



**REPORT  
OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE  
ON THE INDIAN OCEAN**

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

OFFICIAL RECORDS: TWENTY-EIGHTH SESSION

SUPPLEMENT No. 29 (A/9029)

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#### NOTE

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. By resolution 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, the General Assembly:  
(1) decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, consisting of no more than 15 members, to study the implications of the Indian Ocean peace zone proposal, with special reference to the practical measures that might be taken in furtherance of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971 entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace", and having due regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and the interests of any other State consistent with the Charter of the United Nations; and (2) requested the Committee to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session.

2. The General Assembly further decided that the Committee should consist of the following States: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia.

## II. WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

3. The Committee held 11 meetings at United Nations Headquarters between 27 February and 4 October 1973.

4. The Committee elected the following officers:

Chairman: Mr. Hamilton S. Amerasinghe (Sri Lanka)  
Vice-Chairman: Mr. Raden Kusumasmoro (Indonesia)  
Rapporteur: Mr. Moïse A. Rakotosihanaka (Madagascar)

5. In studying the implications of the Indian Ocean peace zone proposal, the Committee had before it a working paper by Sri Lanka, dated 12 March 1973, outlining the main aspects of the question (annex I).

6. As resolution 2992 (XXVII) did not provide for official records, the Secretariat prepared, at the request of the Chairman and with the co-operation of the Committee members, a paper quoting, under appropriate headings, the main views expressed by members in the debate (annex II). The Committee accordingly devoted its attention to the following questions:

1. Aims and implications of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.
2. Terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Committee.
3. Definitions.
4. Littoral and hinterland States: security and consultations.

5. Great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean: question of consultations.
6. Arms control and disarmament aspects of the peace zone.
7. Foreign military bases.
8. Colonial territories.
9. Law of the sea:

- (a) Freedom of navigation and communication;
- (b) Utilization of the resources of the sea.

10. Expert study by the Secretary-General.
11. Draft resolution for the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

7. The consideration of the aims and implications of the Declaration, as well as of the Committee's terms of reference, helped the Committee to identify the main aspects of the question before it and opened the way to a general debate on all the other items listed in the previous paragraph.

8. The question of definitions was emphasized early in the debate and involved such aspects as the limits or boundaries of the "zone of peace" and the precise meaning of such terms as "littoral and hinterland States", "foreign military bases" and the "context of great Power rivalry". The view was expressed that accurate definitions would be necessary, though not in the initial stages of the study entrusted to the Ad Hoc Committee. There was an exploratory discussion of this aspect of the subject but no conclusions were reached.

9. In regard to the role of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, members had in mind the relevant portions of the Declaration, as well as of resolution 2992 (XXVII). A wide range of views was expressed as to how States of the region could best contribute to the implementation of the goals of the Declaration. Among the views expressed were the following: (a) the attainment of a common viewpoint among the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean through close consultations; (b) the affirmation of their resolve to settle disputes between them through peaceful means and without resort to force in conformity with the principle of mutual respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, and without prejudice to the exercise of the right to use force in self-defence against armed attack and in the assertion of the right of self-determination; (c) the need to promote and ensure conditions of security within the region so as to strengthen the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. The further view was expressed that, in considering the subject-matter of this paragraph, reference should be made to the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The suggestion was also made that, for the purpose of attaining a common viewpoint among the littoral and hinterland States, a conference of these States might be convened at some stage.



10. The elaboration of a common viewpoint among the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, it was generally felt, would enable them to enter into consultations with the great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean pursuant to the Declaration and to resolution 2992 (XXVII). At the 8th meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, on 14 June 1973, the Chairman outlined some of the specific issues on which, in his view, a common understanding would have to be reached for the purpose of holding such consultations and mentioned, in particular, the following: (a) the exclusion of great Power rivalry and the elimination of all foreign military presence from the area; (b) a commitment by the nuclear Powers not to deploy nuclear weapons in the area; (c) the elimination from the area of all foreign military bases and installations and a ban on the establishment of new bases or enlargement of existing bases.

11. In this connexion some members drew attention to the question of foreign military bases, particularly those conceived in the context of great Power rivalry. It was pointed out that the aim should be to free the Indian Ocean area from great Power rivalries and conflicts as well as from military bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition. The view was also expressed that the Committee would need to have in mind the positions of the major Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, which had an important interest in and influence upon what happened there; if the Committee did not attract the support of those Powers for its work, it would not be able to succeed in achieving the objectives of the Declaration. The Committee also addressed itself to the status of territories in the Indian Ocean still under colonial domination. It was also urged that the presence of racist régimes bordering the area was inimical to the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

12. The need was recognized for promoting arms control and disarmament measures which would contribute to the establishment of the zone of peace. The respective responsibilities of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and of the extra-regional great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean were emphasized. In this connexion, some members raised the question of the denuclearization of the area. The view was expressed that the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean should lend support to measures of arms control and disarmament consistent with regional objectives and especially conducive to the realization of the aims and objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

13. Questions of the law of the sea were raised in the context of the maintenance of peace and stability in the region of the Indian Ocean. The view was expressed that freedom of navigation should be subject only to the reasonable and necessary jurisdiction of the coastal State over its assets and the right of the coastal State to explore and exploit the adjacent natural resources and to protect its environment. Attention was also drawn to the need for free and unimpeded passage across the Indian Ocean and freedom of access to the ports of the countries of the region for the purpose of trade and in furtherance of programmes of economic co-operation and other peaceful uses. In addition, reference was made to the need to create conditions in which the States of the region would be able fully to exercise their sovereign rights over natural resources, not only on land but also within their jurisdiction over the seas and the sea-bed. In this connexion, it was stated that any system which did not acknowledge the concern of the coastal State and its interest in exercising jurisdiction over the resources in a zone of appropriate width adjacent to its coast might prove unworkable and would not

promote the objective of peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region. It was stated that the forthcoming United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea could provide an opportunity for arriving at mutual accommodation and understanding in the interest of regional harmony.

14. In the course of the debate, it was suggested that a study by the Secretary-General be prepared in 1974 with the assistance of consultant experts, providing authoritative information about the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean, so that the Committee would be in a better position to assess the implications of that presence. The view was expressed that the value of the study could be enhanced if it were prepared with the co-operation of the great Powers. It was stated that definitions could be of basic importance for any such study and that the relevant definitions might need to be settled beforehand.

