

TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Friday, 21 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Installation of the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council Affairs

1. The SECRETARY-GENERAL conducted Mr. Constantin Zinchenko, the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council Affairs, to the platform and introduced him to the General Assembly.

2. *At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zinchenko took the oath, in accordance with regulations 2 and 3 of the provisional staff regulations.*

Freedom of information: access for news personnel to meetings of the United Nations and the specialized agencies

REPORT OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE (A/1011)

3. Mr. VRBA (Czechoslovakia), Rapporteur, presented the report of the Third Committee together with the accompanying draft resolution (A/1011).

4. He pointed out that the Third Committee had approved the draft resolution it was presenting to the General Assembly by 42 votes to none, with 7 abstentions. He hoped that the Assembly would uphold the Committee's decision and adopt the draft resolution.

5. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) said that his delegation regarded the draft resolution submitted by the Third Committee as satisfactory despite its many defects. Several delegations, including his own, had tried during the discussion in the Third Committee¹ to eliminate those defects and to submit to the General Assembly a draft better suited to the purpose in view; they had unfortunately been unsuccessful.

6. The Lebanese delegation would have liked to see the adoption of the amendment submitted by the Philippine delegation, in order that the inconsistency in the text of sub-paragraph (a) of that draft resolution might be eliminated—an inconsistency which lay in the fact that all Member States were urged to grant news personnel free access, not to their own territory, as should have been stated in order to bring the text of that sub-paragraph into line with the basic intention, but rather to countries where meetings of the United Nations or specialized agencies took place, as if such States could have any authority whatsoever to grant free access to countries other than their own.

7. The Lebanese delegation would also have liked to see the elimination from the text of the draft of another defect arising from the fact that in the draft Member States were urged to grant free access in accordance with the terms and conditions of agreements made with them by the United Nations or its specialized agencies, as if those States could grant such access in accord-

ance with agreements which they had not made, or as if they had already acted in violation of agreements made by them, which would make such a recommendation necessary.

8. Finally, the Lebanese delegation would have liked—and that was the purpose of the amendment which it had submitted—to see a greater measure of uniformity and equity in future agreements concluded by the United Nations or the specialized agencies with Member States.

9. In the draft submitted to the Assembly, Member States which had not made agreements with the United Nations or the specialized agencies were urged to grant news personnel free access to their territories on terms and conditions similar to those contained in agreements made by the United Nations or its specialized agencies with other Member States. In the first place, that would be unfair to those States, in view of the fact that they were required to base the facilities which they would have to grant to Press personnel on agreements which they had not helped to prepare. Secondly, it would be unfair to the States which had already concluded such agreements, for it meant that those States would be bound by the terms and conditions accepted in the past, while other States which had not yet concluded such agreements would be given the possibility of altering those agreements in accordance with circumstances. The delegation of Lebanon thought that the States which had already concluded agreements should, in all fairness, have the same opportunity of concluding future agreements on the basis of those already made, instead of having simply to adhere to previous texts.

10. The proposed provisions also seemed likely to lead to an endless diversification of agreements and thus to introduce confusion and chaos into the relationships of Member States with the United Nations and the specialized agencies, as also into the relationship between the personnel of information organs and the various Member States themselves. The delegation of Lebanon would have preferred the Assembly to adopt a standard agreement on free access of personnel of information organs to countries where meetings of the United Nations or the specialized agencies were held; such an agreement to be the basis for all agreements concluded on the subject in the future.

11. In that way, the lack of equity which characterized the draft under consideration would have been avoided, by submitting to the Member States, as the basis for their future agreements with the United Nations or the specialized agencies, a model agreement which they would have helped to prepare and adopt. At the same time, any risk of diversity and possibly of contradiction in the various agreements would have been reduced to a minimum and a great service would have been rendered to the Member States and to the personnel of the information organs. The adoption of the amendment submitted by the Lebanese delegation would have made it possible for those States to know immediately, in ad-

¹See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Third Committee, 235th and 236th meetings.*

vance, the kind of facilities they would be called upon to grant to news personnel before deciding to invite the United Nations or the specialized agencies to hold meetings in their territory. A service would also have been rendered to the news personnel by letting them know immediately, in advance, the kind of facilities which they might expect to receive from those States. It was simply and solely in order to render that double service that the Lebanese delegation had submitted its amendment; Lebanon itself, incidentally, had already concluded agreements with the United Nations and one of the specialized agencies, and it was completely satisfied with those agreements.

12. The vote which had been taken in the Third Committee on the Lebanese amendment had proved that the desires of the delegation of Lebanon had been shared by a great number of delegations, since, while nineteen delegations had voted against the amendment, nineteen others had voted in favour of it. The result of that vote was such as to encourage the Lebanese delegation to submit its amendment again to the General Assembly. It was not doing so solely because it believed that, sooner or later, the large majority of the General Assembly would share its belief in the expedience of drawing up, adopting and recommending a standard agreement, but because, rather than force a decision on the subject at that time, it preferred to obtain at a later date a decision which it hoped might be unanimous.

13. Lebanon confidently hoped that the Secretary-General would nevertheless study the matter, bearing in mind the wish expressed by half the Members of the United Nations present and voting when the vote had been taken in the Third Committee.

14. The Lebanese delegation found the draft resolution which was before the General Assembly satisfactory, in spite of all its faults, at least as a provisional measure pending the final formulation of a standard agreement, and it would therefore have no hesitation in voting for the draft in the form in which it had been submitted.

15. Mr. BRAÑA (Cuba) said his delegation would support the draft resolution. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, for Cuba had taken the initiative in the matter at the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information held at Geneva in April 1948; nevertheless, his delegation regretted that the draft resolution adopted by the Economic and Social Council¹ limited the scope of the idea contained in resolution No. 9 of the Conference on Freedom of Information, which had more accurately embodied the legitimate desire of the world's democratic Press for freedom so as better to serve truth and justice, in accordance with the principles which were *raison d'être* of the United Nations.

16. Although the Economic and Social Council's draft did not change the substance of resolution No. 9, it was restrictive inasmuch as the limiting adjective "public" before the words "information sources and services" circumscribed the access of news personnel to the sources of information and meetings of the United Nations referred

to in sub-paragraph (b) of the draft resolution of the Third Committee, a discrimination not contained in the corresponding paragraph of resolution No. 9 adopted at the Conference on Freedom of Information.

17. The Cuban delegation considered that, despite those limitations, and despite the restrictive tendencies evidenced by the majority group, as shown in the debates in the Third Committee, the draft resolution marked a notable step forward in the scheme for making sources of information freely accessible, and would contribute to a deeper understanding between the Press and the organizations working to strengthen democracy and maintain peace.

18. Mr. Braña recalled that at the 232nd meeting, eloquent speakers, although they had seemed to disagree, had been at one in defending, maintaining and extolling freedom of speech.

19. His statement was proof of his country's immutable principle always to defend freedom of speech and consequently to advocate the fullest and broadest access to the sources of information, without which there could be no such freedom.

20. He reminded his audience of President Roosevelt's definition of the four freedoms, which included freedom of speech. It must be emphasized that what had been at stake in the last world conflict had been those four freedoms and that the better world, foretold in the dreams of that great visionary, was based on the complete realization of freedom of speech.

