

service would constitute an affirmative step which would strengthen one of the important functions of the United Nations, namely, the appointment of missions.

130. The PRESIDENT put to the vote draft resolution A proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1058).

*Resolution A was adopted by 46 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions.*

131. The PRESIDENT put to the vote draft resolution B proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1058).

*Resolution B was adopted by 38 votes to 6, with 11 abstentions.*

### **Report of the Security Council: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1114)**

132. The PRESIDENT drew attention to the report of the Security Council and the report and draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1114). Since that item did not require discussion, unless there were any objections, the General Assembly would take note of the report of the Security Council.

*The resolution proposed by the Ad Hoc Political Committee was adopted.*

### **International control of atomic energy: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1119)**

133. Mr. NISOR (Belgium), Rapporteur of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, presented the report of that Committee on the international control of atomic energy, and the accompanying draft resolution (A/1119).<sup>1</sup>

134. He recalled that on 22 September 1949 the General Assembly had decided to refer to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee the item on its agenda dealing with the international control of atomic energy. The result of that Committee's consideration of the question was formulated in the draft resolution, which contained two main points.

135. First, it requested the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission to continue their consultations, to explore every possibility and to examine all suggestions with a view to determining whether they might lead to an agreement securing the basic objectives of the General Assembly in the question and to keep the Atomic Energy Commission and the General Assembly informed of their progress.

136. Secondly, it recommended that all nations, in the use of the right of sovereignty, should join in mutual agreement to limit the individual exercise of those rights in the control of atomic energy to the extent required, in the light of the foregoing considerations, for the promotion of world security and peace and that all nations should agree to exercise such rights jointly.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.

## **TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING**

*Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Wednesday, 23 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO, (Philippines):*

### **International control of atomic energy: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1119) (continued)**

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that on 24 January 1946 the General Assembly had adopted a resolution (1 (I)) establishing a Commission to study the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy, a force capable either of contributing greatly to the progress of mankind or of annihilating it. The resolution had invited the Commission thus established to make specific proposals to the General Assembly, *inter alia* "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction". It had also said that it was essential to make provision "for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes".

2. Four years, all but two months, had elapsed since the adoption of that historic resolution. None of the steps envisaged by the General

Assembly had yet been taken. No steps had been taken to eliminate atomic weapons from national armaments; none had even been studied. The same was true of the establishment of control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes. Nor had any steps been taken to guarantee the protection and defence of States which respected international agreements and which might be the victims of violation or non-observance of such agreements.

3. The Soviet Union, for its part, had done all that lay in its power to carry out the General Assembly's resolution and deliver mankind from the threat of mass destruction that hung over it because of the atomic weapon, a weapon of aggression whose use would outrage the conscience and offend the honour of peace-loving peoples.

4. From the outset, the Soviet Union had proposed that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the production and use of atomic weapons; on 19 June 1946 it had submitted a plan to that effect to the Atomic Energy Commission.<sup>2</sup>

5. In the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee,<sup>1</sup> the representative of the Kuomintang had stated that

<sup>1</sup> From the discussion on this subject in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 30th to 37th meetings inclusive.*

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, No. 2.*

the Soviet Union had taken more than a year to submit its proposals on inspection. He had neglected to point out that the proposals of 19 June 1946 had envisaged severe penalties for violators of that agreement. Mr. Tsiang's statements, therefore, were not correct. However, he had no intention of engaging in a polemic with Mr. Tsiang, as it was not known whom the latter represented in the General Assembly. On 15 November 1949, Mr. Chou En-lai, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central Government of the People's Republic of China, had informed the President of the General Assembly that the delegation led by Mr. Tsiang Ting-fu could not represent China and had no right to speak in the United Nations on behalf of the Chinese people.

6. The delegation of the Soviet Union supported that statement and would not consider that the Kuomintang delegation represented China.

7. Reverting to the substance of the atomic energy question, Mr. Vyshinsky said that the USSR proposals of 19 June 1946 showed that the USSR had been well aware of the extreme importance of finding a solution to the problem as rapidly as possible. The proposals required that the contracting parties should at least solemnly undertake in no case to resort to atomic weapons; to prohibit the production and possession of atomic weapons; to destroy all stocks of atomic weapons, whether completely manufactured or not, within three months from the coming into force of the convention. They had stated that the violation of those undertakings would constitute an extremely serious crime against humanity and had proposed that any such violations should be subject to extremely severe penalties. The proposals made by the Soviet Union had gone even further. They had suggested the adoption of an effective system of international control by means of a multilateral convention which was to be applied within the framework of the Security Council.

8. To conclude the historical survey of the question, he reminded the Assembly of the USSR proposals of 18 February, 25 March and 3 June 1947,<sup>1</sup> which provided that the organs of control and inspection were to have their own rules for carrying out their task, with the provision that, if necessary, decisions should be taken by a majority vote.

9. That showed the falsity of assertions that the USSR control plan provided that the unanimity rule should apply to voting. That argument had only been used to delay matters and make it impossible to conclude a convention prohibiting atomic weapons. That had not prevented the United States representative from repeating the slander at the 34th meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on 11 November 1949.

10. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that on 17 November 1946, Generalissimo Stalin, head of the Soviet Government, had stated in reply to questions from the Moscow correspondent of the *Sunday Times* that the atomic bomb was not such a powerful force as some politicians believed. Mr. Stalin had stated that the atomic bomb could not decide the outcome of a war. He had added that the

monopoly of the atomic bomb secret obviously created a threat but that it could be countered in two ways: first, the monopoly of the atomic bomb could not last long; secondly, its use would be prohibited.

11. On 27 October 1946, in reply to questions from the director of the American news agency, United Press, Mr. Stalin had said that strict international control of atomic energy was essential.

12. A careful study of the USSR proposals would show how tendentious and untrue were the statements of those who alleged that the Soviet Union was opposed to the inspection of concerns producing atomic energy and that it refused to grant representatives of the control and inspection agency access to all concerns of that kind.

