United Kingdom and those who were supporting them in that illegal undertaking must know that the Soviet Union would not participate in the work of that body, and that no good would come of the measures which were taken not only without the Soviet Union, but even despite its opposition.

129. The USSR delegation wished once again to warn the Members of the United Nations that the adoption of the draft resolution on the continuance of the Interim Committee would constitute yet another action against the principle of co-operation within the United Nations and would embitter the dissensions within it.

130. Generalissimo Stalin, Prime Minister of the USSR Government, had stated in March 1946 that the strength of the United Nations consisted in the fact that that Organization was based on the principle of the equality of rights between countries and not on the principle of the domination of one country over the others. He had stated that if the United Nations continued to respect that principle of equality, it would certainly contribute greatly to the maintenance of international peace and security. The continuation of the Interim Committee was a step designed solely to void that principle by by-passing the Security Council. It would not fail to create new complications and new dissension within the United Nations and to weaken its authority and prestige.

131. Everyone was aware that the Interim Committee was in the process of becoming an illegal body existing side by side with the United Nations. The Assembly of the United Nations was sitting in the Assembly hall where, in accordance with the Charter, the representatives of fifty-nine Member States were gathered together. In the periods between the sessions of the Assembly, another body, created in violation of the Charter, was going to sit. Therefore a number of Member States of the United Nations did not recognize that illegal body and would not take part in its work.

132. Nevertheless, the United States, which had promoted the creation of that body and was directing its labours, was continuing its efforts behind the scenes and, in pursuance of its dictatorial policy, was seeking to impose upon the General Assembly a draft resolution providing for the continuation of the Interim Committee.

133. The USSR delegation was very strongly opposed to the adoption of that draft resolution. It affirmed once again that it could not recognize the Interim Committee as a legal body. It declared once again that that body had been created in violation of the Charter, that its purpose was to substitute itself for the Security Council and that its activity was contrary to the aims and principles of the United Nations.

134. For all those reasons, the Soviet Union would continue to take no part in the work of the Interim Committee and would refuse to recognize its decisions, recommendations or conclusions.

135. The USSR delegation would therefore vote against the draft resolution and believed that all those who had at heart the cause of the United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and security should do likewise.

136. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1049).

The resolution was adopted by 45 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Tuesday, 22 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Admission of new Members: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1066)

1. Mr. NISOT (Belgium), Rapporteur of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, presented the Committee's report on the admission of new Members and the draft resolutions accompanying it.[1]

2. Ten of those draft resolutions proposed that the Assembly should request the Security Council to re-examine the applications for admission with regard to which it had been unable to make the recommendation provided for in Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter. The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee's proposals covered all the applications which had failed, either because they had not received the required majority in the Security Council or because they had been voted against by a permanent member.

3. An eleventh draft resolution, put forward by the delegation of Argentina, proposed that the International Court of Justice should be consulted on a question raised by that delegation with regard to the Assembly's powers in the matter. The question on which the Court would thus be invited to give an opinion had been the subject of frequent discussion in the Assembly in the past. It was advisable, therefore, that it should be elucidated, and as it was of a legal character, it had seemed that it would be in accordance with the Charter to refer it to the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.

4. The PRESIDENT said that the resolutions mentioned by the Rapporteur referred to the applications of Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, the Republic of Korea, Portugal and Nepal. One resolution requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, and one contained a request to the Security Council with regard to the use of the veto and other considerations connected with the applications of non-member States.

[1] For the discussion on this subject in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc* Political Committee, 25th to 29th meetings inclusive.

5. The General Assembly was also seized of a draft resolution (A/1079) proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

6. He suggested that delegations participating in the debate should be allowed to speak with reference to any of the draft resolutions. When it came to the vote, however, he would put the draft resolutions to the vote in the order in which he had mentioned them.

7. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that, after a long debate in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the Assembly was again faced with the problem of the admission of new Members and had to decide on a series of draft resolutions.

8. For the past three years the problem had been discussed in all its aspects, political, juridical, constitutional and procedural. It had been asserted that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice[1] was not advisory but binding, that the Security Council should be censured for its failure to follow the Assembly's recommendations on the admission of new Members and that the admission of five of thirteen equally qualified candidates was to be avoided at all costs. Everything had been discussed but the substance of the problem.

9. The problem was, however, straightforward. Thirteen States were applying for membership in the United Nations, of which only eight were acceptable to the majority. From the point of view of Article 4 of the Charter, there was no difference among the thirteen States. As far as qualifications for membership were concerned, the eight States acceptable to the majority were certainly no better qualified than the five States which were not acceptable.

10. The only bar to the admission of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Mongolian People's Republic and Romania was the fact that the United States did not like their form of government. That form of government was unacceptable solely for strategic reasons connected with the "cold war" which the United States was waging against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies.

11. There was no need to stress the clearly discriminatory nature of such a bar. Ever since the majority had requested the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, it had done nothing but attempt to evade the issue. It was difficult to see what possible objections could be raised to those five candidates.

12. Hungary had been in the Axis camp against its people's wish, and had suffered long and cruelly under the yoke of a military dictatorship. Those who were at the moment unwilling to admit democratic Hungary to the United Nations had maintained normal and even friendly relations with the Horthy Government.

13. Bulgaria was in a similar position. As for Albania, its population had heroically resisted fascist occupation long before the outbreak of the Second World War and its contribution to the Allied effort had been universally recognized.

14. As far as Romania was concerned, representatives could not possibly be misled by the absurd charge that that country had been guilty of violating human rights.

15. In the case of the Mongolian People's Republic, the only argument advanced against its admission had been that many Members did not maintain diplomatic relations with it. Few States, however, maintained diplomatic relations with "Transjordan", for instance. It was doubtful whether Ceylon, Portugal, Ireland or "Transjordan" were better qualified.

16. For the previous two years the view had been expressed that the application of each State should be considered separately, that political considerations should be disregarded and that there should be no trading in principles. The United States and the United Kingdom had, however, shown that it was not a question of principle, but one of politics, which was involved.

17. It was absurd to claim that the non-admission of the five people's democracies was not a question of politics, but one of principle. The only principle involved was the discrimination governing United States policy towards all the people's democracies.

18. There could be only one criterion for the admission of new Members. The United Nations should be a universal organization and its Members were in duty bound to admit the largest possible number of States. Any State which applied for membership should be admitted, provided it was prepared to accept the obligations contained in the Charter. Such was the purpose of the draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation.