21. Mr. Braña was happy to say—and in so doing he also expressed the feelings of the Cuban journalists who had suggested the action taken by the delegation of Cuba at Geneva—that the spirit of co-operation and ardent democratic solidarity demonstrated by several delegations during the debates, and particularly by Mexico and Uruguay, was taking form. Those delegations had expressed the ideas—and had given them the noblest interpretation—which were at the basis of the draft resolution; and Mr. Braña hoped that the Assembly would proceed to adopt that draft.

22. Mr. KAYSER (France) recalled that the French delegation had been among those in the Third Committee which had supported the Lebanese amendment. The arguments advanced by that delegation in the Committee—and just reiterated in the Assembly—had convinced the French representatives. He thanked the representative of Lebanon, however, for having withdrawn his amendment in order to make possible a unanimous vote.

23. He joined the representative of Lebanon in hoping that the Secretary-General would take note of the discussion on that question in the Third Committee and take steps at an early date to ascertain whether it might not be possible to work out a standard agreement on those delicate and complex questions. If that were possible, the procedure of organizing certain conferences would in future be considerably expedited.

24. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the Third Committee.

The resolution was adopted without objection.

¹ See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fourth Year, Ninth Session, Resolutions*, No. 241 A (IX).

The problem of the independence of Korea: report of the United Nations Commission on Korea

REPORT OF THE *Ad Hoc* POLITICAL COMMITTEE (A/1008); REPORT OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE (A/1027); DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (A/1024)

25. Mr. NISOR (Belgium), Rapporteur of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, presented the report of the Committee and the accompanying draft resolution (A/1008).

26. He drew attention to the fact that the Assembly had already adopted two resolutions, 112 (II) and 195 (III), on the question of the independence of Korea.

27. By the second of those resolutions, adopted on 12 December 1948, the Assembly had set up the United Nations Commission on Korea and had provided, *inter alia*, that the Commission should submit a report at a subsequent session. The very detailed report drawn up by that Commission¹ had been discussed at great length by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee², and its principal features constituted the basis on which the Committee had drawn up the proposals before the Assembly. Those proposals, which were in the form of a draft resolution, recommended that the United Nations Commission should be continued and its competence broadened to some extent.

28. The PRESIDENT stated that since the Fifth Committee was meeting at Lake Success, its Rapporteur, Miss WITTEVEEN (Netherlands) was unable to present to the Assembly the report of the Fifth Committee (A/1027) on the financial implications of the draft resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. The report of the Fifth Committee was, however, before the Assembly. No action upon it was required at that stage and it was submitted only in order to fulfil the requirements of rule 142 of the rules of procedure, which stipulated that no resolution involving expenditure should be voted by the General Assembly until the Fifth Committee had had an opportunity of stating the effect of the proposal on the budget estimates.

29. Mr. FAHY (United States of America) said that the General Assembly was fulfilling its highest function when it spoke or acted on behalf of the independence of peoples and of Governments, as in the case of Korea. The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had overwhelmingly resolved that the United Nations Commission on Korea should continue and the United States urged the General Assembly to confirm the action of that Committee.

30. It was approximately two years since the General Assembly had adopted its resolution 112 (II) of 14 November 1947, designed to bring about the creation of a Government in Korea representing the people—a people which had been promised liberation and freedom as a consequence of the defeat of Japan. In the part of Korea south of the 38th parallel a free election had been held under United Nations observation. The Government of the Republic of Korea had been established. United States occupation

forces had been withdrawn. The lawful character of the new Government had been acknowledged by the General Assembly in its resolution 195 (III), and that Government had since been recognized by more than twenty Member States of the United Nations.

31. No free election had been permitted north of the 38th parallel. There, a third of the people and half of the area of the country lay behind a barrier erected by a puppet Government supported by the Soviet Union. The representatives of the United Nations were excluded and the authority of the General Assembly was flouted. A vast propaganda campaign was waged against the United Nations Commission and against the representative Government chosen freely by the people in the area opened to United Nations observation south of the 38th parallel.

32. The United Nations Commission on Korea, established at the third session of the General Assembly, had made a comprehensive report pointing out the threat of conflict, of explosive incidents, the continuation of social, economic and political barriers, and the danger that unification would not take place. There was danger of a cruel civil war growing out of the belligerent manifestations of those who dominated North Korea.

33. The aim of the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee was to aid in maintaining peace and furthering the unification of Korea. So long as the spirit of incitement to armed conflict existed in Korea, and as long as, on occasion, such conflict in fact occurred, the purpose of the General Assembly to bring about the unification and complete independence of Korea under a single national Government, set up under the scrutiny of the United Nations Commission, was endangered. The safety and well-being of the Republic itself, and of its inhabitants, were also endangered. For that reason the draft resolution provided that the Commission should observe and report any developments which might lead to or involve military conflict in Korea. It was the view of the United States that a commission empowered to act in that respect would serve as an important stabilizing and deterrent influence, and that, if conflict should occur, the United Nations would have available testimony from a duly constituted agency of its own regarding the nature and origin of such a conflict and regarding the responsibility for its occurrence.

34. There remained also the important question of the realization of unity and independence for all Korea. The draft resolution provided means whereby, in case the threat of military conflict were removed or mitigated, the Commission might assist in the establishment of a single national Government over an undivided country. The Commission was to seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to friendly intercourse in Korea, and to make its good offices available and be prepared to assist, whenever in its judgment a favourable opportunity arose, in bringing about unification in accordance with the principles endorsed by the General Assembly. The authority of the Commission to utilize the services and good offices of persons whether they were representatives on the Commission or not, was

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 9.

² *Ibid.*, *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, 2nd to 6th meetings inclusive.

designed to give to the Commission the broadest possible facilities in carrying out those purposes and functions. The United States believed that a commission having such powers as were set forth in the draft resolution would be able to contribute substantially and appropriately, in the light of current conditions in Korea, to the final solution of the problem of independence in that country, and do so through the establishment of a national Government acting by, and on behalf of, the will of a united people.

35. The United States accordingly supported the draft resolution submitted by the Committee, and would of course vote against the USSR draft resolution (A/1024), which had been rejected in the Third Committee by an overwhelming vote and which would have brought an end to United Nations assistance. The United States strongly recommended the Committee's draft resolution to the favourable consideration of other delegations as an expression of the purpose of the General Assembly to promote the independence of a long-suffering and valiant people whom the United Nations should help to achieve what so many others enjoyed, namely, freedom and independence.

36. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) said that the first items on the General Assembly's agenda which had come to it after having been discussed in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee belonged to that category of questions which he had characterized during the general debate (228th meeting) as not conducive to better understanding among the Member States or to the strengthening of the United Nations. The General Assembly had started the current session in a hopeful atmosphere. In spite of the North Atlantic Treaty, and in spite of the fact that on the eve of the session there had been a demonstrative military meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers, everyone had felt, at least for a time, that agreement could be reached on solutions for some outstanding problems which had already been on the agenda of previous sessions or had been included in the agenda of the current session.

