

## TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Wednesday, 30 November 1949, at 3 p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

### Condemnation of the preparations for a new war, and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace: report of the First Committee (A/1150) (continued)

1. Mr. STOLK (Venezuela) said that his delegation wished to explain the views it had expressed in the First Committee in order to answer the arguments advanced in that Committee by the representative of the USSR.<sup>1</sup>

2. The representative of the Soviet Union had stated that the Venezuelan delegation had opposed the adoption of the pact for the strengthening of peace before its contents were fully known in order to obviate discussion of the substance of the proposal. The USSR representative had then explained the pacific purposes of that pact. The Venezuelan delegation had drawn attention to a number of facts which had shown that the great Powers had failed, since the end of the war and the founding of the United Nations, to solve the larger political problems among themselves. The representative of Venezuela had added that it would be advisable that the text of the proposed pact should be known before a judgment was formed as to how far it was consistent with the Charter and likely to obtain the agreement of the great Powers.

3. A large number of recent occurrences had led the Venezuelan delegation to feel scant optimism as to the possibilities of agreement among those Powers on the pact proposed by the USSR; the speech made by the representative of that country had strengthened its pessimism. If the General Assembly were to recommend that such a pact should be concluded, the delegation of the Soviet Union might well insist upon the termination of the North Atlantic Treaty, while the delegations of the western Powers might perhaps want the text of the pact to be that of the joint United States and United Kingdom draft resolution adopted by the First Committee, concerning the essentials of peace, to which the USSR and the States which supported it were opposed. Thus disagreement between the Powers would continue as it had done previously.

4. The Venezuelan delegation had stated that it did not believe any Government or any people wished to begin an open war of aggression, and that it could not and did not believe that the Governments specifically accused had any such intentions.

5. The representative of the Soviet Union had also criticized the Venezuelan delegation for having stated that, even if the proposed pact were in fact signed, that would be no reason for the cessation of disputes between the great Powers. He had added that his Government wished the

permanent members of the Security Council to adhere to the pact precisely in order to settle the differences between them and could not conceive of such a pact becoming an impediment to the settlement of those disputes. The Venezuelan delegation had upheld the view that the settlement of disputes among the great Powers should be the prerequisite for the conclusion of a pact between them and had gone on to state that the Charter of the United Nations was the most appropriate international instrument for promoting co-operation between Member States.

6. The cause of international tension was reciprocal distrust, deepened by the existing differences between the great Powers. Even in the very improbable event of the latter agreeing on the text of the pact, the disputes would still remain. Furthermore, since it was virtually certain that they would not be able to reach such agreement, one more dispute would be added to those already separating them: The Charter, on the other hand, provided the best possible basis for the furtherance of international co-operation.

7. The Venezuelan delegation, therefore, had believed, when it had spoken in the First Committee, and still believed, that the existing disputes should be settled by means of the procedures laid down in the Charter rather than by the drafting of any pact. It had, therefore, supported the draft resolution which the First Committee had recommended to the General Assembly.

8. The Venezuelan delegation wished to repeat, in that connexion, its desire for the whole-hearted co-operation of all Member States; its conduct in the United Nations was proof of that desire. One of its most recent efforts had been the submission of a draft resolution to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee<sup>2</sup> during the debate on the question of continuing the Interim Committee. That draft, which had expressed the wishes of other delegations, had proposed the establishment of a sub-committee to study the powers which might be conferred on a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly in order to secure the participation of all Members of the United Nations in the said organ between the sessions of the General Assembly. But that draft had been strongly opposed by a group of States, despite the fact that it had represented a concession by several members of the majority to the minority formed by those States.<sup>3</sup>

9. It was undoubtedly useful for the great Powers to discuss matters together so as to find out the exact points on which they differed. Experience had shown, however, that such consultations could not by themselves bring about complete agreement concerning the liquidation of the consequences of the Second World War, or lead to

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Annex to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, document A/AC.31/L.5.

<sup>2</sup> For the discussion on this question, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, 19th and 20th meetings.

<sup>3</sup> For the discussion on this subject in the First Committee, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, First Committee, 325th to 337th meetings inclusive.

a solution whereby those Powers could live together on the basis of unity, good-will and effective international co-operation, as laid down by the Charter.

10. The Charter provided adequate methods for the solution of such differences. The Secretary-General had rightly pointed out, in the introduction to his annual report for the period from 1 July 1948 to 30 June 1949,<sup>1</sup> that in political disputes the United Nations had exerted powerful influences for conciliation and mediation.

11. The USSR representative had referred to a dispute between Peru and Bolivia, which he had said had been solved after sixty-six different compromise formulas had been considered. In actual fact, the dispute in question had been between Bolivia and Paraguay, not between Peru and Bolivia. The numerous attempted solutions referred to had not been the result of direct negotiation between the States concerned, but the fruit of patient efforts at mediation and conciliation carried out along the lines recommended in the United Nations by the Venezuelan delegation. The dispute had finally been settled thanks to those efforts. That showed how useful it was to assist the parties to a dispute when they did not seem able to solve it by themselves.

12. The Venezuelan delegation had mentioned the possibility of recourse to mediation and conciliation, not only in connexion with the problem of atomic energy but also with regard to disarmament and the question under discussion. In connexion with atomic energy, the delegation of Venezuela had put a specific question to the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission. Two replies had been received, but there had been no response from the Soviet Union.

13. Venezuela would therefore raise the same question once more. If it seemed doubtful that the great Powers could settle their differences in the regular manner through the General Assembly or other United Nations organs, or through consultation, perhaps they should try some new method.

14. Mr. Stolk would therefore reiterate his delegation's belief. In order to settle the differences between the great Powers, it would soon be essential—if it were not already imperative—to adopt the method of mediation and conciliation by persons with high moral qualifications, acting in their personal capacity without instructions from any Government, in the name of peace and security, and naturally on behalf of the United Nations, with the help of men of science and members of the Secretariat. The responsibility lay with those Powers to decide whether they were prepared to use that method in order to reach agreement and to put an end to the cold war.

15. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) said that both the western world and the Soviet Union were disavowing with equal fervour any aggressive intentions towards each other and passionately insisting that they only wanted to co-operate with one another. The world might well wonder what all the trouble was about. The root of the trouble was too much equivocation and not enough plain speaking. Words were no longer being used

merely to conceal thoughts but to lull opponents into a false sense of security.

16. It had been claimed that the USSR had never embarked upon a war of aggression and that, on the contrary, it had itself been the victim of aggression on two occasions. The General Assembly was asked to accept that as evidence of the current and future peaceful policy of the Soviet Union.

17. It had also been said that the United States had been drawn into wars against its will and hence in a state of unpreparedness, and that the original impulse of its people had been to keep out of war. Such an attitude had led to over-confidence and all its tragic consequences. The people of the Philippines had good reason to deplore the half-hearted and inadequate defence measures at Pearl Harbor before the Second World War.

18. The United States had learned its lesson the hard way and was determined never to make the same mistake again. Hence the ring of mighty bases encircling the globe, the emphasis on strategic bombing and the treaties and alliances with all friendly Powers willing to share the responsibility for common action in the event of an aggressive war.

19. Those preparations had been condemned by some as proof of the aggressive intentions of the United States. That was a distortion of facts. Yet, at the same time, it was not entirely accurate to say that those were preparations only for defence, and no more. They were preparations both for defence and counter-attack in the event of aggression by another Power. In modern warfare, no preparations for defence were good enough unless they could also be used immediately and effectively for counter-attack. The Philippines accepted the assurances of the United States and was satisfied that it would never use its military might except in defence of the free world. Furthermore, the Philippines hoped that the might of the United States would act as a deterrent to any aggressive Power.

20. On the other hand, the Philippines did not think that peace could be maintained forever by such precarious means. History showed that peace based solely on a delicate balance of power could only be temporary. The question of war and peace could not therefore be left to the hazards of a system of military checks and balances.

21. Peace could not come from the mere repetition of peaceful assurances, and it would be absurd to ignore the political realities which stood between intentions and actions. It was time for both sides to explore the possibility of co-existence and co-operation instead of merely talking about it. That should not be difficult once they realized that they had achieved a certain balance of power and that war could bring only untold disaster to all.

22. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said the discussion in the First Committee had shown that there were two schools of thought in the General Assembly which were diametrically opposed on the question raised by the draft resolution of the USSR (A/1149).

23. On one side stood those delegations which thought it essential to condemn the war-like preparations proceeding in many countries, and, par-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 1.

ticularly in the United States and the United Kingdom, to prohibit atomic weapons and other means of mass destruction and to conclude a new pact to strengthen peace. The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union expressed that view and was supported by the delegations of the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

24. Other delegations, by contrast, thought the draft resolution was pure propaganda, that there were no preparations for a new war and that no new world conflict was imminent. That was the point of view taken by the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, Chile, Lebanon, Canada, Peru, Cuba and many more.

25. At the 259th meeting, Mr. McNeil, the United Kingdom representative, had told the General Assembly that the USSR was unwilling to furnish particulars of its armaments and armed forces. That allegation was untrue. The Soviet Union had always been ready to give such information; on the contrary, it was the United States which did not intend to give any information on its stockpile of atomic bombs. The USSR thought it essential that information should be supplied on armaments and armed forces, including atomic bombs. It was ready to put its cards on the table, but the United States and the United Kingdom were not willing to do likewise.

26. Field-Marshal Montgomery, on the occasion of his recent visit to New York, had, as reported in the *New York Herald Tribune* of 30 November 1949, told an audience of 1,800 persons at the Waldorf Astoria hotel, that communism was a religion and that civilization was in danger because of the clash between the two world moral codes of communism and democracy. He had said that unless that danger was removed, great trouble could lie ahead. Moreover, in his capacity as one of the chief authors of the defence plans of western Europe, he had said that the fundamental problem was to undertake a crusade against communism. That was the most recent statement of the war-mongers.

27. Mr. McNeil had also alleged that the draft resolution of the Soviet Union contained nothing new and contributed nothing to the cause of peace. That allegation was equally untrue. Numerous letters, telegrams and Press and radio reports showed that the USSR draft resolution expressed the hopes of all men eager for progress, that it deeply affected the great masses of the people throughout the world and had the support of a mighty people's movement for peace.

28. It was generally admitted that all the peoples of the world hated war and were ready to exert every effort to foil the instigators of war and the enemies of peace. In spite of Mr. McNeil and other speakers who had addressed the General Assembly, the peace-loving peoples of the world had already come to regard the proposals of the Soviet Union as a programme designed to usher in world peace. The enemies of peace understood that situation and that was why they were using pacifist slogans to cloak their hatred of the USSR proposals and to be in a better position to slander the Soviet Union.

29. Their attitude was comprehensible. The USSR draft resolution recommended putting an end to the cold war, halting the armaments race,

discontinuing inflated military budgets and desisting from the formation of aggressive blocs. It also recommended the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons and the conclusion of a pact for the strengthening of peace which, by eliminating any possibility of a new war, would establish the prerequisites of a lasting peace.

30. Mr. Harold Laski, one of the most prominent members of the British Labour Party, had said, in an article published in the *Daily Compass* of 25 November 1949, that the world hegemony of the United States could be bought only at the cost of a new war which would be more terrible than the preceding one. The Soviet Union did not want war, Mr. Laski had continued; the time had therefore come for Mr. Acheson to ask his Government for a radical change in the policy of the United States. The current policy of the United States left no hope of peace, and in the next three years the United States and its allies would be obliged to rely on those same forces which the Allies had tried to destroy during the Second World War, namely, the fascists of western Germany. That was the opinion of Mr. Laski, who could hardly be suspected of sympathy towards the Soviet Union; that was the conclusion to which the United States' dream of hegemony led.

31. It was justifiable to ask why the United States did not wish to change its foreign policy; why the United States and the United Kingdom were opposed to the establishment of peace and security in the world.

32. The reason for their attitude was that, from political and economic points of view, the cold war was a profitable business for them. The American Press openly said that the cold war was enabling the United States to maintain a high level of employment among its population, was increasing the demand for merchandise and retarding the arrival of what it called a serious recession, in other words, an economic crisis. It was also making it possible to allocate enormous sums to the manufacture of arms and atomic bombs. The American Press was complacently repeating that a lasting peace, and especially a pacific settlement with the USSR, would hurt business. Thus the *U. S. News and World Report* of 14 January 1949 had written that if the cold war against the Soviet Union were to stop, the economy of the United States would be dealt a blow from which it would not recover, because its hollow prosperity depended entirely upon the constant increase of military expenditures.

33. It could be concluded that, for certain American circles, the establishment of permanent peace would be a catastrophe to be avoided at all cost. The instigators of war were therefore trying to make the great masses of the people believe that they also were interested in following the aggressive policy of the American monopolies because that policy was preventing unemployment. All that showed how right Generalissimo Stalin had been when he had said that what the instigators of war feared most was an agreement and co-operation with the USSR, because their aggressive policy would then be purposeless.

34. The discussion in the First Committee had entirely confirmed Generalissimo Stalin's words. The steady impulse of the Anglo-American imperialists was towards war and they even resorted

to international intrigues and blackmail to that end. It had long been an established fact that, for the Anglo-American monopolies, war was the most profitable business. Thus *Aviation Week*, a periodical of the aviation monopolies, had recently written that the development of military aviation in the United States in 1948 had rescued the aeronautics industry from its post-war slump. At the beginning of 1948, the position of the aviation trusts had been critical. The United States Congress had come to their assistance and had given them orders to the amount of 850 million dollars, a sum exceeding the budget estimates.

35. Leading circles in the United States and the United Kingdom had openly embarked on an aggressive policy aiming at the forcible establishment of Anglo-American or rather, purely American, hegemony over the entire world. The instigators of war were openly challenging all peace-loving people, all those who had no part in the selfish interests of the monopolies of the United States and western Europe.

36. The United States monopolies were attempting, by preparations for a new war, the armaments race and the increasingly harsh exploitation of workers, to ward off the economic crisis which threatened them once more.

37. The latest news reports showed a steady recession of United States economy. Production had been greatly reduced, to an extent approaching that of the first seven months of the great depression of 1929-1933.

38. According to the report of President Truman's economic advisers, total production in the United States had dropped by 13 per cent from October-November 1948 to July 1949 and by 10 per cent during the relatively brief period from March to July 1949. That drop had even affected agriculture. Compared with the last quarter of 1948, the farmer's income had dropped 14.7 per cent during the second quarter of 1949. Those figures showed that the danger of a depression threatened not only stock exchanges and banks but thousands of industrial enterprises, one after another of which were closing their doors and throwing millions of unemployed on the streets.

39. The coming depression held fresh surprises for United States workers. Millions of Americans lived in slums unfit for human habitation. According to the *Daily Compass* of 21 September 1949, in New York alone 400,000 families — in other words, at least 1,200,000 persons — lived in tenements which had been condemned as far back as 1921. Mr. Kiselev recalled the statement of Senator Paul H. Douglas in July 1949 to the effect that millions of Americans lived under appalling conditions, in slums, in an atmosphere harmful to the physical and political welfare of the country. According to the figures submitted to Congress by one of its sub-committees, 8 million families or persons in the United States had had an income of less than 1,000 dollars during the previous year—in other words, less than the necessary subsistence minimum.

40. According to the very modest figures published the previous year by the Bureau of Statistics of the United States Department of Labor, a family of four persons should have an income of over 3,000 dollars to cover minimum expenses and to maintain its health. Yet more than half the

families in the United States earned less than 3,000 dollars. It should also be kept in mind that the figures just cited did not take into account complete or partial unemployment. At the moment there were over 5 million fully unemployed in the United States and 900,000 were only partially employed. According to the same Congressional sub-committee, only one million families—in other words, 2.5 per cent of the population of the United States—had an income of 10,000 dollars a year, while only 7 million families had an income of 5,000 to 10,000 dollars a year.

