tion of the paragraph under discussion. That preparatory work did in fact clearly establish that the General Assembly could accept or reject a favourable recommendation and reject or accept an unfavourable recommendation.

139. The representative of the Ukrainian SSR had complained of the Argentine delegation's forgetful attitude in the Security Council, when that delegation had submitted a recommendation in favour of seven countries and forgotten the remaining five; and he had said that such an attitude could be interpreted as a desire to increase the number of vetoes by the USSR. That was not the case. The Argentine delegation had no interest either in increasing the number of the Soviet Union's vetoes or in placing other delegations in a difficult position.

140. The Argentine delegation had recommended consideration of the applications of seven countries, because, in its opinion, they were the only ones which had fulfilled the general conditions, since they had obtained seven or more favourable votes. The others had not fulfilled those conditions, as they had obtained only two or three votes. They had not been deliberately overlooked, in order to place difficulties in the way of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania or the Mongolian People's Republic.

141. The Iraqi representative had maintained that the decision referred to in Article 4 of the Charter rested with the General Assembly and not with the Security Council. That was the view which the Argentine delegation had upheld. The Iraqi representative had referred to the rule of unanimity, on which the other delegations had said nothing.

142. There was a precedent of a State which had been recommended to the General Assembly without the rule of unanimity, because one of the permanent members had not voted in its favour. Mr. Arce believed that the quantity of the Security Council's votes should be the deciding factor, rather than the quality.

143. The Iraqi representative had said that his delegation would be prepared to vote in favour of all the States which had applied for admission, and that was the view which the Argentine representative had expressed at the beginning of his statement.

144. In conclusion, Mr. Arce stated that it was not possible for the Security Council to function if it did not have the right to give a political interpretation in doubtful cases. However, if one of the organs created by the United Nations had that right, it must be admitted that the General Assembly also had it.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Tuesday, 22 November 1949, at 3 p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Admission of new Members: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1066) (*concluded*)

1. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) recalled that the question of the admission of new Members was one of long standing, which had already occupied a considerable amount of the time of the Security Council, the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and the General Assembly itself. He did not propose, therefore, to go once again over all the ground which had been covered many times by a number of speakers on behalf of various delegations. He did, however, wish to say a few words to explain the attitude of his delegation with regard to the various draft resolutions before the General Assembly.

2. The facts of the situation with which the General Assembly was confronted were comparatively simple. The representative of Argentina had admittedly tried at the preceding meeting to lead the Assembly down the labyrinthine paths of juridical disputation, where Sir Alexander would hesitate to follow him; nevertheless, the immediate facts of the situation, when not distorted, were comparatively simple. There were applications from a number of Governments for admission to the United Nations. Those had, in the usual way, been referred in the first instance to the Security Council. In that body, some of them had been supported by the requisite majority of the members of the Council, all of them having received eight, and the majority of them nine, votes, but unfortunately they had been vetoed by the vote of the USSR representative on the Security Council. Others of the applicants had failed to obtain more than two or, at most, three votes, and had therefore failed to obtain the necessary favourable recommendation of the Security Council.

3. In considering those applications in the Security Council, the United Kingdom delegation had always been guided by the following principle, to which it attached the utmost importance: that each application should be considered on its merits and in the light of the qualifications laid down in the Charter, which were required of applicants. That was what the Charter enjoined. That was what the United Kingdom had always been convinced was right, and lately it had been supported in that by an opinion of the International Court of Justice.[1] The United Kingdom delegation had found that a number of the applicants had the necessary qualifications and were therefore worthy of admission to the United Nations, and it had cast its vote accordingly. In other cases, it had withheld its support, but he would draw the attention of the General Assembly to the fact that when the United Kingdom had done so, it had always publicly stated its reasons, which it held to be in accordance with the standards of the Charter of the United Nations, and that it had been supported by a large

[1] See *Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Article 4), Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1948*, page 57.

majority of the Security Council in all those cases.

4. On the other hand, he would draw attention to the fact that in certain cases, notably that of Italy when the Italian application had been considered, the USSR Government had admitted that the applicant fulfilled the necessary conditions and had the qualifications entitling it to be admitted to the United Nations; yet the USSR Government had vetoed the application and had maintained its intention to continue using its veto unless and until certain of its favoured candidates had been admitted.

5. The United Kingdom considered that attitude to be unjustified and it was supported in that view by the International Court of Justice. It was, however, somewhat difficult to follow the policy of the Government of the Soviet Union in the matter. At the third session, matters had appeared to be clarified when that Government had enunciated the principle of admitting all or none of the candidates. That, however, had very soon proved to be fallacious, because within a few weeks that Government had voted in favour of the admission of one particular candidate.[1]

6. The USSR Government had again, at the current session, formalized its point of view, apparently, by submitting to the General Assembly a specious draft resolution (A/1079) calling for the admission of all the candidates. It was asking the General Assembly to regard that as a generous gesture. Sir Alexander feared, however, that his delegation could not accept that view of the proposal. Rather than as a generous gesture, it regarded the Soviet Union draft resolution as proposing a bargain and a rather shady bargain at that. It was tantamount to that Government proposing that the United Kingdom should abandon its principles, in return for which the USSR would desist from its irregularities. The United Kingdom, however, could not abandon its principles. The USSR Government might find that difficult to understand, having apparently found no difficulty in discarding its own principles.

7. The United Kingdom delegation would therefore support the draft resolutions submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1066). It might be argued that there was very little hope of those draft resolutions achieving anything concrete or beneficial. On the other hand, the situation could not be left as it was; no step that might perhaps lead to better understanding and better sense could be omitted. The United Kingdom delegation had no other immediate or effective solution to suggest and would therefore support the draft resolutions submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. At the same time, it was obliged to oppose the USSR draft resolution, because at the basis of it lay a bargain which the United Kingdom considered to be wrong.

8. Quite apart from the particular applications named in the Soviet Union draft resolution, the United Kingdom, in casting its vote against it, would be voting against the principle of a bargain and the idea of one delegation offering to withhold its veto from another delegation's candidates, provided the latter delegation voted for the admission of the former's candidates, although it considered them to be unqualified.

[1] See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Fourth Year, No. 17.

