

there was another resolution, the one submitted by the Ukrainian SSR, which included all the basic prerequisites for the settlement of the problem in the spirit of justice and with due respect to the rights of self-determination of nations. That resolution called for the withdrawal of troops, the release of political prisoners and the establishment of a genuine United Nations commission. The resolution was not a recommendation, because it took into consideration the limited rights of the General Assembly in view of Article 12 of the Charter; it was an expression of the opinion of the General Assembly on a measure which it deemed essential for the solution of the problem.

99. The hypocrisy of the majority was shown by their formalistic attitude towards that resolution. They were prepared to vote and accept a resolution which welcomed a settlement of which they knew nothing, commended the parties for unknown contributions and agreed to the establishment of a State although there was no certainty of its being set up.

100. The majority did not apparently consider that action to be in contradiction with Article 12 of the Charter. And yet it had refused to permit

a vote on the Ukrainian SSR proposal in the Committee, a proposal which limited itself merely to an expression of opinion concerning the measures to be taken. That attitude spoke for itself.

101. The majority of the United Nations had done its best to lessen the authority of the United Nations and to support the invading forces against the Indonesian people. But there was still time to correct some of the grave injustices which had been done to the people of Indonesia, a people whose aspiration was national independence.

102. The Ukrainian SSR proposal afforded an excellent opportunity to redeem some of the sins previously committed. Its adoption might mark a new course in the approach to colonial problems and start a new era in solving international conflicts in the United Nations through genuine peaceful settlements, due regard being paid to basic principles of international law, to the obligations of the Charter and to the sacred right of self-determination of every nation in every country.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Wednesday, 7 December 1949, at 2.45 p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Question of Indonesia: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1208) (concluded)

1. Mr. ASTAPENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) recalled that the Indonesian question had been discussed very hastily in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee¹ and the necessary time had not been available for the study of the relevant documents, particularly those relating to the Round Table Conference. The only possible explanation was that the Netherlands colonizers and their protectors, whose hands were stained with the blood of the Indonesian people, were afraid to face the verdict of public opinion.

2. For over four years, the Netherlands colonizers and their Anglo-American masters had been openly waging a colonial war against the Indonesian people. The United Nations, and more particularly the Security Council, had not yet taken the necessary steps to put an end to the aggression and to protect the interests of the Indonesian people. The colonial Powers, headed by the United States and the United Kingdom, had resolutely opposed the adoption of every measure proposed by the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Poland. They had at the same time done their utmost to prevent the United Nations from playing any part in solving the Indonesian problem by referring it to a series of commissions, all of which were under the influence of the United States State Department.

3. One such commission had been known as the Consular Commission and had operated under the direction of Mr. Foote, a former United States consul at Batavia. While the Netherlands forces continued their military operations in defiance of the Security Council decisions, the Consular Commission had not only failed to take any steps in defence of the Republic but had even refrained from submitting objective reports on events to the Security Council.

4. The Consular Commission had been replaced by the Committee of Good Offices, later called the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. That Committee had in truth acted as a Committee of Good Offices for the Netherlands colonizers in their campaign against the national liberation movement of the Indonesian people.

5. The Netherlands Government had imposed the harsh *Renville* Agreement on the Republic of Indonesia in January 1948 with the active participation of the Committee of Good Offices. The Round Table Conference at The Hague, which had resulted in the conclusion of an agreement legalizing Netherlands colonial domination over Indonesia in the form of the so-called Netherlands-Indonesian Union, had also taken place with its active help.

6. The Indonesian people did not recognize the deal which the traitors in the Hatta Government had concluded with the Government of the Netherlands, with the complicity of the United Nations Commission. The Indonesian people continued to fight for their independence, and steps must be taken to secure the withdrawal of Netherlands forces to the positions they had held before

¹For the discussion on this subject in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc* Political Committee, 56th meeting.

the resumption of military operations in December 1948.

7. The reign of terror which the Netherlands occupation authorities had unleashed against the Indonesian people must also be brought to an end without delay.

8. It was common knowledge that, in its struggle against the national liberation movement of the Indonesian people, the Government of the Netherlands had enjoyed the strong support of the United States of America.

9. In May 1947, the Netherlands had announced that the Indonesian Republic was unwilling to cooperate in the establishment of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union and had sent the Republic an ultimatum, the acceptance of which would have been tantamount to the destruction of the Republic. That ultimatum had been supported by the United States Government which, through its consul at Batavia, had dispatched a note on 28 June 1947 to the Government of the Indonesian Republic recommending it to accept the Netherlands ultimatum unconditionally.

10. The United States had thus actively assisted the Netherlands in that matter because it was directly interested in the Indonesian question. In fact, the United States Government was anxious to transform the Republic of Indonesia into a so-called "independent" Government of the "Transjordan" type, so as to secure a dominating position for American monopolies in that country.

11. Mr. Astapenko gave some examples in support of his statements. Thus, yielding to United States pressure, the Hatta Government, which the Committee of Good Offices had helped to create, had concluded an agreement with the United States Fox Company, under the terms of which that firm would control all the Republic's domestic and foreign trade for a period of fifteen years.

12. Furthermore, out of 2,500 million dollars of foreign investments in Indonesia, more than 1,000 million dollars belonged to American monopolies, a sum which represented twice the value of British investments and two and one-half times the value of Netherlands investments.

13. At the moment, the enterprises of the Rockefeller group owned hundreds of oil wells and refineries in Indonesia. Finally, the American rubber plantations in Indonesia covered a million acres.

14. In September 1948, obeying the instructions of the United States representative in the Committee of Good Offices, the Hatta Government had, through *agents provocateurs*, started a revolt in Madioen designed to destroy the democratic organizations of Indonesia, particularly the trade unions. At the end of 1948, the Netherlands colonizers, who were under the absolute control of Wall Street and who considered that the Hatta Government, by exterminating the real combatants for Indonesian liberty, had prepared the way for the complete submission of the country, had launched a new armed attack against the Republic of Indonesia. That aggression had marked the opening, on a vast scale, of military operations which were still continuing.

15. In that colonial war, which they were waging against the Indonesian Republic, Netherlands

troops were using American tanks and aeroplanes of a recent type. According to the *Baltimore Sun*, the Netherlands had received from the United States of America war material to the value of 140 million dollars and, in particular, guns and artillery ammunition worth 16 million dollars, military aeroplanes worth 78 million dollars and warships worth 14 million dollars. Moreover, the Netherlands had received enormous financial aid from the United States. Everyone knew that without that aid the Netherlands could not have carried on the war against the Indonesian people.