13. Mr. Vyshinsky briefly recalled the role assigned to the inspection of atomic energy in the USSR proposals.

14. The Soviet Union's draft proposed to give the international control commission very wide powers. It proposed that it should be given access to all enterprises concerned with the mining, production or stock-piling of atomic raw materials or atomic materials or with the utilization of atomic energy.

15. The opponents of the USSR proposals were silent on those points and spread completely false rumours that the Soviet Union would refuse to allow its atomic enterprises to be inspected and supervised. Point 7 (a) of the USSR proposals<sup>2</sup> was sufficient proof to the contrary.

16. While reserving each Government's right to conduct scientific research work in atomic energy, the USSR proposals subordinated that research to the supervision of the international control commission, which must see to it that the established rules were fully observed, that is, that atomic energy was not used for military purposes. A careful study of the USSR proposals, and especially of that of 11 June 1947,<sup>3</sup> would show that they suggested that the international control commission itself should be given full power to carry out scientific research work on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The proposals also emphasized that one of the main tasks of the international control commission should be to ensure a wide exchange of information between the various countries in that field and to provide means of consultative assistance to signatory countries which might need it.

17. The opponents of the USSR proposals were constantly trying to deceive public opinion about the real attitude of the USSR towards atomic energy. Thus, in August 1947, Sir Alexander Cadogan had submitted a special questionnaire<sup>4</sup> which constituted an attempt to discredit the USSR proposals. Mr. Vyshinsky could not spend more time on that question and merely noted that the attempt had failed. Nevertheless, although the British representative's questions had been fully answered, they continued to serve as a basis for the insinuations which certain circles were making about the USSR in the matter of inspection. It was thus that the provision for periodic inspection of enterprises for the mining of atomic raw material and the production of atomic materials and en-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission*, third report to the Security Council, page 20.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission*, third report to the Security Council, page 24.

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission*, second year, No. 2.

<sup>4</sup> See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission*, third report to the Security Council, page 25.

ergy had been attacked. As early as 1947, however, the USSR representative had explained that there should be periodic inspection of all enterprises, beginning with mines and ending with nuclear fuel factories; and that inspection should be carried out not at intervals fixed in advance, but whenever necessary. The necessity was to be determined by the international control commission.

18. That completely destroyed the allegation that periodic inspection would make it impossible for the commission to carry out inspection where it was necessary and as often as it considered essential. Moreover, there could be no question of the unanimity rule because the USSR proposals stipulated that the international control commission would take its decisions in accordance with its rules of procedure. Finally, to put an end to all allusions to the veto, the proposals laid down that all decisions would be taken by a majority vote.

19. All that showed that no well-meaning person could oppose the establishment of inspection as envisaged in one of the USSR proposals.<sup>1</sup> The situation should be clear. Nevertheless, the attempts to put the USSR position in a false light continued. That was what Mr. Hickerson, United States Assistant Secretary of State, for example, had recently attempted to do in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

20. The assertions of those who maintained that periodic inspection could not be effective were equally without foundation. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that the Atomic Energy Commission had already indicated in its first report<sup>2</sup> that there was no reason to assume that control or effective inspection was technically impossible. It was quite clear from that report that inspection could be carried out in such a fashion as to make it absolutely impossible to evade it, to use atomic materials contrary to the provisions of the convention or to manufacture atomic weapons.

21. With a view to strengthening their position, the opponents of the USSR proposals had published a statement on 25 October 1949 (A/1050) regarding the question of atomic energy, in which reference had been made to "six-Power conversations". In spite of what the experts had said, that statement asserted that inspection could not prevent evasion. The reasons were given for the assertion. Its authors apparently considered that science and technique were insufficiently advanced for it to be possible to check how much material had gone into a reactor and how much had come out after a given technical process. The experts declared, however, that there was no reason why such a control system should not work. It was not the experts, but the political representatives of the five Powers, who believed that such control would encounter difficulties. That was quite understandable, for the whole question depended, not on technical considerations, but on whether it was politically expedient to adopt a given control measure.

22. It must be observed, however, that no system of control eliminated the risk of bad faith and of breaches of the convention. Mr. Osborn, the representative of the United States, had admitted that. He had stated that, if all atomic materials

and all atomic enterprises became the property of an international control agency empowered to carry out all measures of control and inspection, as in fact the Anglo-American plan provided, nuclear explosives might fall into the hands of the governments as a result of sudden seizure by violence. That statement showed how ineffective the United States control plan was, because it acknowledged that, in times of serious international tension, no control could prevent breaches of good faith, which would lead to another war. It must not be forgotten that, in any case, the composition of the control agency would be an important factor. If it was acknowledged, as the supporters of the United States plan did acknowledge, that evidence of bad faith might possibly be given by the governments, why not acknowledge that such bad faith might equally well be shown by the staff of the control agency in its administration? Occurrences of that sort had been known in the past and could not be disregarded. The Soviet Union was far from harbouring such suspicions, but there was no reason not to speak of them since the authors of the United States plan referred to the possibility of the governments giving evidence of bad faith.

23. It should be easier to control the atomic bomb than other types of armaments if as reputable an expert as Mr. Chester Barnard, former member of the Lilienthal Commission and at the moment President of the Rockefeller Foundation, was to be believed. The production of atomic bombs necessitated large quantities of raw materials. It was obviously easier for inspection groups to discover large quantities of materials than to unearth small or even insignificant amounts measured in kilogrammes or in tens of kilogrammes. Moreover, atomic bomb production required very complex plants, which would also facilitate the work of inspection.

24. That showed how inaccurate were the assertions that it would be more difficult to establish control over atomic energy than over the production of other armaments. It was for that reason that the Soviet Union stressed the necessity of prohibiting atomic weapons and for establishing extremely strict international control through a convention. The Soviet Union had continued its efforts along these lines during the entire course of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. No one could fail to note that up until the third session of the General Assembly the Soviet Union had always said that it was essential to conclude first of all a convention prohibiting atomic weapons. That was a very logical attitude because the implementation of a decision could not be controlled until the decision itself had been taken.