41. Whereas the average and low income groups of the population of the United States tended progressively to merge, the profits of corporations increased steadily. According to official figures quoted by *The New York Times*, in the first quarter of 1949 the profits of the 300 largest corporations had exceeded by 9 per cent their profits during the first quarter of 1948. The profits of thirty-eight steel companies were 60 per cent higher than in 1948. Moreover, the percentage of profits in relation to the cost of production had also greatly increased. On average, profits had reached 18 per cent of the cost of production; in the case of General Motors, they had amounted to 28 per cent, and in the case of Studebaker to more than 30 per cent.

42. According to figures supplied by the United States Department of Commerce, profits distributed among stockholders of the largest corporations amounted to 826 million dollars in June 1949, as against 728 million the previous year; they had thus increased by 13 per cent.

43. At the same time, the larger enterprises had exploited workers still more. During the first quarter of 1949, profits of corporations had amounted to 37 per cent of the wages paid by them; profits had amounted to 31 thousand million dollars, and wages to 80 thousand million dollars. Thus, for every dollar paid to workers, the corporations had collected almost 40 cents profit.

44. The national wealth was being concentrated more and more in the hands of a very small fraction of the population. In 1945, 46 per cent of savings had been owned by 10 per cent of the population, representing the wealthiest group; in 1947 that group had owned as much as 77 per cent of savings.

45. Such was the economic picture in the United States which was on the verge of an economic crisis even more serious than the previous one.

46. In order to prevent the economic collapse which was threatening the ruling circles and monopolies in the United States, attempts were made to thrust the difficulties connected with the new crisis upon the workers of the United States and of the countries of western Europe.

47. It was common knowledge that the United States was the classic example of a country ruled by monopolies and a financial oligarchy. United States trusts were the ultimate expression of imperialist economy or of monopoly capitalism. That was what USSR representatives meant by the words "Wall Street". That economy was characterized by the transition from free competition to monopoly, to the domination by giant banks and giant trusts of the entire economic and political life of the country.

48. Mr. Kiselev would produce an example in support of his statement. Long before the Second World War, Dillon Read and Co., the well known United States banking firm, under the direction of the late Mr. Forrestal, had provided Bolivia with a credit of 20 million dollars to wage war against Paraguay; shortly after, it had given credit to Paraguay to wage war against Bolivia. With that money, the countries had purchased arms and ammunition from the American concern Remington Arms Co., Inc., which had become a branch of the Dupont trust, manufacturing fire-arms. That operation had brought both companies considerable profit. The representatives of Bolivia and Paraguay in the General Assembly should remember that transaction which had cost many human lives.

49. In order to prepare for war and to consolidate its position, the financial oligarchy of the United States was launching an increasingly strong offensive to lower the standard of living of the working masses and to deprive them of their political rights. Moreover, the foreign and domestic policy of American monopolies had its economic basis in the frantic development of the armaments industry in the United States.

50. Neither in the First Committee, nor in the General Assembly, had the representatives of Lebanon, Chile, Cuba, New Zealand and Yugoslavia spoken as much as one word about the plight—the desperate plight—of the workers of the United States and of the countries of western Europe. By expounding on Marxism-Leninism they had tried to divert the attention of the working masses, and to make them forget the concrete proposals submitted by the USSR delegation. Their arguments had been rebutted by Mr. Vyshinsky in the First Committee as well as in the General Assembly, and Mr. Kiselev would therefore not go into the matter.

51. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union, which took the realities of the existing international situation into account, expressed the deep desire of the Soviet Union to maintain peace and security throughout the world. During the previous thirty years, the USSR had shown that the basic principle of its foreign policy was the maintenance of peace.

52. Millions of people were convinced that the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union was preventing the Anglo-American imperialists from hurling the world into catastrophe. The mere existence of the USSR was blocking the path of the war-mongers and was checking the sinister forces of reaction.

53. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union was intended to strengthen the authority and prestige of the United Nations, at the very time when the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom were trying to divert the United Nations from its responsibilities, chief of which was the maintenance of peace and international security.

54. The Anglo-American bloc openly stated that the Charter embarrassed them, since it was opposed to their policy of unleashing a new war. They were deliberately violating the provisions of the Charter by organizing an armaments race, by incessantly increasing their military budgets

and by refusing obstinately to accept the prohibition of atomic weapons. Moreover, the establishment of aggressive military blocs such as the North Atlantic Treaty, the Western Union, the Organization of American States and the Council of Europe, was obviously directed towards undermining the very foundations of the United Nations.

55. Although the existing international situation was quite different, the faults of the former League of Nations were being repeated. Eminent persons in the United States were openly making aggressive speeches against the Soviet Union and were giving free rein to their deadly imagination. Mr. Kiselev would refrain from quoting from their speeches and would confine himself to recalling that they advocated the use of the atom bomb against cities and civilian populations, the invasion of Europe by United States forces, and an attack against the USSR by European troops under United States generalship. Generals Bradley and Vandenberg and Field-Marshal Montgomery had made statements of that kind, which had already been quoted. Those generals were making excellent arrangements on paper, but reality might be different. They had forgotten one very small point, namely, to ask themselves whether the peoples of the world wished for war. Everyone knew that the whole world thirsted for peace. Instead of peace, those generals and their Wall Street mentors offered a headlong race towards a new war; instead of work, they offered unemployment; instead of bread, they offered truncheons and bullets to workers on strike; instead of human freedom, they were organizing a régime of terror against all persons who wished for progress.

56. Without taking into account the real wishes of the peoples, they were openly and cynically preparing for a new aggressive war. At the same time, they were accusing the Soviet Union of harbouring imperialistic designs and were trying to conceal their real intentions by asserting that they were in favour of peace and that their sole wish was to defend themselves against aggression by the USSR.

57. The peoples of the world did not believe that kind of fiction and understood that only the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union stood in the way of the war-monger's designs.

58. Even such a hardened enemy of the USSR as Senator Taft had been obliged to state, during the discussion of the programme for military assistance to the countries of the North Atlantic bloc, that he could not consider that the Soviet Union was an aggressive Power. On 22 September 1949, while speaking in the United States Senate on behalf of those who opposed the granting of any military assistance, Senator Taft had stated that the United States was adopting a policy that was more likely to lead to war than to peace. He had said that the plan for military assistance constituted a flagrant contradiction of the general policy of the United States, which was to support the United Nations. That plan represented a return to the theory of the balance of power and of the survival of the fittest. According to Senator Taft, the United States was arming all States, from Norway to Iran. That assertion, Mr. Kiselev pointed out, gave the lie to the

representatives of Norway and Iran, who had refuted those statements during the current session of the Assembly. Senator Taft had added that the USSR would be justified in considering that those measures represented the establishment of an aggressive force. In conclusion, Senator Taft had stated that the bill before the Senate was illogical, useless, contrary to all the principles of the United Nations and prejudicial to the peace of the United States and of the whole world.

59. The same views had been expressed by British Field-Marshal Wavell. The former Viceroy of India had stated in London on 24 November 1949 that the Soviet Union was not an aggressive State and that it was not seeking to establish its domination over Europe. He had said that the USSR did not require either living space or expansion; at the same time, it had always borne in mind the German menace and could not be certain that the western Powers would not undertake to rearm Germany.

60. That sane and objective appraisal had been made by persons who could not be suspected of kindly feelings towards the Soviet Union.

61. Furthermore, the USSR proposal for the conclusion of a pact for the strengthening of peace by the five permanent members of the Security Council had been wholeheartedly supported by the peoples of the world. Those peoples, including the people of the United States, did not desire war. That was why the camp of the supporters of peace and democracy, headed by the powerful Soviet Union, was daily becoming stronger.

62. As a result of the ever-growing struggle for peace, the international influence and the prestige of the Soviet Union was increasing. The foreign policy of the USSR was fully compatible with the vital interests of all peoples and met the requirements of the movement for peace which had become universal and a powerful force capable of foiling the plans of all the war-mongers.

63. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR warmly supported the draft resolution of the Soviet Union, because the Byelorussian people had, more than once, to wage a difficult fight against foreign aggressors.

64. In 1918, the German imperialists had taken nearly the whole of the territory of Byelorussia and had instituted a reign of terror against the population of that country. Only because of the efforts of its elder brother, the great Russian nation, had the Byelorussian people been liberated from the yoke of the German invaders.

