to Palestine.

2. When resolution 181 (II) had been adopted in the face of bitter Arab opposition, those

¹ See *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, 227th plenary meeting.*

who were now raising the issue of practicability and implementation in connexion with the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee's draft resolution (A/1222 annex 1) had not stirred a finger. Those who were now raising the issue of the financial problem were the very people who had ignored that aspect in 1947. And those who now spoke of the wishes of the inhabitants of Jerusalem were the very people who had then ignored the wishes of the inhabitants of Palestine.

3. The United Nations could not preserve its prestige and dignity if it was subjected to the shifting policies of power politics, if it yielded to the dictates of local influence and pressure groups. The United Nations had taken a decision in 1947 which, in spite of its grave injustice to the Arabs, contained some recognition of Arab rights to Palestine and provision for an international régime for the Jerusalem area. What had happened? Power politics had enabled the Zionists not only to obtain what had been allotted to them under resolution 181 (II), but also to occupy Arab territories, including those not allotted to them; and now those politics were helping them to turn Jerusalem into a Jewish capital. Some ministries and central offices had already been moved to Jerusalem. Unless and until that aggressive and expansionist attitude on the part of the Jews was checked, there could be no peace in the Middle East and the whole issue of Jerusalem could not be effectively settled.

4. Only three days previously, *The New York Times* had reported: "Premier David Ben-Gurion declared in the Knesset (Parliament) today that Israel considered the United Nations partition resolution of 29 November 1947 as null and void. He said Jews would sacrifice themselves for Jerusalem just as Americans would fight for Washington or Russians for Moscow."

5. Then the statement continued: "Jerusalem, Mr. Ben-Gurion said, in substance, is an integral part of Israel and cannot be annexed, neutralized or in any way separated from the State without once more bringing bloodshed to the Middle East and destroying the present efforts to establish lasting peace."

6. That constituted clear defiance of the United Nations resolution and of the United Nations itself, since resolution 181 (II), as far as the United Nations was concerned, was still valid and effective. It had not been abrogated.

7. It was a well-known fact that the Iraqi delegation had never recognized the legality or justice of the partition plan of 1947, for it believed that the resolution had been adopted without due consideration of the dictates of democratic principles and established rights. It had ignored peace and stability in the Middle East.

8. The delegation of Iraq believed, however, in the sanctity of the whole of the Holy Land and not of Jerusalem alone. The partition of Palestine had in effect been a great blow to the very sanctity of Palestine itself. The Iraqi delegation believed that, in all justice and equity, Jerusalem should be an Arab city within an Arab State. There was no alternative. The Arabs had proved that they could very well be the custodians of the Holy Places in all Palestine. The Moslems, respecting the three great faiths, Christianity, Islam and Judaism, performed the very functions

of internationalization required by the world of the faithful. Since, regrettably, the Arab point of view did not prevail in international politics, the Iraqi delegation was forced to accept full and complete internationalization as the lesser evil, and would accordingly vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. The Iraqi delegation emphatically opposed those draft resolutions which aimed at the partition of Jerusalem, or which might eventually lead to the establishment of Jerusalem as a Jewish capital.

9. If any decision were taken to turn Jerusalem eventually into a Jewish capital, the result would be trouble and war in the Middle East in the future.

10. If Jerusalem was not to be an Arab city, as justice and equity dictated, it certainly should not become a Jewish city. It should not be taken away from the Arabs and turned over to the Jews. The Iraqi delegation sincerely hoped that the General Assembly would not yield to threats and intimidation, but that it would base its decisions on peace, justice, democracy and the spiritual interests of the nations.

11. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ALLENDES (Chile) reaffirmed some of the ideas expressed by his delegation in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee at the 59th meeting on the problem of the internationalization of Jerusalem. The Chilean delegation warmly approved the establishment of a special international régime that would not compromise either the interests of collective security or spiritual interests. Moreover, it had submitted amendments (A/AC.31/L.58) to the Netherlands-Swedish draft (A/AC.31/L.53), with the purpose of making it more organic, and had voted against the Australian draft (A/AC.31/L.37) because it did not consider that it provided the most suitable solution. Practically no progress had been made as a result of the conversations held by various delegations after the voting in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. Jerusalem, however, could not remain without a legal status. The Chilean delegation would abstain from voting because it did not wish to bear the responsibility of denying the religious world the adequate peace and security for the Holy Places, and it trusted that the United Nations would be able to apply that thorny and extremely important draft resolution in the peaceful manner that all the world desired.

12. If the draft resolution which appeared for the moment to have the support of the majority of the General Assembly were not to be adopted, the Chilean delegation hoped that it would be the Netherlands-Swedish draft resolution that would give Jerusalem its statute. In that case, Chile would again present the amendments it had previously submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

13. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the discussion that had taken place in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on the question of Jerusalem had shown that some States wished to forget General Assembly resolution 181 (II) whereby an independent Arab State was established in Palestine and Jerusalem was placed under an international régime administered by the United Nations. The discussions that had taken place during the past two years in the United Nations on the problem of Pales-

tine had shown very clearly that the United Kingdom, the former Administering Power, had not given up the idea of maintaining its control over Palestine. It had endeavoured to establish its control over that country under another form. Its efforts had resulted in the occupation of the Arab zone of Palestine and part of the City of Jerusalem by the troops of King Abdullah of "Transjordan" who, as everyone knew, was a British puppet and an obedient henchman of United Kingdom policy in the Middle East.

14. Furthermore, since the General Assembly had adopted resolution 181 (II) establishing independent Arab and Jewish States in Palestine and an international régime for Jerusalem, the United Kingdom, after reaching an agreement with the United States, had endeavoured to block the implementation of that resolution. Bound by common imperialist considerations, those two countries had succeeded in delaying the implementation of General Assembly decisions by means of intrigues, threats and military, political and economic pressure.

15. Even before the end of the Mandate, when Palestine was still under the official control of the United Kingdom, detachments of the Arab Legion of "Transjordan", commanded by British nationals, had invaded Palestine. Those detachments had occupied strategic points and military bases evacuated by British troops. In fact, the United Kingdom had never left Palestine; they had merely replaced their own troops by troops from "Transjordan".

16. For its part, the United States had proposed the establishment of a trusteeship régime for Palestine. That plan would have allowed the British to remain masters of that country and the United States to take a hand in the management of affairs in Palestine. It was at the instance of the United States that on 1 April 1948 the Security Council had decided¹ to convene a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the United States proposals. As was common knowledge, the United States plan had been rejected² and resolution 181 (II) had remained in force.

17. The implementation of that resolution had been entrusted to the United Nations Palestine Commission. Not only, however, had the United Kingdom Government refused to co-operate with the Commission but it had done everything to impede its work. It had refused to transmit power progressively to the Commission and had not allowed the latter to enter Palestine until two weeks before the expiration of the Mandate. As a result the Palestine Commission had been unable to undertake even the most elementary preparatory work for the establishment of Arab and Jewish States in Palestine.

18. After the special session of the General Assembly had rejected the proposals of the United States and the United Kingdom for the establishment of a trusteeship régime, the United States and the United Kingdom had succeeded in passing through the General Assembly on 14 May 1948 a resolution (186 (S-2)) whereby

the United Nations Palestine Commission was to cease its work and the entire Palestine question was to be entrusted to a Mediator. In that way the body entrusted with the application of resolution 181 (II) had been voted out of existence. On the same day, however, the Jewish State of Israel had been proclaimed in Palestine and thereby one of the most important decisions of the General Assembly had been implemented.

19. In order to destroy the new State, the United Kingdom had provoked the intrusion of foreign elements in Palestine. Through the Arab Legion, the British had taken possession of an important piece of territory in Arab Palestine including a sector of the City of Jerusalem. And so, with the help of its vassal's armed forces, the British had created a situation in Palestine which its representative had used as an argument in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee at the 44th meeting to prove that resolution 181 (II) was inapplicable.

20. Meanwhile, the Mediator had been putting the finishing touch to plans which would give legal form to the United Kingdom control of Palestine. On 28 June 1948,³ the United Kingdom and the United States had put forward proposals through the Mediator which to all intents and purposes had called for the unification of the whole of Palestine with "Transjordan". Had those proposals been accepted it would have meant that the whole of Palestine would have been converted into a puppet State under United Kingdom rule as was already the case with "Transjordan".

21. Those proposals had been rejected both by the Arabs and by the Jews. However, in the recommendations submitted in the name of the Mediator, to the third regular session⁴ of the General Assembly, the United Kingdom and the United States had slightly modified their plan. Those recommendations had proposed to reduce the territory of Israel by two-thirds and to place the area thus taken from the Jewish State, together with the Arab part of Palestine, under complete British control through the amalgamation of those territories with "Transjordan". Those imperialist manoeuvres had however been unmasked and the General Assembly had rejected the recommendations. The United Kingdom and the United States had therefore failed in their attempt to substitute their own plan for the provisions of resolution 181 (II). Nevertheless, they had not renounced the pursuit of their imperialist aims in Palestine. At the third session of the General Assembly, they had succeeded in pushing through the establishment of a new body known as the Conciliation Commission in resolution 194 (III), composed of representatives of France, Turkey and the United States.

22. That Commission had made every effort to prevent the implementation of resolution 181 (II). Moreover, it had been with the same intent that the Anglo-American bloc had rejected, at the third session of the General Assembly⁵

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Third Year, Supplement for July 1948, document S/863.

² See *Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 11, Part I, Section VIII.

³ See *Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly*, Part I, First Committee, Annexes, document A/C.1/401.

⁴ See *Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 2, 1948 (A/620).

⁵ See *Official Records of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly*, Volume 1, 135th plenary meeting.

and in the Security Council,¹ the USSR delegation's proposal that all foreign armed forces should be withdrawn from Palestine.

23. As to Jerusalem itself, the United Kingdom and the United States had done all they could to prevent the establishment there of an international régime under the administration of the United Nations, as provided in resolution 181 (II).

24. In April 1948, in flagrant violation of the General Assembly's decisions, the Trusteeship Council in resolution 34 (II) had taken it upon itself to cease the work it had been called upon to undertake in connexion with the establishment of a statute for the City of Jerusalem. By that step, the United Kingdom and the United States had hoped to bring about a new decision at the second special session of the General Assembly, whereby the whole of Palestine, including Jerusalem, would have been placed under the Trusteeship System.