37. In the general debate, the Czechoslovak delegation had summed up the prerequisites for such successful work as follows: the General Assembly must clear its agenda of such subjects as the so-called problem of the independence of Korea and the so-called problem of the observance in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania of human rights and fundamental freedoms. A further prerequisite for successful work was the strict observance of duties and obligations under the Charter, at least—and in view of past experience Mr. Clementis was being very modest—within the framework of the United Nations and not outside it. In connexion with the Korean question and the draft resolution adopted by the majority of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, he wished to point out the specific reasons why that question did not enter into the competence of the United Nations.

38. The Korean question belonged to the category of those which had been and remained controversial; no solution had been found for the substance of the problem. As all the delegations were well aware, there were on the agenda other problems of the same category with respect to which the usual majority took a decision that was not a decision, only in order that the question

should be brought up again and again at subsequent sessions.

39. Although the General Assembly could, and obviously must, discuss all those questions separately, and although it could, and must, vote on them separately, it could not solve them without fulfilling the general prerequisite to which he had referred. That would, however, require a fundamental change in the attitude of the usual majority or, to put it quite clearly, a change in the attitude of those who commanded the usual majority.

40. It was common knowledge that the current United States policy was responsible for the division of Korea, because such division answered the aims of that policy. That was why the United States did not respect the Moscow agreement on Korea concluded by the great Powers; that was why it had put the question before the United Nations, where it commanded the usual majority, but where the question did not belong.

41. It was hardly possible to expect a change in United States policy and respect for the principles and interests of the United Nations in the Korean question, in which that country was directly concerned, when it was ready to violate hitherto recognized principles of the Charter and the hitherto respected gentleman's agreement, in the interest of the short-sighted and hazardous cold war. That had happened in the case of the election, at the 231st meeting, of one of the new members of the Security Council. That member had been elected against the will of the whole geographical group on whose behalf that election had been held, and notwithstanding the fact that even those who had voted for the United States candidate had been very well aware of the grave consequences of their decision for the possibilities of an understanding in the General Assembly and for the United Nations as a whole.

42. Following upon that event, the old controversial issues had become even more controversial, because it had been clearly proved that, on the other side, there was not the slightest will for understanding and loyal co-operation. Therefore, even though the Korean question was to be examined separately and independently, its connexion with and dependence upon the other issues to which Mr. Clementis had referred should not be forgotten.

43. The question of the independence of Korea was one of the most tragic chapters in the history of the United Nations, as was proved by the fact that the rostrum and the prestige of the United Nations were being abused for the achievement of the selfish aspirations of one Power.

44. Mr. Clementis remembered only too well that, when the activity of the so-called Joint Commission, based on the Moscow agreement of December 1945, had reached a deadlock, it had been the Government of the USSR which had proposed that the Korean people should be given the opportunity to express their will and to form an independent Government without the participation of the United States and the Soviet Union, on the condition that the troops of those two Powers were withdrawn from Korea. Shortly before, on 4 September 1947, in its reply to the note from the United States, the USSR Government had clearly declared that the United States proposals submitted at that time in violation of the

Moscow agreement not only would not solve the situation created by the division of the country into two zones but, on the contrary, would aggravate it still further.

45. Two years later it had to be stated, to Mr. Clementis' great regret, that the fears expressed by the Soviet Union in September 1947 had been confirmed by subsequent developments. There was still no single and united Korea, and the Korean people in the southern zone, who had suffered greatly under Japanese occupation, were being exposed to further hardship and persecution.

46. In 1947, when the establishment of the Temporary Commission on Korea had been advocated, for the purpose—at least according to the formal wording of the draft resolution submitted at that time—of creating a united Korea, the Czechoslovak delegation had categorically opposed that proposal¹. It had maintained then that the question must be decided exclusively by the Korean people themselves, on the assumption that all obstacles to freedom of expression would be eliminated and that the troops would be withdrawn. It had pointed out then that the issue did not belong on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations, because discussion of the item would constitute a serious interference in the internal affairs of the Korean people.

47. At the first part of the third session of the General Assembly, it was the Czechoslovak delegation which had submitted to the First Committee a formal proposal that true representatives of the indigenous population should be invited, representatives who, despite the division of Korea into two military zones, had been elected by secret ballot in democratic elections carried out on the entire territory of Korea in August 1948. The Czechoslovak delegation had been of the opinion that, since the Korean question had been placed on the agenda in complete contradiction with the principle of the Charter that sovereignty was vested in the people, the representatives of the people concerned should at least be present. That proposal had been rejected by the majority of the First Committee². On the other hand, members had been compelled to listen to statements made by the representatives of a puppet Government, a Government appointed with the assistance of the United Nations Commission on Korea, which had been a body entirely subservient to the interests of the imperialistic Powers, primarily the United States.

48. In December 1948 the USSR had withdrawn its armed forces from the northern part of Korea and had thus created the conditions, at least in that part of the country, for an entirely free political and economic development of the local population. That had met with enthusiastic approval on the part of the Korean people, who had been fully aware of the significance of the step taken by the Soviet Union.

49. It would be remembered that a part—and only a part—of the United States troops had been withdrawn six months later. The remainder of the United States armed forces in South Korea had been left behind in order to prevent the realization of the desire of the Korean people for unification, and in order to protect and maintain strategic bases which, especially in view of

the recent development in China, had become of even greater importance in the plans of the warmongers.

50. The debate in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee at the current session had followed the same pattern as at preceding sessions. The USSR proposal that the true representatives of the Korean people should be invited had been instantly and unhesitatingly rejected once more, by representatives who so often advocated the self-determination of peoples and proclaimed their adherence to democratic ideas. Moreover, the representatives of the puppet régime of South Korea had been invited only in order to echo most obediently his master's voice. The debate had been utilized—as usual—for further attacks on the policy of the Soviet Union, attacks which had been completely unfounded and in bad taste.

51. The draft resolution adopted by the majority of the members of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and submitted to the Assembly for its approval maintained the unrealistic approach to the problem made familiar by previous resolutions. That attitude was in complete contradiction with the principles and purposes of the Charter and the wishes of the Korean people, who had not ceased to call for the unification of the entire territory without foreign intervention and without assistance from the United Nations Commission.

52. The preamble of the draft resolution, in referring to the fact that the unity of Korea had so far not been achieved, completely ignored the fundamental importance of the recent development, namely, the emergence of the only legal Government, established on the basis of democratic elections by secret ballot which had been carried out on the entire territory of Korea in August 1948. It culminated in the assertion that the situation described by the Commission might lead to an open military conflict in Korea. But full responsibility for that situation must be imputed to the Commission, and hence to the United States, since the Commission had been the obedient instrument of that Power. On the other hand, under a show of formal objectivity, the draft resolution called for the verification of the withdrawal of the USSR armed forces—a withdrawal completed and announced to the whole world almost a year previously, long before the United States had given any indication of similar action on its part.

