

**REPORT
OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL**

16 June 1973–15 June 1974

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OFFICIAL RECORDS: TWENTY-NINTH SESSION

SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/9602)



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New York, 1974

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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INTRODUCTION

1. The present report¹ is submitted to the General Assembly by the Security Council in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 3, and Article 15, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

2. Essentially a summary and guide, reflecting the broad lines of the debates, the report is not intended as a substitute for the records of the Security Council,

¹This is the twenty-ninth annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. The previous reports were circulated under the symbols A/93, A/366, A/620, A/945, A/1361, A/1873, A/2167, A/2437, A/2712, A/2935, A/3157, A/3648, A/3901, A/4190, A/4494, A/4867, A/5202, A/5502, A/5802, A/6002, A/6302, A/6702, A/7202, A/7602, A/8002, A/8402, A/8702 and A/9002.

which constitute the only comprehensive and authoritative account of its deliberations.

3. With respect to the membership of the Security Council during the period covered, it will be recalled that the General Assembly, at its 2153rd plenary meeting on 15 October 1973, elected the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Costa Rica, Iraq, Mauritania and the United Republic of Cameroon as non-permanent members of the Security Council to fill the vacancies resulting from the expiration, on 31 December 1973, of the terms of office of Guinea, India, Panama, the Sudan and Yugoslavia.

4. The period covered in the present report is from 16 June 1973 to 15 June 1974. The Council held 48 meetings during that period.

Part I

QUESTIONS CONSIDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Chapter 1

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A. The search for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict

CONSIDERATION AT THE 1733RD TO 1735TH MEETINGS
(20-26 JULY 1973)

5. In accordance with its decision of 20 April in resolution 331 (1973) "to meet following the submission of the Secretary-General's report to examine the situation in the Middle East" [for an account of the adoption of resolution 331 (1973) and the report of the Secretary-General (S/10929) see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/9002, chap. 1)*] the Security Council at its 1733rd meeting on 20 July resumed its consideration of the item on its agenda that read:

"Examination of the Situation in the Middle East:

"(a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973)

"(b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) of 20 April 1973 (S/10929)."

6. At the same meeting the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of the 19 States who had participated in the previous discussion without the right to vote to continue to do so. Subsequently the President also invited the representative of Tunisia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

7. Opening the discussion, the representative of Egypt said that the Charter endowed the Security Council with the authority to take the measures necessary for the implementation of its decisions, including, among others, expulsion from membership, diplomatic and economic sanctions and coercive military action against an aggressor. Ever since the Council discussed Israel's attack of 5 June 1967 against Egypt, Jordan and Syria, Israel had been applying a policy of colonization of the occupied territories with the aim of creating new facts in the area. That policy would be abetted by those Council members responsible should the Council fail to act or be prevented from acting in this most serious situation. After recalling the Council's discussion in June, which he considered had revealed general agreement on key points related to the situation in the Middle East, including the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take action to achieve a just peace, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and respect for the legitimate rights of all peoples including the Palestinians, the representative of Egypt said that in contrast, Israel had stated on 8 June in the Council that

no principle and no rule could prejudice the right to self-preservation and defence. In his view, Israel, by insisting on negotiations while Arab territories were under occupation, was seeking to coerce the Arab countries into giving up parts of their homelands. In these circumstances the only option before the Council was to deal with the substance of the problem and to convince Israel that its expansionist policy was contrary to the Charter. The Council should declare Israel's occupation of the Arab territories a most flagrant violation of the Charter, and should invite States to refrain from giving Israel any aid or assistance enabling it to maintain its policy of occupation and coercion.

8. The representative of Israel said that efforts to attain a peaceful settlement between Israel and the Arab States could not succeed if they were based on the one-sided contention that the main problem was Israeli withdrawal. Resolutions not based on the parties' consent could not contribute to the attainment of agreement between them. The only resolution that had played any significant role in the Middle East conflict since 1967 was Security Council resolution 242 (1967). That was so because the resolution had been adopted unanimously following consultation and understanding with the parties. Although the entire resolution was a series of principles, Egypt, in its demands, had singled out some of its concepts and neglected the others. Egypt's demands were contrary, not merely to resolution 242 (1967), but also to the provisions of the Charter. Nothing in the Charter deprived a Member State of the right to defend itself. Furthermore, no principle of the Charter precluded border changes, especially following the use of force in self-defence. Another step to undermine resolution 242 (1967) had been Egypt's demand regarding the alleged issue of the rights of the Palestinians. Egypt sought to replace the resolution's call for a just settlement of the refugee problem by a provision on Palestinian rights. To satisfy the Egyptian demand invoking the principle of self-determination would mean introducing a new element into the framework of resolution 242 (1967) and perhaps dismembering Jordan. The discussion adjourned on 14 June had clarified that all participants understood that resolution 242 (1967) envisaged changes in the 1967 lines between Israel and other Arab States to ensure secure and recognized boundaries. It had also become increasingly apparent that the one method that could bring about agreement between the parties was that of negotiation.

9. The representative of Jordan stated that resolution 242 (1967) aimed at ending the occupation and

establishing the conditions for a just and durable peace. As a resolution based on balance between withdrawal and territorial integrity on one hand, and guarantees for peace on the other, it could have meant nothing less than total withdrawal. Regardless of their technical nationality, the Arab people now under occupation must be granted their full moral rights. Jordan intended to review the structure of the relationship between its two flanks once the occupation ended. His Government hoped that the Council would take into account the facts of the situation and it welcomed the resumption of the efforts of Ambassador Jarring to help put resolution 242 (1967) into effect. Jordan could not acquiesce in a settlement imposed by military and political forces, but believed in peace based on the realization of the objective conditions of justice.

10. The representative of the USSR said that in the light of the favourable changes which had taken place in the international atmosphere, the Security Council, which bore primary responsibility for the attainment of a Middle East settlement, had to take constructive steps to solve that problem which constituted a threat to international peace and security. From the debate, it was clear that the will of the overwhelming majority of Council members and United Nations Member States emphasized the following principles, on the basis of which the Council could and must establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East: the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by means of war; the non-use of force in international relations; respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of States in the Middle East and the total and unconditional withdrawal of all Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories; respect for the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine and the need for compliance with resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts and provisions; approval of the Jarring memorandum of 8 February 1971 as an important initiative towards the attainment of a political settlement in total compliance with resolution 242 (1967); and the need for activating the Jarring mission. The key question, however, had always been and continued to be the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories, resolution of that important question on the basis of respect for territorial integrity and a guarantee of the legitimate rights of all States and peoples of the area, including the Arab people of Palestine.

11. At its 1734th meeting on 25 July, the Council had before it a draft resolution co-sponsored by Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia (S/10974) which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having examined comprehensively the current situation in the Middle East,

"Having heard in this context the statements of the participants in this debate, including the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Algeria, Chad, Guinea, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania,

"Emphasizing its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Emphasizing further that all Members of the United Nations are committed to respect the resolutions of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

"Reaffirming resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967,

"Conscious that the rights of the Palestinians have to be safeguarded,

"Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/10929) which includes an account of the objective and determined efforts of his Special Representative since 1967,

"1. Deeply regrets that the Secretary-General was unable to report any significant progress by him or by his Special Representative in carrying out the terms of resolution 242 (1967), and that nearly six years after its adoption a just and lasting peace in the Middle East has still not been achieved;

"2. Strongly deplures Israel's continuing occupation of the territories occupied as a result of the 1967 conflict, contrary to the principles of the Charter;

"3. Expresses serious concern at Israel's lack of co-operation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

"4. Supports the initiatives of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General taken in conformity with his mandate and contained in his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971;

"5. Expresses its conviction that a just and peaceful solution to the problem of the Middle East can be achieved only on the basis of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, the rights of all States in the area and for the rights and legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians;

"6. Declares that in the occupied territories no changes which may obstruct a peaceful and final settlement or which may adversely affect the political and other fundamental rights of all the inhabitants in these territories should be introduced or recognized;

"7. Requests the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to resume and to pursue their efforts to promote a just and peaceful solution of the Middle East problem;

"8. Decides to afford the Secretary-General and his Special Representative all support and assistance for the discharge of their responsibilities;

"9. Calls upon all parties concerned to extend full co-operation to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative;

"10. Decides to remain seized of the problem and to meet again urgently whenever it becomes necessary."

12. Introducing the draft resolution, the representative of India stated that it would inform the parties directly involved of the general thinking of the Council and instruct them in the ways in which, in the Council's opinion, they should move and make progress. The draft resolution was entirely based on facts and their objective consideration and it should not invite any reservations or criticisms.

13. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation, which supported and co-sponsored the draft resolution, would like to underscore the importance of the fifth preambular paragraph which affirmed resolution 242 (1967).

14. The representative of Indonesia said that his delegation attached great importance to paragraph 5,

which underlined respect for the rights of the Palestinians. Nevertheless, his delegation would have preferred a stronger draft resolution demanding Israel's withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. However, it was prepared to accommodate the viewpoints of other representatives in the hope of obtaining the necessary votes for its adoption by the Council.

15. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the draft resolution took due account of the following elements which characterized the present difficult situation: first, all United Nations efforts to implement resolution 242 (1967) had failed solely because of Israel's refusal to co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General; second, the illegal occupation of the territories of three Member States was continuing; third the demographic, economic and other changes imposed in those territories by Israel in contradiction of all the principles of international law endangered the fundamental rights of the inhabitants; and fourth, the Palestinian political movement could not be destroyed as an active factor in the Middle East without which no definitive solution of the crisis was possible. In his opinion, the Council had no option but to pursue actively its efforts for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967), which he thought represented the minimum expected of the Council.

16. In a further statement the representative of Israel stated that the draft resolution distorted resolution 242 (1967) by selectively taking out of context some of its principles, such as territorial integrity. It dealt in a similar manner with the numerous ideas put to the parties since 1967 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. It referred to Israel's occupation of territories, although it was clear from resolution 242 (1967) that the present cease-fire lines were to be replaced by secure and recognized boundaries. The draft also contained an unwarranted assertion concerning the force of the Council's resolutions. In fact, only resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter could be said to be mandatory. The implication of a resolution of such a nature would be destructive and would mean the end of resolution 242 (1967) as an agreed basis for a settlement.

17. The representative of Egypt drew attention to published statements made in an interview by the Israeli Minister of Defence, indicating that the occupation of Arab territories would remain frozen for 10 years and that the United Nations would be powerless to effect a change even though its composition was against Israel. Because Israel received United States arms it was strong militarily and, according to the Defence Minister, could therefore permit itself to disagree with its friends.

18. The representative of Tunisia said that the Middle East conflict had resulted primarily from the serious injustice done to the people of Palestine, complicated by a series of misunderstandings and acts of aggression. His Government considered, nevertheless, that a solution could be achieved by negotiation. Unfortunately, Israel's intransigent attitude made a meeting impossible. He confirmed Tunisia's support for the Arab countries and conviction that peace must necessarily proceed through withdrawal from all occupied territories and restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

19. At the 1735th meeting on 26 July, the representative of the Sudan said that the draft resolution

co-sponsored by his delegation was the minimum that the Council could adopt and dealt primarily with the existing conditions in the area that were frustrating the Council's efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace. Stressing the long attachment of the Palestinian people to their country, he said that it was beyond the capacity of any aggressor to hold back the tide of national aspiration of any people or to maintain any military occupation indefinitely. Persistence on the part of Israel in maintaining its aggression would render peace more and more remote.

20. The representative of Egypt stated that his Government would accept the draft resolution before the Council because if it were adopted, the Council would thus reaffirm that the occupation of the Arab territories was contrary to the Charter and that those territories must be returned. It would also constitute a message to the Arab peoples counselling patience and hope for a just peace, while its rejection would amount to a call upon them to negotiate away part of their territories or else fight for their rights.

21. The representative of Jordan said that restoration of the basic rights of the Palestinians consisted in ending the occupation and enabling the exiles to return to their homes. Jordan would never abandon its citizens under occupation. His delegation hoped that the constructive elements in the draft resolution would become the basis for broad agreement both inside and outside the Council.

22. The representative of France said that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution because it met the basic needs which should be the primary concern of the Council. Confronted by the dangers of a situation that was a standing threat to international peace and security, it was for the Council to reaffirm its specific responsibility and the principles of a solution acceptable to the parties, and to support the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative. The only new element in the draft in relation to resolution 242 (1967) was the reference to the rights of the Palestinians, but that reference, already made in General Assembly resolution 2949 (XXVII), only reflected the growing concern of the international community.

23. The representative of the USSR stated that his delegation entirely supported the fundamental idea of the draft resolution, which was the need to preserve and actively use the existing machinery of the United Nations in order to ensure a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The USSR agreed with the provision in the draft resolution to the effect that a just peace could be achieved only on the basis of respect for the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and rights of all States in the area and also the lawful rights and aspirations of the Arab people of Palestine. As it was a compromise document, some of its parts were too weak and it failed in particular to reflect the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by war or force. The USSR delegation would have preferred that the draft resolution include a paragraph on the need for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of all Israeli troops from all occupied territories; however, the provision in the draft with regard to Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire made up for that shortcoming. It should also have condemned Israel for maintaining the present dangerous situation and blocking a Middle East settlement.

24. The representative of India pointed out that the draft resolution emphasized the commitment of all Member States to respect the resolutions of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and expressed the hope that by reaffirming resolution 242 (1967), the difficulties encountered by Ambassador Jarring in obtaining acceptance of his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 would be overcome. While some elements on both sides wished to avoid their obligations under resolution 242 (1967) and revert to the situation before the 1967 conflict, such a development would oblige the Security Council, the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to start all over again and would waste the small progress that had been made. India reaffirmed its stand adopted in 1967 that such territorial adjustments as might be made by agreement between sovereign States would be acceptable, provided that such agreements were reached after the troops had been withdrawn and that there was no coercion, and provided also that they related to minor adjustments or insignificant changes and did not reflect the weight of conquest or victory or military superiority. India hoped that eventually negotiations would take place, but conditions for starting negotiations between the parties did not exist at that moment. Ambassador Jarring should resume his efforts to promote a just and peaceful solution within the framework of resolution 242 (1967).

25. The representative of Panama said that the draft resolution contained a certain number of constructive elements on which the majority of Council members had already agreed. If those elements were supported and approved by the Council, constructive steps would have been taken towards the achievement of peace in the Middle East.

Decision: *At the 1735th meeting, on 26 July 1973, the eight-Power draft resolution (S/10974) received 13 votes in favour to 1 against (United States of America), China not participating in the vote, and was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.*

26. Following the vote, the representative of China said that a Security Council resolution on the Middle East question must strongly condemn the Israeli Zionists for their prolonged aggression against the Palestinians and other Arab countries and people. It must ask the Israelis to withdraw immediately from Arab territories they occupied. It must call for the restoration of the Palestinian people's national rights. It must call upon all Governments and people to give firm support to the Palestinians and other Arab people in their just struggle to resist aggression, to recover their territories and to restore their national rights. The Middle East question was one of aggression versus anti-aggression, a question of the Palestinians and other Arab people striving for national independence and their national rights, and a question of opposing the super-Powers' interference and contention for spheres of influence in the Middle East. In view of the fact that the draft resolution has failed to reflect fully the principles of the Charter and the position of China, the Chinese delegation had decided not to participate in the vote.

27. The representative of Guinea said that the draft resolution had represented a strict minimum of progress towards a solution of the Middle East problem. It was with great regret and disappointment that Guinea noted the negative vote of the United States,

a vote which not only rendered even more remote the chance of peace in the Middle East, but reinforced the determination of the peoples of the occupied territories to continue their liberation struggle.

28. The representative of Australia said that his delegation had found the draft resolution lacking in balance. For one thing, it made no specific mention of the ultimate necessity for negotiations between the parties directly concerned. Also it might have been preferable at this stage to refer to the Palestinian refugees in the same terms as in resolution 242 (1967). One positive feature of the text, however, was the reaffirmation in the preamble of resolution 242 (1967) which the Australian Government continued to regard as the basis for a settlement of the Middle East problem. And in order to support a continuing and active effort by the United Nations in the Middle East, Australia had decided to vote in favour of the text.

29. The representative of Austria said that his delegation's vote expressed Austria's firm attachment to the principles contained in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). It also expressed Austria's attachment to a peaceful solution of the conflict, making available all peaceful means which the Charter provided. It was the thrust of the draft resolution in affirming those principles and in mobilizing such peaceful means that had had a decisive influence on Austria's attitude towards it.

30. The representative of the United States said that in his delegation's opinion the draft resolution was highly partisan and unbalanced and its adoption could only have added another obstacle to getting serious negotiations started between the parties. Moreover, it would have changed fundamentally resolution 242 (1967). The United States had done its utmost to avoid that result, having presented to the sponsors a series of reasonable amendments to correct the shortcomings of the draft resolution. The draft resolution spoke of "the" territories occupied in 1967, unlike resolution 242 (1967), and failed to take notice of several other fundamental elements of that resolution, which remained the only hope if ultimately there was to be a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

31. The representative of Peru stated that his delegation had co-sponsored and voted in favour of the draft resolution because it stood as a true contribution to a solution of the Middle East conflict. Peru adhered to the reaffirmation of the validity of resolution 242 (1967).

32. The representative of Kenya believed that the solution to the Middle East situation lay in honest vindication, affirmation and implementation of the formulas and principles contained in resolution 242 (1967). His delegation had voted for the draft resolution in order to register Kenya's complete rejection of the occupation of territories of the other States by force, to register its support for the rights of the Palestinians, and to exemplify commitment to the Charter and the principles of international law.

33. The President of the Council, speaking as the representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation's vote in favour of the draft resolution marked no change in the position which successive British Governments had taken on the Middle East question since the adoption of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The draft resolution reaffirmed resolution 242 (1967), which reconciled the Arab require-

ment for Israeli withdrawal with the Israeli requirement for secure and recognized boundaries and continued to provide the only firm foundation on which a settlement could be built. There had been no change in the United Kingdom's position with regard to the question of the rights of the Palestinians. The phrase as used in the draft resolution referred essentially to the refugees and their rights under General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and its inclusion did not affect the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Any peace in the Middle East must take account of the legitimate interests and aspirations of the Palestinians. The non-adoption of the draft nevertheless should not be allowed to obscure the unanimity among Council members on a number of elements contained in it. There was full agreement on the request to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to resume and pursue their efforts to promote a just and peaceful solution of the problem. It was the Council's task to do what it could to provide renewed impetus to the diplomatic process.

34. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that the Council had found itself unable to impose upon Israel the Charter's principles because of the negative attitude of the United States, which had paralysed all efforts to that end and which continued to do so every time the root causes of the Palestinian question were under discussion. Unless the Arab people of Palestine had its inalienable rights restored to it and unless Israel withdrew from all the occupied Arab territories, Zionist aggression would persist interminably and, hence, the security of that region would remain vulnerable. Any resolution which failed to embody those two conditions without the least ambiguity could not contribute to peace in the Middle East. Israel had been able to pursue its expansionist policy only because of the material, military and moral support provided by the United States. The United States had once again confirmed its policy by vetoing a draft resolution which in any case lacked clarity on the two above-mentioned conditions—the rights of the Palestinians and total withdrawal from occupied territories.

B. Communications, reports of the Secretary-General concerning the status of the cease-fire from 15 June to 6 October 1973 and consideration by the Council

1. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND LEBANON

(a) Communications to the Council, reports of the Secretary-General and requests for a meeting

35. During the period from 16 June to 11 August 1973 the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector continued to be the subject of reports submitted by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council almost on a daily basis (S/7930/Add.2024-2036, 2038-2051, 2053-2081). These reports indicated that personnel of the Israeli armed forces had continued to cross the border and occupy during daylight hours some posts located on Lebanese territory near the armistice demarcation line. They also mentioned occasional flights by Israel's jet aircraft over localities in southern Lebanon and contained complaints by the parties concerning violations of the cease-fire. Some of those complaints could

not be confirmed by the United Nations Military Observers because the location of the alleged incidents was outside the operational range of the observation posts.

36. In a report dated 11 August (S/7930/Add.2082), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO said that he had received a complaint from Lebanon alleging that a Lebanese civilian aircraft leased to Iraq had been intercepted by Israeli aircraft over Lebanese territory and diverted to Israel.

37. In a letter dated 11 August (S/10984), the representative of Iraq stated that on Friday, 10 August at 9.45 p.m. Baghdad local time, a Middle East Airlines Caravelle chartered by Iraqi Airways had been intercepted by two Israeli military aircraft after its take-off from Beirut International Airport on a scheduled flight to Baghdad. The plane had been forced to land at an Israeli military base and the passengers and crew had been forced at gunpoint to leave the plane and subjected to hours of interrogation and detention.

38. By a letter dated 11 August addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10983), the representative of Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the violation of Lebanon's air space by Israel. The letter stated that on the night of 10 August, Israeli air force planes had invaded the air space of Lebanon and forced a civilian plane to fly into Israel and land at an Israeli military base.

(b) Consideration at the 1736th to 1740th meetings (13-15 August 1973)

39. At the 1736th meeting on 13 August, the Security Council included the Lebanese complaint in its agenda without objection. The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Lebanon, Iraq, Israel and Egypt, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. Subsequently the representative of Democratic Yemen was similarly invited, at his request, to participate in the discussion. The Council further agreed, at the 1737th meeting on 14 August, to a request made by the representative of the Sudan in a letter dated 13 August (S/10986), that it extend an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Talib El-Shebib, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations.

40. Opening the discussion, the representative of Lebanon said that on 10 August between 2045 and 2220 hours Beirut local time, units of Israel's air force had penetrated Lebanese air space and flown over different areas of central and southern Lebanon. Some of them had circled over Beirut International Airport. At 2100 hours a civilian Caravelle airliner belonging to Middle East Airlines and on lease to Iraqi Airways had prepared to take off from Beirut for Baghdad. At 2135 hours, soon after the plane had taken off, two Israeli Mirage jet fighters had dived towards the plane, and after having intercepted it several miles north of Beirut, ordered it to follow them to Israeli territory, where it had been forced to land at an Israeli military airbase under the threat of being shot down. After it had been forcibly detained over two hours, during which time the passengers had been subjected to military interrogation, it was permitted to take off, and had landed at Beirut

Airport at 1.15 a.m. on 11 August. The representative of Lebanon said that that act had been a premeditated act of air piracy, of hijacking and of State terrorism, and he called upon the Council to adopt a resolution condemning Israel's action in the strongest terms. Furthermore, the Council should bring any resolutions it might adopt to the attention of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for its consideration.

41. The representative of Iraq said that the complaint before the Council concerned a Government-planned hijacking of a civilian airliner which constituted a declaration by Israel of piracy as an instrument of national policy. The Council, he added, had over the years warned Israel that grave violations of the Charter would not be tolerated and had notified Israel that it would take further steps as envisaged in the Charter. However, the Council so far had failed to put its words into action, and the Zionists continued their aggressions with impunity.

42. The representative of Egypt said that several States, in their observations submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on international terrorism under General Assembly resolution 3034 (XXVII), had distinguished between the terrorist behaviour of individuals and the illicit acts of violence committed by States in direct violation of international law. Israel's aggression on 10 August was an act of State terrorism in accordance with that distinction, and was in flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter. After pointing out that Israel's act of piracy had occurred in the wake of the United States veto of a draft resolution that would have condemned Israel for its continued occupation of the Arab territories, he added that, as a result of that veto, Israel had been encouraged to commit more aggression. To condemn Israel was not an effective remedy. Punishment in the form of sanctions under the Charter was the only way to prevent the aggressor from continuing its crimes.

43. The representative of Israel said that on the evening of 10 August, Israeli air force jets had diverted a Lebanese aircraft chartered by Iraq for a flight between Beirut and Baghdad, because there had been reason to believe that several terrorist leaders were on the flight. However, the aircraft had been allowed to proceed to its destination after the identity of the passengers had been checked. While Arab terrorists, operating with the support of Arab Governments, stood accused of waging a persistent campaign of world-wide bloodshed directed against helpless civilians, Israeli jets, in the pursuit of such terrorists, had entered Lebanese air space and diverted the plane. Such measures by individual States against terrorism had become even more urgent and indispensable as a result of the sabotage by Arab States of all international action. Israel, he continued, could not forgo its right to self-defence and the duty to protect its citizens. Lebanon had shown no regard for Israel's rights under the cease-fire, and therefore could not complain that Israel did not respect Lebanese rights. He noted that the failure of United Nations organs to take effective steps against the plague of terrorism should not be compounded by Security Council action that would give further satisfaction to terrorists.

44. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the Israeli action constituted an act of aggression against a sovereign State

and was an act of air piracy and banditry. Under the Hague Convention of 1970, and the Montreal Convention of 1971, acts of lawless seizure or control of airliners in flight constituted a threat to the safety of persons and property; and any attempt to hijack an airliner or to take control of it by force had been condemned as a criminal act. Therefore, the Security Council must act speedily and with determination and extend support to the Lebanese and Iraqi protests by condemning the policy of Israel. Israel could not justify its illegal action by slanderous attacks on the leaders of the Palestine resistance movement, who were struggling for the restoration of the dignity and rights of their people. He further called for effective measures by the Council, including sanctions against Israel.

45. At the 1737th meeting on 14 August, the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland deplored all acts of violence committed by individuals or groups of individuals. No Government was entitled to take the law into its own hands and commit acts of violence totally inconsistent with international law, which acts only complicated efforts to find a solution to the problem of international terrorism. That Lebanese air space had been deliberately violated by Israeli military aircraft was an undeniable fact, and the Government of the United Kingdom deplored it. He added that the act must be seen against the background of the Middle East problem as a whole, and underlined the necessity for all concerned to make efforts for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

46. The representative of France said that his country fully supported the legitimate complaint of Lebanon. Israel's military intervention against civil aviation should be condemned by the international community, which could not tolerate acts taken in violation of human rights and the principles of the Charter. He called for the States in the area to keep calm and not act in a manner that might compromise attempts at a settlement on the basis of resolution 242 (1967). In view of the nature of the case under consideration, the Council should condemn the action of the Israeli air force and firmly invite Israel to refrain from such actions in the future and to respect international conventions.

47. The representative of Yugoslavia said that by hijacking a civilian plane, Israel had endangered the lives of the persons on board and committed an act of piracy. What was frightening was that a Government would decide to commit such an act, risking the lives of 100 passengers, so soon after shooting down a Libyan airliner in February 1973, resulting in over 100 deaths. If such actions were not checked and condemned in the strongest terms, the basic structure of international law would be compromised and individual security eroded. Bearing in mind that it was acting at a time when international terrorism was being considered by the United Nations, the Council should condemn Israel's act of aggression and the repetition of international State terrorism. Beyond condemnation, the Council might consider what effective measures could be taken against Israel in the framework of the United Nations Charter.

48. The representative of Kenya said that in his delegation's view, the Government of Israel, in using its air force to divert civil aircraft, was not serving the cause of an early and lasting peace in the Middle

East. That diversion was a clear case of hijacking and had been carefully planned and executed. In addition to violating the Charter and international law, Israel's act specifically amounted to a violation of obligations accepted by that Government in a number of instruments - regulating international civil aviation. Besides violating the Chicago Convention of 1944, to which Israel was a party, Israel had acted contrary to the letter and spirit of the Tokyo Convention of 1963, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970) and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971).

49. The representative of China strongly condemned the Israeli Zionists for their act in grave violation of the territory and sovereignty of other countries, which threatened the peace and security of all peoples. He said that the piratical act of the Israeli Zionists had not been accidental but was a continuation of the series of aggressive atrocities which they had perpetrated over a long period against the Palestinian people and other Arab countries and peoples. He said that the Council must fulfil its responsibilities by condemning most severely the Israeli authorities' act and also consider the adoption of effective measures to stop their atrocities.

50. The representative of Australia said that the Australian Government had expressed its strong opposition to terrorists and aircraft hijacking. It saw in the Israeli action implications of the gravest kind both for the safety of passengers and for the security of international air transport and expressed concern that the incident might lead to an escalation of tension in the Middle East.

51. The representative of Democratic Yemen, rejecting an allegation against his Government by the representative of Israel, stated that thanks to the diligence of the civil aviation authorities and high officials of his Government, the crew and passengers of a Lufthansa plane hijacked in February 1972 and forced to land in Aden had been spared and the plane had left Aden safely. Distortion of the facts and vilification of the Palestine resistance movement was a basic tenet of Zionist policy.

52. The representative of India said that Lebanon's specific complaint could not be completely separated from the general problem of the Middle East. While no Council member questioned Israel's right of self-defence should it be attacked, Israel had no right to take violent and illegal actions on the territories of other States nor to enforce what it conceived to be international law. What Israel had done could not be justified and it must be firmly condemned. Any action that the Council might take must ensure that Israel desist from such actions in the future. Israel's professions that it wanted to live in peace and friendship with its Arab neighbours could only be believed if Israel were to withdraw from the territories illegally occupied by it and if it were to respect the rights of the Palestinians.

53. Exercising his right of reply, the representative of Israel said that the discussion had left no doubt that the real problem was the menace of Arab terrorism, which had caused Israel's defensive action on 10 August. He said that Israel could not accept counsel from other States regarding that action, even if they were permanent members of the Security Council,

when the Council had failed ever to condemn terrorist massacres.

54. Also speaking in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of the USSR said that the representative of Israel was attempting to divert the Council's attention from urgent measures required to deal with Israeli air piracy, which had contributed to the explosive situation in the Middle East it had created.

55. At the 1738th meeting on 14 August, the representative of Austria expressed the view that however legitimate the goals might be, certain means employed in their pursuit must be considered inadmissible in all circumstances and at all times. He said that the Israeli act was contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention on the Safety of International Civil Aviation and was directed against the sovereign rights of another Member State. Therefore, his delegation would support a draft resolution that would deal adequately with the incident.

56. The representative of the Sudan stated that his delegation unreservedly condemned Israel's action as an act of international air piracy that constituted a violation of the Israel-Lebanon Armistice Agreement of 1949, as well as a threat to the safety of international civil aviation. It had to be discussed in the context of the Middle East question as a whole, and the root cause was the occupation of Arab territories by Israel and the denial of the Palestinian people's right to their national home. He called for prompt and effective action by the Council and added that nothing short of applying sanctions against Israel would make it pause and think before embarking on similar adventures.

57. The representative of Indonesia said that the Israeli act was a most flagrant violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity. He expressed his delegation's deep regret that the Security Council, by rejecting the draft resolution submitted by the eight non-aligned members of the Council the previous month (S/10974), had missed the opportunity to make a concrete contribution to the solution of the Middle East problem. He said that acts of violence and terrorism arising from the Middle East problem could not be considered apart from their root causes, namely, the injustice inflicted for so long upon the Palestinians and the continued occupation of Arab territories by Israel. The Council should not only condemn Israel's violations but also find ways and means to prevent such acts from happening in the future. If the Council failed to do so it would mean, in effect, that it acquiesced in Israel's policy of terrorism.

58. Addressing the Council in accordance with the decision taken at the 1737th meeting on 14 August, Mr. Talib El-Shibib stated that what was so dangerous and unique about the incident under consideration was that it was an act of national policy by a State Member of the United Nations, an act authorized, carried out and defended by the highest authorities of the State of Israel. The hijacking of the Lebanese aircraft had confirmed that it was Israel's policy to use State terrorism against the Arab people, and in particular, the people of Palestine. If the purpose had been to apprehend some Palestinian leaders, as the representative of Israel had stated, it would mean that any aircraft which carried a Palestinian leader would be subject to hijacking by Israel. He repudiated Israel's self-arrogated right to kidnap, try, execute or imprison

civilians of other countries who had committed no offence on Israeli territory. Rather than charging that Arab Governments harboured Palestinian terrorists, Israel should comply with United Nations resolutions and allow the people of Palestine to return to the homes from which they had been expelled so that they could cease taking refuge in Arab countries. If Israel were allowed to get away with its acts of lawlessness and the Council failed in its responsibilities to safeguard international peace and security, then not only the Middle East but the whole world would be facing untold dangers.

59. The representative of Guinea said that Israel's act had been designed to liquidate the leaders of a revolutionary popular liberation movement. History taught, however, that liquidating the leaders of a popular liberation movement did not liquidate a struggling people, because a people that was fully aware and organized was invincible. His delegation unreservedly condemned the Israeli act and called on the Council to adopt the necessary measures to avoid a repetition of such acts by Israel.

60. The President, speaking as the representative of the United States of America, stated that the United States deplored the violations of Lebanese sovereignty, of the United Nations Charter and of the rule of law in international civil aviation. In connexion with the Israeli Government's explanation of the purpose of its action, he said that national and international efforts to control terrorism must go forward within and not outside the law. The United States Government considered that actions such as Israel's diversion of a civil airliner were unjustified and likely to bring about counteraction on an increasing scale. Recent airline incidents were a reflection of the tensions growing out of the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict. His Government had made and continued to make efforts to improve the security of international civil aviation. However, the Security Council was meeting to deal with a specific complaint about a specific incident; it should therefore deal promptly with that complaint and determine that international society required rejection of unlawful interference with international civil aviation.

61. At the 1739th meeting on 15 August, the representative of Peru said that his delegation was forced to conclude that Israel's act constituted a deliberate violation of the air space of another State in violation of the principles of international law as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and the Convention on international civil aviation. The Council must take action on those violations and his delegation would support any draft resolution that would condemn the act.

62. The representative of Panama voiced dissatisfaction with Israel's act, which undoubtedly was a violation of the sovereignty of a Member State in contravention of the norms of international civil aviation. The act in question was a typical example of what had been defined in the recent meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on International Terrorism as State terrorism. Panama would always be ready to condemn terrorism, whether committed by States, groups or individuals.

63. At the 1740th meeting on 15 August, the representative of the United Kingdom, on behalf of the

delegations of France and the United Kingdom, introduced a draft resolution which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1736,

"Having noted the contents of the letter from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10983),

"Having heard the statement of the representative of Lebanon concerning the violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and the hijacking, by the Israeli air force, of a Lebanese civilian airliner on lease to Iraqi Airways,

"Gravely concerned that such an act carried out by Israel, a Member of the United Nations, constitutes a serious interference with international civil aviation and a violation of the Charter of the United Nations,

"Recognizing that such an act could jeopardize the lives and safety of passengers and crew and violates the provisions of international conventions safeguarding civil aviation,

"Recalling its resolutions 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968 and 286 (1970) of 9 September 1970,

"1. Condemns the Government of Israel for violating Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and for the forcible diversions and seizure by the Israeli air force of a Lebanese airliner from Lebanon's air space;

"2. Considers that these actions by Israel constitute a violation of the Lebanese-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949, the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council of 1967, the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the international conventions on civil aviation and the principles of international law and morality;

"3. Calls upon the International Civil Aviation Organization to take due account of this resolution when considering adequate measures to safeguard international civil aviation against these actions;

"4. Calls upon Israel to desist from any and all acts that violate Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and endanger the safety of international civil aviation and solemnly warns Israel that, if such acts are repeated, and Council will consider taking adequate steps or measures to enforce its resolutions."

Decision: At the 1740th meeting on 15 August 1973, the draft resolution (S/10987) was adopted unanimously as resolution 337 (1973).

64. Speaking in explanation of his delegation's vote, the representative of China said that the resolution was inadequate because it failed to put forward effective measures for stopping Israel's acts and should have condemned Israel in stronger terms. Furthermore the Chinese Government could not assume the obligations at the present stage, on civil aviation, under certain international conventions in whose formulation it had not taken part and which it had yet to study.

65. The representative of the Sudan said that the resolutions just adopted did not fully satisfy the non-aligned and the Arab countries but, for the sake of unanimity, his delegation accepted the resolution as a basis for future effective steps and had refrained from introducing another draft resolution.

66. The representative of the USSR said that the Security Council should have taken effective measures, including sanctions, to halt Israel's aggressive acts and to prevent their repetition. However, despite the weakness of the resolution, the Soviet delegation had voted for it since it condemned the actions of Israel against Lebanon and such condemnation reflected the stand of world public opinion against the air piracy and State terrorism practised by the Israeli ruling circles and military clique.

67. The representative of India said that the resolution, though it did not go far enough, went in the right direction and had the merit of enjoying the unanimous support of the Council. It could, however, have been more specific and direct in its warning against any repetition of such actions by Israel.

68. The representative of Indonesia said that his delegation, which would have preferred a more strongly worded resolution, had voted for the text in order to achieve the unanimous condemnation of Israel.

69. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation had voted for the resolution because in some of its essentials it met the requirements of the situation and condemned Israel unequivocally.

70. The President, speaking as the representative of the United States, said that the resolution was an important step towards the reaffirmation of the rule of law in international civil aviation. The condemnation by the Council of a specific incident should serve as no comfort to anyone contemplating illegal acts of terrorism. Rather it was a warning that the world community would no longer tolerate interference with one of the basic means of communication.

71. The representative of Israel said that the resolution was one-sided and ignored the menace of Arab terrorism. He stated that the Government of Israel would continue its struggle against Arab terrorism and protect the rights of its citizens.

72. The representative of Lebanon expressed satisfaction at the unanimous vote cast on the resolution. He said that the moral and political support of the Council reflected international public opinion.

(c) Subsequent communications and reports

73. In a note dated 4 September (S/10990) the Secretary-General transmitted a letter from the Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) containing a resolution adopted on 20 August by the Council of that organization in which Israel's violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and its diversion and seizure of the Lebanese aircraft was condemned.

74. By a letter dated 18 September (S/11002), the representative of Lebanon transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of the resolutions adopted by the Council of ICAO on 20 August and by its Assembly on 30 August condemning Israel for the forcible diversion and seizure of the Lebanese civil aircraft on 10 August by Israeli military aircraft.

75. From 11 August to 6 October the reports of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO regarding the Israel-Lebanon sector (S/7930/Add.2083-2140) described incidents and complaints of the same nature as those mentioned in previous reports for the period 16 July to 11 August.

2. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General

76. Between 16 June and mid-September, the Secretary-General continued to circulate supplemental information based on reports received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO on the situation in the Israel-Syria sector. The reports related to almost daily firing incidents, crossing of the cease-fire line and overflights by Israeli aircraft of Syrian territory (S/7930/Add.2024, 2026-2033, 2035, 2038-2043, 2048, 2050-2053, 2055-2063, 2065, 2067-2069, 2071-2074, 2078, 2079, 2081, 2084, 2086-2090, 2092-2102, 2104, 2106 and Corr.1, 2108, 2109, 2111-2113, 2115-2118, 2120).

77. In a report dated 12 July (S/7930/Add.2052), the Chief of Staff indicated that Israel had complained of crossing of the cease-fire line and opening of fire at Israeli positions by three tanks of the Syrian forces. This complaint was confirmed. In another report dated 28 August (S/7930/Add.2101), he indicated that Israel had again complained of crossings of the cease-fire line and of attacks on an Israeli patrol with bazooka and automatic fire by a Syrian armed group. However, that complaint had not been confirmed by United Nations observers.

78. In a letter dated 14 September (S/10996), the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic complained that on 13 September 64 Israeli aircraft had violated Syrian coastal air space, forcing Syrian aircraft to take counter-measures, which had resulted in five Israeli planes being shot down and eight Syrian planes being hit.

79. In a reply dated 14 September (S/10998 and Corr.1) the representative of Israel rejected Syria's charge and stated that the incident had been provoked by Syrian fighter planes which had appeared from the direction of the Syrian coast and attacked a routine patrol of the Israeli air force over the Mediterranean. He stated that the number of Israeli aircraft involved and that of the planes lost by both sides had been grossly falsified in the Syrian letter.

80. Between mid-September and 6 October, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO continued to report firing incidents in the Israel-Syria sector almost as frequently as in the preceding period, as well as overflights by Israeli jet aircraft (S/7930/Add.2123, 2125-2131, 2135-2137, 2139).

3. REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SUEZ CANAL SECTOR

81. During the period between 16 June and 6 October the Chief of Staff of UNTSO submitted several reports concerning observation of incidents involving the crossing of the canal by Israeli aircraft as reported by the observers and complaints by Israel of flights by Egyptian aircraft over Sinai (S/7930/Add.2028, 2037, 2038, 2073, 2092).

C. Other matters brought to the attention of the Security Council in connexion with the situation in the Middle East

82. By notes dated 20 July 1973 and 31 May 1974 (S/10972 and S/11303), the Secretary-General drew the attention of the members of the General Assembly and the Security Council to resolutions adopted by the

Commission on Human Rights at its 1210th meeting on 14 March 1973 and its 1254th meeting on 11 February 1974 entitled "Question of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East".

83. In a letter dated 2 August (S/10981) the representative of Egypt transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a declaration made by the secretariat of the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt concerning the position taken by the United States at the Security Council meeting in July. In that declaration it was stated that by its veto of the draft resolution prepared by the group of non-aligned countries, the United States had blocked the way to any true effort towards the achievement of a peaceful settlement, in defiance of the will of the international community and of the United Nations Charter. The Egyptian people, it concluded, had full faith that peoples who believed in freedom and progress would offer their support in the struggle against oppression.

84. In a letter dated 10 September (S/10994) Israel transmitted a note it had addressed to the President of the twentieth session of the Assembly of ICAO in which Israel charged that on 5 September Italian security forces had apprehended near Rome International Airport five Arab terrorists carrying two ground-to-air missiles intended for shooting down Israeli airliners landing at or taking off from that airport. By supplying Arab terrorists with those missiles the Arab countries were committing unlawful interference with international civil aviation and violating the Chicago and Montreal Conventions.

85. In a reply dated 25 September (S/11003) Egypt, Iraq and Syria rejected the Israeli charges and said that Israel's notes contained factual distortions and false accusations against the Arab Governments. On 11 September the representatives of the three countries had addressed a letter to the President of the ICAO Assembly rejecting Israel's allegation.

D. Outbreak of hostilities on 6 October 1973

1. REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, COMMUNICATIONS BY THE PARTIES AND REQUEST FOR A MEETING

86. On 6 October, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported (S/7930/Add.2141) general heavy air and ground activity along the Israel-Syria, the Suez Canal and Israel-Lebanon sectors. He indicated that Egyptian forces had crossed the Suez Canal to the east bank where ground fighting had been reported. Syrian forces had crossed the area between the limits of the forward defended localities (F.D.L.) indicating the cease-fire lines. In subsequent more detailed reports (S/7930/Add.2142-2145), the Chief of Staff indicated that in the Suez Canal sector intense exchange of artillery, tank and mortar fire continued, in addition to intense aerial activity with jet rocket attacks and anti-aircraft fire, Egyptian bridge building across the Canal and continued Egyptian crossing to the east bank. Subsequently, in reports dated 7 and 8 October (S/7930/Add.2146-2160), he indicated less intense but continued exchange of fire between the two sides in addition to continued aerial activity with rockets, bombing and missile firing by both parties.

87. In the Israel-Syria sector it was indicated (S/7930/Add.2142-2160) that Syrian tanks, armoured

personnel carriers, infantry and vehicles had continued to cross the Syrian forward defended localities.

88. In the Israel-Lebanon sector, reports from the United Nations military observers indicated that Israeli jet aircraft had been flying over Lebanese territory and that Israeli forces personnel and vehicles had re-occupied certain positions in the area under observation (S/7930/Add.2143, 2145 and 2146).

89. In transmitting these reports (S/7930/Add.2143), the Secretary-General stated that since receiving the first news of the outbreak of fighting he had been in constant consultations with the parties concerned, the President and members of the Security Council. In the field, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had addressed an appeal to the parties to cease all military activities and adhere to the cease-fire.

90. On several occasions the Chief of Staff reported (S/7930/Add.2150, 2151 and 2156) on firing on or close to United Nations personnel and installations and indicated that the United Nations observation posts both in the Suez Canal and Israel-Syria Sectors had sustained some material damage as a result of the impact of the nearby firing.

91. In a report dated 7 October (S/7930/Add.2150), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that the personnel of two observation posts in the Israel-Syria sector had had to be evacuated to Damascus owing to intense fighting in their vicinity.

92. In a letter dated 6 October (S/11009 and Corr.1), Syria charged that Israel had launched a military attack against Syrian forward positions all along the cease-fire line, with formations of Israeli aircraft penetrating Syria's air space in the northern sector of the front.

93. In a letter dated 7 October (S/11011), Israel charged that Egypt and Syria had launched an attack against Israel along the cease-fire lines, as had been confirmed by the United Nations observers. Shortly before the attack, Israel had made it clear that it would not initiate any military action and its Foreign Minister had informed the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council of the situation.

94. In a letter dated 7 October (S/11010), the representative of the United States requested a meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in the Middle East, bearing in mind that, in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, the Members of the United Nations had conferred primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on the Security Council.

2. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1743RD AND 1746TH MEETINGS (8-12 OCTOBER 1973)

95. At its 1743rd meeting on 8 October, the Council included the letter of the United States in its agenda. The representatives of Egypt, Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic were invited, at their requests, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. Subsequently, the representatives of Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Zambia were extended similar invitations.

96. The representative of the United States said that his Government had requested the meeting of the Security Council in order that it might deal urgently with the current situation in the Middle East. For the first time in more than three years, armed hostilities had broken out on a massive scale, breaking the cease-

fire. Reports based on United Nations sources appeared to indicate that the air attacks in the Golan Heights had been initiated by Syrian MIG aircraft and that the first firing on the Suez fronts had been from west to east. Very shortly before the initial attacks the United States had undertaken intensive diplomatic efforts, including direct discussions with Israel and Egypt. Unfortunately those efforts had not prevented the outbreak of hostilities and intensive fighting was continuing. In his view the Council's purpose was to help promote a solution for the tense and dangerous situation. The United States considered that in a situation where fighting was raging unchecked the most appropriate means must be found for halting the military operations. Then conditions must be restored in the area that would be conducive to a settlement of the long-standing differences there. There must be also respect for the rights and positions of all the States in the region. The parties concerned must return to the positions held before hostilities broke out. In all its efforts the Council must be mindful of the need for universal respect for the integrity of the instruments and principles of settlement for the dispute which had received the adherence of the parties and bore the weight of the Council's authority.