25. The Conciliation Commission in its turn had drawn up a plan (A/973, A/973/Add.I) providing for the political and administrative division of Jerusalem between Israel and "Transjordan". That plan had been supported by the United Kingdom and the United States, who had seen in it a first step towards United Nations endorsement of the machinations of "Transjordan".

26. The discussion which had taken place in the General Assembly at its fourth session showed that those attempts to prevent the implementation of resolution 181 (II) were still being continued. A whole series of draft resolutions, amendments and proposals had been submitted to that end. All those documents had the same aim, which was to legalize the division of Jerusalem into two zones, one occupied by the forces of "Transjordan" and the other by those of the State of Israel.

27. All those events went to prove that the United Kingdom and the United States had always regarded, and continued to regard, Palestine not as a country peopled by two nations each of which was entitled to set up an independent State, but as a territory in which the United Kingdom and the United States had imperialist and strategic interests. The whole history of Palestine since the ending of the British Mandate was coloured by that fact.

28. The application of the decisions taken by the General Assembly in resolution 181 (II) had been made still more difficult by the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom had entered into a positive conspiracy with regard to Palestine. The United States, which had voted in favour of resolution 181 (II), had changed its position and rallied to the support of British policy in Palestine. That attitude had been forced upon it by the interests of the oil and other monopolies and by the anxiety of the joint Anglo-American military staffs, who regarded Palestine as an essential area in their strategic plan for the Middle East.

29. It was that conspiracy between the United Kingdom and the United States which had

brought about the outbreak of war in Palestine, thrown the Arab and Jewish peoples into bloody conflict, caused unspeakable suffering and faced the world with the problem of the Palestine refugees.

30. It was impossible to ignore the fact that if the United States and the United Kingdom had not opposed by all the means in their power the implementation of the decisions taken by the General Assembly in resolution 181 (II), the Palestine problem would not exist. There would have been in Palestine not only the State of Israel, but also an independent Arab State; the City of Jerusalem would long have been under an international régime.

31. On 6 December 1949, at the 59th meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the United Kingdom representative had stated that it was useless to try to fix the responsibility for the fact that the General Assembly's resolution had not been put into force. That was a misleading statement of the problem, for the provisions of resolution 181 (II) had been easy to apply at the time and were so still. The Jewish State had been created; the Assembly was now taking steps to apply resolution 181 (II) with regard to Jerusalem. It only remained to hope that it would also be possible to put into effect the provisions regarding the creation of an independent Arab State in Palestine.

32. In spite of the police restraint exercised by the occupying forces of "Transjordan", a vast movement was emerging among the Arabs of Palestine in favour of the creation of such a State. On 22 August 1949, the Secretary-General of the United Nations had received a memorandum from the Organization of the Arabs of Palestine urging the establishment of an independent Arab State. That document had not been distributed to delegations. On 5 December 1949, the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine had also written to the Secretary-General to urge the establishment of an independent Arab State.²

33. It was to be hoped that the United Nations would succeed in conquering the Anglo-American opposition and that all the provisions of resolution 181 (II) would be put into effect.

34. Moreover, new designs had appeared in the Anglo-American policy. On 6 December, the United Kingdom representative at the 59th meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had spoken of a policy of equilibrium in Palestine, and had said that it was inadmissible that Jerusalem should become a pawn in a political game. Those words had a particularly cynical sound at a time when the United Kingdom, acting through King Abdullah, had obtained control over half of Palestine, and when it was precisely the United Kingdom and the United States who were trying to use Jerusalem as a weapon in their political manoeuvres.

35. In the light of the above, Mr. Tsarapkin stated that the delegation of the Soviet Union continued to consider that General Assembly resolution 181 (II) should be implemented. It would therefore vote for the draft resolution adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1222). Mr. Tsarapkin believed that the implementation of that draft would ensure peace and security in Jerusalem and would meet the

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Third Year, Supplement for May 1948.

² See document A/AC.31/L.55.

interests of both the population of the city and all religious groups.

36. Before concluding, Mr. Tsarapkin wished to make some remarks on the subject of the Conciliation Commission. As he had already said, the Commission had been created at the third session of the General Assembly as a result of manoeuvres by the United Kingdom and the United States. Those two countries had wished to establish an organ which would enable them to apply measures whereby the United Kingdom might gain control of a large part of Palestine and the United States might obtain a solid foothold in that country.

37. The Conciliation Commission's work showed that it had been unable to carry out the duties entrusted to it. Its proposals (A/973, A/973/Add.1) on Jerusalem satisfied only the United Kingdom and the United States; the majority of delegations in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, as well as the representatives of the Arabs of Palestine and of Israel, had spoken against those recommendations.

38. The Conciliation Commission had proved equally incapable of solving the problem of refugees. Its entire activity had been guided not by the purposes and principles of the United Nations but by the wish to further the interests of the United Kingdom and the United States. The conciliation Commission was a harmful organ which stood in the way of the implementation of the General Assembly's resolution (181 (II)) and of the solution of the Palestine problem.

39. For all those reasons, the USSR delegation was submitting the following amendment (A/1238/Rev.1) to draft resolution I proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee:

"Add a new section III as follows:

"III. *Dissolves* the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine."

"Add a new section IV as follows:

"IV. *Approves* an appropriation in the budget estimates for 1950 of 3 million dollars in respect of the implementation of the resolution on an international régime for Jerusalem."

40. As regards the credits required for the implementation of the draft resolution adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the USSR delegation thought that the sum of 8 million dollars estimated by the Fifth Committee for the year 1950 was obviously exaggerated. It considered that the credits in question should not exceed the sum of 3 million. That amount would cover the requirements for 1950 because the international régime in Jerusalem would not be put into effect as from January 1950. The statute of the City of Jerusalem still had to be drawn up by the Trusteeship Council. The Council would meet at the end of January, and the preparation of the statute would take a certain time. No credits should therefore be provided for a period of twelve months. Moreover, in drawing up budgetary estimates, account should be taken of local receipts in Jerusalem as obtained under the British Mandate. Those receipts had amounted to 338,000 pounds sterling in 1943-1944, 474,000 pounds sterling in 1944-1945, and 303,000 pounds sterling in 1945-1946. It should be noted that during those last years the receipts had exceeded expenditures.

41. Mr. KOSANOVIC (Yugoslavia) stated that, in accordance with its consistent view ever since the Palestine question had been put before the United Nations, the Yugoslav delegation considered that the primary objective was peace and understanding between the peoples concerned, the Arabs and the Jews, and to achieve at least a *modus vivendi*. Experience and history had shown the inevitable effect of influence from abroad on nations living on the same territory or on neighbouring territories. It was therefore in the interests of both Jews and Arabs to reach a settlement which was as harmonious as possible.

42. Despite all the difficulties and the tension in Palestine, peace had been re-established by direct agreement and with the able assistance of the United Nations. Peace reigned in that troubled land and should not be jeopardized. In the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation, internationalization imposed by a United Nations decision would be pregnant with new dangers for peace in Palestine. That scheme would complicate the situation and might, quite easily, create serious international problems out of insignificant occurrences, thus giving rise to further difficulties in an area which required peace above all else.

43. The Yugoslav delegation, therefore considered that the internationalization plan was unworkable. It would mean introducing an alien body into an extremely delicate organism. It would not be particularly useful to create further tension, on the one hand, while exposing the United Nations to the risk of failure on the other. Experience had shown that in Palestine itself adjustments and even settlements could be reached, despite all the difficulties, by direct agreement between the Arabs and the Jews, between Israel and the Arab States.

44. Such agreements were of the utmost importance both for the peoples concerned and for world peace. Assistance and encouragement should be given and everything should be done to give the peoples directly concerned time and opportunity to reach such agreements. His delegation's concern was that internationalization, even if it could be implemented by some outside force, would imperil direct agreement between those peoples. It would prefer a direct agreement under the supervision of the United Nations, respecting the feelings of the three great religions.

45. Those were the reasons for which the Yugoslav delegation would vote against internationalization.

46. Mr. RODRÍGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay) stated that at all stages of the discussion of the question of Palestine the Uruguayan delegation had defended fundamental principles on which a solution of the problem should be based. When the question had first been considered, the Uruguayan delegation had believed that the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee might establish general principles to serve as a basis for common agreement. But that had not been the case, and after having been set up, the sub-committee of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had not found it possible to give careful consideration to the most serious aspects of the problem and to the fundamental principles on which a unanimous solution might be reached. Now, however, the Assembly was called upon to consider the matter in the final hours of the final

day of its session. It was impossible to settle the matter so precipitately. Had the fundamental principles advanced by the delegation of Uruguay and by other delegations been considered, it might have been possible to arrive at a solution which would not have involved conflict and contradiction among the divergent tendencies manifest in the General Assembly.

At this point Sir Alexander Cadogan took the Chair.

47. The Uruguayan delegation had advocated at the 47th meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, firstly, the religious right of access to the Holy Places in Palestine; secondly, the need to respect that religious right; thirdly, the establishment of a special international régime under the United Nations; and fourthly, free access to Holy Places in Palestine, freedom of worship at the Holy Places in Palestine, and freedom of movement by the faithful and by pilgrims from one Holy Place to another. In addition, the Uruguayan delegation had proposed immunities for religious associations in Palestine and the observance of the régime which had prevailed during the Palestine Mandate at the time when the Assembly had assumed responsibility for achieving a final solution of the problem.

48. The Uruguayan proposal had, however, not been accepted and accordingly the General Assembly now had before it the draft resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, which had not had enough time to give careful consideration to the various aspects of the problem. Neither had there been time to examine in detail the financial implications of the matter, which had been studied the previous day by the Fifth Committee. It had been said in the General Assembly that the parties directly concerned in the Palestine question categorically refused to accept internationalization of the Holy Places in Jerusalem itself and outside the Holy City. Mr. Fabregat stated that, after hearing a statement from the rostrum of the General Assembly to the effect that the State of Israel opposed a solution of the problem of the Holy Places in Palestine, he had had a private conversation with the representative in question and had been assured that the delegation of Israel did not refuse to consider or to accept a special international régime for the Holy Places in Palestine. If the representative of Israel had really refused to facilitate a solution of the problem, the position of the Uruguayan delegation would have been different.