65. As was known, on 22 June 1941, Hitlerite Germany had launched its treacherous attack upon the Soviet Union. Byelorussia had been one of the first Soviet republics to become the arena of bloody combat against fascism. Unfortunately the German invader had been able to occupy the Byelorussian SSR and threaten it with slavery and death. Like famished hyenas, the fascists had thrown themselves on the wealth which had been created by the work of the Byelorussian people through the centuries. They had looted and devastated opulent Byelorussia. During the struggle, Hitler had hurled his best airborne pirates upon Byelorussian cities, and in particular upon its capital, Minsk. The industrial and cultural centres

of the country had been irreplaceably destroyed. The German invaders had turned out to be the worst enemies of humanity. But the Byelorussian people had not surrendered to that enemy force.

66. In answer to the call of the great Generalissimo Stalin, the Byelorussian people, from the very first day of the patriotic war, had arisen together with all the peoples of the Soviet Union in the holy war against the German occupying forces. Hundreds of thousands of Byelorussians had fought in the ranks of the Soviet army in the great patriotic war of 1941 to 1945. More than 300,000 guerrillas had attacked the enemy's rear. The great friendship of the Byelorussian, Russian, Ukrainian and other peoples of the Soviet Union had withstood the worst ordeals and had become still further cemented in the heat of battle.

67. In the summer of 1944, the glorious Soviet army, with the active assistance of the guerrillas and the whole Byelorussian people, had routed the hitlerite hordes and thrown them out of the Byelorussian SSR. On 9 May 1945, the gigantic struggle of the Soviet people against its worst enemy, hitlerite Germany, had ended, and all the peoples of Europe had been saved from the threat of the hitlerite plague. The Byelorussian people would be eternally grateful to the great Russian people and to the other peoples of the Soviet Union for having liberated them from German occupation.

68. The damage inflicted on the national economy of the Byelorussian SSR by the hitlerite hordes amounted to 75 thousand million rubles. Almost a fifth of the territory had been turned, by the German occupation, into a veritable desert.

69. It was because the Byelorussian people knew what war was that the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR warmly supported the peace proposals of the Soviet Union. That could not be understood by the representatives of Chile, Peru, Cuba, Argentina and many other countries.

70. In the speech he had made at the 257th meeting, Mr. Austin, the representative of the United States, had declared that no provision of the USSR draft resolution could be adopted with or without amendments, and that the draft resolution had to be rejected as a whole. At the same time he had praised the draft resolution of the First Committee, which was designed to thwart the peace proposals of the USSR. The United States imperialists could not, of course, agree to the proposals of the Soviet Union. They felt the ground slipping under their feet. United States monopolies were resorting to every sort of international adventuring and were leading the world towards war.

71. The USSR draft resolution was asking that preparations for a new war should be condemned, that the United Nations should not repeat the errors of the late League of Nations.

72. The Soviet Union had conducted, and was continuing with ever-increasing energy, its struggle against the criminal plans of aggressors.

73. History had not yet known any movement as gigantic as that of the masses united in the camp of those who stood for peace. Mr. Santa Cruz, the representative of Chile, could call that Moscow intrigue if he wished; the truth was that it went infinitely deeper.

74. The peoples of the world were capable of triumphing over any aggressor. The draft reso-

lution sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom and adopted by the First Committee endeavoured to halt the mighty peace movement of the peoples of the world. It was for that reason that the draft must be rejected. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union was the only one which fully met the aspirations and wishes of the peoples of the world.

75. The Members of the United Nations and their representatives in the Assembly owed it to themselves to strive towards the establishment of a sound and lasting peace among peoples. For that reason the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR urged them to vote for the draft resolution of the Soviet Union.

76. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) wished to express the point of view of his delegation, which had not taken part in the discussion in the First Committee.

77. Ever since the General Assembly's first session, everybody had been repeating that good understanding and effective co-operation between the five Powers which were permanent members of the Security Council constituted the most important factor for the accomplishment of the purposes of the United Nations. That affirmation was based on the fact that the Charter had not really established the legal equality of the Member States of the United Nations. Some Articles of the Charter proclaimed that equality, but others granted a privileged position to those five States, to which they gave specific and exclusive powers.

78. Since the birth of the United Nations, the five permanent members of the Security Council had not succeeded in attaining the understanding and co-operation indispensable for the full success of the Organization. On the contrary, there had been a constant and bitter opposition of viewpoints, and the States had adopted suspicious and uncompromising attitudes. That opposition had grown and had spread throughout the United Nations, which had split up into two groups. The antagonism between those groups was all the more serious because the minority group had tried to impose its ideas or to prevent or hinder the adoption of the proposals which represented the views of the majority.

79. That situation had so greatly affected the work of the United Nations that all delegations hoped it would end; in order that it might end, the great Powers must compose their differences in a friendly way and collaborate in a spirit of understanding.

80. Mr. Viteri Lafronte recalled that the opposition between the five Powers had become so acute and violent the previous year that the delegation of Mexico, during the first part of the third session of the General Assembly, had secured the adoption of an appeal to the great Powers to renew their efforts to compose their differences and establish a lasting peace. That appeal had been unanimously adopted and had become resolution 190 (III), which stated that the disagreement between the said Powers in a matter of vital importance to all the United Nations was the cause of the deepest anxiety among all the peoples of the world. But even though that resolution had been adopted, the differences had not disappeared. On the contrary, the discord and the universal anxiety had increased.

81. It might have been thought, therefore, that the proposal by one of the five great Powers that a pact for the strengthening of peace should be concluded between them would be received with rejoicing and enthusiasm by the United Nations and by all the peoples of the world. That would have been logical. But the desired offer of peace had been made, published and disseminated without receiving the desired response from public opinion. Mr. Viteri Lafronte wondered what were the causes of that phenomenon of collective indifference. He wondered how it could be explained that that proposal had been rejected, by a great majority, in the First Committee. It was necessary, in order to consider the problem impartially and objectively, to bear in mind, among other things, who had made the proposal, how it had been presented, and when and with what intention it had been submitted.

82. The draft had been presented by the delegation of the USSR. It was important to make that clear because, in that case more than in any other, the meaning and effectiveness of the draft were closely and indissolubly linked to its source. In view of the events which had preceded it, not only the intrinsic, objective and permanent value of the proposal for a pact for the strengthening of peace must be borne in mind, but also and especially its extrinsic, subjective and circumstantial value. That value depended directly on the author, namely, the Soviet Union, which was supported by a group of countries whose policies were closely bound up with the policy of that Power.

83. The representative of Ecuador recalled various peace offensives of the USSR, dating back to the time of the collapse of the Czarist régime. He recalled the peace decree of 8 November 1917 and the policy which, with vicissitudes and vacillations characteristic of a revolutionary government, the USSR had pursued up to the time of the Second World War; he referred in particular to the attitude of the Soviet Union to the conquest of Ethiopia, the Sino-Japanese war and the Munich Agreement. He recalled the spirit of struggle and heroism and the gigantic effort with which the USSR, allied with the United Kingdom and the United States, had fought against Hitlerite Germany.

84. But with the end of the war, the spirit of co-operation on the part of the Soviet Union had vanished. Long-established suspicions and misgivings had created a crisis of distrust which had extended to Governments, institutions, organizations and persons that did not accept the rigid and monolithic communist system.

85. Western civilization, with its philosophical, political, economic and social system rooted in the centuries, with its successes and failures, was faced with a new form of civilization, new and growing, also with failures and successes, with another philosophical, political, economic and social system.

86. The World Economic Conference, held at Geneva in 1927, had approved, at the suggestion of the USSR and the United States, what had perhaps been the first international declaration recognizing that the capitalist system and the socialist system had to live together if there was to be peaceful international co-operation. Generalissimo Stalin himself had several times advocated that solution, but the Soviet Union had done

little or nothing, in practice, to establish real co-operation. On the contrary, its attitude in international affairs, and especially in the United Nations, had always been aggressive and violent, distrusting and on the offensive, devoid of any spirit of understanding, *rapprochement* or co-operation.

87. That attitude had already lasted four years and was quite familiar. In the existing circumstances, therefore, the USSR delegation's proposal for the conclusion of a pact for the strengthening of peace could not and did not inspire confidence.