97. The representative of Egypt said that on 6 June he had come to the Council to review efforts to secure the implementation of the peaceful settlement as endorsed by the principal political organs of the United Nations and to secure the support of the Council to put an end to Israel's occupation of part of the land of Egypt and of two other Arab States. However, despite the fact that fourteen members of the Council had supported Egypt's claim, the collective will of the Council had been rendered inoperative by the veto of the United States. He went on to charge that Israel advocated a policy of conquest, occupation and territorial expansion. It had rejected Mr. Jarring's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 and had called instead for negotiations, at the same time declaring that Israel would never go back to the pre-5 June 1967 lines. That policy, together with the annexation of Arab Jerusalem and the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories, illustrated the policy of territorial expansion declared by the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister of Israel. The same policy was also demonstrated by the attack of 6 October.

98. On that day Israel's air formations had attacked Egyptian forces stationed in the area of El Zaafarana and El Sukhna on the western bank of the Gulf of Suez while Israel's naval units had been approaching the western coast of the Gulf. The attack had been aimed at El Sukhna where construction had begun on an oil pipeline carrying oil from Suez to the Mediterranean. Egyptian forces had then crossed to Egyptian territory east of the Suez Canal and had raised the Egyptian flag over its territory there. He asked the Secretary-General if United Nations observers had been located at El Sukhna and El Zaafarana, and whether they could confirm the Israeli attack on those localities. He rejected the suggestion that the parties be asked to return to the positions occupied before hostilities had broken out, as it would mean that one party was called upon to give part of its country to occupation by another.

99. The representative of China said that the Israeli Zionists had been pursuing a policy of aggression and expansion over a long period. They had not only main-

tained their illegal occupation of Arab territories but on 6 October had flagrantly launched large-scale attacks against Egypt, Syria and the Palestinian guerrillas. His Government expressed its indignation and most strongly condemned the new aggression, and at the same time admired those who were heroically resisting Israel's aggression. He termed the suggestion that Egypt and Syria should withdraw to their position prior to their counter-attack against the aggressor, an open encouragement to aggression and permission for the Israeli aggressors to perpetuate their occupation of Arab territories. He pointed out that the two super-Powers had connived in and supported Israeli policies of expansion and aggression, and that by advertising the fallacious argument about the so-called "détente", their purpose had been to lull the will of the Arab and Palestinian people to fight against aggression. The people of the area, however, had taken courageous and bold actions and broken through the situation of "no war, no peace" to resist and expel the aggressors. The Security Council must condemn most strongly all Israeli acts of aggression, give the firmest support to the Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian peoples, demand the immediate withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab territories and call for the restoration of Palestinian national rights.

100. The representative of Israel said that in another organ of the United Nations that morning he had spoken about the massive armed attack launched against his country from the west and the north and the very cruel loss and suffering it had caused. As for the Egyptian charge about a naval attack at El-Sukhna and El Zaafarana, no such attack had taken place. Although every other course had been tried, it was still time to embark on the adventure of a negotiated peace.

101. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the first objective of the Council should be to secure the earliest possible end to the fighting, which carried with it grave risks that conflagration would spread. The Council should not engage now in attempts to apportion blame and should resist the temptation of looking backwards. The United Kingdom Government still regarded the prescription set out in resolution 242 (1967) as the corner-stone of any settlement. The Council's immediate responsibilities were to issue an urgent call for a cessation of the fighting and to treat the events as a catalyst for starting a genuine diplomatic process to achieve the peaceful settlement that had for too long eluded the Council.

102. The representative of the USSR said that his Government's approach to the situation in the Middle East could not fail to be determined by such a decisive factor as the fact that war was going on there between Israel, which had occupied the land of others, and the Arab States, which were victims of aggression and had striven to recover their land. Therefore, the solution of the problem should be sought by resolving the question of Israel's withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. In his opinion, no new decision was required, but the United Nations must ensure that its previous decisions were put into effect. That required that both parties to the conflict state clearly their readiness to comply with those decisions. Egypt had given its consent; but Israel, which so far had failed to give it, should state its readiness to proceed to a withdrawal of its troops from the occupied territories. Any discussion in the Council could not be isolated from previous decisions by the Council and the General Assembly requiring Israel to withdraw from the Arab territories

occupied in 1967. Until Israel indicated its readiness to withdraw all its troops from the occupied territories, any new resolution would once again be exploited by the aggressor to divert attention from the key issue and to continue its occupation, appropriation and annexation of the lands of others. He drew attention to the statement of the Soviet Government dated 7 October, which was reproduced in document S/11012 (see subsection E, 2 below).

103. At the 1744th meeting on 9 October, the representative of Yugoslavia said that while the Security Council was trying to find a way out of the Middle East crisis, Israel was ruthlessly bombing urban centres and inflicting grave losses on the peaceful populations of the Arab countries. He quoted from an official communiqué of the Yugoslav Government condemning the Israeli aggression, supporting the just struggle of the Arab countries, and at the same time appealing to all peace-loving forces in the world to take effective measures to extend support and assistance to the Arab countries in their fight for the liberation of their occupied territories. The present escalation of military operations, he continued, had underlined once again the grave responsibility of Israel and those who supported it in blocking avenues conducive to a solution of the crisis, and had shattered the self-deception of the aggressor that its security could be based on the oppression of other peoples and on its own unalterable military superiority. He urged that the Council find an over-all solution of the problem on the basis of Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, and the realization of the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. The Council should also examine the possibility of applying sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, if Israel persisted in its aggression.

104. The representative of France expressed his concern at the reported bombing by Israel forces of a building housing representatives of the Soviet Union in Damascus. He noted that operations were currently taking place in the Egyptian and Syrian territories occupied by Israel since June 1967. He stressed that France remained in favour of a negotiated solution under the United Nations resolutions and in particular resolution 242 (1967), and warned that it would be futile to try to impose provisional measures which would settle nothing or impose commitments which were not coupled with sufficient guarantees. The time had come for the Council to attack the roots of the evil rather than confining itself to examining current events. There was more or less general agreement on the principles contained in resolution 242 (1967) but there was no agreement on their implementation, and the fact of occupation constituted the major obstacle. It was up to the Council to promote the rapprochement of the parties and its deliberations should be directed to that end.

105. The representative of Austria said that in his Government's opinion one objective must take precedence over all other considerations, namely to put an end to the sacrifice of human life and to stop hostilities without delay. A call for an immediate cease-fire would therefore be the primary task of the Security Council, and that call should be unequivocal, unanimous and strong. It was not the moment to offer advice or attribute blame, but to fulfil that basic humanitarian duty. He felt that such an appeal should be the first step towards a new effort to build a firmer structure of peace on the basis of previous United Nations reso-

lutions, the Charter and in accordance with the aspirations of the people of the area.

106. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that once again his country had been the victim of a war of aggression launched by Israel on 6 October. Once again this year the Council's effort to find a solution to the problems of the Middle East had remained without any concrete results because of the improper use of the right of veto by the United States. As a result of that veto Israel had increased its attacks against the Arab countries, its latest being the air attack against Syria on 13 September. Thus Israel, having sabotaged the activity of the Security Council, was conducting a policy of obstruction designed to prevent any peaceful and just solution to the problem. Commenting on Israel's call for a return to the positions held before 6 October and for negotiations for an agreement on secure borders, he said that no country could agree to negotiate without prior condition while its territory was occupied by a foreign Power and which declared that it would never agree to withdraw from the major part of the occupied territory.

107. In connexion with news reports of Israeli bombing in Damascus, he said that there had been a number of casualties among United Nations and other diplomatic personnel. These barbarous acts showed Israel's contempt for all human values and international conventions. His Foreign Minister had addressed to the Secretary-General a telegram of condolence with regard to the death of United Nations personnel.

108. The Secretary-General thanked Syria's Foreign Minister for his expression of condolences at the death of a United Nations Military Observer, Captain Tjorswaag of Norway, and his wife and daughter in Damascus on 9 October, and added that he had addressed a message of sympathy to Norway's Foreign Minister. He also expressed his sympathy to those Governments whose diplomats had been killed or wounded in Damascus.

109. The representative of the USSR, referring to press communications concerning casualties among Soviet citizens in Damascus as a result of Israeli's air raids, said that having been enraged by their defeats on the military fronts, the Israeli aggressors had decided to bomb peaceful areas of cities as a matter of vengeance. The Soviet Union considered that the struggle of the Arab peoples for the liberation of the occupied territories was a sacred and inalienable right and wished once again to unite with them in their fight against the Israel aggression. The Government of Israel must bear responsibility for the loss of human life and property damage caused by its barbaric actions. It would be appropriate for the President, on behalf of the Council, to ask the Government of Israel to put an end to the bombing of peaceful Arab cities and put an end to the massacre of foreigners and others who were in those cities.

110. The President agreed to waive rule 27 of the provisional rules of procedure to enable members to speak in terms of condolence in respect of the tragic news which had reached the Council. A number of the members of the Council expressed their condolences to the Secretary-General and to all those Governments whose people had reportedly fallen victims to the tragic conflict now raging in the Middle East. The President said that he would respect the wishes of the Council and send a message of condolence to the Governments and peoples involved.

111. The representative of Indonesia said that his delegation was of the view that the Council should act speedily in order to achieve a cease-fire and that the parties should return to their original positions, which, however, should be in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). As for real peace, it could only be expected to return if the rights of the Palestinians were recognized and respected. After recalling that the Council had failed to adopt draft resolution S/10974, he said that in rejecting it the Council should have been aware that the only option left to Egypt had been the use of force if it wanted to recover its occupied territories. Recalling that the provisions of resolution 242 (1967) had been left open to contradictory interpretations, he said that if that resolution had to be the basis for any solution, the Council had to agree on one interpretation and, in his delegation's opinion, the only interpretation was to follow the sequence of, first, withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories, and then negotiation as to the outstanding issues. Subsequently, secure and recognized borders could be established and peace would have a realistic chance of returning to the area.

112. The representative of India said that for seven years the Arab countries had waited for a peaceful solution on the basis of resolution 242 (1967). When the Council's efforts last July were obstructed by a veto, the message given to Egypt was clearly that force alone was the only way to assert its legitimate rights. Some delegations had indicated that if the present hostilities came to an end, some unknown and unexpected avenues to peace would open, but since there had been no change in the policies of the different Governments, his delegation could not see how that could be, since a cease-fire had been established at least 4 or 5 times during the last 7 years, always as a first step, but had never been followed by a significant second or third step, and all attempts at political settlement had proved abortive. If peace were to return to the Middle East, Israel must withdraw from the occupied territories; it would be unfair and unjust for the Council to ask for a cease-fire that would leave vast territories of Egypt, Jordan and Syria illegally occupied by Israel. Unless withdrawal took place, Egypt had made it clear that there could be no negotiations; India supported that view. There could be no peace unless political problems were examined as a whole and not simply with a view to stopping the bloodshed without taking its causes into account.

113. The representative of the Sudan stated that to call for a cease-fire on humanitarian grounds was hypocritical; other grounds were needed. This was not a war of revenge but a move to liberate the occupied territories. Many attempts at peace in the past had been foiled by the United States for fear of antagonizing Israel or to protect its design of having a bastion of its interests overseas, impervious to what that meant to the peoples of the area. The Council could not tolerate the fact that the security of Israel should be preserved at the peril of the Palestinians and at the cost of the Arab territories. Any political solution must come to grips with two basic facts: the totally unacceptable occupation of Arab territory and the emergence of the national consciousness of the Palestinian people.

114. At the 1745th meeting on 11 October, the Secretary-General referred to his statement on the conflict in the Middle East issued that day (S/11021), in which he had warned that if war continued it would pose an increasing threat to international peace and

security, and said that he had no illusions about how difficult it was for countries in conflict to turn from war to peace. While he did not wish to deflect any Government from what it believed to be its legitimate sovereign aims, he did, nevertheless, question whether the continuation of the war could possibly achieve those aims. He was deeply concerned also at the wider threat to international peace and security, and appealed to those concerned to consider alternative courses before it was too late, so that bloodshed might cease. He hoped that the members of the Council and other Member States would redouble their efforts toward an end to the fighting.

115. The representative of Egypt said that there had been attacks by Israel's Air Force on airports near Cairo and on Delta towns and villages which were among the most densely populated areas in the world. Those attacks had resulted in a total of 500 civilians killed in addition to the destruction of 67 inhabited houses. He repeated his warning that his Government would do its best to dissuade the military leaders of Israel from continuing these air raids.

116. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that despite the International Red Cross's appeal following the raids on civilian targets in Damascus, the Israeli Air Force had resumed its raids and attacked other cities and other civilian targets, resulting in 100 civilians killed. Further, he wanted to draw the Council's attention to the fact that Israel was using napalm bombs, a fact which reportedly was confirmed by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

117. The representative of Israel said that on 6 October Egypt and Syria had wantonly, and without provocation, decided to end the cease-fire and wage all-out war against Israelis. Now they sought international protection against any Israeli response. They had started a war and were responsible for all its tragic victims. The logical way to stop the war was to restore the cease-fire and then proceed to negotiation of a peace treaty.

118. The representative of Guinea condemned attacks against civilian objectives and populations, renewed its condolences to the people of Syria and wanted to assure the peoples of Egypt and of Syria of her country's unconditional support for their struggle to liberate their territories. Guinea had always maintained that any peaceful solution in the Middle East must impose the evacuation by Israel of the occupied territories and that the Security Council was bound to make that view prevail. The delegation of Guinea asked the Security Council to face up to its responsibilities, otherwise it ran the risk of seeing the world carried away toward a new third world war.

119. The representative of Peru said the situation in the Middle East was not sustainable from the point of view of the security and stability of the region. The presence of Israel in the occupied territories of Egypt, Jordan and Syria had created a state of insecurity rendered more serious by the measures adopted by Israel to make its occupation permanent. Therefore the Council should discharge its responsibilities under the Charter in conformity with the will of the peoples of the area. The Council should make an effort to reach a solution in terms that would facilitate and help to bring about an advance indication of the complete and long-term solution of the problem. The Council should not adopt a proposal that would involve approval by the Council of the

occupation of territories by force, as this would be contrary to the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.

120. The representative of Saudi Arabia warned that any makeshift arrangements in the Council that might be brought about by the pressure of the major Powers to pave the way for a *status quo ante*—before the cease-fire—would not work out, because Arab youth were opposed to the artificial State created by two major Powers. The Council had the responsibility to treat the question not piecemeal but as a whole. Even if the war ended shortly it would be recommenced at a future date either by Israel or by the Arab States and then the interests of all would go with the wind. He questioned whether the major Powers had enough courage to set their petty interests aside, and warned those who helped Israel not to play with fire, because the fire might spread and miscalculations might throw everybody into a world conflict.

121. At the 1746th meeting on 12 October, the representative of Nigeria said that the vital question at issue was not who had fired the first shot but who, in the light of resolution 242 (1967), was the more justified in resorting to the use of force to recover territories, for the present conflict was a continuation of the war which had started in June 1967 when Israel launched a pre-emptive attack on Egypt. While Nigeria recognized and supported the right of Israel to live in peace within recognized and secure boundaries, there should be no mistake about the fact that as long as Israel continued to hold by force one square inch of Arab land, Israel would know no permanent peace. Whatever the final outcome of the fighting, there would be no peace until Arab lands were restored on the basis of resolution 242 (1967) or by force of arms. He cautioned that the super-Powers would not serve the cause of international peace if they escalated the conflict by increasing supplies of arms to the warring parties. It was for that reason that his country urged the Council to exercise courage and order the parties to stop fighting now and take steps to return to the pre-June 1967 positions and comply with all the provisions of resolution 242 (1967).

122. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation viewed with concern and grief the heavy toll of lives lost since 6 October 1973 and in particular lives of innocent civilians. Therefore he was appealing to all the parties to the war to respect humanitarian law during the conflict. In his delegation's opinion, the war had resulted from the non-implementation of resolution 242 (1967), and the sole question in the non-implementation of that resolution was the continued occupation of Arab territories by Israel contrary to the United Nations Charter. The Organization of African Unity could not turn a blind eye to the act that the territory of one of its founding member States had been the object of military occupation. In his delegation's opinion, the Council should seek to declare and to enforce an immediate cease-fire, agreement by whoever occupied the other's land to withdraw from such occupation to the pre-5 June lines, and an entry into immediate negotiations to solve the other outstanding problems of the conflict, including implementation of the principles in resolution 242 (1967) giving due attention to the rights of the Palestinians.

123. Speaking as the representative of Australia, the President said that the renewed outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East had caused deep distress and

concern to the Australian Government and people. The Charter of the United Nations placed a grave responsibility on the Council and it was members' duty to grasp this responsibility. The first task must be to try, as an initial step, to unite in calling upon the warring parties to stop fighting and thus provide a breathing space in which the arduous task of extending any areas of agreement that can be found to exist in the direction of a just and lasting peace on the basis of resolution 242 (1967) would be undertaken with renewed urgency. It was important that members of the Council consider this volatile situation in a mood and an atmosphere as calm and objective as possible.

124. The representative of the USSR quoted a statement from the Soviet press agency TASS that on 12 October, a Soviet merchant vessel, the *Ilya Mechnikov*, carrying equipment for a hydroelectric complex under construction in Syria had been bombed by Israeli rocket-carrying cutters, and had been sunk in the Syrian port of Tartous. Israel's aircraft had bombed the Soviet Cultural Centre in Damascus, as well as other Syrian and Egyptian cities, resulting in civilian casualties and damage. The Israeli military were turning their deadly weapons against peaceful citizens and civilian targets and even carrying out attacks against ships and purely civilian institutions of countries that were not taking part in the war. The continuation of such actions would lead to grave consequences for Israel.

3. *Further reports of the Secretary-General and communications to the Secretary-General and the Security Council*

125. In a letter dated 8 October (S/11013) to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General, after recalling the Council Consensus of 9/10 July 1967 (S/8947) to station United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector under the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, informed the President of the Council of a request on 7 October by Egypt to evacuate the United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector to Cairo, because, owing to the fact that they were behind the Egyptian lines, they were in physical danger and their presence was unnecessary.

126. In a letter dated 9 October (S/11017), the Secretary-General confirmed his understanding that it had been agreed during consultations by the President with the members of the Security Council that he should accede to Egypt's request.

127. The Chief of Staff, in a report dated 9 October (S/7930/Add.2161), said that the Egyptian authorities had requested the immediate evacuation of the observers to Cairo and that he had replied that the request should be made to the Security Council which in July 1967 had established the United Nations observation operation in the Suez Canal sector. However, in view of the request made by Egypt's military authorities in the field that all observers should be evacuated without delay, he had had no alternative but to allow the evacuation. Consequently, seven observation posts on the west bank of the Canal had been closed. On the east bank, four posts had been closed, three had remained operational, and contact had been lost with one since 6 October. Subsequently, on 6 November, the Chief of UNTSO announced that the UNTSO Special Committee of Inquiry had located that post and recovered the remains of the two United

Nations military observers who had been on duty there, Captain G. Banse of France and Captain C. Olivieri of Italy. The report added that in the Israel-Syria sector, all the observation posts had continued to function. Two posts had been closed and their observers transferred to other posts at the request of the Syrian forces. No change had been reported with regard to the observation operation along the Israel-Lebanon sector.

128. In a further report dated 9 October (S/7930/Add.2165) the Chief of Staff indicated that following the evacuation of the remaining two observation posts in the Suez Canal sector, there were no observation operations there. Consequently, and until the redeployment of United Nations military observers in that sector, the report of the Chief of Staff covered only the Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon sectors.

129. Between 8 and 23 October, when the first cease-fire resolution was adopted by the Security Council, the reports regarding the Israel-Syria sector (S/7930/Add.2162-2198, 2200, 2201, 2203, 2208, 2211, 2212, 2214 and 2218) indicated intense firing from both sides from artillery, mortars, small arms, machine guns and tanks, as well as aerial activity and anti-aircraft fire.

130. In a report dated 9 October (S/7930/Add.2165) the Chief of Staff reported the deaths of a United Nations military observer, Captain Dirik B. Tjorswaag of Norway, together with his wife and daughter, during an air attack on Damascus. It was also indicated that Israeli forces units were observed advancing west of their forward defended localities (S/7930/Add.2172).

131. In a report dated 20 October (S/7930/Add.2204), it was indicated that observation post November, which had been under continuous fire, had had to be evacuated and that following that evacuation seven other posts in the sector had had to be closed, leaving nine posts operational, one of which had to be evacuated the following day (S/7930/Add.2205).

132. In the Israel-Lebanon sector the reports (S/7930/Add.2162-2209, 2211, 2213, 2214, 2215-2217) indicated mainly aerial activity with Israeli jet aircraft overflying southern Lebanon, although there were also many cases of firing by Israeli and unidentified forces. Lebanon complained on several occasions that Israeli ships had entered Lebanese territorial water and that Israeli personnel and vehicles had crossed the Armistice Demarcation Line into Lebanese territory frequently. The report of the Chief of Staff dated 9 October (S/7930/Add.2166) contained a complaint by Lebanon that Israeli aircraft had attacked and damaged a radar installation in Lebanon.

133. In a letter dated 9 October (S/11015), Lebanon complained that on that day Israel's air force had invaded Lebanon's air space and destroyed the radar installations in central Lebanon. Furthermore, gunboats had penetrated Lebanon's territorial waters and Israeli mortars had shelled different points in the border region of southern Lebanon.

134. On 22 October the Chief of Staff reported on the status of the United Nations military observers (S/7930/Add.2210). He stated that the Chief of Staff and eight observers were at UNTSO Headquarters at Government House, Jerusalem. In the Israel-Lebanon sector, there were 32 observers based in Beirut and five observation posts. In the Israel-Syria sector, there were

47 observers and nine observation posts (including five closed), in addition to 41 observers based at Tiberias Control Centre, the Quneitra Outstation and seven observation posts (including three closed).

135. On the west side of the Suez Canal sector, there were 42 observers based at Cairo. The Ismailia Control Centre and the nine observation posts were all closed. On the east side of the Canal, there were two observers at the Kantara Control Centre at Rabah and at the Gaza Outstation two more observers. However, from the nine observation posts which had been closed, there were 39 observers based at Jerusalem.

136. In the Israel-Jordan sector, there were two observers at the UNTSO Liaison Office at Amman.

137. In a note dated 11 October (S/11020), the President of the Security Council indicated that he had received from the Secretary-General a letter dated 9 October, in reply to the questions put to him by the representative of Egypt at the 1743rd meeting of the Council on 8 October. In his reply the Secretary-General stated that the United Nations military observers had been 30 and 60 miles respectively from El Sukhna and El Zaafarana on the Gulf of Suez, which Egypt claimed Israel had attacked on 6 October, and that therefore they had been unable to confirm or deny any incidents there.

138. In the period following the outbreak of hostilities, the representative of Israel presented a series of complaints to the Council concerning terrorist attacks on civilian targets in Israel, which it maintained had been perpetrated by infiltrators who had entered Israel from Lebanese territory. Israel declared that Lebanon must be held responsible for that situation and all the consequences arising therefrom. These charges were made in letters dated 17 and 24 October and 4 and 14 December 1973 and 8 and 11 February 1974 (S/11032, S/11041, S/11143, S/11163, S/11213 and S/11215).

E. Cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council

1. CONSIDERATION BY THE COUNCIL AT ITS 1747TH AND 1748TH MEETINGS (21-22 AND 23 OCTOBER 1973)

139. At the 1747th meeting of the Council on 21 October the President stated that the meeting had been convened at the urgent request of the representatives of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Council had before it a draft resolution (S/11036), which was co-sponsored by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, which read as follows:

"The Security Council

"1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

"2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

"3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East."

140. The representative of the United States stated that his delegation together with that of the USSR had called for the meeting to present a joint proposition to the Council. Its aim was to bring an immediate cease-fire in place and promptly begin negotiations between the parties under appropriate auspices looking towards a just and durable peace in the Middle East based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The representative of the United States explained that, in his Government's view, paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, calling for an immediate cease-fire, applied not only to the parties directly concerned but also to those who had joined in the fighting by sending units. His delegation believed that 12 hours should allow ample time to achieve practical implementation of the paragraph calling for a cease-fire. He noted that paragraph 2, calling for implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts, was linked to paragraph 3, which called for the immediate beginning of negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The United States and the Soviet Union were ready to make their joint good offices available to the parties as a means to facilitate the negotiating process. In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of the United States indicated that his country and the Soviet Union had agreed jointly on that draft resolution and requested immediate action by the Council. He added that both countries believed that there should be an immediate exchange of prisoners of war.

141. The representative of the USSR stated that the absence of a political settlement in the Middle East had caused the war to continue. The dangerous situation which had been created in that area seriously menaced the maintenance of international peace. In order to halt the war, consultations had taken place and had resulted in the jointly submitted draft resolution (S/11036). The Security Council should immediately adopt urgent measures to call a halt to the bloodshed and to implement its resolution 242 (1967). Under appropriate auspices, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations should begin between the parties concerned, aimed at establishing a just and durable peace.

142. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the two super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were again engaged in the game of power politics and spheres of influence. The Middle East had become the chessboard on which these two super-Powers were playing their political game with the destiny of the peoples of that area. As long as the major Powers did not formulate their policies on the basis of justice, there would be conflicts in the Middle East. A possible solution, which would not involve the major Powers, could be found if the Jews wished to live among the Arabs, but not as Zionists.

143. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the Council had two immediate responsibilities: to seek the earliest possible cease-fire, and to treat the renewal of hostilities as a catalyst for starting a genuine diplomatic process which would lead to a settlement. A solution to the Middle East problem was not to be found by military means. The only prescription for a settlement that commanded unanimous agreement was resolution 242 (1967). All energies could be devoted to the implementation of that resolution in all its parts. Therefore, the United Kingdom would

vote in favour of the draft resolution. He added that his delegation had interpreted the reference to "appropriate auspices" in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution to mean the auspices of the United Nations. He also urged the United States and the Soviet Union to cease supplying arms to the area once the cease-fire became effective; the United Kingdom had suspended all shipment of arms to the battlefield as soon as the hostilities broke out.

144. The representative of France stated that his delegation would support the draft resolution because it provided for an immediate end of the hostilities as well as for the implementation of all parts of the Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts. France stood by its interpretation of resolution 242 (1967), in particular as regards withdrawal, and by its conception of the role of the Security Council and of its permanent members in the peace settlement and its implementation. Therefore, negotiations "under appropriate auspices" as indicated in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution could mean nothing other than under the aegis of the Security Council.

145. The representative of India expressed his dissatisfaction with the draft resolution for the following reasons: India had maintained that justice must be combined with peace and had emphasized that the Arab lands occupied by Israel must be evacuated before serious negotiations could start; his country had always been cautious about any solution arrived at by the great Powers without full consultation with the general membership of the United Nations. However, since the parties to the fighting seemed to have accepted the joint draft resolution, India would support it. Nevertheless, the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) meant first that the Arab territories must be vacated subject to minor adjustments agreed to by the parties; secondly, that Israel had a right to exist as a sovereign State; and thirdly, that a proper settlement of the rights of the Palestinian people must be accepted.

146. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation would support the draft resolution and hoped that the factors which had frustrated the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) would not occur again. He urged the super-Powers to desist from accelerating the arms race in the area. His delegation believed that an international system would be required to guarantee the implementation of all points of resolution 242 (1967). However, the system should come from the United Nations, and there should be regular reports to the Security Council.

147. The representative of Panama stated that his delegation considered the draft resolution before the Council to be a step in the right direction and therefore would vote in favour of it.

148. The representative of Indonesia stated that resolution 242 (1967) was the basis for solution to the Middle East conflict. However, the Council should agree on one interpretation to the terms of that resolution. Indonesia's interpretation of resolution 242 was to follow this sequence: withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories; then, negotiations as to the outstanding issues, including the rights of the Palestinians. These two aspects, if they were settled, could lead to secure and recognized borders between the parties.

149. The representative of Peru said that despite the obvious imprecisions of the draft resolution, his

delegation would not object to it because it had been designed to put an end to bloodshed and to reaffirm Security Council resolution 242 (1967) as the framework for a just and definitive solution to the Middle East problem. He added that Peru considered that the "appropriate auspices" mentioned in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution would directly involve the United Nations through the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

150. The representative of Israel said Israel's compliance with the proposed cease-fire was conditional on its acceptance and observance by all the States taking part in the fighting. The cessation of military activity must include the elimination of the blockade imposed by the Republic of Yemen at the Bab el Mandab Straits. Israel attached great importance to paragraph 3 of the draft resolution which stated that negotiations should start immediately between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. Israel also regarded the release of all prisoners of war as an indispensable condition of any cease-fire agreement.

151. The representative of China reiterated his Government's position that the Security Council ought to condemn Israel for its aggression, support the Arab people for resisting aggression and demand the immediate withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Arab territories and explicitly provide for the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people. The draft resolution before the Council had failed to reflect such a position. He also pointed out that the two super-Powers had revealed their contention as well as collusion in the Middle East and their attempt to impose the situation of "no war, no peace" on the Arab people. Their practice of imposing their views on the Security Council by hurriedly introducing a draft resolution of their concoction and asking for its immediate adoption was most unreasonable. Therefore, China had decided not to participate in the voting on the draft resolution.

152. The representative of the Sudan said that although a cease-fire would be an important step, it would be only a prelude to peace. Peace in the Middle East could only be achieved through the full implementation of United Nations resolutions. To achieve peace, the occupation must be ended and the root causes of the problem—the Palestinian reality—must be dealt with. The draft resolution referred to negotiations under appropriate auspices, and for the Sudan, no auspices were more appropriate than the United Nations. Any other interpretation would be the first transgression of resolution 242 (1967).

153. The representative of Austria stated that his delegation had taken the earliest possible opportunity in the Council to call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and renewed efforts to build a just and lasting peace in the Middle East on the basis of resolution 242 (1967) to which his delegation remained committed. Therefore, his delegation would support the draft resolution.

154. The representative of Egypt stated that the targets of Egypt remained liberation of its lands, preservation of its territorial integrity, and determination that the usurped rights of the Palestinians would be preserved. Those were the targets which the overwhelming majority of the Council and of the General Assembly had confirmed.

155. The representative of Guinea said that her delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution. Guinea had always placed responsibility on the great Powers in conflicts like the Middle Eastern conflict and therefore welcomed their initiative with great relief. She hoped that the adoption of the draft resolution would mean the withdrawal by Israel from all occupied territories and the preservation of the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine. It would also mean that the negotiations envisaged in paragraph 3 would be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations.

Decision: *At the 1747th meeting of the Council on 21 October 1973, the two-Power draft resolution (S/11036) was put to the vote and was adopted by 14 votes to none as resolution 338 (1973). One member (China) did not participate in the vote.*

156. At the 1748th meeting on 23 October, the representative of Egypt said that he had asked for the meeting to consider the non-implementation of its resolution 338 (1973), and the breaking down of the cease-fire ordered by the Council.

157. The representative of Israel said that on 21 October Israel had expressed its readiness to comply with the proposed cease-fire on the understanding that it would be accepted and observed by all States taking part in the fighting. Immediately after the adoption of resolution 338 (1973), Israel had announced that it agreed to the cease-fire in accordance with that resolution. Of the 10 Arab States attacking Israel, only Egypt had been willing to announce that it would order its forces to cease fire. However, even that announcement had thus far proved to be spurious. Egyptian aggression was the cause of Israel's continued military actions. Israel also regarded the release of the prisoners held in the countries involved as an indispensable condition of any cease-fire agreement.

158. The representative of the United States introduced a draft resolution (S/11039) which was co-sponsored by his country and the USSR which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Referring to its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973,

"1. Confirms its decision on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military action, and urges that the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective;

"2. Requests the Secretary-General to take measures for immediate dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt, using for this purpose the personnel of the United Nations now in the Middle East and first of all the personnel now in Cairo."

159. The representative of the USSR said that the aim of the draft resolution was to confirm the Council's decision of 22 October for a cease-fire and a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, based on resolution 242 (1967), and for the immediate withdrawal of troops to positions occupied at the time of the cease-fire. The present draft resolution also provided that the Secretary-General be requested immediately to send observers from the United Nations to the cease-fire area. Both sponsors of the draft considered

that the troops of the parties should be returned to the positions they occupied at the time the cease-fire adopted in resolution 338 (1973) came into force. The representative of the USSR formally proposed that, in view of the urgency of the question, the draft resolution be put to a vote immediately.

160. Following a procedural discussion, in which the President of the Council and the representatives of China and the Soviet Union participated, the meeting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. and was resumed at 5.30 p.m.

161. The representative of China expressed his dissatisfaction for being arbitrarily interrupted in his speech and for not being allowed enough time to consider the draft resolution. China, he added, firmly opposed the practice of using the Security Council as a tool to be manipulated by the two super-Powers. The sacred fight against aggression and for the recovery of occupied territories waged by the army and people of Egypt, Syria and Palestine had broken through the situation of "no war, no peace", deliberately created by the two super-Powers in the Middle East for their respective interests, and exploded the myth about the "invincibility" of Israel. The dangerous developments in the Middle East, he said, had been caused by the Israel Zionist aggressors with the support and connivance of the two super-Powers. However, the Soviet Union had asserted that the Arab peoples' struggle against aggression had confronted détente with a "dangerous development of events". This showed that what the Soviet Union called "détente" was based on the submissive prostration of all oppressed nations and peoples before the two super-Powers; but the Arab people would never allow themselves to be controlled by the two super-Powers perpetually. In order to divide up further the spheres of influence in the Middle East and to reimpose the situation of "no war, no peace" on the Arab people, the two super-Powers, after hectic bargaining behind the scenes for their respective interests, had produced a draft resolution at the Council on 22 October 1973. That so-called draft resolution was even more ambiguous than resolution 242 (1967) and could solve no problems. As China had foreseen, as soon as the draft resolution had been adopted, the Israeli Zionists had immediately and flagrantly continued to expand their aggression against Egypt and Syria. Again the United States and the USSR had introduced a new draft resolution on what they called supervising the cease-fire. This draft resolution had failed to condemn Israel's expanded aggression or to make the slightest mention of the demand for immediate withdrawal of the Israeli aggressors. China was opposed to the draft resolution. However, taking into consideration the desire of certain countries concerned, China would refrain from voting on the draft resolution.

Decision: *At the 1748th meeting of the Council, on 23 October 1973, the two-Power draft resolution (S/11039), was put to the vote and was adopted by 14 votes to none as resolution 339 (1973). One member (China) did not participate in the vote.*

162. Following the vote, the representative of the United States said that the United States joined with the Soviet Union in introducing the draft resolution adopted by the Council because of its concern that the cease-fire ordered by the Council on 22 October be made fully effective at the earliest possible moment. He noted that resolution 339 (1973) confirmed the

Council's position on the cease-fire and provided for the stationing of observers. It was important that the United Nations resume at once the function of observation of the forces of the parties. The United States would expect the Secretary-General, through the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), to put observers in place at once and to receive immediately reports from them on events in the area of contact between the two sides. Those reports would be transmitted to the Council forthwith.

163. The representative of Yugoslavia said the Council and all responsible international parties had an obligation and a duty under the Charter to make Israel stop violating the cease-fire and start implementing resolution 242 (1967) immediately. The withdrawal of Israel's occupation forces from all Arab territories seized in the 1967 war back to the lines of 5 June 1967 was a basic provision of resolution 242 (1967), and its implementation meant that Israel must start its withdrawal immediately.

164. The representative of the Sudan stated that resolution 338 (1973) had not achieved much. One would have hoped that the Powers who had worked out the resolution would have also worked out the instruments to enforce its aims. It was the duty of the Council to supplement immediately its resolution with a decision to reinforce the United Nations observers who were already in the area and entrust them with the job of observing and controlling the cease-fire. The Powers who had conceived the resolution might call upon the Secretary-General to help in the translation into action of the Council's decision.

165. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that if the cease-fire was to be maintained, there must be proper arrangements on the ground to supervise it, of the sort which had been tested and had on the whole proved effective. The number of the existing observers might be inadequate for the task they were being called upon to perform; that number might well have to be increased.

166. The representative of the USSR said that the Security Council had again been confronted with a challenge by Israel, which, in violation of the Council's cease-fire decision, had renewed military action against Egypt. At this very moment the armed forces of Israel were continuing in their attempts further to extend their incursions into Egyptian territory. His delegation was gratified that the Council had been able to request the immediate dispatch of observers to the cease-fire line for the purpose of forcing Israel to respect the Council's decision on the cease-fire, and to withdraw its troops from the territories it had seized after the cease-fire came into effect. In connexion with the violation by Israel of the cease-fire decision, the Soviet Government had published a special, urgent statement which had demanded that Israel immediately cease firing and withdraw its troops to the cease-fire lines of 22 October; the Soviet Government warned Israel of the serious consequences involved in a continuation of its aggressive actions. By delaying a Council decision, China had helped the aggressor to continue its violation of the cease-fire. It was a common basis of Israel and China to slander and blacken the image of the United Nations. That was the position of China in the United Nations. For two years China had done nothing constructive in the United Nations. The anti-Sovietism of the Chinese delegation and the latter's practice of

sitting with folded arms while the Security Council adopted decisions on the Middle East played into the hands of the Israeli aggressor. If the volume of weapons supplied to the Arab countries by China was as great as the amount of bile and venom spewed forth by the Chinese delegates in the Security Council and the United Nations, the Arabs would have more of a feeling of being helped by China. The Arab people and its armed forces had shattered the myth of Israel's so-called "invincibility". However, it was the Soviet Union, and not China with its anti-Soviet tirades, which had provided them with weapons and taught them how to use them.

167. The representative of France said that the military operations which were apparently continuing on the Israeli-Egyptian front were likely seriously to jeopardize the start of over-all negotiations on the conflict. France attached the greatest importance to having those negotiations start as soon as possible, and had considered that it was up to the Council to pronounce itself most clearly for an immediate cessation of all hostilities, in accordance with resolution 338 (1973).

168. The representative of India stated that his delegation was guided in its vote by one consideration alone: that the parties actually fighting had accepted the resolution. If those parties showed their willingness to respect the cease-fire, the existing observers might be adequate and indeed more than adequate. However, if the number were not adequate for the task and should the Secretary-General come to the decision that a significant and substantial increase in the observers was necessary, India would expect the Council to be consulted as a matter of urgency. The observers should be placed on both sides of the opposing forces so that the Council would be assured of co-operation by all sides and receive the best and most objective reports.

169. The representative of Indonesia asked who was going to determine where the location of the forces had been situated at the moment the cease-fire had become effective on 22 October and how that was going to be done. It was crucial for the restoration of peace that operative paragraph 2 of resolution 338 (1973) be implemented in accordance with the only correct interpretation of resolution 242 (1967), namely, immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces to the lines they occupied before the June 1967 war, and discussions on outstanding issues, including respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

170. The representative of Peru said that his delegation agreed that the situation on the battlefield made it necessary for the Council to take immediate action. Nevertheless, the fact that the usual prior consultations had not taken place should not set a precedent. It was not the individual members but the Council as a whole which, under the Charter, had primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security. It was Peru's understanding that the Council's decision to shoulder its responsibility and to state that it was responsible for maintenance of peace meant that the Council would be continually seized of the matter. Peru understood that the appropriate auspices referred to in resolution 338 (1973) directly involved the United Nations through the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

171. The representative of China, in a further statement, reiterated his position, stating that it was the two super-Powers, not China, which had delayed

the proceedings of the Council. The representative of the Soviet Union had put forth a totally unreasonable point of procedure in order to deprive the Chinese representative of the right to speak. Such a performance of arbitrary manipulation of the Security Council designed to establish a condominium of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Council constituted an insult to the Council and was entirely intolerable. As to who helps the Israeli aggressor, it was precisely the Soviet Union that had long maintained diplomatic, trade and cultural relations with Israel. After the 1967 aggression launched by Israel against the Arab countries, the Soviet Union had stepped up sending immigrants to Israel, now over 30,000 per year, including technical and military personnel. To suit the needs of its contention with the other super-Power for hegemony, the Soviet Union was turning on the tap at one time and turning it off at another in giving its so-called military aid to Arab countries. To say that the Soviet Union had supported the struggle of the Arab people was 100 per cent hypocrisy. It was those actions of the Soviet Union that had enabled Israel to continue expanding its aggression.

172. The Secretary-General said that, pending a Council directive, he had instructed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to hold the United Nations observers in readiness in their present locations. Now that the Council had decided that the military observers should be stationed to observe the cease-fire called for in resolution 338 (1973), he would immediately take steps to put them in place in the shortest possible time. It would in all probability be necessary to increase the number of observers available in the area to carry out effectively the intentions of the Council. The Chief of Staff would be in immediate contact with the military authorities concerned with a view to working out the details of the observation operation.

173. The representative of Egypt said that when Egypt accepted the cease-fire resolution 338 (1973) it had understood that the two Powers that had proposed it would guarantee its effectiveness. Resolution 339 (1973) just adopted, urged that forces be returned to positions they were occupying at the moment the cease-fire became effective. Egypt refused to consider such a decision to be only lip-service to principle. The question of the principle of withdrawal which had been asserted by the representative of the United States should have been explained as withdrawal to the lines from which the attack had begun—as referred to in resolution 242 (1967)—those lines of pre-5 June 1967. The second understanding on the basis of which Egypt had made no objection to resolution 338 (1973), was that it should begin the machinery of putting into effect resolution 242 (1967). Egypt's main objective was the withdrawal of all occupation forces from its lands. Let the sponsors of the resolution make a joint effort to apply the resolution just adopted.

174. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the two resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) of 22 and 23 October, respectively, were traps. The two resolutions were more ambiguous than resolution 242 (1967). The Arab people refused to be manipulated by outside forces.

175. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation had voted for the resolution because of its concern about the lives being lost in the Middle East. However, Kenya could not fail to notice the manner

in which the super-Powers had presented their two resolutions. Instead of taking heed of the first draft cease-fire resolution 10 days previously, they had stepped up arms supplies, which were being used to inflict large-scale death and destruction. It appeared that the super-Powers took action only when their détente was threatened. Resolution 338 (1973) had not been implemented because of the lack of enforcement machinery. Kenya joined hands with those asking for an increase in strength of the United Nations observer corps to be placed at the disposal of the Secretary-General to enable him to carry out effectively the Council's decision.

176. The Secretary-General said that he had just received a communication from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Syria (S/11040 and Corr.1), which read as follows:

"With reference to your cable dated 22 October 1973 transmitting Security Council resolution 338 (1973) adopted on 22 October 1973 at the 1747th meeting, I should be grateful if you would note and inform the Security Council that the Syrian Government has accepted that resolution and states that it has understood the resolution to be based on:

"1. The complete withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories which were occupied in June 1967 and subsequently;

"2. The safeguarding of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations.

"The Syrian Government's acceptance of the resolution is conditional upon the other party's undertaking to implement the resolution."

The Secretary-General added that observation teams were being deployed in the Suez Canal area.

2. FURTHER REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND COMMUNICATIONS TO THE COUNCIL

177. On 24 October, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on the steps taken by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to implement Security Council resolution 339 (1973). The three observer teams, two consisting of two patrols each, and the third consisting of three patrols, had proceeded from Cairo to designated areas on the Egyptian side of the forward defended localities. Arrangements were also being made to deploy observers on the Israeli side. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO recommended an increase in the number of observer teams to 12, which would require 43 additional observers for the sector (S/7930/Add.2219).

178. On the same day, the Chief of Staff reported further complaints of cease-fire violations. In subsequent reports (S/7930/Add.2224, 2228, 2231, 2234 and 2237) the patrols of observers recently deployed began to report on the situation in their area of observation. These reports indicated no change in the situation but contained complaints by the parties regarding ground attacks, aerial bombings and sporadic artillery fire.

179. In the Israel-Syria sector, the Chief of Staff also had to adjust the cease-fire observation arrangements to the current situation. Where the forward defended localities had not moved, the existing United Nations observation posts continued to function, but,

along the perimeter of the Sassa salient, patrols had to be instituted in lieu of the former observation posts (S/7930/Add.2223). The United Nations military observers reported sporadic artillery fire by Israeli, Syrian and unidentified forces on 24 October. There were also several cases of overflights by Israeli forces aircraft and of the use of Syrian anti-aircraft missiles (S/7930/Add.2210, 2225, 2229, 2232 and 2236.)

180. In the Israel-Lebanon sector, no change was reported and the observation posts continued to submit reports on the situation there. There were several firing incidents and overflights of Lebanese territory by Israeli forces aircraft on 24 October (S/7930/Add.2221, 2222, 2230, 2233 and 2235).

181. During October and November the Secretary-General received a number of communications on the situation in the Middle East, some of which contained statements by Governments.

182. By a letter dated 7 October (S/11012), the representative of the USSR transmitted a statement issued by the Soviet Government on the situation in the Middle East in which it was stated that the absence of a political settlement in that area had caused a new outbreak of hostilities after Israel had inflamed the situation and launched military operations. The legitimacy of the demands of the Arab States for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 was in accord with the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by means of war. Without such a withdrawal by Israel, it would be impossible to establish a guaranteed peace for all the States and peoples of the area. The Soviet Union fully supported the legitimate demands of the Arab States and held that responsibility for the present turn of events rested wholly with Israel.

183. By a letter dated 8 October (S/11014), the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Council a message from the Prime Minister of Pakistan urging the Council to take immediate measures to have the occupied Arab territories vacated without further delay.

184. By a letter dated 9 October (S/11016), the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Council a message he had received from the President of Algeria which put the responsibility for the grave events of the Middle East on Israel, expressing the belief that the time had come for the United Nations to do everything in its power to restore just and lasting peace in the region once and for all. By another letter dated 10 October (S/11019), the representative of Algeria transmitted a declaration on the Middle East situation adopted by the non-aligned countries at a meeting held on 10 October at United Nations Headquarters, condemning the indiscriminate bombing of Syria's civilian population by Israel, which had caused the death of hundreds of innocent civilians, including foreign diplomats, United Nations officials and members of their families.