49. Full clarification of that situation must be sought, since any decision which was adopted in the matter would involve not only the responsibility of the United Nations, but would affect the prestige of that Organization.

50. Referring to the statement that resolution 181 (II) had created a juridical reality which must be respected rather than converted into a material reality devoid of juridical value, the representative of Uruguay affirmed that the true juridical reality was the sovereignty of the General Assembly. If the exercise of the competence by which that sovereignty took effect were free, and if that free exercise were put in motion to resolve a situation by harmonizing the legitimate interests involved in a matter which affected international society, the highest juri-

dical reality was being invoked in order to create juridical realities which would truly serve the highest ideals of the international community.

51. Jerusalem had in recent times not been a place of prayer but a battlefield. It had seen the Arab forces of Jordan and the forces of the State of Israel in armed opposition to one another, fighting in the name of a land which both loved.

52. In noting, on the one hand, that there were fundamental principles involved in the defence of, and the respect for, the religious right of access to the Holy Places in Jerusalem and that, on the other hand, there was a juridical reality represented in the Assembly, and in noting that methods had been suggested tending to facilitate a solution of the problem, the Uruguayan delegation was of the opinion that the General Assembly was faced with an unfinished task. The possibilities for solution had not been accepted, and had not even been considered.

53. It would seem that those opposed to the form of internationalization outlined in the draft were opposed to the safeguarding by the international community of the Holy Places of Palestine, and to free access thereto for the faithful of all world religions. In that case, however, "internationalization", "respect" and "effective régime" for the Holy Places were not synonymous expressions. What the Uruguayan delegation sought was fundamentally an international régime for the Holy Places of Palestine, and respect for the religious right of all believers to have access to those Holy Places, which represented the highest values of their thought and their faith. The Uruguayan delegation reaffirmed its consistent position of seeking and proposing a special international régime for the Holy Places of Palestine, within the Old City of Jerusalem and outside its walls.

54. While there was before the Assembly a report referring to a plan for internationalization costing 8,100,000 dollars, it had been stated that that very plan of internationalization could be reduced to 4 million dollars. During the debate in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, however, some delegations, among them France and the United States, had indicated that the cost of the plan of internationalization might fluctuate between 20 million and 30 million dollars. It might appropriately be asked whether the General Assembly, since it was to internationalize Jerusalem, which implied the adoption of a resolution tantamount to requiring a statute to be prepared by the Trusteeship Council for two communities, the Arab community and the community of Israel in the Jerusalem area, should limit the possibilities of progress of those communities, to the sum of 8 million dollars which represented the cost of essential services. It was impossible for so illustrious a city as Jerusalem to be subjected to a régime suitable only to undeveloped social communities. It was impossible for the Hebrew University, the laboratories and institutes, the Hebrew Hospital, the Academy of Music, the Classical Theatre of Jerusalem to be subjected to a trusteeship régime.

55. The statements of the representatives of Israel and Jordan might have led to a harmonious solution allowing the Christians of the world access to the Holy Places and at the same time

preventing the emergence of new elements likely to cause a shift in the delicate balance of power between the forces involved in the tragedy of Palestine.

56. It was still possible to find the solution required by the problem of the Holy Places of Palestine. That solution could be found through a special international régime for the Holy Places of Palestine. Such a solution should guarantee free access to them, freedom of worship in them and the security which might enable the land of ancient prophecy and preaching to become once again the land of peace and justice by virtue of the action of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

57. Mr. CHOUKAIRY (Syria) said that, as a native of Jerusalem and an Arab, he considered that the Holy City had always constituted an integral part of the Arab world and of Syria. He had prayed in its great Mosque and had celebrated Easter with his Christian compatriots in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Before the Zionist aggression, he had watched with reverence and tolerance the native Jews of the city conducting their lamentations and prayers at its Wailing Wall.

58. The report of the Special Committee on Palestine in 1947 had established beyond doubt that the Jews of Jerusalem constituted only 38 per cent of the population and occupied 2 per cent of the area. The Holy City was overwhelmingly Arab in ownership and population. It was therefore the democratic right of the Arabs to exercise sovereignty in Jerusalem. Yet they were prepared to transfer their sovereignty to the United Nations which would administer the area under an international régime. They were prepared to transfer to the United Nations their traditional custodianship of the Holy Places. They were prepared to abandon their political and national interests in order to ensure peace in the Holy Land. They favoured outright and complete internationalization of Jerusalem.

59. In contrast, there was no justification for the position of the Israel delegation. At least 70 per cent of the Jews of Jerusalem were not natives of the city and had not even been born in Palestine. Yet Mr. Ben-Gurion, as reported in *The New York Times* of 3 December, had defied the whole world by his threat to convert Jerusalem into a Jewish capital. The position of the Arab countries was quite clear: they favoured internationalization, while Israel claimed Jerusalem as part of its State. They supported neutralization; Israel was promoting racialism. They wanted demilitarization; Israel wanted to convert Jerusalem into an arsenal. The Arab countries stood for a unified Jerusalem while Israel stood for partition of the Holy City.

60. Mr. Choukairy appealed to the General Assembly to consider the question in the light of those considerations. No international assembly had ever been confronted with a more solemn or decisive issue than the problem of Jerusalem.

61. General Assembly resolution 181 (II) had provided for the creation of two States and the establishment of an international régime in Jerusalem. As a result of that resolution, Jewish sovereignty had come into existence, and Israel's admission to the United Nations had been made possible. Apparently, Israel had now chosen to

respect only that part of the resolution which had authorized its current status and to ignore those parts which it did not find convenient, but the General Assembly could not, in 1949, repudiate its 1947 decision except on grounds of justice and democracy. If it were to do so, it would also have to suppress the sovereignty which had resulted from it. If it decided to maintain its decision in force, it would have to accept it with all its inequities.

62. The solution of the Jerusalem question had been decreed in the 1947 resolution. The resolution before the Assembly provided the means of implementing the earlier decision. The Security Council was vested, under the Charter, with full power to restrain aggression; the Charter was a living reality. The moral power of the United Nations should be brought to bear in case the Government of Israel attempted to resist implementation of the Assembly decision. Such resistance could be put down even without resorting to arms.

63. The draft resolution before the General Assembly had been adopted in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee at its 61st meeting by an overwhelming majority, consisting of the Arab, Latin-American and Soviet blocs and several independent votes. Thus the whole world had expressed confidence in the United Nations decision. The General Assembly should cast a unanimous vote in favour of the complete internationalization of a unified Jerusalem. The urgency to save Jerusalem from destruction and to ensure free and undisturbed access to the Holy Places by believers of all religions should prevail over ideological considerations and political rivalries. There must be no disagreement concerning the need to safeguard the sacred character of Jerusalem. The Arabs, as Moslems, had made great sacrifices by supporting internationalization.

64. The question of the implementation of internationalization had been settled by the General Assembly's resolution 181 (II). Despite strong warnings against partition, it had decided to impose it as well as a special international régime for Jerusalem. It could not now retreat from the responsibility it had then assumed for implementing the decision.

65. The United Kingdom representative, who had expressed readiness at the 274th plenary meeting to reconsider his position if he were certain that internationalization could be implemented, might be asked what prospects of implementation the proposals of the Conciliation Commission had. In view of the fact that Israel was irrevocably opposed to genuine internationalization, it could never be achieved so long as it was made conditional upon the consent of Israel. For that matter, no resolution of the General Assembly could be implemented if its non-acceptance by any Member State were allowed. If the Assembly were to take no action and to sanction the *de facto* situation, the United Nations would become meaningless for it would have been rendered powerless.

66. The representative of Canada had attacked internationalization at the 274th plenary meeting on the grounds that it was unworkable. Mr. Choukairy questioned the criteria which determined whether or not a proposal was workable.

The 1947 decision had been declared workable despite the vehement opposition of the Arab States; the same decision was at the moment being termed unworkable because Israel had stated that it would resist its implementation.

67. The representatives of Canada and the United States had invoked the principle of self-determination of the people of Jerusalem. It was regrettable that that argument should have been adduced by States which, two years earlier, had disregarded the will of those people with disastrous consequences.

68. The Arabs would bear exclusive responsibility for the security of Jerusalem and the Holy Places if the draft resolution before the General Assembly were rejected. They would continue to discharge that sacred right and duty to the satisfaction of the Christian world.

69. On 9 December 1917, thirty-two years earlier, the Arab Moslem Mayor of Jerusalem had handed over Jerusalem to the Allied forces under General Allenby. On that day Jerusalem had been promised peace, justice and security. Should the Assembly fail to adopt the draft resolution before it, 9 December 1949 would stand in history as the day ushering in events which might lead to the destruction of Jerusalem.

70. Mr. MUÑOZ (Argentina) said that his delegation would have wished for a solution reconciling the different points of view on the problem of Jerusalem. But it had not been possible to obtain either the agreement of the parties directly concerned or the support of a large majority of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. The representatives of Israel and Jordan had clearly stated their objections to any régime involving complete internationalization of the Holy City.

71. The Argentine Republic, traditionally and pre-eminently Catholic, could not but react favourably to the idea of internationalizing Jerusalem. The dictates of its religious spirit could in no way be disregarded.

72. The Argentine delegation had been guided by the spiritual desires of its people. No political or territorial considerations had influenced its attitude.

73. It was regrettable that it had not been possible to find a solution that would take into account the important interests of the international community in Jerusalem and the other Holy Places in Palestine. The Australian draft resolution (A/AC.31/L.37), approved with amendments by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee at its 61st meeting, complied at least with the spiritual and religious considerations which consecrated Jerusalem as a symbol of three religions, separated from the territorial vicissitudes of the Near East.

74. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) wished, first of all, to propose formally that the General Assembly should not adjourn the current meeting until it had finished with the question under discussion.