9. Sir Alexander proceeded to refer to a remark made at the preceding meeting by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, who had said that the United Kingdom representative on the Security Council had vetoed the USSR draft resolution. The representative of the Ukrainian SSR himself had admitted that the draft resolution in question had gained only two favourable votes. It had therefore been lost and could not have passed. When, subsequently, the negative votes had been called for, surely a permanent member of the Security Council had as much right as a non-permanent member to cast a negative vote. That was no veto. According to his own way of thinking, the meaning of a veto was that one Power with a privileged vote barred and obstructed the vote of the requisite majority of the Security Council. It had not happened in the case in question and there had in fact been no veto.

10. In conclusion, he alluded to the principle of universality which had been referred to by certain speakers. As a general principle, it was unexceptionable. The United Kingdom Government would gladly see as many properly qualified sovereign States as possible become Members of the United Nations but it could not accept the idea that universality would mean the imposition upon Members of the obligation automatically to admit any State that submitted an application. That could not be done in the light of Article 4 of the Charter, which defined the requirements and the conditions that must be fulfilled before an applicant could be admitted to membership of the United Nations.

11. The United Kingdom would always support the admission of any candidate it considered to be a properly qualified one. In that sense, it was certainly in favour of universality. At the same time, however, it must adhere to the principles which had already been explained, and which would continue to guide it in the future.

12. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation had made its attitude towards the admission of new Members quite plain, both in the Security Council in the summer of 1949 and in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee during the present session of the General Assembly. The Soviet Union was proposing that the United Nations should admit the thirteen candidates for membership, namely, Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, "Transjordan", Austria, Ceylon and Nepal. Its attitude to the question was therefore impartial, objective and equitable and was governed solely by the general interests of the United Nations.

13. The position of the United States and the United Kingdom had also been clearly stated. Those States were guided not by any regard for the general interests of the United Nations but by their own selfish interests and by pursuit of their aggressive plans. The fact that they and the States which supported them were insistent that only "Transjordan", Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Austria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, and the terrorist Rhee Syngman régime of South Korea should be admitted, was clear evidence of that contention. At the same time, the United States and the United Kingdom, with the support of the bloc which, as was known, constituted the majority of the United Nations, were refusing to admit such democratic and peace-loving States as Al-

bania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic. Thus, the United States was using the question of the admission of new Members as an instrument of pressure and of political retaliation against the people's democracies, because those countries were following an independent policy and were refusing to take orders from the United States.

14. With the help of the majority of the Member States, the United States was attempting to convert the United Nations into a passive instrument of its imperialist policy. That was why its delegation and the countries which supported it always voted in favour of admitting to the Organization only those States the policies of which were compatible with the reactionary and aggressive plans of the United States and the United Kingdom. That was also why the United States and the majority which followed it blindly were opposed to the admission of the people's democracies, which had decided that they were masters of their fate and refused to bow down before the Wall Street monopolists and offer their national sovereignty as an object of barter.

15. Obviously that policy was absolutely contrary to the provisions of the Charter, and especially to those of Article 4.

16. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom were trying to use the slanderous charges which they had concocted against the people's democracies as a pretext to block the admission of those countries to the United Nations. They needed those pretexts to disguise the real reasons for their objections to the admission of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic.

17. However, the true reasons for the actions of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom were clear. Mr. Austin had revealed them when he had stated that those countries followed a policy which, in his view, did not entitle them to membership in the United Nations. Mr. Austin had added that the United States would be glad to support their applications if they changed their political views. That statement clearly illustrated the position of the United States; it showed clearly that the United States was attempting to put pressure on the States which had applied for membership. The Soviet Union had always fought against such action and would continue to do so. The USSR delegation considered that the General Assembly could not associate itself with the United States position. It was absolutely essential that the United States and the United Kingdom should cease to divide applicant States into two groups composed of those which they would be pleased to have admitted and those the admission of which they opposed.

18. In reality, that position constituted a measure of discrimination against the countries of the new democracy. It was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Unfortunately, it must be stated that neither the United States, nor the United Kingdom, nor the States which followed them were altering their position.

19. The draft resolutions submitted by Australia and adopted by the majority in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee called upon the Security Council to reconsider the applications of nine States only: Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Portugal, South Korea and "Transjordan". Taking a distinctly discriminatory attitude, it did not so much as mention Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic.

20. Mr. Tsarapkin recalled that the General Assembly had already adopted resolution 113 (II) on 17 November 1947, and resolution 197 (III) on 8 October 1948, which were similar in content and which had in no way contributed to a solution of the problem.

21. For all those reasons, the delegation of the Soviet Union would vote against the nine draft resolutions submitted by the delegation of Australia.

22. In order to break the deadlock, it was essential for the General Assembly to consider the question without hypocrisy and with no partiality towards any given country. Such consideration could be undertaken on the basis of the Soviet Union draft resolution, for that draft had not been inspired by the sympathy or antipathy which the Soviet Union might feel for the political régime in any given country; it had been guided solely by the general interest of the United Nations. While the Soviet Union had good grounds for objecting to the admission of certain countries, it was prepared to withdraw its objections on condition that no discriminatory measures should be taken with regard to Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic.

23. The delegation of the Soviet Union urged that the question, which had already been too often postponed, should be settled without further delay. It was obvious to all that the attempts made to solve the problem by means of individual applications had completely failed on account of the policy of discrimination followed by the United States and the United Kingdom. Consequently, the only possible solution was that set forth in the draft resolution of the Soviet Union, which was to admit the thirteen States which had submitted applications to the Organization.

24. With reference to the Argentine draft resolution which had been adopted by a majority in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, Mr. Tsarapkin observed that it had no real connexion with the question of the admission of new Members. It was nothing but a further attempt by the Argentine representative to deprive the Security Council of its prerogatives in the matter of the admission of new Members. It showed that it was a matter of indifference to that representative who should or should not be admitted to the United Nations. He had, in fact, been obsessed by one idea ever since 1947. He wished to deprive the Security Council, and especially its permanent Members, of the rights and obligations conferred on them by the Charter.

25. The Argentine draft resolution proposed to ask the International Court of Justice whether a State could be admitted to the United Nations even if its admission had not been recommended by the Security Council.

