

effect, were just as dangerous and which were used in conditions violating the fundamental principles and obligations of the United Nations Charter. Those arms could, by more gradual stages perhaps, but just as surely, lead to slavery or death.

106. Mr. Vyshinsky had spoken of an obedient majority. Mr. Montel stated that the majority,

having learnt a lesson from past experience, was a group of free nations which had decided together to obey the imperative demands of their security.

107. The PRESIDENT announced that the list of speakers would be closed at 3.15 p.m.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Wednesday, 23 November 1949, at 2.45 p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

International control of atomic energy: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1119) (concluded)

1. Mr. HICKERSON (United States of America) stated that he had listened in vain for a new proposal or a constructive suggestion in the statement of the USSR representative at the previous meeting. All he had heard was the old propaganda attack upon the United States and its motives. He did not intend to answer those attacks, which had been heard many times before; he was content to let his country's record speak for itself. He was confident that the Assembly would not be diverted from its responsibilities by such familiar crude propagandistic attacks.

2. He would refer briefly to only two of the matters mentioned by the USSR representative. The USSR representative had again quoted out of context from the Acheson-Lilienthal letter of 17 March 1946. That letter had been published at the time it had been written; it transmitted to the President of the United States and the Secretary of State not a plan but a technical report stating for the first time that effective control was possible. The passage the USSR representative had quoted, which was out of context and had been written before any plan had been evolved, merely stated that any nation possessing the atom bomb would not have to destroy its bombs until it was satisfied that no nation could manufacture bombs thereafter.

3. The United Nations plan approved in resolution 191 (III) of the General Assembly, provided for complete and effective prohibition, with the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations to declare when one agreed stage had ended and another was to begin. All countries would be treated exactly alike. Nuclear fuel would be removed from United States atomic weapons at exactly the same moment as it would be removed from the atomic weapon or weapons in the possession of the USSR.

4. With regard to Mr. Vyshinsky's statement (253rd meeting) concerning the inaccuracy of maps of the Soviet Union, Mr. Hickerson could not understand what impression the USSR representative had been trying to give in apparently boasting of the inaccuracy of existing maps of the Soviet Union. There were any number of maps of the United States; every gasoline station in the United States handed out road maps of the United States to anyone who asked for them.

Those maps—apparently unlike the ones in the USSR—were accurate. The United States had no desire to hide its towns and cities; it was proud of them and it welcomed visitors. It wanted to know about other peoples of the world, and to live on terms of peace and friendship with the peoples of all countries, including the people of the Soviet Union.

5. Two draft resolutions concerning atomic energy were before the General Assembly. One draft resolution, recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1119), made it clear that the peace of the world and the protection of all nations required that effective means of enforcement should accompany the promise of prohibition. The other, offered by the Soviet Union (A/1120), proposed, in effect, that all nations should sign a treaty or convention—or perhaps both—prohibiting atomic weapons, without effective means of enforcing such prohibition.

6. The requirements for an effective system of control had been discussed during more than three years of debate in the General Assembly, in the Atomic Energy Commission, and in their committees. They could be stated very simply. Nations could not continue to possess explosive atomic materials or facilities for making or using such materials in dangerous quantities. So long as those materials remained in the hands of nations, he knew of no means by which the actual or threatened use of them in the opening phases of an aggressive war could be prevented. If those facilities and those materials were left in national hands, no system of control and inspection would be stronger than the good faith and intentions of the nations which possessed them.

7. Plants making or using dangerous quantities of explosive atomic materials must be operated and managed by an international agency within the United Nations. Under no other conditions could there be any certainty that nations would not secretly withdraw quantities of explosive materials sufficient to threaten the peace.

8. Turning to the question of inspection, he stressed that inspection by the international personnel of the international control agency was of crucial importance. That personnel must carry out unrestricted inspection in order to prevent or detect secret or clandestine activities. Unless the treaty contained broad provisions to that effect, the world could have no confidence that the treaty was being obeyed. Periodic inspection of declared facilities was not enough; what was needed was continuous inspection.

9. Those were the irreducible, minimum essentials for any effective treaty. They had been written into the plan of control proposed by the Atomic Energy Commission and approved at the third session of the General Assembly as constituting the necessary basis for effective control of atomic energy and effective prohibition of atomic weapons. No other proposals had been made and no other approach to the problem had been found which provided effective enforcement.

10. In his statements before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee,¹ the USSR representative had presented the issue very clearly. He had said that the Soviet Union was using atomic explosives to blow up mountains. He did not need to add that if atomic explosives were used to blow up mountains, those same explosives could be used at any time to destroy cities. He was simply confirming the conclusion previously arrived at by the Atomic Energy Commission and by the Assembly, that such explosive materials were inescapably and interchangeably usable for military purposes and could not safely be allowed to remain in national hands.

11. The United States Government believed that any plan which did not provide for effective control and prohibition would be worse than no plan at all. It would not protect the world against atomic warfare. It would give an aggressor nation an opportunity to acquire an initial military advantage. It would mislead public opinion. Indeed, instead of strengthening peace it would give rise to a false sense of security and thus betray the hopes that it engendered.

12. The plan proposed by the Atomic Energy Commission and approved by the General Assembly in November 1948, contained the provisions essential to control and prohibition. It also made adequate provision for the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. It provided for a co-operative international endeavour, in which all nations would participate and from which all would benefit on fair and equitable terms. It provided for free and unrestricted exchange of information. It provided for the encouragement of private and national research in the field of atomic energy as well as for co-operative research activities by the international agency itself.

13. The United States supported that plan and would continue to support it unless and until proposals were made which would clearly provide equal or more effective and workable means of control and prohibition.

14. The draft resolution sponsored by France and Canada and recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee recognized the necessity for such effective controls and for such a co-operative effort. The United States Government and forty-seven other Governments represented in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had indicated their readiness to join in the co-operative development of atomic energy to ensure that that force should be used for peaceful purposes only and to ensure the effective prohibition of atomic weapons by means of effective international control.

¹ For the discussion on this subject in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc* Political Committee, 30th to 37th meetings inclusive.

15. The draft resolution realistically recognized the stalemate reached in the Atomic Energy Commission. It therefore called for the most effective action which the General Assembly could take at that time. It requested the permanent members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to continue their consultations, to explore all possible avenues and examine all concrete proposals with a view to determining whether agreement could be reached on the problem. That forum was composed of those Powers whose agreement was essential to any effective and satisfactory solution. The United States, for its part, would be prepared to examine any suggestions and proposals that had been made in the General Assembly and elsewhere in an earnest search for agreement upon effective prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

16. In his opinion, the draft resolution constituted a constructive step. It followed the course laid down by a large and increasing majority of the General Assembly each time the matter had come before it for decision. No new arguments had been advanced by the USSR, which had been holding out against effective control. As the representative of the United Kingdom had said a few days earlier, but for the obstructive attitude of the Soviet Union, the United Nations would long ago have reached a safe solution of the atomic energy problem and there might not remain a single atomic weapon in existence. That was the kind of security the world wanted. The Soviet Union, however, maintained that it alone was right and that forty-eight other nations were wrong.

17. Everyone knew that that was not true. It was essential, therefore, to continue the earnest efforts that were being made to persuade the USSR to abandon its reactionary attitude and to join with the overwhelming majority of the United Nations in the only satisfactory solution which human ingenuity had thus far devised for that grave problem.

18. He did not for one moment contend that human ingenuity had necessarily been exhausted in the United Nations plan. The United States, in all humility, would co-operate in every effort to discover whether any other solution might be equally or more effective.

19. In conclusion, he asked whether it were possible for one single country indefinitely to frustrate the will of the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations in a matter so vital to world security. He could only say that the whole history and tradition of the United Nations—admittedly a young organization—pointed to the opposite conclusion.

20. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) said that the international control of atomic energy, a subject of paramount importance to the whole of mankind, had been discussed in the United Nations for the past four years without result. The draft resolution adopted by the usual majority of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee contained neither new ideas nor new intentions.

21. According to an article which had appeared in the *New York Herald Tribune* on 22 November 1949, the United States Department of State had quietly undertaken a re-examination of the nation's atomic energy policy to determine whether new developments, particularly the fact

that the Soviet Union possessed the atomic bomb, dictated a revision of the basic policy followed without deviation since 1946. The study was being directed by Mr. George F. Kennan of the Policy Planning Staff. Until it had been completed and evaluated in terms of United States policy, the usual majority in the United Nations was compelled to wait quietly and to repeat past statements. Those statements had, however, been basically affected by President Truman's disclosure that the United States no longer held a monopoly in the field of atomic energy. As a result, the majority found itself in the embarrassing position of waiting until the State Department had completed its study before drawing conclusions concerning the new situation.