25. On the contrary, the opponents of the USSR proposals, in defiance of all logic, asked that a convention should first be drawn up on control. In effect that amounted to putting the cart before the horse. To avoid any loss of time and in a spirit of compromise, however, the USSR Government had accepted the suggestion that the two conventions, namely, the convention prohibiting atomic weapons and the convention on the control of that ban, should be signed simultaneously. It was quite interesting to note that it had sufficed for the Soviet Union to consent to the simultaneous conclusion of those two conventions for new ob-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission*, third report to the Security Council.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, first report to the Security Council.

jections to be raised. On 9 November 1949, in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the United Kingdom representative had stated that it was quite impossible to accept and carry out the new USSR proposal.

26. That statement betrayed the true intentions of the opponents of the USSR proposals. It showed yet again that the United States and the United Kingdom were in no way interested in banning atomic weapons and setting up control. Their intentions were very different. It was not by chance that, at a meeting of the Security Council in 1948, the representative of the United States, Mr. Jessup, had candidly declared that he wished to see the United States plan of control adopted for if not, there would be no control at all and the armaments race would continue. If the question was put in that way it was clearly useless to think of consultations and negotiations. There could be no agreement because it was a question of an ultimatum. The Soviet Union, to which the ultimatum was delivered, was not in the habit of using such language and would not allow anyone to speak to it in such a way.

27. The Anglo-American bloc continued to press for the plan drawn up in 1945 by the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal Committee, although the questionable nature of that plan had been shown. It was not by chance that the Canadian representative had tried to show that the new United States plan differed substantially from the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan. It appeared, in fact, that it was becoming very difficult to defend the Baruch plan in its original form. It had to be touched up a little. The greatest efforts were being made to that end. Some phrases had in fact been replaced by others, but the substance remained the same. As USSR representatives had already shown on more than one occasion, that plan did not in any way outlaw atomic weapons or suggest the establishment of international control. The plan, in conformity with the United States policy of world domination, had been made at a time when the United States of America had had a monopoly in the field of atomic weapons and had hoped that it would retain that monopoly for a long time, if not always.

28. The Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan had been drawn up in the interests of United States monopoly. That explained its nature and why it could not be accepted by other States which, if they wished to keep their sovereignty and independence, could not hope for the success of the United States plans for world domination.

29. The typical feature of the United States control plan was as follows: all atomic supplies, all plants, all scientific research work must be entrusted to what was known as an international body, on an ownership basis. It was true that the plan allowed States to retain some atomic plants and certain quantities of materials, but only minor plants which could be qualified as non-dangerous. But even those plants would be placed wholly under the supervision of the international control body by the establishment of a system of licenses.

30. Further, the international control body would also have to decide what constituted a dangerous quantity of atomic material, and what was or was not a dangerous plant. All those facts could be gathered from the information contained

in the second report of the Atomic Energy Commission.<sup>1</sup>

31. It was surely clear that such a proposal, like a whole series of other proposed measures, would reduce the sovereign rights of States to nothing. For several years the world had been witnessing an offensive by the Anglo-American bloc directed against the principle of State sovereignty, a principle which was characterized as a reactionary idea, an old prejudice, a remnant of feudalism which had been dragged in the mud in the General Assembly.

32. The Soviet Union vigorously opposed that manner of considering problems because the idea of State sovereignty was a serious obstacle to the achievement of the policy of world domination which could not admit the influence of other States.

33. There was reason to raise another question on which the majority in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had blindly followed the Anglo-American majority which prevailed in the Atomic Energy Commission. It was a question of quotas, of what was called the rationalization of the use of atomic energy. That was a new attempt to undermine the sovereign rights of States. The second report of the Atomic Energy Commission showed that the right to possess atomic energy and the possibility of depriving a country of that right was given to what was called the international control agency. It was obvious that, in the circumstances, all the reservations in the United States plan, the purpose of which was to leave proprietary rights over atomic energy to certain States, lost their entire value. Moreover, those reservations appeared in the plan merely to conceal the true nature of the document and the better to enable the United States of America, or rather United States monopolies, to lay hands on the world's entire resources of atomic energy and thus more easily to control the development of that energy in the various countries. Provisions of the kind were clearly incompatible with the idea of national sovereignty and deprived States of all control over their own economy.

34. One accusation brought against the Soviet Union was that it refused to accept any limitation or any reduction in sovereign rights, even if asked to do so for the sake of international co-operation. The delegation of the Soviet Union had more than once replied to that argument. It was perfectly familiar with the elementary principles of international law. It knew that any form of international co-operation involved some limitation of national sovereignty and the pooling of individual rights in an international whole. That, however, had nothing to do with the international plan that some members were endeavouring to see adopted that day. The plan left no room for any sovereignty. The aim was not to limit certain specific sovereign rights, but quite definitely to deny them outright. The very existence of States would, in effect, be denied. There could be no sovereign will when the national economy of a State, on which its sovereignty rested, was submitted to strict control. A country deprived of its economic independence was no longer sovereign, but merely the slave of another country. Those who opposed the Soviet Union should realize that in opposing its

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission*, second report to the Security Council.

conception of sovereignty and stating that it was obsolete, reactionary and feudal, they were denying the very principle of sovereignty itself and sacrificing their own. Many instances could be cited to illustrate that fact.

35. The Marshall Plan was surely nothing but the submission, to the United States, of the sovereign rights of those States which had accepted an economic yoke. He would not labour the point, but would merely state that the world was witnessing a conflict between two principles: that of world hegemony on the one hand, and that of national sovereignty and effective collaboration based on the sovereign equality of the parties, on the other. It was open to the delegations represented at the General Assembly to adopt what had been called the system of international control. They would realize later the disastrous results of that system on the economic, social and cultural development of their countries, just as they could already see the results of the Marshall Plan.

36. Mr. Vyshinsky declared that many of the representatives knew very well how right he was, but their situation was such that they could not be sincere, having been trapped in the gilded net of United States capitalism.

