

obliged even Mr. McNeil, who was inspired by a mystic faith in the assertions of the Special Committee, to acknowledge the doubtful nature of the evidence quoted in the report.

112. It was quite obvious that the abolition of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans would contribute to the restoration of normal conditions in Greece.

113. For those reasons, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR considered that the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee absolutely ignored the causes of the existing situation in Greece and proposed measures which could serve only to aggravate the evils from which that country was suffering and to render a solution of the Greek problem more difficult. Only the draft resolution of the Soviet Union (A/1063) gave a correct diagnosis of the situation and proposed effective remedies.

114. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would therefore vote for the USSR draft resolu-

tion because it was designed to liberate Greece from the shackles of foreign occupation, to put an end to the civil war and to give the Greek people the right to settle their internal problems for themselves, by means of free general elections; because it was designed to restore elementary democratic rights in Greece and to put an end to the barbarous terror which had been unanimously, but somewhat timidly, condemned by the First Committee; and, finally, because it was designed to prevent the realization of the imperialist plans of the Athens Government and to promote the normalization of Greece's relations with its northern neighbours, namely, Albania and Bulgaria.

115. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would also vote in favour of the USSR draft resolution calling for the suspension of the death sentences pronounced on nine Greek patriots and democrats (A/1080).

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Friday, 18 November 1949, at 3 p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the First Committee (A/1062) and report of the Fifth Committee (A/1092) (continued)

1. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) said the terms of the debate needed clarification so that the General Assembly could reach a fitting decision on the item under discussion. It had been said, with a tendency to oversimplify, that in a debate such as the one on the Greek question, the great Powers alone should take part, since they were primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace. But the best answer to that claim was the United Nations itself.

2. The United Nations had fifty-nine Member States pledged to maintain peace; consequently it was not proper for five Members to endeavour to settle all possible threats to international peace. The representatives of the great Powers held meetings which were attended at times by the heads of State and at other times by the Foreign Ministers. There would hardly have been any need for the United Nations if the five great Powers were primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace. Truly, the fifty-four so-called small nations or Powers represented the universal desire for peace which surrounded the differences between the great Powers; the representatives of the small nations offered some of the most effective contributions to the strengthening of peace. The small nations resented the distinction constantly being drawn between the five great Powers and the other Members of the United Nations; they believed that all States, great or small, which were Members of the Organization, should co-operate, to the extent of their ability, in the maintenance of world peace and in the application of the principles on which the Charter of the United Nations was based.

3. The General Assembly was carrying out its deliberations in an atmosphere of confusion, and the subjects discussed and the arguments presented frequently strayed from the item of the agenda to which the debate should be limited. The item concerning threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece was currently under discussion. Some delegations had spoken on nothing but the internal régime of Greece and the elections in Greece, and had presented proposals which frequently departed completely from the item under discussion.

4. The USSR delegation, for example, had submitted two draft resolutions. One referred to the holding of fresh parliamentary elections in Greece (A/1063). The other called upon the Greek Government to suspend the execution of sentences passed by Greek courts (A/1080). Those were two matters which certainly had nothing to do with Albanian, Bulgarian and Romanian intervention in the Greek civil war.

5. The USSR had alleged that the so-called small nations favoured British and American military intervention in Greece. But the so-called intervention in Greece consisted of aid which enabled that country to acquire military equipment for its own defence; economic aid to assist the recovery of the Greek nation; and the presence of officers who were training the Greek army and helping it to prepare military defence plans and become familiar with advances in war technique.

6. The delegation of El Salvador did not regard the American and British aid to Greece as constituting intervention in the internal affairs of Greece, much less a negation of Greek sovereignty. The sovereignty of Greece was not impaired since the military missions remained on its territory with the consent of the Greek Government. Moreover, the presence of foreign missions in time of peace was a common occur-

rence in many Member States of the United Nations, and had never been interpreted as a derogation from national sovereignty. Finally, the United Nations, for well known reasons, was not in a position, as an international organization, to help Greece to defend itself against such foreign intervention as that of Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, whose Governments helped the Greek guerrillas in their unsuccessful efforts to overthrow the Greek Government.

7. In helping Greece to repel such interventions, any Member State of the United Nations was doing only what it would be for the United Nations itself to do, if it had an army at its disposal and if the Security Council were not paralysed by the veto.

8. The Greek régime had been called monarcho-fascist. States had a right to be organized in accordance with the will of their peoples: they might be monarchies, constitutional monarchies, or republics; they might adopt any form of democratic government. And democratic government meant government in accordance with the will of the people. As to the term fascist, for certain delegations everything which was not in agreement with their opinions became fascist. That was happening with regard to Greece.

9. All representatives knew that Greece was one of the victims of fascism, that it had fought against fascism with the greatest bravery and had been vanquished by the power of military equipment and forces much superior to its own. Yet the country and the people that had fought against fascism were accused of having a monarcho-fascist régime for their government. The countries which recognized their debt to Greek culture applauded the efforts made by Greece for its rehabilitation and reconstruction, and wished success to its efforts.

10. It had been asked how it was possible that Greece could claim to be a peace-loving nation when it was trying to snatch from Albania part of its territory, Northern Epirus. But it could not be said that the unrest in the Balkans was due to Greece's efforts to claim Northern Epirus by diplomatic negotiation. The Greek Government had said more than once that it would not resort to force to press its territorial claims. The United Nations had accepted that promise and trusted the word of the Greek Government.

11. Hostile criticism notwithstanding, the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans,¹ the Committee's statements and its sifting of the evidence carried weight and were trustworthy, because that Committee had represented the United Nations, had been appointed by the United Nations and had been given powers to observe and investigate the events on the northern frontier of Greece, which was the frontier separating Greece from the neighbouring States with which it had the disputes in question.

12. Referring to the charge that the appointment of the Special Committee had been an illegal act on the part of the United Nations, in conflict with the Charter of the Organization, Mr. Castro said that if the General Assembly was an organization for international peace, the appointment

of committees of that kind was bound to be a common occurrence in its activities. The USSR had not been willing to participate in the Committee and had opposed its establishment; but if it had wished to co-operate with it, it could, within the Committee, have exercised all the conciliatory action proposed in the USSR draft resolutions submitted to the First Committee² and resubmitted to the General Assembly.

13. Some delegations had impugned the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses; such attacks were not very convincing, for those same delegations had refused the co-operation of their Governments in the work of the Special Committee.

14. Whereas Albania, Bulgaria and Romania had denied the Special Committee all access to their territories, Greece had thrown its territory wide open, enabling the Committee to carry out its activity there. Greece had acted like somebody who had nothing to hide from the Committee appointed by the United Nations to investigate the dispute between Greece and its northern neighbours.

15. The United Nations must give credit to its own Committee, which had carried out a difficult task, even at the risk of its members' lives. It was no good pulling the evidence of witnesses to pieces, for the Committee had decided if it was reliable or not. It had been said that not even the names of the witnesses were given, and that they were identified by numbers. The reason for that was to give the witnesses the anonymity necessary for their personal safety. They had to be protected so that they could testify without risk of reprisals, and it was to provide that protection that a number had been substituted for the real name of the witness.

16. The delegation of El Salvador would vote for the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee.

17. Mr. Castro turned next to the USSR draft resolution (A/1063), particularly to sub-paragraphs (b) and (e) thereof.

18. The purpose of the proposal contained in sub-paragraph (b) was to secure the reorganization of the Greek Government and, more especially, the participation of the same Greek guerrillas who had been assisted by the enemies of Greece—Albania, Bulgaria and Romania—in the free elections provided for in that sub-paragraph. Instead of offering Greece the least protection against the flagrant acts of aggression committed by its northern neighbours, the proposal called for the internal reorganization of the country and requested the General Assembly to insist on a change in the existing régime. That would mean interference in Greece's domestic affairs, which was incompatible with the principle of non-intervention set forth in the Charter.

19. With regard to the measures provided for in sub-paragraph (e), the representative of El Salvador repeated that circumstances justified the presence in Greece of the military missions of the United States and the United Kingdom.

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 8.