53. It would be superfluous to deal with other details of the draft resolution. They followed a familiar pattern, concerning which the Czechoslovak delegation had expressed its basic attitude on previous occasions. The worst feature was that the duration of the Commission as proposed in the draft resolution was not specified. Thus, from its own rostrum, from which the principle of the self-determination and equality of all nations had been so ardently—even though very often hypocritically—advocated, the General Assembly was being asked to place obstacles in the way of the Korean people's progress toward freedom and independence.

54. It was obvious that, since the draft resolution disregarded basic principles of the Charter, the Czechoslovak delegation could not agree to it, and would therefore vote against it and in favour

¹ See *Official Records of the second session of the General Assembly, First Committee, 92nd meeting.*

² See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, 230th meeting.*

of the adoption of the draft resolution of the Soviet Union which met the interests both of the Korean people and of the United Nations.

55. MR. LIU CHIEH (China) said that the problem of Korean independence and unity had been placed before the General Assembly at its second session in 1947; since that date the Assembly had been continuously seized of the question.

56. From the outset, all had recognized the pressing and legitimate claims of the Korean people to independence and freedom. It was gratifying that, since General Assembly resolution 112 (II) of 14 November 1947, free elections had taken place under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission in certain parts of Korea, the inhabitants of which constituted approximately two-thirds of the total population of the country. A national Government, based on the will of the electorate, had come into being and had been declared by the United Nations as the lawful and sole Government of Korea.

57. Notwithstanding those achievements, the vital problem of unification remained to be settled; unless it was settled the people of Korea would not gain the complete independence and unity promised them during the war. The Korean people had placed full faith and trust in the United Nations and were looking to it for the fulfilment of its pledge and promise.

58. Fully conscious of its obligations toward Korea, the General Assembly, at its third session, had recognized that the work of the Temporary Commission had not been complete and that some way must be found to carry forward the urgent task of unification, if the hopes and aspirations of the Korean people were to be realized. It was for that reason that the United Nations Commission on Korea had been established. Its main purpose, as laid down in General Assembly resolution 195 (III) of 12 December 1948, had been to "lend its good offices to bring about the unification of Korea".

59. But unification had not been accomplished and, according to the Commission's report, the prospect of attaining that end was more and more remote.

60. During the discussion in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the Chinese delegation had outlined the reasons for that failure; those reasons should be apparent to anyone who had studied the reports of the Commission on Korea. Mr. Liu Chieh did not propose to recapitulate those causes, but they were certainly not the fault of the Commission itself; the Commission, as was fully recognized, had performed its work in extremely difficult circumstances. Nor could the failure be attributed to the Korean people, who were homogenous in race, language and culture, and even under prolonged Japanese occupation had not failed to preserve and cherish their unity. The division along the 38th parallel had been introduced for purely military reasons, but its continuance had brought bitterness, frustration and mutual distrust among the people. It had caused great economic distress and had retarded the recovery of the country as a whole.

61. The Chinese delegation took a serious view of the situation. It was convinced that, unless the artificial division of the country into North and South Korea was discontinued in the near future

and unless border incidents were stopped, the situation in Korea would become increasingly difficult, as well as dangerous to the peace and tranquility of the entire Far East. Irrefutable reports showed that armed raids across the 38th parallel, involving increasingly large numbers, had recently become more frequent. Only that day, and account had been given in *The New York Times* of a five-day battle on the border. No one could fail to be alarmed by such clear indication of what might happen in the future.

62. The draft resolution before the General Assembly dealt with the dangers in the Korean situation. It drew attention particularly to the border incursions and made provision for a practical method of observing and reporting on conditions along the 38th parallel so that the prospect of open military conflict in Korea might be lessened. It contained the minimum provisions necessary at that juncture for the safeguarding of peace and security in that troubled part of Asia. It also contained provisions for continuing and strengthening the Commission in its work in Korea, so that it might seek by renewed effort to help bring about the unification of the country.

63. The Chinese delegation therefore urged the Assembly to accord its support to the draft resolution. Mr. Liu Chieh appealed to every delegation, in casting its vote, to place the interests of the Korean people before all other considerations, so that it might be recorded that, in its struggle for unity and independence, Korea had had the steadfast support and encouragement of all peace-loving and freedom-loving States represented at the current session of the General Assembly.

64. MR. ZEBROWSKI (Poland) stated that the Korean people's right to independence had been fully and clearly recognized by an international agreement following closely upon the cessation of hostilities in East Asia. In the report of the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom, held in Moscow in December 1945, it had been laid down that Korea should be an independent State, that it should develop in accordance with democratic principles, and that the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination should be eradicated as early as possible. Provision had also been made for the establishment of a provisional democratic Government of Korea, for joint assistance to that Government by the Soviet Union and the United States, and for the securing of the collaboration of Korean democratic parties and social organizations.

65. Over and above that agreement of the Foreign Ministers, however, there were many other solid and durable foundations for the right of the Korean people to independence. That right was deeply rooted in the historical tradition of Korea and its highly-developed and individual culture. Under modern conditions, the right of the Korean nation to independence was based first and foremost on the will of the masses that in Korea, as elsewhere, a national Government should be established which would ensure them freedom from any sort of oppression and enslavement—external as well as internal, political as well as economic and social—and which would enable the masses to remove all barriers standing in the way of their full participation in the economic and cultural life of the nation. The establishment of such a Government was the true

meaning of national independence and democracy.

66. To attain those ends, the people of Korea had fought against the Japanese rulers long before the Second World War, but particularly during the war. Many Korean patriots, arms in hand, had fought the Japanese in Korea and elsewhere.

67. As soon as the Japanese power in Korea had begun to crack under the blows dealt to it by the USSR army, and some time before the United States troops had landed in Korean ports, a broad movement had spread throughout Korea to set up the first democratic authorities in the country. The spontaneity with which the people's committees had sprung up in thousands of Korean villages and towns was the best proof of the strength of the Korean people's desire to attain independence and a democratic form of government. General Hodge, the United States Military Governor, had succeeded in abolishing the people's committee later on; he had not, however, been able to destroy the latent force of the Korean people.

68. Mr. Zebrowski would not describe the subsequent developments in Korea stage by stage. It was enough to say that the movement which had started with the people's committees in the autumn of 1945 had succeeded. In North Korea, occupied by the army of the Soviet Union, it had met with no obstacles. Since 1945, successive authorities elected by the people of North Korea—including the existing Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had also been elected by the people of South Korea in the election of 1948—had made every effort to create suitable political, economic and cultural conditions for the existence of a real democracy—a people's democracy.

69. Democratic reforms carried out in the national economy had materially changed the living conditions of the population of North Korea and had created the basis for a further development of economic productivity in the interest of the Korean working people. By nationalizing big industrial enterprises, the banks and the land, the democratic authorities had established firm control over the economic life of the country and had started to develop it along the lines of planned economy. That policy had achieved remarkable results in 1948, particularly in power production, coal mining and the chemical industry. A land reform had been carried out on the principle that the land should belong only to those working on it; landowners, former Japanese proprietors and monasteries had been dispossessed. By distributing the land thus acquired to the 720,000 poor peasants of North Korea, the Government had not only improved the general standard of living of the peasantry but, at the same time, substantially raised the productivity of North Korean farming.