19. The delegation of Poland could not agree to the admission of certain States, while others were excluded.

20. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union was opposed by the series of draft resolutions submitted by Australia, which reproduced the texts submitted to the third session of the General Assembly.[2] The Polish delegation considered that no useful purpose would be served by requesting the Security Council to reconsider certain applications for membership.

21. If any change was contemplated, there was no reason why the Security Council should not be asked to reconsider its decision in regard to the five people's democracies.

22. The draft resolution submitted by Argentina was typical. What it in fact proposed was that the International Court of Justice should be asked to give an advisory opinion not on one question but on two: first, whether a State might be admitted to the United Nations without the recommendation of the Security Council, and secondly, whether a State could be admitted when the absence of a recommendation by the Security Council was due to a lack of unanimity among its permanent members.

23. In other words, the Argentine draft resolution envisaged the possibility of a Security Council decision in contravention of the rule of unanimity. Such an eventuality would, however, be a flagrant violation of Article 27 of the

[1] See *Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Article 4), Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1948*, page 57.

[2] See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, Ad Hoc* Political Committee, annexes, documents A/AC.24/7 to A/AC.24/11 inclusive.

Charter. A draft resolution involving a revision of the Charter could not be put to the vote.

24. Furthermore, the first question, that of deciding whether a State might be admitted without the recommendation of the Security Council, could not in fact be asked, since Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter expressly provided that admission would be "effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council".

25. The Australian draft resolutions, like the Argentine draft resolution, were pointless, since it was futile to claim that the question was juridical or constitutional in character. It was in fact purely political and arose from the discrimination practised by the United States against the people's democracies. It could not be solved without the open repudiation and censure of that discrimination by the United Nations.

26. The only solution was to admit the thirteen applicants, as the draft resolution submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposed.

27. Mr. ICHASO (Cuba) said that Cuba, as a member of the Security Council, could not fail to participate in the debate on the admission of new Members as, according to Article 4 of the Charter, the Security Council was the body called upon to recommend to the Assembly the admission of new countries to the United Nations.

28. That provision left no room for doubt. The nations entering into association had wished to take all necessary precautions, and had decided that such an important question should be considered twice, according to the practice of countries having the bicameral parliamentary system, so that no request for admission should be transmitted to the General Assembly before it had first been subjected to careful study.

29. Moreover, it was obvious that admission could not be a unilateral act, expressing the desire of one State. Article 4 of the Charter categorically laid down what was required of candidates for admission to the United Nations. Such a procedure was customary in all associations in which people endeavoured to assure the prevalence of a fraternal spirit among their members.

30. It was for that reason that the much quoted Article laid down, as conditions for a State's admission to the Organization, that it should be peace-loving, should accept the obligations contained in the Charter, and should be able and willing to carry out those obligations.

31. The Security Council and the Assembly were the bodies called upon to decide whether those requirements were fulfilled.

32. As to the method of reaching such a decision, it could be reached only by considering each application separately on its merits. If the applicant State fulfilled the conditions, he thought that nobody would oppose its admission. The principle of universality of the United Nations was firmly rooted in the Assembly. His delegation believed in it to such an extent that it did not consider that the United Nations could achieve its aims until every sovereign State on the earth was represented in the Assembly.

33. When that question had been discussed in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the USSR had presented an anomalous draft resolution, which, in addition to an apparently generous gesture, contained a flagrant contradiction to Article 4 of the Charter. That draft resolution called for consideration of the applications for the admission of new Members as a group, a favourable report on some applications being subordinated to previous automatic acceptance of others. That criterion, which made the entry of some applicants conditional on contingencies not indicated in the Charter, and which did not, as required by the Charter, allow for the separate study of each application, was inadmissible.

34. Furthermore, there was an award of the International Court of Justice, which declared unacceptable the principle of making the admission of some States a prerequisite to the admission of others.

35. Cuba had no prejudice against any State, and wished to be friendly to all, but it could not be an enemy of the Charter, which was the Constitution and supreme guarantee of the United Nations.

36. The Assembly, by an overwhelming majority of votes, had rejected the systematic policy of aggression against human rights and fundamental freedoms in certain countries which were requesting admission to the United Nations (235th meeting). It would not be fitting that the Assembly, in a general resolution, should admit those States, which for the time being were undesirable, together with those which had proved themselves to be peace-loving and able to carry out the obligations incumbent on all Members of the United Nations.

37. The Cuban delegation did not doubt that in time, and as a result of educational and cultural work by the United Nations, it would be possible to admit those countries when they proved that they were peace-loving, that they respected human rights and that they were able to fulfil the obligations imposed by Article 4 of the Charter. The Cuban delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, and against the USSR draft proposal.

38. Mr. HOFFMEISTER (Czechoslovakia) felt that the question of the admission of new Members was important not only for the applicant States but also for the United Nations, since the more States the Organization included, and the more varied their political conceptions, the stronger it would be. His delegation had always defended and would support the view that the maximum possible number of States should be admitted into the United Nations. That attitude did not exclude any State because of its political structure. That was shown clearly by the fact that his delegation recommended the admission of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Mongolian People's Republic, Romania, Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, "Transjordan", Portugal and Nepal, thirteen States which met the requirements laid down by Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

39. That paragraph concerned not only the obligations of the candidates under the Charter, but also the obligations of the United Nations itself towards candidates for membership. He reminded the General Assembly of Article 1, paragraph 2, which referred to one aspect of the mission of the United Nations, and to Article 1,

paragraph 4. He then asked who proceeded more in accordance with the spirit of the Charter, those who recommended the admission of thirteen heterogeneous States as diverse as Mongolia and Ireland or Albania and Portugal, or those who excluded five people's democratic republics.

40. It was obvious that some States, primarily the United States and the United Kingdom, did not like the people's democracies. Perhaps they were annoyed that those States were not anxious to be included as mercenary vassals of the United States. The fact remained that the existence of the people's democracies was not agreeable to the United States, the United Kingdom and others, and that their participation in the United Nations, even though only as a reminder of an additional defeat of the policy of those countries, would be disagreeable to them.

