

not fulfil the conditions which Mr. Panyushkin had stated and was in flagrant conflict with the principles laid down by the United Nations, the USSR delegation would vote against it. By contrast, it regarded the Polish draft resolution as offering a satisfactory approach to the problem, and would vote for it.

130. Mr. DEDIJER (Yugoslavia) stated that since the right of the representative of the Yugoslav delegation to be included in the list of speakers had been challenged, he would withdraw his request to be included in that list so as to counter any suspicion that Yugoslavia was breaking the rules of procedure. The general debate being closed, however, he would like to give a brief explanation of his delegation's vote on the Polish draft resolution, in accordance with rule 80 of the rules of procedure.

131. The Yugoslav delegation had recently enunciated the principle that countries giving asylum to refugees and displaced persons should not use them as cheap labour. It had made that statement in view of the discriminatory treatment accorded to European refugees and displaced persons after the war in some countries, and on the basis of data at its disposal.

132. It would nevertheless abstain from voting on the Polish draft resolution because that draft incorrectly linked the problem of discrimination against immigrating labour with that of discrimination against refugee labour, and because it did not differentiate between refugees and displaced persons, on the one hand, and quislings and war criminals on the other but gave the same rights to both categories. The Yugoslav delegation had quoted figures showing that only 1.2 per cent of 600,000 prisoners of war and persons forcibly deported from Yugoslavia had not returned to that country. On the other hand, it had quoted additional figures concerning quislings and war criminals who had left Yugoslavia together with the German Balkan army. Those facts proved that the majority of Yugoslavs who remained abroad were war criminals and quislings and had been proclaimed by the IRO to be refugees solely on the basis of the fact that they did not wish to return to their country.

133. Those were the reasons why the Yugoslav delegation would abstain from voting on the Polish draft resolution.

134. The PRESIDENT drew attention to the slight drafting amendment which had been suggested by the Mexican delegation, namely, the substitution of the word "ratification" for the word "adoption" in the last paragraph of the draft resolution submitted by the Third Committee.

135. In the absence of any objection, he would consider that amendment adopted.

It was so decided.

136. The PRESIDENT put the draft resolution of the Third Committee, as amended, to the vote.

The resolution was adopted by 45 votes to 6, with 2 abstentions.

Advisory social welfare services: report of the Third Committee (A/1068)

137. Mr. VRBA (Czechoslovakia), Rapporteur of the Third Committee, presented the report of that Committee and the accompanying draft resolution (A/1068).

138. The Third Committee was submitting for the approval of the General Assembly a draft resolution which, first, authorized the Secretary-General to place the advisory social welfare services on a continuing basis; secondly, directed the Secretary-General to make appropriate technical provisions; and, thirdly, requested the Economic and Social Council to review the terms of General Assembly resolution 58 (I), which had originally authorized the establishment of advisory social welfare services on a year-to-year basis.

139. Mr. Vrba pointed out that the draft resolution had been recommended to the General Assembly by the unanimous vote of the fifty-two members of the Third Committee who had participated in the voting. He therefore hoped that the General Assembly would not find it difficult to approve the Committee's decision.

140. The PRESIDENT stated that if there were no objections, he would declare the draft resolution of the Third Committee adopted.

The resolution was adopted.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Thursday, 17 November 1949, at 3 p.m.

President: Gen. Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the First Committee (A/1062) and report of the Fifth Committee (A/1092)

1. Mr. DE DIEGO (Panama), Rapporteur of the First Committee, presented the report of the Committee and the accompanying draft resolution (A/1062). He stated that, in accordance with the General Assembly's instructions, the First Committee devoted twenty-five meetings to the discussion of the agenda item concerning threats to

the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece.¹ The report recorded the Committee's discussion and decisions on that subject, omitting considerations or opinions expressed in the debate, which might detract from the desired objectivity.

2. The First Committee had decided to recommend to the General Assembly the two draft resolutions A and B which appeared at the end

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, First Committee, 275th, 276th, 280th, 282nd to 284th, and 293rd to 311th meetings inclusive.*

of the report. Draft resolution B had been recommended unanimously and hence might be expected to meet with prompt and effective approval.

3. Referring to the draft resolution submitted by Australia and contained in the body of the report, Mr. de Diego recalled that it provided for the establishment of a conciliation committee. He wished to add in that connexion that there had been considerable optimism in the Committee concerning what might be accomplished by the committee in the way of providing a favourable solution to the problem.

4. The PRESIDENT pointed out that the Fifth Committee had examined the financial implications of the draft resolutions proposed by the First Committee. The report of the Fifth Committee appeared in document A/1092.

5. Miss WITTEVEEN (Netherlands), Rapporteur of the Fifth Committee, said that in accordance with rule 142 of the rules of procedure, the Fifth Committee had studied the effect on the budgetary estimates for 1950 of draft resolutions A and B of the First Committee. Paragraph 6 of the Fifth Committee's report gave the estimated net expenditure for 1950 as 811,000 dollars, a figure which might have to be increased if any expenditure arose from paragraph 13 of draft resolution A.

6. With respect to the repatriation of Greek children, the estimates prepared by the Secretary-General and accepted by the Advisory Committee had been approved unanimously by the Fifth Committee. The estimated net expenditure for 1950 for reimbursement of administrative expenses connected with the implementation of draft resolution B amounted to 50,000 dollars and would be included in section 6 of the 1950 budget.

7. The Fifth Committee therefore recommended that the General Assembly should take note of the effect on the budget estimates for 1950, to the extent of the amounts mentioned, of the adoption of the two draft resolutions submitted by the First Committee.

8. The PRESIDENT said that in addition to the draft resolutions submitted by the First Committee, two draft resolutions had been submitted by the USSR: the first, which dealt with the general question, was contained in document A/1063, and the second, which dealt with death sentences passed by military courts, was contained in document A/1080.

9. Mr. MAKIN (Australia) stated that the Assembly had before it a draft resolution designed once again to provide adequate safeguards for the safety of the Greek State and to resolve a problem that had been on the agenda since January 1946.

10. The four years spent in considering the problem had not, however, been in vain. He believed that the possibilities for peace in the Balkans were more promising at the moment than at any time since the United Nations had been given the problem to solve. Draft resolution A, of which Australia had been the co-sponsor with China, the United Kingdom and the United States, was perfectly adequate to put an end to the dispute in the Balkans, if the parties to the dispute earnestly desired peace.

11. Machinery was provided in the draft resolution to enable those parties to agree by themselves,

through the Conciliation Committee or through the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. Any general consideration by the United Nations of the problem must surely begin with the supposition that there was an overwhelming desire for peace. If that supposition were accepted, then some of the obstacles raised by some of the countries concerned would seem irresponsible and some insincere.

12. When the Australian delegation had submitted its draft resolution providing for the appointment of the Conciliation Committee headed by the President of the General Assembly, together with the Secretary-General and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the First Committee, the Australian delegation had had great faith that at last something definite would be achieved. That faith had been shared by the whole of the First Committee, which had voted for the draft resolution unanimously. To Mr. Makin's regret, he had been informed that the Conciliation Committee had been able to narrow existing differences only to a small extent.

13. Nevertheless, the Conciliation Committee's report^a showed that the door was not completely closed. When that report had been received in the First Committee, certain delegations, including the Australian delegation, had urged the Conciliation Committee to continue its efforts. The Australian delegation had urged all other delegations to submit to the Conciliation Committee any ideas or projects that they might be able to formulate to help that Committee to carry out its mandate, and to that end it had submitted to the Conciliation Committee a draft plan that could be applied under paragraphs 12 and 13 of the draft resolution A.

14. Mr. Makin again urged the Conciliation Committee to do all in its power to achieve a settlement. He pointed out to that Committee that peacemaking, if it was a sacred task, was also a most difficult one. It was a task that required constant vigilance and infinite patience. It required greater efforts by the Governments concerned.

15. There was little time left before the close of the session, but he believed that there was adequate time to solve the Balkan dispute or, at any rate, to progress towards a solution. A further effort by the Conciliation Committee would be most desirable. Any progress it made would facilitate the work of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. If, however, the Conciliation Committee could not achieve a positive result, then the Special Committee itself should give urgent consideration to the establishment of a special conciliatory group.

16. Mr. Makin believed that the problem could at last be solved. If the General Assembly could bring peace to the Balkans, it could justify all its work and the faith all Members had in the United Nations. If successful, the United Nations would be made a greater body, but if not, it should not be for want of trying.

17. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) pointed out that the Greek question was before the General Assembly for the third time and had arisen from the aid given by the northern neighbours of Greece to Greek guerrillas in their efforts

^a See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Annex to the First Committee, document A/C.1/506*.

to overthrow the existing Greek Government. That aid, as the Assembly had twice found, in its resolution 109 (II) and 193 (III), was contrary to the Charter and constituted a threat to the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece.

18. The *Cominform* countries had opposed the action taken by the General Assembly at its two preceding sessions and that recommended by the First Committee during its current session, taking the position that the Greek question had arisen as a result of the policies of the Greek Government and the aid extended to it by the United States and the United Kingdom. They had asserted that peace between Greece and its northern neighbours could come about only through measures of internal pacification in Greece itself, and the cessation of aid from the West to the Greek Government.

19. The position of the *Cominform* countries ignored many existing facts and many relating to the recent past. Those facts made it clear that the activities of the *Cominform* countries had been an obstacle, not a help, to the restoration of peace in Greece on a democratic basis.

20. The difficulties in Greece dated back to the struggle which had arisen in the winter of 1944-1945 between the Greek Government of Liberation and EAM, the Greek communist popular front created during the Axis occupation. EAM had viciously attacked the Liberation Government as collaborationist, monarcho-fascist and undemocratic and had sought by force to overthrow it. The supporters of the Government had charged the Communists with being pro-Soviet rather than pro-Greek and had recalled the lack of interest shown by Communist leaders in the defence of Greek freedom until the Soviet Union had been attacked.

