

ciples and to ethics, and all its determination to search unceasingly for the solutions to common problems. The United States stretched out the hand of co-operation to those few who as yet remained aloof.

122. Mr. VAN HEUVEN GOEDHART (Netherlands) wished merely to explain why his delegation would not take part in the debate on the question before the Assembly.

123. The USSR draft resolution had been discussed in the First Committee for days on end, after which it had been defeated by an overwhelming majority. The views of the Netherlands delegation, which remained unchanged, were therefore to be found in the summary records of the First Committee.

124. Although it was the formal right of the Soviet Union to re-introduce its proposals in the

Assembly, that way of exercising its right did not in fact make sense. The only meaning of a rule of procedure entitling a delegation to re-introduce a proposal in the Assembly after it had been defeated in a Main Committee of exactly the same composition as the Assembly itself was that it should be applied in those cases where there was a reasonable chance of reversing the result of the voting in the Committee. If there were no such chance—and all were aware that there was none in the case under consideration—re-introduction served no purpose and amounted simply to a waste of time. For that reason the Netherlands delegation would not take part in the discussions, and it hoped that many other delegations would follow its example.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Tuesday, 29 November 1949, at 3 p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Condemnation of the preparations for a new war, and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace: report of the First Committee (A/1150) (continued)

1. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) wished to face squarely the problem before the General Assembly, which was to find out how to ensure the peaceful co-existence of two systems. One of them, under the hegemony of the United States, was preparing to annihilate the other, the system of socialism and peace which, under the leadership of the USSR, comprised the peoples of the new democracy and had been joined by China.

2. But that was not the sole potential cause of conflict, as the capitalist bloc was full of internal contradictions and, by its very nature, it bred war. The current meeting of the Assembly, however, it was, if not formally, at least in practice, examining the possibility of a conflict between the socialist and the capitalist systems.

3. Capitalism and socialism existed side by side in the world, and it was the firm conviction of the people's democracies that they could so exist side by side and even co-operate as they had done during the Second World War. Mr. Wierblowski believed, therefore, that the co-existence of those two systems did not by itself lead to armed conflict.

4. That extremely important postulate had repeatedly been stated by the great leader of socialism, Generalissimo Stalin, and by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Vishinsky, and it followed from the very principles of Marxism-Leninism. The sincerity of those statements could be doubted only by those who sought bad excuses for their rash ventures.

5. A second postulate followed from the first. The people's democracies not only believed that peace and collaboration were possible; they also

held that such collaboration should assume a constructive character in the interests of all.

6. Those were not mere words. The people's democracies were giving daily proofs of their will to collaborate and were sparing no effort to convince all people of good will of the need for such collaboration.

7. The USSR draft resolution (A/1149) represented an epoch-making contribution to the mighty struggle for peace carried on in the United Nations, and it reflected the will of millions throughout the world to strive against the threat of war.

8. The arithmetical calculations of Mr. Austin, the United States representative, concerning the fifty-three States which always voted for the United States and its proposals, were not convincing, for the real majority was behind the people's democracies.

9. Those who opposed the USSR draft resolution spoke of their aversion to war, but they proposed no concrete solution to relieve the tension prevailing in the world. Nor did they propose any measures for stopping the armaments race or avoiding the horrors of war.

10. They were trying to persuade the General Assembly to vote for unfounded assertions which would solve nothing. No one could affirm that the world was at peace, for all could see the manifestations of the cold war brought about by those who were trying to hoodwink the Assembly with empty phrases.

11. When analysing the joint draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom in the First Committee,¹ the Polish delegation had pointed out that one of its aims was to drag the small States into the cold war at the side of the United States, and indirectly to obtain the blessing of the United Nations on the various

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, First Committee, 325th to 337th meetings inclusive.*

United States pacts which either prepared aggression or strengthened American domination over territories conquered by means of political or economic pressure.

12. Mr. Austin's statement to the General Assembly (257th meeting) had been but a weaker repetition of his already unconvincing arguments; but, carried away by his arithmetical triumphs, he had slipped and had told the Assembly that a vote for the draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom, which had been adopted by the First Committee, would amount to an approval of the North Atlantic Treaty.

13. That was the use to which Mr. Austin wished to put the United Nations. It was, however, a dangerous path, which could lead to the disruption of the United Nations itself, for Mr. Austin wished to make it acquiesce in his country's policy of aggression.

14. Some of the opponents of the people's democracies had argued that the cause for the existing international tension was to be found in the activities of a so-called fifth column. That was a ridiculous assertion, which hardly deserved a reply.

15. The fifth column could hardly be blamed for the fact that workers and peasants were trying to shake off the yoke of internal and foreign exploitation or to improve their lot. It could hardly be blamed for the fact that mass movements of liberation were growing in many countries and that the inhabitants of many colonies were striving for self-government and independence.

16. The General Assembly should not forget that that was the way to progress and the way for many people to win self-government and representation in the United Nations. In most cases, nations had won freedom with their own blood, and many were still fighting for independence. If the history of mankind had not been one of constant progress, the United States might still have been a British colony and the United Kingdom might still be oppressing and exploiting India and Pakistan.

17. It was merely absurd to seek to explain away the great social and economic achievements of many peoples with many centuries of history behind them by fairy stories about police States, only because those achievements had been made possible by the liquidation of capitalism and by socialism. He, who tried to explain the liberation movement of hundreds of millions of Chinese people by alleging infiltration of so-called agents, must indeed be completely lacking in logic and a sense of proportion. The driving power behind the deep social changes taking place throughout the world was not a fifth column or foreign influence, but historical processes which could not be stopped. Washington, Bolivar and Garibaldi had also, in their time, been branded as foreign agents.

18. Yet the fifth column was no figment of the imagination, for it was being organized wherever the rule of the people had been established. Attempts were being made to overthrow Peoples' Governments and thus to slow down the course of history.

19. All the members of the Assembly were no doubt acquainted with the notorious "X" plan for underground espionage and sabotage activity in the USSR and the people's democracies. A so-called National Committee for a Free Europe had been recently set up in the United States to train highly qualified specialists for that type of work. The Committee was headed by eminent United States citizens and supported by the United States Government, and it had been greatly advertised by the official organ of the United States diplomatic service.

20. Members would also be acquainted with the United States Central Intelligence Agency Act which had been secretly adopted by Congress. One of its provisions was that the United States should admit every year 500 aliens who would receive special privileges provided they undertook to carry out espionage work in their native lands. Those aliens were granted United States citizenship on their arrival in the country. Hitler had also followed the same method in his time. Similar work was carried in other countries too. Paris, for instance, was the seat of a so-called Albanian Liberation Committee.

21. It was the organizers of that fifth column of reaction and war who demanded the rejection of the USSR draft resolution, the aim of which was to strengthen peace and show the way to collaboration between different systems and different States.