185. By a letter dated 13 October (S/11023), the representative of Denmark informed the Secretary-General that following consultations between the nine member countries of the European Community they had issued a statement in which they expressed concern about the resumption of fighting in the Middle East and appealed to the parties to halt the hostilities. A cease-fire should pave the way for true negotiation and settlement of the conflict in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

186. By a letter dated 16 October (S/11029), the representative of Mauritania transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a message addressed by Mauritania to the President of the United States expressing concern over the news regarding American intervention on the side of Israeli forces against the Arab peoples, who were engaged in the struggle for the recovery of their occupied territory.

187. By a letter of the same date (S/11031), the representative of the USSR transmitted a statement of 10 October by the World Peace Council urging the United Nations to take measures to compel Israel to implement its resolutions and, in case of refusal, to impose sanctions against Israel.

188. By a letter dated 22 October (S/11037), the representative of the Philippines transmitted a statement by his President, in which he appealed to all the parties concerned to avail themselves of the United Nations for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. He considered the full implementation of resolution 242 (1967) a necessary step for that purpose.

189. By a letter dated 23 October (S/11038) the representative of Sierra Leone transmitted the text of a statement by the Government of that country calling upon all parties to the conflict to observe the cease-fire appeal made by the Security Council and calling upon Israel to facilitate the establishment of a lasting peace in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

190. By a letter dated 24 October (S/11045) the representative of Romania transmitted a declaration made by his Government stating that under the circumstances all efforts should be directed towards the observance of the cease-fire, which should be followed by the achievement of an agreement providing for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territories, the establishment of an enduring peace and settlement of the Palestinian population in accordance with its legitimate aspirations to a free and independent life.

191. By a letter dated 24 October (S/11050) the representative of Turkey transmitted a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey addressed to the Secretary-General stating that Turkey continued to believe that Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which foresaw the evacuation of the occupied Arab territories as one of the important steps for a permanent solution to the conflict, still contained the necessary elements for the attainment of an honourable and just peace in the Middle East which should safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of all concerned.

192. By a letter dated 29 October 1973 (S/11061) the representative of Mongolia transmitted a statement by his Government saying that the development of events in the Middle East had shown Israel's disregard of the various United Nations Security Council resolutions. Mongolia demanded the immediate cessation of Israeli aggression against the Arab countries, the strict observance of the Security Council resolutions on the Middle East and the complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the Arab territories they had occupied.

193. By a letter dated 6 November (S/11081), the representative of Denmark transmitted a statement issued in Brussels by the nine Governments of the European Community expressing the hope that after the adoption of resolution 338 (1973), negotiations would begin for reaching a just and lasting peace in the Mid-

dle East through the application of resolution 242 (1967). They also felt that the Secretary-General and the Security Council should play a special role to that effect.

194. By a letter dated 25 October (S/11047), the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the letter he had addressed to Israel on 24 October and Israel's reply on the following day concerning arrangements for the observers of the cease-fire between Israel and Syria. He asked if Israel accepted the cease-fire with Syria and if so, if it was in agreement with the deployment of United Nations military observers in areas under the control of Israel for purposes of observing the cease-fire. In reply Israel confirmed that it had accepted the cease-fire with Syria and was in agreement with the deployment of United Nations military observers to observe the cease-fire.

195. By a letter dated 26 October (S/11055), the representative of Egypt informed the Secretary-General that Egypt accepted resolution 340 (1973) as a first step in the implementation of the Security Council decisions and was ready to co-operate in their implementation. Furthermore, Egypt considered that the presence of UNEF on its territory was of a temporary nature and governed by the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law which safeguarded Egypt's sovereignty and territorial integrity. When exercising its sovereign rights concerning UNEF, Egypt would be guided by its acceptance of the Security Council's resolution.

196. By a letter dated 31 October (S/11064), the representative of Greece, after stating his Government's position on the situation in the Middle East and indicating that resolution 242 (1967) still provided the best basis for a just settlement of the conflict, reiterated its desire to contribute to all efforts for that purpose and declared its readiness to make peace-keeping observers available immediately or to provide a military contingent for UNEF.

F. Establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force

1. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1749TH AND 1750TH MEETINGS (24 AND 25 OCTOBER 1973)

197. At the 1749th meeting on 24 October, the President said that the meeting had been called at the request of Egypt to consider Israel's continuing violations of the Security Council cease-fire resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) of 22 and 23 October 1973.

198. The representative of Egypt said that a new war had broken out in the Middle East, and at that moment was still going on. Israel had attacked the Egyptian armies on both the east and west banks of the Canal. The United Nations military observers had been prevented by the Israeli military authorities from proceeding to their destinations. He asked the members of the Council to do their best to make sure that the observers were in their places and asked the two Powers that had brought the resolutions to the Council to see to it that they were strictly implemented, adding that the President of Egypt had asked the President of the United States and General Secretary Brezhnev of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union directly to send forces to help the United Nations observers bring the forces of the parties to the conflict back to where they had been at the time the cease-fire went

into effect on 22 October 1973. In conclusion, his delegation hoped that the Security Council resolution submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union on 22 October would be salvaged by those two States themselves or by any other action deemed necessary by the Council.

199. The Secretary-General informed the Council of the action which he and General Siilasvuo, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, had taken in implementation of resolution 339 (1973). He had been in constant touch with General Siilasvuo and the representatives of the parties concerned. General Siilasvuo had been also in contact with both Egyptian and Israeli military authorities in order to carry out the dispatch of United Nations observers. He pointed out two conditions that were essential for the United Nations observers to fulfil their task effectively; first, the complete acceptance of the cease-fire by the parties; second, full co-operation by them with the United Nations observer operation.

200. The representative of Israel, rejecting Egypt's charges as unfounded, said that Egypt had never searched for a peaceful solution at all, and even less so in the Security Council. On 23 October, when the Council had been convened on Egypt's initiative, the fighting had been due to Egypt's failure to comply with Security Council resolution 338 (1973), and Israel's reaction to the Egyptian attacks. The fighting, however, had died down, and it was the time to make an effort to ensure the effectiveness of the cease-fire and to execute all the arrangements necessary for its supervision. He was authorized to reiterate that the Government of Israel would extend its full co-operation to General Siilasvuo.

201. The representative of Egypt said that the Egyptian port of Adabiah and the town of Suez had been attacked by Israel after 0500 hours GMT on 24 October, agreed to as the deadline for the cease-fire, and that the struggle was still going on. Also, United Nations military observers had not yet been permitted to go because of the determination of Israel that they be post-mortem cease-fire observers, receiving the full co-operation of Israel to observe that its conquest was safeguarded. He deplored Israel's violation of the laws of war and deliberate disrespect for the Fourth Geneva Convention by killing about 200 civilians of the town of Adabiah.

202. The representative of the Sudan said that since the cease-fire had been broken by Israel his delegation considered that the Council should condemn Israel for its latest aggression and immediately and seriously consider the implementation of resolution 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

203. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the Council was now faced with a new aggressive war by Israel against Egypt. Though the United States and the USSR had a special responsibility to act to assure the implementation of resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), the matter remained a concern of the Council as a whole. The Member States of the Council had to find the best way for the Council to discharge its responsibilities, for example, by deciding on the increase of the number of United Nations observers or considering the possibility of sending United Nations emergency forces to the area.

204. The representative of the USSR said that Israel's violations of the Security Council's cease-fire

resolutions were a criminal provocation planned to use the cease-fire for the purpose of taking over new strategic positions advantageous to Israeli imperialism in the Middle East. His Government had warned Israel of the dire consequences that would flow from Israel's violations of the Security Council decisions. The members of the Council should adopt firm measures to ensure Israel's implementation of the decisions and resolutions of the Council. The measures proposed by Egypt were justified and entirely in accordance with the Charter. The time had come for the Council to adopt appropriate strict sanctions against Israel under Chapter VII of the Charter. The United Nations observers included only representatives of the Western States, and therefore the Soviet delegation could not agree with such a unilateral selection by the Secretariat of the United Nations. The Council should consider the equitable geographic distribution aspect of the matter; since the time had come to increase the number of the observers, the socialist countries and those of the third world would be able to find among their citizens officers who were capable of carrying out that important mission.

205. The representative of Saudi Arabia quoted news reports that United States military equipment was being loaded aboard ship in West Germany for shipment to Israel.

206. The representative of the United States said that since it was not yet possible to assess with certainty through the United Nations observers the conflicting claims of both parties, the Council's urgent tasks were to urge both parties to comply immediately and fully with the cease-fire resolutions and to encourage the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to move as promptly as possible to place additional observers on the spot. He did not agree with the Egyptian Foreign Minister's suggestion that the Security Council invite the Soviet Union and the United States to send armed forces to the area of fighting in order to supervise implementation of the cease-fire. The United States delegation believed that the parties, with the United Nations observers, could and would bring the fighting to an end, and the United States had been in active and serious consultation with the Israeli Government to impress upon it the urgency of absolute adherence to Security Council cease-fire resolutions. The United States delegation also agreed that the forces of the parties should return to the positions they had occupied when the cease-fire had become effective. The fact that there was no agreed basis for firm truce lines emphasized still further the need for completing the organization and placement of the truce supervision force and for ensuring that the Council and the parties be fully informed of the developments and the military commanders of the two sides instructed in compelling terms to stop the fighting.

207. The Council's meeting was suspended. When it was resumed, the representative of Kenya said that in view of the complete breakdown in the cease-fire and an appeal from Egypt for urgent action by the Council, he was introducing the following draft resolution (S/11046) sponsored by Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia, which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 339 (1973) of 23 October 1973,

“Noting with regret the reported repeated violations of the cease-fire in non-compliance with resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973),

“Noting with concern from the Secretary-General’s report that the United Nations military observers have not yet been enabled to place themselves on both sides of the cease-fire line,

“1. Demands that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties withdraw to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973;

“2. Requests the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations military observers on both sides;

“3. Decides to set up immediately a United Nations Emergency Force under its authority, and requests the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect;

“4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on an urgent and continuing basis on the state of implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973);

“5. Requests all Member States to extend their full co-operation in the implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).”

208. The representative of Guinea said that the aim of the sponsors was in accordance with the desire of the two Powers that had proposed resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973). The sponsors had taken account of all points of view, weighing not only concern shown by the non-aligned members, but also the desire to have the support of all the members of the Council.

209. The Secretary-General stated that he had discussed the cease-fire operation in the Syrian sector both with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Syria and with the Permanent Representative of Israel, and he had requested the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to contact the military authorities on both sides concerning the possibility of adjusting the existing observation arrangements to the current situation. The Chief of Staff had formulated a plan for this purpose. The Secretary-General understood that the reaction of the Syrian authorities to this plan was favourable and that the Israeli authorities had undertaken to give their reaction by the next morning. The United Nations difficulties in immediately setting up an observation system had arisen from the conflict situation in the area and the fact that the cease-fire called for by the Security Council had not been observed.

210. At the 1750th meeting on 25 October, the representative of Kenya said that as a result of consultations between the members of the Council, three amendments had been introduced to the draft resolution contained in document S/11046 submitted at the previous meeting. Under the first amendments affecting paragraph 1 of the draft resolution the word “withdraw” would be replaced by the word “return”; under the second amendment affecting paragraph 3, the words “under its authority” were placed after the word “immediately” and the words “Emergency Force” would be followed by the new phrase “to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council”. Finally, the third amendment affecting paragraph 5 consisted of inserting the phrase “to the United

Nations” between the word “co-operation” and the word “in”.

211. The text of the draft resolution as revised was contained in document S/11046/Rev.1 and read as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October and 339 (1973) of 23 October 1973,

“Noting with regret the reported repeated violations of the cease-fire in non-compliance with resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973),

“Noting with concern from the Secretary-General’s report that the United Nations military observers have not yet been enabled to place themselves on both sides of the cease-fire line,

“1. Demands that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973;

“2. Requests the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations military observers on both sides;

“3. Decides to set up immediately, under its authority, a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council, and requests the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect;

“4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on an urgent and continuing basis on the state of implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973);

“5. Requests all Member States to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations in the implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).”

212. The representative of China said that China had always been opposed to the dispatch of the so-called “peace-keeping force” and maintained the same position with regard to the present situation in the Middle East. The dispatch of the United Nations Emergency Force could only pave the way for further international intervention and control, with the super-Powers as the behind-the-scenes bosses, thus leaving endless evil consequences in its wake. However, in consideration of requests repeatedly made by the victims of aggression, China had decided not to participate in the voting on the eight-Power draft resolution instead of vetoing it.

213. The representative of Israel said his country’s policy was founded on three principles: cease-fire, negotiations, peace. Israel would favour all constructive efforts to strengthen the cease-fire.

214. The representative of Saudi Arabia raised questions regarding operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution; from what countries would the emergency force be selected; who would pay for it? Moreover, if negotiations lasted for years, Israel might establish settlements in the occupied territories. Egypt’s sovereignty over those territories should not be put in jeopardy.

215. The representative of the United States stated that his country supported the draft resolution as amended as a result of consultations. His delegation

agreed on the need to increase the number of observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization immediately, and approved of the establishment of a new United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel from Member States except those of the permanent members of the Security Council. He expressed his Government's readiness to facilitate the transportation of that Force to the area.

216. The representative of the USSR stated that his delegation would vote for the draft resolution because it was submitted by a majority of the Council's members, namely, eight representatives of the non-aligned countries, it contained a condemnation of the aggressor, and it envisaged effective measures to ensure compliance with the Council's decision concerning the cease-fire. However, his delegation had reservations in regard to the provision which stipulated the exclusion of the permanent members of the Security Council from participating in the United Nations Emergency Force. He reaffirmed the need to ensure equitable geographical representation in the composition of the United Nations Emergency Force as well as the United Nations Permanent Observers by including representatives of the socialist and non-aligned countries. The provision of the draft resolution to the effect that UNEF should be established under the authority of the Security Council meant that the Council itself took decisions concerning all aspects of the establishment of United Nations armed forces and the discharge of the peace-keeping missions entrusted to it. With regard to the financial implication of the draft resolution, the Soviet delegation believed that the cost of maintaining the United Nations Observer Force should be borne by the aggressor and not by the United Nations.

217. The representative of Guinea expressed the hope that the eight-Power draft resolution would succeed in stopping the bloodshed and would lead the Security Council to assume its full responsibility.

218. The representative of Indonesia said that in order to stop the fighting, the wording of the draft resolution must be acceptable to those who had different views on the problem from those of his own delegation. His delegation also had agreed to the exclusion of the permanent members of the Council from participating in the United Nations Emergency Force, but hoped that they would provide financial assistance for its effective functioning.

219. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that his delegation agreed on the immediate priorities set forth in the eight-Power draft resolution. The exclusion of forces of the permanent members of the Council from the present emergency force should not prejudice the composition of the United Nations peace-keeping force which would be needed to guarantee a final peace agreement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). His delegation interpreted the phrase "under its authority" in operative paragraph 3 of the eight-Power draft resolution as referring to the ultimate responsibility of the Council for policy and not as assigning to it the day-to-day operational control of the force.

220. The representative of Panama said that his delegation supported the draft resolution before the Council, which would consolidate the cease-fire. If the draft resolution were adopted, his Government was ready to send a military force which could be incorporated into the United Nations Emergency Force.

221. The representative of Austria said that his delegation would support the eight-Power draft resolution as it had the previous two resolutions. It favoured the widest use of United Nations observers and the immediate setting-up of a United Nations Emergency Force.

222. The representative of Peru said that the Emergency Force should be set up in accordance with criteria of geographical distribution and political balance. The exclusion of contingents from the permanent members from the Force would also be preferable.

223. The representative of France stated that his delegation, with some reservations, would vote in favour of the draft resolution. As for the provision which would exclude the permanent members of the Council from the Emergency Force, his Government had undertaken the commitment to participate in a real peace-keeping force, if the case should arise. His delegation requested a separate vote on paragraph 3 of the revised draft resolution (S/11046/Rev.1) which dealt with the composition of the Force, specifically the words "except the permanent members of the Security Council".

224. The representative of Saudi Arabia asked whether all Powers were willing to contribute to financing the Emergency Force and whether the Secretary-General could give an idea of what the initial expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force would be. The Secretary-General replied that he would report to the Council on the following day the approximate estimate of the expense involved.

225. The representative of Kenya stated that he, like other co-sponsors of the draft resolution, had no objection to complying with the request of the representative of France for a separate vote on the words "except the permanent members of the Security Council".

Decision: At the 1750th meeting on 25 October the Security Council voted on the revised eight-Power draft resolution (S/11046/Rev.1). A separate vote was first taken on retaining in paragraph 3 of the draft the words "except the permanent members of the Security Council". The result was 13 votes in favour to none against, with 1 abstention (France). One member (China) did not participate in the vote. The revised draft resolution as a whole was then put to the vote and was adopted by 14 votes to none as resolution 340 (1973). One member (China) did not participate in the vote.

226. Following the vote, the Secretary-General stated that he would do his utmost to respond to the requests set forth in the resolution just adopted. Referring to paragraph 2 of the resolution, he said that paragraph 8 of document S/7930/Add.2219 contained the measures taken thus far to increase the number of observers on both sides. As for the cease-fire in the Syrian sector; both parties had agreed to the adjustment of the observation machinery, and he had instructed General Siilasvuo to proceed immediately to implement the agreed plan.

227. The representative of Egypt said that his Government accepted the resolution just adopted and had decided to grant the Emergency Force all the assistance and co-operation necessary in order to enable it to discharge its tasks. The first task of the United Nations Emergency Force was to let the forces of the two sides return to the positions they had occupied when the cease-fire had gone into effect.

228. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the setting-up of a United Nations Emergency Force was in conformity with the views of the non-aligned countries expressed at their Algiers summit meeting on reinforcing the role of the United Nations in strengthening international peace and security. Despite their feelings about Israel's aggression, the co-sponsors had couched their draft in restrained language in order to facilitate the adoption of the resolution. His delegation hoped and appealed to all to see to it that the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force operation should be smoothly worked out. Proper political and geographical representation should be observed in its composition.

229. The representative of the Sudan emphasized the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Council, particularly the United States of America and the USSR in achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The United Nations Emergency Force should be selected on an equitable geographic basis and its absolute neutrality should be guaranteed. The United States should spare no effort to remove impediments to achieving aims of the resolution.

230. The representative of India said that it was his delegation's understanding that the operations of the United Nations military observers and the United Nations Emergency Force would be carried out on the sovereign territories of Egypt and Syria and that nothing the Council might do would detract from the exercise of that sovereignty except by their consent. However, these measures should be only the prelude to negotiations which should ultimately lead to the relinquishment of all occupied territories and the establishment of durable peace in the area, enabling all the States in that region to live in security inside their own borders. Any final solution must respect the rights of the Palestinian people. His delegation was confident that money would be forthcoming for the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force. His delegation was also hopeful that the Secretary-General would give the Council concrete and practical proposals for the implementation of the Council's decision.

231. The representative of Nigeria drew the attention of the Council to the statement made by General Gowon that morning, in which the Nigerian Government had declared its decision to break diplomatic relations with the Israeli Government.

232. The representative of Kenya, on behalf of the eight sponsors of the draft resolution, thanked all members of the Council for their support in adopting the draft. He said that what remained was a determined effort on the part of all concerned to implement resolution 340 (1973) immediately.

233. The Secretary-General read out the text of his letter (S/11049) to the President of the Security Council sent that afternoon. In the letter, he stated that he would deliver to the Council the report required by resolution 340 (1973). In the meantime, he proposed to arrange for the contingents of Austria, Finland and Sweden—then serving with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)—to proceed immediately to Egypt, and also proposed to appoint General Siilasvuo, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, as the interim Commander of the Emergency Force and to ask him to set up a provisional headquarters staff of personnel from UNTSO. He was having consultations with the representatives of the countries concerned. This step—if accepted by the Council—would be with-

out prejudice to the more detailed and comprehensive report on the Emergency Force which he would submit to the Council on 26 October.

234. The President of the Council stated that, since there was no objection, he would take it that the Council authorized the Secretary-General to proceed in accordance with his proposal.

235. Speaking then as the representative of Australia, he expressed his delegation's support for the initiative taken by the non-aligned members of the Council. The real merit of the resolution lay in its moderate and practical approach. In welcoming the proposal to establish a United Nations Emergency Force he said that many important matters of both a mechanical and substantive nature had to be resolved before the Force could become an effective buffer between the parties to the dispute. In this context, he noted that the Council's responsibility was to lay down policy and broad guidelines, not to decide every detail of the establishment and operation of the Emergency Force. His Government would be willing to consider sympathetically a request for a contribution to the Emergency Force under appropriate conditions.

2. FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF OBSERVERS AND DISPATCH OF CONTINGENTS FROM CYPRUS (CONSIDERATION AT THE 1751ST MEETING, 26 OCTOBER 1973)

236. At the 1751st meeting on 26 October, the representative of Egypt said that he had come to the Council to warn of a grave danger that was threatening his region and beyond. New hostilities had begun on the Suez and Sinai fronts. Having adopted resolution 338 (1973), 339 (1973) and 340 (1973), the Council had not specified which forces had not obeyed the Council and had tried to use the cease-fire to make territorial gains. However, it was admitted by the Secretary of State of the United States that it was Israel that had made territorial gains after the cease-fire. Red Cross vehicles carrying plasma, water, food and medicine had been prevented by the Israeli forces from proceeding to the Egyptian soldiers in Sinai and were on their way back to Cairo because of Israeli conditions that Egypt found impractical and impossible. The Council should condemn the Israeli authorities for those intentional obstructions.

237. The representative of Zambia said that on 26 October 1973, his Government had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel, because Israel was responsible for the current crisis in the Middle East through its intransigence about acceding to Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

238. The representative of Israel said that Egypt had violated the cease-fire by attacks against Israeli forces while at the same time charging Israel with attacking and violating the cease-fire. Egypt also accused Israel of breaches of the cease-fire when no fighting at all was going on. The Egyptian charges were completely unfounded and fabricated.

239. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that Israel seemed to be intent on forcing the Egyptian troops in the Suez area either to surrender or to be destroyed. The Israeli demand that the Red Cross convoys be manned by Israeli personnel was unfair and impractical.

240. The representative of the USSR said that Israel had again launched attacks against Egyptian troops,

and thus had violated the Security Council decisions calling for an immediate cessation of military activities. The Security Council was bound to draw the necessary conclusions therefrom urgently and without any procrastination. In conclusion, he read a statement made by Mr. Brezhnev, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at a meeting of the World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces in Moscow on 26 October 1973. The statement said, *inter alia*, that the USSR was interested in seeing a genuine, strong and just peace established in the Middle East and that the security of all countries and peoples of that region should be guaranteed. The great value of the Security Council decision of 22 October was that it provided for taking important steps toward the elimination of the very causes of the war. In accord with that decision, the parties concerned should immediately begin talks under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing peace in the Middle East. The Soviet Union was ready to take part in appropriate guarantees.

241. Reporting on developments in connexion with the interim arrangements that he had proposed on the previous day to the Council, the Secretary-General said that General Siilasvuo had set up a provisional headquarters in Cairo, and that the contingents of Austria, Finland and Sweden were being transferred from Cyprus to Cairo, an operation which was to be completed by the next morning. He had instructed General Siilasvuo to move advance elements of the Force forward with the maximum possible speed. With regard to UNTSO observers he said that there were nine patrols on the Egyptian side and six on Israeli-held territory. They were now in the vicinity of the forward positions of the respective forces.

242. The representative of the United States said that in word and deed his country stood for strict observance of the cease-fire. The most constructive contribution the Council could make was to proceed systematically, as quickly as possible, on its mission of ending the fighting and beginning peace negotiations. The Council could proceed to implement resolution 340 (1973), which, if carried out, could lead to real peace.

243. The representative of India said that the Council had failed to introduce any appreciable measure of calm into the area of conflict. The moment had come when the Council should take whatever practical steps it could. He then suggested that, first, the Secretary-General be authorized to send additional men from Cyprus if he considered it a necessary step as an interim measure. His second proposal was that the Secretary-General and the President of the Council should appeal to the parties to co-operate fully and effectively with the International Red Cross.

244. The representative of Yugoslavia said that he supported the two proposals just made by the Indian representative.

245. The President of the Council, referring to the two proposals made by the representative of India and supported by the representative of Yugoslavia, stated that, in the absence of any objection, he considered the proposals made by the representative of India and Yugoslavia as approved by the Council.

246. The Secretary-General said that he would actively consider the first proposal, having in mind the task of the Force in Cyprus and the number of troops available there. With regard to the second proposal, he

would consult with the President about the necessary steps. He had been in touch with the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva and had been kept informed of its efforts.

3. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 340 (1973)

247. In pursuance of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) concerning the establishment of a United Nations Emergency Force, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report dated 26 October (S/11052/Rev.1), in which he outlined the terms of reference of the Force, general considerations related to its effective functioning, a proposed plan of action and the estimated cost and method of financing.

248. With regard to the terms of reference, he said that the Force would supervise the implementation of paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting and co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross. It would have the co-operation of the military observers of UNTSO. The essential conditions for its effectiveness were that it must have the full backing of the Council, operate with the full co-operation of the parties and function as an integrated and efficient military unit.

249. With regard to the guidelines for the functioning of the Force, the Secretary-General proposed that it be placed under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. The Commander of the Force would be appointed by the Secretary-General with the Council's consent and would be responsible to him. The Secretary-General would keep the Council fully informed and refer to it for decision all matters that might affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force.

250. The Force must enjoy the freedom of movement and communication required for the performance of its task, as well as the relevant privileges and immunities of the United Nations. It should operate separately from the armed forces of parties concerned. Separate quarters and, whenever feasible, buffer zones would have to be arranged with the co-operation of the parties.

251. The Force would be composed of contingents provided upon the request of the Secretary-General by selected countries, chosen in consultation with the Security Council and the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation.

252. The Force would be provided with defensive weapons only and force would not be used except in self-defence, which would include attempts to prevent it by forceful means, from discharging its duties. It would proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict would comply with the decisions of the Council. The Force would act with complete impartiality and would avoid any action that could prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties, without affecting paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 339 (1973) and 340 (1973). The total strength of the Force could be in the order of 7,000 men and it would initially have a mandate of six months. On that basis, the approximate estimated cost of the Force for that period would be \$30 million, the costs to be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne

by the Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter.

4. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1752ND MEETING (27 OCTOBER 1973)

253. At the 1752nd meeting on 27 October 1973, in addition to the letter from the United States (S/11010), the provisional agenda contained the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) (S/11052/Rev.1).

254. At that meeting the Council also had before it a draft resolution (S/11054) sponsored by Australia.

255. The representative of China said that his delegation opposed the dispatch of the so-called United Nations Emergency Force to the Middle East. Accordingly, his delegation could not pay the expenses for the dispatch of the Force, and would not participate in the voting on the Secretary-General's report.

Decision: *At the 1752nd meeting on 27 October 1973, the Security Council adopted the Australian draft resolution (S/11054) by 14 votes to none as resolution 341 (1974). One member (China) did not participate in the vote.*

256. Resolution 341 (1973) read as follows:

"The Security Council

"1. *Approves* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) contained in document S/11052/Rev.1 dated 27 October 1973;

"2. *Decides* that the Force shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter, if required, provided the Security Council so decides."

257. Following the vote, the representative of France said that the Council should have control over all operations of the Force, particularly the defining of the Force's terms of reference, its duration, its size and its composition. The Security Council must also appoint the commander, decide on the basic directives to be given to that commander, prepare the method of financing, and, finally, ensure constant control over the application of its directives. As the Council was not in a position to direct such a Force on a continuing basis, it was possible to envisage the establishment of a subsidiary organ of the Council under Article 29 of the Charter whose purpose would be to lessen the Council's work. As for the Force's mandate, it should have as its terms of reference the supervision of the implementation of the cease-fire on both sides of the cease-fire lines. The composition of the Force should be such that would give the best possible assurance of its objectivity towards the parties to the conflict. Finally, his delegation would be prepared to accept the principle of complete exemption of the least advanced developing countries from contributions to the financing of the Force.

258. The representative of Guinea said that the Secretary-General's report just approved defined objective provisions taking duly into account the heavy responsibility incumbent on the Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. Peace in the Middle East would depend on their implementation. In voting in favour of the draft resolution and in approving the Secretary-General's report, her delegation

had remained convinced that the strict implementation of its provisions could give rise to no ambiguity.

259. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the Secretary-General's report seemed practical, constructive and balanced. The new United Nations Emergency Force, which should not only keep the guns silent in the Middle East, but should also make a sizable contribution towards achieving a just and a long-awaited peace. With the adoption of the report of the Secretary-General, the United Nations Emergency Force now clearly had its mandate and its means of functioning.

260. The representative of India said that in sending forces mainly to Egyptian territory, the Council should not overlook the question of Egyptian sovereignty. The Council had had three purposes: a cease-fire, the return of both parties to the positions they had occupied at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October; and negotiations which must start as soon as possible.

261. The representative of the USSR noted that an informal consultative meeting of the Council had unanimously approved his delegation's proposal that Israel should be asked to return its troops to the positions they occupied at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973. His delegation had not opposed the Council's approval of the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the question of measures to implement Security Council resolution 340 (1973) despite the fact that the report contained some points that were not altogether coincidental with the approach of the Soviet Union to the question of establishing United Nations emergency forces and the conduct of United Nations peace-keeping operations.

262. The representative of the Sudan said that paragraphs 3 and 4 (e) of the Secretary-General's report did not, in his delegation's understanding, compromise the sovereignty of the Arab Republic of Egypt over its territory. He thanked the representative of France for his suggestion to exempt the least developed countries from contributions to the budget of UNEF. Though his delegation appreciated the motives of the French delegation, he appealed to the latter not to press its suggestion because the least developed countries should not be excluded from contributing to such a noble end. His delegation fully supported the contents of paragraph 7 of the report of the Secretary-General.

263. The representative of Indonesia said that his delegation had voted for the amended report of the Secretary-General, as his delegation was generally in agreement with its provisions. Concerning paragraph 4 (c) of the report, consultations "with the parties concerned" should be interpreted as making serious efforts to persuade the parties at least not to object to the contingents selected by the Secretary-General. That was purely a question of territorial sovereignty. As for the financing of the forces, his delegation understood that paragraph 7 of the report should not be read so as to exclude voluntary contributions.

264. The representative of the United States said that his Government welcomed the action of the Council in approving the Secretary-General's report. His delegation believed that the Emergency Force would from its inception require the full co-operation of the parties concerned and operate as an integrated military unit with efficiency and with special privilege for none. The United States considered the language of the report carefully drawn. For instance, the statement "All matters which may affect the nature of the continued effective functioning of the Force will be referred to the

Council for its decision" assured an orderly agreed withdrawal of the Force but only when the Council so decided. His delegation was also satisfied that the phrase "bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation" was consistent with Article 101 of the Charter and assured that all the obvious and necessary criteria would be given appropriate consideration in the composition of the Force. His delegation hoped that the Secretary-General could move as swiftly as possible to implement the resolution just adopted. The United States was prepared to consider requests for assistance to that end. Finally, he expressed his personal satisfaction that his Government had helped to arrange for a meeting of Egyptian and Israeli military representatives under United Nations auspices, to discuss the practical application of the cease-fire.

265. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution in order to help pave the way for the implementation of urgent and necessary steps to bring peace and normalcy to the Middle East. His delegation hoped that the United Nations Emergency Force would effectively prevent the recurrence of fighting in the area. It was also his delegation's hope that the parties concerned would immediately after the cease-fire start the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), beginning negotiations for a just and durable peace.

266. The representative of Panama said that his delegation had voted in favour of the approval of the Secretary-General's report because it seemed to be the best way to implement resolution 340 (1973) of the Council that had established the United Nations Emergency Force for the Middle East.

267. The representative of the United Kingdom commended the Secretary-General and his staff for his report, which dealt comprehensively and effectively with the immediate issues, and reflected accurately the letter and spirit of the Council's resolutions. For those reasons his delegation had voted for the resolution approving the Secretary-General's report.

268. The representative of Egypt announced that his Government had accepted Security Council resolutions 338 (1973), 339 (1973) and 340 (1973) as a first step in the implementation of the decisions adopted by the Security Council. In giving its consent to the entry and presence of the United Nations Emergency Force on Egyptian territory, his Government was exercising its sovereign rights to enable the United Nations to proceed with the first step and temporary measure towards putting an end to the aggression committed against Egypt since 1967.

269. The representative of Israel said that Israel's policy continued to be guided by three principles: cease-fire, negotiation and peace.

270. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the United Nations Emergency Force was most likely to be extended for many years, which might bring its total expenditure to over \$1,000 million for a period of six or seven years. The Secretary-General's report should not have bypassed paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the Charter. It was the prerogative of the General Assembly not the Security Council to approve the budget of the United Nations.

271. The representative of the USSR said that he had just received a TASS statement issued that very

day, about which he would like to inform the Council members. The statement said that in connexion with Middle East events, there had been reports from Washington regarding the United States armed forces' being placed on alert status. In attempting to justify this step, officials had made reference to some alleged actions of the Soviet Union, which allegedly had given grounds for concern. These explanations were absurd, since the acts of the Soviet Union were strictly directed toward assisting the implementation of the Council decision regarding the cease-fire and the restoration of peace in the Middle East.

5. PROGRESS REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONING OF UNEF

272. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), the Secretary-General issued progress reports on the establishment and functioning of UNEF (S/11056 and addenda). In his first report of 28 October (S/11056), he recalled the terms of Council resolution 340 (1973) and the decision that personnel of the Austrian, Finnish and Swedish contingents serving in Cyprus should proceed to Egypt, and added that UNEF had become established with the arrival of those contingents in Cairo on 26 October. Those contingents had been deployed on 27 October and a United Nations presence had been established in the Israel-controlled area west of Suez city. It was planned also to transfer to the UNEF area the Irish contingent serving with UNFICYP, and consultations for further additions to the Force were in progress. Thus the Force's initial activities had taken place in areas of actual confrontation and had involved supervision of the cease-fire in co-operation with UNTSO observers. On 27 and 28 October, at kilometre marker 109 on the Cairo-Suez road, the first meeting of high-level military representatives of Egypt and Israel was held, in the presence of UNEF officers, to discuss observance of the cease-fire and humanitarian questions. An agreement was reached to allow the transfer of non-military supplies through Israeli-held territory to Egyptian troops on the east bank of the Suez Canal by lorries driven by UNEF soldiers.

6. THE QUESTION OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE (CONSIDERATION AT THE 1754TH MEETING ON 2 NOVEMBER 1973)

273. At the 1754th meeting on 2 November 1973, the provisional agenda included, in addition to a letter from the United States (S/11010), the reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11056 and Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1).

274. The President said that with regard to the item under consideration he was authorized to make the following statement, representing the agreement of the members of the Council (S/11072):

"United Nations Emergency Force (Security Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973); implementation—second phase

"1. The members of the Security Council met for informal consultations on the morning of 1 November 1973 and heard a report from the Secretary-General on the progress so far made in the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973).

"2. After a lengthy and detailed exchange of views it was agreed that in regard to the next stage of implementation of resolution 340 (1973):

"(a) The Secretary-General will immediately consult, to begin with, Ghana (from the African regional group), Indonesia and Nepal (from the Asian regional group), Panama and Peru (from the Latin American regional group), Poland (from the Eastern European regional group) and Canada (from the Western European and other States group), the latter two with particular responsibility for logistic support, with a view to dispatching contingents to the Middle East pursuant to Security Council resolution 340 (1973). The Secretary-General will dispatch troops to the area from these countries as soon as the necessary consultations have been completed. The Council members agreed that at least three African countries are expected to send contingents to the Middle East. The present decision of the Council is intended to bring about a better geographical distribution of the United Nations Emergency Force.

"(b) The Secretary-General will regularly report to the Council on the results of his efforts undertaken pursuant to subparagraph (a) so that the question of balanced geographical distribution in the Force can be reviewed.

"3. The above-mentioned agreement was reached by members of the Council with the exception of the People's Republic of China which dissociates itself from it."

275. The representative of China said that the dispatch of the so-called United Nations Emergency Force would place sovereign Arab States under international control and pave the way for further international intervention, with the super-Powers as behind-the-scenes bosses who had been contending fiercely over the composition of the Force. Both of the two super-Powers were concerned merely about the right of their respective military presences and tried by all means to squeeze in forces which they could influence so as to exercise indirect control, if direct control was not possible. A super-Power which styled itself the friend and benefactor of the Arab countries, while completely disregarding their sovereignty, had contended hard about the composition of the Emergency Force, and thus revealed its true intention.

276. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation, in a spirit of compromise, had accepted the formula just adopted by the Council in order to set in motion the second phase of the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973).

277. The representative of Indonesia said that his delegation had conveyed its readiness to participate in UNEF if requested and not objected to by the parties concerned. His delegation would be ready to dispatch a contingent to the Middle East within a week after the necessary consultations were completed.

278. The representative of France said that his delegation was gratified that the Council had reached agreement on a text that would facilitate the work of the Secretary-General and encourage him to continue his efforts to set up the United Nations Emergency Force. He hoped that the Council would consider the participation in the Force by other States of Europe of the Nine, particularly Belgium and Italy, which had offered to do so.

279. The representative of Panama said that the armed forces of Panama had accepted the task of providing contingents for the United Nations Emergency Force.

280. The representative of the United Kingdom said that in later stages of the implementation of resolution 340 (1973) the offers made by other members of the European Community to participate in the Emergency Force should be taken into consideration.

281. The representative of the USSR said that the Council had taken a decision in the right direction towards the practical implementation of its resolution 340 (1973) with regard to the selection of contingents to be included in UNEF on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. In its decision the Council had also officially affirmed the principle that countries should be selected for that purpose from every geographic area without exception and without discrimination of any kind. The decision had removed the artificial restrictions on participation in UNEF by the socialist countries and the non-aligned countries, including the countries of Africa. He reaffirmed the unchanging nature of the position of principle taken by the Soviet Union with regard to United Nations peace-keeping operations, including the financing of those operations. The Council still must make considerable efforts to ensure full implementation of its resolutions. Furthermore, the United Nations troops should take the necessary measures to have the troops of the parties withdrawn to the positions occupied at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October. The Security Council was entitled to know how the agreed instructions to that end from the Secretary-General to the Commander of UNEF had been complied with. A member of the Council had levelled criticisms against that decision of the Security Council, using the old, worn-out, notorious formula about "the two Powers". In objecting to this, he was objecting to the position of the majority of members of the Security Council, who represented the non-aligned countries in the Council. The efforts of that critic and those he represented in the Council were designed to see that there was no peace in the Middle East and that the United Nations took no part in defending justice in the interest of the victims of aggression.

282. The representative of Peru said that his delegation was gratified at the step forward that the Council had taken in implementation of its resolution 340 (1973). The armed forces of Peru would be placed at the disposal of the United Nations Emergency Force.

283. The representative of the United States said that his delegation was gratified that the Council had reached agreement on important steps in implementation of its resolution 340 (1973). It was critically important, he continued, that the Council should have an integrated, harmonious and impartial force which could carry out its duties efficiently.

284. The representative of Australia said that his delegation was glad that agreement had been reached on the fourth step in the process of setting up a United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, thus maintaining the essential momentum for its speedy emplacement.

285. The representative of Yugoslavia expressed the satisfaction of his delegation with the decision just adopted by the Council and pointed out that an effort

had been made during consultations to remove all artificial obstacles concerning the composition of UNEF which, according to resolution 340 (1973), had to be established on the principle of equitable geographic distribution.

286. The representative of India said that given good will on all sides, the Council would succeed in making UNEF a really practical, effective international force. He welcomed the co-operation of the great Powers in the establishment of the Force.

287. The representative of Kenya announced that his country had decided to break off diplomatic relations with Israel. The President of Kenya had made a statement rejecting armed occupation and expressing the belief that the rupture would accelerate the implementation of the Security Council resolutions.

288. The representative of China said in a further statement that the representative of the Soviet Union had again used his worn-out language to distort the principled position taken by the Chinese delegation and to sow discord in relations between China and the non-aligned countries. But it was completely futile, because numerous countries of the third world, including many non-aligned countries, could see clearly how the Soviet Union and the other super-Power had made use of the temporary difficulties of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples, selling out their interests and vehemently contending for spheres of influence.

289. The representative of the USSR stressed that the Council had confirmed its decision on the cease-fire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the 22 October line, and had also instructed the Secretary-General to send an urgent telegram to the Commander of UNEF to say that he should require Israel's compliance.

290. The Secretary-General assured the Council that he would take immediately the necessary steps to implement the agreement reached by the Council on the second phase of UNEF. As for the request for the return of the Israeli forces to the 22 October line, he had dispatched the cable requested of him on 27 October to the Force Commander. It was his understanding that the official answer to this request was not expected before the Israeli Prime Minister's return from Washington.

291. The representative of Israel said that while the Council was discussing the questions of the Emergency Force, the vital humanitarian problem created by the Yom Kippur aggression remained unresolved. Referring to his letter of 29 October to the Secretary-General (S/11042), he charged Egypt and Syria with inhuman conduct on the question of prisoners of war. The solution of that question in accordance with the Geneva Convention was a crucial test for the future.

292. The representative of Egypt charged Israel with violating the fourth Geneva Convention by attacking the civilian population of Egyptian villages. He noted with satisfaction the constructive action of the Security Council to put an end to the aggression of the Israeli forces against a State Member of the United Nations.

293. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the composition of UNEF was not the crux of the matter. The presence of UNEF in the occupied territories would give Israel an assured opportunity to consolidate its hold over them. It was only when the people of the United States got tired of footing the bill for

UNEF and aid to Israel that the leaders of Israel would come to their senses and might agree to live in peace with the Palestinians.

7. APPOINTMENT OF THE FORCE COMMANDER (CONSIDERATION AT THE 1755TH MEETING, 12 NOVEMBER 1973)

294. On 12 November the Security Council held its 1755th meeting to consider the appointment of the Commander of UNEF, and adopted the agenda listing the letter dated 8 November from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council (S/11103) regarding the matter.

295. The President stated that he had received a letter in which the Secretary-General, after recalling that he had as an interim measure appointed, with the authorization of the Council, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, as the interim Commander of UNEF, said that it was his intention, if the Council consented, to appoint General Siilasvuo as the Force Commander.

296. As there was no objection, the President was authorized to send the following reply (S/11104) to the Secretary-General:

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 8 November 1973 by which you informed me of your intention to appoint General Siilasvuo, at present interim Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force, as the Force Commander, if the Security Council consents. In accordance with your request I have brought this matter to the attention of the members of the Council.

"In reply, I wish to inform you that the members of the Security Council give their consent to this appointment, with the exception of the People's Republic of China which dissociates itself from it."

8. FURTHER PROGRESS REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON UNEF

297. In a further progress report on UNEF dated 4 November (S/11056/Add.2), the Secretary-General indicated that its total strength had risen to 1,004, and described the movement and deployment of the contingents. He indicated that consultations on the dispatch of additional troops were continuing with a view to implementing the Council's agreement of 2 November. In addition, pursuant to the Council's decision in resolution 340 (1973), the Force Commander had met with the Israeli Minister of Defence on 29 and 30 October to request that Israeli armed forces return to positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October. The report indicated that no reply had so far been received. On 3 November, the Commander met the Egyptian Minister of Defence. Four more meetings of Egyptian and Israeli representatives had been held at Kilometre 109, in the presence of UNEF representatives, to discuss possible withdrawals, mutual disengagement and the exchange of war prisoners.

298. In a further progress report on UNEF dated 11 November (S/11056/Add.3), the Secretary-General reported that the strength of the Force had reached 1,600 men. Advance logistic evaluation teams had been dispatched from Canada and Poland, and consultations had continued with a view to implementing the agreement adopted by the Security Council. Re-

quests for contingents had been submitted to Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Panama and Peru. The Force Commander had again requested the return of Israeli troops to positions occupied on 22 October in accordance with resolution 340 (1973). While no reply had been received regarding the implementation of resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), the matter was referred to in an Agreement signed on 11 November by representatives of Egypt and Israel at a meeting at kilometre marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road under the auspices of the Force Commander.

299. The Secretary-General stated that the text of that Agreement had been transmitted to him on 9 November by the United States (S/11091) and that he had immediately instructed the Force Commander to take the necessary measures and to make available his good offices for carrying out the terms of that agreement.

300. Under the terms of the agreement: (A) Egypt and Israel agreed to observe scrupulously the cease-fire called for by the Security Council; (B) Both sides agreed that discussions between them would begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the 22 October positions in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the United Nations; (C) The town of Suez would receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town of Suez could be evacuated; (D) There should be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the east bank; (E) The Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road would be replaced by United Nations checkpoints. At the Suez end of the road, Israeli officers could participate with the United Nations in verifying the non-military nature of the cargo at the bank of the Canal; (F) As soon as the United Nations checkpoints were established on the Cairo-Suez road, there would be an exchange of all prisoners of war, including the wounded.

301. After signing the Agreement, which was to enter into force forthwith, the parties immediately started discussions under the auspices of the Force Commander on the modalities of its implementation.

302. In further progress reports dated 14 and 15 November (S/11056/Add.4 and 5), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that on 14 November the parties had reached an accord on the implementation of paragraphs C, D, E and F of the Agreement, and that the Force Commander had made a summing-up of that accord which had been accepted by the two parties. It provided in particular for UNEF convoys of non-military supplies to Suez City and to the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of the Canal, the exchange of all prisoners of war and the evacuation of the wounded civilians in Suez City. The report of 15 November and a further report dated 24 November (S/11056/Add.6) indicated that UNEF was carrying out smoothly its responsibilities under the terms of that accord.

303. With regard to the organization and composition of the logistic support elements for UNEF, the report of the Secretary-General dated 24 November indicated that, as a result of discussions between the Secretariat and the delegations of Canada and Poland, an agreement had been reached on the detailed requirements and division of tasks for the logistic support of the Force, providing a clear and practical division of responsibilities between Canada and Poland.