88. After recalling that he had always endeavoured to support formulas which would result in compromise and understanding and to ensure that discussions were conducted on a high plane, Mr. Viteri Lafronte went on to speak of the way in which the Soviet Union had made its proposal.

89. It would have been logical for the proposal to be preceded by some act or gesture of good will but, so far as he knew, the USSR had done nothing which showed a genuine desire for a *rapprochement*. It had employed the very opposite technique. Its draft resolution began by making a most serious and unfounded accusation against the United States, the United Kingdom and other States unnamed and requested the General Assembly to condemn the two most important States of the four with which the USSR was to conclude its pact for the strengthening of peace. The draft then referred to one of the topics on which there had been most disagreement between the USSR and the United States and the United Kingdom, and concluded by expressing a desire to organize a pact between the five great Powers for the strengthening of peace. As it stood, it might be said that the pact constituted a sanction which must be applied against the United States and the United Kingdom for making preparations for war and for their unwillingness to settle the question of atomic energy to the liking of the USSR. In other words, the Soviet Union had done its best to include as many as possible of the factors which would ensure the rejection of its proposal.

90. With regard to the timing of the proposal, the Ecuadorean representative was unable to believe that that moment was the most opportune. In the current atmosphere of fear and mistrust, the proposal of a peace pact would have been opportune only if it had been preceded by preparations which could have overcome the disadvantages of the moment and led to a general movement in favour of its consideration. Instead, it had been submitted with accusing and menacing gestures.

91. Mr. Viteri Lafronte wondered what were the intentions and purposes of the authors of the proposal. The USSR representative had said that each time his country made a proposal in favour of peace, the non-communist States questioned its true intentions. That was another instance of prevailing suspicion and distrust.

92. It had formerly been said that diplomacy must judiciously utilize simulation and dissimulation. In the discussion in the First Committee, the view had been frequently expressed that the USSR draft was ostensibly a peace proposal, out

that in reality it dissimulated an act of hostility and aggression against the United States and the United Kingdom, which it charged with being chiefly responsible for the preparation of a new war. Mr. Viteri Lafronte recalled, in that connexion, that in the *Istoria Diplomatica* (History of Diplomacy), edited by Vladimir Potemkin, he had read an essay on the tactics and organization of modern diplomacy, which dealt with such questions as pacifist propaganda as a means of confusing the adversary, and the exploitation of the idea of disarmament for purposes of ideological dissimulation; it also dealt with the utilization of treaties of friendship, treaties of non-aggression and professions of peaceful intentions as instruments designed to lull the vigilance of the adversary. All those methods were included under what the book called categories of diplomatic manoeuvres. If the Soviet professors who had written that history were to be believed, such diplomatic manoeuvres could not be used by the Soviet delegations and the minority which supported them, for the passages to which Mr. Viteri Lafronte had referred were to be found in the chapter on the tactics of bourgeois diplomacy.

93. It was clear that in its draft, the USSR delegation was more concerned to accuse the United States and the United Kingdom than to secure the conclusion of a pact for the strengthening of peace. If that had not been the case, it would have withdrawn the accusations and thereby facilitated the approval of the peace pact; several delegations had said that they would not vote in favour of the draft because it contained that accusation.

94. The reasons given during the debate explained why the USSR draft resolution had been rejected in the First Committee by such an overwhelming majority. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the debate had been the absence of any gesture of compromise, either on the part of the majority or on that of the minority. No amendments had been submitted, either to the USSR draft or to the draft submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom. It would seem that the debate had served only to define the respective positions more rigidly. Other delegations would have submitted conciliatory amendments if they had not been convinced that they would be useless.

95. Although the First Committee's rejection of the draft resolution could be explained and justified, it was nonetheless regrettable that the peace proposal had not been such as to ensure its adoption. It was to be hoped that the Soviet Union would make a sincere gesture of conciliation, because the capitalist and communist systems must co-exist in peace if the human race was to survive.

96. At the communist congress held in Poland in September 1947, Zhdanov had said that Soviet foreign policy was based on the fact of the co-existence, for a long period of time, of the capitalist and the socialist systems; that fact made co-operation possible between the USSR and countries with other systems, on condition that the principle of reciprocity was respected and that the agreements concluded were put into force.

97. Mr. Viteri Lafronte expressed the wish that such agreement could be achieved. He recalled that according to General Bedell Smith, Generalissimo Stalin had replied in the following terms



to Secretary of State Marshall when the latter had referred to the unsuccessful Moscow conference of April 1947: "It is a mistake to give such a tragic interpretation to our present disagreements. When peoples have exhausted themselves in a dispute, they recognize the necessity for conciliation." That was the situation which existed at the moment between the great Powers.

98. Mr. CARIAS (Honduras) said that although he had already expressed his delegation's point of view in the First Committee, he felt bound to take part in the heated debate—in which apparently only the great Powers were directly concerned—in order to voice his deep anxiety. At such a crucial moment of history he also felt it his duty to assert the prerogatives which his country possessed as a Member of the United Nations, especially since no effort must be spared to transform the ideal towards which all men aspired, into a living reality.

99. If the Charter of the United Nations was to be the supreme code of international conduct, it must become part of everyday life. When threats to the peace were presented as generalities, the world seemed unmoved by the prospect of the most terrible catastrophes. But modern science was remorselessly belying the old conception of time and space. Perhaps the innocent as well as the guilty, the weak as well as the strong, would have to pay dearly for the lack of goodwill.

100. At the first session, Mr. Carias had expressed the hope<sup>1</sup> that, in the United Nations, the conviction would persist that, as a first step, all must strive sincerely to restore world confidence, and that the peoples formerly united to face the mortal peril which had threatened them would show still greater ability to work together towards the realization of the ideals of peace.

101. The representative of Honduras continued to believe that the current debate would have had some value if it compelled the great Powers to reflect upon the sincere appeals which had been directed to them. Only by the unequivocal adoption of the principles of tolerance and universality would it be possible to avoid another catastrophe which was bound to lead to the ruin of civilization.

102. The best and most positive contribution that could be made to the world was to endeavour to meet the ever-changing needs of the moment in order to create the conditions essential for peace.

103. Mr. DOMÍNGUEZ CÁMPORA (Uruguay) wished, on behalf of his delegation, to comment as briefly as possible on the conclusions which could be drawn from the debate which had taken place in the First Committee and in the General Assembly.

104. That debate had turned primarily on the USSR draft resolution concerning the strengthening of peace. The content of the Soviet Union plan had not, however, been defined, nor had the concept of peace underlying that plan.

105. There were a number of concepts of peace. Thus peace could be conceived of as based on institutions. But institutions must necessarily be rooted in the community of States, a community governed by law.

106. According to Stalinism, law was merely one of the superstructures erected upon an economic foundation; it had not been possible to refute the primary and essential contradiction in the Stalinist position.

107. The Uruguayan representative proceeded to confirm his argument by quotations from statements made by the founders of the Soviet Union and by those who had governed, and continued to govern, that country. Such statements must be considered as the guiding principles of USSR policy. Those who claimed that such statements were merely the theoretical expression of a doctrine should recall that, according to Generalissimo Stalin, it must always be borne in mind that Lenin had said that there could be no revolutionary movement without a revolutionary theory.

108. In his book, *Leninism*, Generalissimo Stalin had said that Lenin had understood better than anyone else the great importance of theory, above all in a party such as the Communist Party, in view of its role as the militant vanguard of the international proletariat, and in view also of the complexity of the internal and international situation.

109. Those who claimed that that was simply a matter of Party directives should be reminded that they had become norms of the political conduct of the State; article 126 of the USSR Constitution recognized the constitutional character of the Party.

110. That distinguished jurist, Mr. Vyshinsky, had said in his book *The Law of the Soviet State*, that the directive role of the Communist Party in all spheres of activity was a fundamental principle of the dictatorship of the working class.