41. Therefore, from the very beginning of the current session and at previous sessions, Anglo-American attacks had been concentrated on blackening the people's democracies. Thus the matter of Cardinal Mindszenty, the Greek question and the question of the observance of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, had been elaborated in great detail. Those questions had been well timed in order to keep the memory of slander fresh in the minds of the Members of the Assembly when the question of the admission of new Members came up. Thus the United States and the United Kingdom had prepared the way for their odd and unpopular point of view. The United Kingdom had begun a long time previously to libel the people's democracies, starting with the smallest of them, Albania. That was perhaps undignified for a great Power. However, it was not for the Assembly to educate individual Members, but to accept them as they were and to try to find common ground with them in the endeavour to strengthen and glorify the United Nations and its Charter.

42. The United States, which had tried to draw a Mason-Dixon line between the rest of the States of the world and the people's democracies, was endeavouring to discriminate, with all the consequences of racial debasement, not between whites and blacks, but between whites and reds.

43. The United States was trying to convince itself and the Assembly that States worthy of becoming Members of the United Nations were only those which liked the United States, the American way of life and perhaps the United States dollar. The United States simply wished to disregard the existence of socialist independent and sovereign States.

44. Its main goal, however, was different. It was employing money and pressure in an attempt to establish United States rule over the whole world for at least a century and, in the process, to use the United Nations as an instrument for that purpose. European countries, with their intimate experience of the Marshall Plan and the methods by which United States agencies dictated to sovereign Governments, felt that they must express their extreme anxiety concerning the political independence of the United Nations; representatives of other parts of the world subjected to United States influence had associated themselves with such apprehensions.

45. Despite his real sympathy with the people of the United States, who very frequently believed what was written in their Press, he must point out that the United Nations, although on United States territory, was not an institution subordinated to the United States Government. It could not be supposed that that Government feared that it might lose its voting majority in the United Nations in the near future; it must be presumed, therefore, that it wished to have its way merely in order to confirm, for domestic consumption, its control of the voting machinery in the General Assembly, without the least regard for the question whether such a procedure was of benefit to the United Nations or was in accordance with the Charter.

46. The USSR delegation was not hesitating to accept all thirteen applicants, although it did not feel that the balance of votes in the General Assembly would thereby be greatly altered. The supporters of the USSR delegation frequently amounted only to four; that did not mean that they would relinquish the honourable duty of fighting for truth, justice and the sanctity of the United Nations Charter.

47. The application of the so-called Government in South Korea must be considered separately, because the case of dual Governments, only one of which was a representative Government, merited special attention and political vigilance. The Korean case was not unique; there would be a number of similar cases, for example Viet-Nam.

48. The suggestion that the question should be referred to the International Court of Justice was merely one more attempt to disregard the Security Council. That suggestion had been advanced, only too frequently, by the representative of Argentina. It was gratifying to note that the French representative had, while disagreeing in general with the Czechoslovak delegation's views, nevertheless agreed that that proposal conflicted with Article 4 of the Charter.

49. The United States delegation had been unable to explain why the United Nations had maintained its opposition to the applications from the five people's democracies, and had thereby prevented the admission of such significant States as Italy. That was one of the secrets of United States foreign policy and was intelligible only as some form of conditioned reflex to the policies of the USSR. Unfortunately, the United States had been continuously seconded in that policy by the United Kingdom, despite its greater experience of foreign policy.

50. Summing up his delegation's views, the Czechoslovak representative said that he realized that the conditions enumerated in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter did not exhaust all possibilities concerning the admission of new Members. Nevertheless, although the conditions laid down in that Article were merely an enumeration of the basic, and indeed obvious, prerequisites for admission, it was nowhere stated in the Charter that an applicant must be a capitalist, rather than a people's socialist, democracy.

51. In the last analysis, the objections of the United States and United Kingdom to the five people's democracies simply amounted to the fact that they regarded people's democracies as less qualified, or even unqualified, for membership only because they were socialist. That was a clear case of political discrimination between

systems of government, in crass contradiction to the Preamble of the Charter, to Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 4, and to Article 2, paragraph 1.

52. The attempt to shift the political question to legal ground lacked any real basis and was not in accordance with the record of the discussions in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. The United States and United Kingdom obviously regarded the question as a political one, because the objections they advanced against the people's democracies were those of power politics and spheres of influence. The Czechoslovak delegation also regarded the question as a political one. The United Nations was not a committee of legal experts, but the highest political body in the world. Furthermore, the reason why the United Nations was a living and active body was precisely that it comprised States of different, even of opposing, political tendencies. To exclude States having one particular political system would deprive the United Nations both of vitality and of popular support.

53. The system of political discrimination employed by the United States and the United Kingdom was mainly responsible for the exclusion of all thirteen applicants. They, however, were attempting to throw the blame on the USSR, although it had been precisely that delegation which had protested most vigorously against discrimination. Regrettable as it might be that the representatives of the applicant States would be precluded from attending the following session of the General Assembly, a system of favouritism and the introduction of theories of the supremacy of some States over others in the United Nations could not be tolerated. That view and the view expressed by the USSR in its draft resolution had found a large number of supporters, both hidden and open, in the General Assembly. Among the latter might be reckoned the Secretary-General himself, whose statement on page xv of his annual report for 1949[1] might be interpreted in that way.

54. The Czechoslovak delegation, therefore, rejected for the second year in succession the attempt at discrimination on the part of those Governments which were for admitting some States and rejecting others, although both groups fulfilled the conditions laid down in the Charter. It would vote against the Australian proposals, because it regarded them as narrower than the proposals of the Soviet Union, which it would wholeheartedly support.

55. Mr. MONTEL (France) recalled that on 28 September 1948, Mr. Robert Schuman, head of the French delegation at the third session of the General Assembly, had stated, during the general debate, that the United Nations must be universal or it would cease to exist; no peace-loving nation should be excluded for any political or ideological reason, provided its admission did not prejudice the principles of international morality, democracy and freedom upon which the Charter was based.[2]

56. That was and had always been the clear position of the French delegation. On the one hand, it was convinced that universality was the ultimate goal to strive towards; but, on the other hand, it considered that in no case should the other principles, which were the very foundation of the United Nations, be sacrified in the desire to attain that goal too rapidly. Article 4 of the Charter provided that membership in the United Nations was open to all peace-loving States which accepted the obligations contained in the Charter and which, in the judgment of the United Nations, were able and willing to carry out those obligations. There could be no doubt about the meaning of that text. Member States were therefore bound to admit only States worthy of collaborating in the great work of the United Nations. Nothing would be more contrary to the spirit of the Charter than to accept every applicant State, almost automatically. Nothing would be more dangerous for the future of the Organization.