37. The USSR delegation understood the position of those delegations and sympathized with them.

38. In order to hide its imperialist aims in the field of atomic energy, the United States bloc was demagogically advocating international concepts which it opposed to nationalism and the idea of the sovereignty of States. The United States, together with the United Kingdom and their supporters, maintained that the plan would safeguard the interest of humanity as a whole against the selfish interests of States which valued their own welfare more than the common good. The argument was really only camouflage. The true aim of the United States plan was to secure as much influence as possible in the international control organ for the United States monopolies, in order to turn that organ into an instrument for the realization of the expansionist aims of those monopolies.

39. There could be no question of internationalism, as the proposed composition of the organ showed only too well. The staff of the organ would, in the main, be composed of men entirely at the bidding of the United States Government. Such a state of affairs could be observed daily in the work of United Nations organs. There was no reason to suppose that the international control organ would be any different. Mr. Baruch had himself openly stated that staff for the international organ should be chosen on the grounds of competence and also, as he put it, as far as possible in accordance with the principle of geographical distribution. That reference to competence showed quite clearly how staff would be selected. Moreover, Mr. Baruch's mention of applying the principle of geographical distribution "as far as possible" was also sufficiently characteristic. No international spirit would prevail in the control organ. It would not be an international organ, but an American body whose task it would be to achieve the objectives laid down in the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan.

40. A study of the documents of the Atomic Energy Commission brought out another point, to

which Mr. Vyshinsky wished to draw the attention of the General Assembly; the last thing the Commission seemed to have in mind was to reconcile the interests of international security with the possibility of developing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The latter objective could be easily achieved if the use of atomic energy for military purposes were forbidden. But after a careful study of the documents of the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Vyshinsky maintained that the majority of the proposals originating in United States circles seemed to show that the United States plan had only one end in view, namely, to prevent, at any cost, the development of atomic energy production for peaceful purposes in all countries, and first and foremost in the Soviet Union, always excepting, of course, the United States of America, which occupied a special place. Mr. Vyshinsky found the confirmation of his assertion in the basic principle of the United States plan, which provided that international control would include the transfer of the ownership of atomic materials and all plants producing atomic energy to the control organ; on the principle that the various States would have at their disposal, after due authorization by the control organ, only "safe" quantities of atomic materials and "safe" plants; on the principle too that the control organ would fix a quota for the production of atomic energy for each State; and lastly, on the principle of geographical distribution—which would in reality mean strategic and military distribution—of atomic plants throughout the world, without any regard to the economic requirements of the various countries.

41. There was no need to point out that such strategic and military distribution of atomic production would also tend to weaken the productive capacity of certain States and, consequently, their capacity for defence—a result wholly in keeping with the designs of those who were planning for world supremacy.

42. The atomic energy needs of the various States for pacific purposes were tremendous. That was especially the case with the Soviet Union where great progress had been made in the production of atomic energy. That factor should be borne in mind when atomic energy ration cards were distributed to States, just as ration cards had been issued in some countries during the bread shortage, and as they were still being issued, if he were not mistaken, in the United Kingdom.

43. He recalled, in that connexion, that as early as 1945 Professor Irving Langmuir, Director of the Research Laboratory of the General Electric Company, and one of the most qualified of United States scientists, had, after attending a session at the USSR Academy of Sciences in Moscow, published an article in which he pointed out the vast possibilities for the development of energy in the USSR, and had mentioned that that country could very well outstrip the United States in the production of atomic bombs, and consequently in the production of atomic energy. Professor Langmuir had listed the advantages which the USSR possessed in that field. He had stressed in particular the system of emulation which considerably increased the industrial production of the Soviet Union; the fact that that country had no unemployment or strikes; that pure and applied science were highly respected; and that the planning of scientific work was

more energetically pursued in the USSR than in any other country. Finally, Professor Langmuir had said that in those circumstances it could not be denied that the USSR Government was most interested in the development of atomic energy for pacific purposes, and that it was certain to obtain results in that field.

44. Professor Langmuir had spoken of the use of atomic energy for pacific purposes. There was no doubt that that was the intention of the Soviet Union: for four years its representatives had been making the same solemn entreaty, namely, that atomic energy should be prohibited, and international control established to put that prohibition into effect.

45. After gaining possession of the atomic weapon, and completely discovering and mastering the secret of atomic energy, the USSR was continuing to pursue the same policy. It insisted on the proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of a strict international control. At the same time, however, it demanded that nobody should prevent it from developing to the maximum the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, for that was an indispensable condition of the gigantic development of socialist construction in the USSR.

46. The situation was very different in the United States of America. Numerous facts showed that industrial and even scientific circles in the United States attached no importance to the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Some industrial circles even saw a very undesirable rival in atomic energy. Much less importance was attached to that new source of energy in the United States of America than to the already existing sources such as coal, oil and water; for the utilization of those resources was considerable, and it was thought to be inadvisable to develop that new source of energy. In support of those statements, Mr. Vyshinsky quoted passages from Professor Blackett's book and also referred to the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* and statements by Professor Oppenheimer. The latter endorsed the United States Atomic Energy Commission's statement, in its report to Congress dated 31 January 1948, that in the most favourable circumstances nuclear fuel could not contribute to the power requirements of the world during the next twenty years.

47. All that went to show how little the United States was interested in the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. It was only natural that the United States plan of control should be concerned with military considerations, for it took no account of the economic peculiarities and development of other countries.

