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RESOLUTIONS

Resolution no.	Title	Chief sponsor	Discussion on page	Votes	
				First Committee	General Assembly
43/62 . . .	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/25 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	Mexico	239	128-0-6	149-0-5
43/63 . . .	Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions				
	Resolution A	Mexico	214	118-3-13	136-4-13
	Resolution B	Mexico	215	108-3-21	127-3-21
43/64 . . .	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty	Australia	220	127-2-6	146-2-6
43/65 . . .	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	Egypt	374	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
43/66 . . .	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	Pakistan	250	99-2-32	116-3-34
43/67 . . .	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Especially Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects	Sweden	337	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
43/68 . . .	Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	Bulgaria	228	99-17-16	117-17-16
43/69 . . .	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	Pakistan	228	133-0-4	152-0-3
43/70 . . .	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	Sri Lanka	300	137-1	154-1

43/71... Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa

A. Implementation of the Declaration 242 132-0-4 151-0-4
 B. Nuclear capability of South Africa 242 116-4-13 138-4-12

43/72... Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

Byelorussian SSR 312 134-0-2 152-0-2

43/73... Reduction of military budgets

Romania 351 adopted without a vote adopted without a vote

43/74... Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

A. Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention 283 adopted without a vote adopted without a vote
 B. Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 288 adopted without a vote adopted without a vote
 C. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons 284 adopted without a vote adopted without a vote

Australia

Austria

Poland

43/75... General and complete disarmament

A. Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 174 120-0-13 141-0-12
 B. Relationship between disarmament and development 113 adopted without a vote adopted without a vote
 C. Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons 313 adopted without a vote adopted without a vote
 D. Conventional disarmament 332 adopted without a vote adopted without a vote
 E. Nuclear disarmament 177 adopted without a vote adopted without a vote
 F. Conventional disarmament 333 adopted without a vote adopted without a vote
 G. Objective information on military matters 114 109-0-9 130-0-10
 H. Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament 28 106-2-24 131-2-20
 I. International arms transfers 371 93-0-36 110-1-38

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

United Kingdom

Denmark

China

China

United Kingdom

Ukrainian SSR

Colombia

Resolution no.	Title	Chief sponsor	Discussion on page	Votes	
				First Committee	General Assembly
43/75 . . . (cont.)	J. Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	Iraq	314	99-2-30	116-2-29
	K. Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	Canada	179	126-1-6	144-1-7
	L. Naval armaments and disarmament	Sweden	116	134-1	152-1-1
	M. Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof	Norway	117	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
	N. Comprehensive United Nations study on nuclear weapons	Sweden	369	122-1-9	141-1-9
	O. Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	United Kingdom	175	70-0-58	103-0-46
	P. Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe	France	334	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
	Q. Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes	Nigeria	315	103-3-11	129-1-10
	R. Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament	Cameroon	22	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
	S. Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	Peru	335	110-0-18	125-0-23
	T. Dumping of radioactive wastes	Zaire	316	125-0-13	141-0-13
43/76 . . .	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly				
	A. Disarmament and international security	Cyprus	91	109-1-21	129-1-21
	B. Nuclear-arms freeze	Mexico	181	116-13-3	135-12-3
	C. World Disarmament Campaign	Mexico	385	128-0-10	144-0-10
	D. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa	Zaire	387	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
	E. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	India	197	112-17-4	133-17-4

F.	United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme	Nigeria	93	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
G.	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia	Nepal	390	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
H.	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America	Peru	388	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
43/77 . . . Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session					
A.	Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security	India	377	109-7-14	129-7-14
B.	Third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament	Yugoslavia	80	132-0-2	152-0-2
43/78 . . . Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session					
A.	Report of the Disarmament Commission	Bahamas	23	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
B.	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	German Democratic Republic	193	104-17-7	127-17-6
C.	International co-operation for disarmament	Czechoslovakia	95	116-1-13	136-1-13
D.	Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter: report of the Secretary-General	Mexico	360	125-0-9	145-0-9
E.	Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament	Argentina	178	114-13-6	135-13-5
F.	Prevention of nuclear war	Argentina	195	116-3-14	136-3-14
G.	Disarmament Week	Mongolia	393	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
H.	Guidelines for confidence-building measures	Federal Republic of Germany	95	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
I.	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	Netherlands	25	73-0-53	96-0-53

Resolution no.	Title	Chief sponsor	Discussion on page	Votes	
				First Committee	General Assembly
43/78 . . . (cont.)	J. Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security	Romania	364	125-1-9	143-1-9
	K. Comprehensive programme of disarmament	Mexico	112	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
	L. Consideration of the declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade	Nigeria	97	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
	M. Report of the Conference on Disarmament	Yugoslavia	25	117-3-14	136-3-14
43/79 . . .	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	Sri Lanka	31	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
43/80 . . .	Israeli nuclear armament	Jordan	248	87-2-45	99-2-51
43/81 . . .	Verification in all its aspects				
	A. Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	United States	135	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
	B. Study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification	Sweden	367	130-1	150-1
43/82 . . .	Implementation of the conclusions of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Conference	United Kingdom	183	119-0-9	137-0-11
DECISIONS					
Decision no.	Title	Chief sponsor	Discussion on page	Votes	
43/422	Contribution of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament	Czechoslovakia	118	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote
43/423	Liability for the illegal transfer and/or use of prohibited weapons and weapons or substances which cause unnecessary human suffering	Trinidad and Tobago	337	adopted without a vote	adopted without a vote

EDITORIAL NOTE

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook contains a review of the main developments and negotiations in the field of disarmament taking place each year, together with a brief history of the major issues. The series began with the 1976 edition.

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook makes no claim to present fully the views of States Members of the Organization, or even of the Powers directly concerned. The substantive debates in the various disarmament bodies are summarized and a representative sample of statements is presented. Thus the views of all Member States are not covered. For further information on the official positions of States, the reader should consult the *Official Records of the General Assembly*, referred to throughout the text, and other sources. For the definitive text of General Assembly resolutions and decisions quoted in *The Yearbook*, the reader should consult the *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/43/49)*.

For an overview of the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, readers may consult *The United Nations and Disarmament: A Short History* (United Nations, 1988). For a more detailed account of the work of the Organization, they may consult *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1) and the previous volumes of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, which are referred to in footnotes throughout the text simply as *The Yearbook*, together with the appropriate volume number. The complete references are: *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2); vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4); vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales Nos. E.79.IX.2 (cloth-bound) or E.79.IX.3 (paperbound)); vol. 4: 1979 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.80.IX.6 or 7); vol. 5: 1980 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.3 or 4); vol. 6: 1981 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.6 or 7); vol. 7: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.7); vol. 8: 1983 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.84.IX.3); vol. 9: 1984 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.4); vol. 10: 1985 (Sales No. E.86.IX.7); vol. 11: 1986 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.1); and vol. 12: 1987 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.88.IX.2).

It should be noted that in the preparation of this as well as all previous volumes of *The Yearbook* identified above, the Secretariat of the United Nations has taken into account General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI), of 25 October 1971, entitled "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations".

ABBREVIATIONS and ACRONYMS

ABM	anti-ballistic missile
ASAT	anti-satellite
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CAS	Committee on Assurances of Supply
CBM	confidence-building measure
CCD	Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CDE	Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
CFE	Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CORRTEX	continuous reflectometry for radius versus time experiments
CSBM	confidence- and security-building measure
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
EC	European Community
ENDC	Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GLCM	ground-launched cruise missile
GTS	Global Telecommunication System
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
IDFD	international disarmament fund for development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INF	intermediate-range nuclear forces
INFCE	International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
ISMA	international satellite monitoring agency
JVE	joint verification experiment
LRINF	longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces
LRTNF	long-range theatre nuclear forces
MIRV	multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TNCD	Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

INTRODUCTION

THE SPIRIT OF 1988 CONTINUED IN THE POSITIVE DIRECTION that has emerged in the past two or three years. The easing of tensions and the general improvement in international relations, particularly between the Soviet Union and the United States, and between the two major military alliances, contributed to a period in which events and negotiations on a number of important security issues moved forward. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed on 8 December 1987, was ratified and went into effect on 1 June 1988. The INF Treaty, which includes verification measures in unprecedented detail, provides for the destruction of almost 2,700 missiles in the next three years and for extensive verification of certain sites and installations for 10 years thereafter. In Europe, the region that continues to have the largest concentration of armaments, the drafting of an agreement on the holding of two new sets of negotiations had, by the year's end, reached its final stages. One set of negotiations, to be held among the 23 States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw Treaty, concerns conventional forces in Europe, and the other set, to be held among the 35 States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, concerns confidence- and security-building measures. It was generally understood that with the opening of such negotiations, the long-running and unproductive Vienna Talks on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe would be discontinued.

Elsewhere, although there were no specific results in the context of arms reductions, there were events of great significance to the general sense of international security. The United Nations played an important role in several instances. The announcement of the phased withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq conflict, and—at the close of the year—the strong probability that there would be an early settlement of the situation in Namibia and neighbouring States are examples of developments that were conducive to an improved international climate.

There were, however, other signs that were less propitious. Despite the success of the INF Treaty and the prospect of a reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, which seemed to provide a promising background for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held from 31 May to 25 June, the General Assembly was unable, much to the disappointment of the international community, to adopt a substantive concluding document at that session. Nevertheless, as the Secretary-General later observed in his

annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization, the emergence of a better-focused outlook on disarmament was confirmed by a shared acceptance of some important propositions, which provided a basis for productive discussions and action in the General Assembly:

—Disarmament is not the exclusive responsibility of the two most powerful States, but a joint undertaking of all States;

—While nuclear disarmament must continue to be the primary concern, conventional disarmament has acquired a new importance and urgency;

—The qualitative aspect of the arms race needs to be addressed along with its quantitative aspect;

—National security needs to be viewed in the broader context of global issues and international concerns;

—The goals of disarmament and arms limitation need to be pursued in conjunction with efforts to resolve conflicts, build confidence and promote economic and social development;

—The existing machinery for disarmament can and should be utilized better.

In the Conference on Disarmament there was sustained progress in the negotiations on a convention banning all chemical weapons, with the *Ad Hoc* Committee set up for that purpose reviewing and improving the rolling text developed in the previous annual sessions. Several problems remain, mainly concerning verification, which involve a number of technically complex matters, yet at the end of 1988 there was a general feeling in the Conference that solutions to some of them would be found at the 1989 session. The Conference also continued its search for common ground on other agenda items, either through the establishment of *ad hoc* committees or by other organizational means, but it was clear that none of the other issues had achieved the momentum of the negotiations on chemical weapons.

At the same time, mounting concern was evident in the international community at the indications that more countries had acquired or were acquiring chemical weapons. This concern was heightened by investigations, carried out by experts appointed by the Secretary-General, into cases of alleged use of chemical weapons, which produced shocking evidence, documented in the case of the Iran-Iraq conflict, of the effects of such weapons. Arising from a proposal made by President Reagan in the General Assembly on 26 September, and reflecting the role of France as the depositary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, an offer was made by President Mitterrand to host a conference on chemical weapons in Paris in January 1989. The main objectives of the Paris conference were declared to be a high-level reaffirmation of the validity of the prohibition against the use of chemical weapons in the Geneva Protocol and the recognition of the urgent need to intensify current multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a convention to ban the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and to destroy existing stocks.

At its forty-third session, the General Assembly adopted 65 resolutions and 2 decisions on disarmament issues. The number adopted by consensus again increased, from 25 in 1987 to 27 in 1988. It was noticeable that several

proposals submitted at the third special session on disarmament were reintroduced at the General Assembly's regular session and adopted. In addition, the General Assembly endorsed the principles on verification elaborated by the Disarmament Commission.

On 7 December, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev paid his first visit to the United Nations in New York and made a wide-ranging statement of policy at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly. In that address, Mr. Gorbachev announced unilateral reductions in Soviet conventional forces and arms in Eastern Europe, made several other suggestions concerning the level of Soviet defence capability and conversion from military to civilian production, and recalled earlier Soviet proposals on the subject of developing a comprehensive system of international security.

This thirteenth edition of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* features a modest "new look" in comparison with that of its predecessors, with a smaller format and an altered structure in its topical chapters. These changes were made in the interest of achieving greater economy and efficiency and of enhancing readability.

In the new structure, most chapters, in one main section entitled "General developments and trends, 1988", review the status and evolution of work on the issues concerned, both in the United Nations and in other forums. Then, in brief individual sections, the chapters describe "Action by the Disarmament Commission", "Action by the Conference on Disarmament" and "Action by the General Assembly", as applicable. These sections refer to the major documents and initiatives put forward on the various issues and the results achieved. The positions of States on resolutions adopted by the Assembly are amplified, as before, through summaries of their explanations of vote. The new structure is expected to reduce redundancy, while permitting a clearer and more direct assessment of the questions under consideration.

The individual contributions of the specialized agencies engaged in disarmament-related activities, which have previously appeared as appendices to *The Yearbook*, are replaced by one single appendix (appendix II), compiled from the "Report of the Secretary-General on the contributions of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to the cause of disarmament".

The editors of *The Yearbook* based their decision to adopt the new structure on comments from readers and editors of past editions and considerable discussion in the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat on how the twin objectives of better readability and improved analytical value might best be achieved. The Department hopes that the "new look" will achieve these objectives for most readers and would welcome their comments.

The Department for Disarmament Affairs has produced *The Yearbook* since 1976. While it is mainly written in-house, the International Atomic Energy Agency contributes to the chapter on international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (chapter XI), and the United Nations Institute

for Disarmament Research summarizes its work in an annex to the chapter entitled "Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies" (chapter XIX). Appendix I and appendix III are prepared by the Department and provide, respectively, the status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements as of the end of 1988, and the voting patterns on the resolutions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-third session. In addition, a table of resolutions is placed immediately after the "Contents" for ease of reference.

The Yearbook series is intended primarily as a reference collection. Consequently, it focuses to a large extent on specific, active issues and is oriented towards professionals and serious students in the field of disarmament. It is also a source of reliable information on developments in international matters of interest to educational institutions and researchers engaged in the study of peace and security. Finally, it should serve the various constituencies of the United Nations World Disarmament Campaign and should be of value to anyone interested in particular disarmament issues.

PART ONE

Comprehensive approaches to disarmament

CHAPTER I

United Nations disarmament bodies and their activities in 1988

Introduction

ACCORDING TO THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, one of the purposes of the Organization is "to maintain international peace and security" (Article 1). The Charter empowers the General Assembly to consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of those goals, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and to make recommendations regarding them to the Members of the Organization or to the Security Council or to both (Article 11). "In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources", the Security Council is charged with the task of formulating plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments (Article 26).

The Charter thus envisages disarmament and the regulation of armaments as elements in the establishment of an international security system. The first explosion of an atomic weapon only weeks after the signing of the Charter and the possibility that other weapons of mass destruction would soon be introduced clearly enhanced the significance of the disarmament element in that system beyond the level envisaged by the drafters. Accordingly, during the next four decades the question of disarmament was discussed at every session of the General Assembly, in numerous subsidiary bodies and in a variety of forums outside the United Nations. In seeking to discharge its responsibilities in the field, the United Nations has used several different approaches. The number of issues addressed as part of the disarmament agenda has also multiplied.¹

¹ For a brief history of disarmament efforts under United Nations auspices, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1985* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.6). For more extensive presentations of the developments in the field in specific periods, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1) and *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1). For summaries of yearly developments regarding specific disarmament issues since 1976, see earlier editions of *The Yearbook*.

Within the framework provided by the Charter for dealing with disarmament and related international security problems, the General Assembly and the Security Council have repeatedly altered the institutional arrangements created to this end. The most recent developments arose from the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1978.²

The present chapter describes the institutional framework or “machinery” within which United Nations disarmament efforts are now pursued. It refers briefly to the development of that machinery and to a number of the predecessors of the present disarmament bodies, which are mentioned in subsequent chapters. The chapter further gives an overview of the work of the three principal disarmament bodies in 1988, paying special attention to their deliberations on the role of the United Nations in disarmament, and to the activities of two *ad hoc* disarmament committees.

Disarmament machinery

General Assembly

The General Assembly is composed of the representatives of all Member States. As indicated above, it may consider and make recommendations on any questions relating to international peace and security, except when a dispute or situation is currently being discussed by the Security Council. Since the 1950s, the Assembly and its subsidiary bodies have in practice exercised the main influence in the field of disarmament. According to the Final Document of the 1978 special session, the General Assembly is and should remain the chief deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures. Furthermore, it should be informed of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.³ The Assembly is thus a permanent forum for disarmament deliberations and the main source of both initiatives and recommendations by the international community on the whole spectrum of disarmament-related issues. Its regular sessions ordinarily take place between September and December each year.

First Committee

The First Committee of the General Assembly, consisting of all Member States, is one of the seven Main Committees of the Assembly and is subject

² The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution S-10/2, appears also in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III. It is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I. It was also published by the United Nations as a booklet (87-16283).

³ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, paras. 114-115.

to its rules of procedure. As decided in the 1978 Final Document, the First Committee deals only with disarmament and related international security questions.⁴ It approves relevant draft resolutions and recommends them to the Assembly for adoption. Like the other Main Committees, the First Committee elects a Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen and a Rapporteur. It meets from October to November or December.

Special sessions of the General Assembly

In 1978, 1982 and 1988, the General Assembly convened special sessions devoted entirely to the question of disarmament. At the tenth special session, the first of those special sessions devoted to disarmament, it adopted by consensus a 129-paragraph Final Document,² which included an introduction, a declaration, a programme of action and a section on international disarmament machinery. In the Final Document the Assembly proposed a wide range of disarmament measures intended to enhance the security of all nations at progressively lower levels of armaments and stressed the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, in accordance with the Charter. The Concluding Document of the twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1982,⁵ was largely procedural in nature. The validity of the 1978 Final Document was unanimously reaffirmed, with all Member States solemnly committing themselves to it and pledging to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action. The launching of the World Disarmament Campaign (see chapter XVIII) was one of the tangible accomplishments of the session. An account of the fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament, which was held in 1988, is given in chapter II. For the follow-up of the special sessions on disarmament, see chapter III.

Disarmament Commission

The Disarmament Commission provides a subsidiary forum for deliberation on disarmament issues as mandated by the General Assembly, when the Assembly is not in session. It is a successor to the earlier Disarmament Commission, established in 1952, which, although active in the 1950s, did not meet after 1965. According to the 1978 Final Document, which re-established it, the Disarmament Commission is a deliberative body and a

⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 117.

⁵ The Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, approved by Assembly decision S-12/24, is reproduced in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes*, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32; it is also reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, appendix I.

subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, whose function it is to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special sessions. The Commission reports annually to the General Assembly. Like the First Committee, it is composed of all States Members of the Organization.⁶ It meets in New York for a substantive session of approximately four weeks, usually in May-June.

Ad hoc committees

The General Assembly has at times established *ad hoc* committees in order to deal with specific disarmament matters. For the past several years there have been two such committees, namely, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference and the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean.

Conference on Disarmament

The Conference on Disarmament is, in the language of the 1978 Final Document, the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum" of the international community.⁷ Its membership of 40 States includes all 5 of the nuclear-weapon States and 35 others.⁸ The membership of non-nuclear-weapon States is reviewed at regular intervals. The Conference on Disarmament, which meets in Geneva and is known by the acronym "CD", was constituted in its present form in 1978. It held its first session in 1979, carrying forward the negotiating efforts of its predecessors, namely, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or CCD (1969-1978), the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament or ENDC (1962-1969) and the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament or TNCD (1959-1960). From 1979 to 1983, the Conference on Disarmament was known as the Committee on Disarmament. The phrases "the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva" and "the Geneva body" are frequently used in this volume to refer to any one of the above-mentioned bodies.

The Conference on Disarmament has a unique relationship with the United Nations. It is not a subsidiary body of the General Assembly. It defines its own rules of procedure and develops its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations made by the General Assembly. In accordance with the agreement reached at the 1978 special session, the Conference works on the basis of consensus. It reports to the General Assembly annually or more often,

⁶ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 118.

⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 120.

⁸ The members of the Conference on Disarmament are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

as may be appropriate. The Secretary-General of the Conference is appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the Conference, and also acts as his personal representative. The budget of the Conference is included in that of the United Nations, and the Conference holds its meetings on United Nations premises and is serviced by United Nations personnel. The work of the Conference is conducted in plenary meetings or under any arrangement agreed upon by its members. Non-members may submit written proposals or working documents and may, upon invitation, participate in the discussions on substantive items on the agenda. The chairmanship rotates among all members, on a monthly basis. The Conference meets annually in Geneva for approximately six months, usually when the Assembly is not in session.

In 1979, the Geneva body agreed on a permanent agenda consisting of ten areas:

1. Nuclear weapons in all aspects
2. Chemical weapons
3. Other weapons of mass destruction
4. Conventional weapons
5. Reduction of military budgets
6. Reduction of armed forces
7. Disarmament and development
8. Disarmament and international security
9. Collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned
10. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control

From that so-called decalogue, the Conference on Disarmament adopts an annual agenda and programme of work. For its 1988 agenda, see page 19.

Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat

The role the United Nations Secretariat plays in disarmament matters derives from the general functions of the Secretary-General as defined in the Charter and developed over the years through the decisions of the General Assembly and other disarmament bodies. Pursuant to resolution 37/99 K, section V, of 1982, which sought to strengthen the efforts of the Organization in the field of disarmament, the former Centre for Disarmament was transformed, on 1 January 1983, into the Department for Disarmament Affairs, headed by an Under-Secretary-General reporting direct to the Secretary-General.

Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies was established by the General Assembly at the 1978 special session to advise the Secretary-General on

various aspects of studies on disarmament to be made under the auspices of the United Nations. For further information on the Advisory Board and its activities in 1988, see chapter XIX.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) was established on 1 October 1980 as an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations. It undertakes independent research on disarmament and related security issues and works in close relationship with the Department for Disarmament Affairs. The Institute is located in Geneva and is financed partly by voluntary contributions from Governments and other sources and partly from the regular budget of the United Nations. UNIDIR is governed by a board of trustees composed of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies (see above) and the Director of the Institute. For further information on UNIDIR, see chapter XIX; for a summary of its 1988 activities, see the annex to that chapter.

International Atomic Energy Agency

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an autonomous intergovernmental agency, was established in 1956. It has responsibility for international activities concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic energy. With the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in March 1970, the Agency was entrusted with the task of concluding safeguards agreements with the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to cover all nuclear materials and their uses. In addition, full parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) undertake to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA. The Agency reports annually to the General Assembly and, as appropriate, to the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. The General Conference of IAEA has responsibility for the policies and programmes of the Agency and is composed of all its member States, including the five nuclear-weapon States. Thirty-five countries are represented on the Board of Governors, which is the policy-making body of the Agency. For more information on IAEA and its activities in 1988, see chapter XI.

Specialized agencies and other organs of the United Nations system

Some of the specialized agencies and other organs of the United Nations system, including the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the

World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), also carry out disarmament-related activities. For a brief account of such activities carried out by those bodies in 1988, see appendix II to this volume.

General developments and trends, 1988

Throughout the year States expressed the hope that the movement towards arms limitation and disarmament that was discernible in 1987 would not be lost, and much thought was given to the role of the United Nations in this regard. This section deals briefly with the discussion of that question in the principal disarmament bodies.

The *Disarmament Commission* considered its item on the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament for the fourth consecutive year; there was no appreciable change from the positions held by delegations in 1987. In general, members shared the belief that the Organization must play a central role, but they differed as regards specific aspects of its role. Many countries, particularly non-aligned, stressed the continuing validity of the principle that all countries had the right and duty to contribute to efforts in disarmament and that all Members of the United Nations must be made aware of the responsibility of the world Organization in that field. The socialist States felt that the United Nations should be involved in determining both the basic guidelines for a nuclear-free world and ways of achieving that goal, and they advocated augmenting the role of certain United Nations bodies for that purpose. Western States stressed that the United Nations contribution to the disarmament process would be enhanced if full respect for the principles of its Charter was ensured; they also believed that it was necessary to consider concrete measures for streamlining and rationalizing the work of the Organization in that field.

In its Working Group on the item (see section below entitled "Action by the Disarmament Commission"), the Commission was able to deal in a substantial way only with the institutional aspects of the question and had to postpone consideration of its political aspects. Although some progress was evident, difficulties persisted regarding a number of elements of disarmament machinery, such as special sessions and the Conference on Disarmament, and regarding the role of the Security Council.

Members of the *Conference on Disarmament* continued to examine means for improving the way the Conference functioned, but took no decisions on the matter. There was a wide-ranging discussion on the question of membership, with socialist countries stressing the need to provide for the full participation of all States willing to contribute to the work of the Conference and Western and some non-aligned members maintaining that the Conference should remain of limited size. A number of suggestions were made to facilitate the participation of non-members in the work of the Conference. Differences concerning the establishment of *ad hoc* committees persisted. Both socialist

and non-aligned States supported the proposal to establish *ad hoc* committees for each agenda item under the general mandate of the Conference and to have them continue their work until they completed it. Although the Western countries indicated a preference for continuing some subsidiary bodies automatically from year to year, they expressed serious doubts with regard to the suggestion that *ad hoc* bodies should be established for each agenda item without specific mandates, and felt that the rules of procedure of the Conference took account of the fact that some subjects were ripe for technical consideration but not necessarily for negotiation.

At the *fifteenth special session of the General Assembly*, it was generally recognized that the United Nations provided the broadest framework for the consideration of security and disarmament issues and constituted a forum in which all its Members could contribute actively and collectively to the resolution of problems. Conclusion of the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) and the general improvement in relations between the two major Powers generated optimism, not only for further bilateral measures of arms limitation, but also for progress in multilateral efforts within the United Nations.

Many delegations stressed the complementary nature of bilateral, regional and multilateral approaches. In their statements and proposals, delegations, especially from the socialist and the non-aligned States, emphasized the necessity of keeping the United Nations informed of the progress of bilateral and regional negotiations and of strengthening the links between the Organization and outside bodies conducting negotiations.

It was widely felt that there was a need to use the various United Nations bodies dealing with disarmament more effectively, and various proposals were put forward with this in view. The socialist States called for high-level meetings of the Security Council to discuss objectives in disarmament and for the establishment of a subsidiary organ to design guiding principles and courses of action for the effective maintenance of international peace and security, embracing both the political and the military spheres.

Special attention was paid at the fifteenth special session to the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission. A group of non-members of the Conference proposed that the membership of that body be expanded by 4 new members every three years, to a total of 12. They believed that such an approach would safeguard the principles of limited size, balance and effectiveness that should apply to the Conference. Areas for improvement that were discussed in the Conference itself, and on which no decision was taken, are listed below in the section describing action in that forum. Western delegations urged that the Disarmament Commission concentrate on a limited number of complex problems and on making specific recommendations on important questions.

At the *forty-third session of the General Assembly* a serious effort was made to implement the recommendations set forth in resolution 42/42 N for

rationalizing the work of the First Committee. Under its Chairman consultations were held concerning the possibility of rearranging the Committee's agenda, but no decision was taken. It was generally understood that any such efforts should be directed towards ensuring greater clarity and coherence, and should not sacrifice the substance of issues or compromise the right of delegations to request the inclusion of new items.⁹ In fact, at the forty-third session, four items and one sub-item were added to the agenda.

Following the recommendation made in resolution 42/42 N, the Committee telescoped the general and specific debates into one and advanced the deadline for the submission of draft texts, with the result that there was 25 per cent more time for consultation than in 1987. The number of drafts put before the Committee decreased from 79 in 1987 to 75 in 1988, but the number on which action was taken increased, from 63 to 67. Eight proposals were withdrawn and, in a number of instances, merged with others. Although competing texts continued to be put forward and adopted, the mergers that had been achieved in 1987 held and new ones were accomplished in the areas of arms transfers and verification, in which draft texts had been submitted in 1987 but had been withdrawn. Of the 67 proposals on which action was taken, 27 were adopted without a vote, a slightly higher proportion than in the previous year. As in 1987, all the resolutions on chemical and biological weapons were adopted by consensus.

In outlining the activities of his Department to the First Committee, the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs reported that the Department had been instrumental in organizing a number of meetings dealing with technical and scientific matters: a meeting at Dagomys, USSR, on the multilateral verification of arms control and disarmament measures and a symposium at Headquarters on weapons development and the role of science and technology in verification, which was held jointly by the United Nations and the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. He also noted that the Department had been restructured, within existing resources, to include a monitoring and analysis branch that would enable it to better assist Member States in their negotiations on disarmament and related matters.

By resolution 43/75 R, adopted by consensus, the General Assembly noted the necessity of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and the increased reaffirmation of faith in the Organization as an indispensable instrument for international peace and security.

Activities of principal disarmament bodies, 1988

Action by the Disarmament Commission

The Disarmament Commission held its substantive session from 2 to 20 May under the chairmanship of Mr. Davidson L. Hepburn of the Bahamas. It held

⁹ See the Chairman's working paper entitled "Suggestions regarding rearrangement of the agenda of the First Committee" (A/C.1/43/9).

nine plenary meetings. At the end of its session, it adopted by consensus its special report,¹⁰ which was submitted to the General Assembly at its third special session on disarmament in accordance with General Assembly resolution 42/42 G. The special report summarizes the work of the Commission on all the agenda items it had dealt with from 1983 to 1987, and it contains the reports prepared by its subsidiary bodies and the Chairman, including specific recommendations, on the substantive items of its 1988 agenda (see below). In a brief report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session¹¹ the Disarmament Commission referred to its earlier report and recommended that at the forty-third session the General Assembly should consider the decisions and recommendations adopted at its third special session devoted to disarmament in connection with the agenda items of the Commission. The Commission further recommended that, should the General Assembly at its third special session make no decisions or recommendations on the special report, all the recommendations contained therein should be resubmitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its forty-third session.

The Commission had on its agenda three items of long standing: consideration of various aspects of the arms race, with a view to elaborating a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament; the reduction of military budgets, with emphasis on concluding in 1988 work on the last outstanding paragraph of the Commission's text entitled "Principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets"; and the question of South Africa's nuclear capability. The two items dealing with the role of the United Nations in disarmament and the question of naval armaments and disarmament had first been placed on the agenda in 1985, while those concerning conventional disarmament and verification had been added in 1987. An item on confidence-building measures, which had last been on the agenda in 1986, was brought once more before the Commission. The wording of the substantive agenda items was as follows:¹²

4. (a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war
- (b) Consideration of the agenda items contained in section II of resolution 33/71 H, with the aim of elaborating, within the framework of and in accordance with priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament
5. Reduction of military budgets:
 - (a) Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual, agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3)*.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/43/42)*.

¹² *Ibid.*, para. 6, items 5 to 11.

- (b) Examination and identification of effective ways and means of achieving agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, taking into account the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 34/83 F, 35/142 A, 36/82 A, 37/95 A, 38/184 A, 39/64 A, 40/91 A, 41/57 and 42/36, with a view to concluding its work on the last outstanding paragraph of the "Principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets"
6. Substantive consideration of the question of South Africa's nuclear capability as requested by the General Assembly and the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (resolutions 37/74 B, 38/181 B, 39/61 B, 40/89 B, 41/55 B and 42/34 B and document A/CN.10/4)
 7. Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament
 8. Naval armaments and disarmament
 9. Substantive consideration of issues related to conventional disarmament, including the recommendations and conclusions contained in the study on conventional disarmament
 10. Consideration of the question of verification in all its aspects, including principles, provisions and techniques for promoting the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification
 11. Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures

On 2 and 3 May the Commission held a general exchange of views on all agenda items. On 3 May, by a vote of 43 in favour to 5 against, it decided to retain the services of verbatim records. The Chairman noted on that occasion that a precedent was not being set, but that the Commission had certain rules and procedures within its jurisdiction and tried to use them whenever possible.

On 2 May the Commission decided to establish a committee of the whole to consider item 4. This task was later entrusted to a contact group, which was to consider the item and report back to the Committee of the Whole. The Commission further decided to establish two consultation groups to deal with items 5 and 11, respectively. It also established four working groups, for items 6, 7, 9 and 10, respectively. The Chairman of the Commission decided to follow the practice adopted previously and to hold, under his responsibility, substantive and open-ended consultations on agenda item 8.

At the end of its session, the Commission adopted by consensus the reports of all its subsidiary bodies and the report of the Chairman on item 8. The work of the Contact Group on item 4 is discussed in topical chapters throughout this volume, that of the Consultation Group on item 5 in chapter XVI, and that of the Consultation Group on item 11 in chapter III. The work of Working Group II, on item 7, is discussed below. That of Working Group I, on item 6, of Working Group III, on item 9, and of Working Group IV, on item 10, is dealt with in chapters X, XV and V, respectively. The Chairman's report on item 8 is covered in chapter IV.

Working Group II, on the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, met under the chairmanship of Mr. Paul Bamela Engo of Cameroon. It held five meetings between 4 and 19 May and had before it 31

papers, listed in its report.¹³ The Working Group decided to establish an open-ended contact group to assist the Chairman in informal consultations. The Contact Group, co-ordinated by Mr. Richard Butler of Australia, considered the proposals contained in the documents mentioned and in the views expressed and the proposals put forward in the course of deliberations on the item. In carrying out its work, the Contact Group agreed to use annex II to the 1987 report of the Disarmament Commission as the basis for its discussions,¹⁴ on the understanding that all the other documents, views and proposals would be considered on an equal footing. With a view to facilitating its work, the Contact Group decided to commence its deliberations by addressing the section devoted to machinery in annex II and then to proceed to the section on political aspects, it being understood that agreement on any one section would be contingent on agreement on the other. It held seven meetings between 4 and 16 May and also conducted informal consultations through its Co-ordinator. Owing to time constraints, it was unable to consider the section on political aspects.

The Co-ordinator submitted to the Working Group the working paper that had formed the basis for discussions on machinery in the Contact Group. It dealt with the following: the General Assembly and its organs, the Security Council, the Secretary-General, the Conference on Disarmament and other organs. In the paper the Co-ordinator pointed out that other proposals on the same elements were also before the Commission and that, in addition, proposals had been submitted with regard to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, the World Disarmament Campaign, the specialized agencies, review conferences, Disarmament Week and regional arrangements. He gave an account of the discussions, outlining areas in which some progress had been made and those on which substantial divergencies remained.

The Working Group discussed these outstanding issues and the Chairman then undertook further informal consultations, on which he submitted proposals. Because of a lack of time, however, the Working Group was unable to address them. On 19 May the Working Group agreed to incorporate paragraphs 1 to 14 of annex II of the 1987 report and the working paper referred to above into an annex¹⁵ to its own report in the belief that those texts could usefully complement the other documents mentioned and, in conjunction with them, might be of assistance in future deliberations. The Working Group recommended that the new annex, which had not been agreed upon, be transmitted to the General Assembly at its special session with a view to the formulation of concrete recommendations and proposals, taking into account the suggestions of Member States, other documents on the subject and the results of the Assembly's consideration of the relevant agenda item at the special session.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3), para. 47.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42), annex II.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3), annex III.

Action by the Conference on Disarmament

In 1988 the Conference on Disarmament held its session in two parts, as is customary, from 2 February to 29 April and from 7 July to 20 September. During this period the Conference held 48 formal plenary meetings and 18 informal meetings. The following member States assumed the presidency of the Conference: the German Democratic Republic for February, the Federal Republic of Germany for March, Hungary for April and the recess between the first and second parts of the session, India for July, Indonesia for August, and the Islamic Republic of Iran for September and the recess until the beginning of the 1989 session. In May the Conference submitted to the General Assembly, at its fifteenth special session, a special report on its work for the period from August 1982 to April 1988.¹⁶ At the end of the second part of its 1988 session, the Conference submitted its annual report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session.¹⁷

On 2 February the Conference reaffirmed the 10 areas within which it had decided, in 1979, to deal with the question of the cessation of the arms race and disarmament (see page 11). Within that framework, the Conference adopted its agenda, which had the same substantive items as in the previous year:¹⁸

1. Nuclear test ban
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters
4. Chemical weapons
5. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
6. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
7. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
8. Comprehensive programme of disarmament

During the first part of its session the Conference decided to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Committees on the following items: chemical weapons (see chapter XII), assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States (see chapter IX), radiological weapons (see chapter XIV), and the prevention of an arms race in outer space (see chapter XIII). In the second part of its session the Conference decided to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (see chapter IV), whose mandate had expired at the end of the first part of the session.

A number of countries which were not members of the Conference were invited to participate, upon their request, in the discussions on the substantive agenda items. Those that took part in plenary meetings and/or in the meetings of *Ad Hoc* Committees were: Austria, Bangladesh, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand,

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-15/2).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/43/27).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.¹⁹ The Conference reaffirmed its decision that its membership might be increased by not more than four States and that candidates for membership should be nominated, two by the Group of 21,²⁰ one by the Group of Socialist States,²¹ and one by the Group of Western States²² so as to maintain balance. It did not, however, take a decision on the matter in 1988.

Statements were made in plenary meetings of the Conference on its improved and effective functioning. The Conference had before it two reports submitted by an informal group of seven members acting in their personal capacity, which had been established the previous year. The reports and the comments of various delegations on them covered the following areas: (a) subsidiary bodies, (b) the annual report to the General Assembly, (c) participation of non-member States, (d) participation of scientific and technical experts, (e) non-governmental organizations, (f) a disarmament consultative council, (g) time, duration and organization of the annual session and (h) membership. The exchange of views on these matters was not conclusive and will be continued at the next annual session of the Conference.

Action by the General Assembly

The General Assembly held a general debate in its plenary meetings between 26 September and 13 October,²³ during which a considerable number of Member States addressed disarmament questions.

The First Committee, meeting under the chairmanship of Mr. Douglas Roche of Canada, held substantive meetings on the following disarmament items from 17 October to 18 November:²⁴

1. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/25 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

¹⁹ The following are not Members of the United Nations: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, and Switzerland.

²⁰ The term the "Group of 21" refers to the non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Conference on Disarmament not associated with the major blocs. They are: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

²¹ The term "Group of Socialist States" refers to the Eastern European States members of the Conference on Disarmament, which are: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and USSR.

²² The "Western" members of the Conference on Disarmament are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States.

²³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 31st meetings.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, First Committee, 3rd to 43rd meetings.

2. Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions
3. Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty
4. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East
5. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia
6. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
7. Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
8. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
9. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
10. Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa
11. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament
12. Reduction of military budgets
13. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons
14. General and complete disarmament:
 - (a) Contribution of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament
 - (b) Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons
 - (c) Notification of nuclear tests
 - (d) Conventional disarmament
 - (e) Nuclear disarmament
 - (f) Objective information on military matters
 - (g) Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament
 - (h) Naval armaments and disarmament
 - (i) Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes
 - (j) Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission
 - (k) Dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa
15. Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly
 - (b) Freeze on nuclear weapons
 - (c) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons
 - (d) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia
 - (e) World Disarmament Campaign
 - (f) Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/39 H on a nuclear-arms freeze
 - (g) United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme
 - (h) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa
 - (i) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America
16. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session

17. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session:
 - (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission
 - (b) Report of the Conference on Disarmament
 - (c) Status of multilateral disarmament agreements
 - (d) Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies
 - (e) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
 - (f) Review and appraisal of the implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade
 - (g) Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter
 - (h) Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security
 - (i) Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session
 - (j) Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war
 - (k) Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament: report of the Conference on Disarmament
 - (l) Prevention of nuclear war
 - (m) Disarmament Week
 - (n) Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session
18. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace
19. Israeli nuclear armament
20. Verification in all its aspects
21. Implementation of the conclusions of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the Fourth Review Conference
22. Liability for the illegal transfer and/or use of prohibited weapons and weapons or substances which cause unnecessary human suffering

In addition, four agenda items on related security questions were allocated to the First Committee, namely, the items on the question of Antarctica, the strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region, review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, and a comprehensive system of international peace and security. The First Committee considered these items from 21 to 30 November.²⁵

From 3 to 18 November, the First Committee considered 75 draft texts on disarmament and took action upon 67 of them, 2 of which were draft decisions, and submitted its recommendations to the General Assembly. On 7 December the General Assembly adopted the texts as resolutions 43/62 to 43/82 and decisions 43/422 and 43/423.²⁶

On 9 November, Cameroon introduced a draft resolution entitled "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament", which was originally sponsored by 13 States.²⁷ Subsequently, 20 more States co-

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 44th to 54th meetings.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 73rd meeting.

²⁷ Australia, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Senegal and Zaire.

sponsored it.²⁸ Cameroon briefly outlined the main ideas in the text, which, it pointed out, was very similar to the resolution on the subject adopted by consensus in 1987. The following day the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote, and the General Assembly similarly adopted it on 7 December as resolution 43/75 R. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 39/151 G of 17 December 1984, 40/94 O of 12 December 1985, 41/59 O of 3 December 1986 and 42/38 O of 30 November 1987,

Bearing in mind that the primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security,

Reaffirming its conviction that genuine and lasting peace can be created only through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Reaffirming also that the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Recognizing the need for the United Nations, in discharging its central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament, to play a more active role in the field of disarmament in accordance with its primary purpose under the Charter to maintain international peace and security,

Taking into account the part of the report of the Disarmament Commission relating to this question, and noting the progress made in the consideration of the question at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament,

Bearing in mind the common desire expressed at its third special session devoted to disarmament on the necessity to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and the increased reaffirmation of faith in the United Nations as an indispensable instrument for international peace and security,

1. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue its consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament as a matter of priority at its next substantive session, in 1989, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, taking into account, *inter alia*, the views and suggestions of Member States as well as the aforementioned documents on the subject;

2. *Also requests* the Disarmament Commission to submit its report on the subject, including findings, recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission"

Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, the Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Jordan, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Togo and Uruguay, later joined by Ecuador, sponsored a draft resolution entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission". The draft was introduced in the First Committee by the Bahamas on 9 November. The Bahamas drew attention to two paragraphs in the 1988 text that incorporated elements not included in earlier

²⁸ Bahamas, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Thailand, Togo and Ukrainian SSR.

resolutions on the subject. By operative paragraph 2 the General Assembly would commend the Commission for its achievements at its last session, and by operative paragraph 4 would recognize the Commission's interdependence with the Conference on Disarmament. The next day, following consultations on the latter paragraph, the phrase "and facilitating the work of the Conference on Disarmament in its negotiations on specific subjects" was deleted from the text. The Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote, and on 7 December the General Assembly also adopted it without a vote, as resolution 43/78 A, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the special and annual reports of the Disarmament Commission,

Emphasizing again the importance of an effective follow-up to the relevant recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Taking into account the relevant sections of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Also taking into account widespread views expressed during the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament,

Considering the role that the Disarmament Commission has been called upon to play and the contribution that it should make in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions of the tenth special session,

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, 34/83 H of 11 December 1979, 35/152 F of 12 December 1980, 36/92 B of 9 December 1981, 37/78 H of 9 December 1982, 38/183 E of 20 December 1983, 39/148 R of 17 December 1984, 40/152 F of 16 December 1985, 41/86 E of 4 December 1986 and 42/42 G of 30 November 1987,

1. *Takes note* of the special and annual reports of the Disarmament Commission;
2. *Commends* the Disarmament Commission for its adoption by consensus of a set of principles of verification on disarmament issues as well as a set of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level, which were recommended to the General Assembly for consideration;
3. *Notes* that the Disarmament Commission has yet to conclude its consideration of some items on its agenda, but notes also with appreciation the progress achieved on some of these;
4. *Recalls* the role of the Disarmament Commission as the specialized, deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on those issues;
5. *Stresses* the importance for the Disarmament Commission to work on the basis of a relevant agenda of disarmament topics, thereby enabling the Commission to concentrate its efforts and thus optimize its progress on specific subjects in accordance with resolution 37/78 H;
6. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and with paragraph 3 of resolution 37/78 H, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations, at its 1989 substantive session, on the outstanding items on its agenda, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly as well as the results of its 1988 substantive session;
7. *Also requests* the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1989 and to submit a substantive report, containing specific recommendations on the items included in its agenda, to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;
8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the special and annual reports of the Conference on Disarmament, together with all the official records of

the fifteenth special session and the forty-third session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;

9. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to ensure full provision to the Commission and its subsidiary bodies of interpretation and translation facilities in the official languages and to assign, as a matter of priority, all the necessary resources and services to this end;

10. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission"

Two draft resolutions on the report of the Conference on Disarmament were submitted to the First Committee, the first by a group of mainly non-aligned States,²⁹ and the second by a group of mainly Western States.³⁰ Both were approved by the Committee on 17 November.

The draft submitted by the mainly non-aligned group was introduced by Yugoslavia on 9 November. In introducing it, Yugoslavia stated that the general debate had highlighted the common concern of delegations to strengthen the United Nations and multilateralism as a whole at a time when new prospects were opening up for solving pressing questions in the field of disarmament. The sponsors felt that the Conference was being denied the right and authority to negotiate on the most important issues on its agenda. Believing that it must not be made to wait for the completion of certain bilateral negotiations, the sponsors had drafted their text with the intention of encouraging the Geneva forum to work towards negotiations and the adoption of concrete measures on specific matters.

The Netherlands introduced the second draft later the same day. The text, it stated, was of a procedural nature and avoided controversial elements. Although they wished to respond to those delegations that, in the past, had been reluctant to endorse a resolution of a purely procedural nature, the sponsors did not think it appropriate to deal with specific items on the agenda of the Conference in their text, since those issues were addressed in other resolutions. They expressed regret that it had not been possible to present the Committee with a single text on the report of the Conference on Disarmament, since they believed that the work of the Conference could best be granted recognition by a consensus resolution.

The First Committee voted on the two draft resolutions on 17 November. The draft introduced by Yugoslavia was approved by a vote of 117 in favour to 3 against, with 14 abstentions. The draft introduced by the Netherlands was approved by a vote of 73 in favour to none against, with 53 abstentions.

Thirteen States explained their votes on one or both of the draft resolutions, and many of them expressed regret that it had not been possible to achieve a single text on the subject.

²⁹ Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kenya, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

³⁰ Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and Spain.

Austria and the German Democratic Republic explained their affirmative votes on both texts. The former stated that its support reflected the importance it attached to the role of the Conference on Disarmament in international disarmament affairs. The latter outlined the role that it felt the Conference should play and explained that its support was due to the fact that improved political conditions provided an environment for bringing the potential of the Conference to bear more fully on future efforts.

Two States that voted in favour of both drafts expressed reservations about one of them. The Soviet Union supported the second text, introduced by the Netherlands, on the understanding that operative paragraph 4 not only did not exclude, but in fact presupposed, a positive continuation or a beginning of negotiations on issues of high priority. Australia explained its interpretation of two of the operative paragraphs of the first text, introduced by Yugoslavia. It believed that the phrase "international community" in operative paragraph 1 did not preclude regional or other multilateral negotiations in other international forums, and that operative paragraph 4 did not call for negotiating mandates on items before all members of the Conference on Disarmament agreed that such mandates were appropriate.

A number of States explained their abstentions on the second draft. In the view of Algeria, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, the General Assembly should not merely take note of the report of the Conference, but should also assess its work and give it clear political signals regarding its future negotiations. Algeria, India and Mexico believed that the strictly procedural character of the draft deprived non-members of the Conference of their right to speak out on the substance of the work of the Conference. Algeria, India, Pakistan and Venezuela felt that the Western draft was less acceptable than the corresponding 1987 text, resolution 42/42 K, and that changes made in the 1988 version appeared to weaken the role of the negotiating body. Argentina also felt that the language of resolution 42/42 K was preferable to that of the text just adopted by the Committee.

Iraq made a statement advocating expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. It noted that it had abstained on the second draft for the same reasons as it had given for its abstention on previous corresponding resolutions adopted at earlier sessions.

The Netherlands explained that it had abstained on the first text because it contained language that went beyond what had been agreed to in the Conference on Disarmament at the time when it had adopted its report by consensus. The Netherlands objected in particular to the wording of the last paragraph of the preamble and of operative paragraphs 3 and 4. It expressed appreciation of the discussions that it had had with Yugoslavia and hoped that it would be possible to submit a common text the following year.

On 7 December the General Assembly adopted the draft introduced by Yugoslavia by a vote of 136 to 3, with 14 abstentions, as resolution 43/78 M. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 B of 11 December 1979, 35/152 J of 12 December 1980, 36/92 F of 9 December 1981, 37/78 G of 9 December 1982, 38/183 I of 20 December 1983, 39/148 N of 17 December 1984, 40/152 M of 16 December 1985, 41/86 M of 4 December 1986 and 42/42 L of 30 November 1987,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament,

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament,

Expressing its regret that the Conference on Disarmament was not able in 1988 either to establish *ad hoc* committees or to commence negotiations on nuclear issues on its agenda,

Expressing its expectation that the Conference on Disarmament, in view of the positive current processes in some important fields of disarmament, would be in a position to reach concrete agreements on disarmament issues to which the United Nations has assigned greatest priority and urgency and which have been under consideration for a number of years,

Considering that it is more than ever imperative in the present circumstances to give an additional impetus to negotiations on disarmament at all levels and to achieve genuine progress in the immediate future,

1. *Reaffirms* the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that further progress has been made in the negotiations on the elaboration of a draft convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, and urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its work with a view to completing negotiations on such a draft convention as soon as possible;

3. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its work, to further its mandate more earnestly through substantive negotiations, within the framework of *ad hoc* committees as the most appropriate mechanism, and to adopt concrete measures on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

4. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to provide negotiating mandates to *ad hoc* committees on all agenda items, in keeping with the fundamental role of the Conference as identified in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;

5. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament".

On the same day, by a vote of 96 to none, with 53 absentions, the General Assembly adopted, as resolution 43/78 I, the draft introduced by the Netherlands. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the relevant portions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in particular, paragraph 120,

Bearing in mind that considerable and urgent work remains to be accomplished in the field of disarmament,

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating forum for global disarmament questions, should fully take into account the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, which the Conference adopted by consensus,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1988 session;
2. *Reaffirms* that the Conference on Disarmament plays a vital role in the field of disarmament for the world community;
3. *Reaffirms also* its support for the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament in fulfilling its tasks, and calls upon all Conference members and observer States to contribute as effectively as possible to this end;
4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to continue and to intensify its work on the various substantive items on its agenda;
5. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;
6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament".

Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian SSR, later joined by Cameroon, sponsored a draft resolution entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament". When the First Committee considered the draft text, it had before it a report of the Secretary-General containing information provided by Member States, pursuant to resolution 42/38 J, concerning the implementation of Assembly resolutions on disarmament and their views on ways to improve the situation.³¹ In introducing the text on 9 November, the Ukrainian SSR stated that the main objective of the text, which was largely similar to that of resolution 42/38 J, was to draw the attention of States to the need to adhere to the stipulations of General Assembly resolutions. In the sponsors' view, absence of such action on even the best of resolutions would mean that the aspirations of the international community would remain unrealized. The Ukrainian SSR stressed that the draft was fully in keeping with articles of the United Nations Charter concerning the recommendatory nature of resolutions.

On 16 November, just before the First Committee took action on the draft resolution, the Ukrainian SSR announced that the sponsors had decided to delete operative paragraph 2 of the text, by which the General Assembly would have considered that consensus at the stage of adopting decisions assumed readiness on the part of all Member States to take the necessary steps to implement them. The Committee then approved the draft resolution by a vote of 106 in favour to 2 against, with 24 abstentions.

Two States explained their votes at that time. China pointed out that its affirmative vote did not mean that it had changed its position with respect to some of the resolutions that had been adopted on disarmament. Australia had abstained because it did not see value in calling for implementation of a whole class of resolutions when that could well mean that States would be asked to implement resolutions that they might have voted against. Nor did it consider it appropriate to request the Secretary-General to prepare another report on the subject.

³¹ The report (A/43/492 and Add.1-3) contained the replies of nine countries: Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Mexico, Mongolia, Ukrainian SSR and USSR.

On 7 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a vote of 131 to 2, with 20 abstentions. The resolution, 43/75 H, reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 42/38 J of 30 November 1987,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

Recalling paragraph 115 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated, *inter alia*, that the Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures,

Mindful of the fact that the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament could be strengthened substantially through an increased effort by Member States to implement faithfully General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament,

Convinced of the importance of treating recommendations of the General Assembly in the field of disarmament with due respect in accordance with the obligations assumed by Member States under the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Deems it important* that all Member States make every effort to facilitate the consistent implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament, and thus show their resolve to arrive at mutually acceptable, comprehensively verifiable and effective disarmament measures;

2. *Invites* all Member States that have not yet done so to make available to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions on ways and means to improve the situation with regard to the implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session, in accordance with resolution 42/38 J, a report that includes information provided by Member States concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament, as well as their views on possible avenues to improve the situation in this respect;

4. *Calls upon* all Member States to render every assistance to the Secretary-General so that he may fulfil the request contained in paragraph 3 above;

5. *Decides* to continue its consideration of the issue of the implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament at its forty-fourth session.

Activities of other disarmament bodies, 1988

Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean

By resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 1971, entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace", the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, was designated for all time as a zone of peace. In 1972, the General Assembly established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean to study practical measures to achieve the objectives of the Declaration. The number of members in the Committee has increased, at various subsequent dates, from 15 to 49.³²

³² The Committee is composed of the following States: Australia, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Uganda, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Since 1973, consideration of the issue in the General Assembly has generally centred on the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States were initiated in 1977 to pursue possible limitations on military activities in the Indian Ocean; they were suspended in February 1978 and have not been resumed. The issue was also discussed at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978. In 1979, the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States, which the members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean attended, was held in New York. The Meeting recommended that a conference on the Indian Ocean be held, and proposed that the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean undertake the preparatory work for it.

Also in 1979, the General Assembly decided to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981 at Colombo, Sri Lanka, and invited the permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to participate in it. However, the *Ad Hoc* Committee has been unable to make definitive progress in its preparations and has had to postpone the Conference a number of times. In resolution 42/43 of November 1987, the General Assembly stated that the Conference should be held not later than 1990.³³ Non-aligned and Eastern European countries have been in favour of convening the Conference at an early date, and in the First Committee, in 1988, the Soviet Union offered to host an international seminar on the subject of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Western States, however, have stressed that improvement in the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean is essential for the success of the Conference, and the United States and the United Kingdom, in particular, have suggested that the Committee suspend its work until consultations conducted by the Chairman among its members should reveal the possibility of true improvement in the conditions in the region and advancement in the Committee's activities.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean held two sessions in 1988, from 11 to 15 April and from 11 to 22 July, at United Nations Headquarters in New York, under the chairmanship of Mr. Daya Perera of Sri Lanka.

In the course of its April session, the Committee welcomed the invitation of Sri Lanka to hold the Committee's second preparatory session at Colombo. Although a large number of delegations considered such action an important step on the road to holding the Conference, it was not possible, owing to a formal objection raised by one delegation, to decide to hold the session in Colombo. On 15 April the Committee adopted by consensus its report to the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session.³⁴ It contained an account of the Committee's work from 1982 until the end of its current session and

³³ For background, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. XI; United Nations, *The United Nations and Disarmament: A Short History* (New York, 1988), chap. VII; and earlier volumes of *The Yearbook*.

³⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 5* (A/S-15/5).

a recommendation that the General Assembly reaffirm its full support for the implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean.

During its July session, the *Ad Hoc* Committee's open-ended Working Group, originally set up in 1985, continued its work under a mandate to identify, expand and facilitate agreement on substantive issues relating to the establishment of a zone of peace with a view to recommending to the *Ad Hoc* Committee elements that might be taken into consideration during the subsequent preparation of a draft final document of the Conference. The Group, meeting under the chairmanship of Mr. Edmond Jayasinghe of Sri Lanka, discussed a paper containing 20 pertinent substantive issues and principles that had been formulated the previous year. In his report to the *Ad Hoc* Committee, Mr. Jayasinghe listed the 20 issues and principles and stated that the Group agreed that they constituted a very good basis for further elaboration and that there existed the possibility of adding to them.

At its last meeting, the Committee decided to update a 1983 document containing the views of *Ad Hoc* Committee members regarding a zone of peace and arranged on the basis of an informal list of seven topics: (a) geographical limits, (b) foreign military presence, (c) nuclear weapons, (d) security, (e) peaceful settlement of disputes, (f) use of the Indian Ocean by foreign vessels and aircraft and (g) other matters. The views were to be submitted to the Secretariat by 1 February 1989 and would be compiled and distributed to members not later than three weeks prior to the *Ad Hoc* Committee's first session that year. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted by consensus its annual report to the General Assembly.³⁵ That report included a draft resolution that had been submitted earlier by Sri Lanka on behalf of the non-aligned members of the Committee.

In a closing statement, the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee stated that the Committee had made significant progress. Its session had been marked by optimism as the beginnings of a solution to the prolonged conflict in the Persian Gulf had emerged. He was not discouraged by the fact that consensus had not been reached on the item on zones of peace at the third special session on disarmament, as he believed that members of all regional groups had endorsed the validity of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and the importance of its implementation.

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On 3 November, Sri Lanka, as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, presented to the First Committee the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to the General Assembly at its forty-third session and introduced the draft resolution contained in it. Sri Lanka pointed out that the *Ad Hoc* Committee stood by its commitment to convene the Conference in 1990,

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 29.

while it would continue to keep under review the need to organize its work more effectively in order to enable it to fulfil its mandate. It also drew attention to paragraph 9 of the draft, concerning commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. Speaking again, just before the First Committee took action on the draft text on 10 November, Sri Lanka expressed the hope of the non-aligned members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee that the atmosphere of co-operation, particularly between the Soviet Union and the United States, would facilitate the implementation of the Declaration. The First Committee then approved the draft text without a vote.

Seven members made statements on that occasion. Bangladesh, India and the Islamic Republic of Iran all stressed the importance that the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean gave to the creation of a zone of peace in their region. Democratic Yemen hoped that certain countries could be persuaded to withdraw their opposition to the holding of the Conference and abandon their delaying tactics in the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Pakistan stressed that the active participation of all members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee was indispensable for the success of the Conference. The USSR believed that current conditions were such as to enable the *Ad Hoc* Committee to carry out its work in 1989. It recalled its proposal that an international seminar on the Indian Ocean be held in the coming year. The German Democratic Republic welcomed all activities undertaken by countries of the region and by others to create a climate of stability in the Indian Ocean.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote as resolution 43/79. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/68 of 14 December 1978, 34/80 A and B of 11 December 1979, 35/150 of 12 December 1980, 36/90 of 9 December 1981, 37/96 of 13 December 1982, 38/185 of 20 December 1983, 39/149 of 17 December 1984, 40/153 of 16 December 1985, 41/87 of 4 December 1986, 42/43 of 30 November 1987 and other relevant resolutions,

Reaffirming that the establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole,

Recalling also the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean,

Reaffirming its conviction that concrete action for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security, as well as to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful development of the States of the region,

Convinced that agreement on such action should be facilitated by encouraging developments in international relations that could have beneficial effects on the region,

Also convinced that the continued military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean area, conceived in the context of their confrontation, gives urgency to the need to take practical steps for the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration,

Further convinced that the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area is an important consideration bearing on the question of the urgent convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo and that the further easing of tension in the area would enhance the prospect of success of the Conference,

Considering that the creation of a zone of peace requires co-operation and agreement among the States of the region to ensure conditions of peace and security within the area, as envisaged in the Declaration,

Recalling the decision of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to make every effort, in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area and of progress made in the harmonization of views, to finalize, in accordance with its normal methods of work, all preparations for the Conference, including dates for its convening,

Noting that, in accordance with resolution 42/43, the *Ad Hoc* Committee submitted a report, adopted by consensus, to the Assembly at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament, and urged it to reaffirm its full support for the implementation of the Declaration,

Noting also that the *Ad Hoc* Committee has requested the Secretary-General to continue to extend to it all necessary assistance in order to facilitate the intensification of the Committee's work towards the implementation of its mandate and to enable the completion of its remaining preparatory work for the early convening of the Conference, as repeatedly called for by the Assembly, in particular in its resolution 42/43,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean;
2. *Reaffirms* full support for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace;
3. *Reiterates and emphasizes* its decision to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo, as a necessary step for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted in 1971;
4. *Renews* the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions, and requests the Committee to intensify its work with regard to the implementation of its mandate;
5. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the implementation of the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, including the preparatory work for the convening of the Conference, as called for in the relevant resolutions recommended by the Committee and adopted by the General Assembly by consensus, progress has been made by the Working Group of the *Ad Hoc* Committee in its meetings during the sessions of the Committee in 1988;
6. *Urges* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to intensify its discussions of substantive issues and principles, including those identified by the Chairman of the Working Group in his report dated 14 July 1988, with the aim of elaborating elements that might be taken into consideration during the subsequent preparation of a draft final document of the Conference;
7. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to hold two preparatory sessions during the first half of 1989, the first with a duration of one week and the second with a duration of two weeks, for completion of the remaining preparatory work relating to the Conference on the Indian Ocean to enable the convening of the Conference at Colombo in 1990 in consultation with the host country;
8. *Notes* that the *Ad Hoc* Committee will, during its preparatory sessions in 1989, continue to keep under review the need to organize its work more effectively in order to enable it to fulfil its mandate;
9. *Decides* that the *Ad Hoc* Committee should commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, which took place in July 1979, during its preparatory sessions in 1989;
10. *Requests* the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue his consultations on the participation in the work of the Committee by States Members of the United Nations which are

not members of the Committee, with the aim of resolving this matter at the earliest possible date;

11. *Also requests* the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to consult the Secretary-General at the appropriate time on the establishment of a secretariat for the Conference;

12. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session a full report on the implementation of the present resolution;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the *Ad Hoc* Committee, including the provision of summary records, in recognition of its preparatory function.

Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference

In 1971, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2833 (XXVI) calling for the convening of a world disarmament conference open to all States, following adequate preparation. In 1973, the Assembly established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, which was mandated to examine all the views and suggestions of Governments on the convening of a conference and related matters. In its annual reports submitted to the Assembly, the *Ad Hoc* Committee has repeatedly expressed the view that in spite of differences of opinion that have delayed progress towards convening a world disarmament conference, such a conference could be a useful forum for disarmament efforts.

Forty non-nuclear-weapon States are represented in the Committee.³⁶ The basic positions of countries or groups concerning the convening of a conference, as expressed in the *Ad Hoc* Committee over the years, have not undergone essential changes. The Eastern European countries and those non-aligned States that have referred to the issue have favoured a conference, while noting the importance of universal participation and adequate preparation. China has expressed conditional support for the idea. Although the United States and other Western countries have not questioned the proposal in principle, they have emphasized in recent years that the international situation has not been conducive to undertaking preparations for such a conference. Nevertheless, the *Ad Hoc* Committee's mandate has been renewed each year.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee itself did not meet in 1987 because there had been no move towards a reconciliation of views concerning the urgency of convening the conference, and, instead, the Chairman undertook consultations with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States and all other interested States in order to be kept informed of any developments. The Chairman received updated positions from five non-nuclear-weapon States (Bulgaria, Mexico, Philippines, Poland and Sri Lanka), all of which expressed support

³⁶ Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia.

for convening a world disarmament conference, and from the five nuclear-weapon States. Those views were conveyed to the General Assembly in a report of the Secretary-General.³⁷

In 1988 the Committee met for two days under the chairmanship of Mr. Daya Perera of Sri Lanka to prepare its report to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament. In that document³⁸ it reported the updated positions of three of the nuclear Powers.