21. The struggle had led to many excesses and much bitterness. That bitterness had been intensified by the widespread belief held in Greece, and clearly confirmed by after-events, that the Communists were more concerned to seize power on behalf of the Soviet-dominated world communist movement than to restore it to the Greek people. That did not mean, however, that all those working with the EAM had such motives. There were patriotic Greeks who had co-operated with the EAM during the Axis occupation because of the active part which the Communists had taken in the resistance movement.

22. Shortly after the appointment of the highly venerated Archbishop Damaskinos as Regent, the hostilities of 1944-1945 had been brought to an end by an armistice agreement, known as the Varkisa agreement, concluded on 12 February 1945 between the Greek Government and the EAM. The agreement had provided for a broad amnesty, the disarmament of the regular communist forces, a plebiscite on the monarchy and an election under international supervision. Immediately after the armistice both sides had complained of truce violations. The Communists had demanded an immediate election. There had been a revival of bitter attacks upon the Government, accompanied by a recurrence of guerrilla operations.

23. In the winter of 1945-1946, when conditions

within Greece had still been tense, the Soviet Union had sought, through the Security Council, to have the remaining United Kingdom military forces withdrawn from Greece¹. A representative of the Government of Greece had appeared before the Council, stating that the United Kingdom troops were in Greece at its request and that their presence there was necessary for the maintenance of public order and for the prevention of renewed civil war². The Security Council had refused to request the withdrawal of United Kingdom troops.

24. During the winter of 1945-1946, the Greek Government had begun preparation for parliamentary elections and had asked that the four great Powers should observe those elections as contemplated in the Yalta and Varkisa Agreements. France, the United Kingdom and the United States had responded to that request, but the Soviet Union had refused on the grounds that international supervision of the election would constitute an interference in the internal affairs of Greece. The Greek Communists, who had been clamouring for an immediate election, had thereupon changed their position also and had opposed the holding of the election. Some of the centre parties had done likewise, fearing that the bitter anti-communist feeling in the country would react in favour of the more conservative parties. The Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, and the Government had insisted, however, that a free election was necessary for the maintenance of governmental authority and, despite the communist boycott, the election had been held in March 1946.

25. It had been held under the close scrutiny of more than a thousand American, British and French observers. The Allied Mission for observing the Greek elections had estimated the proportion of qualified voters abstaining for party reasons at about 15 per cent.

26. The report of the Allied Mission had concluded that notwithstanding the political emotions prevailing in Greece conditions had been such as to warrant the holding of elections, that the election proceedings had on the whole been free and fair, and that the general outcome represented a true and valid verdict of the Greek people.

27. Although, like most elections, that of 1946 might not have been a perfect reflection of the popular will or of the comparative strength of different parties, it had afforded a much freer expression of that will than had any post-war elections in other countries of South-East Europe. Unquestionably, it had given convincing proof that the groups forming the communist Popular Front did not enjoy the confidence of the Greek people and were not entitled to speak for or represent the Greek people as a whole.

28. The Communists had been unwilling, however, to accept the election or to confine the struggle with their political opponents to a peaceful political opposition. Guerrilla warfare had not ceased, but had increased, and the interests of the *Cominform* countries in such guerrilla activities had been scarcely concealed. Indeed, in the summer of 1946, the Ukrainian SSR had brought before the Security Council the accusation that Greek policy was disturbing the peace in the

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council*, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1, Annex 3.

² *Ibid.*, First Year, First Series, No. 1, 6th and 7th meetings.

Balkans¹. The Security Council, apparently regarding the case as one in which neither party was free from blame, had refused to intervene.

29. It had soon become evident that the guerrillas were being aided and abetted by the northern neighbours of Greece, not sporadically or casually, but actively and deliberately, in accordance with an internationally concerted communist plan. In December 1946, the Greek Government had drawn the attention of the Security Council to the danger to peace arising from the assistance given to the Greek guerrillas by Greece's northern neighbours.²

30. In March 1947, the Greek Government had first appealed to the United States Government for material aid in maintaining its political independence and territorial integrity. From the very beginning, United States assistance had not only been conditional on the continuing consent of the Greek Government, but had been expressly made subject to termination whenever the Security Council or General Assembly might find that action taken or assistance furnished by the United Nations had made the continuance of United States assistance unnecessary or undesirable.³ Furthermore, the United States had expressly declared itself prepared to waive its right of veto, if the question of its assistance should come before the Security Council.

31. United States aid had been extended to Greece, just as United States lend-lease had been extended to other allies during the war, to protect the common interest in the preservation of freedom in the world. It would be recalled that during the war the United States had extended to the Allies lend-lease to a value of more than 50 thousand million dollars and that more than 11 thousand million of that amount had gone to the Soviet Union. That aid had safeguarded, not compromised, the independence of the USSR and every other ally. United States aid had not been used, and would not be used, to compromise the independence of Greece.

32. The aid to Greece had not been given in support of any particular party or faction. It had been given to safeguard the independence of Greece from the efforts of the *Cominform* forcibly to impose the communist system upon the people of that country. Such had been, and was, its sole purpose. United States aid threatened neither the legitimate interests in Greece of any foreign Power, nor the security of Greece's northern neighbours or that of other Powers. No United States combat troops had ever been sent to Greece, nor was there a single United States military, naval or air base in the country.

33. The investigations of the Security Council had confirmed the facts regarding the activities of the *Cominform* countries in support of the Greek guerrillas, but the Council had been unable to act by reason of the USSR veto. It was because of that inability that, at the second session, the United States had first brought the Greek case to the attention of the General Assembly.

34. Both at the second and at the third session the General Assembly had found that the aid given to the Greek guerrillas by the northern

neighbours of Greece was a threat to the peace and a violation of the Charter. At its second session, the General Assembly had set up the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans for purposes of observation and conciliation and, at its third session, it had decided to keep the Committee in existence, laying particular stress upon its conciliatory functions. At the current session, the First Committee was recommending that the General Assembly should again condemn the aid being given, in violation of the Charter, to the Greek guerrillas, particularly by Albania and Bulgaria, and that the Assembly should ask for the immediate termination of such aid. The Committee further recommended that, in the interim, the General Assembly should call upon all States to cease shipments of arms to Albania and Bulgaria and, in its relations with such States, should take into account the extent to which they respected its recommendation. It also recommended that the General Assembly should keep the Special Committee in existence for another year.

35. A further recommendation was that the Assembly should call upon the northern neighbours of Greece, which were harbouring Greek nationals as a result of guerrilla operations against that country, to facilitate the peaceful repatriation of all such individuals who wished to return and live in accordance with the law of the land. The recommendations referred expressly to peaceful repatriation and did not suggest that any individual who did not wish to do so should be required to return.

36. The First Committee also recommended that the Assembly should authorize the Secretary-General to arrange, through the Special Committee or other appropriate United Nations or international agencies, for the extension of any feasible assistance to the Governments concerned in making and carrying out arrangements for the repatriation to Greece or the resettlement elsewhere of Greek guerrillas and other nationals who had been involved in the guerrilla warfare. The United States delegation hoped that, since the struggle between the guerrillas and the Greek Government had abated, the Special Committee, the Red Cross or some other international group might, with the voluntary co-operation of Greece and its northern neighbours, arrange for such repatriation to Greece, or resettlement elsewhere. It was in the interests both of Greece and of its northern neighbours, as well as of world peace, that arrangements should be made for the return to normal life and normal living of such of those people as wished to live normal, peaceful, law-abiding lives. The United States did not wish to see the Greek guerrillas made soldiers of fortune.

37. The *Cominform* States had talked loudly and at length in the Committee about a so-called terror in Greece. It must be hoped that those States might, in their own countries, move toward those ideals of tolerance for dissident groups that they had preached with such eloquence to the Greeks. The Greek Government had had good reason, as Mr. Cohen had shown, to suspect that the *Cominform* interest in Greece had not always been an interest in Greek freedom or Greek tolerance. It had rather been an interest in a fifth column in Greece, loyal not to Greece but to the Soviet-dominated *Cominform*. The Greeks had

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council*, First Year, Second Series, Supplement No. 5, Annex 8.

² *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 10, Annex 16, Supplement No. 10 A, Annex 16A and Supplement No. 11, Annex 20.

³ *Ibid.* Second Year, No. 35.

had good reason to fear the *Cominform* when it came bearing gifts. From their ancient history, they knew something about the use of the Trojan horse as an instrument of foreign policy.

38. The epithets and imprecations that had been hurled at the Government of Greece by the speakers from the *Cominform* countries in the First Committee had seemed more calculated to stir the Greek Government to reprisals than to move it to mercy and greater tolerance. The storm and fury of the *Cominform* spokesmen had contrasted markedly with the quiet dignity and restraint displayed by the Greek representatives under the most grave and unwarranted provocations.

39. The members of the Assembly were aware that there was no iron curtain between Greece and world opinion. They were informed regarding the true state of affairs inside Greece from their own diplomatic representatives and from their own nationals, official or otherwise, who were free to travel in Greece where they chose. They also knew that, if conditions in Greece were somewhat less than perfect, that was primarily the legacy of a cruel occupation and the fruit of the bitter guerrilla warfare fomented and supported by Greece's *Cominform* neighbours.

40. There had been no executions in Greece since the announcement of the leniency legislation on 30 September 1949. In the meantime, however, there had been a number of reports of executions and death sentences in the *Cominform* countries. The violent remarks of the delegations of the *Cominform* countries seemed almost calculated to goad the Greek Government into following the *Cominform's* own system of terror. It was impossible to accept the *Cominform's* pleas for a general repeal of death sentences in Greece as *bona fide* pleas for mercy and greater tolerance, while Greece's independence was still threatened.