304. In connexion with the deployment of UNEF in the Egypt-Israel sector, Egypt, in a letter dated 7 November (S/11084), charged that Israel had prevented the Irish contingent from deploying its troops across the Suez Canal to the east bank in defiance of Security Council resolutions and decisions. In a letter dated 10 November (S/11097), Israel replied that the Irish contingent had reached its destination in the area under Israeli control on 9 November, as had been attested by a spokesman for UNEF.

305. On 23 November, the President of the Council, after consultations with all members of the Council, addressed the following letter to the Secretary-General (S/11127):

"I wish to inform you that I have brought your letter of 20 November 1973, in which you stated that you had the intention of adding to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East contingents supplied by the Governments of Kenya and Senegal, to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

"In reply, I wish to notify you that the members of the Security Council, with the exception of China which dissociates itself from this agreement, agree with the addition of contingents supplied by the Governments of Kenya and Senegal to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East."

9. FURTHER REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE

306. The Secretary-General continued to transmit the reports on the status of the cease-fire based on information submitted by UNEF for the Egypt-Israel sector and by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO for the other sectors. Those reports, while showing a decrease in military activities, indicated some cases of artillery, tank and small arms fire. They also showed that there had been aerial activities and complaints by Egypt of Israel aerial bombardment of the Third Army on the east bank of the Canal.

307. In a report dated 29 October (S/11057) the Secretary-General gave details of the status of the cease-fire operations being carried out by UNTSO and the deployment of the United Nations observers in their areas of operation since the establishment of UNEF. In the Egypt-Israel sector, there were now nine United Nations patrols from the Egyptian side and six from the Israeli side. UNTSO observers in that sector continued to carry out their observation duties and UNEF would have their co-operation in the fulfilment of its tasks. In the Israel-Syria sector, as a result of the readjustment of the cease-fire arrangements following the adoption of resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), UNTSO observation operations consisted of three observation posts and the Quneitra Outstation on the Israeli side, and two observation posts on the Syrian side. The remaining observation posts had been closed and eight patrols had been established: five on the Syrian side and three on the Israeli side. In the Israel-Lebanon sector the five observation posts continued to function as before.

308. Furthermore, the Secretary-General indicated that the series of reports on the status of the cease-fire issued as "supplemental information" in addenda to document S/7930 would be discontinued and future reports would be issued as addenda to S/11057.

309. The reports of the Secretary-General issued as S/11057/Add. series from 29 October until the end of December showed that military activities had lessened in all sectors following the establishment of UNEF. However, there had been many firing incidents and overflights by aircraft.

310. In the Egyptian-Israel sector the reports (S/11057/Add.1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 18, 19, 21, 26, 27, 32, 33, 36, 39, 42, 47, 48, 51, 56, 59, 62, 65, 69, 72, 75, 80, 82, 85, 87, 90, 93, 96, 97, 102, 106, 109, 112, 115, 118, 119, 122, 127, 130, 133, 136, 142, 145, 148, 151, 154, 157, 160, 163, 166, 169, 172, 175, 178, 181, 184, 186 and 189) showed frequent firing incidents involving artillery, mortar and automatic weapons, as well as aerial activity accompanied by anti-aircraft fire. During that period also the reports indicated that there had been some incidents of firing on or close to United Nations personnel and installations resulting in some injuries and some material damage.

311. In the Israel-Syria sector the reports showed a type of incident similar to those in the Egypt-Israel sector (S/11057/Add.2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 22, 24, 28, 30, 35, 37, 40, 44, 45, 50, 52, 55, 58, 61, 63, 67, 70, 73, 76, 78, 83, 88, 91, 94, 99, 100, 103, 105, 108, 110, 114, 117, 121, 123, 125, 128, 131, 135, 138, 140, 143, 146, 149, 152, 155, 158, 161, 164, 167, 170, 173, 176, 180, 182 and 187). The reports, furthermore, contained complaints by the parties of cease-fire violations.

312. In the Israel-Lebanon sector the reports (S/11057/Add.3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 17, 20, 23, 25, 29, 31, 32, 34, 38, 41, 43, 46, 49, 53, 54, 57, 60, 64, 68, 71, 74, 77, 79, 81, 84, 86, 89, 92, 95, 98, 101, 104, 107, 111, 113, 116, 120, 126, 129, 132, 134, 137, 141, 144, 147, 150, 153, 156, 159, 162, 165, 168, 171, 174, 177, 179, 183, 184 and 188) indicated that Israeli forces had repeatedly reoccupied areas around border pillars, and that there had been some firing incidents and frequent overflights of Lebanese territory by Israeli aircraft. Many of those incidents had been the subject of complaints lodged with UNTSO by Lebanon.

G. The Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East

1. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1760TH MEETING (15 DECEMBER 1973)

313. At the 1760th meeting held on 15 December in private, the Security Council included in its agenda the item entitled: "Arrangements for the proposed peace conference on the Middle East". The Council decided without objection to circulate the verbatim record of the meeting as an unrestricted document in accordance with rule 49 of the provisional rules of procedure and to issue a communiqué through the Secretary-General at the close of the meeting.

314. At that meeting the representative of Guinea stated that the "appropriate auspices" mentioned in paragraph 3 of resolution 338 (1973) were clearly those of the United Nations. It was because of the constant respect for the role of the Security Council and the responsibility incumbent upon that body that 10 non-permanent members of the Council (Australia, Austria, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia) had submitted draft

resolution S/11156 which she introduced and which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Considering that it has decided by its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 that talks among the parties to the Middle East conflict for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 should be held under appropriate auspices,

"Noting that a peace conference on the Middle East situation is to begin shortly at Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations,

"1. Expresses the hope that the Peace Conference will make speedy progress towards the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East;

"2. Expresses its confidence that the Secretary-General will play a full and effective role at the Conference, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and that he will preside over its proceedings, if the parties so desire;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council suitably informed of the developments in negotiations at the Conference, in order to enable it to review the problems on a continuing basis;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance and facilities for the work of the Conference."

Decision: *At its 1760th meeting, on 15 December 1973, the 10-Power draft resolution (S/11156) was adopted by a vote of 10 to none, with 4 abstentions (France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America), as resolution 344 (1973). One member (China) did not participate in the vote.*

315. Following the vote, the representative of France said that before the inauguration of the Geneva Conference, a link must be established between the negotiations and the Security Council. Similarly, the terms of the participation of the Secretary-General in the Conference should be clear and precise. In those respects, the draft resolution just adopted was not sufficiently clear. Consequently, his delegation had abstained in the vote.

316. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he fully supported the provisions of the resolution which the Council has just adopted. However, he had preferred to withhold his vote until the two co-sponsors of resolution 338 (1973) were in a position to endorse the resolution just adopted.

317. The representative of the United States said that although negotiations regarding invitations to the Geneva Conference were still proceeding, there were several problems still remaining. For that reason he had not been authorized to support the resolution at that time, and therefore had abstained. He said that his delegation had already made clear in informal consultations that the United States envisaged that the Secretary-General would preside at the opening session of the Conference and that his representative would be there continuously: in other words, that there would be full involvement of the Secretary-General in the Peace Conference proceedings, as there should be and as had been outlined in the resolution just adopted.

318. The President, speaking as the representative of China, said that his delegation had always opposed

any attempt of the two super-Powers to make behind-the-scenes deals at the expense of the interests of the Arab and Palestinian peoples. The Chinese delegation, which had stated its position when the Council adopted resolution 338 (1973), could not accept the present draft resolution which was derived from resolution 338 (1973), and consequently had decided to dissociate itself from the resolution just adopted.

319. The representative of the USSR said that he was speaking in exercise of his right of reply in connexion with a statement of the Chinese representative containing fantastic inventions about some non-existent plot in the Middle East designed, as he saw it, against the interests of the Arab peoples. The best possible answer to the Chinese representative was provided by a quotation from a statement issued at the recent meeting of the Heads of Arab States in Algiers, which said:

“With pride we note the whole-hearted political support and military and economic assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to the Arab States in their just struggle for the liberation of occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine”.

320. The representative of China said in a further statement that facts spoke louder than words. Members of the Council and the United Nations, and the peoples of all countries, had drawn the proper conclusion from the course of the Israeli-Zionist aggression against the Arab and Palestinian peoples in the Middle East in recent years and from the actual deeds of the two super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States.

321. In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General issued an official communiqué approved by the Council at the close of the 1760th meeting (S/11159).

322. In a letter dated 18 December (S/11161) the Secretary-General transmitted to the Council identical letters from the USSR and the United States indicating that they had been informed by the parties concerned of their readiness to participate in the Peace Conference, which would begin at Geneva on 21 December, to be convened by the Secretary-General under the auspices of the United Nations and under the co-chairmanship of the USSR and the United States. They hoped that the Secretary-General would serve as convener and preside in the opening phase and that he would have a representative to keep him informed as the Conference proceeded. They felt that it would be appropriate to secure a favourable consensus of the Council. In his letter of transmittal, the Secretary-General indicated his intention to proceed on the basis of the two letters.

323. On 19 December the President of the Security Council addressed the following letter (S/11162) to the Secretary-General:

“I have been requested by the members of the Security Council to inform you, in response to your letter dated 18 December 1973 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11161), that they have taken note of your letter and the documents attached to it, which they consider to be in accordance with resolution 344 (1973) adopted without opposition by the Security Council on 15 December 1973.

“I have been informed by the French delegation that it reaffirms the reservations it expressed at the

Security Council meeting of 15 December which led it to abstain in the vote on resolution 344 (1973).

“The Chinese delegation, in conformity with its position taken on resolution 338 (1973) and resolution 344 (1973), dissociates itself from what has been mentioned in the first paragraph.”

2. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

324. In a report issued on 24 December (S/11169) in pursuance of resolution 344 (1973), the Secretary-General stated that on 21 December he had convened the Peace Conference on the Middle East in Geneva at which Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the USSR and the United States had been represented. Following two public sessions and one closed session, the Secretary-General summed up the conclusions of the Conference by stating that a consensus had been reached to continue its work through the setting up of a military working group, which would discuss the question of disengagement of forces. Other working groups which it might wish to establish would report to the Conference, which was to continue meeting at the ambassadorial level, and would reconvene at the foreign minister's level as needed.

325. The Secretary-General's report included the text of the statement he had made at the opening of the Peace Conference at Geneva, in which he expressed his gratification that that unique and historic event was taking place under the auspices of the United Nations, which had been seized of the various aspects of the conflict for more than a quarter of a century, and had devoted an immense amount of time and effort both to keeping the peace and to the search for a just and lasting settlement. While no one present underestimated the difficulties of the task ahead, the very fact of the Conference and the willingness of the Governments concerned to respond to the new effort to find a just and lasting settlement were a source of encouragement and hope for all mankind. The Secretary-General expressed confidence that the participants would not fail to seize the opportunity to build a lasting structure of peace in the area, as it was an opportunity which might not recur for a very long time.

H. Developments after January 1974

1. FURTHER PROGRESS REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON UNEF

326. In a further progress report on UNEF dated 11 January 1974 (S/11056/Add.7 and Corr.1) the Secretary-General outlined the efforts made to implement paragraph B of the Agreement on 11 November 1973 (S/11056/Add.3, annex). Bilateral discussions in November under the auspices of General Siilasvuo at Kilometre 101 on the Cairo-Suez road had not achieved concrete results. The discussions had continued under General Siilasvuo's chairmanship in the Military Working Group established by the Peace Conference on the Middle East, which had held meetings from 26 December 1973 to 9 January 1974. The Secretary-General warned that the situation in the Suez Canal sector, with troops of both parties deployed in close confrontation on both sides of the Canal, was unstable and potentially explosive. Conditions in the area made it difficult for UNEF to interpose its troops effectively; hence the importance of efforts to achieve a disengagement of forces.

2. AGREEMENT ON THE DISENGAGEMENT OF EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES OF 18 JANUARY 1974

327. By a letter dated 18 January (S/11198 and Add.1), the Secretary-General informed the President of the Council that on that day, at a meeting held at Kilometre 101 on the Cairo-Suez road, an Agreement on the Disengagement of Forces in pursuance of the Geneva Peace Conference had been signed by the Chief of Staff of Egyptian Armed Forces and the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces, as well as by the Force Commander as witness. Under its terms, Egypt and Israel committed themselves to observe scrupulously on land, sea and air the cease-fire called for by the Security Council and to refrain from all military and para-military actions against each other. The Agreement provided for the separation of the Egyptian and Israeli forces according to zones and lines contained in a map, forwarded separately, and the establishment between the two forces of a zone of disengagement in which UNEF would be stationed. It also provided that armaments and forces would be limited in the area between the Egyptian line and the Suez Canal, as well as in the area between the Israeli line and the line which runs along the western base of the mountains where the Gidi and Mitla passes were located. Furthermore, those limitations would be inspected by UNEF. The detailed implementation of the disengagement would be worked out by military representatives of Egypt and Israel, who would agree on the stages of the process, which would be completed in not more than 40 days after it had begun. The Agreement, which was not regarded by both parties as a final peace agreement, constituted a first step towards a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council resolution 338 (1973) and within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East.

328. In a further progress report of 24 January (S/11056/Add.8), the Secretary-General stated that, in pursuance of the Agreement on the Disengagement of Forces reached on 18 January, further meetings held under the chairmanship of the Force Commander had resulted, on 24 January, in the parties signing maps representing the different phases of disengagement and a time-table for action. On 28 January (S/11056/Add.9), the Secretary-General stated that the implementation of the Agreement had begun on 25 January with the redeployment of forces of the parties in accordance with the agreed plan and the hand-over to UNEF by Israeli forces of the areas involved. As a result of the disengagement of forces, the Secretary-General added, the supply convoys to Suez city had been discontinued but those going to the east bank of the Canal were to continue until 30 January. At the request of the two parties and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNEF had given its assistance in the operation of the recovery of bodies of soldiers killed during the hostilities in the Suez Canal area.

329. In further progress reports of UNEF dated 4, 12 and 21 February and 4 March (S/11056/Add.10-13), the Secretary-General indicated that the redeployment of the forces had proceeded smoothly without incident, while UNEF forces had been interposed and had begun patrolling the UNEF zone of disengagement as well as inspecting the areas limited in armaments and forces. Thus, by 4 March, the disengagement process begun on 25 January had been completed. In accordance with the Agreement, the exchange of prisoners of war had taken place by stages and had been com-

pleted on 25 February in the presence of UNEF officers and representatives of the ICRC.

330. On 16 March, a further progress report on UNEF (S/11056/Add.14) indicated that the strength of UNEF, which on 20 February had reached 6,973 men, had been reduced to 6,814 as a result of the repatriation of elements of a Peruvian battalion, which had not been subsequently replaced. Elements of six contingents of UNEF were deployed in the UNEF zone of disengagement and elements of three more contingents would be deployed in the zone shortly.

331. The activities which had thus far been carried out by UNEF with the co-operation of UNTSO included the survey and marking of the lines defining the zone of disengagement, the supervision of the cease-fire and the implementation of the disengagement of forces, the inspection of the areas of limited armaments and forces, the search for mortal remains, the hand-over of civilians and mine-clearing operations carried out in co-operation with the parties.

3. APPOINTMENT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF UNTSO

332. By a note dated 11 February (S/11214) the President of the Council stated that the Secretary-General had on 9 January asked him to bring to the attention of its members his intention to appoint Major-General Bengt Liljestrand, of Sweden, Chief of Staff of UNTSO as of 1 April, to replace Major-General Siilasvuo, who had been appointed Commander of UNEF on 25 November 1973. In the interim, Colonel R. W. Bunworth, of Ireland, would serve as Acting Chief of Staff until the new Chief of Staff took over on 1 April 1974. The President of the Council informed the Secretary-General on 5 February that the Council had taken note of his letter of 9 January and would have no objection to the appointment of Major-General Liljestrand as Chief of Staff of UNTSO. The delegation of China dissociated itself from the matter.

4. STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AFTER JANUARY 1974

(a) *Reports of the Secretary-General, communications by the parties and request for a meeting*

333. In the first months of 1974 the Secretary-General continued to circulate further reports based on information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO with regard to the status of the cease-fire in the Israel-Lebanon and Israel-Syria sectors, and from the headquarters of UNTSO and UNEF with regard to the situation in the Egypt-Israel sector.

334. In those reports concerning the Egypt-Israel sector, the Secretary-General said that UNEF patrols had reported frequent firing incidents involving artillery, machine-guns and mortars, as well as aerial activities and anti-aircraft fire (S/11057/Add.192, 195, 198, 199, 201, 204, 207, 208, 212, 215, 218, 219, 222, 225, 228, 231, 232, 234, 235, 238, 241, 243, 245, 247, 249, 251, 253, 257, 258, 263, 266, 269, 272, 275, 278, 280, 283, 286, 296, 312).

335. From about the time the Agreement on Disengagement of Forces was reached on 18 January, the reports showed a marked decrease in activity, and the situation was described as remaining calm with the exception of a few sporadic and isolated firing incidents. They also indicated that the operations for the disengagement of forces were proceeding without significant incident. Furthermore, in accordance with the terms of

the Agreement, UNEF was proceeding with the search for the bodies of those killed during the October hostilities. By early February the reports showed almost no incidents, and after 7 February no reports were received on the situation there.

336. In the Israel-Syria sector there was a continuous pattern of incidents, on which the Chief of Staff of UNTSO submitted daily reports (S/11057/Add.190, 193, 196, 202, 205, 210, 213, 216, 221, 224, 226, 230, 237, 240, 254, 255, 259, 261, 264, 267, 271, 273, 277, 281, 284, 287, 288, 291, 292, 294, 298, 300, 302, 304, 306, 308, 310, 313, 315, 317, 319, 321, 323, 328, 330, 332, 334, 338, 341, 343, 345, 348, 350 and 353). Those incidents involved the use of artillery, mortar and automatic weapons, as well as occasional air activity in the sector consisting of flights by Syrian and Israeli aircraft over the territory of the other party. As the reports indicated, both parties frequently submitted complaints of cease-fire violations. Furthermore, the observers from time to time proposed cease-fires to the parties concerned and this occasionally resulted in a temporary cessation of firing, which resumed shortly thereafter. Incidents of firing on or close to United Nations personnel and installations were also reported, and on a few occasions there were light injuries to personnel and damage to United Nations installations and properties.

337. From early March until about the end of May, the situation in the sector became increasingly tense. The reports (S/11057/Add.356, 357, 360, 362, 363, 365, 366, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 377, 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 384, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 403, 406, 407, 411, 412, 414, 416, 418, 420, 423, 426, 428, 429, 431, 433, 435, 437, 439, 441, 443, 445, 448, 450, 454, 456, 458, 460, 462, 464, 466, 468, 470, 472, 474, 476, 478, 480, 482, 484, 486, 488, 490, 492, 494, 496, 498, 500, 502 and 504) indicated markedly intensified and more frequent firing of longer duration which involved the use of artillery, tanks and rockets. On 20 March (S/11057/Add.369), the Secretary-General expressed his concern at the deterioration of the situation and appealed to the parties concerned to exercise the utmost restraint and strictly to observe the cease-fire.

338. However, in a report dated 1 June (S/11057/Add.504) issued one day following the signing at Geneva of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces, the Chief of Staff reported that all firing had ceased in the Israel-Syria sector as of 1109 (GMT) on 31 May. Thereafter no further reports were issued on violations of the cease-fire in the Israel-Syria sector, during the period under review.

339. In the Israel-Lebanon sector, the reports of the Chief of Staff (S/11057/Add.191, 194, 197, 200, 203, 206, 209, 211, 214, 217, 220, 223, 227, 229, 233, 236, 239, 242, 244, 246, 248, 250, 252, 256, 260, 262, 265, 268, 270, 274, 276, 279, 282, 285, 289, 290, 293, 295, 297, 299, 301, 303, 305, 307, 309, 311, 314, 316, 318, 320, 322, 324, 325, 326, 327, 329, 331, 333, 335, 336, 337, 339, 340, 342, 344, 346, 347, 349, 351, 352, 354, 355, 358, 359, 361, 364, 367, 376, 381, 385, 386 and 396) indicated frequent border crossing by Israeli forces and occupation of some posts near the Armistice Demarcation Line. They showed also some artillery fire and frequent overflights of Lebanese territory by Israeli aircraft.

340. In a letter dated 11 April (S/11259), Israel complained that a group of terrorists had crossed the Lebanese border to the village of Kiryat Shmona on Israel territory and massacred 18 of its inhabitants, including 8 children and 5 women, and wounded 15 other persons. It said that responsibility for that slaughter had been acknowledged in Beirut by the terrorist organization known as the "Popular Front—General Command", and asserted that Lebanon, where terrorist organizations enjoyed freedom of movement and operation, must bear full responsibility for a situation that permitted terrorist attacks to be carried out from its territory against Israel.

341. On the following day, Lebanon replied (S/11263) that the United Nations observers' reports had not indicated any infiltration from Lebanon to Israel during that week and that Israel had not produced any evidence to substantiate its allegation. No infiltration whatsoever had taken place from Lebanon into Israel, and the Lebanese Army was taking measures to prevent any infiltration. The Palestine Liberation Organization had affirmed that it was conducting its resistance movement with elements stationed in Israel. Accordingly, Lebanon could not be held responsible for actions of non-Lebanese operating outside Lebanon, and in particular for actions of Palestinians in Israel or elsewhere.

342. On 13 April the Chief of Staff reported (S/11057/Add.402) that in addition to the recurrent incursions near the border, there had been artillery fire by Israeli forces across the Armistice Demarcation Line and flights by its jet aircraft over Lebanese territory. Furthermore, the Chief of Staff reported that he had received complaints from Lebanon alleging that on 12-13 April Israeli forces commandos had infiltrated into Lebanese territory and demolished a number of houses in several villages. Lebanon had requested an inquiry on those incursions. On 14 April, the Chief of Staff reported that the observers' investigation had shown that several houses had been destroyed in several villages. In addition, two women had apparently been killed as a result of an explosion (S/11057/Add.404).

343. On 13 April, Lebanon requested (S/11264) an urgent meeting of the Security Council, stating that as a result of Israel's aggression against six Lebanese villages, two civilians had been killed, others wounded and 13 civilians kidnapped. Israeli forces had also destroyed 31 houses in those villages.

(b) *Consideration of the 1766th to 1769th meetings (15-24 April 1974)*

344. At the 1766th meeting on 15 April, the provisional agenda listing the letter of Lebanon (S/11269) was adopted. The representatives of Lebanon and Israel, as well as the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, Egypt and subsequently those of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were invited, at their requests, to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

345. The representative of Lebanon said that on the night of 12-13 April the Israel regular armed forces had attacked six Lebanese frontier villages inhabited solely by civilians. The attacks had been carried out under the pretext that the assailants responsible for the Kiryat Shmona incident had come from Lebanon. Lebanon deplored any acts of violence wherever they might occur, but it could not be held responsible for acts committed beyond its borders by elements that

were completely outside its control. The Israeli Government had behaved in an identical fashion in the past, immediately after the events that had taken place in Athens, in Munich, in Lod and elsewhere. In attacking six Lebanese villages on 12 and 13 April, Israel had committed a premeditated and obvious act of aggression. Referring to the Council's previous resolutions condemning Israel, the Lebanese representative said that his Government expected that the Security Council would adopt the necessary measures to ensure their application.

346. The representative of Israel said that in recent years Lebanon had become a principal centre for Arab terrorist operations, from which terror attacks had been continuously carried out against Israel. On 11 April, a group of terrorists had crossed the Israel-Lebanon frontier and had massacred 18 persons in Kiryat Shmona, including 8 children and 5 women. Statements made by the leaders of an Arab terrorist movement in Beirut had verified that fact. As long as the Lebanese Government harboured these murder organizations on its territory and tolerated their headquarters in Beirut, it was obvious that its neighbours would treat it accordingly. On 11/12 April, Israel had dynamited 20 empty houses of known collaborators with the terrorists. Israel had come before the Council to accuse the Lebanese Government and all others which harboured, assisted and co-operated with Arab terrorist organizations and to point out that they would not be absolved of their obligation to prevent armed attacks against Israel.

347. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that the question before the Security Council was that of State terrorism practised by Israel, which was fundamentally distinct from acts of individual violence. The Israeli attack on Lebanon was a criminal act in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, the resolutions of the Security Council, the Geneva Convention and the fundamental principles of international law and human rights. The Security Council should condemn such acts and take the measures necessary to prevent a repetition of them.

348. The representative of Egypt said that the acts of the Palestinian movements could not be evaluated in isolation from their plight. There would be no more incidents like that at Kiryat Shmona and no more bloodshed only when Israel indicated a genuine will to recognize the Palestinians, to restore their legitimate rights, and to evaluate the occupied Arab territories. In violation of the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, Israel had committed a series of acts of State terrorism. Israel's latest aggression against Lebanon, coupled with the escalation of its military operations on the Syrian front, would have directly adverse consequences on the chances of peace in the Middle East. If Israel would choose peace instead of war, then it must stop forthwith all irresponsible actions.

349. The representative of Kuwait said that the recent Israeli aggression against Lebanon was a violation of the territorial integrity of Lebanon, contrary to established international obligations including the United Nations Charter. Lebanon was not responsible for acts which had taken place in territories under Israeli control, nor was it responsible for the consequences of Israel's having deprived the Palestinian people of their rights. The Council should not only condemn Israel and respect the Israeli pretext for justifying its ac-

tion, but must implement the warnings it had already issued.

350. The representative of Israel charged that Syria had encouraged and supplied money and arms to terrorist organizations, including the one responsible for the Kiryat Shmona massacre. He said that Syria and its capital were centres of other terrorist organizations as well.

351. The representative of Saudi Arabia pointed out that 300,000 Palestinians lived in Lebanon and that the Government could not suppress them without provoking civil war. He stated that Israel would have to give up its policy of expansion and exclusiveness in order to live peacefully with neighbouring Arabs.

352. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that, contrary to the claims by the Israeli representative, Israel had been persistently violating the Security Council resolutions calling for an immediate cease-fire and the return of forces to positions occupied on 22 October. It was a fact that Israel had followed a policy of intimidation and aggression designed to force the Syrian Government to accept its point of view on the disengagement of forces in such a way as to perpetuate its occupation of the Golan Heights.

353. At the 1767th meeting on 16 April, the representative of the USSR said that the Israeli extremists were trying, by means of terror, which had been elevated to the status of State policy, to achieve the fulfilment of their annexationist plans in flagrant violation of the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by means of war or the use of force. The Government of Israel, as was demonstrated by its official armed intrusion into Lebanon, was still defying the Security Council and violating its decisions. The USSR opposed the idea that terrorist actions by individual, irresponsible persons should be used by aggressor States to justify a policy of aggression and the practice of terrorism carried out, as by Israel, as part of State policy. The Security Council had categorically condemned attempts by Israel to justify its aggression by reference to what it called "reprisals". The Security Council should take effective measures to call a halt to acts of aggression by the Israeli militarists. On 11 April, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev, had stated that the Middle East situation was still explosive and could not be otherwise so long as there was a continuation of the occupation of Arab lands. The danger lay in the fact that with a certain reduction of tension, the aggressor and its protectors could once again attempt to avoid a radical all-embracing solution of the problem by means of ersatz plans for a Middle East settlement.

354. The representative of Mauritania said that it was Israel, not Lebanon, that was truly responsible for the acts of despair committed by the Palestinian people. The Israeli attack of 12-13 April on Lebanon had been an act of State banditry that could not be justified under any pretext. He was certain that the Council would adopt the measures dictated by the gravity of that act of political banditry, and would compel violence to bow to the rule of law.

355. The representative of China said that the Chinese Government and people had always supported the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their just struggles to oppose zionism and hegemonism, to recover their lost territories and to regain their national

rights. His delegation held that the Council should sternly condemn the Israeli aggression, demand that Israel stop all aggressive acts and firmly support the just demand of the Lebanese Government and people in resisting aggression and safeguarding their national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

356. The representative of Indonesia said that while his delegation condemned all acts of violence and terrorism, State terrorism by Israel was more intolerable than those acts of violence committed by the desperate and frustrated Palestinian people. Israel's action was a grave violation of the principles of the Charter and would lead only to lawlessness in international relations. His delegation urged the Council to take the adequate and effective steps referred to in resolution 280 (1970) to prevent a recurrence of such acts of official terrorism.

357. The representative of the United Republic of Cameroon said that his delegation condemned Israel's acts of barbarism, particularly because they had been aimed against a friendly and peace-loving country, because they might jeopardize the slim chances for peace in the area, and because the attack had been incommensurate with the pretext invoked to justify it. His delegation was ready to support any initiative by the Council directed not only to the recent Israeli attack against Lebanon but also to the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

358. The representative of the United Kingdom deplored all acts of violence and terrorism in the Middle East, and condemned the brutal and vicious action that had occurred at Kiryat Shmona. His delegation, however, considered that a government-organized operation into the territory of another State in retaliation could not be justified under the Charter. It was the duty of the Council and the United Nations to do all in their power to prevent a new spiral of violence, of terrorism and retaliation from dashing the hopes for peace in the Middle East. In the present circumstances, the Arab peoples should refrain from expressing their indignation in deeds, and Israel should exercise restraint towards its neighbours.

359. The representative of France said that his Government condemned such acts of violence as that carried out by the Palestinian commando group at Kiryat Shmona, but also condemned the raids and reprisals undertaken by Israeli forces on Lebanese soil. The acts of more or less uncontrolled groups could not be equated with those of a Government. His delegation considered that the Council should denounce all acts of violence, regardless of their origin or reason. The Council should also appeal to all parties to refrain from any act that might jeopardize the hopes that the international community had placed on the negotiations then under way.

360. At the 1768th meeting on 18 April, the representative of Peru said that his delegation could not agree that the incident of Kiryat Shmona justified the Israeli action. The Lebanese citizens captured by Israel must be returned and Israel must reverse its presumed intention to repeat such futile attacks against Lebanon. His delegation was ready to support any action by the Council to put an end to the situation.

361. The representative of Austria said that his delegation deplored the recent instance of violation of Lebanon's territorial sovereignty and integrity, and condemned all other acts of violence, which could

not be justified by any political aim. It was essential to break the dreadful spiral of terrorism and reprisal. The Council must do everything to prevent these events from gaining momentum and escalating further.

362. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR said that his delegation firmly opposed the pursuit by Israel of a policy of State terror, as well as terrorist actions which had tragic consequences and harmed innocent victims. In spite of the progress made towards peace in the Middle East, Israel still continued its policy of aggression. The Security Council must take effective measures to call a halt to the acts of piracy and aggression on the part of the Israeli militarists.

363. The representative of Australia said that his Government had repeatedly expressed its sympathy and concern over the situation of the Palestinian refugees, and it fully recognized that there could be no lasting peace in the Middle East unless proper justice was done to them. But his delegation believed that they had done no service to their cause by acting on the scale of savagery of their assault on the innocent people of Kiryat Shmona. By its retaliatory action against Lebanese border villages, Israel had laid itself open to censure. The Council must condemn all acts of violence and reprisal, which could only exacerbate tensions and threaten the precarious progress made towards a settlement over the past few months.

364. The President of the Council, speaking as the representative of Iraq, said that Lebanon, with its limited security forces, could not be held responsible for the incident of Kiryat Shmona, whether or not the three attackers had in fact come from Lebanon. Only restitution of Palestinian rights would end the violence and bloodshed, war and destruction in the Middle East. Referring to a number of acts of terrorism committed by Zionist terrorists since 1940, the Iraqi representative said it was time for the Council to stop issuing warnings to Israel and to decide upon adequate steps to bring about a decisive end to the cycle of violence in the Middle East.

365. The representative of Lebanon emphasized that his delegation demanded that the 13 persons abducted by Israel be returned immediately to Lebanon.

366. At the 1769th meeting on 24 April, the Council had before it the following draft resolution (S/11275) which had emerged from consultations among members of the Council.

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the agenda item contained in document S/Agenda/1769/Rev.1,

"Having noted the contents of the letters dated 12 and 13 April 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/11263, S/11264) and the letter dated 11 April 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Israel (S/11259),

"Having heard the statements of the Foreign Minister of Lebanon and of the representative of Israel,

"Recalling its previous relevant resolutions,

"Deeply disturbed at the continuation of acts of violence,

"Gravely concerned that such acts might endanger efforts now taking place to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

"1. Condemns Israel's violation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty and calls once more

on the Government of Israel to refrain from further military actions and threats against Lebanon;

"2. *Condemns* all acts of violence, especially those which result in the tragic loss of innocent civilian life, and urges all concerned to refrain from any further acts of violence;

"3. *Calls upon* all Governments concerned to respect their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

"4. *Calls upon* Israel forthwith to release and return to Lebanon the abducted Lebanese civilians;

"5. *Calls upon* all parties to refrain from any action which might endanger negotiations aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East."

367. The representative of Costa Rica said that his delegation deplored the violent events which once again had emerged in the Middle East, and lamented the atrocities of the criminal terrorist acts of Kiryat Shmona. But his delegation was completely in disagreement with reprisal actions undertaken by Israel in violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon. If the Security Council was to adopt any declaration, it should include both a warning to Israel about its incursion into Lebanon and consideration of the terrorist acts of Kiryat Shmona which had led to that action. Nothing should be done to decrease the chances of a dialogue among the parties involved.

368. The representative of Israel said that the draft resolution before the Council was another example of the bias and inequity that prevailed in Council debates on the Middle East, as it did not even mention the massacre of Kiryat Shmona. Israel would continue to hold the Lebanese Government responsible for any armed attacks organized in or perpetrated from Lebanon.

369. The representative of the United States said that in order that the draft resolution (S/11275) might command widespread positive support in the Council, his delegation proposed that paragraph 2 should be amended to read:

"*Condemns* all acts of violence, especially those which, as at Kiryat Shmona, result in the tragic loss of innocent civilian life, and urges all concerned to refrain from any further acts of violence."

370. The representative of Mauritania said his delegation was against the amendment of the United States for the reason that any reference to Kiryat Shmona would entail the presence of a party other than Lebanon and Israel, and the hearing of that party by the Council.

Decision: *At the 1769th meeting on 24 April 1974, the oral amendment proposed by the United States was put to the vote and was rejected by 6 votes in favour (Australia, Austria, Costa Rica, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America) to 7 against, with 2 abstentions (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).*

371. The representative of China expressed support for the following aspects of the draft resolution: condemning Israel's violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and calling on Israel to stop its military actions and threats and to return the abducted Lebanese civilians. At the same time, he pointed out that the draft contained very harmful aspects. It called on "all parties to refrain from any action which might

endanger negotiations aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East"; but the crux of the Middle East question lay in the two super-Powers' contention for oil resources and important strategic points and for hegemony there. In advocating a so-called "just and lasting peace in the Middle East", the super-Powers, who were concerned about their needs in contending for hegemony, spread illusions about peace and lulled the fighting will of the Arab and Palestinian peoples. The wording in the draft would also mean asking the Palestinian and Arab peoples to submit to the manipulation of the two super-Powers and forbidding them to take any action of resistance in self-defence. For those reasons, his delegation had decided not to participate in the voting on the draft resolution (S/11275).

372. The representative of Mauritania said that his delegation understood the provisions of operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution as being solely addressed to Israel. Accordingly, his delegation had decided to support the draft resolution.

Decision: *At the 1769th meeting on 24 April 1974, the draft resolution (S/11275) was adopted by 13 votes to none as resolution 347 (1973). Two members (China and Iraq) did not participate in the vote.*

373. In explanation of vote, the representative of the United States said that his Government pledged to continue its efforts to move the parties towards peace. While regretting that its amendment to refer expressly to Kiryat Shmona had not received the necessary support in the Council, his delegation believed that the resolution just adopted did condemn all violence whatever its origin; including the tragedy at Kiryat Shmona.

374. The representative of Indonesia said that although his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution, it considered that the Council should not treat acts of violence committed by desperate and frustrated victims of aggression equally with acts of aggression committed by a country as part of its official policy.

375. The representative of the USSR said that the resolution just adopted by the Council was insufficiently strong and effective. His delegation, however, had supported the resolution because it was acceptable to Lebanon. The position of the genuinely Socialist countries on the Middle East question had been set forth in the official document adopted on 17/18 April 1974 in Warsaw at the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of States Members of the Warsaw Pact. The statement said that the Middle East remained a dangerous breeding ground of international tension. Israel refused to implement United Nations resolutions requesting it to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories. Continuation of the work of the important Peace Conference on the Middle East in Geneva should lead to the solution of the key problems of a Middle East settlement, i.e. withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab lands, ensuring the legitimate rights of the Arab people in Palestine, and guaranteeing the security, integrity, and sovereignty of all States of the area. The agreement on disengagement of troops was the first, preliminary step towards a general settlement; and this must be followed without failure by other steps aimed at implementing all the provisions of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The position of UNEF was making a positive contribution to the maintenance of peace in the area.

376. The representative of the United Republic of Cameroon said that his delegation interpreted operative paragraph 2 of the resolution as an expression of compassion by the Council for the innocent civilians who had been killed in the events discussed by the Council, but not condemnation of the political activities of liberation.

377. The President, speaking as the representative of Iraq, said that his delegation had refrained from voting on the draft resolution, because a mere condemnation of Israel did not by itself constitute a sufficient deterrent to Israeli aggression. Furthermore, the resolution implied an attempt to view individual acts of violence on the same level as premeditated acts of aggression by one Member State against another. As for the negotiations and diplomatic efforts in the Middle East referred to in the resolution, his Government continued to reserve its position.

378. The representative of Lebanon said that he wondered whether the condemnations expressed in the resolution were sufficient because past condemnations by the Council had not yielded any positive results. The resolution, among other things, called on Israel promptly to release and return to Lebanon the abducted Lebanese civilians. His delegation took it that the Council wished Israel to do so at the earliest possible moment.

(c) Subsequent communications and reports of the Secretary-General

379. By letters dated 15 and 17 May (S/11287 and S/11288), the representative of the United States transmitted the texts of statements by the United States Secretary of State and its Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as well as a resolution adopted by the Senate, regarding the killings of innocent persons in Ma'alot and the retaliatory Israeli air attacks which had led to new killings in southern Lebanon. The statements expressed outrage, condemned the cycle of violence which could well undermine the search for peace in the Middle East, and called on all parties to redouble their efforts to secure a just and lasting peace.

380. In a letter dated 17 May (S/11289 and Corr.1), Lebanon charged that the Israeli air force had attacked several Lebanese towns, villages and Palestinian refugee camps, killing over 40 people and wounding over 180, in addition to destroying 41 houses. Lebanon charged that following the tragic developments at Ma'alot, Israel had sought a scapegoat for an act committed by three Palestinians operating from within Israel and had once again launched an attack against innocent Palestinians living in refugee camps.

381. On the following day and on 22 May, Israel charged in reply (S/11290 and S/11295) that the latest atrocity planned, organized and carried out from Lebanon against Israel had been the massacre at Ma'alot in which 21 school boys and girls had been murdered and another 70 wounded. Israel had taken action against terror organizations located in Lebanon, including the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which had declared its responsibility for the massacre. It considered that responsibility for the results of such action fell squarely on Lebanon, which continued to make it possible for acts of terror to be directed against Israel and its citizens.

382. During the first half of June, the Secretary-General received further communications (S/11309,

S/11314 and S/11319 and Corr.1) from Israel charging that Lebanon was continuing to serve as a base for murder and sabotage activities against Israel, and indicating that there had been further clashes in Israeli territory with terrorists who had penetrated from Lebanon.

383. During the month of April and up to 15 June, the Secretary-General continued, on the basis of information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/11057/Add.404, 405, 408-410, 413, 415, 417, 419, 421, 422, 424, 425, 427, 430, 432, 434, 436, 438, 440, 442, 444, 446, 449, 451, 453, 455, 457, 459, 461, 463, 465, 467, 469, 471, 473, 475, 477, 479, 481, 483, 485, 487, 489, 491, 493, 495, 497, 499, 501, 503, 505 and 506-513) to report the persistence of incidents of overflights by Israeli planes and commando penetration of Lebanese territory, in addition to artillery fire from Israeli territory and occasional exchanges of fire on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line. However, in early June he noted (S/11057/Add.514) that the level of incidents had markedly decreased compared to the situation in May.

I. Extension of the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force

**1. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATED 1 APRIL 1974**

384. As the six-month mandate of UNEF was due to expire in April 1974, the Secretary-General submitted a comprehensive report (S/11248) on the operation of the Force from its inception on 26 October 1973 until 1 April 1974.

385. After recalling the terms of reference of the Force and describing its establishment and current composition, the Secretary-General reviewed the activities described in the progress reports on UNEF he had issued over the previous five months. During that period UNEF had suffered four fatal casualties (two from accidents and two from other causes) and 15 injured as a result of explosions. The activities of the Force had included, at various stages, supervision of the observance of the cease-fire and of the Disengagement Agreement, assistance to the parties in negotiations and in implementing agreements, humanitarian activities and co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross in connexion with the exchange of prisoners of war, the transfer of civilians and the search for mortal remains, the convoy of non-military supplies to the city of Suez and to Egyptian forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal, and co-operation with UNTSO.

386. One of the remaining problems facing the Force and one which called for immediate solution was related to restrictions on the freedom of movement of personnel of certain contingents. The Secretary-General affirmed his consistent position that UNEF had to function as an integrated and efficient military unit, contingents of which served on an equal basis, and that no differentiation could be made regarding the United Nations status of the various contingents. He indicated that the matter was being pursued and that he would continue to exert every effort to solve it in a satisfactory way.

387. Another problem cited by the Secretary-General was that concerning the rate of reimbursement to contributing Governments for the costs incurred by

them as a result of supplying troops to the United Nations. The matter was also being given his close attention.

388. In connexion with the financial aspects of the matter, the Secretary-General recalled that, by resolution 3101 (XXVIII), the General Assembly had appropriated \$30 million for the initial period of UNEF's operation, on the basis of his very approximate initial cost estimates, and had given him the financial authority to carry on the operation if the Council should extend the mandate of the Force. While there had been a number of unexpected expenses, including the cost of supplies and equipment for some contingents and of substantial portions of logistic support, as well as increased prices for some supplies, there had been some offsetting savings as a result of the gradual rate of build-up of the Forces. Moreover, consultations in progress with respect to standardized costs and a reimbursement ceiling would also have a bearing on the total cost of the Force, which would be made available in greater detail for submission to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session for review and approval. It was estimated that the Force would cost more than \$5 million per month period, owing to new expenses such as those for rotation of contingents, unanticipated expenditures for heavy logistical equipment and continuing cost increases for supplies.

389. Having reviewed those aspects of UNEF's activities, the Secretary-General observed that the establishment of the Force in October 1973 had been a milestone in the history of the United Nations and had served to defuse a highly explosive situation, which otherwise could well have had major consequences for world peace. After stressing the effectiveness of the Force, as witnessed by the quiet then prevailing in the Egypt-Israel sector, he remarked that the broad geographical basis of the Force was an important feature which was highly encouraging for the future.

390. The Secretary-General then cautioned that as the disengagement of forces was only a first step towards the settlement of the Middle East problem, the situation remained unstable and potentially dangerous. The continued operation of UNEF was essential not only to maintain the existing quiet in the Egypt-Israel sector, but also to assist in further efforts for the establishment of a just and durable peace in the area. Consequently, he considered it necessary to recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNEF for another period of six months. Having made that recommendation, he felt that the mandate, as approved by the Security Council, was still adequate and he pledged to refer to the Security Council all matters which might affect the nature of the continued effective functioning of the Force.

2. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1765TH MEETING (8 APRIL 1974)

391. At its 1765th meeting on 8 April, the Council included the following item in its agenda:

"The situation in the Middle East:

"Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11248)".

392. At that meeting the Council had before it a draft resolution (S/11253) elaborated in the course of consultations among all the members of the Council.

393. The representative of China said Israeli Zionist aggression and the super-Powers' contention for hege-

mony in the area were the root cause of the Middle East problem. To achieve a genuine settlement Israel must withdraw from the Arab territories, the Palestinian people must regain their national rights, and the super-Powers must cease to practice hegemonism and power politics in the Middle East. China, he added, supported the Arab and Palestinian peoples in their struggle to recover their lost territories and regain their national rights. As for UNEF, China had always opposed it in principle. The Chinese delegation had refrained from casting a veto on resolution 340 (1973) only out of consideration for the desire of the victims of aggression, and would not participate in the voting on the draft resolution prolonging the mandate of UNEF.

394. The representative of Kenya said that experience had shown that unless the parties to the conflict were separated by a neutral force like the United Nations, the mere calling for a cease-fire would, in many cases, have no appreciable positive end. After recalling that resolution 340 (1973) had called for the return of the forces to positions occupied on 22 October, he pointed out that the forces that had advanced beyond the 22 October line had now withdrawn even behind the 1967 cease-fire line. Thus the Security Council resolution had been implemented and the image of the Council had been improved.

Decision: *At its 1765th meeting, on 8 April 1974, the draft resolution (S/11253) was put to the vote and was adopted by 13 votes to none as resolution 346 (1974). Two members (China and Iraq) did not participate in the vote.*

395. Resolution 346 (1974) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973 and 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973 and the agreement reached by members of the Security Council on 2 November 1973 (S/11072),

"Having reviewed the functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force set up under these resolutions as reported by the Secretary-General,

"Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 1 April 1974 (S/11248) that in the present circumstances the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force is still required,

"1. Expresses its appreciation to the States which have contributed troops to the United Nations Emergency Force and to those which have made voluntary financial and material contributions for the support of the Force;

"2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts in implementing the decisions of the Security Council regarding the establishment and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force;

"3. Commends the United Nations Emergency Force for its contribution to efforts to achieve a just and durable peace in the Middle East;

"4. Notes the Secretary-General's view that the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces is only a first step towards the settlement of the Middle East problem and that the continued operation of the United Nations Emergency Force is essential not only for the maintenance of the present quiet in the Egypt-Israel sector but also to assist, if required, in further efforts for the establishment of a just and

durable peace in the Middle East and accordingly decides that, in accordance with the recommendation in paragraph 68 of the Secretary-General's report of 1 April 1974, the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force, approved by the Security Council in its resolution 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973, shall be extended for a further period of six months, that is, until 24 October 1974;

“5. *Notes with satisfaction* that the Secretary-General is exerting every effort to solve in a satisfactory way the problems of the United Nations Emergency Force, including the urgent ones referred to in paragraph 71 of his report of 1 April 1974;

“6. *Further notes with satisfaction* the Secretary-General's intention to keep under constant review the required strength of the Force with a view to making reductions and economies when the situation allows;

“7. *Calls upon* all Member States, particularly the parties concerned, to extend their full support to the United Nations in the implementation of the present resolution;

“8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on a continuing basis as requested in resolution 340 (1973).”