China, reiterating its position conveyed to the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee the previous year, recalled its long-standing support for an international conference to discuss disarmament. It stated that if the majority of the Member States were in favour of holding a world conference for the purpose of discussing how the two super-Powers should take the lead in drastically cutting their armaments, China would be ready to support the idea.

The Soviet Union was in favour of the idea of a world disarmament conference which, through the collective endeavours of all States, could arrive at effective means of curbing and reversing the arms race. In view, however, of the persistent differences among the nuclear Powers regarding the objectives, agenda and dates for a conference, it would consider it advisable to return to the idea of holding a conference and reactivating the *Ad Hoc* Committee at a later time, when the entire world community was ready for it.

The United Kingdom reiterated its belief that no useful purpose would be served by convening a world disarmament conference. It doubted the usefulness of further meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee did not receive updated positions from France or the United States. Both Powers had, in earlier statements, expressed the view that the current international climate was not conducive to the holding of such a conference and favoured curtailing or suspending further meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

In its report to the General Assembly at its special session, the *Ad Hoc* Committee recognized the continuing validity of the initiative for convening a world disarmament conference. Taking into consideration, however, the divergence of views on the immediate convening of such a conference, it recommended that the Committee's work be suspended until such time as the General Assembly deemed it appropriate to reactivate it.

Conclusion

The general improvement in the international situation and the optimism regarding the United Nations itself, generated by the active role it had played in 1988 in alleviating regional conflicts and by the fact that its peace-keeping

³⁷ A/42/542 and Add.1.

³⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-15/4)*.

forces had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, led many Member States to hope that the Organization's role in disarmament would also be enhanced. Nevertheless, following the inconclusive outcome of the third special session devoted to disarmament, a large majority of States felt that the role of the United Nations needed to be strengthened. In all the principal disarmament forums, political and/or institutional aspects of the question were discussed to some extent.

The Disarmament Commission was unable to achieve an agreed text in its review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament; by resolution 43/75 R, the General Assembly requested it to pursue its consideration of the item in 1989. By resolution 43/78 A, on the report of the Disarmament Commission, the Assembly called upon the Commission to persevere in its efforts to complete all outstanding items and commended it for its adoption by consensus of a set of principles of verification on disarmament issues and a set of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures. Both those resolutions were adopted by consensus. The Conference on Disarmament continued its study of ways to improve its functioning and, in the course of debates on the establishment of its subsidiary bodies and their mandates, addressed indirectly the question of the relationship between bilateral and multilateral negotiations. The two resolutions adopted on the report of the Conference, 43/78 I and 43/78 M, reflected the divergence of views among members of the General Assembly concerning the advisability of the Conference's conducting negotiations on all items on its agenda at present. The General Assembly adopted by vote a fifth resolution connected with efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in disarmament: resolution 43/75 H, entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament". Finally, the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 43/79, by which it maintained the target date of 1990 (set in 1987) for holding the Conference on the Indian Ocean.

The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Introduction

IN SEEKING TO DISCHARGE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES in the field of disarmament, the United Nations has through the years used a variety of methods, techniques and approaches. In 1978, in its effort to promote a more peaceful and stable world order through a balanced and verifiable reduction of national armaments, it held, for the first time, a special session of the General Assembly entirely devoted to disarmament. A second special session on disarmament was held in 1982. In the Concluding Document of that session it was agreed that a third special session should be held at a date to be decided by the Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

In supporting the convening of special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Members of the United Nations have been prompted by the desire to strengthen international co-operation in the whole field of disarmament and to provide the opportunity for consideration, at the highest possible level, of relevant issues, such as the appraisal of developments, the encouragement and support of the process of negotiations at all levels, the assessment of the implementation of agreed programmes and measures, the adoption of concrete programmes and measures for the future, and the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

At its first special session on disarmament, in 1978, the General Assembly was able to adopt, by consensus, a Final Document¹ embodying a comprehensive disarmament strategy, which would provide guidelines for future disarmament efforts. The Final Document recognized that the United Nations had a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament. It also contained specific recommendations for strengthening the disarmament machinery. The Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament was held four years later. Unable to reach agreement on a wide-ranging final document at that session, the Assembly did agree, *inter alia*, to launch a

¹ General Assembly resolution S-10/2. The Final Document is reproduced also in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III; and in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

World Disarmament Campaign. It also reaffirmed the validity of the 1978 Final Document.

By resolution 41/60 G, adopted in 1986, the General Assembly decided to convene its third special session on disarmament in 1988 and to establish an open-ended preparatory committee for it. It requested the Preparatory Committee to prepare a draft agenda for the special session, to examine all relevant questions, and to submit its recommendations and a progress report to the Assembly in 1987.

Work of the Preparatory Committee

The Preparatory Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, held an organizational session in December 1986 and its first substantive session from 26 May to 5 June 1987, both at United Nations Headquarters. The Committee, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 41/60 G, set for itself the task of preparing a draft agenda for the special session and examining all relevant questions. In accordance with the same resolution, Member States submitted views on both the draft agenda and other questions.² Following the practice of the Preparatory Committees for the first and second special sessions devoted to disarmament, the Preparatory Committee for the third special session decided to allow representatives of non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutions to be present at its meetings, and to invite IAEA and specialized agencies interested in disarmament to take part in its work as observers.

The Preparatory Committee submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-second session, in 1987, a report³ containing a set of recommendations concerning the organization of the work of the special session, including a provisional agenda. The Committee also recommended that the special session take place in 1988, before the forty-third regular session of the General Assembly. The special session would follow the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, on the understanding that it would, in so far as possible, adopt decisions on matters of substance by consensus. The Committee believed that it would be desirable for Member States to be represented at the special session at the highest possible political level.

With respect to its future work, the Preparatory Committee recommended that it hold its third session (its second substantive session) from 25 January to 5 February 1988 at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

By resolution 42/40, adopted on 30 November 1987, the General Assembly scheduled the special session for the period from 31 May to 25 June 1988; endorsed the report of the Preparatory Committee and the recommendations contained therein; endorsed also the recommendation of the Prepar-

² A/AC.230/2 and Add.1-10.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 46 (A/42/46)*.

atory Committee that it meet in New York at the above-mentioned dates, in order to consider substantive issues for incorporation in the document or documents to be adopted at the third special session devoted to disarmament, and any remaining organizational and procedural matters.

At the conclusion of its 1988 session, the Preparatory Committee submitted its final report for the special session,⁴ which included the following provisional agenda:

1. Opening of the session
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation
3. Credentials of representatives to the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Appointment of the members of the Credentials Committee
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee
4. Election of the President of the General Assembly
5. Organization of the session
6. Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament
7. Adoption of the agenda
8. General debate
9. Review and appraisal of the present international situation, especially in the light of the vital objective of terminating the arms race and the pressing need to achieve substantial progress in the field of disarmament
10. Assessment of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its first and second special sessions devoted to disarmament:
 - (a) Report of the Conference on Disarmament
 - (b) Report of the Disarmament Commission
 - (c) Resolutions of the General Assembly in the field of arms limitation and disarmament
 - (d) Status of negotiations on arms limitations and disarmament in bilateral and various multilateral forums
11. Consideration and adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
12. Assessment of developments and trends, including qualitative and quantitative aspects, relevant to the disarmament process, with a view to the elaboration of appropriate concrete and practical measures and, if necessary, additional principles, taking duly into account the principles and priorities established in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament
13. Consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and of the effectiveness of the disarmament machinery
14. United Nations information and educational activities in the field of disarmament, including measures to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament:
 - (a) World Disarmament Campaign
 - (b) Other public information activities
15. Relationship between disarmament and development, in the light of the action programme adopted at the International Conference
16. Adoption, in an appropriate format, of the document(s) of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-15/1)*.

The report of the Preparatory Committee also included, as an annex, an informal paper by the Chairman containing suggested elements for consideration under the substantive items of the provisional agenda of the special session. The paper was divided into three main parts, entitled: "Assessment", "New developments and trends", and "Machinery".

The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Opening of the session

The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (the fifteenth special session) was convened at United Nations Headquarters on 31 May. Mr. Peter Florin, Deputy Foreign Minister of the German Democratic Republic and President of the General Assembly at its forty-second regular session, was elected President.

In his statement, the President noted that changes had taken place in the thinking about the relationship between disarmament, peace, security and development. It had been recognized world-wide, he believed, that, in view of the state of development of weapons of mass destruction, their actual use would lead to the annihilation of mankind; that even the use of conventional weapons could lead to the destruction of entire regions and continents; that technical and human failure in the modern world could unleash the ultimate catastrophe; that superarmament constituted an enormous waste of resources and, in the last analysis, increased the danger of war; and that, in view of the scope of non-military global challenges, mankind was beginning to face the alternative of having either disarmament or catastrophe.

There could be no doubt, he stressed, that the first special session devoted to disarmament had made a substantial contribution to the necessary turn-about in thinking, as demanded by the realities of the nuclear and space age. The Final Document of that session contained a thorough analysis of the causes and consequences of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field. The subsequent statement of the highest representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States to the effect that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought, and that neither side must strive for military superiority, was fully in harmony with the spirit of the first special session. It was the task of the General Assembly at its third special session to point the way to a more secure world, ultimately free of weapons of mass destruction and the threat or use of force. A prerequisite for the continuing dialogue at the special session and subsequent disarmament negotiations was the wide range of substantive proposals that had been submitted by all groups of States.

The Secretary-General, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, stressing the recent significant shifts that had occurred in perception and attitude, made clear that the transformation of the present arms situation could result only from a joint

undertaking by all States. All major questions of security and disarmament had bilateral, regional and global dimensions. Negotiating processes at each of those levels, which represented different aspects of the pursuit of the common goal of achieving greater security at progressively lower levels of armaments, rightly supported and complemented each other. Consequently, the international community should strongly encourage the two major military Powers to sustain and develop the momentum of their mutual relationship, to broaden their understanding and to make progress on issues that had global implications. At the same time, it was felt that their bilateral actions to halt and reverse the arms race should generate a corresponding multilateral response. As to the direction of those joint efforts, the Secretary-General held that the highest importance should be given to the reduction of nuclear weapons, of armed forces and of conventional weapons, to the conclusion of an international convention on the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to the cessation of nuclear tests.

Nuclear issues, the Secretary-General emphasized, went far beyond national security and impinged directly on human survival. Thus, it was imperative that the international community continue to press for the sharp reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. "A rational military policy", he stated, "is incompatible with the danger of annihilation of the human race". Equal determination should be evinced by the international community to deal effectively and expeditiously with other weapons of mass destruction, in particular with chemical weapons. The time had also come for it to recognize the need to deal squarely with the mounting toll of death, destruction and human suffering inflicted by the use of conventional weapons in conflicts around the world. The term "conventional" should not hide or minimize the vast destructive powers of some of those weapons, nor should the innocuous-sounding phrase "arms transfers" make people forget the devastating effect of the supply of weapons in local conflicts.

In the field of armaments, the Secretary-General stated, the technological revolution had made it possible to invent and accumulate ever more sophisticated weapons at an unbridled pace and at an exorbitant cost. However, with international co-operation, the same revolution could be made available for peaceful purposes. Among the areas where good use of modern technology was possible, one might mention the verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements, "an area in which the United Nations might be able to make an important contribution".

Following the statement by the Secretary-General, the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee presented the report of the Committee, containing recommendations on organizational questions relating to the special session and its provisional agenda. The General Assembly endorsed as a whole the report of the Preparatory Committee and the recommendations contained therein. The Chairman of the Preparatory Committee was then elected by acclamation Chairman of the Committee of the Whole of the fifteenth special session. The Assembly decided to allocate items 10 to 15 of the agenda (see

section above entitled "Work of the Preparatory Committee") to the Committee of the Whole for consideration and preparation of reports, while the other items would be considered in plenary meetings. It was further decided that the Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly at its forty-second regular session⁵ would serve in the same capacity at the fifteenth special session and that the Chairmen of the Main Committees of the forty-second session would continue in the same posts for the fifteenth special session.

General debate in plenary meetings

The general debate in plenary meetings opened on 1 June. In the course of 20 meetings, the Assembly heard 135 speakers, including 23 heads of State or Government, 1 vice-president, 6 deputy prime ministers and 61 foreign ministers, on subjects ranging from confidence-building measures to general and complete disarmament.

Several heads of State or Government sent messages to the session.⁶ The USSR and the United States submitted the text of their joint statement of 1 June, issued at Moscow at the conclusion of the meetings held there, from 29 May to 1 June, between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan.⁷ In the course of the general debate, representatives of the non-member States of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland and the Holy See, as well as the Director General of IAEA, also made statements. In addition, representatives of the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization and the South West Africa People's Organization, addressed the Assembly.

On the whole, the debate reflected a heightened international awareness of disarmament issues. The support for greater security through fewer weapons was universal. In addition, several speakers stressed the need to redefine the concept of security, freeing it from the traditional militaristic point of view. It was widely felt that at the third special session the Assembly must build on the work of the earlier sessions, in particular the first. Many speakers referred to the 1978 Final Document and called for reaffirmation of its goals. At the same time, other speakers welcomed the opportunity offered by the third special session for reassessment. Many speakers renewed their call for the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and advocated strengthening the role of the United

⁵ The representatives of the following Member States: Botswana, Cameroon, China, Comoros, France, Jordan, Mauritania, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Portugal, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Tunisia, USSR, United Kingdom and United States.

⁶ Message of H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea (A/S-15/21); Message of H.E. Mr. Todor Zhivkov, President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (A/S-15/24); Message of H.E. Mr. Wojciech Jaruzelski, President of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic (A/S-15/29); and Message of King Hussein of Jordan (A/S-15/PV.6).

⁷ A/S-15/28.

Nations in the field of disarmament. Many focused attention on the close link existing between bilateral and multilateral disarmament and the need to view the two as complementary.

It was felt that the third special session should provide momentum for the elimination of the risk of war; for confidence-building, more openness and transparency; for promoting the security of all countries in accordance with the principles of stability and sufficiency; for preventing the development and deployment of new weapons of mass destruction; for accelerating the outlawing of particularly injurious and inhumane weapons; for reducing national and global military expenditures and promoting the reallocation of resources to development and other peaceful objectives; and, in general, for taking effective measures—regional as well as global—that could contribute to curbing the arms race and enhancing security at a lower level of arms and forces, and for moving closer to comprehensive disarmament and to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) was widely welcomed as an unprecedented measure of nuclear arms reduction and a move marking the transition from the management of the arms race to real disarmament. In the multilateral field, the achievements of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, concluded in 1986, continued to find positive response. Also in other contexts, a regional approach to the negotiation of arms control and disarmament agreements was generally viewed very favourably. Much attention was also devoted to negotiations under way, notably those between the United States and the Soviet Union, on a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and those engaging the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body, on the complete elimination of chemical weapons.

Practically every disarmament issue had a place in the general debate but, as had been the case at the two earlier special sessions, nuclear issues received priority consideration. However, increased attention was focused on matters relating to conventional weapons and to chemical weapons. An important place in the debate was also occupied by the questions of naval armaments and disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The broad questions of verification, disarmament and development, and the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament were also central issues in the general debate.

On the question of the *cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament*, the United States stressed that bilateral progress by the United States and the Soviet Union had been substantial, as evidenced, in the first place, by the INF Treaty. The breakthroughs in the Treaty in respect of verification and openness might be considered almost as important as the nuclear reductions themselves. Moreover, major progress had been made

towards a treaty to cut United States and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals by 50 per cent. That was currently the top arms control priority of the United States. In 1988, the two Powers, the United States recalled, had also opened nuclear risk reduction centres, which would further decrease the chance of war through accident or miscalculation and would play a direct role in implementing the INF Treaty. The two sides had also agreed to provide 24 hours' advance notice of strategic ballistic-missile launches.

The Soviet Union reaffirmed its proposal for a step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The search for appropriate political methods, the purpose of which would be to build a nuclear-free world, was now the order of the day, it stated. Meanwhile, it was confident that an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms, with observance of the ABM Treaty of 1972, would be concluded in the near future. Beyond that, the Soviet Union had two objectives: the first was to expand and intensify the process of disarmament without losing momentum; the second was to contribute to creating a state of world affairs based on a qualitatively different concept of security. The Soviet Union had no illusion that nuclear weapons could be eliminated easily or regardless of other elements of security, but the first and perhaps the hardest thing to do was to abandon the myth of nuclear weapons as the guarantor of peace—a "guarantor", it stressed, capable of reducing all life on Earth to ashes. The Soviet Union expressed its conviction that ensuring security by non-nuclear means was possible on the basis of sufficiency, which must be viewed as a psychological and political disposition towards ever smaller arsenals, sufficient for defence but not for attack, and supportive of an institution such as the United Nations, which could be the central focus of a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

France welcomed the progress achieved in the dialogue between the two major Powers and at the regional level. It held, however, that the international community could not be satisfied with the role of a more or less passive observer. The community must, instead, play its role to the full in the task of disarmament and to do so it must be realistic. It should, therefore, steer clear of those themes, notably, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, which could never secure the assent of all. General and complete denuclearization would have to go hand in hand with general and complete disarmament, which, unfortunately, was not a short-term goal. Regional denuclearization, for instance in Europe, would not be any more realistic, France held. In the nuclear sphere, the reality of the situation was that the two most heavily armed Powers, fearing to exhaust themselves in a race without end, were gradually shifting in the direction of sufficiency.

The United Kingdom noted that confidence between East and West had increased and that greater confidence had been the catalyst of the INF Treaty and of the progress made in the strategic arms reduction talks. The latter, in turn, should further increase confidence, but the slow pace of progress underlined that there was still a long way to go. For the present, what was needed was to focus on the possible, not the speculative; on the gradual, not the

Utopian; on INF (“the best possible curtain-raiser” for the special session) and strategic arms reductions, not the wildly unrealistic calls for a nuclear-free world by the year 2000. In its view, a 50 per cent reduction in super-Power strategic nuclear systems was an ambitious but realistic goal. The United Kingdom remained committed to stability and security at lower levels of forces.

China stressed that in their negotiations on disarmament the two super-Powers had paid great attention to “balance” and “equal security” between themselves. The question, however, was whether “balance” and “equal security” between the two major Powers would indeed ensure security for the other countries. It was China’s view that the military imbalance between the two major Powers and the rest of the world made the vast majority of countries feel extremely insecure. Furthermore, China stressed, the arms race was still going on, with qualitative improvement overtaking quantitative reductions. Long-range cruise missiles had emerged as a new strategic nuclear force and were in the process of further development. Strategic nuclear weapons were being improved in respect of accuracy, mobility and stealth; so were tactical nuclear weapons. Outer space risked becoming an arena for the arms race between the two super-Powers. The signing of the INF Treaty, China stated, was an encouraging step towards drastic reduction of nuclear armaments. However, only by persisting in that approach could further concrete results be achieved in the cause of disarmament. The two super-Powers, China stressed, should take the lead in putting an end to the testing, manufacture and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons and in drastically reducing and eliminating all the types of nuclear weapons that each of them had deployed. Then, a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament could be convened with the participation of all nuclear States to discuss the steps and measures to be taken for the total elimination of nuclear armaments.

The Federal Republic of Germany, speaking on behalf of the 12 member countries of the European Community, viewed the INF Treaty as a milestone in the reduction of nuclear arms—a breakthrough from arms control to genuine arms reductions. The principle of asymmetrical reductions had also been applied for the first time and a far-reaching co-operative verification régime had been agreed on. The Treaty should now provide a significant impetus to further progress, particularly on halving the offensive strategic nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States. Speaking on its own behalf, the Federal Republic of Germany stated that, in Europe, advantage must be taken of the new developments in the Soviet Union to create a peaceful European order. Nuclear weapons were a political means of war prevention which would be needed in the foreseeable future for the Western Alliance’s strategy aimed at preventing war. It was just as necessary, however, to reduce, through a co-operative security policy, the reliance on nuclear deterrence. The Netherlands believed that now that the world seemed to be moving towards real disarmament, Member States should ask themselves whether some of the concepts which had been discussed in the past had not become

outmoded. Had not the freeze concept, for example, been overtaken by events? Canada thought that the special session could identify and isolate those areas which now commanded consensus and on which it would be worth while to concentrate attention in the future. The first area was that of nuclear disarmament. Deep and verifiable reductions in the nuclear arsenals, Canada stated, must remain the highest priority in the field of disarmament.

The Eastern European States envisaged various measures, nuclear as well as non-nuclear, for limiting armaments and strengthening confidence in Europe, particularly in Central Europe. In order to intensify the process of establishing security and co-operation for all of Europe, Czechoslovakia reaffirmed its proposal for the establishment of a zone of confidence, co-operation and good-neighbourly relations along the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty States and those belonging to NATO. This proposal, Czechoslovakia made clear, followed from its earlier proposals for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor and a zone free of chemical weapons in Central Europe, as presented, jointly with the German Democratic Republic, to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. The German Democratic Republic reiterated that never again must war emanate from German soil. It stressed that the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, the elimination of all nuclear weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space were measures of first priority. It underscored its own contribution to the implementation of the INF Treaty, and stated that endeavours to compensate for the first nuclear disarmament accord by an intensified buildup in other directions or under cover of "modernization" must cause concern. Poland reaffirmed its plan for decreasing armaments and increasing confidence in Central Europe as presented to the General Assembly at its forty-second session. Romania called for the establishment of a special body for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Such a body would conduct negotiations for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, cessation of nuclear tests, and the working out of a general programme of nuclear disarmament.

Sweden, referring to the Six-Nation Initiative and to the 1988 Stockholm Declaration by the leaders of the six countries, welcomed recent positive developments as represented by the INF Treaty, but stressed that the remaining nuclear weapons still posed a mortal threat. As such, they must be totally abolished. As a first step, a speedy agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic arms must be achieved by the USSR and the United States. Tactical nuclear weapons must also be eliminated without delay. Military competition must not be introduced into new fields. The testing of nuclear weapons must be stopped. The nuclear option must be closed and the use of nuclear weapons prohibited.

India outlined an action plan for comprehensive disarmament in stages (1988-1994, 1995-2000 and 2001-2010), with nuclear disarmament as its centrepiece in each stage. By the year 2010 at the latest, all nuclear weapons should be eliminated. In the first stage, India envisaged a 50 per cent reduction in the United States-Soviet strategic arsenals; immediate cessation of the

production of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissionable materials; a moratorium on testing of nuclear weapons to set the stage for negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban; an international convention to outlaw the threat or use of nuclear weapons; negotiations for replacing the non-proliferation Treaty, in 1995, by a new treaty to give legal effect to a binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2010 and by all non-nuclear States not to cross the nuclear-weapon threshold; and strict measures to end all covert and overt assistance to those seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. India also proposed arrangements for controlling, by systematic monitoring, the continuous qualitative upgrading of nuclear and conventional weapons, through increasing transparency in research and development in frontier technologies with military applications. All this would be done under an integrated multilateral verification system.

Japan appealed to the nuclear-weapon States to strive for the realization of nuclear disarmament. For its part, Japan continued to maintain, as a matter of national policy, the three basic principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their introduction into Japan.

Australia stressed that the halting and reversing of the nuclear-arms race and the prevention of nuclear war were matters to be pursued not only at the bilateral, but also at the multilateral, level. In a situation where the consequences of nuclear exchanges would be world-wide, nuclear issues could not be the sole domain of the nuclear-weapon Powers.

Nigeria called for priority consideration of the threat posed by nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear weapons existed in the arsenals of States, the possibility of their use could not be ruled out. That was particularly so in view of the dogmatic clinging to the theory of nuclear deterrence, a theory which, in Nigeria's view, no longer had validity or credibility. Recalling the statement of the leaders of the two major Powers that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", it maintained that the logic of nuclear disarmament could no longer be attributed only to the non-aligned and neutral States, but to all States which were genuinely concerned with common global security.

Mexico welcomed the progress made by the two major Powers in the field of nuclear arms reductions, but also insisted on the decisive importance of negotiations of multilateral scope. Member States must look beyond the horizon of passing circumstances and pursue goals of fundamental importance, namely, the prevention of nuclear war, the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, the reduction and elimination of strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Many countries spoke on the *cessation of nuclear tests*, a measure which continued to be viewed as a priority goal by the overwhelming majority of Member States.

Sweden recalled that the participants in the Six-Nation Initiative had declared their readiness to contribute to the speedy adoption of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Their offer to assist in the monitoring of any halt in

nuclear testing still stood. Austria renewed its appeal to the Governments of the United States and the USSR to renounce further nuclear testing, until the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, as an essential step towards curbing the nuclear-arms race.

Mexico insisted on the importance of concluding and signing a multi-lateral treaty on the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions, a measure which would contribute decisively to the halting of the nuclear-arms race. Ecuador's priorities were the elimination and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a complete ban on all kinds of nuclear testing. Venezuela believed that the Conference on Disarmament must, as soon as possible, draft an international agreement to bring about the cessation of nuclear testing. It also recalled the initiative promoted by a group of countries, including Venezuela, aimed at amending the partial test-ban Treaty in order to turn it into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. India, in its action plan for comprehensive disarmament, envisaged in the first phase of the plan a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons to set the stage for negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Pakistan stated that a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-test explosions by all countries, in all environments, for all time would contribute effectively to stopping the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and preventing their proliferation. At the very least, the nuclear-weapon Powers must set a time limit—not exceeding five years—on further nuclear tests for any nuclear-weapon programme in which they were engaged. Egypt appealed to the two super-Powers and other parties concerned to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty at the earliest possible date. Ghana stressed that it was illogical to pursue nuclear disarmament while remaining attached to nuclear testing.

Japan appreciated the negotiations under way between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear testing. It very much hoped that those two countries would step up their negotiations and ratify the threshold test-ban Treaty of 1974 and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty of 1976 at the earliest practicable date, so that they could proceed to the next phase of limiting nuclear tests. It further announced plans to convene an international conference in Japan, under joint Japanese/United Nations auspices, devoted to the development of measures to verify nuclear testing by seismological means through a global system. Australia recalled its own proposal for the immediate establishment of a global seismic monitoring network to verify a ban on all nuclear-test explosions and referred to its own contribution to the experimental monitoring network which was laying the groundwork for such a system. New Zealand emphasized that a bilateral agreement on cessation of nuclear tests would be inadequate. If ever there was an example of a multilateral dimension to arms control, it stated, the question of cessation of tests provided it. Thus, New Zealand looked to the members of the Conference on Disarmament to resolve the existing procedural stand-off and to start negotiations for a treaty. Similarly, Norway stated that nuclear testing was not the concern of nuclear-weapon States alone. The Conference on Disarmament should undertake substantive work on relevant questions relating to

a test ban. A global seismological network should be the central tool in monitoring compliance with a test ban. The Norwegian Government would make all three of the seismic arrays in Norway—NORSAR, NORESS and ARCESS—available as stations in the global seismological network. In view of the evolving shift in emphasis from the quantitative to the qualitative aspects of the nuclear-arms race, Yugoslavia advocated the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

The USSR indicated that the USSR-United States talks on cessation of nuclear tests were close to attaining the goal of the first stage, namely, producing improved measures to verify compliance with two bilateral treaties, the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty, leading to their ratification by both countries. That would make it possible to move on to the next phase, in which limitations on the number and yield of test explosions would be discussed. Those bilateral negotiations, the Soviet Union added, were only part of ongoing efforts to achieve a total ban on all nuclear testing. Serious work remained to be done at the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference could begin, if necessary, with a step-by-step consideration of a verification system. The USSR, moreover, stated that it was ready, on the basis of reciprocity with the United States, to resume a moratorium on nuclear testing and to observe it permanently.

The German Democratic Republic noted that the prospects for a cessation of nuclear-weapon tests had improved. It was expected, it stated, that the Soviet-American negotiations would lead soon to a reduction in the number and yield of tests. Parallel with those negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament should prepare the ground for a comprehensive solution by working out, as a first step, a comprehensive international verification system for a nuclear-test ban. Similar views were expressed by Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland.

The United States emphasized the stage-by-stage aspect of the ongoing bilateral negotiations. The first step was to agree on effective verification, to make it possible to ratify the 1974 and the 1976 Treaties. At the Moscow summit meeting, at the end of May, the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed on the detailed procedures necessary for conducting a joint verification experiment at each other's test sites. The two sides had also made progress on a new protocol to their peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty.

Several speakers emphasized that an agreement on cessation of nuclear tests would contribute decisively to the *non-proliferation of nuclear weapons*. The question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in itself received considerable attention at the special session.

The United States announced that since June 1982, 19 additional States had joined the non-proliferation Treaty, and it noted that the Third Review Conference on the Treaty, held in 1985, had unanimously concluded that the Treaty was essential to international peace and security. Some 136 nations had freely chosen to adhere to the Treaty, and there was no good reason why every nation should not make such a commitment. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United States further noted, remained a key part of the non-proliferation

régime. All eligible States, it stressed, should fully adhere to it. At the very moment when the United States and the USSR had agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals, it would be tragic for other countries to pursue nuclear-weapon capability to cross the nuclear threshold. Nuclear proliferation was one of the most direct and serious threats to regional and global stability. In the view of the United States, it was in South Asia that the danger was most acute at the present time. On a related issue, the United States said that, in 1987, the United States itself and six other industrialized democracies had formed a missile technology control régime to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. It added that at the Moscow summit meeting the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to hold exploratory talks and to exchange ideas and information about how to cope with the growing problem of such proliferation.

Ireland stressed that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had become the accepted norm of international life and that it was the responsibility and lay in the interest of every country, large or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, to do all in its power to ensure that the menace of nuclear weapons would spread no farther. Thus, it was unfortunate that a sizeable number of States were not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. Ireland found it most disturbing that several States were actively seeking or might already have obtained a nuclear weapons capability, in the belief that acquiring nuclear weapons would somehow strengthen their security. The truth was the very opposite. Any country which acquired nuclear weapons would provoke a similar response from its rivals and expose itself to an increased risk of involvement in the horror of nuclear war. In the interest of general security, Ireland held, all countries should give complete co-operation to IAEA by permitting and facilitating full inspection at all civilian nuclear installations.

It was Denmark's view that the non-proliferation régime had made a significant contribution to world stability. Since the entry into force of the Treaty, no non-nuclear-weapon State party had acquired nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation régime—and strong international support for it—should see to it that the nuclear option would never become an attractive solution to perceived security needs. Denmark welcomed recent accessions to the Treaty, and urged those who still stood outside it to recognize their responsibility and join it. The Netherlands urged that an effective world-wide non-proliferation régime be maintained. Such a régime could include appropriate measures for preventing the introduction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery to particular regions. Furthermore, the regional context would be a suitable one in which to consider nuclear-weapon-free zones as another measure for strengthening non-proliferation.

Egypt, recalling that in 1964 it had hosted the African summit conference which had issued a call to declare Africa a non-nuclear-weapon continent, expressed grave concern about the policies of the *apartheid* régime in South Africa, which was hindering the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. Senegal condemned "the policy of duplicity" which had enabled South Africa "to equip itself with nuclear weapons".

Pakistan stated that its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation was firm and unwavering. Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons, nor did it intend to possess them, it added. It had not carried out a nuclear explosion nor did it intend to conduct one. Its nuclear programme was emphatically peaceful in nature. For its part, Pakistan was ready to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty simultaneously with India; to accept full-scope safeguards for its nuclear programme simultaneously with India; to conclude a bilateral agreement with India for the inspection of each other's nuclear facilities; to make a joint declaration with India renouncing nuclear weapons; and to enter into a bilateral nuclear test-ban treaty with India. In conclusion, Pakistan would accept any equitable and non-discriminatory agreement with effective verification arrangements that would commit the countries of the region, in a legally binding manner, not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons. In reply, India stated that Pakistan was very close to acquiring nuclear weapons, if it had not already done so.

The Director-General of IAEA provided an account of how the Agency had helped prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries. For over 25 years, he stressed, the Agency had administered the world's first international on-site inspection system—the safeguards system—verifying that nuclear installations and fissionable material submitted to Agency control were used only for peaceful purposes. The Director-General analysed the experience gained by IAEA in administering the safeguards system. He rejected the contention that there was an inevitable link between civilian nuclear power and nuclear weapons. The fact was, he stated, that all the acknowledged nuclear-weapon States had nuclear weapons first and developed their civilian nuclear power thereafter, and that no State that had developed civilian nuclear power had so far used it to develop nuclear weapons. Thus, while such a link was possible, the rationality of non-proliferation had so far prevailed. The central idea of a generous transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, combined with binding commitments to non-proliferation, was an important part of that rationality. That approach had also prompted the birth of IAEA's on-site inspection system. It would be incorrect to say that the safeguards verification requirement was based on distrust of the sincerity of the non-proliferation pledges. Rather it was important both to the suppliers of nuclear technology and material and to the recipient countries to demonstrate to neighbours and to the world that no weapons use was made of technology or material transferred. For that reason, pledges to that effect were supplemented by verification. The system was thus based on the now world-famous saying, "Trust, but verify".

A considerable number of speakers, not only from developing countries but also from other areas, in particular Eastern Europe, addressed the question of *nuclear-weapon-free zones*. Nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, it was felt, could make an important contribution to non-proliferation, especially in areas where not all countries had acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty. It was also stressed that, in accordance with the 1978 Final Document, nuclear-weapon-free zones must be based on arrangements

freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and taking into account the characteristics of each region. On the other hand, as again prescribed by the Final Document, the nuclear-weapon States must respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zones.

In addition to the regions covered by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga, speakers mentioned Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, South-East Asia, Central Europe and the Balkans. The Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was also a subject of debate. There were also some references to other areas, in particular, the South Atlantic.

As in recent years, the related question of the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and the nuclear capability of South Africa received close attention. Kenya stated that the acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability by the *apartheid* régime in South Africa constituted a very grave danger to the African continent as it could only be designed to hold the whole of Africa hostage. Nigeria called on the General Assembly at its special session to take effective measures to ensure that Africans' determination that their continent be nuclear-weapon-free was not frustrated by the nuclear-weapon programme of South Africa, "which, unfortunately, was aided and abetted by the favoured transfer of nuclear technology to the *apartheid* régime".

Several speakers focused their attention on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. In that connection, Egypt stated that it would continue to pursue the proposal actively until the proposal received tangible expression, and it put forward some practical steps towards that goal. Israel again invited the Arab States to negotiate direct with it on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Concerning South Asia, Pakistan recalled that all the States of South Asia had declared at the highest level that they would not acquire or develop nuclear weapons. It further recalled that it had made a number of proposals (including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone) to convert those unilateral declarations into binding legal obligations. Indonesia stated that the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) were engaged in the elaboration of an appropriate instrument for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia, to be subsequently presented to the other regional States and to the nuclear Powers for their concurrence and endorsement. It was its view that the success of those endeavours would constitute a significant step in transforming South-East Asia from an area of recurrent tension and strife into a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. Viet Nam welcomed the initiative of ASEAN and its formulation of an instrument on a nuclear-free South-East Asia.

The German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia advocated nuclear-weapon-free and chemical-weapon-free zones in Central Europe. They stressed that their proposal, like other initiatives of the socialist countries, was meant to relax tension and increase security on the European continent.

Bulgaria recalled that its initiative for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans had met with positive international response.

Indonesia, speaking on the subject of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, stressed that the aspirations of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to establish peace in their zone were being seriously set back by the growing militarization of the Indian Ocean, which had instilled a pervasive sense of instability and insecurity, both region-wide and beyond. The Indian Ocean zone of peace could not materialize as long as naval manoeuvres, the fortification of foreign military bases and other manifestations of military power projection by external Powers continued unabated. Nor could resort to the principle of freedom of the high seas be used as a pretext to justify the ever-growing military activities in the Indian Ocean. The complex ramifications of the problems involved and the differing perception of them could only be addressed comprehensively through the long-pending international Conference on the Indian Ocean. Indonesia, together with the non-aligned States, therefore, remained firmly committed to convening the Conference no later than 1990 as a *sine qua non* of securing the objectives of the United Nations Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Sri Lanka stated that a consensus existed among permanent members of the Security Council, the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, and the regional States, for holding the Conference on the Indian Ocean in Colombo, Sri Lanka, at a date not later than 1990. It was to be hoped that it would be possible for all States to participate fully in the convening of the Conference.

Brazil stated that, together with its South Atlantic neighbours, it was dedicated to contributing to a collective effort to achieve fully the objectives of the Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic, as proposed by the Government of Brazil and endorsed by the United Nations in resolution 41/11.

The question of *strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons* was referred to by several countries, including Afghanistan, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Kenya, Kuwait, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Pakistan, Portugal and Zimbabwe. As Zimbabwe put it, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, binding agreements whereby States undertook not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States would engender some degree of confidence on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States. The efficacy of a policy of non-proliferation, it added, hinged in large part on the sense of protection that non-nuclear-weapon States had against nuclear blackmail or attack.

The *non-use of nuclear weapons*, was not, *per se*, widely debated at the special session, but many speakers referred to the dictum by the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought and they considered its implications. In addition, China clearly reaffirmed its position that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the

first to use nuclear weapons and not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. India reiterated its proposal for an international convention to outlaw the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Ecuador urged, as an interim measure, the conclusion of a treaty by which every nuclear-weapon State would commit itself never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Sweden suggested that such commitments be followed by a treaty on the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Mongolia held that, as a first step, nuclear-weapon States should join the declaration of the USSR and the United States on the inadmissibility of nuclear war. In addition, the General Assembly at the special session, Mongolia stated, might make a recommendation to the Security Council to explore the possibility of elaborating a legal document on the question of non-first use of nuclear weapons which would be acceptable to all the nuclear-weapon States. Algeria held that a total ban on the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons must be agreed upon by the five nuclear-weapon Powers, as an initial measure, to be set forth in a binding instrument.

The debate on *conventional weapons*, like the one on nuclear weapons, was multifaceted. It touched upon such questions as the spreading of ever more sophisticated conventional weapons throughout the world; the tragic losses of life and property in conventional warfare since the end of the Second World War; the increasing threat posed by conventional forces and weapons world-wide; the insensitivity to the danger of conventional arms proliferation and use as a result of the overwhelming threat posed by nuclear war; the ever-expanding arms trade and transfer in conventional weapons; the rising level of armaments and conventional war in developing countries; the need for phased conventional disarmament on the basis of the concept of sufficiency, in regional and subregional areas; and the problems created by new technologies as applied to conventional weapons.

The Soviet Union stated that talks on conventional armed forces and armaments, above all in Europe, were for it a matter of priority. The Soviet Union proposed that reductions in conventional armaments begin with the elimination of existing imbalances and asymmetries on the basis of a reciprocal exchange of data. Such an exchange could take place even before the start of negotiations. Once negotiations got under way, on-site inspections should be conducted to check baseline data, thus removing differences in assessments. At that stage, ways of eliminating imbalances and asymmetries could be identified and the first practical steps taken to that effect. Methods of carrying out reductions of armed forces and armaments under the strictest control could also be devised. The second stage of the negotiations would deal with cut-backs in the armed forces of both sides by approximately 500,000 men each. At the third stage further reductions would be made in armed forces and conventional armaments; the armed forces of both sides would be given a defensive character and their offensive nucleus would be dismantled. During the negotiating process, furthermore, the Soviet Union was ready for reciprocal reductions in all types of offensive arms, including tactical nuclear weapons, attack aircraft, tanks and so on. Discussions could also be held, in

parallel, on measures for the disengagement of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO forces and the establishment of corridors and zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union also advocated the elimination of any foreign military presence and military bases in foreign territories by the year 2000. That goal, it stated, should be pursued gradually, with due regard for specific regional situations. The United Nations, it added, could be invited to participate in verifying the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories; where the presence of foreign troops was needed to maintain peace, they should be provided by the United Nations. It would be a very good thing, the Soviet Union suggested, if States agreed to provide to the Secretary-General information on their military presence abroad and on foreign military presence on their own territories.

The United States stressed that, together with its NATO allies, it had pressed for progress in conventional arms control in Europe. The aim of the Alliance was to establish a situation in Europe in which force postures as well as the numbers and deployments of weapons systems no longer made surprise attack and large-scale offensive action a feasible option. NATO leaders had been very specific about what steps must be taken: enhance stability in the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, in a way which safeguarded the security of all but took into account the particular problems facing each region; focus on the key weapons systems in seeking to eliminate the ability to conduct large-scale offensive actions; deal with stationed forces, including forward-deployed Soviet units, while taking into consideration reinforcement capabilities; concentrate on results which would eliminate the disparities that threatened stability, not on schemes for "equal reduction", which would have no such effect; redress the conventional imbalance, which could be achieved through a set of measures, including reductions, limitations and redeployments, as well as the establishment of equal ceilings; require highly asymmetrical reductions by the East, entailing, for example, the elimination from Europe of tens of thousands of Warsaw Treaty weapons that could be used in a surprise attack, including tanks and artillery pieces; propose, as a concurrent element, measures to produce greater openness in military activities, and to support a rigorous monitoring and verification régime; and include in that régime the exchange of detailed data about forces and deployments, and the right to sufficient on-site inspections to be confident of compliance. All that, the United States concluded, must not be allowed to obscure the fact that building a safer world was not a United States-Soviet problem alone, or even an East-West problem: it was every nation's responsibility.

The United Kingdom emphasized the need to tackle the problem of the Warsaw Treaty countries' conventional superiority in Europe. The Western Alliance, for its part, remained committed to stability and security at lower levels of forces. Similarly France, stressing the concepts of stability and sufficiency, called for significant progress in the reduction of conventional imbalances in Europe and reaffirmed its commitment to get talks started to

that end. China emphasized that there was an urgent need to reduce drastically conventional armaments. Moreover, they should be used only for defence and not for aggression or to threaten the security of States.

The Federal Republic of Germany expressed the hope that 1988 would be the year in which negotiations on conventional stability would start. The Federal Republic sought for Europe a system of co-operative security that would make it impossible to start and wage a conventional war. Negotiations on conventional stability were to be seen in that perspective. The strength, equipment, deployment, readiness and structure of conventional forces must be reduced to a level that would meet the requirements of a non-offensive capability. The objective was to attain a situation in Europe in which neither side possessed any longer the capacity to attack foreign territory. That already held true of the forces of the Western Alliance, the Federal Republic stated. Denmark was encouraged by the increased interest in conventional disarmament and problems related to conventional weapons and welcomed the Secretary-General's concern about that question. Italy hoped that willingness existed to eliminate the present asymmetries in Europe by means of adequate negotiated reductions, thus eliminating the need for an increase in the military arsenals of the Western countries. It further stated that it intended to pursue in the United Nations the issue of control and limitation of trade in conventional weapons, an old, still unresolved issue.

Poland stated that new generations of conventional weapons with increased strike accuracy and precision were frequently no less destructive than tactical nuclear weapons. In that context, the question of dual-capacity weapons became particularly significant. The exclusion of dual-capacity weapons from the negotiations on the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments could preclude the elimination of existing disproportions. The German Democratic Republic stated that the peoples of the world did not want a mere shifting of the threat from an area where it was clearly felt to areas where it was less obvious. What they wanted was the verifiable elimination, once and for all, of everything that threatened their continued existence. Czechoslovakia stressed that opening meaningful talks on substantial reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals was a priority task. The East-West meeting in Vienna should, therefore, intensify its efforts to agree on a mandate for such talks.

India described as a key task of disarmament a general reduction of conventional arms across the globe, accompanied by measures to preclude surprise attacks and by consensus strategies for non-provocative defence. Reductions must, of course, begin in areas where the bulk of the world's conventional arms and forces were concentrated. However, other countries should also join the process without much delay. The United Nations, for its part, needed to evolve by consensus a new strategic doctrine of non-provocative defence. Uganda noted that the developing countries, which devoted a disproportionate share of their budgets to military expenditures, must be prepared to redress the imbalance by spending less on armaments and more on development. Underscoring the urgency of reducing and eventually elim-

inating nuclear weapons, it stated that the need for drastic reductions of conventional weapons and for the elimination of chemical weapons was equally urgent.

Yugoslavia, expressing concern at the spreading of ever more sophisticated and destructive conventional weapons throughout the world, stated that, if the international community wanted to curb the arms race, it must in the future—much more than it had done in the past—become preoccupied with conventional weapons at global, regional and sub-regional levels. It also suggested that the General Assembly address an appeal to all States unilaterally to reduce conventional weapons and armed forces by 10 per cent by the year 1990 as a concrete sign of their readiness to contribute to disarmament.

A number of Member States, notably Albania, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Colombia, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, Luxembourg, the Philippines, Spain, the USSR and the United States, devoted attention to the question of *arms transfers*. In particular, the United States noted that in the five years from 1977 to 1981, some \$128 billion worth of arms had been delivered to developing countries. In the following five years, ending in 1986, the figure had risen to \$180 billion—an increase of some 40 per cent. The Soviet Union had been by far, the United States stated, the most significant source of arms deliveries throughout the decade. In the first five years, Warsaw Treaty countries had accounted for 51 per cent of the weapons shipments, while countries of NATO had been responsible for 41 per cent. In the second five years those figures had declined somewhat, to 50 per cent for the Warsaw Treaty and 37 per cent for NATO. During the same period the developing countries themselves had shown a big increase as the sources of their own weapons. In percentage terms, their share had almost doubled from the first period to the second, rising from 6 to 11 per cent.

The Soviet Union stated that it favoured restrictions on the sale and supply of conventional arms. One of the obstacles to a settlement of regional conflicts, it pointed out, was the intensive importation of weapons into zones of increased confrontation.

Australia called on the General Assembly to consider how international arms transfers, in both overt and covert forms, could be regulated. The spectacle of States attempting to solve political or foreign policy problems through arms transfers was seen too often, Australia stated, and was clearly revealed as providing no solution at all. It was also clear that arms exports should not be turned to as a way of solving domestic economic problems; arms transfers must not become “a new cash crop”. It should also be recognized, especially by those whose development needs were great, that the purchase of arms was at the cost of the purchase of investment goods essential to the creation of employment and economic growth. Belgium stressed that transparency meant also the communication of reliable data on export flows and arms transfers. Thus, Belgium continued to support the idea of creating an international register or of notifying the Secretary-General about all arms transfers. It believed that the idea should be acted upon. Colombia emphasized that the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries had pointed out repeatedly that

the tremendous buildup in conventional weaponry represented a tragic misuse of resources in a world which was afflicted with mass poverty and hunger. Italy, as indicated above, stated that it would pursue further the question of the control and limitation of trade in conventional weapons.

Considerable attention was given in the debate to *chemical disarmament*, in particular, the need to respect the letter and the spirit of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and the urgency of concluding successfully, in the shortest possible time, the multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

There was general agreement that negotiations on such a ban must be pressed ahead with increased co-operation by all sides. As the United States put it, at the Conference on Disarmament the outstanding issues of a chemical weapons ban had been identified. All 40 participating nations must now apply themselves to resolving them, notably the problem of ensuring effective verification and undiminished security. For the future convention to have real meaning, the United States stressed, all chemical-weapons-capable States must be party to it. Meanwhile, all nations had a responsibility to combat the proliferation of those weapons. The General Assembly had voted to strengthen the Secretary-General's investigations of the suspected use of chemical weapons. That was a limited but positive step. Whenever evidence emerged that chemical weapons were being used, all nations must bring political pressure and moral suasion to bear on offending States. States with chemical manufacturing capabilities had a special responsibility to work against proliferation. Stringent export controls for the chemicals needed to make those weapons were a good place to start.

Similarly, the USSR strongly condemned any use of chemical weapons or any transfer of such weapons to others. In its view, the danger of chemical weapons proliferation must be regarded as yet another argument for reaching early agreement on a total ban, not as a pretext for avoiding it.

The United Kingdom stated that it remained committed to a comprehensive, verifiable and world-wide ban on chemical weapons; at the same time, it reaffirmed its commitment to uphold the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The United Nations must condemn as outcasts of the civilized world those who used chemical weapons. The international community was not powerless to prevent the creeping proliferation of chemical weapons and thus should use all the resources at its command to make it plain that it meant business, the United Kingdom stated. France, stressing that the possession of chemical weapons was not vital to anyone's defence, made it clear that, to be acceptable, the future chemical weapons convention must be universal, global and verifiable. China called for an early solution to the problem of chemical weapons.

The European Community, vigorously condemning the continued use of chemical weapons, strongly supported the work of the Conference on Disarmament in seeking an agreement and appealed to all Member States to do likewise. Joint efforts could bring closer the resolution of the pending problems, including the complex verification issues, in a way acceptable to all.

The Federal Republic of Germany called for the investigation by the United Nations of alleged violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The international community, it added, must demonstrate by all available means that it does not want to remain indifferent to violations. Belgium stressed that the risk of the moral and legal force of the Geneva Protocol being eroded might well open the door to the proliferation of the use of chemical weapons. Because of the importance it attached to chemical disarmament, the Netherlands was, in principle, ready to serve as host to the institutions to be established under the chemical weapons convention.

Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic reaffirmed their proposal, addressed to the Federal Republic of Germany, for a chemical-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe. Bulgaria recalled the joint Bulgarian-Romanian initiative to establish a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Balkans. Romania held that the United Nations should promote the setting up of chemical-weapon-free zones in the Balkans, Central Europe and other regions of the world as an action to support the ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban in the Conference on Disarmament. The German Democratic Republic held that the special session should be an occasion for speeding up those negotiations, which had lately slowed down. It could, for example, recommend to the Conference on Disarmament the holding of a session at the foreign minister level and discussion of specific measures with a view to finalizing the convention without delay.

Israel was concerned about the introduction of chemical weapons into the Middle East and advocated steps to prevent their proliferation, including the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in that region.

The Islamic Republic of Iran devoted most of its statement in the general debate to the issue of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war and called on the Security Council to condemn Iraq in the strongest and most unequivocal terms. Iran also called for effective, serious and immediate measures to prevent the sale of materials or technology to Iraq for the production of chemical weapons, and to establish mechanisms to inspect chemical-weapon facilities in Iraq. For its part, Iraq called on Iran to accept unconditionally Security Council resolution 598 (1987), which contained all the relevant elements of a comprehensive settlement.

Argentina underscored the fact that negotiations on a chemical weapons ban demonstrated the feasibility of a process of disarmament in a multilateral forum, when the political will was present. Venezuela considered that the verification mechanism envisaged in the draft convention would very possibly absorb considerable resources and thus exact heavy contributions from the States parties. It was therefore concerned that this might have a negative effect on the goal of universality which everyone wished for the convention. Austria called attention to the fact that IAEA had at its disposal highly qualified and experienced experts working in the field of monitoring and verification. Although every disarmament agreement had its own verification problems and needed specific solutions, the new control organization to be established under

the future convention on chemical weapons might benefit from the experience of those experts. The sharing of knowledge might prove useful and even lead to financial savings. Austria also reiterated that it would be willing to act as host for the new organization. Yugoslavia proposed the convening of an international conference in 1989, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the purpose of signing a comprehensive convention on chemical weapons.

A number of States took up the question of *naval armaments and disarmament*, a relatively new question. (The United States did not speak on the subject.) Sweden called attention to the fact that the naval arms buildup was continuing. According to some estimates, the five nuclear-weapon States now possessed over 15,000 nuclear weapons earmarked for maritime use, more than half of which were strategic nuclear arms. Problems related to naval armaments and disarmament were thus truly global in nature. Moreover, the huge number of tactical nuclear arms that were routinely carried around the world by vessels of the nuclear-weapon States in itself constituted a threat to international security. In Sweden's view, the time had come to initiate negotiations on naval confidence-building measures, naval disarmament and the modernization of the laws of sea warfare. Of course, measures in the naval field, Sweden added, must be considered in their general military context; asymmetries related to different geographical situations of States must be taken into account; the traditional principle of freedom of navigation must be upheld. Naval confidence-building measures should contribute to increased openness and transparency, improve predictability and stability, and reduce the danger of military conflict at sea. The existing bilateral agreements on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas were successful examples of such measures. The secrecy traditionally surrounding the deployment of nuclear weapons at sea, Sweden concluded, did not build confidence: on the contrary, it was confidence-blocking. Therefore, the nuclear-weapon Powers should abandon their outdated policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board any particular ship at any particular time. Sweden did not permit visiting warships to carry nuclear arms and would work internationally for a new policy in which assurances against such visits would be given.

Denmark stressed that, as a maritime nation, it must defend freedom of navigation on the high seas. However, confidence-building, openness and transparency were important concepts for naval as well as for other disarmament areas. The role of naval forces must be examined in an overall military and political context since they represented an important element in the global strategic balance. Norway stated that the discussion of naval confidence-building measures must take into account geographical asymmetries as well as the principle of the freedom of navigation. Also, the possibility of starting negotiations on a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea should be considered. New Zealand recalled that in 1987 it had adopted national legislation which effectively banned nuclear weapons from any part of the country.

The Soviet Union held that security of sea communications would be facilitated by establishing, in areas of major international ocean lanes, zones of lower density in armaments and enhanced confidence and by withdrawing offensive forces and systems from such zones. Furthermore, recent events had once again shown that it was desirable to create United Nations naval forces, the Soviet Union stated. The permanent members of the Security Council should announce in advance which elements they would be prepared to assign to such forces. Finally, on the basis of reciprocity with the United States and other nuclear Powers, the USSR was ready to announce the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board its naval vessels calling at foreign ports. That and the other proposals, the Soviet Union suggested, should be discussed in the United Nations at a meeting of military experts. Bulgaria recalled that the socialist countries had proposed the opening of negotiations with the participation of the major naval Powers, especially those that possessed nuclear weapons, as well as other interested countries. Romania proposed that rules be worked out to regulate the movement and conduct of naval forces on the high seas, including prior notification to the United Nations of naval military activities. To that end a committee for the peaceful utilization of seas and oceans should be established within the United Nations.

Indonesia emphasized that there was an urgent need to focus attention on the dangerously neglected issue of the naval arms race and naval disarmament. Apart from the fact that no less than one third of the world's nuclear arsenal was destined for naval deployment, the distinguishing feature of the sea-based nuclear forces was their ability to spread geographically throughout the world and to be deployed along any coastal point. Indonesia strongly believed, therefore, that at the special session the Assembly should establish guidelines on measures for naval arms limitation and disarmament, including confidence-building at sea.

On the question of the *prevention of an arms race in outer space*, the debate was rather restrained. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom spoke on the subject. China simply stated that an international agreement on the complete prohibition of space weapons should be concluded at an early date.

The Soviet Union held that preventing the introduction of weapons into outer space was the most important task in the area of disarmament. One of the ways to achieve that goal was to make space a sphere of expanding peaceful co-operation among States, the benefits of which could be enjoyed by all peoples on Earth. To that end, the Soviet Union advocated the establishment of a world space organization and suggested that, building on the idea put forward by France in 1978, at the first special session on disarmament, a start could be made in establishing an international space monitoring agency.

France stressed that the international community could not remain indifferent to any legal régime that might apply to future military activities in space. For that reason, it must not be negotiated only by the two super-Powers. In the short run, the international community could play a greater

role in three directions: the reaffirmation and development of the principle of non-interference with non-aggressive space activities; the framing of a code of good conduct in space designed to prevent accidents and allay fears that might arise from certain manoeuvres by objects in space; and the strengthening of the system of notification laid down by the 1975 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, with a view to achieving greater disclosure. France believed that it would be desirable for the Conference on Disarmament to undertake a serious review of those questions without delay.

The European Community, expressing the hope that agreement would soon be reached on halving the offensive strategic nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States, stated that a solution must be found to the problems relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In general, speakers on the subject saw the prevention of an arms race in outer space as a problem the solution of which was to be sought urgently. The position of the non-aligned countries, as expressed in the 1988 Havana Declaration, was that the militarization of outer space must be prevented through the speedy conclusion of a multilateral treaty to that end. In that connection, Brazil suggested that the Conference on Disarmament must complete and improve upon the existing legal régime so as to prevent one more environment from being contaminated by the effects of the arms race. Kenya, emphasizing that outer space must in no way become a new frontier for the extension of the arms race, believed that discussions should focus on how best to reach agreement on a more comprehensive legal régime which, with sufficient guarantees, would prevent the militarization of outer space. Pakistan considered that the existing legal régime was not enough to prevent an arms race in outer space and needed to be strengthened. It supported, therefore, the early establishment of an international space-monitoring agency which could make a positive contribution to verification, confidence-building and transparency. Senegal urged the General Assembly, at its special session, to give a clear mandate to the Conference on Disarmament for the starting of negotiations on binding measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. Sri Lanka stressed that the Conference on Disarmament should be permitted to exercise its mandate to undertake negotiations. Bilateral negotiations by the two super-Powers would in no way be jeopardized by negotiations at the multilateral level, but only complemented.

Czechoslovakia advocated the adoption and implementation of a whole set of proposed measures to sustain the peaceful régime in space, including the setting up of an international space inspectorate. Poland stressed that prevention of an arms race in outer space was a pressing issue because any such arms race would have destabilizing effects, which could result in the dismantling of existing disarmament agreements. The ABM Treaty of 1972, it thought, would most likely fall as the first victim of the extension of the arms race in space. Romania called for the conclusion of an international treaty which would provide for the renunciation of the use of space for military

purposes and for the regulation of the launching of satellites and other objects in outer space. The German Democratic Republic recalled its 1987 proposal, submitted jointly with Mongolia, for the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons. Both countries favoured the negotiation by the Conference on Disarmament of an agreement on the prohibition of such weapons.

Ireland viewed outer space as an area where an arms race could still be averted by agreement. A repetition in that environment of what had already taken place on Earth could only lead to greater insecurity for all. One of the driving forces impelling the arms race had been the belief that the introduction of some new weapon system would at last usher in an era of complete security. Experience, however, had shown that every advance in military technology had merely added a new dimension to the arms race and squandered vast resources. Italy expressed the hope that the Conference on Disarmament would make more incisive progress on the item on outer space, despite undeniable problems of politics, strategy and technology. But it was precisely technology, Italy stressed, that could provide security solutions, that is, greater security with fewer weapons. The Netherlands saw the two major Powers getting closer to an agreement on a fixed period of non-withdrawal from their obligations under the ABM Treaty. In the meantime, the Netherlands believed, the Conference on Disarmament could identify and examine possible gaps in the legal régime applicable to outer space. It could also investigate whether certain measures for increasing stability, such as the protection of satellites in high orbits, were possible. A strengthening of the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space should be given consideration as well.

A number of countries stressed the need to adopt effective measures to check the development of new generations of ever more dreadful and sophisticated weapons and prevent the use of *new technologies for military purposes*. For instance, as noted above, India in its action plan on disarmament put forward proposals for precluding the development of new weapons based on emerging technologies. Sweden stressed the need for proper evaluation of emerging technologies with a view to regulating developments that might have adverse effects. In that connection, it referred to the possibility that battlefield laser weapons for anti-personnel use might be developed. In the view of the Swedish Government, an anti-personnel laser should be considered a particularly injurious and inhumane weapon. Indeed, the issue was of such urgency that it merited speedy action. The Soviet Union fully supported the idea of conducting a systematic assessment of scientific and technological achievements, with a view to the timely elaboration of recommendations on preventing the use of new technologies for weapons development, and suggested that, to that end, a committee of prominent scientists should be established under the auspices of the United Nations. That should be done, in the first place, with respect to laser, genetic and electro-magnetic systems. The Soviet Union also viewed as worthy of consideration the proposal of the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries for the cessation and prohibition of the use of scientific and technological achievements for de-

veloping and producing new generations of weapons of mass destruction and of new kinds and systems of conventional arms.

The overall question of *verification of disarmament agreements* was the object of a broad and comprehensive debate. In it, the institutional and organizational aspect of verification occupied a prominent place.

Practically every Member State which addressed itself to that aspect of the verification question advocated that the United Nations be given an effective role in that field. Argentina and Mexico recalled the proposal contained in the Stockholm Declaration of 21 January 1988, under the Six-Nation Initiative, for the establishment of an integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations. Greece viewed the United Nations as the organism best suited to undertake measures of verification on behalf of the international community. With reference to the Six-Nation Initiative, Greece and Sweden suggested that the Secretary-General should present to the General Assembly an outline on the technical means which were or would be available to the international community for the verification of disarmament agreements. The Netherlands stressed the increasing importance and increasing acceptance of sometimes stringent measures of verification. Verification was, of course, treaty-specific; yet, there was need for strengthening the overall role of the United Nations in that field in a practical manner, possibly a role in fostering the exchange of information and the provision of practical assistance in the field of verification, as proposed jointly by Canada and the Netherlands itself. Denmark suggested that the role of the United Nations in verification would primarily be to provide a data and service base, a view also shared by Finland. Hungary held that an expert study should consider the possibility of establishing a verification agency within the framework of the United Nations. A similar view was expressed by Czechoslovakia. The German Democratic Republic stated that it was ready for all measures of verification that served disarmament.

France recalled that, as early as 1978, in proposing to set up an international satellite monitoring agency, it had sought to show that disarmament should be the task of all, under the control of all. Since then, thinking on the subject had made progress. For instance, the notion of individual verification régimes, each relating to a specific agreement or negotiation, had gained acceptance. That did not necessarily mean, however, that the United Nations should not play a part in verification. Some roles could be initially envisaged for the Organization and, to that end, France proposed that a meeting of experts on verification be convened.

The United States welcomed the fact that the United Nations had contributed support to some essential principles of arms control. For two years in a row, the United States noted, the General Assembly had adopted, by consensus, resolutions calling for compliance with existing treaties, and resolutions emphasizing the importance of verification of arms agreements. In 1987, the General Assembly had adopted a resolution calling for "furthering openness and transparency" on military matters, including objective infor-

mation on military capabilities. Every country could help build the confidence on which true peace depended, the United States added, by publishing honest figures about defence expenditures, for all the world to see.

The Soviet Union stated that, as the process of disarmament came to encompass an increasing number of countries, international verification arrangements would probably be required. This was likely to put on the disarmament agenda the establishment of an international monitoring and verification agency under the auspices of the United Nations. The international verification body could co-ordinate and, where appropriate, monitor the fulfilment of obligations under arms limitation and reduction agreements, verify compliance with agreements on easing international tensions and monitor the military situation in areas of conflict. Fully aware of the difficulties involved in putting this idea into effect, the Soviet Union assumed that the eventual establishment of an international monitoring and verification agency would be based on decisions by consensus. Also, the possibility that control machinery could be set up on a case-by-case basis for specific situations should not be excluded. It would also be desirable to establish, under the Secretary-General, a multilateral centre to assist in verification. In the view of the Soviet Union, the centre could, on instructions from the Secretary-General, perform such functions as promptly dispatching missions to areas of international conflict and rendering assistance in verification matters to the parties to bilateral and regional agreements. On the basis of reports from those missions, the Secretary-General could hold consultations with States concerned and use his right of recourse to the Security Council.

The relationship between *disarmament and development* was another major subject of debate. A very large number of countries, notably developing ones, referred to it, and, in particular, to the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.