² For the discussion on this subject in the First Committee, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, First Committee, 275th, 276th, 280th, 282nd to 284th, and 293rd to 311th meetings inclusive.

20. The delegation of El Salvador would therefore be obliged to vote against that draft resolution of the Soviet Union.

21. Turning to the second USSR draft resolution (A/1080), which called upon the Greek Government to suspend the carrying out of death sentences passed on nine persons, Mr. Castro said that, once sentence had been passed, repeal did not depend upon the wish of the executive power and certainly not on the whim of the Government. The United Nations could not petition for the repeal of a sentence. The First Committee had discussed the possibility of satisfying humanitarian desires by saving the lives of the condemned; but when sentence had been passed by a court and when that sentence was about to be carried out, the government of the State was not empowered to repeal it.

22. The procedure was different. But almost no attention had been paid to that procedure. There was the process of amnesty and pardon which, as a rule, was a matter for the legislature. There was also the power of commutation of sentences which the constitutions of some States at times granted to the executive power which, in such cases, could mitigate the penalty imposed. But those were measures of reprieve which a government was not forced to take. If it were bound to take them, the sentences of tribunals would be meaningless. It was the delegations of the self-same States which were constantly attacking the Greek Government which were asking it to use its right of pardon; they forgot that the use of that right was a matter of magnanimity and that no Government could be compelled to use it. In any case, the countries which attacked the Greek Government and continued to threaten the independence of Greece were the last which should ask it for favours.

23. Mr. Castro recalled that his delegation had submitted a draft resolution to the First Committee recommending simply that consultations should take place between the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the First Committee and the representatives of Greece so that the latter, bearing in mind the views expressed by various delegations during the debate, should communicate to their Government the tenor of the discussion and so that the Greek Government itself, without any pressure on the part of the United Nations, might take the decision which was most appropriate and most consistent with justice. That was all the delegation of El Salvador was prepared to do; it was not prepared to ask Greece, or any other country, to quash sentences pronounced by its courts.

24. The delegation of El Salvador would therefore also vote against the second USSR draft resolution.

25. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) wished first to reply briefly to an allegation made by the Czechoslovak representative, Mr. Clementis, concerning the Yugoslav Government.

26. Mr. Clementis had stated at the 245th meeting that the Yugoslav Government had impeded the re-emigration to Czechoslovakia of Greek refugees in Yugoslavia and that it had forbidden them to take their goods and effects with them to Czechoslovakia. Mr. Bebler denied that allegation. When approximately 2,500 to 3,000 of a total of over 36,000 Greek refugees

in Yugoslavia had expressed the desire to leave for Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslav Government had taken steps to make their departure possible. It was true that their departure had been somewhat delayed, but that had been due to the Hungarian Government. Moreover, the refugees had been permitted to take whatever goods belonged to them personally. The only goods which had been held in Yugoslavia had been goods acquired through more or less speculative commercial dealings.

27. The Yugoslav Government had not therefore hindered and would not hinder the departure of Greek refugees who had expressed or who might express the desire to leave.

28. Mr. Bebler then passed to the Greek situation and recalled Mr. Tsaldaris' statement (244th meeting) that repression in Greece was on a small scale.

29. Information provided by thousands of refugees in Yugoslavia or on their way to that country proved the contrary. Those refugees had come in great numbers during the previous few years, especially during the previous few months, and they continued to come in great numbers. They spoke of horrors beyond description, acts of repression and terror committed by the troops of the Athens Government throughout Greece and especially in Slav Macedonia.

30. It was a regrettable fact that men, women, children and old people with all their chattels and cattle were fleeing across the frontier of that so-called mirror of democracy.

31. The statements of the refugees could fill a very large volume. As an example, Mr. Bebler read out the statement of a Greek refugee, Spiro Stecor, a merchant from the village of German. That refugee had stated that after the democratic units had retreated on 14 August, the monarchists had come into his village. Bands of soldiers had entered the houses and taken what they wanted—clothes, fats, cheese, wool, beans and other articles. Non-commissioned officers and even officers themselves had frequently taken part in the looting. All the loot had been loaded on to lorries. In some villages, the peasants had even been deprived of their firewood and window glass. If the owner had objected, more often than not he had been killed on the spot. For example, a man named Done Tanev had thus been killed for asking the soldiers why they were taking away his clothes.

32. Mr. Bebler went on to describe the fate of hundreds of people arrested by the authorities. The innumerable trials in progress before Greek courts-martial usually ended with the death sentence.

33. He then spoke of the trial which had taken place at Florina from 8 to 22 August. Approximately seventy-two inhabitants of the village of Sorovic and the hamlet of Xinon Neron had been accused. The chief witness at the trial of those villages brought before the court-martial had been police major Panagopoulos. Of the seventy-two villagers, fifty-one had been sentenced to death.

34. On many occasions, partisans who gave themselves up were not even taken before a military court. In that connexion, Mr. Bebler gave an example which seemed to him particularly horrible. On 3 August 1949, the Ninth

Athenian Division had discovered a partisan hospital in the mountains, near the village of Negovani, where there had been 150 badly wounded men. The monarchist troops had fallen upon them and, after cutting off the noses and ears of some of them, had cut all their throats.

35. With regard to the procedure adopted in the military courts, Mr. Bebler referred to a report which had appeared in the Athens newspaper *Akropolis* on 9 July. It was stated in that report that it was usual for the trial to take place with the rapidity of a film; witnesses filed in to give their testimony every five minutes, and nobody else—neither the accused nor the defence—asked any questions or made any comments.

36. In contemporary Greece, however, not being condemned to death did not mean escape from death. It was easy to die in Greece, in prison or in the concentration camps, without being sentenced to death. The most recent case was that of Georgis Lambrinos, an artist and journalist on the *Rizospastis*, who had died in prison at Lamia after being tortured.

37. Living conditions in the concentration camps could rather be called dying conditions. Mr. Bebler referred to the events which had taken place recently at Makronisos. Of 3,300 deportees on that island, 600 had been transferred on 12 October to the so-called re-education camp, a name borrowed from Hitler. It should be recalled that there had been re-education camps in Germany, the *Umbildungslager*.

38. Immediately upon their arrival in the camp, re-education had begun. The deportees had been assembled in the courtyard and asked provocative questions. The guards had asked those who were Greeks to take one step forward and those who were traitors to remain where they were. Since nobody had taken the required step forward, the guards had been ordered to beat up all the deportees. That operation had lasted several hours. As a result of the brutality, scores of deportees had been wounded, some seriously. Three had died from their wounds.

39. Mr. Bebler wondered whether it was really possible to assert in those circumstances that such a state of affairs was no concern of the United Nations; whether it was possible to say, as the representative of El Salvador had just done, that the Organization founded, according to Article 1 of the Charter, to develop and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, should ignore the acts of mass terror committed in Greece. It was impossible to maintain that such acts of brutal repression, for which the only reason was the vengeance of the conqueror on all who sympathized with the conquered, tended to calm public opinion in Greece and to improve relations between neighbouring countries in the Balkans, particularly when it was remembered that such vengeance was particularly atrocious in regions inhabited by the Slav Macedonian minority whose sufferings could not but find an echo in the heart of the Yugoslav people, bound to them by ties of blood and language.

40. Those facts must not be ignored. It was a sacred duty to bring them to light.

41. It was in that spirit that the Yugoslav delegation supported sub-paragraph (a) of the USSR draft resolution (A/1063), proposing a general amnesty, and the draft resolution

(A/1080) asking for mercy for the nine Greek heroes of the war against Hitler Germany condemned to death in Greece.

42. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) recalled that both the question of the threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece and the draft resolution before the Assembly had been the subject of lengthy discussion in the First Committee.

43. Sensible people everywhere wondered why there was still no peace in Greece, why executions of patriots took place in that country every day, and why those questions had remained on the General Assembly's agenda for the past three sessions. A great deal of time had been devoted to the problem. Many resolutions had been adopted, but the domestic situation in Greece continued to deteriorate notwithstanding, and its relations with neighbouring States remained as strained as ever.

44. The Greek people sought a just and honourable peace. It was the duty of the United Nations to help the Greek people to restore peace and prosperity in their country. The Greek problem must be solved in accordance with the true interests of the Greek people and of international peace and security.