75. The Netherlands and Swedish representatives had spoken of their deep interest in the protection of the Holy Places. In his opinion, it was essential to distinguish between the Holy Places in the plural and the Holy Place in the singular. Those representatives thought of the Holy Places

as so many walls and perhaps buildings scattered throughout the area of Jerusalem, while the real issue before the General Assembly was whether it would agree to regard Jerusalem as a Holy Place and as such take it under its protection. The essence of the problem was whether Jerusalem as a city or only the Holy Places should be protected by the western Christian world.

76. Furthermore, the Netherlands representative had expressed at the 274th plenary meeting doubts regarding the practicability of the plan proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, without, however, giving any proof to show that the joint Netherlands-Sweden plan (A/1227) would be any more practicable. Mr. Malik, on the other hand, had been informed authoritatively that Jordan considered the Netherlands-Sweden plan more detrimental to its position in the long run, and was even more opposed to it, than to the full internationalization proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. Moreover, there was no doubt in Mr. Malik's mind that the Netherlands-Sweden plan was no more workable than that of the Commission, although he would be very much surprised if the Government of Israel did not announce a last-minute decision to accept the former proposal.

77. Even if both Jordan and Israel accepted that plan, however, it would not lead to internationalization. It was further removed from internationalization than the proposal of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (A/973, A/973/Add. I). It had become acceptable to both parties only because the principle of internationalization had been greatly watered down, without taking into account other factors which were really decisive.

78. He repeated, therefore, that in his view the Netherlands-Swedish proposal was no more workable than the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee's plan were it only because of Jordan's opposition, and, moreover, that there was nothing to substantiate its claim to internationalization. Indeed as it would leave the area completely divided and partitioned between two antagonistic States, all its sponsors could do was to hope for the best.

79. The Norwegian representative had argued that the plan of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee might endanger the truce and hence the Holy Places themselves. Once again, it was necessary to remember the fundamental distinction between the Holy Places and the Holy City as such. The Norwegian representative had also argued that it would be wrong for the United Nations to adopt resolutions which could not be implemented, although two years previously, when voting for the resolution on the partition of Palestine, he had not been so fastidious about the practicability of implementation. Furthermore, the Norwegian representative had said that because the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee proposal was not workable, he would vote for the Netherlands-Swedish plan. Mr. Malik wondered whether the Norwegian representative could really prove that the latter plan was any more workable than that of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

80. The representative of Denmark had announced in the 274th plenary meeting that he would cease to support the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee's plan and, on the contrary, would vote against it because certain facts which had emerged from the speeches made at the previous

meeting of the General Assembly had changed the whole picture of the situation. He had particularly referred to a telegram received from King Abdullah of Jordan (A/1231). Yet any objective examination of the speeches preceding the statement of the Danish representative would show that no change whatsoever had occurred between the moment the Danish representative had voted for the plan in the Committee, two days previously, and the moment he had announced his change of position at the 274th plenary meeting of the General Assembly. Indeed, any changes which had occurred had been in favour of the Committee's plan rather than against it because the speeches of the United States and the United Kingdom representatives at the 274th plenary meeting had been much weaker than those they had made in the Committee. There had been nothing new in the telegram from Jordan. The representative of Jordan had, indeed, read out much stronger statements in the Committee. Nothing, therefore, justified the Danish representative's shift from support to opposition. He regretted very much that the representative of Denmark should have had to play such a part.

81. It was of course the prerogative of any Member of the United Nations to change its mind. Indeed, the supporters of the resolution on the partition of Palestine had had full moral justification for trying to persuade a few hesitating Members to vote in favour of that resolution in 1947, because they were just in sight of their goal. That, however, was not the case at present and to his knowledge no second thoughts had ever led the Members of an overwhelming majority to change their mind overnight. He begged the Danish representative to reconsider his reconsideration and at least to remain neutral.

82. The United Kingdom representative had spoken at the 274th plenary meeting of a compromise and agreement and had recalled the consistency of the position adopted by the United Kingdom delegation since 1947. Mr. Malik was wholeheartedly for agreement and also believed in compromise. He emphasized, however, that all depended on where and how the compromise was reached. Indeed, even the representative of the United Kingdom would agree that it was impossible to compromise on principles, and that it was necessary to draw a line somewhere.

83. Regarding the consistency of the United Kingdom policy, he wished to point out that seven months previously, when the United Nations was discussing whether to admit Israel to membership immediately or postpone the question until the current session, he had submitted a draft resolution proposing postponement.¹ That draft resolution had been supported by the United Kingdom Government because of the complete uncertainty regarding the future of Jerusalem. What had been a valid reason in the mind of the United Kingdom representative seven months previously could not have become invalid now, so that the United Kingdom had not been as consistent as it claimed to have been.

84. Furthermore, in the past, the United Kingdom had washed its hands of the whole issue and had abstained on every decisive vote. The United

Kingdom representative had, however, announced his intention at the 274th plenary meeting of taking part in the vote against the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. That was obviously a departure from the consistent course of abstaining which had been followed hitherto.

85. Turning to the remarks made by the representative of Canada, in the 274th meeting, Mr. Malik said that he had listened to them with great attention. He had replied already to the assertion that the proposed solution was not practicable. In his opinion, the representative of Canada had made two very important points. He had stated that the wishes of the local population were not the sole nor even the overriding consideration, but later he had added that their legitimate interests could not be ignored. Mr. Malik agreed fully with those two basic principles, but he did not agree with the conclusion that the plan proposed by the Netherlands and Sweden took both principles into account. In his opinion, that plan made the wishes of the local population the overriding consideration and it did not take into account the expressed wishes and interests of Christendom. It was on that point that he disagreed with the representative of Canada.

86. He next wished to comment on the statement made by the United States representative, who said that the solution adopted by the General Assembly must conform to the wishes of the local population. He apparently did not agree with the representative of Canada on that point. Mr. Malik asked the United States representative whether he intended the Assembly's decision to conform to the wishes of the local population to the extent of destroying the principle of internationalization altogether. That was a question of principle; it was no longer a question of a compromise within a principle. Compromise was permissible, but not on principles.

87. The United States representative had reaffirmed at the 274th meeting his Government's strong support for a permanent international régime for the Jerusalem area, but his interpretation of a permanent international régime was not the full internationalization of Jerusalem, as desired by the majority. The United States representative should state plainly whether he really believed in the genuine internationalization of Jerusalem or whether he wanted only an international régime for certain scattered Holy Places. He had always expressed support for the plan submitted by the Palestine Conciliation Commission, but he had never urged the Committee to adopt that plan, neither had he made his amendments public. He had simply allowed that plan to die and another very different one to take its place.

88. Mr. Malik emphasized that the problem was religious rather than political, but the speech made by the United States representative had been entirely political in character. The religious bodies and the churches throughout the United States all believed in a system of internationalization, which was different from the plan supported by the United States representative. The American Catholic Hierarchy had stated that the proposal submitted by the Palestine Conciliation Commission would not have achieved the genuine internationalization of the Jerusalem area.

¹ See documents A/AC.24/62/Rev.1 and A/AC.24/62/Rev.2 and A/AC.24/62/Rev.3.

Furthermore, the statement went on to say that the Pope had made it clear time and time again that the only effective guarantee for the safety and the sacred character of Jerusalem, for the protection of the Holy Places, for the free exercise of the indisputable rights of the Christian minority and for the free access of pilgrims to their shrines was a territorial internationalization of Jerusalem and its area under the sovereign and effective control of the family of nations. Thus the Catholic Church wanted a truly international régime over the whole area and not merely control over a few of the Holy Places. The Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Jerusalem had also expressed their concern for the indisputable rights of the Christian minority in Jerusalem.

89. The United States representative had not consulted any of the parties who were pre-eminently interested in the issue. He had obviously not taken into account the opinion of the American Catholic Hierarchy or that of any of the Protestant churches, for they had all expressed themselves strongly in favour of some form of internationalization. He was not referring to the opinions expressed individually by Christians, or Protestant ministers, for they only represented themselves. He was speaking of the opinion expressed by official Christian bodies. It might of course be argued that, although the Churches wanted some system of internationalization, they did not want the formula submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. If that were the case, the United States representative should have suggested some alternative system, but instead he had left it to the Netherlands and Sweden to propose a plan which provided no system at all and was precisely what the churches had opposed.

90. If representatives wished to cite the opinion of individuals, he could cite two individuals who had favoured internationalization, for everyone that had spoken against it. As an example, he mentioned the great American preacher, Harry Emerson Fosdick, and the President of Union Theological Seminary, both of whom had supported the plan for internationalization.

91. Mr. Malik turned next to the question of the Holy Places in the Old City and the New City of Jerusalem. It had been persistently claimed by the Foreign Minister of Israel that there were only a few minor Holy Places outside the Old City. It was nevertheless stated in a Catholic publication entitled *The Crusaders' Almanac* that there were over fifty religious places in the New City, among them the Upper Room, Mount Zion, Mount Scopus and the Mount of Olives. The representative of Israel had stated that some of those places fell in the Arab territory. There was nevertheless no dispute about the fact that the Upper Room came within Israel territory, and it was one of the fundamental Holy Places of Christianity.

92. There were, in fact, at least three fundamental Holy Places in Israel territory, the Upper Room, the Church of the Nativity of St. John the Baptist, and the Church of the Visitation of the Holy Virgin.

93. He wished to emphasize that deep issues were involved in that problem, which required a definite choice between a number of alternatives.

It had been proposed that Jerusalem should be made an international city. Some representatives were horrified by that idea, for example, the representative of Yugoslavia, remembering as he did the experience of Trieste. Jerusalem, however, was something different from Trieste and Danzig. Trieste and Danzig were significant internationally only because there had been a clash of races and political interests there. The international character of Jerusalem was not distinguished by the conflict between Arab and Jew but by the fundamental fact that it was a holy city to three world religions and that to Christians, at least, it was the most holy city.

94. The choice lay between the internationalization of Jerusalem and nationalization which would make it a centre of nationalistic activity. It would be most inappropriate for Jerusalem to become a centre of nationalistic activity. It had never been such a centre nor even a capital during the last two thousand years.