22. Mr. Austin had mentioned the relations between Poland and the USSR. The whole of Poland would always remember with gratitude the heroic struggle of the Soviet people who had restored Poland's independence and had saved that country from annihilation. The Polish people would always be grateful to the Soviet Union for its support and help in regaining for their country its old frontier on the Oder and the Neisse. They would never forget the brotherly and unselfish help given to them in the reconstruction of their national economy.

23. The Polish people were proud of the opportunity they had had to fight hand in hand with the Soviet army and to share in its victorious march to Berlin. They were proud to join with the Soviet Union in its fight for peace in the United Nations.

24. Mr. Wierblowski wished to state categorically that Poland's relations with the USSR were based on mutual respect for each other's sovereign rights and national interests. He also wished to add that the friendship of the Polish and Soviet people, sealed by blood shed in common, represented a valuable contribution to the cause of peace. That friendship was unshakable.

25. Many representatives had, of course, spoken for peace. Some of them unfortunately had only paid lip service to peace, and great was the gap between their words and their deeds. The most frenzied preparations for war were in fact being made by some of the countries whose representatives had been most eloquent in defending the blatantly hypocritical draft resolution of the First Committee. Mr. Wierblowski was forced to remind members of the Assembly of the North Atlantic Treaty which had been concluded in violation of the Charter, and of the agreements on United States military aid in connexion with that Treaty. He would also remind

them of the constant travellings of United States generals in preparation for war.

26. The dean of the United States House of Representatives, Mr. Sabath of Illinois, himself had said that the North Atlantic Treaty was the beginning of the third world war, and he had added that those who had enriched themselves by war were unfortunately stirring up mass hysteria through the Press and radio and trying to deprive the people of the United States of the peace they had won at the cost of thousands of lives.

27. United States losses could be reckoned in thousands. The Soviet Union had lost 17 million men, who had fallen for the cause of peace in the struggle against the nazi aggressors. Poland had lost 6 million men, who had given their lives for freedom and to prevent a repetition of the holocaust.

28. The *Christian Century*, a paper published in the United States, had stated in an article about the North Atlantic Treaty that United States foreign policy was warlike, that it had been conceived in military circles and could be understood only by them. On the same subject, Senator Taft, whom it would be difficult to suspect of sympathy towards the progressive popular movements represented by the people's democracies, had stated that he thought United States foreign policy and the North Atlantic Treaty in no way corresponded to the principles of the United Nations and the obligations which the United States had accepted under the Charter. He had gone on to say that the fact that the greatest nation in the world was arming a number of other nations against a single nation was, in itself, a threat. It had seemed to him that the United States was turning its back on the successes which had been achieved on the road to a peaceful world.

29. The Polish delegation condemned that policy which, in the eyes of all reasonable people, could only have disastrous results. That was the main reason why the Polish delegation would vote for paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution, which stated the truth without ambiguity and indicated who were the real war-mongers.

30. When it condemned war-mongering, Poland knew that it was defending the vital interests not only of the peoples of the countries which had suffered most as a result of the Second World War, but also of the peoples of those countries whose Governments were placing still heavier burdens on the working classes, despite the decreasing incomes of those classes, by spending millions on armaments and preparations for war. Surely the millions of American dollars which had been spent to finance the cold war and on preparations for a shooting war could have been used for the construction of schools and hospitals, even in the wealthy United States.

31. The General Assembly could give no better proof of its desire for peace than by condemning those who were preparing for a new war. It was claimed that armaments, military bases and increased military budgets were required merely for purposes of defence, and that they were evidence of the lack of confidence which was displayed in international relations. It was an odd method of defence for one Power to build bases throughout the world in the territories of other

States and in dependent territories. Such a method of defence was merely an attempt to gain imperialistic control over those territories and over the world. It had nothing in common with the maintenance of peace. Such empires always led to war and conquest, and the conquerors divided the booty among themselves. The era of the rise of empires was gone forever; the world was witnessing their decline, for there was no place in the world for any sort of empire. It would be timely to recall that the United States and other States which had signed the United Nations Charter had assumed the obligation to refrain from a policy of extending their empires.

32. To attempt to explain international tension by the lack of confidence in international relations was merely to misrepresent the question. It was an argument frequently employed by the United Kingdom representative, who had stated that confidence in international relations was a necessary prerequisite to a reduction of armaments. The argument was quite without foundation, as it was clear that the growth of armaments increased the tension in international relations. Confidence in the peaceful development of international relations could be secured only by a cessation of the armaments race; while that race continued, lack of faith and fear would grow. International economic co-operation was stifled by the fear of war; the standards of living of the masses throughout the world were thereby lowered.

33. Thus the delegation of the United Kingdom and other delegations were not proposing a direct way to strengthen the peace and to end the cold war and the threat of war as quickly as possible, but a means of aggravating the existing intolerable position in international affairs by means of the armaments race. That was the only solution proposed in the draft resolution of the First Committee.

34. The draft resolution appeared insignificant; in fact, it was designed to create a diversion and to do harm. If that were the only answer the United Nations could give to the difficult international situation, the fact was not only sad but also dangerous. The cold war, the armaments race, and the active preparations for real war were facts, and the United Nations was doing absolutely nothing to improve the situation. It was hard to imagine what answer the representatives of the various States in the Assembly could give the people in their countries who asked what the United Nations was doing to improve the international situation and to strengthen peace.

35. The draft resolution of the First Committee recommended that States should agree to a limitation of sovereignty in connexion with the control of atomic energy. The Soviet Union had agreed to periodic control of all undertakings producing atomic energy and had thereby proved that it was ready to relinquish as much of its national sovereignty as was essential for the effective functioning of the system of collective security within the framework of the United Nations. But neither of the authors of the joint draft resolution adopted by the First Committee, namely, the United States and the United Kingdom, had so far shown any intention of relinquishing even the smallest part of their sovereignty to the United Nations.

36. The Polish representative did not wish to deal with such important questions as disarmament, the control of atomic energy or the prohibition of the use of the atomic bomb. But even where minor questions were concerned, the settlement of which would expedite the work of the United Nations, the United States persistently stressed its rights in relation to the United Nations, thereby restricting the Organization's already limited rights at its headquarters. Not only the sovereignty of the United States but the rights of individual States, and New York State in particular, were placed above the rights of the United Nations. The numerous conditions and reservations in the agreements signed by the United States bore witness to the particular emphasis which the United States placed on sovereignty when it affected its own interests.