16. Anxious to safeguard the interests of international peace and security, the USSR had proposed to the Security Council¹ that it should condemn the aggression committed by the Netherlands Government against the Republic of Indonesia, and that it should ask for an immediate cessation of military operations, the withdrawal of Netherlands troops to the positions they had occupied before December 1948, and the liberation of the President and other political personalities of the Republic. It had also proposed to the Security Council the establishment of a commission composed of all its members to supervise the execution of its resolution relating to the cessation of military operations and the withdrawal of Netherlands troops.

17. However, in place of that draft resolution, the Council had adopted a resolution² supported by the United States which, without condemning the Netherlands aggression, had recommended the cessation of military operations without indicating any time-limit and without stipulating that Netherlands troops should be withdrawn to their original positions. Sure of the support of its protectors, the Netherlands Government had not even considered carrying out that resolution. It was continuing hostilities against the Indonesian people.

18. The Republic of Indonesia, which had been established during the Indonesian people's fight for national liberation from Japanese imperialism and which had been recognized by several Governments, seemed to have the right to be defended by the United Nations. Unfortunately, it had not been granted such defence.

19. Only by adopting the draft resolution of the Ukrainian SSR (A/1209) could the General Assembly objectively and equitably solve the Indonesian problem, and only by adopting the measures proposed by that draft could the Assembly co-operate in re-establishing peace in Indonesia.

20. On the other hand, by adopting the draft resolution proposed by the majority of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the Assembly would only encourage the aggression committed against the Indonesian people by the Netherlands, with the backing of the United States and the United Kingdom.

21. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR would vote against the draft resolution proposed by the majority of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. It warmly supported the draft submitted by the Ukrainian SSR.

22. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that as far back as January 1946,

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Third Year, No. 134.

² See document S/1150.

when the United Nations had begun to deal with the Indonesian question, the Anglo-American bloc had made great efforts to dissimulate and justify the acts of aggression committed by the Netherlands Government in Indonesia. The position taken by the Anglo-American bloc in the Security Council had prevented the Council from taking the necessary measures to protect the rights and interests of the Republic of Indonesia. On the contrary, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had done everything in their power to help the Netherlands Government to suppress that Republic. Guided solely by their selfish considerations, they had used the Indonesian problem as a bargaining counter in their political manoeuvres and deals. As a result of the machinations of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, the Indonesian question had not been considered at the previous session of the General Assembly.

23. The military situation in Indonesia in 1948 had been characterized by the presence in that country of approximately 100,000 Netherlands troops, equipped with the latest types of American weapons. According to the *Baltimore Sun*, the Netherlands had received from the United States war material to the value of 140 million dollars; it had received 469 million dollars under the Marshall Plan; furthermore, in 1948 it was granted a loan of 354 million dollars by the International Bank. Those credits had enabled the Netherlands to spend over 436 million dollars on military operations in Indonesia in 1948.

24. Press reports showed that the assistance given by the United States to the Netherlands aggressors had been dictated by imperialistic considerations and was intended to enable American monopolies to lay their hands on the principal resources of the Republic of Indonesia.

25. The United States of America controlled nearly all Indonesian petroleum resources. It had also obtained possession of vast rubber plantations. Furthermore, it controlled the production of tin, lead, nickel, copra, tea and so forth.

26. The interests of American monopolies in Indonesia had determined the position taken by the United States delegation in the Security Council and had constituted the fundamental reason for the Security Council's inability to take effective measures to put an end to Netherlands aggression and to protect the interests of the Indonesian people.

27. It was not the *Cominform* that bore the responsibility for the sufferings of the Indonesian people, as Mr. Austin had alleged for propaganda purposes. The *Cominform* was in no way concerned in the events that had taken place in Indonesia and the real guilt lay with Wall Street, which had grasped the resources of Indonesia and did not wish to grant freedom and independence to the people of that country.

28. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, who regarded Indonesia as a strategically important source of raw materials, were trying to conceal and support the aggressive machinations of the Netherlands Government against the Republic and people of Indonesia. Although the activities of the Netherlands aggressors had jeopardized the existence of the Republic of Indonesia and the freedom of its people and

although they had given rise to a threat to peace and security in that area, the Anglo-American majority had succeeded in having the Indonesian question removed from the agenda of the third session of the General Assembly and had made every effort to prevent the Security Council from reaching an effective decision. At the proposal of the United States delegation in the Security Council, the territory of the Republic of Indonesia had been reduced to the town of Jogjakarta and the surrounding district.

29. The periodical *Department of State Bulletin*, in its issue of 26 September 1949, had quite openly given the reason for the United States support of Netherlands aggression: it pointed out that the Netherlands was deriving between 200 and 300 million dollars annually from its investments in Indonesia. The same article showed that the United States of America intended to use the rich resources of Indonesia for the purposes pursued by the Marshall Plan and to transfer the profits that might be obtained from that country to the United States and to certain western European countries. Thus, an extensive programme of looting Indonesia in the interests of the United States of America, the Netherlands and other "Marshallized" countries which were members of the aggressive North Atlantic alliance had been drawn up and was already being executed.

30. At the fourth session of the General Assembly, on 3 December 1949, the Anglo-American majority in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had, without discussing the Indonesian question and without studying the relevant documents, adopted hastily a resolution thanking those who had participated in the Round Table Conference for their contribution to the conclusion of the agreements of The Hague and noting with satisfaction the establishment of the so-called "United States of Indonesia".

31. By that resolution, which had been forced upon the majority of the Committee, the Anglo-American bloc sanctioned The Hague agreements, tried to mislead world public opinion and alleged, without any justification, that the Indonesian question was settled and that the Indonesian people would again consent to be subjected to colonial slavery. The real picture was very different from that painted by the Netherlands colonizers and their abettors. The Indonesian people's struggle for its liberty and independence was continuing. The Netherlands had over 150,000 troops in Indonesia and another infantry brigade and six battalions were to be sent in 1950. The terror that had been let loose against the Indonesian patriots was still raging.

32. During the Round Table Conference at The Hague, harsh measures of repression had been taken against the democratic elements in Indonesia. That fact alone was enough to show that the Netherlands colonizers and their American protectors had used that Conference to re-establish their colonial rule in Indonesia. The representatives of the Indonesian people had not taken part in the Conference. The negotiations had been between the representatives of the Netherlands Government and the representatives of those claiming the title of the "Government of the Republic of Indonesia".