95. The alternative between nationalizing Jerusalem and placing it under the protection of the international community was quite clear. It was a choice between the unity and the partition of Jerusalem. In its entire history Jerusalem had never been partitioned. It was the first time that any representative had ever, as had the representative of Israel, proposed partition.

96. Furthermore, the choice lay between removing Jerusalem from the area of possible future conflict once and for all and leaving it as a point where such conflict was most likely to break out.

97. Jerusalem lay at the eastern-most point of the Israel thrust. Some representatives proposed that that point should become a political centre and be divided between conflicting political activities. It would be unreasonable to expect that such a centre of political activity would have any stability in the future without absolute international control.

98. Moreover, it was essential to decide whether political or religious considerations should predominate. The representatives of Canada and of the United States had failed to take that issue into account. In their arguments, political and sociological considerations took precedence over the spiritual and religious.

99. The Lebanese delegation was fully aware of the difficulties likely to hamper the implementation of internationalization. The representative of Israel would undoubtedly plead that that plan could not be implemented and that a solution along the lines of the joint Netherlands and Swedish proposal would be more effective. The prestige of the United Nations was, however, at stake because the Organization had taken a firm decision on that matter previously and because a number of representatives had stated during the second part of the third session of the General Assembly that Israel had been admitted into the United Nations because they firmly believed that Israel could be trusted to implement the decisions of the United Nations.

100. Furthermore, thousands and possibly millions of people in many countries had been praying for United Nations action in connexion with the question of Jerusalem. Special services in the

cathedral at New York had been held recently at which prayers had been asked that the United Nations would implement the internationalization of Jerusalem under a genuine United Nations régime as originally voted by the General Assembly in 1947.

101. If the hopes of the millions of men and women who were interested in the problem from a religious rather than a political point of view were disappointed, if they came to realize that their deepest prayers during the past few months had not been answered because the United Nations itself had been guilty of failing to do its duty, that would reflect unfavourably upon the prestige of the United Nations.

102. There was an even more serious choice before the General Assembly. Those who voted for the nationalization and partition of Jerusalem were, knowingly or unknowingly, voting for the total Israelization of Jerusalem in the foreseeable future. That would be true not only of the friends of Israel, who might desire that solution, but also of those who maintained that they wished to uphold the political and territorial *status quo*.

103. Yet another problem was whether western Christendom, suffering as it was from the fatigue caused by two world wars, from a series of crises and countless other problems, was in a position to take the opportunity of sharing with Islam the control of the Holy City. For the first time in more than a thousand years, the whole hinterland of that region was agreeing to share its government with western Christendom and was anxious to see whether such co-operation was really possible.

104. Moreover, the problem of Christian life and culture in Jerusalem itself was involved in any decision which the General Assembly might take. A decision to partition and nationalize Jerusalem would imply that representatives who called themselves Christians would be participating in the liquidation of Christian life and culture and the Christian community in Jerusalem. There had been a very flourishing Christian life in Jerusalem until recent events. Nothing was more calculated to wipe out that life and culture almost entirely than the decision to partition and nationalize Jerusalem. Dozens of Christian schools, colleges, convents and monasteries needed a united, undivided and unpartitioned Jerusalem for their proper functioning. The process of liquidation had already begun, although almost nothing had been said about it. A good example was the fact that the Franciscan foundation of Terra Santa, one of the Christian schools in the city, was being used as part of the Hebrew University.

105. In conclusion, he wished to make a very sincere appeal to the representative of Israel, although he fully realized the feeling of his country about the situation. Every effort should be made to regard Jerusalem as something above politics, as something which could devote its whole activity to civilization and culture. It might be possible to envisage one region of Jerusalem as completely devoted to the highest flowering of modern Hebrew culture and thought, another section equally devoted to the flourishing of Moslem life, culture and thought and a third section equally devoted to the flourishing of Christian culture. It should be possible to think of

those three sections living at peace side by side with each other, without political implications. It would surely be possible that that wonderful institution, the Hebrew University, should develop to the greatest possible extent and that at the same time another similar institution, a Moslem university, should be developed in the Holy City.

106. Equally, it should be possible to think of a similar Christian institution which would develop around the places which were holy to the Christian world. He sincerely believed that that picture could be made a reality, if the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States were genuinely determined to see that that was done. If that picture became a reality, the future possibilities of the Holy City would greatly enhance the prestige of the United Nations and of Israel.

At this point General Rómulo resumed the Chair.

107. Mr. SHARETT (Israel) said that at the end of a prolonged debate, first in the General Assembly, then in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, then in Sub-Committee 1, then again in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, and, finally, in the plenary meeting, the delegation of Israel stood bewildered and dismayed by the grave implications of the draft resolution before it.

108. The unreality of the discussion in its last phases, culminating in the adoption of the draft resolution by such a considerable majority in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, had been depressing and profoundly disturbing. The clarity of vision and the earnestness of purpose of the entire General Assembly were being put to a test. He could not believe that the majority opinion formed in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee could be allowed to become a decree of fate, still less the considered verdict of international statesmanship.

109. The delegation of Israel refused to accept the conclusion that the cause of reason had been lost and that a last-minute appeal to cool judgment and a sense of realities must be doomed to futility. It had the faith that saner counsels might still prevail and that dictates of justice and constructive statesmanship could be made to triumph.

110. In the final effort to oppose what appeared to the Israeli delegation to be a disastrous course and to urge a solution which was at once fair and practicable; the salient facts of the situation should briefly be restated.

111. The first fact was the unique character of Jerusalem. It was, on the one hand, the historic centre of the Jewish people, the focus of its national life, a city which had entered history as a Jewish capital and, as such, had become the scene of prophecy. On the other hand, it was a city whose name had been sanctified by the three world religions, and, in a specific sense, by Christianity, for it was there that events had occurred which had brought the Christian religion into the world. Jerusalem was also holy to Islam and contained Islam's third shrine. But those connotations of Jerusalem lay on entirely different planes. It was not a question of setting one connotation above another, nor of subordinating one connotation to another. Rather was it a question of assessing each in its true value and of harmonizing all of them. To the Chris-

tians, Jerusalem was a spiritual concept, an exalted symbol, a place which they worshipped in prayer, where some devoted their lives to divine service and meditation, which most could only hope to visit in pilgrimage. To the Jews, Jerusalem was not merely their one great religious centre, the source of their spiritual inspiration, it was the live national centre, the heart of the nation, a city which they had rebuilt and recreated—he referred to the major part of the City outside the walls, which had been built by Jews and developed by them during the past seventy or eighty years, but, for the most part, within the past twenty-five years. It was a city where they expected their creative national genius to receive full opportunity of self-expression. Jerusalem was sacred to the whole monotheistic world, but it had never played a decisive part in the national life of any people but the Jews. Twice, they had been exiled from it. They had always returned. They believed that they had now come to stay.

112. Jewish Jerusalem, which was largely continuous but by no means identical with the New City, was today an integral part of Israel in every conceivable respect: in territorial contiguity, in legislative and administrative oneness, in complete financial dependence—above all, in the identity of political and spiritual consciousness.

113. At a time when the United Nations had been legally entitled and morally bound to take over the City from the departing Mandatory Administration and to establish its authority there, it had resolutely and irrevocably failed to do so. By recurring votes in the General Assembly and in the Trusteeship Council, it had refused to shoulder in time the responsibility which it had previously voted to assume.

114. The resulting vacuum had been filled immediately and inevitably by the State of Israel. The State had stepped into the breach when the United Nations had defaulted. It had done so to rescue the City from starvation, slaughter and ruin. The bond between the State and the City had thus been cemented by heroic deeds of rescue, by untold suffering and by heavy loss of life.

115. That bond could not be dissolved without plunging the City into disaffection and chaos. It was no longer a question, as it had been at a certain stage in 1947, whether Jerusalem should be incorporated into an independent State, or independent States, or, rather, constituted as a *corpus separatum*. The question was whether the fact that Jewish Jerusalem formed part of the independent State of Israel should be accepted, or whether an attempt should be made to wrench the City from the body of the State and force it, against the will of its population and to their extreme and undeniable detriment, into the strait-jacket of imposed tutelage. The Jews of Jerusalem had left no doubt in anybody's mind as to their attitude and their determination. They would acknowledge no other authority in the City than that of Israel.

116. Jewish Jerusalem was to-day a model of orderly government. Its water and food supply, as well as its health, educational, police and postal services were exemplarily organized. Since the conclusion of the Israel-“Transjordan” Armistice Agreement in April 1949, complete

peace and quiet had prevailed throughout the entire city. Its Holy Places were inviolate and unthreatened.

117. The Holy Places in and around Jerusalem were concentrated chiefly in the Arab section. There were but a few Christian sanctuaries of note in the Israeli part of Jerusalem, all were on the fringes of the area, which area, throughout its main part, contained no Holy Places at all, either Christian, Moslem or Jewish. On the other hand, the Church of the Nativity and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, that is to say the cradle and the tomb of Christ, as well as the Garden of Gethsemane and all the four Christian patriarchates were, together with the main Moslem and Jewish shrines, all in Arab hands. To represent, therefore, the issue of the Holy Places of Jerusalem as lying mainly between the Christian world and Israel was to throw the picture completely out of focus.

118. Another fact which had thrown the picture most grotesquely out of focus during the debate was the unanimous championship of a full international régime for Jerusalem by the representatives of Arab States. The impression thus created, particularly by the statement of the representative of Syria, that opposition to territorial internationalization was voiced only by Israel while the Arab world was unitedly behind it was utterly false. The only Arab Power which controlled a part of Jerusalem, a very important part of Jerusalem, and whose attitude on the issue of internationalization was therefore of direct and material import, was the Kingdom of Jordan. That Government, as had been stated by the representative of Lebanon, was implacably and uncompromisingly opposed to internationalization in any form.