22. It must be acknowledged that many delegations felt uneasy and had expressed the sincere desire, in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, to break the deadlock on atomic energy and to reach unanimous agreement which would release the new force for peaceful uses in the construction of a better world. Unfortunately, they had not acted in accordance with those aims and would vote in favour of the draft resolution which they were well aware would have no effect but to prolong the existing deadlock.

23. The same Policy Planning Staff of the State Department which was quietly studying the United States atomic energy policy, had used that country's stockpile of atomic bombs as a principal weapon in its cold war strategy. Since a prolongation of the cold war was necessary to rearmament and the preparations for a new war and there was no indication that the United States intended to stop it, it could be assumed that any new decision on atomic energy would be designed to further it. The use of atomic stockpiles in the cold war had not had the desired effect. Other cold war tactics had similarly fallen short of their objective. For example, the publication of United States Air Force plans for atomic bombing of seventy towns in the Soviet Union and the people's democracies had not frightened the populations of those countries. On the contrary, it had spread fear among the peoples of the United States and the European countries associated with it. The brandishing of the atomic bomb had effectively assured the favourable votes on military budgets of certain members of the United States Congress; it had helped to gain the consent of the Marshall Plan and North Atlantic Treaty countries to United States objectives. But at the same time it had created war hysteria among the people of the United States which was harmful to their own interests. That hysteria had abated somewhat with the announcement that the atomic bomb monopoly had come to an end. The United States Press had begun to feature stories of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The United States representative had pointed out that it was being used especially in medicine. That was only one example of the vast variety of uses to which atomic energy could be put under the USSR proposal before the Assembly.

24. The opponents of the proposal held that the system of control which it provided was inadequate. Yet its adequacy could not be evaluated until the Atomic Energy Commission had drafted a convention on control. Criticism of the USSR system of control was deliberately misleading at

the current stage. Moreover, it was surely more desirable to introduce effective control, as proposed by the Soviet Union, than no control at all. The argument regarding the adequacy of the USSR system was obviously insincere and apparently based on a new illusion of superiority on the part of the United States owing to its initial advantage in atomic stockpiling.

25. In his statement at the 33rd meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on 10 November 1949, the USSR representative had indicated that the Soviet Union was not using atomic energy to accumulate stockpiles of atomic bombs, although it would have as many bombs as it might need in the unhappy event of war. Those who disbelieved that statement were making the same mistake as those who had believed that the Soviet Union would collapse within six weeks after its invasion by nazi Germany or that it could not produce an atom bomb before 1952. Once again they were victims of their own propaganda, which assured them that the United States led the world in scientific research and that the Soviet Union was a technically backward country.

26. It was high time that the ruling circles in the United States and in the countries dependent upon it acknowledged the fact that the scientific and cultural life in the Soviet Union and in the people's democracies was in a state of constant growth and expansion. Tremendous results had already been obtained, not in spite of, but precisely because of, the application of the principles of socialism and communism. Those results had been made possible because it was not threatened by crises or restricted by vested interests; it was devoted wholly to the service of a society of the highest type—a socialist society.

27. The "expert opinion" of those who maintained that the United States still retained the advantage in the field of atomic energy should be weighed by United States policy-makers in the light of previous errors.

28. The United States was blocking agreement on international control of atomic energy because its ruling circles feared the political, economic and social effects of the large-scale use of atomic energy in production and in the technical field. No doubt it was a danger to capitalist society, as it was a blessing to socialist society. Consequently, while there was little hope that its use for those purposes could be prevented in the long run, every effort was being exerted to postpone its use for constructive purposes and atomic resources were being wasted in the production of atomic bombs. Such a procedure had many precedents in capitalist society:

29. The United States had chosen two means of preventing other countries, and especially the Soviet Union, from using atomic energy for peaceful purposes. First, by stockpiling atomic bombs and publicizing the fact, it hoped to force the USSR to waste its atomic resources on bomb production. That hope would not be fulfilled because, as Mr. Malenkov, the Vice-Premier of the USSR had stated, atomic energy must be an instrument for the rapid development of the productive forces of the Soviet Union. The work of USSR scientists had been directed to that end and had begun at a time when scientists in capitalist countries were either utterly prevented from, or had only limited possibilities of, undertaking such

work. Thus the prediction that the Soviet Union could not use atomic energy for constructive purposes for some three to five years had also proved fallacious.

30. In the second place, the authors of the United States plan of control of atomic energy had hoped that the Soviet Union would accept the idea of a super-trust, or "world co-operative", as the United States insisted, which would own or hold in trust all atomic resources and means of producing atomic energy. That body would, of necessity, be governed by the will of an American-dominated majority. It had evidently been erroneously assumed that the Soviet Union and the people's democracies would willingly renounce part of their national sovereignty in favour of an American super-trust which would prevent them from using atomic energy to promote the technical progress of their peoples and would act as the instrument of an intelligence system directed against them. Moreover, the fact that the great majority of States which might serve on such a body were bound together in an aggressive military pact was surely not designed to strengthen confidence in it.

31. It was difficult to believe that the majority plan had been introduced on the assumption that it would be accepted by the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. The decisions of the majority were not always dictated by genuine political considerations; they were often guided by the identity of the authors of proposals and by mere considerations of prestige. In view of that experience, to ask sovereign nations to abandon part of their sovereignty in favour of a United States trust was to make a mockery of the General Assembly.

32. The French representative, referring to the paragraph of the majority draft resolution which dealt with the limitation of sovereign rights in connexion with atomic energy control, had described those rights as quasi-feudal. Yet those rights included the use of atomic energy to achieve unprecedented technical progress. A theory of sovereignty which characterized them as quasi-feudal was certainly strange; it might perhaps be acceptable to countries dependent on Marshall Plan aid.

33. An analysis of the provisions for the limitation of sovereign rights in the field of atomic energy showed that it would also restrict scientists, preventing them from making unlimited use of atomic raw materials for purposes of research. Such a condition was unacceptable to the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. Those countries had further cause to mistrust the grandiloquent phrases used in the draft resolution adopted by the majority in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. They could hardly be expected to accept the assurance given in paragraph 4 to the effect that they should abandon certain sovereign rights in favour of the joint exercise of those rights, when the majority had repeatedly demonstrated its intention to exclude the States of the minority from United Nations organs. An example could be found in their exclusion from the organs created by the decisions on the disposal of the former Italian colonies. Past experience did not leave the slightest doubt concerning the uses to which the proposed international control agency would be put.

34. Finally, the majority had offered no satisfactory answer to the question for what purpose States were being asked to abandon a substantial part of their sovereignty. The obvious purpose, which was to ensure a ban on atomic weapons, had never been admitted by the sponsors of the majority draft resolution. Instead, they had carefully avoided any commitment concerning the time or manner of the prohibition of atomic bombs and had attempted to evade the issue by stating that control and prohibition would go into effect over a period of time by a series of stages. Thus the United States would continue to produce atomic bombs while the international control agency assumed ownership of or trust over all atomic resources. Clearly, such a plan was absurd and wholly unacceptable.

35. The Czechoslovak delegation deplored the fact that there should be any argument concerning the necessity for the prohibition of atomic weapons. It was dismayed to find that the majority had to be convinced that the use of those weapons of genocide and mass destruction of civilian populations should be unconditionally prohibited. It was shocked that certain Powers should withhold the assurance that they would not wage atomic war unless granted the right to control the economic life of other States.

36. The Czechoslovak delegation did not find it difficult to choose between the two draft resolutions before the Assembly; it would vote in favour of the USSR proposal for the prohibition of atomic weapons and effective control which would ensure the elimination of that instrument of genocide.

37. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) declared that, the question of atomic energy having been debated at considerable length in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, he did not want to go over the same ground again. Nevertheless, he felt obliged to deal with some of the Soviet arguments which had been repeated so many times in the Committee and some of which the USSR representative had again produced at the previous meeting.