15. It was generally agreed that the work of the Committee should continue and that, for the future, provision should be made for summary records.

16. The view was also expressed that the Committee could function as a forum for the exchange of views on questions of arms control and disarmament relative to the region, as they arose.

17. In addition to the meetings mentioned in paragraph 3 above, informal meetings of littoral and hinterland States were convened by Ambassador H. S. Amerasinghe in order to keep those States informed about the work of the Committee and elicit their views on the main issues dealt with by it (see annex III).

18. At the request of the Chairman, a selected bibliography of the Indian Ocean was prepared by the Secretariat (annex IV).

## ANNEX I

### Sri Lanka: working paper\*

#### Introduction

1. The General Assembly, by resolution 2992 (XXVII) adopted at its twenty-seventh session (1972), decided to appoint an Ad Hoc Committee of not more than 15 members to study the implications of the Indian Ocean peace zone proposal, with special reference to the practical measures that may be taken in furtherance of the objectives of resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace", having due regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and the interests of any other State consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session. The Ad Hoc Committee consists of the following members:

Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia.

2. It will be recalled that, at its twenty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace". The Declaration sought to define in its ultimate form the concept of the peace zone. The essential elements of the peace zone concept are described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 2832 (XXVI), which read as follows:

"2. Calls upon the great Powers, in conformity with this Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to:

(a) Halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean;

(b) Eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry;

3. Calls upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, in pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances and strengthening international security through regional and other co-operation, to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of this Declaration and such action as may be necessary to ensure that:

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\* Issued on 12 March 1973 under the symbol A/AC.159/L.2 and Corr.1.

(a) Warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) Subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations is unaffected;

(c) Appropriate arrangements are made to give effect to any international agreement that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace."

3. It is now necessary for the littoral and hinterland States to consider the measures that should be taken for the Ad Hoc Committee to discharge its mandate, and for this purpose it is desirable that they should arrive at an understanding on the position which they should jointly take up both within the Ad Hoc Committee itself and in the course of the consultations which will necessarily have to be conducted with the great Powers, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users. It is equally necessary that they themselves should be very clear in their minds about the nature and scope of the proposal and the actions contemplated, in order that they could develop a common will to action and that their collective action could be effective.

#### Concept of the peace zone

4. The peace zone Declaration contemplates the establishment within the Indian Ocean area of a zone of peace free of nuclear weapons in which conditions of peace and tranquillity would be ensured by the exclusion of great Power rivalries and competition as well as the elimination of bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition. The Declaration was also intended to serve as a contribution to the relaxation of general international tensions and the strengthening of international peace and security, as well as to ensuring conditions of security within the region which would render redundant and superfluous the need for military alliances with outside Powers and the maintenance of military bases and appurtenant establishments and facilities. This would help the States of the region to devote more attention to the task of economic and social reconstruction.

#### Littoral and hinterland States

5. It would be necessary first of all to decide on which States would qualify to be considered as littoral and hinterland States for purposes of the proposal.

In the course of the negotiations and discussions in the General Assembly, and taking into account practical considerations, the following States have been considered as littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean:

Afghanistan	Iraq	Qatar
Australia	Kenya	Saudi Arabia
Bahrain	Kuwait	Singapore
Bhutan	Lesotho	Somalia
Botswana	Madagascar	Sri Lanka
Burma	Malawi	Sudan
Democratic Yemen	Malaysia	Swaziland
Egypt	Maldives	Thailand
Ethiopia	Mauritius	Uganda
India	Nepal	United Republic of
Indonesia	Oman	Tanzania
Iran	Pakistan	Yemen
		Zambia

If any State that has a part of its seaboard on the Indian Ocean has been omitted from the list, it is because its primary concern has been deemed to be with regard to the Atlantic seaboard. It would be necessary, however, to keep even such a State informed of the deliberations in the Ad Hoc Committee. A suitable procedure for this purpose could be determined at the appropriate stage.

#### Renunciation of the use of force

6. The creation of a peace zone in a region must presuppose the renunciation by States of that region of the threat or use of force against any other State in that region and the affirmation of their resolve to settle their disputes with one another by peaceful means and without resort to force, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The right of self-defence would be reaffirmed.

7. The main danger in regard to the arms race in the Indian Ocean region, or anywhere else, relates to the presence of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. It is suggested that those littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean which have not yet done so should, as an earnest of their good faith and good intentions, consider acceding to or ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty).

8. It would be understood that any limitations or restrictions imposed upon themselves by States in this respect result from decisions taken by them in the exercise of their sovereign rights, as in the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

#### Limits of the peace zone

9. The definition of the limits of the peace zone is a matter that would require early consideration. There are two aspects of such a definition:

- (a) Territorial;
- (b) Geographical.

In regard to territorial limits, the definition adopted in the Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty could serve as a model.

The geographical limits would have to be defined in terms of latitude and longitude.

It would also be necessary to agree on the definition of the term "foreign military base" for the purpose of implementing the Declaration.

The status of islands in the Indian Ocean under foreign control or occupation would require careful examination in relation to the definition of the limits of the peace zone.

#### Peaceful uses of the Indian Ocean

10. It must be agreed, as stated explicitly in the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, that the régime of the peace zone would at every stage guarantee the use of the Indian Ocean for peaceful purposes, including commerce and merchant shipping, that the passage of warships across the Indian Ocean would be permissible provided their passage or presence is not a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States or prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of these States.

#### Enforcement

11. As regards the enforcement of any international instrument under which the peace zone is ultimately brought into effect, it would be necessary to consider alternative methods of enforcement. Methods that suggest themselves are either self-enforcement or enforcement through an international authority.

#### Ad Hoc Committee's procedure

12. It is suggested that the Ad Hoc Committee, in the initial stage of its work, focus attention on the following tasks:

(a) Cataloguing the military presence of foreign Powers in this area, taking bases also into consideration;

(b) Considering proposals for a phased programme for the gradual reduction and ultimate elimination of such military presence on the part of foreign Powers.

At the appropriate stage it would be necessary for the Ad Hoc Committee to hold consultations with the littoral and hinterland States as a group, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean.



## ANNEX II

### Excerpts from statements made in the general debate in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean\*

#### A. AIMS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE (RESOLUTION 2832 (XXVI))

"The aims of the proposal, as distinct from its implications, are the establishment in the Indian Ocean area of a nuclear-free zone where peace would be ensured by the exclusion from the zone of great Power rivalry as well as elimination of bases conceived in the context of such great Power rivalry." (Sri Lanka, 6th meeting.)