119. A telegram from the Foreign Minister of that Government reaffirming that opposition in unequivocal terms had been read. Mr. Sharett quoted in that connexion a report which his delegation had just received regarding Arab reaction in and around Jerusalem to the resolution before the General Assembly. The cabled report was dated 10 December 1949 and read as follows:

“His Majesty King Abdullah made a demonstrative appearance at morning prayer today in the Mosque of Al Aksa, the mosque commonly known as the Mosque of Omar, in the Old City of Jerusalem. His personal chaplain said in his sermon: ‘You have heard much talk about internationalization. Do not fear, place your trust in your King, who has proclaimed that he will smite every hand which wishes to steal from us any inch of ground and will not allow foreign forces to play with the fate of the City.’ A telegram of the Foreign Minister of Jordan to Mr. Trygve Lie was broadcast on all radio stations.¹ The inhabitants of Beth Galla, a large Christian village, actually a town, next to Bethlehem, telegraphed to Trygve Lie expressing their opposition to internationalization. Mr. Issa Bandak, the Christian Mayor of Bethlehem, announced in Cyprus that Bethlehem opposed internationalization. He quoted the King as saying that internationalization will take place only over his dead body.”

120. Another fact was the position which Christendom held in Israel and in the Israeli part of Jerusalem. It was obvious that close con-

¹ A/1231.

tact and relations of full harmony now prevailed between the Government of Israel and the Christian ecclesiastical authorities throughout the territory of Israel, including Jerusalem. Ever since its rule had been consolidated after the initial turbulent period, the Government of Israel had ensured scrupulous respect for Christian rights and Christian susceptibilities. Complete freedom of worship and full liberty and safety of movement for the clergy were effectively guaranteed. In connexion with the Holy Year 1950, the Government of Israel had announced its readiness to grant pilgrims full facilities of transit in both directions. Mr. Sharett pointed out that in the vital fields of religious education and religious jurisdiction, and in matters of communal organization, his Government had granted every facility requested by the heads of the religious communities concerned. High Catholic and other Christian authorities had expressed full gratification at his Government's policy in that connexion.

121. The Government of Israel readily acknowledged the authority of the United Nations concerning the Holy Places in Jerusalem and throughout the territory. Having expressed its views that the best way to safeguard the interests of the international community in the sanctuaries of Jerusalem would be to conclude an agreement between the United Nations and Israel, the Israeli delegation did not regard that agreement as the only possible or acceptable way of meeting the issue. On the contrary, Mr. Sharett wished to make it clear that a resolution or statute adopted by the General Assembly for which the Netherlands-Swedish joint resolution, as amended by Chile (A/AC.31/L.58), might well serve as a starting point, and which imposed the supervision of the United Nations over the Holy Places and required the Government or Governments concerned to acknowledge that supervision and co-operate with a United Nations representative in that connexion, would be equally acceptable to the Israeli Government. That Government was ready solemnly to pledge its wholehearted co-operation with such an international representative if he were appointed. It would contract that obligation in the full knowledge of the grave responsibility it would incur through any failure to comply with the United Nations representative's legitimate injunctions.

122. Mr. Sharett felt that, in view of the facts he had mentioned, the solution was obvious. It only required normal judgment to see the way in which the authority of the United Nations might be upheld and established in regard to the Holy Places of Jerusalem, not only without conflict with the rights, interests and aspirations of the city's population, but in full harmony with them; not at the expense of the established Government, but with its full and willing support. It would be the first chance in history to bring the Holy Places and sites under the direct supervision of an international organ, and would be an unprecedented opportunity to achieve that high world purpose with the full accord and ready co-operation of the Government concerned. It would be a unique guarantee of the workability of that arrangement, inherent in its unreserved acceptance by the Israeli Government, and an invaluable opportunity of associating the entire population

with responsibility for the implementation of that régime.

123. Instead, what did the draft resolution before the General Assembly imply? Nothing short of an attempt to fly in the face of entirely legitimate and unalterable realities, to devise an arrangement utterly impossible of execution, to set the United Nations on a course which seemed bound to end in a fiasco, and to leave the Holy Places without adequate provision.

124. The fact that New Jerusalem was a modern city athrob with economic, cultural and political activity and already playing a central and guiding role in the life of Israel had been completely ignored by the authors of the present draft resolution. It was treated as an abstraction—a mere sublimation of its real self. A gratuitous and gravely pernicious conflict had been artificially conjured up in the debate between the live interests of the city and its population on the one hand, and its religious world associations on the other. Instead of seeking harmony, so easily attainable, a headlong clash had been deliberately produced. The great chance to place the international régime upon the secure foundations of national consent had been recklessly thrown to the winds. The inestimable asset of willing co-operation of the only authority capable of putting that régime into effect had been frittered away and a most reckless adventure embarked upon.

125. The living tissue of economic and financial life which had inseparably united modern Jerusalem with the body of the State of Israel was to be cut asunder with one stroke. The authority of the State of Israel, with all the machinery of modern government—the public services of health, education, labour, police, posts, telegraphs and railways, the functions of tax collection, organization of supplies, provision of employment and administration of justice and all the other complex aspects of governmental regulation of life in a highly developed modern community—were to be completely abrogated. The compelling experiences of life were all to be sacrificed on the altar of a *corpus separatum*. The free population of Jerusalem was to be forced into intolerable subjection. The undisturbed serenity of Jerusalem was to be wrecked and the city left a prey to severe political strife and inevitable confusion and disorder. The operation was not to confine its deadly effects to Jerusalem alone. It was to strike the State as a whole: the State's very heart was to be cut out from its living body.

126. The assumption of some delegations that, when once the international régime was set up in Jerusalem, Israel would continue to maintain public services there, was a complete misconception of the position. The plan outlined in the draft resolution and the maintenance by the Government of Israel of its responsibilities and functions in Jerusalem were a contradiction in terms. If Jerusalem became a *corpus separatum*, the Government of Israel must leave and with it would go its services, amenities and subventions. The same was true of the Holy Places. If the Government of Israel remained the responsible authority, it must have full executive powers in its area and would then be ready, within that area, to honour its obligations with regard to sanctuaries. If, however, the Government of Israel departed, all its obligations in Jerusalem

would fall to the ground, and if the population, in the meantime, made the establishment of any other authority impossible, there would be no effective organ whatsoever to assume the protection of the Holy Places. Such was the choice before the Assembly.

127. The Arab representatives supporting the draft resolution seemed to expect their sudden and unprecedented outbursts of fervour for the universal associations of Jerusalem, and their appeals to the religious conscience of the world to be taken at their face value, despite the fact that it was they who had helped to vote down the international régime in 1947, when it might have been realized, and who had voted against internationalization at every stage, particularly on three decisive occasions, while their Governments were seeking to destroy both Jerusalem and the international régime by bloody violence. Was it in order to set up the rule of the United Nations in Jerusalem that the armies of Egypt and Jordan had stormed Jerusalem from both sides, in full accord with the Governments of Iraq, Lebanon and Syria?

128. Representatives who were supporting the draft resolution seemed to assume that human life could be moulded at will into arbitrary constitutional forms. It was furthermore assumed that a certain constitutional principle, once propounded, became eternally valid, and that, even had it been shelved at the decisive stage, it could still, no matter how long the interval or how great the intervening change, be revived at the whim of fancy and put into effect regardless of the complete transformation of background which had meantime taken place. The representatives who supported the draft resolution seemed to see nothing incongruous in the fact that in 1948 when the fate of Jewish Jerusalem hung literally in the balance between life and death, the United Nations had washed its hands of the specific responsibility which it had assumed for Jerusalem under the 1947 resolution, and yet in 1949, after Jewish Jerusalem had been saved and rehabilitated by Israel, could calmly come forward and claim its prerogatives under a chapter of the resolution it had itself deliberately allowed to be destroyed, although by pressing the claim at that stage it was liable to plunge the city back into the chaos from which it had just emerged.

129. The most astounding feature of the background against which the draft resolution was to be put to the vote, however, and one to which many representatives had called attention, was the stubborn refusal to meet the crucial and decisive problem of implementation. It surely could not be assumed that the sponsors of the draft resolution and their supporters had in mind merely the enunciation of an abstract principle, without any accompanying action. Yet the repeated and specific challenges addressed to those sponsors on that score, both in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee in Sub-Committee 1, and before the General Assembly, remained unanswered.

130. Pertinent questions could not be disposed of merely by being ignored, however. What guarantee was there that the Trusteeship Council would be able to find a way of implementing the plan? The purpose of the Trusteeship System as defined in the Charter was to assist immature communities towards independence. But in the

case at issue, the Trusteeship Council was being used to reduce a mature and independent community to a state of subjection. Was it an act of constructive international statesmanship to inflict on the Trusteeship Council such a hopeless and incongruous task?

131. What means, moreover, had the Trusteeship Council of asserting authority over an angry population, roused to resistance by a challenge to its freedom? What forces would be at its disposal to ensure security? How would it collect taxes? What sources of revenue would it draw upon to cover the formidable deficit which Jerusalem would face once the huge subsidies from the State of Israel were no more?

132. The Economic Union, on the revenue of which the budget of Jerusalem was to have been the first charge in the original plan, did not exist. The draft resolution merely took note of that fact, by deleting the clause in the Statute of Jerusalem which had a bearing on the Economic Union, but it substituted nothing in its stead. How was the Trusteeship Council to solve the financial problem of Jerusalem?

133. Reference had been made to the financial implications of the draft resolution; that was a question which could only be answered by facts and figures, not by wishful thinking. Some of the figures mentioned in the General Assembly were quite irrelevant, referring as they did to the municipal budget of Jerusalem in past years, when Jerusalem was the seat of the Central Government of Palestine, the British Mandatory Administration. During that period only secondary functions were left for the municipality to discharge, such as the lighting of streets, the paving of certain roads, scavenging services and the like. The main departments, the State Department, the Health Department, the Education Department, the Public Works Department, and the Police Department had spent lavish amounts on Jerusalem during those years, far in excess of the amount warranted by the relation of Jerusalem's population to the general population. Moreover, the very existence of a central administration in Jerusalem was the main lever of its economic life, a direct source of livelihood for many thousands of families and an indirect source for the whole city.

134. At the time of speaking, the Government of Israel was supplementing all those deficiencies. The estimates of 8 million dollars submitted by the Fifth Committee were utterly unrealistic; they were based both on faulty assumptions and on wrong calculations. The new régime would have to provide all the governmental services and subsidize economic activities which had till then been carried on by the people of Israel.