26. That was not a new question. During the third session the Argentine representative had requested that the question of the admission of new Members should be settled outside the Se-

curity Council.[1] That proposal was such a flagrant violation of the Charter that even the United Kingdom representative had been unable to support Mr. Arce. So far as Mr. Tsarapkin could remember, only the representatives of Chile and Brazil—who had submitted the draft resolution jointly with the Argentine representative—had supported Mr. Arce. As everyone knew, the latter had been obliged to withdraw his proposal.[2]

27. Having thus failed in his frontal attack on the Security Council, the Argentine representative had decided to renew his efforts at the present session, but in a more veiled form.

28. In submitting the draft resolution which was before the Assembly, Mr. Arce pretended not to understand the terms of Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter. He queried whether it was indispensable that the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations had to be recommended by the Security Council, and thought it essential that the opinion of the International Court of Justice should be sought on the matter. Yet Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter was perfectly clear, for it declared that admission would be effected by a decision of the General Assembly "upon the recommendation of the Security Council".

29. That provision could not be clearer. It showed very definitely that the General Assembly was not empowered to take any decision whatsoever on the admission of new Members without a recommendation by the Security Council.

30. Rule 126 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly also confirmed that point of view. It was perfectly clear that the Security Council must make a recommendation and that it was entirely unnecessary to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice.

31. Nor was it for the Court to question why the Security Council had not recommended the admission of any given State. That question was entirely the responsibility of the Security Council, and the International Court of Justice was not competent to express even an advisory opinion on the voting procedure in the Council.

32. Moreover, the documents relating to the preparation of the United Nations Charter at the San Francisco Conference left no doubt on the question. When the problem had been discussed in Commission II of the San Francisco Conference, some delegations had requested that the United Nations should adopt the principle of absolute universality; certain States had even asked that all Governments should be included in the United Nations without any distinction. Their purpose had been to come to a point where recommendation by the Security Council would have been unnecessary. The authors of those proposals had wanted admission to the United Nations to depend solely on the General Assembly, in other words, they had been in favour of the procedure currently proposed by the Argentine representative. Their proposals had met with objections from most delegations. The majority of the countries represented in Commission II had felt that, as the Security Council was to bear the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it should also assume responsibility for the admission of new Members to the United Nations.

33. The Australian delegation, which on that question was of the same opinion as the Argentine delegation, had at the San Francisco Conference done its best to help the few delegations which had wished to reduce the Security Council's prerogatives and thus to strike at the foundations on which the United Nations was being built. The Australian delegation had submitted an amendment[3] according to which only States which at any time since 1 September 1939 had been at war with any Member of the United Nations, or which since that date had given military assistance to such States, could not be admitted by the General Assembly to membership in the United Nations without the recommendation of the Security Council.

34. That amendment as well as a series of other amendments which aimed at modifying the principles adopted at Dumbarton Oaks had been rejected by a large majority and the Conference had adopted the text which had been incorporated in the Charter as Article 4, paragraph 2.

35. For all the above-mentioned reasons, the General Assembly was not in any way justified in adopting a resolution to request an advisory opinion on that Article from the International Court of Justice.

36. For all the above-mentioned reasons, the delegation of the Soviet Union in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had protested against the Argentine draft resolution and had voted against it. It would also vote against that draft in the General Assembly.

37. With regard to draft resolution K of the Committee's report, which requested the permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from the use of the "veto", the USSR delegation considered that to be equally unacceptable.

38. That proposal was clearly in keeping with the policy through which the United States and the United Kingdom were endeavouring to place in a false light the question of the admission of new Members to the United Nations. It was in keeping with the attitude of those who were attempting to give the impression that the reason why the problem of the admission of new Members had not been resolved had been the Soviet Union's use of the "veto".

39. The fact was that the question of the "veto" was irrelevant, for the attitude of the Soviet Union on the question was well known. Far from opposing the admission of new Members the delegation of the Soviet Union was prepared, both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, to vote in favour of the simultaneous admission to the United Nations of the thirteen countries which had made application. As everyone knew it had submitted a draft resolution to that effect to the General Assembly.

40. That fact proved that the sponsors of resolution K were not attempting to solve the problem of the admission of new Members. Their real object was to replace that problem by another, that of the "veto", or in other words that of the

[1] See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, Ad Hoc* Political Committee, annexes, document A/AC.24/15.

[3] See *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization*, volume VIII, document 204,

voting procedure in the Security Council. That was merely a new weapon in the armory of the Anglo-American bloc—a weapon which the United States and the United Kingdom would undoubtedly use to prevent a just solution of the problem of the admission of new Members.

41. That was why the delegation of the Soviet Union would vote against draft resolution K.

42. Finally, Mr. Tsarapkin stated that the Soviet Union hoped that the United Nations would be strong enough to put an end to the policy of prejudice with regard to the admission of new Members and that, with a view to the interests of the Organization as a whole, it would adopt the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union.

43. Mr. COOPER (United States of America) observed that the subject of the admission of new Members to the United Nations had been discussed on a number of occasions. Nevertheless, he would once more express the views of the delegation of the United States because of its continuing interest in the matter and its conviction that the principles which underlay the question were fundamental to the objectives and integrity of the Organization.

44. The United States regarded the United Nations as a universal Organization, which should ultimately embrace all States in the world. The President of the United States had voiced that hope in his recent speech before the General Assembly (237th meeting). Yet it could not be denied that the concept of absolute universality was not applicable. Each Member was bound to determine that an applicant possessed, as prerequisites to admission, the qualifications set forth in Article 4 of the Charter: that it was a State, that it was peace-loving, that it accepted and was able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter. Those standards should be applied fairly, equitably and tolerantly. To admit an applicant which did not meet those standards was not in accordance with the Charter. There was no authority granted to Members to impose requirements extraneous to the Charter.

45. There was no authority, and certainly no moral right, to make the admission of one applicant a condition to the acceptance of another applicant. There was no necessity to discuss in detail the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, rendered on 28 May 1948. The United States adhered to those principles. It was difficult to believe that they were misunderstood by any Member which was genuinely interested in the admission of qualified nations. Yet, in a constant attempt to divert the attention of the General Assembly, the applicant States and public opinion, the Soviet Union had repeatedly alleged that other Members, and particularly the United States, were practising discrimination against Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic, because of their different governmental structure and philosophy and that it was that alleged discrimination which was blocking the admission of all applicants for membership.

46. The delegation of the United States did not intend to engage in an exchange of denunciation and recrimination, which could serve no useful purpose. It preferred to emphasize principles and constructive methods upon which agreement must ultimately be founded if the issue was to be solved.