"The Indian Ocean zone belongs to the countries and peoples of that region. ... In order to truly realize the just proposal for the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, it is imperative first of all to stop the two super-Powers' military expansion and contention for hegemony in the Indian Ocean zone, and have all the foreign military bases removed from the Indian Ocean and its coastal areas and all the foreign armed forces withdrawn therefrom, and to prohibit all nuclear countries from deploying and using nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean zone and all foreign warships and military aircraft from using the Indian Ocean to encroach upon the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. So long as the military bases already established or to be established by the two super-Powers in the Indian Ocean and its environs are not removed and as long as their military threats, naval expansion and nuclear submarine activities continue, there can be no talk of peace at all in the Indian Ocean zone.

"Obviously, the establishment of the Indian Ocean peace zone also depends on the countries in this region basing their relations on the principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence and joining their efforts in opposing big-Power hegemony and the policies of expansion and aggression." (China, 5th meeting.)

"The objectives of the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace are twofold. On the one hand, the concept contemplates the relaxation of international tensions through arresting developments that portend the extension of the arms race and the maintenance or creation of military alliances in the area. On the other, it intends to maintain international peace and security and to preserve the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the States of the area by means other than military alliances in the interest of social and economic development.

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\* This paper was prepared by the Secretariat, at the request of the Chairman. It provides, under appropriate headings, the views expressed by members on the main issues before the Committee, at meetings held from 21 to 25 May and from 11 to 14 June 1973.

"The basic principle upon which the elements of the concept rest is that it is a measure for strengthening international peace and security, and not a measure for disarmament. However, there is no denying the fact that these two fields are interconnected, and the degree of success achieved in the one field necessarily enhances success in the other. With this concurrence in mind, paragraph 2 of resolution 2832 (XXVI) calls upon the great Powers to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States, with a view to halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and to eliminating from it all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence conceived in the context of great Power rivalry. ... Paragraph 3 of the same resolution addresses itself to another element of the concept. It aims at the establishment of a system of universal collective security without military alliances and the strengthening of international security through regional and other co-operation. Towards this end, the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean are all called upon to enter into consultations with a view to implementing the objectives of the concept." (Iraq, 8th meeting.)

/Madagascar -- see section D.

"The implications ... of this proposal are the following. Firstly, the countries of the region, both littoral and hinterland States, as well as countries outside the region but militarily active in the region, would have to assume certain commitments if any stable agreement is to be reached. As far as the countries in the region are concerned, they will have to commit themselves to a policy of denuclearization which would entail the permanent renunciation by them of a nuclear weapon option and the assumption of an obligation to deny the use of their territories and their territorial waters and their air space to nuclear weapons belonging to other States. On the part of the nuclear Powers their contribution would be the assumption of an obligation not to deploy nuclear weapons in the peace zone area.

"Secondly, the creation of a peace zone in the region presupposes also the renunciation by States of the region of the threat or use of force against any other State in the region and the affirmation of their resolve to settle their disputes with one another by peaceful means and without resort to force. The right of self-defence, of course, is reaffirmed. ...

"Thirdly, the freedom of the high seas will continue to be guaranteed for peaceful purposes, including commerce and merchant ships, and the passage of warships across the Indian Ocean would be permissible provided that their presence is not a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States or prejudicial to the good order or security of these States.

"Fourth, the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace will mean the elimination from this area of all foreign bases and military installations. We realize that this elimination of bases cannot be achieved overnight -- what is required is a gradual winding down, a process which can be accelerated when the achievement of the other aspects of the proposal render such bases redundant and unnecessary. A more immediate implication of the proposal is that no new bases



will be established and that existing bases are not enlarged in any way." (Sri Lanka, 6th meeting.)

"We have throughout consistently treated this question not as a question of disarmament but as a contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security. As far as this aspect goes, however, there is undeniably a link with the question of disarmament, though in introducing the proposal we preferred to stress the non-armament aspect and the need to arrest and reverse the arms race in the Indian Ocean." (Sri Lanka, 6th meeting.)

"The Committee ... should not be confined to questions of arms control and disarmament alone but should include all aspects of the problem to fulfil its mandate." (Sri Lanka, 6th meeting.)

#### B. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE

"The terms of reference of this Committee, as set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2992 (XXVII) contain four points which deserve emphasis. First, this is a committee formed to study a specific problem and it would be appropriate to begin without restrictive preconditions ... in a pragmatic and responsible manner ... and ... it would be wise to adopt a step-by-step approach. Second, we are called upon to consider what practical measures might be taken in furtherance of the proposal ... a practical measure /being/ one which - among other things - could command a necessary measure of support, including the support of the nations of the region, and which could make a real contribution to the security of the region. Third, we are required to have due regard to the security interests of the States of the region ... and ... we should acknowledge a consequent responsibility to strengthen that security. Fourth, we are required to have due regard to the security interests of 'any other State'. This would imply that we shall need to have in mind the positions of the major Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, which have an important and legitimate interest in and influence upon what happens there. If we are unable to attract the support of these Powers for our work we shall not be able to regard that work as successful; worse, it might prove counter-productive from the point of view of peace and security." (Australia, 4th meeting.)

"The Committee's mandate, as contained in paragraph 2 of resolution 2992 (XXVII), is clearly linked, from the point of view of the substantive aspects of our work, with the provisions of resolution 2832 (XXVI), for it is in these provisions that the objectives and the elements of the concept of the Indian Ocean peace zone can be found". (Iraq, 8th meeting.)

#### C. DEFINITIONS

"In his useful intervention on 23 April, the representative of India suggested that we might examine the matter of the limits of the zone and the matter of definitions - for example the definition of the terms 'foreign military base' and 'littoral and hinterland State'. These are important substantive questions on which no doubt divergent views exist and which will not be easy to resolve." (Australia, 4th meeting.)

"The question of the limits or boundaries /of the area of the zone of peace/ is one of great complexity ... We can see merit in starting to discuss the various alternatives on limits. We do not believe, however, that there would be value in trying now to define those limits by agreement because we see a danger that to do so might prejudice positions and attitudes in regard not only to the matter of limits but also to the substantive content of the over-all concept ..."  
(Australia, 4th meeting.)