396. Following the vote, the representative of Peru said that the work of UNEF had been decisive for the preservation of calm in the area, and therefore the renewal of its mandate for another six months was indispensable. Although his Government would continue to contribute to the new effort with the same enthusiasm, it was, nevertheless, concerned about the problem of reimbursement and hoped that it would be solved very speedily.

397. The representative of Mauritania said that since the cease-fire was precarious, the least incident could lead to a resumption of hostilities, a possibility that could not be ruled out so long as the territories of Egypt, Syria and Jordan continued to be under occupation and so long as the Palestinian people remained expelled from their homeland. UNEF, he added, must continue on an emergency basis and carry out its activities under the terms of reference determined by the Council. He stressed that the Force should be regarded as an integrated military unit and enjoy full freedom of movement, and that all contingents must be treated on a footing of equality.

398. The representative of the United Republic of Cameroon said that during the past six months, UNEF had at all times had the confidence of the Security Council and the parties concerned and had been able to function as an integrated military unit. He also noted with gratification that the financial estimates of the functioning of the Force had been adhered to, without affecting its efficiency, and that its geographical composition was useful and should be borne in mind in the future. After noting that the situation was still tense despite the positive accomplishments of the United Nations in the area, he said that, because the presence of UNEF was still necessary in the region, he had supported the extension of the mandate of the Force.

399. The representative of the USSR said that, while his delegation would have preferred a stronger resolution, the question of the stay of UNEF in the Middle East was closely bound up with the development of the general situation in the region. It con-

tinued to be particularly important that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and subsequent resolutions 338 (1973), 339 (1973) and 340 (1973) be strictly complied with as an essential prerequisite for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev, had declared on 29 January 1974 that the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concerning troop disengagement was a positive step, but only a partial measure of a purely military nature. Matters could not be allowed to rest there; the Geneva Conference must press for a radical political settlement, which could be obtained only if Israeli troops were withdrawn from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and if the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine were respected. The Soviet delegation considered that systematic supervision by the Security Council of the activities of UNEF was helping matters substantially; it noted with satisfaction that the Secretary-General was submitting periodic progress reports to the Council on this subject. It welcomed the fact that it had been possible not only to refrain from increasing the strength of the Force, but to get by with a strength of less than 7,000. UNEF's operations should be carried out with the least possible cost; and the Security Council was entitled to expect that appropriations for UNEF would not exceed the level established by the General Assembly. Concerning the freedom of movement for UNEF's contingents, he said that Israel should halt all the restrictive measures and discrimination practised against the contingents of any country included in the composition of UNEF, as they were United Nations troops conducting an international United Nations peace-keeping operation entrusted to them by the Council. The Council, on the other hand, must see to it that the principle of equitable geographical distribution should be applied in all the command posts and units of the Force as well as in the Secretariat department which was conducting UNEF affairs. Furthermore, it was essential that all UNEF contingents should be placed on an equal footing as regards reimbursement of costs. He concluded that as the questions raised by his delegation had been taken into account in the Council's resolution, his delegation had not opposed the extension of the mandate of UNEF for another period of six months.

400. The representative of Costa Rica said that his delegation was very happy to vote in favour of the resolution that had just been adopted. He noted that the report indicated very clearly the Secretary-General's concern and dedication in ensuring effective implementation of the measures decided upon by the Council concerning the re-establishment of peace in the Middle East.

401. The representative of Austria said that UNEF had in six months fulfilled what had been expected of it. It had become an indispensable instrument in controlling a highly dangerous situation and had provided the basis for supplementary efforts to obtain the separation and disengagement of opposing forces. However, much more must be done to prevent recurrence of fighting and to bring about a fundamental change in the situation. In that respect a United Nations contribution might be the continued existence and service of UNEF.

402. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR stated that the establishment of UNEF and its suc-

successful operation had been helped by the general trend toward détente, which had also created conditions for a start toward the solution of the Middle East problem. Another positive factor in the establishment and functioning of UNEF had been the close attention paid by the Secretary-General to the views of members of the Council as stated in the course of informal consultations. His delegation was alarmed at discrimination practised by Israel in regard to certain contingents. With regard to the question of financing, there had been delay in revising standards for expenditure and setting an upper limit for reimbursement. Those matters needed to be resolved as quickly as possible.

403. The representative of Indonesia said that the problem of reimbursement and of freedom of movement of all contingents required a solution; Indonesia hoped that it would be possible for the Secretary-General to start very soon the process of reimbursing the countries contributing contingents to UNEF, if necessary partially until the availability of funds made full reimbursement possible. Indonesia also hoped that it would be able to eliminate discriminatory treatment in order to achieve the maximum efficiency and economy in the functioning of UNEF.

404. The representative of the United States said that his Government would continue to extend its full support to the efforts of UNEF, which had played an indispensable role in re-establishing peace in the Middle East. The Force had made possible the implementation of the cease-fire ordered by the Council last October and subsequent agreement on the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces. The contribution made by UNEF to peace in the Middle East far outweighed any difficulties caused by differences of opinion regarding questions of financing and operations.

405. The representative of Australia said that the continued presence of UNEF was indispensable to the continuation of the quiet at present prevailing in the area of operation and to the creation of an atmosphere in which a successful and final solution could come about. He noted with gratification that the Secretary-General did not expect the need of any increase in the Force and that he would keep under constant review its strength with a view to making reduction in economies.

406. The representative of the United Kingdom said that while his Government had no desire to see an emergency force of this nature become permanent, it believed that the Force was performing an invaluable service and making an important contribution to the efforts for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Referring to the problems pointed out by the Secretary-General, he said that his Government was confident that the Secretary-General would be able to resolve them and would constantly keep in mind the possibility of reductions and economies in the Force, provided that these could be made without lessening its effectiveness in carrying out its mandate.

407. The representative of France said that his delegation approved fully the Secretary-General's report and was of the opinion that the Force had been able to fulfil the terms of the mandate entrusted to it. He added that, regarding the question of reimbursement and that of freedom of movement of all contingents, he shared the concern and the views of many and was of the opinion that a formula should be devised and applied that would do away with the present disparities. Any

hindrance of the freedom of movement of all contingents was contrary to the Charter and Council resolutions. The terms of the mandate of the Force as defined in the Secretary-General's report of 27 October 1973 seemed to cover the situation quite adequately. The same would not be the case when a peace agreement had been arrived at between the parties. Then the role of the Force would be to guarantee not only the cease-fire but peace, and that peace-making Force should also include contingents supplied by the permanent members of the Council.

408. Speaking as the representative of Iraq, the President said that his country had dissociated itself from the Council's resolutions by which the present role of the United Nations was defined. However, Iraq recognized its responsibilities as a United Nations Member and had fulfilled its financial obligations towards the financing of UNEF. With regard to the question of reimbursement paid to the Governments contributing contingents to UNEF, he said the disparity in the rate of reimbursement was clearly a question of discrimination. As for the limitation on the freedom of movement of certain UNEF contingents, it was an act of discrimination by Israel against certain countries furnishing contingents to UNEF. He warned that, if practices of discrimination were allowed to continue, the future participation of Governments in the formation of United Nations peace-keeping forces would be in jeopardy and the whole principle of equitable geographic distribution and composition would be in danger.

3. SUBSEQUENT REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON UNEF

409. In further progress reports on UNEF dated 19 April and 13 May (S/11248/Add.1 and 2), the Secretary-General indicated that the strength of the Force had been 6,788 men on 19 April and 6,645 men on 13 May, and that it continued to patrol and control the zone of disengagement and to inspect the areas of limited armaments and forces. While no significant incidents had been reported, overflights of the zone of disengagement by unidentified aircraft had taken place and there had been occasional minor incursions into the zone of disengagement by military personnel of the parties, who had been immediately escorted out of the zone. During the period under review there had been an exchange of civilians between Israel and Egypt, which had been witnessed by UNEF officers and representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

410. The Secretary-General also reported that the parties had agreed, in the presence of a UNEF officer, to recommence the operations for the recovery of the bodies of soldiers killed during the hostilities in the Suez area, relying for that purpose on UNEF assistance. In addition, further efforts had been made regarding the question of freedom of movement for all UNEF contingents in the operational area, and consultations had continued with the representatives of the countries contributing contingents to UNEF concerning the possibilities of standardizing costs and determining a ceiling, as requested by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session.

411. In a further progress report dated 20 May (S/11248/Add.3), the Secretary-General stated that on 18 May he had been informed by the Permanent Representative of Ireland of his Government's decision to

withdraw the Irish contingent serving with UNEF, in view of the exceptional strains then imposed on the Irish security forces. The Irish Government had indicated that it would send air transport in order to repatriate the contingent on 22 May. The Commander of UNEF had reported that the Irish contingent would be relieved by the Nepalese battalion. The Secretary-General had informed the President of the Council of those developments.

412. On 21 May, the Secretary-General reported (S/11248/Add.4) that in a further letter dated 21 May the Government of Ireland had indicated that when the need to retain its troops in Ireland had passed, Ireland would be ready to return them to the Middle East should the United Nations feel that desirable, as it wished to be regarded as continuing its commitment to UNEF even though it could not supply troops at the time.

413. On 23 May, the President of the Security Council issued a note (S/11296) in connexion with the Secretary-General's reports concerning the request of the Irish Government, in which he informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had no objection to the request and agreed to the course of action set out in those reports. The Chinese delegation dissociated itself from that matter.

J. Establishment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES OF 31 MAY 1974

(a) Report of the Secretary-General

414. On 29 May, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council (S/11302) about arrangements for signing the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces. The signing would take place on 31 May in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. He had asked Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, Commander of UNEF, to be available there at that time, and had also designated his personal representative to the Geneva Conference, Mr. Roberto Guyer, to represent him at the signing.

415. On 30 May, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council (S/11302/Add.1) the text of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, together with the Protocol to that Agreement concerning the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. He pointed out that those documents called for the creation of a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). If the Security Council decided to establish the Force, he would take the necessary steps in accordance with the provision of the Protocol. It was his intention to draw the Force, in the first instance, from United Nations military personnel in the area.

416. Under the terms of the Agreement, Israel and Syria would scrupulously observe the cease-fire on land, sea and air and would refrain from all military actions against each other from the time of the signing of the document, in implementation of resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

417. It further provided that the two military forces would be separated in accordance with certain principles, which stipulated that: (a) all Israeli military

forces would be west of a line designated as Line A, except in the Quneitra area where they would be west of Line A-1 on a map to be precisely delineated by military representatives of Israel and Syria in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group meeting in Geneva following the signature of the Agreement; (b) all territory east of Line A would be under Syrian administration and Syrian civilians would return to that territory; (c) the area between Line A and Line B would be an area of separation in which the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force would be stationed; (d) all Syrian military forces would be east of Line B; (e) there would be two equal areas of limitation in armaments and forces, one west of Line A and one east of Line B, and the air forces of the two sides would be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side. Furthermore, there would be no military forces between Line A and Line A-1.

418. The Agreement stated that the precise delineation of a detailed map and a plan for the implementation of the disengagement of forces would be worked out by the military representatives of Israel and Syria in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference, who would agree on the stages of this process. They would begin this work 24 hours after the signing of the Agreement and would complete this task within five days. Disengagement would begin within 24 hours thereafter and would be completed not later than 20 days after it had begun.

419. Under the Agreement, its provisions concerning the cease-fire, the separation of forces and the absence of military forces in the area between Lines A and A-1 would be inspected by UNDOF personnel. Within 24 hours after its signature, all wounded prisoners of war would be repatriated, and all others upon completion of the work of the Military Working Group. Within 10 days, the bodies of all dead soldiers held by either side would be returned for burial.

420. Finally, the Agreement stated that it was not a peace agreement, but a step towards a just and durable peace on the basis of resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

421. The Protocol concerning UNDOF indicated that both parties agreed that the function of the Force would be to maintain the cease-fire, see that it was scrupulously observed and to supervise the Agreement and Protocol thereto with regard to the areas of separation and limitation. In carrying out its mission, the Force would comply with Syrian laws and regulations and would not hamper the functioning of local civil administration. The Force would enjoy the freedom of movement and communication necessary for its mission. It would be mobile and provided with personal weapons of a defensive character to be used only in self-defence. The strength of UNDOF was set at 1,250, to be selected by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties, from Members of the United Nations that were not permanent members of the Security Council.

422. Under the terms of the Protocol, UNDOF would be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. It would carry out inspections and report to the parties not less often than once every 15 days or when requested by either party, and would

mark on the ground the lines shown on the map worked out under the Agreement.

423. Finally, the Protocol provided that Israel and Syria would support a Security Council resolution which would provide for the Force contemplated by the Agreement. The initial authorization would be for six months, subject to renewal by a further Security Council resolution.

(b) Consideration at the 1773rd and 1774th meetings (30 and 31 May 1974)

424. In a letter dated 30 May (S/11304) the representative of the United States requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in the Middle East, in particular, the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces.

425. At its 1773rd meeting on 30 May, the Council included the United States letter in its agenda, together with the report of the Secretary-General (S/11302 and Add.1).

426. The Secretary-General said that the Council had before it his report, to which were attached the texts of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces and the Protocol concerning the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. The announcement of agreement was most welcome and encouraging news. He would take the necessary steps in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol, if the Council so decided. In that event, it would be his intention to set up the Force on the basis of the same general principles as those defined in his report (S/11052/Rev.1) on the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) which the Council had approved in resolution 341 (1973). It would also be his intention that the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force would be drawn, in the first instance at any rate, from United Nations military personnel already in the area.

427. At the 1774th meeting on 31 May, the Council had before it a draft resolution (S/11305/Rev.1) sponsored by the USSR and the United States. The representatives of Israel and Syria, at their request, were invited to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

428. The representative of the United States said that his Government welcomed the Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Agreement, which together with the agreement reached earlier on the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces would open the way for progress in Geneva toward the achievement of an enduring settlement in the Middle East. As the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force provided for in the Protocol to the Agreement would play a key and indispensable role in maintaining a cease-fire and seeing that it was scrupulously observed, he asked that the Council authorize the creation of that Force. The draft resolution before the Council was grounded in the recent successful actions of the Council and the Secretary-General's statement on the previous day. The general principles which had guided the United Nations Emergency Force clearly applied to all aspects of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, including the assurances of its continued effective functioning for the duration of the mandate established by the draft resolution. He urged its speedy adoption.

429. The representative of the USSR said that he was authorized to inform the Council that his Govern-

ment, which had taken part in numerous contacts preparing the way for the agreement, favourably assessed the Agreement on Disengagement of Syrian and Israeli troops and at the same time considered it necessary to stress that the Agreement was only a step towards the fulfilment of the major task, which was the total liberation of Arab territories from Israeli occupation. Accordingly, the task of the Geneva Conference was to find a solution on that basis which would be in the interest of peace and security and would protect the legitimate interests of all the States and peoples in the region, including the Arab people of Palestine. In that respect his country would continue to do everything possible along those lines, including its role as a participant in the Geneva Conference. The Soviet delegation approved the statement of the Secretary-General on 30 May to the effect that the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force would be created on the basis of the general principles set forth in the Secretary-General's previous report (S/11052/Rev.1). His delegation also agreed that UNDOF would be recruited from the military personnel of the United Nations Emergency Force already in the area, so that the expenses connected with the maintenance of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East would not be increased. Finally, since the mandate of UNDOF was for a period of six months, its renewal should be approved by the Council in a new resolution on the subject. With that understanding, his delegation hoped that the members of the Council would support the draft resolution before the Council.

430. The representative of China said that to seek a fundamental solution of the Middle East question, it was imperative to stop the hegemonism and power politics practised by the two super-Powers in the region, to demand Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and to restore completely to the Palestinian people their national rights. China had always held to its principled position on the dispatch of troops in the name of the United Nations under whatever form. It was only out of consideration for the attitude of the victims of aggression that the Chinese delegation had decided not to participate in the voting on the draft resolution before the Council.

431. The representative of Iraq said that on 8 April, during the 1765th meeting he had explained his country's position regarding the role of the United Nations forces in the area, and dissociated Iraq from the pertinent Security Council resolutions defining the role of those forces. His delegation therefore would not participate in the voting on the draft resolution contained in document S/11305/Rev.1, which was now before the Council.

Decision: At the 1774th meeting, on 31 May 1974, the draft resolution (S/11305/Rev.1) was adopted by 13 votes to none as resolution 350 (1974). Two members (China and Iraq) did not participate in the vote.

432. Resolution 350 (1974) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/11302 and Add.1, and having heard his statement made at the 1773rd meeting of the Security Council,

"1. Welcomes the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, negotiated in implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

"2. *Takes note* of the Secretary-General's report and the annexes thereto and his statement;

"3. *Decides* to set up immediately under its authority a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to this effect in accordance with his above-mentioned report and the annexes thereto. The Force shall be established for an initial period of six months, subject to renewal by further resolution of the Security Council;

"4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed of further developments."

433. Following the vote, the representative of Australia said that his Government, as had been stated by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, welcomed the announcement of the Disengagement Agreement between Israel and Syria signed in Geneva. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his statement, had paid tribute to the statesmanship shown by both Governments, and the untiring efforts of the United States' Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger. His Government stood ready to play whatever part it might be asked to play within the framework of the United Nations in ensuring that the Agreement was put into full effect.

434. The representative of Costa Rica said that his delegation congratulated the Governments of Syria and Israel for the conclusion of the troop disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights. His delegation also wished to congratulate Mr. Kissinger, the Secretary of State of the United States. The United States had taken a position in keeping with its immense world responsibility.

435. The representative of Indonesia said that the spirit of accommodation and the momentum so far achieved must not be lost. It was the need to keep the fragile peace in the area from relapsing that necessitated the presence of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in the area. It was upon the basis of these considerations that his delegation had supported the draft resolution just adopted.

436. The representative of Mauritania said that the Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement was not a peace agreement, but simply a first step towards a just and lasting peace in the area. Furthermore, the presence of the Force should in no way be prejudicial to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic.

437. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation was happy to vote for the resolution before the Council. He would like to repeat congratulations to the two Governments for the efforts which they had made to reach the Agreement and to the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, for the remarkable part he had played in helping to achieve the Agreement. The functions of the Force, he added, should be carried out as economically as could be done without impairing the Force's efficiency. His Government stood ready to play its part in any way, and in particular in the composition of any peace-keeping force which might be needed to guarantee a final peace agreement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967).

438. The representative of France said that the Security Council must decide upon the modalities governing the Force according to the Protocol annexed to the Disengagement Agreement. It was to be hoped

that the Secretary-General would very soon be able to supply the Council with more detailed information on the financial implications of the creation of a new force. Commenting on the exclusion of the permanent members from the Force, he expressed his Government's readiness to participate in any future peace-keeping force which would maintain not only the cease-fire but peace in the area.

439. The representative of Austria said that the Disengagement Agreement between Israel and Syria was a historic event which, it was hoped, would pave the way towards the attainment of a peaceful, just and durable settlement of all the problems of the Middle East. The Council had just created a new United Nations peace-keeping force, and it was not necessary to reiterate his Government's positive and favourable attitude in regard to United Nations peace-keeping operations.

440. The representative of the United Republic of Cameroon said that his delegation shared the view that the mandate and the conditions for the functioning of the Force should be completely in keeping with the views expressed by the Secretary-General in his report of 27 October 1973 (S/11052/Rev.1).

441. The representative of Peru said Peru had heard with great happiness the news of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces. The Council's action in creating a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force was an integral part of the Agreement between the parties, and demonstrated that the United Nations was inextricably linked to the task of creating peace in the Middle East.

442. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR said that the signing of the Israeli-Syrian troop disengagement agreement represented a great success for all those interested parties that had taken part in the talks. Following that Agreement, the work of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East should be resumed for the discussion of the fundamental aspects of the Middle East problem. His delegation supported the expressed intention of the Secretary-General on the organization and the principles of the recruitment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.

443. The President, speaking as the representative of Kenya, said that the Israeli-Syrian Agreement was a historic development, and his Government applauded this important step on the road towards the establishment of a just and durable peace in the area. His delegation wished the Geneva peace talks a speedy and successful conclusion.

444. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that his delegation supported the resolution just adopted by the Council. It considered that the Agreement on Disengagement between Syrian and Israeli Forces was a first step along the road to a just and stable peace in the Middle East on the basis of resolution 338 (1973), which was based on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories and safeguarding the national rights of the Palestinian people.

445. The representative of Israel said that his Government was in agreement with the draft resolution just adopted, and added that the Agreement signed that morning would provide a great opportunity for bringing about a positive change in the relations between Israel and Syria.

446. In presenting his proposals for interim arrangements to give effect to resolution 350 (1974), the Secretary-General suggested that the initial composition of UNDOF should comprise the Austrian and Peruvian contingents from the United Nations Emergency Force, supported by logistical elements from Canada and Poland. UNDOF would also comprise those United Nations military observers, in accordance with the terms of the Protocol, who were already deployed in the area. He also proposed to appoint as Interim Commander of UNDOF Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceño Zevallos of Peru who would be assisted by staff officers drawn from UNEF and UNDOF. The parties concerned had accepted those arrangements. While the new operation would inevitably involve additional expenditure, he would make every effort to keep it to the minimum.

447. The representative of the USSR said that while his delegation had no objection in principle to most of the Secretary-General's proposals, it would prefer to have no increase in the strength of the peace-keeping force or in expenditures for its financing. In his view, a reduction of the Canadian contingent would reduce the general expenditures, without detriment to the cause, as its strength far exceeded the indicated level.

448. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, as he understood it, there was no suggestion that the Secretary-General's report should be put to a vote in the Council, nor was there any suggestion of a reduction in the size of any of the contingents.

449. The President stated that since there did not appear to be any objection, he assumed that the Council agreed to the proposals made by the Secretary-General. It was so decided.

(c) Reports of the Secretary-General on the establishment and functioning of UNDOF

450. In his first progress report dated 5 June (S/11310) on the implementation of resolution 350 (1974), the Secretary-General indicated that in response to his request, Austria and Peru had agreed to the transfer to UNDOF of their contingents serving with UNEF. Furthermore, Canada and Poland had also agreed to the transfer of elements of their contingents from UNEF to UNDOF to provide logistic services.

451. With regard to the implementation of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, he said that the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference had begun its work under the aegis of the United Nations, immediately after the signing of that Agreement. Following discussions in Geneva with Mr. Roberto Guyer, his personal representative to the Conference, and Lieutenant-General Siilasvuo, Commander of UNEF, the Secretary-General had given instructions to move advance elements of UNDOF to the operational area on 3 June with a view to making the Force operational there by 5 June. On 3 June, he had appointed Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceño Zevallos of Peru as interim Commander of UNDOF, and the latter had established temporary offices in Damascus on the same day. The strength of the contingents being transferred to the Force from UNEF was approximately the following: Austrian contingent—500; Peruvian contingent—350; Canadian and Polish logistic elements

—250. In addition, 90 UNTSO military observers deployed in the area were to be transferred to UNDOF.

452. On 6 June, in an addendum (S/11302/Add.2) to his report of 29 May on the Agreement on Disengagement, the Secretary-General said that from 31 May to 5 June 1974, the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the aegis of the United Nations had held six meetings. Military representatives of Syria had joined the Group and representatives of the co-chairmen of the Conference had also participated in the meetings. At the meeting held on 31 May, the military representatives of Israel and Syria had signed the Agreement on Disengagement and a map attached thereto. In the subsequent meetings, full agreement had been reached on a map showing different phases of disengagement; a disengagement plan (areas and a time-table) and an agreed statement which had been signed also by Lieutenant-General Siilasvuo, who had presided over the meetings and had read the statement at the final meeting held on 5 June 1974.

453. The plan of separation of forces involved the redeployment of Israeli forces from the area east of the 1967 cease-fire line. It also provided for Israeli redeployment from Quneitra and Rafid and the demilitarization of an area west of Quneitra still held by Israel. Under the plan, UNDOF would initially occupy a buffer zone between the parties and, by 26 June, the separation of forces was to be completed. After the completion of each phase of the redeployment of forces set out in the plan, UNDOF would carry out an inspection and report its findings to the parties; after verifying, on 26 June, that the agreed limitation of forces was being observed, it would carry out regular bi-weekly inspections of the 10-kilometre restricted forces area.

454. Agreement was also reached in the Military Working Group that both sides would repatriate all prisoners of war by 6 June; that they would co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in carrying out its mandate, including the exchange of bodies, also to be completed by 6 June; and that they would make available all information and maps of minefields in their respective areas and the areas to be handed over by them.

K. Communications concerning violations of the cease-fire

455. After the outbreak of hostilities in the area on 6 October 1973 the Security Council and the Secretary-General received many communications in which Egypt, Israel and Syria exchanged charges and countercharges of cease-fire violations in their respective sectors.

456. The letters from Israel containing complaints of violations of the cease-fire by Egypt were dated 16, 24, 26, 29 and 31 October; 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 28 November; 2, 6, 13, 19 and 26 December; 4, 10, 11 and 15 January (S/11030, S/11043, S/11051, S/11053, S/11058, S/11063, S/11069, S/11073, S/11076, S/11078, S/11079 and Corr.1, S/11082, S/11088, S/11089, S/11098, S/11101, S/11105, S/11108, S/11111, S/11114, S/11117, S/11135, S/11141, S/11147, S/11155, S/11164, S/11170 and Corr.1, S/11181, S/11188, S/11189 and S/11194). They charged Egypt with initiating

many cases of artillery, small arms and tank fire, firing of ground-to-air missiles, forward movements of forces and air attacks. Furthermore, according to the Israeli letters, Egypt had tried to construct a bridge across the Canal, from west to east, in order to improve its lines in an attempt to open the ring encircling its Third Army. Israel also charged that there had been many instances of crossing cease-fire lines in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 338 (1974) and 339 (1974).

457. The letters from Egypt containing complaints of violations of the cease-fire by Israel were dated 24 and 25 October; 1, 3, 9, 11, 13, 16, 21 and 27 November; 21, 24 and 29 December; 7, 11, 14 and 16 January (S/11044, S/11048, S/11070, S/11077, S/11095, S/11102, S/11109, S/11118, S/11124, S/11134, S/11167, S/11171, S/11176, S/11184, S/11191, S/11196 and S/11197) and contained lists of many cases of small-arms fire, bombing and artillery shelling by Israeli forces. Israel was also charged with air lifting soldiers and large crates by helicopter to Gebel Aataka in an attempt to reinforce and consolidate positions occupied by its forces after the cease-fire. Egypt rejected Israel's allegations of cease-fire violations as attempts to seek pretexts to violate the cease-fire with a view to launching extensive military operations.

458. In Israel's letters dated 3, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 23 and 29 November; 4 and 14 December; 6, 16 and 29 January; 5, 12 and 16 February; 11, 15, 19, 22 and 27 March; 2, 10, 16, 22 and 28 April; 3, 8, 14, 21, 24 and 26 May (S/11075, S/11087, S/11090, S/11099, S/11100, S/11106, S/11107, S/11110, S/11113, S/11116, S/11128, S/11136, S/11142, S/11158, S/11182, S/11186, S/11195, S/11203, S/11209, S/11217, S/11222, S/11232, S/11235, S/11236, S/11240, S/11243, S/11249, S/11257, S/11267, S/11270, S/11277, S/11282, S/11284, S/11286, S/11293, S/11297 and S/11298) complaining of cease-fire violations by Syria, it charged Syria with continuous use of artillery, small-arms and tank fire. It charged that Syria was attempting to advance its positions in order to effect changes in the cease-fire line. Israel also rejected Syria's assertion that it had occupied new positions after the cease-fire, insisting that the positions had been held by Israeli forces before the cease-fire.

459. In Syria's letters dated 1, 9, 19 and 26 November; 12 February; 14, 20, 27 and 28 March; 4, 6, 9, 10, 15, 17, 19, 24 and 29 April; 3, 20 and 28 May (S/11067, S/11094, S/11119, S/11132, S/11219, S/11234, S/11238, S/11244, S/11245, S/11251, S/11252, S/11255, S/11258, S/11265, S/11266, S/11268, S/11269, S/11274, S/11278, S/11281, S/11292 and S/11300) containing complaints of cease-fire violations by Israel, it was charged that Israel had occupied new positions after the cease-fire had become effective, and had directed shelling and small-arms fire across the cease-fire line.

L. Communications concerning the situation in and around Jerusalem and its Holy Places

460. In a letter dated 5 July 1973 (S/10965), the representative of Morocco complained that during January and February 1973, Israel had notified 51 Moroccan families, totalling 187 persons, that they would

have to evacuate their dwellings in the city of Jerusalem. He stated that that action constituted a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and was contrary to the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

461. In a reply dated 17 July (S/10969), the representative of Israel stated that the families in question had been relocated for the purpose of clearing and reconstruction of slums and the relocation of inhabitants from substandard dwellings to adequate housing. Moreover, those families had been offered alternative accommodations in greatly improved conditions.

462. In a letter dated 29 March 1974 (S/11246), the representative of Jordan complained that Israeli authorities were carrying out destructive excavations near the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the surrounding area. The Chairman of the Supreme Muslim Council in Jerusalem had protested against such excavations, which were said to have caused a crack in the historic building of Al Jawhariah School on the western side of the Mosque, and had demanded an immediate halt to those excavations. Pointing out that the excavations could cause the collapse and destruction of several religious and historic buildings, and render 3,000 persons living in that area homeless, Jordan requested action to halt any further excavations in the Holy City, which were in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the Hague Convention of 1907 as well as the principles of international law, the United Nations Charter, and the Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem.

463. In a reply dated 30 April (S/11279), the representative of Israel rejected Jordan's charges as being without any foundation and denied that there had been any excavation under the building in question, which, in view of its age and general state of dilapidation, had to be repaired periodically. As to the excavations conducted in the area of the Temple Mount, they were carried out by distinguished archaeologists who had made invaluable contributions to the knowledge of the different cultures, societies and religions identified with that historic site, without posing any danger whatsoever to existing historical and religious monuments.

M. Communications concerning the treatment of the civilian population in occupied territories and of prisoners of war in violation of the Geneva Conventions

464. During the period under review, the Secretary-General received a number of communications from the parties containing charges and counter-charges related to the treatment of civilian populations in localities which had been affected in the hostilities. The parties also exchanged charges and counter-charges regarding the treatment of prisoners of war in violation of the Geneva Conventions.

465. In letters dated 14 and 18 October 1973 (S/11024, S/11033), the representative of Egypt expressed his Government's readiness to comply with the appeal to the parties by the International Committee of the Red Cross to abide by the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and charged Israel with refusing to reply to the appeal. In a reply dated 19 October (S/11034), Israel stated that Egypt was attempting to conceal its responsibility for the aggression that began on 6 October and to falsify Israel's position in respect of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

466. In letters dated 1, 5, 7, 8 and 20 November, and 20 and 24 December (S/11068, S/11080, S/11083, S/11093, S/11122, S/11168 and S/11172) Egypt charged that Israel was persistently committing aggressive and inhumane acts against civilians in the Israeli-occupied areas, which constituted violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War.

467. In letters dated 14 and 15 October (S/11025 and S/11028), Egypt charged that Israeli planes had used high explosive bombs in the highly populated Nile delta towns, and submitted photographs showing some victims of those bombs.

468. On 1 November (S/11068), Egypt complained that on 30 October, the Israeli military forces had expelled the civilian population from the towns and villages of Goneifa, arrested 600 civilians, fired at the livestock and destroyed shopping centres.

469. On 5 November (S/11080), Egypt charged that on 3 November, Israeli forces had rounded up 298 inhabitants of the villages of El Ganein and Amer and had forced them to evacuate their homes and fields and move to the nearest Egyptian military position, and on 7 November (S/11083), Egypt also charged that in the few days preceding 6 November, Israeli forces had been rounding up civilians and compelling them to seek refuge in areas near Suez where Egyptian advanced positions were located.

470. Israel replied to the foregoing Egyptian charges in letters dated 3 and 9 November, 6 December 1973, 3 and 7 January 1974 (S/11074, S/11096, S/11112, S/11146, S/11180/Rev.1, and S/11183) stating that those charges were entirely baseless and full of distortion of the facts, and were intended to divert attention from Egypt's own violations of the Geneva Conventions.

471. On 14 November (S/11112) Israel referred to Egypt's letter of 8 November (S/11093), containing charges that Israel had hampered the humanitarian

activities of the ICRC in connexion with wounded and captured prisoners of war, and stated that, contrary to those charges, it was Egypt that must bear responsibility for preventing the exchange of wounded prisoners and for failing ever to provide a full list of the names of prisoners of war held by it, despite Israel's prompt provisions of lists of all prisoners of war it was holding.

472. In letters dated 10 and 31 October, 20, 21 and 29 November, and 5, 14 and 18 December 1973, and 17 and 21 February, 9 April and 6 May 1974 (S/11018, S/11066, S/11120, S/11123, S/11138, S/11144, S/11157, S/11160, S/11220, S/11227, S/11256 and S/11283), the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic charged that Israeli forces had shelled and bombed civilian quarters, hospitals and schools, killing a large number of civilians, and that Israel was maltreating Syrian prisoners of war, in violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

473. In letters dated 19, 24 and 29 October, 7, 22 and 26 November and 8, 9 and 26 December 1973 and 27 March 1974 (S/11035, S/11042, S/11060, S/11085, S/11126, S/11130, S/11148, S/11149, S/11151, S/11174 and S/11242), the representative of Israel rejected the charges lodged by Syria and in turn charged that Syrian forces had subjected civilian localities to missile, artillery and air attacks that had caused heavy civilian casualties. Israel also charged that Syria was violating the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war, and forwarded copies of complaints it had lodged with the ICRC.

474. In a letter dated 2 January 1974 (S/11177), Israel charged that, as a result of the freedom of movement and action enjoyed by the terrorist organizations in Lebanese territory, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine had attempted on 31 December 1973 to carry out an assassination attempt on the life of Mr. Joseph Edward Sieff in London because, as a spokesman of the terror organization said, of his important role in the world Zionist movement.

Chapter 2

COMPLAINT BY CUBA

A. Communications to the Security Council and request for a meeting

475. By a letter dated 12 September 1973 (S/10993) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Cuba transmitted a letter from the Acting Foreign Minister of Cuba charging that on 11 September the armed forces of Chile had surrounded and opened fire on the Cuban Embassy in Santiago, Chile, wounding a Cuban diplomat. The letter charged further that the Cuban merchant vessel *Playa Larga*, sailing in international waters off Chile, had been the target of attacks by aircraft of the Chilean air force and by vessels of the Chilean navy. The letter denounced those acts as grave violations of the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the international rules of navigation.

476. In a letter dated 13 September (S/10995), the representative of Cuba requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the actions of the

Chilean armed forces. The situation created by such actions, the letter stated, was a serious threat to international peace and security within the meaning of Articles 34, 35 and 39 of the Charter.

477. In a letter dated 15 September (S/10997), the representative of Chile rejected the Cuban charges and stated that the situation did not constitute a threat to international peace and security. One hundred and fifty Cuban officials and Embassy staff had departed peacefully from Chile on 13 September, and Chilean authorities had complied fully with international shipping standards with respect to the *Playa Larga*.

B. Consideration at the 1741st and 1742nd meetings (17 and 18 September 1973)

478. At the 1741st meeting on 17 September, the Security Council included the item in its agenda and considered it at two meetings held on 17 and 18 September. In the course of the discussion, the representatives of Cuba, Chile, Democratic Yemen, Senegal,

Madagascar and Algeria were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

479. Opening the discussion, the representative of Cuba said that on 11 September, while the Fascist military coup was taking place in Santiago, several hundred members of the Chilean armed forces had surrounded the Cuban Embassy and started shooting at it. The Cuban Ambassador had received calls from several high Chilean military officers, who threatened to launch a vigorous attack on the Embassy. Throughout the night of 11 September, shots had been fired against the Cuban Embassy, and a staff member had been seriously injured. Early on 12 September, the Cuban Ambassador and Counsellor, while standing in the doorway of the Embassy with the prior agreement of the Chilean officers who surrounded the building, had been shot at with machine-guns, and the Ambassador had been seriously injured. The seige, the armed attack, the effort to take over the Cuban Embassy and the aborted assassination of the Cuban Ambassador were gross violations of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, specifically of its articles 22, 29, 30, 44 and 45 (a). In other incidents on 11 September, planes of the Chilean air force and units of the Chilean navy had bombarded the Cuban ship *Playa Larga* while it was in international waters, causing it serious damage; in Valparaiso, the boatswain of a Cuban vessel had been attacked and mistreated; and, in Santiago, two Cuban doctors participating in a programme organized by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization had been arbitrarily arrested and detained in the Tacna regiment barracks until the next day. The Cuban Government was deeply concerned over the fate of a number of Cuban citizens who were in Chile to fulfil bilateral agreements signed by legitimate Chilean authorities or as participants in activities planned by organizations within the United Nations system. The military régime that had emerged from the coup of 11 September was a threat to all civilized peoples, and it was the duty of the international community to express solidarity with the Chilean people who were still struggling against the repression of that régime. The anti-Chilean conspiracy, the Cuban representative said, had begun as soon as the Chilean people elected Salvador Allende the constitutional President and endorsed his programme of revolutionary transformation. The rise to power of the military régime was the culmination of the interfering policies of North American imperialism against the constitutional government. The scandalous activities of International Telephone and Telegraph, Kennecott, Anaconda and other powerful monopolistic corporations were well known, as were the trade and financial blockade imposed on Chile by the United States and the open conspiracy indulged in by American diplomats in Santiago. Cuba formally accused the Government of the United States of being an accomplice in, and mainly responsible for, the crimes against the Chilean people. Equally guilty were the political parties and groups of the Chilean right that had participated directly in wrecking the achievement of the Chilean workers. The heroic death of President Salvador Allende had earned him a place of honour among the martyrs of the revolutionary cause of Latin America.

480. The representative of Chile said that the complaints submitted in the Cuban letter of 12 September had never threatened international peace and security.

In that letter there was no mention of any of the Articles of the Charter defining such matters as fell within the purview of the Security Council nor any request for a Council meeting. The facts were that, on 12 September, at midday, the harassment of the *Playa Larga* had been abandoned, and late the same day, by agreement, the Ambassador of Cuba and all his staff had left Chile, leaving the Cuban Embassy in the hands of the Swedish Embassy. It was only on the next day, 13 September, and in the absence of any new events, that Cuba had decided to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council. Referring to the *Playa Larga*, the Chilean representative stated that the ship had disobeyed the repeated orders of the maritime authorities not to sail and had left without the pilot or the papers called for by Chilean navigation laws. Chile had invoked the right of hot pursuit against a ship that had been in a Chilean port, subject to Chilean jurisdiction, and was absconding with 8,000 tons of sugar and a quantity of equipment belonging to a Chilean firm. That right flowed from article 23 of the Vienna Convention on the High Seas. The case of the *Playa Larga* fell within the domestic jurisdiction of the State of Chile, and neither the Council nor any other United Nations organ could take up a matter of that nature. Turning to the charges concerning the incident at the Cuban Embassy, the representative of Chile stated that, early on the morning of 11 September, when the Cuban Embassy was no longer guarded, the new authorities had been obliged to protect it against possible violence. Popular indignation against the Cuban diplomats for their systematic interference in the domestic affairs of Chile was such that serious risk of attack existed. Cuba had violated all the obligations imposed by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, as it had used diplomatic freedom surreptitiously to bring into Chile an enormous number of weapons and had converted its Embassy into a veritable fortress and a general headquarters for subversion and sabotage. The military patrol sent to protect the Cuban Embassy on 11 September had been received with offensive remarks against the Chilean arm situation in Chile. Staff members of the Embassy repeatedly fired at the soldiers, who had fired back exercise of their right of self-defence. As the first shots had come from the Embassy, it was Cuba that had violated the Charter; but the incident was now over, and there was no ground for action by the Security Council.

481. The representative of Peru stated that the people and Government of Peru had followed the recent events in Chile with interest and concern, and also with the strictest observance of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. He had noted with relief that all the Cuban diplomats had left Chilean territory and that the *Playa Larga* had left the coast of Chile. He added that, if both attacks were to be confirmed, Peru would profoundly lament them as violations of practices universally enshrined because of their benefits as part of peaceful coexistence among nations.

482. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the attempts to justify the attacks upon the Cuban Embassy and the merchant ship in international waters were entirely unconvincing and unsupported and could not distract the Council's attention from the clear facts. Such an attack by the regular army on the embassy of a sovereign State was comparable to terrorist action and an inadmissible

violation of international law as contained in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Although an attempt had been made to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the consideration by the Council of the Cuban complaint, an attack upon a foreign embassy and the firing on a merchant vessel in international waters by armed forces were serious incidents in international relations. In the past, he noted, such actions had led to military conflict. Thus Cuba was acting in strict compliance with the United Nations Charter in calling upon the Council to adopt appropriate action. The Council must firmly condemn the hostile actions of the Chilean militia against the Cuban Embassy and its staff as flagrant violations of the norms of international law and a direct violation of the spirit and the letter of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It should also adopt appropriate decisions of principle to prevent similar unlawful actions in international relations in future. In conclusion, he noted that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in a statement issued on 13 September, had emphasized that the overthrow of the Government of Salvador Allende had been the culmination of the subversive actions of the reactionary forces of Chile, supported by outside imperialist forces, and had expressed confidence that no repression or terror would be able to break the will of the Chilean people or bar its way to economic and social progress.

483. The representative of Panama condemned the attacks on the Cuban Embassy and on the Playa Larga as acts in violation of the norms of international law recognized by all States. As a strong advocate of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States, Panama would not comment on developments in Chile, but it trusted that the military junta would respect the fundamental principles of co-existence in the Declaration of Human Rights, the principles of territorial asylum and the rules governing political refugees.

484. The representative of China, after expressing his Government's profound condolences on the death of President Allende, said that it was clear that the Cuban Embassy in Chile and a Cuban merchant vessel had been subjected to gross attacks by the forces of the Chilean coup d'état in flagrant violation of the norms of international behaviour. His delegation expressed concern and regret at their occurrence.

485. The representative of Democratic Yemen recalled, that in an address to the General Assembly in 1972, President Allende had accused the International Telephone and Telegraph Company of attempting to bring about civil war in Chile, which was the greatest possible source of disintegration of a country, and had denounced that attempt as imperialist intervention. In the early hours of 12 September the prophetic words of President Allende had come true. As a result, the safety of about 10,000 political refugees who had fled from the dictatorial régime of their respective countries and had found safe haven in Marxist Chile was at stake, for there were reports that the military junta in Santiago would forcibly deport them to their countries. The Council was in duty bound to intervene on their behalf and see to it that their human rights were upheld in accordance with international law and morality.

486. At the 1742nd meeting on 18 September, the representative of Indonesia said that acts constituting harassment of embassies and endangerment of embassy personnel could not be condoned. It was the position of his delegation that the principle of non-interference

in the internal affairs of a country must be respected. In view of the contradictory statements made by the representatives of Cuba and Chile, the Indonesian delegation was unable to pass judgement on what had happened or was happening in Chile.

487. The representative of Australia stated that the charges brought by Cuba were of a kind that gave rise to serious concern on the part of all Governments sharing the obligation to respect the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and property and to permit the free and unmolested passage of merchant ships on the high seas. However, statements by Cuba and Chile in the Council gave different versions of the events, and the Council, on the basis of the evidence it had heard, could not find the Chilean Army forces guilty of grave violations of Chile's international obligations. The Australian delegation, which had no independent sources of information, was not in a position to make a judgement on the conflicting versions of the events heard by the Council.

488. The representative of Kenya stated that the coup d'état in Chile was not a subject that could or should be discussed in the Council, as it was strictly a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of Chile. It was clear, however, that in international relations the highest standards of protecting foreign missions remained paramount in the event of an insurrection. In no case should any governmental authorities launch an attack on a specific mission or its diplomatic agents on a discriminatory basis. Although the versions of the two parties were contradictory, it had been conceded by both sides that the Cuban Embassy had been the target of shots by the Chilean army, and his Government was therefore concerned. His delegation was in no position to pass judgement on the conflicting accounts of the maritime incident, but it considered that the action of the Chilean navy and air force had been extreme, for it had the potential of locking the two countries in conflict. Charges of foreign intervention in the Chilean coup were not supported by proof, but the Council should continue to watch developments closely.

489. The representative of the United States of America stated that the United States regretted departures from constitutional processes wherever they occurred and opposed any violent action against diplomatic establishments and merchant shipping in international waters. The question was whether the assertions by the Cuban delegation were founded in fact. The Council had heard contradictory reports. The United States delegation agreed with several other Council members that the actions referred to in the complaint by Cuba had resulted from the violent internal upheavals within the territory of a Member State. Accordingly, any redress would be more appropriately sought through bilateral channels. His delegation had no indication that such channels had even been tried when the Security Council meeting was requested. There were other ways, short of a Council meeting, for Governments to gain the attention of the international community, such as circulating letters bringing bilateral or regional matters to the Council's attention. If the United States and other Member States were to seek to convoke the Council on every occasion when injuries were inflicted or when diplomatic and overseas missions were damaged, the Council would be in almost continuous session. The representative of the United States, exercising his right of reply, rejected the accusations against the United States made by the representative of Cuba.