47. Nevertheless, it would not fail to point out to the General Assembly and to the States which sought admission, the facts which demonstrated wherein the discrimination lay and by whom it was being practised. The history of the question showed that clearly. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic had submitted themselves to the tests prescribed by Article 4 of the Charter. None had ever been able to secure as many as seven favourable votes in the Security Council. When the question had been reviewed by the General Assembly in 1947 and 1948, it had made favourable recommendations to the Security Council with respect to other applicants, but it had not recommended that the five referred to above should be admitted.

48. Those repeated findings by the Security Council and the General Assembly did not represent a policy of discrimination against those States, and no Member was really deceived or misled concerning the reasons which had prevented their admission thus far. The records of the General Assembly clearly showed the belief of most Members that those five applicants had not met the requirements of the Charter. The General Assembly, in a resolution adopted at its 246th meeting, had declared that the active assistance given to the Greek guerrillas by Albania in particular, and by Bulgaria and certain other States, including Romania, in disregard of the General Assembly's recommendations, was contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and endangered peace in the Balkans. The General Assembly had decided at its 235th meeting to ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion, which was made necessary by the refusal of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania to co-operate in efforts towards the peaceful settlement of the differences arising out of charges to the effect that those three countries were committing serious violations of their peace treaties.

49. The conduct of those three States, from which the General Assembly discussions had arisen, justified a reasonable doubt of their attitude towards international obligations.

50. The representative of the Soviet Union had quoted a statement made by Mr. Austin in the Security Council. The statement had been taken out of its context, and could leave the impression that the policies of those States, to which he objected, had no connexion with the test laid down by Article 4 of the Charter. It was therefore only fair to read his statement. He had said: "The United States would be very pleased to support the admission of these applicants if they would change their policies in question and give evidence of their willingness to abide by the Charter."[1]

51. No statement could be more in harmony with the Charter, nor less subject to the charge of interference in the internal affairs of a State.

52. Neither the United States nor any other Member charged by the USSR with discrimination had created the conditions or had encouraged or supported the action of those States which made them inadmissible. It was their responsibility to qualify for membership. The Soviet Union would perform a service to those States

[1] See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Fourth Year, No. 32.

and to the United Nations if it would lend its good offices and its undoubted influence to persuade those nations so to conduct themselves as to qualify for membership.

53. In addition to the States mentioned above, there were several applicants that had received overwhelming support in the Security Council and the General Assembly, but which still remained outside the United Nations because of the veto of the Soviet Union.

54. At various times since 1946, nine members of the Security Council had voted that Portugal, Jordan, Italy, Finland, Ceylon, Ireland and Austria should be admitted to membership. In 1948 the General Assembly, in resolution 197 (III), had declared its opinion that each should be admitted to membership. It had requested the Security Council to reconsider their applications in the light of that declaration and of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. In substance, the request had been directed to the Soviet Union, because its vote had denied membership to those States.

55. Nevertheless, when the Security Council had reconsidered those applications in 1949, and when nine members had again favoured the admission of those same States, the USSR had ignored the recommendation of the General Assembly and the opinion of the International Court of Justice, and again had vetoed their applications. During the current year it had also vetoed[1] the applications of Nepal and the Republic of Korea, although nine members of the Security Council had voted in favour of their admission, on the ground that its own five candidates were not being favourably recommended.

56. In the light of that record, it could not be reasonably urged or believed that the preponderance of votes cast in the Security Council and the General Assembly against the admission of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary or Romania, or favouring the admission of Portugal, Jordan, Italy, Finland, Ceylon, Ireland, Nepal and the Republic of Korea was, as the Soviet Union had described it, an "automatic" majority, or a "hidden" veto, used as an instrument of discrimination.

57. If the USSR was charging that more than two-thirds of the Members of the General Assembly were insincere and unfaithful to their obligations, its position was a denial of the morality of the United Nations.

58. The representative of the Soviet Union assumed, at least with respect to the General Assembly, that a preponderant majority of its Members were wrong, because they did not agree with a minority of five Members. Such an assumption was an evidence of failure to understand the democratic process of the General Assembly, or perhaps the democratic process itself, which was the process which permitted individual Members to vote as they saw fit, and the process in which a minority yielded to the decision of the majority as one representing the collective will.

59. The United States held that its position and the positions taken by other Members in the Security Council or in the General Assembly were not discriminatory when they were based objectively upon the terms and requirements of Article 4 of the Charter. The discrimination was being exercised by those who would disregard Article 4 of the Charter by imposing new obstacles to the admission of States now entitled to membership.

60. The position of the Soviet Union was based neither upon a concept of universality, to which it had made appeal in the debate and which held the sympathetic interest of some Members, nor upon the principle of qualification for membership prescribed by the Charter. The draft resolution which it had submitted appeared, superficially, to support universality, but, if that were actually so, its proponent would support any applicant, individually as well as in a group, without respect to qualifications. That, however, it refused to do.

61. Furthermore, the USSR did not support the principle of qualification for membership. Its representatives had stated that it had serious objections to the qualifications of certain States and considered them unworthy to be Members. Whatever the merit of its objections, it was fully entitled to make them. Yet by its draft resolution, it showed that it was willing to abandon objections which it had contended were serious and sincere and was ready to admit States which in its present view were unworthy to be included among the Members of the United Nations.

62. That could not be called a compromise of reasonable viewpoints. The real purpose of the proposal was to demand that the majority of the Assembly should accept as Members, States which they sincerely believed were not eligible for membership, their admission to be the price of a relaxation of the Soviet Union veto of other applicants.

63. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union stated, contrary to the facts, that there was in the General Assembly a "general feeling" in favour of the admission of all the applicants except Korea. It then requested reconsideration of their applications, on that assumption.

64. The draft resolution would require the Assembly either to subscribe to a statement it could not accept about a group of applicants, or to favour the admission of the entire group, regardless of the Members' views concerning their individual qualifications. It could only serve to support the bargaining tactics which had been used in the Security Council earlier in the year and it was evidently intended for that purpose.