"To begin with we must address ourselves to the following: (1) Limits of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. In this the Committee should seek a clear definition of the territorial and geographical limits of the Indian Ocean. It would seem that the definition adopted in the sea-bed denuclearization treaty should not form a precedent in this respect for the purposes of the declaration. Different aspects of the peace zone may have different limits of applicability and therefore this question needs careful examination by the Committee. (2) Definition of foreign military bases conceived in the context of great Power rivalries ..."  
(India, 6th meeting.)

/Indonesia - see sections D and F.

"Paragraph 5 of document A/AC.159/L.2 and Corr.1 states that it is indeed necessary to decide upon the question of which States would qualify to be considered as littoral and hinterland States for the purposes of the proposal. In this connexion, it is clear that the Sri Lanka paper adopts the functional criterion of the 'primary concern' of the State in question. In elaborating upon this, ... Sri Lanka /had/ stated ...: 'Broadly, coastal States of the Indian Ocean are taken to be those whose main seaboard was the Indian Ocean, while those hinterland States whose main access to the sea is the Indian Ocean have also been included in the list (of document A/AC.159/L.2 and Corr.1) ... The list in paragraph 5 is not necessarily complete. There may be some others who qualify, under the given definition, for inclusion in the list.' Iraq agrees with this definition ... for it includes all States directly bordering the Indian Ocean, or any one of its natural sea extensions, the access from which to the high seas has to be the Indian Ocean itself. We would go further and state that in our view this definition should also be considered as the outline of the limits of the peace zone itself."  
(Iraq, 8th meeting.)

/Iraq - see also section D.

/Malaysia - see section E.

"It was suggested that various terms and factors ... need clear definition. What is a foreign military base? And how to distinguish it from one conceived in the context of the cold war? The limits of the zone of peace we seek to establish and so forth. Pakistan has no objection to seeking the help of the Secretariat in clarifying these terms ..."  
(Pakistan, 6th meeting.)

"There is the question of the definition of terms such as 'zone' or 'area', 'bases' and 'the context of great Power rivalry' ... For our present purposes ... it would be sufficient if we proceeded to adopt the normally accepted meanings of these words and phrases ... As far as the Indian Ocean itself is concerned we might adopt for our working purposes the Indian Ocean in the cartographical sense.

As far as the zone is concerned we already have the precedent of the sea-bed demilitarization treaty, which we could use as a working basis. We realize that at some stage more accurate legal definitions will be necessary but we do feel that for our present working purposes we need not have absolutely legal definitions of these terms and can proceed on the understanding that this in no way prejudices our subsequent stand on these definitions." (Sri Lanka, 6th meeting.)

"Paragraph 5 of document L.2 contains a preliminary list of /the littoral and hinterland/ States compiled in the course of negotiations and discussions in the General Assembly and taking into account practical considerations. Broadly, coastal States of the Indian Ocean are taken to be those whose main seaboard was the Indian Ocean, while those hinterland States whose main access to the sea is the Indian Ocean have also been included in the list. Any State that has part of its seaboard in the Indian Ocean but whose concerns or interests are related primarily to the Atlantic seaboard has not been included in this list. Even such States are most welcome to subscribe to the concept just as we expect extraregional Powers to do. The list in paragraph 5 is not necessarily complete. There may be some others who qualify, under the given definition, for inclusion in the list ... This is the least of our problems and can perhaps be cleared up in due course." (Sri Lanka, 6th meeting.)

/Sri Lanka - see also section D.

/United Republic of Tanzania - see section J.

#### D. LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATES: SECURITY AND CONSULTATIONS

/Australia - see sections B, F and I.

/China - see section A.

"All littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean should take an active interest in the deliberations to enable a coherent and acceptable concretization of practical measures. At the first session in this Committee, India had underlined the need for informal consultations among the delegations to determine acceptable practical steps which the Committee could recommend for implementing the proposal. India would emphasize it once again. Effective discharge of the mandate of the Committee calls for close consultations and understanding among the countries of the region to begin with." (India, 6th meeting.)

"Among the most important requirements ... in the task of ... transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace is the attainment of a common viewpoint among the littoral and hinterland States of the region. For the purposes of our discussion, we may take the list of States compiled in working paper A/AC.159/L.2 and Corr.1, paragraph 5, as definitive for the consultations which would necessarily precede the attainment of a consensus. Certainly, it must be understood that nothing in such consultations could be implied to exclude other interested States from taking part in our further deliberations. Indeed the full participation of these States, particularly those whose ships are frequent users of the Indian Ocean, would be both necessary and desirable." (Indonesia, 5th meeting.)

/Indonesia - see also section F.

"Our first observation relates to the security interests of States ... What is needed is perhaps a greater emphasis, not on individual interests as such, but rather, as the Declaration provides, on 'a system of universal collective security without military alliances'. At the same time, our mandate makes it incumbent upon us to take into account the interests of States, but with the important qualification that these be consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations ...". (Iraq, 8th meeting.)

"States of the region are called upon to commit themselves to withdrawal from military alliances and should dismantle foreign military bases which are found on their territories; this logically presupposes the determination of what is meant by a 'foreign military base'." (Iraq, 8th meeting.)

"The machinery for discharging the tasks entrusted to us is that of involving all the categories of States referred to in resolution 2832 (XXVI) in the process of consultations desired by the General Assembly ...". (Iraq, 8th meeting.)

"The renunciation by the States of the region of the use of force ... and the settlement of disputes through peaceful means without the resort to force are the essential modalities for the creation of the peace zone. States of the region cannot in all earnestness advocate the concept of a peace zone without themselves practising first what they preach to the outside world. They should therefore commit themselves first to the renunciation of the threat or use of force or the concentration of troops along borders so as to constitute a threat against others. They should commit themselves to the settlement of disputes through peaceful means." (Iraq, 8th meeting.)

/Iraq - see also sections A and F.

"We entertain a deep and abiding sympathy for the aspirations of littoral and hinterland countries of the Indian Ocean to strengthen peace and security in the region through their endeavour, free from big Power rivalry." (Japan, 4th meeting.)

/Japan - see also section I.

"It might help to achieve the desired objective if consultations among littoral and hinterland States be carried out on a regional basis." (Malaysia, 6th meeting.)

/Malaysia - see also section E.