490. The representative of India said that, in the view of his delegation, what had happened in Chile was essentially an internal matter, and there was no evidence of immediate threat to international peace and security. Under the Vienna Convention the armed forces of any régime were precluded from taking violent action against a diplomatic mission, but it appeared that the Cuban Embassy had been put in a state of siege. With the departure of the officials of the Cuban Embassy, the immediate problem of safety of their lives had been solved. Only two elements remained: the question of compensation and the question of assessment of guilt. The first should be subject to negotiations between the two Governments, but the assessment of culpability, if it were to be established, would require further consultation and information. As for the use of force against the Cuban ship *Playa Larga*, concerning which the Chilean representative had cited the doctrine of "hot pursuit", his delegation doubted that the doctrine was applicable but was prepared to examine with legal experts the precise position. In view of the nature of the complaint and the paucity of facts, his delegation considered that the Council would be best advised to adjourn until it had had time to sift the facts and consider their legal implications.

491. The representative of Austria stated that the principle of non-interference in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State was one of the fundamental principles of the Charter and must be respected. The tragic events in Chile thus fell, by definition, outside the competence of the United Nations and of the Security Council. The people and Government of Austria had, however, followed with a sense of deep concern the events in Chile and mourned the death of President S. Allende. Violent attacks against diplomatic agents gravely disrupted the mechanism for safeguarding peace and strengthening international security. Observance of the principle of freedom of navigation was essential for the uninterrupted conduct of relations among sovereign and independent States. His Government had noted with satisfaction that the Cuban officials had departed from Chile in compliance with international law and that the Cuban merchant vessel *Playa Larga* had been able to pursue its way. Having listened to the statements in the Council, the Austrian delegation felt that not all elements were available to pass safe judgement.

492. The representative of Guinea said that the attack on the Cuban Embassy and on the Cuban merchant vessel by Chilean armed forces, together with the arrest and the detention of innocent persons by the Chilean police, constituted grave violations of the principles of the Charter and of international law. Her delegation was also concerned about the fate of political refugees in Chile. In her view, the Security Council was duty-bound to condemn the military junta for violating the premises of the Cuban Embassy and for acts of provocation likely to trouble international peace and security.

493. The representative of the Sudan said that his delegation supported Cuba's request for a Council meeting on its complaint. Having listened to the statements made by the two parties, his delegation continued to believe that the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States constituted one of the basic foundations of international relations. The Sudan deeply regretted the firing on the Cuban Embassy and the attack on the Cuban vessel on the high seas by the

Chilean forces. Those attacks were certainly a violation of both the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Conventions on the Laws of the Sea. The Sudan also shared the concern expressed for the safety of foreign refugees in Chile.

494. The representative of Algeria said that the facts on which the Cuban complaint were based were sufficiently clear and grave to impel the Council to take the necessary measures against the military authorities of Chile as a matter of urgency. The acts of the Chilean authorities constituted, in the view of his delegation, an unpardonable infringement of all the international rules concerning the treatment of foreign diplomatic missions and of the protection of foreign nationals and property. What was still more serious and what should retain the Council's attention was the dangerous situation behind the brutal activities of the authorities in Santiago. It was Algeria's constant policy to avoid any interference in the domestic affairs of other countries and to denounce all acts of foreign interference, and it would therefore refrain from interfering in the internal policies of Chile, irrespective of its sympathy for the Government of President Allende and of its concern over the events that had led to his brutal overthrow. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to divorce the acts denounced by Cuba from the whole context of the situation in Chile or to assess them without taking full account of their inherent danger to peace and harmony in that part of the world.

495. The President, speaking as the representative of the Yugoslavia, upheld the right of any Member State to ask for a meeting of the Security Council. As the facts presented by Cuba constituted serious threat to international peace and security within the meaning of Articles 34, 35 and 39 of the Charter, the meeting of the Council was fully justified. The new authorities in Chile were attacking relations with other countries on political and ideological grounds and subjecting large numbers of foreign nationals to arrest, terror and violence, using their presence in Chile as a justification for what the junta was doing. The broader implication of the situation was that the dispute had its root predominantly in foreign interference against the Government of Chile during the past three years or more. President Allende himself had given an account of efforts at economic coercion at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly. It had been precisely in the larger context of peace and security in Latin America that the Security Council, meeting in Panama, had adopted resolution 330 (1973).

496. The representative of Senegal stated that the new authorities in Chile had failed to provide convincing proof of their good faith and had prohibited those whose profession it was to keep world opinion informed from entering the country. Senegal considered that the international community could not remain indifferent to the action undertaken by the military junta that had seized power in Chile against the local citizenry and persons on the staff of the Cuban Embassy in Santiago. That action constituted the most flagrant violation of the elementary rules of contemporary international law and clearly had the potential to endanger peace and security, at least in that part of the American continent.

497. The representative of Madagascar said that the incidents related in the Cuban complaint represented very serious breaches of the standards of conduct imposed by international law. The Security Council should

see to it that the grave situation did not degenerate beyond remedy; it should not merely confine itself to noting a situation that threatened international peace and security, for its duty was to prevent any development which might jeopardize peace and normal friendly relations between nations.

498. Following statements by the representatives of Cuba and Chile in exercise of their right of reply, the President stated that as he had no indication as to

when members of the Council might wish to speak or present proposals on the item, it would be premature to fix a time for another meeting on the issue.

C. Subsequent communications

499. In a letter dated 18 September (S/11001), the representatives of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic set out the views of their Governments on the Cuban complaint to the Security Council.

Chapter 3

THE SITUATION IN NAMIBIA

A. Communications to the Security Council and request for a meeting

500. By a letter dated 2 July 1973 (S/10963), the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of a consensus concerning the question of Namibia (A/AC.109/425) adopted by the Special Committee on 29 June in which it expressed the hope that the Security Council would take effective measures to secure South Africa's compliance with Council resolution 310 (1972) calling for that Government's immediate withdrawal from the Territory.

501. By a letter dated 7 September (S/10992), the representative of South Africa transmitted a communication from his Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning the second session of the Advisory Council for South West Africa, which had been held in Johannesburg on 16 and 17 August under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The letter recalled that the Advisory Council had been established to enable representatives of the various regions and regional governments or authorities in South West Africa to discuss matters concerning South West Africa as a whole and to advise the Prime Minister on such matters.

502. In a letter dated 4 December addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11145), the representatives of Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council for the consideration of the serious situation in Namibia.

B. Consideration at the 1756th to 1758th meetings (10-11 December 1973)

503. The Security Council resumed its consideration of the question at its 1756th meeting on 10 December and included in its agenda the Secretary-General's report dated 30 April (S/10921 and Corr.1) on the implementation of Security Council resolution 323 (1972). In that report, the Secretary-General had, in the light of the results achieved so far, raised the question as to whether the contacts and efforts initiated pursuant to resolutions 309 (1972), 319 (1972) and 323 (1972) should be continued. In the course of the discussion at the 1756th to 1758th meetings, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Niger, Somalia, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The Council also agreed, upon the

request of the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia that a delegation composed of the President of that Council and the representatives of Burundi, Indonesia and Mexico be invited to participate in the discussion, to extend an invitation to that delegation, in accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

504. Opening the discussion at the 1756th meeting, the Secretary-General, in introducing his report, stated that, in fulfilling his mandate under resolution 323 (1972), he had sought through further contacts with the South African Government to obtain a complete and unequivocal statement of its policy regarding self-determination and independence for Namibia as well as clarification of its position on other fundamental questions raised during the last debate in the Council. In his discussions with the representatives of the South African Government, he had emphasized the United Nations firm stand on the international status of Namibia, the preservation of its national unity and territorial integrity, the exercise by the Namibian people of their right to self-determination and independence as a single, united nation and the creation of conditions for the exercise of that right by abolishing discriminatory legislation and removing restrictions on freedom of movement and political activity and as assuring freedom of speech and freedom of association. Following discussions with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, the Secretary-General had received on 30 April the statement of that Government's position contained in his report. Although that statement had made clearer South Africa's position on some basic issues, it had fallen short of the complete and unequivocal clarification of South Africa's policy in regard to self-determination and independence for Namibia that the Security Council had sought when it adopted resolution 323 (1972).

505. The Secretary-General said that he had subsequently obtained the views of several of the other parties concerned, namely, the United Nations Council for Namibia, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the Chief Clemens Kapuuo, the Chairman of the National Convention of Non-Whites in Namibia, and had discussed the matter with many heads of State and Government during his visits to Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania and while attending the OAU Conference in Addis Adaba in May and the Conference of Non-Aligned States in Algiers in September. The Secretary-General concluded that the general view, in the light of the position of the Government of South Africa as given in its statement of

30 April, was that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the policy envisaged in Security Council resolution 309 (1972) and that that approach should be resumed only if the Government of South Africa were to make a substantial move towards reconciling its position with that of the United Nations.

506. The representative of Peru expressed regret that, far from giving an unequivocal pronouncement on its policy on the exercise of the right to self-determination and independence of the people of Namibia, the Government of South Africa had affirmed the division of the Territory into Bantustans by means of legislative measures adopted at the beginning of 1973. He then introduced a draft resolution sponsored by Peru (S/11152) which had been prepared after consultation with members of the Council and orally proposed the addition of a new preambular paragraph. The draft resolution as orally amended (S/11152/Rev.1), read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 309 (1972) of 4 February 1972, 319 (1972) of 1 August 1972 and 323 (1972) of 6 December 1972,

"Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/10921 and Corr.1),

"1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General;

"2. Decides, in the light of the report and the documents attached thereto, to discontinue further efforts on the basis of resolution 309 (1972);

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed of any new important developments concerning the question of Namibia."

507. The representative of Zambia, in his capacity as President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, recalled that that Council had always been sceptical about the usefulness of any dialogue with South Africa. At a special session held in Lusaka in June 1973, the Council for Namibia had assessed the situation in the Territory and had issued a declaration reaffirming its decision of March 1973 that the contacts with South Africa must be terminated because they were detrimental to the interests and welfare of the Namibian people and served only to alleviate the pressure put upon South Africa by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The Council for Namibia urged that the Security Council terminate those contacts and endorse some of the recommendations of the Lusaka session by adopting a resolution that would oblige those States giving direct or indirect political, military or economic support to South Africa to discontinue such support immediately, to withdraw all consular offices from Namibia and to terminate the investment of foreign capital and the activities of Western transnational corporations there. He stressed the view of the Council for Namibia that, if necessary, the Security Council should not hesitate to adopt measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to compel the South African Government to withdraw from Namibia.

508. The representative of Kenya said that, despite their doubts as to the legality of such talks, the representatives of the African States and other regions had voted in favour of the Security Council resolutions to continue the contacts with South Africa in the hope that those Western States that had close ties and considerable influence with South Africa would apply

friendly pressure on the Government to begin transferring power in Namibia to the United Nations and thus to end its illegal occupation of the Territory. But the South African régime had not seriously considered ending its illegal rule, and the African and other peace-loving peoples had come to the conclusion that the dialogue between the United Nations and the South African authorities must be ended. His delegation could not accept that the illegal occupier should dictate or determine the timing of the realization of the inalienable right of the Namibians to self-determination. He urged the Security Council to condemn South Africa for its continued occupation of Namibia, its perpetuation of Bantustans and its exploitation of the Territory's resources; to request the permanent members of the Western group in the Council to exercise the utmost influence on South Africa with a view to bringing an immediate end to that occupation; to request those countries that continued to trade with South Africa and exploit the resources of Namibia through licences granted under South African laws to desist from such activities immediately; to request all countries maintaining diplomatic or consular presence in Namibia to remove it immediately; and to terminate the United Nations dialogue with South Africa, since no basis for realizing the desired results existed.

509. The representative of Guinea declared that the report of the Secretary-General clearly showed that South Africa had no intention of complying with the decisions of the United Nations on immediate withdrawal from Namibia nor of abolishing its policies of *apartheid* and Bantustans that were vehemently opposed by the overwhelming majority of the Namibian population. While taking note of the Secretary-General's efforts, her delegation believed that it was time to end the mandate that the Council had given him in resolution 309 (1972). She appealed to all States, particularly those having military and economic ties with South Africa, to extend to South Africa the economic embargo which seemed to have had some effect in Southern Rhodesia, in order to compel its compliance with the pertinent United Nations resolutions.

510. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recalling that his delegation had consistently expressed serious doubts concerning the appropriateness of a dialogue with South Africa, said that it was clear that the dialogue and contacts between the United Nations and the South African racists had proved to be a total failure. Such dialogue was incompatible with the United Nations position on Namibia. It had served only as a cover-up for the racists and had created entirely unfounded illusions among peoples of the world and among Member States. Moreover, it was prejudicial to the interests of the Namibian people. The United Nations, he continued, should try to induce those countries, particularly the Western States, which were co-operating militarily and economically with South Africa, to cease such co-operation immediately. It was the duty of the Security Council to adopt the most effective measures to compel South Africa to comply with United Nations decisions and ensure that the Namibian people exercised their inalienable right to freedom, national independence and territorial integrity.

511. At the 1757th meeting on 11 December, the Council further agreed to a request made by the representatives of Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan in a letter dated 10 December (S/11153) that it extend an invita-

tion under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Mishake Muyongo, Vice-President of SWAPO.

512. The representative of Indonesia said that there was an obvious contradiction between the policies actually practised in Namibia and the explanation of those policies given to the United Nations by the South African Government. It was in that light that one must view South Africa's establishment of an Ovambo "homeland" in Namibia, which threatened to destroy the unity and territorial integrity of the Territory, while the contacts with the Secretary-General were in progress. That Government had violated the guarantees of freedom of speech, assembly and political activity in Namibia, though it had assured the Secretary-General that it recognized and accepted those guarantees. Thus the suggestion by the South African Government that within 10 years the population of Namibia would be ready to exercise its right to self-determination must be viewed with the greatest suspicion. He regretted the establishment in Namibia of the so-called Advisory Council, which could not truly represent the wishes of the majority. In the circumstances, a continuation of the dialogue between the Secretary-General and the South African Government would only strengthen South Africa's rule in Namibia and give the impression to the world of legitimatizing its illegal occupation of the Territory.

513. The representative of Yugoslavia regretted that South Africa had used the contacts and dialogue established under Security Council resolution 309 (1972) as an opportunity to buy time and, with the help of the tolerant attitude and frequently the direct support of some Western countries, to consolidate further its reactionary rule over the people of Namibia. In the light of the Secretary-General's report, his delegation was convinced that South Africa had not approached the contacts in good faith, and as there was no justification at all for the continuation of those contacts, they should be discontinued. The contacts had made it crystal clear to all that it was not possible to settle matters with the racists in Pretoria in a peaceful way. The only remaining recourse in such a situation was to intensify the struggle, including the armed struggle that the people of Namibia were waging under the courageous leadership of SWAPO.

514. The representative of Australia said that his delegation shared the general disappointment over South Africa's equivocal response to the Secretary-General's requests for clarification of its intentions. He emphasized that, for his delegation, the question was not simply one of the usefulness of the current dialogue but rather whether or not the Security Council should retain some degree of flexibility against the possibility of future change in circumstances and attitudes. It was in the light of such circumstances, he explained, that his delegation found itself able to support the draft resolution introduced by the representative of Peru.

515. The representative of Niger, speaking as Chairman of the African group of States, said that there was nothing in the Secretary-General's report to indicate that South Africa was prepared to comply with United Nations decisions concerning Namibia, to accept the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 1971 or to carry out the transfer of power to the United Nations Council for Namibia, as called for in General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V). The activities of South Africa in Namibia made its position clear, because in addition to the intensification of its "homelands" policy, aimed at dividing the Territory and ulti-

mately annexing it, arrests, detentions and torture had increased in Namibia. In requesting the Security Council to put an end to the Secretary-General's contacts with South Africa and to take steps pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to compel the South African Government to cease its illegal occupation of Namibia, the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity wished to express their support for the United Nations Council for Namibia in its efforts to discharge the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly.

516. The representative of India asserted that the Secretary-General's report had completely demolished the theory that by removing or reducing South Africa's isolation, the United Nations could make it behave in a decent or civilized manner. South Africa had systematically taken actions to frustrate the Secretary-General's mission. The results of the so-called elections in Namibia were a clear defeat for the South African Government, which had initiated a policy of terror. In the circumstances, there was no doubt that any meaningful talk with its representatives was impossible. Nevertheless, he considered that it would be useful if the Secretary-General was requested to watch the situation and report to the Council as circumstances warranted.

517. The representative of Panama stated that the Secretary-General's report showed that the South African Government's position was quite different from the one indicated in United Nations resolutions concerning Namibia. He said that, although unsuccessful, the efforts of the Secretary-General in the fulfilment of his mandate deserved the appreciation of the Security Council.

518. The representative of the Sudan said that the problem of Namibia was a challenge to the authority of the Security Council as well as to that of other United Nations organs. For the two years during which the dialogue had been pursued, South Africa had consolidated its *apartheid* policy in Namibia and illegally granted foreign concessions. He urged that the Security Council should take a very serious view of the situation and should, first, determine that the continued presence of the South African administration in Namibia constituted an act of aggression and therefore a threat to international peace and security, and, secondly, adopt appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to secure the compliance of the South African Government.

519. At the 1758th meeting on 11 December, the representative of Nigeria said that South Africa was able to persevere in its policy in Namibia only because of the support of certain Western States. He urged the Security Council to terminate the Secretary-General's contacts with the South African Government and to take all appropriate measures to prevent South Africa's further use of Namibian territory for aggressive purposes. The Secretary-General should be asked to collect and distribute data on South Africa's plundering of Namibian resources and the role of some Member States in encouraging South Africa's persistence in its policies. Finally, he urged that the Security Council invite the Secretary-General to keep in constant touch with the Governments of those Member States still maintaining diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa with a view to the immediate suspension of those relations.

520. In accordance with the decision taken at the 1757th meeting, the Council heard a statement by

Mr. Muyongo, who stated that the racist South African régime had used its contacts with the Secretary-General to deceive the United Nations and consolidate its illegal occupation of Namibia. Moreover, the situation had deteriorated markedly since the inception of the contacts. Contrary to the undertakings made to the Secretary-General, South Africa did not allow freedom of movement and political activity in Namibia. He said that SWAPO was convinced that all reasonable resolutions had already been adopted by both the Security Council and the General Assembly; what was now necessary was for those decisions to be vigorously implemented. He declared that Namibians, for their part, would continue the struggle until final victory was achieved.

521. The representative of Saudi Arabia recalled that over the past half century all the mandated Territories created by the Allied Powers had been liberated, with the exception of Namibia. If South Africa persisted in maintaining its rule over Namibia for economic or strategic reasons, or to preserve certain vested interests, then economic safeguards, political guarantees or a system of reparations after independence might possibly be devised. South Africa might be prevailed upon to accept two or three neutral co-administrators to accelerate the process of achieving independence for Namibia, and the Trusteeship Council should be informed, through the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, of the progress towards independence that would have to be achieved in Namibia within a period of not more than three or four years.

522. The representative of Austria outlined briefly the position of principle of his Government on this issue.

523. Although the contacts had not yielded the desired results, they had served to provide a further clarification of the Namibian question and of various aspects of the problem. While South Africa had recognized that South West Africa had a separate international status, it had failed to make any reference to the independence of Namibia, even after the overly long period of time the Government of South Africa seemed to need to ascertain the wishes of the people of Namibia. The overriding consideration of all efforts of the Security Council must be the well-being of the Namibian people as a whole. It was in this spirit that his delegation would support the Peruvian draft resolution and would interpret it as keeping the way open for the initiation of a new, more positive phase in the efforts of the United Nations to realize the objectives it had established with regard to the future of Namibia.

524. The representative of the United States of America stated that, on balance, the Secretary-General's efforts vis-à-vis the South African Government had been beneficial to United Nations involvement in the Namibian question. Nevertheless, some of South Africa's actions conflicted sharply with the tenor of that Government's statements to the Secretary-General. He cautioned against any expectation of rapid progress on the issue of self-determination for Namibia. Protracted discussion would be required, but only negotiation held out the promise of ultimate success. In his view, the responses given to the Secretary-General by the South African Government represented important departures from previous South African policy, and signalled openings, admittedly narrow but worth further exploration.

525. The President, speaking as the representative of China, recalled that his delegation had consistently

refrained from participating in the voting on the Security Council resolutions in connexion with the initiation of dialogue and contacts between the Secretary-General and the South African Government because it considered that the conduct of a so-called "dialogue" with the South African authorities before they had indicated readiness to accept United Nations resolutions on Namibia would be of no help to the Namibian people in their struggle for national independence, but would only be utilized by them to create confusion and actively pursue their policy of "Bantustan" in an effort to legalize their unlawful presence in Namibia. His Government maintained that the correct position previously adopted by the United Nations on the Namibian question must be adhered to, namely, the South African colonialist authorities must immediately end their illegal occupation of Namibia, withdraw their military and police forces and their administration and let the United Nations Council for Namibia take over so that Namibia would achieve its independence at an early date. The heroic Namibian people were fighting for that lofty goal, and all countries and people upholding justice should give firm support to their just struggle. While his delegation would support the revised draft resolution submitted by Peru, operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution should in no circumstances be so construed as to make it possible to resume the dialogue between the Secretary-General and the South African authorities before the adoption of a new resolution to that effect by the Security Council.

Decision: At the 1758th meeting, on 11 December 1973, the revised draft resolution submitted by Peru (S/11152/Rev.1) was adopted unanimously as resolution 342 (1973).

526. Speaking in explanation of vote, the representative of France expressed his Government's disappointment on reading the report of the Secretary-General on the mandate entrusted to him. In spite of some very minor concessions which were the first the South African Government had been willing to grant in the matter and which meant that the contacts had not been entirely useless, South Africa had not provided the complete and unequivocal clarifications desired by the Council regarding self-determination and independence for the Territory. Moreover, it pursued the policy known as "separate homelands" and was not putting into practice the declared intentions with regard to political liberties. It was now for the South African Government to adopt positive measures which, by making it possible for the Secretary-General to prepare a new report for the Security Council, would break the present deadlock on the Namibian question. That, he stated, was his delegation's interpretation of operative paragraph 3 of the resolution just adopted.

527. The representative of Kenya informed the Council that a second draft resolution was being prepared that would be formally introduced as soon as the necessary consultations had been concluded.

C. Subsequent communications

528. By a letter dated 1 February 1974 (S/11210), the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of resolution 3111 (XXVIII) concerning the question of Namibia, adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1973, and drew attention to paragraph 8, which invited the Security Council to consider taking effective measures, in accordance with the relevant Chapters of the Charter

of the United Nations, to put an end to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia.

529. By a letter dated 8 February (S/11228), the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia transmitted the text of a statement adopted by the Council on 7 February expressing its grave concern about recent developments in Namibia and its strong condemnation of the intensification of mass repression, arrests, trials and other acts of intimidation by the South African régime against the Namibian people and their leaders designed to suppress their struggle for freedom and independence.

530. By a letter dated 11 April (S/11260), the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation

with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitted the text of a consensus concerning the question of Namibia, adopted by the Special Committee on 8 April. In paragraph 3, the Special Committee declared that it considered that recent mass arrests, the detention and trial of political leaders and restrictions on freedom of the press constituted a grave escalation of repression by the South African authorities, seriously endangering peace and security in the region, and expressed the hope that the Security Council would urgently consider taking effective measures to secure South Africa's compliance with its resolution calling for immediate withdrawal from Namibia.

Chapter 4

THE CYPRUS QUESTION

A. Communications and reports to the Security Council received between 16 June and 14 December 1973

531. In the period between 16 June and 14 December 1973, a number of communications were addressed to the Secretary-General by the representatives of Cyprus and Turkey regarding certain aspects of the Cyprus question.

532. In letters dated 20 July (S/10973), 3 October (S/11008) and 13 November (S/11115), the representative of Turkey transmitted communications from the Vice-President of Cyprus, Mr. Rauf R. Denktash, concerning the statement made by the representative of Cyprus in the Security Council with regard to the basis on which the intercommunal talks in Cyprus were being conducted. In those communications, the Vice-President stated that there was no agreed concept of a unitary State and stressed that an agreed solution should be based on partnership between the two communities that would protect the autonomous rights of the Turkish community. He also outlined the Turkish community's view on the matters of deconfrontation, freedom of movement and normalization and protested that views expressed by the President of Cyprus tended to prolong the situation indefinitely.

533. In replies dated 17 August (S/10988) and 2 November (S/11071), the representative of Cyprus maintained the position that the concept of a unitary State was the agreed basis of the intercommunal talks. The definition of that concept was a matter for juridical interpretation. Cyprus hoped that the Turkish Cypriot leadership would realize that the solution of the problem did not lie in the pursuit of separatism and division but in fostering a spirit of co-operation and unity. He also outlined the measures taken by his Government in the matter of deconfrontation, freedom of movement and normalization.

534. On 20 July, the Secretary-General issued a further appeal (S/10978) to States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies for voluntary contributions for the financing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for the period from 16 June to 15 December 1973.

535. On 1 December, the Secretary-General submitted his twenty-fourth report (S/11137) on the

United Nations operation in Cyprus, covering developments from 1 June to 1 December 1973. Assessing the events of the previous six months, the Secretary-General said that, although the intercommunal talks had proceeded since 1972 in a constructive spirit only limited progress had been made on the basic issues. The outstanding differences were on the scope of local autonomy and the degree of State supervision over the activities of local government bodies; as well as on the concept of an "independent sovereign and unitary State with the adequate participation of the communities" as a basis for an agreed solution, which had previously seemed generally acceptable. Moreover, certain external political developments had made it difficult for the parties concerned to agree to the necessary mutual adjustments in their positions. However, he continued to believe that with concessions on both sides, an agreed accommodation could be worked out within the framework of the talks.

536. The Secretary-General also noted that, despite persistent efforts, the problem of military confrontation remained unchanged, though progress in deconfrontation could reduce the tension between the two communities. On the other hand, he had been encouraged by the helpful response received from both communities when it had become necessary to dispatch the bulk of four UNFICYP contingents to the Middle East. During the period when the Force was under-strength, the two communities, acting in concert with his request, were able to maintain calm and practically no incidents had occurred. He outlined his plan for reducing the size of the Force and said that after consultation with the interested parties and upon the recommendation of the Force Commander, a two-phase arrangement had been worked out. Under the first phase, a reduction of 439 personnel had already been carried out. The second phase would result in a further reduction of 383 personnel. As a result of the first and second phase a 26 per cent over-all reduction of the strength of the Force would be achieved that would bring about savings of \$1.52 million for each six-month period. The Secretary-General stressed, however, that implementation of the second phase was dependent upon the close co-operation of all parties concerned with UNFICYP in its role of preventing a recurrence of fighting. The Secretary-General stated that, in the pre-

vailing circumstances, he considered it essential that the Force be maintained for a further limited period and recommended extension of its mandate until 15 June 1974.

B. Consideration at the 1759th meeting (14 December 1973)

537. At the 1759th meeting on 14 December, the report of the Secretary-General (S/11137) was included in the agenda. The representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

538. The President of the Council announced that as a result of prior consultations, agreement had been reached on the text of the following draft resolution (S/11154):

"The Security Council,

"Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 1 December 1973 (S/11137) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

"Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 December 1973,

"Noting also from the report the condition prevailing in the island,

"1. Reaffirms its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June and 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968, 266 (1969) of 10 June and 274 (1969) of 11 December 1969, 281 (1970) of 9 June and 291 (1970) of 10 December 1970, 293 (1971) of 26 May and 305 (1971) of 13 December 1971 and 315 (1972) of 15 June and 324 (1972) of 12 December 1972 and 334 (1973) of 15 June 1973, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting on 25 November 1967;

"2. Urges the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;

"3. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 June 1974, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force."

Decision: *At the 1759th meeting, on 14 December 1973, the Security Council adopted the draft resolution (S/11154) by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (China), as resolution 343 (1973).*

539. In a statement after the voting, the representative of Cyprus said that the situation had not changed since the preceding June. The only new element was the reduction of UNFICYP. He stressed that his Government was ready to co-operate with any decision of the Secretary-General regarding the strength of the Force, but it would not consent to any change in the mandate of UNFICYP or to any action in disregard of the sovereign rights of Cyprus. It felt that military deconfrontation was the first element required for the reduction of the Force and hoped for a more reasonable approach to that problem by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, as well as to the problems of normalization and freedom of movement, on which there had been no progress. He added that the intercommunal talks had run into difficulty over the extent of local government within the framework of a unitary State. To go beyond the generally accepted definition of local government would disrupt the cohesion of the State by creating a State within a State. The impasse in the talks could only be overcome by growing co-operation between the parties. His Government hoped that by the next meeting of the Council there would be more progress towards a solution.

540. The representative of Turkey said that the Turkish community in Cyprus was willing to make certain concessions in respect of its rights in return for local autonomy, provided the system of the bi-communal State was preserved. Turkey was apprehensive about the clandestine importation of arms by some Greek Cypriot elements, which might ultimately be used against the Turkish Cypriots. Regarding the proposed second phase of reduction of UNFICYP, he said that the circumstances in Cyprus were not opportune. The security of the Turkish community remained the predominant consideration; but if that could be preserved, Turkey was ready to assist in that endeavour. On the question of the unitary State, he stressed that Cyprus had come into being as a bi-communal State and would remain so, for that was the wish of one of its communities.

541. The representative of Greece said that the fact that the reduction of UNFICYP had been accomplished without any objection by those concerned was evidence that the situation in Cyprus had improved. Greece felt that both parties in the intercommunal talks should take further steps towards accommodation by displaying mutual goodwill and understanding and that the talks were the best procedure for arriving at a viable solution. In connexion with the reduction of the Force, he pledged his Government's determination to ensure that intercommunal incidents were prevented and to continue its financial contributions, although his delegation was disappointed that so few Members were contributing under the current system of voluntary financing and would favour review of that system.

542. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation had voted for the resolution because it considered that the Force had continued to play a constructive role and its presence was still necessary for the promotion of peaceful conditions.

543. The representative of Indonesia said that although some positive developments had occurred during the past period, the over-all situation still required the presence of the Force. His delegation, however, was disturbed that the situation persisted so long and hoped that the parties would increase their

efforts to find a suitable solution, so that the mandate of UNFICYP might come to a positive end. Indonesia was also concerned that the controversy surrounding the concept of an independent, sovereign and unitary state had prevented the parties from reaching an agreement on the constitutional framework that would provide for the adequate participation of the two communities in the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

544. The representative of Australia welcomed the first phase of reduction of the Force and supported the proposals of the Secretary-General concerning the second phase. Regarding the domestic situation, he regretted that there had been little progress towards military deconfrontation. His delegation was also disturbed by the news of illegal importation of arms and the recurrence of serious incidents. In the circumstances, his Government considered that the forum of the intercommunal talks represented the best means for reaching an accommodation between the two parties.

545. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland said that there remained a requirement for UNFICYP to maintain a close watch on developments in the island, to help prevent confrontations and to promote harmony. His Government looked to those concerned to facilitate the efforts made by the United Nations to end military confrontation. It likewise hoped that the remaining problems in the intercommunal talks would be overcome. The United Kingdom had welcomed the Secretary-General's plan to achieve economies in UNFICYP and thought a further modest reduction necessary, provided the situation did not deteriorate. His Government hoped a reduction to a total of about 2,300 would be made at the earliest appropriate opportunity. The United Kingdom, which continued to advocate strict budgetary control, would maintain its troop contingent and logistic support for UNFICYP.

546. The representative of the Sudan regretted that there had been no progress towards a return to normal conditions and considered that, in the circumstances, the talks remained the best hope for reaching an understanding between the parties. His delegation felt that the reduction of the Force had generated a sense of responsibility in the parties concerned and hoped that the positive trend would be further strengthened.

547. The representative of Panama said that the solution of the Cyprus problem lay in the consolidation of a united and indivisible nation, where the rights of minorities were guaranteed. Panama hoped that all inhabitants of Cyprus would be able to live in peace and harmony.

548. The representative of Guinea considered that the presence of the Force was still necessary to maintain peace; however, Guinea regretted that the two parties had not been able to move ahead and that their positions remained deadlocked on the constitutional issues. Her delegation approved the reduction of the Force and was convinced that it would not be detrimental to the effectiveness of UNFICYP.

549. The representative of France said that the reduction of UNFICYP envisaged in phase one had taken place without incident. That, in itself, was proof of the sense of responsibility displayed by the two parties. Moreover, incidents had been avoided while the Force was temporarily depleted because of urgent needs in the Middle East. He noted that the second phase also contemplated a structural reorganization of the Force.

There were certain risks in phase two, but on the basis of the experience of recent weeks, his delegation expected the operation to proceed smoothly. As for the intercommunal talks, his delegation realized that the stakes were too high for the parties to accept uncertain compromises, but the *status quo* was not the lesser evil. He stressed that the talks had had the support of the Council since their start, and the Council, therefore, could not be complacent over the threat that they might be broken off. It was its duty to warn both sides against the long-range effects of excessive procrastination.

550. The representative of Austria said that his country was committed to bringing about a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem. Austria considered that the talks held the best prospect for achieving a settlement acceptable to both communities, but it was disappointed at the slow progress that cast doubt over their ultimate success. Referring to the second phase of the reduction of the Force, he said that the plan would not only be significant in terms of savings in manpower and finances but could have impact on the *modus operandi* of the Force. It was therefore necessary to take a cautious approach, but if the necessary prerequisites were attained, implementation could lead to further military deconfrontation.

551. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation had voted for the resolution in the hope that normalization would soon come about through the assistance of UNFICYP, which remained an element of stability in the sensitive area of Cyprus. He noted that the excellent performance of the Force in serving as a crucial help to UNEF indicated that a reduction of its strength in Cyprus was eminently possible. Yugoslavia hoped that the two communities would find a way of living in a sovereign and united State, enjoying equal rights, because the current state of affairs, if allowed to persist, could entrench a *de facto* separation.

552. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reaffirmed the principal position of his Government that the problem should be settled by peaceful means by the Cypriots themselves. That settlement, moreover, should be based on respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The USSR rejected any outside interference and any attempts to infringe on Cypriot sovereignty and advocated the withdrawal of all foreign troops and military bases from its territory. Regarding the Secretary-General's proposal for the reduction of UNFICYP, he said that the USSR supported the idea in principle but stressed that the agreement of the Government of Cyprus would be an essential condition for undertaking such measures. In any case, implementation of the plan should be carried out without detriment to either community. In conclusion, he pointed out that his delegation had cast its vote in favour of the resolution on the assumption that the extension of the mandate would be carried out in compliance with resolution 186 (1964) and the subsequent decisions of the Council, maintaining the function of the troops and the voluntary system of financing.

553. The representative of the United States of America said that his delegation was in favour of the Secretary-General's plan to reduce United Nations financial and manpower commitment. The first results were already achieving needed economies and adapting the United Nations presence to current realities. Al-

though the second phase involved more difficult steps, such as restructuring the Force, the United States held that the Force's main function was conciliation and persuasion, which might be achieved with substantially fewer personnel. His delegation urged the Secretary-General to examine all opportunities for further reductions in 1974. With respect to the situation in Cyprus, he said that the United States was encouraged about the future, for although there had not been any breakthrough, the negotiations continued, the military situation remained calm and the neighbouring Powers had taken responsible attitudes. Regarding the financial situation, he urged once again that Member States co-operate in efforts to put UNFICYP on a sound financial basis.

554. The representative of India said that he was encouraged that the recent reduction in UNFICYP had not affected in any way the domestic situation in Cyprus. Although progress in the political field had not been rapid, India was hopeful that the parties would reach agreement on the basis of the principles accepted since 1964. India supported a non-aligned, independent Cyprus and rejected any suggestion regarding a partition of the country.

555. The representative of Peru said that Cyprus, Greece and Turkey shared the desire to arrive at a solution that would ensure peace and security. Peru held that such goals called for the presence of UNFICYP, although reduced in size. There was a good prospect that fears and suspicion between the two sides were diminishing.

556. The Secretary-General said that in the light of statements made by the members of the Council, he would proceed with consultations on the implementation of phase two of the reduction plan.

557. The representative of Cyprus, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, stressed that the basis of the talks had always been a unitary State and that any deviation from that premise would undermine the foundation of the negotiations. The Turkish minority would be accorded the maximum rights to which it was entitled within a unitary State, inasmuch as circumstances did not allow federation.

558. The representative of Turkey, also exercising his right of reply, said that the Turkish community and the Turkish Government, contrary to the allegations, did not seek partition of Cyprus but claimed recognition of the rights to which that community was entitled in the exercise of its right to self-determination as one of the founding communities of independent Cyprus as a bi-communal State.

C. Communications and reports to the Security Council received between 14 December 1973 and 15 June 1974

559. On 28 February 1974, the Secretary-General issued an appeal (S/11206) to Member States of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies for voluntary contributions for the financing of UNFICYP for a further period ending 15 June 1974.

560. On 22 May, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his twenty-fifth report (S/11294) on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period from 2 December 1973 to 22 May 1974.

In his report he said that more than 10 years had passed since the establishment of UNFICYP and that thanks to its presence the situation in Cyprus had remained quiet, but the basic objectives of the operation had yet to be achieved. He noted that he had been concerned by the interruption of the intercommunal talks on 2 April, as he considered them to be the best means for carrying out the search for an agreed settlement. The suspension of the talks had arisen owing to the different conceptions of the basis on which they had been conducted since June 1968 and reactivated in June 1972. The Government of Cyprus, with the support of the Government of Greece, maintained that they had been conducted on the basis of a solution to be sought within the framework of an independent, sovereign and unitary State, whereas the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the Turkish Government held the view that a unitary State had never been the agreed basis of the talks and the Turkish Prime Minister had suggested that in the talks, the parties should seek a solution within the framework of an independent and federal State. After the interruption of the talks, steps had been taken by the Secretary-General which had led to an agreement between the parties to resume the talks at the beginning of June on the same basis as that on which they had been conducted until 2 April 1974. However, the Secretary-General underlined that the road ahead would not be an easy one since the relations between the two communities were still marred by mutual fear and distrust. The Secretary-General added that the enhanced combat effectiveness of the armed forces of both sides was a disturbing development, as it tended to increase military pressures in areas of confrontation. Recent reports of the introduction of additional weapons into the island was a further cause for concern to UNFICYP, and he hoped that the parties would again co-operate in placing the imported weapons and equipment under UNFICYP surveillance or control.

561. The Secretary-General reported that the second phase of the proposed reduction of the Force had been carried out with the co-operation of the troop-contributing countries as well as of the parties concerned, who had agreed to share with UNFICYP the responsibility of carrying out the Council's mandate. That reduction had entailed a restructuring of the Force into a mixed operation comprising both static manned posts and mobile teams. The total strength of the Force had been reduced to 2,341. He hoped that both sides would exercise the utmost restraint and avoid any action that might alter the military *status quo*. Turning to the financial situation, he said that the reduction of UNFICYP had somewhat alleviated, but not solved, its financial problem. Some Member States, including the largest financial contributor, favoured further reduction of the Force but, after assessing all the factors involved, he felt it would be premature at that stage to make further reductions, as the situation in Cyprus was still tense and potentially dangerous. Noting that the parties concerned had expressed reservations about even the current reductions, he said that it would be wise to allow more time for an assessment of the effects of the reductions already made before taking further steps. In view of the prevailing situation, the Secretary-General recommended, with the concurrence of the Governments concerned, that the Council extend the mandate of UNFICYP until 15 December 1974.

D. Consideration at the 1771st and 1772nd meetings (29 May 1974)

562. At the 1771st meeting on 29 May, the report of the Secretary-General (S/11294) was included in the agenda. The representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

563. The President of the Council announced that, as a result of prior consultations, agreement had been reached on the text of the following draft resolution (S/11301):

"The Security Council,

"Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 22 May 1974 (S/11294) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

"Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 June 1974,

"Noting also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

"Reaffirms its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June and 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968, 266 (1969) of 10 June and 274 (1969) of 11 December 1969, 281 (1970) of 9 June and 291 (1970) of 10 December 1970, 293 (1971) of 26 May and 305 (1971) of 13 December 1971, 315 (1972) of 15 June and 324 (1972) of 12 December 1972 and 334 (1973) of 15 June and 343 (1973) of 14 December 1973, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting on 25 November 1967;

"2. Urges the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;

"3. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1974, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force."

Decision: *At the 1771st meeting on 29 May 1974, the Security Council adopted the draft resolution (S/11301) by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (China), as resolution 349 (1974).*

564. Following the voting, the representative of Cyprus said that, while for 10 years UNFICYP had been effectively performing its peace-keeping mandate, there had been a lack of progress in areas of military

deconfrontation, normalization and freedom of movement. His Government had always been ready to accept general or partial deconfrontation as proposed by UNFICYP. Regrettably the Turkish Cypriot leadership had not complied with repeated appeals for a measure of deconfrontation. He hoped that UNFICYP would continue its efforts towards reducing the confrontation. Regarding freedom of movement, he said that his Government had unilaterally lifted all restrictions in 1968, in the expectation of a reasonable response from the other side, but that the Turkish Cypriots had again chosen the pattern of non-co-operation. The same negative attitude was also reflected in the economic field. Furthermore, he stated, the Turkish Cypriot leadership had resisted all measures for economic co-operation, advocating instead separatism and segregation in all aspects of life for their community. Turning to the question of the intercommunal talks, he said that they had been started in 1968 on the agreed basis of an independent, sovereign and unitary State. That consensus had been recorded by the Secretary-General in his report of 2 December 1970. When the talks had run into difficulties over the structure and functions of local government, they had been reactivated by the Secretary-General's aides-mémoires of 18 October 1971 and 18 May 1972, still based on the concept of an independent and unitary State. The talks had been interrupted when the Prime Minister of Turkey injected the concept of a federal State for Cyprus. That concept was rejected outright by the Government of Cyprus, since a federal structure was not applicable in Cyprus, as there was no pattern of territorial separation on which to base a federal structure. Only on the basis of a unitary State could a solution be found. Through the efforts of the Secretary-General and his assistants an agreed formula had been found for the resumption of the talks on 4 June. Cyprus hoped that the agreed formula would create a new co-operative spirit so that positive results might be achieved towards a just solution in the interest of all concerned.

565. The representative of Turkey said that his Government maintained its reservations regarding the further reduction of UNFICYP, since it considered that the strength of the Force had already been reduced to its minimum level of effectiveness. He said that disturbances within the Greek community mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General had been directed towards the goal of realizing *enosis*, and that the Greek community was engaged in extensive arguments over how, when and by whom *enosis* should be achieved. He considered that under the guise of the concept of a "unitary State", the Greek Cypriot administration was pursuing an approach to *enosis* that required first the abolition of the bi-communal state structure. The report mentioned the influx of new arms, which had caused deep concern to his Government and to the Turkish community, which was reluctant to reduce its military precautions. On the question of the return to normal conditions, he said that the problem of displaced persons required a practical solution, but that the other side continued to reject the Turkish proposal to set up a joint committee under United Nations chairmanship to arrange the rehabilitation of the Turkish Cypriot refugees. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot side was still impeding the return of refugees to their villages. He said that in 1968 the Turkish community had started the intercommunal talks without any precondition and thus had never accepted a

unitary State as a framework for discussions. The 1960 Constitution had established a bi-communal State based on the equal partnership of the two communities. When the talks had been reactivated on the basis of the Secretary-General's aides-mémoires of 18 October 1971 and 18 May 1972, there had been no mention of a unitary State as a basis for negotiations. The talks had proceeded without any preconditions and had been exploratory in their nature. The new Turkish Government favoured an independent, sovereign and federative system for Cyprus, but it did not intend to create a geographic basis for it, nor did it envisage a population exchange between various areas of Cyprus. On the eve of the resumption of talks, Turkey wanted to stress that it had never had any *arrière-pensée* with regard to partition of the island.

566. The representative of Greece said that at the time when it appeared that a solution of the Cyprus problem was not far away, an official statement advocating a federal solution had been made by a high-ranking personality whose influence on the Turkish Cypriots could not be questioned. That development had led to the suspension of the talks. In his delegation's opinion, the concept of an independent, sovereign and unitary State had been from the outset the basic principle of the talks. Thanks to the efforts of the Secretary-General and his associates, a formula had been reached for resumption of the talks, and his Government hoped that a solution would be found by the interested parties within the framework of the Charter and in accordance with Council resolutions 186 (1964) and 244 (1967). Regarding the reduction of UNFICYP, he said that although Greece was aware why some Member States desired further reductions, it nevertheless agreed with the Secretary-General that they would be premature at that time. Greece felt that in order to alleviate the financial situation of the Force a new effort should be made to persuade more Member States to contribute to the budget of UNFICYP.

567. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had voted for the resolution because it considered that the presence of UNFICYP was still needed. Accordingly, his Government would maintain its troop contingent and continue its logistic support for UNFICYP. The United Kingdom supported the Secretary-General's decision regarding troops reductions, but the need for further economies remained. It was essential that there should be stringent control over expenditures. He hoped the Secretary-General would make his views on possible further Force reductions known well before the expiration of its mandate. The total value of the British contribution was now something in excess of £5 million per annum. Regarding the substance of the Cyprus problem, he said that a return to normal conditions was long overdue. The fault for current conditions could not be laid at the door of those who were conducting the United Nations operation. The efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff regarding promotion of a peaceful settlement, and especially their role in achieving agreement on the resumption of the talks, had been of great value. Now it was up to the parties concerned to achieve an acceptable settlement. It would be unfortunate if the continued presence of the Force should in any way lessen the sense of urgency with which the talks were to be approached. His Government looked to the parties to make the mutual concessions required to reach a settlement.

568. The representative of Costa Rica said that his delegation was concerned that, after 10 years of UNFICYP presence, an agreement among the parties was still not possible. However, Costa Rica shared the Secretary-General's hope that the renewal of talks would bring about a lasting settlement if both parties showed good faith.