38. Mr. Vyshinsky asked the General Assembly to believe that the majority plan—which, incidentally, the Assembly itself had overwhelmingly approved—was a complete fraud. According to him, it had never been meant to be accepted, but had been concocted by the United States and the United Kingdom in the certainty that the Soviet Union would reject it and that that rejection might then be used for anti-Soviet propaganda. At the same time, however, Mr. Vyshinsky maintained, with some lack of consistency, that the plan had been carefully devised to secure United States domination of the world by the establishment of an atomic super-trust under United States control; and, finally, he argued that the plan would not prohibit atomic weapons but would prevent the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

39. Having thus disposed of the majority plan to his own satisfaction, although perhaps not to that of most of the members of the General Assembly, Mr. Vyshinsky asked the Assembly to accept the USSR proposals put forward and rejected in 1946, 1947 and 1948. The USSR plan, he said, and that plan alone, was sincere and honest; it alone could provide for the immediate

prohibition of atomic weapons and for the effective control of atomic energy. The sovereignty of individual States, he declared, must be jealously and rigidly and continuously maintained; the unimpeded control and management of atomic energy must remain in national hands and intervention by any international agency must be limited to periodic or special inspection. The USSR was not going to tolerate any international supervision of its use of atomic explosives to blow up mountains or forests, as it claimed, within its own territory. Yet, in some mysterious and totally unexplained manner, the remainder of the world could apparently rest assured that those same atomic explosives would in no circumstances be used to blow up cities outside the Soviet Union.

40. Stripped of its verbiage, the Soviet Union's case was seen to be so unconvincing that it was scarcely worth refuting. There were, however, one or two points on which USSR misrepresentations might have caused some confusion, and to which he would therefore refer briefly.

41. The Soviet Union alleged, for example, that the majority plan provided for an unnecessarily elaborate system of control while postponing indefinitely the prohibition of atomic weapons. That point was to some extent covered by the section on stages in the statement of the five Powers (A/1050). It also involved, however, the whole relationship between control and prohibition. That was a fundamental issue and, in the view of the United Kingdom delegation, one on which the USSR proposals were most manifestly inadequate. He would not repeat the arguments in the five-Power statement, but he could possibly make some of them rather more concrete by referring to one or two of the problems which would actually arise in putting into force a plan for the control of atomic energy and for the prohibition of atomic weapons.

42. In the case, for example, of atomic raw materials such as uranium and thorium, and atomic plants for producing the finished product, namely, nuclear explosives, it was obvious that control would have to be established over both the raw materials and the finished products, and, indeed, over the various intermediate processes.

43. A familiar USSR assertion, which had often been refuted, was that in the majority plan control would first be established over the raw materials and that it would only be much later, if at all, that control over the finished products would come into effect. The majority plan, in fact, laid down no such time-table or order of priorities, since those were matters which could be settled only after agreement had been reached on the system and the kind of control, and in the light of the knowledge that would have been acquired by that time.

44. What the majority plan did say was that when control had been established over the raw materials, those materials would be entrusted to the international agency so that they would not be at the disposal of individual States. Similarly, control over the production of nuclear explosives would have entrusted the agency both with the explosives themselves and with the operation and management of the plants which produced them. It would thus be seen that when the agency took over nuclear explosives and the plants producing them, individual States would automatically cease

to possess the means of making or stockpiling atomic bombs. In exactly the same way, the agency, by taking over the raw materials such as uranium and thorium, would automatically bring into force another stage in the prohibition of atomic weapons, by removing those materials from national control. To argue that control must come first and prohibition afterwards, or that prohibition was the primary objective and that control was secondary, was therefore meaningless. Prohibition was dependent upon control and the two must go hand in hand. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that control was, in fact, prohibition.

45. The difference between the majority plan and the USSR plan was that the former provided for the necessary connexion and correlation between control and prohibition. The USSR plan, in spite of its specious but deceptive emphasis on simultaneity, did not do so. According to that plan, nations would pledge themselves to stop the manufacture of atomic weapons immediately and to destroy their stockpiles within a very brief period. The system of control, even on the totally inadequate basis of the USSR proposals, could take effect only over a much longer period. The Soviet Union was, in fact, asking the rest of the world to trust its word alone. In view of its policy and record over the past years, it was hardly surprising that the United Nations should insist on some more concrete safeguard than a mere pledge or assurance.

46. Both Mr. Vyshinsky in the Assembly and the USSR representative in the Committee had argued that any United Nations agency which might be established for the control of atomic energy would either be exclusively under United States control or be entirely under the direction of a majority belonging to the so-called aggressive, anti-Soviet bloc. That, indeed, was one of the main reasons they had advanced for rejecting the majority plan. If that argument meant anything at all, the only conclusion to be drawn was that the USSR would reject any effective control plan which could be set up by the United Nations. It said that it would accept international inspection, but according to its own arguments the inspectors would be the agents of United States imperialism whose only object would be to conduct what they call "espionage" and to sabotage the Soviet Union.

47. It was hardly feasible to suppose that, if the USSR adopted an attitude of such blind prejudice towards any international agency, it would really be prepared to co-operate with the representatives of that agency and enable them to exercise their function properly and effectively in its territory.

48. Sir Alexander was sometimes inclined to wonder how he would fare if he arrived in Moscow as an inspector under the international authority, asking to inspect a certain locality in the Soviet Union where the international authority had reason to think that irregularities were being practised. He feared he would have short shrift, for there Mr. Vyshinsky would be able to indulge his gift of oratory even more effectively, and perhaps even more vehemently, than in the Assembly and would be able to exercise a veto which would certainly be the last word.

49. The argument used by the USSR representatives themselves proved beyond doubt that,

if that State was genuinely ready to accept international inspection, it was only because it knew that such inspection would do nothing to hamper its plans and would be wholly ineffective in establishing prohibition or control.

50. Mr. Vyshinsky had been at great pains to defend the Soviet Union's proposals for inspection. Sir Alexander was quite ready to accept the USSR interpretation of "periodic inspection", but he must maintain that it would be wholly inadequate. It might be effective in the case of what were called conventional armaments. The conversion of industry from peace-time production to the production of conventional armaments was, in modern times, a complicated and a more or less slow operation. For conversion to production of the ordinary weapons of war, industry had to be re-planned and re-tooled, a process which could hardly escape the notice of visiting inspectors. On the other hand, the conversion of atomic energy from peaceful to martial uses was a much less complicated matter. Explosive atomic material could be used for peace or for war, and the process in all stages of its manufacture was identical. It was only its final application that was different and the choice could be made, as it were, at the last moment. That was why a continuous and intimate and effective control must be exercised at all times, in order that governments might be assured that they were not exposed to the hazard of violation by others.

51. In a statement to the Committee he had drawn attention to the fact that, although the USSR must be presumed to have the technical knowledge required for the manufacture of atomic weapons, it had not produced any detailed arguments to counter the criticisms brought against its proposal for inspection. Those criticisms had been elaborated in some detail, and members of the Assembly would find them set out in the five-Power statement (A/1050) and in the summary records of the six-Power consultations (A/1045). Mr. Vyshinsky had professed to take up that challenge, but all he had in fact done had been to repeat at length the USSR proposals for control, which had been put forward in 1947 and had at that time been found to be inadequate. Apart from that, he could only produce the unconvincing generalization that Soviet scientists had found the USSR proposals to be sufficient. Unless he could deal with the criticisms in the same detailed and factual way in which they had been put forward, he could scarcely hope to convince the Assembly of his point of view.

52. Mr. Vyshinsky had waxed extremely eloquent on the question of sovereignty and on the virtuous struggle of the Soviet Union to defend the sovereignty of States against alleged United States attempts at world domination. Sir Alexander would point out, in passing, that the USSR appeared to hold one view when it was considering the sovereignty of the Soviet Union itself, but a rather different view in regard to the sovereignty of its neighbours. If the position adopted by the USSR was final and unalterable, that was the end of the matter. He still hoped, however, that there might be a chance that, on reflection, the Government of the Soviet Union would come to see that all Members at one time or another had in many ways ceded portions of their sovereign rights to an extent which might have been considered well nigh impossible a gen-

eration earlier. Things tended to move faster in modern times and all had to be prepared for a change. Many of the derogations from sovereign rights which had been accepted in the past had been made in the interest of peace or the betterment of the lot of mankind.

53. The derogation, nations were now asked to make, was admittedly a large one, but it was required for a large purpose — the safeguarding of civilization against annihilation. In the opinion of the United Kingdom the price was not too high; the insurance premium was not a prohibitive one. The Assembly must obviously not despair of finding a solution to that vital question, however discouraging the immediate prospects might be. At the same time it was clear that any solution that was to remove the threat of atomic war which hung over the world must be acceptable to the major Powers, and particularly to those which already possessed the secret of the atomic bomb. That was one of the reasons why the United Kingdom delegation supported the proposal in the resolution before the General Assembly for a continuation of the six-Power consultations. As the Assembly was aware, the six permanent members had not been able to report success, but he considered that they had made progress in that they had been able to cover a great part of the ground in a full and frank exchange of views which, if it had not resulted in agreement, had at least defined for them and for the world the real nature of the difficulties and differences dividing them.