70. In the field of education and culture, the people of North Korea were progressing rapidly, making good the losses suffered under Japanese rule. The campaign against illiteracy was enabling millions of Korean citizens to participate more fully in the political and cultural life of their country. New schools, community houses, theatres and libraries were being built. General and technical education was spreading rapidly among the population.

71. Unemployment was non-existent. Trade unions, and peasants', women's, and youth organizations were growing in numerical strength and importance.

72. Under the leadership of the democratic parties, the political activity and experience of the masses in North Korea were growing at a great pace. Several general elections by secret ballot had been held in North Korea, with the active participation of practically the whole electorate. In the elections held in August 1948 in both North and South Korea, the Supreme People's Assembly had been elected. In that Assembly, the representatives of South Korea occupied 300 seats out of a total of 572. The Supreme People's Assembly had approved the reforms previously introduced in North Korea and had given the country a democratic Constitution.

73. Thus, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the only independent Korea, had come into being and was rapidly progressing. It was well known that its very existence was resented in certain quarters. One of the principal aims of United States policy in Korea had been to prevent its birth and, once it had been born, to restrict and to smother it.

74. The régime established by the United States in South Korea was not only based on a violation of the Moscow Agreement of 1945; it was also a violation of the right of the Korean people to independence and self-determination. The way in which the functioning of the Joint Commission of the United States and the Soviet Union had been obstructed by the United States partner was too well known to require further mention. The aim of the Seoul régime, created and sponsored by the United States, was neither the independence of Korea nor democracy in Korea. The so-called Government of Syngman Rhee was not a Government of the Korean people, for the Korean people, by the Korean people.

75. It was not a Government of the people because its members had long since forfeited the right to represent their own people, either because they had collaborated with the Japanese or because they had fostered and promoted collaboration. They were afraid to be left alone with their own people and to have to account to them for their actions. That was why they were whimpering for more American dollars and bayonets.

76. Neither was it a Government by the Korean people. Abundant evidence could be produced to show that it was a régime established by foreign intervention, that the people were in almost continuous revolt against that régime, and that it was a fact a Government by foreign agents—agents from the United States.

77. Still less was it a Government for the Korean people, since its only *raison d'être* was to be the willing tool of United States imperialistic policy and to preserve the vested feudal interests of the small group of reactionary politicians, landlords and Japanese puppets, a group threatened in its very existence by the march of Korean democracy. That so-called Government had not yet done anything to promote the well-being of the Koreans or to foster the progress of the nation. It had done much to turn South Korea into a United States colony and a vast prison for its own countrymen.

78. The Polish delegation did not wish to be accused of preferring unsubstantiated charges. The item on the Assembly's agenda was not new; the facts corroborating the views of the Polish delegation had been amply quoted in Committee, not only at the current session but also at earlier ones. Every item of factual news coming from South Korea was an accusation of United States policy in that country and of the resulting conditions. Even the reports of the United Nations Commission on Korea, no matter how they tried to conceal unpleasant facts, were full of outrageous information on what was going on in South Korea.
79. The very existence of peoples' democracies, in Korea as elsewhere, was a thorn in the side of United States imperialistic policy. Peoples' democracies meant national sovereignty, political as well as economic; they were synonymous with freedom and peace. But it was not for freedom or for peace that the Americans had come to South Korea. Regardless of official declarations, the United States, which in fact ruled South Korea, looked upon it as a springboard to the Asian continent, as a check against popular movements of momentous importance sweeping East Asia, and as a likely victim for American capitalist monopolies. Though the United States delegation might not like to hear it, the similarities between the United States policy in Korea and that of Japan were striking.
80. It was no accident, therefore, that the only allies the United States Military Government had found in South Korea had been the most reactionary elements which, to save themselves from the wrath of the Korean people, were only too ready to serve the new American masters as many of them had served the Japanese in earlier days. That was to have been expected; it was impossible to promote imperialism and export democracy at the same time. From the very beginning, it had been obvious that the United States Government's foothold in Korea was very precarious.
81. The policy of upholding and sheltering the terroristic régime of Syngman Rhee, the policy of delaying the withdrawal of occupation forces—as contrasted with the policy pursued by the Soviet Union—and the policy of checking the political, social and economic development of South Korea could not but bring permanent discredit upon the American masters and their Korean servants in the eyes of the Korean people.
82. In view of the growing opposition in South Korea, increasingly wider measures of terrorism had become necessary. The United States, unwilling to bear the responsibility alone, had two years previously sought and obtained the blessing of the United Nations for maintaining United States control over the southern part of Korea.
83. Generally speaking, there was little in the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea to distinguish it from its predecessor, the report of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea¹. The purpose of both Commissions had been to provide camouflage for Syngman Rhee's régime and to muffle the voice of those people of South Korea who were leading a determined and heroic struggle against that régime.
84. It was, however, amusing to note that the Commission, after going to Seoul to act rather as a mentor to Syngman Rhee's so-called Government, was in fact being bullied by that Government and told what to do and what not to do. Dispatched from Paris to the sound of bugles, the Commission had turned out to be a sort of Cinderella at the court of that potentate who seemed to have grown confident in the attributions of his own sovereignty. Mr. Zebrowski wondered whether Syngman Rhee had perhaps been instructed to act in that way by some United States adviser.
85. He recalled the experience of the Commission in seeking to carry out its instructions to check upon the development of representative government in South Korea. It had been made clear that anyone whom the Commission might wish to hear had to be screened by the so-called Government itself. After showing some unwillingness, the Commission had complied, stating that any reputable Korean who approached the Commission in good faith could not be denied access to it. But whether the Korean in question was really reputable and *bona fide* and not merely subservient could be established only with the help of the Government itself.
86. Mr. Zebrowski then referred to the adoption by the Commission of the procedure of approaching the Government of the Democratic People's Republic through the good offices of the USSR. The method was preposterous, since it was a well-known fact that the Government in North Korea was a sovereign Government enjoying international recognition. But it was exactly what Mr. Syngman Rhee had wanted the Commission to do.
87. In its conclusions, the Commission had tried to make the Soviet Union and the United States equally responsible for the division of Korea. At the same time, however, the whole report was nothing but an attempt to give the United States a clean bill of health. The inference was obvious.
88. After the Commission's report had come the joint draft resolution of Australia, China, the Philippines and the United States, which was before the Assembly as a draft resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.
89. The Polish delegation viewed the draft resolution with grave concern. Fully conscious of its responsibilities, it wished to draw the attention of the General Assembly to the fact that, by adopting the draft, the United Nations would be taking a further ill-advised step along the dangerous road which it had been following since 14 November 1947. In some respects the draft resolution echoed resolutions 112 (II) and 195 (III) of 14 November 1947 and 12 December 1948, which had created the former United Nations Commissions on Korea. But it was also characterized by three new features, all of extreme importance. First, the Commission was to be made a permanent body; secondly, in view of an alleged danger of open military conflict in Korea, the Commission was to be authorized to observe and report any development which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea; thirdly, the Commission was to verify the withdrawal of the Soviet occupation forces.
90. In the opinion of the Polish delegation, the inclusion of those three new points in the draft

¹ See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 9.*

resolution showed better than anything else the real purpose of its chief promoter, the United States Government.