The developing countries which spoke on the subject generally urged that resources be reallocated from military to development purposes. They generally regarded the 1987 Conference as a success and achievement; they considered that the Final Document of the Conference, adopted by consensus, deserved the widest support and they called for the implementation of its plan of action. Some countries explicitly advocated the creation of a disarmament-development fund. Concern was also expressed that the debt burden of many developing countries had reached unbearable levels. Some speakers referred to underdevelopment as a threat to peace and security. In the view of Zimbabwe, the third special session provided an opportunity to take the first step forward and the international community could do no less than act accordingly. The world should not forget, Zimbabwe stated, that in 1987 the toll from hunger-related diseases was equivalent to a Hiroshima every two days. Consequently, the third special session should move boldly to implement the programme of action contained in the Final Document of the Conference; specific provisions must be made for keeping the subject under constant review; and mechanisms should also be instituted to manage the transfer of

resources released as a consequence of disarmament measures to development purposes.

Among the developed countries which referred to the subject, Sweden stressed that it was incumbent on Member States to consider how their commitments deriving from the Charter of the United Nations and the Final Document of the 1987 Conference were being honoured. The time had come to move from words to deeds and to let development reap the fruits of disarmament. The Federal Republic of Germany emphasized that economic instability and poverty in the third world caused social tensions world-wide. At the same time the means existed for creating a more humane world and ensuring that the growing world population would live in dignity. Thus, Governments and peoples must assume greater responsibility in safeguarding peace, preserving natural resources and solving global social and economic problems. The German Democratic Republic noted that the recommendations of the 1987 Conference were of direct relevance to the creation of comprehensive security. In that context, it supported the setting up of a disarmament-development fund. The Soviet Union reaffirmed its willingness to participate in such a fund. The Soviet Union also indicated that it intended to undertake a thorough examination of the problems of converting military industry to civilian purposes and of preparing relevant plans on the national and local levels. All those issues could be included in the agenda of a meeting of the top leaders of the States members of the Security Council, as proposed by General Secretary Gorbachev. France reiterated that it attached great importance to efforts designed to strengthen the link between disarmament and development and to that end put forward three concrete ideas: the evaluation of savings that could be made over the next 10 years as a result of possible agreements in the chemical, conventional and nuclear spheres; the inclusion in disarmament agreements of clauses providing for an indication of how hoped-for dividends might be reallocated; and the utilization of the human and technological skills of the armed forces of different countries for development purposes and humanitarian undertakings. Norway stressed that insecurity was intimately linked to social and economic underdevelopment and it was a fundamental challenge to multilateral diplomacy to change the present disproportion between arms expenditure and development efforts. The aim should be to turn the negative relationship between arms buildup and development needs into positive interaction between disarmament, development and security.

In the words of the Holy See, disarmament for development was a question of ethical choice and concerted political will. The Holy See hoped that the international community would make that choice, because disarmament for development, by reducing disparities between North and South, could at the same time lessen one of the causes of world instability which most seriously threatened peace.

Numerous statements were made on the broad subject of the *role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament*. The principle that the Organization has a central role in disarmament received strong support. Several Member

States spoke of the need to strengthen the multilateral approach to disarmament within the United Nations framework. Bilateral negotiations, it was stressed, should not be allowed to supplant multilateral negotiations in the United Nations context. There was also an evident desire to enhance the negotiating role of the Conference on Disarmament. Some non-members of the Conference brought up the question of the enlargement of its membership. There were several references to the role of the Secretary-General in disarmament and that of the Department for Disarmament Affairs. Support was voiced for the activities being carried out under the Secretary-General, notably, the World Disarmament Campaign, the fellowship programme, the programmes of the United Nations regional centres, and the expert studies.

In particular, Nigeria emphasized that the international interest generated by the United Nations through its activities in the field of disarmament had helped in mobilizing world opinion and in sensitizing the attitudes of Governments. The World Disarmament Campaign, in particular, had greatly helped to create the requisite favourable environment from which new agreements were finally emerging. Similarly, the modest investment which the United Nations had made in the creation in many countries of a cadre of well-informed officials, through the establishment of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament, had contributed to better-informed debates on the complex issues involved. Cameroon, stating that disarmament must be seen as an integral part of an overall process or strategy for peace, reiterated its proposal that nuclear disarmament negotiations among nuclear-weapon Powers should take place within the framework and under the auspices of the Security Council, the body charged under the Charter with the maintenance of international peace and security. Cameroon also commended the Secretary-General and his staff for the very capable and effective manner in which the Secretariat performed its duties in the field of disarmament, despite the very limited resources available to the Department for Disarmament Affairs. Similarly, the Philippines emphasized that the multilateral machinery of the United Nations must occupy centre stage and not be relegated to the wings, awaiting a cue from the major Powers. It noted that the United Nations had taken measures to strengthen the effectiveness of its bodies and commended the Department for Disarmament Affairs for its work. Considering that the Department had a relatively small staff, its output (conference servicing, research, training, studies and publications) was all the more remarkable, it stated.

Documents, proposals and trends

A vast body of documentation was issued and circulated in connection with the special session. It comprised, in addition to the provisional agenda and the agenda of the special session and the report of the Preparatory Committee (see above), the report of the Conference on Disarmament, the report of the Disarmament Commission, the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World

Disarmament Conference, the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, and various reports of the Secretary-General, as well as documents by Member States.⁸ Most of the documents submitted by Member States contained concrete proposals,⁹ which generally reflected and expanded views expressed in the general debate. The proposals were considered, as described below, by the Committee of the Whole established by the General Assembly at the first plenary meeting of its fifteenth special session.¹⁰ Not all the proposals were new, but whether new or old, they contained elements that might become a basis for future action.

Some of those documents were of a comprehensive nature, that is, they outlined general approaches to disarmament. The following documents belonged to this category: a memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom,¹¹ defining the United Kingdom's approach to disarmament and providing an agenda of nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons disarmament, and items to which the Government of the United Kingdom attached particular importance; a working paper submitted by China¹² stating its position on all the major questions under discussion at the fifteenth special session; a note verbale by the USSR¹³ providing information on bilateral and multilateral negotiations in which the USSR was a party, and reaffirming that the basis of the Soviet approach to negotiations was the statement made by Mr. Gorbachev on 15 January 1986, laying down a stage-by-stage programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world by the year 2000; a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. E. A. Shevardnadze,¹⁴ addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on the question of openness and *glasnost* in international relations; a memorandum from the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty,¹⁵ entitled "Security through disarmament", containing concrete suggestions for dealing with the broad spectrum of disarmament issues (including nuclear disarmament, a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, nuclear-weapon-free zones, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, prevention of an arms race in outer space, complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, limitation and reduction of naval armaments, dismantling of foreign military bases, reduction of military budgets, disarmament and development, and verification); a document from Ro-

⁸ For a full list of the substantive documents of the special session, see the report of the Committee of the Whole of the Fifteenth Special Session (A/S-15/50). The reports of the Secretary-General were on the following subjects: objective information on military matters (A/S-15/7 and Add.1 and 2); developments in the field of arms limitation and disarmament since 1982, including the status of negotiations, in bilateral and various multilateral forums (A/S-15/8 and Corr.1); the World Disarmament Campaign (A/S-15/9); and programmes and activities undertaken by the United Nations system in the area of "women and peace" (A/S-15/40).

⁹ A/S-15/50, annex I.

¹⁰ A/S-15/50, paras.1 and 2.

¹¹ A/S-15/11.

¹² A/S-15/20.

¹³ A/S-15/37.

¹⁴ A/S-15/47.

¹⁵ A/S-15/26.

mania,¹⁶ outlining a number of proposals in the field of disarmament for consideration at the fifteenth special session; a document by Mongolia containing a number of suggestions on distinct aspects of disarmament for possible inclusion in a final document of the session; the Final Communiqué of the special ministerial meeting devoted to disarmament issues of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 26 to 30 May 1988;¹⁷ and a working paper submitted by Brazil¹⁸ suggesting that the fifteenth special session should make a balanced and forward-looking assessment of new trends and developments relevant to disarmament.

On the subject of *nuclear disarmament*, India submitted three working papers:¹⁹ (a) "Action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order"; (b) "New technologies and the qualitative arms race"; and (c) "Disposal of the warheads on the nuclear missiles covered by the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)". The first of the three papers provided a comprehensive plan for nuclear disarmament in a precise time frame and was based on the ideas put forward by India in plenary meetings (see above). The paper on new technologies considered the characteristics and implications of "the new arms race", not only in the nuclear field but also in the fields of chemical and biological weapons and conventional weapons. The third paper addressed itself to one particular issue not covered by the INF Treaty, namely, the disposal of the nuclear warheads on the missiles to be eliminated under the Treaty. The German Democratic Republic submitted two documents, namely, (a) a working paper on nuclear disarmament,²⁰ which *inter alia* called on the General Assembly at its special session to make specific recommendations with a view to promoting an irreversible process of nuclear disarmament leading to the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons; and (b) a working paper on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe.²¹

On the question of a *comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty*, New Zealand submitted a working paper²² reaffirming the fundamental importance of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty to the disarmament process and calling for its early conclusion through multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

On the subject of *non-proliferation of nuclear weapons*, the five Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden—submitted a memorandum,²³ which advocated progress in a number of areas relating to

¹⁶ A/S-15/30.

¹⁷ A/S-15/27.

¹⁸ A/S-15/AC.1/28.

¹⁹ A/S-15/12.

²⁰ A/S-15/23.

²¹ A/S-15/48.

²² A/S-25/16.

²³ A/S-15/14.

non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, with a view to ensuring the “prolongation and the continued effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime” after 1995.

Proposals on *nuclear-weapon-free zones* were submitted by Egypt, the German Democratic Republic and New Zealand.²⁴ Concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, Egypt substantially proposed that all the States of the region should declare that they would not introduce nuclear weapons into the region and suggested ways to give impetus towards the realization of that objective.²⁵ The German Democratic Republic, in a working paper which focused on ways of freeing our planet from nuclear weapons, held that it was high time for a comprehensive consideration of the whole question of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a way of substantially contributing to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.²⁶ New Zealand submitted a working paper²⁷ which affirmed the value and importance of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga and called for express support of those two Treaties by all States, in particular those States which had been invited to observe restrictions within the zones created by the two Treaties.

In the field of *conventional disarmament*, Denmark submitted a text²⁸ which provided a compendium of its views on the subject, and concluded that the fifteenth special session offered an opportunity to expand the area of consensus on the subject and that appropriate action should be taken by the Assembly reflecting the increased recognition of the importance of conventional disarmament. The USSR submitted a working paper²⁹ proposing that the year 2000 should be set as a target for the elimination of foreign military presence and military bases abroad. The United Kingdom offered language on the transfer of conventional weapons, for inclusion in the final document of the session.³⁰ Trinidad and Tobago did the same with regard to the use or transfer of prohibited weapons and weapons which cause unnecessary human suffering.³¹

In the area of *chemical weapons*, Argentina submitted a working paper³² outlining various criteria for the early conclusion of a convention prohibiting all chemical weapons and installations for their production, and for ensuring universal accession to the convention. The United Kingdom offered language about investigations into allegations by Member States of the use of chemical weapons, for inclusion in the final document of the session.³³

²⁴ In addition, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea circulated, through Czechoslovakia, a working paper on regional approaches to nuclear disarmament, which suggested that north-east Asia could eventually be turned into a nuclear-weapon-free zone (A/S-15/19).

²⁵ A/S-15/AC.1/25.

²⁶ A/S-15/32.

²⁷ A/S-15/16.

²⁸ A/S-15/AC.1/3.

²⁹ A/S-15/AC.1/12.

³⁰ A/S-15/AC.1/23.

³¹ A/S-15/AC.1/26 and A/S-15/AC.1/27.

³² A/S-15/AC.1/9.

³³ A/S-15/AC.1/22.

On *naval armaments and disarmament*, a paper by Finland, Indonesia and Sweden³⁴ provided principles which should guide future negotiations on the subject, with a view to halting the naval buildup and enhancing security at sea. In that context, the paper contained proposals for naval confidence-building measures, as a first step, and suggested that the Conference on Disarmament could be an appropriate forum for negotiations on such measures, on a global scale, including a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents. Similarly, another paper,³⁵ which was co-sponsored by Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the USSR, suggested that the objective of limiting and reducing naval armaments could be achieved in practice stage by stage, beginning with relatively simple measures in respect of which the elements of mutual understanding already existed. Such initial measures included primarily confidence-building measures and measures to strengthen guarantees of the safety of shipping. As to the parameters and limits for naval activity and armaments, the paper suggested, they needed to be drawn up on the basis of the principle of sufficiency and the criterion of the defensive purposes of naval forces. Such parameters and limits could be considered at the Conference on Disarmament or in the Disarmament Commission.

On the *prevention of an arms race in outer space*, a working paper by Argentina³⁶ provided an analysis of the problem, which was the subject, it noted, of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR and, unfortunately, only of discussion in multilateral forums. Argentina argued that the existing legal régime for outer space needed to be improved if an arms race in outer space was to be prevented.

A number of proposals on *verification of disarmament agreements*, which covered two different aspects of the problem, were submitted. The Netherlands and Canada submitted a comprehensive paper on verification and the United Nations,³⁷ focusing on the role that the Organization could constructively play in that field, and proposing an in-depth study on the subject by a group of experts. France submitted a paper entitled "The role of the United Nations in contractual verification, investigation procedures and collection of space data".³⁸ The paper covered the three subjects in separate parts. In the first part of the paper, France focused on the need for "systematic reflection" on multilateral verification by a United Nations group of experts. In making this proposal, France emphasized that it was willing to combine it with the proposal made by Canada and the Netherlands, in order to produce a joint document acceptable to all. Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania submitted a brief text³⁹ on an integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations, for adoption by the General Assembly at its special session. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the USSR submitted a comprehensive

³⁴ A/S-15/AC.1/13.

³⁵ A/S-15/AC.1/16.

³⁶ A/S-15/AC.1/8.

³⁷ A/S-15/25.

³⁸ A/S-15/34.

³⁹ A/S-15/AC.1/1.

paper on the "Establishment of an international verification mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations".⁴⁰ Norway, for its part, submitted a memorandum on procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons,⁴¹ a document based on a research programme carried out by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment as a contribution to the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention in the Conference on Disarmament.

Concerning the overall *role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament*, the twelve member States of the European Community outlined their position in a document⁴² covering all the main aspects of the question (disarmament machinery, specific disarmament bodies, special sessions on disarmament, review conferences, the role of the Secretary-General and the Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations disarmament studies, World Disarmament Campaign). Similarly, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Poland and the Ukrainian SSR, in a joint working paper,⁴³ made detailed recommendations on how to achieve increased effectiveness in the United Nations activities in the field of disarmament. Argentina, for its part, focused attention on a more limited subject,⁴⁴ namely the existence of circumstances which were impeding or hindering the effective and full use of powers conferred upon the United Nations in the Charter and the 1978 Final Document.

Austria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ecuador, Finland, Greece, Senegal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Zimbabwe took up the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament.⁴⁵ Bulgaria, Mongolia and the Ukrainian SSR, in another working paper, dealt with the questions of information and educational activities in the field of disarmament (World Disarmament Campaign, Disarmament Week, United Nations regional centres on disarmament, etc.).⁴⁶ Finally, a working paper by Australia, Canada and New Zealand⁴⁷ on the advancement of women in the disarmament process considered ways of fulfilling the objective of increasing the participation of women in the process of peace and disarmament and, in particular, the participation of women in the activities of the United Nations.

Yet another initiative was taken by Sweden, which submitted a working paper⁴⁸ proposing that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to carry out, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, a new *comprehensive United Nations study on nuclear weapons*.

Concerning the *relationship between disarmament and development*, Sweden proposed that the General Assembly, at its third special session, reaffirm the urgency of implementing all those measures contained in the action programme of the Final Document of the 1987 Conference, for which

⁴⁰ A/S-15/AC.1/15.

⁴¹ A/S-15/13.

⁴² A/S-15/43.

⁴³ A/S-15/AC.1/2.

⁴⁴ A/S-15/AC.1/7.

⁴⁵ A/S-15/AC.1/11.

⁴⁶ A/S-15/AC.14.

⁴⁷ A/S-15/AC.1/24.

⁴⁸ A/S-15/AC.1/5.

it was not necessary to await the achievement of genuine disarmament.⁴⁹ Cyprus re-submitted in document form⁵⁰ a proposal advanced in the general debate for the establishment of a fund derived from savings in military expenditures.

Czechoslovakia submitted a document⁵¹ on its *regional initiative* for the gradual establishment of a zone of confidence, co-operation and good-neighbourly relations along the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty States and NATO States.

Finally, mention should be made of the submission of the following documents: (a) a working paper by the Netherlands and Sweden⁵² on *radiological weapons*; (b) a working paper by Argentina⁵³ concerning the *prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations*; and (c) a working paper by Nigeria⁵⁴ on the danger of radiation arising from *clandestine dumping of nuclear wastes*.

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This review of the substantive documents of the special session, no less than the general debate in plenary meetings, should leave no doubt that Member States participated very actively in the deliberations of the session. The cessation of the nuclear-arms race, in all its aspects, usually continued to receive priority attention both in the debate and in the documents. This did not, nevertheless, prevent Member States from concentrating also on other areas, notably conventional and chemical disarmament. Never before had these two issues held so high a place in the disarmament deliberations in the General Assembly.

The ratification of the INF Treaty by the United States and the USSR (promptly followed by initial steps in its implementation), as well as the improved prospects for an agreement between the two major Powers on reduction of strategic weapons by 50 per cent, provided strong evidence that there could be a process of disarmament, even in the nuclear field. Not surprisingly, therefore, there were calls for a nuclear-free world within a specific time frame. At the same time, there was a clearer realization, as evidenced by proposals on the subject, that lead time for comprehensive disarmament in the nuclear field would necessarily be long. There was strong, world-wide support, nevertheless, for the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, a measure which, it was felt, would slow down the nuclear-arms race and prevent nuclear proliferation.

⁴⁹ A/S-15/AC.1/6.

⁵⁰ A/S-15/42.

⁵¹ A/S-15/17.

⁵² A/S-15/AC.1/4.

⁵³ A/S-15/AC.1/10.

⁵⁴ A/S-15/AC.1/17.

Conventional disarmament (particularly in Europe) was debated intensely—indeed, as a key task—and with the participation of representatives from all regions of the world. One particular aspect of the issue that received earnest attention was that of arms transfers. As was stated in the general debate (see above), the spectacle of States attempting to solve internal or external political problems through arms transfers was commonplace, in spite of the fact that such arms transfers did not provide any solution at all. Remedies had, therefore, to be sought.

The trend with regard to disarmament in the field of chemical weapons was one of growing, though not uniform, expectations and urgency. In general, it was felt that chemical weapons were not essential to anyone's defence; that a convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons was within reach, if the political will to overcome still unsolved verification problems was present; that the remaining problems demanded increased co-operation by all sides; and that all chemical-weapons-capable States must become parties to the future convention. Meanwhile, proliferation of chemical weapons—a growing concern—should be firmly opposed. Also, the role of the Secretary-General in investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons should be strengthened.

There were fewer initiatives on the question of preventing an arms race in outer space than on other occasions. However, it was felt as strongly as ever that the future stability of the relationship between the two major Powers would be at risk if space were to become an arena for weapons deployment and possible use. Thus, space must remain remote from human conflict and the international community must continue to promote and support efforts by both sides to maintain a really peaceful régime in space.

The question of naval armaments and disarmament received considerable attention. An effort was evident on the part of the main supporters of naval disarmament to focus, at this initial stage, on confidence-building measures and safety measures at sea.

An increasing degree of co-operation was manifest in the deliberations on the question of verification. Many initiatives were taken in this field and a feeling prevailed that, in general, convergence on how to deal with verification problems would continue to develop. Growing interest was expressed from many sides in an effective United Nations role in this field.

As evidenced by the number of initiatives, there continued to exist a strong current in support of an enhanced role for the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Equal support for multilateralism was manifested on the subject of the relationship between disarmament and development. For the developing countries, the progressive implementation of the Final Document of the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development remained a priority goal.

On the whole, the new trends in the Soviet-American relationship seemed to encourage the United Nations membership to raise its expectations about possible additional achievements from the ongoing process of disarmament

deliberations and negotiations, bilateral and multilateral. The special session was, however, guided by a good degree of realism in its approach to disarmament, which it constantly related to security. The Assembly was also fully aware that confidence-building was essential to progress in disarmament; that it was not only the threats from nuclear weapons that must be removed, but also those engendered by conventional and chemical weapons; that transferring threats from Earth to outer space would not make our planet any safer. Another positive development was that the Assembly devoted attention to verification to an unprecedented degree and was able to find much common ground on that question. There was also a large measure of consensus on the need for a genuine and effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, and for moving the disarmament agenda forward.

Although the General Assembly did not take action on any of the proposals submitted to it at its special session and was unable to adopt a final document, later in the year, at the regular session, it was in a position to explore some of those initiatives further. This provided additional evidence that the deliberations of the third special session on disarmament had been based on experience and realism.

The Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Shultz, was one of the speakers who underscored the need for realism leading to achievement. "Sweeping statements of principle", he said, "have their place, but noble words can never substitute for concrete deeds". The Foreign Minister of the USSR, Mr. Shevardnadze, stressed that if the international community was prepared to draw appropriate lessons from the first treaty on nuclear disarmament—the INF Treaty—the nations of the world could move on together towards even higher goals. In his view, the main lesson of that Treaty was that disarmament "has become a universal human goal which can indeed be achieved". The non-aligned countries emphatically reaffirmed their belief that, provided there is political will, disarmament can be achieved, and thought that to make progress on the way to disarmament the international community must build on the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament.

Work of the Committee of the Whole

An early task of the Committee of the Whole was to hear statements by representatives of non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutes. On 8 and 9 June, the Committee heard statements from 87 such organizations and 20 such institutes.⁵⁵

Meanwhile the Committee had begun consideration of the six agenda items assigned to it (items 10 to 15) and of the vast documentation described

⁵⁵ For a complete list of the non-governmental organizations and research institutes that addressed the Committee of the Whole, see A/S-15/50, annex II.

in the section "Documents, proposals and trends" of this chapter, on the basis of a decision made at its first meeting, on 3 June.

At that meeting, the Committee had before it the following agenda:

10. Assessment of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its first and second special sessions devoted to disarmament:
 - (a) Report of the Conference on Disarmament
 - (b) Report of the Disarmament Commission
 - (c) Resolutions of the General Assembly in the field of arms limitation and disarmament
 - (d) Status of negotiations on arms limitations and disarmament in bilateral and various multilateral forums
11. Consideration and adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
12. Assessment of developments and trends, including qualitative and quantitative aspects, relevant to the disarmament process, with a view to the elaboration of appropriate concrete and practical measures and, if necessary, additional principles, taking duly into account the principles and priorities established in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament
13. Consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and of the effectiveness of the disarmament machinery
14. United Nations information and educational activities in the field of disarmament, including measures to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament:
 - (a) World Disarmament Campaign
 - (b) Other public information activities
15. Relationship between disarmament and development, in the light of the action programme adopted at the International Conference

The Committee decided to establish three working groups, as follows: Working Group I to deal with agenda item 10 and to be chaired by Mr. Davidson L. Hepburn of the Bahamas; Working Group II to deal with agenda items 12 and 15 and to be chaired by Mr. Paul-Joachim von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany; Working Group III to deal with agenda items 13 and 14 and to be chaired by Mr. Paul Bamela Engo of Cameroon. The Committee of the Whole, furthermore, authorized the Chairman to request Mr. Alfonso García Robles of Mexico to conduct consultations on agenda item 11, as appropriate, and thereafter to report to the Committee of the Whole.

Each of the three Working Groups held several meetings between 6 and 17 June. On 13 June, the three Chairmen submitted progress reports to the Committee of the Whole. On 20 June each of the three Working Groups submitted a final report to the Committee.⁵⁶ In addition, the Chairman of Working Group III also submitted a report.⁵⁷ On that same date, Mr. García Robles also reported on the results of his consultations. The Committee took note of the reports. In substance, what the three Working Groups reported

⁵⁶ A/S-15/AC.1/18; A/S-15/AC.1/19 and Add. 1-3; A/S-15/AC.1/20 and Corr.1.

⁵⁷ A/S-15/AC.1/21.

back to the Committee, after two weeks of intensive deliberations, was that their discussions had been useful in that they clarified the positions of Member States, but it had not been possible to produce agreed formulations.

Consequently, in an attempt to identify points of convergence which might command consensus, the Committee requested its Chairman to prepare a paper for its consideration, as a basis for working out the final document of the session.

The Chairman's text was prepared taking into account the deliberations in the Working Groups and on the basis of consultations with various delegations. It was never circulated as an official document of the session, but only as a Chairman's draft. It consisted of 67 paragraphs divided into five sections (Introduction, Assessment, Directions for the future, Machinery, and Conclusions).

Before submitting the text to the Committee for final consideration and, it was hoped, adoption, the Chairman held further informal open-ended consultations, which at times involved the entire membership of the Committee. After uninterrupted consultations throughout the last day and night of the session, it became apparent that a number of differences in the positions of Member States could not be reconciled. The main difficulties were encountered in the section on "Directions for the future" and, to some extent, in the section "Conclusions". Other paragraphs were cleared on the understanding that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed".

The "Introduction", which was by and large cleared, pointed out that in a world of growing interdependence, it was essential for the international community to stimulate and deepen awareness of the common interest of our global society in strengthening international peace and security. Arms limitation and disarmament constituted a crucial element in that process. The United Nations was the universal forum for harmonizing and developing global actions towards the attainment of those common ends.

The "Assessment" section was also largely cleared. The most sensitive part was the opening reference to the 1978 Final Document. For many Member States, this Document continued to be of primordial importance and, in their opinion, any assessment of the international situation must be based on an evaluation of how much of its Programme of Action had remained unimplemented. On the other hand, some other States felt that most of these provisions were no longer relevant because the circumstances had changed. Those States were therefore unwilling to reaffirm the continued validity of the 1978 Document. The Chairman's formulation—welcomed by many as one which struck a balance between these two conflicting positions—stated that the Final Document "continues to be the principal expression of the international community's determination to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament".

Other paragraphs of the section acknowledged recent positive trends in international relations in general, and in disarmament in particular. In that context, the historic INF Treaty between the United States and the USSR,

by which they agreed on the elimination of their intermediate-range nuclear missiles, was welcomed. The unilateral reduction by one million in the armed forces of China was also noted, as well as important progress in the resolution of some regional conflicts.

While reiterating the utmost importance of nuclear disarmament measures, the draft also recognized that conventional disarmament at the global, regional and subregional levels had become a vital part of the disarmament process.

The draft also noted significant progress in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention and the unprecedented convergence of views on verification issues.

It also recognized the growing realization that measures of arms limitation and disarmament must be pursued in a broader context of international relations, together with such issues as sources of international tensions, regional conflicts, non-military threats to security, social and economic development, and human rights.

While fully acknowledging the significance of recent positive developments, the draft also recognized that in many respects progress remained elusive. The levels of armaments had not yet been significantly reduced and qualitative advances continued to be made. New technological developments were often directed towards military requirements. There was also a danger of the extension of the arms race into outer space.

The section entitled "Machinery" created the least problem. It basically reiterated that the United Nations had a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament and called upon States to use the existing multilateral machinery to promote the cause of international peace and security.

It was the section "Directions for the future" that proved to be the most difficult. Here again, the question of a reference to the 1978 Final Document had to be resolved. It was done by stating that "building on the Final Document", mutually complementary bilateral, regional and global approaches were needed for success in disarmament negotiations to be achieved.

The importance of nuclear disarmament as "a priority objective" and "a central task" facing the international community was reiterated. In that context, early and significant reduction of nuclear armament was acknowledged as being of critical importance and the two major Powers were urged to conclude a treaty on deep cuts in their strategic offensive arms. At the same time, the draft recognized the urgency and importance of conventional disarmament, including the question of international arms transfers in all aspects, for the disarmament process.

Another highly controversial issue—the cessation of nuclear testing—was resolved by acknowledging that bilateral full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations between the United States and the USSR, on the one hand, and multilateral efforts in the Conference on Disarmament, on the other, needed to continue.

For another highly sensitive issue—the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—a compromise was found between those States which wanted to reaffirm in strong terms their support for measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and some other States which, in that context, wanted to avoid references to the 1968 non-proliferation Treaty in view of their reservations about this international instrument. The compromise draft formulation read:

To achieve the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, global and regional efforts are encouraged on the part of all States, including those efforts aimed at further strengthening the non-proliferation régime and other measures to halt and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, on a non-discriminatory basis and under appropriate international safeguards, should be ensured.

Compromise formulations were also close to being worked out with regard to the questions of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and new technological developments. On the subject of outer space, the draft urged the two major Powers to achieve positive results in their bilateral negotiations on the one hand, and the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its effort in this area, on the other. Concerning the latter issue, the draft called for appropriate self-restraint in research and development directed at new weapons. For different reasons, both issues were of much concern to all States, in particular to some Western countries, which had difficulties with these formulations.

To facilitate compromises that might lead to a consensus on the whole document, the proponents of a text on naval disarmament were ready to withdraw their proposal.

On the question of verification of multilateral disarmament agreements, the Assembly would have endorsed the principles drawn up by the Disarmament Commission. The Secretary-General would also have been requested to carry out, with the assistance of governmental experts, an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of multilateral verification.

The draft also recognized the importance of the early conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of a comprehensive and universal convention on chemical weapons.

The paragraphs dealing with confidence-building measures, a comprehensive programme of disarmament, radiological weapons and military budgets were also agreed upon. The Assembly was to endorse the guidelines for confidence-building measures drawn up by the Disarmament Commission.

When time ran out, no compromises to further the acceptance of the document as a whole had been reached on issues such as nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, nuclear-weapon capabilities of South Africa and Israel, the investigatory role of the Secretary-General with regard to the use of chemical weapons, and the relationship between disarmament and development. The two-paragraph "Conclusions" also remained outstanding.

Action by the General Assembly at its forty-third session

At its forty-third regular session, the General Assembly had on its agenda an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session".

On 31 October, Algeria, Bangladesh, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Madagascar, Morocco, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia submitted in the First Committee a draft resolution entitled "Third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament", which was later also sponsored by Djibouti, the German Democratic Republic, India and Malaysia. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Yugoslavia on 9 November. Yugoslavia stressed that the sponsors of the draft resolution were convinced, as pointed out in the preamble of the draft, that multilateral action had an increasingly important role to play in the quest for ways and means to bring about lasting security. That was all the more so since, despite the progress achieved, the general situation in the field of disarmament still fell short of the expectations of the international community and of the needs and requirements of contemporary international relations. In the opinion of the sponsors of the draft resolution it was necessary to achieve complementarity of bilateral, regional and multilateral actions, primarily through the United Nations, since the Organization was the sole forum which provided the opportunity for all members of the international community to participate in the consideration and solution of questions of disarmament that had a bearing on their security.

The operative paragraphs of the draft resolution, Yugoslavia added, were intended to pinpoint the more positive aspects and effects of the three special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The sponsors were of the opinion that, despite the fact that consensus on a final document had not been achieved in 1988, the third special session had served the purpose of increasing awareness of the areas in which future efforts should be concentrated and that States should work resolutely for the common cause of curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament. The sponsors also proposed that the General Assembly take note with appreciation of the numerous constructive proposals submitted by Member States at the special session aimed at advancing disarmament and increasing security. At the same time, the sponsors considered that it was necessary further to strengthen the role of the United Nations; in that context they considered the special sessions of the General Assembly very useful and one of the best ways to ensure the universal character of the disarmament process.

On 17 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 132 to none, with 2 abstentions (United Kingdom and United States).

In connection with the vote, the United States made clear that it had been unable to join in a consensus adoption of the draft resolution for a number of reasons. First, in the seventh paragraph of the preamble, the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly was treated as

a compendium of universally accepted principles, while in reality there was a profound disparity of views on many of the disarmament issues addressed in the Final Document. Secondly, operative paragraph 1 misdirected the attention of its readers through the insertion of the phrase “particularly in the nuclear field”, and operative paragraphs 3 and 4 were misleading.

France, which voted in favour, stated that it shared the views expressed by the sponsors of the draft resolution, namely, that the special session had served the purpose of increasing awareness of the areas in which future efforts should be concentrated. France would have preferred, however, that operative paragraph 1 contain wording that would better reflect its priorities in the field of disarmament, in particular with regard to the role of nuclear disarmament within the framework of disarmament in general.

Australia, which also voted in favour, expressed concern about operative paragraph 3, which it found ambiguous. It had, nevertheless, decided to cast a positive vote because it supported the call for strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament through multilateral consideration of issues which had a bearing on the security of all Member States and, as appropriate, on the resolution of such issues. Australia interpreted operative paragraph 3 as characterizing the United Nations as the most representative forum for its Member States as a whole in which to deal with arms limitation and disarmament issues.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 152 to none, with 2 abstentions, as resolution 43/77 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced that, in the international community’s continuing search for lasting security, multilateral action has an increasingly important role,

Welcoming the fact that during recent years a favourable climate has developed within the international community and progress has been recorded in some important fields of disarmament,

Encouraged by the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which represents a valuable initial step in the reduction of nuclear weapons,

Taking into account that, despite the positive processes and developments, the general situation with regard to armament is far from satisfactory,

Stressing the necessity of mutually complementary bilateral, regional and global approaches for success in disarmament negotiations and the attainment of peace and security,

Expressing its regret that the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament, ended without agreement on a concluding document,

Reaffirming the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, which reflected a historic consensus on the part of the international community that the halting and reversing of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and the achievement of genuine disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency,

1. *Considers* that the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly served the purpose of increasing awareness of the areas where future efforts should be concentrated and underscored the urgency that States should work resolutely for the common cause of curbing the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and achieving disarmament;

2. *Takes note with appreciation* of the numerous constructive proposals submitted by Member States to the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session aimed at advancing disarmament and increasing security;

3. *Calls upon* all Member States to contribute to the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, as it provides the most appropriate forum for all Member States to contribute actively and collectively to the consideration and resolution of disarmament issues that have a bearing on their security;

4. *Considers* that the contribution of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has been useful in reviewing and assessing the results of the efforts of Member States in moving forward deliberations and negotiations on all disarmament and related issues, and that they can provide a new direction and impetus for these efforts;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session an item entitled "Special sessions on disarmament"

Conclusion

The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament took place in a considerably improved political atmosphere as compared with the second (1982) or even the first (1978). As the Secretary-General stated at the opening meeting of the session, positive developments were taking place which could have far-reaching implications for international peace and security; if their constructive effect was broadened and supported by multi-lateral action, a new and promising turn would be given to international affairs.

A two-week general debate in plenary meetings of the General Assembly set the tone which was to prevail during the entire session—one of openness and moderation, which facilitated the consideration of the many substantive problems that are found at the core of the disarmament question.

The session will also be remembered for the unprecedented number of proposals that were submitted from all sides, with a view to promoting further progress in disarmament and moving forward the disarmament agenda, in both its bilateral and its multilateral aspects. Although no proposal was acted upon at the session, it can be expected that a number of the session's proposals will, in due time, provide elements for concrete action. Some, in fact, were acted upon later in the year, at the regular session of the General Assembly.

In the end, Member States were unable to adopt by consensus a final document setting the pace and direction for future negotiations. Member States came close to consensus, but in the short time available they were unable to overcome some of the residual, more entrenched national and regional positions on what they regarded as realistic priorities and their relationship to security. However, the search for consensus brought Member States closer to mutually acceptable positions, even on issues that until recently were viewed as intractable. Thus, the special session confirmed that a common outlook on disarmament was emerging.

CHAPTER III

Follow-up of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Introduction

IN THE THREE SPECIAL SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, the first held in 1978 (known as the tenth special session, or the first devoted to disarmament), the second held in 1982 (the twelfth special session, or the second devoted to disarmament), and the third held in 1988 (the fifteenth special session, or the third devoted to disarmament), the international community has endeavoured to reach agreement on the future course of disarmament efforts. The special sessions have provided an opportunity for discussion at a high level of the full range of questions related to the arms race and the possibilities of limiting and reversing it. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,¹ usually referred to in this volume as the 1978 Final Document, was adopted by consensus and is considered by many as the authoritative guide, or strategy, for disarmament efforts not only within, but also outside, the United Nations. At the twelfth special session, consensus was not reached on a final document, but the validity of the 1978 Final Document was unanimously reaffirmed in a concluding document.² Although a high degree of agreement was reached on numerous questions, no consensus was achieved and no document was issued at the conclusion of the fifteenth special session. For an account of that session, see chapter II.

Since the thirty-third session of the Assembly, which followed shortly upon the first special session, the item "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" has figured on the agenda of every regular session. At its thirty-seventh session, in 1982, the Assembly added a second standing follow-up item: "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly". At its forty-third session,

¹ General Assembly resolution S-10/2. See also *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

² By its decision S-12/24 of 10 July 1982, the General Assembly approved the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Twelfth Special Session (A/S-12/32) as the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly. The text is reproduced also in *The Yearbook*, vol.7: 1982, appendix I.

in 1988, the Assembly, pursuant to its resolution 42/40, added a third follow-up item, "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session".

The agenda items on the follow-up of the first two special sessions, together with the recurrent item entitled "General and complete disarmament" (the subject of chapter IV), have served as the framework for proposals on a wide range of disarmament issues. Many of the proposals introduced under these items have been debated together with related proposals raised under agenda items on specific issues. In practice, these general, or collective, items have given rise to so many draft resolutions each year that they have constituted a significant proportion of the programme of work of the First Committee. They have, at the same time, provided a convenient management device for accommodating additional approaches and ideas without formally changing the basic agenda. Some of the questions first introduced as sub-items under the general headings have subsequently become separate agenda items.

Through the years, however, the range of issues covered in the follow-up context has remained relatively constant, with only a few additions or deletions annually. A number of these issues fit appropriately in topical chapters of *The Yearbook* series and are discussed in detail therein.

The debates on the items, particularly on those relating to the tenth special session, have been marked by expressions of disillusionment at the inadequate implementation or non-implementation of the strategy agreed upon and outlined in the 1978 Final Document, particularly in its "Programme of Action".³ In fact, despite continuing and concerted multilateral efforts, few if any of the substantive measures of disarmament recommended have been brought to their conclusion, nor has it been possible concurrently to complete negotiation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, as called for in paragraph 109 of the Final Document.

The inability of the General Assembly to reach agreement on a document at its fifteenth special session caused further disappointment in the international community. At the same time, the frank, new high-level exchange of views that took place within the improved international atmosphere revealed that necessary changes in emphasis, if not priority, had evolved over the past decade and also served to identify the relatively few areas in which differing views could not be reconciled.

These developments have led to innumerable calls for continued and even greater emphasis on the complementary nature of multilateralism and bilateralism, and on the enhancement of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. They have similarly involved increased consideration of the relationship between disarmament and international security and of the relationship between disarmament and development, as well as of questions relating to nuclear disarmament and to chemical and conventional weapons

³ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, paras. 43-112. The subsequent paragraphs, 113-129, deal with the international disarmament "Machinery", which has generally been put into effect.

and their place in the disarmament process. Accordingly, issues relating to follow-up of the Assembly's special sessions, including its fifteenth special session, continue to figure significantly in disarmament forums.

A list of the proposals presented under the follow-up items in the Assembly in 1988 and approved by the First Committee is given later in this chapter.

General developments and trends, 1988

The *Disarmament Commission*, meeting in its substantive session prior to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, covered the question of follow-up of the two earlier special sessions only in broad terms, primarily in the context of its agenda item concerning the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and the Commission's special report to the Assembly at the third special session. Three other long-standing items, on the elaboration of an approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament; the reduction of military budgets; and confidence-building measures, were also referred to from time to time in terms of follow-up of the special sessions, as they had figured as specific measures in the 1978 Final Document.

As the Chairman emphasized in his opening statement, the Commission was mandated to follow-up the relevant decisions and recommendations of those sessions, but the measures set out in the 1978 Final Document remained largely unimplemented. He commented, as did a great many delegations from all regions and groupings, on the particular importance of achieving results from the Commission's work in 1988 in the context of the expectations of the Assembly's forthcoming third special session. In fact, in the course of its session, the Commission succeeded in fulfilling a mandate related to follow-up, namely the elaboration of guidelines for confidence-building measures, a subject which had originally been introduced by the Federal Republic of Germany, in 1982. During the debate it was pointed out by Togo that the guidelines were to be based on the principles of the United Nations Charter and the 1978 Final Document, and could not be a substitute for disarmament measures. Compromise texts for a number of outstanding paragraphs were formulated, and the entire text of the draft guidelines was adopted by consensus. The guidelines took note of the fact that a universal model for confidence-building measures was not practicable; such measures had rather to be adjusted to the threat, or the requirements for confidence, implied in a specific situation or region. The Commission's action on this item is summarized below in the section "Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1988".

In the debate in the *Conference on Disarmament*, which is not specifically mandated to follow up the Assembly's special sessions on disarmament (see chapter I), the connection between the programme of work and the agenda

of those sessions was even more peripheral than in the Disarmament Commission. On the other hand, the item on the agenda of the Conference entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" derives directly from the 1978 special session.⁴ Several other items appearing on the standing agenda of the Conference, or "decatalogue" of disarmament areas to be dealt with, closely parallel the measures outlined in the 1978 Final Document. Most notably, they concern the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, but also chemical weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and the reduction of armed forces and military budgets.

During the first part of the 1988 session of the Conference, most of the statements relating its programme of work to the forthcoming special session emphasized the importance of proceeding with determination and in a co-operative spirit to achieve results, or at least clearly tangible progress, on the several complex issues under negotiation, so that the special report of the Conference to the Assembly at its special session could demonstrate unequivocally the essential contribution of the multilateral forum. Thus, a number of members, particularly among the Group of 21, including Cuba, Sweden and Yugoslavia, emphasized the importance of a clear reaffirmation by the Assembly at its special session of the future course of multilateral disarmament efforts and their proper relationship with bilateral ones.

In its special report to the Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament,⁵ the Conference included a résumé of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament since 1982 and the latest draft of that programme, showing many formulations and paragraphs in parentheses indicating alternative texts or texts on which agreement had not been reached. The Conference also noted the growing emphasis and convergence of views on the question of verification, and drew attention to the stated intention of certain States to submit a proposal on that question at the special session of the General Assembly.

In the second part of the session of the Conference, the debates in plenary meetings were marked by various interpretations and assessments of the results or lack of results of the Assembly's third special session. Most members—there were a few exceptions—regarded the session as disappointing but far from a failure in that it had permitted a frank airing of views at a very high level, which had indicated a broad and encouraging spectrum of agreement; in fact, several members observed, it was only on a relatively few issues that it had not been possible to reconcile views. Some delegations felt that consensus formulations might have emerged even on these if only there had been more time at the special session.

⁴ As a result of agreement at that session, the Disarmament Commission was mandated to set out the "elements" of such a programme. Then, by resolution 34/83 H, the Assembly in 1979 requested the Secretary-General to transmit the "elements" and the Commission's recommendations on them to the Committee on Disarmament.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-15/2)*.

Thus, there were some common themes in these assessments: pervasive good will and genuine attempts to resolve differences had marked the session; the 1978 Final Document remained intact; the disarmament machinery, including the Conference on Disarmament, was generally regarded as satisfactory for its essential functions, and multilateralism clearly remained a necessary ingredient in that machinery notwithstanding the recent improvement in bilateral relations; various specific proposals presented at the session confirmed the need for forward-looking policies; and the Conference must redouble its efforts to ensure its efficient functioning and the early achievement of concrete results at the multilateral level. Among members voicing such themes were China, which noted, *inter alia*, that equal security between the super-Powers alone could not make a peaceful world, and France and Sweden, which stressed that the common interest shown in multilateral disarmament was essential to continuance of the Conference and, as a corollary, noted that there was indeed a common view that the Conference was the indispensable forum for work on numerous outstanding issues of concern to the international community.

On the other hand, a few members questioned whether concerted multilateral follow-up expectations could be met on the basis of positions and proposals which had not achieved the consensus sought. Venezuela for instance, while noting that the confidence of the international community in the sole multilateral negotiating body had been strengthened, perceived the persistence of a view that the role of the United Nations and associated competent bodies was marginal, or suitable for the implementation only of "ancillary" measures. Sri Lanka commented on the firmly held national positions that would not yield fully to international prompting, even though considerable compromises had been made at the special session out of concern to reach consensus. While such impasses illustrated that all delegations shared a conviction that the entire international community was concerned with the disarmament process, some appeared reluctant to apply multilateral approaches consistently.

In general, there appeared to be in the Conference a new consciousness of the delicate relationship between national and international security and disarmament interests on the one hand and between bilateral and multilateral forums on the other.

In the *General Assembly at its fifteenth special session*, the wide-ranging general debate and abundant submission of proposals, as described in chapter II, showed a universal, urgent and virtually global desire to move forward in a process of genuine disarmament. As many speakers noted, such a positive trend had not been experienced since the historic agreement reflected in the 1978 Final Document, notwithstanding the recent encouraging developments in bilateral relations manifested in the conclusion of the INF Treaty and the improved dialogue between the two major nuclear Powers.

Numerous non-aligned and developing countries recalled that the Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament had been convened

largely in response to their initiative, evolving from their collective concern at the nuclear threat and the human as well as monetary costs of the arms race. Their perceived insecurity and lack of an effective voice in regard to disarmament and related international security matters, which they saw as dominated by the major military Powers, had inspired them to strive for fundamental change through such a major, well-prepared convocation. Although a disarmament strategy strengthening the role of the United Nations in disarmament and setting out an order of priorities had been agreed upon, its "Programme of action", they stated, remained largely unimplemented, even in 1988, in spite of the reaffirmation of the validity of the Final Document at the second special session, in 1982. Thus many of them at the third special session called for action on the main inventory of disarmament measures outlined in the 1978 Final Document, or early completion and acceptance of the comprehensive programme of disarmament which it called for.

Many other speakers, among them high-level representatives of all political and geographical groupings and from developing and industrialized countries, emphasized particular areas or measures—nuclear weapons and their testing, chemical weapons, conventional weapons, the relationship between disarmament and security, the relationship between disarmament and development, and various issues of regional concern—which they considered realistic, feasible and ripe for effective follow-up action at an early date. Many speakers emphasized that any new document emanating from the third special session must build upon the old, but had to be forward-looking.

In general, most delegations which discussed the disarmament machinery considered it appropriate, but called for some updating, particularly of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament, and more effective use of existing forums. The need for greater use of the Security Council was stressed, particularly by Eastern European States. Many speakers also emphasized the established "central role and primary responsibility" of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, as affirmed in the Final Document.⁶ As disarmament was of vital interest to all peoples, all States had not only the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament, but also the right to participate in disarmament negotiations.⁷ Accordingly, much stress was laid on the need for disarmament measures to be achieved not only through bilateral efforts, but also through multilateral negotiations and through efforts at the international, regional and State levels as well.

At the fifteenth special session the item "Assessment of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth and twelfth special sessions" was discussed intensively in a working group and reviewed in numerous documents, among them a comprehensive paper prepared by the Secretariat entitled "Summary of developments in the field of arms limitation and disarmament since 1982, including the status of negotiations in bilateral and various multilateral forums, called for under

⁶ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 27.

⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 28.

resolution 42/38 J".⁸ It was not possible, however, to reach consensus on a substantive report on the subject. The Working Group responsible for the item did, however, annex to its report to the Committee of the Whole⁹ an informal working paper of the Chairman, consisting of 36 paragraphs, in which he covered and attempted to assess progress on, or the status of, the major ongoing issues considered by the international community in the context of special sessions on disarmament. As agreement could not be reached on the paper as a whole, it cannot be regarded as enjoying partial agreement or, in terms of substance, as having any official status.

In the *General Assembly at its forty-third session*, the question of follow-up of the 1978 and 1982 special sessions devoted to disarmament continued to hold a prominent place in the debates. While disappointment and concern at the absence of agreement at the 1988 special session found some expression in plenary meetings, the dominant view was that the essential role of the United Nations and of multilateralism in disarmament affairs had been reaffirmed. The proposals put forward at the special session and the few areas of non- but near-agreement therefore deserved special attention and further work in a continuation of the spirit of good will that had been demonstrated during that session. Poland, Spain, Sweden and Yugoslavia, for instance, suggested building upon the positive aspects of the special session.

In the First Committee such an attitude indeed prevailed, with members observing that the session had contributed to a more profound dialogue than ever before and urging further exploration of the proposals put forward at the session. Individual States from both the Eastern European and the Western groups as well as numerous non-aligned States took similar positions, with many of the non-aligned States emphasizing the acceptance and reaffirmation, at the session, of multilateralism and of the substantive role of the United Nations and its machinery in the quest for disarmament, development and security. On the other hand, a few States emphasized their disappointment at the Assembly's inability to agree on a final document, with one speaker holding that, by an honest assessment, the fact that the 1978 Final Document had remained intact was the greatest achievement of the session.

The new item on follow-up of the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament remained on the Assembly's agenda in accordance with resolution 42/40 adopted in 1987; two draft resolutions were submitted under the item in the First Committee in 1988.

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1988

The Disarmament Commission prepared a special report to the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session,¹⁰ containing a résumé of the reports

⁸ A/S-15/8 and Corr.1.

⁹ A/S-15/AC.1/18.

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3)*.

on the work of the Commission's various subsidiary bodies from 1983 to 1988 inclusive. It also concluded its work on the item of its agenda entitled "Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures". In so doing, it completed its mandate in an issue area which had been given shape in the 1978 Final Document.

The Commission had most recently dealt with the item on confidence-building guidelines in 1986, at which time it had succeeded in reaching agreement on all but a very few formulations under the heading "Characteristics".¹¹ Also left unresolved at the time was the question of an illustrative catalogue, or compilation, of possible individual confidence-building measures. At its forty-first session, the General Assembly took note of the draft guidelines, expecting that new developments in disarmament and concrete experience with confidence-building measures would facilitate their further elaboration. Subsequently, by resolution 42/39 F of 1987, the Assembly requested the Commission to consider the draft guidelines in 1988, with a view to finalizing them.

For that purpose the Commission took up the question, as it had two years earlier, in a consultation group. In the course of its six meetings, the Consultation Group, chaired by Mr. Davidson Hepburn of the Bahamas, who was also Chairman of the Commission, adopted by consensus compromise texts on the outstanding areas, later reporting to the Commission that it had reached full agreement on the guidelines, thereby concluding its work on the item. It went on to request the Commission to recommend the guidelines to the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session, for its consideration. The guidelines, as adopted by consensus and recommended by the Disarmament Commission, are reproduced below, as an annex to this chapter.

Action by the General Assembly, 1988

The only comprehensive document emanating from the General Assembly's fifteenth special session was the "Report of the Committee of the Whole of the Fifteenth Special Session".¹² That report is administrative, describing the organization of work of the session and listing, in a brief introductory section, the documents the Committee had before it; then summarizing the reports of the Working Groups and their consideration of the substantive agenda items; and, finally, stating that the Committee adopted the report. A list of the proposals submitted by Member States and a list of non-governmental organizations and research institutes which addressed the Committee of the Whole are annexed to the report.

At the forty-third session of the General Assembly, 24 draft resolutions were submitted and considered in the First Committee under the three agenda

¹¹ See *The Yearbook*, vol.11: 1986, chapter II, "Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1986".

¹² A/S-15/50.

items on follow-up of the Assembly's special sessions. In all, 23 of these were adopted as resolutions. One draft resolution, entitled "Freeze on nuclear weapons", was withdrawn. It is discussed in chapter VI. The draft resolutions that were adopted are discussed in this and topical chapters of this volume as follows:

- (a) In this chapter, beginning on the page shown—
 - (i) 43/76 A (Disarmament and international security), page 91;
 - (ii) 43/76 F (United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme), page 93;
 - (iii) 43/78 C (International co-operation for disarmament), page 94;
 - (iv) 43/78 H (Guidelines for confidence-building measures), page 95;
 - (v) 43/78 L (Consideration of the declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade), page 97;
- (b) In other chapters, chapter number shown—
 - (i) 43/76 B (Nuclear-arms freeze), chapter VI;
 - (ii) 43/76 C (World Disarmament Campaign), chapter XVIII;
 - (iii) 43/76 D (United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Africa), chapter XVIII;
 - (iv) 43/76 E (Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons), chapter VII;
 - (v) 43/76 G (United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia), chapter XVIII;
 - (vi) 43/76 H (United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America), chapter XVIII;
 - (vii) 43/77 A (Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security), chapter XVII;
 - (viii) 43/77 B (Third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament), chapter II;
 - (ix) 43/78 A (Report of the Disarmament Commission), chapter I;
 - (x) 43/78 B (Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war), chapter VII;
 - (xi) 43/78 D (Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter: report of the Secretary-General), chapter XVII;
 - (xii) 43/78 E (Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament), chapter VI;
 - (xiii) 43/78 F (Prevention of nuclear war), chapter VII;
 - (xiv) 43/78 G (Disarmament Week), chapter XVIII;
 - (xv) 43/78 I (Report of the Conference on Disarmament), chapter I;
 - (xvi) 43/78 J (Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security), chapter XVII;
 - (xvii) 43/78 K (Comprehensive programme of disarmament), chapter IV;
 - (xviii) 43/78 M (Report of the Conference on Disarmament), chapter I.

The draft resolutions were submitted to the First Committee on 31 October and were adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December.

On 3 November, Cyprus introduced the draft resolution entitled "Disarmament and international security" in the First Committee. In so doing, it stressed that even perfect plans for disarmament could not necessarily bring about fruitful results, as disarmament was unattainable in a world of anarchy. Thus a degree of world law and order was a prerequisite of disarmament.

The concept of international security had expanded over past decades, but security could be achieved only through the establishment of a comprehensive system on the basis of the powers of the Security Council under Article 26 of the United Nations Charter. Accordingly, in the text the General Assembly called upon the Security Council to take the necessary steps to implement effectively the provisions of Article 26, calling for a system for the regulation of armaments. Thus far, Cyprus noted, the Security Council had ignored and bypassed the relevant provision of the Charter and earlier General Assembly resolutions, notably 39/63 K, in this respect.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution on 17 November by a recorded vote of 109 to 1 (United States), with 21 abstentions. The General Assembly adopted it as resolution 43/76 A by a recorded vote of 129 to 1, with 21 abstentions, as resolution 43/76 A; it reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 A of 11 December 1979, 35/156 J of 12 December 1980, 36/97 K of 9 December 1981, 37/100 E of 13 December 1982, 38/73 H of 15 December 1983, 39/63 K of 12 December 1984 and 40/151 A of 16 December 1985,

Expressing the growing alarm of the world community over the dangers of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and its adverse social and economic consequences,

Noting that the present state of the international situation requires that the disarmament principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations become part and parcel of any collective efforts aimed at ensuring a truly safe world, including those undertaken by the Security Council,

Reaffirming that the United Nations under its Charter plays a central role and bears main responsibility in the area of disarmament and the strengthening of international security,

Recalling paragraph 13 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which the Assembly acknowledged that genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example,

Recalling that, under Article 26 of the Charter, the Security Council is responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, plans for establishing an arms regulation system,

Noting the fact that the Security Council, which is vested under the Charter with the principal responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, has not yet conducted any examination of the question of the adverse effects of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, on international peace and security, as provided for in the relevant General Assembly resolutions,

Welcoming the entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which opens the process of genuine disarmament,

Mindful of the need to use all avenues for further progress through effective measures in the field of disarmament,

1. *Calls upon* the Security Council, in particular its permanent members, within the framework of its main task, to contribute to establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least possible diversion of world human and economic resources to armament, and to take the necessary steps for the effective implementation of Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations with a view to enhancing the central role of the United Nations in facilitating solutions to the issues of arms limitation, primarily in the nuclear field, and disarmament, as well as the strengthening of international peace and security;

2. *Recommends* that the nuclear-weapon States, which at the same time are the five permanent members of the Security Council, hold joint meetings and provide regular information

to the General Assembly, as well as to the Conference on Disarmament, about the state of affairs as regards the range of issues related to disarmament, especially in the nuclear field, the prevention of a nuclear war and the status of the current agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, and about progress at those negotiations which include the participation of the nuclear-weapon States;

3. *Recommends* that the Security Council consider the question of establishing, under Article 29 of the Charter, such subsidiary bodies as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions to facilitate a solution to disarmament issues;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution within the framework of the agenda item entitled "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly"

Algeria, Argentina, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Venezuela and Zaire submitted the draft resolution entitled "United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme". Djibouti, Ghana, Greece, Mauritania, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam subsequently became additional sponsors.

In connection with the sub-item, the First Committee had before it the report of the Secretary-General¹³ on the programme, in which he reviewed the 1988 activities of the programme and stated that there were 25 new fellows, mostly from developing countries.¹⁴ In addition to attending lectures and undertaking research projects, the candidates paid study visits to IAEA at Vienna and various relevant offices and institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Japan, Sweden, the USSR and the United States. The report described also the implementation in 1988 of the "Regional disarmament training programme"—which is intended to assist Governments through the organization of training courses at the regional and subregional levels—and the implementation of "Disarmament advisory services"—the aim of which is the furtherance of international co-operation, especially among developing countries, to contribute to disarmament efforts. The report noted, in conclusion, the expansion and renaming of the programme, and stated that 1988 marked the tenth anniversary of the programme since its launching by the General Assembly at its tenth special session.

Nigeria, in introducing the draft resolution on 9 November, observed that the importance attached to the programme was demonstrated by the fact that the demand for places on the programme was greater than the number of openings available. Nigeria expressed appreciation to the Governments concerned and to the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat for their assistance in implementing and executing the programme.

¹³ A/43/719.

¹⁴ The participants were nationals of: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, China, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, Mauritania, Ireland, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uganda, Venezuela and Yemen.

The First Committee on 14 November approved the draft resolution without a vote, and on 7 December the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote. The resolution, 43/76 F, reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision, contained in paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, as well as its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in which it decided, *inter alia*, to continue the programme and to increase the number of fellowships from twenty to twenty-five as from 1983,

Noting with satisfaction that the programme has already trained an appreciable number of public officials selected from geographical regions represented in the United Nations system, most of whom are now in positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament affairs in their respective countries or Governments,

Recalling its resolutions 37/100 G of 13 December 1982, 38/73 C of 15 December 1983, 39/63 B of 12 December 1984, 40/151 H of 16 December 1985, 41/60 H of 3 December 1986 and 42/39 I of 30 November 1987,

Noting with satisfaction that the programme, as designed, has enabled an increased number of public officials, particularly from the developing countries, to acquire more expertise in the sphere of disarmament,

Believing that the forms of assistance available to Member States, particularly to developing countries, under the programme will enhance the capabilities of their officials to follow ongoing deliberations and negotiations on disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral,

1. *Reaffirms* its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly and the report of the Secretary-General approved by resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Japan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America for inviting the 1988 fellows to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the programme;

3. *Commends* the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has continued to be carried out;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue the implementation of the programme within existing resources;

5. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session on the implementation of the programme.

Czechoslovakia submitted a draft resolution entitled "International co-operation for disarmament". In introducing it on 14 November, Czechoslovakia stated that the text was intended as a reminder of the importance of the principle of co-operation for the disarmament process. Accordingly, it differed significantly from the texts of earlier corresponding resolutions, avoiding reference to any particular subject, as co-operation was essential in respect of every item on the agenda. Thus this shorter text took note of encouraging recent developments and recognized the importance of adopting further measures of disarmament through a balance of bilateral and multilateral approaches. The text called for increased co-operation among all States, aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling its role in disarmament, and encouraged as wide participation of States as possible in disarmament efforts. Czechoslovakia then submitted a revised text, avoiding

a reference in the preamble to the 1979 Declaration on International Cooperation for Disarmament and further shortening various paragraphs of the preamble and the operative part and thereby broadening their scope.

The First Committee approved the revised draft resolution on 16 November by a recorded vote of 116 to 1 (United States), with 13 abstentions (mainly Western States). The Assembly adopted it by a vote of 136 to 1, with 13 abstentions, as resolution 43/78 C, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the importance of achieving international co-operation in the field of arms limitation and disarmament,

Taking into account that since its forty-second session there have been important and encouraging developments in the areas of arms limitation and disarmament,

Stressing that disarmament can only be achieved through active and sustained joint efforts of all States,

Stressing also the vital importance of proceeding to balanced, mutually acceptable, fully verifiable and effective measures of arms limitation and disarmament, in accordance with established priorities, for the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security,

Stressing further that the necessary balance between bilateral and multilateral approaches to arms limitation and disarmament should be secured through a significantly enhanced role of the United Nations and its respective bodies in this field,

1. *Invites* all States further to increase co-operation for achieving effective arms limitation and disarmament agreements on the basis of reciprocity, equality, undiminished security, non-use of force and the rule of law in international relations;

2. *Calls upon* all States to aim at strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling its central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament and to contribute actively to the consideration and resolution of all disarmament issues that have a bearing on their security and other fundamental interests;

3. *Also invites* all States to consider, in a spirit of co-operation, ways and means to facilitate both bilateral and multilateral solutions to disarmament.

Twenty-two States, mainly Eastern European and Western,¹⁵ sponsored a draft resolution entitled "Guidelines for confidence-building measures", which the Federal Republic of Germany introduced on 9 November. When considering the draft text, the First Committee had before it the report of the Disarmament Commission, which had succeeded in 1988 in overcoming the divergent views that had prevented completion of the draft guidelines since 1986.

In introducing the proposal, the Federal Republic of Germany first reviewed the project concerning confidence-building guidelines, noting that the concept of confidence-building had been given importance in the disarmament context in the 1978 Final Document.¹⁶ Then, in 1981, on the basis of a 1979 initiative of the Federal Republic, a study on confidence-building measures¹⁷

¹⁵ Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.

¹⁶ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, paras. 24 and 93.

¹⁷ Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.3)

had been submitted to the General Assembly, leading in 1982 to the Assembly's mandate to the Disarmament Commission to develop guidelines for confidence-building measures. By the guidelines, which, it stated, had been adopted by consensus, Member States reaffirmed the need for confidence-building measures to strengthen peace and security, and contribute to confidence, better understanding and stability. Their immediate objective was to reduce mistrust, fear, tensions and hostilities. This might be achieved only through a step-by-step process permitting measurement and assessment at each stage, the Federal Republic of Germany stated. It added that a main characteristic of such measures was that they could translate principles, such as renunciation of the use of force, into reality, and that since 1978 they had gained increased acceptance as an important instrument. In the light of those considerations the Assembly would, according to the draft resolution, endorse the Guidelines adopted by the Disarmament Commission (see the annex to this chapter) and recommend them to all States for implementation, taking into account specific regional conditions.

On 15 November, before the draft resolution was put to the vote, the Federal Republic of Germany, on the basis of extensive consultations, orally announced several amendments to the preambular part of the text and a change in its paragraph 2, from:

Recommends these guidelines to all States for implementation, fully taking into account the specific political, military and other conditions prevailing in the particular region;

to the formulation of that paragraph shown in the text of the resolution given below. The First Committee subsequently approved the draft resolution without a vote. The United States, while joining in the consensus and appreciating the important role of confidence-building, noted that it considered the oral amendments to be largely selective excerpts from the agreed guidelines, which did not necessarily improve the text; rather they moved it away from a faithful reflection of the totality of the guidelines and disturbed the balance.