"If the co-operation of the great Powers is necessary, the Committee cannot fail, in the first place, to clearly indicate, in conformity with the interests of the countries of the area, what is implied in its concept of the 'Indian Ocean a zone of peace'." (Madagascar, 8th meeting.)

"We will have to make an inventory of all the problems ... with a view to solving them step by step. Hence the importance of a serious study /of such problems/ which cannot be successful without the concerted action of all the States of the Indian Ocean." (Madagascar, 8th meeting.)

"The suggestion of the delegation of the United Republic of Tanzania for a high-level meeting of the States of the Indian Ocean should be considered with due attention." (Madagascar, 8th meeting.)

"The establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean must be founded on the determination, the efforts and actions, first of all, of the countries situated in the region ... The countries of the region must base their relations with each other on the principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit." (Pakistan, 6th meeting.)

"We go along with the ideal set out in paragraph 4 of the Sri Lanka paper (A/AC.159/L.2) that the declaration proclaiming the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace is intended to serve as a contribution to the relaxation of general international tensions and the strengthening of international peace and security, as well as to ensuring conditions of security within the region which would render redundant and superfluous the need for military alliances with outside Powers and the maintenance of military bases and appurtenant establishment and facilities ... It is imperative and it is feasible that States of the region should affirm their resolve to settle their disputes with one another, as suggested in the Sri Lanka paper, by peaceful means and without resort to force ... A concomitant ... is ... the need to establish machinery or arrangements which would help the countries of the region in resolving their existing disputes and if not prevent the emergence of new ones, provide for their peaceful settlement." (Pakistan, 6th meeting.)

/Pakistan - see also section F.

"We must have clear in our minds who the littoral and hinterland States are. That is to say, who the States in the region are. A definition by itself achieves nothing. It would be sufficient if the coastal States and their immediate neighbours, not adjacent to the Indian Ocean, agree to the concept, abide by the principles which are recognized as the constituent elements of the concept and co-operate in their realization." (Sri Lanka, 6th meeting.)

"Paragraph 2 of resolution 2992 (XXVII) requests us to pay due regard to the security interests of littoral and hinterland and other States as well. Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of working paper contained in document A/AC.159/L.2 and Corr.1 deal with this aspect of the problem as far as States in the region are concerned. The right to self-defence is not denied and States in the region are called upon to renounce the threat or use of force against each other. Those outside it, including the great Powers, have also to renounce the use of force, nuclear or otherwise, in the area if the proposal is to become a reality." (Sri Lanka, 6th meeting.)

"Paragraph 2 of resolution 2832 (XXVI) calls upon the great Powers to enter into consultations immediately with the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and calls upon littoral and hinterland States to enter into consultations amongst themselves in paragraph 3. Obviously the latter set of consultations should take place first so that the littoral and hinterland States would be able as a group to consult with the permanent members of the Security Council ... One such preliminary consultation has already taken place and periodic consultations of that nature will be necessary in the future." (Sri Lanka, 6th meeting.)



/Sri Lanka - see also section A.

"A high-level meeting of the States of the region must be called to lay down the political foundation for the practical measures to be taken to implement the Declaration. On the basis of the study we have mentioned\* and other points we might prepare in this Committee, such a meeting of littoral and hinterland States could come up with ... points of agreement and guidelines for action to implement the Declaration.

"It could be envisaged, for example, that such a meeting would agree on the elaboration of a general instrument or instruments to embody such things as renunciation of foreign military bases in the region, establishment of an alternative system of military, political and economic security, machinery to implement the provisions of the agreement or agreements, a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes and other measures to strengthen peace and security in the region. To ensure effectiveness of the agreement the meeting will have to take place at the highest possible level of representation. In fact it may be that more than one meeting at different levels of representation will have to be called ...

"If the Ad Hoc Committee could succeed in having such a meeting convened with the appropriate preparations it would be a big step towards the implementation of the Declaration ..." (United Republic of Tanzania, 7th meeting.)

/United Republic of Tanzania - see also section J.

#### E. GREAT POWERS AND MAJOR MARITIME USERS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN: QUESTION OF CONSULTATIONS

/Australia - see sections B, F and I.

/China - see section A.

"While formulating its recommendations, the Committee should know the position of the major Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean. The main aim is to free the area of the Indian Ocean from great Power rivalries and conflicts as well as military bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition." (India, 6th meeting.)

/Indonesia - see sections D and F.

"We should not prematurely enter into consultation with other maritime Powers until the time when we have more than a hazy picture of what we are going to bargain about and ... a better-than-nil chance of success." (Iran, 5th meeting.)

"We know that the major maritime Powers outside of the region have so far shown no inclination to abide by the wishes of the littoral and hinterland States of the region to end their military presence in the Indian Ocean. Yet we also know that their security interests in this region are secondary and peripheral compared to their immediate surroundings. None of these Powers has such a naval investment

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\* See section J.

in the Indian Ocean that it could not be withdrawn safely if other exogenous Powers also withdrew. This is a firm ground on which this Committee can pin its hopes." (Iran, 5th meeting.)

/Iran - see also section J.

/Iraq - see sections A and D.

"In order to realize the proposed scheme of halting the further escalation and expansion of the military presence in the Indian Ocean and eventual elimination of the great Power military presence, it is essential to obtain the co-operation of all the countries which have direct interest in the region and, particularly, all the major military Powers of the world." (Japan, 4th meeting.)

/Madagascar - see section 4.

"Before the next step is taken to approach the big Powers and the maritime users of the Indian Ocean, the Committee needs first of all to determine the limits of the zone, to define 'foreign military bases' and a host of other questions which still remained unanswered, and there should be a consensus of views of the littoral and hinterland States on some of these questions, and perhaps it might help to achieve the desired objective if consultations among littoral and hinterland States were carried out on a regional basis ...". (Malaysia, 6th meeting.)

/Pakistan - see section F.

/Sri Lanka - see sections A and D.

/United Republic of Tanzania - see sections D and J.

#### F. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ASPECTS OF THE PEACE ZONE

"We consider that this Committee would perform a useful service if it were to encourage all littoral and hinterland States to give maximum support to existing international treaties of arms control that bear upon our regional objectives. Among those treaties we would include the non-proliferation treaty and the sea-bed arms control treaty. Widespread support for these treaties, in the region as well as beyond, would help materially to strengthen peace and security in the region." (Australia, 4th meeting.)

"We consider that the great Powers might with profit discuss prospects for limiting their naval deployments in the Indian Ocean." (Australia, 4th meeting.)