41. The United States delegation saw no reason for the General Assembly to single out Greece for such an appeal. While the General Assembly had been in session, clemency had been denied and death sentences for alleged subversive activity had been carried out in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania.

42. The effect of the remarks of the *Cominform* delegations in the First Committee, whatever their intention, had been not to further peace in Greece or peace between Greece and its northern neighbours but to incite and revive efforts to overthrow the Greek Government in keeping with past *Cominform* policy. Their pleas had seemed designed to stir up passions and even to incite the extremists on both sides in Greece to further violence.

43. The way to bring about good will and tolerance in Greece was to stop incitement to civil war. Armed rebellion always called forth stringent security measures to maintain law and order and usually strengthened the more extreme elements on both sides.

44. The United States was truly concerned to see an era of good feeling inaugurated in Greece which would permit the free expression of opinion in elections and greater freedom in all other aspects of Greek life, but the way to bring about such an era of good feeling, amnesty and tolerance was to remove the threats to the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece.

45. Whatever might be the shortcomings of the Greek Government, it was impossible to support the proposals made by the Soviet Union in the First Committee; those proposals were based on an assumption which, in Mr. Cohen's judgment, was contrary to the facts, namely, that external threats to Greek independence arose from the repressive measures of the Greek Government. It was his view that the stringent security measures in Greece, concerning which the USSR and others were complaining, were a direct result of the external threats to Greek independence. Those measures would, and certainly should, be relaxed and eliminated when the external threats to Greek independence were removed.

46. Some of the *Cominform* delegations had also maintained that the difficulties between Greece and its northern neighbours were due to the aggressive territorial designs of Greece. Such a suggestion was without the slightest basis in fact. The investigations carried out by the Special Committee on the Balkans over the previous two years had revealed that, while there had been some minor and unavoidable frontier violations by Greece in repulsing guerrilla warfare along the frontier, there was no evidence whatever of aggressive designs by Greece upon the territory of its northern neighbours.

47. After the war, Greece had claimed the right to submit to the Council of Foreign Ministers certain historic claims, but it had also repeatedly declared that it did not seek any change in its frontiers except by peaceful means. Greece had made it clear to the Conciliation Committee that it would respect its Charter obligations and that it would unqualifiedly accept the Conciliation Committee's suggestion that it and its northern neighbours should agree not to use force or the threat of force to change existing boundaries. The way ultimately to resolve the conflicting century-old claims in the Balkans was not through efforts to make it appear that existing frontiers were not fixed and secure unless they were accepted as eternally final.

48. The Greek case continued to occupy the attention of the General Assembly not because of any aggressive designs on the part of Greece, but because of the continued meddling of Greece's northern neighbours in the internal affairs of Greece. The findings of the Special Committee on the Balkans, in the work of which the representatives of nine independent States from different parts of the world had participated, revealed that some of Greece's northern neighbours still continued to ignore their Charter obligations and the recommendations of the General Assembly and to endanger peace by aiding and fomenting guerrilla activity.

49. Thanks, however, to the courage of the Greeks and to the support given to Greece by States which respected the Charter and the recommendations of the General Assembly, the danger to peace in the Balkans had been substantially reduced. It had even been announced that the guerrilla forces had temporarily laid down their arms. That did not mean that vigilance on the part of the United Nations was not necessary to ensure that the guerrillas did not take them up again. It was, however, happily becoming apparent that the Charter and the recommendations of the General Assembly could not be treated as mere scraps of paper.

50. The Special Committee on the Balkans had also reported that one of Greece's northern neighbours, which in the past had contributed substantially to the Greek guerrillas, had virtually stopped that aid. That action was significant not only because of its bearing on the Greek case. It was significant of a growing appreciation among States that those who wished the protection of the United Nations must respect the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter and the considered opinions of the General Assembly regarding the fulfilment of those purposes and principles.

51. To some, the recommendations of the General Assembly might seem like a small voice crying in the wilderness, but it was the voice of humanity and resurgent law. It was a voice that no nation which desired and valued the security of a world order could afford to ignore.

52. It was to be hoped that more and more States were coming to realize that they had an interest in the observance of the Charter, even though their own immediate interests were not affected, or even though they might be adversely affected. It was to be hoped that the day was not far off when the common interest of all Members of the United Nations in the Charter as an instrument of law, of freedom and of peace would unite them in defence.

53. For the reasons Mr. Cohen had explained, the United States delegation would support the draft resolutions recommended by the First Committee and would vote against the USSR draft resolutions.

54. Approximately 25,000 children had, in one way or another, been removed from Greece to various Eastern European countries. In resolution 193 (III), the Assembly had unanimously urged the return of those children to their parents. Unfortunately, the Greek children had not yet been returned to their homes. The First Committee had unanimously recommended that the Assembly should again urge all States harbouring Greek children to co-operate with the International Red Cross to arrange for the early return of those children. It was the hope of the United States delegation that the General Assembly would make that appeal on behalf of the Greek children without dissent and that all the States concerned would act promptly to carry out that humanitarian work.

55. Mr. TSALDARIS (Greece) said that the First Committee's report on the question of threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece had been submitted after a long and exhausting debate. It was based on two main documents: the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans¹ and the report of the Conciliation Committee.

56. The conclusions contained in the report of the Special Committee were clear and unequivocal. It was not, therefore, surprising that the representatives of the *Cominform* countries should have reverted to a large-scale tactical movement of diversion and slander. They had aimed at diverting the First Committee from the main object of the debate and, at the same time, they had tried to divest themselves of the blame for the failure of

Greece's conciliatory efforts, when the Conciliation Committee itself had clearly shown the reasons for that failure.

57. The *Cominform* countries had hurled charge upon charge against Greece. They had simply ignored the fact that it was Greece which had been acknowledged the victim of an internationally branded foreign aggression and was therefore entitled to aid under the Charter. Two United Nations commissions of inquiry had in the past shown clearly the problems with which Greece was faced.

58. In addition, the Special Committee, operating on the spot, had reported during the previous two years that foreign countries were supporting a war which threatened the independence and territorial integrity of Greece.

59. Deliberately overlooking all factual evidence as well as the provisions of the Charter, some representatives had stubbornly tried to induce the United Nations to interfere in the domestic affairs of Greece. Relentless efforts had been made to divert the Assembly's attention from the real issue to matters alien to its aims and purposes and to the item on the agenda.

60. In the First Committee, the representatives of the *Cominform* countries had made a strong appeal to the humanitarian feelings of the other representatives. They had been extremely careful, however, not to mention the fact that those for whom they were pleading—people sentenced or imprisoned for their treacherous crimes—were simply unwitting tools and therefore victims of the very countries whose delegations had spoken in their defence.

61. That was not simply a diversionary move; there was a deeper strategic motive behind it. It was essential for the *Cominform* countries that the conspiracy against Greece should continue, even in a different form; moreover, in addition to publicizing the interest of those countries in the fate of their agents, the move was designed to uphold the morale of the disheartened *Cominform* supporters at a crucial moment.

62. Mr. Tsaldaris wished to state briefly the position of his Government and people. The measures taken to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of Greece represented the bare minimum necessary to counter the orgy of mass killings, sabotage, terrorism, looting, destruction and, above all, foreign armed aggression with which the Greek Government had been faced. His Government had restrained itself to the utmost and its sole concern had been for the very existence of the Greek people, threatened as they had been by a foreign conspiracy. It had considered it essential to preserve the democratic way of life in Greece, an ideal for which his Government had been fighting and which its foes had been trying to annihilate.

63. It was his belief that, in the struggle against tyranny, his Government had succeeded in keeping democracy in Greece unscathed.

64. Greece had thus defeated one of the two objectives of the *Cominform* countries; it was for the General Assembly to counter the other, which was embodied in the USSR draft resolution (A/1063) and which was intended to make possible the resumption of guerrilla warfare or,

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 8.

at least, of the well known technique of communist infiltration.

65. In the first paragraph of the draft resolution there was an appeal to the conflicting parties to cease military operations. Mr. Tsaldaris wondered what political purport such an appeal could have at the moment. The communist bands had acknowledged their defeat in the field and the Greek army was mopping up the last scattered remnants. The appeal was an attempt to provide moral support for the *Cominform* agents by putting the legitimate Greek Government on the same footing as themselves. The adoption of such an appeal would make it possible for the communist bands to reopen hostilities with the assistance of the *Cominform* countries where they had taken refuge.

66. A realistic solution would be to call upon Greece's neighbours to cease giving assistance to Greek guerrillas, a solution which had been adopted by the First Committee. Nevertheless, the USSR draft resolution proposed that the General Assembly should appeal to both the Greek Government and the so-called Democratic Government to cease operations, a move which would actually sanction fresh invasions of Greek territory from Albania and Bulgaria. Furthermore, it would cleverly vindicate the frequently repeated and unfounded thesis of the Soviet Union that what was going on in Greece was domestic ideological strife. The connexion with the abnormal situation on Greece's borders was more apparent at that point than at any other of the USSR draft resolution.

67. Mr. Tsaldaris turned next to the proposal for a general amnesty, contained in sub-paragraph (a), and again asked what the meaning of such a proposal could be. It was known by all, including the USSR delegation, that several thousands of communist bandits had already been granted amnesty and had resumed a normal civilian life. The real aim of the proposal was therefore to provide moral encouragement for the routed Communists.

68. Sub-paragraph (b) spoke of "general and free parliamentary elections", with "representatives of Greek democratic circles at the head of the national freedom movement in Greece" participating in the organization of the elections. That, incidentally, was the way in which the delegation of the Soviet Union styled the Communist leaders who had hurriedly abandoned their credulous followers and escaped to Tirana, Sofia or Prague, and whose chief interest had been to save their own lives and continue their intrigues in safety. It was unnecessary to point out that the basic objective of that proposal remained the same as for the other proposals. It was, however, peculiar to see a request for a free election originating from the representatives of the *Cominform* countries. The usual result of an "election" in such countries was a majority of 99.9 per cent in favour of the only authorized party, since all opposition was ruthlessly suppressed.