37. The United States jealously guarded the privileges and rights connected with its sovereignty but at the same time coolly suggested that the sovereignty of other States should be curtailed in favour of a super-sovereignty of the United States. Senator Thomas's visit to Sweden was an outstanding example of the way in which certain important people in the United States envisaged that super-sovereignty. The Senator had made the trip to see to what use European aid under the Marshall Plan was being put. When he had left Stockholm, he had publicly expressed his dissatisfaction at the lack of respect shown to him in Sweden. He, a mere Senator from Oklahoma, had stated that he would not agree to any further credits for Sweden.

38. The draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom and adopted by the First Committee concealed the true intentions of its authors, whereas the USSR draft resolution drew concrete conclusions from the actual state of affairs. The latter draft was based on the just point of view that a non-aggression pact between the five great Powers would be a real step to ending the cold war and to preparing the way for peaceful co-operation between all Powers; it was designed to end the feelings of distrust which were troubling millions of people throughout the world. It was not true to say that the proposed pact would violate the rights of small States. It merely stressed the particular and unquestionable responsibility of the great Powers for international peace and security.

39. The five-Power pact would be a logical consequence of the Moscow Declaration of October 1943 and the agreements reached at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. Mr. Wierblowski recalled paragraph 7 of the Moscow Declaration, which stated that its authors would consult together and co-operate with each other and with other Members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period. At Teheran, the representatives of the three Powers had stated that they fully recognized the supreme responsibility resting upon them and on all the United Nations to make a peace that would command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and would banish the scourge and horror of war for many generations. The Yalta Declaration stated that only with the continuing and growing co-operation and understanding among the three

great Powers and all peace-loving nations could the highest aspiration of humanity—secure and lasting peace—be realized.

40. In 1945, President Roosevelt had stated in one of his last messages to Congress that the great Powers of the world must continue to work together untiringly and assume joint responsibility for the solution of any problems which might threaten world peace. Though they would not always find the ideal answers, they must assume the responsibility for peaceful co-operation or for a new world conflict.

41. Those principles had never been put into practice. The United States and the United Kingdom had chosen to achieve their selfish aims by means of the cold war, the armaments race and the atomic bomb.

42. The Soviet Union draft resolution was an attempt to put those principles into practice. Mr. Wierblowski wondered how that draft resolution could fail to be adopted since it was based on principles which had been jointly adopted such a long time before.

43. When he had opened the fourth session of the General Assembly (220th meeting), the President had expressed the hope that it would go down into history as the Peace Assembly. He had undoubtedly hoped that it would relieve the tense political atmosphere and facilitate the solution of those questions which constituted a barrier to the peaceful co-existence of nations; he had hoped that the United Nations would finally fulfil its basic purposes in the sphere of collective security and in the economic, social and humanitarian fields. He had taken certain steps in that direction.

44. The fourth session was drawing to a close. Mr. Wierblowski wondered whether the President's hopes would be fulfilled and whether the Assembly would achieve any concrete results in the most important sphere, that of peace. He was regretfully obliged to answer in the negative. The fourth session of the General Assembly had not brought the expected decrease in international tension.

45. A number of the resolutions adopted during the session were evidence of the fact that the previous policy of ignoring the principles of international co-operation and violating both the spirit and the letter of the Charter had not been abandoned. The USSR draft resolution had not yet been put to the vote, but Mr. Wierblowski was sure that the Assembly, like the First Committee, would again let slip a real opportunity to take a creative and epoch-making step which might ensure peace throughout the world. The course of the discussion, and the fact that the USSR draft resolution had been rejected in Committee without any attempt to find a compromise, proved that the United States and the United Kingdom were making use of the majority they commanded in order to oppose any return to normal international relationships and any form of peaceful co-operation. Instead of agreement, those countries used dictatorial methods and indulged in slanderous attacks against the Soviet Union.

46. In the eyes of the world, however, the USSR draft resolution would remain a real attempt to ensure peace for the millions of people who longed for it, who needed it and who would

eventually achieve it, thereby saving the prestige of the United Nations. Hypocrisy, lies, noisy debates and base abuse would not belittle the significance of that draft resolution. Regardless of its ultimate fate and the results of the work accomplished at the fourth session, world opinion understood which countries really desired peace, and what country led the peace-loving nations.

47. The mechanical majority subservient to the dictatorship of the United Kingdom and the United States rejected any proposals which might advance the work of the United Nations, but they were not in a position to hide the truth about the profound conflicts of interests between the nations grouped around the United States. It was sufficient to recall the restoration on the Rhine of an aggressive and militarist Germany to realize how deep a conflict existed between the capitalist States on the German question. The Polish representative also recalled the conflicting interests of the United Kingdom, France and the United States in the matter of the restoration of a capitalist Western Europe based, at the expense of the interests of British and French industry, on heavy industry in the Ruhr Basin.

48. Co-operation between the Marshall Plan countries was another part of the same problem and was well illustrated by the devaluation of currencies in the countries receiving Marshall Plan aid. There were similar conflicts in other parts of the world where the vital interests of certain nations clashed with the imperialist expansion of the dollar. The fact that those States voted with the United States in no way proved that the opponents of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies were united in a single coalition ruled by peace and agreement.

49. Poland would continue to work unceasingly in the cause of peace. Above all, it would strive to secure a better future for humanity and to ensure that wars should cease to be a means of solving fundamental social and international disputes. With the support of many millions of people throughout the world, who were stubbornly and unceasingly striving for peace, Poland would energetically oppose the plans of the warmongers. The Polish delegation would leave the fourth session of the General Assembly in the knowledge that it was not to blame for the lack of any serious achievements. The final verdict would not be pronounced by the mechanical majority of delegations present at the Assembly, but by world public opinion.

50. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) recalled that for fifteen years, on various occasions, there had been talk of peace offensives, a term which had sprung from totalitarian practices.

51. It had been a hitlerian method. Hitler had frequently used it immediately after some act of violence. He had done so in particular after the invasion of Poland. Having settled that country's fate to suit himself and consolidated the settlement by an agreement in the East, he had indicated that he was ready to deal with the West provided that it was on the same basis, namely, that of the *fait accompli*. If the offer were accepted, the gain was confirmed. If it were refused, offer and refusal were used for propaganda purposes. But the assumption that it would be accepted was always admitted and often preferred.

52. Another and an original method of making an offensive had been evolved. Mr. Vyshinsky had made an offer of a pact which he presented as an offer of peace, but he did not think that his offer had the slightest chance of being accepted. He was sure in advance—he had said so plainly—that it would be rejected. It was not surprising, therefore, that the text was unacceptable; Mr. Vyshinsky had doubtless been careful to make it so. For the USSR did not desire an agreement; it expected and counted upon a refusal, which it proposed to use to its own advantage.

53. During a statement of some length, a representative worked himself up, gesticulated, struck the table, accused his hearers of every crime—the word was in the records—proffered insults and threats. That was his way of making a peace offer. Such peace was very strange and was worth investigating.