"In the longer term, Australia can see advantage in arranging for the Committee to continue to function as a clearing-house for regional questions of arms control and disarmament as these arise, and as appropriate to ask it to undertake studies to this end." (Australia, 4th meeting.)

/China - see section A.

/India - see section F.

"We fully support the suggestion that, for the countries of the region, 'it

would be reasonable to call upon them, as an earnest of their good faith, to commit themselves to a policy of denuclearization which would entail the permanent renunciation by them of a nuclear weapon option and the assumption of an obligation to deny the use of their territories and territorial waters and their air space to nuclear weapons belonging to other States' (A/AC.159/L.3, p. 3). Such a renunciation would be the result of the common view which we would seek in the consultations of the regional States." (Indonesia, 5th meeting.)

"It would be wise to begin our search for the denuclearization of the zone with ... efforts from within. Indonesia is unsure that the approach ... of first seeking to obtain the pledges of the nuclear Powers to respect the zone and then seeking to carry out the denuclearization of the regional States is the method most likely to achieve success." (Indonesia, 5th meeting.)

"The implementation of the concept of the zone of peace might best take place in two phases. The first phase would consist of the formulation of a common viewpoint among the littoral and hinterland States which would establish the basic framework and definitions within which these States would co-operate to implement the concept. Once this stage had been achieved, it would be necessary to request the extraregional great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to agree to the provisions of the over-all formula of denuclearization advanced by the regional Powers. This second goal might be accomplished in a manner analogous to that of Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which provided the machinery through which these Powers would signify their assent to the principles embodied in the Treaty.

"Another provision of the Treaty of Tlatelolco offers a helpful parallel in dealing with the problem of the status of colonial territories which fall within the purview of the zone. Here it would be useful to propose a device similar to that of Protocol I of the Treaty. By this Protocol, the administering Power subscribes to the provisions of the Treaty in so far as they apply to the colonial areas falling within the scope of the agreement. This would permit the solution of the problem presented by the necessity for the adherence of those Non-Self-Governing Territories which exist within the zone of peace." (Indonesia, 5th meeting.)

"An additional problem that would be solved by the initiative of the regional States to denuclearize themselves would be the problem of the limits of the zone. So long as each of the States of the region undertakes to exclude from its land area and from its territorial waters all nuclear weapons, the question of the delimitation of the zone would become irrelevant. The act of denuclearization on the part of the individual States would itself define the area of the zone of peace." (Indonesia, 5th meeting.)

"As regards the problem of the enforcement of any international instrument under which the peace zone is ultimately brought into effect, Iraq believes that this function should be entrusted to an international authority composed of the States of the region." (Iraq, 8th meeting.)

/Iraq - see also section A.

"It is essential that any disarmament scheme should be accompanied by adequate and effective measures for inspection and verification. We therefore are most



interested in learning from the regional States what kind of practical steps they are envisaging in this respect. For example, we feel that it will take a long time before any practical measure could be agreed upon to verify the movement of submarines." (Japan, 4th meeting.)

"The proposal /for a zone of peace/ may ... be considered as keeping in line with such regional disarmament scheme as the denuclearization of Latin America and disarmament of Antarctica. It is the basic position of the Japanese Government to support any arms control measure as a step toward general and complete disarmament." (Japan, 4th meeting.)

"Madagascar supports the suggestion put forth in paragraph 7 of the working paper of Sri Lanka (A/AC.159/L.2)."<sup>\*</sup> (Madagascar, 8th meeting.)

"The question of the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean ... is a matter which affects the vital interests of and strategic balance between, or among, the Powers which possess arsenals of weapons of mass destruction. The long and slow history of the talks on strategic arms limitation must make one wary of expecting quick results ... In considering the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean, three factors must be taken into account: the strategic balance among the great Powers; the need to evolve a common point of view among the countries of the region; and the need to reconcile the rights and interest of these two sets of Powers." (Pakistan, 6th meeting.)

"Pakistan would favour the two-phase approach suggested ... by ... Indonesia ..."<sup>\*\*</sup> (Pakistan, 6th meeting.)

"We take it for granted, if there is to be denuclearization of the Indian Ocean, that the countries of the region will not themselves become nuclear-weapon Powers. Pakistan has no difficulty in endorsing the pleas made ... for support of the various arms control measures and in particular the non-proliferation treaty. The Committee might give thought to ways of enabling or encouraging all the littoral and hinterland States to sign or ratify this treaty." (Pakistan, 6th meeting.)

"We might ... request the Secretariat to compile the views of the littoral and hinterland States on the non-proliferation treaty." (Pakistan, 6th meeting.)

"Regional measures, if they are properly thought out and successfully carried out, may, by reducing tension in one part of the world, contribute to the diminution of tension in the world as a whole and bring it nearer to the goal of complete disarmament and peace. We have an example of such regional effort in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, though one must be careful about drawing an analogy. The area covered by the Indian Ocean poses problems which are different in nature and more complex in their implications than those of the South American region." (Pakistan, 6th meeting.)

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\* "It is suggested that those littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean which have not yet done so should, as an earnest of their good faith and good intentions, consider acceding to or ratifying the ... sea-bed arms control treaty".

\*\* See third statement of Indonesia in this section.

"Clearly in the initial stages at any rate, the States in the region will not have the capability for policing the Indian Ocean. To be effective all States will have to commit themselves to the observance of the area as a zone of peace. At the beginning at least we have to depend on the good faith of those States. The problem is one that exists not only here but also in so far as disarmament as a whole is concerned ...". (Sri Lanka, 6th meeting.)

/Sri Lanka - see also section A.

"The example of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has already been advanced by early speakers. We share the view that we could with considerable advantage draw on that example." (United Republic of Tanzania, 7th meeting.)

/United Republic of Tanzania - see also section D.

#### G. FOREIGN MILITARY BASES

/China - see section A.

/India - see section E.

/Iraq - see sections A and D.

"What we would regard as prejudicial to the establishment of the peace zone is the existence of foreign military bases, as they would encourage competition and rivalry between foreign Powers and among the littoral and hinterland States themselves. We want to avoid spheres of interest and protective umbrellas which might turn inside out when powerful political gales begin to blow." (Sri Lanka, 6th meeting.)