69. Sub-paragraph (c) provided that the USSR should participate in the supervision of an election in Greece. In that connexion, Mr. Tsaldaris referred to the attitude of the Soviet Union in 1945-1946, when it had refused to participate in the international supervision of the first post-war

election in Greece, stating that it was opposed in principle to the supervision of national elections by foreign countries. That had been necessary at the time as a political move; it had enabled the USSR to ignore the fact that the election in question had been carried out under the supervision of 1,155 observers from France, the United Kingdom and the United States and subsequently to question its validity. The political scene had changed, however, in the meantime, and the current aim of the USSR was to strengthen the morale of the defeated guerrillas and, possibly, its own prestige by an overt act of political assistance. The 1946 policy had consequently been discarded and a new policy was put forward in the draft resolution, which made supervision of national elections by a foreign country permissible and, in fact, welcome. Mr. Tsaldaris wondered whether it was a mere coincidence that, as opposed to the situation in 1946, no staged elections were due to be held within the orbit of the Soviet Union.

70. As for the proposal contained in sub-paragraph (d) for a joint commission of Powers for the control of the Greek frontiers, it would have been much easier to achieve results if the USSR had not refused to take the seat reserved for it on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. It was obvious that the motives for the proposal of a joint commission were highly questionable.

71. Sub-paragraph (e) contained a proposal that military assistance to the Greek Government should cease and that all foreign troops should be withdrawn. Mr. Tsaldaris reminded the sponsor of the proposal that, on 31 October 1949, the United Kingdom representative had announced in the First Committee that the contingent of foreign troops in Greece—a small United Kingdom force—was to be withdrawn within a short time. Mr. Tsaldaris took the opportunity to reiterate the appreciation already expressed in the First Committee by the Greek representative for the contribution which that force had made to the cause of liberty in Greece at a critical moment in its history. Mr. Pipinelis had suggested that the decision taken by the United Kingdom Government should inspire a similar gesture on the part of the USSR in the countries to the north of Greece. No answer had ever been received to that suggestion and the reason seemed clear to all.

72. Finally, sub-paragraph (f) of the USSR draft resolution proposed the dissolution of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. Mr. Tsaldaris hoped, however, that the Assembly would recognize the paramount importance of the part played by the Special Committee in the previous few years. He was convinced that because of the presence of the Special Committee, the fighting had been confined to the area within the Greek frontiers and the entire burden and suffering of that struggle had been borne by the Greek people alone. Without the Special Committee, a general clash in the Balkans might easily have developed as a result of the overt aggression against Greece. Mr. Tsaldaris took the opportunity to praise the heroic spirit and impartiality with which the members of the Special Committee had performed their duties.

73. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union did not contain a single acceptable proposal which might lead to the desired peaceful settlement. In the circumstances, it was unnecessary to ask

whether, if accepted, it would offer any real guarantee of peace.

74. It was unfortunate that the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria should have displayed a similar attitude during the talks which had been held with a view to effecting a settlement. They had made every effort to introduce extraneous issues and their attitude towards the objective of conciliation had been such that a representative, speaking in the First Committee, had stated that the only solution of the Greek question to which the USSR would agree would be the creation of a people's republic in Greece.

75. Mr. Tsaldaris had stressed the negative aspect of the question in order to emphasize once more the nature of the aims followed by the *Cominform* countries in the United Nations with regard to the Greek question.

76. As to the positive side of the question, there was a recommendation from the First Committee before the Assembly. The Greek delegation considered that Greece would be justified in requesting further effective action by the United Nations, a more outspoken declaration of solidarity among Member States and a sharper warning to those who threatened international peace. It would not, however, insist on that point as it did not wish to render the Assembly's work more difficult.

77. The Greek delegation believed that, sooner or later, means must be devised for the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions. It had voted for the First Committee's draft resolution A as representing the minimum which could be asked of the United Nations. The Greek delegation, however, had the right to expect that the victory of democracy won at the cost of thousands of Greek lives would not ultimately prove a handicap to a final solution of the problem by the United Nations.

78. The Greek delegation had displayed similar restraint and moderation regarding the question of the abducted Greek children. It had not asked for any expression of censure, although the matter involved the lives of thousands of Greek children and caused great distress to all the Greek people. Nor had it reminded the First Committee of the Special Committee's findings that the bandits had sent a number of those children to fight with the guerrillas and had thus doomed them to death. So far, that was the only way Greek children had been "repatriated." The whole matter was a great tragedy for Greece, as not one single child had been repatriated despite the unanimous adoption of resolution 193 C (III). There again, the Greek delegation had the right to expect that the concession it had made in order to achieve unanimity would not prove to have been in vain and that the human right of the Greek children to be sent home would no longer be ignored. The question was of such paramount importance and urgency for the General Assembly that Mr. Tsaldaris was convinced that it would be the first objective of any conciliatory effort.

79. Mr. Tsaldaris was certain that he was expressing the feelings of the Greek people and Government when he told the Assembly once more that his country was prepared at any time to resume diplomatic relations with its northern neighbours provided the latter renounced their hostile attitude, stopped threatening the indepen-

dence and integrity of Greece and decided at last to abide by the resolutions of the General Assembly.

80. On several occasions Greece had offered them its friendship and was doing so once more. Mr. Tsaldaris hoped that the political wisdom and the interests of their own peoples would convince those countries that what the world needed was peace and a chance to do constructive work.

81. It rested with those Governments, and above all with the USSR, to restore peace in the Balkans. All they had to do was to respect Greece's independence and integrity. All the peoples in the Balkans, and in the first instance the people of Greece, were longing for an era of peace. The Greek people believed that their country's struggle during the previous nine years had greatly contributed to the cause of democracy and freedom. They wanted to be given a chance to continue their contribution to the ideals of the United Nations by resuming their peaceful work.

82. The youth of Greece was shedding its blood to achieve peace in its part of the world. The Greek people believed in the principle of government of the people, by the people and for the people, and nothing would ever discourage them in that belief. To maintain peace was the task of the General Assembly. The representatives of tyranny—who were not trying to achieve peace but rather to use peace as a bargaining counter—could rest assured that freedom would not die in Greece as long as the Greek spirit remained alive.

83. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the representative of the United States had developed his speech on the usual lines. His treatment of facts had been somewhat disingenuous, as was customary with the representatives of Wall Street.

84. Mr. Cohen had accused the countries which he referred to as the *Cominform* countries of having helped Greek partisans in their attempts to overthrow the Government of their country, but he had been unable to adduce any proofs in support of his statements. He had not even attempted proof since it was not his habit to produce evidence.

85. He had credulously accepted the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, to which only a brief reference would be necessary, since Mr. Vyshinsky had already laid facts and documentary evidence on that matter before the Committee. In the General Assembly he was obliged to declare that neither the representative of the United States, whom he had called and whom he would continue to call "the representative of Wall Street", nor the other representatives who were supporting the draft resolution sponsored by Australia, China, the United Kingdom and the United States, had offered any facts or evidence in support of their position. It was enough for them that the Special Committee had spoken and that its utterances had been recorded; no useful purpose was served by convicting that Committee of falsification of facts and lies.

86. When endeavouring to trace the history of events in Greece within the previous few years, Mr. Cohen had stated that EAM had attacked the Greek Government. It might be asked why he had

not said who had violated the Varkisa Agreement of 1945, which would have made it possible to avoid all the happenings which had laid Greece waste. Mr. Cohen was sufficiently educated to know the truth of the matter, but he had glossed over the facts since, from his point of view, they were awkward. He did not see any advantages in talking about facts when it was necessary to distort the truth. The Varkisa Agreement had in fact been violated by the representatives of the Greek Government at the instigation of the powers behind the policy of Wall Street and of the leading circles in the United States and the United Kingdom, whose aim was to hinder any understanding between the various parties in Greece and to use the internal dissensions in that country as a means to their own end, namely, the penetration of the Balkans. As Mr. Vyshinsky had already pointed out, that was one of the chief factors in the United States plan for world domination.

87. Mr. Cohen had referred to free elections in Greece. Everyone knew what those free elections had been. In 1946, a few days after that parody of a plebiscite, Mr. Sophoulis had himself declared that only persons without any scruples could speak of a plebiscite, for the proceedings in Greece had not been a plebiscite but a put-up job. Mr. Cohen could not deny the facts, for the statement had been published in the paper *Estia* on 7 September 1946.

88. Such was the nature of the elections which had filled Mr. Tsaldaris with admiration. His feelings were quite understandable since, in the absence of such an election, he could never have become a minister. It was also in 1946 that a correspondent of the London *Times* had written that impartial observers were very dubious of the validity of the plebiscite. Three other British eye witnesses, members of the executive committee of the British League for Democracy in Greece, and Members of Parliament, had also adduced in their book, *Tragedy in Greece*, numerous facts to show that the elections of 1946 had been a complete fraud. At the time, the Vice-Premiers, Mr. Kafandaris and Mr. Tsouderos, had resigned in protest against those so-called elections. Mr. Kafandaris had gone so far as to say that elections were rapidly being made into a parody, a fact fraught with serious danger.

89. Those were the facts which must be borne in mind in order to understand what had happened three years previously in Greece. Those were the circumstances which had given rise to the struggle of the partisans, to the fight of the Greek progressive parties and the Greek people for true democracy, liberty and the independence for their fatherland, against foreign occupation and the puppet Governments which the foreign occupying forces had set up in Greece. That was what should have been said in order to give a true account of those historical events; but Mr. Cohen was incapable of doing that.