The General Assembly subsequently adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 43/78 H, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 42/39 F, adopted without a vote on 30 November 1987,

Taking note of the report of the Disarmament Commission containing the agreed text of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level,

Appreciative of the work accomplished by the Disarmament Commission in finalizing the text of these guidelines,

Reaffirming its conviction that confidence-building measures, especially when applied in a comprehensive manner, have a potential to contribute significantly to the enhancement of peace and security and to promote and facilitate the attainment of disarmament measures,

Mindful of the fact that confidence-building measures, while neither a substitute nor a precondition for arms limitation and disarmament measures, can be conducive to achieving progress in disarmament,

Realizing that effective disarmament and arms limitation measures which directly limit or reduce military potential have particularly high confidence-building value,

Appealing to all States to consider the widest possible use of confidence-building measures in their international relations,

Aware that there are situations peculiar to specific regions which have a bearing on the nature of the confidence-building measures feasible in those regions,

Noting with satisfaction the encouraging results of specific confidence-building measures agreed upon and implemented in some regions,

Pointing to the example of progress in the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures adopted at Stockholm in 1986 that has contributed to more stable relations and increased security, reducing the risk of military confrontation in Europe,

1. *Endorses* the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level, as adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission at its 1988 substantive session;

2. *Recommends* these guidelines to all States for implementation, fully taking into account the specific political, military and other conditions prevailing in a region, on the basis of initiatives and with the agreement of the States of the region concerned;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on the implementation of these guidelines on the basis of national reports on accumulated relevant experience;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session an item entitled "Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures"

Argentina, Indonesia, Nigeria, Poland and Zaire submitted a draft resolution entitled "Consideration of the declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade", which was later also sponsored by Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic and Thailand. In connection with the sub-item the General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General entitled "Review and appraisal of the implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade."¹⁸ The report consisted of replies received from Governments to a request of the Secretary-General whereby they provided views on the shortcomings as well as encouraging aspects of developments in the field of disarmament throughout the Decade up until the time of writing of their responses. The draft resolution was introduced on 9 November by the representative of Nigeria.

In presenting the text he recalled that, encouraged by the limited disarmament achievements of the 1970s, the Assembly had decided to declare a Second Disarmament Decade and in 1979 directed the Disarmament Commission to prepare elements for a draft resolution which would embody the declaration. The resultant Declaration, which was annexed to resolution 35/46, of 1980, expressed, through its adoption by consensus, the hopes and aspirations of the international community in the sphere of disarmament. Optimistic about the disarmament process and encouraged by the genuine efforts of the late 1980s in nuclear disarmament and towards a chemical weapons convention, the sponsors saw a need for a third disarmament decade. The text, therefore, in its operative part, set out a decision whereby the General Assembly would declare the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade, and direct the Disarmament Commission to prepare, at its 1989 session, elements

¹⁸ A/43/507 and Add.1.

for the "Declaration", as had been done in the earlier case. The representative called for adoption of the draft resolution by consensus.

The following day, on 10 November, the Committee approved the draft without a vote, with the Byelorussian SSR expressing its support and the sentiment that the Third Disarmament Decade would become a decade of progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. The General Assembly later adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 43/78 L, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, in which it declared the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade,

Recalling also its resolution 34/75 of 11 December 1979, in which it directed the Disarmament Commission to prepare elements of a draft resolution entitled "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade" for submission to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session for consideration and adoption,

Bearing in mind that the Second Disarmament Decade declared by its resolution 35/46 is coming to an end,

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations in the attainment of disarmament,

Noting the progress in the disarmament talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America and its positive impact on the attainment of global peace and security,

Desirous of maintaining the current momentum in the disarmament process,

Convinced that a third disarmament decade will accelerate the disarmament process,

1. *Decides* to declare the decade of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade;
2. *Directs* the Disarmament Commission, at its 1989 substantive session, to prepare elements of a draft resolution to be entitled "Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade" and to submit them to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session for consideration and adoption;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to seek the views and suggestions of Member States and of relevant specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the possible elements to be included in the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade and to make these available to the Disarmament Commission at its 1989 substantive session;
4. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the Disarmament Commission in implementing the present resolution;
5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session an item entitled "Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade"

Conclusion

Early in 1988, even more than in 1987, consideration of the follow-up of special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament focused on the forthcoming third special session. Generally, the discussions weighed the possibility of achieving substantive results, or at least tangible progress, on various active disarmament mandates and issues being dealt with prior to the session against the meagre overall record of achievement since 1982. Universally regarded as positive signs were the conclusion of the bilateral INF Treaty and the improved relations between the two major military Powers. At the same time, there was grave disappointment at the difficulties being

experienced by the international and multilateral disarmament bodies in their efforts to break out of entrenched positions and impasses. An exception, related to follow-up, was exemplified by the success of the Disarmament Commission in reaching agreement on guidelines for confidence-building measures, thus concluding its work on that significant agenda item.

Following the special session, the discussion concentrated on interpreting its outcome. On balance, it was felt that the session had provided considerable benefits for the international community in terms of producing not only a clearer understanding of both the desire and the need for internationalism and multilateralism in disarmament affairs, but also a better appreciation of the limits of those two approaches to the solution of specific disarmament questions in a world of States, large and small, each concerned with individual and regional security as well as with the security of all.

It may be expected that the Assembly's special sessions devoted to disarmament, including the fifteenth special session, will continue to influence the work of all the disarmament bodies, not only on the basis of their general terms of reference, but also in the context of relevant ongoing work and new mandates. Thus, various requests, recommendations and suggestions of the Assembly emerging from the third special session and subsequent regular sessions may be dealt with in resolutions presented under follow-up agenda items.

ANNEX

Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level*

The Commission has elaborated the subsequent guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures for the consideration of the General Assembly at its forty-first session, in keeping with resolution 39/63 E.

The text of the guidelines is agreed on all counts.

The Commission wishes to draw particular attention to paragraph 1.2.5 of the guidelines where it is emphasized that the accumulation of relevant experience with confidence-building measures may necessitate the further development of the text at a later time, should the General Assembly so decide.

In elaborating the guidelines, all delegations were aware, notwithstanding the high significance and role of confidence-building measures, of the primary importance of disarmament measures and the singular contribution only disarmament can make to the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war. Some delegations would have wished to see the criteria and characteristics of a regional approach to confidence-building measures spelt out in greater detail.

1. *General considerations*

1.1 *Frame of reference*

1.1.1 The present guidelines for confidence-building measures have been drafted by the Disarmament Commission in pursuance of resolution 37/100 D adopted by consensus

* *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3)*, para. 41, "Report of the Consultation Group on item 11", para. 6. The Guidelines were endorsed by the General Assembly at its forty-third session (resolution 43/78 H).

by the General Assembly, in which the Disarmament Commission was requested "to consider the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level", and of resolutions 38/73 A and 39/63 E in which it was asked to continue and conclude its work, and was further requested to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-first session a report containing such guidelines.

- 1.1.2 In elaborating the guidelines the Disarmament Commission took into account, *inter alia*, the following United Nations documents: the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2), the relevant resolutions adopted by consensus by the General Assembly (resolutions 34/87 B, 35/156 B, 36/57 F, 37/100 D and 38/73), the replies received from Governments informing the Secretary-General of their views and experiences regarding confidence-building measures,^a the *Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures*^b by a Group of Governmental Experts, the proposals made by individual countries at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly,^c the second special session devoted to disarmament, as well as the views of delegations as expressed during the annual sessions of the Disarmament Commission in 1983, 1984 and 1986 and reflected in the relevant documents of those sessions.

1.2 General political context

- 1.2.1 These guidelines have been elaborated at a time when it is universally felt that efforts to heighten confidence among States are particularly pertinent and necessary. There is a common concern about the deterioration of the international situation, the continuous recourse to the threat or use of force and the further escalation of the international arms build-up, with the concomitant rise in instabilities, political tensions and in mistrust, and the heightened perception of the danger of war, both conventional and nuclear. At the same time, there is a growing awareness of the unacceptability of war in our time, and of the interdependence of the security of all States.
- 1.2.2 This situation calls for every effort by the international community to take urgent action for the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war—in the language of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, a threat whose removal is the most acute and urgent task of the present day—and for concrete measures of disarmament—to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth, to limit, reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability—but also for efforts to reduce political confrontation and to establish stable and co-operative relationships in all fields of international relations.
- 1.2.3 In this context, a confidence-building process embracing all these fields has become increasingly important. Confidence-building measures, especially when applied in a comprehensive manner, have a potential to contribute significantly to the enhancement of peace and security and to promote and facilitate the attainment of disarmament measures.
- 1.2.4 This potential is at present already being explored in some regions and subregions of the world, where the States concerned—while remaining mindful of the need for global action and for disarmament measures—are joining forces to contribute, by the elaboration and implementation of confidence-building measures, to more stable relations and greater security, as well as the elimination of outside intervention and enhanced co-operation in their areas.

The present guidelines have been drafted with these significant experiences in mind, but they also purport to provide further support to these and other endeavours on

^a A/34/416 and Add.1-3, A/35/397.

^b United Nations publication, Sales No.E.82.IX.3.

^c See A/S-12/AC.1/59.

the regional and global level. They do not, of course, exclude the simultaneous application of other security-enhancing measures.

- 1.2.5 These guidelines are part of a dynamic process over time. While they are designed to contribute to a greater usefulness and wider application of confidence-building measures, the accumulation of relevant experience may, in turn, necessitate the further development of the guidelines at a later time, should the General Assembly so decide.

1.3 *Delimitation of the subject*

1.3.1 *Confidence-building measures and disarmament*

- 1.3.1.1 Confidence-building measures must be neither a substitute nor a pre-condition for disarmament measures nor divert attention from them. Yet their potential for creating favourable conditions for progress in this field should be fully utilized in all regions of the world, in so far as they may facilitate and do not impair in any way the adoption of disarmament measures.
- 1.3.1.2 Effective disarmament and arms limitation measures which directly limit or reduce military potential have particularly high confidence-building value and, among these measures, those relating to nuclear disarmament are especially conducive to confidence-building.
- 1.3.1.3 The provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session relating to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, also have a high confidence-building value.
- 1.3.1.4 Confidence-building measures may be worked out and implemented independently in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures, or, no less important, as collateral measures in connection with specific measures of arms limitation and disarmament.

1.3.2 *Scope of confidence-building measures: military and non-military measures*

- 1.3.2.1 Confidence reflects a set of interrelated factors of a military as well as of a non-military character, and a plurality of approaches is needed to overcome fear, apprehension and mistrust between States and to replace them by confidence.
- 1.3.2.2 Since confidence relates to a wide spectrum of activities in the interaction among States, a comprehensive approach is indispensable and confidence-building is necessary in the political, military, economic, social, humanitarian and cultural fields. These should include removal of political tensions, progress towards disarmament, reshaping of the world economic system and the elimination of racial discrimination, of any form of hegemony and domination and of foreign occupation. It is important that in all these areas the confidence-building process should contribute to diminishing mistrust and enhancing trust among States by reducing and eventually eliminating potential causes for misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscalculation.
- 1.3.2.3 Notwithstanding the need for such a broad confidence-building process, and in accordance with the mandate of the Disarmament Commission, the main focus of the present guidelines for confidence-building measures relates to the military and security field, and the guidelines derive their specificity from these aspects.
- 1.3.2.4 In many regions of the world economic and other phenomena touch upon the security of a country with such immediacy that they cannot be disassociated from defence and military matters. Concrete measures of a non-military nature that are directly relevant to the national security and survival of States are therefore fully within the focus of the guidelines. In such cases military and non-military measures are complementary and reinforce each other's confidence-building value.

1.3.2.5 The appropriate mixture of different types of concrete measures should be determined for each region, depending on the perception of security and of the nature and levels of existing threats, by the countries of the regions themselves.

2. *Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for their implementation*

2.1 *Principles*

2.1.1 Strict adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and fulfilment of the commitments contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), the validity of which had been unanimously and categorically reaffirmed by all Member States at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, make a contribution of overriding importance for the preservation of peace and for ensuring the survival of mankind and the realization of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

2.1.2 In particular, and as a prerequisite for enhancing confidence among States, the following principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations must be strictly observed:

- (a) Refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State;
- (b) Non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States;
- (c) Peaceful settlement of disputes;
- (d) Sovereign equality of States and self-determination of peoples.

2.1.3 The strict observance of the principles and priorities of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session is of particular importance for enhancing confidence among States.

2.2 *Objectives*

2.2.1 The ultimate goal of confidence-building measures is to strengthen international peace and security and to contribute to the prevention of all wars, in particular nuclear war.

2.2.2 Confidence-building measures are to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the peaceful settlement of existing international problems and disputes and for the improvement and promotion of international relations based on justice, co-operation and solidarity; and to facilitate the solution of any situation which might lead to international friction.

2.2.3 A major goal of confidence-building measures is the realization of universally recognized principles, particularly those contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

2.2.4 By helping to create a climate in which the momentum towards a competitive arms build-up can be reduced and in which the importance of the military element is gradually diminished, confidence-building measures should in particular facilitate and promote the process of arms limitation and disarmament.

2.2.5 A major objective is to reduce or even eliminate the causes of mistrust, fear, misunderstanding and miscalculation with regard to relevant military activities and intentions of other States, factors which may generate the perception of an impaired security and provide justification for the continuation of the global and regional arms build-up.

2.2.6 A centrally important task of confidence-building measures is to reduce the dangers of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities, to help to prevent military confrontation as well as covert preparations for the commencement of a war, to reduce the risk of surprise attacks and of the outbreak of war by accident; and thereby, finally, to give effect and concrete expression to the solemn pledge of

all nations to refrain from the threat or use of force in all its forms and to enhance security and stability.

- 2.2.7 Given the enhanced awareness of the importance of compliance, confidence-building measures may serve the additional objective of facilitating verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

In addition, strict compliance with obligations and commitments in the field of disarmament and co-operation in the elaboration and implementation of adequate measures to ensure the verification of such compliance—satisfactory to all parties concerned and determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the relevant agreement—have a considerable confidence-building effect of their own.

Confidence-building measures cannot, however, supersede verification measures, which are an important element in arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

2.3 *Characteristics*

- 2.3.1 Confidence in international relations is based on the belief in the co-operative disposition of other States. Confidence will increase to the extent that the conduct of States, over time, indicates their willingness to practise non-aggressive and co-operative behaviour.
- 2.3.2 Confidence-building requires a consensus of the States participating in the process. States must therefore decide freely and in the exercise of their sovereignty whether a confidence-building process is to be initiated and, if so, which measures are to be taken and how the process is to be pursued.
- 2.3.3 Confidence-building is a step-by-step process of taking all concrete and effective measures which express political commitments and are of military significance and which are designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security to lessen tension and assist in arms limitation and disarmament. At each stage of this process States must be able to measure and assess the results achieved. Verification of compliance with agreed provisions should be a continuing process.
- 2.3.4 Political commitments taken together with concrete measures giving expression and effect to those commitments are important instruments for confidence-building.
- 2.3.5 Exchange or provision of relevant information on armed forces and armaments as well as on pertinent military activities plays an important role in the process of arms limitation and disarmament and of confidence-building. Such an exchange or provision could promote trust among States and reduce the occurrence of dangerous misconceptions about the intentions of States. Exchange or provision of information in the field of arms limitation, disarmament and confidence-building should be appropriately verifiable as provided for in respective arrangements, agreements or treaties.
- 2.3.6 A detailed universal model being obviously impractical, confidence-building measures must be tailored to specific situations. The effectiveness of a concrete measure will increase the more it is adjusted to the specific perceptions of threat or the confidence requirements of a given situation or a particular region.
- 2.3.7 If the circumstances of a particular situation and the principle of undiminished security allow, confidence-building measures could, within a step-by-step process, where desirable and appropriate, go further and (though not by themselves capable of diminishing military potentials) limit available military options.

2.4 *Implementation*

- 2.4.1 In order to optimize the implementation of confidence-building measures, States taking, or agreeing to, such measures should carefully analyse, and identify with the highest possible degree of clarity, the factors which favourably or adversely affect confidence in a specific situation.
- 2.4.2 Since States must be able to examine and assess the implementation of, and to ensure compliance with, a confidence-building arrangement, it is indispensable that

the details of the established confidence-building measures should be defined precisely and clearly.

- 2.4.3 Misconceptions and prejudices, which may have developed over an extended period of time, cannot be overcome by a single application of confidence-building measures. The seriousness, credibility and reliability of a State's commitment to confidence-building, without which the confidence-building process cannot be successful, can be demonstrated only by consistent implementation over time.
- 2.4.4 The implementation of confidence-building measures should take place in such a manner as to ensure the right of each State to undiminished security, guaranteeing that no individual State or group of States obtains advantages over others at any stage of the confidence-building process.
- 2.4.5 The building of confidence is a dynamic process: experience and trust gained from the implementation of early largely voluntary and militarily less significant measures can facilitate agreement on further and more far-reaching measures.
- The pace of the implementation process both in terms of timing and scope of desirable measures depends on prevailing circumstances. Confidence-building measures should be as substantial as possible and effected as rapidly as possible. Whilst in a specific situation the implementation of far-reaching arrangements at an early stage might be attainable, it would normally appear that a gradual step-by-step process is necessary.
- 2.4.6 Obligations undertaken in agreements on confidence-building measures must be fulfilled in good faith.
- 2.4.7 Confidence-building measures should be implemented on the global as well as on regional levels. Regional and global approaches are not contradictory but rather complementary and interrelated. In view of the interaction between global and regional events, progress on one level contributes to advancement on the other level; however, one is not a pre-condition for the other.

In considering the introduction of confidence-building measures in particular regions, the specific political, military and other conditions prevailing in the region should be fully taken into account. Confidence-building measures in a regional context should be adopted on the initiative and with the agreement of the States of the region concerned.

- 2.4.8 Confidence-building measures can be adopted in various forms. They can be agreed upon with the intention of creating legally binding obligations, in which case they represent international treaty law among parties. They can, however, also be agreed upon through politically binding commitments. Evolution of politically binding confidence-building measures into obligations under international law can also be envisaged.
- 2.4.9 For the assessment of progress in the implementing action of confidence-building measures, States should, to the extent possible and where appropriate, provide for procedures and mechanisms for review and evaluation. Where possible, time-frames could be agreed to facilitate this assessment in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

2.5 *Development, prospects and opportunities*

- 2.5.1 A very important qualitative step in enhancing the credibility and reliability of the confidence-building process may consist in strengthening the degree of commitment with which the various confidence-building measures are to be implemented; this, it should be recalled, is also applicable to the implementation of commitments undertaken in the field of disarmament. Voluntary and unilateral measures should, as early as appropriate, be developed into mutual, balanced and politically binding provisions and, if appropriate, into legally binding obligations.
- 2.5.2 The nature of a confidence-building measure may gradually be enhanced to the extent that its general acceptance as the correct pattern of behaviour grows. As a

result, the consistent and uniform implementation of a politically binding confidence-building measure over a substantial period of time, together with the requisite *opinio iuris*, may lead to the development of an obligation under customary international law. In this way, the process of confidence-building may gradually contribute to the formation of new norms of international law.

- 2.5.3 Statements of intent and declarations, which in themselves contain no obligation to take specific measures but have the potential to contribute favourably to an atmosphere of greater mutual trust, should be developed further by more concrete agreements on specific measures.
- 2.5.4 Opportunities for the introduction of confidence-building measures are manifold. The following compilation of some of the main possibilities may be of assistance to States wishing to define what might present a suitable opportunity for action.
 - 2.5.4.1 A particular need for confidence-building measures exists at times of political tension and crises, where appropriate measures can have a very important stabilizing effect.
 - 2.5.4.2 Negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament can offer a particularly important opportunity to agree on confidence-building measures. As integral parts of an agreement itself or by way of supplementary agreements, they can have a beneficial effect on the parties' ability to achieve the purposes and goals of their particular negotiations and agreements by creating a climate of co-operation and understanding, by facilitating adequate provisions for verification acceptable to all the States concerned and corresponding to the nature, scope and purpose of the agreement, and by fostering reliable and credible implementation.
 - 2.5.4.3 A particular opportunity might arise upon the introduction of peace-keeping forces, in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations Charter, into a region or on the cessation of hostilities between States.
 - 2.5.4.4 Review conferences of arms limitation agreements might also provide an opportunity to consider confidence-building measures, provided these measures are in no way detrimental to the purposes of the agreements; the criteria of such action to be agreed upon by the parties to the agreements.
 - 2.5.4.5 Many opportunities exist in conjunction with agreements among States in other areas of their relations, such as the political, economic, social and cultural fields, for example in the case of joint development projects, especially in frontier areas.
 - 2.5.4.6 Confidence-building measures, or at least a statement of intent to develop them in the future, could also be included in any other form of political declaration on goals shared by two or more States.
 - 2.5.4.7 Since it is especially the multilateral approach to international security and disarmament issues which enhances international confidence, the United Nations can contribute to increasing confidence by playing its central role in the field of international peace, security and disarmament. Organs of the United Nations and other international organizations could participate in encouraging the process of confidence-building as appropriate. In particular, the General Assembly and the Security Council—their tasks in the field of disarmament proper notwithstanding—can further this process, by adopting decisions and recommendations containing suggestions and requests to States to agree on and implement confidence-building measures. The Secretary-General, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, could also contribute significantly to the process of confidence-building by suggesting specific confidence-building measures or by providing his good offices, particularly at times of crises, in promoting the establishment of certain confidence-building procedures.
 - 2.5.4.8 In accordance with item IX of its established agenda—the so-called decalogue—and without prejudice to its negotiating role in all areas of its agenda, the Conference on Disarmament could identify and develop confidence-building measures in relation to agreements on disarmament and arms limitation under negotiation in the Conference.

General and complete disarmament and the comprehensive programme of disarmament

Introduction

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT has been implicitly understood to be the final objective of the United Nations disarmament efforts since the inception of the Organization and has been pursued along two parallel paths.¹ During most of the 1950s, a long-term approach dominated, which envisaged the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments, by stages, in accordance with a co-ordinated, comprehensive programme. From 1955 on, in parallel with that approach, proposals were put forward for partial measures that could take effect in the short term.

In resolution 1378 (XIV) of 1959, it was explicitly stated for the first time that "general and complete disarmament under effective international control" was the goal of the United Nations disarmament efforts and that measures leading to that goal were to be worked out and agreed upon in the shortest possible time. The comprehensive approach was given added impetus by the 1961 USSR-United States joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (the so-called Zorin-McCloy agreement)² and by elaborate proposals submitted by the two major Powers in 1962³ to the negotiating body in Geneva. With the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty in 1963, the emphasis again shifted towards reaching agreement on limited measures.

In 1969, in the context of a proposal to designate the 1970s a "disarmament decade", the then Secretary-General, U Thant, expressed the view that the General Assembly could establish a specific programme and timetable for dealing with all aspects of arms limitation and disarmament.⁴ Subse-

¹ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chaps. 3-6, and *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. I.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

³ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. C (ENDC/2) (Soviet Union) and sect. F (ENDC/30 and Corr.1) (United States).

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/7601/Add.1)*.

quently, the Assembly, in its resolution 2602 E (XXIV), requested the CCD, while continuing intensive negotiations on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The CCD debated the question between 1970 and 1978, and a number of specific proposals were submitted. In 1970, Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia proposed a comprehensive programme in the General Assembly,⁵ but it was not possible to reach agreement on it.

In paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,⁶ the General Assembly stated that the Committee on Disarmament would undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control would become a reality, and it entrusted the Disarmament Commission with the task of considering the elements of such a programme. The following year, the Commission adopted by consensus the "Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament",⁷ which included sections on objectives, measures, and machinery and procedures.

The Committee on Disarmament thereupon established an *ad hoc* working group to begin negotiations, and in 1982 it submitted to the Assembly at its special session a draft programme,⁸ in which many points of disagreement remained. It did not prove possible to reconcile the conflicting points of view at the special session nor was it possible at subsequent sessions of the Geneva negotiating body, and in 1987 the areas of disagreement widened. At its forty-second session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 42/42 I, in which it urged the Conference on Disarmament to resume its work on the elaboration of a comprehensive programme at the outset of its 1988 session with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the programme in time for its submission to the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session, and for this purpose to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

This chapter deals with the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which is an expression of the desire to apply a long-term, broad approach to the search for general and complete disarmament, and with three more specific topics, disarmament and development, objective information on military matters, and naval armaments and disarmament, which were introduced into the General Assembly's agenda under the item "General and complete disarmament".

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 27, document A/8191 and Corr. I.

⁶ General Assembly resolution S-10/2.

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, para. 19. The "Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament", as agreed upon and recommended by the Disarmament Commission, is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, appendix II.

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-12/2)*, appendix I.

General developments and trends, 1988

Delegations at the *Conference on Disarmament* expressed the hope that the negotiations in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament would be concluded early in 1988 so that the results could be submitted to the General Assembly at its special session, but that did not prove possible. Throughout the session of the Conference, divergencies persisted on a number of sensitive issues, such as that of a nuclear-test ban, the role of the Conference with respect to nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear war, nuclear-weapon-free zones, zones of peace, and the relationship between disarmament and development. Nevertheless, some narrowing of differences, in the area of principles for example, was achieved in the *Ad Hoc* Committee. (See the section "Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1988", below.)

The majority of delegations that addressed the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament during the special session and the regular session of the *General Assembly* in 1988 were non-aligned. In most cases they made only passing references to the programme, often in the context of the need to implement measures that would follow the priorities established in the 1978 Final Document and guarantee the attainment of general and complete disarmament. Perhaps because of the difficulties encountered in negotiating the programme in the Conference on Disarmament, attention focused on other, more recent comprehensive programmes that had been developed by individual States or groups of States, for example, the phased programme of nuclear disarmament for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, proposed by the Soviet Union,⁹ and India's three-stage plan for a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order.¹⁰ India pointed out that while nuclear disarmament formed the central element of its plan, other measures were also included to further the process in a comprehensive manner, and it believed the plan would assist the Conference in negotiating a comprehensive programme to achieve general and complete disarmament. Romania stated that the United Nations should adopt a comprehensive programme for nuclear and general disarmament that would take into account the proposals submitted by all States at the third special session devoted to disarmament.

For the most part, States did not discuss broad approaches to disarmament or the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament itself; rather they directed their attention to measures or aspects of the process. Under the item "General and complete disarmament", they focused on a wide variety of specific matters, most of which are dealt with in this volume in chapters devoted to particular areas of disarmament.

Two of the topics considered under the omnibus item and discussed in this chapter are naval armaments and disarmament, and disarmament and

⁹ CD/732, appendix I, vol. 1, document CD/649; the proposal was also circulated as a General Assembly document (A/41/97).

¹⁰ See A/S-15/12 and chapter II of this volume.

development. With regard to the former, the Soviet Union, as part of its effort to promote confidence-building in naval matters, officially provided the United Nations with data on the composition of its navy as of 1 July 1988. With regard to the latter, the Secretary-General set up a high-level task force within the Secretariat to consider measures to strengthen the central role of the United Nations and its appropriate organs in the field of disarmament and development, the need for which was recognized in the action programme of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.¹¹

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1988

For the third consecutive year, the Disarmament Commission had on its agenda the item entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament". The Chairman decided to follow the practice of previous years and hold, under his responsibility, substantive and open-ended consultations on the subject. Subsequently, he delegated the conduct of the consultations to a "Friend of the Chairman", Mr. Rolf Ekeus of Sweden. The United States did not take part in the deliberations on naval armaments and disarmament, feeling that it was not in a position to discuss restrictions in that area, since it was separated from its allies by two oceans and relied on maritime activities and freedom of navigation under international law to protect its security and trade interests.

The consultations took as their point of departure the Chairman's paper on the item drafted in 1987.¹² Several new documents on the subject were submitted to the Commission:¹³ revisions of earlier working papers by Finland and Sweden, and a working paper by Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union. There was widespread agreement in the consultations that significant elements and principles included in the Chairman's earlier report should be retained. While continuing its discussion on those aspects, members of the Consultation Group exchanged views with the intention of first identifying objectives and later examining by what measures those objectives might be achieved.

In reaffirming the principle that reduction of naval nuclear forces and naval non-nuclear forces should follow the general approaches of nuclear and conventional disarmament efforts, some States pointed out that maritime disarmament measures should be balanced and that, because of differences in the geographical situations of States, multilateral measures of restriction for forces and weapons might have to be numerically asymmetrical. There was widespread recognition that a fundamental feature of the global maritime

¹¹ See *Report of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development* (A/CONF.130/39), part II. The Final Document was also issued as United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.8.

¹² A/CN.10/102.

¹³ A/CN.10/90/Rev.1 (Finland), A/CN.10/101/Rev.1 (Sweden) and A/CN.10/109 (Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic and Soviet Union).

environment, both military and non-military, was freedom of navigation and that naval confidence-building measures should be in harmony with the current law of the sea. The interest in confidence-building measures that was evident in 1987 continued, and the importance of establishing a better flow of objective information on naval capabilities was noted.

The Group made progress in amplifying the three objectives that had already been identified: peacetime security, security for non-military activities at sea, and seaboard security. They also identified two more: strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, taking into account the need for States to protect their security, and wartime security at sea of vessels belonging to States neutral to a conflict.

The findings of the Consultation Group were incorporated into a working paper by the Chairman,¹⁴ which met with the approval of all delegations participating in the substantive consultations and which they believed could form the basis of further deliberations. The Chairman's report on the work accomplished under the item on naval armaments and disarmament was adopted by the Commission on 19 May and incorporated into its report to the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session.¹⁵

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1988

The Conference on Disarmament considered its agenda item on the comprehensive programme of disarmament in plenary meetings during the periods from 4 to 8 April and from 29 August to 2 September. On 2 February, it agreed, in accordance with the request made by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/42 I, to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the programme in time for its submission to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament. As that did not prove possible, at the beginning of the second part of its session, on 19 July, the Conference re-established the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue negotiations with the firm intention of completing the elaboration of the programme and submitting it to the General Assembly at its forty-third session or, at the latest, its forty-fourth session.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Alfonso García Robles of Mexico, met in plenary and informal meetings during both parts of the session. The Conference on Disarmament decided to invite, at their request, the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee: Austria, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Zimbabwe. In addition to the documents submitted during pre-

¹⁴ A/CN.10/113.

¹⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3* (A/S-15/3), para. 54.

vious sessions, the *Ad Hoc* Committee had before it two new working papers. The first, submitted by the United Kingdom, contained a proposal for the addition of a subparagraph to the section "Other measures" in chapter V of the draft programme. According to the new text, which was later agreed to, States should consider implementing measures based on the principles of openness and transparency, such as the provision of objective information on military matters. The second, submitted by Peru, related to the establishment of a zone of peace and co-operation in the South Pacific.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee began its work on the basis of the text annexed to its 1987 report.¹⁶ In some cases it was possible to reach agreement on the wording of certain paragraphs, and in others considerable progress was made towards harmonizing positions. However, as reflected in the report and annex prepared by the Committee for submission to the General Assembly at its special session,¹⁷ points of difference remained on a number of issues.

At the second part of the session, the *Ad Hoc* Committee continued its negotiations on the programme, concentrating on various outstanding issues. Contact groups were established and consultations held among interested delegations with a view to resolving differences concerning certain texts. Some progress was made towards harmonizing positions and narrowing areas of disagreement. However, in the short time available it was not possible to reconcile all differences and thus complete the elaboration of the programme. The results of the work in the second half of the year are contained in the annex to the *Ad Hoc* Committee's report to the Conference.¹⁸ It was understood that delegations could not take final positions thereon until agreement had been reached on outstanding points of difficulty and until the document was complete. In its report, the *Ad Hoc* Committee drew the conclusion that it should resume work at the outset of the 1989 session of the Conference with the firm intention of completing the elaboration of the programme for its submission to the General Assembly, at the latest at its forty-fourth session.

Action by the General Assembly, 1988

The General Assembly adopted a resolution on the comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted under an item on follow-up of the tenth special session, and 20 resolutions and a decision under its agenda item "General and complete disarmament". The actions taken under the latter item are dealt with in this volume as follows:

- (a) In this chapter, beginning on the page shown—
 - (i) 43/75 B (Relationship between disarmament and development), page 113;

¹⁶ CD/783.

¹⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-15/2)*, sect. III, H. The report contains a brief description of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee since 1982.

¹⁸ CD/867, reproduced in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/43/27)*, sect. III, H.

- (ii) 43/75 G (Objective information on military matters), page 114;
 - (iii) 43/75 L (Naval armaments and disarmament), page 116;
 - (iv) 43/75 M (Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof), page 117;
 - (v) Decision 43/422 (Contribution of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament), page 118.
- (b) In other chapters, chapter number shown—
- (i) 43/75 A (Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations), chapter VI;
 - (ii) 43/75 C (Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons), chapter XIV;
 - (iii) 43/75 D (Conventional disarmament), chapter XV;
 - (iv) 43/75 E (Nuclear disarmament), chapter VI;
 - (v) 43/75 F (Conventional disarmament), chapter XV;
 - (vi) 43/75 H (Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament), chapter I;
 - (vii) 43/75 I (International arms transfers), chapter XVII;
 - (viii) 43/75 J (Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons), chapter XIV;
 - (ix) 43/75 K (Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes), chapter VI;
 - (x) 43/75 N (Comprehensive United Nations study on nuclear weapons), chapter XVII;
 - (xi) 43/75 O (Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations), chapter VI;
 - (xii) 43/75 P (Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe), chapter XV;
 - (xiii) 43/75 Q (Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes), chapter XIV;
 - (xiv) 43/75 R (Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament), chapter I;
 - (xv) 43/75 S (Conventional disarmament on a regional scale), chapter XV;
 - (xvi) 43/75 T (Dumping of radioactive wastes), chapter XIV.

In addition, two draft resolutions, entitled “Objective information on military matters” and “International transfer of conventional armaments”, were submitted to the First Committee and later withdrawn. The former is discussed in this chapter in conjunction with resolution 43/75 G, and the latter is discussed in chapter XVII.

On 9 November, Mexico introduced a draft resolution entitled “Comprehensive programme of disarmament”. After outlining the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament, Mexico pointed out that in the short time available in the second part of the session of the Conference, the Committee had not been able to reconcile differences on a number of issues. It had agreed that it should resume its work at the outset of the 1989 session of the Conference in order to complete its elaboration of the programme by the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly. By the draft resolution, the Assembly would include in its agenda the item on the comprehensive programme.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution by consensus the next day, and the General Assembly adopted it without a vote on 7 December as resolution 43/78 K. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 42/42 I of 30 November 1987, in which it urged the Conference on Disarmament to resume the work on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament at the outset of its 1988 session with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the programme,

Having examined the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament concerning its work during the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament, which is an integral part of the report of the Conference, and noting the agreement of the *Ad Hoc* Committee that it should resume its work at the outset of the 1989 session of the Conference with the firm intention of completing the elaboration of the programme for its submission to the General Assembly, at the latest at its forty-fourth session,

Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session an item entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament"

On 28 October, Zimbabwe, on behalf of the non-aligned States, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development", which it introduced on 9 November. Zimbabwe explained that the draft was primarily of a procedural nature, its sole purpose being to include the item in the agenda of the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly. It drew attention to a revision to operative paragraph 1, by which the Assembly would request the Secretary-General to report to it at its next session on the implementation of the action programme of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. The revised draft resolution was later sponsored also by the German Democratic Republic and Romania.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. Four States explained their positions on the matter at that time.

Both the Byelorussian SSR and Czechoslovakia stated that they attached importance to the request made in the draft that the Secretary-General take action for the implementation of the programme adopted at the Conference.

The United Kingdom, although joining in the consensus, reiterated its reservations about the Final Document of the Conference: the Document did not reflect the complex nature of the relationship between disarmament, development and security; aid disbursement should not in any way depend on progress in arms control; and the need for transparency in the provision of information on military expenditure was not adequately stressed. The United Kingdom understood that the request made in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution applied only to that aspect of the programme in which action by the Secretary-General was specifically indicated.

The United States announced that it would not participate in any decision taken by the First Committee on the draft. It believed that disarmament and development were two distinct issues that could not be appropriately considered in terms of an interrelationship. It would not consider itself bound in

any way by either the declaration in the Final Document of the International Conference or the terms of the draft resolution.

On 7 December the General Assembly adopted the draft text without a vote. On that occasion as well, the United States stated that it was not participating in the action. Resolution 43/75 B reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly related to the relationship between disarmament and development,

Recalling also the adoption on 11 September 1987 of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take action through the appropriate organs, within available resources, for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

2. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session an item entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development".

With regard to the provision of objective information on military matters,¹⁹ a subject closely related to that of the reduction of military budgets (see chapter XVI), two draft resolutions were submitted to the First Committee. The first was sponsored by a group of mainly Western countries²⁰ and the second by a group of socialist States.²¹ Intensive consultations were held and the two texts were merged before either was introduced in the Committee.

On 9 November the United Kingdom introduced the compromise text, which by that date was sponsored by 30 States,²² and noted several small changes that had been made in it. The United Kingdom pointed out that the draft resolution built upon its predecessors and reflected developments during the last year. The United Kingdom attached special importance to the recommendation in the draft that the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures be implemented, believing that it offered a way of giving concrete form to the principles of openness and transparency. It hoped that the invitation to States to submit views on further consolidating the trend towards greater openness would result in practical suggestions as well as in statements of principle. The sponsors believed that the issue of objective information on military matters should be given in-depth consideration in the Disarmament Commission.

¹⁹ For information concerning the positions of States on this subject, see the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its special session containing the views of Governments on ways and means of ensuring confidence and furthering openness and transparency in military matters (A/S-15/7 and Add.1 and 2).

²⁰ Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Samoa, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

²¹ Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Soviet Union. Romania subsequently became a sponsor.

²² Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Samoa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States. Romania subsequently joined the sponsors.

Expressing its satisfaction with the outcome of the consultations, the Soviet Union withdrew the second draft.²³ It declared that the beginning of real nuclear disarmament, marked by implementation of the USSR-United States Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, demonstrated the indissoluble link between openness and disarmament. When conditions came about for a realistic comparison of military expenditures, it would proceed to use the United Nations system of standardization of accounts to present details of its military expenditures. The Soviet Union was convinced that the trend towards enhancing the role of the United Nations in international affairs must make itself felt in the exchange of objective information on military matters.

On 14 November the sponsors submitted a further revision incorporating a minor change. On 17 November the First Committee approved the revised draft by a recorded vote of 109 to none, with 9 abstentions.

At the same meeting, three States explained their positions. Hungary, a sponsor, stated that the provision of objective information was an effective confidence-building measure. Yugoslavia also supported the text for that reason, but felt that the draft overestimated the effect a lack of information could have on the arms programmes of States. Cuba abstained because the draft limited the concept of confidence-building. In its view, it was the cessation of hostile acts, not the exchange of objective information, that would strengthen the security of States.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution on 7 December by a recorded vote of 130 to none, with 10 abstentions. Resolution 43/75 G reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 105 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which the Assembly encouraged Member States to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the arms race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Taking into account the attention paid to the questions of openness and of ensuring an exchange of objective information in the military field at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament,

Noting with satisfaction that recent agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament have provided for qualitatively new standards of openness,

Believing that the adoption of confidence-building measures to promote openness and transparency would contribute to the prevention of misperceptions of military capabilities and intentions which would induce States to undertake armaments programmes leading to the acceleration of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and to heightened international tensions,

Believing also that balanced and objective information on all military matters, in particular of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would contribute to the building of confidence among States and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements, and thereby help to halt and reverse the arms race,

²³ See A/43/856, paras. 38 and 39.

Recognizing that greater openness and transparency would contribute to enhancing security,

Convinced that greater openness on military activities, *inter alia*, through transmittal of relevant information on these activities, including on the levels of military budgets, would contribute to increased confidence among States,

Taking into account the work undertaken in the Disarmament Commission on the reduction of military budgets,

Noting with satisfaction that an increased number of States have provided annual reports on military expenditures in conformity with the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures under the auspices of the United Nations,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on this subject to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

2. *Reaffirms its firm conviction* that a better flow of objective information on military capabilities would help relieve international tension and contribute to the building of confidence among States on a global, regional or subregional level and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements;

3. *Recommends* that those States and global, regional and subregional organizations which have already expressed support for the principle of practical and concrete confidence-building measures of a military nature on a global, regional or subregional level should intensify their efforts with a view to adopting such measures;

4. *Recommends also* that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, should implement the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, with the aim of achieving a realistic comparison of military budgets, facilitating the availability of objective information on, as well as objective assessment of, military capabilities and contributing to the process of disarmament;

5. *Invites* all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General before 30 April 1989 measures they have adopted towards these ends, for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

6. *Also invites* all Member States also to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on ways and means of further consolidating the emerging trend towards greater openness in military matters, specifically with regard to the provisions of objective information on military matters, for consideration by the Disarmament Commission at its 1990 session;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Objective information on military matters"

Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, China, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, Iceland, Indonesia, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament",²⁴ which was later also sponsored by Malaysia. The text was introduced by Sweden on 7 November. In introducing it, Sweden outlined the progress that the Disarmament Commission had made during its deliberations on the subject. It had identified some concrete confidence-building measures on which negotiations could be pursued, for instance a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea beyond the territorial seas, but it still had to elaborate several other important aspects of naval disarmament. Thus in the draft the Commission was requested to continue its substantive work at its forthcoming session and to report to the General Assembly in 1989.

²⁴ Two papers on the subject of naval armaments had been submitted to the General Assembly at its special session: the first, by Finland, Indonesia and Sweden (A/S-15/AC.1/13), and the second, by Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union (A/S-15/AC.1/16).

On 16 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 134 to 1 (United States), and on 7 December the General Assembly adopted it as resolution 43/75 L by a recorded vote of 152 to 1, with 1 abstention.

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 38/188 G of 20 December 1983, by which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study on the naval arms race,

Recalling also its resolution 40/94 F of 12 December 1985, by which it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the issues contained in the study entitled *The Naval Arms Race*, both its substantive content and its conclusions, taking into account all other relevant present and future proposals, with a view to facilitating the identification of possible measures in the field of naval arms reductions and disarmament, pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, as well as confidence-building measures in this field,

Recalling further its resolution 42/38 K of 30 November 1987, by which it requested the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its 1988 session, the substantive consideration of the question and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly not later than at its forty-third session,

Having examined the report of the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission on the substantive consideration of the question of the naval arms race and disarmament during the 1988 session of the Commission, which met with the approval of all delegations participating in the substantive consultations and which, in their view, should be discussed at the forty-third session of the General Assembly,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* the report on the substantive consideration of the question of the naval arms race and disarmament by the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission;
2. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its forthcoming session in 1989, the substantive consideration of the question and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;
3. *Also requests* the Disarmament Commission to inscribe on the agenda for its 1989 session the item entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament";
4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament"

A group of 44 States from all regions, later joined by 2 more,²⁵ sponsored a draft resolution entitled "Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof". On 3 November the draft resolution was introduced by Norway, which had presided at the Second Review Conference of the Treaty, in 1983. Norway explained that following its consultations with a number of countries, the States parties to the sea-bed Treaty had met informally and decided to convene the Third Review Conference in 1989. A preparatory committee open to all States parties would be established and would hold a one-week session in Geneva in April. Norway drew attention to the fact that

²⁵ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

the number of parties to the Treaty was currently 80, having increased by 7 since the Second Review Conference. Among the States parties were three nuclear-weapon States and some of the most significant maritime Powers in the world.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. At that time two Committee members made statements. France announced that it had not participated in the action. The Ukrainian SSR noted that the information to be made available to the Preparatory Committee and subsequently to the Conference itself should reflect the progress made in implementing resolution 40/94 J, concerning further measures for preventing an arms race on the sea-bed, which had been adopted by consensus in 1985.

On 7 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote as resolution 43/75 M. At that time, France requested that the records of the meeting reflect the fact that it had not participated in that action. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2660 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, in which it commended the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,

Noting the provisions of article VII of that Treaty concerning the holding of review conferences,

Bearing in mind that, in its Final Declaration, the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, held at Geneva from 12 to 23 September 1983, decided that a third review conference should be held at Geneva at the request of a majority of States parties not earlier than 1988 and not later than 1990,

Recalling also its resolution 38/188 B of 20 December 1983, in which it made an assessment of the outcome of the Second Review Conference,

Bearing in mind also all the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

1. *Notes* that, following appropriate consultations, a preparatory committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof is to be established prior to holding a further review conference in 1989;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Review Conference and its preparation;

3. *Recalls* its expressed hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty.

Cuba, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union submitted a draft decision entitled "Contribution of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament", which was introduced by Czechoslovakia on 14 November. The sponsors were of the opinion that the United Nations specialized agencies played an important part in overall efforts in the field of arms limitation and disarmament and they welcomed the report of the Secretary-General on their

work (see appendix II of this volume). They felt, however, that before the potential of the agencies to contribute in their own way strictly within their respective areas of competence could be discussed effectively, it would be necessary to achieve a broader consensus than currently existed in both the United Nations and the specialized agencies. They therefore proposed that further consideration of the item be deferred. They believed that by proposing a deferral, they were addressing the concerns expressed by some delegations.

On 16 November the First Committee approved the draft decision without a vote, and on 7 December the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as decision 43/422. It reads as follows:

At its 73rd plenary meeting, on 7 December 1988, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, took note of the report of the Secretary-General, and decided to defer until a later date, to be agreed upon in consultations among Member States, the consideration of the item entitled "Contribution of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament"

The General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions on international security issues that contained elements related to disarmament and that were submitted under agenda items of the First Committee.

On 30 November Yugoslavia introduced a draft resolution entitled "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security", which was co-sponsored by Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Tunisia and Uganda. At the same meeting the First Committee approved the text by a recorded vote of 102 to 1, with 25 abstentions, and on 7 December the General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 128 to 1, with 22 abstentions, as resolution 43/88. The passages that relate most directly to disarmament appear in operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 5:

3. *Calls upon* all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to take immediate steps aimed at:

(a) Promoting and using effectively the system of collective security as envisaged in the Charter;

(b) Halting effectively the arms race and achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control and, to this end, to conduct serious, meaningful and effective negotiations with a view to implementing the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and to fulfilling the priority tasks listed in the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document;

4. *Invites* all States, in particular the major military Powers and States members of military alliances, to refrain, especially in critical situations and in crisis areas, from actions, including military activities and manoeuvres, conceived within the context of East-West confrontation and used as a means of pressure or threat to and destabilization of other States and regions;

5. *Expresses its conviction* that the gradual military disengagement of the great Powers and their military alliances from various parts of the world should be promoted.

The General Assembly also adopted two resolutions, 43/83 A and B, which deal with the question of Antarctica, but neither addresses disarmament matters directly.

Conclusion

In an attempt to realize their hope of achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament, members of the Conference on Disarmament continued throughout the year their efforts to negotiate the comprehensive programme of disarmament, and the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 43/78 K, by which it decided to include the item concerning the programme in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session.

In general, however, States focused their attention on specific aspects and interim measures of disarmament. Of the draft resolutions of this type submitted under the item "General and complete disarmament" that are discussed in this chapter, the General Assembly adopted two by consensus: resolution 43/75 B, on the relationship between disarmament and development, and resolution 43/75 M, on the Third Review Conference of the seabed Treaty. Two others were adopted by very large majorities: resolution 43/75 G, on objective information in military matters, co-sponsored by NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, was adopted with no negative votes, while resolution 43/75 L, on naval armaments and disarmament, co-sponsored by States from all political groupings, was adopted with only one negative vote and one abstention. Because of a lack of consensus on the subject, consideration of the contribution of the specialized agencies was deferred by decision 43/422.

Verification and compliance

Introduction

VERIFICATION IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ARMS LIMITATION and disarmament agreements. In the interest of security, compliance with such agreements must be verifiable.

There are different modes and degrees of verification and, therefore, a variety of terms may be employed, for instance, "monitoring", "observation", "control", "investigation", "inspection", and "on-site inspection". All these terms, although not equivalent, contain one or more of the elements of information-gathering, analysis and determination of compliance, which are the essential components of verification.

Since its inception, the United Nations has dealt with problems of verification, at both the deliberative and the negotiating stages. Several arms limitation and disarmament agreements currently in force provide a role for the United Nations in ensuring compliance with agreements (see table 1).

In the 1978 Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, the Member States affirmed, by consensus, that disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they were being observed by all parties. They also agreed that: the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement; agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process; where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.¹

Since the fortieth session of the General Assembly, in 1985, consideration of the question of verification has intensified.² The deliberations on the subject

¹ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 31.

² See General Assembly resolutions: 40/152 O of 16 December 1985; 41/86 Q of 4 December 1986; 42/42 F of 30 November 1987; and 43/81 B of 7 December 1988.

have helped to clarify the concept of verification and make it more widely acceptable. At the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1988, the question of verification was one of the major subjects in the deliberations. At the forty-third session of the General Assembly, later that year, "Verification in all its aspects" was on the agenda as a separate item for the first time.

Verification³ may be defined as a process which serves to provide confidence that the provisions of an agreement are being observed, that is, that the parties are complying with their obligations. Thus, compliance (the fulfilment of obligations) and verification (the process of gathering and analysing information with a view to assessing compliance) are two sides of the same coin.

In the verification process, two main components can usually be found, namely, the fact-finding or gathering of data (monitoring), and the interpretation or evaluation of the data. These imply the availability of a verification system which possesses a highly accurate monitoring capability to recognize a violation and provide a timely warning—not just an *ex post facto* indication of a violation. The same high degree of accuracy and objectivity should be present in the evaluation of the data provided by the verification system. It should not be forgotten in this connection that, ultimately, judgements of compliance or non-compliance are essentially political judgements.

Unavoidably, any such judgements are subject to some degree of error. In the present circumstances, 100 per cent verifiability is, in fact, unattainable. Consequently, the field of arms control and disarmament, whether bilateral or multilateral, provides for some form of consultative procedure for addressing compliance questions, although in actual form such procedures vary greatly. Some multilateral agreements envisage the use of the United Nations as a forum for such consultations.

Thus, in practice, Governments cannot reasonably seek absolute verification, but rather "adequate" or "effective" verification, that is, verification to the extent necessary adequately to safeguard national security. The task of identifying acceptable and reliable measures at a sufficiently high level of verifiability can present challenging difficulties and has occasionally proved to be a serious obstacle to the conclusion of disarmament accords. It is,

³ The question of verification has been discussed in various publications issued by the United Nations and by other bodies involved in United Nations disarmament matters. See, for example, the report of the United Nations Meeting of Experts on Verification (Dagomys, USSR, 11-15 April 1988) in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XI, No.2 (Summer 1988); the report of the Pugwash Symposium on Scientific and Technical Aspects of Development of New Weapons, Verification Issues, and Global Security (United Nations Headquarters, 11-12 May 1988) in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XI, No.3 (Autumn 1988); Government of Canada, *Verification in All Its Aspects: A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification pursuant to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 40/152 O* (Ottawa, 1986), pp. 22-23; and UNIDIR, *The Verification Issue in United Nations Disarmament Negotiations*: study prepared by Ellis Morris, Research Associate of the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, with the co-operation of the Department for External Affairs, Government of Canada (United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.87.0.4).

however, a vital task because only when the parties to an agreement are confident that the obligations deriving from it are being fulfilled by all concerned can the agreement fully achieve its goal, which is greater security for all.

At the same time, the experience of the past thirty years has clearly indicated that when the negotiating parties were firmly decided to reach agreement, they were ultimately able to overcome the obstacles relating to the verification measures no less than those involved in the substantive arms limitation and disarmament measures to be verified. Since the late 1950s, many such accords have been reached and reference will be made in this section to a large number of them. The experience gained during this time also tends to prove that it is an illusion to think that adequate verification of a treaty is more difficult than routine monitoring in the absence of a treaty: when there is no treaty, what constitutes a significant threat remains to be determined, and the co-operative undertakings usually to be found in a treaty are not available.

This is particularly true in an international environment in which confidence-building, openness and transparency are the norms of political behaviour. As has been stated, there can be no ambiguity on that score: as long as there is confidence in strict compliance with the undertakings, the entire structure of disarmament will rest on solid foundations.

Verification may be carried out by national or international means or by a combination of both. The term "verification by national means" denotes the existence of a national system whereby relevant information is collected and presented to another party or other parties to the agreement. This could be done directly or through an international organization. The term "international verification" is used when States together, or through an appropriate international framework, ascertain events or occurrences in the context of a given agreement within the territory of one or more States. Under a mixed system of verification, an international organization may make use of the findings of a national authority made available to it, while also carrying out some degree of verification itself.

Whatever the form of verification—national, international or mixed—the verification process should, as far as possible, be free from recourse to "intrusive" measures, inasmuch as experience shows that Governments always seek minimum interference. Through the years, however, new verification technologies have been developed that have made verification less dependent on intrusive measures such as examination, demonstration or inspection. Thus, increasingly, information about compliance is collected by national technical means (NTMs), notably satellites, early warning systems, radar and other intelligence-gathering systems. Many different technologies may be used for the operation of an effective NTM system, including imaging, optics, sensors, infrared, spectroscopy, seismology, satellites and detection of nuclear materials. In these circumstances, on-site inspection has generally come to be viewed as an adjunct to national technical means, involving a reciprocal admission of designated observers of the parties concerned into

areas under national control—an adjunct which can, however, still play a very significant role in some verification agreements.

Of course, negotiated solutions to determine what is adequate and effective can be found only on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the scope of the agreement and striking a balance between the technically feasible and the politically acceptable. As shown in the following pages, including the table, and also in the annex to this chapter, quite different solutions have been adopted in pursuing the goal of effective verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements. For each agreement, particular modes and degrees of verification have been agreed upon.

Scope of verification—some examples

Agreement was reached, for instance, in 1963 on the cessation of nuclear tests in three environments (though not under ground) through a decision that the parties would rely on national technical means of verification. The relevant treaty, known as the partial test-ban Treaty (PTBT), contains no provision concerning verification. That implied that the parties would monitor the implementation of the Treaty by using NTMs.

Similarly, the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction does not envisage specific verification measures, even though it introduces the mode of consultation. In article IV, the Convention simply says that each State party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent within its own territory the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery that are banned by the Convention. In article V, the States parties undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of the Convention. Consultation and co-operation may also be undertaken through international procedures within the framework of the United Nations. Ultimately, any State party which finds that any other State party is not complying with its undertakings may, under article VI, lodge a complaint with the Security Council.

A completely different solution was adopted in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which declares that Antarctica shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that there shall be prohibited, *inter alia*, any measures of a military nature. In order to promote international co-operation in scientific investigation in Antarctica, the relevant provisions of the Treaty provide for an unprecedented system of exchange of information, scientific observations and personnel by the contracting parties. Observers designated by the parties shall, moreover, have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica. This is undoubtedly the most unrestricted on-site inspection provision of any arms control accord currently in force.

An analogous approach is found in the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. According to article II of the Treaty, outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of the Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty shall, under article X, consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States. Under article XII all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. The States parties also commit themselves, in article XI, to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of their activities in outer space. Appropriate international consultations are also envisaged by the Treaty, in article XII.

The 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof again offers a different approach to the problem of verification. In order to promote the objectives of the Treaty and ensure compliance with its provisions, each State party has, under article III of the Treaty, the right to verify, through observation, the activities of other parties on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, provided that observation does not interfere with such activities. Verification pursuant to this right may be undertaken by any State party using its own means, or with the full or partial assistance of any other State party, or through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. If after such observation reasonable doubts remain concerning the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the Treaty, consultation and co-operation between the parties concerned are envisaged by the Treaty. If the doubts are not removed, a State party may, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refer the matter to the Security Council, which may take action in accordance with the Charter.

In the case of the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, the assistance of a consultative committee of experts was also envisaged, in article V, prior to the lodging of a complaint with the Security Council.

In the case of the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) it was felt that their goal, namely, the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, could best be secured by

entrusting an international organization, IAEA, with a major verification role. This was a very significant innovation, one that was found fitting for a global treaty—the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—no less than for a regional one, namely, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. At the same time, the specific verification provisions of the two Treaties (those of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in a regional context and those of the NPT in the Geneva multilateral negotiating body, under United Nations auspices) were so drafted as to meet the requirements of two distinct situations and guarantee maximum effectiveness. In the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco some specific verification functions were entrusted to regional bodies, under article 19.

In the more recent pact, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), concluded in 1985, the control system established for the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations under the Treaty is again based on a combination of regional measures and IAEA safeguards.

All the agreements to which reference has been made thus far in this Introduction, whether regional or global, are of a multilateral nature. Equally important can, of course, be the role of verification in bilateral arms control agreements. It is sufficient to recall, in this connection, the SALT I and SALT II agreements. The United States and the USSR agreed in 1972, in their Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and in article XII of their Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, that for the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Interim Agreement, each party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law; each party shall not interfere with the national technical means of the other party; and each party shall not use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means. These same principles were embodied in article XV of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1979, a treaty which has not formally entered into force.

The same language is also found in article II of another USSR-United States treaty that has not yet entered into force, namely, the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (threshold test-ban Treaty). In the USSR-United States Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes of 1976, also not yet in force, the two Powers, while agreeing once again that they would use national means of verification at their disposal for the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, further agreed, under article IV, that each Party would “provide the other Party information and access to sites of explosions and furnish assistance” in accordance with the provisions set forth in a Protocol to the Treaty. Indeed, the Parties would, under article VI, “develop co-operation on the basis of mutual benefit, equality and reciprocity in various areas related to carrying out underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes”.

The verification provisions of the 1987 United States-USSR Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) are particularly significant. This is true of the relevant provisions in the body of the Treaty itself and of the Protocols regarding Inspections and Elimination, which are integral parts of the Treaty. The INF agreement builds upon verification arrangements previously agreed upon by the two sides, adding to the well-established practice of inspection by satellite important new ways, notably, on-site inspections, inspection by challenge and an extensive data exchange. Thus, the Treaty breaks new ground and opens up unprecedented avenues for future arms regulation and disarmament negotiations within both bilateral and multilateral frameworks.

Whatever the scope of verification provisions in arms limitation and disarmament agreements, there is at least one element that such provisions have in common: all are meant to deter violations of obligations, that is, to ensure that violations cannot occur without detection. The provisions have, however, an additional, equally important function, namely, to contribute to confidence-building. This is quite possible, since there is no basic contradiction between systematic and effective verification and the self-interest of each party in the continued life of an agreement it has freely accepted. Together, these two elements are likely to ensure effective compliance, develop trust and strengthen political support for arms limitation and disarmament.

Co-operative measures by the parties to an arms limitation and disarmament agreement can contribute most significantly to confidence-building. Reference has been made above to the fact that, under the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to an extensive data exchange. It seems reasonable to assume that this exchange, to be validated by the party receiving the data, can provide abundant new ground for confidence-building.

In a multilateral context, the recent agreement known as the Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE),⁴ signed on 19 September 1986 by 35 States, including the United States and Canada, is another accord in which the confidence-building element is very prominent. As stated in the Document, the aim of the parties is "to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general".

Accordingly, a number of concrete measures are to be carried out by the parties to fulfil their aim. Such measures include: prior notification and observation of certain military activities; exchange of annual calendars of military activities subject to prior notification; additional communications concerning military activities subject to prior notification, when the number of troops involved in such activities is in excess of agreed levels; and adequate

⁴ The Stockholm Conference was convened within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which had opened in Helsinki in 1973.

forms of verification, both through monitoring by national technical means and through inspection.

A United Nations role in verification

It should be evident from the many accords to which reference has been made above that the verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral (regional or global), calls for participation of the interested parties in the verification process. It must be noted, in this connection, that given the different technological levels attained by States, the contributions that the parties can make to the verification process of arms limitation and disarmament agreements are far from equal. As a matter of fact, only a few States possess the advanced techniques that make verification, as it is known today, possible. The question then arises, in the context of multilateral agreements, how to satisfy the demands for verification systems that are universal and non-discriminatory in nature, available to all States on the basis of equality, systems which are meant to compensate for the different levels of verification technology among the parties.

This is likely to imply that, once agreement has been reached on the principles and parameters of the verification system, the parties will have to entrust to a common body the management and implementation of the verification provisions—a body in which the parties will be duly represented. This, of course, raises a series of major political and technical questions, in particular, the question how to reconcile the existence of one single body with the fact that verification measures are treaty-specific. In addition, there are the technical and logistical aspects of verification, the analysis of the data obtained from monitoring, and then all the questions concerning personnel and training, and the overall question of cost.

This is a problem to which the members of the international community have come back repeatedly, in particular at the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, in 1988 (see chapter II). At that session, the General Assembly focused, to an unprecedented extent, on the role that the Organization could constructively play in respect of verification of disarmament agreements and on the strengthening of its ability to respond to increased demands by the international community regarding arms limitation and disarmament agreements, notably multilateral agreements.

As the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated on that occasion, although certain aspects of verification would continue to be taken up in a bilateral framework, multilateral agreements on the limitation and reduction of armaments would require multilateral verification. “This is an area”, he said, “in which the United Nations might be able to make an important contribution. The United Nations might be able to help apply, by all the means accepted by the parties concerned, the verification measures provided for in multilateral treaties. The United Nations might be able to co-ordinate inter-

national debates on questions related to verification, to provide technical advice and to carry out research. Generally speaking, the participation of our Organization in the search for generally acceptable and effective verification measures for observance of the agreements and the expansion of the functions of information and advice might make it possible in the future to create, under its auspices, verification machinery".⁵

At the forty-third session of the General Assembly, resolution 43/81 B was adopted (see below), by which the Secretary-General was requested to carry out an expert study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification.

General developments and trends, 1988

In 1988, the issue of verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements received earnest consideration in the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly, and, in particular, at the Assembly's third special session on disarmament, where the deliberations on the subject produced several new initiatives and an increased degree of understanding and co-operation.

The *Disarmament Commission* was able to conclude its work on the subject of "verification in all its aspects" (initiated in 1987, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 41/86 Q) by adopting general principles of verification, which were later endorsed by the General Assembly at its regular session, in resolution 43/81 B. The Commission also discussed (a) methods, procedures and techniques available for the verification of compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements, and (b) the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. While consensus was not achieved on those two aspects of the question of verification, the proposals made in that context are likely to be relevant in the future consideration of the subject. In particular, the proposals discussed in connection with the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament included, *inter alia*, the following: the establishment of a verification data base within the United Nations; research on the role of the United Nations in respect of verification, beginning with a request addressed to the Secretary-General to explore the matter with the assistance of qualified experts; and the establishment of an integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations.

These and other verification proposals were considered by the *General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament*. Five different proposals were formally submitted to the Assembly. Canada and the Netherlands submitted a comprehensive paper on verification and the United Nations, focusing on the role that the Organization could constructively play in that field, and proposing an in-depth study on the subject by a group of

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st meeting.

experts. France submitted a paper entitled "The role of the United Nations in contractual verification, investigation procedures and collection of space data", and considered ways of producing practical results, possibly by a United Nations group of experts on verification. In making this proposal, France emphasized that it was willing to combine it with the one made by Canada and the Netherlands, in order to produce a joint document acceptable to all. Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania submitted a working paper on an integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations, for adoption by the General Assembly at its special session. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the USSR submitted a comprehensive working paper on the "Establishment of an international verification mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations". Norway submitted a memorandum on procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, a document based on a research programme carried out by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment as a contribution to the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention in the Conference on Disarmament.