45. Mr. Kiselev was profoundly convinced that the Greek question would have been settled long before if the United States and the United Kingdom had abandoned their selfish and greedy policy and their strategic affection for Greece, and if they had ceased to grant military and other assistance to the monarcho-fascist government.

46. However, interference by the United States and the United Kingdom in Greek internal affairs continued to increase. As matters stood, that country had almost lost its political independence and national sovereignty. That interference meant that democratic freedoms were disappearing in Greece, it meant civil war, the economic subordination of the country to foreign Powers and a marked decline in the standard of living. The Greek people were suffering want and famine. The situation of the working class was so grave that even the right-wing newspapers were obliged to recognize it. For example, on 14 May 1949, the newspaper *Akropolis*, which had close links with the Court and the so-called Populist Party, had written that famine was assuming threatening proportions and that the whole country was in the grip of fantastic poverty. In certain parts of Crete, it added, poverty was such that, the houses having been destroyed, the inhabitants lived like primitive peoples in mud huts or, as in Herakleion, in caves. In Epirus, refugees had spent the winter without cover; others were living in the ruins of ancient tombs. Nor was it always the partisans who were to be blamed. The provinces were calling for immediate help from the Government, for the want and famine they were suffering were indescribable.

47. Such was the cry of despair which was being uttered by millions of unhappy Greeks who were sacrificing themselves every day in the fight for a truly democratic Greece. The situation had become impossible. For more than four years, the Greek people had fought obstinately against the Anglo-American imperialists and the Greek monarcho-fascists for democratic freedom and Greek national independence. Their resistance to

reaction at home and violence from abroad was growing year by year. That infuriated the monarcho-fascist clique governing Greece. They felt an animal fear at the thought of the stern punishment they would receive for their crimes. They sought vainly to break the will of the Greek people and to do so they had undertaken the extermination of all progressive and democratic elements and launched a campaign of mass political assassinations.

48. The Soviet representatives had shown more than once that the terror raging in Greece was inspired by the United States Mission in that country, although the direct instruments of persecution were the gendarmerie and police which formed a part of the so-called Ministry of Public Security.

49. According to Press reports, the police had a force of 30,000 men who were directed and supplied entirely by the United States. Recently it had been noticed that the proportion of death sentences in relation to sentences as a whole had risen considerably. Any person appearing before a court-martial was condemned to death, unless he declared that he renounced his democratic ideals and unless he betrayed partisans or Communists.

50. Summarizing information which had appeared in the Greek Press, Mr. Kiselev stated that, between August 1948 and March 1949, 380 persons had been shot in Greece, 452 condemned to death and 330 sentenced to penal servitude for life or to terms of imprisonment, and 4,764 arrested. Between June 1946 and the first six months of 1948, courts-martial alone had pronounced 1,600 death sentences which had been carried out, while 10,000 Greek patriots had been put to death without trial by government representatives or monarcho-fascist armed bands. More than 70,000 Greek democrats were still in prison or in exile in various islands. Among those shot, many had won distinction through their heroism in the struggle against the German occupying forces. The courts had shown no regard either for the age of the accused or for their family responsibilities. Thus, a widow, the mother of three young children and of a son who was serving in the ranks of the national army, had been condemned to death and shot. To take another instance, an old man, a former lawyer, member of Parliament and governor of one of the Greek provinces, who had belonged to the Liberal Party, had been arrested and sent to prison. The unhappy man, though 81 years of age, had been shot the same night.

51. In its work of annihilating all democratic elements, the Athens police was adopting a new method, that of suicide and sudden death in the torture chambers of the secret police. The indignation of all countries had been aroused when the trade unionist leader, Mr. Paparigos, had been killed in a police cell and his assassination represented as suicide. The Athens Press had reported the case of a 62-year old milliner who had been arrested for a breach of the peace and who had "committed suicide" by throwing herself out of the window at the headquarters of the special division of the police.

52. Not content with the persecution of Communists, the Greek monarcho-fascists had proceeded to persecute all those who held democratic

convictions and all those who had any connexion with the parties of the left. Thus, the Corinth military tribunal had condemned to death a lawyer and member of the Socialist Party, while the military tribunal of Chalcis was trying one of the leaders of the left-wing Liberal Party and one of the founders of the Liberal Party.

53. Mr. Kiselev went on to quote the newspaper *Bradini*, which, in February 1949, had announced that, on the preceding day, six persons had been shot in Athens after they had been condemned by the military courts of Kastoria and Florina for violating decrees on public order. The same paper had reported that twenty-three persons had been shot on 16 and 17 February. Moreover, a Greek news agency had stated that the special court-martial of the Piraeus had condemned to death eight Greeks, including four women. All that went to show that the monarcho-fascist government in Athens and the Anglo-American fascists had decided to continue an unrelenting reign of blood and terror throughout the country. The relatives of the condemned had appealed to world opinion to put an end to the executions, since only thus could the peace which it so sorely needed be restored to Greece.

54. Mr. Kiselev turned next to the testimony of a Belgian, Mr. Laroque, who had told the newspaper *La Nation* that 80,000 Greek citizens had been prosecuted in 1946, although no action had been taken against persons guilty of collaboration with the occupying forces. Thus Mr. Rallis, who had been Prime Minister in the collaborationist government, had been buried under the Greek flag, whereas it was considered a serious crime to have taken part in the resistance movement. Mr. Laroque had pointed out that only fifteen of 1,000 workers in the Piraeus had received the certificate of good citizenship for which they had applied. Liberty existed only for those who supported the right-wing movement. Cases of intimidation and arbitrary arrest grew daily more numerous and the administration of justice was based solely on denunciations. In 1947, more than 2,000 persons had been shot. Mr. Laroque had concluded that more people had been killed during that year than during the three years of German occupation.

55. Such were the facts which Mr. Tsaldaris and Mr. Pipinelis denied with bland hypocrisy when they stated that they shot none but offenders against the common law. The fascist judges regarded all those Greeks who longed to see their country become free, democratic and independent as lawbreakers.

56. To put an end to that bloodshed, the General Assembly should adopt the draft resolution submitted by the USSR (A/1063). That was the only method whereby it could fulfil its duty and help to restore the peace and prosperity in Greece.

57. Mr. Kiselev then turned to the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.

58. The draft resolution submitted in the First Committee by the delegations of Australia, China, the United Kingdom and the United States, and adopted by that Committee, approved the activities of the Special Committee and accused Albania and Bulgaria of having given moral and material assistance to the partisan movement in Greece. The representative of the Soviet Union

and other representatives had proved the inconsistency of those charges in the First Committee. The purpose of the authors of the draft resolution, in seeking to prove that Albania and Bulgaria were guilty of violating international peace and were threatening the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece, was simply to hide their own interference in Greek affairs and to make world public opinion forget the assistance that the United States itself was giving to the Government of Greece, which it was turning into a military base.

59. The Special Committee, which had been composed of carefully chosen individuals, had carried out all the functions assigned to it by the United States and the United Kingdom; it had submitted to the United Nations a report which did not contain a grain of truth, but which skilfully dissimulated Anglo-American interference in Greece. The Committee had, however, been unable to achieve one of its aims; it had been unable to spread the influence and control of the United States and the United Kingdom to Albania and Bulgaria. That task had proved to be beyond its powers.

60. To appraise the real value of the activities of the so-called United Nations Committee on the Balkans, it was necessary to note the composition of the six groups of observers responsible for inspecting Greek land frontiers. As had been pointed out by the correspondent of the Reuter Agency at Salonika, all the observers were military men, though they had worn civilian clothes. Each group had had jeeps equipped with radios. They had worn yellow arm bands with the letters "UN" in black. The observers, of whom there had been 113, were United Kingdom, Australian, French, Chinese, Brazilian and United States nationals. The foreign Press had openly stated that they all belonged to the intelligence services of their countries. It was easy to imagine the conclusions that such observers might reach.