90. Turning to the question of international control, Mr. Vyshinsky doubted whether there had been any international control. He would mention for the fifth time the case of Professor Neyman of the University of California, who had been excluded from the Allied Mission responsible for observing the elections when he had reported thirty cases of fraud out of thirty-six cases examined. If those who had thus tried to win

acceptance for democracy and honesty had not been thrown out, Mr. Tsaldaris would never have occupied the post of Prime Minister.

91. Everything had been built on fraud and dishonesty and all that dishonesty had been covered up by the Allied Mission. There seemed to be a belief that the Assembly was composed of persons who did not know the facts, did not read the newspapers and did not follow events. Such cynicism was inadmissible. Mr. Cohen himself had said, moreover, at that very meeting, that on the whole the elections in Greece had been free. Mr. Vyshinsky wondered what was meant by the phrase "on the whole".

92. It had been stated, however, that in the eastern European countries, in what were called the *Cominform* countries, there were no elections of that type. It was true that there were no shameful elections in those countries. Elections were free and equitable, a fact which could be borne out by all those, and in particular the hundreds of British and American journalists, who had been present during the elections not only in Poland and Czechoslovakia but also in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

93. It was alleged that those elections had shown that the Communists did not enjoy the people's confidence. The whole world knew how much confidence the peoples placed in the Communists and it was not for Mr. Vyshinsky to defend the Communists at that time. He recalled, however, that he had just shown how the so-called confidence of the people had been gained in such countries as Greece. He had quoted facts to prove his case. He invited the other representatives to try, at least once, to refute his arguments.

94. It had been claimed that the Security Council had been unable to act because of the veto. But it would be interesting to know what had been the negative value of the veto. The Soviet Union had used the veto, was using it and would continue to use it as long as the United Nations existed, in all cases involving the potential adoption of decisions incompatible with the interests of the United Nations and contradictory to the Charter.

95. In order to illustrate his argument, Mr. Vyshinsky would mention one of the forty-one occasions on which the Soviet Union had used the veto. The question at issue had been the admission of new Members. The majority had agreed to admit Portugal, Ireland and Finland to the United Nations but had rejected the applications of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. It wished to accept only the countries which suited it. But whereas the majority wished to admit only the reactionary States, the Soviet Union wished to accept only those States which would follow its policy, namely the democratic States. It insisted that discriminatory measures should not be taken against such countries as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic. By consistently raising the same question and applying discriminatory measures, other countries were forcing the USSR to continue to vote in the same way, to continue to apply the veto. The United States and its supporters, when they wished to ensure the rejection of a proposal, adopted a hypocritical procedure which was another form of veto: they abstained. They reached agreement among themselves and ab-

stained, which meant that the proposal did not receive the necessary seven votes.

96. Mr. Cohen had claimed that Greece had been the victim of intrigues and malevolent schemes which had later been transformed into open aggression. He seemed to have forgotten that in 1946, for example, the Bulgarian Government had proposed to the Greek Government that the 1931 frontier convention between Greece and Bulgaria should be put into effect and that the Greek Government had rejected that proposal; such a step would, however, have made it possible to settle the numerous frontier incidents of all sorts which were so much fuel to the mutual dissatisfaction existing between the two countries. Like all the other events which had subsequently taken place in Greece, that attitude was entirely due to the fact that the whole machinery of government had passed into the hands of the United States military authorities.

97. Mr. Cohen had stated that there were no United States armed forces in Greece. It was well known that the armed forces stationed in that country were British but that the High Command was American. In 1947, the American Mission had been led by Mr. Griswold, who had devoted his entire attention to the rehabilitation of ports and military airports in the guise of supplying so-called aid to Greece.

98. An American had in fact controlled Greece's national economy at that time. Two Americans had directed the country's finance. All that showed that the governmental machinery in Greece had been entirely in the hands of Americans. Mr. Vyshinsky wished, however, to make one thing clear. He was not speaking of the American people, but only of the multi-millionaires in the United States and of those who controlled the great monopolies; their plans were entirely unrelated to the plans, desires and aspirations of the people of the United States.

99. Mr. Tsaldaris said joyfully that the fight was over. The partisans had been beaten and there was no need for anxiety in the future. One of the *Cominform* countries had had to admit defeat, said Mr. Tsaldaris, for in his eyes there was no difference between Communists and partisans. Mr. Vyshinsky wondered in that case why a general amnesty was refused. Mr. Cohen said it was impossible to speak of crimes. That was a very interesting statement. That was why the daily executions carried out as a result of verdicts given in Greek military courts against the political adversaries of the Greek Government were being encouraged.

100. It had been said from the rostrum of the General Assembly that Greece did not covet any part of its neighbour's territory. The fact that Greece claimed Northern Epirus, which formed the southern part—a very substantial part—of the territory of Albania, was passed over in silence. It was true that Greece said that it had no intention of using force and that it would await a favourable occasion before raising the matter. Nevertheless, an attitude of that kind was hardly calculated to re-establish normal relations between Greece and its northern neighbours.

101. That was why the delegation of the Soviet Union could not accept that reasoning nor yet the draft resolution put forward in the First Com-

mittee by the delegations of Australia, China, the United Kingdom and the United States and adopted by the Committee, a draft which, unfortunately, the States which had constituted the majority in the First Committee continued to support.

102. Mr. Vyshinsky had already shown on what basis Mr. Cohen had made his allegations that the Greek partisans had received assistance from Greece's neighbours and that that had been the cause of all the difficulties raised by the so-called Greek question. The draft resolution of the First Committee went even further; it implied that Romania and even certain other countries had taken part in the fight against the Greek Government.

103. The Special Committee had not quoted any facts in support of those allegations. Consequently, they could carry no weight.

104. On the other hand, as all the representatives who had taken part in the discussions in the First Committee knew, the delegation of the Soviet Union had brought convincing evidence to show that the Special Committee had falsified the facts, that in certain cases the Committee had been misled by its groups of observers, and that the First Committee in its turn or at least the majority in that Committee had been misled by the Special Committee.

105. In fact, the Special Committee based all its conclusions on the testimonies of so-called witnesses. Mr. Vyshinsky asked who those witnesses were and how their testimonies had been taken. It was common knowledge that no names were given and that the witnesses were identified solely by symbols such as witness 173, 255, 313. It was said that somewhere, in some strong-box, there was a list of the names and testimonies of those persons. Mr. Vyshinsky would have liked to know who those witnesses were. At least, if representatives were not worthy of that trust, they might have been told what people were involved. It was true that on one occasion, although no name had been given, it had been revealed who the witness was. It had turned out that the same witness had been questioned on two occasions. On the first he had been 41 years old and on the second 57. The first time he had been an engineer and the second he had been only a peasant.

106. Not only was it not known who the witnesses were, but also in what circumstances they had been present at the incidents they reported. Generally, witnesses went before a magistrate who investigated their statements. In British law there was the system known as cross-examination. A witness's statements were checked with the help of those of other witnesses. Witness and accused were brought face to face. Lastly, under normal court procedure, examinations were conducted by question and answer.

107. But no trace of questions and replies was to be found anywhere in the records of the observation groups, and those records had been used by the Special Committee in drafting its report.

108. Mr. Vyshinsky asserted that in most cases there had not even been any records. What had been said at the cross-examinations had merely been reproduced. It was not known whether a witness had replied to questions put to him or whether he had come with a text previously prepared by the Greek police who, on the pretext of

serving their country, were bringing witnesses before the Committee. It could not be denied—for the Special Committee itself had said so—that the great majority of witnesses had been provided by the Greek liaison service, in other words, the Greek police.

109. Every one acquainted with legal matters knew how delicate a cross-examination was and how easy it was, by asking certain leading questions, to obtain the desired replies. That type of questioning was therefore prohibited by law in most civilized countries. On the other hand, that type of questioning was to be found everywhere in the Special Committee's records.

110. It might well be asked where the Greek police had found its witnesses. It had taken them from concentration camps, it had found them among the captured guerrillas and even among deserters. Before being brought before the Special Committee, all the witnesses had been questioned by the police, who had chosen the ones who could give the information which fitted in with the interests, plans and assignments of the police itself.

111. The result was that the various witnesses had contradicted themselves hopelessly. To put it mildly, totally inexplicable assertions were to be found in each testimony. The witnesses had made statements which could not possibly be true.

112. In order to avoid speaking at too great length, Mr. Vyshinsky would give only one example to illustrate his argument. Paragraph 84 of the Special Committee's report was entitled "Recruitment of guerrillas" and referred to the statements of three witnesses to the effect that on 12 and 13 March 1947, Albanian newspapers had published an edict of the Albanian Government ordering all Chams to enrol as guerrillas to fight against the Greek Government.

113. If the procedure of the Special Committee were considered, it would be seen that that allegation had really originated with the Greek police. After it had been made, witnesses had been questioned and they had confirmed the statement. The Special Committee had been sensible enough to request a Greek liaison officer to furnish the text of the alleged orders of the Albanian Government. Considerable time had elapsed without the text being produced; it could not be found, for the very good reason that it did not exist. Then the statements of witnesses Nos. 377, 383, and 385, who, incidentally, had given entirely contradictory testimony, were reconsidered. The first had spoken of an order from the Albanian authorities published in an Albanian newspaper; the second, of a call to the colours of Greek partisan officers; the last one said he had seen an order from a Greek organization.

114. Mr. Vyshinsky invited the representatives to check the veracity of those words. They would see, by looking at the records of the Special Committee, that that was exactly the way in which an effort had been made to prove that the Albanian Government had published a decree providing for the mobilization of Chams on Albanian territory to reinforce the partisans.

115. Mr. Vyshinsky asked whether that were not a fraud and a crime. Yet it was on such testimony that the entire report of the Special Committee was based.