"The declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace will mean the elimination from this area of all foreign bases and military installations. We realize that this elimination of bases cannot be achieved overnight - what is required is a gradual winding down, a process which can be accelerated when the achievement of the other aspects of the proposal render such bases redundant and unnecessary. A more immediate implication of the proposal is that no new bases will be established and that existing bases are not enlarged in any way." (Sri Lanka, 6th meeting.)

/Sri Lanka - see also section A.

/United Republic of Tanzania - see section D.

#### H. COLONIAL TERRITORIES

"We must address ourselves to the status of islands in the Indian Ocean area which are still under colonial domination. The General Assembly has determined in its various resolutions that the existence of colonialism is incompatible with peace. Since colonial territories are the victims of foreign aggression, a zone of peace cannot be realized without the elimination of such aggression." (India, 6th meeting.)

/Indonesia - see section F.

## I. LAW OF THE SEA

### (a) Freedom of navigation and communication

"In the interests of stable development, it will be necessary to accept and promote other legitimate uses of the Indian Ocean by States in and outside the region, both within and beyond national jurisdiction, to the mutual benefit of those States and their peoples. Perhaps the most important of these other uses is that of freedom of navigation beyond the territorial sea. This freedom, which contributes materially to the quality of our international way of life, should be subject only to the reasonable and necessary jurisdiction of the coastal States over its assets and the right of the coastal State to explore and exploit the adjacent natural resources and to protect its environment ..." (Australia, 6th meeting.)

"Although Japan is not a littoral State bordering the Indian Ocean, it has a vital stake in maintaining peace and stability in the region. Japan is in friendly relations with all the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and we have close trade relations and programmes of economic co-operation with them. We also get essential raw materials for our industry by way of the Indian Ocean. The maintenance of free and unimpeded passage across the Indian Ocean as well as free access to the regional countries are, therefore, of paramount importance for Japan." (Japan, 4th meeting.)

/Sri Lanka - see section A.

### (b) Utilization of the resources of the sea

"It would be desirable, in the interests of promoting peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region, to create conditions in which the States of the region are able fully to exercise their sovereign rights so as to secure the maximum yield from their natural resources, on land and within their jurisdiction over the seas and sea-bed. We believe that the Committee could encourage the Conference on the Law of the Sea to facilitate this objective, as far as the seas and the sea-bed are concerned.

"It would seem necessary ... to acknowledge that States whose coasts look on to the Indian Ocean have a prime concern with and interest in that region. This is not to suggest ... that other States, for example the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean as well as the great Powers, also do not have a prime concern with and interest in that legal system. But it may be argued that any system which does not acknowledge the concern of the coastal States and their interest in jurisdiction over the resources in an appropriately broad zone adjacent to their coastlines may prove not to be workable. An outcome of this sort would not promote the objective of peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region." (Australia, 6th meeting.)

"We must ... appraise very carefully the proposed scheme from the point of view of the law of the sea because ... the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee is preparing a codification of general régime for the high seas. We must examine carefully the possible implications of proposing a special régime of a regional character which deviates from the general régime for the high seas." (Japan, 4th meeting.)

"An equitable system should be evolved at the forthcoming Conference on the Law of the Sea to prevent a scramble for the resources of the sea and sea-bed." (Pakistan, 6th meeting.)

"The forthcoming Conference on the Law of the Sea ... could provide the best opportunity for arriving at that mutual accommodation and understanding which would contribute to national harmony." (Sri Lanka, 6th meeting.)

/Sri Lanka - see also section A./

#### J. STUDY BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

"We think that, as the first step, we need to have authoritative knowledge about the presence of great Powers in the Indian Ocean ... so that we may be in a position to assess various implications arising therefrom. We think that the Ad Hoc Committee would be well advised if it were to /prepare/ guidelines for this study and agree on the text of a draft procedural resolution which, upon adoption by the General Assembly, would request the Secretary-General to undertake with the assistance of a group of experts a thorough, authoritative and objective study in accordance with the guidelines we have drafted." (Iran, 5th meeting)

"We quite agree with the suggestion that a study be prepared of the big Powers' presence in the region ... with a view to determining the extent to which their presence is the cause or consequence of their rivalry in the region. Such a study could form the basis of our future work of definition as well as a basis of the dialogue among the littoral and hinterland States and between them and the big military Powers." (United Republic of Tanzania, 7th meeting.)

#### K. DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE TWENTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/Iran - see section J./

"The proposal of the delegation of Sri Lanka for an extension of the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate should be retained." (Madagascar, 8th meeting.)

"At the next set of meetings ... we might ... proceed to the drafting of a resolution to be presented at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly providing in that draft for a continuation of this Committee till such time as it has been able to complete its mandate." (Sri Lanka, 6th meeting.)

### ANNEX III

Statement made by Mr. H. S. Amerasinghe, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka, at the informal meeting of littoral and hinterland States convened by Sri Lanka and held at United Nations Headquarters on 16 April 1973\*

This informal meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean listed in paragraph 5 of the working paper of 12 March 1973 (A/AC.159/L.2 and Corr.1), presented to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean by the Sri Lanka delegation has been convened to ascertain from the representatives of the littoral and hinterland States their observations in regard to the approach that should be adopted by their representatives on the Ad Hoc Committee to secure the effective discharge of its mandate by that Committee.

It was with this purpose in mind that the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, Mrs. Sirima R. D. Bandaranaike, addressed the Heads of State or Government of the littoral and hinterland States so that they might first consult among themselves to reach agreement on the position that the representatives on the Ad Hoc Committee might jointly adopt in their own deliberations as well as in their consultations with the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean. Attached to the letter addressed by the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka to Heads of State or Government of the littoral and hinterland States was an aide-mémoire setting out the essential features of the concept of the peace zone and suggesting procedures that might be adopted for its implementation. The substance of this aide-mémoire has since been issued as the Sri Lanka delegation's working paper referred to earlier.

I should like to draw the attention of the distinguished delegates present here to paragraph 12 of the working paper where it is suggested that the Ad Hoc Committee, in the initial stages of its work, focus attention on the following tasks:

"(a) Cataloguing the military presence of foreign Powers in this area, taking bases also into consideration;

"(b) Considering proposals for a phased programme for the gradual reduction and ultimate elimination of such military presence on the part of foreign Powers."

Paragraph 12 of the working paper also suggests that at the appropriate stage it would be necessary for the Ad Hoc Committee to hold consultations with the

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.159/L.3.

littoral and hinterland States as a group, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean.