57. Much had been said about the preparatory work involved in drafting the Charter. The concern for selectness, the fear of opening the United Nations to States which were not peace-loving and which were unable to fulfil the obligations of the Charter or not willing enough to do so, were clearly expressed on every page of the records of that work. A choice had therefore to be made, and the merits and qualifications of each applicant had to be weighed. That was an obligation and not merely an option. The Charter indicated the appropriate criteria in Article 4. During the second session, the question had been raised whether the five conditions laid down in Article 4 were the only prerequisites and whether a State had a right to vote against an application for reasons not specifically stated in Article 4.

58. The International Court of Justice, which had been consulted on the matter in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 113 B (II), had proclaimed the restrictive nature of those provisions. There was no point in going over the question again, although the French delegation had expressed reservations on a part of the Court's decree. Apparently, the clash between the two arguments was largely based on a quibble. The conditions laid down in Article 4, according to which a State must be peace-loving and able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter, could, in fact, be interpreted to justify all kinds of objections on political grounds.

59. The problem which had in fact arisen was much more limited. Could a Member State of the United Nations refuse to vote for an applicant on the grounds that another applicant had not been admitted? The International Court of Justice had explicitly stated that such a practice was contrary to the Charter; the French delegation fully shared the authoritative opinion of the Court. The Charter required that each application should be considered on its own merits; how then could such consideration be given except on individual cases? Clearly, consideration of any given application in relation to another could only lead to bargaining, in the course of which a delegation would be prepared not to insist that an applicant should fulfil certain conditions for admission, in exchange for a similar concession in favour of an applicant which it was championing.

[1] See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 1, page xv.

[2] See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I*, 146th plenary meeting, page 235.

60. The USSR delegation had repeatedly stated that it was prepared not to press certain serious objections which it had raised to certain applications, on condition that the Security Council and the General Assembly accepted certain other applications as a compromise.

61. There could be no clearer demonstration of readiness to violate the provisions of Article 4. Two wrongs, two disqualifications, however transitory, could not compensate for or cancel one another: on the contrary, they increased what was amiss. That was the danger to be avoided. The French delegation had always refused to proceed in such a direction. Accordingly, it would vote against the Soviet Union draft resolution which proposed that thirteen of the applications before the Assembly should be accepted *en bloc*.

62. The French delegation would, on the other hand, vote in favour of the nine draft resolutions which had been submitted by Australia and adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. They expressed the Assembly's favourable attitude toward the individual applications of nine States which the French delegation considered to be fully qualified under Article 4 of the Charter.

63. With regard to the draft resolution proposing that the International Court of Justice should be consulted on the question of the powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly, respectively, in the matter of the admission of new Members, the French delegation thought that the text of the Charter on that point was perfectly clear. It was obvious that the General Assembly could not admit a State unless the Security Council made a favourable recommendation concerning its application. Such a recommendation could be adopted by the Council only by the affirmative vote of seven of its members, including all the permanent members.

64. The French delegation would not oppose the proposal to ask the Court for an advisory opinion for the benefit of delegations which continued to have doubts on the issue; it was convinced, however, that the Court's opinion would not differ from that of the French delegation.

65. Mr. Montel wished to express the deep regret with which the French delegation witnessed the annual repetition of the same debate on the question of the admission of new Members. Such repetition was useless and even harmful, because it accentuated still more strongly, every time, the differences of interpretation separating certain delegations and put off still further the hope of a fair and happy solution.

66. For that reason, the French delegation fully endorsed the view that it would be preferable to let the discussion rest for the time being, and to let time work changes in the opposing views and offer to the parties concerned new opportunities to demonstrate their fitness to be Members of the United Nations.

67. The ultimate goal was that all Members of the United Nations, present or future, should be sincere in their work for peace and their respect for the freedom of nations and the human person. That was the only criterion which should guide the Assembly in its decisions, and it would determine the decision of the French delegation.

68. The PRESIDENT announced that the list of speakers would be closed at 12.15 p.m.

69. Mr. NIKOLNIKOV (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that, in spite of all the efforts made by the Soviet Union to reach agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of the admission of new Members to the United Nations, that question had not yet been resolved. Several Governments which had expressed the desire to belong to the United Nations were still outside it, although no valid reason existed to explain that situation.

70. At the time the question of the admission of new Members had been discussed in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the United States and United Kingdom representatives, as well as those who followed their lead, had tried, by means of dishonest manoeuvring and by distorting the facts, to give the impression that it was the Soviet Union which was responsible for the delay in admitting new Members to the United Nations, whereas, in point of fact, it was they themselves who were responsible for the systematic violation of Article 4 of the Charter. Those delegations had unceasingly attacked the stand taken by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in its capacity as a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

71. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR could not allow the distortions of reality to which the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc resorted to go unchallenged, and considered it necessary to state its Government's position on the question before the General Assembly.

72. For more than three years the Soviet delegations and those of the people's democracies had upheld, in the Security Council and in the meetings of the General Assembly, a policy of international co-operation, of strengthening of the United Nations, of respect for its Charter, and of respect for the sovereign and equal rights of nations. They waged a ceaseless battle for an equitable solution to the problem of the admission of new Members to the United Nations.

73. The representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom, on the contrary, were pursuing a policy of sabotaging international co-operation and endeavoured to use the United Nations for their own selfish ends. They were attempting to infringe the Charter, to pursue a policy which had as its aim the violation of the sovereign rights of States. They were trying to ignore the rights of small nations, and not to admit to the United Nations the countries whose Governments, established according to the régime of the people's democracies, were not to the taste of the Anglo-American bloc.

74. It was precisely that policy practised by the United States and the United Kingdom that explained why those countries persisted in refusing to admit to the United Nations peace-loving democratic and sovereign countries such as Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and the People's Republic of Mongolia.

75. At the same time, the Anglo-American bloc supported the admission to the United Nations of countries which, in the opinion of many delegations and particularly in that of the Ukrainian SSR, had a dubious right to belong to the Organization. Those countries were indeed

far from sure that those candidates were peace-loving, democratic and fully sovereign.