116. Mr. Vyshinsky would not introduce further facts, although he had a whole series available. What he had said was sufficient to show that the serious conclusions and accusations which were recorded in the draft resolution of the majority of the First Committee submitted for the approval of the General Assembly, should not be adopted on the basis of such shaky evidence.

117. It was a serious error to believe that the report of the Special Committee could be used in an attempt to settle the question of the relations between Greece and its northern neighbours. That error might cause extremely bitter disillusionment. If such action were taken, the only result would be an increase of complications.

118. An attempt had been made to argue from the personal observations of members of the Committee. But there again the evidence was entirely contradictory and inconsistent. Thus, on one occasion, a group of observers had stated that they had seen a fleet of lorries advance from Bulgarian territory, then drive into Greek territory. It had been evening; the observers had seen the movement of the vehicles only by their headlights and had entirely disregarded the fact that there were two roads in the area which ran almost parallel, 500 metres apart. One was in Bulgarian territory, and the other in Greek territory. The error was only natural, especially if one considered that those movements had occurred in complete darkness, at a distance of 12 kilometres from the observers, and that the road was hidden by vegetation. In any case it was fantastic to assume that persons wishing to transport contraband goods into foreign territory, for the benefit of partisans in that territory, should light up the scene with the headlights of their trucks. On another occasion, the observers had seen a whole system of trenches and communication trenches in Bulgarian territory. They had concluded that they were shelters prepared for the partisans. The fact was that that system was at the frontier and it was perfectly normal that troops guarding the frontier should have some defence works ready.

119. The Soviet Union had submitted to the appropriate body a whole series of documents of the greatest importance. They were orders or communications from the Information Service or from the General Staff of the Greek Government. Those documents established the fact that the partisans were receiving weapons by various routes from Italy, especially from the port of Bari, from North Africa, Turkey and France. Mr. Vyshinsky could not guarantee the reliability of those documents. He pointed out, however, that they bore the stamps and signature of the General Staff of the Greek Government. How, in such circumstances, could it be said that Bulgaria and Albania had been the principal suppliers of arms to the partisans?

120. It had also been stated that the partisans obtained most of their food supplies from Bulgaria and Albania. Mr. Vyshinsky had already cited documents which appeared in the Greek Democratic Government's *Blue Book* and which no one had contested. Those documents, which had been prepared by the General Staff of the Greek Government and had later been captured by the partisans, stated that the partisans in the Grammos mountains had remained for weeks on end without any bread while, in the central regions, they

had obtained ample supplies from the local population.

121. That fact could not be reconciled with the accusations made by false witnesses, deserters and all those who had sought to redeem themselves in the eyes of the Greek Government; those people had been trying to save their lives, for it should not be forgotten that all the witnesses produced had been under arrest and awaiting sentence. The psychology of a person awaiting a possible death sentence was a matter of common knowledge and all men could not be heroes. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it was to those weak and stricken men that the Greek Government had turned through the agency of its police; it was among such men that it had sought witnesses in order to prepare the false and slanderous testimony it needed.

122. It was impossible to speak of agreements while making charges against other States on the basis of evidence provided by questionable witnesses. Normal relations between Greece and Albania could not be established while the Greeks refused to recognize the elementary fact that the existing frontier between Greece and Albania was final, in other words while they refused to give up their claims to a foreign territory, to wit, Albanian territory.

123. Defending the viewpoint of the Greek Government, Mr. Cohen had said history showed that frontiers often changed, so that the idea that a frontier was final was on the whole out of date.

124. That was certainly true. Changes in frontiers could take place as a result of agreements between the Governments concerned. The USSR and Poland, for instance, had changed their frontier, taking the Curzon line as a basis for their territorial settlement, as advised by the Governments of France and the United States. Another example was provided by Czechoslovakia, which of its own free will had ceded Carpatho-Ruthenia to the Soviet Union.

125. No Government could expect friendly relations from another Government if it said that, although it did not intend to attack that Government for the time being, or to use force, it would maintain certain claims to be put forward in due time. Mr. Tsaldaris had said that he had held out his hand to the neighbours of Greece. That was true, but while he stretched out one hand, he held a knife in the other. Besides, it might not even be necessary to use the knife. There were many other methods, such as blockade and economic pressure, subtle pressures of the kind so dear to Anglo-American diplomacy. To hear Anglo-American diplomats, they were full of good intentions. To adapt a somewhat famous quotation, Mr. Vyshinsky would say that hell was paved with good declarations.

126. It was precisely on the frontier question that the Conciliation Committee had failed. Mr. Tsaldaris might have agreed to consider that the frontier was final, but those who were seated behind him in the General Assembly had not allowed him to do so because that would not have been in their interests.

127. The Greek Government had stated that it did not intend to use force to settle the frontier question. The Soviet Union was proposing a very

simple solution, namely, that all frontier claims should be abandoned.

128. Mr. Tsaldaris had objected to the USSR draft resolution which, however, he had not analysed very carefully. The Soviet Union had requested that military operations should be brought to an end. Mr. Tsaldaris had asked what that meant, as the Communists had admitted their defeat. If that were true, however, it would be very simple to agree to the USSR draft resolution. Mr. Tsaldaris himself, however, had admitted that the Greek Government was continuing to fight against the guerrillas wherever any centres of resistance remained.

129. The Soviet Union had proposed a general amnesty. In Mr. Tsaldaris's opinion that meant only one thing, that the Soviet Union wished to give moral support to the Communists. A general amnesty was a manifestation of the most elevated and humane sentiments. It was the refusal to take vengeance by annihilating political adversaries. It was a gesture which was open to any magnanimous victor. Without taking into account the fact that his words were in direct contradiction with the principles of the Charter, Mr. Tsaldaris, however, stated specifically in the Assembly that his Government would continue to exact vengeance and annihilate its adversaries because it was momentarily strong and recognized no moral law.

130. On 24 October, the USSR delegation had made a statement in the First Committee concerning the death sentence passed on several fighters for democracy. It had said that the Greek Government's former political opponents were being subjected to ruthless repression. It had indicated that in a number of cases even the Greek courts martial, which were composed of five judges, had passed the death sentence by a majority of only three votes to two. Thus even some of the Greek officers who were acting as executioners of democracy in their country had had the courage to speak up against such sentences. The USSR delegation had asked that the execution of death sentences should be suspended. That proposal had not been accepted. The Committee had adopted the Ecuadorean proposal, to the effect that the President of the General Assembly should be asked to ascertain the Greek Government's viewpoint on the question. Some time later it had been learnt that that Government had not changed its attitude, in other words, that there could be no question of amnesty. That was a characteristic phenomenon of the fascist régime of terror which had been established in Greece with the connivance of certain Governments, in particular those of the United States and the United Kingdom.

131. The speech made by the USSR representative in the First Committee had not produced any results, although in a private conversation which Mr. Vyshinsky had had with the President of the General Assembly, the latter had given him his word of honour that the death sentences would not be carried out. Mr. Vyshinsky was very grateful to General Rómulo and had complete confidence in him, but he was not sure that the President had been in a position to exert his influence to the full in that matter. Mr. Vyshinsky feared that there would be a repetition of what had taken place at the third session of the General Assembly when the question of the members of the Greek seamen's union, who had been condemned to death,

had been considered.¹ Those sentences had not been carried out because the United Nations had intervened. At that time Mr. Evatt had been President of the Assembly. Mr. Vyshinsky had been informed, however, only the previous day, that the Greek Court of Appeals had refused to quash the sentences and that the Greek authorities were preparing to carry out the sentences on the seamen. Mr. Vyshinsky urgently asked that that fascist terrorism should be brought to an end.

132. That was why the USSR delegation had submitted to the General Assembly a draft resolution (A/1080) in which it urgently requested that an end should be put to such sentences and that the verdicts already announced should be repealed, because they were unjust and cruel and because they had been passed in circumstances which did not call for any repression against those who had fought for the Greek people, its interests, its freedom and its independence.

133. Each day brought it harvest of new occurrences in that field. Thus, on 31 October, the USSR delegation had received a telegram from the Committee of Greek Democratic Doctors protesting against the death sentence on Dr. Manolis Siganos pronounced by the court martial on 17 October. More recently, Mr. Vyshinsky had learned that the court at Volos had condemned twenty-eight persons to death.

134. Thus, while discussions were proceeding on the question of normalizing the situation in Greece, on the pretext that that country's political independence and territorial integrity were being threatened, the fascist terror continued. By rejecting the Soviet Union's proposal that the Greek Government should be requested to suspend the executions, the majority in the First Committee had in fact given their blessing to the savage measures which the Greek Government was taking against patriots in that country.

135. That was why the USSR delegation was requesting the General Assembly to intervene in the matter. It was told that that would be an interference in the domestic affairs of a country. But that was a question which concerned the conscience and the honour of the United Nations. It was in that spirit that Ecuador had taken up the idea launched by the Soviet Union. It was not, in fact, an intervention in the domestic affairs of a State in the meaning of the Charter. It was an appeal to humanity. It was for that reason that the USSR delegation was placing the question before the General Assembly once again and with increasing urgency.

136. Mr. Tsaldaris had expressed his great gratitude to the United Kingdom for the military aid which it had supplied to his Government. It could have done nothing to support more strongly the position of the USSR and the other people's democracies, which proposed to show that the Government of Mr. Tsaldaris could not have survived even for a very short time without foreign aid. Mr. Tsaldaris had thanked the United Kingdom troops and the Government of the United States for the aid which they had supplied to Greece. That simply showed that without such aid

he would not have been able to govern Greece against the will of the Greek people. Mr. Tsaldaris had shown that the people would have none of his Government. But those were domestic matters and Mr. Vyshinsky alluded to them only in order to set right a historic truth which the representative of the United States had attempted to distort.