48. As was shown by the second report of the Atomic Energy Commission, the United States plan would make the international control organ responsible for distributing atomic plants on a geographical basis, so as not to enable any particular country to obtain a military advantage by taking possession of the plants located on its own territory or in the territory of its neighbours. That was still another confirmation of his remark to the effect that no account had been taken of the economic needs of individual countries. That was evident too from the report of the Frank Commission submitted to the United States Secretary of War in 1945 and published in the *Bulletin of*

*the Atomic Scientists* on 1 May 1946. That document had to some extent inspired the authors of the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan, and clearly revealed its meaning. The authors of the report stated that the simplest method of control would be the rationing of raw materials, and especially of uranium ore. The production of nuclear explosives, the report said, was effected by the transformation of considerable quantities of uranium in big plants which produced isotopes in huge reactors. If a certain amount of uranium ore were allocated to each State, the mass production of isotopes would be rendered impossible. That limitation, according to the report, would have one disadvantage, namely, that it would render impossible the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

49. Mr. Vyshinsky could therefore state that the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan adopted by the Atomic Energy Commission, approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, and submitted to the General Assembly by the majority of that Committee, was intended to prevent the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The plan was therefore reactionary. It was opposed to scientific, technical and economic progress, it was opposed to the interests of mankind as a whole. Nevertheless, it was in the name of that plan that States were being asked to sacrifice what they held most dear, namely their sovereignty and independence.

50. Turning to that part of the United States plan which provided for the establishment of control by stages, Mr. Vyshinsky said that it had been based on the idea that the United States would be free of international control for possibly a long period of time. The report of the Atomic Energy Commission stated that the first task of an international body should be to determine the existence of raw materials and establish control over them. According to the report, the establishment of control over raw materials would bring up the political and technical question of access to them. The United States plan, however, offered no counter-proposal in respect of countries which had not yet reached the first stage. Certainly, there was a suggestion that technical information should be made available, but that possibility was left wholly undefined and was not, therefore, of any practical interest. Thus, the first stage of the plan—the stage which was of particular interest to countries whose production was little developed—offered no advantage to any country except the United States of America. Furthermore, the control organ could always maintain that some country had not fulfilled its obligations regarding the first stage of the implementation of the plan, and could refuse to pass on to the next stage with regard to that country.

51. All the aforesaid considerations served to emphasize the main fault in the United States plan, namely, that control would be unilateral and would operate to the advantage of the United States and be wholly unacceptable for all other countries. Thus, control by stages too was linked with the negation of the principle of national sovereignty, the negation of the principle of equality among the signatories of conventions prohibiting atomic weapons and establishing control over atomic energy.

52. The delegation of the Soviet Union could accept neither the principle of stages nor the

principle of quotas. It could not, therefore, accept the United States plan, in which both those principles played a very important part.

53. Once again he was compelled to declare that the United States plan was intended to protect the military and strategic interests of the United States of America and was not aimed at the prohibition of the production of atomic weapons.

54. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky referred to a letter addressed to Mr. Byrnes, United States Secretary of State, on 17 March 1946, by Mr. Acheson, Mr. Vannevar Bush, Mr. James Cronin and General McCloy, in which the signatories had declared that the atomic energy production plan did not require that production of atomic bombs should cease once the international plan had come into force. The letter showed, in particular, that the United States did not consider itself bound by what was called the international control plan, and that any decision to stop production of atomic bombs would be a matter of high policy, which would have to be decided, by the Senate, in accordance with the United States Constitution. Thus even if the United States plan came into force, it might not be ratified by the Senate, which could refuse to put an end to the manufacture of atomic bombs. Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out that the letter to which he had referred was dated March 1946, although on 24 January 1946 the General Assembly had adopted a decision in principle on the necessity for taking measures to prohibit atomic weapons.

55. Nothing in the plan corresponded to the aspirations of the peoples of the world and to the clearly expressed wishes of the General Assembly in resolutions 1 (I) of 24 January and 41 (I) of 14 December 1946. Bearing all those considerations in mind, therefore, the delegation of the USSR could not accept the plan and opposed it in the belief that, far from bringing about the prohibition of atomic weapons, it would merely give rise to the dangerous illusion that some kind of international control was being established on the production and use of atomic energy.

56. There was another particular aspect of the United States plan for control to which Mr. Vyshinsky wished to call attention. The plan quite rightly prescribed sanctions for any infringement of the rules which the international control organ would establish. The conditions under which that organ would function should, however, be examined.

57. The United States control plan made it possible and very easy to create artificial pretexts enabling the control organ to interfere in a field outside its competence. It also made it possible for it to prescribe sanctions. Such interference could take place when, for example, a State was accused of producing more than its quota of energy in spite of the fact that for reasons of national economy, it was unable to adhere to the quotas prescribed. That was by no means a fantastic hypothesis; an effort might be made to apply sanctions because of acts which were a natural consequence of the country's economic development.

58. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky would cite only one instance: when the Soviet Union had adopted a plan proposing to raise its production

of steel to 60 million tons a year, Mr. Bullitt, the well-known reactionary United States politician, had stated that that decision showed the imperialistic and aggressive attitude of the USSR, and he had requested that measures of a military nature should be taken against that country.

59. It was quite certain that individuals such as Mr. Bullitt would make their appearance in the international control organ and that they would endeavour to use that organ to curb manifestations of "Soviet imperialism", and would try by every possible means to prevent the development of the economy of the Soviet Union, despite the fact that those efforts were doomed to failure beforehand. When they realized that they had failed, they would claim that the control conditions had been violated and that an international crime had been committed, and they would threaten to take military measures against the USSR although well aware that they could not intimidate that country. The threat of military action had had no effect, thirty-two years previously, when fourteen Governments had organized international intervention on the territory of the Soviet Union; it would be no more effective at the current time. However, the possibility remained that attempts of that kind might be made and they would be rendered possible by that very plan for international control. That was the dangerous aspect of the plan, which its authors were trying to present as a document for social progress which would ensure the welfare of mankind.

60. Those who protested against the proposals of the Soviet Union maintained that they did not provide for the establishment of effective control and that they were dangerous because they merely gave the illusion of control of that kind. That was obviously a malicious invention. The truly dangerous plan was that of the United States, which was being foisted on the United Nations. That proposal, in fact, had as its aim to ensure that the United States would have an obedient majority within the international control organ so as to be able to take possession of the world reserves of atomic materials, of all the plants using those materials and all related plants. It would thus be able finally to regulate and, if necessary, restrict or arrest altogether the development of atomic energy production for peaceful ends, on the pretext that such development, in the proportions it had reached, would constitute a danger to world peace.