54. That might be the first step towards a bridging of those differences. That exchange of views would be resumed as soon as possible and Sir Alexander was not without hope that it might bring them nearer to ultimate agreement. He retained some optimism in regard to that; the only thing that would fill him with pessimism would be if Members were to put their names to a scheme which was a sham and a delusion.

55. Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) said that the report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee showed that no positive results had been reached on the problem of atomic energy. That meant that the armaments race would continue, and that the weapon of mass destruction would continue to hang as a terrible threat over peaceful cities and millions of people. The majority in the Committee had found no way out of the existing situation. Many representatives had tried to minimize or gloss over the fact that the United States had long ceased to have a monopoly of atomic weapons.

56. The Polish delegation was by no means surprised to note that Mr. Vyshinsky's statement regarding the Soviet Union's use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes on a grand scale characteristic of that country had caused real alarm in imperialist circles. While atomic energy had been exclusively in the hands of the United States, its use had been limited to the manufacture of atom bombs. The sinister sound of the explosion of American bombs dropped over the civilian population of Hiroshima had given to the world its first news of the release of atomic energy. But as soon as Soviet scientists had made themselves masters of that branch of science, it had become widely known that the great discovery was being used not for death but for life, not to make cripples but to improve the lives of human beings.

57. The energy which, in the hands of imperialists, was a weapon of war had, in the hands of a socialist State, become a means of taming nature for the benefit of mankind. The juxtaposition of those two facts was so dangerous to the military bloc that everything possible had been done to weaken the impression caused by Mr. Vyshinsky's statement.

58. After President Truman's announcement about the atomic explosion in the USSR, attempts had been made to draw comfort from the thought that the production of atom bombs in the Soviet Union had not reached the United States level of production; similarly, there had been attempts to ridicule Mr. Vyshinsky's statement about moving mountains.

59. All those subterfuges merely went to show that there was consternation in the imperialist camp; needless to say, they served no other purpose. Humanity already knew that atomic energy could already be used for the progress of civilization.

60. That knowledge was a constant worry to the great industrial magnates who, fearing a drop in the price of such commodities as electric power due to the use of relatively cheaper atomic energy, tried to retard progress in that field by artificial means.

61. Attempts to discredit the USSR achievements and to ridicule its potential were reminiscent of the letter from the United States Secretary of Defence to President Roosevelt after the beginning of the German-USSR war, to the effect that the Germans would be busy dealing with the Soviet Union for a minimum of one month or a maximum of three months. It was well known that Hitler himself had thought along similar lines, and had had to pay dearly for his naïve mistake.

62. The statements of more sober-minded Americans, too, had begun to reflect the enormous significance of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Thus, the Director of the American Association for the United Nations, Mr. Clark Eichelberger, had advanced the idea of creating a commission to study the possible uses of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Mr. Morrison, professor of physics at Cornell University, had noted that competition in the atomic field would result in the victory of the country which would be the first to use atomic energy for lighting, heating and so forth. In a recently published book called *Atomic Energy and Society*, Mr. James S. Allen had stated that if the United States used the wonderful new technical achievement for destructive purposes, it would deserve and would suffer a fate no better than that of Hitler Germany.

63. The majority in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, and particularly the United States delegation had, however, failed to notice or had pretended not to notice the significant changes which had taken place recently in the field of atomic energy and which rendered a settlement of that problem still more essential.

64. True, a note of anxiety had been sounded in the speeches of some smaller States belonging to the so-called majority. Those delegations were beginning to adapt their approach to questions in the atomic field to new world conditions.

65. The draft resolution submitted by Haiti and subsequently withdrawn — a fact which spoke for itself — had reflected those new, still timid wishes for a revision of the so-called majority plan. While the draft had been devoid of any consistent concrete proposals, it had recognized that decisions bearing upon atomic weapons and the control of atomic energy were inseparably interlinked and should be put into effect simultaneously. Such a view represented an admission that the basic theory underlying the Soviet plan was correct.

66. The United States, however, had not altered its position in any way. It was true that, as the representative of Czechoslovakia had already pointed out, the Washington correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune*, Mr. Levin, had reported that, under pressure from a number of influential Americans and representatives of the main Western allies, the State Department had begun a review of United States atomic policy, with a view to determining whether new events, notably the atomic explosion in the Soviet Union, necessitated a revision of the policy pursued by the United States since 1946. In the United Nations, however, the United States continued to insist on the adoption of a plan essentially identical with the Baruch Plan, promising that it would change its position only when a better plan was proposed. Such assurances were intended for trusting simpletons. Mr. Naszkowski recalled in that connexion how, at the third session, the United States delegation had reacted to the USSR compromise proposal regarding the simultaneous conclusion and entry into force of two conventions on prohibition of the atomic weapon and control of atomic energy respectively.

67. The draft resolution submitted by the Canadian and French delegations and approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, was only another variant of the old United States view; it merely sanctioned and prolonged the existing deadlock. It could be foreseen that, in view of the attitude of the United States delegation, further fruitless consultations among six States on the abstract question of a possibility of agreement would lead to nothing. That, however, was precisely what the American bloc wanted.

68. The Polish delegation believed that the deadlock could be solved, not by means of the continuance of those consultations, which left the United States entirely free to continue its production of atomic weapons, but only by the renewal of the Atomic Energy Commission's work for the purposes set forth in the USSR resolution.

69. The Committee's draft resolution reiterated certain familiar theories regarding the need for a renunciation of national sovereignty. True, the word "renunciation", which might offend the sensibilities of certain delegations, had been replaced by the word "limitation"; nevertheless, the text bore the unmistakable stamp of the Baruch Plan.

70. The United States representative had protested against the description of the majority plan as the Baruch Plan. Such a description was, of course, very awkward for the United States in view of its relations with its various allies; nevertheless, it was perfectly correct.

71. During the consultations of the six permanent members, General McNaughton had done his

utmost to find differences between the majority plan and the Baruch Plan. His search, however, had been fruitless: the substance of the plan remained unaffected whether the international organ of control was described as a trustee or as an owner.

72. In the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, Mr. Hickerson had shown great resentment of the fact that the organ proposed by the majority had been described as a United States super-trust. He had protested that the United States was proposing to hand its whole atomic industry over to an international organ within the United Nations and should not, therefore, be accused of evil intentions.

73. It was perfectly obvious that, in existing circumstances, a possible transfer of the United States atomic industry to an international organ would in no way affect the position of the United States, while a similar transfer would place the Soviet Union at the mercy of the Anglo-American bloc. Mr. Naszkowski stressed that he was speaking of a "possible" transfer because, under the majority plan, the United States would by no means be obliged to hand over its atomic industry even to an international organ entirely obedient to it.

74. The Polish delegation in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had exposed the hypocritical position of the so-called majority and had proved that it was designed only to disguise the aggressive plans of the imperialist camp. It had unswervingly opposed the schemes of the militarists because it remembered full well the dreadful sufferings imposed upon the Polish people by the Second World War. Nevertheless, the majority had ignored its warnings and had rejected the peaceful USSR proposal, approving instead the draft resolution submitted by Canada and France.

75. The Polish delegation had no illusions about the results of the voting in the plenary meeting; but it wished to emphasize that the will of the majority expressed in such voting did not represent the will of the nations. It firmly believed that the real majority, comprising millions of Soviet citizens, Poles, Frenchmen, Americans, colonial and semi-colonial peoples, simple men and women ardently desiring peace, would frustrate the aggressive plans to use atomic energy — that force which should and could become a blessing to mankind — for purposes of destruction and war.

76. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that of the two draft resolutions before the General Assembly on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of control of atomic energy, the first, which had been submitted by Canada and France and approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, was based on the unacceptable plan of the United States; the second, submitted by the USSR delegation, was the only one which showed the true way of resolving that vast and complex problem.

77. There was no problem with which world public opinion was so concerned as it was with the problem of atomic weapons and their use in a future war.

78. In their statements to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and the General Assembly, the representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom had tried to place on the Soviet Union

the responsibility for the fact that the problem of the international control of atomic energy had not yet been solved. It was to that end that they had published the statement which the representatives of Canada, China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States had made with regard to the consultations of the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission. United States propaganda had widely disseminated that libellous statement, so that the truth should not be heard and the proposals of the USSR Government should once again be concealed from the public. It would, however, be difficult to mislead public opinion, for truth always triumphed in the end. Responsibility for the fact that General Assembly resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946 had not been implemented lay with the United States and United Kingdom Governments. Mr. Vyshinsky had just made a very concise and complete survey of the problem.