137. The proposals of the USSR delegation, which had been rejected by the majority of the First Committee, provided a firm basis for the establishment of normal conditions in Greece. They recommended not only the declaration of a general amnesty and a request to the two parties to put an end to military operations; they also advocated the organization of free parliamentary elections.

138. It could hardly be deemed unreasonable to ask that free elections should take place in Greece, and that the whole Greek people would take part in them. It was obvious that the electoral campaign could not be carried out without the participation of the leaders of the democratic movement. Moreover, in the troubled atmosphere currently existing in Greece and which would continue to exist for some time, it was advisable that the elections should be supervised by the representatives of other Powers. That supervision was all the more necessary because, as Mr. Vyshinsky had already shown, the 1946 election had been faked. No one had ever denied that such supervision was necessary. Why therefore was there opposition to the participation of the Soviet Union in the organ of supervision? The answer was that the Soviet Union had been offered such participation in 1946. Now, however, that Power felt that it could participate in the work of supervision; no valid objection could be raised.

139. The USSR asked that the military assistance which foreign Governments furnished to the Greek Government should be brought to an end. That proposal was all the more opportune because the Governments concerned were themselves attempting to decrease their aid to Greece; they were becoming more far-seeing and their aid was beginning to be too heavy for the American taxpayers. Apparently the United States Government sometimes thought of those taxpayers.

140. Finally, the Soviet Union proposed the dissolution of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans which, during long years of work, had not been able to produce a single reliable document. Why should that Committee's expenses be paid, when it was constantly distorting the truth and when its conclusions could not be believed?

141. The USSR proposals were perfectly logical and perfectly practical. They were acceptable to all except those who had no interest in the re-establishment of a normal situation in Greece itself, and on its frontiers. To say that the internal situation in Greece was dependent on the country's external relations was incorrect. The contrary was true, for the facts proved that external relations depended on the internal situation.

142. The USSR delegation was certain that no one could produce any logical arguments to counter its conclusions. The only opposition it might meet would be that which arose by order whenever a proposal was submitted by the Soviet Union.

¹ See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, 186th, 187th and 193rd meetings and Annexes, documents A/C.1/371 and A/C.1/372.*

143. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) said that, before turning to the subject under discussion, he would like to say a few words about the point raised by the USSR representative at the beginning of his speech. Mr. Vyshinsky had spoken of the efforts which were being made by the majority to provoke the delegation of the Soviet Union and the others which usually associated with it. If Mr. Vyshinsky had been making a plea, the United Kingdom delegation would be the last to set it aside hurriedly or inconsiderately.

144. The USSR representative had said, for example, that the majority deliberately provoked his delegation into using the veto. That was a subject which would need very extensive and careful examination before any conclusion could be reached. Mr. Vyshinsky, however, in illustrating his case, had turned once more to the question of the admission of new Members. That was a matter of great concern to all delegations because they knew that, as a result of their actions, certain States, which were anxious to belong to the United Nations, were excluded from their deliberations.

145. There were States about which all fair-minded people would admit that there was some doubt — doubt as to whether they should be excluded, or doubt as to whether they should be admitted. Mr. Vyshinsky, however, in making his plea, had mentioned five States and had singled out the case of Outer Mongolia. In Mr. McNeil's opinion, no poorer case among all the applicants for admission could possibly have been chosen. If there had ever been provocation on the part of the majority, the mention of Outer Mongolia showed that such provocation was not confined to one side. Outer Mongolia was not a good applicant and the representative of the Soviet Union was fully aware of the fact. If Mr. Vyshinsky considered that some of the candidates the United Kingdom delegation had supported were not good applicants, he was at liberty to say so and, setting aside the poorer applicants on each side, the Assembly could again consider the question.

146. Mr. McNeil emphasized once more, however, that delegations had no power and no right to look upon the two lists as though they could trade one against the other. The conditions for membership were quite plainly laid down. The Assembly could not escape from them and each case had to be discussed on its individual merits. The Assembly had to make sure not only that the applicants were peace-loving States, but also that they were able and willing to carry out their obligations as Members of the United Nations. There was no need for any provocation if the Assembly would approach the subject on the basis of the directives contained in the Charter. If the USSR representative really wished to discuss the matter reasonably without any polemics, then the United Kingdom delegation would be most anxious to accede to his plea by adopting an equally rational attitude.

147. Mr. McNeil would try, without reference to any fables, to meet some of the points which Mr. Vyshinsky had raised in the course of his argument.

148. In dealing with the efforts of the Conciliation Committee, Mr. Vyshinsky had again reverted to the question of Northern Epirus. He had used language which suggested that the Greek

Government, with the backing of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, had never given up the intention of seizing that portion of Albanian territory. Mr. McNeil asked the Soviet Union delegation, or any other delegation, to indicate any statement made at the Paris Peace Conference, in the Council of Foreign Ministers, in the Committees, Sub-Committees or General Assembly of the United Nations during the three years in which the subject had been under discussion, in which the Government of the United Kingdom had made any pronouncement on the merits of that claim. That Government had simply said, as the USSR delegation had said in relation to another frontier question, that it was a matter to be decided between the two sovereign States, and that the United Kingdom's only concern in the matter was that those two sovereign States should pledge themselves to accept the obligations in relation to the adjustment or settlement of such questions which States accepted as Members of the United Nations. Consequently, if the Assembly wished to decide whether the Greek Government or any other Government associated in the question had behaved with propriety and dignity in relation to the Conciliation Committee, it must ask itself whether that Government had sought to evade its obligations as a Member of the United Nations.

149. Any dispassionate examination of the question could lead only to the conclusion that the Greek Government had simply and unambiguously fulfilled its duty as a Member of the United Nations. If all Members had been equally concerned to advance the process of conciliation under the distinguished leadership of the President of the Assembly, that would have been sufficient.

150. Mr. McNeil could well understand the anxiety of the Soviet Union delegation to gain political prestige with the Government and people of Albania by its attitude towards that process. That was not necessarily wicked. Many Members of the United Nations hoped to serve two ends when they intervened or took part in such negotiations, an essential end, and an ancillary end which emerged in the process. But if they did not recognize what was essential and what was ancillary, if they were prepared to sacrifice the essential for the ancillary and, in the case in question, to impede the processes of conciliation in an effort to sustain some political gain or political prestige, then they would be behaving wrongly as Members of the Organization.

151. The Soviet Union delegation was seeking to escape from the blame in which it was associated when it tried to pretend that it was upon the issue of Northern Epirus that the efforts of the Conciliation Committee had failed. That was **not so; they had failed** because the Albanian Government, employing language similar to that employed by the USSR delegation, had stipulated a price for entering into the agreement. The Conciliation Committee had recognized, probably correctly, that it was neither its business nor within its power to pay the price which the Albanian Government had asked.

152. The representative of the Soviet Union had once again tried to discredit the witnesses, the evidence and the conclusions of the Special Com-

mittee on the Balkans. He had stated, first that the Greek Liaison Forces, which he had called the Greek police, chose the witnesses. That was only partially true. Mr. Vyshinsky probably knew that the Special Committee had drawn the Assembly's attention to the fact that on several occasions the observer groups had chosen witnesses themselves; indeed, Mr. Vyshinsky must certainly know it because, when the same subject had been debated at the third session, and when Mr. McNeil had recalled that fact, Mr. Vyshinsky had countered by questioning the reliability of such witnesses. He had stated that an observer walked into a village, picked up the first man he met and placed him on the stand as a witness. Mr. Vyshinsky had continued that such a man was not a good witness because it was impossible to ascertain how much he knew. The argument had since changed. Mr. Vyshinsky stated that when the observer groups chose a man, he was a poor and discredited witness, and when the Greek Liaison Forces chose a man because he knew the subject, he was a prejudiced witness.

153. It was hard to know what Mr. Vyshinsky, that distinguished jurist, expected the Special Committee to do. He could hardly expect the investigators to put the names in a hat and draw at random a man who might not even have been in the country. No other method was available to the Special Committee in its efforts to find out what had been happening. Mr. Vyshinsky simply could not take both sides of the argument.

154. Mr. Vyshinsky had then drawn attention to the doubtful evidence offered in connexion with the recruitment of the Moslem people, the Chams. It was true that the evidence was not particularly convincing. The same could be said of two of the incidents mentioned by Mr. Vyshinsky in the First Committee. That, however, did not dispose of the whole report. Witnesses to the number of 1,105 had been interviewed under the auspices of the Special Committee; 101 reports had been issued between October 1948 and June 1949. The members of the Committee were skilled and reliable people who had done their utmost to satisfy themselves of the trustworthiness of the evidence; indeed, in the course of the current year, some of them had even gone to the frontiers themselves. The members of the observer groups were also most reliable and skilled, although it was natural that they might make mistakes at times. Thus a great body of evidence existed and was available to every member of the Assembly, and it was impossible to dispose of the conclusions presented in the report merely by challenging the testimony of some of the witnesses. It was most certainly impossible to dispose of those conclusions by saying that the method used in 1948 had been bad and then, when another method was used in 1949, maintaining that the Special Committee should have used the method denounced in 1948.

155. Anyone anxious properly to assess the report could easily do so. On the other hand, if anyone had Mr. Vyshinsky's brilliance and energy and wished to discredit the report, he could certainly achieve some measure of success in that direction.

156. Mr. Vyshinsky had for the second time referred to some documents which, so he had said, had been captured from the Greek General Staff

by partisans. Mr. McNeil had himself received information to that effect. He suggested that those documents had come to the knowledge of the USSR delegation because the partisans believed that their political outlook would be regarded with favour in some organizations which had eventual access to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. There was nothing wrong in that; but the General Assembly should bear that fact in mind. Mr. Vyshinsky had said that the partisans were people of great valour who carried on a tremendous moral struggle. That might be true. But Mr. Vyshinsky had also said that the people who came to the observer groups and the Committee were disreputable and dubious individuals, though he had magnanimously conceded that everyone could not be a hero.