91. In the course of 1949, United States policy in the Far East had suffered a tremendous blow, a defeat of historical importance, inflicted by the advance of the people's army in China and the establishment of the Government of the People's Republic of China. The changes wrought by those events could not as yet be fully appreciated. It was obvious, however, that, in view of the tremendous surge of China's millions towards freedom, the need for the United States to preserve full control of its South Korean base had become even more pressing. On the other hand, the actions of the Soviet Union and the pressure of Korean public opinion had forced the United States to withdraw some of its troops from South Korea. The United States feared that its remaining forces, including American-trained but highly unreliable Korean police forces might some day prove inadequate to maintain United States control of South Korea.

92. Therefore, by invoking the spectre of a military conflict, the United States wished in advance, and with the help of the United Nations, to create an excuse for sending more troops to Korea should the need arise and should the régime upheld by American imperialism crumble under the weight of its own crimes and incapacity. Anxious to avoid the accusation of intervening in the internal affairs of Korea, the United States wished to give the impression that Korea was threatened by a danger from the outside. What the United States really wanted was to induce the United Nations to hold open the door of Korea for further American military intervention.

93. The pattern was only too familiar to all the peoples who had to fight to free themselves from the grip of imperialism.

94. The Polish delegation objected most categorically to that attempt to involve the United Nations in the aims of United States imperialistic policy. The Polish delegation would vote against the draft resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. At the same time, it would vote for the draft resolution submitted by the USSR which, in short but clear terms, presented the only position acceptable to the Polish Government, motivated as it was by deep friendship for the Korean people and respect for its only lawful Government, that of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

95. Mr. DJERDJA (Yugoslavia) recalled that the Yugoslav delegation had already stated its views on the Korean question in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. He would confine himself to summarizing the position of his delegation.

96. Basing himself logically on the principle that every nation had the right to self-determination, the Yugoslav delegation saw no reason why that right should be denied to the people of Korea, especially since, by their struggle against the Japanese occupying forces, they had manifested a high level of political consciousness and readiness to fight in defence of their national and social rights.

97. Having adopted that position of principle, the Yugoslav delegation felt that it could not countenance any interference in or any outside influence upon the internal affairs of Korea,

especially when the people of that country were making great efforts to settle the problem confronting them, that of the unification and democratization of their entire national life.

98. The Yugoslav delegation therefore considered that, in the existing circumstances, the sending of a commission to Korea, or any interference of any kind whatever, could only impede the efforts of the Korean people to resolve the questions which were of vital importance to them. Such a measure could not contribute to the consolidation of peace in that part of the world.

99. The past experience of the two Commissions on Korea and the conditions prevailing in that country served only to confirm the Yugoslav delegation in its decision to maintain its position on the question. The fact that some democratic leaders of the two Korean political parties had, for no reason whatever, adopted an attitude towards Yugoslavia which could hardly be considered either democratic or friendly, could not weaken the determination of the Yugoslav delegation to maintain its original position. It was therefore perfectly natural that the Yugoslav delegation could not vote in favour of a draft resolution providing for the maintenance or dispatch of a commission to Korea and could not support any other form of interference, by any party whatsoever, in the internal affairs of Korea.

100. For those reasons, the delegation of Yugoslavia would vote against the draft resolution; at the same time, it would support the proposal that the Commission on Korea should be dissolved.

101. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thought that the fact that the Korean question had been placed on the agenda of the General Assembly for the third time was a clear indication of the efforts which United States ruling circles were making to transform the United Nations into a tool for their expansionist and colonial policy. It was common knowledge that the Korean question had arisen as a result of the defeat of imperialist Japan during the Second World War and the liberation of Korea and that that country, after forty years under the Japanese colonial yoke, had been freed by the victorious USSR army which, in 1945, had routed the extremely strong Japanese Kwantung army.

102. After Korea's liberation, the Soviet Union had made every effort to reach a settlement with the United States, whose forces had occupied the southern part of Korea, on the question of Korea's re-establishment as a unified, independent, democratic State. The United States, however, had frustrated all negotiations on the matter and had started to implement plans in South Korea for the establishment of a separate reactionary régime headed by Mr. Syngman Rhee, who was the United States nominee and who had arrived in Korea in the wake of the army of occupation.

103. Faithful to its policy of granting the right of self-determination and independence to all, the USSR as early as September 1947, had suggested to the United States Government that the forces of the two Powers should be withdrawn from Korea simultaneously and that the people of that country should be allowed to set up a free and independent Government of its own choice without any outside pressure. The United States, however, had rejected that proposal because such

measures did not agree with its economic designs on Korea.

104. It was well known that the Government of the Soviet Union had evacuated all its troops from North Korea in 1948. The United States Government, however, had disregarded the request of the People's Supreme Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw its troops from that country. The fact that United States forces had remained on Korean soil after Soviet troops had been withdrawn had shown that the United States was openly intervening in South Korea, and Washington had been obliged, in the summer of 1949, to publish a statement to the effect that the United States intended withdrawing its troops from Korea.

105. The reason for the United States Government's refusal to withdraw its troops had been explained in President Truman's message to Congress on United States aid to the Seoul puppet Government. That message stated that United States troops were remaining in South Korea to enable that country to set up a force capable of defending it against domestic disorders and outside aggression. Thus the message of the President of the United States had implied that, without the support of United States bayonets, the position of Syngman Rhee's puppet Government would be hopeless.

106. The *New York Herald Tribune*, in its issue of 30 May 1949, had stated in regard to South Korea that that so-called independent country was in fact only an American protectorate and that the general feeling was that it would collapse within twenty-four hours if it did not receive aid from the United States.

107. The United States had declared its intention of withdrawing its forces from South Korea. In fact, however, it controlled all the reactionary and terrorist gangs of Syngman Rhee, which it had itself formed, armed and trained. A standing mission of United States military advisers had been left in South Korea with an official complement of 500; it was in reality very much larger. The mission was headed by General Roberts, who had formerly commanded the United States occupation forces in Korea and who continued as before to control the forces of the puppet régime.

108. Majors Peh Mou Wong and Kan Te Mou of the armed forces of South Korea, who had gone over to the Korean People's Republic with their forces on 5 May 1949, had stated that the armed forces of Syngman Rhee were entirely dependent on the United States military mission.

109. Those facts served to show that the United States was continuing its occupation of South Korea and that the withdrawal of its forces had altered only the form of the occupation. The United States had not left South Korea and had not given the Korean people a free opportunity of deciding its own destiny. Even the United States diplomatic representative in Seoul had admitted that fact when, commenting on the official statement delivered to the United Nations Commission regarding the withdrawal of the United States forces, he had said that the main purpose of that statement was to assure the Korean people that the United States was not abandoning Korea.

110. The illegal submission of the question of Korea to the General Assembly, the imposition on

that body of long resolutions designed to "legalize" the Seoul puppet régime, and the raising of the Korean question in the so-called Interim Committee were simply attempts to give some semblance of justification to United States machinations in South Korea, while Washington sought to make the country into a colony and to reduce its people to slavery.