76. Recalling Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter, Mr. Nikolnikov stated that the Ukrainian SSR had persistently requested that the conditions stipulated by the Charter should be observed with regard to the admission of new Members to the United Nations.

77. He also recalled that the Potsdam Declaration, signed by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, had stated that the conclusion of peace treaties with recognized democratic Governments in Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria would enable the signatory Governments to support applications from them for membership to the United Nations. Those undertakings entered into by the three great Powers had also been recorded in the peace treaties with the countries in question.

78. For those reasons, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR felt compelled to protest against the fact that States such as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic had not yet been admitted to the United Nations solely because the Anglo-American bloc was pursuing an unwarranted policy of discrimination in their respect. The political and social structure of those States, as well as their peace-loving foreign policy, guaranteed their conscientious fulfilment of the obligations imposed upon them by the United Nations Charter.

79. Everyone knew that Albania, which had been the first victim of fascist aggression, the Mongolian People's Republic, which had begun to offer resistance to Japanese aggression well before the Second World War, and Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, which had once and for all eliminated the reactionary pro-hitlerite régimes in their countries, had made an important contribution to the struggle of the Allied Powers against fascism.

80. Everyone knew that heroic little Albania had engaged more than 100,000 officers and men of the hitlerite army during the war, that it had sent its best divisions to the aid of Yugoslavia, that it had lost 15 per cent of its population of military age in the struggle against the aggressors, and, lastly, that 50,000 Albanians had been confined in fascist prisons and concentration camps.

81. Everyone was aware that as early as in 1939 the Mongolian People's Republic had taken part in the struggle against the Japanese aggressors at Haleil Sumi and Halhin Gol; that, on 10 August 1945, it had declared war on Japan, and had sent into battle an army of 80,000 men, which had taken part in the liberation of Inner Mongolia.

82. Everyone was aware also that Bulgarian and Romanian troops had taken part in military operations against the hitlerite occupants. The military valour of those troops had been noted in orders of the day of Generalissimo Stalin, commander-in-chief of the Soviet armies.

83. Lastly, everyone was certainly aware of the aid given by the Hungarian people to the Soviet troops marching on Berlin.

84. Nevertheless, some countries which had helped hitlerite Germany in its struggle against the Allied armies and had supplied raw materials to Germany, now ventured to oppose the admission of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic to membership in the United Nations.

85. It was surely impossible to contest the fact that Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania scrupulously observed their obligations under the Treaties of Peace. The Governments of those countries had repeatedly declared their readiness to accept the responsibilities imposed upon them by the Charter as regards the maintenance of international peace and security. Only those lacking in honour and good faith could cast doubt upon their peace-loving character.

86. Did those Governments have military budgets amounting to billions? Did their land, sea and air forces comprise hundreds of thousands of men? Did they have military bases in foreign countries? Did they, like Greece, make territorial claims against neighbouring countries? Did they participate in aggressive blocs or alliances? That was not the case; indeed, very much to the contrary. That was true, however, of those who closed the doors of the United Nations to those countries.

87. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR could not help but note that the question of the admission of new Members had become the object of an undignified game engaged in by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, who used it as a pretext for systematic attacks against the principle of unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council, disregarding the fact that that principle was the cornerstone of the Charter and of the entire work of the Organization.

88. In pursuing their policy of favouritism towards some States and political discrimination against others, those representatives had on several occasions proposed the admission to the United Nations of only the States they favoured. They well knew that by so doing they would oblige the Soviet Union, which opposed such arbitrary proceedings, to vote against those applications for membership, for it could not allow so unjust a policy to be adopted in the case of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic. By acting thus, those representatives had obliged the Soviet Union delegation to cast a negative vote on several occasions, which had permitted credulous people to be convinced that the Soviet Union abused what was called the right of "veto". In order not to repeat himself, Mr. Nikolnikov would speak only of recent events.

89. On 16 June 1949, at the 427th meeting of the Security Council,[1] the Argentine delegation had submitted seven draft resolutions recommending the admission of Portugal, "Transjordan", Italy, Finland, Ireland, Austria and Ceylon to membership in the United Nations. The statements made by all the other countries which had applied for membership in the United Nations had been overlooked on that occasion. The purpose of that manoeuvre was to oblige the representative of the Soviet Union to vote against the seven resolutions and give the impression that it was the USSR which was responsible

[1] See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Fourth Year, No. 30.

for the fact that these States were not admitted to the United Nations.

90. The Soviet Union delegation had countered these tactics. At the following meeting of the Security Council on 21 June 1949,[1] the USSR delegation stated that it was willing to waive its objections to the admission of the States supported by the Anglo-American bloc if the representatives of that bloc were to forsake their discrimination against Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic.

91. As each of the applications for membership had been discussed in detail more than once in the Security Council, the USSR delegation had proposed that the twelve Governments which had applied for membership, namely, Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, the Mongolian People's Republic, Portugal, Romania, "Transjordan", Finland and Ceylon, be recommended for admission to membership in the United Nations. The USSR delegation had later added Nepal to the list.

92. By that proposal the USSR delegation had endeavoured to extricate the United Nations from the deadlock in which it had become involved, to enable the members of the Security Council to adopt a solution acceptable to all and thus to help to create a more normal atmosphere for the Council's work.

93. The representatives of France and Cuba had accused the Soviet Union of manoeuvring for the admission *en bloc* of candidates for membership in the United Nations. Such accusations were ill-founded. The USSR proposal sought only to find a generally acceptable solution to the situation that had arisen. The Soviet Union was merely taking into account the atmosphere that had already been created at the third session of the General Assembly and which had found its expression in the Swedish draft resolution.[2]

94. Yet the Soviet Union proposal, which aimed at promoting co-operation between the great Powers, had encountered fierce opposition from the delegation of the United States.

95. At the 445th meeting of the Security Council,[3] in spite of the objections raised by the USSR representative, who pointed out that it was contrary to rule 32 of the Council's rules of procedure, the United States representative had managed to secure a decision that the USSR proposal should be voted on section by section. As might have been expected, the Council had not recommended the admission of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the People's Republic of Mongolia. At the time of the vote, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had made use of the disguised veto by abstaining, together with the members of the majority.