111. A series of decisions taken by the Bolshevik Party showed the forms of organization used by the Party to direct the organs of the State. Those decisions defined the functions of the Party in relation to those of the State, on the principle that the Party must ensure the execution of its decisions through the agency of the organs of the Soviet State, within the framework of the Soviet Constitution. The Party was to control the work of the organs of the Government, rectifying the inevitable errors and deficiencies, helping them to carry out the Government's decisions and at the same time seeking to ensure that those decisions were supported by the masses.

112. It was undeniable that the statements which Mr. Domínguez Cámpora had quoted defined the guiding principles of the USSR policy.

113. What, then, constituted the basic contradiction in the Stalinist position?

114. The communists wanted to eliminate the bourgeois State. Generalissimo Stalin had said that the dictatorship of the proletariat could not be the result of the peaceful development of bourgeois society and bourgeois democracy. It could be nothing but the result of the destruction of the machinery of the bourgeois State, the bourgeois army, the bourgeois administrative apparatus and the bourgeois police.

115. Not only was the State to be eliminated; it was to be eliminated by force. Lenin had said in his book, *State and Revolution*, that all previous revolutions had simply perfected the machinery of the State, whereas what was necessary was to break it and to destroy it.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the first part of the first session of the General Assembly*, 30th plenary meeting, appendix.

116. Again, according to Stalinism, the structure of bourgeois economy led to imperialism and war, class conflict and the violent destruction of the State. In his book, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, Generalissimo Stalin had said that the practical activity of the proletarian party must be based upon the laws of social development and the study of those laws, and not upon the noble desires of the *élite*, the demands of reason or universal morality.

117. Generalissimo Stalin had also said that the violent conflict between the different capitalist groups necessarily resulted in imperialist wars for the possession of foreign territories. He had therefore concluded that war was inevitable under imperialism and that the proletarian revolution in Europe and the colonial revolution in the East must necessarily coalesce to form one world front of revolution against the world front of imperialism.

118. The step from capitalism to socialism and the freeing of the working class could therefore be effected only by changing the very nature of the capitalist system, by a revolution and not by means of reforms. Thus, in order to succeed in politics, it was necessary to be a revolutionary and not a reformer.

119. Since progress was achieved by bringing to light internal contradictions, it was clear that the class struggle of the proletariat was an inevitable phenomenon.

120. The contradictions of the capitalist system must therefore not only not be disguised, but must be exposed. Class warfare must not be suppressed, but must be carried on to the end.

121. Thus in order to succeed in politics. It was necessary to carry out an intransigent class policy and not a reformist policy aimed at harmonizing the interests of the working class and the middle class, of capitalism and socialism.

122. How could such a theory be reconciled with a system based on institutions, and how could it be considered as expressing a concept of peace?

123. A second concept of peace might be of a casual nature. Mr. Domínguez Càmpera had already described that concept, pointing out that however perfect a peace code might be, its authority depended on two fundamental conditions: first, that peoples must be masters of their own fate in order to enjoy effective democracy and, secondly, that social peace was based on social justice.

124. But even if that concept of peace were borne in mind, a contradiction existed between effective democracy and Stalinism owing to the radical difference in their definitions of democracy, and also owing to the fact that Stalinism could not achieve social peace within the structure of democratic States.

125. Thus life, under the Stalinist concept of social peace, could be reduced to terms of class struggle. But there was still another concept of peace, namely, the teleological or finalist concept.

126. Mr. Domínguez Càmpera proceeded to define that concept, according to which peace was not an end in itself but a means of co-operation whereby certain human aims could be achieved. That co-operation must be governed by law, which was the fruit and the guarantee of liberty and

justice, so that the human person—the supreme end of society and law—might fully develop those cultural capacities which made of man the creator of truth, beauty and justice. Such an achievement was the result of co-operation. Existing political societies were not perfect, but they could be freed from the defects created by selfishness, and human solidarity would lead men to that goal.

127. According to Stalinism, existing society was incapable of solidarity either at the national or at the international level. With regard to solidarity at the national level, that was shown by the criticism which the distinguished jurist, Mr. Vyshinsky, had made of the doctrine of Duguit. He had written in his *Law of the Soviet State* that the idea of social solidarity, which was fundamental to Duguit's entire juridical conception of the State, contradicted the fact of the class division of society and of the class struggle which destroyed that solidarity. He had concluded that Duguit did violence to facts and falsified history.

128. With regard to solidarity at the international level, Stalin had said, in *The Proletarian Revolution in Russia*, that while formerly it had been customary to speak of the proletarian revolution in one country or another as an absolute quantity, opposed to one or another national front of capitalism, that definition no longer sufficed. There was now a world proletarian revolution, because the different national fronts of capitalism had become the links of a single chain, the world front of imperialism, which must be opposed by the general front of the revolutionary movement in all countries. The essential task of the victorious revolution was therefore to develop and support revolution in other countries.

129. Those were the salient points of the Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution. Generalissimo Stalin had added that the three principal tasks before the dictatorship of the proletariat were to organize the army of the revolution for the fight against foreign enemies and against imperialists; then to consider the stages of the revolution and its strategy; and, thirdly, to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country and to use that country as a base in order to overthrow imperialism in all countries.

130. Such was the mission of the USSR. One of the theorists of Stalinism, Professor Korovin, had rightly defined the Soviet Union as an international State both in essence and because of its characteristic class doctrine.

131. With such a conception of international life, how was it possible to undertake the study of peace and hope to construct it on the basis of human solidarity?

132. According to Stalinism, States other than the Soviet group were essentially incapable of carrying out a work of human solidarity. The western States, on the other hand, believed in that solidarity and in its positive vitality which enabled them to live in hope.

133. Mr. KOSANOVIC (Yugoslavia) recalled that, during the discussion of the USSR draft resolution in the first Committee, the Yugoslav delegation had put forward a series of arguments based on Yugoslavia's own relations with the Soviet Union. His delegation had proved the striking discrepancy between the words and the deeds of the

USSR and of the States, both Members and non-members of the United Nations, which supported that Power.

134. Mr. Vyshinsky thought that the best way of combating the Yugoslav arguments was to keep silent about them, while at the same time, the USSR continued its activities. On the other hand, neither Mr. Vyshinsky nor the *Cominform*, in intensifying the campaign of slander, had discovered any new rules; it was a well-known old adage that if slander were audacious enough, some of it would be remembered. By means of such practices, Mr. Vyshinsky hoped that not only the world at large, but also the Yugoslavs themselves, would forget history and everything of which Yugoslavia was rightly proud.

135. Moreover, an attempt was being made to camouflage, behind the screen of ideology, the political, economic and other methods of the USSR, which were in no way new. In that connexion, ideological discussions with regard to Marxism and socialism had developed in the Assembly. As the representative of a country which was trying to find—and which actually had found—in socialism a better way of life for the large mass of its people and their liberation from exploitation and abuse, a country which, at the same time, wanted to remain independent and free and to remain a conscientious Member of the United Nations, Mr. Kosanovic considered it necessary to make a series of pertinent observations.

136. It was not new in history for poor interpreters of great ideas to do much damage to those very ideas. That happened particularly when those interpreters believed that inheritance, historical developments and other circumstances entitled them to a monopoly of orthodox interpretations.

137. Mr. Vyshinsky had not done much good to the evolution of socialism by insisting that the methods of the Soviet Union were to be identified with socialism. That was why it was wrong for others—including several representatives to the United Nations—to identify the policy represented by Mr. Vyshinsky with socialism. The conduct of the Soviet Union towards Yugoslavia was the best proof that the aim of the new policy of the Soviet Union was not the success of those ideas in the world, but the repetition of the mistakes which many a predecessor of Mr. Vyshinsky had committed, persons who, not so long before, had been sending Russian socialists and revolutionaries to Siberia and death.

138. It was very probable that the *Cominform* would wonder why Mr. Kosanovic should be speaking thus in view of the fact that he himself was not a Marxist. He had, however, a particular reason for doing so. Eighteen months before, the *Cominform* had attempted first to separate the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia from the Communist Party itself, and then to separate the Communist Party from the people of Yugoslavia. In the Assembly those who spoke for the *Cominform* thought that the term "Tito's clique" was the most convenient argument to justify all the oppressive and abusive measures to which they had resorted.