At the special session, the idea of an integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations, first put forward by Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania, in their Stockholm Declaration of 21 January 1988,⁶ had numerous supporters. The language used in the Declaration by the Heads of State or Government representing the Six-Nation Initiative was at the same time brief and comprehensive. "We recognize the need," they stated, "for the establishment of an integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations, as an integral part of a strengthened multilateral framework required to ensure peace and security during the process of disarmament as well as in a nuclear-weapon-free world." This proposal by the six nations, which came about eighteen months after their Document on verification measures issued at the Mexico summit meeting on 7 August 1986,⁷ provides new evidence of general acceptance of the principle that verification is an integral part of disarmament agreements. Indeed, there was overwhelming evidence in the general debate at the special session (see chapter II) that the principle was not questioned.

With a view to clearing the ground for the achievement of practical results, the *General Assembly at its regular session* requested the Secretary-General (resolution 43/81 B) to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification of arms limitation and disarmament which would: identify and review existing activities of the United Nations in that field; assess the need for improvements in existing activities as well as explore and identify possible additional activities; and provide specific recommendations for future action by the United Nations in the verification context. For the second consecutive year, furthermore, the General Assembly, mindful of the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance

⁶ A/43/125, annex.

⁷ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 11: 1986, chap. VIII, annex.

of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them, adopted by consensus a resolution (43/81 A) on compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

The question of compliance was dealt with more specifically in connection with investigations of the alleged use of chemical weapons. There was growing support in the General Assembly, across all political and regional groups, for strengthening the Secretary-General's role in that area. This led to the adoption of resolution 43/74 A, entitled "Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention", by which the General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to develop further technical guidelines and procedures available to him for the investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical and biological weapons.

In the course of the general debate in plenary meetings, the President of the United States, Mr. Ronald Reagan, expressing concern at a growing number of cases of non-compliance with the obligations deriving from the Geneva Protocol of 1925 outlawing the use in war of chemical weapons, called upon the signatories of that Protocol, as well as other concerned States, to convene a conference to consider actions that could be taken by the international community to reverse the serious erosion of that agreement. He also urged all nations to co-operate, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, in negotiating a verifiable, truly global ban on chemical weapons.

Again in the general debate, the President of France, François Mitterrand, stated that France, the depositary of the Geneva Protocol, favoured a meeting of the 110 signatories to that agreement. The purpose of such a meeting would be to solemnly reaffirm the commitment not to use chemical weapons, to prevent their proliferation, to encourage new accessions to the Protocol, to improve investigative procedures—in short, to express a common desire for the success of the work which was being carried out at Geneva within the context of the Conference on Disarmament.

As a result, it was agreed to hold a conference on the Geneva Protocol, in Paris, early in January 1989.

In the *Conference on Disarmament*, the means of verifying a global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons remained the major concern. Some progress was achieved on specific articles of the draft convention, but the pace of the negotiations remained slow. Consequently, many delegations felt obliged to stress the need to accelerate the ongoing negotiations, especially in view of the recurrent use of chemical weapons and the dangers of their proliferation. They also expressed the hope that the negotiations would be further facilitated by the numerous confidence-building measures taken by a number of participating States,⁸ as well as by the agreement to hold trial

⁸ The measures included: declarations on the possession or non-possession of chemical weapons; declarations on the production of some specific chemicals relevant to the convention; exchange visits to chemical facilities; and a more active involvement of representatives of the chemical industry in the negotiating process.

inspections of the chemical industry, with a view to testing the verification procedures envisaged in the draft convention.

In conclusion, developments in all the main disarmament bodies, in 1988, confirmed that verification was essential to the arms limitation and disarmament process and that specific verification measures were required for each agreement, so that compliance could be effectively proved. An international consensus is developing on the subject, including a consensus in principle on a role for the United Nations in the field of verification. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 43/81 B, a process has been initiated to determine how best the United Nations can undertake verification measures on behalf of the international community.

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1988

At its session in 1988, the Disarmament Commission, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 42/42 F of 30 November 1987, continued its consideration of the item, "Verification in all its aspects", which it had dealt with for the first time in 1987. In 1988, the Disarmament Commission held a general exchange of views, and then concentrated its efforts on three major parts of the subject, namely, principles of verification, provisions and techniques of verification, and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification. In that connection, a number of suggestions for possible recommendations were put forward.

In 1988, as had been the case in 1987, the subject was considered in a working group. In carrying out its mandate, the Working Group, under the chairmanship of Mr. Douglas Roche of Canada, had before it, *inter alia*, the replies of Member States to the Secretary-General regarding the subject of verification,⁹ submitted pursuant to a number of General Assembly resolutions. It also had before it a paper submitted by the Chairman of the Working Group¹⁰ and one submitted by Canada.¹¹ In the course of its deliberations, the Working Group was able to complete its work and reach full agreement on a text on principles of verification, as follows:

PRINCIPLES OF VERIFICATION

In the context of pursuing general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as a matter of critical importance in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements, the Disarmament Commission affirms the continued relevance of the principles concerning verification as enunciated in the following paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly:

Paragraph 31: Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary

⁹ A/41/422 and Add.1 and 2, A/CN.10/87 and Add.1, and A/CN.10/106 and Add.1 and 2.

¹⁰ A/CN.10/107.

¹¹ A/CN.10/111.

confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.

Paragraph 91: In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

Paragraph 92: In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

The Disarmament Commission considers that the following general principles elaborate upon or add to those stated in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. While further work can be done to formulate adequately these and other principles relating to verification, the following is a non-exhaustive listing of such principles:

(1) Adequate and effective verification is an essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

(2) Verification is not an aim in itself, but an essential element in the process of achieving arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

(3) Verification should promote the implementation of arms limitation and disarmament measures, build confidence among States and ensure that agreements are being observed by all parties.

(4) Adequate and effective verification requires employment of different techniques, such as national technical means, international technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspections.

(5) Verification in the arms limitation and disarmament process will benefit from greater openness.

(6) Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit provisions whereby each party undertakes not to interfere with the agreed methods, procedures and techniques of verification, when these are operating in a manner consistent with the provisions of the agreement and generally recognized principles of international law.

(7) Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit provisions whereby each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the agreement.

(8) To assess the continuing adequacy and effectiveness of the verification system, an arms limitation and disarmament agreement should provide for procedures and mechanisms for review and evaluation. Where possible, time-frames for such reviews should be agreed in order to facilitate this assessment.

(9) Verification arrangements should be addressed at the outset and at every stage of negotiations on specific arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

(10) All States have equal rights to participate in the process of international verification of agreements to which they are parties.

(11) Adequate and effective verification arrangements must be capable of providing, in a timely fashion, clear and convincing evidence of compliance or non-compliance. Continued confirmation of compliance is an essential ingredient to building and maintaining confidence among the parties.

(12) Determinations about the adequacy, effectiveness and acceptability of specific methods and arrangements intended to verify compliance with the provisions of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement can only be made within the context of that agreement.

(13) Verification of compliance with the obligations imposed by an arms limitation and disarmament agreement is an activity conducted by the parties to an arms limitation and disarmament agreement or by an organization at the request and with the explicit consent of the parties, and is an expression of the sovereign right of States to enter into such arrangements.

(14) Requests for inspections or information in accordance with the provisions of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement should be considered as a normal component of the verification process. Such requests should be used only for the purposes of the determination of compliance, care being taken to avoid abuses.

(15) Verification arrangements should be implemented without discrimination, and, in accomplishing their purpose, avoid unduly interfering with the internal affairs of State parties or other States, or jeopardizing their economic, technological and social development.

(16) To be adequate and effective, a verification régime for an agreement must cover all relevant weapons, facilities, locations, installations and activities.

The principles set forth above were endorsed by the Disarmament Commission¹² and, later, by the General Assembly (see next section). Concerning the provisions and techniques of verification, the Working Group also reached some preliminary general conclusions, while recognizing the utility of continuing the examination of the subject.¹³ With regard to the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification, the Working Group took note of the various views expressed in its debates.¹⁴ The views on the subject were significantly expanded at the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament (see chapter II) and were again the object of consideration by the General Assembly at its regular session.

Action by the General Assembly, 1988

Pursuant to its resolution 42/42 F of 30 November 1987, the General Assembly at its regular session in 1988 had on its agenda, for the first time as a separate item, "Verification in all its aspects". Four draft resolutions were submitted under the item; two were adopted and two were not pressed to a vote.

Three of the draft resolutions concerned a possible role for the United Nations in the field of verification and contained a request to the Secretary-General to carry out an in-depth study on the subject. Two of the three drafts were withdrawn, and the third, entitled "Study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification", sponsored by 35 countries from all geographical and political groupings, was adopted as resolution 43/81 B. By the operative part of that resolution, the General Assembly recognized that the United Nations could make a significant contribution in the field of verification, in particular of multilateral agreements; noted with satisfaction the Disarmament Commission's completion of its work on verification in all its

¹² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3)*, para. 60, sect. I.

¹³ *Ibid.*, sect. II.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, sect. III.

aspects and endorsed the general principles of verification that it had drawn up; requested the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification that would identify and review existing activities of the United Nations in that field, assess the need for improvements in them, as well as explore and identify possible additional ones, and provide specific recommendations for future action by the United Nations in that context; requested the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session; and decided to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Verification in all its aspects".

The United States was the only country that voted against the draft resolution. In its view, any verification arrangements, including those which might provide for a United Nations role, must be developed and agreed upon by the negotiating parties. The United States, therefore, did not see how the Secretary-General could undertake an in-depth study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification in the abstract, in the absence of any parameters that specific agreements might provide for such a role in individual cases, and how, in the circumstances, the participants in the study could provide specific recommendations for future action by the United Nations in the field of verification. (For a full account of the First Committee's consideration of the question of a study on verification, see chapter XVII, which deals with studies.)

The United States, on the other hand, strongly supported the fourth draft resolution submitted under the item on verification, which concerned compliance. On 31 October, Australia, Austria, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United States and Zaire submitted a draft resolution entitled "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements", which was later also sponsored by Côte d'Ivoire, Ecuador, El Salvador, Morocco, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Thailand and Uruguay. The draft resolution was introduced by the United States, on 4 November. Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements, it stated, was now firmly established as a matter of concern to the global community of nations; if arms control agreements—past and future—were to be effective, the parties must comply with all of their provisions. In other words, confidence in existing agreements played a significant part in laying the foundation for future agreements. On the other hand, non-compliance could not but have an adverse effect on the prospects for future agreements and efforts to enhance international peace and security in general. The United States believed that the adoption of the draft resolution by consensus would constitute a strong affirmation by the world community of the crucial importance of compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

On 18 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the text without a vote, as resolution 43/81 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 42/38M of 30 November 1987,

Conscious of the abiding concern of all Member States for preserving respect for rights and obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law,

Convinced that observance of the Charter of the United Nations, relevant treaties and other sources of international law is essential for the strengthening of international security,

Mindful, in particular, of the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them,

Stressing that any violation of such agreements not only adversely affects the security of States parties but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements,

Stressing also that any weakening of confidence in such agreements diminishes their contribution to global or regional stability and to further disarmament and arms limitation efforts and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system,

Recognizing in this context that, *inter alia*, full confidence in compliance with existing agreements can enhance the negotiation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements,

Believing that compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements by States parties is, therefore, a matter of interest and concern to all members of the international community, and noting the role that the United Nations could play in that regard,

Convinced that resolution of non-compliance questions that have arisen with regard to agreements on arms limitations and disarmament would contribute to better relations among States and the strengthening of world peace and security,

1. *Urges* all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions of such agreements;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to give serious consideration to the implications of non-compliance with those obligations for international security and stability, as well as for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament;

3. *Also calls upon* all Member States to support efforts aimed at the resolution of non-compliance questions, with a view to encouraging strict observance by all parties of the provisions of arms limitation and disarmament agreements and maintaining or restoring the integrity of such agreements;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide Member States with assistance that may be necessary in this regard;

5. *Welcomes* efforts by States parties to develop additional co-operative measures, as appropriate, that can increase confidence in compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements and reduce the possibility of misinterpretation and misunderstanding;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements".

Conclusion

In 1988, the question of verification was pre-eminent in the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission, in those of the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament and at its forty-third regular session, and in those of the Conference on Disarmament. The progress made by those

bodies in their efforts to develop common views on verification have been described above. On the whole, there was very little controversy on the subject in 1988. While this is no guarantee of success in the actual negotiation of verification clauses in future arms limitation and disarmament agreements, it is a reassuring sign that verification is no longer a major obstacle to the conclusion of disarmament accords. This progress must, however, be consolidated by strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements. It is encouraging, in this connection, that the General Assembly, at its regular session, was able once again to adopt by consensus a resolution on the subject of strict observance by all parties of the provisions of arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

One aspect of the question of verification that received particular attention was that of the role therein of the United Nations. At its forty-third regular session, the General Assembly clearly recognized that the United Nations, in accordance with its role and responsibilities under the Charter, could make a significant contribution in the field of verification, in particular the verification of multilateral agreements. Thus with a view to providing specific recommendations for future action by the United Nations in that context, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification.

TABLE 1. DISARMAMENT-RELATED AGREEMENTS: VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE PROVISIONS

Name of agreement ^a	Signed (1)	Entered into force (2)	Objective (3)	Specific verification provisions (4)	Verification methods (5)	Compliance procedures (6)	United Nations role (7)
Geneva Protocol . . .	1925	b	Prohibit use in war of CB weapons	None	None	See col. (7)	Investigation of alleged use ^c
Antarctic Treaty . . .	1959	1961	Antarctica to be used for peaceful purposes only	Art. III, VII	Exchange of information. General on-site inspection by designated observers. Aerial observation	Consultation (Art. VIII and XI), ICJ settlement (Art. XI)	Development of cooperative working relations with United Nations specialized agencies having a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica (Art. III, para. 2)
Partial Test Ban Treaty	1963	1963	Prohibit any nuclear-weapon test in atmosphere, outer space and under water	None	National technical means	None	
Outer Space Treaty	1967	1967	Protect common peaceful interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space	Art. X, XII	Observation of flights of space objects on a basis of equality. General on-site inspection with respect to the Moon and other celestial bodies, on a basis of reciprocity	Consultations (Art. IX)	Parties to inform Secretary-General of their activities in outer space (Art. XI)

Treaty of Tlatelolco . . .	1967	^a	Establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America	Art. 12-16	IAEA safeguards. Special inspections by IAEA or regional organs	Various measures (Art. 20). ICJ settlement (Art. 24)	Reports to Security Council and General Assembly, through Secretary-General, in connection with inspections (Art. 16) and in the event of violations of the Treaty (Art. 20)
Non-Proliferation Treaty	1968	1970	Prevent wider dissemination of nuclear weapons	Art. III	IAEA safeguards	Review conferences (Art. VIII, X)	Role in connection with review conferences
Sea-Bed Treaty . . .	1971	1972	Prevent a nuclear arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor	Art. III	Observation of activities on the seabed using own means, or with the assistance of any other party, or through international procedures	Consultations. Lodging of complaint with Security Council (Art. III). Review conference (Art. VII)	See col. (6). Also, role in connection with review conferences
Biological Weapons Convention . . .	1972	1975	Total ban on bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons. Destruction of any such weapons	None	National technical means	Consultations (Art. V). Lodging of complaint with Security Council (Art. VI, VII)	See col. (6). Also, role in connection with review conferences (Art. XII)
SALT I ABM Treaty . . .	1972	1972	Limit ABM systems and not deploy them for defence of the national territory	Art. XII, XIII	National technical means	Standing Consultative Commission (Art. XIII)	

TABLE I (continued)

Name of agreement ^a	Signed (1)	Entered into force (2)	Objective (3)	Specific verification provisions (4)	Verification methods (5)	Compliance procedures (6)	United Nations role (7)
Interim Agreement . . .	1972	1972	Limit strategic offensive arms	Art. V, VI	National technical means	Standing Consultative Commission (Art. VI)	
Threshold Test Ban Treaty	1974	*	Prohibition of any underground nuclear-weapon test exceeding 150 kt	Art. II	National technical means	Consultations; inquiries; information in response to inquiries (Art. II)	
CSCE: Document on CBMs and certain aspects of security and disarmament . . .	1975	†	Increase stability and security in Europe	Sect. I	Prior notification of major military manoeuvres and movements. Exchange of observers (Sect. I)	Observation on a reciprocal basis. Confidence-building measures (Sect. I)	
PNE Treaty	1976	*	Develop co-operation in the field of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes	Art. IV-VI	National technical means	Joint Consultative Commission (Art. V and VI). Cooperation on the basis of reciprocity (Art. VI)	
Environmental Modification Convention	1977	1978	Prohibit military or any other hostile	Art. V	National technical means	Consultation / Cooperation procedure	See col. (6). Also, role in connection

with review conferences	<p> dure, including Consultative Committee of Experts. Lodging of complaint with Security Council (Art. V). Review conferences (Art. VIII) </p>	<p> Advance notification of ICBM launches (Art. XVI). Standing Consultative Commission (Art. XVII) </p>	<p> National technical means </p>	<p> Art. XV-XVII </p>	<p> Limit and reduce strategic offensive arms </p>	<p> Salt II Treaty . . . 1979 </p>
						<p> Agreement on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies </p>
						<p> 1979 </p>
						<p> 1984 </p>
						<p> Art. 15 </p>
						<p> Govern the activities of States on the Moon and other celestial bodies </p>
						<p> General on-site inspection with respect to the Moon and other celestial bodies, using own means, or with the assistance of any other party, or through international procedures </p>
						<p> Consultations. Settlement of disputes by peaceful means, with or without assistance of Secretary - General (Art. 15). Review conferences (Art. 18) </p>
						<p> Secretary-General to receive information from States carrying out activities (various articles). Settlement of disputes with assistance of Secretary-General; see col. (6). Also, specific role in connection with review conferences </p>

TABLE 1 (continued)

Name of agreement ^a	Signed (1)	Entered into force (2)	Objective (3)	Specific verification provisions (4)	Verification methods (5)	Compliance procedures (6)	United Nations role (7)
Treaty of Rarotonga	1985	1986	Establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific	Art. 8-10	Reports and exchange of information. IAEA safeguards	Consultations (Art. 8 and 10). Consultative Committee (Art. 10). Complaints procedure (Art. 8)	
Document of the CDE Stockholm Conference	1986	^b	Strengthen confidence and security and make progress towards disarmament in Europe	Section on compliance and verification and other relevant sections of the Document	Prior notification and observation of certain military activities. National technical means. Inspection	Timely clarification, communications etc.	
INF Treaty	1987	1988	Elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range ground-launched missiles	Art. XI-XIII, plus Protocol on Inspection and Protocol on Elimination	On-site inspection; inspection by challenge. National technical means	Special Verification Commission (Art. XIII)	

^a In abbreviated form. The full name is given in the annex.

^b For each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions take effect on the date of the notification of the depositary Government.

^c Pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 35/144 C, 36/96 C, 37/98 D, 37/98 E, 38/187 C, 39/65 E, 42/37 C, 43/74 A. See also Security Council resolutions 582 (1986), 612 (1988) and 620 (1988).

^d For each Government individually.

^e Not yet ratified, but it is generally understood that the two signatories are adhering to it.

^f In the Helsinki Final Act, of which the Document forms a part, the

participants declared their resolve, "in the period following the Conference [CSCE], to pay due regard to and implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference". The Final Act is not eligible, in whole or in part, for registration with the Secretariat under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, as would be the case were it a matter of a treaty or international agreement.

^g Not ratified, but it is understood that the Treaty has been generally observed.

^h The measures adopted in the Document are politically binding and came into force in 1987.

ANNEX

Basic verification and compliance provisions of the agreements listed in the table

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925)

No specific provisions concerning verification and compliance.

Antarctic Treaty (1959)

Article III

1. In order to promote international co-operation in scientific investigation in Antarctica, as provided for in Article II of the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable:

- (a) information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit maximum economy and efficiency of operations;
- (b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions and stations;
- (c) scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made freely available.

2. In implementing this Article, every encouragement shall be given to the establishment of cooperative working relations with those Specialized Agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations having a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica.

Article VII

1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of the present Treaty, each Contracting Party whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings referred to in Article IX of the Treaty shall have the right to designate observers to carry out any inspection provided for by the present Article. Observers shall be nationals of the Contracting Parties which designate them. The names of observers shall be communicated to every other Contracting Party having the right to designate observers, and like notice shall be given of the termination of their appointment.

2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica.

3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection by any observers designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas of Antarctica by any of the Contracting Parties having the right to designate observers.

5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the present Treaty enters into force for it, inform the other Contracting Parties, and thereafter shall give them notice in advance, of

- (a) all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its territory;
- (b) all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and
- (c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica subject to the conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article I of the present Treaty.

Article VIII

...

2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, and pending the

adoption of measures in pursuance of sub-paragraph 1 (e) of Article IX, the Contracting Parties concerned in any case of dispute with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica shall immediately consult together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution.

Article XI

1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, those Contracting Parties shall consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent, in each case, of all parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for settlement; but failure to reach agreement on reference to the International Court shall not absolve parties to the dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the various peaceful means referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (1963)

No specific provisions concerning verification and compliance.

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967)

Article IX

In the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.

Article X

In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States.

The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States concerned.

Article XI

In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities in outer space, including the Moon and

other celestial bodies, agree to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities. On receiving the said information, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it immediately and effectively.

Article XII

All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (1967)

Article 12. Control system

1. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations entered into by the Contracting Parties in accordance with article 1, a control system shall be established which shall be put into effect in accordance with the provisions of articles 13-18 of this Treaty.

2. The control system shall be used in particular for the purpose of verifying:

(a) That devices, services and facilities intended for peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not used in the testing or manufacture of nuclear weapons;

(b) That none of the activities prohibited in article 1 of this Treaty are carried out in the territory of the Contracting Parties with nuclear materials or weapons introduced from abroad; and

(c) That explosions for peaceful purposes are compatible with article 18 of this Treaty.

Article 13. IAEA safeguards

Each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its safeguards to its nuclear activities. Each Contracting Party shall initiate negotiations within a period of 180 days after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of this Treaty. These agreements shall enter into force, for each Party, not later than eighteen months after the date of the initiation of such negotiations except in case of unforeseen circumstances or *force majeure*.

Article 14. Reports of the Parties

1. The Contracting Parties shall submit to the Agency [for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America] and to the International Atomic Energy Agency, for their information, semi-annual reports stating that no activity prohibited under this Treaty has occurred in their respective territories.

2. The Contracting Parties shall simultaneously transmit to the Agency a copy of any report they may submit to the International Atomic Energy Agency which relates to matters that are the subject of this Treaty and to the application of safeguards.

3. The Contracting Parties shall also transmit to the Organization of American States, for its information, any reports that may be of interest to it, in accordance with the obligations established by the Inter-American System.

Article 15. Special reports requested by the General Secretary

1. With the authorization of the Council, the General Secretary may request any of the Contracting Parties to provide the Agency with complementary or supplementary information regarding any event or circumstance connected with compliance with this Treaty, explaining his

reasons. The Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate promptly and fully with the General Secretary.

2. The General Secretary shall inform the Council and the Contracting Parties forthwith of such requests and of the respective replies.

Article 16. Special inspections

1. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Council established by this Treaty have the power of carrying out special inspections in the following cases:

(a) In the case of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with the agreements referred to in article 13 of this Treaty;

(b) In the case of the Council:

(i) When so requested, the reasons for the request being stated, by any Party which suspects that some activity prohibited by this Treaty has been carried out or is about to be carried out, either in the territory of any other Party or in any other place on such latter Party's behalf, the Council shall immediately arrange for such an inspection in accordance with article 10, paragraph 5;

(ii) When requested by any Party which has been suspected of or charged with having violated this Treaty, the Council shall immediately arrange for the special inspection requested in accordance with article 10, paragraph 5.

The above requests will be made to the Council through the General Secretary.

2. The costs and expenses of any special inspection carried out under paragraph 1, subparagraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article shall be borne by the requesting Party or Parties, except where the Council concludes on the basis of the report on the special inspection that, in view of the circumstances existing in the case, such costs and expenses should be borne by the Agency.

3. The General Conference shall formulate the procedures for the organization and execution of the special inspections carried out in accordance with paragraph 1, subparagraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article.

4. The Contracting Parties undertake to grant the inspectors carrying out such special inspections full and free access to all places and all information which may be necessary for the performance of their duties and which are directly and intimately connected with the suspicion of violation of this Treaty. If so requested by the authorities of the Contracting Party in whose territory the inspection is carried out, the inspectors designated by the General Conference shall be accompanied by representatives of said authorities, provided that this does not in any way delay or hinder the work of the inspectors.

5. The Council shall immediately transmit to all the Parties, through the General Secretary, a copy of any report resulting from special inspections.

6. Similarly, the Council shall send through the General Secretary to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for transmission to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, and to the Council of the Organization of American States, for its information, a copy of any report resulting from any special inspection carried out in accordance with paragraph 1, subparagraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article.

7. The Council may decide, or any Contracting Party may request, the convening of a special session of the General Conference for the purpose of considering the reports resulting from any special inspection. In such a case, the General Secretary shall take immediate steps to convene the special session requested.

8. The General Conference, convened in special session under this article, may make recommendations to the Contracting Parties and submit reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be transmitted to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly.

Article 20. Measures in the event of violation of the Treaty

1. The General Conference shall take note of all cases in which, in its opinion, any Contracting Party is not complying fully with its obligations under this Treaty and shall draw the matter to the attention of the Party concerned, making such recommendations as it deems appropriate.

2. If, in its opinion, such non-compliance constitutes a violation of this Treaty which might endanger peace and security, the General Conference shall report thereon simultaneously to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to the Council of the Organization of American States. The General Conference shall likewise report to the International Atomic Energy Agency for such purposes as are relevant in accordance with its Statute.

Article 24. Settlement of disputes

Unless the Parties concerned agree on another mode of peaceful settlement, any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty which is not settled shall be referred to the International Court of Justice with the prior consent of the Parties to the controversy.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968)

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article VIII

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3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depository Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article X

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (1971)

Article III

1. In order to promote the objectives of and ensure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party to the Treaty shall have the right to verify through observation the activities of other States Parties to the Treaty on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the zone referred to in article I, provided that observation does not interfere with such activities.

2. If after such observation reasonable doubts remain concerning the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the Treaty, the State Party having such doubts and the State Party that is responsible for the activities giving rise to the doubts shall consult with a view to removing the doubts. If the doubts persist, the State Party having such doubts shall notify the other States Parties, and the Parties concerned shall co-operate on such further procedures for verification as may be agreed, including appropriate inspection of objects, structures, installations or other facilities that reasonably may be expected to be of a kind described in article I. The Parties in the region of the activities, including any coastal State, and any other Party so requesting, shall be entitled to participate in such consultation and co-operation. After completion of the further procedures for verification, an appropriate report shall be circulated to other Parties by the Party that initiated such procedures.

3. If the State responsible for the activities giving rise to the reasonable doubts is not identifiable by observation of the object, structure, installation or other facility, the State Party having such doubts shall notify and make appropriate inquiries of States Parties in the region of the activities and of any other State Party. If it is ascertained through these inquiries that a particular State Party is responsible for the activities, that State Party shall consult and co-operate with other Parties as provided in paragraph 2 of this article. If the identity of the State responsible for the activities cannot be ascertained through these inquiries, then further verification procedures, including inspection, may be undertaken by the inquiring State Party, which shall invite the participation of the Parties in the region of the activities, including any coastal State, and of any other Party desiring to co-operate.

4. If consultation and co-operation pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article have not removed the doubts concerning the activities and there remains a serious question concerning fulfilment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty, a State Party may, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refer the matter to the Security Council, which may take action in accordance with the Charter.

5. Verification pursuant to this article may be undertaken by any State Party using its own means, or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party, or through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

6. Verification activities pursuant to this Treaty shall not interfere with activities of other States Parties and shall be conducted with due regard for rights recognized under international law, including the freedoms of the high seas and the rights of coastal States with respect to the exploration and exploitation of their continental shelves.

Article VII

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any relevant technological developments. The review conference shall determine, in accordance with the views of a majority of those Parties attending, whether and when an additional review conference shall be convened.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1972)

Article V

The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

Article VI

1. Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

Article VII

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.

Article XII

Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (SALT I: ABM Treaty) (1972)

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I: Interim Agreement) (1972)

Article V

[See article XII of ABM Treaty (identical wording, *mutatis mutandis*).]

Article VI

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article.

Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) (1974)

Article II

[See article XII, paras. 1 and 2, of ABM Treaty (identical wording).]

3. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty the Parties shall, as necessary, consult with each other, make inquiries and furnish information in response to such inquiries.

Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament (1975)

I

Prior notification of major military manoeuvres

[The participating States] will notify their major military manoeuvres to all other participating States through usual diplomatic channels in accordance with the following provisions:

Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components (in this context the word "troops" includes amphibious and airborne troops). In the case of independent manoeuvres of amphibious or airborne troops, or of combined manoeuvres involving them, these troops will be included in this total. Furthermore, in the case of combined manoeuvres which do not reach the above total but which involve land forces together with significant numbers of either amphibious or airborne troops, or both, notification can also be given.

Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres which take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and air space.

In the case of a participating State whose territory extends beyond Europe, prior notification need be given only of manoeuvres which take place in an area within 250 kilometres from its frontier facing or shared with any other European participating State; the participating State need not, however, give notification in cases in which that area is also contiguous to the participating State's frontier facing or shared with a non-European non-participating State.

Notification will be given 21 days or more in advance of the start of the manoeuvre or in the case of a manoeuvre arranged at shorter notice at the earliest possible opportunity prior to its starting date.

Notification will contain information of the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the manoeuvre, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. The participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces.

Prior notification of other military manoeuvres

The participating States recognize that they can contribute further to strengthening confidence and increasing security and stability, and to this end may also notify smaller-scale military manoeuvres to other participating States, with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres.

To the same end, the participating States also recognize that they may notify other military manoeuvres conducted by them.

Exchange of observers

The participating States will invite other participating States, voluntarily and on a bilateral basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and good will towards all participating States, to send observers to attend military manoeuvres.

The inviting State will determine in each case the number of observers, the procedures and conditions of their participation, and give other information which it may consider useful. It will provide appropriate facilities and hospitality.

The invitation will be given as far ahead as is conveniently possible through usual diplomatic channels.

Prior notification of major military movements

In accordance with the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations the participating States studied the question of prior notification of major military movements as a measure to strengthen confidence.

Accordingly, the participating States recognize that they may, at their own discretion and with a view to contributing to confidence-building, notify their major military movements.

In the same spirit, further consideration will be given by the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to the question of prior notification of major military movements, bearing in mind, in particular, the experience gained by the implementation of the measures which are set forth in this document.

Other confidence-building measures

The participating States recognize that there are other means by which their common objectives can be promoted.

In particular, they will, with due regard to reciprocity and with a view to better mutual understanding, promote exchanges by invitation among their military personnel, including visits by military delegations.

Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (1976)

Article IV

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall:

(a) use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law; and

(b) provide to the other Party information and access to sites of explosions and furnish assistance in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 (a) of this article, or with the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 1 (b) of this article.

Article V

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Joint Consultative Commission within the framework of which they will:

(a) consult with each other, make inquiries and furnish information in response to such inquiries, to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(b) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with the means for assuring compliance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(d) consider changes in technology or other new circumstances which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty; and

(e) consider possible amendments to provisions governing underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Joint Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Article VI

1. The Parties will develop co-operation on the basis of mutual benefit, equality, and reciprocity in various areas related to carrying out underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

2. The Joint Consultative Commission will facilitate this co-operation by considering specific areas and forms of co-operation which shall be determined by agreement between the Parties in accordance with their constitutional procedures.

3. The Parties will appropriately inform the International Atomic Energy Agency of results of their co-operation in the field of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1977)

Article V

1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. These international procedures may include the services of appropriate international organizations, as well as of a Consultative Committee of Experts as provided for in paragraph 2 of this article.

2. For the purposes set forth in paragraph 1 of this article, the Depositary shall, within one month of the receipt of a request from any State Party to this Convention, convene a Consultative Committee of Experts. Any State Party may appoint an expert to the Committee whose functions and rules of procedure are set out in the annex, which constitutes an integral part of this Convention. The Committee shall transmit to the Depositary a summary of its findings of fact, incorporating all views and information presented to the Committee during its proceedings. The Depositary shall distribute the summary to all States Parties.

3. Any State Party to this Convention which has reason to believe that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all relevant information as well as all possible evidence supporting its validity.

4. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties of the results of the investigation.

5. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Convention.

Article VIII

1. Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, a conference of the States Parties to the Convention shall be convened by the Depositary at Geneva, Switzerland. The conference shall review the operation of the Convention with a view to ensuring that its purposes and provisions are being realized, and shall in particular examine the effectiveness of the provisions of paragraph 1 of article I in eliminating the dangers of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.

2. At intervals of not less than five years thereafter, a majority of the States Parties to this Convention may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary, the convening of a conference with the same objectives.

3. If no conference has been convened pursuant to paragraph 2 of this article within ten years following the conclusion of a previous conference, the Depositary shall solicit the views of all States Parties to this Convention, concerning the convening of such a conference. If one third or ten of the States Parties, whichever number is less, respond affirmatively, the Depositary shall take immediate steps to convene the conference.

Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II Treaty) (1979)

Article XV

[See article XII of ABM Treaty (identical wording).]

Article XVI

1. Each Party undertakes, before conducting each planned ICBM launch, to notify the other party well in advance on a case-by-case basis that such a launch will occur, except for single ICBM launches from test ranges or from ICBM launcher deployment areas, which are not planned to extend beyond its national territory.

2. The Parties shall agree in the Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of this Article.

Article XVII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of 21 December 1972.

2. Within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, with respect to this Treaty, the Parties will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligation assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification, and questions involving unintended impeding of verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures for replacement, conversion, and dismantling or destruction, of strategic offensive arms in cases provided for in the provisions of this Treaty and upon

procedures for removal of such arms from the aggregate numbers when they otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, and at regular sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission, notify each other in accordance with the aforementioned procedures, at least twice annually, of actions completed and those in process;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979)

Article 15

1. Each State Party may assure itself that the activities of other States Parties in the exploration and use of the moon are compatible with the provisions of this Agreement. To this end, all space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations on the moon shall be open to other States Parties. Such States Parties shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited. In pursuance of this article, any State Party may act on its own behalf or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party or through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the Charter.

2. A State Party which has reason to believe that another State Party is not fulfilling the obligations incumbent upon it pursuant to this Agreement or that another State Party is interfering with the rights which the former State has under this Agreement may request consultations with that State Party. A State Party receiving such a request shall enter into such consultations without delay. Any other State Party which requests to do so shall be entitled to take part in the consultations. Each State Party participating in such consultations shall seek a mutually acceptable resolution of any controversy and shall bear in mind the rights and interests of all States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be informed of the results of the consultations and shall transmit the information received to all States Parties concerned.

3. If the consultations do not lead to a mutually acceptable settlement which has due regard for the rights and interests of all States Parties, the Parties concerned shall take all measures to settle the dispute by other peaceful means of their choice appropriate to the circumstances and the nature of the dispute. If difficulties arise in connexion with the opening of consultations or if consultations do not lead to a mutually acceptable settlement, any State Party may seek the assistance of the Secretary-General, without seeking the consent of any other State Party concerned, in order to resolve the controversy. A State Party which does not maintain diplomatic relations with another State Party concerned shall participate in such consultations, at its choice, either itself or through another State Party or the Secretary-General as intermediary.

Article 18

Ten years after the entry into force of this Agreement, the question of the review of the Agreement shall be included in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations in order to consider, in the light of past application of the Agreement, whether it requires revision. However, at any time after the Agreement has been in force for five years, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as depository, shall, at the request of one third of the States Parties to the Agreement and with the concurrence of the majority of the States Parties, convene a conference of the States Parties to review this Agreement. A review conference shall also consider the question of the implementation of the provisions of article 11, paragraph 5, on the basis of the principle referred to in paragraph 1 of that article and taking into account in particular any relevant technological developments.

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) (1985)

Article 8. Control system

1. The Parties hereby establish a control system for the purpose of verifying compliance with their obligations under this Treaty.

2. The control system shall comprise:

- (a) reports and exchange of information as provided for in Article 9;
- (b) consultations as provided for in Article 10 and Annex 4 (1);
- (c) the application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by the IAEA as provided for in Annex 2;
- (d) a complaints procedure as provided for in Annex 4.

Article 9. Reports and exchanges of information

1. Each Party shall report to the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (the Director) as soon as possible any significant event within its jurisdiction affecting the implementation of this Treaty. The Director shall circulate such reports promptly to all Parties.

2. The Parties shall endeavour to keep each other informed on matters arising under or in relation to this Treaty. They may exchange information by communicating it to the Director, who shall circulate it to all Parties.

3. The Director shall report annually to the South Pacific Forum on the status of this Treaty and matters arising under or in relation to it, incorporating reports and communications made under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and matters arising under Articles 8 (2) (d) and 10 and Annex 2 (4).

Article 10. Consultations and review

Without prejudice to the conduct of consultations among Parties by other means, the Director, at the request of any Party, shall convene a meeting of the Consultative Committee established by Annex 3 for consultation and co-operation on any matter arising in relation to this Treaty or for reviewing its operation.

Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (1986)

Prior notification of certain military activities

29 The participating States will give notification in writing through diplomatic channels in an agreed form of content, to all other participating States 42 days or more in advance of the start of notifiable military activities in the zone of application for confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).

30 Notification will be given by the participating State on whose territory the activity in question is planned to take place even if the forces of that State are not engaged in the activity or their strength is below the notifiable level. This will not relieve other participating States of their obligation to give notification, if their involvement in the planned military activity reaches the notifiable level.

Observation of certain military activities

38 The participating States will invite observers from all other participating States to the following notifiable military activities:

38.1 —The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components.

38.2 —The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBMs.

38.3 —In the case of the engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated, the concentration of these forces. Forces which have been transferred into the zone will be subject to all provisions of agreed confidence- and security-building measures when they depart their arrival points to participate in a notifiable exercise or to be concentrated within the zone of application for CSBMs.

38.4 The above-mentioned activities will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 17,000 troops, except in the case of either an amphibious landing or a parachute assault by airborne forces, which will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 5,000 troops.

Annual calendars

55 Each participating State will exchange, with all other participating States, an annual calendar of its military activities subject to prior notification, within the zone of application for CSBMs, forecast for the subsequent calendar year. It will be transmitted every year, in writing, through diplomatic channels, not later than 15 November for the following year.

Constraining provisions

59 Each participating State will communicate, in writing, to all other participating States, by 15 November each year, information concerning military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 40,000 troops, which it plans to carry out in the second subsequent calendar year. Such communication will include preliminary information on each activity, as to its general purpose, timeframe and duration, area, size and States involved.

60 Participating States will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 75,000 troops, unless they have been the object of communication as defined above.

61 Participating States will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 40,000 troops unless they have been included in the annual calendar, not later than 15 November each year.

62 If military activities subject to prior notification are carried out in addition to those contained in the annual calendar, they should be as few as possible.

Compliance and verification

63 According to the Madrid Mandate, the confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon "will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content"

64 The participating States recognize that national technical means can play a role in monitoring compliance with agreed confidence- and security-building measures.

65 In accordance with the provisions contained in this document each participating State has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating State within the zone of application for CSBMs.

66 Any participating State will be allowed to address a request for inspection to another participating State on whose territory, within the zone of application for CSBMs, compliance with the agreed confidence- and security-building measures is in doubt.

67 No participating State will be obliged to accept on its territory within the zone of application for CSBMs, more than three inspections per calendar year.

68 No participating State will be obliged to accept more than one inspection per calendar year from the same participating State.

69 An inspection will not be counted if, due to *force majeure*, it cannot be carried out.

70 The participating State which requests an inspection will state the reasons for such a request.

71 The participating State which has received such a request will reply in the affirmative to the request within the agreed period of time, subject to the provisions contained in paragraphs 67 and 68.

72 Any possible dispute as to the validity of the reasons for a request will not prevent or delay the conduct of an inspection.

73 The participating State which requests an inspection will be permitted to designate for inspection on the territory of another State within the zone of application for CSBMs, a specific area. Such an area will be referred to as the "specified area". The specified area will comprise terrain where notifiable military activities are conducted or where another participating State believes a notifiable military activity is taking place. The specified area will be defined and limited by the scope and scale of notifiable military activities but will not exceed that required for an army-level military activity.

74 In the specified area the representatives of the inspecting State accompanied by the representatives of the receiving State will be permitted access, entry and unobstructed survey, except for areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or restricted, military and other defence installations, as well as naval vessels, military vehicles and aircraft. The number and extent of the restricted areas should be as limited as possible. Areas where notifiable military activities can take place will not be declared restricted areas, except for certain permanent or temporary military installations which, in territorial terms, should be as small as possible, and consequently those areas will not be used to prevent inspection of notifiable military activities. Restricted areas will not be employed in a way inconsistent with the agreed provisions on inspection.

75 Within the specified area, the forces of participating States other than the receiving State will also be subject to the inspection conducted by the inspecting State.

76 Inspection will be permitted on the ground, from the air, or both.

Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (1987)

Article XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this Article, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this Article both within the territory of the other Party and within the territories of basing countries.

3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the Memorandum of Understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment and other data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to verify the elimination, notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities, which are thus no longer subject to inspections pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of this Article. Such an inspection shall be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility. If a Party conducts an inspection at a particular facility pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility, then no additional inspection of that facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be permitted.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last five years. Neither Party shall use more than half of its total number of these inspections per calendar year within the territory of any one basing country. Each Party shall have the right to conduct:

(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities, to ascertain, according to the categories of data specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at each missile operating base or missile support facility at the time of the inspection; and

(b) inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty other than former missile production facilities.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right, for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty, to inspect by means of continuous monitoring:

(a) the portals of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages, any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this Treaty, is accomplished; or

(b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced.

The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of this Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party conducts the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the other Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah; in accordance with subparagraph (a), for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

7. Each Party shall conduct inspections of the process of elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Inspectors conducting inspections provided for in this paragraph shall determine that the processes specified for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and support equipment have been completed.

8. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination, and of training missiles, training missile stages,

training launch canisters and training launchers eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV and V of the Protocol on Elimination.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or

(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

3. To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each Party shall have the right until a treaty between the Parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, to request the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in excess of 5500 kilometers, which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The Party making such a request shall inform the other Party of the deployment base at which cooperative measures shall be implemented. The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) no later than six hours after such a request, the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and

(b) the Party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such an observation.

Each Party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these cooperative measures at any one time.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and

(b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to:

(a) exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination;

(b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of this Treaty;

(c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of this Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and

(d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this Treaty.

P A R T T W O

Nuclear disarmament

Nuclear arms limitation and disarmament

Introduction

NOT LONG AFTER ATOMIC WEAPONS WERE FIRST DEVELOPED and certainly with the advent of the thermonuclear weapon and the recognition of its devastating power, the international community became aware that it faced the risk of the destruction of civilization. The measures proposed to avert or reduce that risk include the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; the cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; a freeze on the production of additional nuclear weapons; the restriction or prohibition of the deployment by nuclear-weapon States of nuclear weapons on the territories of other States; and more generally, the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Yet the number and destructive capability of the available nuclear weapons have continuously increased, amounting to what has been called "overkill capacity". In addition to the 5 nuclear-weapon States, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, from 15 to 25 other States are believed to be able to develop a rudimentary nuclear weapon, should they decide to do so.¹

In the 1978 Final Document, the General Assembly declared that it was essential for the survival of mankind to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects; that the ultimate goal was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons; and that the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the major ones, bore a special responsibility for taking effective steps towards nuclear disarmament.² For many States those considerations are the corner-stone of their disarmament policies, almost to the exclusion of other aspects of disarmament and arms limitation.

There have long been bilateral negotiations on nuclear matters—particularly between the Soviet Union and the United States—and through the years a number of agreements have been reached. The Strategic Arms Limitation

¹ See *Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.11), chaps. VI and VIII.

² General Assembly resolution S-10/2, paras. 47 and 48. The Final Document is reproduced also in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, and in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

Talks (SALT), which the Soviet Union and the United States initiated in 1969, led in their first phase (SALT I) to the signing of two agreements in Moscow on 26 May 1972: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, subsequently amended by a Protocol of 3 July 1974, and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with a Protocol attached.³ Both the anti-ballistic missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement entered into force on 3 October 1972. The primary goal of the second phase of the negotiations (SALT II), which began in November 1972, was to replace the Interim Agreement with a more comprehensive one, providing broad limits on strategic offensive weapons systems. That phase ended on 18 June 1979 in Vienna with the signing of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II), a Protocol to be considered as an integral part of the Treaty, and a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms.⁴ The SALT II Treaty has not entered into force. Early in the 1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union opened two new sets of negotiations, one on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and one on the reduction of strategic arms (START). Both ended in disagreement in December 1983.

In March 1985, the two Governments again entered into negotiations, the objective of which, they announced, would be "to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability".⁵ Under this mandate, negotiations were again developed on reduction of nuclear arms—strategic as well as intermediate-range. At meetings in Geneva in November 1985⁶ and in Reykjavik in October 1986, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reviewed the progress made in the two sets of negotiations. In December 1987, in Washington, they signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). By that Treaty, which entered into force on 1 June 1988, an entire class of nuclear weapons is being eliminated from the arsenals of the super-Powers. The two States are currently negotiating a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic arms.

The multilateral disarmament forums have been seized all along with a variety of items relating to nuclear weapons. Divergences of view, however,

³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 944, No. 13446 (anti-ballistic missile Treaty); vol. 1042, No. 13446 (Protocol of 3 July 1974); and vol. 944, No. 13445 (Interim Agreement).

⁴ For the text of the Treaty, the Protocol and the Joint Statement of Principles, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr. 1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr. 1), document CD/28.

⁵ See in this connection the USSR-United States statement on the Geneva meeting of the Soviet Foreign Minister and the American Secretary of State, 8 January 1985. The text of the statement appears in *Disarmament*, vol. VIII, No. 1 (Spring 1985) (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.3).

⁶ The USSR-United States statement following the November 1985 summit was circulated as a General Assembly document (A/40/1070), and the disarmament-related sections appear in *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, chapter II.

have hampered significant progress; for example, no *rapprochement* has taken place between the positions of the Western States, on the one hand, and those of the socialist and non-aligned, on the other, concerning the desirability of establishing subsidiary bodies in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with three of its agenda items in the field of nuclear disarmament.

At the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (see chapter II) these developments were reviewed extensively. It was the general view of Member States that the INF Treaty represented a real breakthrough from arms control to genuine arms reduction. Its verification provisions, it was stated, might be considered as important as the nuclear reductions themselves. At the same time, it was felt that, in a world of overarmament, deep and verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals must remain as the highest priority in the field of disarmament. Hence the need for the two major Powers to move rapidly towards the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms. Many Member States also considered that the international community had a role to play in disarmament—even within the field of nuclear disarmament—because the security of every country on Earth was threatened by the existence of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The international community could not, therefore, be satisfied with the role of a more or less passive observer.

General developments and trends, 1988

In view of the fact that 1988 saw the entry into force of the INF Treaty—a treaty for the complete and verified elimination of an entire class of United States and Soviet nuclear missiles—the year's deliberations on nuclear disarmament in the United Nations and in the Conference on Disarmament were marked by a renewed sense of hope.

On 27 May, the United States Senate approved the resolution on ratification of the INF Treaty. The following day, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ratified the Treaty. On 1 June, at the Moscow Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev exchanged the instruments of ratification. The two leaders,⁷ welcoming the entry into force of that historic agreement, expressed their determination to achieve the full implementation of all the provisions and undertakings of the Treaty, viewing their joint and successful work in that respect as an important precedent for future efforts in arms limitation. The Treaty, they stated, set new standards for arms control. With its entry into force, the process for the actual elimination of some 2,500 intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles of the two major Powers was officially started, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

The two leaders also expressed their joint confidence that the extensive work already done on the draft treaty on the reduction and limitation of

⁷ For the text of the joint statement issued following the meetings in Moscow between the two leaders, see A/S-15/28, annex.

strategic offensive arms provided the basis for concluding it. Its conclusion, they stated, would strengthen the security not only of the peoples of the USSR and the United States, but of all mankind.

Assessing the state of United States-Soviet relations, the two leaders were convinced that the expanding political dialogue they had established would endure because it was based on realism and focused on the achievement of concrete results. It could serve, they believed, as a constructive basis for addressing not only the problems of the present but those of tomorrow and the next century; it could contribute to a more stable, more peaceful and safer world.

During the first part of the 1988 session of the *Conference on Disarmament*, the United States and the USSR submitted to the Conference the text of the INF Treaty, together with the two Protocols and Memorandum that are integral parts of the Treaty itself. While those documents were welcomed by members of the Conference, the hope was expressed for a further development, namely early conclusion of the treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in the strategic offensive arms of the two major Powers.

In reviewing developments and trends during the period between the second and the third special sessions that were related to its item on cessation of the nuclear-arms race and disarmament, the Conference noted that, in spite of efforts over a number of years, no consensus had been reached on setting up a subsidiary body in the Conference to deal with that item, and that even the holding of a large number of informal meetings on the substance of the agenda item had not helped to resolve the impasse.⁸ Early in the first part of the session, the Group of 21 again proposed a draft mandate for an *ad hoc* committee on the item on nuclear disarmament⁹ with a view to identifying, *inter alia*, substantive issues for multilateral negotiations. The Western countries, for their part, indicated that while they were prepared to participate in informal plenary meetings on the subject-matter of the item, they were not convinced that the creation of a subsidiary body would contribute to the cause of nuclear disarmament and, therefore, they were not in a position to join in a consensus with regard to the proposed mandate.

During the second part of the 1988 session, there continued to be an impasse in the Conference on the procedural issue of how to deal with the item, in spite of the fact that the Group of Socialist States and China reiterated their flexibility with respect to an adequate organizational framework for the item. It was clear, however, from the repeated statements of the Soviet Union and the United States, underlining the importance of their efforts in the search for new nuclear accords, that the issue of nuclear disarmament would continue to figure prominently in disarmament deliberations and negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral. This feeling was further strengthened by statements

⁸ See the special report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly at its third special session (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-15/2)*), paras. 57 to 76.

⁹ CD/819.

made in the Conference in connection with the twentieth anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

At the *third special session of the General Assembly* devoted to disarmament, the question of nuclear disarmament received priority consideration, as could have been expected. It was generally felt that the entry into force of the INF Treaty, as well as the prospects for an agreement between the two major Powers on reduction of strategic weapons by 50 per cent, provided strong evidence that there could be a process of disarmament, even in the nuclear field. Not surprisingly, therefore, there were calls for a nuclear-free world within a specific time frame. The Soviet Union reaffirmed its proposal for a step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. India outlined an action plan for comprehensive disarmament in three stages, with nuclear disarmament as its centrepiece in each stage. By the year 2010 at the latest, all nuclear weapons should be eliminated. At the same time, there seemed to be, in general, a clearer realization that the process of achieving comprehensive disarmament in the nuclear field would necessarily be long. There was very strong support for early conclusion of a partial measure, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, a measure which, it was felt, would slow down the nuclear-arms race and prevent nuclear proliferation.

In the general debate at the special session, the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Shultz, stressed that nuclear proliferation posed the greatest threat to international stability. The United States, he added, considered nuclear proliferation "the most important item on the special session's agenda" and, at a time when the United States and the USSR had agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals, "it would be tragic for other countries to pursue the capability to cross the nuclear threshold".¹⁰

For their part, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, in a memorandum entitled "Security through disarmament",¹¹ emphasized that the INF Treaty was a confirmation of the feasibility of nuclear disarmament and of the creation of a nuclear-free and non-violent world. The INF Treaty, the memorandum clearly stated, was but a beginning, and it called upon the General Assembly of the United Nations to come out in favour of the internationalization of efforts for the adoption of new concrete measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and to reaffirm in that context that bilateral and multilateral efforts should be complementary. In particular, the nuclear non-proliferation régime should be strengthened through promoting universal participation and ensuring the full implementation of all the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty, including those on nuclear disarmament.

At the *forty-third session of the General Assembly*, the non-aligned countries tried persistently to preserve the primacy of the objective of nuclear disarmament and, in particular, of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such a treaty was widely held to be a priority objective by non-aligned and socialist States, and also by some Western States. The latter group in general

¹⁰ A/S-15/PV.19, pp. 59-60.

¹¹ A/S-15/26.

advocated, however, a step-by-step approach to the cessation of tests as well as to nuclear disarmament. The United States and the Soviet Union expressed the hope that a treaty, with effective verification, on the reduction by 50 per cent of their strategic nuclear forces would soon be a concrete reality. In that connection, the Soviet Union noted that, while the two major Powers, as a result of historical circumstances, had led the way in nuclear disarmament, the challenge facing mankind could not be met without collective thought and joint action.

As the Secretary-General stated with regard to nuclear arms limitation and disarmament at the opening of the special session: "Nuclear issues will, therefore, rightly remain a major concern of all States and central to global security. It is imperative that the international community continue to press for the sharp reduction and ultimate elimination of such weapons."¹²

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1988

As in previous years, in 1988 the Disarmament Commission had on its agenda an item, item 4, covering various aspects of the nuclear-arms race, nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and also conventional disarmament. (For the full wording of the item, see p. 16.)

The Commission decided that, as at previous sessions, agenda item 4 should be dealt with, in the framework of the Committee of the Whole, by a contact group open to all delegations. Under the Chairman, Mr. Sergei Martynov of the Byelorussian SSR, the Contact Group held nine meetings between 4 and 17 May and continued its work on the agenda item on the basis of the compilation of proposals for recommendations on that item contained in the report of the Commission on its 1987 session.¹³ The Contact Group also had before it a working paper entitled "Negotiations on nuclear disarmament", submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the USSR.¹⁴

The Contact Group made some progress towards narrowing areas of disagreement, but was unable to reach a consensus on a complete set of recommendations on agenda item 4. As it noted in its report to the Committee of the Whole, the majority of the recommendations in the updated "Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4"¹⁵ remained in brackets to signify that their formulation was to some extent still the object of disagreement. Consequently, the Contact Group recommended that the Disarmament Commission should continue its efforts with a view to reaching agreement on a complete set of recommendations relating to the agenda item.

¹² A/S-15/PV.1.

¹³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42)*, annex I.

¹⁴ A/CN.10/110.

¹⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3)*, annex II.

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1988

The agenda item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament" was considered by the Conference during the periods from 15 to 26 February and from 18 to 29 July.

From the very beginning of the session, the Conference was faced with the request (see "General developments and trends, 1988", above) to establish a subsidiary body which would allow substantive discussions on the item on nuclear disarmament. As noted, once again the problem of finding an organizational framework acceptable to all could not be resolved.

During the first part of the session, the Soviet Union and the United States submitted to the Conference the documents relating to the INF Treaty.¹⁶ Members of the Conference welcomed the Treaty and many expressed the hope that the two major Powers would reach early agreement on a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic offensive arms. The two States also circulated, during the second part of the session, the joint statement issued by their leaders at the Moscow summit¹⁷ as well as the Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles, signed at Moscow on 31 May.¹⁸ The five Nordic States (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), Mexico, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States, Hungary, Egypt, Australia and Canada issued documents in connection with the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.¹⁹

During the second part of the session, India circulated a document,²⁰ already submitted to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament (see chapter II), containing an action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order. The plan called for negotiation of a binding commitment for the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2010.

The Group of 21 reaffirmed its conviction of the paramount need for urgent multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and for the adoption of concrete measures leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Its basic position was that all nations had a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament, because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of States and their quantitative and qualitative development directly jeopardized the security of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. Some members of the Group pointed out that States that had voluntarily renounced the nuclear weapons option had done so in the larger interest of contributing to the goal of a world

¹⁶ CD/797, 798, 799 and 800.

¹⁷ CD/844 and 846.

¹⁸ CD/845 and 847.

¹⁹ CD/835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 841, 850, 855 and 866 respectively.

²⁰ CD/859.

free of nuclear weapons and in the expectation that the nuclear-weapon States would also come to renounce them. To deny to the non-nuclear-weapon States the right to participate in the elaboration of measures for nuclear disarmament would therefore be morally indefensible as well as legally incorrect, the non-aligned members held. They also believed that doctrines of nuclear deterrence lay at the root of the continuing development of nuclear armaments and increased insecurity and instability in international relations.

Accordingly, the Group of 21 proposed that the Conference set up an *ad hoc* committee to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the 1978 Final Document, by which the General Assembly had recognized the urgent need for negotiation of agreements, in appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification, for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems; cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and the substantial reduction of existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination. The text of the draft mandate of the Group of 21 reads as follows:

Group of 21

Draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on item 2 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament—Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

1. In the discharge of its responsibility as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I, the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an *Ad Hoc* Committee under item 2 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"

2. The Conference requests the *Ad Hoc* Committee, as a first step, to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify substantive issues for multilateral negotiations as follows:

- (i) the elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament;
- (ii) clarification of the issues involved in prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament, and in the prevention of nuclear war;
- (iii) clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence;
- (iv) measures to ensure an effective discharge by the CD of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and in this context its relationship with negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament conducted in bilateral, regional and other restricted fora.

3. The *Ad Hoc* Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and report on its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1988 session.²¹

The socialist members stressed the primary importance they attached to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. While un-

²¹ CD/819.

derlining the significance of the bilateral efforts to conclude a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in the strategic offensive weapons of the two major nuclear-weapon States, they favoured the beginning of multilateral negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States within the Conference on Disarmament. Consequently, they supported the proposal of the Group of 21 for the establishment of a subsidiary body on the issue. They also supported proposals aimed at conducting an in-depth consideration of the substance of the nuclear disarmament item in informal plenary meetings of the Conference.

The Soviet Union drew attention to its programme for the progressive elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world by the year 2000. It pointed out that after the signing of the INF Treaty, the prospect had opened up of reaching agreement on a more difficult question: 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms in conditions of compliance with the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, and non-withdrawal from the Treaty for a specified period of time. It also stressed that bilateral efforts, undertaken through bilateral negotiations, should be complemented by multilateral efforts. It was necessary to know when and under what conditions the other nuclear-weapon States would join the process of nuclear disarmament. In its view, the possibility already existed of starting discussion at the Conference on specific directions for multilateral efforts in the domain of nuclear disarmament. For that reason, it suggested beginning to identify in practice the substance of possible multilateral measures in that field. On the question of security concepts relating to nuclear arms, the Soviet Union advocated the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security to replace the deterrent role played by nuclear weapons.

Western members also emphasized that they attached importance to issues of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament, in particular to substantial and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. They believed that the negotiations between the two major Powers played a vital role in any process for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, and welcomed the commitment of those two States to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Western States considered that, for the time being, informal and plenary meetings constituted the most suitable framework for continuing the work of the Conference on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. They also emphasized that nuclear-arms reductions could not be divorced from other disarmament measures and should be pursued so as to enhance international stability and security.

The United States stressed that the arms race could not be dealt with as an abstract issue and that the tensions between States or groups of States that caused a buildup of arms must be taken into account. It believed that nations acquired nuclear weapons for the same reason that they acquired conventional ones—to enhance security. Nuclear weapons were an essential component of its strategy of deterrence, which, in its opinion, contributed to preserving peace between the two major Powers and their allies, and such weapons would remain part of its arsenal for the foreseeable future.

The United Kingdom also stated that its security would depend for the foreseeable future on nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, its aim was to maintain security and peace at lower levels of nuclear forces, combined with the complete elimination of chemical weapons and progress towards conventional stability at lower levels of forces, taking into account imbalances. The most realistic way to make progress, it felt, was through bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations aimed at step-by-step mutual, balanced and effectively verifiable agreements. Given the minimum nature of its own nuclear deterrent, it did not feel that it had any scope for contributing to reductions at present; it would maintain the credibility of its deterrent.

France reaffirmed its support for increasingly greater nuclear arms control. From that point of view, it stressed the priority of reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, in particular the priority objective of a 50 per cent reduction of their offensive strategic weapons. While recognizing the importance of the INF Treaty, it cautioned that it should not be expected to lead to the denuclearization of Europe and that the priority in that region was the establishment of conventional stability.

China reiterated its call for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. It held that the two States possessing the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenals bore special responsibility in that regard and that the entry into force of the INF Treaty should be followed by an agreement on the 50 per cent reduction of their strategic nuclear weapons. China advocated that a broadly representative international conference with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States be convened to discuss measures for further nuclear disarmament after the two major nuclear-weapon States had taken the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons and in drastically reducing them. It was of the view that the nuclear-arms race should be halted in both its quantitative and its qualitative aspects. Moreover, China maintained that in the interests of promoting nuclear disarmament, great importance should be accorded to the issues of conventional disarmament and curbing the arms race in outer space.

Towards the end of the session, the United States and the Soviet Union provided information on the status of their bilateral talks on nuclear and space arms.

The United States summed up the situation as follows. In the strategic arms reduction talks, there was agreement in principle to reduce strategic forces by 50 per cent; to impose a ceiling of 6,000 warheads on 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; and to create subceilings of 4,900 ballistic missile warheads, and of 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles. The sides had also agreed to a 50 per cent reduction in the throw-weight of Soviet missiles. In addition, agreement had been reached on a counting rule for the armaments borne by heavy bombers. Agreement existed on certain verification measures including several kinds of on-site inspection, data exchange, and measures to reduce the possibility of cheating. This progress had been recorded in a

joint draft treaty text, which, of course, also set out the remaining areas of disagreement. At the Moscow summit, in May-June 1988, some common ground had been identified with respect to the problem of verification of mobile missiles—should they be permitted in a strategic arms reduction treaty—and with respect to air-launched cruise missiles. In the forum dealing with defence and space issues, the objective of the United States was to seek agreement on how it would, jointly with the Soviet Union, manage a stable transition to increased reliance on effective defences that threatened no one. A separate agreement on these issues was being worked on, which reflected the principles which President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev had outlined at the Washington summit, in December 1987. In addition, work was continuing on a draft protocol designed to improve predictability as research was carried out in the strategic defence area and preparations made for a possible transition to greater reliance on defences.

The Soviet Union provided additional information on the subject, as follows. The joint draft treaty reflected the earlier understanding on establishing ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic delivery systems and 6,000 warheads, as well as agreement on subceilings of 4,900 in the aggregate of ICBM and SLBM warheads and of 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles. The draft treaty also recorded agreement between the parties that, as a result of the reductions, the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs would be brought down to approximately 50 per cent of the existing level. Agreement had also been reached on a rule that heavy bombers equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and short-range missiles would count as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and one warhead against the 6,000 limit. Of course, this counting rule, which had been agreed back in Reykjavik, would apply if the 600-kilometre threshold, also agreed before, was used to divide air-to-surface missiles into long-range and shorter-range missiles.

The Soviet Union noted that the draft of the protocol on inspections, the protocol on conversion or elimination and the memorandum of understanding, which were integral parts of the treaty, built on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, extending and refining them as necessary to meet the more demanding requirements of the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The verification measures would include as a minimum such items as the exchange and updating of data, baseline inspections, on-site observation of the elimination of relevant systems, and continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production facilities to confirm the output of weapons to be limited, etc.