65. It had been stated that the present impasse was merely a deadlock of the contending interests of two groups of Members. That suggestion connoted arbitrary action by both groups which did not take into account the interests of other Members of the United Nations and of the Organization itself. The United States rejected that view. It did not reflect the true approach to the problem; it simply stated a result. It was an easy way to avoid fixing responsibility and to avoid finding the causes which must be understood if, as the United States greatly desired, the question was to be settled favourably. Those Members who upheld Article 4 of the Charter and who refused to admit applicants until they had qualified themselves, and, particularly, applicants found by the General Assembly to be acting against the Charter, were not contributing to a deadlock. They were contributing to the best interests of the United Nations.

66. The United States delegation would support draft resolutions A to I submitted by the Com-

[1] See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Fourth Year, Nos. 26 and 39.

mittee, and would oppose the draft resolution of the Soviet Union for the reasons it had indicated.

67. Without attempting to anticipate the decision of the International Court of Justice with respect to draft resolution J and without commenting upon its substance, the United States supported it. Its introduction and passage in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee revealed the concern caused by the failure to admit qualified States to the United Nations.

68. The United States would also support draft resolution K as recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. It reflected the desire of the United States that all applicants, including those to which it was constrained to object at present, should be kept under consideration. It further proposed that the permanent members of the Security Council should refrain from the use of the veto in respect of membership applications. The United States Government had already pledged that it would not use its privileged vote to block the admission of a State which received seven affirmative votes in the Security Council, and it would continue that practice.

69. The delegation of the United States regretted that so much of the time of the General Assembly had been taken up in reviewing facts so well known and understood. It recognized that such a discussion might emphasize differences which might make solutions more difficult. It hoped that the discussion in the General Assembly might give rise to a better understanding of the issues involved, a greater effort on the part of all applicants to make them eligible for membership and a greater willingness on the part of all Members to keep under objective and continuous consideration the cases of all applicants. The United States sincerely desired an early solution of the issue and hoped that all applicants would become eligible for membership in the United Nations.

70. The PRESIDENT put to the vote, in succession, the eleven draft resolutions submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1066).

Resolution A was adopted by 51 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

Resolution B was adopted by 53 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

Resolution C was adopted by 53 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

Resolution D was adopted by 51 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

Resolution E was adopted by 51 votes to 6, with 1 abstention.

Resolution F was adopted by 50 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

Resolution G was adopted by 50 votes to 6, with 3 abstentions.

Resolution H was adopted by 53 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

Resolution I was adopted by 52 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

Resolution J was adopted by 42 votes to 9, with 6 abstentions.

Resolution K was adopted by 42 votes to 5, with 11 abstentions.

[1] For the discussion on this subject in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc* Political Committee, 21st to 24th meetings inclusive.

71. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/1079).

The USSR draft resolution was rejected by 32 votes to 12, with 13 abstentions.

United Nations Field Service: reports of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1058) and of the Fifth Committee (A/1122)

72. Mr. NISOT (Belgium), Rapporteur of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, presented the report of that Committee on a United Nations field service, and the accompanying draft resolutions (A/1058).[1]

73. The PRESIDENT drew attention to the report of the Fifth Committee (A/1122) on the financial implications of the draft resolutions proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

74. Mr. PITTALUGA (Uruguay) said that his delegation had carefully studied the political, juridical, technical and financial aspects of the Special Committee's two draft resolutions which had been approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and could find nothing in them to which it could object.

75. During the current session of the General Assembly his delegation had listened carefully to all the arguments adduced against the establishment of a United Nations field service and a panel of field observers.

76. All that opposition had been based principally on legal considerations. He recalled that, in the General Committee, Mr. Vyshinsky had alleged that the need to ensure the protection of the members of the various organs or commissions of the United Nations when they were on duty abroad was only a pretext and that the proposal was designed to provide the Secretary-General with an armed force.[2] He said that the number of men who would constitute that force was immaterial; what mattered was the principle, since such a force was contrary to Article 43 of the Charter, which stipulated that armed forces should be made available to the Security Council, not to the Secretary-General.

77. Mr. Tsarapkin, the USSR representative in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, had said that it was currently more inadmissible than ever that a military service should be set up within the Secretariat and that the Charter did not provide for the placing of military units at the disposal of the Secretary-General.

78. Another argument repeatedly used was that the amended proposal of the Secretary-General exceeded the authority conferred upon him by the Charter. Thus the opposition declared that the fundamental provisions governing the authority and duties of the Secretary-General were contained in Chapter XV of the Charter and had been explained in detail in the February 1946 resolutions of the General Assembly and that none of those documents contained any provision, decision or rule which would confer upon the Secretary-General the function of establishing a field service or a panel of observers as an integral part of the Secretariat.

[2] See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, General Committee, 65th meeting.

79. It should be noted that while the original proposal of the Secretary-General had undergone serious modifications, the arguments of the opposition had not changed. Mr. Pittaluga proceeded to explain why he considered those arguments inconsistent in substance as well as in form.

80. In the first place, the field service could by no means be regarded as the armed force which was to be made available to the Security Council under Article 43, and could never be used for the coercive action provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter.

81. The Secretary-General and the Special Committee stated that the field service would in no way be of a military nature. In their reports they said clearly and categorically that the field service would not be armed and that only in very special circumstances and with the authorization of the local authorities would they be provided with side-arms for their personal protection.

82. In the second place, it might also be said, to refute the legal objections to the establishment of a panel of observers, that the individuals whose names appeared on the list could not be called upon to perform their functions without a resolution to that effect adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council or an organ authorized by the Assembly or the Council, as set forth in the draft resolution before the Assembly.

83. Finally, under Article 97 of the Charter, the Secretary-General was to administer such staff as the Organization might require. Thus he was fully authorized to co-ordinate its services and the United Nations should have the necessary means to protect the life and physical well-being of the members of missions in the exercise of their duties.

84. That principle, which was implicitly recognized in the Charter, had been officially stated by the International Court of Justice when it had given its advisory opinion on reparation for injuries incurred in the service of the United Nations.[1]

85. The budgetary aspect had been methodically and exhaustively studied by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and had been discussed by the Fifth Committee.

86. Both Committees had recommended that the budgetary appropriation proposed by the Secretary-General should be approved and had expressed the hope that a policy of caution would be followed in the development of the field service.

87. As for the panel of observers, it would for the present be no more than a list of persons available and expenditure on that score would, to begin with, be nominal; once those observers had been called upon, expenditure in that connexion would be included in the budgets of the missions using them.