61. It was quite natural, therefore, that the Special Committee should have proved to be an obedient tool of the expansionist policy of the United States. Walter Lippmann, the well known reactionary journalist, had stated explicitly that Greece represented a useful base for a United States offensive against the Soviet Union. The purpose of the observers' activities had been to collect information for the United States army and for the Greek General Staff. The activities of the Special Committee had been devoted entirely to justifying the slanderous inventions of the monarcho-fascist ruling circles of Greece concerning Albania and Bulgaria, and obviously that had not failed to aggravate tension in the Balkans.

62. By spreading such slanders, the Athens government had tried to persuade world public opinion that Albania was threatening the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. With the support of the Press and radio, Mr. Cohen, the representative of Wall Street, had frequently propagated such slanders in the General Assembly and in the First Committee. The Special Committee had not tried to carry out the functions entrusted to it by the General Assembly. It had tried to carry out the task assigned to it by the State Department; that task had

been to collect as many accusations and slanders as possible against Bulgaria and more especially against Albania, irrespective of the sources and, if necessary, to invent such information. Its report contained some quite unfounded accusations.

63. Numerous documents issued by various governments, among others those of the United States and the United Kingdom, showed how false were the fascist Greek Government's accusations against Albania. Those accusations were proved wrong by the peaceful attitude of the Albanian People's Republic, by the fact that the activities of the Greek democratic army had extended to regions as far from Albania as the Peloponnesus, Thrace, the island of Samos and Crete.

64. In reality, the great British and American monopolies alone were intervening in Greece. On 25 March 1949, *The New York Times* had stated that Greece was a laboratory experiment to try out United States policy towards other governments. Thus Greece was to be a military testing ground.

65. Between November 1944 and the end of September 1949, the armed forces of the Athens government had been guilty of 1,565 armed provocations or sorties in Albania, 826 of which had been carried out on land, 675 by air and 64 by sea. Between 1 November 1948 and 27 September 1949, Greek Government troops had been responsible for 492 provocations or sorties in Albanian territory, 220 by air and 10 by sea. During the same period, 334 soldiers of the so-called Greek national army had penetrated 400 metres into Albania. In other cases, in June, July and August 1948, an unknown number of soldiers with air and artillery support had penetrated to a depth of 2 kilometres into Albania. During the same period, 7,132 shells and 640 trench mortar shells had been fired to a depth of as much as 4 kilometres into Albanian territory. Four hundred and seventy-one aircraft had flown over Albanian territory and in many cases had bombed or machine-gunned the civilian population. During those armed aggressions, 18 Albanian soldiers and officers had been killed and 15 wounded. Seven civilians and a large number of animals had been killed and 15 houses destroyed. During the same period, the monarcho-fascist aggressors had lost more than 800 soldiers or officers in Albanian territory, of whom 37 dead and 12 wounded had not been recovered by their comrades. Seventy-five Greek soldiers and officers had been captured while carrying arms on Albanian territory.

66. The number of monarcho-fascist provocations against Albania had varied according to Greece's internal and foreign situation. Provocations had been particularly frequent in the summer of 1945, when the Greek Government had made preparations to launch a real offensive against Albania and in particular against Northern Epirus. They had also been frequent during the summer of 1946, when the Athens government had put forward its claims against Albania at the Peace Conference in Paris, and during the winter of 1946, when the Athens government had accused Bulgaria and Albania in the Security Council of assisting the Greek guerrillas and of intervening in the internal

affairs of Greece.¹ They had been numerous, too, during the summer of 1947, when the Security Council had examined the report of the Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents² and when the Greek Government had requested assistance from the United States and the United Kingdom and had asked the Security Council to take the measures provided in Chapter VII of the Charter against Greece's northern neighbours which, it had claimed, had been guilty of intervening in the internal affairs of Greece.³ Lastly, the provocations had increased on the arrival in Greece of the so-called United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. In August 1949, they had become open acts of aggression, when the monarcho-fascist troops had been thrown into the attack against the Albanian People's Republic on the eve of the fourth session of the General Assembly, in conformity with a plan drawn up by the Anglo-American imperialists and following a campaign of pressure, threats, blackmail and slander.

67. On 2 August 1949, the monarcho-fascist troops had attacked Albanian frontier posts in the Velishta district and, with artillery and air support, had occupied a section of Albanian territory. Throughout the month of August, ever-increasing numbers of monarcho-fascist forces, commanded by the United States General Van Fleet, had carried out a succession of attacks against Albanian territory. Seven divisions on a war footing had been concentrated on the Albanian frontier. Three brigades had penetrated into Albania and had occupied strategic heights; 178 aircraft had taken part and had penetrated 13 kilometres into Albania, bombing and machine-gunning villages and the civilian population. Albanian villages had been subjected to 5,251 rounds of shellfire.

68. The forces of the Albanian People's Republic had stopped all the attacks by the aggressors and had valiantly defended the integrity and independence of their country.

69. The aggressive nature of the military operations carried out in August 1949 by the monarcho-fascist troops against Albania was established by numerous semi-official statements and reports in the Press; bands of monarcho-fascist officers and soldiers who had been taken prisoner in Albania had explicitly stated that they had been ordered to attack Albania. The plan of attack against Albania had been drawn up by the Anglo-American imperialists. Its execution had been entrusted to the Greek monarcho-fascist movement under United States leadership with the consent of certain other governments.

70. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR thought that the draft resolution of the First Committee, which was based on the conclusions contained in the report of the Special Committee, would not bear serious consideration and should be rejected.

71. Mr. Kiselev recalled the terms of the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/1063) and stated that it was based on a sincere desire to end the tension which prevailed in international relations, to re-establish peace in the

Balkans and to put an end to the blood-bath in Greece. The Greek people must be allowed to enjoy full democratic rights and to decide their own fate.

72. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR would vote against the draft resolution of the First Committee and would support the USSR draft resolution.

73. Mr. SARPET (Turkey) said that he had not intended to take part in the Assembly in a debate on a question which had been exhaustively discussed in the First Committee, but he felt obliged to clarify one point which had been brought up by the representative of the Soviet Union at the 244th meeting.

74. Mr. Vyshinsky had said that the Soviet Union was in possession of certain documents which stated that the rebels in Greece had received arms and war material from countries other than Greece's northern neighbours. The three countries cited by Mr. Vyshinsky included Turkey, although he had, of course, added that he could not guarantee the truth of those documents. During the discussion in the First Committee, Mr. Vyshinsky had made the same statement.

75. In order to dispel any doubt which might still exist in some minds, Mr. Sarper repeated the clarification already offered by his delegation in the First Committee. The allegation made by Mr. Vyshinsky was completely without foundation. There had been no traffic in arms or war material from Turkey to the Greek rebels through any channels, not even by smuggling.

76. Mr. KAN (China) recalled that after the failure of the Conciliation Committee to find a basis of conciliation for an agreement between the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece, his Government had sponsored jointly with the delegations of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, the two draft resolutions adopted by the First Committee and submitted to the Assembly.

77. Draft resolution A called for a peaceful settlement of the Greek question and draft resolution B had as its object the repatriation of Greek children. The latter draft had been unanimously adopted by the First Committee and the former by a very large majority. Mr. Kan appealed to the Assembly to adopt them.

78. There had been a very careful examination and thorough discussion of the contents of the two draft resolutions. Draft resolution B dealt with a purely humanitarian question. It was free from any political considerations. He hoped that that draft resolution would also be adopted by the unanimous vote of the Assembly. Draft resolution A contained provisions which constituted the minimum the Assembly should do to safeguard the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece.

79. At the 245th meeting there had been some argument in connexion with the proposal of the Polish delegation that the representative of Albania should be permitted to be heard in the Assembly. The proposal had been ruled out of order by the President, and the Assembly had not had the opportunity of hearing the represent-

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council*, First Year, Second Series, Supplement No. 10, annex 16; Supplement No. 10 A, annex 16A, and Supplement No. 11, annex 20.

² See document S/360.

³ See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Second Year, No. 71.

ative of Albania, but many representatives had heard the statements and the replies to questions of the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria in the First Committee.

80. For the benefit of those who had not heard them, Mr. Kan would outline the strange ideas advanced by the representatives of Bulgaria and Albania, supported by a number of delegations in the Assembly, which would at the same time serve to throw considerable light on the whole controversy in Greece, and point to a way of solving the problem effectively.