61. The United States plan was aimed at deceiving world public opinion and at concealing the aggressive ends on which it was based behind such false pretexts as a desire for peace and international co-operation, and concern about the best interests of mankind.

62. It should also be noted that the United States plan laid down that investigations could be carried out without any supervision on any part of the territory of each of the signatory Powers of the conventions. In particular, the inspection services would have extensive powers of investigation with regard to atomic materials in every country. Such a procedure would make it possible for the so-called international control organ to make an excellent survey of the objectives pursued by every country and to organize a vast network of military and economic espionage. Pro-

fessor Blackett had stated in his book that in view of the attitude of the United States it was only natural that the USSR military authorities should have wished to keep the site of their large industrial establishments secret. In that connexion, Professor Blackett had quoted a statement attributed to Field-Marshal von Rundstedt that the maps with which Hitler's General Staff had been provided had been completely wrong. Where highways had been marked on the maps there had in fact been only secondary roads. Some railways marked on the maps had simply not existed. There had been large towns in places which had been marked on the map as open country. It was hardly necessary to stress the importance of that reference to history.

63. Immediately upon the appearance of that plan, the Soviet Union had considered it its duty to show what was really behind it, to show that under the pretext of establishing an international control organ, its purpose was to create a super-trust to permit the development of United States monopolies and establish an instrument for the launching of war.

64. The Soviet Union had always demanded the absolute prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control. It still maintained that position after gaining possession of the atomic weapon.

65. In conclusion, Mr. Vyshinsky wished to say a few words on the draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly by the representatives of Canada and France. That draft, which had been accepted by a majority in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, claimed quite wrongly that humanity would be threatened so long as control of the development and operation of atomic energy remained in the hands of Governments. That was untrue, for the Soviet Union's proposals made it possible to establish an international control and inspection which would avert that danger while respecting the principle of national sovereignty.

66. It was also impossible to accept the provisions of the Canadian-French draft resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee which called on all States to submit to international control as provided for in the United States plan. The fact was that that type of control was incompatible with the interests of States. Under the pretext of promoting international peace and security, paragraph 4 of the draft proposed that the sovereign rights of States should be restricted. It should be noted that the wording of that paragraph had been changed. The original wording openly invited governments to renounce their sovereign rights as far as the control of atomic energy was concerned. It was only in consequence of the opposition they had encountered from a number of delegations, and particularly the delegations of the USSR and the peoples' democracies, that the representatives of Canada and France had been obliged to modify their wording. Nevertheless, the somewhat attenuated wording that had been adopted in no way changed the substance of the question. Any delegation which voted for that provision would show that it was prepared to sacrifice the sovereignty of its country.

67. The remainder of the draft resolution was merely a collection of recommendations devoid of substance, which made it still more unacceptable.

Even when it spoke of the prohibition of atomic weapons, the draft resolution did so in terms which were so vague and timid that paragraph 2, which was devoted to that question, had no practical significance whatever. The draft confined itself to expressing the desire that everything possible should be done to secure the prohibition of atomic weapons, whereas the solution was both possible and simple: it was sufficient to decree the prohibition of atomic weapons, to decide that those weapons would be removed from the national arsenals and to establish a system of control to make the prohibition effective.

68. The delegation of the Soviet Union had submitted to the General Assembly its draft resolution (A/1120) which pointed out that none of the tasks assigned by the General Assembly to the Atomic Energy Commission in its resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 1946 had yet been fulfilled, and that responsibility for that situation fell entirely upon the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, which had systematically opposed in the Commission any agreement on the subject of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of a strict international control of atomic energy.

69. The USSR draft resolution also noted that the consultations between the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission had not contributed to a solution of those problems, for the United States and the United Kingdom had, during those consultations, continued to uphold proposals which were essentially opposed to the immediate prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of control.

70. Mindful, however, of the importance of reaching an agreement and executing the tasks laid down in the General Assembly resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 1946, the USSR draft resolution proposed that the Atomic Energy Commission should be requested to resume its work and proceed immediately with the preparation of a draft convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons and a draft convention on a system of control to make that prohibition effective. The two conventions should enter into force simultaneously.

71. The adoption of that resolution would give fresh impetus to the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. The USSR delegation therefore addressed itself to all delegations who had the cause of the maintenance of international peace and security at heart, and warmly urged them to vote for its draft resolution.

72. Mr. KAN (China) said that the mere wish of Mr. Vyshinsky would not seat the Chinese Communists in the General Assembly. If Mr. Vyshinsky's wish were law, 80 per cent of the delegation in the General Assembly would have lost their seats. Fortunately Mr. Vyshinsky's words were nothing more than propaganda.

73. In a few days his delegation would present to the General Assembly documents and proof to show that the USSR had shamelessly violated the treaty entered into by China and the Soviet Union, and the Charter of the United Nations.

74. The PRESIDENT pointed out that the discussion of the Chinese question was premature.

75. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wished to speak on a point of order.



In his intervention, he had said that, in view of the fact that the People's Government of China, the only legitimate Government of China, had stated that the so-called Chinese delegation to the General Assembly had forfeited its powers, the USSR delegation considered itself in duty bound to support that declaration. Therefore, it would not recognize as the legitimate delegation of China the so-called Chinese delegation which was actually a Kuomintang delegation. At the moment almost all the territory of China was under the jurisdiction of the People's Government. More than 350 million Chinese had recognized that Government. Yet the Chinese representative in the General Assembly refused to do so.

76. The PRESIDENT again pointed out to the Assembly that any discussion of the Chinese question was premature.

77. Mr. MONTEL (France) said that the Canadian and French delegations had tried to depict clearly the dispute between those who were sincerely aiming at security in the age of atomic weapons and those who were seeking to evade the issue by invoking traditional conceptions of sovereignty.