54. Peace was not a mere word. It was not enough to talk about. If peace were to be transformed from a word into a fact, it must be nurtured not merely by words but by action, and that action must be of a practical nature. What was required was not simply the definition of general principles, but an attempt to solve, in concrete terms, the particular issues to which those principles applied.

55. The current difficulties, those which had confronted the First Committee in its discussion of the question under consideration and the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee in its discussion of the question of control of atomic energy,¹ were not difficulties of wording but of substance. The current tension, which everybody felt and the effects of which were feared by most, was caused by the fact that no solution was visible on any important problem. What was being offered as a token of peace was not a solution of substance but a procedural solution, cloaked in solemn declarations couched in oft-repeated and general terms which experience had shown to be futile.

56. If the USSR draft resolution were adopted, the United Nations would have condemned war and certain methods of war, and a pact would be concluded. It might be added, incidentally, that logically speaking there was no need for a condemnation of certain methods of warfare in a condemnation of war. But there had already been a pact—the Briand-Kellogg Pact—solemnly outlawing war. And the Treaty of Locarno had been concluded. And the League of Nations had taken steps to the same end. Yet the Second World War had broken out, during which methods had been used which could scarcely be surpassed in thoroughness and horror. If the USSR draft resolution were adopted, there would be a pact, but all the problems would still remain to be solved. Mr. Chauvel did not see, therefore, in what way the solution would have been brought nearer.

57. He reminded the Assembly that he had asked Mr. Vyshinsky some questions about the exact meaning and practical scope of his draft resolution. Mr. Vyshinsky had failed to answer any of them; or rather, he had answered them, as he had answered those of all other speakers.

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 30th to 37th meetings inclusive.*

en bloc. He had not answered specific questions about the USSR draft resolution; he had, however, replied to the general question, the fundamental question, raised both by the resolution adopted at the 254th meeting on the control of atomic energy and by the draft resolution of the First Committee defining the essentials of peace, the draft which was under discussion at the current meeting. When asked to acknowledge that collective security should take precedence over the individual rights of States, he had replied, as usual, in the negative. He had gone further. More explicit than he had been on other occasions, he had enlarged upon his negative reply. He had stated with regard to atomic energy, for example, that he refused to agree to the quota system and why he refused to agree. That was of the utmost importance.

58. Mr. Chauvel recalled that on 4 November 1948,¹ Mr. Vyshinsky had stated that one of the most important problems connected with the international control of atomic energy was the problem of regulating the production of atomic energy, including the appropriate distribution among countries of quotas of atomic raw materials. He had said, moreover, that according to the statements of authoritative scientists, the establishment of such a system of quotas would ensure a due balance between the interests of those countries and those of the United Nations as a whole.

59. Mr. Chauvel considered that that statement showed clearly that the representative of the Soviet Union changed his mind during the previous six months. However, it was for a different reason that he regarded Mr. Vyshinsky's latest rejection as a matter of capital importance.

60. To say that the existence of the atomic weapon dominated the international scene was to flog a dead horse. No one denied it. However, forty-nine States had recently recognized that the prohibition and outlawing of atomic weapons were not possible or even conceivable without the genuine implementation of an effective system of control.

61. The question was what that system of control was, or rather, what it should be.

62. It had not, perhaps, been made sufficiently clear during the discussions in the Assembly that the control must be exercised not in respect of atomic bombs but in respect of atomic energy. It was not a question of counting existing bombs, or of guarding them, or destroying them, or preventing their manufacture. What was important was not only, or essentially, to prevent the manufacture of bombs, but to control the production of energy. Control must be exercised in respect of nuclear material itself. The reason was very simple.

63. Once the process was known, the manufacture of the bomb was a simple and rapid operation and required no extensive plant. The long, complicated, difficult and expensive process was the preparation of the nuclear material. Any State in possession of a sufficient quantity of that material could easily and rapidly manufacture bombs without any elaborate equipment. However, until the last moment, the moment when the nuclear material was introduced into the bomb,

it was equally and indifferently usable for peaceful or warlike purposes.

64. Thus, at the very moment when peace was spoken of, when an alleged offer of peace was being made, the sole effective method of safeguarding peace against the most deadly threat of all times was being rejected.

65. Mr. Chauvel considered that the effect of Mr. Vyshinsky's rejection was in fact incalculable.

66. Mr. Vyshinsky had mentioned the peaceful uses to which atomic energy had been put in his country, claiming—without any further details than that mountains had been moved and rivers diverted as announced by the Tass Agency—that they were more advanced in the USSR than anywhere else. He had mentioned the ever-increasing needs of Soviet economy. He had finally refused, on the basis of the above, to agree to any international control of national atomic production.

67. It was obvious that the representative of the Soviet Union, on the pretext of being concerned with atomic matters, was thus rejecting international control of the most dangerous war potential in the world. Surely, that was the most striking illustration which could be found of the refusal of the USSR, officially registered by two votes, both to restrict individual exercise of its rights of sovereignty as far as might be necessary to ensure peace and world security, and to pool for common purposes, as far as might be necessary, the exercise of the same rights.

68. The arguments on which the USSR representative based his refusal were no less remarkable. He had stated that the international authority which would control atomic energy would be a tool of Washington or, more accurately, of Wall Street. Such modesty was touching. Without wishing to vex anyone, Mr. Chauvel pointed out that all countries did not always have the same influence everywhere and in all circumstances. So far it seemed that while all had the chance of making themselves heard, some had their own ways of making themselves listened to.

69. Mr. Vyshinsky had also said that the sole object of the majority plan was to enable the United States services to obtain information on the USSR war machine. The participation of the Soviet Union in the international control would, however, provide the USSR services with exactly the same means of obtaining information on the military machine of the United States and some other countries. Surely the fact that the USSR and the United States would henceforth have at their disposal the same categories of weapons, put those two Powers on exactly the same footing as far as that type of information was concerned.

70. Finally, no effort was spared to enlarge on the greed of the United States for information and power. The Assembly had to listen to long extracts from *The New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune* or other equally confidential publications, the conclusion being that there were in existence a Marshall Plan, a North Atlantic Treaty and a Brussels Treaty, and that the United States was organizing its armed forces, was co-ordinating those forces with those of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and was granting those States assistance designed to ensure their reconstruction. Thus, bit by bit, a

¹ See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, 156th plenary meeting.*

threatening tentacled monster was being created against which any defence was good.