139. Mr. Kosanovic emphasized that the constant failures which the *Cominform* had suffered since its initial move in June 1948 had not made

it see the plain and simple truth that not only the leadership and the rank and file of the Yugoslav Communist Party, but also the entire People's Front of Yugoslavia, including Mr. Kosanovic's own Party—in other words, politically speaking, practically the entire nation—were closely and strongly united in the construction of the new political order and in defence of the country's freedom and independence.

140. Yugoslavia had many striking examples throughout its long history of that same attitude. For instance, there was the correspondence between Czar Alexander I of Russia and Peter I, archbishop and ruler of Montenegro, which dated back to 1803. Czar Alexander I had written offering to send Count Ivanitch to Montenegro to convince the people of that country, into which some "enemies of the Slavic language and religion" had infiltrated, of the Czar's lasting grace and to show the people the way and means to glory and happiness. The leaders of Montenegro had replied that their people were not subjects of the Russian Empire but only under its moral patronage and would defend their freedom to the last.

141. Mr. Kosanovic had himself been a member of the Government of Yugoslavia, brought to power in 1941 by the people's rebellion against the Government which only two days previously had signed the tri-partite pact with Hitler in Vienna. On 28 March 1941, according to documents produced at the Nürnberg trial, Hitler had decided to annihilate Yugoslavia and, what was even more important for the discussion in progress, to postpone the attack on the Soviet Union from 15 May, as had been originally intended, to 22 June. On 5 April the Government of Yugoslavia, of which Mr. Kosanovic had been a member, had signed the treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, and on 6 April Yugoslavia had been brutally attacked from all sides by the Axis Powers.

142. Yugoslavia had collapsed in two weeks, but the rebellion of 27 March 1941 remained a fundamentally important historical fact from a much wider point of view. With the collapse of Yugoslavia, a vigorous struggle had been organized in the country under the leadership of Tito, a struggle almost unique in its importance, its organization, success and wide-spread popular support. Incidentally, the Yugoslav Minister in Moscow had been given his papers on 12 May 1941, three weeks after Hitler's occupation of Yugoslavia.

143. All that was history, for which Mr. Vyshinsky apparently showed no particular interest when it concerned other peoples. The great work of Tito and of all the self-sacrificing leaders who had brought the country out of chaos and built up its freedom and independence was also history; and so were the 1,700,000 Yugoslav graves with which Yugoslavia had paid for its participation in the Second World War.

144. Yugoslavia was proud of its long history, respected it and was always inspired by it. No resolutions of the *Cominform* could do away with it, nor could any slander, let alone such fantastic falsehoods as had been resorted to in the notorious Rajk trial.

145. The *Cominform* intended to isolate Yugoslavia and wanted to reduce the whole question of its action against Yugoslavia to a purely internal problem which it expected to solve by force.

146. In connexion with the draft resolution submitted by the USSR, the Yugoslav delegation had already called the attention of the United Nations to the discrepancies between the words and the deeds of the Soviet Union, because it had seen in the attitude of that country a danger to the peace and independence of small countries.

147. Mr. Kosanovic doubted if it were a coincidence that, at the very moment when the USSR draft resolution concerning the strengthening of peace was being discussed in the General Assembly, the *Cominform* had adopted a new resolution directed against Yugoslavia on Yugoslavia's National Day, 29 November. In 1943, in the midst of their momentous national struggle, the Yugoslav peoples had formulated clearly through their political representatives the programme for the future constitution of Yugoslavia. That was why the Yugoslavs had come out of the war without plunging into civil war, without having to deal with and to solve any thorny problems, and with all the positive and constructive political forces closely united in a broad national front for the reconstruction of the country in peace.

148. The anniversary of the National Day symbolizing those events had been used by the *Cominform* as an occasion to call Yugoslavia a fascist country and to declare that the struggle against the "Tito clique, hired spies and assassins" was the international duty of all communists and of all workers' parties.

149. The representative of Yugoslavia did not intend to ascribe too much importance to such a resolution, but called attention to one of the issues which it raised. It was very probable that Mr. Vyshinsky would say that he, as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, was not responsible for such resolutions. The fact remained, however, that it was precisely because Yugoslavia had been unwilling to submit to such resolutions that the Yugoslav Communist Party had been expelled from the *Cominform* and that all possible political, economic and other measures had been resorted to against Yugoslavia. It was quite clear that the Governments abiding by such orders of the *Cominform* were in fact called upon to apply all possible pressure against Yugoslavia. That was not a means—in all probability not even for Mr. Vyshinsky—for the preservation of peace and independence of countries.

150. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) thought it essential to approach the problem under consideration with complete frankness, since a few sincere statements might possibly help to inform not only world public opinion but also opinion in the Soviet Union.

151. The complete—at times even brutal—frankness which had marked the discussion had made it possible to analyse profoundly opposed ideologies and policies.

152. The Peruvian delegation considered that there was no foundation whatever for the allegation that the western Powers had pursued a policy of aggression. Facts had shown that the methods adopted by the western Powers had been the inevitable consequence of the methods adopted by the Soviet Union. The western Powers, which had failed to pursue a prudent and far-sighted policy in regard to German armaments in 1914, had made the same mistake in 1938. They were

not to be blamed if they did not wish to repeat that policy of drift and overconfidence.

153. The methods employed by the western Powers had been motivated by incontrovertible facts. When those Powers had made arrangements for the demobilization of their armed forces, their action had not been imitated by the USSR. The western Powers had not acquired new territories; on the contrary, events had occurred which were greatly to the credit of the United Kingdom: the sovereignty of the Dominions had been increased and strengthened; independence had been granted to India; and the representatives of the territories formerly under British influence had declared in the United Nations that the United Kingdom had not attempted to interfere in their internal affairs. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had adopted a so-called realistic policy which consisted in surrounding itself with a cordon of friendly States. It had become obvious to the whole world that the policy of establishing such a cordon would everywhere create problems similar to those created by Hitler's policy when he had annexed Austria and had tried to do the same with Poland. That policy of the USSR had been brought about by mistrust. But that mistrust must be eliminated by means of a sincere *rapprochement* and full and direct discussion with the western Powers, through the United Nations.

154. The Soviet Union must realize that the potential causes of war were mistrust, the mistaken concept of the State and of sovereignty held by the USSR which was incompatible with the western Powers' concept of sovereignty and, finally, political mysticism.

155. Mistrust was increasing in the States which followed a policy of isolation. But it could be eliminated by a *rapprochement* and by a desire to understand the thoughts of others.

156. The Soviet Union, however, did not wish to understand the aims of the western Powers. It was following a policy of absolute spiritual isolation and believed it had an infallible formula and absolute political truth.

157. When Soviet leaders and theoreticians came into contact with reality, they made contradictory, equivocal or ambiguous declarations. Thus, the USSR representative had shrewdly shifted the debate to channels where he was in a position to give what might be called an incomplete reply, since he could rely on texts which were obviously in contradiction with the texts cited by his opponents. But other representatives had invoked the philosophy of history, which showed that when a country tried to impose its system on another country by force, it must face national resistance. That lesson was confirmed by the movement called Titoism and by other phenomena on which exact information was not available, but which could be inferred in other spheres close to the Soviet Union. Those facts had not been refuted, nor had the USSR concept of the State, a concept which inevitably led to dictatorship at home and war between nations.

158. For the western Powers, the State was a legal and political entity designed to serve a higher authority—the nation. But then Engels had appeared, that extraordinary and titanic man, the ideological ancestor of Marx, who had thrown the relations between the State and the nation into

confusion. The nation, which was the people, a spiritual community which should be free and superior to the State, became confused with the structure of the State, which was the expression of the divine will. It was clear that under that concept there was no room for internal freedom or international peace.

159. The western Powers had always sought to differentiate between the State as a political structure and as an instrument of constraint and force, and the spiritual community in which the idea of liberty reigned supreme. Mr. Belaúnde recalled the saying "render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's", and added that when Caesar took upon himself the role of God—not only the religious role but also the cultural role—he became a dictator in the international field. That was a terrible law because it was a sociological law which was more powerful than economic laws, as the latter were often not applicable to man. He sincerely hoped that the modern world would listen to the voice of economic interests. If the man in the street in the Soviet Union or the United States were asked what he desired, he would reply, thinking of his economic interests, that he wished for peace. But peace was not possible, in spite of those economic interests which coincided with spiritual interests, because alongside economic interests there were unsettling psychological factors. The psychological factor of power could be useful when placed in the hands of men who were inspired by divine laws. The desire to dominate could be evil. The psychology of power had given rise to the idea of totalitarianism, and had caused international disagreements.