In order to obtain as much material as possible relevant to the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate, I have consulted organizations which are interested in and conduct research into questions relating to disarmament and arms control as well as the strengthening of international peace and security. Two such organizations are the Institute of Strategic Studies, London, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

I should like to supplement what has been stated in the Sri Lanka delegation's working paper of 12 March 1973 by certain observations of a general nature on the question of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. These observations are largely the result of the consultations I have held so far.

The Sri Lanka delegation has throughout the discussion of the question of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace treated it not as a disarmament measure but as a contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security, on the principle that there should be a positive approach to the problem of disarmament and the essence of that approach must be the effort to create a climate of peace and security in which nations would not find it necessary to arm themselves or to enter into military alliances to ensure their security from attack or aggression. In that sense, a comprehensive plan for the strengthening of peace and security in the Indian Ocean would call for measures of a political nature as well as measures of arms control, disarmament and non-armament. A region cannot be converted overnight or in a brief period of time into a zone of peace. The Indian Ocean was selected as a test case, so to say, because the arms race had not yet assumed serious proportions there and the time was opportune to arrest the competition among the major Powers to build up their military strength and presence in the Indian Ocean.

Denuclearization or the prevention of nuclearization would logically form the first step in a gradual approach to the realization of our objective.

Countries of the region, viz. the littoral and hinterland States, as well as countries outside the region but militarily active in the region, would have to assume certain commitments if any stable agreement were to be reached.

So far as the countries in the region are concerned, it would be reasonable to call upon them, as an earnest of their good faith, to commit themselves to a policy of denuclearization which would entail the permanent renunciation by them of a nuclear weapon option and the assumption of an obligation to deny the use of their territories and territorial waters and their air space to nuclear weapons belonging to other States.

On the part of the nuclear Powers, their contribution would take the form of the assumption of an obligation not to deploy nuclear weapons in the peace zone area.

These two requirements are interrelated but not necessarily dependent upon each other. The first is more difficult than the second and it would be necessary, therefore, to concentrate our efforts initially on securing from the nuclear weapon Powers the commitment that we seek of them as their contribution towards the attainment of our objective.



Not all the nuclear threshold countries in the Indian Ocean region seem ready or willing to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. If a new nuclear weapon Power were to emerge in the Indian Ocean region, denuclearization and also demilitarization of the area would be seriously jeopardized.

The emergence of a new nuclear weapon Power in the Indian Ocean region would have two possible consequences: other nuclear threshold countries in the region might decide to go nuclear; they might, in addition, or as an alternative, invite the presence of nuclear Powers outside the region as a counterpoise and also to provide a protective umbrella. Such a development would, far from realizing the objective of a zone of peace, result in increased tension and conflict in the region.

The two major Powers, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, show no inclination to withdraw from the scene but rather to strengthen their presence there. They could maintain their forces and their military strength in the area, especially their nuclear submarines, even without the aid of shore facilities. No legal objection to their presence could be raised.

The principle of the freedom of the high seas could be invoked as giving them the right to conduct any military activity in the Indian Ocean, as in any other part of the high seas, as long as there is no infringement of the sovereignty or sovereign rights of the littoral States.

Apart from the United States of America and the USSR, even other nuclear weapon Powers have not declared their intention or willingness to withdraw from the area.

The principle of the freedom of the high seas is not inconsistent with denuclearization nor an impediment to it as long as peaceful navigation is permitted unhampered. Any arms control commitment or agreement is a restriction, voluntarily assumed, on certain freedoms which States assuming such a commitment or States parties to such an agreement would otherwise enjoy or exercise. But that is the price that must be paid for arms control measures if disarmament is seriously contemplated. The most recent example of the voluntary acceptance by sovereign Powers of a limitation on their freedoms is the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, although the Treaty leaves the nuclear Powers free to deploy nuclear missile carrying submarines in the area covered by the Treaty.

The security interests of the two largest nuclear Powers are not directly involved in the Indian Ocean. The progressive détente between them that has been developing in recent times may make it advantageous for them and encourage them to avoid nuclear competition in the area.

The presence of nuclear missile carrying submarines is of strategic importance to the United States and the USSR, but even in this respect the United States seems to enjoy a greater advantage as their submarines in the Indian Ocean can cover many important Soviet and Chinese targets.

Soviet submarines, on the other hand, cannot reach any part of the United States with their missiles and they are not necessary for action against Chinese

targets. Strategically, the presence of Soviet nuclear missile carrying submarines in the Indian Ocean is necessary only as a riposte to the United States presence in the area.

It would appear, therefore, that the initiative in renouncing a strategic nuclear role in the Indian Ocean rests primarily on the United States and that such a step would not endanger its security.

As a new type of submarine-launched missiles being built in the United States and the USSR would bring any part of either Power's territory within range even from the other Power's own off-shore waters, neither of them would be making a sacrifice by agreeing to nuclear disengagement in the Indian Ocean.

The reference to the United States and the USSR and China and to the targets within these countries must not be construed as an imputation to those countries of any hostile designs against one another. They are merely mentioned in an attempt to make an objective analysis of the existing situation and its possibilities.

Even under any agreement for nuclear disengagement in the Indian Ocean, the Powers may not renounce the right of transit of any type of warships, including submarines, and they would probably wish to maintain enemy submarine surveillance and detective devices to ensure compliance with any agreement on disengagement in the area. It would be for the Ad Hoc Committee - and this is an aspect to which the littoral and hinterland States not members of the Ad Hoc Committee might wish to give special attention - to consider how these rights could be exercised in a manner consistent with the objective of establishing the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

There are definite limitations to any nuclear disengagement measure. It would not by itself eliminate competition between the great Powers for hegemony in the Indian Ocean but it could certainly have a beneficial effect on the situation in the region by arresting further inroads into matters pertaining to the security of the countries in the region. It is essential, therefore, that such a disengagement measure should precede rather than follow the denuclearization of the littoral and hinterland States to which reference has been made earlier by me as the contribution that we, the littoral and hinterland States, should make towards the attainment of our objective.

The most decisive step would be to control, compose and resolve intraregional disputes and thereby remove the danger to peace by averting the possibility of great Power interference and involvement in local conflicts accompanied by a show of force, including nuclear force.

These are the observations I wish to make to supplement the Sri Lanka delegation's working paper of 12 March 1973, and I would be glad to hear the reaction of the distinguished representatives who are present here.



#### ANNEX IV

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