81. The first idea was that Albania, Bulgaria and other countries which had taken away Greek children from Greece were justified in so doing because they had given the children better treatment and because the children were happier in those countries than they would be in their own. Whether the children had actually received better treatment, and whether they were actually happier, was not known. Normally, children could not be happier when separated from their parents, but, in any event, no one had the right to take children away from their countries and from their parents merely because they intended to give them better treatment and make them happier. If that contention were accepted, any person could walk into a neighbour's home and take away the children because he thought that his neighbour had not given them sufficiently good care or made them as happy as they should be.

82. A neighbouring country had still less right to take away the children from another country and to educate them with a view to convincing them that their own government was an enemy of the people. Some of the children had even been armed to fight against their own country. The argument advanced by Albania and Bulgaria was that it was only natural that the children should be influenced by the revolutionary atmosphere in which they found themselves, but that did not explain their right to take the children away from their own country and to place them in a revolutionary atmosphere hostile to their own country.

83. The second dangerous idea advanced by Albania and Bulgaria, and supported by a number of delegations in the Assembly, was that Greece itself was responsible for the deplorable situation existing in Greece. In other words, Greece, instead of Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, was responsible for the guerrilla movement which had its bases of operation in Bulgaria, Albania and Romania and which received arms and supplies from those countries.

84. The representatives of Albania and Bulgaria, and the representatives who supported them, had argued that the settlement of the matter of the guerrilla movement in Greece depended upon the settlement, on a democratic basis, of the internal problem of Greece. In other words, the argument was that the Greek Government was not a democratic government in the sense which those countries gave to the term democracy; and that, so long as the Greek Government was not democratic, the guerrilla movement was inevitable. To be more specific the argument was that so long as the form of government in Greece failed to meet with the approval of its northern neighbours, the guerrilla movement would go on, and the Greek Government must take the blame for what happened. Surely that was a fantastic idea. Were that idea

to be accepted, every country unfortunate enough to have communist countries as neighbours would be in constant danger. For, in communist countries, a democratic government was the form of government approved by Moscow; any government which did not receive the approval of Moscow was called a monarcho-fascist government or a government of Wall Street. It was, however, extremely difficult to please Moscow. It was not enough to be communist; it was necessary to be Cominform communist, in other words, communist and, at the same time, willing to take orders from Moscow. Yugoslavia, for example, was communist but not democratic from that point of view.

85. The Chinese delegation believed that no country had the right to question the form of government of a neighbouring country and, still less, the right to interfere in its internal affairs. The invasion from Albania and Bulgaria, disguised as a Greek guerrilla movement, must be stopped immediately by conciliation and peaceful means. That was the purpose and the intention of the two draft resolutions which the Chinese delegation had joined other delegations in submitting to the Committee. The draft resolutions provided for fair and practical means of implementation.

86. Mr. Kan therefore appealed to the assembly to adopt the draft resolutions, so that justice might prevail, so that peace in the Balkans might be secured, and so that disguised invasions, which threatened other parts of the world also, might be discouraged and prevented from becoming the cause of another world conflagration.

87. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee struck a familiar note. It was not necessary to consult files or recall many facts to establish the reasons for that familiarity. In spite of certain minor innovations, the new draft resolution was identical to those previously adopted by the majority of the General Assembly on the Greek question. The accusations against the neighbours of Greece, the continuation of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, the assurances of the majority of the General Assembly to the Greek Government were again repeated.

88. Such repetition gave the impression of a complete lack of responsibility both in approaching the question and in the proposed solution. It would be logical that, if certain measures did not bring about a solution of the problem, new measures should be sought and new solutions proposed. The majority of the General Assembly, however, preferred to continue to follow blindly the strategic policy of the United States in the matter. In spite of the failure of the resolution 196 A (III) to provide adequate measures to remedy the troubled situation, the majority was prepared to repeat the same resolution with an eagerness which showed how little concerned it was with the real issue.

89. The sponsors and supporters of the draft resolution of the First Committee again claimed that it was based on evidence contained in the report of the Special Committee. Mr. Katz-Suchy, as well as other representatives in the First Committee, had shown that the evidence submitted was based on rumours, hearsay, prejudice and bad faith.

90. He had shown in the First Committee that the purpose of the Special Committee had been to concoct sufficient evidence to justify the political aims of the United States in Greece. The accusations and conclusions had been prepared beforehand, and the so-called investigation had been designed merely to confirm them. But even in that respect it had failed, as Mr. Katz-Suchy could prove to the General Assembly.

91. He could analyse the report in detail and make representatives see its contradictions, the conjectural nature of its findings, the glaring partiality of the Anglo-American observers. He could ask representatives again to consider why, among the 1,105 witnesses who had been heard by the Special Committee, there had not been one whose testimony had not been favourable to the Greek Government or to the desires of the so-called investigators. He could show that witnesses had been intimidated, that all witnesses had been supplied by the Greek authorities, that many of them had been under sentence of death and awaiting execution. He could speak of the unheard-of method applied during the hearings, by which witnesses had been divided into willing and unwilling, and no witness had ever been asked a single embarrassing question. He could invite representatives to check on a map how far the Peloponnesus, Thrace, Mount Olympus, Samos, and other places were from any frontier, and then explain who had supplied the guerrillas with arms. He could draw attention to the peculiar composition of the observer and military groups in which, of 61 members, 41 were United States and United Kingdom nationals. He could refer to testimonies giving exact figures of bullets and guns allegedly supplied by Albania or Bulgaria, the accuracy of which had not been questioned by members of the Committee.

92. The Assembly was being invited to accept rumours as truth and to adopt, as its own, conclusions which were an insult to the intelligence of any average person. But whatever the proofs which might be given to show that the Special Committee had acted in bad faith and as an agent of United States expansionist policy, members would fail to accept them and would always claim that the Committee's report was truthful and impartial.

93. There were, however, two facts to which Mr. Katz-Suchy must draw attention if he was not to fail in his duty as his Government's representative. The first was that the draft resolution invited the Assembly to condemn three sovereign States on the basis of flimsy evidence. Without troubling to present satisfactory evidence, the American authors and the other supporters of the report said that Romania must be condemned, not because they had found evidence that it had been helping the Greek guerrillas and supplying arms, but because the Special Committee's observers claimed to have established that the Free Greek radio station was situated in Romania and that Romania had a committee to aid the Greek people. Mr. Katz-Suchy asked whether any honest person could consider that as evidence.

94. The second fact to which attention must be drawn was the striking disproportion between events in Greece and the explanation of them offered in the report. The Special Committee, in contempt of the Assembly's abilities to judge

soundly, and with a total disregard of logic, wished it to be believed that the tragic events in Greece which had cost the Greek nation so much suffering and so many losses, had been caused by external aid.

95. The representative of Poland invited members to compare the armaments and arms used in Greece, where the war had been going on for three years with modern weapons, from the newest British incendiary bombs to tanks and heavy bombers, with the supplies that had allegedly been provided by Albania and Bulgaria. All those alleged supplies would amount to merely a fraction of one per cent of the amount of weapons involved in the war. Even if the two countries accused could have supplied the Greek guerrillas with all their weapons, that would still have amounted to less than one per cent of the military equipment delivered by the United States to Greece. It was unbelievable that the Greek guerrillas could, for three years, have challenged the Greek army, 205,000 strong and equipped with the most modern weapons, aided by the might of the United States and the United Kingdom which stood behind the puppet regime of Athens.

96. The sole aim of Mr. Katz-Suchy's statement was to induce representatives, before voting on the draft resolution, to consider the dangerous implications of its adoption, and the injustice which would be done to the United Nations, to Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, and to the cause of peace.

97. The problem of Greece did not require appeals, argumentation or eloquence. There were data and figures which spoke for themselves, and statements of policy so explicit, cynical and brutal that they did not call for comment. He was referring to the Truman Doctrine and to the figures of the aid to Greece programme.