78. The plan adopted the previous year by the General Assembly in its resolution 191 (III) was doubtless somewhat revolutionary from the political, legal and economic points of view, but that was no longer a subject for definite criticism. The only really revolutionary element worthy of attention was the possibility which man had of annihilating a hundred thousand of his fellow creatures in a second.

79. The question was therefore whether mankind was going to resign itself to that as an incurable evil or whether it was going to do everything possible to ensure general peace and security and have the courage even to modify traditional ideas inherited from a past in which it had been impossible to foresee such catastrophes.

80. It had been wondered whether civilization would survive an atomic war. At all events, even without an atomic war the most precious moral values of civilization would already be greatly impaired if man accepted the idea that such disasters could become a sad reality in the future.

81. The Assembly must take a stand on the problem of sovereignty as far as the development of atomic energy was concerned.

82. As disagreement amongst the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission had prevented that body from breaking the deadlock, Mr. Montel felt that those members were bound to state the basic reasons for their disagreement and to inform the sovereign Assembly about them. Five delegations had explained those reasons to the Assembly in the memorandum which they had published (A/1050) at the same time as the provisional report on the first consultations (A/1045). That was the point on which the Canadian and French delegations had thought it necessary to request the Assembly's opinion.

83. At the same time those delegations had explained what form the necessary partial sacrifices of sovereignty would take, because it was necessary to choose the lesser of two evils. He intended to explain how the efforts at international co-operation, which alone could ward off

the dangers of the contemporary situation, should be visualized.

84. If there was any field in which States jealously guarded their sovereignty, it was obviously the field of economic development. States had always considered it not only their right but also their duty to develop to the full the economic resources with which nature had endowed them, in order to improve the standard of living of their people. In the field of atomic energy, however, that complete freedom was incompatible with the current demands of security. A new industry had come into being and it was well known how it could be put to military use. Its application to peaceful purposes, in the production of energy, for example, had not yet reached the practical level. Nevertheless, the development of atomic energy production could not be separated from the production of nuclear explosives. It could be said that States with powerful atomic energy plants were, because of that, powerful in the field of atomic weapons and it was that very fact which brought out the particular nature of the problem of atomic weapons in relation to the question of conventional armaments.

85. A country which had no aggressive designs might be a great metallurgical Power without thereby immediately being a great military Power if it had not previously adapted its resources to war production. On the other hand, the most significant point was certainly that the conversion of a peace-time industry to a war industry not only required rather long periods of time but was also accompanied by certain unmistakable signs. That was not the case when the products of a peace-time industry could be turned to military purposes within a very short time and without evidence.

86. General security required that the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes should, however, be the subject of an international agreement which would primarily take into account security considerations. If until then sovereignty had enabled States to develop their economic resources in full freedom, it was necessary to limit that freedom to the extent demanded by international security.

87. Nevertheless, the problem was not to provide for unconditional renunciation of that freedom. The plan provided that States should themselves, by treaty, set the quotas of atomic energy which would be available to each. It was therefore inaccurate to state, as Mr. Vyshinsky had stated, that the international control organ could arbitrarily set limits to the production of atomic energy. The second report of the Atomic Energy Commission (page 53, paragraph XI) stated that "the international agency shall distribute its production facilities and other facilities containing dangerous stocks of nuclear fuel . . . in accordance with the quotas, provisions and principles laid down in the treaty".

88. Furthermore no one had been deceived regarding the true intentions of the plan approved by the General Assembly the previous year. On 4 November 1948, Mr. Vyshinsky himself had said that one of the most important problems connected with international control of atomic energy was the problem of regulating the production of atomic energy including the appropriate distribution among countries of quotas of atomic raw

materials, and that, according to the statements of authoritative scientists, the establishment of such a system of quotas to ensure a due balance between the interests of those countries and those of the United Nations as a whole could be settled legally. Yet only a few minutes previously, Mr. Vyshinsky had vehemently stated that the establishment of quotas constituted a lowering of the traditional principle of national sovereignty. That contradiction might perhaps be explained by the fact that during the intervening year the USSR had produced the atomic bomb.

89. In any case, it was quite apparent that Mr. Vyshinsky had changed his mind on that point since, that very year, he was claiming that countries should have the right to develop atomic energy according to their needs. The substance of the problem at the moment was therefore that the USSR intended to act in the matter exclusively according to the plan it had drawn up and without giving any account of its activity to any truly effective international control organ. Therein lay the substance of the debate, for as long as the situation remained as it was, it would be impossible to organize world security.

90. The question was how to spare mankind the horrors of an atomic war. If Mr. Vyshinsky meant that the prohibition of atomic weapons would achieve that result, then that provision was common to the USSR proposal and the majority proposal. If, however, he considered that control was necessary to ensure that result, then it was difficult to see how the system proposed by the USSR representative could meet the aim then defined.

91. Mr. Vyshinsky claimed that the plan approved by the General Assembly would not provide the world with an effective guarantee against the danger of the use of atomic weapons in the course of a long war. Everyone was, however, aware that, in the unfortunate event of an outbreak of hostilities, all control would come to an end and that, at that moment, the manufacture of atomic weapons could be resumed quite freely.

92. Mr. Montel held the view that, if a system were established under which the production of nuclear fuels was regulated by quotas with due regard to security conditions and under which control was exercised by a direct administration of the plants producing or using those nuclear fuels, the chances of a country deliberately stockpiling in advance sufficient nuclear fuels and atomic weapons to launch a decisive surprise attack would be reduced to a minimum.

93. If that aim were achieved, it would at least result in preventing the development of atomic energy from increasing the state of insecurity in international relations and from becoming itself a cause of war.

94. If States remained free to plan their own development and if control only took the form of periodical inspections, the risk of one State being capable of making a surprise attack would become so great that it would be contrary to the general interest to recommend such a system for the approval of the United Nations. It would be a delusion, far more dangerous than the lack of any control.