71. Mr. Vyshinsky had great advantages in that respect. The western countries had parliaments which voted budgets and ratified treaties and pacts. Thus, the contents of budgets were common knowledge, as were the treaties and pacts. They were discussed publicly and freely. They were not only discussed in parliament but also in the Press, which was free. Responsible people made specific statements about them, which were reproduced everywhere. In addition to those sources, numerous memoranda were published, especially in the United States, by high officials on returning to private life. Finally, people were also free to move about within the territories of the western countries. It was evident that in Moscow, diplomats had daily or periodic reading material which was less plentiful and that within the confines of the area in which they could move, which was a few kilometres, they had fewer subjects for observation. Mr. Chauvel referred to Moscow because practically no foreigners other than diplomats stationed in Moscow were authorized to reside in the USSR.

72. It was true that there was a North Atlantic Treaty, a Marshall Plan and a Brussels Treaty, and that all the parties to those treaties and to the plan were determined to do what was expected of them to make them as effective as possible.

73. The conclusion of treaties was not, however, the sole prerogative of the West. Mr. Chauvel recalled that between 12 December 1943 and 21 July 1948, twenty-two political treaties had been signed between eastern European States, and that the USSR had itself been a party to six of those treaties.

74. Furthermore, it was wrong to assert that the policy of which that plan and those treaties were the implementation was directed against the USSR and had been conceived as an instrument of attack or even of defence against that country. It had been a question of establishing peace and of reconstructing the world. That effort had been constantly misunderstood by the Soviet Union, which had moreover rejected two basic methods of co-operation, namely, the Byrnes plan, which had been a possible basis for joint action in Germany, and the Marshall Plan. It was not Mr. Marshall who had excluded the USSR from his plan; it was the USSR which had refused to reply to the appeal of the United States Secretary of State, dragging Poland along with it and forcing a *volte-face* upon Czechoslovakia in circumstances which were well known.

75. Little was known of the military machine of the Soviet Union. The West had been informed about an atomic explosion in the USSR not by Moscow but by Washington. The forces which the Soviet Union currently had at its disposal were unknown. In the First Committee, the United Kingdom representative had quoted some figures. Those figures had not been challenged. They were substantial and were out of comparison with the united forces of Western Europe. It was sufficient to glance at a map to realize that those forces at the moment covered an area stretching from Vladivostok to Eisenach, which brought them up to a line 350 kilometres from the French frontier.

76. Since 23 August 1939, to mention Europe alone, the Soviet Union had absorbed most of the former territory of Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, the Karelian Isthmus, Viborg, Petsamo, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, East Prussia and Ruthenia. It had also, in circumstances which had attracted some attention, secured exclusive influence over Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania.

77. Confronted with such a picture, Mr. Chauvel thought that the threatening and tentacled monster summoned up by the USSR delegation reverted to its true stature and significance. Admittedly there was a Brussels Treaty, a Marshall Plan, a North Atlantic Treaty. Yet transcending all, there was also a Charter of the United Nations. To that France was faithful.

78. Such, for Mr. Chauvel, was the meaning of the discussion which had begun with the opening of the session and was still continuing in the Assembly. The terms of that discussion had been embodied in the draft resolutions of the First Committee and in the draft resolution of the USSR.

79. France, both orally and by its vote, supported the First Committee's draft, which was really nothing other than the Charter and the principles on which the Charter was founded, the principles essential for the achievement and maintenance of any peace which would still leave man a reason for living and in which man would be free. It was not merely to an empirical freedom or a political freedom that he was referring.

80. In the beginning, man, the savage, had become aware of the world. That awareness had been empirical. Then he had formed an idea of the world. Next, the strongest or the most numerous men had sought to impose their ideas of the world on other men and, more often than not, they had succeeded. Later men had come to admit that others' ideas of the world might differ from their own. Thus, as the culmination of a long evolution, there was born tolerance, the slow and patient conquest of civilization and of civilized man by which human personality had developed and grown strong. Yet, in 1949, anyone who spoke of tolerance had too often to feel that he was a voice crying in the wilderness.

81. Man stood in need of defence and not defence against sickness, hunger and war only. He needed to be defended against the distortions and extravagances of his own mind, against himself. To do so it was necessary to be human.

82. It might have been thought that in the presence of that simple and universal phenomenon, death, the USSR had become humanized. After the war, when the danger was over, other countries had found again the same State, with its hardheadedness, its demands and its incompatibilities.

83. It was Mr. Chauvel's ardent hope that, faced with that new danger—the greatest mankind had ever known—in the face of that prowling menace to all mankind, the countries of the world might find themselves dealing, no longer with adversaries or with persistent questioners, but with creatures of flesh and blood whose minds were open to conviction.

84. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the USSR draft resolution

became especially important at a time when the horrors of the recent war were still fresh in the minds of all peoples and when the world-wide movement of the peoples in the cause of peace was meeting with frantic resistance from the war-mongers and their accomplices who were giving themselves free rein in the United States and the United Kingdom in particular. That draft resolution also acquired especial value from the fact that it took into account the important changes which had appeared on the international scene in the post-war period and particularly in the period which had elapsed between the third and fourth sessions of the General Assembly.

85. Everyone knew that, as a result of the Second World War, such great capitalist States as Germany, Italy and Japan, the fascist and militaristic leading circles of which had been responsible for launching a war of aggression on peace-loving peoples, had collapsed. Although they had emerged from the war as conquerors, a number of other capitalist European States was also in a difficult position. It was enough to mention the case of France, which, having become economically, politically and militarily dependent on the United States, had in fact been reduced to the status of a second-class Power. The position of the United Kingdom was equally seriously impaired, for it was forced to retreat all along the line under the pressure of the United States, which was gradually taking over the British Dominions and colonies.

86. The war had given a tremendous impetus to the unequal growth of capitalism. It had brought about the collapse of numerous capitalist States and given the United States the leading part in the capitalist world.

87. Although the United States monopolies had reaped profits without precedent in history out of the war, and although the United States had in fact lived in peace for eighty years and was currently making weaker countries bear all the consequences of the war, it had not been able to escape the economic crisis which had grown much worse as a result of the Second World War. In point of fact, all the links in the capitalist chain were indissolubly joined together.

88. It was in that atmosphere of crisis, aggravated by the decay of capitalism, which condemned the masses of the people to unemployment and poverty, that a series of countries in Eastern Europe had escaped from the capitalist orbit and had established people's democratic régimes enabling them to build their future life on socialist foundations.

89. China, which for long years had been subject to foreign aggression, to the intestine struggles of war-lords fomented by foreigners, and to exploitation by so-called civilizers from abroad, allied to the feudal lords, had no longer been willing to accept its colonial status. Having freed itself from the yoke of the Japanese invaders, the great Chinese people had finally become masters in their own house, had put an end to the sufferings of 450 million souls, had finally swept away the rotting régime of the Kuomintang, and had assured itself a free and independent existence.