It was of great significance for the positive development of the negotiations, the Soviet Union added, that the joint statement adopted at the end of the Moscow summit meeting of 1988 reaffirmed the language on ABM Treaty issues agreed at the Washington summit in December 1987. The Soviet and United States leaders had directed their representatives at the negotiations to prepare a joint draft of a separate agreement on space issues and to continue work on its associated protocol. As a result of the Moscow meeting, the

parties had expressed their shared conviction that the extensive work done provided the basis for concluding a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms which would promote strategic stability and strengthen security not only for the Soviet and American peoples, but for the whole of mankind. The parties had agreed to continue their efforts in this area energetically and purposefully. They had also reached an understanding in principle that, once the remaining problems had been solved and the treaty and its associated documents agreed, they would be signed without delay. Thus the Moscow summit gave both negotiating teams a joint mandate, drawing on the progress already achieved, to seek the early preparation of the treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons in strict compliance with the ABM Treaty. Progress at the negotiations, the Soviet Union stated, was now largely dependent on the resolution of such issues as compliance with and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and limitations on the deployment of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles.

Action by the General Assembly, 1988

Once again, in 1988, nuclear arms limitation and disarmament were at the centre of the First Committee's disarmament deliberations. Eight draft resolutions were submitted on the subject and of these, seven were approved by the First Committee and adopted by the General Assembly. The draft resolutions, to which detailed reference is made in the following pages, dealt with the bilateral (United States-USSR) nuclear-arms negotiations; the general aspects of nuclear disarmament; the question of the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; a freeze on nuclear weapons; and the preparations for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in 1990.

In introducing a draft resolution entitled "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations" on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, on 9 November, Zimbabwe stated that the spirit of the draft emanated from the consensual positions of the 1978 Final Document. Zimbabwe also made it clear that the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution were either updates or restatements of the paragraphs contained in General Assembly resolution 42/38 D of 1987, which had been adopted by 143 votes to none, with 13 abstentions; so the new draft should not cause controversy.

On 14 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 120 to none, with 13 abstentions (Western countries). On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 141 to none, with 12 abstentions, as resolution 43/75 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/18 of 18 November 1985, 41/86 N of 4 December 1986 and 42/38 D of 30 November 1987,

Recalling also the Harare Appeal on Disarmament, adopted by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, the Havana Appeal, adopted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries at the special ministerial meeting devoted to disarmament issues held at Havana from 26 to 30 May 1988, and the final documents of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Nicosia from 5 to 10 September 1988,

Gravely concerned about the continuing escalation of the arms race, especially in nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, despite the fact that this increases the risk of nuclear war and endangers the survival of humanity,

Convinced that the alternative today in the nuclear age is not between war or peace, but between life and death, which makes the prevention of nuclear war the principal task of our times,

Also convinced that international peace and security can be ensured only through general and complete disarmament under effective international control and that one of the most urgent tasks is to halt and reverse the arms race and to undertake concrete measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament,

Further convinced that, in the interest of mankind as a whole, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, in their bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, should continue their endeavours with the ultimate objective of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Welcoming the ratification and commencement of implementation by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,

Affirming that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament should facilitate and complement each other and that progress at the bilateral level should not be used to postpone or prohibit action at the multilateral level,

1. *Calls upon* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to exert every effort to achieve the goal they set themselves of a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms as part of the process leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons;

2. *Also calls upon* the two Governments to intensify their efforts with the objective of achieving agreements in other areas, in particular the issue of a nuclear-test ban, as a matter of urgency;

3. *Invites* the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to keep the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament duly informed of progress made in their negotiations.

Another draft resolution on "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations", which was sponsored by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom, was introduced by the United Kingdom on 4 November. The thrust of the draft resolution, the United Kingdom stated, was to welcome the achievements of the bilateral process in 1988 and call for continued progress in the year ahead.

On 14 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 70 to none, with 58 abstentions (non-aligned countries).

In connection with the vote, Zimbabwe explained that it abstained on the draft introduced by the United Kingdom because the text over-emphasized the importance of verification, it did not adequately reflect the priority of nuclear disarmament, and it did not affirm that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament were complementary. Zimbabwe expressed its

regret that in spite of long and patient efforts to merge the two draft texts—the non-aligned and the Western—efforts had not succeeded. Indonesia, while agreeing with the thrust of the Western draft resolution, abstained because the draft failed to mention the complementary nature of bilateral and multi-lateral negotiations and was not sufficiently specific in pointing out the priority issues. Again in connection with the vote, China stated that it had voted in favour because it endorsed the thrust of the draft.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, by a recorded vote of 103 to none, with 46 abstentions, as resolution 43/75 O. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that at their meeting at Geneva in November 1985 the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America committed themselves to the objective of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth,

Noting the joint statement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America issued following meetings held in Moscow from 29 May to 1 June 1988,

Noting with satisfaction the report in the joint statement that a joint draft text of a treaty on reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms had been elaborated, through which process the two sides had recorded extensive and significant areas of agreement and detailed positions on remaining areas of disagreement,

Noting also the importance of the verification procedures contained in the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles as an example of the high standards of verification that are now achievable in arms control agreements, both bilateral and multilateral,

Believing that, through negotiations pursued in a spirit of flexibility and with full account taken of the security interests of all States, it is possible to achieve far-reaching and effectively verifiable agreements,

Firmly convinced that an early agreement in these negotiations, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments, would be of crucial importance for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Further convinced that the international community should encourage the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America in their endeavours, taking into account both the importance and complexity of their negotiations,

1. *Welcomes* the ratification by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles;

2. *Also welcomes* the successful commencement of the implementation of the provisions of that Treaty;

3. *Calls upon* the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to spare no effort in seeking, in accordance with the security interests of all States and the universal desire for progress towards disarmament, the attainment of all the agreed objectives in the negotiations, that is, the resolution of a complex of questions concerning space and strategic nuclear arms with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship;

4. *Invites* the two Governments concerned to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in their negotiations, in accordance with paragraph 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

5. *Expresses its firmest possible encouragement and support* for the bilateral negotiations and their successful conclusion.

China introduced a draft resolution entitled “Nuclear disarmament” on 8 November. Making clear that the draft was based on the text of resolution 42/38 H of 1987, which the General Assembly had adopted by consensus, China stressed that the draft, while welcoming the encouraging progress that had been made in the field of nuclear disarmament thanks to the conclusion and ratification of the INF Treaty, called on the two major Powers further to fulfil their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament. Also, in view of the fact that all countries were seriously concerned about the qualitative arms race between the two major Powers, an expression of the belief that the qualitative aspect of the arms race needed to be addressed along with its quantitative aspect had been added to the preamble.

On 11 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 43/75 E. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 41/59 F of 3 December 1986 and 42/38 H of 30 November 1987,

Reaffirming the determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war as expressed in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced that the most acute and urgent task of the present day is to remove the threat of a world war—a nuclear war,

Recalling and reaffirming the statements and provisions on nuclear disarmament set forth in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and, in particular, provisions that “effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority”, contained in paragraph 20, and that “in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility”, contained in paragraph 48,

Bearing in mind that the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Noting that the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America agreed in their joint statement issued at Geneva on 21 November 1985 that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and the common desire they expressed in the same statement calling for early progress in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of a 50 percent reduction in the nuclear arms of the Soviet Union and the United States appropriately applied,

Noting also that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have conducted intensive negotiations on various issues of disarmament,

Noting further that the Conference on Disarmament has not played its due role in the field of nuclear disarmament,

Believing that the qualitative aspect of the arms race needs to be addressed along with its quantitative aspect,

Bearing in mind that the Governments and peoples of various countries expect that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America will reach agreement on halting the nuclear-arms race and further reducing nuclear weapons,

1. *Welcomes* the signing and ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and calls upon the two States strictly to observe and fully to implement the Treaty;

2. *Urges* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, further to discharge their special responsibility for

nuclear disarmament, to take the lead in halting the nuclear-arms race and to negotiate in earnest with a view to reaching early agreement on the drastic reduction of their nuclear arsenals;

3. *Reiterates its belief* that bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Nuclear disarmament"

Argentina, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Ecuador, the German Democratic Republic, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Romania, Sweden, the United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela submitted a draft resolution entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament", which was later also sponsored by Malaysia and Mongolia. It was introduced by Argentina on 9 November. In its statement, Argentina pointed out that the draft brought up to date resolution 42/42 C of 1987 on the same subject, welcomed the progress achieved in the nuclear sector and reaffirmed the complementarity existing between bilateral and multilateral negotiations. As the Conference on Disarmament had not yet been able to reach agreement on the establishment of a subsidiary body with an appropriate negotiating mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament, the General Assembly would, by the draft resolution, again request the Conference to establish an *ad hoc* committee to submit recommendations to the Conference on how best it could initiate multilateral negotiations for cessation of the qualitative and quantitative nuclear-arms race, leading to the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.

On 11 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 114 to 13 (Western countries), with 6 abstentions (Australia, Bahamas, Denmark, Iceland, Israel and Japan).

In connection with the vote, China and New Zealand explained their affirmative votes. China stated that it supported the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of an *ad hoc* committee to deal with nuclear disarmament; it noted, however, that there were differences of opinion with regard to the scope of the mandate of such a committee. Discussions, it considered, could take the form of informal meetings; in any case the Conference should step up its work on nuclear disarmament. New Zealand stressed that, as the draft resolution acknowledged, both bilateral and multilateral action would be necessary to achieve the eventual complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It further held that satisfactory progress in conventional force reductions must accompany developments in nuclear disarmament if international stability was to be enhanced.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 135 to 13, with 5 abstentions, as resolution 43/78 E. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Believing that all nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament because the existence of nuclear weapons jeopardizes the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike,

Recalling that, in paragraphs 11 and 47 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly stated

that the nuclear-arms race, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States, on the contrary weakens it and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war,

Noting that at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Countries held at Nicosia from 5 to 10 September 1988, the Ministers welcomed the recent developments in the field of disarmament, which they considered a historic achievement, expressed the hope that they would result in further substantive progress in the field of current and future bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament, and emphasized as well the need to encourage this positive trend through the immediate adoption of measures for the reversal of the nuclear-arms race, so as to remove the threat of a nuclear holocaust which endangers the very survival of mankind,

Welcoming proposals on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world and, especially, the signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,

Considering that it is necessary to halt all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons of all types and versions and their delivery systems as a first step in the process that should lead to the achievement of substantial reductions in nuclear forces, and welcoming in this context the proposals to that end forwarded by the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania in their various declarations,

Noting that, at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament, and at the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament, several proposals on nuclear disarmament were introduced by Member States and that there was general agreement that nuclear disarmament remains a priority objective and represents a central task facing mankind,

Taking into account that all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those with the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility for the fulfilment of the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament,

Convinced of the imperative need to take constructive multilateral action towards halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race,

1. *Reaffirms* that both bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the nuclear and space arms race are by nature complementary to one another;

2. *Believes* that efforts should be intensified with a view to initiating, as a matter of the highest priority, multilateral negotiations in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

3. *Again requests* the Conference on Disarmament to establish an *ad hoc* committee at the beginning of its 1989 session to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to submit recommendations to the Conference as to how it could best initiate multilateral negotiations of agreements, with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) Substantial reduction in existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session on its consideration of this subject;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament".

Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Botswana, Cameroon, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Romania, Samoa, Sweden and Uruguay sponsored a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes", which was introduced

by Canada on 9 November. Noting that every continent and every group of countries were represented among the sponsors, Canada stressed that the draft resolution was a reminder that a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes remained an important element in any progress towards nuclear disarmament. It was a realistic draft resolution, it stated, because it took the position that progress in the achievement of such a ban was related to progress in the realization of a comprehensive test ban. Recently, encouraging developments had occurred in the nuclear-testing area, developments which gave new meaning to the draft resolution on prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Indeed, the anticipated result of the stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing between the United States and the USSR was that they would lead to further limitations on the size and number of tests. In view of these developments, the sponsors hoped that the draft resolution would, as in previous years, continue to attract strong and broad support.

On 11 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 126 to 1 (France), with 6 abstentions (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, United Kingdom and United States). In connection with the vote Argentina explained that it had abstained because it considered that the question of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes should not be separated from the general context of disarmament.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 144 to 1, with 7 abstentions, as resolution 43/75 K. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/91 H of 16 December 1978, 34/87 D of 11 December 1979, 35/156 H of 12 December 1980, 36/97 G of 9 December 1981, 37/99 E of 13 December 1982, 38/188 E of 20 December 1983, 39/151 H of 17 December 1984, 40/94 G of 12 December 1985, 41/59 L of 3 December 1986 and 42/38 L of 30 November 1987, in which it requested the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to consider urgently the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration,

Noting that the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for 1988 included the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" and that the programme of work of the Conference for both parts of its 1988 session contained the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament",

Recalling the proposals and statements made in the Conference on Disarmament on those items,

Considering that the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race,

Considering also that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices would be an important measure in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and explosive devices,

Requests the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately

verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

On the question of a nuclear-arms freeze, two draft resolutions were submitted: one by India and Romania, and another by Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru and Sweden. After consultations between the two sets of sponsors, the texts were merged and India and Romania joined with Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru and Sweden as co-sponsors of the revised draft resolution.

By the first draft resolution, initiated by India and entitled "Freeze on nuclear weapons", the General Assembly would once again call on all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a freeze on such weapons. The freeze would, *inter alia*, provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of the further production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. In introducing the draft resolution on 8 November, India noted that a similar text had been placed before the General Assembly every year since 1982. Its adoption would be a positive step towards the development of a new treaty to replace the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, which, India held, was discriminatory.

The second draft resolution was introduced, in its original form, by Mexico on 7 November. The main provision of the draft was a call upon the Soviet Union and the United States to agree on an immediate nuclear-arms freeze that would embrace: (a) a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons and on their delivery vehicles; (b) the complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles; (c) a ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles; and (d) the complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

On 17 November, Mexico introduced the revised draft resolution, noting that by the merged text, the General Assembly would request all the nuclear-weapon States to declare a total freeze on their nuclear arms and, as a first step towards that end, it would urge the Soviet Union and the United States to proclaim an immediate nuclear-arms freeze. Both India and Mexico pointed out that the revision enjoyed the sponsorship of all the States that had sponsored the two original texts. At that meeting, India announced that the draft resolution that it had introduced would be withdrawn.²²

On 17 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 116 to 13 (Western countries), with 3 abstentions (China, Iceland and Spain).

In connection with the vote, France, Japan and the Netherlands explained their negative votes and Iceland explained its abstention. France stated that its objections were based on the very notion of a freeze and had been set out repeatedly. A freeze, France emphasized, would confer a lasting advantage

²² See A/43/857, paras. 17 and 18.

on States that had increased their armaments sizeably compared with those that had limited their efforts; a freeze would be very difficult to verify; negotiations to define the conditions of an effective freeze would be no less lengthy or complex than negotiations on verification of an arms reduction agreement; and a freeze benefiting a given Power could well diminish substantially that Power's interest in pursuing negotiations and its determination seriously to negotiate an arms reduction agreement. Thus, progress towards a reduction of nuclear arsenals would in no way be promoted by declarations in favour of a freeze. Similarly, Japan thought that a nuclear freeze would lead to the preservation of a real or perceived nuclear superiority of one side over the other, and that verification would be extremely difficult to apply to such a freeze. The Netherlands stressed that calling for a freeze on nuclear weapons was hardly appropriate at a time when substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two major Powers were taking place. For the same reason, Iceland abstained in the vote.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 135 to 12, with 3 abstentions, as resolution 43/76 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, adopted in 1978 and unanimously and categorically reaffirmed in 1982 during the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly expressed deep concern over the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

Convinced that, in this nuclear age, lasting world peace can be based only on the attainment of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Welcoming the improvement of the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America and the conclusion of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, as well as their agreement in principle to reduce by 50 percent their strategic nuclear arsenals,

Convinced of the urgency further to pursue negotiations for the substantial reduction and qualitative limitation of existing nuclear arms,

Considering that a nuclear-arms freeze, while not an end in itself, would constitute an effective step to prevent the continued increase and qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weaponry during the period when the negotiations take place, and that at the same time it would provide a favourable environment for the conduct of negotiations to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons,

Convinced that the undertakings derived from the freeze can be effectively verified,

Noting with deep concern that nuclear-weapon States have not so far taken any action in response to the call made in the relevant resolutions on the question of a nuclear-arms freeze,

1. *Urges once more* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, as the two major nuclear-weapon States, to agree to an immediate nuclear-arms freeze, which would, *inter alia*, provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

2. *Calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States to agree, through a joint declaration, to a comprehensive nuclear-arms freeze, whose structure and scope would be the following:

(a) It would embrace:

(i) A comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons and on their delivery vehicles;

- (ii) The complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
 - (iii) A ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
 - (iv) The complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;
 - (b) It would be subject to appropriate and effective measures and procedures of verification;
3. *Requests* the nuclear-weapon States to submit a joint report, or separate reports, to the General Assembly, prior to the opening of its forty-fourth session, on the implementation of the present resolution;
4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session an item entitled "Nuclear-arms freeze".

Finally, 47 States, later joined by 13 others,²³ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Implementation of the conclusions of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Conference".

On 7 November, the United Kingdom introduced the draft resolution and called attention to the fact that it was time for the three depositary Governments of the non-proliferation Treaty to start the process of convening the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty, which was to be held in 1990. In the draft resolution, which was completely procedural, the Secretary-General of the United Nations was requested to render the necessary assistance and provide such services as might be required for the forthcoming Review Conference and its preparation.

On 15 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 119 to none, with 9 abstentions (Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Guyana, India, Israel, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia).

Several members explained their positions at that time. France stated that it had not participated in the vote. India announced, before the vote, that since it was not a signatory of the non-proliferation Treaty it would abstain in the voting on the draft resolution. Pakistan explained its affirmative vote as being dictated by its belief that the spread of nuclear weapons to more than the current five nuclear-weapon States would make the world more insecure. The USSR, which was a co-sponsor, stated that strengthening the non-proliferation Treaty was one of the conditions essential to a stable and constant process of disarmament.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 137 to none, with 11 abstentions, as resolution 43/82. France once again noted that it was not participating in that action. The resolution reads as follows:

²³ Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yemen.

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, the annex to which contains the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Noting the provisions of article VIII, paragraph 3, of that Treaty concerning the holding of successive review conferences,

Noting that, in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons held at Geneva from 27 August to 21 September 1985, the Conference proposed to the Depositary Governments that a fourth conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1990, and also noting that there appears to be a consensus among the parties that the Fourth Review Conference should be held at Geneva in August/September of that year,

1. *Notes* that, following appropriate consultations, an open-ended preparatory committee has been formed of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons serving on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency or represented in the Conference on Disarmament, as well as any party to the Treaty that may express its interest in participating in the work of the preparatory committee;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its preparation.

Conclusion

In 1988, with the entry into force of the INF Treaty, the two major Powers expressed their determination to achieve the full implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty, within the agreed time limits. Further, though not decisive, progress was made by the Soviet Union and the United States in their negotiations with a view to a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic offensive arms.

The General Assembly, both at its third special session and at its forty-third regular session, devoted major attention to nuclear disarmament. At the regular session, several resolutions were adopted on both bilateral and multilateral aspects of nuclear disarmament. One of them, initiated by China, was adopted by consensus, as had been the case at the previous two sessions. Another resolution, on the establishment of a preparatory committee for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, to be held in 1990, was co-sponsored by 60 Member States and was adopted without any negative vote.

No major progress, however, was achieved within the multilateral framework. Once again, in the Conference on Disarmament, there was no agreement to set up an *ad hoc* committee to deal with the item on nuclear disarmament, although many members of the Conference felt that it would be possible at least to identify measures for concrete multilateral efforts under that item. All this confirms that, while effective efforts are continuing for the establishment of greater security at a lower level of nuclear forces, there is still an impasse in the multilateral negotiation of nuclear disarmament. Consequently, it appears that significant nuclear disarmament in the multilateral framework cannot be achieved in the short term. The prospects might improve, however, if the two major Powers were soon to make decisive progress in the reduction of their strategic nuclear weapons.

Prevention of nuclear war

Introduction

REMOVING THE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR WAR, the General Assembly formally stated at its first special session devoted to disarmament, in 1978, is the most urgent task of the present day.¹ In the Final Document of that session,² the General Assembly sought to establish principles, guidelines and procedures with regard to the removal of that threat, and called on the Member States to take urgent and appropriate measures. Its clear call for action was dictated by the awareness that there was no insuperable barrier dividing peace from war and that, unless nations brought the spiralling nuclear-arms race to an end, the day might come when nuclear weapons would actually be used, with catastrophic consequences. In adopting the Final Document, the international community achieved, for the first time, a consensus on an international disarmament strategy having as its immediate goal "the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race".

The General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament, in 1982, reaffirmed the validity of the 1978 Final Document.³ At that session, the Soviet Union made a solemn commitment never to be the first to use nuclear weapons.⁴ This pledge by the Soviet Union (as well as China's long-standing commitment never to be the first to use nuclear weapons) was viewed by many countries as offering a concrete way to decrease the danger of nuclear war and to promote nuclear disarmament. The Western States, however, continued to believe that a strategy of nuclear deterrence was the most effective means for the prevention of nuclear war and all wars, and that a declaration on the non-first use of nuclear weapons would restrict and thus undermine the wider principle of the non-use of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. The key measures the Western States have supported in that

¹ General Assembly resolution A/S-10/2, para.18.

² General Assembly resolution A/S-10/2. The Final Document is also reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol.3: 1978, appendix I.

³ See paragraph 57 of document A/S-12/32, which was approved by the General Assembly in its decision S-12/24 of 10 July 1982.

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 12th meeting.

context, in addition to the non-use of force, are: restraint, balanced disarmament measures, confidence-building, and reduction of the risk of nuclear escalation implicit in a conventional war.

President Reagan of the United States, addressing the General Assembly in 1983, declared: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought."⁵ At the 1985 summit in Geneva, General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan, conscious of the special responsibility of the USSR and the United States for maintaining peace, not only agreed that that was the reality of the situation, but also recognized that any conflict between the USSR and the United States could have catastrophic consequences. Thus, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. The two sides also stated that they would not seek to achieve military superiority.

In the joint statement issued at Washington on 10 December 1987,⁶ following their signing of the INF Treaty, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev affirmed the fundamental importance of their meetings at Geneva (1985) and Reykjavik (1986), which had laid the basis for concrete steps in a process intended "to improve strategic stability and reduce the risk of conflict". They also welcomed the signing on 15 September, at Washington, of the agreement to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in their capitals. The agreement, they stated, would be implemented promptly. The two leaders further recognized the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union to search for realistic ways to prevent confrontations and to promote a more sustainable and stable relationship between their countries. To that end, they agreed to intensify dialogue and to encourage emerging trends towards constructive co-operation in all areas of their relations, in particular arms control—including nuclear and space talks, nuclear testing and nuclear non-proliferation.

At the beginning of 1988, Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania—the signers of the Six-Nation Initiative—in their Stockholm Declaration⁷ welcomed the resumption of the dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States, and the signing of the INF Treaty, which they viewed as a "historic first step" and as significant evidence that "a reversal is possible", but stated that much more remained to be done. The arms race had not even been halted, let alone reversed. The war machines of a handful of nations could still put an end to civilization and all life on Earth. They believed that no nation had the right to use nuclear weapons, and declared that "what was morally wrong should also be explicitly prohibited by international law through a binding international agreement".

At the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in 1988, the Secretary-General underscored⁸ that "significant shifts" had occurred "in

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th meeting.

⁶ A/43/58.

⁷ A/43/125-S/19478.

⁸ A/S-15/PV.1.

perception and attitude”, in the relations among nations. For many long years, he noted, the world had seemed to be settled in a fatalistic stance about the arms race. “In a global climate of suspicion and fears, at times exaggerated”, he said, “the arms race appeared inevitable and the goals of halting and reversing it utopian.” Now, refreshing changes were leading to a renewal of constructive dialogue between the two major Powers. The Secretary-General cautioned, however, that such encouraging developments must be seen as only the beginnings of disarmament in the nuclear field, providing undoubtedly a vital impetus to the disarmament effort, but insufficient, by themselves, to end that condition of overarmament that had aggravated fear and insecurity throughout the world and involved a gigantic waste of human and material resources. The stopping and reversing of the arms race, the Secretary-General stressed, could only result from a joint undertaking by all States. Progress in bilateral co-operation in the field of arms control could not be sustained indefinitely in an environment of tension and conflict in the world, in the same way that significant multilateral agreements could not be evolved in conditions of mistrust and confrontation between the two great military Powers. Indeed, disarmament could not continue with success if it was not placed within the context of the global environment. This was particularly true of the nuclear issues, which went far beyond national security and impinged directly on human survival. Nuclear issues should, therefore, rightly remain a major concern of all States and central to global security.

General developments and trends, 1988

In 1978, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly unanimously declared that removing the threat of nuclear war was “the most acute and urgent task of the present day”. Ten years later, in 1988, it still was. Even though the risk of nuclear war has ebbed somewhat in recent years, its prevention remains a continuing task in a divided world armed with nuclear weapons.

There is no disagreement about the danger of nuclear war. As the recent (1988) United Nations expert study on the climatic and other global effects of nuclear war confirmed, the prospects for this planet in the event of a major nuclear war are grim. In the words of the report,⁹

The socio-economic consequences in a world intimately interconnected economically, socially and environmentally would be grave. The functions of production, distribution and consumption in existing socio-economic systems would be completely disrupted. The severe physical damage from blast, fire and radiation in the targeted countries would preclude the type of support that made recovery possible following the Second World War. The breakdown of life support systems, communications, transportation, the world financial and other systems would compound the difficulties caused by food shortages in non-targeted countries. Long-term recovery would be uncertain.

⁹ *Study on the Climatic and Other Global Effects of Nuclear War* (United Nations publication, Sales No.E.89.IX.1), paras. 25 and 26.

The immediate and direct effects of nuclear explosions and the global, environmental consequences of a major nuclear war constitute a continuum. Each would exacerbate the other. Moreover, there would be synergy within each aspect as well as between them so that the integrated total effect of fire, blast and radioactivity would be greater than their sum. Similarly, temperature decrease, brief sub-freezing episodes, diminished precipitation, suppressed monsoons and increased ultraviolet radiation would interact in a manner that would compound their separate effects. The global, environmental disruption resulting from a major nuclear war would be inseparably related to its direct and localized effects. Both should be considered in resolving policy issues of nuclear weaponry and should be the concern of all nations.

There continues to be disagreement, however, about how best to avert the danger of nuclear war. This was evident at the session of the *Disarmament Commission*, which once again was unable to adopt a unanimous recommendation to the General Assembly to undertake, as a matter of priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Thus, the Commission could not advance beyond the established position of principle that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought; that, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, all States should co-operate in an effort to adopt appropriate and practical measures to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war and to avoid the use of nuclear weapons; and that note should be taken of existing undertakings by two nuclear-weapon States¹⁰ about non-first use of nuclear weapons as well as declarations made by some States about non-use of any weapon, except in response to an armed attack.

Discussions on the point about non-first use of nuclear weapons reflected long-standing and continuing differences, in spite of the agreement of all parties that there would be no winner in a nuclear war. Basically, while the Western countries contended that in the current circumstances there was no alternative but to continue to pursue the goal of preventing nuclear war and all wars by firm adherence to the strategy of nuclear deterrence, the Soviet Union and China maintained that a firm commitment by all the nuclear Powers never to be the first to use nuclear weapons would deliver the peoples of the world from the threat of nuclear devastation and open the way to nuclear disarmament. The non-aligned States, for their part, persevered in their efforts to keep the question of the prevention of nuclear war in the forefront of international concern.

This they did primarily at the *Conference on Disarmament*, where the Group of 21 put before the Conference for decision the text of a mandate for an *ad hoc* committee on prevention of nuclear war, a step they have taken every year since 1984. Once again, however, no progress was made in the search for a generally acceptable organizational arrangement for dealing with the question. In the absence of consensus on an organizational framework, issues concerning the prevention of nuclear war and all related matters were addressed at plenary meetings, with no changes in the well-established positions on the substance of the question.

¹⁰ A clear reference to the Soviet Union and China.

At the fifteenth special session of the *General Assembly*, apart from the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, which was raised mainly by non-aligned countries, the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war, *per se*, were not widely debated (see chapter II). At the regular session of the General Assembly, on the other hand, the debate followed traditional lines and three resolutions were adopted (none of them by consensus) on well-defined aspects of the question of prevention of nuclear war, with focus on the role of the Conference on Disarmament in achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures to that end.

In 1988, the fourth meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan, in Moscow, encouraged the international community to hope that the risk of nuclear war would continue to lessen. Their joint statement of 1 June¹¹ provided a comprehensive account of the efforts and progress made by the two major Powers to put their relation “on a more productive and sustainable basis”. Assessing the state of those relations, the two leaders underscored the historic importance of their meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow in laying the foundation for a realistic approach to the problem of “strengthening stability and reducing the risk of conflict”.

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1988

As in previous years, the Disarmament Commission addressed the question of nuclear war under item 4 of its agenda, an item that has, as its centrepiece, “the effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war” (for the full wording of the item, see page 16). The item was discussed in plenary meetings of the Commission as well as in the subsidiary body (a contact group open to all delegations) dealing specifically with item 4.

In the course of its work the Contact Group updated some of the texts under consideration and made some progress towards narrowing areas of disagreement. Nevertheless, as evidenced by its basic document, “Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4”,¹² it was unable to reach a consensus on a complete set of recommendations.

Of seven recommendations in the Compilation dealing entirely or in part with the question of the prevention of nuclear war,¹³ only two¹⁴—recommendations of a very general character—were without any brackets, signifying that they were generally acceptable. Of the other five recommendations, which were of a more specific nature, two still had some parts in brackets,¹⁵ while

¹¹ A/S-15/28.

¹² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No.3 (A/S-15/3)*, annex II.

¹³ Recommendations Nos. 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17 and 21 of part I of the Compilation.

¹⁴ Recommendations Nos. 9 and 17.

¹⁵ Recommendations Nos. 10 and 21.

the remaining three were entirely in brackets.¹⁶ In particular, there was no consensus on recommending that the Conference on Disarmament should undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war; that the fundamental approach to the prevention of nuclear war must involve the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons; that an agreement giving full, legally binding force to a commitment by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons should be concluded; and that, pending the conclusion of such an agreement, declarations of non-first use of nuclear weapons would be a means of lessening the risk of nuclear conflict.

Given these unresolved problems, the broadest consensus text on prevention of nuclear war to be found in the Compilation expressed the common denominator as follows:

There is today wide endorsement of the statement of the two major nuclear-weapon States that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, all States should co-operate for the adoption of practical and appropriate measures to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war and to avoid use of nuclear weapons. Note should be taken of existing undertakings by two nuclear-weapon States about non-first use of nuclear weapons as well as declarations made by some States about non-use of any weapon, except in response to an armed attack.¹⁷

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1988

In the course of the 1988 session, the Soviet Union and the United States presented to the Conference two documents closely related to the question of prevention of nuclear war, namely (a) the text of the Agreement between the USSR and the United States on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, and of Protocol I and Protocol II to that Agreement, signed at Washington on 15 September 1987;¹⁸ and (b) the text of the Agreement between the USSR and the United States on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, signed at Moscow on 31 May 1988.¹⁹

During the first part of the session, once again consultations were held under the President of the Conference to consider an appropriate organizational arrangement for dealing with the item, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", in particular the establishment of a subsidiary body, but no agreement could be reached.

The Conference had before it for decision the latest version of the draft mandate for an *ad hoc* committee on the agenda item, proposed by the Group of 21.²⁰ Under this proposed mandate, the *ad hoc* committee would, as a

¹⁶ Recommendations Nos. 13, 14 and 15.

¹⁷ Recommendation No. 10, first paragraph.

¹⁸ CD/814 and CD/815, submitted by the USSR and the United States, respectively.

¹⁹ CD/845 and CD/847, submitted by the USSR and the United States, respectively.

²⁰ CD/515/Rev.4.

first step, consider all proposals relevant to the item, including appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Western countries could not associate themselves with a consensus on the proposed mandate. The socialist States expressed their support for the draft mandate and their regret that the Conference was not in a position to adopt it. China was prepared to accept the draft mandate and held that, meanwhile, the Conference could carry out its work on the item in other ways. In practice, the issues relating to prevention of nuclear war were addressed at plenary meetings of the Conference. Efforts during the second part of the session to reach agreement on the setting up of an *ad hoc* committee again ended in disagreement.

For its part, the Group of 21 reiterated its conviction that the prevention of a nuclear war was a matter of the highest priority and noted with concern that the Conference had made no progress on the subject since its inclusion in the agenda in 1984 as a separate item. The Group of 21 consistently expressed the belief that the surest way to remove the danger of nuclear war lay in the elimination of nuclear weapons and that, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited. While nuclear-weapon States had the primary responsibility for avoiding a nuclear war, all nations had a vital interest in the negotiation of measures for the prevention of such a war. It was unacceptable, the Group affirmed, that the security of all States and the very survival of mankind should be held hostage to the threat of a nuclear holocaust. Non-aligned countries again welcomed the statement of the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States concerning nuclear war and stressed that it was time to translate that statement into a binding commitment. Members of the Group held that belief in the maintenance of world peace through nuclear deterrence was a most dangerous fallacy, and since nuclear weapons undoubtedly posed a unique threat to human survival, the question of the prevention of nuclear war could not be dealt with in the context of the prevention of all armed conflicts. Beyond that, they were of the view that, nuclear weapons being weapons of mass destruction, article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations could not be invoked to justify their use in the exercise of the right of self-defence against armed attack not involving the use of nuclear weapons.

The socialist States called for a new approach to the issues of war and peace, disarmament and other complex global and regional problems, and for the abandonment of the concept of nuclear deterrence, which, in their view, was a constant threat to strategic stability and a continuing source of fuel for the arms race. They, too, believed that the United Nations Charter could not be invoked to justify the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right of self-defence in the case of armed attack not involving the use of nuclear weapons, since nuclear war would threaten the very survival of mankind. Socialist members called for the creation of a comprehensive system of international security embracing measures in the military, political, economic and humanitarian spheres and leading to a nuclear-free and non-violent world. Believing that, under present-day conditions, recourse to military means to resolve any dispute was inadmissible, they emphasized the

defensive nature of the military doctrine of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which was inspired by their determination never in any circumstances to initiate military action unless they were themselves the target of an armed attack, by their firm intention not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, by the absence of territorial claims on their part against any other States, and by the fact that they did not view any State or any people as their enemy.

The socialist States stressed the significance of the programme proposed by the Soviet Union for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000²¹ and the prohibition of space-strike weapons. They also reiterated the importance of commitments on non-first use of nuclear weapons and reiterated their support for the proposal for the conclusion of a convention to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. They also re-stated their readiness to consider confidence-building measures, for example those designed to reduce the danger of unintentional nuclear war and to prevent surprise attacks.

Western delegations, including France, the United Kingdom and the United States, while reaffirming that they attached the utmost importance to the prevention of nuclear war, reiterated that the subject could not be isolated from the problem of preventing war in general and that the real question at issue was how to maintain peace and international security in the nuclear age. They stressed that this comprehensive approach to the prevention of war was in no way designed to minimize the catastrophic consequences and the inadmissibility of a nuclear war. Western delegations further considered that deterrence had made a significant contribution to East-West stability. They held that, in the current circumstances, nuclear weapons continued to be a basic element in the balance needed to maintain peace and security. At the same time, they reiterated that none of their weapons would ever be used except in response to armed attack. They again emphasized that strict compliance by all States with the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the obligations to refrain from the threat or use of force and to settle all disputes by peaceful means, was a key element in the prevention of nuclear war. They also stressed the importance of deep and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons, but considered that reductions in one class of weapons must not make the use of other types of weapons more probable and that, therefore, in order to maintain stability and security, it was necessary to take into account the threat posed by conventional and chemical weapons. Western countries highlighted the significant contribution that confidence-building measures could make to lessening the danger of war, including nuclear war. Beyond that, they noted the value of measures for reducing the risk of fortuitous nuclear war.

China believed that the effective prevention of nuclear war called for a stable international environment. It believed that to safeguard peace and security it was imperative to oppose hegemonism and power politics, check aggression and expansion and eliminate regional trouble spots. All countries

²¹ CD/649.

should honour the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. China underlined that all countries should respect and observe the United Nations Charter, renounce the use or threat of force in international relations and settle disputes by peaceful means. The fundamental way to eliminate the nuclear threat and prevent nuclear war lay in the complete prohibition and total destruction of all nuclear weapons, and the two major nuclear Powers bore a special responsibility in that regard. In China's view, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances and should unconditionally pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. On this basis, China felt that an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons should be concluded, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. It further considered that conventional wars should also be prevented and that the outbreak of a conventional war in areas with a high concentration of nuclear and conventional weapons involved the danger of escalation into a nuclear war; the two military blocs should, therefore, reach agreement on the drastic reduction of their conventional armed forces and armaments.

Thus, at the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament the dialogue on the subject of the prevention of nuclear war continued. There were no breakthroughs, but each side seemed desirous of keeping the debate open within the context of security, indeed of an enhanced state of security, allowing nations to seek their own development and progress without the fear of total destruction.

Action by the General Assembly, 1988

The Assembly's deliberations, at the forty-third regular session, on the prevention of nuclear war were focused on three draft resolutions—one, by non-aligned and socialist countries, again requesting the Conference on Disarmament to establish an *ad hoc* committee with a view to achieving appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war; one, promoted almost exclusively by non-aligned countries, reiterating the Assembly's request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and one, by three socialist States and Cuba, calling on nuclear-weapon States that had not committed themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons to consider making a declaration to that effect, and requesting the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on the elaboration of an international instrument on non-first use of nuclear weapons. This draft resolution was submitted first.

Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Romania submitted the draft resolution, entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war", which was later sponsored also by Bulgaria and Mongolia. On 4 November, it was introduced by the German Democratic

Republic, which explained that, using paragraph 58 of the 1978 Final Document of the Tenth Special Session as a starting-point, the text called upon all nuclear-weapon States to follow the example set by China and the USSR and to assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Furthermore, in the text the Conference on Disarmament was requested to commence negotiations on the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character on the non-first use of nuclear weapons. In that connection, the German Democratic Republic recalled that the item "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" had been on the annual agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for five years and, while discussions had been held on the subject, negotiations had not yet begun. According to the draft resolution, the General Assembly would welcome practical measures for the reduction of the risk of nuclear war.

On 11 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 104 to 17 (Western countries), with 7 abstentions.

In connection with the vote, Australia explained that its negative vote was dictated by its inability to accept the implication in the draft resolution that the unverifiable pronouncement of non-first use would be a truly useful way to prevent nuclear war. In Australia's view, there was only one fail-safe way to prevent nuclear war, and that was by eliminating nuclear weapons. Similarly, New Zealand explained that it had voted against the draft resolution because the text made no attempt to reflect the reality of the international security environment. The text exhorted all countries to adopt a single policy, without regard to particular circumstances and perceptions, and ignored the disparities in conventional weaponry in Europe.

Finland, which voted in favour, stated that nowhere was it professed that nuclear war was an element of rational policy. Nuclear weapons should never be used in any circumstances, it stressed. Sweden, which also voted in favour, considered that a firm commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, made through an international instrument of a legally binding character, would be an important contribution to successful efforts to prevent nuclear war. It cautioned, however, that such an instrument should deal solely with the concept of non-first use and should not contain any further elements. In fact, the Swedish Government considered that the prohibition of the use or threat of the use of force in international relations laid down in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations was mandatory and sufficient. What was required, rather, was improved compliance by Member States with the existing prohibition and with the obligation, also laid down in the Charter, to settle their disputes by peaceful means.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution that had been introduced by the German Democratic Republic by a recorded vote of 127 to 17, with 6 abstentions, as resolution 43/78 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in accordance with paragraph 20 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, effective

measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority and that this commitment was reaffirmed by the Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling also that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document, it is stated that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered,

Recalling further that, at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament, it was generally recognized that the prevention of nuclear war was of utmost concern and that specific efforts, bilateral, regional or multilateral, should be vigorously pursued and measures should be strengthened to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of nuclear war,

Reaffirming that the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and for undertaking measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war,

Welcoming measures taken by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to reduce the risk of nuclear war,

Stressing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Recalling that, in the Political Declaration adopted at the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, all nuclear-weapon States were called upon to enter early into an internationally binding commitment not to be the first to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons,

Emphasizing that for the sake of international peace and security, military concepts and doctrines must be of a strictly defensive character,

1. *Considers* that the solemn declarations by two nuclear-weapon States made or reiterated at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, concerning their respective obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, offer an important avenue to decrease the danger of nuclear war;

2. *Expresses the hope* that those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so will consider making similar declarations with respect to not being the first to use nuclear weapons;

3. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on the item in its agenda concerning prevention of nuclear war and to consider, *inter alia*, the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character laying down the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war"

Twenty-three States, later joined by four others,²² sponsored the draft resolution entitled "Prevention of nuclear war". The text of the draft resolution, introduced by Argentina on 9 November, was, in essence, very close to that of resolution 42/42 D on the same subject, adopted in 1987. Argentina pointed out that there were, however, some changes in the preamble, which referred to the progress made in the bilateral field. In 1988, as in previous years, it had not been possible to establish at the Conference on Disarmament an *ad hoc* committee to examine procedures designed to ensure the avoidance of nuclear war. Thus, in the light of the urgency of the question and of the inadequacy or insufficiency of existing measures, the draft resolution contained a request to the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter

²² Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, German Democratic Republic, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia.

of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures that could be negotiated and adopted individually for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish an *ad hoc* committee on the subject at the beginning of its 1989 session.

On 11 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 116 to 3 (France, United Kingdom and United States), with 14 abstentions (Western countries).

In connection with the vote, two States that had voted in favour explained their positions. Australia stated that it strongly supported the objective of the prevention of nuclear war by all possible means, but that it would have preferred to see the text drafted in such a way as to give due recognition to the fact that the issue of the prevention of nuclear war had not necessarily been a matter of indifference in the past and was not something that could be dealt with in isolation. One of the most important ways to prevent a nuclear war was through preventing all wars. As to the *ad hoc* committee, although Australia was not certain that such a body would be able to undertake negotiations on the matter at the current stage, it believed that it could consider and identify possible areas for detailed examination of the issue, operating in a manner similar, perhaps, to that of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The Byelorussian SSR held that the multilateral disarmament machinery could play an important role in preventing nuclear war. Thus, it urged establishment of an *ad hoc* committee at the Conference on Disarmament for the negotiation of agreements on the issue and believed that the idea of establishing a multilateral centre to reduce the risk of nuclear war was worth developing.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by Argentina by a recorded vote of 136 to 3, with 14 abstentions, as resolution 43/78 F. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced that the prevention of nuclear war and the reduction of the risk of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority and of vital interest to all people of the world,

Recalling the provisions of paragraphs 47 to 50 and 56 to 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, regarding the procedures designed to secure the avoidance of nuclear war,

Reiterating that it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war, which would inevitably be a nuclear war,

Noting that at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Countries held at Nicosia from 5 to 10 September 1988, the Ministers stated that, being aware that the gravest danger confronting humanity today was the nuclear threat, they welcomed the recent developments in the field of disarmament, which they considered a historic achievement, and emphasized the need to encourage that positive trend through the immediate adoption of measures for the prevention of nuclear war,

Recognizing that the prevention of nuclear war requires disarmament measures, and welcoming the first bilateral nuclear disarmament agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the elimination of all land-based intermediate-range nuclear forces,

Aware of the essential complementarity which links both bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1988 session,

Taking into account the deliberations on this item at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament, and at its forty-third session,

1. *Notes with regret* that, despite the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has discussed the question of the prevention of nuclear war for several years, it has been unable even to establish a subsidiary body to consider appropriate and practical measures to prevent it;

2. *Reiterates its conviction* that, in view of the urgency of the matter and the inadequacy or insufficiency of existing measures, it is necessary to devise suitable steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war;

3. *Again requests* the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures that could be negotiated and adopted individually for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an *ad hoc* committee on the subject at the beginning of its 1989 session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war"

Finally, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Romania, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia submitted the draft resolution entitled "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons", which was later also sponsored by Malaysia. By the draft proposals, the General Assembly would reiterate its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons, taking as a basis the draft convention annexed to the draft resolution.

In introducing the draft, on 8 November, India expressed regret that, despite the lapse of many years and the adoption by the General Assembly of numerous resolutions, including resolution 42/39 C in 1987, the Conference on Disarmament had not been able to register any progress on the subject. Conclusion of a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons, India stressed, would constitute an important step forward, and would lead to a qualitative change in doctrines of security. It would transform the understanding that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" into a legally binding commitment, and would make negotiations on nuclear disarmament, leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth, possible. Humanity should not continue to play a game of brinkmanship with its own survival, India stated.

On 11 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 112 to 17 (Western countries), with 4 abstentions.

Two States that supported the draft resolution explained their positions. China reiterated its view that, before nuclear disarmament could be accomplished, all nuclear States, and in particular the two major nuclear Powers, must undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and nuclear-free zones in any circumstances. At the same time, it was imperative that the present nuclear arsenals be drastically reduced,

and finally that all nuclear weapons be destroyed. Only in that way would the material conditions for nuclear wars be eradicated. Sweden, although it had reservations about the preamble, supported the concept of prohibiting, by means of an international legal instrument, the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons. It observed that an international norm had come into existence, namely that the use of nuclear weapons contravened the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience, and there was an urgent need to close the gap between that norm and international law, that is, to prohibit on the basis of international law the use of nuclear weapons. Such a prohibition was not deducible from the Charter. As there were already many rules of international law which limited or prohibited the use of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, a comprehensive ban on their use in an appropriate, legally binding form, Sweden felt, would constitute an important political step.

New Zealand, which voted against the draft resolution, considered that there had been important new developments in the disarmament area. Such developments must be reflected in the Committee's deliberations and the repetition of set formulas should be avoided. Unfortunately, New Zealand held, the draft resolution was not in line with the new trends.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by India by a recorded vote of 133 to 17, with 4 abstentions, as resolution 43/76 E. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining system posed by nuclear weapons and by their use, inherent in concepts of deterrence,

Conscious of an increased danger of nuclear war as a result of the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and the serious deterioration of the international situation,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Also convinced that a prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it is stated that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981,

Noting with regret that the Conference on Disarmament, during its 1988 session, was not able to undertake negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the text annexed to General Assembly resolution 41/60 F of 3 December 1986 and 42/39 C of 30 November 1987,

1. *Reiterates its request* to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting

the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the present resolution;

2. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session on the results of those negotiations.

ANNEX

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The States Parties to this Convention,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,

Convinced that this Convention would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Determined to continue negotiations for the achievement of this goal,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Article 2

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 3

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State that does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-five Governments, including the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 4

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Government of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at _____ on the _____ day of _____ one thousand nine hundred and _____.

Conclusion

In 1988, the question of the prevention of nuclear war remained on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly. It continued to be the object of active, though perhaps less intense, consideration in those bodies. The General Assembly adopted, as it has each year since the early 1980s, three initiatives of socialist and non-aligned members calling for the Conference on Disarmament to conduct negotiations concerning the obligation of non-first use, practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, and a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

The two major Powers, for their part, continued to make progress in their efforts to put United States-Soviet relations "on a more productive and sustainable basis". As the leaders of the two Powers had stated at their Moscow summit, in the spring of 1988, they felt that they had laid the foundation for a realistic approach to the problem of strengthening stability and reducing the risk of conflict between them.

Even though these developments were welcomed, it was generally felt that additional efforts must be made to reduce further the risk of any conflict which might lead to nuclear war, and that it was precisely at a time when the risk of war had lessened that efforts should be intensified to overcome the disagreements on how best to avert the danger of nuclear war and, indeed, of any war.

The encouraging developments of the last few years need to be consolidated. As the Secretary-General stated at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, nuclear issues should remain a major concern of all States, since progress in bilateral co-operation in the field of arms control could not be sustained indefinitely in an environment of tension and conflict in the world. In the same way, he observed, significant multilateral agreements could not be evolved in conditions of mistrust and confrontation between the two great military Powers.

Undoubtedly, all nations have a vital interest in the negotiation of effective measures for the prevention of nuclear war, since nuclear weapons pose a unique threat to human survival. If nuclear war were to occur, in all certainty its consequences would be global, not simply national. Therefore, "the scientific advances that have led to a clearer understanding of the global consequences of a major nuclear war should be pursued internationally. They should also interact strongly with the analysis of public policy decisions on these issues, which have potential implications for non-combatant nations as well as for nations that might be in conflict."²³

²³ *Study on the Climatic and Other Global Effects of Nuclear War*, para. 28.

Cessation of nuclear-weapon tests

Introduction

EFFORTS AIMED AT THE COMPLETE CESSATION of nuclear-weapon tests have been pursued since 1957 as an independent subject on the nuclear disarmament agenda. A first step towards this objective was the conclusion in 1963 of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water¹ (the partial test-ban Treaty). In the preamble, the original parties, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, state that they seek to achieve “the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time” and express their determination to continue negotiations to that end. Two other nuclear-weapon States, China and France, have not become parties but, since 1980 and 1974 respectively, they have in fact conducted only underground tests. As France had done in 1974, China, in 1986, stated formally that it would not conduct atmospheric tests in the future.²

The preamble of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons³ recalls the objective set out in the partial test-ban Treaty; and at three Review Conferences of the parties to the former held so far—in 1975, 1980 and 1985—a comprehensive test ban was widely regarded as an essential element in the implementation of its article VI. By that article, the parties undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

In 1974 the Soviet Union and the United States signed a bilateral Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests,⁴ known as the threshold test-ban Treaty, and in 1976, the Treaty on Underground Nuclear

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964. The text is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 3rd edition: 1987 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.88.IX.5).

² Address by Premier Zhao Ziyang of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on 21 March 1986, circulated as a United Nations document (A/41/230-S/17937 and Corr.1).

³ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex. The text is also reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.

⁴ Circulated in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627)*, annex II, document CCD/431.

Explosions for Peaceful Purposes,⁵ known as the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. The Treaties have not formally entered into force, but it is generally understood that both Powers are in fact adhering to their provisions. The former instrument limits permitted nuclear-weapon tests to a maximum yield of 150 kilotons, while the latter prohibits: (a) any individual nuclear explosion exceeding the 150-kiloton yield; (b) any group explosion with an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons unless the individual explosions can be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures; and (c) any group explosion with an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons.

In 1977, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States began trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty, in the course of which they agreed that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would be covered in a separate protocol. The last progress report⁶ on those negotiations was submitted to the Committee on Disarmament in 1980, and although it indicated considerable progress, negotiations on a trilateral basis were never resumed.

In the 1978 Final Document, the General Assembly identified the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests as a most important initial measure in working towards the highest priority requirement of nuclear disarmament.⁷ Since then, growing attention has been given to the issue, as a comprehensive test ban has been regarded increasingly as the essential element in halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race.

Since 1982, the United States has emphasized the need for prior clarification of questions of verification and compliance and has regarded the negotiation of deep, verifiable reductions in existing nuclear arsenals as of greater priority than a test ban. The position of the United Kingdom has also reflected concern about questions of verification and the scope of a treaty, particularly the need to include in the prohibition nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The Soviet Union, however, has repeatedly expressed its readiness to enter into negotiations on a test ban and, in 1982, it submitted to the General Assembly a document entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests"⁸

The Geneva multilateral negotiating body has long been involved with the issue of a test ban. Its *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, established in 1976 to address the seismic aspect of verification on a global network basis, continues to meet.

In 1982 and 1983 the negotiating body established a subsidiary body on a test ban with a limited mandate to examine verification and control questions, but not to actually negotiate a treaty. It made no tangible progress, however,

⁵ Circulated as a General Assembly document (A/31/125). The text is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, appendix III.

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27)*, appendix II (CD/139), document CD/130.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 45-51.

⁸ A/37/243 and resolution 37/85, annex; see *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. X.

because of disagreement over that mandate, and, for the same reason, since 1984 the Conference has been unable to agree to set up an *ad hoc* committee on that item.⁹ While the socialist States and the Group of 21 in the Conference have held the view that all questions relating to verification have been adequately studied and that the actual negotiation of a treaty should be undertaken, in the opinion of most Western members consideration of those questions is far from exhausted and the question of scope—for instance, the treatment of peaceful nuclear explosions once a comprehensive test ban has been concluded—will also have to be examined and some understandings reached before negotiations can begin. In 1987 the Soviet Union, together with other socialist States, submitted to the Conference a new version of “Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests”,¹⁰ which contained fuller verification provisions than the 1982 document.

⁹ From that time until the beginning of 1988, the Conference had before it basic mandates from each of the three major groups. The latest versions of each read as follows:

A. Group of 21 (from document CD/520/Rev.2, of 21 March 1986):

*Draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee
on a Nuclear Test Ban*

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish for the remainder of its 1986 session an *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban to initiate the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests and report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the session.

Pursuant to its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, it will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations. The *Ad Hoc* Committee will also take into account the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

B. Western States (from document CD/521, of 21 July 1984):

*Draft mandate for the ad hoc subsidiary body on item 1 of the agenda
of the Conference on Disarmament, entitled “Nuclear-test ban”*

In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document the Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish an *Ad Hoc* Committee under item 1 of its agenda entitled “Nuclear-test ban”.

The Conference requests the *Ad Hoc* Committee to resume its substantive examination of specific issues relating to a comprehensive test ban, including the issue of scope as well as those of verification and compliance with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject.

The Conference also requests the *Ad Hoc* Committee to examine the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network as part of an effective verification system.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1984 session. The Conference will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard.

C. Socialist States (from document CD/522/Rev.1, of 26 July 1985):

*Draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on item 1 of the agenda
of the Conference on Disarmament by a group of socialist States*

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish for its 1985 session an *Ad Hoc* Committee to carry out practical negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account all existing drafts, proposals and future initiatives. The *Ad Hoc* Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work at the end of its 1985 session.

¹⁰ CD/756. The document is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 12: 1987, chapter VIII, annex.

Debates in the General Assembly have reflected continuing disagreement regarding the way a test-ban objective might best be achieved. Most resolutions have called for action on the part of the Geneva body; others, since 1985, have concerned the possibility of converting the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive instrument or, since 1986, of notifying all States of nuclear tests carried out. In 1986 the States of the Five-Continent Peace Initiative circulated in the General Assembly a document on verification measures,¹¹ in which they declared their readiness to co-operate with the USSR and the United States in monitoring a nuclear-test moratorium. Since 1987, when the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to conduct bilateral negotiations on nuclear testing (see below), the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have stressed the importance of exploring all avenues in working to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

Nuclear-weapon testing has continued since the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty because the States concerned have felt that in the existing circumstances their security interests are promoted by developing new weapons, further refining existing ones or, occasionally, confirming the effectiveness of their stocks. The Soviet Union attempted to break this pattern when, beginning on 6 August 1985, it unilaterally halted all its nuclear testing until 1 January 1986 and called upon the United States to do so as well. The Soviet moratorium, subsequently renewed a number of times, was maintained for a period totalling 18 months. The United States, however, together with some other countries, did not accept an unverified, unilateral, revocable moratorium as a constructive initiative. The United States in particular has continued to regard the agreed reduction of numbers of nuclear weapons on the basis of negotiated, binding treaties as a more urgent issue than a comprehensive ban. However, it has also emphasized the need for more precise means of verifying and measuring limitations on permitted tests, with a view to reaching agreement on more stringent limitations.

In 1986 the two major nuclear-weapon Powers opened bilateral talks on verification and measurement methodology related to nuclear testing. A year later, in November 1987, the two began actual negotiations on the cessation of testing. They agreed to conduct these negotiations on a stage-by-stage basis, with the aim of reaching agreement on verification measures to make possible ratification of the 1974 and 1976 test limitation Treaties mentioned above. Thereafter, they would proceed to negotiate further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing, leading ultimately to its complete cessation as part of an effective disarmament process.

General developments and trends, 1988

Both the Soviet Union and the United States addressed the nuclear testing issue in various forums in the context of their bilateral negotiations. The latter

¹¹ A/41/518-S/18277, attachment. The document is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 11: 1986, chapter VIII, annex.

noted that the step-by-step negotiations were beginning with the working out of measures to make possible the ratification of the threshold test-ban and peaceful nuclear explosions Treaties. To that end, the two had formally agreed to design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites, and their respective teams carried out and hosted preliminary exchange visits, near Semipalatinsk in the USSR and in Nevada in the United States. The Soviet Union, noting the bilateral commitment to achieve further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing as a step on the way to achieving the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of testing, argued that complementary practical work on the issue in the Conference on Disarmament was especially urgent. It felt that the joint verification experiments would be useful for the multilateral negotiations, and reaffirmed its readiness to use the services offered in the Six-Nation Initiative regarding the monitoring of the non-conduct of tests. It was satisfied that the documents agreed upon in the first round of the negotiations provided a sound basis for speedy progress.

In mid-August the first phase of the joint verification experiment was carried out at the United States test site. Soviet scientists, technicians and observers—using their own, mainly hydrodynamic, equipment—were involved in measuring, separately from the American operators, the yield of the designated underground nuclear-test explosion. In September, the corresponding joint verification experiment took place at the Soviet test site. The visiting American scientists used their own preferred measuring technique, known as CORTEX.¹² It is understood that the resultant yield indications were analysed and compared as part of the joint verification experiment.

As for the other nuclear-weapon States, the United Kingdom for its part endorsed the bilateral negotiations and their step-by-step approach. China continued to maintain that the Soviet Union and the United States must take the lead in stopping the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and in reducing and eliminating them.

France held that while the banning of nuclear tests was important to those aspiring to denuclearization, the reduction and cessation of tests could only be the consequence, rather than the cause, of a cut in arms. It noted in this regard the linkage in the bilateral talks between reductions in arsenals and limitations on tests. As its nuclear arsenal was already at the strictly essential level, it could not feel bound by any limitations that might be agreed by the major Powers. Out of concern for openness, however, it decided to provide a yearly statement of the number of tests carried out. This would allow a more accurate assessment of its actual testing activity and its logic in the context of effective deterrence than was possible from information circulated by third States. A number of South Pacific Forum members and other countries of the region specifically objected to nuclear testing by France

¹² Acronym for "Continuous Reflectometry for Radius versus Time Experiment"

in their area, and called for further adherence by the nuclear-weapon States to the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga.¹³

As in other years, the specific question of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests was not a central issue in the work of the *Disarmament Commission* in 1988. The brief general exchange was marked by expressions of disappointment at the lack of progress on the test-ban question in the negotiating body, support of the stage-by-stage negotiations under way between the two major nuclear-weapon Powers, and hope that those negotiations would proceed apace from stage to stage. The USSR referred to progress in the bilateral negotiations and also reaffirmed its readiness to respond positively to efforts by any State that could contribute to the cessation of testing. Some non-aligned States were critical not only of the absence of tangible results, but also of the reluctance of the major Powers to fix a date for the cessation of testing or even to agree fully on verification requirements.

In its work on agenda item 4, concerning recommendations on a general approach to nuclear and conventional disarmament, the Commission was once again unable to reach agreement on any part of a text for a recommendation covering the comprehensive nuclear test-ban question. Its Contact Group was only able to edge away from its previous draft formulations, comprised of brief proposals from different initiators, to a more consolidated three-paragraph draft text in which the importance of the bilateral negotiations was acknowledged, but which remained entirely within brackets.¹⁴

Ever since 1979, the first item on the annual agenda of the *Conference on Disarmament* has been "Nuclear-test ban". The basic positions of the three major groups of States in 1988 remained essentially the same as in other recent years, and no substantive progress was made on the item. New mandates for an *ad hoc* body on a nuclear-test ban were, however, introduced on behalf of the Group of 21 and by Czechoslovakia (see "Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1988", below). Although these still failed to break the deadlock, both were found acceptable to the socialist States and China, and the Czechoslovak proposal was of interest to Western members of the Conference and to some members of the Group of 21 for consideration as a possible basis for reaching agreement.

The Western members noted that the mandate they had proposed in 1984 had been formulated in terms of working "with a view to the negotiation of a treaty on the subject". They believed that that approach, which had been blocked on the grounds that it did not constitute a negotiating mandate, would, if accepted, permit the resumption of practical work on the issue in three recognized, central areas: scope, verification and compliance.

The Group of 21 stressed the approach, espoused by a number of members of the Group in a document already put forward in the Conference in

¹³ For the text of the Treaty and the Protocols, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, appendix VII. The text is given also in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 3rd edition: 1987 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.88.IX.5).

¹⁴ See A/S-15/3, paras. 22-25 and annex II, part I, recommendation No. 7.

1987,¹⁵ that the *ad hoc* committee should be established “with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty”, and that it should comprise two working groups, to deal, respectively, with the content and scope of the future treaty, and with compliance and verification. That formulation was, however, unacceptable to Western members for the very reason that the sponsors had chosen it: it could and would be open to diverse interpretations.

The representative of Czechoslovakia acknowledged that the Conference was not currently in a position to commence full-fledged negotiations on the question, but felt that important aspects of the issue could be discussed and the problems standing in the way of a test ban could be clarified, thus opening the door to their solution or reappraisal. In that context, he recalled the informal proposal he had put forward in 1987 in his capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament. According to it, the Conference would request the *ad hoc* committee “to initiate, as a first step towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification and compliance”. He drew attention to the expression “to initiate, as a first step towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty”, and stressed that any work undertaken must be considered with the final goal—complete and general cessation of nuclear testing—in view. He believed that the Conference was in a position, through an appropriate *ad hoc* committee, to contribute to reaching that goal.

The USSR announced its support of the Czechoslovak approach and further clarified its own position to the effect that while it remained an advocate of an immediate and comprehensive ban, it did not take a maximalist approach. Taking into account the reality of the positions of other nuclear Powers, it favoured working stage by stage towards that objective, through limitations on the number and yield of tests. It expected, once bilateral understandings were reached on the 1974 and 1976 Treaties, that there would be an opportunity for drastically lowered ceilings and numbers. However, the USSR also favoured parallel multilateral negotiations since other States also conducted nuclear tests and only a multilateral test ban would complement the non-proliferation Treaty. It supported in principle the idea of broadening the scope of the partial-test-ban Treaty by having it include underground tests.

The United States reaffirmed that, for it, a comprehensive test-ban was a long-term objective, to be viewed in the context of non-dependence on nuclear deterrence, broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions, a stable East-West balance, expanded confidence-building measures, and improved verification capabilities. On that basis, a ban could be expected to be enduring. At the same time, the United States believed that the ongoing bilateral process could lead to real progress in the area of nuclear testing. Rather than addressing complex problems in simplistic terms—for example amending the partial test-ban Treaty to make it a comprehensive one—the United States urged those

¹⁵ CD/772 (submitted by Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia).

States desirous of limitations on testing that would contribute to stability to support its ongoing bilateral efforts with the Soviet Union. In parallel, it gave an assurance of its support for the setting up of an appropriately mandated *ad hoc* committee in which practical multilateral work on such issues as scope, verification and compliance could be carried out.