79. The United States representative had attempted, in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and in the General Assembly, to defend the Baruch Plan for international control which the United States had submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission as far back as 14 June 1946.¹ He refused to take the time factor into account; he refused to take into account the fact that almost four years had passed since that plan had been submitted, that scientific work on atomic energy had advanced considerably, that the peoples of the whole world demanded the prohibition of atomic weapons, that the whole world longed for the "cold war" to come to an end, and that the people throughout the world passionately desired peace.

80. The United Kingdom representative had not changed his position, either. Both he and the United States representative had given in detail their version of the differences of opinion which had become apparent in the course of the last few years between them and the USSR representative. They had warmly praised the United States plan and had tried to show that the USSR plan was unacceptable to them.

81. The United States and the United Kingdom representatives had stated once again that they would continue to support the control plan set forth in the recommendations of the majority of the Atomic Energy Commission. In words, they advocated the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes, but in deeds they were categorically opposed to the prohibition of atomic weapons, and to the conclusion and simultaneous implementation of two conventions, one prohibiting atomic weapons, the other establishing control over the implementation of that prohibition.

82. They had rejected the USSR proposal to strengthen an international convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons by means of the establishment of a comprehensive system of international control. The records of the discussions between the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission showed that the five Governments making up the majority had protested, not only against the immediate prohibition of atomic weapons, but also against the establishment of effective international control. They had attempted to replace such control by an incomplete system

¹ See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission*, First Year, No. 1.

of control by stages, which would be put into effect first of all with regard to raw materials, leaving aside all other aspects of the question.

83. Their statements contained slanderous allegations to the effect that the proposals made by the Soviet Union were dangerous in character. The authors of those allegations had not even deemed it necessary to produce arguments to bear out their charges.

84. It might well be asked which of the USSR proposals could prove dangerous to them. It seemed that they considered dangerous the proposals forbidding the manufacture, possession or use of atomic weapons and ordering the destruction of all reserves of atomic weapons within a period of three months from the entry into force of the convention, or those providing for the utilization of the nuclear fuel contained in those weapons for peaceful purposes.

85. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Atomic Energy Commission and in other organs of the United Nations were thoroughly convinced that the United States of America held a monopoly of atomic weapons and that any convention prohibiting that weapon would constitute a threat to their interests and their security. The futility of those views had become evident.

86. Atomic energy which, in the hands of the capitalists, was a means for the manufacture of lethal weapons, an instrument of threat, blackmail and violence, had, in the hands of the peoples of the Soviet Union, become a powerful means of technical progress, of developing their country's productive forces and for the furtherance of their well-being. Far from being guided by the common interests of humanity, the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc pursued only their own selfish interests and refused to free humanity from the threat of the atomic weapon by prohibiting it immediately and unconditionally. The ruling circles of the United States of America were endeavouring to conceal their true intentions behind the authority of the United Nations. Everyone was aware that during the post-war period the United States had resorted to "atomic diplomacy", and had exerted pressure on other countries by openly stating that they intended to make use of atomic weapons. It should be noted, however, that since President Truman's famous statement the sponsors of that policy were beginning to exhibit greater restraint.

87. Nevertheless, the United States was continuing to insist on the adoption of its plan. As had been pointed out, the Baruch Plan was based on the transfer of the right of ownership of all means of atomic energy production to an international organ of control. That would inevitably lead to the establishment of a monopoly in that field, and would transform the organ of control into a world atomic super-trust under the auspices of the United States monopolies. Under the Baruch Plan, the international organ was to have practically unlimited powers. The plan insisted upon the establishment of control by stages, the first of which concerned raw materials. The United States representative consistently refused to say how much time would elapse before the establishment of control and inspection in the other stages, and accused the Soviet Union rep-

resentative of not wishing to accept such control. Documents showed that the United States representatives had rejected the USSR representative's proposals for the simultaneous establishment of strict international control over all facilities for the extraction of atomic raw materials and production of atomic energy. That showed that the United States of America intended to confine itself to the establishment of control over sources of atomic raw materials throughout the world and to evade the immediate establishment of control over the centres of atomic production, which were more important. There could be no doubt that such a system of control would be mere trickery to deceive the people of the world by creating the illusion of the existence of a system of control, while the most important stages of atomic production would escape control for an indefinite time and the question of prohibition of the atomic weapon would remain unsolved.

88. At the current meeting of the General Assembly, Sir Alexander Cadogan had stated that no progress could be made with regard to international control of atomic energy so long as the Soviet Union continued to reject the proposals of the majority. He had merely repeated what certain representatives, particularly those of Canada, France and New Zealand had said in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

89. In that regard, Mr. Kiselev referred to the telegram (A/1123) sent by Mr. Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the Central Government of the Chinese People's Republic to the President of the General Assembly and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR would no longer recognize the delegation of the Government of the Kuomintang because it no longer represented China and had no right to speak in the name of the Chinese people.

90. Returning to the question of atomic energy, Mr. Kiselev said that there were many documents to show how unsubstantiated and slanderous were the assertions of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom that the Soviet Union would not accept international inspection. A perusal of the Atomic Energy Commission's second report to the Security Council showed that the USSR Government was proposing the establishment of such a system of inspection, to go into operation simultaneously in all plants, those engaged in the extraction of atomic raw materials and those engaged in the production of atomic materials and atomic energy. Mr. Kiselev would not enumerate all the very broad powers which the Soviet proposals conferred upon the international control agency; the USSR representative had already done that, in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, on 8 November 1949 and in the General Assembly.

91. The facts indicated that the Soviet Union was demanding the immediate and unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons while the United States and the United Kingdom were taking a stand against such prohibition; the Soviet Union was asking for the establishment of strict and simultaneous control over all stages of atomic production from the extraction of raw materials to the production of atomic materials and atomic energy. On the contrary, the United States and the United Kingdom were proposing to limit the

control of raw materials to the first stage, without stating how long that stage was to last and leaving the production of atomic materials and atomic energy free from all control for an indefinite period.

92. That was intended to conceal the real aims of the United States of America, which expected to continue to use atomic energy for military purposes as long as it could, manufacturing and stockpiling atomic weapons which the ruling circles of the United States and the United Kingdom intended to use as an instrument of their aggressive policy. Those were the facts, said Mr. Kiselev, and he challenged the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom to deny them from the rostrum of the General Assembly.

93. It might justifiably be asked why the Atomic Energy Commission had been unable to solve the most important political problem facing the world. The main reason was that from the beginning of the Commission's work, the United States had adopted a position utterly incompatible with the establishment of international control of atomic energy.

94. As the spokesman of capitalist monopolies and United States military circles, Mr. Baruch, the United States representative on the Atomic Energy Commission, had presented proposals which excluded any possibility of agreement. The principal objective of his plan had been to consolidate the world monopoly of the United States in the field of atomic energy through the agency of an international control organ dominated by United States representatives.

95. On 23 September 1949, President Truman had announced that an atomic explosion had taken place in the Soviet Union. The organs of the American, British and French Press, as well as the newspapers of a good many other countries, had published reports on the matter which had spread alarm among the general public. Mr. Baruch had also made a statement on it which *The New York Times* had published on 4 October 1949. He had expressly stated that the United States of America should do everything possible to maintain its overwhelming superiority in the field of atomic weapons. Mr. Baruch had added that, in the interests of the maintenance of world peace, the United States must not lose its advantage. In his view, the United States should adopt a peace-time mobilization plan. Thus Mr. Baruch had not deviated from his earlier position. He was maintaining his previous militarist and aggressive attitude; he was continuing to advocate an atomic armaments race.

96. According to Press reports Mr. Baruch was not only adviser to President Truman, he was also *persona grata* with the Wall Street monopolies. Moreover, his remarks were not without interest. They reflected the opinion of United States circles, which were perfectly well aware that agreement with the Soviet Union on atomic energy would mean the end of atomic bomb production and would reduce the production of atomic energy in the United States, in which thousands of millions of dollars had been invested. That would endanger the most cherished interests of an influential group of American industrialists and financiers. Mr. Baruch had

done his best to bolster faith in the atomic bomb and to sustain the theories of American politicians and military men who had built up elaborate plans on the basis of the United States superiority in atomic weapons.