90. It would be very naive to think that a war on so vast a scale as that from which humanity had just emerged would not give rise to impor-

tant changes affecting States and peoples, and that the world could return to the *status quo ante bellum*. Only a madman would say, as did the instigators of war, that the Soviet Union was the cause of all the misfortunes suffered by the capitalist system. History showed that before the birth of the USSR, wars, even unimportant wars, had always left traces behind them and had considerably affected the development of various countries.

91. It was common knowledge that twice in the thirty-two years of its history, the USSR had been obliged to defend itself against the aggression of the capitalist countries. No one would dare to allege that it was the young Soviet Socialist Republic which had attacked the capitalist world in 1918-1920. On the contrary, that republic had been attacked by the British, the Americans, the Japanese, the French, the Turks, the Germans, the Polish reactionaries, the Finnish reactionaries, the mercenaries of the Baltic countries—by the troops of fourteen States in all. Nor would anyone dare to allege that it was the Soviet Union which had been guilty, in 1941, of aggression against nazi Germany and its vassals.

92. All that did not prevent the United States and the United Kingdom from stating today that capitalism was on the defensive and that it was communism which was guilty of aggression. To mask the true aims of the United States and the United Kingdom, which were preparing a new war, a member of the First Committee had even declared that wars of modern banditry were not caused by imperialist cliques, that it was not the United States and the United Kingdom which were preparing war, but that the real instigators to war were Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels who, in 1848, had drawn up the *Communist Manifesto*. Such assertions were ludicrous, since there had been wars both before and after the publication of that manifesto. Thus the Napoleonic wars of conquest could hardly be laid to the door of communism. But perhaps the communists were responsible for the Crimean War of 1854, or for the Franco-Prussian war of 1870?

93. The second half of the nineteenth century, during which capitalism had entered the stage of imperialist development, had been filled with wars of conquest. During that period, the working-class movement had been controlled by social-democratic, reformist and collaborationist parties rather than by communists.

94. Only persons totally devoid of scruples could say that it had been the communists who had been responsible for the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the Spanish-American War for the Philippines of 1898, the Boer War of 1899, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and the Balkan Wars of 1911 to 1913. It was common knowledge that the communists had most vigorously opposed the world war of 1914 to 1918 and had been jailed, deported, hanged and shot for it, under the pretext that they were guilty of high treason. That had not prevented certain members of the First Committee, speaking as the theoreticians of the Anglo-American bloc, from saying that it had been the leaders of the working class who had been responsible for the outbreak of the First World War.

95. All the wars to which Mr. Manuilsky had referred, with the exception of the First World War, had been local in character. On the other hand, the purpose of the war which the ruling circles in the United States and the United Kingdom were currently preparing was not the seizure of one territory or another or even of one continent or another; it was to enable them to establish their domination over the entire world. By means of such a war, the ruling circles in the United States hoped to set the house of capitalism in order and rehabilitate a system ruined by two world wars.

96. On many occasions the Soviet delegations had proved that it was in the United States and in the United Kingdom that a new war was being prepared. It was in those countries that the plot against the peace of the world was being hatched. It was in those countries that plans for aggression against the USSR were being made. In the United States in particular, war hysteria was being encouraged and the cult of the atomic bomb was being created; the bomb was to be the universal instrument whereby the American monopolies could establish their dominion over all the countries and all the peoples of the world. It was in the United States that barbarous calls were heard for the destruction of cities and the mass slaughter of peaceful populations. Whole volumes could be filled with statements which were more serious crimes than the worst actions of gangsters. Mr. Manuilsky stressed the fact that he was quite aware of the responsibility he was taking in making that statement.

97. He could also recall the remarks of United States General Clay who, on 21 November 1949, had stated that the United States had been preparing to conduct military operations in the future theatre of European operations with the help of German infantry, the artillery of the Benelux countries, French armoured troops and the British navy. He could also recall a statement by the well-known Senator Cannon who, on 13 April 1948, had said that in the next war the United States might perhaps not need to send infantry to Europe. He had added that the United States should equip the troops of other countries and send the young men of those countries to their death in the place of the United States soldiers. He could also recall statements by Field Marshal Montgomery, or by Mr. Churchill, whom the British people had repudiated.

98. If the General Assembly wished to maintain the dignity of the United Nations and respect for the Charter it should, in accordance with its resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947, demand that the United States Government should bring before the law courts those who had been guilty of having advocated the use of atomic weapons. The General Assembly should have insisted that the names of those guilty persons and the punishments inflicted on them should be made known to the whole world. However, most of the delegations in the General Assembly preferred to close their eyes to that situation. They preferred to pretend that they knew nothing of the war preparations which were being made in the United States and in the United Kingdom, and asked the Soviet delegations to produce evidence.

99. Surely the extraordinary increase in the military budgets of the United States and the United Kingdom was proof in itself. The statements of President Truman made it clear to the whole world that the direct and indirect expenditure of the United States for purposes of war constituted nearly 70 per cent of the whole budget.

100. The existence in different parts of the world of 484 United States military bases, most of which were located around the Soviet Union, tended to confirm the fact that the United States was preparing for war.

101. No one could describe as the mere figment of journalists' imagination the signature of pacts of aggression, plans for rearming European States, and the trips of United States generals throughout Europe to supervise the execution of those plans. And what should be said of the feverish activity of the war factories, of the stockpiling of raw materials of strategic importance, of the militarization and the activity of the United States? All those facts proved that war preparation had gone beyond the stage of mere propaganda, and that the stage of practical measures of organization had been reached.

102. The behaviour of persons who closed their eyes to events of that kind recalled the hypocrisy of the signatories to the Munich Agreement, who had attempted to divert hitlerite aggression towards the East, against the Soviet Union, and at the same time to mislead the peoples by alleging that the Munich Agreement was a peace pact, that they had no knowledge of aggressive plans on the part of nazi Germany, and that the warnings of the USSR were nothing but propaganda. Those had been the actions of the persons on whose behalf the French representative had addressed the General Assembly.

103. Nevertheless, the whole course of events during the Second World War had proved that the warnings of the Soviet Union had been well founded. As far back as 1936, when the Governments of the United Kingdom and France had been lulling their peoples with the illusion of peace, Generalissimo Stalin had stated in his interview with Mr. Howard that there were two hotbeds of war, one in the West, in Germany, and the other in the Far East, in Japan. If the politicians of the western world had realized then the wisdom of the leader of the Soviet people and had accepted the proposals made by the Government of the USSR for the adoption of collective security measures against the two aggressors, war could certainly have been averted and the lives of tens of millions of men could have been saved.

104. It would have seemed that that lesson, which proved the blindness and malevolence of those who had then guided the destinies of the western Powers, should have been of use to the Governments of the States Members of the United Nations. But the contrary was true. The representatives of those Governments were indignant that the USSR draft resolution named two States—the United States and the United Kingdom—as potential foci of war in the existing circumstances. No attempt had, however, been made to prove that that was not the case. No one had tried to refute the facts set out by the leader of the USSR delegation. The Soviet Union considered it to be its bounden duty to the United

Nations and to peace-loving peoples to state who was responsible for the preparation for a new war. It was impossible to ignore the truth for diplomatic reasons when the prevention of war and the maintenance of international peace and security were at stake.