111. From the very beginning of the occupation of South Korea, the leading figures of the American monopolies had proceeded to destroy the country's major heavy industries, the equipment of which had been broken up, buried or thrown into the sea. The explanation for such vandalism in the middle of the twentieth century lay in the general policy of American monopolies towards countries dependent on the United States. The United States was attempting to transform South Korea into an agricultural area and a source of raw materials, into a colonial market for United States products, into a country without heavy industries. The United States was following a similar policy not only towards the underdeveloped countries of South America, Asia, the Middle and Far East and Africa, but also towards the industrialized but "Marshallized" countries of Western Europe.

112. The American monopolies had taken over the power stations, the mines and oil-wells of South Korea as well as almost all its light industries. The holder of the office of United States Economic Co-operation Administrator in fact directed the entire economy of South Korea. The puppet régime of Seoul could take no action without his authorization. Exports and imports were likewise under the control of the United States representative, to whom the so-called Government was obliged to render detailed accounts. That so-called Government was also obliged to make the greatest possible increase in exports of raw materials to the United States monopolies and to remove every obstacle to the dispatch of such materials to the United States.

113. Instead of restoring the agriculture and industry of South Korea, the United States was transforming that country into an armed camp and was setting up large military installations there. It was clear that such action was entirely unrelated to the interests of the Korean people themselves and was merely ruining the economy of South Korea.

114. The United Nations Commission on Korea had itself been compelled to admit that the economic situation of South Korea was extremely distressing as a result of the machinations of the United States monopolies.

115. The report of that Commission showed that, far from assisting the Korean people to obtain the withdrawal of United States troops and achieve the unification of the country, the Commission had become a tool of the foreign policy of the United States and had attempted to justify and defend the selfish colonial policy of the United States in South Korea and the measures adopted by the terrorist régime of Syngman Rhee. The Commission had in fact hampered the unification of Korea by its activities. With regard to the withdrawal of United States troops, the Commission had adopted an attitude which in no way differed from that adopted by the State Department.

116. In the previous spring, the Commission had received a petition signed by sixty-two members of the so-called National Assembly in Seoul requesting the immediate withdrawal of the United States troops and expressing the Korean people's hope that their country would not become the scene of a disastrous situation similar to the one in Greece. The Commission had confined itself in its report to taking note of that petition and had taken no action on it. The report also referred to the fact that some of the signatories, in particular Mr. Kim Yak Soo, Vice-President of the Assembly, had subsequently been arrested.

117. At its meeting on 23 May 1949, the Commission had taken a decision implicitly supporting the retention of United States occupation troops in South Korea and had refused to take any steps to expedite their withdrawal. On the proposal of the Philippine representative, it had adopted a resolution to the effect that it had no responsibility with regard to the time-limits for the evacuation of the occupation forces¹. The Commission had thus emphasized that it was no longer concerning itself with the examination of a matter of the utmost importance for the independence of Korea. That fact alone sufficed to depict the machination of the Commission in their true colours and showed what interests it was serving.

118. Nevertheless when, some time previously, as a result of the deep dissatisfaction of the entire population of Korea at the maintenance of United States troops in South Korea and the pressure of public opinion, the United States had been compelled to announce its intention to withdraw its forces, the Commission had immediately changed its line of conduct and conformed to its principle of implicitly obeying the State Department. In a resolution which said exactly the opposite of the preceding resolution, the Commission had recognized that General Assembly resolution 195 (III) of 12 December 1949 imposed obligations upon it in connexion with the withdrawal of foreign troops. It had therefore decided to supervise the evacuation of the United States occupation forces from South Korea. All that showed to what degree the Commission had lacked principle and to what extent it had followed the instructions of the United States instead of serving the higher interests of the Korean people and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

119. As appeared from its report, the Commission had opposed the unification of Korea on a democratic basis in order to satisfy foreign colonizers. It would be remembered that in June 1949 the democratic parties and social organizations of North and South Korea had called a Congress of the Democratic Front of Korea for the attainment of unification for the Fatherland. That Congress had adopted a manifesto which it had sent to the Commission² and which presented a concrete plan for the democratic unification of the country by the following measures:

(a) The Korean people should take into their own hands the problem of the peaceful unification of their country.

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 9, Volume I, Chapter II, paragraph 35.

(b) United States forces which impeded that unification must be withdrawn from Korea.

(c) The illegal organ of the United Nations known as the United Nations Commission on Korea must leave South Korea immediately.

(d) Elections to a single legislative assembly must be organized simultaneously in North and South Korea.

(e) Those elections must be carried out under the supervision of a committee composed of representatives of all democratic parties and all social organizations which sought the peaceful unification of Korea.

(f) A conference of representatives of political parties and social organizations of North and South Korea should be convened to discuss the plan of peaceful unification. That conference should have the responsibility of designating the committee which would supervise the elections.

(g) The elections should be carried out on the basis of universal suffrage for men and women by secret ballot. The right to vote would not be granted to any person who had actively collaborated with the Japanese.

(h) In order to guarantee free elections, it was essential:

(i) To put a stop to the persecution of democratic political parties and social organizations, and their leaders;

(ii) To give legal status to all democratic political parties and social organizations and to give them complete freedom of action;

(iii) To repeal the order closing down the Press of the democratic political parties and social organizations and to give those groups the right to maintain their Press;

(iv) To guarantee freedom of speech, freedom of the Press, freedom of assembly and freedom to hold demonstrations;

(v) To liberate all political prisoners immediately.

120. It had also been proposed that the supreme legislative body set up after the general elections should approve the constitution of the Republic of Korea and should appoint its Government in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. The Government created in that manner would assume the powers transferred to it by the existing authorities in North and South Korea. After that transfer of powers, the latter authorities would be abolished.

121. The Commission had received that plan unfavourably and had refused to support the Korean people in their struggle for democracy and for the unification of their country. Wall Street had no intention of allowing Korea to become free and independent. By its refusal to consider that plan for the peaceful unification of the country, a plan supported by the entire Korean people, the Commission had decided against the unification of Korea and in favour of the continued United States domination of South Korea.

122. To satisfy the United States, the Commission asserted in its report that the puppet régime

² See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 9, Volume II, Annex IV, C.

in Seoul headed by Syngman Rhee was a democratic and representative Government. But in its report, the Commission could not conceal the many facts which proved exactly the contrary. For instance, the report showed that Syngman Rhee and his puppet Government were in no way subject to the legislative power, which in principle belonged to the National Assembly of Seoul.

123. On 2 June 1949, by 82 votes to 61, the same puppet National Assembly had demanded the resignation of the Syngman Rhee Government. Despite the best practices of parliamentary procedure, however, that Government had not resigned.

124. On 6 June, the Assembly had reiterated its request by 89 votes to 59. Once again the Government had not obeyed the so-called legislative power. That was indicative of the type of political régime which obtained in South Korea.

125. To gratify the United States, the Commission cynically described the shameless attitude of the United States agent Syngman Rhee as a healthy sign of democracy. In the same report, however, the Commission was forced to recognize that the Government of Syngman Rhee did not command sufficient support among the people. That Government in reality had no popular support at all; on the contrary it was in open conflict with the Korean people.