In the *General Assembly at its fifteenth special session*, a large number of States of all political and regional groupings stressed the priority and urgency of achieving a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, with many of the more passionate demands for an early and complete agreement coming from non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear-weapon States. The positions of a number of individual States as expressed in plenary meetings are summarized in chapter II.

While the bilateral negotiations on the subject between the two major nuclear Powers were widely regarded as promising, it was noted that their final and necessary objective was not time-bound, that there were also other nuclear-weapon States, that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests was the concern of all and, finally, that such a measure was necessary to the continued viability of the non-proliferation Treaty. Accordingly, disappointment was expressed in the Conference on Disarmament with regard to the stagnation of work on the subject and great stress was laid on the need for multilateral negotiations in that body to complement the bilateral efforts.

There was also support for the approach aimed at amending the multilateral partial test-ban Treaty to make it cover underground test explosions as well as those in the other environments. Numerous speakers, however, felt that, in the end, only a specific multilateral treaty arrived at on the basis of multilateral negotiations could guarantee the essential requirement of the cessation of all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. Finally, there was a widely shared feeling that only a comprehensive ban on testing could preclude the further development of nuclear weapons and thus curb the nuclear-arms race and, conversely, that without such a ban nuclear disarmament would not be possible.

The need for international verification was recognized by all who touched upon that aspect of the issue. In this regard, Sweden drew attention to the inclusion in the Six-Nation Initiative of the offer to assist in monitoring non-testing; Japan proposed a conference under Japanese and United Nations auspices aimed at the establishment of a global seismological monitoring system; and Australia and Norway supported such a system and explained their various contributions to its development.

The United States and the Soviet Union presented their respective positions and reported on their bilateral negotiations. The former reported that the two sides were making progress on a new protocol to the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. The latter emphasized that the Conference on Disarmament could contribute substantively to the test-ban process, perhaps beginning with the consideration of a verification system. It was ready, on a reciprocal basis with the United States, to resume a moratorium on all testing, which could become a permanent agreement.

At the *forty-third session of the General Assembly*, support for an immediate or early multilateral, comprehensive test ban remained intense.

The approach initiated in 1985 by Mexico whereby the parties to the partial test-ban Treaty would convene in a conference called for the purpose of converting the Treaty into a comprehensive instrument was endorsed not only by numerous non-aligned States, but also by some Eastern European ones. In 1988, for the first time, the concept was formalized by the submission of identical letters to the three depositary Governments,¹⁶ requesting them to circulate the proposal to all the parties to the Treaty, so that such a conference might be convened following the request of one third of the parties, in accordance with article II of the Treaty. Two of the depositaries, the United Kingdom and the United States, reiterated their clear opposition to this approach, regarding it as, at best, unrealistic, but they stated that they would, none the less, continue to meet all of their obligations as depositaries under the Treaty. At the same time, both countries emphasized their continuing support for the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee in the Conference on Disarmament with a non-negotiating mandate, which, they held, would permit substantive examination of specific issues relating to a comprehensive test ban and complement the ongoing preparatory work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts, which is discussed in the next section.

Support for efforts to break the deadlock and for the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee of the Conference was virtually universal, with differing points of view apparent mainly on the question whether such a body could conduct actual negotiations in the existing circumstances. In this regard, Western States as a whole continued to reject the view that negotiations could begin.

In general, the ongoing bilateral efforts were widely praised but not regarded as meeting the whole requirement. The joint verification experiments being conducted as part of that process were viewed, first, as evidence of a marked attitudinal change in the relations between the two countries and, secondly, as demonstrating the often voiced belief that existing technical resources were adequate for readily detecting and identifying any nuclear test of military significance. As a corollary to this view, for the great majority of States it was not acceptable to regard the total banning of nuclear tests only as a long-term objective, or as one that could await perfect means of verification or large-scale nuclear disarmament. These positions were linked to the equally prevalent opinion that a comprehensive ban would be the most effective means of heading off further technical developments and nuclear proliferation, both horizontal and vertical.

Some States did not concur with the majority positions on these matters or else they considered them impractical. They called attention to such points as: the value of the confidence-building aspect of the step-by-step approach;

¹⁶ Circulated in the General Assembly as document A/43/597 and in the Conference on Disarmament as documents CD/852 and CD/860. The letters were signed by the representatives of Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela (adding itself later) and Yugoslavia.

the respective existing positions of all five nuclear-weapon States; possible legal obstacles to converting the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive instrument; the value of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts and of their projected second technical test; and the potential of resumed substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament to complement, and thus facilitate, the bilateral negotiations.

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1988

Most of the discussion on the item on a nuclear-test ban took place in plenary meetings of the Conference. Informal consultations on the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on the item were also held, but agreement could not be reached on a mandate for a subsidiary body on the item. Further to the three most recent competing proposals for a mandate, footnoted in the Introduction, and various documents concerning the structure and programme of work for such a body, the Group of 21 officially submitted a new proposed draft mandate.¹⁷

The new text reproduced the one put forward in 1987 by eight States of the Group, with the addition of a footnote. The text read, *in extenso*, as follows:

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an *Ad Hoc* Committee on item I of its agenda with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee will set up two Working Groups, which will deal, respectively, with the following interrelated questions:

- (a) Working Group I—Contents and scope of the treaty;
- (b) Working Group II—Compliance and verification.

Pursuant to its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, it will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations. The *Ad Hoc* Committee will also take into account the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1988 session.

This draft mandate is put forward in a spirit of co-operation and constitutes a clear proof of the flexible approach adopted by the Group of 21. If a similar flexibility is reciprocated by the other groups, this could replace the draft mandate contained in document CD/520/Rev.2 of 21 March 1986.

The Group's spokesman referred to the good will shown by the Group as a whole in making the submission possible, and drew particular attention to the footnote. The Group also stressed that the term "with the objective" was open to the widest variety of interpretations. To some members of the

¹⁷ CD/829.

Conference it was an immediate objective, to others, for instance the United States, it was a long-term objective. Thus, if the draft mandate were adopted, any delegation would be able to set out in a statement what its interpretation was. Accordingly, consensus adoption of the proposal would not make it necessary for any member to abandon its position. The Group hoped for a consensus decision to adopt the proposal at the beginning of the second part of the session, and noted that socialist States and China indicated that it would be acceptable to them.

The proposal of the Group of 21 was immediately rejected by Western member States. As explained by the spokesman of the Western delegations: first, the substance of the proposal was the same as that put forward in 1987 by some members of the Group of 21, which Western States had already made clear was unacceptable to them; secondly, the explanation regarding flexibility on the part of the Group of 21 was not substantiated by any subsequent textual change; and, thirdly, a variety of statements of interpretation could not constitute a sound basis for the conduct of work. Rather, it would confuse and possibly defeat any practical work which an *ad hoc* committee constituted under such a mandate might conduct. The Western States were also concerned that it might set a precedent by which the Conference would be expected to work on the basis of overtly different interpretations of a particular text.

The Western delegations none the less regretted the long stalemate, and wished to see an *ad hoc* committee established on the item without any further delay, but in accordance with their 1984 proposal and associated 1985 draft programme of work. To be fruitful, any practical work on the item must involve the participation of all members which wished to take part, including the nuclear-weapon States. The Western position held out that possibility, and the Western States also hoped for further consideration of the issue and agreement during the summer part of the session.

In formalizing its proposal late in August, Czechoslovakia emphasized its continued belief that a compromise approach to a mandate for a subsidiary organ was still needed. It made clear that the proposal was not its own preference but an attempt at compromise which could be a basis for further consultation. It had been suggested among the groups that such formalization could facilitate further discussion on it. Czechoslovakia felt that any work under its proposal should be regarded as a first step towards achieving a nuclear test-ban treaty. It felt that if the Conference commenced active work in this light, it could help the Conference explore ways and means of progressing towards the cessation of nuclear testing. The text of its proposed draft mandate reads, *in extenso*, as follows:

In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document, the Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish an *Ad Hoc* Committee under item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear-test ban"

The Conference requests the *Ad Hoc* Committee to initiate, as a first step towards achieving a nuclear test ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification and compliance.

Pursuant to its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, it will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations.

The Conference also requests the *Ad Hoc* Committee to examine the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network as part of an effective verification system of a nuclear test ban treaty. The *Ad Hoc* Committee will also take into account the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1988 session.¹⁸

In the short time remaining following the Czechoslovak submission, several members, particularly socialist States and some non-member States addressing the test-ban question, indicated interest in it. While the Group of 21 continued to regard its own proposal as better suited to accommodation of all positions, some of its members as well as some Western States indicated a willingness to consider the Czechoslovak approach, as a possible basis for compromise and agreement at the 1989 session.

In 1988, the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events was primarily engaged in work on its fifth report to the Conference, which is to be submitted in 1989. In its progress reports¹⁹ to the Conference, it listed its member and non-member participating countries²⁰ and detailed the work it was doing to develop the overall concept of a modern international seismic data exchange system based on the expeditious exchange of level I (parameter) and level II (waveform) data and their processing at international data centres (IDCs). In its second progress report, the Group detailed its work on GSETT-2 (Group of Scientific Experts' Second Technical Test) and annexed a planning document, drafted by the Co-ordinator of the experiment, outlining the various start-up tests in which a number of countries had indicated that they would participate.

In presenting the reports, the Chairman, Mr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden, stressed that the new data exchange system envisaged would provide more data and data of considerably higher quality than had been available until then, and would make it readily available for detailed analysis by participating States. Accordingly, it would be possible for all parties to conduct verification of a test ban on an equal footing. He also described in detail the sensitivity—and limitations—of modern seismological stations for detection of various events under various conditions, concluding that the detection capability of a given network was largely controlled by the density of stations and whether they were array stations or single stations.

¹⁸ CD/863.

¹⁹ CD/818 and CD/853.

²⁰ Participants members of the Conference: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States. Participants non-members: Austria, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway and Spain.

Late in the session, Norway, a non-member of the Conference participating in the *Ad Hoc* Group's work, submitted and introduced a document entitled "Verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban: establishing a global seismological network incorporating small aperture arrays".²¹ The document outlined recent developments in seismic array technology, and described and projected possibilities for multi-array processing and its use on the basis of early results from the new ARCESS (Arctic Experimental Seismic System) array in northern Norway. Norway emphasized that it continued to attach importance to research with a view to utilizing the full potential of seismic arrays in a future global network.

Action by the General Assembly, 1988

In connection with its two current test-ban items, the General Assembly had before it, besides the report of the Conference on Disarmament, several documents, mainly letters from representatives of Member States or groups, conveying, for instance, the Stockholm Declaration of the sponsors of the Six-Nation Initiative,²² the documents adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries²³ and the final communiqué of the Nineteenth South Pacific Forum.²⁴

In addition, under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament", in connection with the sub-item "Notification of nuclear tests", it had two notes by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 42/38 C of 1987, by which the Assembly called upon States to provide the Secretary-General with data on nuclear explosions; and upon the Secretary-General to make the information received immediately available to all Member States²⁵ and to submit an annual register compiled on the basis of the information provided. The annual register for 1988,²⁶ covering the period 15 September 1987 to 14 September 1988, was comprised of information received from the USSR and from New Zealand, a non-nuclear-weapon State with a detection capability. The information from the Soviet Union indicated that it had conducted 12 nuclear-test explosions, between 13 December 1987 and 6 September 1988 with a variety of yields: not exceeding 20 kilotons, between 5 and 20 kilotons, and between 20 and 150 kilotons. Seven of its tests were listed as having been conducted "with a view to improving military technology", while three concerned research into nuclear-explosion physics or the verification of the results of such research, and two were in the interests of the national economy. New Zealand reported on eight explosions detected

²¹ CD/862.

²² A/43/125-S/19478.

²³ A/43/667-S/20212.

²⁴ A/43/762.

²⁵ A/43/152 and Add.1-11.

²⁶ A/43/625.

at the Muroroa Atoll in 1987 (four of them prior to 15 September 1987), with estimated yields of from 3 to 60 kilotons.

Under the two agenda items, three draft resolutions were introduced in the First Committee, two by Mexico and one by Australia.

Ecuador, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution to the First Committee entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions", which was subsequently also sponsored by Ireland and Romania. In introducing the proposal on 7 November, Mexico outlined its provisions, emphasizing, *inter alia*, the long time the issue had been under examination and the fact that more than 50 resolutions had been adopted on it. It recalled that, in 1984, the Secretary-General had stated that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be the litmus test of real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament. By the operative part of the text, the General Assembly would reiterate its concern that testing was continuing unabated and would reaffirm its conviction of the priority and importance of such a treaty. It would urge the early discontinuance of all test explosions, appeal to the Conference on Disarmament to establish an *ad hoc* committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions, and recommend that the *ad hoc* committee comprise two working groups dealing, respectively, with the content and scope of the treaty, and with compliance and verification.

The First Committee approved the first draft resolution introduced by Mexico by a recorded vote of 118 to 3 (France, United Kingdom and United States), with 13 abstentions (Western and associated States, and China).

The United States explained its negative vote on the grounds that the text was in fundamental conflict with its often-stated policy regarding limitations on nuclear testing. France stated that it had voted against the draft because, in its view, the prohibition of nuclear tests should be placed within the framework of an effective process of nuclear disarmament, as had been stated in paragraph 51 of the 1978 Final Document, and could be realized only when sufficient progress towards disarmament had been made that a test ban would not jeopardize international security. Thus the prohibition could not be a pre-condition for the reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the major Powers. The nuclear tests carried out by France were conducted, it stated, to maintain its deterrent force at the minimum level of credibility necessary for its security. On the same grounds, it had also voted against the other two draft resolutions before the Committee, discussed below.

Two States that had abstained explained their positions. Japan said it attached priority importance to the early realization of a comprehensive test ban and believed that it was vital for the Conference on Disarmament to undertake substantive work on the item. But for this to come about, all concerned should show more flexibility on the basis of an objective assessment of reality, including the important progress in the USSR/United States negotiations. The Netherlands, making clear that it believed the issue was best

served by a stage-by-stage approach, which was not reflected in the text, stated that it could not support the appeal for an *ad hoc* committee with a negotiating mandate, as called for in paragraph 5.

A number of countries explained their affirmative votes. India noted that the scope of the treaty envisaged in the text was not in keeping with the generally accepted scope for such a treaty, which was clearly set out in the preamble of the partial test-ban Treaty. Its vote was therefore without prejudice to its position on the proper scope of a treaty. Czechoslovakia based its support of the proposal on its belief that all avenues should be considered with a view to making early progress towards a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. For that reason, it also supported the other two initiatives before the Committee, discussed below. It held that the Conference on Disarmament continued to be an indispensable forum for negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Czechoslovakia felt that its new compromise proposal before that forum provided a good basis for further meaningful work. Brazil, while also supporting the proposal, would not renounce the 1986 draft mandate for an *ad hoc* committee on the subject presented in the Conference on Disarmament by the Group of 21. Referring to the footnote to the Group's new draft mandate, it observed that the proposal reflected an important show of flexibility, which could lead to the superseding of the 1986 proposal only if reciprocated. Brazil also held to its positions of principle on the scope of a treaty and on what article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco authorized (in respect of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes). New Zealand was pleased that the 1988 text had been improved considerably from the previous year, and found in it a number of themes which were common to the proposal it had co-sponsored, which is discussed below. It had reservations, however, about the text's emphasis on the responsibilities of the three depositaries of the partial test-ban Treaty, as all five nuclear-weapon States must be involved in the negotiations, and about the failure of the text to make clear that a nuclear-test-ban treaty must apply to all nuclear explosive devices.

Two further States supportive of the draft resolution also clarified their positions. Argentina particularly appreciated the clarity of the mandate given to the Conference on Disarmament on the question of the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions. Because all five nuclear-weapon States were members of the Conference on Disarmament, it preferred the approach taken in that draft to that of amending the partial test-ban Treaty, as in the second proposal introduced by Mexico, discussed below. The Islamic Republic of Iran believed that the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions was a first step towards disarmament, inasmuch as such tests had adverse effects on disarmament negotiations, on the international atmosphere and on the environmental balance.

Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia submitted a second draft resolution entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions", which was later sponsored also by Ecuador and Romania. Mexico introduced this second proposal on the same day as the first, stressing the point that the text sought the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions. Mexico called attention to the reference, in the final paragraph of the preamble, to

article II of the partial test-ban Treaty, which provided a procedure for the consideration and eventual adoption of amendments to the Treaty by a conference of its parties. By the operative paragraph, the Assembly would welcome the submission to the Treaty's three depositary Governments of the amendment proposal for consideration at such a conference. The sponsors were convinced that the adoption of the proposed amendment, which would ban underground nuclear tests, would greatly strengthen the Treaty.

The First Committee approved the second draft resolution introduced by Mexico by a recorded vote of 108 to 3 (France, United Kingdom and United States), with 21 abstentions (Western and neutral States).

In connection with the vote, two of the depositaries of the Treaty explained their negative votes. The United Kingdom re-emphasized its continuing dependence on deterrence, based in part on nuclear weapons, for its security, and therefore its continued need for underground nuclear tests to ensure that its weapons remained effective. While a comprehensive test ban remained a long-term goal, progress towards it could be made only through a step-by-step approach, taking account of technical advances in verification, progress in arms control, and the positions of other States. Accordingly, it did not consider it appropriate to use the amendment provisions in the partial test-ban Treaty in order to change totally the nature of that instrument—not even if all the parties favoured the objective of the immediate creation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Thus it could not support the idea of a conference of parties charged with such a task and was opposed to the idea of convening one. It would, however, fulfil in an objective manner its duties as a depositary State. The United States similarly reiterated that it did not believe the approach envisaged was appropriate or practicable, but also affirmed that it would carry out its responsibilities as a depositary State.

Australia, which had abstained in the voting, emphasized none the less its strong belief that there was an urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. While it had not yet taken a position on the idea of a conference to amend the partial test-ban Treaty, it had long considered the Conference on Disarmament to be the forum best equipped to address the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Belgium, which had also abstained, similarly believed that the Conference on Disarmament represented the best framework for dealing, at the multilateral level and not in isolation from other aspects of disarmament, with questions relating to the cessation of nuclear-test explosions. The Federal Republic of Germany could not support a project aimed at widening the scope of the partial test-ban Treaty without the necessary groundwork having been done in the field of verification; rather, it advocated reliably verifiable, legally binding undertakings derived through a step-by-step approach ultimately leading to the complete cessation of nuclear testing. For similar reasons, it could not support the idea of rushing into full-fledged multilateral negotiations on a test ban and had also abstained in the voting on the first proposal introduced by Mexico. Japan understood the frustration of many at the lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament for many years, but remained firmly convinced that the Conference provided the best

avenue for achieving the shared goal of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and had serious reservations regarding a course of action which might impair or side-track its work. The Netherlands felt that the special conference would not provide an adequate way of dealing with the question, nor did the proposed text take into account the promise of the step-by-step approach, which related the test ban issue to the disarmament process. Holding that the time was not ripe for a comprehensive ban, it felt there was no alternative to the efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to achieve progress on practical points relating to nuclear testing. New Zealand, which had also abstained, similarly preferred to place its trust in the ability of the Conference on Disarmament to make progress towards the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as it considered that the avenue most likely to yield practical results.

On 31 October, 26 sponsors, later joined by 5 additional States,²⁷ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty", which was introduced by Australia on 8 November.

The representative of Australia noted that the text was the product of joint drafting with New Zealand and consultation with some other delegations, and that the corresponding resolution in 1987—resolution 42/27—on which it was based, had been adopted with a record degree of support: 143 to 2, with only 8 abstentions. The sponsors were convinced that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would make a major contribution to efforts to reduce and eliminate nuclear arms and to prevent their further proliferation, but that it could be achieved only if the world community agreed to take a practical approach—including unilateral, bilateral and multilateral steps—in particular in the Conference on Disarmament, as described in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the text (see below). While acknowledging other approaches, the sponsors held that theirs was the only comprehensive one avoiding a declaratory stance and any attempt to apportion blame for lack of progress. New Zealand, as a co-sponsor, underlined the need to begin work immediately on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. For this, the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament over the mandate of an *ad hoc* committee must be broken. As nuclear testing was the trigger for new technologies and refinement, there should be no further delay in the development of a verifiable, comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty capable of attracting universal adherence. While welcoming the bilateral efforts, New Zealand remained concerned that they envisaged the cessation of testing only as the last step, an approach which tended to make the goal of the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons a pre-condition to, rather than the result of, a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

At the point of voting in the First Committee, a third co-sponsor, Denmark, stated that it fully subscribed to the approach set out in the Australia-New Zealand text, which, over the years, had realistically taken account of

²⁷ Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Liberia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sweden, Thailand, Vanuatu and Zaire.

current circumstances while outlining the most feasible way of achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

On 15 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution introduced by Australia by a recorded vote of 127 to 2 (France and United States), with 6 abstentions (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Israel and United Kingdom).

India explained its abstention in the voting on the grounds that the Conference on Disarmament was a negotiating body, and that therefore a mandate calling for anything less than negotiating would reduce its role and downgrade the importance of the issue. Regarding the bilateral talks, as the Six-Nation Initiative had noted, any agreement leaving room for continued testing was not acceptable. Argentina explained that it had abstained also on the ground that the text did not refer explicitly to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

Four States that had voted affirmatively also explained their positions. Belgium was pleased that the text favourably acknowledged the bilateral efforts and the policy of a gradual and verifiable implementation of a total cessation of all types of nuclear testing. It also appealed to the members of the Conference on Disarmament to consider the proposal by Czechoslovakia regarding a mandate for an *ad hoc* committee on the question. The Federal Republic of Germany felt that the most promising way to achieve a reliably verifiable comprehensive test ban, which it sought, was through a step-by-step approach combining bilateral and multilateral efforts, and it particularly appreciated paragraphs 2 (c) and 3 in this connection. Although it had voted in favour of the draft, the Netherlands had not co-sponsored it because, in its view, the text did not sufficiently reflect the stage-by-stage approach and was, therefore, less balanced and realistic than the Netherlands would have wished. Venezuela's favourable vote was in spite of its reservations about the approach taken in the draft to the work of the Conference on Disarmament (in operative paragraph 2 of the text); in its view, that body's activity should be to initiate substantive negotiations.

All three draft resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December by recorded votes.

The first draft resolution introduced by Mexico was adopted by a recorded vote of 136 votes to 4, with 13 abstentions, as resolution 43/63 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for more than thirty years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than fifty resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which it has repeatedly assigned the highest priority,

Stressing that on eight different occasions it has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it has stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war,

Recalling that the Secretary-General, addressing a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 12 December 1984, after appealing for a renewed effort towards a comprehensive test-ban

treaty, emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons and that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament,

Taking into account that the three nuclear-weapon States that act as depositaries of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water undertook in article I of that Treaty to conclude a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear-test explosions, including all those explosions underground, and that such an undertaking was reiterated in 1968 in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, article VI of which further embodies their solemn and legally binding commitment to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

Noting that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration adopted on 21 September 1985, called upon the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and upon all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, as a matter of the highest priority, in the Conference on Disarmament,

Recalling that the leaders of the six States associated with the five-continent peace and disarmament initiative affirmed in the Stockholm Declaration, adopted on 21 January 1988, that "Any agreement that leaves room for continued testing would not be acceptable",

Taking note with satisfaction of the progress made in the Conference on Disarmament by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on the seismic verification of a comprehensive test ban,

1. *Reiterates once again its grave concern* that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;

2. *Reaffirms its conviction* that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority;

3. *Reaffirms also its conviction* that such a treaty would constitute a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race;

4. *Urges once more* all nuclear-weapon States, in particular the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to expedite negotiations to this end;

5. *Appeals* to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1989 session of an *ad hoc* committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions;

6. *Recommends* to the Conference on Disarmament that such an *ad hoc* committee should comprise two working groups dealing, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty, and compliance and verification;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions"

The second draft resolution introduced by Mexico was adopted by a recorded vote of 127 votes to 3, with 21 abstentions, as resolution 43/63 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the determination, proclaimed since 1963 in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Bearing in mind also that in 1968 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalled such determination and included in its article VI an undertaking by each of its parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date,

Recalling that in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, adopted unanimously, it had stressed that one of the basic principles on which the treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be based was that such treaty, which was then to be negotiated, should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers,

Recalling also that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration adopted by consensus on 21 September 1985, expressed its deep regret that a comprehensive multilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty had not been concluded so far and called for the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a treaty as a matter of the highest priority,

Noting that article II of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water provides a procedure for the consideration and eventual adoption of amendments to the Treaty by a conference of its parties,

1. *Welcomes* the submission to the Depositary Governments of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water of an amendment proposal for consideration at a conference of the parties to the Treaty convened for that purpose in accordance with article II of the Treaty;

2. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session an item entitled "Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water"

The draft resolution introduced by Australia was adopted by a recorded vote of 146 to 2, with 6 abstentions, as resolution 43/64, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Convinced of the consequent urgent need for an end to the nuclear-arms race and the immediate and verifiable reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that an end to nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time is an essential step in order to prevent the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons and their further proliferation and to contribute, along with other concurrent efforts to reduce nuclear arms, to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the ongoing negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in accordance with their joint statement of 17 September 1987, and noting the significant developments on improved verification arrangements to facilitate the ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, signed on 3 July 1974, and the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, signed on 28 May 1976,

Welcoming also the conclusion on 8 December 1987 of the historic Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and the agreement in principle on and progress made towards an agreement for 50 per cent reductions in the strategic nuclear forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America,

Recalling the proposals by the leaders of the Six-Nation Initiative to promote an end to nuclear testing,

Convinced that the most effective way to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time is through the conclusion, at an early date, of a verifiable, comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that will attract the adherence of all States,

Reaffirming the particular responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

1. *Reaffirms its conviction* that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States in all environments for all time is a matter of fundamental importance;

2. *Urges*, therefore, that the following actions be taken in order that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty may be concluded at an early date:

(a) The Conference on Disarmament should intensify its consideration of item 1 of its agenda entitled "Nuclear-test ban" and initiate substantive work on all aspects of a nuclear-test-ban treaty at the beginning of its 1989 session;

(b) States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, and all other States should co-operate in order to facilitate and promote such work;

(c) The nuclear-weapon States, especially those that possess the most important nuclear arsenals, should agree promptly to appropriate verifiable and militarily significant interim measures, with a view to realizing a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

(d) Those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so should adhere to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water;

3. *Also urges* the Conference on Disarmament:

(a) To take immediate steps for the establishment, with the widest possible participation, of an international seismic monitoring network with a view to the further development of its potential to monitor and verify compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

(b) In this context, to take into account the progress achieved by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, including work on the routine exchange and use of wave-form data, and other relevant initiatives or experiments by individual States and groups of States;

(c) To initiate detailed investigation of other measures to monitor and verify compliance with such a treaty, including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity;

4. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session on progress made;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty"

Conclusion

The approach to be followed in the bilateral USSR-United States negotiations with a view, ultimately, to the complete cessation of nuclear testing had already been announced in the latter part of 1987 and the initial negotiations had commenced in November of that year. Nevertheless, the progress in those negotiations, particularly in the area of the joint verification experiments conducted by the two parties in the context of the ratification of the 1974 threshold test-ban and 1976 peaceful nuclear explosions Treaties, together with the apparent good will with which their work was being carried out, was the most noteworthy development on the question of nuclear testing in 1988. It appeared, more strongly in 1988 than in 1987, that successful results from this initial stage of the negotiations could well lead to agreement on significantly more stringent intermediate limitations on nuclear testing by the two parties.

This evolution in bilateral activities relating to that question was not matched by any comparable development in the multilateral or international forums.

In the Conference on Disarmament, the new proposal of the Group of 21 for a mandate for a negotiating body—which, under certain conditions, could supersede their 1986 proposal—did not appear to come any closer than had the 1986 proposal to being accepted by the Western States, and since the socialist States in the Conference were already amenable to the 1986 text, the new one did not seem to demand any significant further compromise on their part. The formalization of the 1987 Czechoslovak proposal for a compromise mandate generated somewhat more interest. It gained not only the support of socialist members but also the interest of some members of the Group of 21 and of the Western States as a possible step in breaking the deadlock. Thus, in the final analysis, there remained the possibility of two out of the three groups reaching an acceptable compromise, but little hope of all members of all three agreeing on a formulation that would make it possible for an *ad hoc* committee to commence substantive work, either on the negotiation of a multilateral treaty or on the issues deemed to require prior multilateral understanding, as the case might be.

In other developments, one additional nuclear-weapon State—France—announced its decision to provide data to the United Nations on an annual basis on its underground nuclear tests; the Secretary-General was able to submit to the General Assembly the first annual register of information provided to him on nuclear explosions during a 12-month period; the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts continued to enjoy support; and the proposal to amend the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty to make it cover underground nuclear explosions was conveyed to the three depositary Governments.

In the General Assembly, the non-aligned States again initiated two resolutions—one focusing on the objective of a negotiating mandate within the Conference on Disarmament and one on the amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty; both were adopted by large majorities. Australia introduced a draft resolution, supported by States from all geographical and political groupings, urging the Conference on Disarmament to initiate substantive work on all aspects of a nuclear-test-ban treaty, to take steps towards establishing a seismic monitoring network and to investigate other measures for verifying compliance with a future comprehensive treaty. Although the three draft resolutions drew wide support, some nuclear-weapon States, a number of non-parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, some Western States and several others maintained their established positions, as indicated by their negative votes or abstentions, on one or more of the resolutions.

Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States

Introduction

EVER SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NUCLEAR AGE, non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those that do not belong to one of the major military alliances, have emphasized the need for effective measures to ensure their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The issue was raised forcefully in 1968 in connection with the negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.¹ After prolonged consideration of various options, the three nuclear-weapon States parties—the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States—agreed to provide such assurances through a Security Council resolution.

In its resolution 255 (1968), sponsored by the three, the Security Council recognized that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat thereof, against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty would create a situation that would call for immediate action by the Council and, above all, by its nuclear-weapon States permanent members. (China voted in favour of the resolution and France abstained.) The Council also welcomed the intention expressed by certain States that they would assist any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty that was a victim of an act or threat of nuclear aggression and reaffirmed the right to collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.

However, a number of non-nuclear-weapon States, while welcoming the “positive” assurance provided for in the resolution, expressed preference for a “negative” assurance, a commitment by nuclear-weapon States that they would not use nuclear weapons against them.² Although this issue has since figured almost uninterruptedly in the agenda of various disarmament forums, no agreed solution has so far been found.

¹ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 3rd edition: 1987 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.88.IX.5).

² Under a “positive” assurance, nuclear-weapon States would commit themselves, in specific circumstances, to come to the defence of non-nuclear-weapon States, as envisaged, for example, in Security Council resolution 255 (1968). Under a “negative” assurance, nuclear Powers would commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

In the 1978 Final Document, the General Assembly noted the individual declarations on the question made or reaffirmed by the nuclear-weapon States at the tenth special session and urged those Powers to conclude effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.³ In 1979, the United States proposed that those declarations be formalized, but it has not pursued its initiative. Summaries of the unilateral pledges given in 1978 and, in several cases, subsequent reformulations are contained in the annex to this chapter.

The complexity of the question of security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States continues to prevent significant progress in either the General Assembly or the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, which has established a subsidiary body to deal with this item each year since 1979, with the exception of 1986. In the early 1980s, the Eastern European States specifically advocated, in General Assembly resolutions that they sponsored, the conclusion of a legally binding international convention, but recently they have stressed effective arrangements rather than a convention, and have appealed for flexibility in reaching a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. Pakistan, whose proposal has remained virtually unchanged, focuses on the need for agreement on a common formula, which could be included in an international instrument. Proponents of both approaches note that in the Conference on Disarmament there is widespread support for the conclusion of a convention. Western States, however, have not favoured a convention and believe that differences in the nature of the security requirements of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States make agreement on a common formula difficult.

General developments and trends, 1988

In the *Conference on Disarmament*, debate continued on the scope, substance, form and nature of security assurances, but the positions of States remained largely unchanged. The non-aligned members maintained that, pending nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon States had an obligation to guarantee, in clear and categorical terms and in an internationally binding form, that they would not attack or threaten non-nuclear-weapon States with nuclear weapons, and they were convinced that the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations could not be invoked to justify such use in the case of armed attack not involving nuclear weapons, since nuclear war would threaten the very survival of mankind. The socialist members also held that various interim measures should be taken to strengthen the security of

³ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 59.

non-nuclear-weapon States. They continued to support the conclusion of an international legally binding instrument to assure, uniformly and unconditionally, non-nuclear-weapon States having no nuclear weapons on their territories against the use or threat of use of such weapons. China reiterated its unconditional guarantee not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and its support for the conclusion of an international convention to grant security assurances. Western countries held that security assurances should remain qualified by a provision of non-attack in alliance or in association with a nuclear-weapon State. They also stressed the importance of the commitment of States Members of the United Nations under Article 2 of the Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force, and their right, under Article 51, to individual or collective self-defence.

No significant developments on the subject of security assurances took place in the Conference on Disarmament during its session. Although considerable efforts were made to arrive at a common approach, specific difficulties relating to differing perceptions of the security interests of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States persisted and the complex nature of the issues involved prevented agreement on a common formula. At the same time, the discussion underlined that all delegations were ready to continue the search for a common approach with regard to the substance of negative security assurances and, in particular, with regard to a common formula.

In the *General Assembly* at its special and its regular sessions, delegations tended to focus on aspects of nuclear disarmament other than security assurances. The question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States was referred to mainly by non-aligned countries, which felt that binding undertakings by nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States would engender some degree of confidence on the part of the latter. The subject was discussed in connection with calls for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, for pledges of non-first use, for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and for strengthening the non-proliferation régime. Senegal, for instance, felt that measures taken to protect non-nuclear-weapon States were tantamount to measures to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, and Kenya pointed out that action taken to provide assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States should be seen as a step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons and not as an end in itself.

Consultations were held among interested delegations in the First Committee in an attempt to formulate a single draft resolution on the issue of security assurances, but that did not prove possible. Nevertheless, a number of countries—Bulgaria, Hungary, the Netherlands and New Zealand—stressed the importance of working to achieve such a text in 1989. Two resolutions were adopted, both of which referred to the need to reach agreement on a common approach to the subject and recognized the widespread support in the Conference on Disarmament for the conclusion of an international convention.

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1988

The agenda item entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” was considered by the Conference on Disarmament in plenary meetings during the periods from 28 March to 1 April and from 22 to 26 August. The Conference re-established its *Ad Hoc* Committee on the item with a mandate to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on such arrangements. The Conference appointed Mr. Dimitar Kostov of Bulgaria as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee; Mr. Konstantin Tellalov of Bulgaria served as Chairman in the absence of Mr. Kostov during the spring part of the session. The *Ad Hoc* Committee submitted two reports to the Conference: the first set out the current state of negotiations on the subject, taking into account the negotiations conducted since August 1982, and was incorporated into the special report of the Conference to the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session;⁴ and the second focused on the negotiations and discussions held during the summer part of the session of the Conference.⁵

During its consideration of the item, the *Ad Hoc* Committee had before it the documents of the previous sessions as well as a paper prepared by the Chairman, Mr. Kostov, entitled “Chairman’s discussion paper: elements of a ‘common formula’ of negative security assurances”, which gave a structured compilation of many of the ideas raised at meetings of the Committee. The *Ad Hoc* Committee generally felt that the discussion paper, like other papers and proposals before the Committee, could make a useful contribution to its work.

During its session, the *Ad Hoc* Committee continued to examine and negotiate on proposals for a common formula of assurance to be included in an international legally binding instrument and for interim arrangements. Three approaches were discussed with regard to a possible legal instrument: (a) a single common formula; (b) a common formula for each category of non-nuclear-weapon States, established according to certain criteria, such as participation in a military alliance or adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty or other international legal instrument (see the criteria contained in the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States reproduced in the annex to this chapter); and (c) other possible options.

Early in the session, Nigeria orally proposed that nuclear-weapon States set aside their various unilateral declarations to facilitate effective negotiations and the adoption of a convention on the basis of a common formula and that any nuclear-weapon State, while ratifying such a convention, preserve the right to make reservations reflecting its unilateral declarations.

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-15/2)*, sect. III, paras. 90 and 91.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Forty-third Session (A/43/27)*, sect. III, paras. 81-83.

Some Western delegations, including the Western nuclear-weapon States, saw this as an interesting possible first step that needed further development. Some socialist delegations considered that such an international instrument should reflect the need for reciprocity of the obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States and they pointed out that nuclear-weapon States might use the opportunity of ratification of such an international instrument to improve the substance of their unilateral declarations of non-use. Bulgaria and New Zealand pointed to the need for some form of verification procedures to be included in any international instrument of this kind. Some delegations of the Group of 21, in particular Argentina and Pakistan, maintained that a single common formula to which any nuclear-weapon State would have the right to make reservations would not be credible and would not meet the legitimate security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee also focused its attention on proposals for establishing categories of non-nuclear-weapon States.⁶ Some socialist delegations felt that such an approach would help the Committee overcome its difficulties in reaching agreement on a single common formula. They pointed out that the approach had the merit of allowing the common formulas of the respective categories of non-nuclear-weapon States to be unconditional and of providing assurance in accordance with the principle of reciprocity of status of obligations of non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon States. The approach could be applied on a stage-by-stage basis, beginning with the largest and easiest category of non-nuclear-weapon States, those non-parties to a military alliance with a nuclear-weapon State. Some delegations of the Group of 21, however, especially Argentina and Pakistan, cautioned that the approach would undermine the perceived consensus that only a single common formula offered a practical and acceptable solution to the problem. Moreover, they believed that such an approach would not be acceptable because it implied that non-nuclear-weapon States should fulfil certain conditions before they could become eligible for assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Some Western delegations, including the Western nuclear-weapon States, stressed that extending assurances to categories of non-nuclear-weapon States would have the effect of limiting the scope of the existing unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States.

Though the *Ad Hoc* Committee held a structured and goal-oriented debate during the session of the Conference, in which new ideas were explored and a clearer understanding of the many issues involved was achieved, the deliberations on the various approaches proved inconclusive. In its report to the Conference, the Committee recommended that it should be re-established at the beginning of the 1989 session in order to continue its work.

⁶ For further details, see the proposal by Nigeria (CD/768) of 1987 and the 1983 report of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly, issued in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27)*, para. 76.

Action by the General Assembly, 1988

Pakistan introduced a draft resolution entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" in the First Committee on 7 November. Pakistan stressed its unwavering commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and stated that until the objective of nuclear disarmament was achieved, the critical importance of credible guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States could not be over-emphasized. It was a source of deep disappointment to Pakistan that, although there were no objections in principle to the concept of negative security assurances, the Conference on Disarmament had failed to register any progress in negotiating an internationally binding legal instrument on the subject. It considered it important that the General Assembly call upon the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts in searching for a common formula. Pakistan noted that the draft resolution had been prepared along the lines of resolution 42/32, adopted the previous year, and appealed to the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach an agreement of a legally binding character.

A second draft resolution on the subject of security assurances, entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", which was sponsored by Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia and the Soviet Union, was introduced in the First Committee on 9 November by Bulgaria. In introducing the text, Bulgaria stated that various interim measures should be taken to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The sponsors believed that States having no nuclear weapons on their territories should be granted reliable, uniform and unconditional assurances through the conclusion of an international, legally binding instrument. Bulgaria noted that the General Assembly had traditionally voted on two separate draft resolutions on the subject, containing many common points. Since the sponsors believed that the introduction of one draft resolution of a primarily procedural character would create a more favourable atmosphere in the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Conference on Disarmament in 1989, they had undertaken consultations with interested delegations in an attempt to agree upon a text. They regretted the failure of that attempt.

On 10 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution introduced by Pakistan by a recorded vote of 133 to none, with 4 abstentions (Afghanistan, Brazil, India and United States). On the same day, it approved the draft introduced by Bulgaria by a recorded vote of 99 to 17 (Western and associated States), with 16 abstentions.

After the vote in the First Committee, the Netherlands stated that agreement should be reached on a common formula that would combine the various unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States. Such an agreement could eventually be embodied in a mandatory resolution of the Security Council,

for example, or in an international agreement. It welcomed the neutrally worded draft resolution introduced by Pakistan. The Netherlands voted against the draft introduced by Bulgaria because, although it took into account some of the reservations made by Western States, it still contained paragraphs that it could not support, such as the last paragraph of the preamble, which seemed to prejudice the outcome of the discussions. The Netherlands looked forward to the introduction the following year of a single draft resolution on the issue that could obtain wider support.

Clarifying its vote in favour of the draft introduced by Bulgaria, India said it was convinced that the only guarantee for non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons lay in the negotiation of disarmament measures aimed at achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The development of security assurances could not be considered an objective in itself, but only an interim step in the overall plan to usher in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world.

New Zealand explained its abstention on the draft introduced by Bulgaria. Although it considered it a distinct improvement over the corresponding resolution of the previous year, New Zealand still found shortcomings in it, such as the implication that nuclear weapons were the sole cause of war of any kind. In its opinion, the goal of a draft resolution on the subject should be to bridge the different strategic perceptions of the military alliances. New Zealand hoped that at the next session of the General Assembly delegations would have before them a single consensus text.

On 7 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by Pakistan by a recorded vote of 152 to none, with 3 abstentions, as resolution 43/69. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Taking into account the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolutions 3261 G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 and 31/189 C of 21 December 1976,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Recalling its resolutions 33/72 B of 14 December 1978, 34/85 of 11 December 1979, 35/155 of 12 December 1980, 36/95 of 9 December 1981, 37/81 of 9 December 1982, 38/68 of 15 December 1983, 39/58 of 12 December 1984, 40/86 of 12 December 1985, 41/52 of 3 December 1986 and 42/32 of 30 November 1987,

Further recalling paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, *inter alia*, that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this item,

Noting the proposals submitted under that item in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

Taking note of the decision of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference reiterated in the Final Communiqué of the Seventeenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Amman from 21 to 25 March 1988, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Further noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

1. *Reaffirms* the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;

3. *Appeals* to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. *Recommends* that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including, in particular, those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;

5. *Recommends* that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

6. * *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

On 7 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by Bulgaria by a recorded vote of 117 to 17, with 16 abstentions, as resolution 43/68. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of war,

Considering that, until complete nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective arrangements to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the general desire to conclude effective international measures to that end at an early date,

Noting also the unilateral declarations on the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, made by all nuclear-weapon States,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Recognizing that effective measures of such security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States would constitute an important contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Aware of the in-depth negotiations on this subject in the Conference on Disarmament during the past ten years,

Recalling the relevant parts of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, and of the special report of the Conference on Disarmament submitted to the Assembly at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament, as well as of the annual report of the Conference on its 1988 session,

Welcoming the unanimous support in the Conference on Disarmament for continuing the search for a common approach to the substance of negative security assurances and, in particular, to a "common formula", which could be included in a legally binding instrument,

Recognizing the need for a fresh look at the issue, in particular by the nuclear-weapon States, in order to overcome the difficulties encountered at the negotiations in previous years,

Noting the proposals on this subject submitted to the Conference on Disarmament,

Considering that the non-nuclear-weapon States having no nuclear weapons on their territories have every right to receive reliable, uniform and unconditional international legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

1. *Reaffirms* the urgent need, pending the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament, to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Recommends* that the Conference on Disarmament pursue intensive negotiations in its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons at the beginning of its 1989 session, with a view to reaching such an agreement, taking into account the widespread support in the Conference for the conclusion of an international convention;

3. *Appeals* to all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate willingness and to exercise the flexibility necessary to reach agreement on a common approach to, including the possibility of a common formula in, an international instrument or instruments of a legally

binding character, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

Conclusion

In 1988 the Conference on Disarmament continued its consideration of the question of effective security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. Although new proposals and ideas were put forward in the *Ad Hoc* Committee which, in the opinion of some delegations, opened the possibility of formulating a new strategy, the differences in the perception of the security interests of the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon States were still pronounced and agreement on a common formula still eluded the Committee. Members did, however, reiterate their readiness to continue the search for such a formula for guarantees, in particular one that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding nature.

In the General Assembly, in spite of efforts made to agree upon a single draft resolution on the issue of negative security assurances, two drafts emerged, similar to those of previous years. Nevertheless, a number of delegations looked forward to the possibility of a single draft at the forty-fourth session, one which could receive wider support. In the two resolutions that it adopted, the General Assembly recommended that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue its negotiations on the subject at its 1989 session.

ANNEX

Unilateral security assurances by nuclear-weapon States

China

In the annex to a letter of 7 June 1978 to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of China stated:

For the present, all the nuclear countries, particularly the super-Powers, which possess nuclear weapons in large quantities, should immediately undertake not to resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones. China is not only ready to undertake this commitment but wishes to reiterate that at no time and in no circumstances will it be the first to use nuclear weapons.^a

In a communication of 28 April 1982 to the Secretary-General, the Government of China declared:

Pending the realization of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear countries must undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones.

As is known to all, the Chinese Government has long declared on its own initiative and unilaterally that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons, and that it undertakes unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones.^b

^a A/S-10/AC.1/17, annex, para. 7.

^b A/S-12/11.

France

On 30 June 1978, the representative of France stated:

Furthermore, as regards paragraph 59 [of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session] concerning assurances of the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States, the delegation of France would recall that France is prepared to give such assurances, in accordance with arrangements to be negotiated, to States which constitute non-nuclear zones.^c

On 11 June 1982, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France declared:

For its part, it [France] states that it will not use nuclear arms against a State that does not have them and that has pledged not to seek them, except if an act of aggression is carried out in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State against France or against a State with which France has a security commitment.^d

Soviet Union

On 26 May 1978, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union stated:

From the rostrum of the special session our country declares that the Soviet Union will never use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories.

We are aware of the responsibility which would thus fall on us as a result of such a commitment. But we are convinced that such a step to meet the wishes of non-nuclear States to have stronger security guarantees is in the interests of peace in the broadest sense of the word. We expect that the good will evinced by our country in this manner will lead to more active participation by a large number of States in strengthening the non-proliferation régime.^e

On 12 June 1982, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union read a message from the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, according to which the Soviet Union assumed "an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This obligation shall become effective immediately, at the moment it is made public from the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly". The Soviet Union added that the question of the granting of security guarantees to the non-nuclear States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty by the nuclear Powers "could be solved by concluding an international convention. The USSR is also prepared to conclude bilateral agreements on guarantees with States which do not possess nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territory".^f

United Kingdom

On 28 June 1978, the representative of the United Kingdom declared:

I accordingly give the following assurance, on behalf of my Government, to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices: Britain undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against such States except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.^g

United States

In the annex to a letter of 17 November 1978 from the representative of the United States to the Secretary of the First Committee, the United States cited a Presidential Declaration which read as follows:

The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT [non-proliferation Treaty] or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack.^h

^c *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 27th meeting, para. 190.*

^d *Ibid.*, *Twelfth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 9th meeting.*

^e *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 5th meeting, paras. 84 and 85.*

^f *Ibid.*, *Twelfth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 12th meeting.*

^g *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 26th meeting, para. 12.*

^h A/C.1/33/7, annex. The Presidential Declaration was also cited by the representative of the United States on 23 June 1978 in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, 13th meeting.*

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Introduction

FOR THE LAST SEVERAL DECADES, there has been considerable support for the idea that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones would greatly assist in deterring the spread of nuclear weapons and would promote nuclear disarmament. The 1978 Final Document¹ states that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure, and that the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

Three years earlier, in 1975, an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts had prepared a study entitled *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects*,² which contained several agreed recommendations on principles to be taken into account in creating such zones when appropriate conditions exist. In 1983, a group of governmental experts was established to review and supplement the earlier study. This time, however, the experts were not able to agree on the study and no conclusions were presented.

Since 1957, various proposals have been made for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in several regions.³ While in 1959 and in 1967 agreement was reached on the denuclearization of the Antarctic⁴ and of outer space,⁵ respectively, the first such zone in a densely populated area was created

¹ See General Assembly resolution S-10/2, paras. 60 and 61. The Final Document is reproduced also in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4*.

² United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.I.7.

³ For details, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 15; *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. V; *The United Nations and Disarmament: A Short History* (United Nations publication, 1988); and earlier issues of *The Yearbook*.

⁴ The Antarctic Treaty, 1959 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, No. 5778). The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 3rd edition: 1988 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.88.IX.5).

⁵ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967 (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex). The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.

by the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).⁶ Parties to that Treaty commit themselves to use the nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, and the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of such weapons. In 1986 the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga,⁷ entered into force. The Treaty commits its parties not to manufacture, acquire, possess or control any nuclear explosive device inside or outside the zone; to prevent in their respective territories the stationing or the testing of any such device; and not to dump radioactive wastes at sea anywhere within the zone.

The discussion on the question of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world is continuing in the principal United Nations disarmament bodies. It is argued that the creation of such zones will prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons, strengthen the security of the countries concerned and contribute to confidence-building among them, be conducive to agreement on disarmament steps in other areas, such as the reduction of conventional arms, and facilitate international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While supporting the concept as such, many Member States stress certain prerequisites, including the principles that the initiative should be based on agreement freely arrived at among the States of a given region; that the arrangements should take into consideration the specific characteristics of the region in question; that such arrangements should contain provisions concerning verification of the commitments undertaken; that the nuclear-weapon States should undertake obligations to respect the denuclearized status of such zones; and that the zone should strengthen not only the security of the region concerned, but that of the entire world. For many years, debates have taken place in the General Assembly on the desirability and possibility of setting up nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. In addition, there have been proposals for the creation of such zones in other regions, including Northern and Central Europe and the Balkans. For an account of the consideration of the related subject of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, see chapter I.

General developments and trends, 1988

There were no significant changes in the positions of States with regard to the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones during the year. Debates in the main bodies revealed that there was continued support for the establishment of such zones in various regions of the world, taking into account the specific

⁶ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.

⁷ For the text of the Treaty, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, appendix VII, or *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.

characteristics of each region, with a view to promoting nuclear disarmament and enhancing and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation régime. Many delegations, however, emphasized certain conditions, outlined in the Introduction to this chapter, that would have to be fulfilled before such benefits could be realized. The United States, in particular, did not universally endorse the establishment of such zones, believing that, in addition to meeting the conditions mentioned above, a zone should effectively prohibit nuclear explosive development or possession for any purpose and should not restrain the exercise of rights such as the right of freedom of navigation or the right to arrange for port calls and transit privileges. India continued to doubt the efficacy of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as a way to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. Since a major nuclear war would have global climatic effects and both combatant and non-combatant countries would suffer, the only solution, it believed, lay in the elimination of nuclear weapons themselves.

Discussions regarding zones in Africa and the Middle East were dominated by concerns about the alleged nuclear-weapon capability of South Africa and Israel and the fact that those two States had neither acceded to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty nor placed all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. It was widely believed that these circumstances posed a serious threat to security and constituted the main obstacle to the creation of denuclearized zones in those regions. Israel, for its part, reiterated its offer to Arab States to negotiate freely the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and denied allegations of any nuclear collaboration with South Africa.

A lack of agreement among all South Asian countries continued to prevent the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that area. As a part of their efforts to enhance regional co-operation, members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) continued work on the elaboration of an instrument for the establishment of a zone in their region. The South Pacific nuclear-free zone was further strengthened when the Soviet Union ratified Protocols 2 and 3 of the Treaty of Rarotonga, without reservations, on 21 April, and China ratified them on 21 October.

The socialist States felt that the conclusion of the INF Treaty had created favourable conditions for the practical introduction of nuclear-free status for different parts of Europe. As a follow-up to the elimination of Soviet and American intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe along the dividing line between Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries would constitute a logical step towards the ultimate goal of ridding the whole continent of nuclear weapons. It was also proposed that an agreement be drawn up not to allow the deployment of weapons, troop units and warships in the Balkans, following their reduction in other parts of Europe. The German Democratic Republic stated that at the International Meeting of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held in Berlin in June, participants from 113 countries, representing Governments,

non-governmental organizations and research institutes, had demonstrated the viability of the idea of establishing such zones.⁸

In their consideration of nuclear-weapon-free zones, most delegations to the *Disarmament Commission* focused on the question of South Africa's nuclear capability, a subject on which the Commission had been elaborating recommendations for a number of years. Although the Commission was able to reach agreement on some paragraphs of its draft recommendations, it was unable to complete its work. (See "Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1988", below.) Differences of view centred on the key question whether or not South Africa had nuclear-weapon capability. Certain States, mainly Western, did not consider that South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability and possession of nuclear weapons had been verified. Many other States, mainly non-aligned and socialist, however, believed that that had been proved.

During the special session and the regular session of the *General Assembly*, a great number of delegations, in particular of non-aligned and socialist States, addressed the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. While several delegations advocated the creation of such zones in general, others expressed support for specific proposals: Pakistan for a South Asian zone, ASEAN members for a South-East Asian zone, Bulgaria for a zone in the Balkans, and Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic for a zone in Central Europe, to name some.

Egypt, the German Democratic Republic and New Zealand submitted proposals on nuclear-weapon-free zones to the Assembly at its third special session on disarmament.⁹ Through Czechoslovakia, the Democratic Republic of Korea, which is not a Member of the United Nations, circulated a working paper on regional approaches to nuclear disarmament,¹⁰ in which it advocated the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in north-east Asia, beginning with the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and its vicinity. Egypt proposed that all the States of the Middle East should declare that they would not introduce nuclear weapons into the region and suggested ways to realize that objective. In its proposal the German Democratic Republic dealt with ways of ridding the world of nuclear weapons and suggested measures to ensure the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones. New Zealand's proposal underscored the value of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga—the only two treaties creating nuclear-free zones in permanently inhabited areas of the world.

At the special session, representatives were unable to reconcile their differences over the questions of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace and over the question of the nuclear capability of South Africa and

⁸ See A/43/741.

⁹ A/S-15/AC.1/25 (Egypt), A/S-15/32 (German Democratic Republic) and A/S-15/16 (New Zealand).

¹⁰ A/S-15/19.

Israel; and at its regular session, the General Assembly adopted its traditional resolutions on these subjects.

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1988

A working group established by the Disarmament Commission to deal with the question of South Africa's nuclear capability and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission met under the chairmanship of Mr. Daya Perera of Sri Lanka. It held nine meetings between 4 and 17 May, basing its work on the text of the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Commission to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.¹¹ The Working Group registered significant progress but was unable to achieve consensus on the text as a whole and felt that the work should be continued as a matter of priority at its next substantive session, in 1989, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations.¹²

Besides paragraphs 2, 4, 11 (f) and 11 (g), on which agreement was reached by the Working Group at its 1987 session, the Group reached agreement on paragraphs 1, 5, 7 and 11 (e) at its 1988 session. The Commission, in paragraph 1, would condemn the perpetuation of a racist minority régime in South Africa and the continued illegal occupation of Namibia and would support the struggle for the independence of Namibia; in paragraph 5, it would reaffirm the concern, expressed in paragraph 12 of the 1978 Final Document, regarding the acquisition of arms and arms technology by racist régimes, and would strongly recommend that the Assembly renew its call upon all States to adhere strictly to the relevant decisions of the Security Council; in paragraph 7, it would note that earlier reports of the discovery of preparations for a nuclear-weapon-test site in the Kalahari desert and other reports regarding South Africa's capability in the nuclear field caused legitimate concern to the African States and the international community; and in paragraph 11 (e) it would recommend that all States, particularly the five permanent members of the Security Council, prevail upon South Africa to accept an internationally binding nuclear non-proliferation commitment and to place all its activities under IAEA safeguards. The points on which agreement has not yet been reached concern the questions whether South Africa does possess a nuclear-weapon capability, whether other States are assisting it in acquiring such a capability and whether the arms embargo against South Africa, called for in several Security Council resolutions, is being adequately enforced and whether it should be extended.

In introducing the Working Group's report in the Commission, the Chairman stated that in view of the complexity of the subject and the length of

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42)*, annex I.

¹² *Ibid.*, *Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3)*, sect. III, para. 33. The report of Working Group I is reproduced *in extenso* under paragraph 33.

time the Commission had been considering it, the fact that the Group had been able to reach consensus on the four paragraphs should be seen as a significant achievement. He added that the Group had been very much closer to reaching agreement on several other paragraphs than it had been in the past. Although lack of consensus prevented their adoption, the degree of agreement reached could certainly be built on in the future. The Chairman stressed that the Group's inability to agree on the remaining 10 paragraphs of the basic text was due, not to lack of interest on the part of the participants, but purely to the complexity of the item under consideration.

In concluding statements, some speakers expressed disappointment that despite the significant threat to regional and international peace and security posed by the South African régime, only a slow rate of progress had been achieved.

Action by the General Assembly, 1988

In 1988 the General Assembly had four items on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones on its agenda: (a) "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/25 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)", (b) "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", (c) "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East" (discussed in chapter XVII below) and (d) "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia". In addition, a separate item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament" was considered in the context of the zone in the Middle East. The following sections describe General Assembly action related to nuclear-weapon-free zones in the four regions indicated in the agenda items.

Latin America

Since 1979, an item on the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has remained on the Assembly's agenda. The Protocol concerns the application of the Treaty to territories in the Latin American region for which outside States have *de jure* or *de facto* responsibility. Three of those States—the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United States—became parties to Additional Protocol I, in 1969, 1971 and 1981, respectively. France signed Additional Protocol I in 1979, but has not yet ratified it.

A draft resolution entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/25 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)" was submitted by the Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia,

Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela, later joined by Honduras, Jamaica and Suriname. In introducing it on 7 November, Mexico, the depositary Government of the Treaty, recalled that 1987 had seen the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty and its two Additional Protocols and that there were already 23 States parties to the Treaty. It stated that it would not be right for the peoples of the territories situated within the zone of application of the Treaty to be deprived of the benefits deriving from the Treaty without having had an opportunity to express their opinion on it. By the draft, the General Assembly would again deplore the fact that France had not yet followed its signature of Additional Protocol I with ratification and would once more urge it not to delay such action any further.

On 15 November, the draft resolution was approved by the First Committee by a recorded vote of 128 to none, with 6 abstentions (Argentina, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, France and Senegal).

Among those voting in favour, the Netherlands expressed regret that not all eligible States in Latin America had acceded to the Treaty and voiced the hope they would do so. The United States expressed disappointment that the draft focused on Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and not on the issue of adherence to the Treaty by all eligible States. It therefore urged the sponsors of the draft to consider altering their approach should they introduce a draft resolution on the Treaty in the future.

Among those abstaining, Cuba explained that it could not renounce its right to have the weapons it needed as long as part of its territory was under the occupation of a foreign country, and for that reason, it could not become a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. France could not agree to being singled out while other countries within the area of application had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty, or had not made use of the clause that provided for its immediate entry into force in respect of themselves before all the countries ratifying the Treaty or the Protocols had become parties to those instruments. It stated that it would make a decision regarding ratification of Additional Protocol I, bearing in mind the status of the ratification of the Treaty itself.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution on 7 December by an unrecorded vote of 149 to none, with 5 abstentions, as resolution 43/62. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2286(XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 32/76 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/58 of 14 December 1978, 34/71 of 11 December 1979, 35/143 of 12 December 1980, 36/83 of 9 December 1981, 37/71 of 9 December 1982, 38/61 of 15 December 1983, 39/51 of 12 December 1984, 40/79 of 12 December 1985, 41/45 of 3 December 1986 and 42/25 of 30 November 1987 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),

Taking into account that within the zone of application of that Treaty, to which twenty-three sovereign States are already parties, there are some territories which, in spite of not being sovereign political entities, are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from

the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the four States that *de jure* or *de facto* are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Considering that it is not fair that the peoples of some of those territories are deprived of such benefits without being given the opportunity to express their opinion in this connection,

Recalling that three of the States to which Additional Protocol I is open—the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America—became parties to the Protocol in 1969, 1971 and 1981, respectively,

1. *Deplores* that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France, which took place on 2 March 1979, has not yet been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the pressing invitations which the General Assembly has addressed to it;

2. *Once more urges* France not to delay any further such ratification, which has been requested so many times and which appears all the more advisable, since France is the only one of the four States to which the Protocol is open that is not yet party to it;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session an item entitled “Implementation of General Assembly resolution 43/62 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

Guyana, explaining its affirmative vote in the General Assembly, stated that it had chosen in the past to abstain on the draft resolutions on the item as a form of protest against article 25, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, concerning admission of a political entity part or all of whose territory was the subject of dispute between an extra-continental country and a Latin American State. That provision, in its view, discriminated against Guyana and prevented it from becoming a party. However, because it expected that that impediment would be removed in the near future, it had decided in 1988 to give full support to the draft resolution.

Africa

Since the adoption of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa in 1964 by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the General Assembly has repeatedly called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Moreover, since 1979, the Disarmament Commission has considered the question of South Africa’s nuclear capability and has reported on its deliberations in this area to the General Assembly (see “Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1988”, above). The item entitled “Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa” was included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its forty-third session in accordance with resolution 42/34 A of 1987. By another resolution adopted in the same year, resolution 42/34 B, the Assembly had requested the Secretary-General to report to it at its forty-third session on South Africa’s evolution in the nuclear field.

The Secretary-General informed the Assembly¹³ that he had continued to follow developments in South Africa very closely and, in order to obtain

¹³ A/43/701.

information that would assist in the preparation of his report, he had been in contact with IAEA and OAU. The Director General of IAEA had provided him with updated information regarding South Africa's nuclear capability, which the Secretary-General included as annex I to his report. Appended to the annex, as attachment II, was a letter setting out the position of the South African Government with regard to negotiations on the question of its accession to the non-proliferation Treaty. Stating that it was prepared to commence negotiations with each of the nuclear-weapon States on the possibility of signing the Treaty, South Africa spelt out its concerns: rights and privileges in terms of article IV of the Treaty, particularly as they relate to the exchange of equipment, materials and technology; the ability of South Africa, should it accede, to market uranium commercially like all other producers, subject only to IAEA or equivalent safeguards; discriminatory domestic legislation currently existing in a number of countries signatories of the non-proliferation Treaty that was contrary to the principles embodied in several articles of the Treaty; United Nations resolutions which called for a complete ban on nuclear co-operation with South Africa; challenges to South Africa's credentials at IAEA General Conferences and review conferences of the non-proliferation Treaty; and the discriminatory nature of the NPT in so far as it distinguished between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. Annex I also contained a brief account of a meeting of the depositaries of the Treaty and South Africa and a statement by the depositaries addressed to the thirty-second General Conference of IAEA, maintaining the position that South Africa should adhere to the Treaty as soon as possible. Annex II to the Secretary-General's report contained the text of IAEA resolution GC(XXXII)/RES/503, on South Africa's nuclear capabilities, adopted in September 1988.

Under the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", two texts, draft resolution A, entitled "Implementation of the Declaration", and draft resolution B, entitled "Nuclear capability of South Africa", were introduced on 7 November, on behalf of the African Group, by Zaire. In introducing the texts, Zaire stated that the two draft resolutions were linked by South Africa's persistence in acquiring nuclear capability, thus frustrating the purpose of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. By draft resolution A, the Assembly would call on all States to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and would appeal to all States to monitor South Africa's research on and development and production of nuclear weapons. By draft resolution B, the Assembly would condemn all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with South Africa, and demand that South Africa submit its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by IAEA.