98. American companies had taken over all major industries in Greece. Greece had become a United States colony, and military operations in the Greek civil war were under the complete control of United States staff officers. United States military, political and economic missions decided on every aspect of Greek life. Whatever might be said about the Special Committee's report would not change the fact that Greece had lost its political independence.

99. None of the sponsors or supporters of the draft resolution had any doubts on that question. Every observer who had visited Greece confirmed it. The well known journalist, Howard K. Smith, chief of the European News Bureau of the Columbia Broadcasting System, who had recently visited Greece, said in a book entitled *The State of Europe* that no one was protecting Greek democracy, for it did not exist. Democracy in Greece was a paper façade, and beyond a quarter of a mile radius of the hotel districts of Athens and Salonika where the foreigners lived, not even the façade existed. No one was seeking to preserve Greek independence, for there was no such thing.

100. Howard K. Smith agreed with Homer Bigart, of the *New York Herald Tribune*, that all the claims that Greek democracy and independence were being defended were a mere blind.

101. Another United States observer, John Gunther, who had recently visited Greece and

devoted to it a chapter entitled "The American War in Greece" in his book *Behind the Curtain*, had a similar opinion. Mr. Gunther had been much concerned as to the shock which his description might produce upon the reader in the United States, and had therefore been careful to describe the situation in Greece and the dependence of Greece on the United States in very mild terms. Nevertheless, he wrote that Greece was completely an American puppet; that final authority over high policy rested just as much if not more with the United States Congress in Washington as with the Greek Parliament in Athens; and that the United States played politics to such an extent that no Greek Cabinet could possibly remain in office without United States approval.

102. Those opinions had been expressed by two well known United States writers, but even some Greeks had expressed similar opinions. The *New York Post* of 18 November 1949 had revealed that Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. George McGhee, had received a group of prominent Greeks, headed by George Exintaris, executive of the Liberal Athens newspaper *Vima*, who had come to the United States in an unofficial capacity. The group had had a lengthy conference with Mr. McGhee, who had been about to go abroad to the conference of United States Ambassadors. They had stated that the régime of Premier Alexander Diomedes was utterly unable to cope with the wide-spread corruption, nepotism, incompetence and tax evasion prevailing in the Government. They had told Mr. McGhee that a military *coup d'état* was being prepared and that a military dictatorship would be established.

103. The same report had also revealed that as much as a year previously, the State Department had prepared a report, never published, in which it had recommended the suspension of the Greek Parliament and the establishment of a non-political government of high calibre civilians.

104. It must not be thought that there were no clashes between the Greek puppets and their United States masters, but in such conflicts the puppets were usually the losers.

105. The Greek-American daily published in New York, *Ethnikos Kirix*, which supported the views of the Athens government, had described an interesting case in its issue of 15 November 1949. It appeared that a disagreement had arisen between the Minister of National Economy, Mr. Mavros, and the director of foreign trade, Mr. Terrel—an American from the economic mission—concerning the extent of competence of the Greek Minister. As a result, Mr. Mavros had submitted his resignation.

106. Mr. Katz-Suchy wished to put an end to the glib talk about independence and democracy in Greece, because both had been lost by the Greek people.

107. Greece, however, although it had lost its political independence, still had Greek inhabitants, and those who fought each other were not Americans but Greeks. The United States Government was directing the war, the horrible fratricidal struggle, pouring arms into Greece and constantly adding fuel to the fire, in order to be able to spread it further when it so decided, but those who suffered and starved and died were Greeks, not Americans. That was the real issue before the General Assembly.

108. It had started in December 1944, when United Kingdom troops had occupied Greece, after the Greek democratic forces had successfully driven out the nazi invader. The purpose of the intervention by the United Kingdom in Greece had been to save the Greek monarchofascists from their well-deserved fate at the hands of the Greek people and, at the same time, to establish in Greece a government friendly to the United Kingdom in view of British strategic interests in that part of the world.

109. Elections had been held, under the threat of British bayonets. Those elections had been considered as proving that the Tsaldaris government was representative and had come to power as a result of free elections. They had, however, been described by many foreign witnesses, including some British Members of Parliament and some United States Congressmen, as the greatest fraud ever heard of. They had been preceded by terror. Within three months, 1,500 Greek democrats had been murdered by the fascists. The EAM had repeatedly warned that such methods would lead to civil war and that the terror must stop, but the Greek fascists and their British protectors had refused to listen. The inevitable had happened. Those who had heroically fought the nazi invader, had taken up arms again to protect their lives and liberty. Thus the Greek monarchofascists, aided and abetted by the United Kingdom Government, had started civil war in Greece three years previously.

110. Mr. Cohen, who might be described as the representative of the Wall Street delegation, had ventured, at the 244th meeting, on an excursion into history. He might find it possible to consult his neighbour, Mr. McNeil, who would tell him what government had been in power in Greece when the British had helped to abolish it, and whether it had not been a coalition of all democratic forces, including EAM. Mr. McNeil might also be able to tell Mr. Cohen of his arrival in Athens in 1945, and of the way he had dictated the composition of a certain Greek government. In exchange for that information, Mr. Cohen might perhaps tell Mr. McNeil how, during the crisis of 1948, the United States Ambassador had quickly seen to the formation of a government so that it might at least be possible to represent it as such to the General Assembly. After that exchange of information, they might correct their previous statements.

111. During the discussions in the First Committee, many speakers had referred to the heroic struggle of the Greek people against the nazi invaders. Among them had been the representative of Greece, who had brazenly tried to represent the struggle of the Greek people against the nazis as that of the existing Greek Government. It had become common knowledge that those who composed the existing Greek Government under Anglo-American auspices had had nothing to do with the struggle for the freedom of their country. The existing rulers of Greece had contributed to the war efforts of the Allies by living lavishly at the Mayfair Hotel in London, or by serving the occupying Power in various ways, but always to the great advantage of the occupier. British intelligence officers who had contacted the famous EDES band, often represented as the war effort of the Tsaldaris clique, had been amazed to find that it had consisted solely of Napoleon Zervas

and fourteen officers. After the war, that group had enlisted the help of all kinds of scoundrels and hooligans to murder democratic leaders. The real defenders of Greek freedom, the men who had brought about the liberation of their country, were the men of ELAS and EAM, who, as in the past, were still striving to protect Greece against yet another occupation.

112. Those were men whose patriotism none had ever doubted. When, to defeat the nazis, the British had needed an ally in the Balkans, they had contacted ELAS, which they had helped with inconsiderable amounts of arms. When, however, the British had needed military and strategic bases and had wished to substitute their own for the nazi occupation, they had made use of EDES, the so-called white guards and the royal army, which had never seen service on any battlefield, but had been kept in reserve for the future occupation of Greece by the fascists and the British.

113. The political and military aspects of that civil war and the manner in which the United States Government had taken over from the British were known to all, as was the way in which the Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents had come into being and later the history of the Special Committee. It might also be remembered that, from the beginning of 1947 and throughout 1948 and 1949, the Greek democratic army had never ceased to appeal for conciliation. A year had passed since, during the third session of the General Assembly, the provisional Greek democratic government, though holding *de facto* power over two-thirds of Greek territory, had issued an appeal stressing the fact that it was prepared to make the greatest possible concession to obtain a cease-fire and stop the fratricidal war. It had not done so because it had been defeated, and it was continuing to do so despite the claims to victory made by the United States, United Kingdom and Greek General Staffs. It had done so because it was anxious to see peace established, because it saw the great devastation which war had brought to Greece, because it thought that the Greek people deserved a better fate than that of tools in the American war. It had sincerely welcomed the efforts of the then President of the General Assembly, Mr. Evatt, to restore peace and had declared that it would do anything in its power to achieve a happy outcome.

114. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom nor, last but not least, the monarcho-fascist Greek Government had taken a reasonable and conciliatory attitude. The monarcho-fascists had not been allowed to do so. It was true that they had sought and taken revenge on defenceless civilians; it was true that they were merciless in devastating hundreds of villages and in inflicting horrible tortures on men and women whose only crime was that of being anti-fascist. Yet even in their madness, the monarcho-fascists had known moments of lucidity. Some at least had realized that the United States was using Greece as a testing ground for new American military equipment and that the United States Government had need of a civil war to justify its intervention in the face of American public opinion.