33. The representatives of the United States of America, who had helped the Netherlands aggressors in their war of conquest against the Indonesian Republic, had acted as mediators. Mr. Cochran had particularly distinguished himself on that occasion; nevertheless, it was impossible to call him anything save the executioner of the Indonesian people.

34. The agreements reached at the Round Table Conference were nothing but a bargain between the Netherlands colonizers and the traitors to the Indonesian people. On the pretext of setting up the "United States of Indonesia", those agreements provided for the parcelling out of the territory of the Indonesian Republic among a series of puppet States created by the Netherlands occupation forces in violation of the *Renville* Agreement, after their aggression of December 1948.

35. The correspondent of *The New York Times* had said on 22 August 1949 that thenceforward the Netherlands would attempt to replace its absolute control of Indonesia by a more subtle form of political and economic domination. Moreover, the afore-mentioned *Department of State Bulletin* had stated that after seizing the chief towns situated in Republic territory in December 1948, the Netherlands had proclaimed the formation of an Indonesian Government which they had set up beforehand and had appointed the leaders in the occupied areas of Indonesia.

36. The agreements reached at The Hague were designed simply to consolidate the successes won in Indonesia through aggression. As a result of those agreements, Indonesia would remain a colonial appendage of the Netherlands. The statute of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union provided that Indonesia would be subject to the Netherlands Crown. The Indonesian Government would have no independence either in domestic or foreign policy. It would not be able to conclude agreements with other countries without consulting the Netherlands Government. Nor would it be able to conclude trade conventions with third Powers and it would be forced to give guarantees to foreign business and in particular to the Netherlands companies, which had interests amounting to thousands of millions of guilders in Indonesia.

37. The agreements prolonged Netherlands military occupation in Indonesia for an unspecified period. In fact, on the pretext of being "transferred" to the Government of the United States of Indonesia, the military units would not leave the country. Moreover, the Netherlands Government was to maintain a permanent military mission in Indonesia.

38. The USSR delegation had never changed its attitude towards the Indonesian question. It had always demanded that the Netherlands troops which had spread over the territory of the Republic should be withdrawn, and that the Indonesian people should be able to decide their future themselves. As soon as the question of the Netherlands aggression had been submitted to the United Nations, the USSR delegation had asked that military operations should cease, that political prisoners should be freed, the Netherlands troops withdrawn and the rights of the Republic respected. The USSR delegation had made it clear that the Indonesian question could not be solved

in an equitable manner if the Netherlands troops did not return to the positions they had held in 1948 and if the *status quo ante* of the Republic were not restored.

39. Faithful to that attitude, the USSR delegation asked that instead of ratifying the bargain concluded between the Netherlands aggressor and the betrayers of the Indonesian people, the Assembly should recommend that the Netherlands troops should be withdrawn to the position they had held in 1948, that all Indonesians held in custody should be set free and that an end should be put to the régime of terror which the Netherlands occupation authorities had set up against the Indonesian people who were struggling for their freedom and independence.

40. The United Nations Commission for Indonesia should be dissolved immediately. It had completely discredited itself by its activities and had shown the world that it was protecting the Netherlands Government and helping it to strangle the Indonesian Republic.

41. The USSR delegation whole-heartedly supported the draft resolution presented by the Ukrainian SSR; it would vote against the draft resolution which was intended to kill the Indonesian Republic.

42. During his speech at the previous meeting, the representative of the Netherlands had been unable to deny a single one of the facts adduced by the Ukrainian representative. He had raised questions of procedure, that is to say, he had acted like someone who was running out of arguments. If procedure had to be mentioned, it could be recalled that when the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had been dealing with a draft resolution which, in fact, ratified the agreements of The Hague, the representative of the Netherlands had not said anything about the violation of procedure. By contrast, questions of procedure were raised when the General Assembly was being asked to decide on the fate of the Indonesian people who were struggling for their freedom and independence.

43. The Netherlands representative had asked the General Assembly to look ahead and not back. He had betrayed himself by that remark; he had shown that he was afraid to face the past, that that past consisted of four years of bloody war, of aggression by the Dutch against the people of Indonesia. For almost three years that campaign had proceeded with the connivance of the Committee created by the Anglo-American bloc and known under the name of the committee of three members. The Netherlands representative feared lest the General Assembly and the people of the world might look to the past. Therefore, he invited the world to look to the future, towards the mirage of the independence of the United States of Indonesia. That independence, however, was only a mirage because The Hague agreements granted the Indonesian people neither freedom nor sovereignty.

44. Mr. Austin, the United States representative, had said that the committee of three members had made a constructive effort. Some clarification was needed, Mr. Malik said. That committee, like the Anglo-American bloc on the Security Council, had worked constructively if one considered not that it had attempted to settle the Indonesian question but rather that it had attempted to snuff out the

life of the Indonesian Republic and to place the Indonesian people again under the colonial yoke of both the Netherlands and the United States.

45. All those struggling for international peace and security, all those who respected the provisions of the Charter could not fail to take the view that The Hague agreements were likely to give rise to fresh disputes and further threats to peace and security and that those responsible for that situation were the agents of Wall Street as well as the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc in the United Nations.

46. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) stated that his country had welcomed with great satisfaction the agreements concluded at the Round Table Conference at The Hague. His country was happy to have been associated, as a member of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, in the efforts which had led to that end.

47. The parties concerned had fully merited the General Assembly's congratulations, which were expressed in the draft resolution submitted to it. All those who had followed, even from afar, the negotiations at The Hague knew with what careful attention the representatives of Indonesia had seen to it that the sovereignty and independence of the new Republic of the United States of Indonesia had been fully ensured.

48. Criticisms had been made, however, in the General Assembly on the subject. Those criticisms, which were absolutely without foundation, might at first sight seem surprising when their sources were considered. They had been expressed, in particular, by the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR and by that of the Byelorussian SSR. Those delegations represented precisely populations which did not enjoy any of the fundamental prerogatives of a sovereign State and which certainly enjoyed fewer of such prerogatives than any dependent territory.

49. It must be admitted that that was a singular contradiction. But the explanation could be found in the fact that, in the Soviet States, the words "sovereignty and independence" had a meaning quite opposite to that which they had throughout the rest of the world. In the Soviet régime, those words meant, in reality, strict obedience to the decisions of the leaders of the Communist Party, who were at the same time the leaders of the Soviet State, and who, in that dual capacity, enjoyed almost unlimited powers.