160. Gustave Le Bon had proved that, in 1914, Germany had economically dominated the world and had controlled 30 per cent of Russian economy, and that a balance might have been established between Germany, England, and Russia. Bismarck had also foreseen the same thing when he had said that Germany should never fight the whale or the elephant. But psychological factors, a desire for power, had brought about the 1914 and 1939 wars and, despite the need for harmonizing current economic interests, would cause the war of the future.

161. Mr. Belaúnde wondered in which country that desire for power, that wish to dominate, to impose its institutions on the world, was to be found. It was certainly not to be found in the United Kingdom, which had recently given India its freedom and which did not interfere with the countries that only a short while before had been part of its Empire. It was not to be found in the United States, which had to respect its democratic traditions, and which, so far as the countries of South America were concerned, wished to accept points of view calculated to promote friendly relations based on equality and honour. Those countries did not want to spread democracy by means of bayonets and guns; they believed that natural evolution, a gravitation towards higher ideals, and the appearance of favourable geographical or economic factors could aid in the universal development of democracy.

162. Referring to those who were opposed to such views and who should be treated with all the respect due to their mystical concepts which he

believed to be sincere, the representative of Peru said that those persons were convinced that not only should democracy be imposed on peoples, and the economic and political structure of all countries changed, but that that change could not be brought about by the natural, slow and evolutive working of the laws of historical materialism.

163. The only accurate science was political psychology; and in that psychological element lay the threat of war. Political mysticism was an erroneous philosophy. Religious mysticism was the philosophy of the absolute in the spiritual world, where the absolute did, in fact, exist, whereas political mysticism was the philosophy of the absolute in the material world. The western Powers were absolutists in matters concerning morals and the guiding principles of life. In the Soviet Union, however, the philosophy of the absolute was such as to lead to statements similar to those of Robespierre, Marx and Lenin, the great advocates of the imperative Utopia, to the effect that reality was not reality, and that it must serve their ideas. That was the Procrustean method; everyone must submit to their ideas because their mission on earth was to create a new reality and thus to dominate the world.

164. It might be suggested to the Soviet Union that it should not be distrustful, but that it should study the institutions of the western countries, and analyse their interests, which were similar to the legitimate interests of the USSR. But the Soviet Union would not listen to such advice. It could be told that according to the western Powers' concept of sovereignty, the State was subject to justice. The judicial organization of the United States, and of most of the countries of America, could say that a law was unconstitutional. In other countries, the religious community could oppose some action of the State, saying that the government had been wrong, and eventually public opinion would insist that the action of the government should be rectified.

165. Presidents Hoover, Coolidge and Harding had not followed the good neighbour policy, but a man named Alfred Smith had arisen who had said that their policy was bad, that the countries of Latin America should be treated on an equal footing, and that the Monroe Doctrine of non-intervention should be respected. That movement of opinion had grown and President Roosevelt had made those ideas his own.

166. The Soviet Union used the forum of the United Nations to make propaganda for its ideas. Its representatives made long and able speeches, because they knew that the United States was susceptible to propaganda. Nevertheless, they should realize that that country respected the principles of law, justice and morality, as did all the western democracies, and for that reason war could never become popular and could never become a political necessity. On the other hand, war had become a necessity in the plans of the Soviet Union, because the day that Soviet democracy sensed that there were difficulties in the countries within the orbit of the *Politburo*, in the immense sea that was China, for example, suspicion would grow and it would be necessary to intoxicate the people with some new myth of national supremacy. That would create an inevitable factor of war.

167. Mr. Belaúnde confessed that he had seldom heard such a debate as that in progress, in which

each delegation had delivered speeches so full of sincerity and conviction. The Soviet Union should take to heart the example of fifty-three widely separated countries, with different political institutions, cultures and cultural modalities, yet following only the dictates of their conscience.

168. The USSR should also take into consideration the desire for peace common to all countries. When they had voted against the proposed pact, all the delegations had expressly signified their desire that negotiations should continue through the marvelous medium of inter-governmental consultation which the New World had passed on to the Old World as a token of thanks for having created it and having transmitted its civilization to it.

169. But nobody could believe himself infallible. Young countries should do no more than reiterate their hopes, their anxiety or, as Unamuno had put it, "their agony for peace".

170. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ALLENDES (Chile) moved the adjournment of the meeting.

171. The PRESIDENT announced that three representatives still wished to speak on the subject before the Assembly: the Chilean representative, the Brazilian representative, who wished to explain his vote, and the USSR representative who wished to reply to some previous remarks.

172. As several representatives interested in certain of the subsequent items on the agenda of the Assembly were desirous of leaving on Friday, 2 December, he left it to the Assembly to decide whether it would adjourn, on the proposal of the Chilean representative, or continue the discussion and proceed to the vote.

*The motion for adjournment was adopted by 28 votes to 10, with 8 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

*Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Thursday, 1 December 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).*

### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war, and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace: report of the First Committee (A/1150) (concluded)**

1. Mr. OSTRIA GUTIÉRREZ (Bolivia) said that before explaining his delegation's vote, he wished to correct the statement made at the 260th meeting by the representative of the Byelorussian SSR, namely, that Bolivia, under pressure from United States capitalist interests, had negotiated a loan from Dillon, Read and Co. in order to make war on Paraguay. That was quite untrue, because Bolivia had obtained that loan many years before the Chaco war and had devoted the whole of it to building railways.

2. Furthermore, the assertion that that war had been incited by United States trusts was equally false and ridiculous, because its real cause had been the territorial dispute over the Chaco, which had lasted almost a century; and Bolivia had conducted the war thanks to its own mineral resources and the heroic sacrifices of its people.

3. The conduct of the Bolivian people which had been inspired by the eternal ideal of patriotism, could not be intelligible to representatives of countries which had no will of their own and lay under the tyranny of fanatical and transient dogmas. Fortunately, distortions such as those of the representative of the Byelorussian SSR did not change historical truth and could not harm the brotherhood and friendship of Bolivia and Paraguay, which had risen above disaster at the close of the sanguinary Chaco war and which had buried the hatchet.

4. Mr. Ostria Gutiérrez reiterated the explicit statement made by the representative of Bolivia in the First Committee<sup>1</sup> to the effect that Bolivia

could not accept the USSR draft resolution: condemnation of the preparations for a new war, and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (A/1149). On the other hand, it reaffirmed its support of the draft resolution on the essentials of peace submitted by the United States and United Kingdom delegations and approved by the First Committee, because that draft resolution not only reasserted the principles of the Charter, but also provided a guarantee for the peace and security of the weaker countries and a pledge that their freedom and independence would be respected in the face of any act or threat likely to lead to civil strife and to the subversion of the will of their peoples.

5. The Bolivian delegation felt that the first sentence of paragraph 3 of the draft resolution of the Soviet Union expressed an idea which appeared in a clearer and more complete form in the draft resolution of the First Committee. It considered, therefore, that each draft should be voted on as a whole, and either adopted or rejected as a whole, because any one provision, taken separately, might lend itself to misinterpretation and give rise to confusion. Bolivia would support the draft resolution of the First Committee and would vote against the USSR draft resolution.

6. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) said that during the debate in the First Committee as well as in the discussion in the Assembly, the Soviet Union had suffered its greatest reverse to date in the United Nations. The unanimity of the fifty-three democratic countries had exposed the vassals of Moscow to the moral censure of a peace-loving, but vigilant, public opinion.

7. Apart from the Stalinist profession of faith made at the 258th meeting by the representative of Poland, nothing new had been revealed during the debate. On the contrary, the Soviet delegations and the delegations which supported them had once more accused the democratic countries of following the United States and the United

<sup>1</sup> For the discussion on this subject in the First Committee, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, First Committee, 325th to 337th meetings inclusive.*