95. The USSR delegation had also said that control should be based on the need to prohibit

atomic weapons. When, in 1946, the General Assembly had, by its resolution 1 (I), defined the Commission's terms of reference, it had placed the abolition of atomic weapons and the control of atomic energy on an equal footing, without subordinating one to the other. It had reiterated that point of view in its resolution 41 (I) of 14 November 1946 which had been voted unanimously and which requested that a draft convention or conventions should be drawn up for the creation of an international system of control and inspection, those conventions to include the prohibition of atomic weapons and the control of atomic energy.

96. Realizing the dangers involved in the free development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the Assembly had adopted that point of view. Those dangers, just as much as the need for prohibiting the use of the atomic weapon, were the reason for control. Such control must moreover be effective; and, to that end, States must agree to some sacrifice of their sovereignty in developing atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

97. Finally, the draft resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee invited the six permanent members of the Commission to continue their consultations. That course of action was the only possible one since the Atomic Energy Commission had found that it would not be able to accomplish any useful work so long as no agreement had been reached between the six members.

98. In the endeavour to reach such agreement, all the concrete suggestions which had been made or which would be made in the course of the discussion would be taken into account.

99. Nothing would be more contrary to the general interest than to allow the belief to persist that the dispute in question was one which interested only the largest States. The problem concerned all peoples.

100. If some nations were, for various reasons, called upon to play a more important part than others, that laid particular responsibilities upon them.

101. The six members would continue their discussions with a deep sense of those responsibilities. The directives and the support of world public opinion were essential if those discussions were to be successful.

102. The dispute which opposed security and sovereignty raised a difficulty of such considerable proportions that the six members had deemed it necessary to request the opinion of the Assembly as well as confirmation of their terms of reference, in order to pursue their efforts more productively.

103. Those were the considerations which the Canadian and French delegations had had in mind when they had submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee the draft resolution on which the Assembly had to take a decision.

104. The right to security demanded that the citizen should make some sacrifices for the good of mankind. To agree to those sacrifices was an act of freedom, the freedom to prefer life to destruction.

105. There were other arms, moreover, which, although more insidious and slower in their

effect, were just as dangerous and which were used in conditions violating the fundamental principles and obligations of the United Nations Charter. Those arms could, by more gradual stages perhaps, but just as surely, lead to slavery or death.

106. Mr. Vyshinsky had spoken of an obedient majority. Mr. Montel stated that the majority,

having learnt a lesson from past experience, was a group of free nations which had decided together to obey the imperative demands of their security.

107. The PRESIDENT announced that the list of speakers would be closed at 3.15 p.m.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

*Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Wednesday, 23 November 1949, at 2.45 p.m.*

*President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).*

### **International control of atomic energy: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1119) (concluded)**

1. Mr. HICKERSON (United States of America) stated that he had listened in vain for a new proposal or a constructive suggestion in the statement of the USSR representative at the previous meeting. All he had heard was the old propaganda attack upon the United States and its motives. He did not intend to answer those attacks, which had been heard many times before; he was content to let his country's record speak for itself. He was confident that the Assembly would not be diverted from its responsibilities by such familiar crude propagandistic attacks.

2. He would refer briefly to only two of the matters mentioned by the USSR representative. The USSR representative had again quoted out of context from the Acheson-Lilienthal letter of 17 March 1946. That letter had been published at the time it had been written; it transmitted to the President of the United States and the Secretary of State not a plan but a technical report stating for the first time that effective control was possible. The passage the USSR representative had quoted, which was out of context and had been written before any plan had been evolved, merely stated that any nation possessing the atom bomb would not have to destroy its bombs until it was satisfied that no nation could manufacture bombs thereafter.

3. The United Nations plan approved in resolution 191 (III) of the General Assembly, provided for complete and effective prohibition, with the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations to declare when one agreed stage had ended and another was to begin. All countries would be treated exactly alike. Nuclear fuel would be removed from United States atomic weapons at exactly the same moment as it would be removed from the atomic weapon or weapons in the possession of the USSR.

4. With regard to Mr. Vyshinsky's statement (253rd meeting) concerning the inaccuracy of maps of the Soviet Union, Mr. Hickerson could not understand what impression the USSR representative had been trying to give in apparently boasting of the inaccuracy of existing maps of the Soviet Union. There were any number of maps of the United States; every gasoline station in the United States handed out road maps of the United States to anyone who asked for them.

Those maps—apparently unlike the ones in the USSR—were accurate. The United States had no desire to hide its towns and cities; it was proud of them and it welcomed visitors. It wanted to know about other peoples of the world, and to live on terms of peace and friendship with the peoples of all countries, including the people of the Soviet Union.

5. Two draft resolutions concerning atomic energy were before the General Assembly. One draft resolution, recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1119), made it clear that the peace of the world and the protection of all nations required that effective means of enforcement should accompany the promise of prohibition. The other, offered by the Soviet Union (A/1120), proposed, in effect, that all nations should sign a treaty or convention—or perhaps both—prohibiting atomic weapons, without effective means of enforcing such prohibition.

6. The requirements for an effective system of control had been discussed during more than three years of debate in the General Assembly, in the Atomic Energy Commission, and in their committees. They could be stated very simply. Nations could not continue to possess explosive atomic materials or facilities for making or using such materials in dangerous quantities. So long as those materials remained in the hands of nations, he knew of no means by which the actual or threatened use of them in the opening phases of an aggressive war could be prevented. If those facilities and those materials were left in national hands, no system of control and inspection would be stronger than the good faith and intentions of the nations which possessed them.

7. Plants making or using dangerous quantities of explosive atomic materials must be operated and managed by an international agency within the United Nations. Under no other conditions could there be any certainty that nations would not secretly withdraw quantities of explosive materials sufficient to threaten the peace.

8. Turning to the question of inspection, he stressed that inspection by the international personnel of the international control agency was of crucial importance. That personnel must carry out unrestricted inspection in order to prevent or detect secret or clandestine activities. Unless the treaty contained broad provisions to that effect, the world could have no confidence that the treaty was being obeyed. Periodic inspection of declared facilities was not enough; what was needed was continuous inspection.