569. The representative of Indonesia said that, by voting for the resolution, his delegation wanted to stress that it was important for the parties to increase their efforts to achieve a final settlement. He welcomed the reduction of UNFICYP and was pleased that the parties had concurred, but he was concerned that no progress had been made in securing military deconfrontation. Apparently neither side was prepared to reduce its military strength because of mutual fear. There had also been no progress regarding development of economic relations between the two communities. Such attitudes hindered the efforts to establish the institutional framework required if both sides were to live in peace. Indonesia hoped that the resumed talks would produce a constitutional structure that would satisfy the needs of all Cypriots.

570. The representative of the USSR recalled that his Foreign Minister had stated on 7 May 1974 in Nicosia that the Soviet Union continued to pursue a policy designed to strengthen the national independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. He stressed that the solution of the domestic problems of Cyprus was the business of the Cypriots themselves. The Soviet Union had always opposed attempts to settle the problem by means of external intervention and favoured the elimination of foreign bases. The USSR considered the intercommunal talks an important means of overcoming the current difficulties and hoped that the agreement on their resumption would speed up the negotiations. Regarding the reduction of the Force, he said that the USSR found the Secretary-General's position justified regarding the need for careful weighing of the consequences of further reductions. He reaffirmed that his delegation had voted in favour of the resolution on the understanding that the extension of the mandate of the Force was in full compliance with the provisions of original resolution 186 (1964) of the Security Council and the Council's subsequent decisions, provided the functions of the Force remained the same and it continued to be financed on a voluntary basis.

571. The representative of Austria said that there was no doubt that the Force had rendered a valuable service to Cyprus in maintaining peace and providing for the past several years the calm necessary for promoting a political solution. The Austrian Government regretted that little progress had been made in the field of normalization, especially with respect to deconfrontation, and was relieved that the intercommunal talks would shortly resume. The Government was pleased with the success of the first two phases of the reduction of the Force, but it endorsed the Secretary-General's opinion advocating a cautious approach to further reductions. Nevertheless his delegation felt that the momentum gained in reducing and restructuring the Force should not be lost and that the matter should therefore be kept under review.

572. At the 1772nd meeting on the same day, the representative of Australia said that his delegation was concerned by the interruption of the intercommunal talks, as it considered them to be the best vehicle for

the attainment of a final settlement. It had therefore been glad to learn that an agreement had been reached to resume the talks in June. He urged the parties to exercise patience and mutual accommodation in order to make genuine progress. He hoped that both sides would be able to build on the progress that had resulted from the previous discussions. Australia was pleased with the results of the reductions in the level of the Force; although it felt that the grounds for further reductions might be established in due course, it shared the Secretary-General's opinion that for the time being a further decrease in the strength of the Force would be premature since the situation on the island remained tense. Turning to the normalization process, he expressed regret that there had been little progress in deconfrontation, economic co-operation or the extension of public services. Mutual fear and distrust were still a major obstacle to better relations. Through the exercise of its good offices, UNFICYP could foster greater co-operation between the two communities in order to help them to dissipate the atmosphere of suspicion. While the financial situation had shown some improvement, the Secretary-General's appeal for voluntary contributions had not produced satisfactory results. Australia hoped the Secretary-General would continue his efforts to reduce the deficit of the Force and at the same time look for all possible economies.

573. The representative of France said that his delegation had voted for the resolution with a certain concern. The dispatch of a peace-keeping force was one of the means by which the Council could discharge its duty but, after 10 years in Cyprus, the circumstances which had been invoked for the establishment of UNFICYP were still being put forth to justify its continued maintenance. In such conditions his delegation felt that the Council, while taking note of the positive performance of the Force, might have the duty to question the operation. It seemed that the Council had neglected to draw the appropriate conclusion from a situation that was no longer marked by open confrontation. In that connexion he noted that his Government had supported the reduction of the Force and considered that a new evaluation of its mission should continue. France hoped that, upon the resumption of the talks, the parties concerned would not take refuge in the *status quo*, which was causing a further polarization of the intercommunal life of Cyprus.

574. The representative of the United States said that his delegation was gratified that both sides had agreed to resume the negotiations and to continue the search for a peaceful solution. He reaffirmed his delegation's support for those talks as the best means of achieving a just solution, based on the concept of a single and independent Cyprus, with appropriate guarantees for the safety and well-being of all its people. His delegation was pleased with the completion of the second phase of the reduction of the Force. Based on the events of the past six months, it considered that UNFICYP could efficiently carry out its mandate as a mediator/observer Force with substantially fewer personnel. Such a measure would have a beneficial impact on alleviating the financial difficulties of the Force. For those reasons, the United States supported further reductions in the UNFICYP force level although it understood the reluctance of some troop contributors and others to support such additional reductions. However, it trusted that as the intercom-

munal talks resumed their course, the necessity for further cuts would be accorded serious consideration.

575. The representative of the United Republic of Cameroon expressed his delegation's regret that the parties had not made efforts to achieve a relaxation of the military and political situation. A military confrontation was still possible, as both communities were reinforcing their military equipment and living in an atmosphere of fear and suspicion. Cameroon was concerned lest such a situation might be prolonged indefinitely and require the continued presence of the Force. It was true that major obstacles were still standing in the way and that it was difficult for the parties to overcome them, but his delegation hoped that both sides would make further efforts to arrive at an agreement on a constitutional structure for the State. He announced that his Government had decided to make a voluntary contribution of 500,000 francs CFA to the special fund for UNFICYP.

576. The representative of Mauritania said that tension and mistrust between the two communities seemed to be the main characteristics of the situation, and there had been no progress towards a final solution. Mauritania was convinced that the presence of UNFICYP was the determining factor not only in maintaining peace but also in seeking a solution that would take into account the legitimate interests of the parties concerned. It was for that reason that Mauritania had voted for the resolution extending the mandate of the Force, but it was obvious that the renewal of the mandate was not an end in itself, as efforts by the Secretary-General and his staff could not succeed unless they were matched by those of the parties.

577. The representative of Iraq expressed regret that little progress had been made in resolving the basic issues. He therefore hoped that the intercommunal talks would be pursued in earnest and would not be bogged down by semantic hurdles. He appealed to the parties to banish suspicion and mistrust so that an agreement on constitutional arrangements satisfactory to all concerned could be reached.

578. The representative of Peru said that his delegation considered that the presence of UNFICYP was required to maintain peace. It trusted that, as a result of the resumed talks, the agreement so long desired by all would be arrived at.

579. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR said that UNFICYP had continued to play an important role in the establishment of peace and the return to normal conditions. His delegation believed that the problem should be settled by peaceful means, above all by the Cypriots themselves. That settlement should be based on respect for the freedom, independence and the territorial integrity of Cyprus. It would continue to oppose any attempts to infringe upon the sovereignty of Cyprus. He said that the Byelorussian SSR had voted for resolution 349 (1974) in the belief that it would be carried out in conformity with the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964.

580. The President, speaking as the representative of Kenya, said that it had been 10 years since the establishment of UNFICYP and there was no doubt that the Force had been a stabilizing element in a tense situation. Kenya respected the unity, sovereignty and independence of Cyprus and considered that the rights

and security of all its citizens should be secured. The resumption of the intercommunal talks was a good sign. Kenya hoped that the outstanding problems of the structure and functions of local government bodies would be solved soon through the process of negotiations.

581. The representative of Cyprus, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that before December 1973 the representative of Turkey had never mentioned any objections to the concept of a unitary State. The talks, therefore, would be resumed on the previously agreed basis of a unitary State. Regarding the idea of a federation advanced by the Turkish side, he stressed that it was ruled out by the realities of the situation, as the population of Cyprus was intermingled. The existing Constitution was not a federation; the administration was central and the Turkish community had only communal rights. Turkey had systematically raised the problem of *enosis* in order to confuse the real issue of independence and to find some excuse for its obstruction of any workable solution for an independent State. Turkey's fears of *enosis* were not genuine, but assumed, since it knew that *enosis* was not considered a viable proposition and was not an official policy of either Cyprus or Greece.

582. The representative of Turkey, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the Constitution of Cyprus was based on the concept of equality of the two communities, and consequently had a federalist spirit. The Greek Cypriot concept was of a unitary State in which the majority would make law and dictate it. In such a system, then, nothing would have prevented the majority from opting for union with Greece. However, that would not be possible under a federal system in which the two communities had equal rights regarding any decision on the indepen-

dence and territorial integrity of the State. He said that on several occasions his delegation had objected to the mention of the concept of a unitary State, and emphasized that in the view of his Government the agreed formula on the resumption of the talks did not include any preconditions or reference to a unitary State. Turkey could not accept any other basis for further negotiations than the two memoranda of the Secretary-General, dated 18 October 1971 and 18 May 1972.

E. Subsequent communications

583. In a letter dated 30 May (S/11307), the representative of Turkey rejected the assertions made by the representative of Cyprus in the Council's debate on 29 May that Turkey had first objected to the concept of a unitary State on 14 December 1973, pointing out that since 15 June 1972 his delegation had repeatedly expressed its objections to the use of the term "unitary State" and suggested the possibility of a federative form.

584. In a letter dated 6 June (S/11312), the representative of Cyprus, in reply to the letter of 30 May from the representative of Turkey, stated that before 1972 Turkey had not disputed the unitary State as part of the agreed basis of the intercommunal talks, but had merely questioned the interpretation given the term in that context. In the process of further discussion it had become evident that the term "unitary State" in its main essentials was an established legal definition. He said that the recently agreed formula elaborated by the Secretary-General and his assistants was aimed at promoting progress in the talks by effecting a more solid adherence to the basis on which they had so far been conducted.

Chapter 5

COMPLAINT BY IRAQ CONCERNING INCIDENTS ON ITS FRONTIER WITH IRAN

A. Communications to the Security Council and request for a meeting

585. By a letter dated 12 February 1974 (S/11216) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Iraq requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation arising from continuing acts of aggression launched by Iranian armed forces against the territorial integrity of Iraq. He enclosed a resumé of a series of incidents that had occurred between 24 January and 10 February that had caused casualties on both sides.

586. In a letter dated 12 February (S/11218), the representative of Iran transmitted the text of a note delivered to the Iraqi Embassy in Teheran by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran on 11 February 1974, concerning armed incursions of Iraqi forces into Iranian territory between 30 January and 10 February.

B. Consideration at the 1762nd to 1764th meetings (15-28 February 1974)

587. At its 1762nd meeting on 15 February, the Security Council included the Iraqi complaint in its

agenda and considered the item at three meetings held between 15 and 28 February. At their request, the President invited the representatives of Iran, Democratic Yemen and, subsequently, the United Arab Emirates and the Libyan Arab Republic to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

588. At the same meeting, the representative of Iraq said that on 10 December 1973, a group of Iranian technicians, accompanied by irregular Iranian troops had crossed the Iraqi border to survey and delineate the area of an Iraqi police post. The group had been driven away, but regular Iranian troops that had replaced them still remained 5 kilometres inside Iraqi territory. On 24 December 1973 and 4 and 10 February 1974, Iranian troops had again violated Iraqi territory at several points and undertaken road-building activities. The known death toll so far was 44. Iranian military aircraft were consistently violating Iraqi air space in depth. After referring to the history of the area since the sixteenth century, he recalled that in 1935, after many years of dispute, direct negotiations between Iraq and Iran had been initiated at the recommendation of the League of Nations that had ended in the signing of a boundary treaty on 4 July 1937. In spite of that Treaty, he declared, Iran had con-

tinued its encroachment upon Iraq and had established more than 30 frontier guardposts with military strength inside Iraq. In April 1969, Iran had unilaterally and illegally abrogated the Iraqi-Iranian Boundary Treaty of 1937. The recent aggression was another step taken by Iran in pursuit of its aggressive policy of expansionism and the fulfilment of a grandiose dream of domination and of seeing the Arab Gulf transformed into a Persian lake. Iraq had, on several occasions in 1970 and 1971, drawn the attention of the Secretary-General to the seriousness of the situation resulting from Iranian troop concentrations. It had expressed its readiness to receive a special representative of the Secretary-General to investigate the situation on its eastern frontiers and had also offered to submit the Iranian complaint regarding the implementation of the 1937 Boundary Treaty to the International Court of Justice. Iran had rejected those offers. Iraq was confronted on its eastern border by an expansionist and expensively armed war machine that aspired to play the role of a super-Power. The Security Council was duty-bound to expend its efforts to see that justice was done, the rule of law upheld and peace and stability restored to the region.

589. The representative of Iran said that the recent violation of Iran's frontier by Iraq on 10 February had been the climax of a series of provocations that dated back a long time. On that date, Iraqi armed elements using light and heavy weaponry, artillery, tanks and armoured carriers, had shelled five Iranian frontier posts. The Iranian armed forces had returned the fire and forced the intruders to withdraw. The Iraqis had left behind on Iranian soil 14 dead and much ammunition and weaponry, which constituted irrefutable proof of the violation of Iranian territory by Iraq. Territorial violations were only one aspect of a much broader and more complex problem which Iran had been forced to face in its relations with Iraq. Two years previously, Iraq had cruelly expelled tens of thousands of persons of Iranian origin and nationality. Iran had been the victim of incredible and hateful campaigns on the part of Iraq, in which the press, radio and television controlled by the Iraqi State had ceaselessly hurled insults against the legitimate régime and incited the people of Iran to rebel. Iraq had set up camps to train terrorists and had sent them to Iran to carry out acts of sabotage. It had offered asylum to all sorts of movements that were opposed to the constitutional régime of Iran. Instead of making use of the recently re-established diplomatic relations between the two countries, Iraq preferred to come to the Security Council and accuse Iran of having initiated the recent incidents. Iran was not seeking confrontation with Iraq but direct negotiation based on the principles of international law and justice. The Security Council could best contribute to the creation of the necessary favourable climate between the two parties by recommending to Iraq that it have recourse to the existing diplomatic relations between the countries.

590. At the 1763rd meeting on 20 February, the representative of Democratic Yemen noted that the latest Iranian aggression against Iraqi border posts and the penetration of their armed forces 5 kilometres into Iraqi territory could be regarded as an escalation of tension and an invitation to large-scale hostilities. It was no coincidence that Iraq was subjected to Iranian military pressure at a time when it was courageously depriving the proponents and underwriters of

Israel from plundering its natural resources. In its attempt to disrupt Arab solidarity and to mitigate the over-all Arab power by exerting pressure on Iraq, Iran was doing great service to Zionist aggressors. Iran, moreover, was engaged on more than one front. Its illegal occupation of the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and its invasion of Oman were acts of violence endangering the peace and security of the area. The Security Council's moral and political obligations warranted its immediate action to extinguish the first sparks of hostility.

591. The representative of the United Arab Emirates rejected Iran's claim that the islands of Abu Musa, Lesser Tunb and Greater Tunb were Iranian and added that his country would not recognize any sovereignty over those islands other than that of the State of the United Arab Emirates. His Government considered that any disputes must be resolved by peaceful means.

592. The representative of the Libyan Arab Republic said that Iran's latest acts of aggression were but one manifestation of its policy of expansion and domination over the entire Arabian Gulf area. The most perfidious chapter of that policy began in December 1972 when the Iranian Government, through military aggression, had illegally occupied three Arab islands in the Arabian Gulf. Iran's policy of aggression reflected an imperial dream and mythology entertained by the Shah of Iran to resurrect the ancient Persian empire. Moreover, the forces of imperialism and neo-colonialism had found in that dream a golden opportunity to exploit the entire area. Unless the international community could halt Iran's expansionism and aggression, the area would witness in the near future an explosive and endless conflict with global dimensions and implications.

593. At the opening of the 1764th meeting on 28 February, the President announced that following consultations he had been authorized to make the following statement (S/11229) which represented the agreement of the members of the Council:

"1. Following the complaint presented on 12 February 1974 by the representative of Iraq, the Security Council met on 15 and 20 February. The President of the Security Council has had consultations with all the members of the Council and with the Permanent Representative of Iran. As a result, the President has found that there exists within the Council a consensus in the following terms.

"2. The Security Council, having heard the statements of the representatives of Iraq and Iran regarding the events referred to in the complaint by Iraq, believes that it is important to deal with a situation which could endanger peace and stability in the region. It deplores all the loss of human life; it appeals to the parties to refrain from all military action and from any move which might aggravate the situation. The Council reaffirms the fundamental principles set out in the Charter regarding respect for the territorial sovereignty of States and the pacific settlement of disputes and the duty of all States to fulfil their obligations under international law, as well as the principles referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

"3. From the information available to the Council, it appears that the cause of the events lies, *inter alia*, in the fact that the legal basis for the delimitation of the boundary between the parties is contested.

"4. The Council has noted the recent exchange of ambassadors between the two States and hopes that this could constitute a channel through which problems affecting relations between the parties might be resolved.

"5. As additional information is required, the Security Council requests the Secretary-General

— to appoint as soon as possible a special representative to conduct an investigation of the events that have given rise to the complaint by Iraq and

— to report within three months.

"6. The above-mentioned consensus was reached by members of the Council with the exception of China, which dissociates itself from it; the Chinese delegation made the following statement:

'The Chinese delegation hopes that Iran and Iraq will arrive at a fair and reasonable settlement of their boundary dispute through negotiations in accordance with the five principles of peaceful co-existence. Therefore, the Chinese delegation does not favour United Nations involvement in any form in a boundary dispute. In view of this position, the Chinese delegation dissociates itself from the above consensus of the Security Council.'

Decision: *At the 1764th meeting on 28 February 1974, the consensus (S/11229) was adopted without objection.*

C. Subsequent communications

594. In a letter dated 20 February (S/11224), the representative of Iraq stated that, since 16 February, Iran had increased its troop concentration along the frontier and that there had been further clashes inside Iraqi territory. He added that despite its efforts to maintain self-restraint, Iraq might nevertheless be compelled to take necessary measures in self-defence and to ensure the respect of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

595. In two letters dated 6 March (S/11230 and S/11231), the representative of Iran charged that, on 4 and 5 March, an Iraqi force had opened fire with heavy military equipment on Iranian border posts and said that Iranian patrols, acting in self-defence, had returned the fire. He added that Iraq's unprovoked acts of hostility were in defiance of the Security Council consensus, which had appealed to the parties to refrain from all military actions.

596. In a letter dated 12 March (S/11233), the representative of Iraq charged that, on 3, 4, 5 and 6 March, Iranian forces had opened concentrated fire with heavy and medium artillery against Iraqi border forces and had tried to occupy a border height inside Iraqi territory. He said, further, that the charges in the two Iranian letters were baseless allegations and that Iran had followed a policy of encroachment on Iraqi territory since its unilateral abrogation of the 1937 Boundary Treaty.

597. In a letter dated 27 March (S/11241), the representative of Iran rejected the charges contained in the Iraqi letter of 12 March and indicated that the

Treaty of 1937 had been rendered defunct by Iraq's failure to carry out its obligations under the terms of the Treaty.

D. Report of the Secretary-General

598. On 20 May 1974, the Secretary-General submitted a report (S/11291) to the Council on the implementation of its consensus (S/11229) of 28 February. The report stated that, on 18 March, Ambassador Luis Weckmann-Muñoz of Mexico had been appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General to conduct an investigation of the events that had given rise to the complaint by Iraq. Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz had held extensive consultations in the capitals of both parties to the dispute and, on 16 May, he had submitted a written report, which was annexed to the report of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General stated that the Governments of Iraq and Iran had agreed through Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, acting in exercise of the good offices of the Secretary-General, to the following points: (a) a strict observance of the 7 March 1974 cease-fire agreement; (b) prompt and simultaneous withdrawal of concentrations of armed forces along the entire border, in accordance with an arrangement to be agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the two countries; (c) total avoidance of any hostile actions against each other in order to create atmosphere conducive to achieving the purpose stated in point (d); and (d) an early resumption of conversations at the appropriate level and place, without any preconditions, with a view to a comprehensive settlement of all bilateral issues.

599. In his report, Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz noted that the recent incidents might be traced to the conflicting views of the two Governments concerning the continuing validity of the 1937 Boundary Treaty. In most of the areas of recent clashes the frontier had never been clearly delimited or marked on the ground. Moreover, the maps used by Iran and Iraq showed different border lines, apparently without either side being aware of the fact. Most if not all the recent incidents had taken place in those areas of conflicting geographical claims. The only likely exception was the most serious of the incidents, which took place on Hill 343 in the Zaluab Heights on 10 February 1974. That Hill was shown as part of Iran's territory on Iranian maps. Although the scale of the map provided by Iraq did not permit the mission to confirm that fact, the 1914 map did. Generally speaking, however, the 1914 border line tracing the Khanaqin-Badra/Qasr-e-Shirin-Mehran sector seemed to favour Iraq's interpretation, although again not in every respect. However, both Governments had indicated that they had no territorial claims along the frontier and that they would stand by the findings of a new joint delimitation commission, which could also settle the question of the sharing of waters of those rivers that flowed from one country to the other. Both sides also appeared willing to negotiate the important issue of navigation in the Shatt al-Arab estuary. Other points mentioned that seemed to require negotiation were the question of the extent of territorial waters and fishery zones and exploitation of the continental shelf.

E. Consideration at the 1770th meeting (28 May 1974)

600. The Security Council resumed its consideration of the question at its 1770th meeting, held on 28 May,

and included the report of the Secretary-General (S/11291) in its agenda. At his request, the representative of Iran was invited to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

601. At the same meeting, the President of the Council announced that, as a result of prior consultations, the following draft resolution (S/11299) had emerged:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its consensus adopted on 28 February 1974 (S/11229),

"1. Takes note with appreciation of the Secretary-General's report, which was circulated to the Security Council on 20 May 1974 (S/11291);

"2. Welcomes the reported determination on the part of Iran and Iraq to de-escalate the prevailing situation and to improve their relations and, in particular, the fact that both countries have agreed through the Secretary-General's Special Representative, acting in the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices, to the following points:

"(a) A strict observance of the 7 March 1974 cease-fire agreement;

"(b) Prompt and simultaneous withdrawal of concentrations of armed forces along the entire border, in accordance with an arrangement to be agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the two countries;

"(c) The creation of a favourable atmosphere conducive to achieving the purpose stated in the following subparagraph, by refraining totally from any hostile actions against each other;

"(d) An early resumption, without any preconditions, at the appropriate level and place, of conversations with a view to a comprehensive settlement of all bilateral issues;

"3. Expresses the hope that the parties will take as soon as possible the necessary steps to implement the agreement reached;

"4. Invites the Secretary-General to lend whatever assistance may be requested by both countries in connexion with the said agreement."

602. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics noted the extreme importance, bilaterally and in international terms, of the agreement reached between Iran and Iraq. The USSR was convinced that adoption of the draft resolution would help to foster a settlement of the frontier dispute and the development of good relations between these two countries. The border conflict between those two countries with which the Soviet Union was maintaining and developing relations of friendship and co-operation had been a cause of great concern, and his delegation accordingly welcomed the agreement concluded between Iran and Iraq with great satisfaction. Deterioration of relations between Iran and Iraq could have been to the benefit only of those circles interested in fanning the tension in the region in order to further their own selfish purposes, contrary to the interests of the peoples of the Middle East as a whole. It was particularly important that nowhere in the world should acts be permitted that might be detrimental to the over-all process of *détente* and the normalization and improvement of international relations. All matters in dispute between

countries, and between those two particular countries, should be settled by peaceful means through negotiation, as required by the United Nations Charter, the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, the General Assembly's Declaration on the Non-use of Force in International Relations and Permanent Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, and other fundamental documents and decisions of the United Nations. Of great importance also was the statement both parties had made to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the effect that neither, in principle, had territorial claims along the frontier and that they would stand by the findings of the new joint delimitation commission. The USSR would have preferred that paragraph 4 of the draft resolution indicate that the Secretary-General, in discharging his mandate, would act in accordance with, and with the approval of, the Security Council. However, the USSR took into account the explanations given by the parties and considered that the Secretary-General would act in accordance with the Security Council. Therefore, the USSR would not insist on including in the draft resolution a special provision to that effect.

603. The representative of China expressed satisfaction that Iran and Iraq had indicated readiness to settle their dispute through negotiations. The parties to a dispute should reach a fair and reasonable settlement of a boundary question through negotiations based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Inasmuch as China had never favoured United Nations involvement in any form in boundary disputes, it would not participate in the voting on the draft resolution.

Decision: *At the 1770th meeting, on 28 May 1974, the draft resolution (S/11299) was adopted by 14 votes to none as resolution 348 (1974). One member (China) did not participate in the vote.*

604. The representative of the United Republic of Cameroon paid tribute to the Governments of Iran and Iraq for the understanding and spirit of compromise they had evinced in agreeing to resolve all bilateral questions by peaceful means and without prior conditions. The Council should by all means encourage the two parties to persevere in that course. He fully supported the resolution just adopted.

605. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland said that the way the situation had been defused was an excellent example of how United Nations machinery could be used effectively for the peaceful settlement of disputes. He said that the representative of the USSR, in his statement, had attempted to introduce an entirely new element into the proceedings, namely, the precise relationship between the Secretary-General and the Security Council when a dispute of that nature had been brought to the Council and to the United Nations. It was not appropriate to discuss a matter of that category and that importance on a resolution dealing with an agreement entered into bilaterally between the parties to a dispute, particularly, when no amendment to that effect had been introduced. Nothing in the resolution or in the discussion in the Council altered the relationship which existed between the Secretary-General and the Security Council. The United Kingdom believed that if anything of substance were to happen in relation to the Irano-Iraqi dispute, the Secretary-General would not wish to act without coming to the Security Council to hear its views.

606. The representative of France welcomed the results achieved by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative and said that the Council has discharged its responsibilities in a useful manner. It was for the parties concerned, on the basis of the four principles which they had laid down and which the Council had welcomed in resolution 348 (1974), to seek solutions to the disputes between them. The Council would continue to watch developments and would stand ready to lend the parties any assistance they might need.

607. The representative of the United States of America said that the United Nations had fulfilled the aspirations of its founders in the quiet resolution of potential conflict and in the skilful use of its role as a third party through which nations might find a way to help settle their differences. Should the Secretary-General deem it appropriate, the United States would welcome information on any further efforts he might be asked to undertake by the parties in accordance with resolution 348 (1974).

608. The representative of Indonesia said that, despite the encouraging signs of basic agreement, the Secretary-General's report indicated that the situation in some areas continued to be tense. Although that was a cause of concern, Indonesia was hopeful that the genuine desire of both Governments to de-escalate, coupled with the steps they had agreed to undertake, as incorporated in the Council's resolution, would have the cumulative effect of restoring normal conditions throughout the area and that the forthcoming negotiations between the parties would soon lead to a settlement of all bilateral issues.

609. The representative of Mauritania said that his delegation had supported resolution 348 (1974) because it was an approach based on mutual understanding and the quest for a peaceful solution to the conflict. The method adopted by Iraq and Iran for the settlement of their dispute would further consolidate their relations of friendship and co-operation.

610. The representative of Austria said that the action of the Council on the issue was a model for the potential of United Nations involvement for peace. Austria fully shared the findings and conclusions of the Secretary-General's Special Representative. His mission had shed light on a number of unknown facts and misunderstandings that could be eliminated. Most important, however, were the four points on which both Governments had agreed.

611. The representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic said his country considered resolution 348 (1974) to be in keeping with the desire of the parties to the dispute. As to paragraph 4 of the resolution, the connexion between the Secretary-General and the Security Council had always existed in regard to the implementation of Security Council resolutions and to matters discussed by the Council. His delegation believed that by inviting the parties to call on the Secretary-General for assistance, the nature and the extent of such assistance would be determined by the Council.

612. The representative of Australia stated that his delegation had had no hesitation in supporting the resolution, which created a climate in which the parties could settle their outstanding problems without further resort to the use of force. If the parties should need to call on the Secretary-General for his assistance, members of the Council could expect that the Secretary-

General would keep the Council informed of the nature and extent of such assistance.

613. The representative of Peru was gratified that the Council's consensus of 28 February had produced such positive results and said that his delegation had voted in favour of the resolution because it placed the bilateral problem in its proper context, so that it could be solved in the best possible way by the parties concerned.

614. The President, speaking as the representative of Kenya, said that resolution 348 (1974) was the result of strenuous efforts by all members of the Council and the Government of Iran. A large burden in carrying out the terms of the resolution would fall on the two Governments, and Kenya was sure that with patience and goodwill on both sides a solution would be found. Paragraph 4 of the resolution linked the United Nations with the peaceful efforts, and Kenya was certain that United Nations membership would spare no effort to help both parties, should the need arise.

615. The representative of Iran said that his country considered the four points of resolution 348 (1974) as solely a bilateral agreement between Iraq and Iran that came about through the mission of Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, an agreement on future procedures and steps to be taken to start a dialogue. He regretted that, in spite of that agreement, Iran continued to be exposed to unmitigated, hostile propaganda from Iraq. Such conduct, he concluded, was not conducive to the dialogue which Iraq had declared itself ready to engage in.

616. The representative of Iraq said that the manner in which the Council had dealt with the question provided an excellent example of the use to which the machinery of the United Nations could be put. Iraq was very pleased and satisfied with the report and the findings of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. It was not a mere incident that Iraq had brought before the Council in February but a series of events which had taken their most serious form when Iran abrogated the 1937 Border Treaty between the two countries in 1969. That dark event had naturally led to the serious fighting that had taken place during February. The four-point agreement reached as a result of the efforts of the Special Representative and the use of the Secretary-General's good offices had been endorsed in the resolution just adopted. Iraq would enter into fulfilment of the steps specified in good faith and goodwill, which it hoped would be reciprocated by Iran.

F. Subsequent communications

617. By a letter dated 30 May (S/11306), the representative of Iraq transmitted a statement in which his Government declared its acceptance of Security Council resolution 348 (1974) and emphasized its readiness to implement all its clauses with sincerity and goodwill.

618. By a letter dated 6 June (S/11313), the representative of Iran also transmitted a statement by his Government in which it declared its acceptance of Security Council resolution 348 (1974), with the understanding that the question under dispute was merely a bilateral question between Iran and Iraq and could be solved only by the two countries concerned. Iran would have preferred that the Council designate by name the country that had committed aggression.

619. In a letter dated 14 June (S/11323), the representative of Iraq expressed regret that the statement of the Iranian Government contradicted the letter and spirit of the Council's decisions, as it constituted a pre-

condition for acceptance of resolution 348 (1974). Iraq continued to hope that the Iranian Government would fulfil its obligations under that resolution in a spirit of goodwill and co-operation.

Part II

OTHER MATTERS CONSIDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Chapter 6

ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

A. Applications of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany

620. At its 1729th meeting on 21 June 1973, the Security Council considered the applications for admission to membership in the United Nations submitted on 12 and 13 June 1973, respectively, by the German Democratic Republic (S/10945) and the Federal Republic of Germany (S/10949). [See *Report of the Security Council, 16 June 1972-15 June 1973, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 2*, p. 142.] The Council also had before it letters dated 16 June from France (S/10952), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (S/10953), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (S/10954) and the United States of America (S/10955) transmitting the text of a declaration issued on 9 November 1972 by those four Powers in which they expressed their agreement to support the two applications for membership in the United Nations when submitted and affirmed that that membership should in no way affect the rights and responsibilities of the four Powers and the corresponding related quadripartite agreements, decisions and practices.

621. At the same meeting, in accordance with rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure, it was agreed to refer both applications to the Committee on the Admission of New Members, in order that it might consider them and report to the Council its conclusions on each.

622. At the 1730th meeting on 22 June, the Council considered the report of the Committee (S/10957), which contained the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered separately the application of the German Democratic Republic (S/10945) and the application of the Federal Republic of Germany (S/10949) for admission to membership in the United Nations,

"1. Recommends to the General Assembly that the German Democratic Republic be admitted to membership in the United Nations;

"2. Recommends to the General Assembly that the Federal Republic of Germany be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

Decision: *At the 1730th meeting, on 22 June 1973, the Security Council adopted the draft resolution by consensus as resolution 335 (1973).*

623. In a letter dated 26 June (S/10958), the representative of the USSR, referring to the letter dated

13 June (S/10950) from the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the representation of the interests of West Berlin in the United Nations, stated that the western sectors of Berlin were not a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and could not be governed by it. Provided that matters concerning security and status remain unaffected, the Federal Republic of Germany could represent the interests of the western sectors of Berlin in certain specific spheres enumerated in annex IV of the Quadripartite Agreement, including the representation of the interests of the western sectors of Berlin in international organizations (annex IV, paragraph 2 (c)). The basis for such representation was the Quadripartite Agreement of 3 September 1971, regulating its admissibility and scope.

624. In a letter dated 7 December (S/11150), the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States stated that on the basis of the supreme authority that they maintained and exercised in the western sectors of Berlin and in accordance with the provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement of 3 September 1971, the three Powers had agreed to the assumption by the Federal Republic of Germany of the rights and obligations of the Charter of the United Nations also with respect to the western sectors of Berlin and had approved the representation of those sectors by the Federal Republic in the United Nations and its subsidiary organs.

625. In a letter dated 20 December (S/11165), the representative of the USSR referred to the three-Power letter of 7 December and reaffirmed the position of his Government on the question of the representation of the interests of West Berlin in the United Nations and its organs in accordance with the Quadripartite Agreement of 3 September 1971.

B. Application of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas

626. In a telegram dated 10 July (S/10966), the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas submitted the application of the Bahamas for membership in the United Nations and declared that his Government accepted the conditions contained in the Charter of the United Nations and solemnly undertook to fulfil them.

627. At the 1731st meeting on 23 June, the President of the Security Council referred the application of the Bahamas for membership in the United Nations to the Committee on the Admission of New Members for examination and report, in accordance with rule 59 of the Security Council's provisional rules of procedure.

628. At its 1732nd meeting, on 18 July, the Council considered the Committee's report on the application of the Bahamas (S/10968). In its report, the Committee recommended the adoption of the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the application of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas for admission to membership in the United Nations (S/10966),

"Recommends to the General Assembly that the Commonwealth of the Bahamas be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

Decision: *At the 1732nd meeting, on 18 July 1973, the Security Council unanimously adopted the draft resolution as resolution 336 (1973).*

C. Application of the People's Republic of Bangladesh

629. At its 1775th meeting on 7 June 1974, the Security Council adopted an agenda entitled "Admission of New Members: Application of the People's Republic of Bangladesh for admission to membership in the United Nations" and decided to refer the application of Bangladesh to the Committee on the Admission of New Members for examination and report in accordance with rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council.

630. At its 1776th meeting, on 10 June, the Council considered the report of the Committee on the applica-

tion Bangladesh (S/11316). In its report, the Committee recommended the adoption of the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the application of the People's Republic of Bangladesh for admission to membership in the United Nations,

"Recommends to the General Assembly that the People's Republic of Bangladesh be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

631. The representatives of Pakistan, Algeria, India, Egypt and Bhutan were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

Decision: *At the 1776th meeting, on 10 June 1974, the draft resolution contained in the Committee's report (S/11316) was adopted without vote as resolution 351 (1974).*

D. Application of Grenada

632. In a letter dated 30 May 1974 circulated by the Secretary-General (S/11311) the Prime Minister of Grenada submitted the application of Grenada for admission to membership in the United Nations, together with a declaration of acceptance of the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

633. The Security Council did not consider the application during the period covered in the present report.

Chapter 7

INCLUSION OF CHINESE AMONG THE WORKING LANGUAGES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

634. In a letter dated 10 January 1974 (S/11187) the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of General Assembly resolution 3189 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, in which the Assembly considered it desirable to include Chinese among the working languages of the Security Council.

635. In a letter dated 11 January (S/11190) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of China, referring to the Secretary-General's letter, requested that a Security Council meeting be convened to consider measures that should be adopted in accordance with the provision of the above-mentioned Assembly resolution.

636. At its 1761st meeting on 17 January, the Security Council included the question in its agenda. The President noted that the General Assembly, when it had adopted resolution 3189 (XXVIII), had had before it a report of the Fifth Committee (A/9307) recommending the adoption of the draft resolution and informing the Assembly of the budgetary requirements that it would entail.

637. The President stated that, as a result of prior consultations, agreement had been reached on the text of the following draft resolution (S/11192):

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the question concerning the inclusion of Chinese among the working languages of the Security Council,

"Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 3189 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973,

"Taking into account that the General Assembly, in that resolution, after noting that four of the five official languages had already been made working languages of the General Assembly and the Security Council and affirming that, in the interest of efficiency in the work of the United Nations, Chinese should be accorded the same status as the other four official languages, decided to include Chinese among the working languages of the Assembly and considered it desirable to include Chinese among the working languages of the Security Council,

"Decides to include Chinese among the working languages of the Security Council and to amend accordingly the relevant provisions of chapters VIII and IX of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council as set forth in the annex to the present resolution.

"ANNEX

"Revised text of rules 41 to 47 and 49 of the provisional rules of procedures of the Security Council

"Rule 41

"Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish shall be both the official and the working languages of the Security Council.

"Rule 42

"Speeches made in any of the five languages of the Security Council shall be interpreted into the other four languages.

"Rule 43

"[Deleted]

"Rule 44

"Any representative may make a speech in a language other than the languages of the Security Council. In this case, he shall himself provide for the interpretation into one of those languages. Interpretation into the other languages of the Security Council by the interpreters of the Secretariat may be based on the interpretation given in the first such language.

"Rule 45

"Verbatim records of meetings of the Security Council shall be drawn up in the languages of the Council.

"Rule 46

"All resolutions and other documents shall be published in the languages of the Security Council.

"Rule 47

"Documents of the Security Council shall, if the Security Council so decides, be published in any language other than the languages of the Council.

"Rule 49

"Subject to the provisions of rule 51, the verbatim record of each meeting of the Security Council shall be made available to the representatives on the Security Council and to the representatives of any other States which have participated in the meeting not later than 10 a.m. of the first working day following the meeting."

638. In the discussion of the above draft resolution, all members indicated their support for it.

639. The representative of Kenya, said that his delegation considered including Chinese as a working language of the Security Council, a desirable sequence of events since the other four official languages were already working languages. He added that, although his delegation was not putting forward any concrete proposals at the time, Africa could not remain for ever the only continent without a language at the United Nations.

640. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics noted that the year 1973 had been marked by a further perceptible easing of international tension and a strengthening of the trend towards the consolidation of international peace and security, the development of friendship and co-operation among nations and a fundamental restructuring of international relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence between States. The fact that the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly had taken place in conditions of *détente* had enabled it to adopt a series of positive decisions whose aims included the strengthening of international peace and security, disarmament, a cut in military budgets and preparations for a world disarmament conference. The Assembly had also recognized and reaffirmed the interrelationship between *détente* and development and the role therein played by disarmament. The representative declared that the meeting of the Council had been convened to adopt a decision to develop and strengthen a resolution adopted by the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly. In that context he stated that the Security Council bore a duty to implement another Assembly resolution, adopted at its twenty-seventh session, on the non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. As to the item

under discussion, the delegation of the Soviet Union had supported it when it had been discussed in the General Assembly and would take a similar position in the Security Council.

641. The representative of the United States of America said that the view of his delegation on all aspects of the issue under discussion were well known and did not require repetition.

642. The representative of Peru said that inclusion of Chinese among the working languages was the just and necessary corollary to ensure the effectiveness of the work of the United Nations and, in the present case, of the Security Council.

643. The representative of Austria said that the proposal under discussion was the logical consequence of earlier decisions that had enlarged the number of working languages of the Security Council over the years and that henceforth the official and working languages of the Council would be identical. After noting that inclusion of a further working language necessitated a revision of a number of rules in two chapters of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, he said that his delegation believed that the Security Council should not lose sight of the over-all problem of reviewing and updating other chapters of the rules of procedure, which should correspond as closely as possible to the existing realities. He recalled that the General Assembly in resolution 3186 (XXVIII), had drawn the attention of the Security Council, when considering steps to enhance its effectiveness, to the views and suggestions submitted by Member States in response to Assembly resolutions 2864 (XXVI) and 2991 (XXVII), and expressed the hope that the present decision of the Council would be a starting point for a more general review of its rules of procedure and for gradual adoption of measures in that field that might strengthen the effectiveness of the Security Council in response to the desire expressed by the General Assembly.

644. The representative of France said that, given the place that China occupied in the world and its position as a permanent member of the Security Council, it was only normal and just that Chinese be given the status of a working language. The intrinsic beauty of the language and its precision, which made it remarkably adaptable to the political, diplomatic and technical vocabulary of today's world, were further reasons for strengthening the position of Chinese in the Organization. Although inclusion of Chinese among the working languages would increase the workload and might increase the financial burden of the Organization, his delegation felt that in the present case the investment was fully justified.

645. The representative of Australia said his delegation considered that inclusion of Chinese among the working languages of the Council and the consequent changes in its provisional rules of procedure were appropriate and desirable for the future conduct of the business of the Council.

646. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland said that his delegation recognized the importance and value of according Chinese the same status as the other four official languages of the Council.

647. The representative of Indonesia said that it was only logical to end the difference between the offi-

cial and the working languages when it had been reduced to only one language, Chinese, the language of 800 million people, who had contributed much to civilization.

648. The representative of the United Republic of Cameroon said that by according Chinese the same status as that of the other four official languages the Council would offer all its permanent members identical working conditions in concordance with the identical obligations and prerogatives they had under the Charter.

649. The representative of Iraq said that inclusion of Chinese among the working languages of the Security Council was the final procedural act in the process of restoration of the rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, a cause Iraq had actively supported since 1958.

650. The representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic said that concern for strengthening of peace was one of the most important themes of the time, and therefore of the Security Council. As to the item on the agenda, his delegation would vote for the

draft resolution and for the corresponding changes in the provisional rules of procedure.

651. The representative of Mauritania recalled that the General Assembly had adopted the resolution on the inclusion of Chinese among the working languages of the Assembly and the Council without any opposition and hoped that the Security Council would do likewise.

Decision: *At the 1761st meeting on 17 January 1974, the President, in the absence of a request for a vote, declared the draft resolution adopted (resolution 345 (1974)).*

652. The representative of China expressed appreciation to the Council members for supporting the inclusion of Chinese as a working language of the Security Council. The Chinese delegation believed that that action of the Council, which was entirely logical and in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations Charter, had terminated the abnormal state of affairs that had long existed in the United Nations. China hoped that, through that action, the efficiency of the Security Council would be enhanced.

Part III

THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Chapter 8

WORK OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

653. The Military Staff Committee functioned continuously under the draft rules of procedure during the period under review and held a total of 26 meetings without considering matters of substance.

Part IV

MATTERS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT NOT DISCUSSED IN THE COUNCIL DURING THE PERIOD COVERED

Chapter 9

REPORTS AND COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

654. By a letter dated 25 June 1973 (S/10959), the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitted the text of a statement adopted by the Special Committee on that date, in which it again drew the attention of the Security Council to the critical and explosive situation resulting from the intensified repression of the people of Zimbabwe by the illegal racist régime of Southern Rhodesia.

655. On 4 January 1974, the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia submitted its sixth report (S/11178), covering its work since issuance of its fifth report on 22 December 1973. The report said that the Committee had met 65 times and had continued its consideration of 37 cases of suspected violations of sanctions carried over from previous reports, together with 42 new cases, including 18 cases of importation of chrome, nickel and other materials from Southern Rhodesia into the United States of America, as well as two cases opened on the basis of information supplied by individuals and non-governmental organizations. The Committee had also considered a number of proposals in implementation of resolution 320 (1972), including 24 put forward by the African delegations. As a result, 13 recommendations and suggestions that had been agreed upon had been submitted to the Council on 15 April 1973 in the Committee's second special report (S/10920 and Corr.1), together with other proposals advanced by some members, and statements of position of various delegations. The report also gave an account of the actions taken by the Committee, by the Secretary-General and by States in implementation of the relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 333 (1973) of 22 May 1973, in which the Council had approved the recommendations contained in the second special report. With regard to consular, sporting and other representational matters, which also had been mentioned in the Committee's previous reports, the sixth report contained accounts of sporting activities brought to its attention that either involved participation by persons from Southern Rhodesia or were staged in Southern Rhodesia, involving participation of teams from abroad—activities that might be contrary to the provisions of Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. In addition the Committee had considered matters relating to airlines operating to and from Southern Rhodesia, immigration and tourism in the territory and certain legal and other matters, including new proce-

dures for handling information and replies, aimed at increasing the Committee's efficiency.

656. On 9 January, the Committee issued an addendum (S/11178/Add.1) to its sixth report, containing five annexes. Annexes I to IV contained the texts of reports on new cases and correspondence conducted with Governments and non-governmental organizations concerning all the cases considered. Annex V contained the text of the Secretary-General's notes and Government replies concerning the implementation of paragraph 21 of the Committee's second special report, which the Security Council had approved in resolution 333 (1973), relating to the discrepancies revealed in the Committee's previous report (S/10852/Add.2, annex V) between the reported quantities of certain commodities imported from South Africa, Mozambique and Angola and the quantities reported to have been exported by those countries.

657. In a second addendum (S/11178/Add.2 and Corr.1) issued on 11 January, the Committee published information on Southern Rhodesia's trade for 1972, together with statistical data. The figures showed that the territory's merchandise exports in 1972 had amounted to \$US 499 million (compared to \$388 million in 1971) while its total imports had amounted to \$417 million (compared with \$395 million in 1971).

658. By a letter dated 8 February (S/11212), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of a General Assembly resolution 3116 (XXVIII), paragraphs 7 and 8 of which recommended widening the scope of the sanctions against the illegal régime to include all the measures envisaged in Article 41 of the Charter, in particular the institution of measures for the confiscation of all shipments to and from Southern Rhodesia, the nullification of all insurance policies covering such shipments and the invalidation of passports and any other documents for travel to Southern Rhodesia, and also drew the Council's attention to the need to consider imposing sanctions against Portugal and South Africa.

659. By a letter dated 11 April (S/11262), the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitted to the Security Council the text of a resolution adopted by the Committee on 2 April, paragraphs 7 and 8 of which reiterated the text of the above-mentioned paragraphs of General Assembly resolution 3116 (XXVIII), while paragraph 9 appealed to the permanent members of the Council to reconsider the use of their veto on matters relating to the question.