97. In an effort to help preserve mankind from the threat of atomic weapons which United States militarists held over it, the USSR Government had submitted proposals which represented a positive step in the solution of the problem of atomic energy. They were based on respect for the rights of all peoples, great or small. They would prevent the international control of atomic energy from being used for the purpose of establishing a monopoly by one country or one group of countries in that field. Finally, they would prevent the utilization of the atomic weapon for the mass destruction of peaceful populations. They safeguarded the political and economic independence of all States and guaranteed the solution of the problem of the establishment of an international control of the production of atomic weapons.

98. The USSR proposals called upon the Atomic Energy Commission to resume its work of giving effect to the General Assembly resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 1946. They also asked it to proceed immediately with the preparation of conventions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and for the control of atomic energy. They specified that the two conventions were to be concluded and brought into force simultaneously. The problem of atomic energy could only be solved by adoption of the USSR proposals. Those who opposed their adoption would bear a heavy responsibility in history towards mankind.

99. The Byelorussian delegation considered the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee unacceptable and would vote against it.

100. General McNAUGHTON (Canada) stated that the Canadian delegation had followed with the closest attention and the greatest interest the debate on the international control of atomic energy which had taken place in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly. The Canadian delegation, like other delegations, had had ample opportunity in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee to make known the position of its Government on that important question. It did not, therefore, intend to repeat the views it had already expressed, but would merely state that what it had heard during the course of the debate bore out the merit of the proposals in the draft resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, which the Canadian delegation, in association with the delegation of France, had had the honour to sponsor.

101. Several speakers had reminded the Assembly that Mr. Vyshinsky had said that the atomic explosive which could blast a city could also blast a mountain. If that were so, the reverse was no less true, which proved conclusively the correctness of the basic fact which the Canadian delegation had pointed out from the beginning, namely, that the same materials which could be used for constructive and peaceful purposes could also be used to bring destruction to the cities of men. That was precisely why effective international control was essential if the world was

to be made secure, from the terrible power which might be released in the fission of the atom.

102. At one point in the debate Mr. Vyshinsky had seemed to suggest that his Government would not accept any international control over the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and he had appeared, furthermore, to reject the idea of quotas in the production of atomic materials intended for peaceful purposes. At another time, however, he had claimed that he was prepared to accept international inspection.

103. What the Soviet Union delegation had in the past meant by strict international inspection differed very substantially from what those words meant to other members. If, however, there was any ambiguity in Mr. Vyshinsky's recent statements, he could assure the General Assembly that the Canadian delegation would do its best, in the consultations of the six Powers, to resolve that ambiguity. It would certainly seek a clear statement of just what the USSR Government had in mind, though it did not seem to him that the Soviet Union's position on the matter had changed during the past year. At the next meeting of the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission, however, he would ask the USSR representative whether there had in fact been any change in the position of his Government and, if so, just what it had been.

104. Meanwhile, the delegation of the USSR had reintroduced in the Assembly the same draft resolution which had been carefully considered and decisively rejected by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. Since the Soviet Union delegation was obliging the Assembly to take time to vote again on that draft resolution, he must say that it was still as misleading, unsatisfactory and unacceptable as it had been a few weeks earlier and that the Canadian delegation would therefore continue to oppose it. From what he had heard in the debate, it would not seem that the gap between the USSR Government and the other Members on the international control of atomic energy had been narrowed. Nevertheless, the Canadian delegation had not given up hope that agreement might eventually be reached. In its view no Member must ever give up hope of attaining agreement on a question so vital to the future of all the peoples of the world.

105. The principle that the nations must continue to work for agreement was implicit in the draft resolution adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. Other important principles which had been developed in the Committee and which were, in his view, correctly embodied in the draft resolution, were that the door must be kept open and that minds must be kept open; the General Assembly must retain a sense of responsibility and must refuse to gamble with the peace and security of the men and women all over the world whom it represented. It must be very careful not to mislead the world or to pretend that there was security when there was none.

106. The Canadian delegation had insisted throughout that Members must maintain open minds, must explore all avenues carefully and examine all concrete suggestions objectively and sincerely with a view to determining whether they could lead to agreement which would secure the basic objectives of the General Assembly with re-

gard to the question. During the course of the debate a number of suggestions had been put forward. The draft resolution before the Assembly called upon the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission, in continuing their consultations, to consider those suggestions. He himself had the privilege of being the Chairman of that group for its next meeting, and in that capacity he had arranged for the compilation of a list of all suggestions put forward by representatives in the course of the debate. That list would be placed before the group at its next meeting. He would like to assure the President, therefore, that, if the draft resolution were adopted, as recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, it would provide the mandate for their task to be continued and would give the assurance that their work was acceptable to the conscience of the world.

107. With that mandate and with a full sense of responsibility, the group would certainly do its utmost to explore all avenues and examine all concrete suggestions which could help in the endeavour to reach an agreement which could effectively prohibit and indeed eliminate the atomic weapon by establishing effective international control of atomic energy.

108. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that before dealing with the draft resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, he would like to say a few words on the digressions that some members had made during the discussion. He wondered why Mr. Hickerson had found it necessary to refer to maps which could be bought at any store. Mr. Hickerson had also tried to make the General Assembly believe that Mr. Vyshinsky had quoted Mr. Acheson's letter about the control of atomic weapon production incorrectly. The fact was that the letter quoted by Mr. Vyshinsky did state explicitly that acceptance of international control would not mean that the United States would stop producing atomic bombs. Mr. Hickerson could not escape that fact. Mr. Manuisky said he would not take up Mr. Hickerson's statement that one Power was opposing fifty-eight others on the question of atomic energy. He would show later that the situation was a little different.

109. Turning to the Canadian-French draft resolution, which the majority in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee was submitting for the approval of the General Assembly, he noted that the resolution related to the "International control of atomic energy". That heading alone was an indication of its authors' intentions and of the interests which they were protecting despite the aspirations of the masses, who urgently demanded prohibition of atomic weapons. The purpose of the Canadian-French draft resolution was clear: it was to avoid the prohibition of atomic weapons and allow the use of such weapons of mass destruction in a war for which—and he was choosing his words carefully—the ruling circles of the United States of America and the United Kingdom were preparing.

110. The Canadian-French draft resolution was not intended to serve the interests of peace, but the interests of such monopolies as the Dupont, Westinghouse and General Electric companies, all of which, under the pretext of working for

United States national defence, had made the production of atomic weapons one of the most profitable concerns in the United States.

111. In confirmation of his statements, he cited the book written by a Canadian engineer, Dyson Carter, which had unfortunately been withdrawn from circulation by the American censorship. In that book Mr. Carter had revealed the whole machinery of the relationship between those companies and the state apparatus of the United States of America. It could be considered an established fact that, from the time of the first important discoveries in the field of atomic energy, all use of that energy had been kept in the hands of the American monopolies. In order to derive vast profits, they had directed the scientific research and the practical application of atomic energy wholly towards military ends.

112. The American Press—which could not be suspected of sympathy for the plans of the USSR—and specifically the *New York Herald Tribune* of 12 April 1949, had said that the United States House of Representatives had allocated over a thousand million dollars for the development of atomic energy. The “business men” of atomic energy had made sure they would get the lion’s share in the application of those credits. The *New York Sun* of 1 August 1949 had confirmed that view in reporting that the parts making up the atomic weapon tested at Eniwetok in 1948 had been mass-produced by industrial undertakings or state factories in the United States.

113. Apart from the men of the trusts, United States military circles had gained control of the greatest scientific discovery ever made and that was an equally ominous situation. In point of fact, it was the high-ranking officers of the United States Army, Navy and Air Force who directed the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

114. When parliamentarians of the type of Mr. Cannon were added to the men of the trusts and the military, it would be seen what an odd triumvirate determined United States policy with respect to atomic energy and why that policy had nothing in common with the prohibition of atomic weapons or with the establishment of control over the production of atomic energy. That policy was guided by the selfish interests of the United States. It did not take moral considerations into account. It had been expressed by Mr. Elmer Davis, former Director of the Office of War Information, who had stated cynically in an article that he did not allow himself to be influenced by the assertion that the atomic bomb was an inhuman weapon and its use contrary to military honour as well as to Christian morality. Except for economy and speed, Mr. Davis had added, there was no difference between incendiary raids and the use of the atomic bomb. When it was recalled that the United States of America had no atomic raw materials and received limited quantities of those materials from Canada and the Belgian Congo and used them solely for military ends, the statement in the second paragraph of the recital of the draft resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, that atomic energy used for peaceful ends would lead to an improvement in the standard of living, could be appreciated at its true value. The references to the development

of the peaceful uses of atomic energy for the benefit of all peoples, in the fourth paragraph of the recital, and to peaceful ends, in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the draft resolution, were also hypocritical. In point of fact, military circles and the men of the power-production trusts feared the competition of atomic energy and were preventing its use for the benefit of all peoples and for peace.