88. There was general agreement, as the United States representative in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had stated, that the success of the methods used towards reaching a settlement of controversies depended for a large part on the satisfactory functioning of United Nations missions, which could justly be proud of the results they had achieved in that field.

89. The Uruguayan delegation held the view that, in spite of the political exploitation of the question, those two proposals which were of a pre-eminently administrative nature, were most opportune.

90. Uruguay, which demonstrated the sincerity of its democratic institutions not only in the letter and in the spirit of its basic laws, but also in the concrete and tangible reality of everyday life, in the electoral laws guaranteeing the unimpeachability of its elections, in its respect for the rights of its political minorities and in its justice in the social and economic spheres, warmly supported the draft resolutions, which would improve the machinery of the United Nations.

91. Mr. MONTEL (France) recalled that in Committee the French delegation had supported the first draft resolution dealing with the establishment of the United Nations field service. The reservations it had made in that connexion had not questioned the legality of the service, but had related to the scope which the Secretariat's first draft indicated as regards the members and staff of the new organization. The French delegation was glad to see that its arguments on the matter had been taken into consideration. In the new form given it by the Secretary-General, the draft merely regularized the existing practice of recruiting a number of auxiliaries to be made available, in the capacity of dispatch riders, chauffeurs, orderlies and attendants, to commissions of investigation and conciliation sent out to the spot by the Security Council or the General Assembly.

92. The Secretary-General had given the assurance that he would recruit only the numbers strictly necessary for the field service. That assurance should satisfy representatives who were concerned about the cost.

93. On the other hand, the French delegation considered that, while the second draft submitted to the Assembly to set up a panel of field observers was legally justifiable, such a panel might give rise to practical objections.

94. Obviously, the United Nations would have to make the necessary staff of observers available to commissons of investigation, conciliation or mediation, as it had done in the cases of Palestine, Indonesia and Kashmir. The only problem, therefore, was how to choose those observers. As their political impartiality must be incontestable, it was essential that their country should not be directly concerned in the dispute. In the second place, their technical competence should be beyond question.

95. Hitherto, the Secretary-General, acting on the instructions of the Security Council, had asked various Member States of the Organization to select and to make available to him the persons who had seemed to be best qualified to carry out a given task. That method had proved satisfactory on the whole, but it was said to be too slow. That objection had led to the new plan of drawing up in advance a panel from which the officers or civilian officials required for a specific mission might be chosen when necessary. The French delegation was afraid that, although such a system might appear attractive in theory, it would not be especially advantageous in practice.

[1] See *Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: I.J.C. Reports 1949*, page 174.

96. It was obvious that observers would still be chosen, in every case, with due regard to their nationality, in order to guarantee their neutrality and impartiality. Further, the Security Council would naturally not be bound by the the existence of the panel and would not be obliged, in every case, to call upon observers chosen, in equal numbers, from among the representatives of the fifty-nine Member States of the United Nations.

97. Even if that absurd and dangerous interpretation were eliminated from the outset, the French delegation considered that it would be difficult to reconcile the system of the panel with the necessity of finding observers with the optimum technical qualifications. The qualifications of those observers had to be extremely varied. In the first place, the nature of the tasks that might be entrusted to them had to be taken into consideration. The report of the Special Committee mentioned, in particular, truces, armistices and plebiscites; but that list was obviously not complete. The language spoken in the countries to which the observers might be sent and the political, historical and geographical conditions in which the dispute might arise, had also to be taken into account. A panel of field observers so complete that it could be used in any eventuality could not be prepared in advance. Moreover, the draft restricted the number of observers on the panel to 2,500 for the fifty-nine Member States.

98. Mr. Montel was afraid that, when the time came to use the list, it would immediately be found that it did not provide the personnel required in any given case. After some loss of time recourse would have to be had once more to the method used in the past and the various Member States would have to be asked to suggest candidates fulfilling the necessary conditions for the mission concerned.

99. Again, even if the impossible were achieved and a perfect panel was drawn up, that panel would only serve its purpose at the moment when the names of the observers were included in it. The various Governments could not keep the persons on the list unemployed. Thus, the officers or officials available for United Nations service when the panel was drawn up, would almost certainly be no longer available after a short lapse of time. The French Ministry of National Defence was categorical on that point. It could not nominate in advance officers on the active list who would continue to be available at any time; it could only consider specific requests relating to missions the nature and the time-limit of which were clearly defined.

100. The same objection applied to reserve officers who might be unable to respond to a call when the time came, owing to their professional duties.

101. For those purely practical reasons, the French delegation was unable to support the second draft resolution.

102. Mr. DROHOJOWSKI (Poland) remarked that the insistence with which the item was being presented to the General Assembly was a reason for serious reconsideration of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee's recommendation and placed a grave responsibility upon Members.

103. The Polish delegation had expressed its views on the matter during the third session of the General Assembly, in the Special Committee, and finally, in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee during the current session. Only a brief restatement of the Polish delegation's opinion was therefore necessary.

104. The Polish delegation was opposed to the creation of a special para-military unit inside the Secretariat, and was convinced that such an action was unconstitutional under the Charter and might create a dangerous precedent. If additional evidence were required that the creation of an armed guard for discharging security or police functions on the territory of Member and non-member States was not merely, in the words of the Secretary-General, "designed to render precisely the same services as are now rendered in a less systematic way by members of the Secretariat", he would draw attention to the fate of an amendment[1] submitted in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, to the effect that the United Nations field service should be placed at the disposal of United Nations missions only in response to a specific resolution by the Security Council or the General Assembly. The members of the majority had rejected that amendment despite the fact that its purport was non-controversial and indeed obvious. The authors of the scheme preferred to be perfectly free to use the field service at their own pleasure.

105. Nevertheless, the discussion in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had brought to light some facts regarding the nature of the proposed unit. One delegation had plainly stated that the newly-created unit would be called upon to perform functions of a police character; another had remarked that police duties could, at times, assume a certain military aspect. In that connexion, it should be recalled that the French proposal for a census of armed forces originally presented to the Commission for Conventional Armaments on 26 May 1949[2] and later to the Security Council[3] and finally endorsed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee through the adoption of a draft resolution submitted on 16 November 1949 by the French and Norwegian delegations (A/AC.31/L.33/Rev.2) clearly included in the proposed census "national police forces" as well as ground, naval, air and para-military forces, thus unmistakably giving expression to the view that police forces were part and parcel of the armed forces of a State. It was difficult to understand how the French delegation and other sponsors of the United Nations field service could, at one and the same time, hold two strikingly contradictory opinions, one regarding the census of armed forces and the other regarding the field service, to the effect that that service, though having a police character, should be regarded as a civilian force unrelated to armed forces of any kind.