96. The draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation had then been put to the vote in its entirety and rejected. The draft resolution had obtained two votes, those of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, whilst four votes—those of the United Kingdom, France, Canada and Norway—had been registered against it, and four States, the United States, China, Cuba and Egypt, had abstained. It was to be noted that though he had often affirmed that he had never used the veto in connexion with the admission of new Members, the United Kingdom representative had, in fact, exercised that right on that occasion. Therefore, the responsibility for the non-admission to the United Nations of certain new Governments desirous of joining the Organization devolved not upon the Soviet Union but upon the United States and the United Kingdom, which, by their voting policy with regard to the USSR draft resolution, had opposed the admission not only of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the People's Republic of Mongolia, but also of Italy, Finland, Austria, Portugal, Ireland, "Transjordan", Ceylon and Nepal. Realizing how weak was their position and apprehending a setback at the fourth session of the General Assembly, the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc had decided to strengthen their campaign against the admission to the United Nations of the States they did not favour. It was for that reason that at the present session of the General Assembly they had launched their campaign of slander against Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. They had claimed that Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania had not respected the fundamental freedoms and human rights. They had accused Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania of having created threats to the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had attempted thus to slander those peaceful and democratic States and to justify the policy of discrimination which they had adopted against them.

97. Behind the curtain of lies and demagogy, the representatives of the United States and United Kingdom had, through the Australian representative, submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee draft resolutions proposing the admission to the United Nations of nine Governments which they supported, adding South Korea to the eight States to which they had already extended their favour. As several speakers had already noted, the candidature of that puppet Government established by the United States had not even been considered by the Security Council. Moreover, the independence of that Government—if it could be called a Government—had been subjected to severe criticism during the discussion of the Korean question in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.[4]

98. The Australian draft resolutions had been adopted by a majority in the Committee because of the pressure exerted by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, which proposed the admission of thirteen States, had been rejected.

99. The voting on the latter draft resolution had been very typical. Nine delegations, including those of Sweden, Mexico and Iraq, had voted for the USSR draft resolution. Thirty delegations had voted against it, and sixteen had ab-

[1] See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Fourth Year, No. 31.

[2] See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, Ad Hoc* Political Committee, annexes, document A/AC.24/17.

[3] See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Fourth Year, No. 42.

[4] See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc* Political Committee, 2nd to 6th meetings inclusive.

stained. Thus twenty-five delegations had expressed a negative attitude to the policy of dictatorship and favouritism which the United States and the United Kingdom were attempting to impose upon the United Nations. That showed that the Anglo-American bloc was encountering more and more difficulty in its attempts to establish a policy of discrimination against the peaceful and democratic States which desired to join the United Nations.

100. In the question of the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the policy of the United States and the United Kingdom was not to admit countries which were friends of the Soviet Union, and thus, by a process of selection, to increase their "majority". The aim of that manoeuvre was to establish within the United Nations a situation more and more intolerable to the USSR and the countries which supported it, and to make increasingly burdensome the struggle carried on by the Soviet Union and its supporters to consolidate international security.

101. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR to the Security Council had been unable to vote for the Argentine draft resolutions proposing the admission of seven States favourable to the Anglo-American bloc. It had been unable in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee to vote for the Australian proposals urging the admission of nine countries supported by the delegation of the United States and the Anglo-American bloc in general. It would also be unable in the General Assembly to vote for the so-called Australian proposals, which sought to impose an inadmissible predominance of the Anglo-American bloc within the United Nations.

102. To vote for the Australian, or, more accurately, the United States proposals, would be to vote against the Charter of the United Nations and particularly against Article 4. That would mean voting against the Potsdam Declaration and the provision of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. It would mean that the objective consideration of applications for membership in the United Nations was to give way to a tendentious choice dictated by motives which had nothing in common with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

103. Although it had doubts with regard to a whole series of countries the applications of which were supported by the United States and the United Kingdom, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR, in order to reach a solution obtained by common agreement, would vote for the USSR draft resolution proposing the admission to the United Nations of the thirteen States mentioned in that document.

104. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that his delegation, like many others, believed in the universality of the United Nations, but felt that several States were deprived of membership, not because they did not fulfil the requirements stipulated in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter, but because they belonged to a given political group. It was an open secret that the world was divided into two camps. It was sad to see that that division had found its way into the United Nations. For two reasons, that should not affect the admission to membership of those States which fulfilled the requirements of the Charter.

105. In the first place, his delegation believed that it was much better to have nations of opposing points of view assemble to express freely their opinions. That would provide an opportunity for self-examination and self-correction by all nations, whenever required. Argument within the United Nations might very well lead to peaceful solutions of problems and preclude fighting on the battlefield. That was why he appealed to the States leading the conflicting sides to ensure that no State was denied admission because of belonging to one political camp or the other.

106. In the second place, his delegation felt that the veto could not be applied in the matter of the admission of new Members. Article 4, paragraph 2, was very clear in that respect. Decisions on the admission of new Members were left to the General Assembly, and not to the Security Council. The Security Council only recommended, and a recommendation was not a decision.

107. Moreover, the rule of unanimity had recently been waived in connexion with the admission of the latest Member. One permanent member of the Security Council, the United Kingdom, had abstained, and abstention could not be described as concurrence. Article 27, paragraph 3, required the concurring votes of the five permanent members in any decision of the Security Council. That was not, however, to be considered as a decision; it was a recommendation and it was only thus that the action of the General Assembly in the admission of the most recent Member could be justified.

108. In that connexion, his delegation regretted the postponement of the admission of a sister Arab State, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which was a peace-loving State.

109. He did not wish the world to gain the impression that, whenever the great Powers agreed, an issue would be settled by the General Assembly, whether right or wrong. Nor did he wish the world to gain the impression that, when the great Powers disagreed, nothing would be done, even though it was right. That was why his delegation was making a proposal which contained two points. The first point was an appeal to the permanent members of the Security Council not to use the veto in connexion with the admission of new Members; the second point was the re-examination and reconsideration of the admission of all States which had applied.

110. That brought up the problem of the definition of the requirements of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter, and of the term "peace-loving". No one could, with absolute assurance, speak of one nation as peace-loving and any other as not peace-loving. The standard applied seemed to him very relative. The same was true of the ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of the Charter.

111. The only fair and just solution was a comparison between candidates and Members. If the applicant States had their likes in the Assembly, they should be admitted.

112. It was with that idea in mind that his delegation thought that all applicant States had their likes among actual Member States, each having its good and bad points and its strong and weak points. That was why his delegation

had submitted a proposal appealing to the Security Council to reconsider and re-examine the applications of all those States, and why his delegation would vote for the admission of all applicant States.

113. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) said that every Member State of the United Nations had the right to vote, as it thought best politically, on all questions submitted to it. With regard to the admission of new Members, every State—whether in the Security Council or in the Assembly—could base its vote on purely political grounds without saying a word about it.

114. The International Court of Justice had said that, legally, no State could base its decisions on grounds other than those expressly stated in the Charter. However, the Court had not said, nor could it have said, if it wanted to continue to be an International Court, that Member States subscribing to that international agreement, the Charter of the United Nations, could not vote on political grounds, as that would have been tantamount to interference in the sphere of politics and giving a non-judicial opinion.

115. The General Assembly's decisions on that question must be brought into line with the Charter, for in it alone would the way to break the deadlock be found.

116. To ask the Security Council to reconsider its attitude and to request the five big Powers to cease to regard themselves as being big where they were not, namely, in the General Assembly, would lead absolutely nowhere.

117. The Argentine delegation had voted for the draft resolutions submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee by Australia; it had done so as a tribute to a country the delegation of which had fought incessantly and energetically since 1945 against the excessive use of the veto.

118. Mr. Arce believed that the Assembly should not continue to humiliate itself before the Security Council by asking it to reconsider its decision, since it would end by submitting itself to the totally extraneous jurisdiction of a body it had created to accomplish certain tasks, but not to act capriciously.

119. The Argentine delegation would confine itself to making a few comments on the statements that had been heard, so that it could not be accused of listening in silence to a series of declarations that had nothing to do with the Charter. It must not be forgotten that the Charter was an international treaty and that there were general rules for interpreting international agreements which could not be disregarded.

120. Looked at from that point of view, nothing was more contrary to common sense than the assumption that the admission of new Members to the United Nations could be blocked by the veto. That interpretation led to the most absurd of conclusions, since one reason for rejecting an assumption of that kind lay precisely in the fact that, in case of doubt, the interpretation of international agreements must correspond to a rational interpretation. So far, the United Nations had preferred to adopt the most absurd interpretation of the Charter that could be found. Naturally, such an interpretation had led to the current deadlock, in which all the doctors and quacks learned in the interpretation of the Charter offered a series of remedies which served absolutely no purpose, when the simplest thing would have been strict compliance with what the Charter said.

121. It had been stated in the Assembly, he believed by the representative of Poland, that the majority was unwilling to admit the five Balkan States because the United States did not want them to be admitted. That statement was entirely unfounded.

122. The majority, as it was understood by the delegations to the United Nations, accepted or refused the five States referred to, individually, because the Charter laid down that decisions in the United Nations should be individual.

123. To show that the interpretation to which he had referred was not correct, he recalled that a few days before, in his capacity of President of the Security Council, he had told some members of the Council that he was ready to vote for all the States that had applied for admission to the United Nations.

124. It had been said that the United Nations should seek to achieve universality, but those who spoke most of universality at the present time were those who had opposed it most bitterly at the San Francisco Conference. He did not wish to criticize such an attitude, because he considered that the ability to evolve was a quality of wisdom, but he might, in exchange, discuss the reasons for that change of view.

125. The Polish representative had said that the draft submitted by the Argentine delegation and approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee should not even be submitted to the Assembly, because it put to the International Court of Justice two questions which would be contrary to the Charter. According to the Polish representative, the first question constituted a violation of the provision of paragraph 3 of Article 27, having to do with the required number of votes, and the second ran contrary to the rule of unanimity set forth in the same Article. This was not actually the case. The representative who made that statement was moving in a vicious circle. What was to be decided was whether an application for admission from a State which did not have the seven votes in the Security Council, or which obtained a negative vote, was a recommendation which had been unfavourably recommended or an application which the Security Council did not wish to recommend either favourably or unfavourably. That was really what the Court was being asked to settle.

126. In the three years during which the matter had been discussed, only the Foreign Minister of the USSR had replied, by employing political arguments which certainly did not lack in cleverness, to the arguments developed by the Argentine delegation. Lately the French representative had considered and discussed the Argentine delegation's arguments in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, and had apparently opposed them. Mr. Arce said he had not had time to re-read the French representative's arguments, but he was sure that he could refute them.

127. The Cuban representative had stated that his delegation had no doubts about Article 4,

and that the admission of new Members should be settled by a decision of the Assembly and a recommendation of the Security Council, which was roughly equivalent to the position in a bicameral parliament where a law required the consent or both chambers for passage. The Argentine representative regretted that so democratic a country as Cuba should so readily accept a theory generally admitted in the corridors of the United Nations by delegations which had not taken the trouble to discuss and study the Argentine interpretation. But it was not so. The Charter itself proved as much when, for example, it laid down that the procedure referred to by the Cuban representative was necessary for the election of judges of the Court. The Charter, however, used a different wording when it referred specifically to the admission of new Members.

128. Even if the Charter said that the recommendation of the Security Council and the decision of the Assembly were necessary for the admission of new Members, that the two together formed the judgment of the Organization, no one had so far shown that the adjective "favourable" had been omitted from the Charter through a typographical error, and that where it said "recommendation" it meant "favourable recommendation". The Argentine delegation maintained that the recommendation might equally well be for the admission, the rejection or the postponement of an application.

129. Neither the International Court of Justice, nor the General Assembly, nor the Security Council could refuse to recognize the right of members of the Security Council to say that a State should not be admitted because it was not peace-loving. But when an application was put to the vote, and the number of votes necessary for a favourable recommendation was not obtained, then the Council did not recommend the admission of that State. The Council might submit an unfavourable recommendation to the Assembly in two ways: by not giving it the votes necessary to a favourable recommendation—and in that case the recommendation was against—or by stating specifically that the Security Council did not wish that State to be admitted, although it had requested admission.

130. It was argued that the importance attaching to the opinion of the permanent members of the Security Council should be disregarded in favour of the acceptance of the absurd rule that a single one of the fifty-nine countries could stand in the way of the application of a peace-loving State for admission into the United Nations. It was obvious that when the great Powers were among those who recommended that a State should not be admitted, the Assembly would have to reflect before taking a decision. It was illogical to agree that the recommendations of the Security Council might or might not be accepted by the Assembly, while not agreeing that the Assembly might accept or reject a negative recommendation.