50. That had been clearly revealed, in a particularly significant manner, by the conflict which had recently arisen in Eastern Europe and to which reference had been made on several occasions during the debates at the current session of the General Assembly. That conflict had emphasized the fact that the Soviet régime implied for other countries a subordination of their national interests to those of a foreign State, and led to an imperialism in comparison with which the colonialism of former times was only a mild phenomenon.

51. That was not the way in which the peoples of Indonesia understood independence, and they could only be congratulated on that fact. They must also be congratulated for having understood that their new State could only benefit from free co-operation, on a footing of equality, with other States, and especially with the Netherlands. Moreover, such international co-operation was in com-

plete harmony with one of the basic objectives of the United Nations.

52. In conclusion, Mr. van Langenhove stated that the Belgian delegation expressed its best wishes for the full success of the new State which was about to be established, and hoped that it would soon become a member of the great family of independent nations.

53. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1208).

The resolution was adopted by 44 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

54. The PRESIDENT drew attention to the Ukrainian draft resolution (A/1209), which had previously been submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

55. Article 12 of the Charter provided that the General Assembly could not make any recommendation with regard to a dispute or situation while the Security Council was exercising in respect of it the functions assigned to it in the Charter. The question of Indonesia was on the agenda of the Security Council. The General Assembly, therefore, could not make any recommendation on that subject, although there was no restriction on its power to discuss it. The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had decided, by 42 votes to 1, with 6 abstentions, that the draft resolution which it recommended in its report did not constitute a recommendation within the meaning of Article 12 of the Charter.

56. The draft resolution submitted by the Ukrainian delegation, however, appeared to be of a different character. It contained the phrases "to take the following measures", "to withdraw the Netherlands troops", "to demand that the Netherlands Government release the Indonesian political prisoners", "to propose the establishment of a United Nations commission" and "to dissolve the United Nations Commission for Indonesia". In his opinion, those phrases clearly constituted recommendations.

57. The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had also decided, by 42 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions, that that draft resolution did constitute a recommendation within the meaning of Article 12. It would, therefore, be possible to rule the Ukrainian draft resolution out of order; but that might entail a lengthy discussion on procedure and thus delay the work of the Assembly. Since the Assembly was at all times master of its own procedure, he would therefore request it to decide whether or not it was in favour of voting on the Ukrainian draft resolution.

58. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) noted with satisfaction that the resolution just voted upon did not constitute a recommendation, as had been decided at the meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. It was not a recommendation but, basically, it ratified the decisions of the Round Table Conference although none of the members of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee of the General Assembly knew what those decisions were. Mr. Manuisky was familiar with them because he was a member of the Security Council and had received the document. The other representatives, however, had voted in the dark. Thus, the resolution did not constitute a recommendation; legal experts would have to de-

cide exactly what it was. In the opinion of Mr. Manuisky, it was a document which bound no one. He wished to protest against the decision taken by the President that the proposal of the Ukrainian SSR should not be put to the vote. He cited Article 12. of the Charter, which declared:

"While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests".

59. The Indonesian question was of vital importance; an attempt was being made to crush a people numbering 70 millions. If the President or the Secretary-General, who were present, were to demonstrate a little good will, the question could be resolved in ten minutes; indeed, the Security Council could have asked the General Assembly to examine the problem, as had frequently been done before. But certain people were afraid to raise the question because they knew that in doing so they would place before the world a problem which would damage the reputations of numerous persons.

60. There was one solution to the situation, but Mr. Manuisky would not insist on that point. He would simply say that, as the first draft resolution had been voted upon, the draft resolution of the Ukrainian SSR should also be put to the vote. In fact, the latter draft, while not concerned with decisions taken at The Hague—which should be studied by the Security Council—did on the other hand deal with a problem the examination of which had been interrupted by the treacherous aggression committed by Netherlands troops on 18 December 1948. Mr. Manuisky recalled that at the opening of the fourth session of the General Assembly, the President had declared that it would be the peace session. Now that the proposals of the USSR on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the conclusion of a pact to strengthen peace had been rejected, Mr. Manuisky wondered what adjective could be applied to the fourth session. He personally would say frankly that, if the Ukrainian draft resolution were not put to the vote, the current session would go down in history as the session of the violation of the rules of procedure and of the United Nations Charter, of the violation of the most elementary rights of the Member States of the Organization.

61. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the proposal that the Ukrainian draft resolution should be voted upon by the Assembly.

The proposal was rejected by 33 votes to 5, with 12 abstentions.

Report of the Economic and Social Council: chapter II b—report of the Second Committee (A/1083); chapter III—report of the Third Committee (A/1069); chapters I, IV and VI—report of the Joint Second and Third Committee (A/1107); chapter VII—report of the Fifth Committee (A/1193)

62. The PRESIDENT considered that it would be appropriate to take up the four reports simul-

taneously with a view to approving a brief resolution presenting the whole of the Economic and Social Council's report. He therefore declared the discussion open.

63. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) said that the Second, Third and Fifth Committees had studied the annual report of the Economic and Social Council; it had also been studied by the Joint Second and Third Committees and by the last two Committees in a joint meeting with the Fifth Committee. All those Committees in a joint meeting with the Fifth Committee. All those Committees had recommended that the General Assembly should take note of the report.

64. The reason for that recommendation was simple. The most important points of the report, concerning the activities of the Council in the field of economic development, technical assistance, full employment and other matters, had been dealt with separately, and the Assembly had adopted important resolutions on them.

65. The delegation of Chile felt that the General Assembly should express its satisfaction with the work accomplished during the past year by the Economic and Social Council. The Assembly should acknowledge that the work of the Economic and Social Council had been of special importance during that year, and that it had been of particular benefit to the countries of Latin America. Mr. Santa Cruz mentioned in that respect the technical assistance missions which had been sent to Venezuela, Haiti, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and to his own country. He also mentioned the fellowships which had been granted under the resolutions on technical assistance in the field of social welfare and economic development, the seminars on those problems, the aid to the victims of the earthquake in Ecuador, the examination of specific problems such as the chewing of the coca leaf in Bolivia and Peru, the work of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, and the studies and technical assistance of the specialized agencies.

66. The delegation of Chile felt that the programmes of technical and financial assistance to the under-developed areas should, both in their economic and in their social aspects, attain considerable proportions in the coming years.

67. The delegation of Chile had constantly insisted, in the United Nations, on the imperative need for international collaboration in the economic and social field as an essential element for the peace of the world. The Economic and Social Council had proved that it could successfully carry out the great mission with which it had been entrusted under the Charter, and its success should be brought to the attention of the people of the world, who heard so much of the failures of the United Nations.