106. The United Nations had not been created as an additional State with armed forces and an armed constabulary of its own. Neither had it been created as a kind of super-State obliterating the sovereignty of its Member States. The States which had founded the Organization as a free association of sovereign and equal Members had reserved for the latter the exclusive right to

[1] See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc* Political Committee, 22nd meeting.

[2] See document S/C.3/SC.3/21.

[3] See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Fourth Year, Supplement for September 1949.

maintain and use armed and police forces as essential attributes of their sovereign rights.

107. Turning to the United Nations panel of observers, Mr. Drohojowski remarked that it was difficult to understand why the Polish motion to defer consideration of the Special Committee's report until the fifth regular session had been defeated with reference to the panel as well as to the field service. The proposal to create a panel of field observers had been severely criticized not only by the so-called minority, but also by the delegations of the United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, India, Canada, Guatemala, Mexico, Lebanon, the Union of South Africa and Saudi Arabia. The Polish delegation found those criticisms, based as they were on practical considerations, extremely well founded. Even the sponsors of the scheme had seemed to share the doubts expressed by its critics. It was therefore not quite clear why the proposal had been adopted so hastily in disregard of all objections and warnings. The Polish delegation saw no grounds for the adoption of a scheme which gave rise to so many doubts among so many delegations.

108. The Polish delegation wished to avoid the impression that such unexplained haste was due to the vague language in which the proposal for the creation of the panel was couched. In particular, it drew attention to the fact that no restrictions whatever were provided for in connexion with the arms the observers were to carry. It was merely stated that "the competent organ shall in each particular case lay down the precise functions to be performed and shall establish provisions concerning protective weapons to be used by them". The expression "protective weapons" could cover a great deal more than side-arms. Such nebulous terms were obviously designed to make the creation of an international army possible, in violation of Article 43 of the Charter.

109. Unlike the vague language of the proposal, however, the intention of its sponsors was clear: the United Nations field service was conceived for the purpose of illegally implementing the exclusive duties and rights of the Security Council, which alone was empowered to supply an armed force wherever it might be necessary.

110. The entire scheme was therefore contrary to the Charter; for that reason, the Polish delegation would vote against the proposed draft resolution.

111. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the discussion of the question of organizing a United Nations field service, which had taken place both in the Special Committee established by General Assembly resolution 270 (III) and in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, had shown that the problem was connected with the questions of the Interim Committee and the admission of new Members. Indeed, in connexion with those three problems, an attempt had been made to reduce the importance and powers of the Security Council, to transfer its functions to other organs of the United Nations, and to take away from it the principal responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

112. During all those discussions, the USSR delegation had shown that the proposal for the establishment of a United Nations field service was in contradiction with the provisions of the Charter. Those, on the contrary, who had wished that decision to be adopted, had found an argument in Article 97 of the Charter, which provided that "The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require". Mr. Tsarapkin felt that that provision of the Charter referred only to the Secretariat entrusted with the accomplishment of a special duty, and to no one else. Article 97, indeed, concerned only the staff necessary for the Organization's headquarters services, which was civilian staff possessing technical qualifications, and was composed of office workers, shorthand typists, telephonists, and experts in various economic, legal and other problems. There could be no question of duties, such as those which would devolve on the members of the field service or the panel of field observers.

113. An attempt had been made to prove that the question was purely administrative. However, the memorandum presented by the Secretary-General showed that the problem of the establishment of a United Nations field service was directly connected with questions dealing with the settlement of armed conflicts, situations and disputes and had nothing to do with the daily work of the Secretariat or of the other organs of the United Nations.

114. The question of the field service and the panel of field observers undoubtedly belonged to the category of problems relating to the settlement of the situations and various problems treated in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. Just as the sending of United Nations missions to various places to put an end to armed conflicts or to contribute to the settlement of situations or disputes came under the provisions of Chapters VI and VII of the Charter and in particular of Article 43, the placing of various services at the disposal of those missions was also covered by the texts he had just mentioned.

115. Article 43 specified that "All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security".

116. Furthermore, paragraph 2 of the same Article specified that "Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces . . . and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided". Thus it was shown quite clearly that the question of the facilities or assistance to be provided for the settlement of conflicts, situations or disputes came within the jurisdiction of the Security Council.

117. It must be concluded that the proposals now submitted to the General Assembly could not, according to the provisions of the Charter, emanate from the Secretariat of the United Nations. It must also be concluded that the members of the field service and the panel of field observers—otherwise known as the military observers—could in no way be regarded as members of the Secretariat. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that Governments which had United Nations missions in their territory were responsible for supplying facilities and assistance and also, obviously, for protecting those missions.

That point of view had been expressed by many delegations in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. If that Committee had endorsed their opinion, the General Assembly would not have had to concern itself with the question of establishing a field service.

118. Thus, the reference to Article 97 of the Charter was wholly unjustified. It must be added, moreover, that the form it was proposed to give the field service was purely military, as was revealed clearly in the Secretary-General's memorandum. It was proposed to admit to the field service and the panel of field observers only men between twenty-two and thirty years of age, with military training, who were to wear uniforms, be formed into detachments of a military type, live in barracks, carry arms and undergo special training to enable them to carry out their duties.

119. The Secretary-General's proposal (A/656) had been subjected to detailed criticism at the third session of the General Assembly and had been rejected.[1] Nevertheless, the authors of the proposal, who, in violation of the Charter, were trying to form the nucleus of an armed force within the Secretariat, however small, had not abandoned their project and were again submitting their plan, this time in the form of a revised proposal from the Secretary-General.

120. Careful examination of those revised proposals showed, however, that nothing had been changed except the names to be given to the formations. Instead of the United Nations guard, it was proposed to establish a field service and a panel of field observers. The number of military observers rose from 500 to 2,000. The ideas were the same as those which had motivated the proposals that had been rejected at the third session. The Secretary-General's revised proposals defined the functions and powers of the field service and the panel of field observers in such vague terms and with so many reservations that the body which would have those formations at its disposal would be able to use them for any purpose it deemed fit.