115. The Greek monarchist newspaper *Kathimerini*, for instance, had written, in reply to a memorandum of the provisional Greek government, that it was Greeks who were fighting and

killing each other, and that it was therefore up to them to consider quickly and seriously what they should do in order to stop killing each other. The writer had concluded by saying that it would have been inadvisable to put the point more plainly, for the Greeks were not alone. Thus even a monarchist newspaper had been afraid to speak freely under the monarchist régime.

116. It should be pointed out that that editorial had been published a few weeks after the Greek democratic forces had called for a loyal coalition. The Greek democratic army, seeing the terrible devastation of their country and its economic enslavement, had once again urged that a settlement could be found in the spirit of conciliation. That appeal to all the people of Greece had not been a sign of weakness, but a true expression of the devotion of the Greek democrats to their liberties and of their love for their country.

117. In May 1948, the provisional democratic government of Greece had made it clear that despite the military success of the Greek democratic forces, it was willing to establish a coalition government. It had said it was ready, as always, to accept and encourage any action, regardless of its origin, which would assist in restoring peace to Greece. It had added that the popular democratic movement had never intended nor did it intend to claim exclusive power; it was always ready to discuss every proposal which would be for the good of the people and the country.

118. In October 1948, the Greek democrats had again renewed their offer. In a letter to the General Assembly, they had stated that the provisional democratic government and the democratic army were ready to agree to any step calculated to help the people towards reconciliation and peace, and that the sole purpose of their proposal was to secure a return to normal life within Greece and the strengthening of international peace.

119. But there had been no response. The United States Government had been determined to prevent any possible agreement or conciliation between those Greeks who were fighting for their freedom and those who were fighting for their fortune.

120. Events not long past, statements and incidents had lifted the veil on United States intentions in Greece. A series of frontier incidents, accompanied by verbal incitements to war with Albania, had shown clearly that the United States, satisfied with what it regarded as the total occupation of Greece, was considering extending its power in the Balkans by the occupation of Albania. The Special Committee had paid no attention to the many violations of the Albanian frontier by Greek military forces, although in extent and number they rivalled any of the incidents, frontier crossings and armed engagements to which reference was made in the report it had concocted. Even since the General Assembly, at its current session, had embarked on the discussion of the Greek question, thirty further frontier clashes had occurred to which no one in the Special Committee had paid any attention. By reason of its smallness, the poverty of its territory and its isolation from any potential allies, Albania had been the victim selected.

121. Mr. Katz-Suchy had no intention of again quoting the incitements to war which could be found in the British and American press and in

the Greek fascist press. He would not quote again statements made in the British Parliament which were nothing less than incitement to hatred, bloodshed and war, or statements of United States generals who cherished nostalgic dreams of entering Tirana on a white horse. It would suffice to recall the report of the Conciliation Committee¹ established by the First Committee and presided over by the President of the General Assembly, to see that United States designs on Albania, which Greece expressed only on behalf of its master, constituted the one real stumbling block—ingeniously erected by the United States—to achieving conciliation at the current session.

122. The Greek monarcho-fascists had refused to renounce their military designs and their desire for Albanian territory. In order, as he had put it, to save the sensitivity of the Greeks, the representative of the United States had recognized their claims. The Tsaldaris clique had not been so sensitive about Greece being ruled by Americans. It had not been so sensitive when, in 1945, Mr. McNeil had dictated the composition of a Greek government. It was not so sensitive in face of the large number of American military, political and economic advisers in Greece who lived in luxury and enjoyed diplomatic immunity, or when the United States Ambassador, a United States general and an American economic adviser formed both the legislative and the executive power in Greece. The Greek fascists had not been so sensitive when a part of sovereign Greek territory, inhabited by 400,000 Greeks—who, regardless of their political beliefs, wanted their island to be returned to Greece—had become a crown colony under a British Governor. They had never even dared to raise their voices to question the doubtful rights of the United Kingdom to Cyprus. With outside encouragement, they had, however, dared to launch a wild campaign against Albania, for they had become sensitive when Albania had refused to yield to their claims.

123. Everyone knew that it was the United States which had refused to renounce Greek territorial claims. There was still time, however, for the General Assembly to act. The greatest opportunity to seek conciliation would be lost if it did not act. Both the current and the third sessions of the General Assembly had set an excellent record in dealing with the problem of Greek children. Member States had been deeply concerned with the fate of those youngest and most innocent victims of war and had disregarded the ignominious attempts of the Greek representative, Mr. Pipinelis, to make political capital out of the sufferings of those children. Had it been otherwise, neither General Assembly resolution 193 C (III), nor draft resolution B which was before the Assembly, could have been drafted jointly by the members of the largest drafting committee of the Assembly, the First Committee, and adopted unanimously. Mr. Katz-Suchy wondered whether it was not possible to draw up jointly some new recommendations for the settlement of the Greek questions as a whole, instead of repeating old charges and adopting measures which had twice proved futile and would never prove to be anything otherwise.

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, annex to the First Committee, document A/C.1/506.

124. The way was still open. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union went to the very roots of the problem—the necessity for both internal and external conciliation—and offered an excellent opportunity for solving it. None of the counter-arguments had been directed at the content of the draft resolution itself. They had all been of a procedural nature, submitted by representatives who had sought refuge in Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter in order to escape from the call to duty embodied in the draft resolution. Those arguments were most hypocritical. It could not be said that free elections, an amnesty, a frontier settlement, or the withdrawal of foreign troops constituted interference in the internal affairs of Greece, when the United States was ruling Greece, with the United Kingdom as a junior partner, and when the Greek Government was, as always, relegated to the role of executioner of its own people.

125. The Greek problem was one of internal peace, the end of foreign intervention, and the rule of justice. All Greece's problems arose from the fact that the country had become a pawn in the power politics of the United States. It was not communism which threatened Greece, as Mr. Cohen had tried to imply. It was an American who had said that Greece's problem was not communism, but government and outright economic injustices. The author of those words had had to pay with his life for those and similar opinions. He was George Polk, who was murdered by the Greek fascists.

126. The affairs of Greece had long ceased to be internal affairs. They had become of international concern because of the presence of United Kingdom and United States troops in Greece and, in view of the aggressive plans of those powers and of the Greek monarcho-fascists, they constituted a threat to world peace and security. They had ceased to be the internal affairs of Greece because there was no independent Greece and because United States arms and munitions were being poured in to prevent Greece from attaining independence. Mr. McNeil had sought to justify United States intervention because it had been agreed to by the rulers of Greece, but he should know of similar cases where the rulers of some European countries had yielded to Hitler. Mr. Katz-Suchy reminded the United Kingdom representative that, when a democratic government in Spain had been fighting a civil war against fascists supported and equipped by Germany and Italy, which had participated directly in that civil war, the United Kingdom and France had established a policy of non-intervention for the purpose of helping the fascists to destroy Spanish democracy. When, however, a fascist government invited foreign intervention in order to maintain itself in power against the will of its own people, Mr. McNeil, in the best tradition of British Tory foreign policy, sought to justify such intervention.

127. Throughout the whole discussion, the problem of executions, terror and martyrdom had loomed large. Members could not escape it, or leave without stating whether they wished murder and terror to continue in Greece. Mr. McNeil could not cover up his negative vote and his support for executions by a vote on competence. Scores of thousands of Greeks in prisons and concentration camps were waiting for the vote. Members had heard their story. Some names were

mentioned in the draft resolution of the Soviet Union (A/1080), but others were not known. All that was known was the cold figure of nearly 2,000 persons shot since 1946, which did not include those who had been murdered without court proceedings. All those who had been killed had wanted to live as citizens of a free and democratic country.

128. The number of death sentences was mounting. Since the current session of the Assembly had opened, nearly one hundred known death sentences had been passed. There would be more and they would be followed by executions. It would go on as long as the United Nations allowed it.

129. Mr. Katz-Suchy recalled that once, during the third session, a vote had saved eleven lives.¹ Notice had recently been received that those eleven trade union members had been refused mercy; the cable stated that all that remained to spell the doom of the eleven was the signature of King Paul of Greece. Their trade union appealed urgently to the Assembly to use its good offices to intervene once more to stop one of the most hideous crimes in history, the execution of eleven innocent men, fighters for democracy, peace and a better life for the working people of Greece.