131. According to the prevalent interpretation, the role of the Assembly was reduced to that of endorsing a decision already taken by the Security Council. But that was not what the Charter intended. What the United Nations Charter intended was that the Security Council should give its opinion to one or the other effect, and that the General Assembly, in turn, should be qualified to accept or reject the Council's recommendation. The Assembly, comprising as it did the States which had signed the Charter at San Francisco, was sovereign. It had the last word with reference to the admission of new Members, as the Charter itself stated when it set forth that the "decision" rested with the General Assembly.

132. The representative of Cuba had also said that it was necessary to make a previous investigation of the qualifications of a State applying for admission and that for that very reason the Charter wished the Security Council, which functioned throughout the year and was in a position to be acquainted with the general political situation, to draw the Assembly's attention to any dangers which a given State might present, or to inform it that there was no danger and that that State could be admitted.

133. Mr. Arce recalled having read that the representative of one of the great Powers had said at San Francisco, before the end of the war, that it would be necessary to exercise discretion in considering who should be admitted to the United Nations, and that disturbing elements—the very words used by the Cuban representative—and States which were not peace-loving, or which wished to promote war, should not be admitted. He wondered what that same representative of one of the great Powers would say if asked at the moment, on 22 November 1949, whether the danger was outside or inside the United Nations.

134. There had been much talk about universality, but those who spoke about it were precisely the ones who put the greatest number of obstacles in the way of universality in order to prevent the Assembly from deciding to accept all the States concerned. The Argentine delegation was prepared to vote for all fourteen States and not merely for thirteen, but could not do so, as it had not been given the opportunity.

135. He referred to the opinion expressed by the International Court of Justice to the effect that no State was juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission of new Members dependent on conditions not expressly provided in the Charter, and thought that it had thus been established *contrario sensu* that all States could vote politically, as they found convenient, provided they assumed responsibility for their votes.

136. The representative of France had asserted that the Argentine argument was unjustified and that he had no doubt what the opinion of the Court would be. Mr. Arce, without knowing what the judgment of the Court might be, had, however, no doubts about the wording of the Charter or the rational interpretation to be laid upon such clear provisions as those of Article 4, and of the remainder of the relevant Articles of the Charter.

137. The Argentine delegation was not the only one to think that the Charter did not say what most delegations made it say. The Iraqi representative had expressed that view on that very day and there were three or four other delegations which were of the same opinion, although they had not said so.

138. If there were any doubts on that matter, the preparatory work of the San Francisco Conference should be referred to for an interpreta-

tion of the paragraph under discussion. That preparatory work did in fact clearly establish that the General Assembly could accept or reject a favourable recommendation and reject or accept an unfavourable recommendation.

139. The representative of the Ukrainian SSR had complained of the Argentine delegation's forgetful attitude in the Security Council, when that delegation had submitted a recommendation in favour of seven countries and forgotten the remaining five; and he had said that such an attitude could be interpreted as a desire to increase the number of vetoes by the USSR. That was not the case. The Argentine delegation had no interest either in increasing the number of the Soviet Union's vetoes or in placing other delegations in a difficult position.

140. The Argentine delegation had recommended consideration of the applications of seven countries, because, in its opinion, they were the only ones which had fulfilled the general conditions, since they had obtained seven or more favourable votes. The others had not fulfilled those conditions, as they had obtained only two or three votes. They had not been deliberately overlooked, in order to place difficulties in the way of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania or the Mongolian People's Republic.

141. The Iraqi representative had maintained that the decision referred to in Article 4 of the Charter rested with the General Assembly and not with the Security Council. That was the view which the Argentine delegation had upheld. The Iraqi representative had referred to the rule of unanimity, on which the other delegations had said nothing.

142. There was a precedent of a State which had been recommended to the General Assembly without the rule of unanimity, because one of the permanent members had not voted in its favour. Mr. Arce believed that the quantity of the Security Council's votes should be the deciding factor, rather than the quality.

143. The Iraqi representative had said that his delegation would be prepared to vote in favour of all the States which had applied for admission, and that was the view which the Argentine representative had expressed at the beginning of his statement.

144. In conclusion, Mr. Arce stated that it was not possible for the Security Council to function if it did not have the right to give a political interpretation in doubtful cases. However, if one of the organs created by the United Nations had that right, it must be admitted that the General Assembly also had it.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Tuesday, 22 November 1949, at 3 p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Admission of new Members: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1066) (*concluded*)

1. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) recalled that the question of the admission of new Members was one of long standing, which had already occupied a considerable amount of the time of the Security Council, the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and the General Assembly itself. He did not propose, therefore, to go once again over all the ground which had been covered many times by a number of speakers on behalf of various delegations. He did, however, wish to say a few words to explain the attitude of his delegation with regard to the various draft resolutions before the General Assembly.

2. The facts of the situation with which the General Assembly was confronted were comparatively simple. The representative of Argentina had admittedly tried at the preceding meeting to lead the Assembly down the labyrinthine paths of juridical disputation, where Sir Alexander would hesitate to follow him; nevertheless, the immediate facts of the situation, when not distorted, were comparatively simple. There were applications from a number of Governments for admission to the United Nations. Those had, in the usual way, been referred in the first instance to the Security Council. In that body, some of them had been supported by the requisite majority of the members of the Council, all of them having received eight, and the majority of them nine, votes, but unfortunately they had been vetoed by the vote of the USSR representative on the Security Council. Others of the applicants had failed to obtain more than two or, at most, three votes, and had therefore failed to obtain the necessary favourable recommendation of the Security Council.

3. In considering those applications in the Security Council, the United Kingdom delegation had always been guided by the following principle, to which it attached the utmost importance: that each application should be considered on its merits and in the light of the qualifications laid down in the Charter, which were required of applicants. That was what the Charter enjoined. That was what the United Kingdom had always been convinced was right, and lately it had been supported in that by an opinion of the International Court of Justice.[1] The United Kingdom delegation had found that a number of the applicants had the necessary qualifications and were therefore worthy of admission to the United Nations, and it had cast its vote accordingly. In other cases, it had withheld its support, but he would draw the attention of the General Assembly to the fact that when the United Kingdom had done so, it had always publicly stated its reasons, which it held to be in accordance with the standards of the Charter of the United Nations, and that it had been supported by a large

[1] See *Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Article 4), Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1948*, page 57.