135. The Palestine Conciliation Commission, had reached the conclusion that if Jerusalem were to be a separate territorial entity, it would require an annual expenditure of 20 to 30 million dollars for the maintenance of governmental and public services. In actual fact it was estimated that the Government of Israel, which had already administered the greater part of Jerusalem for the past year and a half, had provided in its annual budget the sum of 28 million dollars for the city. That sum included the financing of services and of public expenditure, but did not include the municipal budget which, in the current fiscal year,

was about 4 million dollars. Those figures did not include expenditure by voluntary agencies on maintenance of health and social and religious institutions.

136. The General Assembly had to deal with a very intricate and delicate fabric, one which faced the danger of disruption in the event of a major political crisis, such as the imposition of complete international rule seemed likely to produce, since there the General Assembly was not dealing with a State or Government which might supposedly be brought to book by international influence or pressure. It was dealing with a population which would simply refuse to obey or acknowledge the existence of someone sent to rule over it from afar, which did not constitute a corporate body and was subject to no international obligations. It existed, however, and was capable of making its will effective.

137. Assuming, nevertheless, that the Trusteeship Council proceeded to the selection of a Government, could the United Nations seriously expect any self-respecting citizen of the world of adequate standing and competence to assume that task? The Assembly should try to imagine the position of such a representative, exposed to the indignity of being simply ignored by the population and standing before them helpless, without any means of enforcement.

138. Two values of world significance were at stake: the authority of the United Nations and the fate of the Holy Places. The prestige of the United Nations was bound to suffer a severe setback if an attempt to carry out the draft resolution failed, as it must fail. The Holy Places would remain unprotected if the existing authority was removed and no other substituted. By trying to assert international authority in an exaggerated measure, which bore no relation either to the actual needs or to the practical possibilities, the sponsors of the draft resolution would achieve only the opposite of what they sought and incur grave responsibility both for undermining the authority of the United Nations and for neglecting its sacred trust.

139. A determined effort must be made to arrest such a fatal course. The international régime was a means to an end, not an end in itself. It had originally been invoked as a method for ensuring the protection of the Holy Places and the religious associations of Jerusalem; that purpose remained the substance of the matter. Even the régime laid down in resolution 181 (II), including its cardinal principle of *corpus separatum*, had not been intended by the authors of that resolution to remain sacrosanct and everlasting. The resolution had expressly provided for its eventual revision and had envisaged a referendum to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants as to the future government of the city.

140. The changes in the situation in Jerusalem, which could be neither undone or ignored, in no way militated against the institution of an effective international régime for the Holy Places. That régime, to be practicable, must be based on two main principles; first, the Holy Places must be placed under a permanent supervision of the United Nations; secondly, the Government concerned, while retaining full executive authority, must accept that international prerogative and undertake to co-operate with the United Nations

organ charged with its execution. But in order to make such a constructive approach possible, the obstacle formed by the resolution must be removed. The opportunity of solving the problem once and for all must not be sacrificed for the sake of a mere demonstration which would come back on the United Nations with boomerang effect. The international Organization must not give up the good will of the national community. Nor should that community be exempted from its responsibility by the fact that its offer had been rejected and a régime contrary to its conscience enforced. The national and the international interests could and should be synthesized. But they must both be taken into account, and the one could not and must not be sacrificed to the other.

141. The representative of Lebanon would have Jerusalem constitute a kind of museum, a university, a place where men would have to live by the spirit alone, by the word of God. The representative of Israel, however, while cherishing the spiritual associations of Jerusalem, knew that it was a city full of people and of life, and knew that no culture, no spiritual activity could flourish if it were not firmly rooted in an enduring and productive social and economic structure. The representative of Israel had spent decades of his life in Jerusalem, had witnessed the hard struggle of an immigrant community to strike roots and make good, and had seen the remarkable spectacle of economic, social, cultural and spiritual values develop and flourish.

142. The interests of the United Nations, of the Holy Places and of Jerusalem all united to urge the course which he had indicated. Jerusalem appealed to the General Assembly to spare it further ordeal, not to disrupt its life, re-established at the cost of so much sacrifice, but to enable it in freedom and dignity to continue its work, of reconstruction, to fulfil its historic destiny and to serve freely as a place of pilgrimage and worship to all who held it sacred.

143. At a decisive moment in Jerusalem's destiny, the people of Israel recalled the words uttered in Jerusalem at another solemn moment in its history: "For Zion's sake will I not hold my peace, and for Jerusalem's sake I will not rest, until the righteousness thereof go forth as brightness, and the salvation thereof as a lamp that shineth."

144. Mr. THORS (Iceland) remarked that the delegation of Iceland had not had the opportunity to participate in the debate in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on the matter of the international régime for the Jerusalem area and the protection of the Holy Places in Palestine.

145. It had become clear in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and the General Assembly that the two States concerned, Israel and Jordan, were opposed to the proposal of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, which was likely to make its implementation difficult. The United Nations would thus have to impose that solution on the States in control of Jerusalem and on the people living within that City and the United Nations did not at the moment have the forces nor the strength to impose its decision on any State or any groups of people.

146. In the opinion of the Icelandic delegation, the adoption of the resolution presented by the

Ad Hoc Political Committee would add to the number of impracticable resolutions which only produced deception and invited trouble. The main objective should be to secure the protection of the Holy Places. Free access to them was the sacred desire of people all over the world. That ideal could best be achieved by approving the international control of the Holy Places as outlined in the proposal of the Netherlands and Swedish delegations. The General Assembly would then be dealing realistically with the matter and simultaneously would be preserving the ideal of the protection of the Holy Places.

147. He advocated adoption of the Swedish-Netherlands resolution which seemed to be the only solution which might lead to conciliation between the parties concerned and thus safeguard the Holy Places and ensure peace in the Holy Land.

148. Rather than approve a resolution which could only bring trouble and weaken the authority of the United Nations, the General Assembly might wisely consider postponing its decision on the matter until some later date. Time had solved many difficult problems in Palestine and cured many wounds.

149. Mr. RODRÍGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay) said that it was still possible to find a solution that would satisfy everyone. It was still possible to set up an international régime for the Holy Places in Palestine and to serve the rights and religious interests of believers.

150. He submitted on behalf of the Uruguayan delegation a joint draft resolution which had been seconded by the Danish delegation (A/1241).

151. He added that at the end of his previous statement he had taken the liberty of saying that a harmonious solution could be found to the problem of the Holy Places.

152. The door had been opened; much consideration had been given to the matter in the course of the discussion. He wondered whether there was any hurry, sufficient urgency, any time factor making it necessary for the resolution to be passed that very day and that very evening. The General Assembly could possibly meet again to study the problem and examine the various factors involved. He wondered what difficulty and what obstacle there was in the way of reconsidering the matter, taking it up again in its different aspects. That would make it possible to take opinions on the matter into better account with a view to lessening the opposition which had made the solution of the problem even more difficult.

153. There were men of good will who did not firmly believe that harmonious and peaceful solutions were possible when such delicate and fundamental questions as the one before the Assembly were being considered.

154. He felt honoured to submit on behalf of the Danish and Uruguayan delegations for the consideration of his colleagues—and he was using the word “consideration” in its broadest and fullest significance—the proposal for the Assembly’s decision.

155. The PRESIDENT recalled that the Lebanese representative had moved that the General Assembly should continue until it had finished with the

item under discussion. The motion for adjournment which had just been made, however, took precedence over the motion of the Lebanese representative under rule 64 of the rules of procedure.

156. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) challenged the President’s statement that the motion which had just been presented was a motion to suspend the meeting. The representative who had submitted that motion had had much more in mind than a mere suspension of the meeting. He had said that a special session of the General Assembly should be called. He had spoken on the substance of the matter.

157. Mr. Malik desired to go into the substance of the matter himself. Consequently while he left the whole matter to the judgment and sense of justice of the President, to which he fully deferred, if the resolution were to be put to the vote first as a motion to adjourn, he would request a roll-call vote and he appealed to the representatives to reject it.

158. The PRESIDENT explained that there were two parts to the draft resolution. Firstly, there was, according to the terms of the resolution, a motion to adjourn the debate on the item during the current session; secondly, it was proposed to hold a special session for further consideration of the item.

159. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) said that a motion to adjourn, according to the rules of procedure, did not refer to adjourning the debate on a certain item so far as the current session was concerned. According to the rules of procedure, debate could be adjourned until a later time in the same session but not until another session, without full discussion of the matter.

160. The first part of the draft resolution beginning with the words “considering that further consideration of item 18 (a) and (b) of the agenda is necessary before a final decision can be taken” was a substantive matter. How did the Assembly know it was necessary? The resolution went on to say “decides to adjourn the debate on this item during the present session of the General Assembly”. Nowhere did the rules of procedure declare such action permissible.

161. Had the Uruguayan representative contented himself with proposing the adjournment, pure and simple, that would have been quite in order and a vote could have been taken on the matter. But the introduction of considerations of a substantive nature was unfair and was not in accordance with the rules.

162. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) was disturbed to think that after two and a half years, during which the question of Palestine including the question of Jerusalem had been considered, no decision had been taken or implemented, particularly since the representative who was supposed to be more thoroughly acquainted with the matter had been the one to move adjournment. The Uruguayan representative had been sent by the United Nations to study the question in Palestine. The Commission of which he was a member had submitted a lengthy report on the basis of which the partition of Palestine had been decided with due provision for the internationalization of Jerusalem. That had been as early as 29 November 1947 and in December 1949 the Assembly was not

yet ready to say whether its decision would be implemented or abandoned.

163. The Assembly was seized of a very serious matter in which the entire world was deeply interested. The proposal submitted dealt with the matter lightly. The text had been drafted so hastily that, although the Uruguayan representative had stated that the Danish delegation was co-sponsor, there was no mention of that delegation.

164. He would vote against adjournment and protested against the tardy proposal submitted to the Assembly.

165. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) said he could not understand the motion for adjournment submitted by the representative of Uruguay, despite the value that might be attached to the Sub-Committee's proposal and to that of the Netherlands and Swedish delegations.

166. The matter had been discussed very fully and various opinions had been expressed. The question could hardly be left as it stood. Yet it was now being proposed that the Assembly should adjourn *sine die* without coming to any decision on the questions before the delegations. Mr. Chauvel thought such a solution was impossible.