130. The vote of the Assembly would decide whether those enumerated in the Soviet Union draft resolution, those enumerated in the cable, and all the others, would live or die, whether they would be free, or whether they would be shot. Scores of thousands of wives, mothers and children were waiting for the vote. Hundreds of thousands of other democrats, who were still alive on Greek soil, were awaiting the vote in the General Assembly to learn their future fate, to learn whether fascists were going to take them away to an unknown fate. Representatives could not refuse to answer and they would bear the responsibility for their answer.

131. Offers of conciliation and settlement had been rejected by the Athens régime, upon the advice of the United States military mission. It had been easy for the United States Government to give orders for the continuation of the persecution, the terror, the devastation of towns and villages and the operation of concentration camps in Greece. United States interests in Greece—both strategic and economic—prospered from the civil war. The Members of the United Nations, however, were not concerned with United States interests; they were concerned with those who were suffering, starving and dying in Greece so that United States interests might prosper. That was the real issue.

132. Members were concerned with the one million uprooted peasants— one-seventh of the total population of Greece—who had been driven out of their homes by the monarcho-fascist troops and forced either to take up arms or to work as slave labourers in the construction of roads and fortifications. Members were concerned with the extermination of the Greek peasantry as a consequence of the cold-blooded, ruthless United States policy of creating a vacuum around the democratic army of Greece. They were concerned with the total devastation of the Greek country-

side, with the poverty, starvation, malnutrition and unemployment of millions, and with the tens of thousands of children who had been made to suffer as victims of the Truman Doctrine. If representatives in the Assembly decided to sacrifice the lives and the sufferings of the Greek people to United States foreign policy, their hands would remain bloodstained, like the hands of all those who were ruling Greece, whether British, American, or Greek.

133. Mr. Katz-Suchy recalled that those who fought in Greece were the same guerrillas who, answering the call of the Allied leaders, had gone out so gallantly to fight the nazis and fascists. Their heroic struggle was, as always, that of all democratic peoples. They had been fighting for peace and freedom and democracy everywhere, not only in Greece, the Balkans and Europe, but throughout the world.

134. In the history of man's struggle against tyranny and oppression, there had never been a more courageous, a more determined little army fighting against heavier odds than that handful of Greeks surrounded by United States guns, bombarded from United States planes and vilified by United States propaganda.

135. The representative of Poland was sure that, in spite of political differences, many members felt in their hearts that that little group of gallant men had earned their respect and won their sympathy. That was why he felt confident that many delegations would support the USSR draft resolutions.

136. The PRESIDENT appealed to the representatives to observe the rules of decorum in the debates. The use of such expressions as "American colony" when referring to Greece, which was a sovereign Member State, or "country governed by puppets of the State Department", or "delegation of Wall Street" when referring to the United States, or "satellites of Moscow" and "representatives of the *Cominform*" when referring to the Eastern European countries, was beneath the dignity of the United Nations and did not make for conciliation, good-will or peace. He therefore gave warning that thereafter such statements would not be allowed and, if and when they were made, he would order that they should be expunged from the records.

137. The President put draft resolution A of the First Committee to the vote.

The resolution was adopted by 50 votes to 6, with 2 abstentions.

138. The PRESIDENT put draft resolution B of the First Committee to the vote.

The resolution was adopted unanimously.

139. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) requested that the draft resolution of the Soviet Union, contained in document A/1063, should be voted on by roll-call, paragraph by paragraph, and then as a whole.

140. The PRESIDENT accordingly put to the vote the preamble and the first paragraph of the USSR draft resolution as far as the words "to cease military operations".

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Cuba, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

¹ See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, 186th meeting.*

In favour: Czechoslovakia, Haiti, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Against: Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China.

Abstaining: Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Uruguay, Afghanistan, Argentina, Colombia.

The preamble and the first paragraph of the draft resolution were rejected by 27 votes to 8, with 23 abstentions.

141. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the second paragraph and sub-paragraph (a), beginning with the words "and recommends".

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Nicaragua, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

Against: Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Iceland, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand.

Abstaining: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Uruguay, Yemen, Afghanistan, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Iran, Israel, Mexico.

The second paragraph and sub-paragraph (a) were rejected by 36 votes to 6, with 16 abstentions.

142. The PRESIDENT put to the vote sub-paragraph (b).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Ethiopia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

Against: Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador.

Abstaining: Guatemala, India, Israel, Uruguay, Yemen, Ecuador.

Sub-paragraph (b) was rejected by 46 votes to 6, with 6 abstentions.

143. The PRESIDENT put to the vote sub-paragraph (c).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Lebanon, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

Against: Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq.

Abstaining: Yemen, Afghanistan, Guatemala, India, Israel.

Sub-paragraph (c) was rejected by 47 votes to 6, with 5 abstentions.

144. The PRESIDENT put to the vote sub-paragraph (d).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Thailand, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland.

Against: Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria.

Abstaining: Thailand, Uruguay, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, India, Israel, Mexico.

Sub-paragraph (d) was rejected by 41 votes to 5, with 12 abstentions.

145. The PRESIDENT put to the vote sub-paragraph (e).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Burma, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia.

Against: Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,

El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil.

Abstaining: Colombia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Israel, Mexico, Uruguay, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina.

Sub-paragraph (e) was rejected by 42 votes to 6, with 10 abstentions.

146. The PRESIDENT put to the vote sub-paragraph (f).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Philippines, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

Against: Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru.

Abstaining: Israel.

Sub-paragraph (f) was rejected by 51 votes to 6, with one abstention.

147. The PRESIDENT said that as each of the sub-paragraphs had been rejected it would be useless to vote on the draft as a whole. He therefore declared the draft resolution rejected.

148. He said that the Assembly would take up the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/1116) at the following meeting.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Saturday, 19 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece (continued)

1. The PRESIDENT reminded the Assembly that the Conciliation Committee had been asked by the First Committee¹ to continue its work and that conversations would take place during the next few days.

2. In view of that fact, the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom had agreed to postpone consideration by the General Assembly of the USSR draft resolution (A/1080) and the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/1116).

3. The Assembly would therefore pass immediately to the next item on the agenda.

Question of the disposal of the former Italian Colonies: report of the First Committee (A/1089) and report of the Fifth Committee (A/1109)

4. Mr. DE DIEGO (Panama), Rapporteur of the First Committee, presented the report of the First Committee and the accompanying draft resolutions (A/1089).

5. Numerous delegations had participated in the discussion on the disposal of the former Italian colonies and had heard statements made by the representatives of various organizations and political parties of the territories concerned.² Six draft resolutions had been submitted and a number of suggestions for a solution of the question had been made. The draft resolution of the Argentine

delegation calling for the establishment of a sub-committee to study the proposals and suggestions which had been submitted to the Committee, as well as those which might be submitted to the Sub-Committee itself, had been approved.

6. The Sub-Committee had held twenty-nine meetings, and the significant fact that it had submitted a single draft resolution containing a formula for a total solution of the problem showed the persistent, patient and constructive work which it had accomplished.

7. When the First Committee had discussed the report presented by the Sub-Committee, it had noted the spirit of goodwill, conciliation and genuine desire to solve the problem in the best possible way which had inspired each of the representatives on the Sub-Committee. It seemed that that same spirit had been reflected in the First Committee itself, judging from the fact that draft resolution A, which the First Committee was recommending to the General Assembly, had been approved by 49 votes to one, with 8 abstentions.

8. The other two draft resolutions recommended by the Committee, designated as B and C, were self-explanatory. Draft resolution B set forth the procedure for appointing a United Nations commissioner in Libya, and the other referred to the Interim Committee the consideration of the procedure to be adopted for the delimitation of the boundaries of the former Italian colonies, in so far as they had not been determined by international agreements.

9. The PRESIDENT drew the Assembly's attention to the report of the Fifth Committee

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, First Committee, 276th meeting.

² *Ibid.*, 278th to 293rd, and 311th to 324th meetings inclusive.