157. It seemed to be more probable that honest, noble and also timid men could be found in both camps and that it was reasonable to assume that any representative group of either side would display the normal characteristics of men and women distributed in approximately equal proportions. It was equally reasonable to assume that the evidence of those people from both sides would respond to the same tests. When interviewed, they would display the same amount of credibility and would show approximately similar powers of observation and articulateness. The USSR delegation made the mistake of thinking that the General Assembly and other bodies would accept without question the proposition that the angels were always on the side of the USSR delegation and its proposals, while the devils were always on the side of anyone who opposed that delegation.

158. Mr. Vyshinsky had stated that the witnesses examined by the Special Committee were disreputable. He had said, moreover, in connexion with a report transmitted by a group of observers at the Bulgarian frontier, that those observers could not have been sure that the lorries they had seen had not remained within Bulgarian territory. But he had never said that if the observers had been correct in stating that the lorries had entered Greek territory, and if it had been established that the Bulgarian Government had had responsibility for those lorries, then that Government had been behaving improperly.

159. When the Bulgarian representative had appeared before the First Committee, he had not attempted to deny that he gloried in the moral support which his Government and Party had afforded the guerrillas and he had evaded direct answers to the questions which had been put to him.

160. If Mr. Vyshinsky was convinced that no improper aid was being given to the guerrillas, it would not be unfair to ask him whether he would, on behalf of his Government, associate himself with any simple resolution recommending to the northern neighbours of Greece that they should exert themselves as duly constituted Governments, to see that their frontiers were not improperly employed in the war against Greece. That was an obvious way in which the USSR delegation and the delegations associated with it on the question could relieve the anxieties of the Assembly.

161. It was unlikely that Mr. Vyshinsky would acquiesce in any such resolution. If, however, he

was not going to do so, it was hard to understand why he should employ such ingenuity in an effort to prove to the Assembly that the evidence about such improper action was not reliable. The situation would be more intelligible if Mr. Vyshinsky openly stated that his Government approved of the support coming from Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania, and was not prepared to offer any apology for the moral support which it was giving to such action.

162. Mr. McNeil hoped that the First Committee's draft resolution B, on the repatriation of Greek children, would be adopted without opposition. He was confident that the USSR draft resolution contained in document A/1063 which, in his opinion, was mere propaganda, would be rejected. He hoped that the First Committee's draft resolution A would be overwhelmingly approved, and that the powers of the Special Committee on the Balkans would thus be sustained and, in one small respect, extended.

163. With regard to the USSR draft resolution contained in document A/1080, the General Assembly lacked any power to judge whether the men referred to in the draft were guilty of any particular offence and, if they were guilty, what sentence would be appropriate. If the Assembly committed itself to a precedent of that kind, there would be no limit to the cases which would be brought before it, and no limit to the extraordinary functions which it would be assuming in addition to its defined powers. While there could be absolutely no doubt that Mr. Vyshinsky was perfectly sincere in his request that the General Assembly should display its humanitarian feelings, the United Kingdom delegation must unfortunately stress its view — despite the risk of misinterpretation — that the General Assembly was not competent to deal with such a subject.

164. In the hope, therefore, of obviating an extensive and acrimonious debate, the delegation of the United Kingdom, acting under rule 72 of the rules of procedure, submitted the following draft resolution to the General Assembly (A/1116):

"The General Assembly

"Decides that it is not competent to adopt the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/1080) calling for the suspension and repeal of certain death sentences pronounced in Greece."

165. Mr. PLAISANT (France) said that whenever security was threatened anywhere in the world, it became the concern of all peoples. That maxim was especially true in the case of the Balkans. No one could therefore be surprised at the close attention which France had paid from the very beginning to all measures for safeguarding the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. France was not only traditionally attached to a nation dear to it; it was also anxious at all times to smooth out possible differences and to eradicate all causes of disorder liable to develop and threaten peace.

166. In that spirit the French delegation supported the First Committee's draft resolution extending the powers of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and specifying its tasks.

167. The Greek-Yugoslav frontier had recently been closed; guerrilla activity had apparently de-

creased; a new stage had been reached on the way to peace. It would therefore be unfair not to pay a tribute to the pioneers in that effort, to the exertions of Mr. Evatt during the third session, to the new endeavours of General Rómulo and, finally, to the United Nations Assembly itself, which had endowed the Special Committee with its authority. It was unfortunate that such noble efforts had not been successful, especially since the differences between the proposals and the claims had narrowed to such an extent that there had seemed to be some hope of a compromise.

168. Mr. Plaisant felt that the continued existence of the Special Committee was justified by the scope and importance of the functions which it was called upon to carry out.

169. The specific request to Albania, Bulgaria and the other States concerned not to afford any assistance to the guerrillas in their campaign against Greece and, in particular, to deny the guerrillas the use of their territory, had the moral force conferred by a recommendation of the Assembly; it would help to raise the prestige of the Special Committee.

170. The recommendation to all States, even to those not bordering on Greece, to do nothing likely to aid armed groups against Greece directly or indirectly and not to provide them with weapons or war equipment, was in accordance with the objective of the United Nations itself, which was to prevent and remove threats to peace. Such dangers should be exposed as soon as they arose. When nefarious intentions were exposed, they immediately lost part of their harmful effect.

171. The recommendation included a sanction: any further foreign aid to the guerrillas which resulted in further action by neighbouring countries and which seriously increased the threat to peace, would oblige the Special Committee to take steps to secure the convening of a special session of the General Assembly for the purpose of reconsidering what action was necessary to remove the threat. Mr. Plaisant hoped that the warning and admonition would render such a step unnecessary.

172. The Special Committee also had long-term objectives, of greater importance than the current emergency; it must be prepared to assist the four Governments concerned, and to encourage the re-establishment of normal relations between Greece and its northern neighbours and the maintenance of security in the Balkans.

173. The all too sorrowful memory of the past must also be dispelled; such was the meaning of the second draft resolution on the speedy repatriation of Greek children. The representative of France would give that draft his full support. It was intolerable that children should be compelled to take part in the fratricidal strife of their elders.

174. Mr. Plaisant pointed out that respect for the independence of all peoples was a *sine qua non* of peace. In the case of Greece, such respect had the most far-reaching significance, for Greece had been the cradle of Mediterranean civilization. The defence of Greece was natural to France, which for over a century had contributed to Greek emancipation.

175. In conclusion, the French representative asserted that reason and the prestige of the United Nations were weapons which must ensure peace.

176. The PRESIDENT announced that the list of speakers was closed.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Friday, 18 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the First Committee (A/1062) and report of the Fifth Committee (A/1092) (continued)

1. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland), speaking on a point of order, said he understood that the representative of Albania had asked the President of the General Assembly to allow him to outline before the Assembly the opinion of his Government concerning the charges which had been levelled against it. In the opinion of the Polish delegation, such a request was fully justified, since the practice hitherto had been that whenever a Government, or sometimes merely an organization, had requested permission from the General Assembly or a committee to express its opinion on certain matters concerning it, such a request had never been refused.

2. The question under discussion was one of extreme importance and, furthermore, one in which very grave, though baseless, accusations had been levelled against the Government of Albania. Mr. Katz-Suchy therefore appealed to the General Assembly, in the interests of clarity and impartiality, to grant the representative of Albania permission to speak so that he could present to the Assembly the point of view of his Government and the reply to the many accusations which had already been heard and would continue to be heard during the discussion of the Greek problem.

3. The PRESIDENT replied that the precedent established by the United Nations since its inception was that non-governmental organizations could be allowed to state their case if and when invited by Committees, but never in a plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

4. When, therefore, he had received a letter from the representative of Albania asking for permission to appear before the Assembly, he had replied in the negative, drawing attention to the fact that the practice of the General Assembly had been to provide in its Main Committees for the hearing of testimony from sources not represented in the General Assembly.

5. That practice had also been followed during the current session; the views of non-governmental organizations and non-member States had been heard by the First Committee during its consideration of the Greek question and were fully reported in the report of the First Committee. A full discussion of the case had taken place in the First Committee,¹ and ample op-

portunity had been provided for the participation of non-member States in that discussion.

6. The President therefore ruled that it was inappropriate to reopen that discussion in the plenary meeting, where the Assembly would be considering a draft resolution drawn up by the First Committee on the basis of the Committee's discussion of the question.

7. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked to be allowed to speak on a point of order.

8. The PRESIDENT asked the USSR representative whether he wished to appeal against the ruling of the Chair.

9. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that that was his intention.

10. The PRESIDENT put the appeal to the vote.

11. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) repeated his request to speak on a point of order.

12. The PRESIDENT pointed out that the voting had already started.

The ruling of the Chair was upheld by 34 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

13. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking on a point of order, stated that the President was not entitled, under the rules of procedure, to refuse to allow a representative to speak if he had asked to speak on a point of order before the Assembly had begun to vote.

14. He regarded the President's ruling on the request of the Albanian representative as irregular. The President claimed that he had acted in conformity with the precedents. But there was no rule in the rules of procedure which stated that the General Assembly could deny a hearing to the representative of a sovereign State against which charges had been levelled in the Assembly.

15. Mr. Arutiunian stated that the President's action was irregular on two counts. In the first place, the President had arbitrarily established a new rule of procedure; in the second place, he had violated the existing rules of procedure under which every delegation was entitled to speak on points of order. The representative of the Soviet Union felt obliged to protest against such violations of the rules of procedure, which might create precedents.

16. Mr. Arutiunian was well aware that the majority, without hearing the representatives of the Governments which had been accused and without weighing the arguments which had been put before it, was determined to support the draft resolution which the same majority had

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, First Committee*, 275th, 276th, 280th, 282nd to 284th, and 293rd to 311th meetings inclusive.