167. It was clearly a case of adjournment *sine die*. The Secretary-General would be left completely free to discuss with Governments any date for the calling of a special session; it was not even stated that the special session should be convened within a certain period of time. Nor was any mention made of measures of conservation which could be taken on the spot. Nothing was said of certain aspects of the problem raised in various quarters. It was useless to labour the point, since everyone knew the rumours concerning possible developments on the spot.

168. Mr. Chauvel therefore did not think that the discussion could simply be postponed or that the Assembly could disregard that aspect of the question which would entail the adoption of measures of conservation to ensure that the situation on the spot did not deteriorate when the United Nations took no further action.

169. He could well understand a proposal to adjourn for a day or two, which would give delegations time to consider at greater length what the representative of Israel had said during the meeting. It was inconceivable, however, that a decision should be taken to discuss no further, at the present session, a question which had been so thoroughly examined.

170. Mr. RODRÍGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay) said, in answer to the surprise expressed by the representative of El Salvador, that he had been a member of the Special Committee on Palestine and that in his view the problem had not been considered in the light of all the experience gained from the Assembly's 1947 resolution 181 (II), the following resolution 194 (III), the discussions that had taken place, subsequent events, the fight in Palestine, etc. Because all those points had not been considered with due deliberation and reflection, the delegation of Uruguay together with the delegation of Denmark proposed that the debate should be adjourned in order to provide an opportunity for a closer study of the problem and a more suitable solution.

171. With reference to the surprise expressed by the French representative, Mr. Rodríguez Fabregat said that he himself had been surprised, since he had heard the French representative express grave doubts in connexion with the problem. He had asked three important questions, one of which was whether the United Nations could assume responsibility for the implementation of the proposed draft resolution. It was because those doubts and those questions had remained unanswered that the delegation of Uruguay was moving the adjournment of the debate.

172. Mr. LONDOÑO Y LONDOÑO (Colombia) intervened on a point of procedure. Rule 67, which had been invoked by the President in order to give the delegations of Denmark and of Uruguay an opportunity of submitting a motion after the discussion on the resolution before the General Assembly had already been closed, was more complicated than the President seemed to think. In order to interpret it, it was necessary to refer to rule 66, which said:

"During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the General Assembly, declare the list closed. He may, however, accord the right of reply to any member if a speech delivered after he has declared the list closed makes this desirable."

173. Closing the list meant closing the debate, which the President had done so conclusively and absolutely that he, Mr. Londoño, who had asked to speak, had been unable to do so.

174. Once the list had been closed and the debate concluded, as at that juncture, the next step was to take a vote. He quoted rule 67:

"During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the debate on the item under discussion. In addition to the proposer of the motion, two representatives may speak in favour of, and two against, the motion, after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote."

175. Mr. Londoño pointed out that the discussion had been concluded, since the speeches of the speakers on the list had ended and the only remaining business had been to vote on the resolution.

176. He moved, on a point of procedure, that it was impossible to admit the proposal of the Uruguayan representative or that of the French representative, should he submit one, or any other proposal, since the General Assembly should not allow such a generous interpretation of its rules of procedure.

177. Mr. HOOD (Australia) requested clarification regarding the procedural position in the light of the ruling by the Chair that the motion of the representative of France had precedence over that of the representative of Uruguay. The earlier ruling had been that the motion of the representative of Uruguay was a motion for adjournment and therefore took precedence over the motion of the representative of Lebanon. If the motion of the representative of France was also a motion for adjournment, according to the earlier ruling of the Chair the motion of the representative of Uruguay would surely have to take precedence in the vote.

178. The PRESIDENT replied that the motion of Uruguay was to adjourn the debate on the item under discussion, whereas the French motion was to adjourn the meeting. In accordance with rule 70, a motion for the adjournment of a meeting took precedence over a motion for the adjournment of the debate on the item under discussion.

179. He then put to the vote the motion to adjourn the meeting until the following morning.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Greece, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Iceland, Israel, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Thailand, United States of America, Uruguay, Canada, Denmark, France.

Against: Greece, Haiti, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia.

Abstaining: Guatemala, Honduras, India, Iran, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic.

The motion was rejected by 34 votes to 14, with 11 abstentions.

180. The PRESIDENT proposed to put the Uruguayan draft resolution (A/1241) to the vote as a whole.

181. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) stressed that the proposal could not be put to the vote as a whole. The text would have to be thoroughly discussed, since there was a considerable amount of substance therein.

182. Furthermore, if it was decided to adjourn the debate on that item during the current session, it would mean simply that the item would be taken up again the following year, without any decision regarding how it would be handled. Those who had voted for the adjournment of the debate must understand that they were postponing the item for a year. He therefore appealed to the President not to put the whole text to the vote but only the simple statement concerning the adjournment of the debate.

183. Mr. GARCÍA BAUER (Guatemala) disagreed with the Lebanese representative. The Uruguayan proposal had been submitted as one single proposal and should therefore be voted on as a whole unless there was a request that it should be voted on in parts.

184. Mr. KAUFFMANN (Denmark) agreed that the proposal made by the representative of Uruguay and seconded by the representative of Denmark should not be put to the vote without discussion. The list of speakers had been closed but, as he understood the rules of procedure, that did not make it impossible for a delegation to submit amendments to proposals.

185. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) asked for an immediate vote on the Uruguayan proposal. He recalled that the representative of Lebanon had asked that the Uruguayan proposal be divided

into two parts. Mr. Castro presumed he would also be ready to see the whole proposal defeated, instead of seeing it defeated part by part.

186. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Uruguayan draft resolution as a whole.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Canada, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Guatemala, Iceland, Israel, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia.

Against: China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Abstaining: Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Paraguay, Turkey.

The resolution was rejected by 34 votes to 20, with 5 abstentions.

187. Sir Carl BERENDSEN (New Zealand) said that he would abstain in the vote on the proposals of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee because they contained no provisions for implementation. The New Zealand Government continued to support the principle that there should be an international régime in the Jerusalem area and that the proposals made by the Conciliation Commission offered the most reasonable measures for attaining that objective.

188. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the first part of the amendment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/1238/Rev.1).

The first part of the amendment was rejected by 43 votes to 5, with 8 abstentions.

189. The PRESIDENT then put to the vote the second part of the amendment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The second part of the amendment was adopted by 19 votes to 14, with 16 abstentions.

190. Mr. KYROU (Greece) recalled that the amendment just voted on had been submitted the previous day as a proposal to the Fifth Committee and had been rejected. He therefore feared that there had been some misunderstanding on what had been voted upon.

191. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) also did not clearly know what he was voting on. He therefore asked the President to put the amendment to the vote again.

192. He also requested that all subsequent votes taken that evening should be by roll-call.

193. General McNAUGHTON (Canada) drew the President's attention to rule 76 of the rules of procedure to the effect that decisions on budgetary questions had to be taken in the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority. The vote, as announced, had not represented a two-thirds majority.

194. The PRESIDENT pointed out that, if there had been any misunderstanding concerning the matter on which the vote had just been taken, there would be an opportunity to make any necessary adjustment the following day when the budget would be before the Assembly.

195. It had been requested that resolution I (A/1222) should be voted on in parts. He therefore put to the vote the first part of the draft resolution, comprising the preamble and paragraph 1 of section I down to and including the words "page 146".

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma.

Against: Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Guatemala, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia.

Abstaining: Chile, Honduras, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Thailand.

The first part of draft resolution I was adopted by 39 votes to 14, with 6 abstentions.

196. The PRESIDENT put to the vote point (1) of paragraph 1 of section I.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Belgium, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia.

Against: Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Guatemala, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia.

Abstaining: Chile, Honduras, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Thailand.

Point (1) of paragraph 1 of section I was adopted by 39 votes to 14, with 6 abstentions.

197. The PRESIDENT put to the vote point (2) of paragraph 1 of section I.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Norway, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nicaragua.

Against: Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Guatemala, Iceland, Israel, Netherlands.

Abstaining: Panama, Thailand, Chile, Dominican Republic, Honduras, New Zealand.

Point (2) of paragraph 1 of section I was adopted by 38 votes to 15, with 6 abstentions.

198. The PRESIDENT put to the vote point (3) of paragraph 1 of section I.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Australia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina.

Against: Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Guatemala, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia.

Abstaining: Chile, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Thailand.

Point (3) of paragraph 1 of section I was adopted by 37 votes to 14, with 8 abstentions.

199. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the first sentence of paragraph (2) of section I, down to the words: "approve the Statute".

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Iceland, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti.

Against: Iceland, Israel, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Guatemala.

Abstaining: Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Thailand, Chile, Dominican Republic, Honduras.

The portion of the sentence as read was adopted by 37 votes to 14, with 8 abstentions.

200. The PRESIDENT then put to the vote the remainder of the same sentence.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Belgium, having been chosen by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia.

Against: Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Guatemala, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia.

Abstaining: Chile, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Thailand.

The latter part of the sentence was adopted by 37 votes to 14, with 8 abstentions.

201. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the remainder of paragraph 2 beginning with the words "The Trusteeship Council".

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Guatemala, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa.

Abstaining: Chile, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Thailand.

The sentence was adopted by 37 votes to 14, with 8 abstentions.

202. The PRESIDENT put to the vote section II.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Yugoslavia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Yemen.

Against: Yugoslavia, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Guatemala, Iceland, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay.

Abstaining: Chile, Dominican Republic, Honduras, New Zealand, Panama, Thailand.

The paragraph was adopted by 38 votes to 15, with 6 abstentions.

203. The PRESIDENT finally put to the vote the draft resolution as a whole.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Haiti, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Haiti, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece.

Against: Iceland, Israel, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Guatemala.

Abstaining: Honduras, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Thailand, Chile, Dominican Republic.

The resolution was adopted by 38 votes to 14, with 7 abstentions.

204. The PRESIDENT announced that since the draft resolution dealing with Palestine had been adopted the draft resolution of the Netherlands and Sweden was superfluous and he would not put it to the vote.

The meeting rose at 8.20 p.m.