68. The Governments of Member States, in particular those with the greatest influence in world economy, should carry out the Economic and Social Council's plans and recommendations, which would be of no avail if those Governments did not give them their strong support. International co-operation, if limited to the sessions of the United Nations organs, would be a mere fiction.

69. The delegation of Chile was convinced that the Economic and Social Council and its substi-

diary organs would continue to follow the successful path of recent times, that it would concentrate on essential questions, and that, in the coming years, it would be able to submit to the General Assembly and to the world concrete and pertinent achievements, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the programme of technical assistance in the economic field.

70. In conclusion, Mr. Santa Cruz proposed that the recommendations of the various commissions relating to the several chapters of the report of the Economic and Social Council should be covered by a single resolution, which would read:

"The General Assembly

"Takes note of the report of the Economic and Social Council."

71. The PRESIDENT put the Chilean proposal to the vote.

The proposal was adopted by 48 votes to none.

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945 and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations: report of the First Committee (A/1215)

72. Mr. PANYUSHKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that on 25 November 1949 his delegation had informed the First Committee¹ that it would ignore any decision taken on the false complaint lodged with the United Nations by the representative of the Kuomintang.

73. During the consideration of the question in the General Committee,² and later in plenary meeting,³ the delegation of the Soviet Union had shown that the proposal by the representative of the Kuomintang represented a calumny and a challenge; indeed, nobody could say that the USSR was threatening the political independence and territorial integrity of China, or the peace in the Far East. Nor could there be any question of violation by the Soviet Union of the United Nations Charter.

74. The USSR delegation had stressed ever since that the question had been raised simply to divert public attention from the historical events taking place in China as a result of the Chinese people's victory after its long struggle against internal reaction and the yoke of foreign imperialist capital.

75. The USSR delegation had already informed the United Nations that it supported the statement sent to the President of the General Assembly by the Government of the Chinese People's Republic, to the effect that the latter did not recognize the right of the delegation headed by Mr. Tingfu Tsiang to represent the Chinese people and to speak in its behalf in the United Nations.

76. The USSR delegation considered that the Chinese delegation present in the Assembly Hall

had no powers, as it did not represent the Chinese people. It considered that the United Nations was not called upon to examine the alleged complaint submitted by the former Chinese Kuomintang Government. Such action would give a certain importance to the fictitious representatives of an equally fictitious Government which no longer exercised any power in China, except in a strip of territory the liberation of which might be a matter of only a few days.

77. The Kuomintang complaint was a manoeuvre to conceal the true causes of the failure of the Chinese militarist clique. It was known that the complaint had been lodged with the support of certain delegations led by the United States and the United Kingdom delegations. That fact constituted another blow to the prestige and dignity of the United Nations.

78. For all those reasons the USSR delegation declared once more that it would have no part in the discussion of a question submitted by the Kuomintang delegation, a delegation divested by its people of all its powers. The USSR delegation repeated that it would take no heed of any decisions which might be adopted in that regard.

79. Mr. ZEBROWSKI (Poland) announced that the Polish delegation would not take part in the debate because it believed the matter to be a political provocation from a Government which had practically ceased to exist and which had no right to represent the Chinese people.

80. Members who were anxious to vote for the draft resolution would perhaps be pleased that the Polish delegation and some other delegations would not take part in the debate, because if they did take part, the debate might last a day longer and the Kuomintang Government might have ceased to exist anywhere except on Formosa, under the protection of the United States.

81. Mr. DE DIEGO (Panama), Rapporteur of the First Committee, presented the report of the First Committee on the matter under discussion (A/1215).

82. Some delegations had abstained from taking part in the consideration of the subject. Nevertheless the Committee had approved the two draft resolutions which appeared at the end of the report.

83. Mr. DURÁN BALLÉN (Ecuador) requested the adjournment of the debate so that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution could confer on some extremely important developments.

84. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) wondered whether the Ecuadorean representative would consent to changing his motion for adjournment to a motion for a brief recess.

85. Mr. DURÁN BALLÉN (Ecuador) accepted the suggestion of the United States representative.

The meeting was suspended at 4.25 p.m. and resumed at 4.50 p.m.

86. Mr. TSIANG (China) said that, before discussing the substance of the item, he wished to comment on the remarks made by the representatives of the USSR and Poland, who had tried to insinuate that his delegation did not represent the people of China. A puppet régime had been set up in Peiping and had sent a cablegram to the

¹For the discussions of this subject, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, First Committee, 277th, 299th, 338th to 344th meetings inclusive.*

²*Ibid., General Committee, 67th meeting.*

³*Ibid., Plenary meetings, 223rd, 226th, 227th, 229th, 230th, 272nd, 273rd meetings.*

General Assembly challenging the authority of his delegation. The question before the Assembly was not whether his delegation had authority, but whether there had been any authority behind that cablegram. It had been sent by someone called Chu En-lai, who stated that he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the so-called People's Central Government. Who had made him Minister of Foreign Affairs and who had set up that Government? It had not been elected by the Chinese people and there was thus no authority whatever behind the puppet régime in Peiping.

87. The Government that Mr. Tsiang represented was based on a Constitution which had been adopted two years previously by the representatives of the Chinese people. It was led by a President and a Vice-President, both of whom had been elected by the representatives of the people. The legislature, to which the executive was responsible, was made up of more than 700 members, each of whom had been elected by popular vote.

88. It would therefore be fantastic to allow the puppet régime in Peiping, none of the members of which had been elected by the people of China and none of the laws of which had popular sanction in the country, to challenge the authority of his delegation.

89. Turning to the First Committee's report, he referred to the two draft resolutions therein. Draft resolution I had been sponsored jointly by the delegations of Australia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines and the United States. He had no doubt that, in making their proposal, those five delegations had been animated by the best motives both with regard to the principles of the Charter and to the interests of China. On behalf of his Government, he thanked those five delegations for their proposal. He had stated several times in the Committee that the draft resolution was good as far as it went but that it did not go far enough. Nevertheless, the draft resolution had been adopted by an overwhelming majority in the First Committee and it did embody some incontestable principles, fully in line with those of the Charter. In the years to come those principles might be of great service to China and to the cause of peace in the Far East, as they had already been in the past. He would therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution, while regretting that it did not go further.

90. Draft resolution II was procedural in character. It had been submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru, and two amendments proposed by the delegations of Lebanon and Uruguay had been incorporated into the text. He thanked those five delegations on behalf of his Government. The draft resolution did not commit the General Assembly to any particular policy and it passed no judgment on the substance of the matter. All it did was to direct the Interim Committee to study further the accusations made by his delegation against the USSR Government and to report, with recommendations, to the fifth session of the General Assembly, or to the Secretary-General so that he could, if necessary, request the Security Council to take action.