Chapter 10

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

660. On 25 June 1973, the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples addressed a letter (S/10960) to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the text of a resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 22 June (A/AC.109/424). In paragraph 10 of the resolution the Special Committee drew the attention of the Security Council to the urgent need for taking effective steps to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and related decisions of the United Nations.

661. In a report dated 17 August (S/10734/Add.1), the Secretary-General set forth the substantive parts of eight additional replies from Governments to his inquiry concerning action taken or envisaged by them in implementation of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 312 (1972).

662. By a letter dated 5 October (S/11022), the representative of Nigeria sent to the President of the Security Council three documents related to the declaration of independence of Guinea-Bissau: (1) the proclamation of the State of Guinea-Bissau by the People's National Assembly, dated 24 September; (2) the constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, and (3) a communiqué issued on 28 September by the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC).

663. On 8 November (S/11092), the representative of Morocco, as Chairman of the African Group of States, transmitted the text of a PAIGC communiqué dated 3 November, reporting bombing attacks by Portuguese aircraft against villages in Guinea-Bissau.

664. By a letter dated 20 November (S/11125), the representative of Morocco, as Chairman of the African

Group of States, sent to the Secretary-General the text of a communiqué of the Organization of African Unity dated 20 November, announcing that OAU had admitted Guinea-Bissau to its membership on 19 November.

665. In letters dated 20 November (S/11133), and 1 February (S/11211), the Secretary-General conveyed to the President of the Security Council the texts of two General Assembly resolutions, respectively 3061 (XXVIII) adopted on 2 November and 3113 (XXVIII) adopted on 12 December 1973. In paragraph 4 of the first resolution the Assembly drew the attention of the Security Council to the critical situation resulting from the illegal presence of Portugal in Guinea-Bissau and the urgent need for effective steps to restore the territorial integrity of the Republic. In paragraph 10 of the second resolution the Assembly drew attention to the urgent need for taking effective steps to secure the full and speedy implementation of its resolution 1514 (XV) and related decisions of the United Nations.

666. In letters dated 29 March (S/11247) and 11 April (S/11261), respectively, the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitted to the President of the Security Council the texts of two resolutions adopted by the Special Committee on 15 March (A/AC.109/439) and 5 April (A/AC.109/445). In paragraph 10 of the first resolution, the Special Committee drew the attention of the Security Council to the urgent need for taking effective steps to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and related decisions of the United Nations and, in paragraph 7 of the second resolution, to the serious situation in Cape Verde as a result of the continued Portuguese colonial domination.

Chapter 11

COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING RELATIONS WITH THE LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC

667. In a letter dated 18 June 1973 (S/10956), the representative of the United States of America responded to a letter of 30 May from the Libyan Arab Republic (S/10939). The United States letter denied any infringement by United States aircraft or vessels of Libya's 12-mile territorial waters or interference with the operation of Libyan military forces. Neither the presence nor the activities of the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean constituted aggression or reflected an aggressive intent on the part of the United States. The establishment by the Libyan Government of a "restricted area" with a radius of 100 nautical miles from Tripoli was inconsistent with the Convention on International Civil Aviation, to which the Libyan Arab Republic was a party, and with generally recognized principles of international law. Although the Libyan Arab Republic had not responded to repeated offers, the United States reiterated that it remained prepared to discuss with the Libyan Government any issues which the latter might regard as damaging to normal relations.

COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA RESULTING FROM THE POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

668. In a note dated 24 July 1973 (S/10975), the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics forwarded to the Secretary-General a statement in connexion with General Assembly resolution 2923 A to E (XXVII) on the question of *apartheid*. The statement emphasized that, as had been repeatedly stated, the Soviet Union actively supported the struggle against colonialism, racism and *apartheid* in the international arena, including the United Nations system, consistently approved the implementation of the most resolute and effective measures directed against the policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations, had always complied with United Nations resolutions dealing with those matters, and would continue to render support of every kind to the peoples struggling against colonialism, racism and *apartheid*.

669. By a letter dated 14 September (S/11000), the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* transmitted the text of a statement issued by the Special Committee on 13 September in connexion with the murder by the South African police of a number of African mineworkers at Carletonville, and a record of the discussion in the Committee. The letter also stated that the Special Committee was following the situation closely and would report as appropriate.

670. On 2 October, the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* transmitted a special report (S/11005), adopted by the Special Committee that day, concerning the military build-up in South Africa and the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa. The report noted that in the light of the growing conflicts in the colonial territories adjacent to South Africa and the brutal methods to which racist and colonial authorities had resorted, the military build-up in South Africa constituted a particularly grave menace to peace. The Special Committee therefore considered it of great urgency that the Security Council should take decisive steps, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to secure full implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa. In the view of the Special Committee, there could be no doubt that the policies and actions of the South African régime constituted a threat to international peace and security in terms of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

671. In a letter dated 3 October (S/11007), the representative of South Africa transmitted to the Secretary-General copies of a memorandum on the riots which had occurred at the Western Deep Levels Mine at Carletonville on 11 September. According to the memorandum, the riots and the deaths resulting therefrom would shortly be the subject of a judicial inquiry, and a full account of the incident and the circumstances which gave rise to it would be available only after the judicial inquiry had been completed and its findings published. However, it appeared that the incident had its origins in a labour dispute between the mine management and its black miners, which had erupted into violence and forced the mine management to seek the assistance of the police.

672. By a note dated 4 October (S/11006), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had addressed a letter to him on 2 October, transmitting the report adopted unanimously by the Special Committee on that date, which was submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2671 (XXV) of 8 December 1970 and 2923 (XXVII) of 15 November 1972. The Secretary-General informed the Council that the report of the Special Committee appeared as *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 22 (A/9022)*.

673. By a letter dated 1 February 1974 (S/11208), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council resolutions 3151 A to G (XXVIII), adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1973. The Secretary-General drew particular attention to paragraph 6 of resolution G, in which the General Assembly requested the Security Council to consider urgently the situation in South Africa and the aggressive actions of the South African régime, with a view to adopting effective measures, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to resolve the grave situation in the area and, in particular: (a) to ensure that all Governments implemented fully the arms embargo against South Africa, without any exceptions as to the type of weapons, and prohibited any violation of the arms embargo by companies and individuals within their jurisdiction; (b) to call upon the Governments concerned to refrain from importing any military supplies manufactured by, or in collaboration with, South Africa; (c) to call upon the Governments concerned to terminate any existing military arrangements with the South African régime and to refrain from entering into any such arrangements.

674. In a note dated 19 March (S/11237), the representative of the USSR forwarded information in connexion with General Assembly resolution 3151 A to G (XXVIII) on the question of *apartheid* and the appeal of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* regarding the observance on 21 March 1974 of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The letter stressed that, as had been repeatedly stated, the Soviet Union consistently supported the application of the most drastic and effective measures directed against the policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations, and had always complied with United Nations resolutions dealing with those issues. The letter further stated that, proceeding from its position of principle, the Soviet Union would continue in the future to render support of every kind to the peoples struggling against colonialism, racism and *apartheid* and to take all necessary steps to help to bring about the speedy and complete elimination of colonialism, racism and *apartheid*.

675. By a letter dated 5 April (S/11254), the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* transmitted the special report on the assassinations of Mr. Onkgopotse Abraham Tiro and Mr. John Dube,

adopted by the Special Committee on 1 April. The report stated that the Special Committee considered that the recent assassinations were a complement to the brutal repressive measures by the white racist South African régime against the leaders of the black people inside South Africa, and aggravated the situation in southern Africa as a whole. It declared that there could be no peace in the region until *apartheid* was totally eradicated. The Special Committee expressed the hope that those events would lead to a greater recognition by Governments and peoples of the grave dangers of *apartheid*, and thereby result in more effective and concerted international action to eradicate that crime.

676. In a letter dated 18 April (S/11271), the representative of South Africa referred to the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on the assassination of Mr. Onkgopotse Abraham Tiro and Mr. John Dube. He recalled that his Mission had addressed a letter to the Secretary-General on 13 February in con-

nexion with Mr. Tiro's death (A/9580), which had stated that his Government took the strongest exception to the imputations and insinuations of South African involvement in the death of Mr. Tiro and had categorically affirmed that it had been in no way directly or indirectly responsible for his death and had in no way connived at it, but had frequently expressed its strongest opposition to and condemnation of acts of terrorism of any kind, and accordingly also condemned that particular outrage by whomever it might have been committed. He added that his Government placed on record that the terms of that letter and the sentiments expressed therein were equally applicable in the case of Mr. Dube's death, that the South African Government stated categorically that it was in no way responsible for Mr. Dube's assassination and had in no way connived at it, and, furthermore, reaffirmed its strong opposition to and condemnation of acts of terrorism of any kind, and accordingly condemned Mr. Dube's assassination no less than it condemned that of Mr. Tiro.

Chapter 13

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING A COMPLAINT BY ZAMBIA

677. By a letter dated 12 July 1973 (S/10971), the representative of Zambia transmitted a list of 31 border incidents that had been committed against Zambia between 9 January and 14 June by minority régimes in southern Africa. He stated that the list bore testimony to the greater cohesion among the white minority régimes, whose wanton use of ruthless tactics served to intensify the state of tension in that part of the world.

Chapter 14

COMMUNICATIONS FROM GUINEA

678. In a letter dated 1 October 1973 (S/11004), the representative of Guinea requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the serious situation between Guinea and Senegal, relations between which had deteriorated because of support given by Senegal to armed groups preparing aggression against Guinea.

679. By a letter dated 21 February 1974 (S/11225), the representative of Guinea withdrew his Government's complaint to the Security Council against Senegal, stating that, following the visit of the President of the Organization of African Unity to Guinea, it had been agreed that the matter would be discussed in OAU.

Chapter 15

COMMUNICATION FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

680. In a letter dated 24 April 1974 (S/11273), the representative of the Congo stated that on 22 April on two separate occasions Portuguese aircraft had made incursions into Congolese territory. The letter stated that that was not the first time that the Portuguese forces had engaged in acts of aggression and provocation against the Congo in the area adjoining the Angolan enclave of Cabinda. Previously his Government had reacted with restraint, but in the future it was prepared to take all necessary measures to ensure its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Government of the Congo at the same time reaffirmed its support for the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and the Cape Verde Islands.

Chapter 16

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

681. By a letter dated 23 November 1973 (S/11129), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council resolution 3066 (XXVIII), adopted by the General Assembly on 15 November 1973, concerning the item "Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity". The Secretary-General called attention to paragraph 4 of the resolution, in which the General Assembly drew the attention of the Security Council to the need to take effective measures to associate the Organization of African Unity regularly with all its work concerning Africa, including the activities of its Committee on Sanctions.

Chapter 17

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL UNDER RESOLUTION 307 (1971) CONCERNING THE BANGLADESH RELIEF OPERATION

682. In a report dated 6 December 1973 (S/10853/Add.4), the Secretary-General concluded his series of reports concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 307 (1971) and General Assembly resolution 2970 (XXVI), regarding United Nations relief activities in India and in Bangladesh. He stated that the United Nations Relief Operation in Dacca (UNROD) had completed its operations on 31 March, and that the United Nations Special Relief office in Bangladesh, which had succeeded UNROD, had discharged its responsibilities to the full and would terminate its activities as scheduled on 31 December.

Chapter 18

COMMUNICATION FROM DEMOCRATIC YEMEN

683. In a letter dated 1 December 1973 (S/11140), the representative of Democratic Yemen stated that units of the United States Seventh Fleet were currently stationed in the Arabian Sea near Bab-el-Mandab. His Government considered that American naval deployment an act of military provocation, which endangered the peace and security of all the Arab peoples of the area.

Chapter 19

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC YEMEN AND OMAN

684. In a letter dated 19 November 1973 (S/11121), the representative of Oman stated that on 18 November a military aircraft of the Democratic Yemen air force had entered Omani air space and bombarded an area of Oman adjacent to the [South] Yemeni border. Furthermore, it had become apparent that units of the regular army of Democratic Yemen had been penetrating Omani territory to perpetrate sabotage activities, in the company of insurgents of the Dhofar mountains. He requested that the Secretary-General exercise his good offices in convincing the Government of Democratic Yemen to cease its provocation and its interference in the internal affairs of Oman.

685. In a letter dated 26 November (S/11131), the representative of Democratic Yemen indicated that his Government had categorically rejected all the Omani allegations. He added, however, that it was a fact that Sultan Qabus of Oman and his colonial masters were facing an armed revolution by the Omani masses under the leadership of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf.

REPORTS ON THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

686. The report of the Trusteeship Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, covering the period from 17 June 1972 to 22 June 1973, was communicated to the Security Council in document S/10976 (*Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Special Supplement No. 1*).

687. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 70 (1949) of 7 March 1949, the Secretary-General, on 7 June 1974, transmitted to members of the Security Council the report (S/11315) of the Government of the United States of America on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the period from 1 July 1972 to 30 June 1973.

Chapter 21

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

688. By a note verbale dated 30 July 1973 (S/10982), the representative of Zambia transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a statement on the situation in Cambodia issued by the representatives of non-aligned countries at the United Nations on 26 July 1973. In that statement, the representatives of non-aligned countries condemned the indiscriminate and massive bombing by the armed forces of the United States of America as acts of aggression against the people and territory of Cambodia and as violations of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and of chapter 7 of the Paris Agreement of 27 January 1973, particularly subparagraph (6) of article 20. They demanded that the bombings of Cambodian territory cease forthwith and that all other acts of aggression against the people of Cambodia be brought to an end without any delay, so that peace might be restored to that war-ravaged country and its people might freely determine their own destiny without outside interference.

Chapter 22

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING CERTAIN ISLANDS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

689. By a letter dated 18 January 1974 (S/11199), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Viet-Nam transmitted a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet-Nam containing charges that the People's Republic of China had violated the sovereignty of Viet-Nam by sending Chinese nationals and boats to three islands in Viet-Nam's Paracels archipelago. In the note dated 16 January, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that on 11 January the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs had claimed Chinese sovereignty over the Viet-Nameese archipelagos of the Paracels and Spratley Islands in the South China Sea; and, during the preceding few days, the Chinese authorities had openly violated the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of Viet-Nam by sending their nationals and boats into the territorial waters of the Paracels. The fact that those archipelagos were indivisible parts of the Republic of Viet-Nam's territory was based on geographical and historical grounds, as well as on international law. The administrative acts by which the Republic of Viet-Nam exercised sovereignty over those islands had not been challenged by any country, including China. As the violation of its sovereignty constituted a threat to the peace and security of the region, his Government requested the Security Council to take all appropriate

measures which the Council deemed necessary to correct the situation.

690. In a letter dated 20 January (S/11200), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam charged that on 17 January the People's Republic of China had sent an important naval task force to the Paracels archipelago; and that on 19 January a Chinese landing party had opened fire on Viet-Nameese troops and taken other hostile actions. He complained that China was engaging in aggression across international borders against an independent and sovereign State with the aim of occupying and annexing Viet-Nameese territories by force of arms. In accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Charter, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam drew the attention of the Security Council to that grave situation and requested the President to convene an immediate meeting of the Council to consider the Chinese aggression and take urgent actions to correct the situation.

691. By a letter dated 21 January (S/11201), the representative of China transmitted the text of a statement by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 20 January, in which it was charged that since 15 January the Saigon authorities in "South Viet-Nam" had sent naval and air forces to encroach on the Yungle Islands of

China's Hsisha Islands and dispatched armed troops to forcibly occupy China's Kanchuan and Chinyin Islands. It added that on 19 January Saigon forces had made an armed attack on China's Chenhang Island, killing and wounding a number of Chinese fishermen and militia-men, and that Saigon's naval forces had been first to open fire on China's warships on patrol duty. Chinese naval units had been forced to fight back in self-defence. The statement charged that the Saigon authorities had long attempted to invade and occupy China's Hsisha and Mansha Islands. They had not only illegally incorporated into their bounds more than 10 islands of China's Nansha Islands, including Nanwei and Taiping, but had carried out military provocations against China and seized China's territory by armed force. The Chinese Government and people strongly protested those acts. As was known to all, the Hsisha as well as the Nansha, Chungsha and Tungsha Islands had always been China's territory. That indisputable fact was maintained by all Chinese and any pretexts used by the Saigon authorities in their attempt to seize China's territory were wholly untenable. China had never occupied the territory of other countries, nor would it tolerate the occupation of its territory by others. The Chinese Government and people had the right to take all necessary actions of self-defence to safeguard China's territorial

integrity and sovereignty. Captured personnel of the other side would be repatriated at an appropriate time. The Saigon authorities must immediately stop all their military provocations against China and their illegal activities of invasion and occupation of China's territory, or take all the consequences arising therefrom.

692. In a letter dated 24 January (S/11202), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam stated that he had made his earlier request for an urgent meeting of the Security Council in the hope that the Council would remedy the situation. However, since the People's Republic of China was a permanent member of the Council and had veto power, and since its representative had issued a thoroughly negative statement on the matter, there was little hope for any constructive debate or positive action. Accordingly, his communications should be regarded as designed to draw the attention of the Security Council to its responsibilities so that it might decide what should be done to correct the situation. Viet-Nam again rejected the unfounded claim of China to the Hoang-Sa (Paracels) and Truong-Sa (Spratley) archipelagos and reaffirmed the sovereignty of the Republic of Viet-Nam over the islands. Viet-Nam would take all necessary measures to defend its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

Chapter 23

ORDERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

693. Pursuant to Article 41, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council, for the information of its members, copies of Orders of the Court, indicating interim measures of protection in connexion with cases before it.

A. Interim measures of protection in the Nuclear Tests Cases

694. On 6 July 1973 (S/10962), the Secretary-General transmitted copies of two Orders of 22 June by which the Court had indicated interim measures of protection in the Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France and New Zealand v. France). The Court, by these two Orders, indicated the following provisional measures pending its final decision in the proceedings instituted on 9 May by Australia against France, and by New Zealand against France: each of the parties should ensure that no action of any kind was taken that might aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to the Court or prejudice the rights of the other parties in respect of the carrying out of whatever decision the Court might render in the case; and in particular, the French Government should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposits of radio-active fall-out on Australian territory and on the territories of New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue or the Tokelau Islands.

B. Interim measures of protection in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases

695. On 2 August (S/10979), the Secretary-General transmitted copies of two Orders of 12 July by which the Court had continued the interim measures of protection indicated in its Order of 17 August 1972 (see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 2, Chapter 25*) concerning the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland and Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland). By its Orders of 12 July, the Court confirmed that the provisional measures it had indicated on 17 August 1972 should, subject to revocation or modification by the Court, remain operative until the Court had given final judgement in the cases.

C. Interim measures of protection in the case concerning Pakistani Prisoners of War

696. On 2 August (S/10980), the Secretary-General transmitted a copy of an Order of 13 July by which the Court had indicated interim measures of protection in the case concerning the trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India). By that Order, the Court decided that the written proceedings should first be addressed to the question of its jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, and fixed time-limits for the written proceedings.

Chapter 24

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES

697. By a joint letter dated 10 July 1973 (S/10964), the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of a joint communiqué on the negotiations held in the United States from 18 to 25 June between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Leonid Brezhnev, and the President of the United States, Mr. Richard M. Nixon, and their associates.

698. The communiqué stated that the two sides had agreed that the process of reshaping relations between the United States and the USSR on the basis of peaceful coexistence and equal security was progressing in an encouraging manner and constituted an important contribution to strengthening peace and international security, to curbing the arms race and to developing business-like co-operation among States with different social systems. On 22 June, the two States had concluded an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, which strengthened the foundations of international security as a whole. They had emphasized the fundamental importance of the treaty on the limitations of anti-ballistic missile systems and the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms; and they had reaffirmed their intention to carry them out and their readiness to move ahead jointly toward an agreement on the further limitation of strategic arms. Both sides considered that the current process of improvement in the international situation created new and favourable opportunities for reducing tensions, settling outstanding international issues, and creating a permanent structure of peace. They had expressed their deep satisfaction at the conclusion of the agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Viet-Nam, and had reaffirmed their stand that the political futures of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia should be left to the respective peoples to determine, free from outside interference. They had also noted with satisfaction that in Europe the process of relaxing tensions and developing co-operation was actively continuing and thereby contributing to international stability. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, opening on 3 July, would enhance the possibilities for strengthening European security. The goal of lasting peace would be further advanced by a reduction of military tensions in Central Europe through the negotiations on the mutual reductions of forces and armaments in the area, which would begin

on 30 October. Finally, both parties had expressed their deep concern with the situation in the Middle East and had agreed to continue to exert their efforts to promote the quickest possible settlement in accordance with the interests of all States in the area and with the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.

699. By a joint letter dated 23 January 1974 (S/11205), the representatives of Romania and the United States transmitted to the President of the Security Council a joint statement signed by the President of Romania, Mr. Nicolae Ceausescu, and the President of the United States, Mr. Richard M. Nixon, during the visit of the former to the United States from 4 to 7 December 1973. The statement emphasized the friendly relations existing between the two countries as well as their co-operation in political, economic, cultural, and scientific fields. It also stressed the importance of strengthening the role of the United Nations, the relaxation of tensions, European security, peace in Viet-Nam, and a Middle East settlement based on Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967.

700. By a joint letter dated 12 February (S/11226), the representatives of Cuba and the USSR transmitted the text of a Declaration signed by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Mr. Fidel Castro Ruz, and by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Leonid Brezhnev, during the visit of the latter to Cuba from 28 January to 3 February. The Declaration emphasized the fraternal friendship between the Soviet and Cuban peoples and between their Communist Parties; the expansion of Soviet-Cuban co-operation in various fields, and their identity of views on many international issues such as disarmament and colonialism.

701. By a joint letter dated 19 March (S/11239), the representatives of Cuba and the German Democratic Republic transmitted excerpts from a Declaration signed in Havana on 26 February by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Mr. Fidel Castro Ruz, and by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Mr. Erich Honecker. The Declaration emphasized the friendship and deepening co-operation between the two countries as well as the identity of their views on such international issues as the situation in Indo-China, the problems of European security, the Middle East conflict and the liquidation of colonialism.

Chapter 25

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

702. On 16 August 1973, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed a letter (S/10999) to the Secretary-General transmitting a statement, in accordance with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2993 (XXVII), entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security". The statement noted that there

was a trend in international relations towards *détente* and towards the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. More favourable prospects had opened up for the peaceful settlement of disputes, no matter how complicated, in the interests of world peace. Among many important contributions to that positive development were the agreements concluded between the USSR and

the United States on the prevention of nuclear war and on respect for the rights and interests of all States, as well as their agreement to refrain from the threat or use of force. The USSR considered that the cessation of the arms race and the implementation of disarmament measures would have great significance for the strengthening of international security. A major step would be the immediate implementation of the General Assembly's decision at its twenty-seventh session concerning a World Disarmament Conference. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, the discussion of the question of strengthening international security at the forthcoming twenty-eighth session of the Assembly should be conducted in such a way as to facilitate the consolidation and further development of the successes already achieved in the general normalization of the international situation. To those ends it was essential for the session to have a comprehensive discussion of the measures taken by States to implement the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security and also to outline specific new measures for the further implementation of its most important provisions. The USSR was in favour of settling the conflict in the Middle East on the basis of principles which would safeguard the rights and interests of all peoples and States in that area, including the interests of the Arab people of Palestine. The basis for a just settlement of the problem of the Middle East was the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories. It attached great significance to the Charter principle of the non-use of force in international relations, and considered that an effective means of converting that principle into a rule of international life would be a solemn declaration of the General Assembly on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations undertaking to refrain from the use of force in international relations and to prohibit permanently the use of nuclear weapons. To that end the Security Council should adopt the appropriate decision on the matter and States should include in bilateral multilateral instruments and declarations provisions on support for the principle of the non-use of force and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Finally, it considered it essential, in accordance with the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security and the Charter of the United Nations, that all States should take measures to implement the decisions of the United Nations on decolonization, *apartheid* and racism with a view to the speediest possible elimination of hotbeds of colonial and racist conflicts.

703. By a letter dated 19 February 1974 (S/11223), the representative of the USSR transmitted the text of a message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR in connexion with a message received on 17 January from the Chairman of the Eighth Special Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity. The message emphasized Soviet sup-

port for the activities of OAU; the opposition of the USSR to colonialism; the need for complete implementation of Security Council decisions on the Middle East; the contribution of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security; and Soviet determination to support the United Nations and the Security Council in the struggle for peace, the lessening of tensions and the freedom of peoples.

704. By a joint letter dated 23 April (S/11276), the representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR transmitted the text of the communiqué issued by the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which had been held on 17 and 18 April in Warsaw.

705. The communiqué stated that the trend towards the lessening of tensions was at present the dominant feature in Europe and the whole world. The relaxation of international tensions had been decisive in the solution of the Viet-Nam and Laos conflicts as well as on the South Asian subcontinent and in the Middle East. The constructive foreign policy activity of the socialist countries had contributed towards normalizing the situation in Europe. The Conference on European Security and Co-operation, which should lay down the principles of interstate relations and thereby safeguard the security of all European peoples, should be a starting point for building new relations among all the States of the European continent. It was also important to supplement the political relaxation with military relaxation; the success of the talks on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe would make a considerable contribution to that end. The increased role in international affairs of the non-aligned movement and its growing contribution to the lessening of tensions were a welcome development. Great importance was attached to enhancing the role of the United Nations, thereby increasing its effectiveness on the basis of the United Nations Charter in solving international problems, strengthening peace and promoting co-operation. Finally, the participants stood ready to disband the Warsaw Treaty Organization simultaneously with the disbanding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or, as an initial step, to undertake the liquidation of their military organizations.

706. Transmitted with the communiqué were the following 3 statements: (a) a statement on the Middle East calling for steps aimed at implementing all the provisions of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973); (b) a statement on Viet-Nam appraising the Paris Agreement as an historic accomplishment of the heroic Viet-Nameese people and calling for strict and unswerving compliance with the Paris Agreement by all sides; and (c) a statement on Chile condemning the arbitrary rule of the Chilean military junta as a gross violation of the United Nations Charter.

Chapter 26

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING RESOLUTION 1796 (LIV) OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

707. By a note verbale dated 28 June 1973 (S/10961), the Secretary-General drew the attention of the President of the Security Council to resolution 1796 (LIV), entitled "Question of the absence and gross infringements of

trade union rights", which had been adopted by the Economic and Social Council on 18 May, as well as to the resolution and the report prepared by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of Experts of the Commission on Human Rights.

Chapter 27

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3186 (XXVIII) ON THE REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

708. By a letter dated 28 January 1974 (S/11204), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council General Assembly resolution 3186 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, in connexion with the report of the Security Council, and drew particular attention to paragraph 3, by which the General Assembly drew the attention of the Security Council, when considering steps to enhance its effectiveness in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Charter, to the views and suggestions submitted by Member States in response to Assembly resolutions 2864 (XXVI) and 2991 (XXVII), as contained in the annexes to the Secretary-General's reports submitted in accordance with these resolutions.

APPENDICES

I. Membership of the Security Council during the years 1973 and 1974

1973

Australia
Austria
China
France
Guinea
India
Indonesia
Kenya
Panama
Peru
Sudan
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
Yugoslavia

1974

Australia
Austria
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
China
Costa Rica
France
Indonesia
Iraq
Kenya
Mauritania
Peru
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United Republic of Cameroon
United States of America

II. Representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives accredited to the Security Council

The following representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives served on the Security Council during the period covered by the present report

Australia

Sir Laurence McIntyre, C.B.E.
Mr. Charles Robin Ashwin
Mr. A. Duncan Campbell
Mr. Lance Joseph
Mr. H. C. Mott
Mr. R. Douglas Starkey
Mr. R. Hugh Wyndham
Mr. J. B. Campbell
Mr. A. C. Kevin

Austria

Mr. Peter Jankowitsch
Mr. Wolfgang Wolte
Mr. Georg J. Lennkh
Mr. Alexander Christiani

Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic^a

Mr. Vitaly Stepanovich Smirnov
Mr. Oleg Nikolaevich Pashkevich

China

Mr. Chiao Kuan-hua
Mr. Huang Hua
Mr. Chuang Yen

Costa Rica^a

Mr. Gonzalo J. Facio
Mr. Fernando Salazar Navarrete
Mr. Ricardo Morales Hernández
Mr. Bernal Vargas Saborio
Mrs. Emilia Castro de Barish

France

Mr. Louis de Guiringaud
Mr. Jacques Lecompt
Mr. Guy Scalabre
Mr. André Travert

Guinea^b

Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cissé
Mr. Hady Touré
Mr. Philippe Maddy
Mr. Morou Balde

India^b

Mr. Samar Sen
Mr. N. P. Jain
Mr. A. K. Budhiraja

Indonesia

Mr. Chaidir Anwar Sani
Mr. Yoga Soegomo
Mr. Raden Kusumasmoro
Mr. Djoko Juwono
Mr. Prayitno Singgih

Iraq^a

Mr. Abdul Karim Al-Shaikhly
Mr. Talib Hussain El-Shibib
Mr. Wissam Zahawie
Mr. Hisham Al-Khudhairi
Mr. Riyadh Al-Qaysi
Mr. Amer Salih Araim
Mr. Sa'ad Nouri Al-Khayat

Kenya

Mr. Njoroge Mungai
Mr. Joseph Odero-Jowi

^a Term of office began on 1 January 1974.

^b Term of office ended on 31 December 1973.

Mr. Charles Gatere Maina
 Mr. Omar Ahmed Fakih
 Mr. Ochieng Adala
 Mr. Peter Joseph Ndung'u
 Mr. Frank X. J. C. Njenga
 Mr. Donald Wacieni Kaniaru

Mauritania^a

Mr. Moulaye El Hassen
 Mr. Ismail Ould Mouloud
 Mr. Mamadou Kane

Panama^b

Mr. Aquilino E. Boyd
 Mr. Narciso E. Garay
 Mr. Dídimo Ríos
 Mr. Jorge E. Illueca
 Mr. Antonio Stagg

Peru

Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar
 Mr. Ricardo Walter Stubbs
 Mr. Alvaro de Soto

Sudan^b

Mr. Mansour Khalid
 Mr. Rahmatalla Abdulla
 Mr. Salah Ahmed Ibrahim
 Mr. Izzeldin Hamid
 Mr. Abdel Magied A. Hassan
 Mr. Isaac Odhong La

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. Yakov Aleksandrovich Malik
 Mr. Viktor Levonovich Issraelyan
 Mr. Vasily Stepanovich Safronchuk

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Sir Colin Crowe
 Sir Donald Maitland
 Mr. Ivor Richard
 Mr. K. D. Jamieson
 Mr. J. Murray
 Mr. M. S. Weir
 Mr. Henry Steel
 Mr. J. C. Thomas

United Republic of Cameroon^a

Mr. Vincent Efon
 Mr. Michel Njine
 Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh
 Mr. Ambroise Mvogo
 Mr. Johnson Ndimbie
 Mr. Souaibou Hayatou

United States of America

Mr. John A. Scali
 Mr. W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.
 Mr. William E. Schauffele, Jr.

Yugoslavia^b

Mr. Milos Minic
 Mr. Lazar Mojsov
 Mr. Miljan Komatina
 Mr. Cvijeto Job

III. Presidents of the Security Council

The following representatives served as President of the Security Council during the period covered by the present report

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. Yakov Aleksandrovich Malik (16 to 30 June 1973)

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Sir Colin Crowe
 Mr. Kenneth Jamieson } (1 to 31 July 1973)

United States of America

Mr. John A. Scali (1 to 31 August 1973)

Yugoslavia

Mr. Lazar Mojsov (1 to 30 September 1973)

Australia

Sir Laurence McIntyre (1 to 31 October 1973)

Austria

Mr. Peter Jankowitsch (1 to 30 November 1973)

China

Mr. Huang Hua (1 to 31 December 1973)

Costa Rica

Mr. Gonzalo Facio (1 to 31 January 1974)

France

Mr. Louis de Guiringaud (1 to 28 February 1974)

Indonesia

Mr. Chaidir Anwar Sani (1 to 31 March 1974)

Iraq

Mr. Talib El-Shibib (1 to 30 April 1974)

Kenya

Mr. Charles Gatere Maina (1 to 31 May 1974)

Mauritania

Mr. Moulaye El Hassen (1 to 15 June 1974)

IV. Meetings of the Security Council during the period from 16 June 1973 to 15 June 1974

Meeting	Subject	Date	Meeting	Subject	Date
1729th	Admission of new Members: (a) Application of the German Democratic Republic for admis-	21 June 1973		sion to membership in the United Nations: Letter dated 12 June 1973 from the Min-	

Meeting	Subject	Date	Meeting	Subject	Date
	<p>Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic addressed to the Secretary-General (S/10945)</p> <p>(b) Application of the Federal Republic of Germany for admission to membership in the United Nations: Letter dated 13 June 1973 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany addressed to the Secretary-General (S/10949)</p>			<p>Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to the Secretary-General (S/10966)</p>	
1730th	<p>Admission of new Members:</p> <p>(a) Application of the German Democratic Republic for admission to membership in the United Nations: Letter dated 12 June 1973 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic addressed to the Secretary-General (S/10945)</p> <p>(b) Application of the Federal Republic of Germany for admission to membership in the United Nations: Letter dated 13 June 1973 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany addressed to the Secretary-General (S/10949)</p> <p>(c) Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the application of the German Democratic Republic and the application of the Federal Republic of Germany for admission to membership in the United Nations (S/10957)</p>	22 June 1973	1732nd	<p>Admission of new Members:</p> <p>(a) Application of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas for admission to membership in the United Nations: Telegram dated 10 July 1973 from the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to the Secretary-General (S/10966)</p> <p>(b) Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the application of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas for admission to membership in the United Nations (S/10968)</p>	18 July 1973
			1733rd	<p>Examination of the situation in the Middle East:</p> <p>(a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973)</p> <p>(b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) of 20 April 1973 (S/10929)</p>	20 July 1973
			1734th	Ditto	25 July 1973
			1735th	Ditto	25 July 1973
			1736th	<p>The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 11 August 1973 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10983)</p>	13 August 1973
			1737th	Ditto	14 August 1973
			1738th	Ditto	14 August 1973
			1739th	Ditto	15 August 1973
			1740th	Ditto	15 August 1973
			1741st	<p>Complaint by Cuba</p> <p>(a) Letter dated 13 September 1973 from the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., of the Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10995);</p>	17 September 1973
1731st	<p>Admission of new Members: Application of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas for admission to membership in the United Nations: Telegram dated 10 July 1973 from the</p>	17 July 1973			

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Date</i>
	(b) Letter dated 12 September 1973 from the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., of the Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10993)		1755th	Letter dated 8 November 1973 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning the appointment of the Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11103)	12 November 1973
1742nd	Ditto	18 September 1973	1756th	The situation in Namibia:	10 December 1973
1743rd	The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 7 October 1973 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11010)	8 October 1973		(a) Letter dated 4 December 1973 from the Permanent Representatives of Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11145)	
1744th	Ditto	9 October 1973		(b) Report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 323 (1972) concerning the question of Namibia (S/10921)	
1745th	Ditto	11 October 1973	1757th	Ditto	11 December 1973
1746th	Ditto	12 October 1973	1758th	Ditto	11 December 1973
1747th	Ditto	21/22 October 1973	1759th	Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488)	14 December 1973
1748th	Ditto	23 October 1973		Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/11137)	
1749th	Ditto	24/25 October 1973	1760th (private)	Arrangements for the proposed Peace Conference on the Middle East	15 December 1973
1750th	Ditto	25 October 1973	1761st	Inclusion of Chinese among the working languages of the Security Council:	17 January 1974
1751st	Ditto	26 October 1973		(a) Letter dated 10 January 1974 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11187)	
1752nd	The situation in the Middle East: (a) Letter dated 7 October 1973 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11010) (b) Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) (S/11052/Rev.1)	27 October 1973		(b) Letter dated 11 January 1974 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11190)	
1753rd (private)	Consideration of the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly	31 October 1973	1762nd	Complaint by Iraq concerning the incidents on its frontier with Iran: Letter dated 12 February 1974 from the Deputy Permanent Representative	15 February 1974
1754th	The situation in the Middle East: (a) Letter dated 7 October 1973 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11010) (b) Progress reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11056/Add.1)	2 November 1973			

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Date</i>
	of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11216)			Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/11294)	
1763rd	Ditto	20 February 1974	1772nd	Ditto	29 May 1974
1764th	Ditto	28 February 1974	1773rd	The situation in the Middle East:	30 May 1974
1765th	The situation in the Middle East: Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11248)	8 April 1974		(a) Letter dated 30 May 1974 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11304)	
1766th	The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 13 April 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11264)	15 April 1974		(b) Report of the Secretary-General (S/11302 and Add1)	
1767th	Ditto	16 April 1974	1774th	Ditto	31 May 1974
1768th	Ditto	18 April 1974	1775th	Admission of new Members: Application of the People's Republic of Bangladesh for admission to membership in the United Nations	7 June 1974
1769th	Ditto	24 April 1974			
1770th	Complaint by Iraq concerning incidents on its frontier with Iran: Report by the Secretary-General dated 20 May 1974 on the implementation of the consensus adopted by the Security Council on 28 February 1974 (S/11291)	28 May 1974	1776th	Admission of new Members: Application of the People's Republic of Bangladesh for admission to membership in the United Nations—Report of the Security Council Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the application of the People's Republic of Bangladesh for admission to membership in the United Nations (S/11316)	10 June 1974
1771st	Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488)	29 May 1974			

V. Resolutions adopted by the Security Council during the period from 16 June 1973 to 15 June 1974

<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Date of adoption</i>	<i>Subject</i>
334 (1973)	15 June 1973	The Cyprus question
335 (1973)	22 June 1973	Admission of new Members to the United Nations (German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany)
336 (1973)	18 July 1973	Admission of new Members to the United Nations (Commonwealth of the Bahamas)
337 (1973)	15 August 1973	The situation in the Middle East
338 (1973)	21 October 1973	The situation in the Middle East
339 (1973)	23 October 1973	The situation in the Middle East
340 (1973)	25 October 1973	The situation in the Middle East
341 (1973)	27 October 1973	The situation in the Middle East
342 (1973)	11 December 1973	The situation in the Middle East
343 (1973)	14 December 1973	The Cyprus question
344 (1973)	15 December 1973	The situation in the Middle East
345 (1974)	17 January 1974	Inclusion of Chinese among the working languages of the Security Council
346 (1974)	8 April 1974	The situation in the Middle East
347 (1974)	24 April 1974	The situation in the Middle East
348 (1974)	28 May 1974	Complaint by Iraq concerning incidents on its frontier with Iran
349 (1973)	29 May 1974	The Cyprus question
350 (1974)	31 May 1974	The situation in the Middle East
351 (1974)	10 June 1974	Admission of new Members

VI. Meetings of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council during the period
from 16 June 1973 to 15 June 1974

1. Security Council Committee on the Admission
of New Members

Meeting	Date
42nd	21 June 1973
43rd	17 July 1973
44th	7 June 1974

2. Security Council Committee established in pursuance of
resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of South-
ern Rhodesia

Meeting	Date
145th	21 June 1973
146th	26 June 1973
147th	29 June 1973
148th	3 July 1973
149th	9 July 1973
150th	11 July 1973
151st	13 July 1973
152nd	18 July 1973
153rd	19 July 1973
154th	25 July 1973
155th	26 July 1973
156th	27 July 1973
157th	31 July 1973
158th	2 August 1973
159th	6 August 1973
160th	8 August 1973
161st	10 August 1973
162nd	16 August 1973
163rd	22 August 1973
164th	24 August 1973
165th	28 August 1973

Meeting	Date
166th	30 August 1973
167th	4 September 1973
168th	6 September 1973
169th	11 September 1973
170th	13 September 1973
171st	2 October 1973
172nd	12 October 1973
173rd	18 October 1973
174th	5 November 1973
175th	9 November 1973
176th	14 November 1973
177th	21 November 1973
178th	19 December 1973
179th	20 December 1973
180th	21 December 1973
181st	21 December 1973
182nd	28 December 1973
183rd	30 January 1974
184th	6 February 1974
185th	13 February 1974
186th	27 February 1974
187th	6 March 1974
188th	13 March 1974
189th	3 April 1974
190th	10 April 1974
191st	17 April 1974
192nd	1 May 1974
193rd	8 May 1974
194th	17 May 1974
195th	21 May 1974
196th	23 May 1974
197th	3 June 1974
198th	4 June 1974
199th	12 June 1974

VII. Representatives, Chairmen and Principal Secretaries of the
Military Staff Committee

A. REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH SERVICE IN RESPECT OF EACH DELEGATION

16 June 1973 to 15 June 1974

Chinese delegation

Mr. Lin Fang, Army representative and head of delegation	16 June 1973 to present
Mr. Chang Wu-tang, Air Force representative	16 June 1973 to present
Mr. Yang Ming-liang, Naval representative	16 June 1973 to present
Mr. Chi Shu-jang, Assistant to the head of delegation	16 June 1973 to present

French delegation

Brigadier General E. de Grasset, French Army	16 June 1973 to present
Colonel M. J. Espieux, French Air Force	16 June 1973 to present
Lieutenant Commander P. Andrieu, French Navy	16 June 1973 to 20 August 1973
Commander A. Sauvage, French Navy	20 August 1973 to present

USSR delegation

Major General V. S. Tovma, USSR Armed Forces	16 June 1973 to present
Colonel R. N. Soupriagin, USSR Armed Forces	16 June 1973 to 6 June 1974
Colonel V. I. Linkevitch, USSR Armed Forces	16 June 1973 to present
Captain 3rd Rank A. P. Koval, USSR Armed Forces	16 June 1973 to present

United Kingdom delegation

Vice Admiral I. Easton, Royal Navy, head of delegation	16 June 1973 to present
Rear Admiral L. B. Bell-Davies, Royal Navy	16 June 1973 to present
Brigadier H. G. Woods, British Army	16 June 1973 to present
Air Commodore W. Harbison, Royal Air Force	16 June 1973 to present

United States delegation

Lieutenant General A. J. Russell, US Air Force	16 June 1973 to 15 October 1973
Lieutenant General D. L. Crow, US Air Force	15 October 1973 to present
Vice Admiral H. L. Harty, Jr., US Navy	16 June 1973 to 1 December 1973
Vice Admiral J. P. Moorer, US Navy	1 December 1973 to present
Lieutenant General D. H. Cowles, US Army	16 June 1973 to present

B. CHAIRMEN AND PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES AT MEETINGS

16 June 1973 to 15 June 1974

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Chairman and Principal Secretary</i>	<i>Delegation</i>
731st	28 June 1973	Brigadier General E. de Grasset, French Army Major J. L. Crespin, French Army	France
732nd	12 July 1973	Major General V. S. Tovma, USSR Armed Forces Captain 3rd Rank A. P. Koval, USSR Armed Forces	USSR
733rd	26 July 1973	Colonel R. N. Soupriagin, USSR Armed Forces Captain 3rd Rank A. P. Koval, USSR Armed Forces	USSR
734th	9 Aug. 1973	Vice Admiral I. Easton, Royal Navy Colonel J. Wilson, British Army	UK
735th	23 Aug. 1973	Rear Admiral L. B. Bell-Davies, Royal Navy Captain K. C. D. Watson, Royal Navy	UK
736th	6 Sept. 1973	Lieutenant General A. J. Russell, US Air Force Colonel R. E. Sheridan, US Air Force	USA
737th	20 Sept. 1973	Vice Admiral H. L. Harty, Jr., US Navy Colonel C. S. Johnson, Jr., US Army	USA
738th	4 Oct. 1973	Mr. Lin Fang, Army representative Mr. Chi Shu-jang, Assistant to the head of delegation	China
739th	18 Oct. 1973	Mr. Lin Fang, Army representative Mr. Yang Ming-liang, Naval representative	China
740th	1 Nov. 1973	Brigadier General E. de Grasset, French Army Colonel M. J. Espieux, French Air Force	France
741st	15 Nov. 1973	Brigadier General E. de Grasset, French Army Commander A. Sauvage, French Navy	France
742nd	29 Nov. 1973	Brigadier General E. de Grasset, French Army Brigadier General E. de Grasset, French Army	France
743rd	13 Dec. 1973	Colonel R. N. Soupriagin, USSR Armed Forces Captain 3rd Rank A. P. Koval, USSR Armed Forces	USSR
744th	27 Dec. 1973	Colonel R. N. Soupriagin, USSR Armed Forces Captain 3rd Rank A. P. Koval, USSR Armed Forces	USSR
745th	10 Jan. 1974	Air Commodore W. Harbison, Royal Air Force Captain K. C. D. Watson, Royal Navy	UK
746th	24 Jan. 1974	Brigadier H. G. Woods, British Army Colonel J. C. C. Richards, Royal Marines	UK
747th	7 Feb. 1974	Vice Admiral J. P. Moorer, US Navy Colonel R. E. Sheridan, US Air Force	USA
748th	21 Feb. 1974	Vice Admiral J. P. Moorer, US Navy Colonel R. E. Sheridan, US Air Force	USA
749th	7 Mar. 1974	Mr. Lin Fang, Army representative Mr. Chang Wu-tang, Air Force representative	China
750th	21 Mar. 1974	Mr. Lin Fang, Army representative Mr. Chang Wu-tang, Air Force representative	China
751st	4 Apr. 1974	Brigadier General E. de Grasset, French Army Brigadier General E. de Grasset, French Army	France
752nd	18 Apr. 1974	Lieutenant Colonel R. F. Hervé, French Army Lieutenant Colonel R. F. Hervé, French Army	France
753rd	2 May 1974	Colonel R. N. Soupriagin, USSR Armed Forces Captain 3rd Rank A. P. Koval, USSR Armed Forces	USSR
754th	16 May 1974	Major General V. S. Tovma, USSR Armed Forces Captain 3rd Rank A. P. Koval, USSR Armed Forces	USSR
755th	30 May 1974	Colonel R. N. Soupriagin, USSR Armed Forces Captain 3rd Rank A. P. Koval, USSR Armed Forces	USSR
756th	13 June 1974	Vice Admiral I. Easton, Royal Navy Group Captain A. D. A. Honley, Royal Air Force	UK

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