126. All democratic parties and organizations in South Korea were forbidden and illegal; their Press had been banned. Even the insufficient data received by the United Nations Commission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the puppet Government in Seoul showed that between 4 September 1948 and 30 April 1949, 89,710 Koreans had been arrested under the so-called national security law alone. The Commission did not say a word about what had happened to the persons arrested. From the statements of Korean political leaders, however, it was known that during the first seven months of 1949 the clique supporting Syngman Rhee had shot nearly 53,000 Korean patriots. The Commission's report indicated that the Seoul authorities had even arrested five newspapermen accredited to the Commission, as well as ten members of the puppet Seoul parliament. A large number of women, children and old men were held in the concentration camps established by Syngman Rhee.

127. The scope of the political persecutions in South Korea could be judged by the complaint brought before the ninth meeting of the Commission's Sub-Committee II on 15 March 1949 by a partisan of the Seoul Government named An Chai Hong. He had stated that the Government had lost the trust of the people and that under the existing Government it was practically impossible for the people openly to express their will. The Commission had been forced to recognize that even the members of the puppet National Assembly accused the Seoul Government of not trusting the people, of carrying out mass arrests, of torturing the persons arrested, of taking entirely exceptional repressive measures, of being out of touch with the people, of being indifferent to their misery and wants and of seeking to control local affairs through pro-Japanese officials. All those facts appeared in paragraph 71 of chapter III, volume I of the Commission's report.

128. All that showed that the United States, which was absolute master of the puppet Government it had established in Seoul, had taken over the economy of South Korea and that, through its military, economic and so-called diplomatic missions and through its agents in the puppet government of Seoul, it had established its colonial domination over that country, in which it was encouraging relentless terror against Korean patriots. All aspirations of the population of South Korea to freedom and independence were suppressed in the most odious manner. Rights to fundamental freedom were violated. Such actions obviously made it impossible to settle the Korean question normally. The United Nations Commission on Korea itself was forced to admit it. In thus admitting its failure, the Commission recognized that the situation in Korea had not improved, and that it had been unable to fulfil the objectives laid down by the General Assembly.

129. The Commission's failure was explained by the fact that it had been a tool of the foreign policy of the United States and that, instead of serving the interests of the Korean people, it had endeavoured only to strengthen the colonial domination of the United States in South Korea. The unification of Korea and the creation of a democratic and unified Korean State was a matter for the Korean people themselves. As had been seen in North Korea, those people were quite capable of establishing their own democratic system of government, of improving their living conditions and developing their economy, culture and arts without any foreign interference.

130. The example of the creation and development of the Korean People's Republic showed that the Korean people did not need nurses from the United Nations to establish their own Government. There was therefore no reason to force foreign interference upon them under the pretext of helping them to organize representative institutions.

131. The delegation of the Soviet Union considered that the United Nations Commission on Korea had shown by its activities that it allowed itself to be guided by the interests of foreign colonialists and that in the future, as in the past, it would simply stand in the way of the peaceful unification of Korea. If the Commission were allowed to continue its activities in South Korea, there was danger that the internal condition of Korea would deteriorate and a whole series of disputes develop.

132. Only the cessation of all foreign interference in the internal affairs of Korea could help the Korean people to unite their country and to establish a democratic Government.

133. In the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the USSR delegation had voted against the draft resolution which had been adopted by the majority and in which it was provided—in order to please the United States—that the Commission should continue to function, and even—in order still to better serve the interests of the United States—that the Commission should have still greater powers.

134. The delegation of the Soviet Union proposed that the so-called United Nations Commission on Korea should be abolished, and it submitted the following draft resolution (A/1024) to the General Assembly:

"The General Assembly,

"Recognizing that the solution of the problem of the unification of South and North Korea and the establishment of a unified democratic State are the task of the Korean people themselves;

"Recognizing that foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Korea is inadmissible;

"Recognizing that the activities of the United Nations Commission on Korea are incompatible with these principles and are an obstacle to the unification of South and North Korea;

"Resolves to terminate the United Nations Commission on Korea immediately."

135. The PRESIDENT stated that there were two draft resolutions before the General Assembly:

the draft resolution presented by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and the draft resolution the USSR representative had just submitted.

136. In accordance with rule 83 of the rules of procedure, he would put the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee's draft resolution to the vote first.

The resolution was adopted by 48 votes to 6, with 3 abstentions.

137. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) requested that the USSR draft resolution should be put to the vote.

The draft resolution was rejected by 42 votes to 6, with 5 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Friday, 21 October 1949, at 3 p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Observance in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania of human rights and fundamental freedoms: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1023)

1. Mr. NISOT (Belgium), Rapporteur of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, recalled that the General Assembly, in its resolution 272 (III) of 30 April 1949, expressed the hope that, in accordance with the peace treaties, measures would be diligently applied to ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Bulgaria and Hungary.

2. There had since been referred to the General Assembly the diplomatic correspondence between certain signatories of the peace treaties concerning the functioning of the machinery for settlement of disputes which was established by those treaties. Those signatories included Romania, whose case the General Assembly had recently placed on its agenda (224th meeting).

3. That correspondence had been made available to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, which, in the course of its debates¹ had also heard explanations and arguments presented by numerous representatives. Thus informed, the Committee had decided to recommend that the General Assembly should request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on a certain number of points concerning the interpretation of the relevant clauses of the peace treaties.

4. The Committee had therefore drawn up a draft resolution, which Mr. Nisot submitted in its name to the General Assembly (A/1023).

5. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) recalled that in the spring of 1949, the whole world had been shocked by the trials and strange confessions of Cardinal Mindszenty in Hungary and of the Protestant pastors in Bulgaria. At that time, the General Assembly had expressed its deep concern in regard to the charges made by his own and other Governments regarding the systematic

violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in those countries and had endorsed the measures taken by the signatories to invoke the peace treaty procedure in order to ensure the observance of those rights and freedoms.

6. In accordance with the General Assembly's resolution, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand had since endeavoured to apply the treaty procedures but the USSR had refused to co-operate in having the charges of treaty violation considered by the heads of mission of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States in the three countries concerned, as was provided by the treaties. Moreover, the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania had refused to co-operate in setting up treaty commissions to consider the charges, notwithstanding the fact that the treaties provided that such commissions should be set up whenever the heads of missions were unable to resolve any dispute.

7. The draft resolution proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee requested the General Assembly to express its deep and continuing concern at the charges of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in those countries, and its further concern at the failure of those countries to co-operate in the General Assembly effort to find a solution.

8. As, despite the apparently clear language of the treaties, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania had claimed that the treaty procedures were not legally applicable to the disputes, the resolution requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice to determine, first, whether the treaty procedures applied to those disputes; secondly, whether the ex-enemy countries were obliged to co-operate in the carrying out of those procedures; thirdly, whether the Secretary-General was authorized to appoint the third member of a treaty commission, if requested to do so by one of the parties to the dispute in accordance with the treaty provisions; and, fourthly, whether a commission composed of a representative of one party and third member appointed by the Secretary-General would constitute a commission competent to settle

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 7th to 15th meetings inclusive.*