121. It was not difficult to see, finally, that the Secretary-General's revised proposals would leave the decision on the use of the panel of field observers to the Interim Committee.

122. The Secretary-General's memorandum stated that a certain appropriate body might determine the exact nature of those functions. It was not difficult to see that at any time, when it was in the interest of the United States, for example, a majority of the General Assembly might empower the Interim Committee to define those functions, since it was obvious that the Secretary-General's memorandum did not refer alone to the General Assembly or the Security Council. The adoption of the draft resolution calling for the establishment of a field service would, therefore, be a direct violation of Articles 24, 34, 36, 39 and 43 of the Charter.

123. Furthermore, as the representative of Uruguay had just recalled, Mr. Vyshinsky, Head of the Soviet Union delegation, had already protested in the General Committee against the inclusion of that question on the General Assembly's agenda and had emphasized that the establishment of a United Nations field service would be contrary to the provisions of Article 43. No organ of the United Nations, other than the Security Council, was entitled to have armed forces at its disposal.

124. The Soviet Union delegation would therefore vote against the proposals which had been submitted to the General Assembly.

125. Mr. COOPER (United States of America) wished to emphasize that the United States delegation was strongly in favour of the establishment of both the field service and the panel of observers. In the first place, it considered that the draft resolutions added nothing to the power already possessed by the Secretary-General. It could reasonably be said that not only did he possess that power, but that he also had the duty of providing the services under consideration when requested by an appropriate organ of the United Nations. Secondly, the United States delegation thought that, in a very practical sense, the effect of the passage of the resolutions would be no more than to systematize and regularize the functions which the Secretary-General was already performing with respect to the servicing of field missions, furnishing technical personnel and providing observers as they were needed.

126. The United States delegation was not at all impressed by the novel idea that had been advanced to the effect that the regularization of a function which the Secretary-General was now performing would transform those routine services into an armed force. There was nothing in the size of the service that had been proposed or in its duties or functions which could lead reasonable people to believe that its establishment would circumvent the Security Council.

127. The United States delegation had been somewhat surprised at the objections that had been raised against the establishment of a panel of observers. It did not appear to be a complex institution that was proposed. The Secretary-General was only proposing to establish a list of observers, or a list from which observers could be drawn as needed. It would give him an opportunity to make arrangements in advance for servicing missions when the need came. There had been certain objections raised in regard to the difficulties which would arise in the preparation of such a list. He would not deny that difficulties might arise, but those difficulties were already present under the existing system. The difficulties which always arose in the establishment of a new function should not be allowed to prevent its adoption if that function had a valuable purpose. The real question was whether the establishment of a panel of observers would be an improvement on the existing system. Despite the difficulties that would arise, the United States delegation felt very strongly that it would be.

128. The two services, as proposed by the Secretary-General, took account of the great principle of the equality of all Members of the United Nations. The result would be a more equitable distribution of those functions among all the Members of the Organization. That was a very important consideration which should be taken into account when the question was voted on.

129. In conclusion, Mr. Cooper wished to stress that the establishment of a United Nations field

[1] See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part II*, 200th plenary meeting and *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, 30th through 32nd meetings inclusive.

service would constitute an affirmative step which would strengthen one of the important functions of the United Nations, namely, the appointment of missions.

130. The PRESIDENT put to the vote draft resolution A proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1058).

Resolution A was adopted by 46 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions.

131. The PRESIDENT put to the vote draft resolution B proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1058).

Resolution B was adopted by 38 votes to 6, with 11 abstentions.

Report of the Security Council: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1114)

132. The PRESIDENT drew attention to the report of the Security Council and the report and draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1114). Since that item did not require discussion, unless there were any objections, the General Assembly would take note of the report of the Security Council.

The resolution proposed by the Ad Hoc *Political Committee was adopted.*

International control of atomic energy: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1119)

133. Mr. NISOT (Belgium), Rapporteur of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, presented the report of that Committee on the international control of atomic energy, and the accompanying draft resolution (A/1119).[1]

134. He recalled that on 22 September 1949 the General Assembly had decided to refer to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee the item on its agenda dealing with the international control of atomic energy. The result of that Committee's consideration of the question was formulated in the draft resolution, which contained two main points.

135. First, it requested the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission to continue their consultations, to explore every possibility and to examine all suggestions with a view to determining whether they might lead to an agreement securing the basic objectives of the General Assembly in the question and to keep the Atomic Energy Commission and the General Assembly informed of their progress.

136. Secondly, it recommended that all nations, in the use of the right of sovereignty, should join in mutual agreement to limit the individual exercise of those rights in the control of atomic energy to the extent required, in the light of the foregoing considerations, for the promotion of world security and peace and that all nations should agree to exercise such rights jointly.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Wednesday, 23 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO, (Philippines).

International control of atomic energy: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1119) (*continued*)

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that on 24 January 1946 the General Assembly had adopted a resolution (1 (I)) establishing a Commission to study the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy, a force capable either of contributing greatly to the progress of mankind or of annihilating it. The resolution had invited the Commission thus established to make specific proposals to the General Assembly, *inter alia* "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction". It had also said that it was essential to make provision "for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes".

2. Four years, all but two months, had elapsed since the adoption of that historic resolution. None of the steps envisaged by the General Assembly had yet been taken. No steps had been taken to eliminate atomic weapons from national armaments; none had even been studied. The same was true of the establishment of control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes. Nor had any steps been taken to guarantee the protection and defence of States which respected international agreements and which might be the victims of violation or non-observance of such agreements.

3. The Soviet Union, for its part, had done all that lay in its power to carry out the General Assembly's resolution and deliver mankind from the threat of mass destruction that hung over it because of the atomic weapon, a weapon of aggression whose use would outrage the conscience and offend the honour of peace-loving peoples.

4. From the outset, the Soviet Union had proposed that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the production and use of atomic weapons; on 19 June 1946 it had submitted a plan to that effect to the Atomic Energy Commission.[2]

5. In the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee,[1] the representative of the Kuomintang had stated that

[1] From the discussion on this subject in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee,* 30th to 37th meetings inclusive.

[2] See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission,* First Year, No. 2.