115. Because of its lack of atomic raw materials and because its capitalistic monopolies were trying to establish their control over the production of atomic energy, the United States of America had been impelled, in 1946, to submit the notorious Baruch plan, the essential elements of which appeared once more in the draft resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee in the third paragraph of the recital. In fact, that paragraph repeated, in veiled form, the proposal to establish the right of ownership of the American atomic trust over all the sources of atomic raw materials and all the concerns producing atomic materials or atomic energy.

116. Such claims were all the more strange because the authors of the draft resolution and the members of the majority of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee were fully aware of the criticisms of the American plan for control that such eminent physicists as the British professor Blackett and the French professor Joliot-Curie, as well as other eminent specialists in nuclear research, had made.

117. The authors of the draft resolution were also fully aware that experiments had been made in some countries which showed that the United States no longer held a complete monopoly of the production of atomic energy. That changed the situation entirely and made the persistence with which the United States pressed for the adoption of its outmoded plan, without taking facts into account, even less justifiable.

118. The United States representatives realized that their position was far from sound, and were trying to convince the General Assembly that their plan was no longer an American plan, and that, since it had received the sanction of the General Assembly, it had become an international plan approved by world public opinion. That was the view Mr. Hickerson had upheld.

119. It would, however, be a mistake always to identify world public opinion with that of the General Assembly. No referendum had ever been held in the United States, the United Kingdom or other countries on the United States plan of control and the USSR proposals for prohibition of atomic weapons. On the other hand, it was known that a study published in 1948 by the United States State Department showed that in the United States, a country where public opinion was exposed to constant pressure from a powerful propaganda machine, more than 50 per cent of the persons consulted had said that they did not approve of the “American plan”. After the atomic explosions in the Soviet Union—for industrial purposes—it was unlikely that the number of champions of the American plan in the United States had grown while that of supporters of agreement with the USSR on the subject of prohibition of atomic weapons had decreased. On the contrary, President Truman’s declaration of 23 September 1949 and the Tass communiqué of

25 September 1949 had caused a powerful movement in favour of agreement with the Soviet Union on the atomic question.

120. That tendency was manifest not only among average Americans; scientists, soldiers, statesmen, journalists had declared that it was essential to reach understanding on the subject of atomic energy. In other countries, the movement in favour of prohibition of atomic weapons and of agreement on that subject between the USSR and the United States had been still more marked.

121. The same state of mind had become apparent even among some members of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, and had found expression in the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Haiti. No one knew why the representative of Haiti had withdrawn his draft resolution, moderate in form and content, but differing somewhat from the plans of the United States atomists. Had the well-known apparatus of pressure behind the scenes been put into action? It was also possible that the Haitian draft resolution had merely been a trial balloon intended to create the illusion that an attempt at understanding was wanted while, in reality, the draft had been destined to be withdrawn from the start. Whatever the truth might be, it was a fact that the representative of Haiti had hastily withdrawn his draft without even having been able to explain to the Committee why he had so suddenly changed his position. There could be no doubt that it had been much easier to bury that draft resolution than to stifle the voices of the millions of men in all countries of the world who demanded prohibition of the atomic weapon.

122. The voices were those of sovereign nations, and it was on them that the question of prohibition of atomic weapons would ultimately depend. That was precisely why the men behind the authors of the draft resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee were afraid of the free sovereign nations, which they meant to deprive of their freedom and their sovereignty so as to hold them more closely to the course of the American pretenders to world hegemony.

123. The threat that nations would be deprived of their sovereignty in disregard of the Charter was real because the United States was exerting economic, political and military pressure on other countries, especially the smaller countries, with a view to forcing them to surrender their national sovereignty. That was an integral part of the campaign of American expansionist circles for world hegemony. The whole problem could be summed up in very simple terms: "I want to strangle you, and you must not resist me, because I am doing it for your own good".

124. The American expansionists were constantly repeating that national sovereignty was too costly a luxury for small States in the "atomic age". The key to the frontiers of those States, they said, was in the pockets of the United States of America. That did not mean, however, that the key to the frontiers of the United States could be trusted to anyone.

125. It might well be asked where was the principle of equality of States large and small proclaimed by the United Nations Charter.

126. It was said again and again that all nations should sacrifice their national sovereignty for the

common good. It might be asked what sacrifice would be made by the United States, which would stand at the head of the international atomic trust, control the economies of other countries, increase its profits from day to day, and make others suffer its losses.

127. Paragraph 4 of the draft resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee which called upon all States to demonstrate their sovereignty by abandoning it, sounded like a sorry joke. Such an absurd idea was simply a play on words, and, although its authors might think it the height of diplomatic subtlety, it was quite out of place in a serious political document.

128. Would the Soviet Union's position in defence of the sovereign rights of States prevent the establishment of international control of atomic energy if atomic weapons had been prohibited? That was how Sir Alexander Cadogan had tried to portray the situation. Sir Alexander knew that that was not correct. It was perfectly clear that every State signing the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the convention for the establishment of control and implementation of that prohibition would assume an obligation to adhere to the provisions of the conventions in good faith and would recognize the right of the international control agency which was to see to it that that obligation was scrupulously observed.

129. The powers of the international control organ, as also the obligations of States, could be accepted only within the limits of practical necessity. He used the word "limits" advisedly, for he had every reason to suspect and to allege that the United States, which aimed at world domination, would be secretly at the back of the international control organ.

130. Any attempt to give to the international control organ and to the obligations assumed by States which signed conventions a wider interpretation than was dictated by practical needs would constitute an attempt to abolish national sovereignty and could not be accepted by any self-respecting State. He asked Sir Alexander Cadogan to take note of those words.

131. He could not pass over in silence paragraph 2 of the operative part of the Committee's draft resolution which again raised the question of which convention was to be concluded and put into effect first—the convention prohibiting atomic weapons, or the convention establishing international control of that prohibition. As all were aware, the Government of the USSR, in an effort to achieve agreement, had proposed that the two conventions should be drawn up and put into effect simultaneously. Yet the representatives of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom were asking the Soviet Union what new proposal it had to offer and whether it had anything fresh to say about the two conventions.

132. Mr. Hickerson had told the Assembly that in his statement Mr. Vyshinsky had merely repeated what had already been said. Mr. Manuilsky would take the liberty of saying that Mr. Hickerson himself had brought nothing new into the discussion and had done nothing but repeat the old United States ditty. The only possible explanation for the paragraph in question of the Committee's resolution was that the

sinister forces behind that resolution were trying by all possible means to prevent an agreement and to increase disagreements, so as to make it impossible to prohibit atomic weapons.

133. The same reasons would explain the contents of paragraph 3 of the Committee's resolution, the effect of which would be to put an end to the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission and to place the question in the hands of the six permanent members of the Commission. It was permissible to wonder what part would be played by the Security Council, which had the chief responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and of which there had been so much talk in the First Committee at the time of the discussion of the Soviet Union's proposals for the conclusion of a treaty between the five permanent members, with a view to consolidating the peace.¹

134. By voting in favour of the Canadian-French resolution, the majority in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had crudely violated the most important provisions of the General Assembly resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 1946 and had violated the Charter of the United Nations.

135. It was quite obvious that the Ukrainian delegation could not vote for the draft resolution adopted by the majority of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, which clearly reflected the desire of the ruling circles in the United States to keep the atomic weapon as a weapon of aggression against peaceful peoples. In spite of its diplomatic language, the draft resolution was full of intolerance for any solution reached by agreement and of hatred for the Soviet Union, whose Government had submitted proposals of great historic importance, condemning war preparations, prohibiting atomic weapons and providing for the signature of a treaty between the five permanent members of the Security Council with a view to consolidating peace. Whether that were desired or not, those proposals would be recorded in history as the highest proof of the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union, and the efforts of slanderers would be fruitless. The proposals showed to what degree the Government of the Soviet Union was motivated by good-will and the desire to achieve international co-operation.

136. He asked what proofs the representatives belonging to the majority could offer of their own good-will and desire to co-operate in international affairs.

137. The worst slanderers and enemies of the USSR would not dare to allege that propaganda for a new war was being made in the Soviet Union, or that the Press of the Soviet Union was calling for the destruction of cities and the mass extermination of the civilian population by atomic bombs, as happened every day in the United States of America.