91. In the course of the discussions in the First Committee, he had felt that the representatives were profoundly disturbed by the gravity of the charges he had made against the Soviet Union.

Although he had placed before the Committee irrefutable evidence of the USSR violations of the Treaty and of the Charter, the complicated nature of the problem, as well as the length and fullness of his statement, had embarrassed the members of the Committee. On 1 December 1949, therefore, he had suggested that, since the question involved many points of law, it might well be referred to the International Court of Justice—a suggestion that had already been made previously by the representative of the United States. He had even gone further and had stated that his Government would accept any other mode of international settlement of the question. He had also suggested that his other charges, which did not involve points of law, might well be referred to the Interim Committee for further study and report. The draft resolution submitted by the three delegations was thus strictly in harmony with his own suggestions.

92. The USSR and its associates had chosen not to participate in the debate, either in the Committee or in the plenary meeting. In the opinion of his delegation, such a decision was a violation of the obligations of the Charter as well as of the resolution adopted recently (261st meeting) on the essentials of peace. Nevertheless, that refusal to participate might make some delegations reluctant to pass judgment on the matter. He respected those moral scruples and that was why he had suggested that the question should be referred to the Interim Committee and had also accepted the draft resolution.

93. A misunderstanding had unfortunately arisen during the debate on draft resolution II. He had understood that the aim of the Philippine amendment had been to limit the discussion in the Interim Committee to the principles of draft resolution I. If that had been the case, the Philippine amendment would have prevented any discussion of the charges which he had made in the Committee, while he felt that they were of such a serious nature that they could not be shelved. Hence he had opposed the amendment in question.

94. Since then, however, he had been informed that he had misinterpreted the aim of the amendment which was to widen the scope of the discussion so that the Interim Committee could examine not only the charges he had made, but also study and report on any violations of the principles of draft resolution I. He would support any amendment empowering the Interim Committee to study such possible violations.

95. He had hoped that the General Assembly might go further than the two draft resolutions and that the General Assembly would solemnly censure the Soviet Union for violating the principles of the Charter and the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1945, that it would urge all Member States not to give military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists and not to accord diplomatic recognition to any régime they might set up. Finally, he had also hoped that the General Assembly would make China's political independence and territorial integrity the common cause of the world.

96. Those were the hopes he had voiced before the Committee; they remained the hopes of his Government and of his people. Clearly, the elementary duty and self-interest of Member States demanded that they should bar any military or

economic aid to the Chinese Communists. There could be no justification either in law or in political considerations for approving or condoning material or moral aid to the Chinese Communists.

97. Governments contemplating diplomatic recognition usually argued that recognition did not mean approval. It was immaterial whether such a view was technically sound: for most people recognition did mean approval. Diplomatic recognition of the Chinese Communists would undoubtedly enhance their prestige in China and the Far East and consolidate their power. It would be the greatest blow to the cause of freedom in China and, eventually, to the cause of freedom everywhere. Some Governments wished to safeguard their commercial interests in China. There was, however, need for some sense of proportion. As opposed to the commercial interests of some countries, the Chinese had their whole future at stake. He did not believe that commercial interests should be allowed to jeopardize the fate of 450 million people.

98. From the purely practical point of view, recognition of the Chinese Communists would be a short-sighted action. He could not imagine that any foreign investments in China would be secure so long as the Chinese Communists remained in power. His delegation was very disappointed that some countries hesitated to call upon the nations of the world to refrain from granting recognition to the Chinese Communists. Those who hoped to benefit from such recognition would be the very victims of that act.

99. Furthermore, his delegation had hoped that the General Assembly would pronounce moral judgment against the Soviet Union. He had shown in the Committee that the Soviet Union had violated the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945. No evidence whatever had been advanced to disprove his accusations. The President of the United States himself had told the joint session of Congress on 17 March 1948 that one nation had "persistently ignored and violated agreements which could have furnished a basis for a just peace". The State Department of the United States had transmitted to the Senate a detailed list of violations of agreements by the Soviet Union, which were set forth in Senate Report No. 1440. The following instances concerned China:

"1. Industry, in the three eastern provinces also known as Manchuria, was directly damaged to the extent of \$858,000,000 during Soviet occupancy. The greatest part of the damage to the Manchurian industrial complex was primarily due to Soviet removals of equipment.

"2. The Chinese Government has failed to receive from the USSR since August 14, 1945 the promised military supplies and other resources, and when the Russian troops withdrew from Manchuria, Chinese Communists in that area appeared with Japanese arms in various substantial quantities. The natural assumption is that they were taken with the acquiescence at least of the Russians.

"3. Chinese Nationalist troops attempting to enter Manchuria subsequent to the Japanese surrender were denied the right to land at Dairen by the Soviet authorities there and were forced to utilize less advantageous landing-points. Due in

large part to Soviet obstructionism, China has up to the present been unable to establish a Chinese Government administration in Dairen."

100. Despite such irrefutable evidence several delegations, including the delegation of the United States, were reluctant to censure the Soviet Union. Those countries should remember the tragic consequences of the League of Nations' failure to implement its Covenant in connexion with the Manchurian and Ethiopian crises.

101. The rise of fascist imperialism had been responsible for the Second World War. Peace was at the moment threatened by communist imperialism; China was the first victim of that new diabolical imperialism. The members of the Assembly knew, however, that it would not be the last.

102. During the current critical phase in the history of the world, all the forces of the world should be marshalled to stamp out, at the very beginning, the manifestations of that new imperialism which would surely destroy peace and, with it, much of the civilization which peoples in all parts of the world had built up in the course of centuries.

103. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) said that after the long discussion in the First Committee on the preceding day, two draft resolutions had been adopted: one submitted jointly by Australia, the United States of America, the Philippines, Mexico and Pakistan and the other by Ecuador. The latter resolution had originally been submitted as an amendment but was virtually a separate resolution.

104. As approved, those were the draft resolutions adopted by the First Committee concerning the item submitted to the General Assembly by the Chinese delegation.

105. The item had constituted a serious charge against a Member State since it involved the violation of an international treaty and of the principles embodied in the Charter.