105. In order to explain their refusal to accept the USSR peace proposals, the enemies of peace asserted that those proposals were insincere. What was the basis for such statements? Everyone knew that the military budget of the Soviet Union was a peace-time budget and that the military expenditure of the USSR represented only 19 per cent of the total budget. It could not be alleged that the Soviet Union was establishing bases on foreign territory in order to launch an aggressive war against the United States or the United Kingdom. No one could accuse the USSR of concluding aggressive pacts. Its agreements with its neighbours did not exceed the scope of the treaties which the Soviet Union had concluded with France and the United Kingdom. Neither the rulers of the USSR nor its Press or radio had launched appeals for aggression against the United States or the United Kingdom or had asked that atomic weapons be used against American or British cities. Mr. Manuilsky challenged any one to refute those statements.

106. The peaceful policy of the Soviet Union had its origins in the very principles of socialist structure and in the very nature of the Soviet State, which had put an end to the exploitation of man by man and to the oppression of one nation by another, had established fraternal co-operation between races and nations, and had liquidated once and for all the policy whereby the welfare of a State had to be based upon the oppression of other States.

107. Soviet economy was not beset with crises, unemployment, or any of the other contradictions which were inherent in capitalist society; in spite of the extensive destruction caused by the war, the economy of the USSR was being rehabilitated at a rate unknown in the capitalist world.

108. The Soviet Union and the people's democracies did not need a war, since they were developing, growing and progressing incessantly. The States with socialist systems had no reason to fear the peaceful rivalry of capitalist States. Their policy was just, because it took into account the changes that had taken place in the world. The States which wished for war were those which were on the road to ruin, those which feared the peaceful emulation of the two systems, and those which, refused, with blind obstinacy, to recognize that a new source of strength had been established and which were trying to modify the position for their own profit. That was an adventurer's policy which threatened world peace and was directed against the interests of the people of the United States themselves. The people of the United States were beginning to understand that if the war-mongers were to succeed in bringing about a new holocaust, disaster would also strike their women and children.

109. The USSR, basing itself upon the doctrines of Lenin and Stalin, countered that policy of adventure pursued by the aggressive circles in the United States and the United Kingdom by a policy advocating the lasting co-existence of the two economic systems; their co-operation, the

peaceful settlement of the differences existing between them, and the development of commercial and economic relations between the socialist and the capitalist systems.

110. That policy of the Soviet Union, which was based upon mutual interests, had proved its value in the period between the two wars and during the Second World War, and enjoyed the support of the working masses throughout the world. Only war-mongers could assert that co-operation between the socialist and the capitalist systems was impossible owing to ideological differences. Ideology in itself had never been a source of war, since it was a mere superstructure which reflected the interests of certain groups of States. All the talk of an ideological war emanated from the enemies of peace, whose sole intention was to prevent the establishment of co-operation between the United States and the USSR.

111. Neither ideological differences, nor differences in the social and political structure of States, nor the opposition of the two economic systems, could prevent the establishment of co-operation between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world if there was a sincere wish for such co-operation on both sides.

112. In his conversation with an important member of the United States Republican Party on 9 April 1947, Generalissimo Stalin had told his visitor, who had asked whether opposite economic systems could co-operate, that obviously such co-operation was possible. The political systems of Germany and the United States had been similar, but that had not prevented the outbreak of war between those two countries. The economic systems of the United States and the USSR were different, but those countries had co-operated during the war and had fought side by side. If co-operation between those two systems could be achieved in time of war, why should that not be possible in time of peace? Co-operation was possible if there was a wish to co-operate. Generalissimo Stalin had said that the peoples and the Communist Party of the USSR had that wish. Mr. Manuilsky would like those words to be engraved in letters of gold in the United Nations and, perhaps, in the United States Congress as well.

113. The peaceful proposals submitted by the Soviet Union faithfully reflected that attitude. The refusal of the United States and the United Kingdom to accept the USSR draft resolution proved, on the contrary, that they refused to co-operate with the Soviet Union in maintaining international peace and security.

114. All lovers of peace would realize the consequences if the General Assembly adopted the USSR draft resolution.

115. The condemnation of war preparations, and the designation by name of the States that were carrying out those preparations, would prove that the United Nations was an active instrument for the maintenance of peace, that it was an independent body whose position was above the individual and selfish interests of its Members, and that it was a body which defended the interests of all countries and all persons which did not want war.

116. The condemnation of the war preparations which were being carried on by the United States

and the United Kingdom would be in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Mr. Manuilsky added that the Charter could not be violated with impunity, since it would be a grave mistake to think that the peoples could still be deceived as they had been deceived in the time of the League of Nations of unhappy memory. Anyone who adopted that attitude would be playing with fire.

117. Only by stating the question of responsibility for the preparations for war directly, frankly and honestly could the General Assembly force the United States and the United Kingdom to modify the aggressive tendencies of their foreign policies. Any manifestation of weakness or cowardice, or any concession to the aggressive circles of the United States and the United Kingdom, would merely increase their folly and give them the impression that they could act as they wished with impunity. Such an acceptance of the aggressive intentions of the ruling circles of the United States and the United Kingdom could lead only to the ruin of the United Nations.

118. Although the Soviet Union had known the secret of the manufacture of atomic weapons for a long time, it had proposed that they should be prohibited and that strict international control should be imposed to ensure that that prohibition was observed. The adoption of that proposal would make it possible to abolish atomic weapons and to take an important step forward in the path of the reduction of all types of armaments. Obviously the peoples of the whole world would joyfully welcome such a decision on the part of the General Assembly, as had been proved by the recent movements of public opinion in all countries, including the United States, which called for an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the prohibition of atomic weapons.

119. In those circumstances, Mr. Manuilsky could not but express astonishment at the speech made by the United States representative, which showed that the United States atomic experts were persistently playing for time by indulging in academic discussions, as the representative of France had done, and were trying to solve the problem on the basis of theoretical calculations which could not stand the test of experience, instead of on the basis of actual facts. It should not be forgotten that the prime concern of all countries, both the economically developed ones and the under-developed ones, was that atomic energy should be used solely for peaceful purposes.

120. Finally, a pact for the strengthening of peace would immediately put an end to the existing tension in international relations and would create that atmosphere of confidence which, according to the opponents of the USSR draft resolution, was a prerequisite for such a pact. It was quite obvious that if an atmosphere of confidence already existed, there would be no need for such an agreement.