138. If anyone in the USSR had dared to make statements similar to those made by Mr. Cannon and Mr. Davis, to which he had already referred, the guilty person—assuming that he was mentally sound—would have been arraigned before the courts and exposed to the contempt of the entire population. There were those who asked the

Government of the USSR to open the country more widely to foreign broadcasts. In the USSR, of which the 30 million Ukrainians formed a part, there was not and never would be any place for war propaganda.

139. The work of Soviet experts in the field of atomic energy was designed to serve the interests of peace and the welfare of the various nationalities making up the Soviet people. On 6 November 1949 one of the most eminent political personalities in the USSR, Mr. Malenkov, had expressed the thoughts of the people of the Soviet Union when he had said that for an imperialist, atomic energy was but a means for the production of murderous weapons and a basis for threats, blackmail and violence; in the hands of the Soviet people, however, that energy could and should become a powerful instrument for technical progress and the development of the productive forces of the USSR. That was an expression of the noble humanism of Soviet socialism and sprang from the political and social structure of the Soviet State. That humanism had inspired the Government of the USSR when it had submitted its proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons and persistently defended its proposals over a period of three years, despite the fierce opposition of the opponents of international peace and co-operation.

140. The USSR Government had given proof of very great patience in its efforts to arrive at agreement, while the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc had done their utmost to find new obstacles to hinder any solution of the problem of the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. Nevertheless, Sir Alexander Cadogan had denied those facts from the tribune of the General Assembly. He knew very well, however, that when it was evident that agreement was possible between the majority of the members of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Soviet Union on the question of the destruction of stocks of atomic weapons, it was enough for the United States to intervene for all possibility of agreement to disappear. There had been other times when the possibility of agreement had been in sight, but on each occasion the United States delegation had virtually imposed a veto and made any agreement impossible.

141. When the United States delegation refused to support the prohibition of atomic weapons and began to place the question of the institution of the international control of atomic energy in the forefront, the Government of the USSR had submitted its proposals of 11 June 1947.² It was sufficient to be acquainted with those proposals, and more especially with paragraphs 6 and 7, to be convinced that the Soviet Union had proposed that extremely wide powers of inspection should be given to the international control organ. The representatives of the United States, however, had deliberately kept silent on those proposals, or had distorted them, in order to continue the production of atomic weapons without any control.

142. No one was unaware, either, that when the Atomic Energy Commission had found itself at a deadlock in connexion with the so-called entry-into-force stages of international control and the

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, First Committee, 325th to 337th meetings inclusive.*

² See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Second Year, No. 2.*

priority of control over prohibition, the USSR Government had found a solution by proposing the simultaneous conclusion and application of the two conventions.

143. The Government of the United States of America, however, had abandoned no part of the notorious Baruch plan. Its representatives at the current session of the General Assembly had in no way changed their position, and were thereby rendering agreement impossible.

144. The Ukrainian delegation supported the draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation, because that draft was based on the fundamental proposals contained in the General Assembly resolutions 1 (I) of 24 January and 41 (I) of 14 December 1946, and because it recommended that the Atomic Energy Commission should resume the work which the arbitrary action of the Anglo-American representatives had interrupted, notwithstanding the provisions of the resolutions and of the Charter of the United Nations. Finally, the Ukrainian delegation supported the USSR draft resolution because, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter, it defended the prerogatives of the Security Council in the field of atomic energy, whereas the draft adopted by the majority of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee withdrew those questions from the Council's competence.

145. For all those reasons, the Ukrainian delegation rejected the draft resolution adopted by the majority of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, and would vote for the draft resolution submitted by the USSR.

146. The Ukrainian delegation also considered it its duty to inform the General Assembly that it supported the statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, which had withdrawn the right to represent China from the group of private individuals directed by Mr. Tsiang, who no longer had the confidence of the Chinese people.

147. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1119).

The resolution was adopted by 49 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions.

148. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked for the USSR draft resolution (A/1120) to be voted on by roll-call and paragraph by paragraph.

149. The PRESIDENT put paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution to the vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Uruguay, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: Uruguay, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway,

Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Yugoslavia.

Paragraph 1 was rejected by 50 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

150. The PRESIDENT put paragraph 2 to the vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Syria, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland.

Against: Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden.

Abstaining: Yugoslavia.

Paragraph 2 was rejected by 51 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

151. The PRESIDENT put paragraph 3 to the vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Pakistan, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

Against: Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway.

Abstaining: Yemen, Afghanistan, Costa Rica, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Mexico.

Paragraph 3 was rejected by 41 votes to 6, with 10 abstentions.

152. The PRESIDENT declared that the USSR draft resolution as a whole was rejected.

153. The resolution which the General Assembly had adopted was a great and impressive act of faith, faith in the principles of the Charter, faith in the possibility of agreement on the most difficult and most compelling problem of the age.

154. Much devoted work had gone into the proposals on atomic energy which had been under

consideration for the past three years. The discussions in the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission had produced much information and had clarified many points of view. The deadlock, however, still persisted.

155. As President of the General Assembly, he had addressed an appeal on 3 November 1949 to the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission urging them to continue by every conceivable means to seek agreement on an effective system of control and prohibition of atomic weapons. Specifically, he had suggested that attention should be directed along four lines. First, the possibility of a short-term atomic armistice accompanied by an inspection system; secondly, the possibility of an interim prohibition of the use of atomic weapons, with adequate safeguards; thirdly, the possibility of further compromises between the majority and the minority plans for atomic energy control; fourthly, the possibility of a new approach to the fundamental problem of control. He had made it clear that he was not advocating any particular plan; the four points were merely indications of four paths which should be explored.

156. He would say nothing more about those suggestions except to reject as supercilious and unfair the criticism that those proposals, or any others that might be advanced, were "naive". It was a common error to distrust a solution merely because it seemed too simple. The many learned men who had applied themselves to the problem had been either atomic scientists or political thinkers who knew all the physical and political equations involved in it. Yet he did not imagine that any one of them having the innate modesty of greatness, would deny a hearing to any proposal which attempted to inject the human factor into the mechanical equations that seemed thus far to be leading nowhere.

157. It was gratifying to note that, in the resolution just adopted, the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission were requested to continue their consultations, to explore all possible avenues and examine all concrete suggestions with a view to determining whether they might lead to an agreement securing the basic objectives of the General Assembly in the question.

158. The permanent members were thus under grave responsibility to the General Assembly and to the world. They had been asked to explore

all possible avenues and to examine all concrete suggestions. It could not be expected that an entirely new plan would suddenly be discovered and unanimously accepted, but the Assembly had a right to expect open-minded consideration of every possibility of reaching agreement on an effective means of control which, at the same time, would make possible an agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons.

159. The atomic energy problem had become part of the context of international strife and tension which had dominated the post-war period. That fact made a solution more difficult, but it also made a solution more urgent. Every step taken towards the amelioration of political problems, every move towards the relaxation of tension and suspicion was a step towards the solution of the problem of atomic energy. The reverse was equally true, for all the problems before the Assembly reacted one upon the other, and the slightest progress achieved on the problem of atomic energy would immediately cast a more hopeful light on all the other questions before the Assembly.

160. While he whole-heartedly congratulated the General Assembly on the adoption of the resolution, he would be less than frank if he did not say that some of the speeches which had been made on that and related subjects did not call for congratulations. In certain respects the Assembly seemed to be developing a tendency to disregard the substance of problems and to consider them merely as incidents in a constant polemic. Whatever might be said of less pressing problems, atomic energy was too serious to be treated as an incidental phase in the battle of propaganda. It was a problem before which all mankind stood equally interested and equally defenceless.

161. If the horrors of atomic war should ever be visited upon the world, the pitiful survivors of blasted and ruined cities would take little consolation in the thought that the representatives at the United Nations had made brilliant and witty speeches about atomic energy. They would ask but one question: why had the United Nations not prevented that catastrophe?

162. The resolution the Assembly had adopted could be summed up in one sentence: it was an appeal to save humanity while there was yet time.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Thursday, 24 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly: reports of the Fifth Committee (A/1074, A/1075, A/1076, A/1077 and A/1078)

1. Miss WITTEVEEN (Netherlands), Rapporteur of the Fifth Committee, presented the Committee's reports on the Advisory Committee on Ad-

ministrative and Budgetary Questions (A/1074), the Committee on Contributions (A/1075), the Board of Auditors (A/1076), the United Nations Staff Pension Committee (A/1077) and the Investments Committee (A/1078) together with the draft resolution contained therein, and said she wished to mention two points.

2. First, the Committee had felt that a two-thirds majority was not required for recommendations