106. After the two draft resolutions had been voted separately and in view of the substantial majority obtained by the draft resolution submitted jointly by five delegations and the draft resolution submitted jointly by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru, the sponsors of the latter resolution felt it advisable to try for better co-ordination between the two draft resolutions in order that the final draft to be adopted by the General Assembly should cover all the major aspects of the serious charges. Accordingly, in order to obtain the widest possible support, the delegations of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru had decided to submit an amendment (A/1221) to the draft resolution they had sponsored. They proposed that in the operative paragraph of draft resolution II, the words, "and any charges of violations of the principles contained in that resolution" should be added after the words "Decides to refer that item".

107. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) pointed out that one thing which had stood out clearly in the debates in the First Committee had been the strong friendship of the overwhelming majority of nations for China and their concern for the welfare of the people of China. Those debates had also revealed the determination of the overwhelming majority, as shown in the

adoption of the resolution on the promotion of the stability of international relations in the Far East, to do their part to maintain China's integrity and independence.

108. In sharp contrast to the attitude of the vast majority in the First Committee had been the attitude of the delegation of the Soviet Union and of the small group of delegations following its lead. Their attitude strengthened the justified suspicions of other nations regarding the policy and intentions of the Soviet Union towards China. Their attitude had revealed two things particularly: first, a callous disregard for the interests of China and the Chinese people; and, secondly, a renewed indication of the most regrettable unwillingness of the Soviet Union to co-operate in the work of the United Nations and to carry into effect the principles of the Charter. It was appropriate to review the actions of the delegation of the Soviet Union in connexion with the item under consideration.

109. Its first action had been to oppose the placing of the item on the agenda, in order to deprive the General Assembly of an opportunity even to study the matter. Its second action had been an attempt to deny the right of the duly accredited representative of China to speak in the General Assembly. The delegation of the Soviet Union was not unaware of the existence of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. It had, on frequent occasions, invoked those rules.

110. If it had chosen to abide by the rules of procedure, it would have found in rule 25 the exact way in which the point might have been raised in a regular fashion but the Soviet Union had not chosen to follow the procedure laid down.

111. Thirdly, the Soviet Union had failed to respond to the expressed willingness of the Chinese delegation to refer certain questions to the International Court of Justice. Fourthly, the Soviet Union had refused to participate in the debates in the First Committee and had just said that it refused to participate in the debates in the plenary meeting. Normally, most Members of the United Nations were willing to discuss items on the agenda.

112. The Soviet Union had placed on the agenda an item containing slanderous attacks upon the United Kingdom and the United States. Those attacks had been repudiated, after full discussion, by a vote of 53 Members at the 261st session. In the first instance, however, when the Assembly had been asked to consider placing the item on the agenda, the United States delegation and the delegation of the United Kingdom had made no objection to the consideration of the item, because they believed that the Assembly was the forum in which charges, no matter how unfounded, should be discussed.

113. His Government had not been afraid to have the record of the United States policy in China in recent years examined by the world. The official United States publication telling that story had been referred to by Mr. Vyshinsky himself, who had stated that its frankness must be admired. If the Soviet Union admired frankness and open discussion of national policies, why did it not practise frankness? Why did it not publish or produce before the General Assembly

the text of the barter agreement which, according to the representative of China, the Soviet Union had concluded with the local authorities in Manchuria, an agreement under which the Soviet Union had sought an arrangement to take away from the people of China the food and other products of Manchuria which were essential to Chinese recovery? Why did it not publish or produce before the General Assembly the text of the reported monopolistic agreement which it had concluded for the exploitation of the resources of Manchuria, or the text of the reported agreement under which it sought to control, for fifty years, the monopolistic exploitation of the natural resources of Sinkiang, or the record of any other such agreements for special rights and privileges which it might be seeking to obtain or which it had already obtained in China?

114. If the Soviet Union had not been afraid to publish the facts concerning its policies and practices in the Far East, the Assembly could have had a basis on which to decide whether or not it was mistaken in its well-founded conclusions that current USSR policy in China was part of a continuous story, a story which had begun in the days of Tsarist Russian imperialism and which was still characterized by the search for special monopolistic privileges, by encroachments and by the attempted dismemberment of China.

115. The vote in the First Committee on the draft resolution to promote the stability of international relations in the Far East was most revealing. The Polish delegation, which more often than not reflected the view of the USSR delegation, had called for a separate vote on the title which included the words "promotion of the stability of international relations in the Far East". Five negative votes had been cast against the title. Those five negative votes could only be interpreted as the opposition of five delegations to stability in the Far East. Such an attitude was indeed in accordance with the communistic creed of promoting turmoil and unrest. The five negative votes on the rest of the resolution to promote the stability of international relations in the Far East must raise more questions in the minds of members.

116. It was quite possible that the Soviet Union did not intend or wish to respect the political independence of China or the right of the Chinese people freely to choose their own political institutions or to maintain a Government independent of foreign control. He wondered if the Soviet Union intended or wished to respect its treaties relating to China. Did it not intend or wish to refrain from seeking spheres of influence or the creation of puppet régimes, or from obtaining special monopoly rights in China?

117. Those were the points set forth in the draft resolution which he called upon all States to adopt; those were the principles which the USSR and four other delegations opposed.

118. In his opening statement before the First Committee, he had said that the failure to endorse the resolution might well be interpreted as indicating an intention to profit by the existing situation in China for purposes of imperialist aggrandizement. The world could hardly draw any other conclusion from the five votes cast against those fundamental principles.

119. The very fact of the Soviet opposition attested to the importance of the draft resolution. The Soviet opposition was proof that the USSR understood perfectly that the draft resolution, far from condoning the past actions of the Soviet Union in China, was occasioned by those very actions and reflected the acute fears of the international community of the continuation of the Soviet Union of Tsarist Russian imperialism in the Far East. The draft resolution went to the very roots of the international problem, and expressed the real concern that the international community felt regarding the situation.

120. The representative of Chile had pointed out in the First Committee that the General Assembly was not dealing with the question of the justice or injustice of the civil strife raging in China. The draft resolution dealt with all the international aspects of the problem. The draft resolution was constructive because it looked to the future. While it did not ignore the past, it did not content itself with a mere sifting of past events. It was a clear statement of the principles to which all nations must adhere at all times.

121. In the First Committee certain misunderstandings had arisen among various delegations with regard to draft resolution II.

122. He had listened with interest to the suggestion just advanced by the representative of Ecuador proposing, on behalf of the three sponsors of the original draft resolution, a new amendment which would incorporate an additional element in their joint resolution. While it was true that the amendment did not go the whole way in meeting the difficulties emphasized in the First Committee, he did feel that it went part of the way, and he would accordingly vote for the draft resolution if the amendment were adopted.