121. The opponents of the USSR draft resolution also maintained that it was essential to provide guarantees before a pact for the strengthening of peace could be signed. Even a child would understand that a pact itself would be the best possible guarantee for the maintenance of international peace and security.

122. The USSR proposal that the five permanent members of the Security Council should sign a pact was particularly important because it took into account the new balance of power among those five States. That fact alone sufficed to show how sincerely the Soviet Union desired peace.

123. The draft resolution of the First Committee, which allegedly dealt with the essential requirements for the maintenance of peace, did not in fact mention any of those requirements. The USSR representative had already spoken on that point and Mr. Manuilsky would therefore confine his remarks to the strict minimum. He simply wished to say that certain provisions of the draft resolution constituted violations of the United Nations Charter and of the national sovereignty of States. In other provisions, the wording of the Charter was used the better to cloak proposals aimed at violating the Charter and in order to give an appearance of legality to recommendations whose sole aim was to serve the interests of the Anglo-American bloc.

124. Only the USSR draft resolution provided tangible guarantees for peace, for it showed how to solve the three main problems on which international peace and security depended. It was one of the most important documents ever submitted to the United Nations and its significance could not be belittled by the slander poured on the great socialist countries.

125. The greater the activity of the enemies of the Soviet Union, the more patent was their weakness. The reason for their ardour was that the forces of reaction and war were growing weaker, while those of democracy and peace were becoming stronger every day. Instead of 300 millions as heretofore, 800 million people were joined together in the people's democracies of Europe and Asia and in the great Soviet Socialist country. Hundreds of millions in other countries were taking part in the mighty movement for peace, although the leading circles in those countries continued to prepare for war.

126. Some representatives might see cause for gratification in the illusory victory they had scored in the First Committee. That was a Pyrrhic victory which discredited the victors and lost them the confidence of their own peoples. It was a victory which contained in itself the seeds of future defeat.

127. In conclusion, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR wished to recall the words of one of the most important statesmen in the Soviet Union, Mr. Malenkov, who had declared on 6 November 1949 that his country did not desire war and would do everything possible to prevent it. No one should think that the USSR could be frightened by the clash of arms. The imperialists and aggressors, Mr. Malenkov had said, were those who should fear war. The First World War had been set in motion by the imperialists and had led to the victory of the great October Revolution in the USSR. The Second World War had also been begun by the imperialists and had led to the establishment of people's democracies in a whole group of central and south-east European countries; it had also led to the victory of the Chinese people. Mr. Malenkov had concluded by asking whether anyone could doubt that, if the imperialists started a third world war, they would be digging the grave, not

of any particular capitalist State, but of capitalism itself.

123. Those whom the gods had not made mad should draw the obvious conclusions from history. Despite all the threats made by the United States

and the United Kingdom, the Soviet peoples would continue to defend the cause of peace, as they had always done, in the assurance that it would eventually triumph.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Wednesday, 30 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Condemnation of the preparations for a new war, and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace: report of the First Committee (A/1150) (continued)

1. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) recalled that the representative of the Soviet Union, in his speech at the 257th meeting, had asked why Iran had tried to obtain arms from the United States. The reply was very simple; it needed such arms to ensure that order and security prevailed in its territory.

2. The Iranian army had been disorganized because Iran had put all its arms and all its communications and transport facilities at the disposal of its allies during the war. Mr. Entezam wished to recall, in passing, that the only arsenal in Iran had been employed, during the war, in the manufacture of automatic rifles for the USSR army.

3. Hundreds of thousands of tons of munitions and arms sent to the Soviet Union by the United States had crossed Iran via the Trans-Iranian railroad. The people of Iran had therefore been in danger of famine. They had no regrets, however, because they were convinced that, in a common struggle, all allies, great or small, must contribute to the joint effort.

4. During the war, the whole world had recognized the services rendered by Iran to the allied cause. Therefore, in the declaration which they had signed at the end of the Teheran Conference, Mr. Churchill, President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Stalin had thanked Iran and had promised to assist it after the victory. It was surely not surprising that one of the Allies should try to keep the promises it had thus made.

5. Iran requested arms only to ensure that order and security prevailed within its borders. No representative in the Assembly would question the peaceful intentions of the Government of Iran. No one could think for a moment that Iran was trying to arm itself in order to endanger the existence of its neighbours. Only a few days before (250th meeting), the Shah of Iran had come to the General Assembly to plead the cause of peace. Iran had only one desire; it wished to live in peace with all its neighbours, provided they respected the rights of Iran as Iran respected theirs.

6. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) recalled that Mr. Vyshinsky had accused him of offering no facts, whereas Mr. Vyshinsky had claimed that he himself and the delegations supporting him had offered many facts. The definition of fact was, of course, a curious business in which Mr. Vyshinsky was doubtless very skilled. Mr. McNeil

had certainly not attempted to lay before the First Committee, during the discussion of the question,¹ a whole range of Press cuttings and to maintain that they were fact, nor had he offered sweeping assertions such as Mr. Vyshinsky's reference to 140 bases in one country, while giving the name of only one such base. Mr. McNeil had, however, attempted to deal with some quite simple factual matters.

7. For instance, Mr. McNeil had offered figures relating to the budget proportions of the United Kingdom. Yet at the 258th meeting, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, Mr. Manuilsky, without any reference to that examination, had blandly and emphatically referred once more to those budgets. It was a slogan, and although a slogan might in some situations be an admirable instrument, it was not a substitute for argument and certainly no substitute for fact.

8. Mr. McNeil had tried to draw the attention of the USSR delegation and the First Committee to another single group of figures; he had said that by the best calculations available to him, the Soviet Union had at least four million people mobilized, whereas the United Kingdom had reduced its mobilized forces from around 5 million at the end of the war to a figure of 720 thousand. As he had pointed out before and would point out again, that figure was verifiable, whereas, as far as the General Assembly was concerned, no figure given by the USSR was verifiable. It was noteworthy that Mr. Vyshinsky had not addressed himself to that point, but had urged upon the Assembly other considerations such as the Soviet Union proposals relating to atomic energy. The Assembly might well ask itself why, if the USSR delegation was unwilling to co-operate and to pledge itself to such a relatively simple matter as an international instrument for the verification of figures which were of such great concern to the whole Assembly, Mr. Vyshinsky had urged upon the Assembly the much greater instrument relating to atomic energy.

9. Mr. McNeil would not for a second suggest that Mr. Vyshinsky's proposals with regard to atomic energy were adequate or workable, or would produce satisfaction in the minds of the world, but since Mr. Vyshinsky obviously believed that they were so, it would be natural to assume that, if he was prepared to go so much farther on that subject, he should be prepared to go at least a little way towards the verification of effectives.

¹ For the discussion on this subject in the First Committee, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, First Committee, 325th to 337th meetings inclusive.*