123. In the First Committee he had pointed out that the conscience of the world had expressed itself in the past in multipartite declarations, which had played a real part in the history of China's struggle for its integrity. The value of those declarations had been proved, even though from time to time they had been flouted by aggressors. The declaration made by the United States Government in 1900 concerning the policy of promoting the maintenance of the independence and integrity of China had served as a restraining influence on the conduct of all the Powers in the ensuing years, despite the continuance of unsettled conditions in China. Those principles had been written into the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, which, as the representative of China himself had stated, had given his country the opportunity for constructive development.

124. If the nations of the world had not, during the previous fifty years, entered into those unselfish agreements, the devouring waves of Russian and Japanese imperialism might well have totally engulfed China. The proper place for the reaffirmation of those principles was the General Assembly. The vote in the First Committee showed that the world would again speak in the interests of the people of China.

125. The debate on the item under consideration was in reality a continuation of the debate which had resulted in the adoption of the resolution on essentials of peace by a vote of fifty-three Members. The general charges made against the

policies and activities of the Soviet Union in that debate found a further specific application in the matter under discussion. Although attention was focused upon one geographical area, the fundamental problem was unchanged. It was the problem of maintaining an independent, unified and free country against the aggressive encroachments of a foreign Power. The resolution on essentials of peace applied to China as well as to all other parts of the world. That resolution and the draft resolution before the Assembly concerning the promotion of the stability of international relations in the Far East were closely linked. Together they constituted a code of conduct regarding the Far East. The United States pledged itself to abide by that code of conduct, and it expected all other nations to do likewise.

126. In joining with other delegations in sponsoring the draft resolution on the stability of international relations in the Far East, the paramount consideration of his delegation had been to promote the interests of the people of China. That was not a new policy for the United States. The record showed that that had consistently been its policy. That policy had received only one challenge, the charge by Mr. Vyshinsky that the proposal of the item had been instigated by the United States for imperialistic reasons. It had not been instigated by the United States. Moreover, the United States, unlike the USSR, had no imperialistic designs on China.

127. He wondered what evidence of United States imperialism in China Mr. Vyshinsky might have had in mind—surely not monopolistic agreements of the type which the Soviet Union had been concluding in China, for the United States had neither sought nor obtained such rights. The Chinese people would agree that there was nothing imperialistic in the continuation of the historic policy of aiding Chinese students and scholars by the allocation in recent years of 200 million dollars for the programme of exchanging students and teachers between the United States and China. The Chinese people did not believe that it was a sign of United States imperialism to distribute some 400,000 tons of rice and 180,000 tons of wheat and flour in Shanghai and Canton during the previous two years. Nor would they maintain that it was United States imperialism which had led to the supplying of cotton to keep the textile mills of China in operation so that the workers would not be unemployed and so that they would have wages with which to buy food and clothing.

128. Charges of United States imperialism could hardly be levelled against the joint United States and Chinese rural reconstruction programme, which had been launched in 1948 and had continued as long as possible in Szechwan and Chekiang, to improve rural living conditions, increase foreign output, and improve the social and educational position of the Chinese farmer. The United States neither desired nor claimed any monopoly in extending help to the people of China; his country had not been alone in extending help. Nor was it only in the previous eighteen months that the United States had sent food. It had done so also on earlier occasions when the people of China had been hungry. The rice alone which the United States had sent in 1948 and 1949 had meant that 10 million Chinese had had their rice bowls filled daily during that period.

129. In view of the vast problems facing that great population, what the United States had been able to do had been little enough, but in view of current food shortages in China, it contrasted favourably with the barter agreement recently concluded by the Soviet Union with local authorities in Manchuria, under which food was to be taken from the rice bowls of the Chinese people for shipment to the Soviet Union.

130. The United States would not cease its efforts on behalf of the people of China, nor would it cease, in the sphere of international relations and through the United Nations, to work for the real interests of China itself, for its independence and its integrity.

131. The draft resolution on the promotion of the stability of international relations in the Far East would unite the peoples of the free world in the promotion of that common objective.

132. Mr. CHAUDHURY (Pakistan) recalled that, when draft resolution II was being discussed in the First Committee, his delegation had abstained from voting for the very simple reasons that the words "that item" in the operative part of the draft resolution had considerably limited the scope of the problem. It had been limited to the extent that the entire draft resolution appeared to be an outcome of prejudice.

133. He warmly welcomed the amendment submitted, which focused attention on the four fundamental principles contained in draft resolution I.

134. The amendment had greatly improved the draft resolution, and, therefore, in spite of the fact that his delegation had abstained from voting in the First Committee, it would vote for the amendment and the draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Thursday, 8 December 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945 and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations: report of the First Committee (A/1215) (concluded)

1. The PRESIDENT stated that, no member having asked to speak on the item, he would put to the vote draft resolution I, entitled "Promotion of the stability of international relations in the Far East" (A/1215).

2. Mr. TARN (Poland) asked for a vote to be taken on the title.

3. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the title of draft resolution I.

The title was adopted by 18 votes to 4, with 4 abstentions.

4. The PRESIDENT put draft resolution I to the vote.

Resolution I was adopted by 22 votes to 4, with 3 abstentions.

5. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the amendment submitted by the delegations of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru (A/1221) to draft resolution II, entitled "Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945 and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations".

The amendment was adopted by 17 votes to 4, with 8 abstentions.

6. The PRESIDENT proceeded to explain that, in his opinion, draft resolution II was of a procedural nature from the beginning of the first paragraph as far as the word "recommendations"

in the last paragraph, the amendment being included. A simple majority would therefore be required. The last sentence, however, he considered substantive and a two-thirds majority would therefore be required for its adoption. He therefore proposed to put draft resolution II to the vote in two parts: the first part reading as far as the word "recommendations", and including the amendment; and the second comprising the remainder of the draft resolution.

7. He put to the vote draft resolution II, as far as the word "recommendations".

8. Mr. TARN (Poland) asked that the vote be taken by roll-call.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: United States of America, Uruguay, Bolivia, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Lebanon, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey.

Against: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen, Afghanistan, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, India, Iraq, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Sweden, Thailand.

Yugoslavia did not participate in the voting.

The first part of resolution II was adopted by 25 votes to 4, with 16 abstentions.

9. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) pointed out that in two of the votes the number of votes cast had amounted to 29 only; that did not constitute the necessary quorum. He would therefore ask the President to take that point into consideration and proceed if necessary to a further vote.