On 17 November, before the vote on draft resolution A, Zaire, on behalf of the African Group, drew the Committee's attention to its reasons for introducing the text. It highlighted a number of facts which, it stated, had been well established by studies of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and relevant reports of IAEA, as well as by

recent statements by the leaders of the South African régime themselves, and which, it felt, enabled the African Group to state unequivocally that South Africa was developing a military nuclear programme and, hence, a nuclear capability. In the light of those facts, the Group called for the adoption of draft resolution A by consensus.

At the same meeting, Zaire orally revised draft resolution B by replacing the twelfth paragraph of the preamble, by which the General Assembly would have strongly condemned "the continued military occupation by South African troops of parts of the territory of Angola in violation of its national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity", and would have urged "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan soil;" by a new text. For the final version, see resolution 43/71 B below.

At the same meeting, the First Committee took action on the two texts. Draft resolution A was approved by a recorded vote of 132 to none, with 4 abstentions (France, Israel, United Kingdom and United States). Draft resolution B, as orally revised, was approved by a recorded vote of 116 to 4, with 13 abstentions.

Among those voting in favour of both of the draft resolutions, Denmark, speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries, expressed reservations on certain formulations in the two texts: those that failed to take into account the division of work between the Security Council and the General Assembly, those that singled out countries, and those that addressed private citizens and enterprises, rather than Governments. Furthermore, the Nordic countries voiced reservations on operative paragraph 7 of draft resolution A and on the twelfth paragraph of the preamble of draft resolution B, stating that the latter did not reflect the actual situation in Angola. New Zealand explained that it supported draft resolution B because it shared the concern expressed in the text regarding South Africa's unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. However, it also voiced reservations over the singling out of one country or group of countries. It urged South Africa to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, thereby renouncing any interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Uruguay, speaking of draft resolution B, noted that the Government of South Africa had still not adhered to the non-proliferation Treaty—an action which might have given the international community adequate guarantees with regard to South Africa's nuclear capability. It also felt that the singling out of certain States in the text fragmented the efforts which were necessary to bring about a viable solution to the situation.

Australia voted in favour of draft resolution A, but abstained on draft resolution B because it objected to the singling out of certain States and to what it considered questionable assertions regarding South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability. It stressed, however, that it considered the *apartheid* régime of South Africa abhorrent and strenuously opposed it. Japan, likewise voting in favour of draft resolution A, stated that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in any region of the world would foster nuclear non-proliferation and the peace and security of the region in question provided

that their establishment was agreed to by the countries of the region and all the countries concerned and that they would strengthen the peace and security of the world as a whole.

Three States that abstained on draft resolution A and voted against draft resolution B explained their positions on one or both texts. France agreed with the fundamental objectives of the two texts, but believed it was necessary to distinguish between military applications and civilian use of nuclear energy. As draft resolution A did not, in its opinion, make a sufficient distinction between the two and draft resolution B did not make any distinction at all, it abstained on the former text and voted against the latter. The United Kingdom noted that draft resolution A contained judgements that were either insufficiently substantiated or more properly matters for the Security Council. While it reiterated that it did not collaborate in any way with South Africa in the development of its nuclear programme, it maintained that all States had the right to apply and develop programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Israel voted against draft resolution B, claiming that it was unfairly named in the preamble, and it noted that it had often categorically rejected the allegation that it collaborated with South Africa in the nuclear field. Moreover, it had on many occasions made known its total condemnation of *apartheid* and South Africa's régime of racial discrimination and had curtailed its relations with that country.

The General Assembly adopted both of the draft resolutions on 7 December. Draft resolution A, on the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, was adopted by a recorded vote of 151 to none, with 4 abstentions, as resolution 43/71 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling its resolution 1652(XVI) of 24 November 1961, its earliest on the subject, as well as its resolutions 2033(XX) of 3 December 1965, 31/69 of 10 December 1976, 32/81 of 12 December 1977, 33/63 of 14 December 1978, 34/76A of 11 December 1979, 35/146B of 12 December 1980, 36/86B of 9 December 1981, 37/74A of 9 December 1982, 38/181A of 20 December 1983, 39/61A of 12 December 1984, 40/89A of 12 December 1985, 41/55A of 3 December 1986 and 42/34A of 30 November 1987, in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Recalling that in its resolution 33/63 it vigorously condemned any overt or covert attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent of Africa and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent or elsewhere,

Bearing in mind the provisions of resolution CM/Res.1101(XLVI)/Rev.1 on the denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its forty-sixth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 20 to 25 July 1987,

Having taken note of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research entitled "South Africa's nuclear capability", undertaken in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, as well as of the report of the Disarmament Commission,

Noting the actions taken by those Governments which have taken measures to restrict co-operation with South Africa in nuclear and other fields,

Expressing regret that, despite the threat that South Africa's nuclear capability constitutes to international peace and security and, in particular, to the realization of the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, the Disarmament Commission, although it made some progress during its substantive session in 1988, failed once again to reach a consensus on this important item on its agenda,

1. *Strongly renews its call* upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

2. *Reaffirms* that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity would be an important measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security;

3. *Expresses once again its grave alarm* at South Africa's possession and continued development of nuclear-weapon capability;

4. *Condemns* South Africa's continued pursuit of a nuclear capability and all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime that enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, which seeks to keep Africa free from nuclear weapons;

5. *Calls upon* all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to desist from further collaboration with the racist régime that may enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;

6. *Demands once again* that the racist régime of South Africa refrain from manufacturing, testing, deploying, transporting, storing, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons;

7. *Appeals* to all States that have the means to do so to monitor South Africa's research on and development and production of nuclear weapons and to publicize any information in that regard;

8. *Demands once again* that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance that the Organization of African Unity may seek regarding the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of the relevant convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa;

10. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa"

Draft resolution B, on the nuclear capability of South Africa, was adopted by a recorded vote of 138 to 4, with 12 abstentions, as resolution 43/71 B.

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's nuclear capability,

Recalling its resolutions 34/76B of 11 December 1979, 35/146A of 12 December 1980, 36/86A of 9 December 1981, 37/74B of 9 December 1982, 38/181B of 20 December 1983, 39/61B of 12 December 1984, 40/89B of 12 December 1985, 41/55B of 3 December 1986 and 42/34B of 30 November 1987,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling that, in paragraph 12 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it noted that the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm,

Recalling also that, in its resolution 33/63 of 14 December 1978, it vigorously condemned any overt or covert attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent of

Africa and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent or elsewhere,

Bearing in mind the provisions of resolution CM/Res.1101(XLVI)/Rev.1 on the denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its forty-sixth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 20 to 25 July 1987,

Noting with regret the non-implementation by *apartheid* South Africa of resolution GC(XXX)/RES/468 adopted on 3 October 1986 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency during its thirtieth regular session,

Having taken note of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research entitled "South Africa's nuclear capability", undertaken in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity,

Expressing regret that despite the threat that South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability constitutes to international peace and security and, in particular, to the realization of the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, the Disarmament Commission, although it made some progress during its substantive session in 1988, failed once again to reach a consensus on this important item on its agenda,

Alarmed that South Africa's nuclear facilities, particularly those that remain unsafeguarded, enable it to develop and acquire the capability of producing fissionable material for nuclear weapons,

Gravely concerned that South Africa, in flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, has continued its acts of aggression and subversion against the peoples of the independent States of southern Africa,

Deeply indignant at the persistent policy of hostility by the racist régime of South Africa as demonstrated by its constant encroachment into the territory of Angola, which constitutes an act of aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country,

Expressing its grave disappointment that, despite repeated appeals by the international community, certain Western States and Israel have continued to collaborate with the racist régime of South Africa in the military and nuclear fields and that some of these States have, by a ready recourse to the use of veto, consistently frustrated every effort in the Security Council to deal decisively with the question of South Africa,

Recalling its decision taken at the tenth special session that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the implementation of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa,

Stressing the need to preserve peace and security in Africa by ensuring that the continent is a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's nuclear capability;
2. *Condemns* the massive buildup of South Africa's military machine, in particular its frenzied acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail;
3. *Also condemns* all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime of South Africa, in particular the decision by some Member States to grant licences to several corporations in their territories to provide equipment and technical and maintenance services for nuclear installations in South Africa;
4. *Reaffirms* that the acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability by the racist régime constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
5. *Expresses its full support* for the African States faced with the danger of South Africa's nuclear capability;
6. *Commends* the actions taken by those Governments which have taken measures to restrict co-operation with South Africa in nuclear and other fields;
7. *Demands* that South Africa and all other foreign interests put an immediate end to the exploration for and exploitation of uranium resources in Namibia;

8. *Calls upon* all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith all forms of military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime;

9. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to consider once again as a matter of priority during its substantive session in 1989 South Africa's nuclear capability, taking into account, *inter alia*, the findings of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on South Africa's nuclear capability;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance that the Organization of African Unity may seek regarding the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of the relevant convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa;

11. *Commends* the adoption by the Security Council of resolutions 558 (1984) of 13 December 1984 and 591 (1986) of 28 November 1986 on the question of South Africa, with a view to blocking the existing loopholes in the arms embargo so as to render it more effective and prohibiting, in particular, all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field;

12. *Demands once again* that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow very closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session.

In connection with the item entitled "Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa", the General Assembly adopted several resolutions with some disarmament-related provisions: 43/50 B, "Military collaboration with South Africa"; 43/50 C, "Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist régime of South Africa"; 43/50 D, "Imposition, co-ordination and strict monitoring of measures against racist South Africa"; 43/50 E, "Relations between South Africa and Israel"; and 43/50 K, "Concerted international action for the elimination of *apartheid*".

Middle East

The item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament" was included in the provisional agenda of the forty-third session pursuant to resolution 42/44 of 1987, in which the Assembly had requested the Secretary-General to follow closely Israeli nuclear activities and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session. The Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General,¹⁴ in which he noted that apart from the resolution of the IAEA General Conference annexed to it, he had no additional information that would require him to supplement his earlier report to the Assembly on the subject.¹⁵ By the resolution, GC(XXXII)/RES/487, the General Conference requested the Director General to continue to report to the Board of Governors and to it on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat and on the implementation of that resolution. It also requested the Director General, pending the acceptance by Israel of IAEA safeguards, to prepare a technical study on different modalities of application of IAEA safeguards in the region.

¹⁴ A/43/693.

¹⁵ A/42/581.

Algeria, Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen submitted a draft resolution entitled "Israeli nuclear armament" in the First Committee. In introducing the draft on 7 November, Jordan, on behalf of the Arab Group, maintained that Israel was still continuing to develop its nuclear capability. According to the draft, the Assembly would, *inter alia*, reiterate its condemnation of Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons and of its co-operation with South Africa; demand that Israel place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; and request IAEA to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel which could contribute to its nuclear capabilities.

Commenting on the draft at the same meeting, Israel stated that no State had ever made a blanket statement renouncing possession of nuclear weapons, not even signatories to the non-proliferation Treaty, which had the right to withdraw from the Treaty. It reiterated that there was no nuclear co-operation between itself and South Africa. Concerning the call for Israel to place all its facilities under full-scope safeguards, it asserted that once a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had been established, full-scope safeguards would be part of it, made credible by a mutuality of reassurances. It requested those States which contemplated abstention to consider the serious implications of their vote and to vote against the text.

On 15 November the Committee took separate recorded votes on a number of paragraphs of the draft (see the text below): it approved the sixth paragraph of the preamble by a vote of 77 to 19, with 32 abstentions; the ninth paragraph of the preamble by a vote of 69 to 21, with 35 abstentions; operative paragraph 2 by a vote of 79 to 19, with 28 abstentions; operative paragraph 5 by a vote of 71 to 24, with 31 abstentions; and operative paragraph 6 by a vote of 72 to 23, with 32 abstentions. It then approved the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 87 to 2 (Israel and United States), with 45 abstentions.

Three delegations explained their votes. Argentina voted in favour of the draft as a whole but abstained on the two preambular paragraphs that were voted on separately. It opposed the call to States to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision.

Australia and Japan abstained in the vote on the text as a whole and voted against in several of the separate votes. Australia explained that it abstained because the call for IAEA to suspend scientific collaboration with Israel and the call upon States to discontinue co-operation with Israel in the nuclear field could have implications for Israel's rights and privileges of membership in IAEA. Moreover, it did not accept that there was sufficient evidence for the theses expressed in the last three paragraphs of the preamble. However, it stressed its concern about the failure of Israel and a number of other countries to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and urged them to do so. At a later meeting, Japan explained that it had abstained because it had reservations on several paragraphs of the text on which it could not make

judgements owing to the lack of objective information. Like Australia, it urged Israel and other countries not parties to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty as soon as possible and thus remove the apprehension of the international community.

On 7 December the General Assembly took a vote on the draft resolution. It first adopted the sixth paragraph of the preamble by a recorded vote of 90 to 19, with 35 abstentions; the ninth paragraph of the preamble by a recorded vote of 78 to 21, with 42 abstentions; operative paragraph 2 by a recorded vote of 91 to 19, with 35 abstentions; operative paragraph 5 by a recorded vote of 82 to 24, with 35 abstentions; and operative paragraph 6 by a recorded vote of 81 to 23, with 39 abstentions. The draft resolution as a whole was then adopted, as resolution 43/80, by a recorded vote of 99 to 2 (Israel and United States), with 51 abstentions. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind its previous resolutions on Israeli nuclear armament, the latest of which is 42/44 of 30 November 1987,

Recalling its resolution 42/28 of 30 November 1987, in which, *inter alia*, it called for placing all nuclear facilities in the region under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Recalling also Security Council resolution 487(1981) of 19 June 1981, in which, *inter alia*, the Council called upon Israel urgently to place all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Noting that only Israel has been specifically called upon by the Security Council to place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Noting with grave concern Israel's persistent refusal to commit itself not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, despite repeated calls by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Taking into consideration resolution GC (XXXII)/RES/487 of 23 September 1988 adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which the General Conference strongly condemned the continued refusal by Israel to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons and to submit all its nuclear facilities to the Agency's safeguards in compliance with Security Council resolution 487(1981),

Deeply alarmed by the information with regard to the continuing production, development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel,

Aware of the grave consequences that endanger international peace and security as a result of Israel's development and acquisition of nuclear weapons and Israel's collaboration with South Africa to develop nuclear weapons and their delivery systems,

Deeply concerned that the declared Israeli policy of attacking and destroying nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes is a part of its nuclear armament policy,

1. *Reiterates its condemnation* of Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons;

2. *Reiterates also its condemnation* of the co-operation between Israel and South Africa;

3. *Requests once more* the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to ensure that Israel complies with Council resolution 487(1981);

4. *Demands once more* that Israel place all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

5. *Calls upon* all States and organizations that have not yet done so to discontinue co-operating with and giving assistance to Israel in the nuclear field;

6. *Reiterates its request* to the International Atomic Energy Agency to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel that could contribute to its nuclear capabilities;

7. *Requests also* the International Atomic Energy Agency to inform the Secretary-General of any steps Israel may take to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow closely Israeli nuclear activities and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament"

A related resolution, 43/65, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", is discussed in chapter XVII since, by it, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to undertake a study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a zone in that region. The study is to be submitted to the Assembly at its forty-fifth session, and parties of the region are to be requested to submit to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions with respect to the practical measures called for therein.

For the second successive year, the General Assembly decided to retain on its agenda the related item entitled "Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security", but took no action on it.

South Asia

Under the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia", Bangladesh and Pakistan submitted a draft resolution. In introducing it on 7 November, Pakistan held that, pending nuclear disarmament, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones represented an important collateral measure that could make a significant contribution towards providing a measure of security to non-nuclear-weapon States of the region concerned. It could insulate the region in question against the threat of nuclear attack and prevent the geographical spread of nuclear weapons. Pakistan expressed the belief that a regional approach, with each State accepting equal and non-discriminatory obligations, was the most feasible and effective means of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the South Asian region. By the draft, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to ascertain the views of the regional and other concerned States and to promote consultations among them to further efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. The Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General.¹⁶

On 15 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 99 to 2 (Bhutan and India), with 32 abstentions. Nine countries explained their positions.

¹⁶ A/43/505, transmitting the views of one State (Maldives) on the question, prepared in response to the Assembly's request in the corresponding resolution of 1987.

Among those voting in favour, Australia stated that its vote reflected its deep concern about the mounting pressures for nuclear proliferation in South Asia and a number of other regions in the world. Finland, voting affirmatively because it was its policy to support endeavours to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, asserted that initiatives to that end should arise from the States within a region and that the process should enjoy the support of all States concerned. The Islamic Republic of Iran explained that a fundamental part of its policy was to give top priority in disarmament measures to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Thus the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones was particularly important. Japan, speaking at a later meeting, was of the view that such zones would be conducive to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the peace and security of the region in question, but considered that a number of conditions (outlined in its explanation concerning "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", page 243) should first be fulfilled. Sri Lanka believed that the establishment of a zone in South Asia should be encouraged in the context of the ultimate aim of establishing a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, and that the creation of a zone there could reach fruition through the efforts primarily of the States of the region. The United States supported the proposal on South Asia because it appeared to be in harmony with its criteria for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. However, it noted that there were other areas in which those criteria would not be satisfied, and it therefore did not endorse the creation of such zones on a universal basis.

Indonesia, while supportive of efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones, abstained in the vote because the countries in South Asia were still in the process of achieving agreement on the issue. Sweden also supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in general, but abstained because States concerned voted against the draft resolution. It stressed that a basic prerequisite for such zones must be acceptance of and co-operation with the initiative by all States in the region.

India, which voted against, contended that the presence of nuclear weapons on the ground and in the waters bordering South Asia raised fundamental problems of defining the viability of any nuclear-weapon-free zone. It also asserted that the draft did not have the consent of all Member States of the region.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 116 to 3, with 34 abstentions, as resolution 43/66. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978, 34/78 of 11 December 1979, 35/148 of 12 December 1980, 36/88 of 9 December 1981, 37/76 of 9 December 1982, 38/65 of 15 December 1983, 39/55 of 12 December 1984, 40/83 of 12 December 1985, 41/49 of 3 December 1986 and 42/29 of 30 November 1987 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures which can contribute effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will assist in the strengthening of the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting with appreciation the declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States that are developing their peaceful nuclear programmes reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Welcoming the recent proposal for the conclusion of a bilateral or regional nuclear-test-ban agreement in South Asia,

Taking note of the proposal to convene, under the auspices of the United Nations, a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, as soon as possible, with the participation of the regional and other concerned States,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the region of South Asia,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Reaffirms* its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

2. *Urges once again* the States of South Asia to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the mean time, from any action contrary to this objective;

3. *Calls upon* those nuclear-weapon States that have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to communicate with the States of the region and other concerned States in order to ascertain their views on the issue and to promote consultations among them with a view to exploring the best possibilities of furthering the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

5. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".

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An item concerning Antarctica, which is related to the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, was on the General Assembly's agenda at its forty-third session. Two draft resolutions on the subject were submitted and adopted, as resolutions 43/83 A and B, but neither one directly addressed disarmament matters.

Conclusion

In 1988 the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world continued to generate considerable interest, as reflected in state-

ments made during debates in the main United Nations bodies. A large number of delegations supported the concept and specific proposals in the context of regional disarmament measures and the nuclear non-proliferation régime. Along with the extensive debate on the creation of zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, proposals to create zones in other regions, such as South-East Asia, the Balkans, and Northern and Central Europe, were also commented on. In the course of the deliberations, it was often stressed that certain conditions should be met in establishing zones in order to ensure their nuclear-free status and to enhance the security both of the regions involved and of the entire world. Attention was also called to the value of the two existing nuclear-free zones, in Latin America and the South Pacific.

Concern continued to be expressed and differences of view persisted with regard to the alleged nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel, which many Member States considered the main obstacle to the denuclearization of Africa and to the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

The texts of resolutions related to nuclear-weapon-free zones that were adopted by the General Assembly at its regular session in 1988 were very similar to the corresponding texts of recent years. The resolution concerning the Middle East contained a new element, namely a request for a study on measures to facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, and for this reason is discussed in chapter XVII.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and IAEA safeguards and related activities*

Introduction

FOR MANY YEARS INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSIONS on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy—both within the United Nations and elsewhere—have reflected two divergent approaches. In the first approach, stress is laid on the potential benefits of the peaceful application of this source of energy to a variety of purposes, particularly the generation of electric power. That approach is to some extent in conflict with the second approach, which emphasizes the risks engendered by the spread of nuclear material, equipment and technology that might lend themselves to the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

States seeking to obtain such items (usually referred to as “recipient countries”) have traditionally emphasized their need and their inherent right to have unimpaired access to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, while most of the actual or potential manufacturers of equipment and suppliers of material and technology (customarily called “supplier States”), wishing to avoid contributing to the spread of a nuclear-weapon capability among recipients, have advocated restrictions on international transfers, especially of nuclear know-how and installations. In the mid-1970s, a group of current and future exporters of nuclear items entered into consultations on joint guidelines and principles to govern their nuclear exports. The 15 States¹ concerned agreed upon criteria for the application of IAEA safeguards to exports and formulated requirements to prevent unauthorized transactions. The requirements included restrictions on re-exportation.²

In February 1980, the Conference on the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), initiated by the United States, completed a technical

*Sections of this chapter were contributed by IAEA. A reference to a party in this chapter, including its footnotes and annexes, does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the secretariats of IAEA or of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country or of its authorities or of its designation or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

¹ Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland (non-member of the United Nations), USSR, United Kingdom and United States.

² For a detailed outline of the guidelines, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, chapter IX.

evaluation of data and options that it had undertaken to find less-proliferation-prone nuclear fuel cycles. In all, 66 States—both suppliers and recipients of nuclear technology—took part in the evaluation, which did not however lead to the hoped-for result.

In June 1980, in response to the need for adequate supplies of fuel and related services, the IAEA Board of Governors established the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), open to all IAEA members, to advise the Board on ways to ensure long-term availability of such supplies and services in accordance with non-proliferation considerations and the role of IAEA. So far, the work of CAS has failed to yield a consensus on the means for achieving the purposes of both establishing the assurances sought and avoiding undue proliferation risks.

Recipient countries have sought to develop mutual assistance, self-reliance and co-ordinated action on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the United Nations and in other international organizations, particularly IAEA. In 1977 they proposed that an international conference be convened to promote co-operation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Three years later, by resolution 35/112, the General Assembly decided to hold the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

The Conference was held at Geneva from 23 March to 10 April 1987, with 106 States participating. In his message to the Conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated that the aim of the Conference must be to establish an appropriate framework for enhanced international co-operation that would serve the interests of both the technologically advanced and the developing countries. Although it did not prove possible to reach agreement on a complete set of principles and means for strengthening co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it was felt that the numerous scientific and technical papers presented could be useful to Governments and to the public, and that the comprehensive exchange of views between the supplier and recipient countries at the Conference had contributed to greater mutual understanding.

With regard to nuclear safety, the General Conference of IAEA, meeting in a special session in 1986, following a nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl, in the Soviet Union, adopted two international conventions: the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.³

General developments and trends, 1988

At the *thirty-second session of the General Conference of IAEA*, many delegations underlined the importance of nuclear energy on both economic and environmental grounds and recognized the need for international co-operation in this field.

³ See IAEA, *Final Document, Resolutions and Conventions adopted by the first special session of the General Conference, 24-26 September 1986*, sects. I-IV.

Delegations continued to support the Agency's expanded safety programme, which had been begun in 1986 as a result of the Chernobyl accident, stressing the importance of the existing international conventions on emergency planning and assistance, and the international Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Many delegations welcomed the issuance of revised nuclear plant safety codes and basic safety principles and stressed the value of the Agency's Operational Safety Review Teams. It was made clear, however, that fundamental safety and regulatory responsibility would have to rest with member States.

During the year there was increased adherence to the two agreements of 1986, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. As of September 1988, 31 States had ratified the former, and 26 the latter. The Agency continued with the activities it had undertaken to implement the provisions of both agreements.

Many delegations expressed their support for the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation activities, in particular for regional co-operation programmes, but there was also concern about a decline of the Agency's promotional activities in relation to its "regulatory" functions.

In September 1988, China and IAEA signed a safeguards agreement. Thus, all five nuclear-weapon States have now concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA covering some of their nuclear facilities. In general, the Agency's safeguards were praised as a reliable and effective system supporting the nuclear non-proliferation system. It was underlined that this confidence-building system was an essential condition for world-wide co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

There was also considerable interest in the question of liability for nuclear damage and in the application of two existing international conventions, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, both of which govern compensation for victims of a nuclear accident. On 21 September, a one-day diplomatic conference, known as the Conference on the Relationship between the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention, was held at IAEA headquarters. The 51 States that attended adopted by consensus a protocol—the Joint Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention—which will have the effect of extending the existing civil liability régime and avoiding possible conflicts of the applicable law.

In the *General Assembly* at its fifteenth special session and its forty-third session, States from all political groupings considered the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the work of IAEA. According to the Agency's report,⁴ most forecasts pointed to increased demand for electricity world-wide in the near and intermediate future. In 1988 some 10 new nuclear

⁴ International Atomic Energy Agency, *The Annual Report for 1987* (GC(XXXII)/835), transmitted to the General Assembly at its forty-third session under the symbol A/43/488.

power plants came on line. It was estimated that the proportion of the world's electricity produced by nuclear power would increase to close to 20 per cent by the mid-1990s.

Awareness of the risk of accident continued to influence the development of nuclear power and caused an upsurge in awareness of the need for nuclear safety. Some States, such as Sweden, where opposition to nuclear power was strong, had slowed down or suspended nuclear power programmes, and Austria, citing general concern regarding safety hazards, radioactive waste disposal and physical protection, had withdrawn from the nuclear option. However, in most other countries, particularly Japan, the Soviet Union and other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and the Republic of Korea (a non-member of the United Nations), commitments to nuclear power programmes had been reasserted.

While in most countries there appeared to be no significant changes in public and political acceptance of nuclear power, there was increasing concern about the environmental impact of non-nuclear power sources. The Director General of IAEA was of the view that the problems attributed to nuclear power—safety, waste and risk of proliferation—must be examined and that the risks identified must be compared with the risks connected with other options. To that end, he proposed a United Nations study on environmentally responsible and practical energy policies. Concerted action could come, he believed, only from common convictions that would emerge from a discussion among the world's Governments of energy needs and the economic and environmental consequences of different approaches.

It was widely recognized that an effective international non-proliferation régime was indispensable for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and it was stressed that the availability of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, on a non-discriminatory and long-term basis, should be ensured under adequate safeguards commitments. As the Director General of IAEA stated, it was important, both to the suppliers of nuclear technology and material and to the recipient countries, to demonstrate to neighbours and the world that no weapons use was made of technology or material transferred. According to the Agency's report, no anomaly was detected during the year that would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material or the misuse of facilities or equipment for any military purpose.

Both Eastern European and Western States underlined the importance of the Agency's safeguards activities in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, believing that the non-proliferation Treaty could not fulfil its indispensable role if it were not for the safeguards system or for the special place that IAEA had been given under the Treaty, and they reiterated their appeal to those States having nuclear facilities that were not under IAEA safeguards to place them under that régime. China observed that, in order to facilitate implementation of its safeguards agreement with IAEA, it was developing systems of accounting for and controlling nuclear material and was consulting with the Agency on auxiliary arrangements. Some concern was expressed that

because of limited financial resources, the Agency might have difficulties in meeting new demands for control and inspection activities.

As in previous years, IAEA resources earmarked for technical co-operation increased, bringing about an expansion of its programme, which comprised expert missions, equipment, fellowships and training courses, benefiting the developing countries in particular. Nevertheless, several developing countries expressed concern that the financial allocations for the safeguards programme were increasingly larger than those for technical co-operation and assistance activities. They stressed that the latter activities were indispensable for them if they were to reap the benefits derived from the peaceful uses of nuclear power.

It was noted that the developing countries themselves were participating more actively in the programme of technical co-operation. Some speakers in the debate emphasized the desirability of promoting the use of experts from developing countries and urged IAEA to intensify its efforts to assist those countries in establishing appropriate infrastructures and acquiring the expertise necessary to carry out, on their own, substantial parts of their nuclear programmes, particularly in the areas of nuclear power and nuclear applications. Argentina stated that, together with Brazil and several other countries, it had undertaken important projects in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which, in the near future, would clearly demonstrate the many benefits to be derived from co-operation among States of the southern hemisphere.

A number of non-aligned and developing countries condemned all practices of dumping nuclear wastes that would infringe the sovereignty of States and called for strong measures to end such practices. For details concerning the resolution on this subject adopted by the General Conference of IAEA, see the following section; for details concerning the corresponding resolutions in the General Assembly of the United Nations, see chapter XIV.

Action by the General Conference of IAEA, 1988

The thirty-second regular session of the General Conference of IAEA, held from 19 to 23 September in Vienna, was attended by more than 600 delegates from 101 of the 113 member States. The following is a brief outline of some of the resolutions adopted by the Conference.

Concerns among States about toxic waste disposal practices within their territories led to resolution GC(XXXII)/RES/490, by which the Conference condemned practices that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States and/or endanger the environment or public health. In the resolution IAEA was requested to set up a technical working group of experts to elaborate a code of practice for international transactions involving nuclear wastes. It would be based, among other things, on a review of current national and international laws and regulations on waste disposal.

Regarding nuclear safety and radiological protection, the Conference adopted resolution GC(XXXII)/RES/489, endorsing the Board of Governors' wish to maintain emphasis in these areas.

With respect to liability for nuclear damage, the Board of Governors was requested, in resolution GC(XXXII)/RES/491, to convene an open-ended working group in 1989 to study all aspects of liability for nuclear damage as part of its ongoing consideration of the question.

The Conference adopted resolution GC(XXXII)/RES/492 on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, in which it noted the signature and ratification status of the Convention and expressed the hope that the Convention would obtain the widest possible adherence.

The Conference adopted by consensus resolution GC(XXXII)/RES/493 concerning the status and implementation of the two Conventions concluded in 1986: the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

In a resolution on sustainable development, GC(XXXII)/RES/494, the General Conference requested the Director General to submit to the Board of Governors in February 1989 information on the Agency's contribution to the achievement of the objectives of environmentally sound and sustainable development. The information would serve as a basis for a report to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-fourth session.

By resolution GC(XXXII)/RES/487, entitled "Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat", which was adopted by a roll-call vote of 44 to 29, with 11 abstentions, the Director General was requested, pending the agreement of Israel to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, to prepare a technical study on different modalities of application of IAEA safeguards in the region.

By resolution GC(XXXII)/RES/503, entitled "South Africa's nuclear capabilities", which was adopted by a roll-call vote of 58 to 27, with 4 abstentions, the General Conference resolved to consider and take a decision at its next regular session on the June 1987 recommendation of the IAEA Board of Governors to suspend South Africa from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership in the Agency.

Status of safeguards

IAEA safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials and other equipment or information for military and other prohibited activities have been evolving almost since the Agency's establishment in 1956, and thus their methodology has been described briefly in earlier editions of *The Yearbook*.

In connection with the three treaties mentioned below, safeguards agreements are in force between IAEA and non-nuclear-weapon States.⁵ For the

⁵ The text of the three treaties—the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)—are reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 3rd edition: 1987 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.88.IX.5).

status of safeguards agreements in force pursuant to the non-proliferation Treaty, see annex I to this chapter. The terms of the safeguards agreements negotiated so far under the Treaty of Tlatelolco are practically identical to those of the safeguards agreements under the non-proliferation Treaty, with some variations to take account of the different provisions of the two Treaties. Three States (Colombia, Mexico and Panama) have negotiated safeguards agreements with the Agency pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. For a list of parties to the Treaty having safeguards agreements in force under the Treaty, refer to annex II. The parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga undertake to conclude with the Agency safeguards agreements along the lines of those concluded pursuant to the non-proliferation Treaty to cover all their peaceful nuclear activities. Most of them are already covered by safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to the non-proliferation Treaty.

By the end of 1988, safeguards agreements were in force for nine non-nuclear-weapon States that were not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, namely, Albania, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa. Viet Nam, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Spain have acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, but since safeguards agreements pursuant to that Treaty had not been concluded by 31 December, safeguards were being applied in these States under previously concluded agreements. For a complete list of the status of agreements other than those in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco as of 31 December 1988, see annex III to this chapter.

During 1988 safeguards continued to be applied to some of the peaceful nuclear activities in four nuclear-weapon States pursuant either to voluntary-offer agreements or to safeguards transfer agreements. A safeguards agreement pursuant to an offer made by China to place some of its civilian nuclear facilities under safeguards was signed in September 1988. Once this agreement has entered into force, all five nuclear-weapon States will have submitted all or some of their peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards.

Committee on Assurances of Supply

At its session in May 1987, the Committee on Assurances of Supply had agreed that further detailed discussions, at that stage, seemed unlikely to produce a solution of the outstanding problems, in particular the formulation of principles of international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy, and that more time was needed for reflection in capitals before a continuation of the discussions in the Committee. In June 1988 the Board of Governors, having heard a report from the Chairman of the Committee, postponed until June 1989 a decision on reconvening the Committee.

Action by the General Assembly, 1988

At its forty-third session, the Assembly had on its agenda an item entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency". The item was discussed mainly in plenary meetings.

In introducing a draft resolution on the 1987 report of IAEA on 27 October, Canada—speaking in its capacity as Chairman of the Board of Governors of IAEA and on behalf of Algeria and the German Democratic Republic, the other members of the Bureau—indicated that the text was the result of close consultation among interested member States, in both Vienna and New York. Canada introduced the draft, stating that the text was similar to earlier Assembly resolutions on the item, with some additions in both the preamble and the operative parts reflecting recent IAEA nuclear safety activities. By the draft, the Assembly would welcome the initiation of a project under IAEA auspices for a conceptual design of an international thermonuclear experimental reactor. It would also urge all States to strive for international co-operation in carrying out the Agency's work, in promoting the use of nuclear energy, in strengthening technical assistance and co-operation for developing countries, and in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system.

On 28 October the draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote as resolution 43/16. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having received the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1987,

Taking note of the statement of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency of 27 October 1988, which provides additional information on the main developments in the Agency's activities during 1988,

Recognizing the importance of the work of the Agency to promote further the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, as envisaged in its statute,

Also recognizing the special needs of the developing countries for technical assistance by the Agency in order to benefit effectively from the application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as well as from the contribution of nuclear energy to their economic development,

Conscious of the importance of the work of the Agency in the implementation of safeguards provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international treaties, conventions and agreements designed to achieve similar objectives, as well as in ensuring, as far as it is able, that the assistance provided by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose, as stated in article II of its statute,

Recognizing the importance of the work of the Agency on nuclear power, nuclear safety, radiological protection and radioactive waste management, including its work directed towards assisting developing countries in planning for the introduction of nuclear power in accordance with their needs,

Again stressing the need for the highest standards of safety in the design and operation of nuclear plants so as to minimize risks to life, health and the environment,

Welcoming the initiation of a project under the auspices of the Agency by the world's four major fusion partners for a conceptual design of an international thermonuclear experimental reactor,

Noting with appreciation the adoption of a joint protocol relating to the application of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, which would have the effect of extending the existing civil liability régime and avoiding possible conflicts of the applicable law,

Bearing in mind resolutions GC(XXXII)/RES/487 on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat, GC(XXXII)/RES/489 on measures to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear safety and radiological protection, GC(XXXII)/RES/490 on dumping of nuclear wastes, GC(XXXII)/RES/491 on liability for nuclear damage, GC(XXXII)/RES/492 on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, GC(XXXII)/RES/493 on the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, GC(XXXII)/RES/494 on the Agency's contribution to sustainable development and GC(XXXII)/RES/503 on South Africa's nuclear capabilities, adopted on 23 September 1988 by the General Conference of the Agency at its thirty-second regular session,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
2. *Affirms* its confidence in the role of the Agency in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;
3. *Urges* all States to strive for effective and harmonious international co-operation in carrying out the work of the Agency, pursuant to its statute; in promoting the use of nuclear energy and the application of the necessary measures to strengthen further the safety of nuclear installations and to minimize risks to life, health and the environment; in strengthening technical assistance and co-operation for developing countries; and in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency the records of the forty-third session of the General Assembly relating to the Agency's activities.

Conclusion

Safeguarding the non-proliferation régime and promoting co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy continued to be dominant concerns of the international community in 1988. With the conclusion in September of an agreement between China and IAEA, under which some nuclear facilities in China will be placed under Agency safeguards, all five nuclear-weapon States have now arranged to submit some of their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards. About 95 per cent of the fissile material and 95 per cent of the nuclear installations in non-nuclear-weapon States are at present covered by IAEA safeguards. For 1987 (the latest year on which it reported), the Agency considered it reasonable to conclude that nuclear material under its safeguards system remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for. During the year IAEA expanded its technical co-operation programmes. Through efforts to promote human resources development, a number of developing countries established appropriate infrastructures and acquired the capability to carry out, on their own, substantial parts of their nuclear programmes. The initiation of a number of joint projects among developing countries indicated the growth of co-operation among developing countries themselves.

The General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 43/16 on the 1987 report of IAEA, by which it urged all States to strive for harmonious

international co-operation in carrying out the work of the Agency, in promoting the use of nuclear energy and the application of measures to strengthen the safety of nuclear installations, in strengthening technical assistance and co-operation for developing countries, and in ensuring the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system.

ANNEX I

Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty having safeguards agreements in force under the Treaty as of 31 December 1988

The following 80 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have concluded safeguards agreements—now in force—pursuant to the Treaty.^a

Afghanistan	Holy See	New Zealand
Australia	Honduras	Nicaragua
Austria	Hungary	Nigeria
Bangladesh	Iceland	Norway
Belgium	Indonesia	Papua New Guinea
Brunei Darussalam	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Paraguay
Bulgaria	Iraq	Peru
Canada	Ireland	Philippines
Costa Rica	Italy	Poland
Côte d'Ivoire	Jamaica	Portugal
Cyprus	Japan	Republic of Korea
Czechoslovakia	Jordan	Romania
Denmark	Lebanon	Samoa
Dominican Republic	Lesotho	Senegal
Ecuador	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Singapore
Egypt	Liechtenstein	Sri Lanka
El Salvador	Luxembourg	Sudan
Ethiopia	Madagascar	Suriname
Fiji	Malaysia	Swaziland
Finland	Maldives	Sweden
Gambia	Mauritius	Switzerland
German Democratic Republic	Mexico	Thailand
Germany, Federal Republic of	Mongolia	Turkey
Ghana	Morocco	Uruguay
Greece	Nauru	Venezuela
Guatemala	Nepal	Yugoslavia
	Netherlands	Zaire

^a In 39 cases, no safeguards are applied because the State concerned does not yet have any significant nuclear activities. Full application will begin as soon as the State concerned acquires nuclear material or a plant requiring the application of safeguards.

ANNEX II

States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco having safeguards agreements in force under the Treaty as of 31 December 1988^a

Colombia ^b	Honduras	Paraguay
Costa Rica	Jamaica	Peru
Dominican Republic	Mexico ^c	Suriname
Ecuador	Nicaragua	Uruguay
El Salvador	Panama ^b	Venezuela
Guatemala		

^a Unless otherwise indicated, the safeguards agreements also refer to the non-proliferation Treaty.

Furthermore, safeguards agreements have to be entered into by the parties to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty. So far there are agreements with the Netherlands and the United States; the agreement with the latter is still awaiting entry into force.

In 10 cases, no safeguards are applied because the State concerned does not yet have any significant nuclear activities. Full application will begin as soon as the State concerned acquires nuclear material or a plant requiring the application of safeguards.

^b Refers to the Treaty of Tlatelolco only.

^c The application of safeguards under an agreement which refers to the Treaty of Tlatelolco only was suspended after the conclusion of an agreement with Mexico in connection with both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the non-proliferation Treaty.

ANNEX III

Agreements providing for safeguards, other than those in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, approved by the Board as of 31 December 1988

*(While the Agency is a party to each of the following agreements,
the list mentions only the State(s) party(ies) to them.)*

<i>Party(ies)^a</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No. INFCIRC</i>
A. Project agreements			
Argentina	Siemens SUR-100	13 March 1970	143
	RAEP Reactor	2 December 1964	62
Chile	Herald Reactor	19 December 1969	137
Finland ^b	FiR-I Reactor	30 December 1960	24
	FINN sub-critical assembly	30 July 1963	53
Greece ^b	GRR-I Reactor	1 March 1972	163
Indonesia ^b	Additional core load for TRIGA Reactor	19 December 1969	136
Iran (Islamic Republic of) ^b	UTRR Reactor	10 May 1967	97
Jamaica ^b	Fuel for research reactor	25 January 1984	315
Japan ^b	JRR-3	24 March 1959	3

<i>Party(ies)^a</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No. INFCIRC</i>
Malaysia ^b /United States	TRIGA-II Reactor	22 September 1980	287
Mexico ^b	TRIGA-III Reactor	18 December 1963	52
	Siemens SUR-100	21 December 1971	162
	Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant	12 February 1974	203
Morocco ^b	Fuel for research reactor	2 December 1983	313
Pakistan	PRR Reactor	5 March 1962	34
	Booster rods for KANUPP	17 June 1968	116
Peru ^b	Research reactor and fuel therefor	9 May 1978	266
Philippines ^b	PRR-I Reactor	28 September 1966	88
Romania ^b	TRIGA Reactor	30 March 1973	206
	Experimental fuel elements	1 July 1983	307
Spain	Coral-I Reactor	23 June 1967	99
Thailand ^b /United States	Fuel for research reactor	30 September 1986	—
Turkey ^b	Sub-critical assembly	17 May 1974	212
Uruguay ^b	URR-ReactoR	24 September 1965	67
Venezuela ^b	RV-I Reactor	7 November 1975	238
Viet Nam ^c	Fuel for research reactor	1 July 1983	308
Yugoslavia ^b	TRIGA-II Krsko Nuclear Power Plant	4 October 1961	32
		14 June 1974	213
Zaire ^b	TRICO Reactor	27 June 1962	37
B. Unilateral submissions			
Albania	All nuclear material and facilities	25 March 1988	359
Argentina	Atucha Power Reactor Facility	3 October 1972	168
	Nuclear material	23 October 1973	202
	Embalse Power Reactor Facility	6 December 1974	224
	Equipment and nuclear material	22 July 1977	250
	Nuclear material, material, equipment and facilities	22 July 1977	251
	Atucha II Nuclear Power Plant	15 July 1981	294
	Heavy water plant	14 October 1981	296
	Heavy water	14 October 1981	297
	Nuclear material	8 July 1982	303

<i>Party(ies)*</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No. INFCIRC</i>
Chile	Nuclear material	31 December 1974	256
	Nuclear material	22 September 1982	304
	Nuclear material	Approved by Board September 1987	
Cuba	Nuclear research reactor and fuel thereto	25 September 1980	298
	Nuclear power plant and nuclear material	5 May 1980	281
	Zero-power nuclear reactor and fuel therefor	7 October 1983	311
Democratic People's Republic of Korea ..	Research reactor and nuclear material therefor	20 July 1977	252
India	Nuclear material, ma- terial and facilities	17 November 1977	260
	Nuclear power station	27 September 1988	—
Pakistan	Nuclear material	2 March 1977	248
Spain	Nuclear material	18 June 1975	221
	Vandellos Nuclear Power Plant	11 May 1981	292
	Specified nuclear facilities	11 May 1981	291
United Kingdom	Nuclear material	14 December 1972	175
Viet Nam	Research reactor and fuel therefor	12 June 1981	293
C. Agreements concluded with nuclear-weapon States on the basis of voluntary offers			
China	Nuclear material in facilities designated by China	Approved by Board September 1988	
France.....	Nuclear material in facilities submitted to safeguards	12 September 1981	290
Soviet Union	Nuclear material in facilities selected from list of facili- ties designated by USSR	10 June 1985	327
United Kingdom	Nuclear material in facilities designated by the Agency	14 August 1978	263
United States	Nuclear material in facilities designated by the Agency	9 December 1980	288

Party(ies) ^a	Subject	Entry into force	IAEA
			document No. INFCIRC
D. Other agreements			
Argentina/United States		25 July 1969	130
Austria ^d /United States		24 January 1970	152
Brazil/Germany, Federal Republic of ^d		26 February 1976	237
Brazil/United States		31 October 1968	110
Colombia/United States		9 December 1970	144
India/Canada ^d		30 September 1971	211
India/United States		27 January 1971	154
Iran (Islamic Republic of) ^d /United States		20 August 1969	127
Israel/United States		4 April 1975	249
Japan ^d /Canada ^d		20 June 1966	85
Japan ^d /France		22 September 1972	171
Japan/United States		10 July 1968	119
Japan ^d /United Kingdom		15 October 1968	125
Pakistan/Canada		17 October 1969	135
Pakistan/France		18 March 1976	239
Philippines ^d /United States		19 July 1968	120
Portugal ^d /United States ^e		19 July 1969	131
Republic of Korea/United States		5 January 1968	111
Republic of Korea ^d /France		22 September 1975	233
South Africa/United States		26 July 1967	98
South Africa/France		5 January 1977	244
Spain/United States		9 December 1966	92
Spain/Canada ^d		10 February 1977	247
Spain/Germany, Federal Republic of ^d		29 September 1982	305
Sweden ^d /United States		1 March 1972	165
Switzerland ^d /United States ^e		28 February 1972	161
Turkey ^d /United States ^e		5 June 1969	123
Venezuela ^d /United States ^e		27 March 1968	122

^a See note on page 254.

^b Agency safeguards are being applied to the items required to be safeguarded under this (these) project agreement(s) pursuant to an agreement in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty covering the State indicated.

^c The requirement for the application of safeguards under this agreement is satisfied by the application of safeguards pursuant to the agreement of 12 June 1981 (INFCIRC/293).

^d Application of Agency safeguards under this agreement has been suspended in the State indicated as the State has concluded an agreement in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty.

^e Application of Agency safeguards under this agreement has been suspended in the United States in order to comply with a provision of INFCIRC/288.

Editorial note

IAEA has informed the United Nations of two additional safeguards agreements by which the Agency has applied safeguards to the nuclear facilities in Taiwan, China. The relations between the Agency and the authorities in Taiwan are non-governmental and the agreements are implemented by the Agency on that basis.

PART THREE

Prohibition or restriction of use of other weapons

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

Introduction

THE FIRST ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE CHEMICAL AND bacteriological (biological) weapons date back to the Brussels Declaration of 1874 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which banned the use of poisons and poisoned bullets in warfare, and a separate declaration of the Hague Convention of 1899 that condemned the use of projectiles for the sole purpose of diffusing asphyxiating or deleterious gases. Nevertheless, during the First World War the widespread use of chemical agents caused some 1,300,000 casualties, more than 100,000 of them fatal. Those tragic figures contributed to a new global awareness of the need to prevent chemical warfare and to the emergence of the basic instrument for its elimination, the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.¹ The Protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, as well as of bacteriological methods of warfare. As of 31 December 1988, the Protocol had 112 States parties (see appendix I of this volume).

While the Protocol makes the “use” of chemical or biological weapons illegal, it does not prohibit their development, production and stockpiling, a shortcoming which quickly led to the recognition of the need for a more comprehensive ban. Some 40 parties to the Protocol made reservations to the effect that it would not be binding on them with regard to States that failed to respect its prohibitions. Various disarmament bodies, particularly in the course of the last 15 years, have discussed the possibility of strengthening the existing prohibition and widening its scope.

Chemical and biological weapons were defined by the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1948 as weapons of mass destruction. The first General Assembly resolution devoted specifically to the

¹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare: League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138, p. 65. The text of the Protocol is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 3rd edition: 1987 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.88.IX.5). See appendix I below for details on its status.

question of chemical and biological weapons was adopted in 1966,² and the subject of chemical and bacteriological warfare was first taken up in 1968 as a distinct issue by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC). Also in 1968,³ the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare an expert study on the question, and the following year he submitted to the General Assembly a report entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*.⁴ The study contributed to the intensification of the consideration of the subject by the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva. Among the proposals made at the time was a draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare, submitted by the United Kingdom.⁵

The following year, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European States submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of both chemical and biological weapons and on their destruction.⁶ Those States held that a separate approach to biological weapons would delay the solution of the question of chemical weapons, and that therefore both types of weapons should be dealt with together. However, the United Kingdom, the United States and several other countries favoured separate treatment. The United States announced that it was committed to effective control of both types of weapons but believed that a single instrument covering both was not feasible. It further believed that a ban on biological weapons alone could be achieved at an early date.

In 1971, agreement was finally reached on the separation of the two issues. The Eastern European States accepted separation as a first step towards the solution of the whole complex of problems and submitted a draft text of a convention⁷ on biological weapons to the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva. Subsequently, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, submitted identical drafts on the subject,⁸ and the text was annexed to the negotiating body's report to the General Assembly.⁹

In the Assembly, a majority of States expressed support for the draft biological weapons convention, many of them noting that it constituted the first measure of genuine disarmament in that it involved the destruction of existing weapons. By resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 1971, the General Assembly commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and

² Resolution 2162 B (XXI).

³ Pursuant to resolution 2454 A (XXIII).

⁴ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24.

⁵ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969* (DC/232), document ENDC/255/Rev.1; see also *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 16.

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 104, document A/7655.

⁷ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1971* (DC/234), document CCD/325/Rev.1.

⁸ *Ibid.*, documents CCD/337 and CCD/338.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Supplement for 1971* (DC/234), annex A.

on Their Destruction, which was annexed to the resolution, and requested the depositary Governments—the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States—to open the Convention for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date. The Convention was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975, when, pursuant to its article XIV, 22 Governments had deposited instruments of ratification. By the end of 1988, 110 States were parties to the Convention.

The operation of the biological weapons Convention has been reviewed twice, in 1980 and 1986, at conferences of the States parties convened to ensure that its purposes and provisions were being realized. Both Review Conferences concluded with the adoption, by consensus, of Final Declarations. At the Second Review Conference, which took place at Geneva in September 1986, the importance that States parties attach to strengthening the authority of the Convention was evident. Among other things, they agreed on the exchange of data and information to preclude ambiguities or doubts which might arise and to improve international co-operation in peaceful biological activities. The following year, the *Ad Hoc* Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts of States parties to the Convention adopted by consensus a report containing modalities for such exchanges of information.¹⁰

When the United Nations expert study was written in 1969, only a very few countries were known to possess chemical weapons in militarily significant quantities. Today the number possessing the capacity to produce them has increased considerably and the actual hostile use of certain chemicals has caused great concern. Furthermore, many additional countries able to manufacture rudimentary chemical weapons could now reportedly also produce nerve agents—known as “second-generation” weapons—should they decide to do so.

Since 1971, the discussions on the question of a chemical weapons convention have involved a number of complex matters, such as verification, the scope of a prohibition, the pace of its total implementation and the relationship between the Geneva Protocol and a new legal instrument. From 1972 onwards, numerous proposals have been considered in the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, including the complete texts of draft conventions and elements of such instruments. The main aim of the negotiations has been an agreement to prohibit development, production and stockpiling and to lead to the destruction of all lethal chemical weapons. Parallel to the multilateral negotiations, the Soviet Union and the United States, between 1974 and 1980, conducted bilateral negotiations, and in 1979 and 1980 the two countries submitted substantial reports to the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva on the progress they had achieved.¹¹ They held no further talks, however, for several years thereafter.

¹⁰ BWC/CONF.II/EX/2.

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), document CD/48, and *ibid.*, *Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27)*, appendix II (CD/139), document CD/112; the reports are summarized in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. XV, and vol. 5: 1980, chap. XIII.

In 1981, an *ad hoc* working group of the Geneva body set out 18 draft "elements" for inclusion in a chemical weapons convention. Those elements concerned, for instance, definitions and criteria; declaration of stocks and production facilities; destruction and dismantling; verification of compliance; and the proposed treaty's relationship with other treaties. At the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, in 1982, the Soviet Union submitted a document on the basic provisions of such a convention.¹² Two years later, in 1984, the United States submitted the full text of a "Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons".¹³

Since 1984, the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons have intensified. In that year, the relevant *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Conference was able to agree on a preliminary structure for a convention, producing a document to be used as the basis for further negotiations on the scope of the convention, definitions of chemical agents and precursors (chemical reagents involved in the production of toxic chemicals), and the machinery for ensuring compliance. Certain fundamental disagreements persisted, however, particularly on the question of verification. At their November 1985 summit meeting, General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan submitted a joint statement¹⁴ reaffirming their commitment to a convention, and since 1986 the two major Powers have held bilateral talks concurrent with the multilateral ones with a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions.

In 1987, the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament reached a qualitatively new stage, which greatly improved the prospects for the early conclusion of a convention. Among other things, agreement was reached that all chemical weapons would be destroyed, which means that no chemical warfare agents can be diverted to other uses. There also emerged an understanding among most of the major negotiating parties that all chemical weapons should be fully declared, also by location, and verified when the convention enters into force. Furthermore, provisions were drafted for the verification, closure and elimination of production facilities.

New efforts were made to find a solution to the problem of preventing the clandestine production of chemicals for weapons purposes without creating undue complications for the chemical industry. With regard to the sensitive problem of international on-site inspection on challenge, political progress was noted, as an understanding seemed close at hand that there should be no right of refusal in the case of a challenge. Several elements of the process of inspection on challenge appeared to have been agreed upon. Moreover, new

¹² A/S-12/AC.1/12 and Corr.1. The document is reproduced in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/37/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/335), document CD/294. See *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. XIV, for discussion of the proposal.

¹³ For the text of the draft treaty, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, appendix VII.

¹⁴ For the part of the joint statement which dealt with arms limitation and disarmament problems, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, chap. II.

consideration of the institutional aspects of a future convention showed promising progress. In the General Assembly for the first time there were no competing draft resolutions regarding the work of the Conference on a draft convention, and the single draft submitted was adopted by consensus.

Besides being involved in efforts to conclude a convention banning chemical weapons, the General Assembly has endeavoured to investigate allegations of their use. In 1981 and 1982, at its request, the Secretary-General submitted expert reports on the use of chemical weapons in certain parts of the world.¹⁵ In 1984, following a fact-finding mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran, four specialists concluded that chemical weapons had been used in that country.¹⁶ Subsequent investigations led to similar conclusions.¹⁷ In addition, the Assembly established a group of experts to devise procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of information concerning activities that might constitute a violation of the Geneva Protocol or relevant rules of customary international law; their findings were reported in 1984.¹⁸ In 1987, for the first time, the General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution—42/37 C—calling on the Secretary-General to investigate possible violations of the Geneva Protocol.

General developments and trends, 1988

In the *Disarmament Commission* it was generally agreed that all efforts should be exerted for the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. As the subject was not on the Commission's agenda, the issue was not however considered in depth. Those addressing it were mainly Eastern European States, which saw, in the prevailing positive international atmosphere, prospects for an early conclusion of a convention. Reflecting the position it had already expressed in 1987, the Soviet Union considered that the convention should provide for reliable verification procedures, including inspections on challenge without the right of refusal. In the view of the Soviet Union, the negotiations could be accelerated by an immediate multilateral exchange of relevant data. In addition to supporting the conclusion of a convention, the socialist States also continued to advocate the establishment of a Central European zone free of both nuclear and chemical weapons.

Some neutral and non-aligned countries expressed concern at the setback that disarmament efforts had suffered as a result of large-scale use of chemical weapons in violation of the Geneva Protocol. Accordingly, they

¹⁵ A/36/613, annex; and A/37/259, annex.

¹⁶ A/39/210 and S/16433.

¹⁷ S/17911 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2 (summary of 1985 and 1986); S/18852 and Corr.1 and Add.1 (1987); and S/20063, S/20134, and S/20060 and Add.1 (1988).

¹⁸ A/39/488, annex II.

held that the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention was a priority task and welcomed the intensification of the negotiations to that end in the Conference on Disarmament.

As regards the work in the *Conference on Disarmament*, it was recognized that, compared with those of previous years, the negotiations had slowed down somewhat in 1988. This was so despite expectations to the contrary raised by the fact that a number of steps had been agreed upon by the beginning of the year that could have facilitated the negotiations: exchange visits to chemical facilities; trial inspections to test the verification procedures intended to ensure that chemical weapons were not produced by civilian chemical industries; and more active participation of representatives of such industries in the negotiations.

Progress was however recorded in the course of the year in the definition of a chemical weapons production facility. Agreement was also reached that such facilities should be destroyed instead of being converted to use for peaceful purposes, and language concerning the principles and methods for their destruction was drafted. Some progress was also achieved on the issue of inspection on challenge and on procedures to be followed after the submission of inspection reports.

The need for States to provide the Conference with certain data prior to the signing of the convention—an issue that had been raised a number of years earlier by the United Kingdom—began to assume greater urgency. This was seen as particularly necessary in the case of States with large arsenals of chemical weapons, but it was recognized, particularly by the socialist and Western States, that the exercise should be conducted with the widest possible participation. By early in 1988, about 20 States had declared that they did not possess chemical weapons, and two, the Soviet Union and the United States, had declared that they did. Both the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany submitted papers recommending that States provide the following types of data, among others: the presence of chemical weapons on their territory; possession of such weapons on the territory of another State; and the number of their production and storage facilities. It was apparent during the year that there was an increased willingness on the part of members to disclose such data. The Soviet Union declared the size of its chemical weapons stocks, and the United States declared the location of each of its chemical production facilities. In addition, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom provided information relevant to the convention in documents, working papers and statements.

It was generally agreed that further work was needed on a number of difficult aspects of the convention: (a) establishing the order of destruction of stocks and production facilities in such a way as to ensure undiminished security during the 10-year transition period in which they would be destroyed; (b) ensuring the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry, while not impeding the normal development of chemistry for peaceful purposes and while guaranteeing the confidentiality of information about those

facilities; (c) resolving the remaining questions concerning the mandatory nature of inspection on challenge; (d) dealing with the possible development of new agents; (e) providing assistance to parties to the convention in cases of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons; and (f) questions regarding the bodies responsible for the implementation of the future convention, in particular the composition and decision-making procedures of the executive council, and financial issues.

In all political groupings there was increased recognition of the importance of achieving universal acceptance of the convention and the need for prior consultations beyond the membership of the Conference on Disarmament to ensure its acceptability to all. The suggestion was made that the convention not be submitted direct to the General Assembly for adoption, but that an invitation be addressed to all States to attend a conference for the purpose of considering and signing a comprehensive convention.

As noted in chapter II, there was a lively discussion on chemical weapons in the course of the *fifteenth special session of the General Assembly*. In particular, representatives stressed the need to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the need for the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons as soon as possible. There was general agreement that negotiations on such a ban must be intensified, with the increased co-operation of all sides, especially with a view to the solution of the remaining verification problems. The United States voiced the opinion that, in order for the future convention to have real meaning, all countries capable of producing chemical weapons must become parties to the convention. One non-aligned State, Argentina, considered it important that the convention should be non-discriminatory politically, militarily, economically and technologically. It was generally felt that a convention could be concluded soon, if there was sufficient political will.

It was also recognized that, before the goal of concluding a comprehensive ban was reached, the proliferation of chemical weapons should be prevented. The Soviet Union condemned any use of chemical weapons and their transfer to others. In its view, the danger of the proliferation of chemical weapons was another reason for concluding a total ban as soon as possible. Members expressed concern about the documented reports of the use of chemical weapons, and supported efforts to strengthen the role of the Secretary-General in investigating reports of alleged use.

In the report on the work of the Organization which he submitted to the *General Assembly at its forty-third session*, the Secretary-General stated that immediate attention needed to be directed to the negotiation of those measures on which agreement was possible in the foreseeable future, among which he cited the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. In his opinion, the need for such an agreement was compelling in view of the shocking evidence, which had been documented in the case of the Iran-Iraq war, of the use of chemical weapons.

Moved by the same concern, President Reagan put forward a proposal designed to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. He suggested that the signatories of the Protocol, as well as other concerned States, convene a conference in order to consider actions "to reverse the serious erosion" of the Protocol. He stated also that all nations should co-operate in negotiating a verifiable, truly global ban on chemical weapons at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

The proposal received immediate and wide support, although a few States expressed some concern that such a conference might detract from the work of the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical weapons convention.

In expressing his support, President François Mitterrand stated that the meeting should aim at a reaffirmation of the commitment to the non-use of chemical weapons and to the prevention of their proliferation and that it should encourage new accessions to the Protocol. The conference should also indicate support for the work being carried out by the Conference on Disarmament. The Government of France, the depositary State of the Protocol, offered to host the proposed conference. It was later scheduled to take place in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989.

This proposal reflected another common trend during the session: the desire to expand the role of the United Nations in preventing the proliferation and use of chemical weapons, and to strengthen the procedures that would enable the Secretary-General to initiate investigations of allegations of the use of chemical weapons so that it would become impossible for any State to use such weapons with impunity. In August the Security Council adopted resolution 620 (1988), by which it encouraged the Secretary-General to carry out promptly such investigations. Moreover, by that resolution and by one of May—resolution 612 (1988)—the Security Council called on States to continue to apply, to establish or to strengthen strict control of the export of chemical products serving for the production of chemical weapons. The Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly a report containing an account of the work of the group of qualified experts in developing further the technical guidelines and procedures for such investigations and lists of experts and laboratories that were in a position to contribute to that work.¹⁹

Another development with respect to the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention was the announcement of France that it would no longer insist on the right of States parties to the convention to set up security stocks after the entry into force of the agreement. As it would take States possessing chemical weapons a number of years to destroy their stockpiles—an undertaking they would assume upon signing the convention—France proposed that chemical weapons factories be closed as soon as the convention entered into force and, like the stockpiles, be subjected to international surveillance before they were dismantled. France declared its readiness to renounce, as

¹⁹ A/43/690.

of the moment of entry into force, any possibility of producing chemical weapons. France went on to caution that a chemical weapons ban could not be imposed on some if the nuclear Powers did not persevere in their efforts to move towards nuclear disarmament. It also announced that it did not possess chemical weapons.

The two resolutions on chemical weapons that the General Assembly adopted by consensus at the end of its session reflected the widespread wish to come to grips with the problems of the use of such weapons and their general prohibition.

There was less discussion on the question of bacteriological (biological) weapons. Western European States appealed to the parties to the Convention on biological weapons to provide the Secretariat of the United Nations, on a continuing basis, with the data they had agreed to at the Second Review Conference. They believed that such information would give a clearer indication of the extent to which signatories were fulfilling their obligations. The Arab Group stressed the need for rigorous application of the Convention and of the Geneva Protocol. A third resolution, adopted by consensus, on the subject of biological weapons, had as its purpose to intensify exchanges of information and data between the parties to the Convention.

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1988

The agenda item entitled "Chemical weapons" was considered at plenary meetings of the Conference on Disarmament during the periods from 14 to 25 March and 15 to 19 August. On 9 February, the Conference decided to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, with the same mandate as in previous years, namely, to continue the process of negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and of developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting.²⁰ On the same day, the Conference appointed Mr. Bogumil Sujka of Poland as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee had before it a report on its work during the inter-sessional period from 12 to 29 January 1988,²¹ containing, in appendix I, the rolling text of the draft convention, reflecting the stage that the negotiations had reached by the beginning of the 1988 session of the Conference. As a contribution to the documentation for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the *Ad Hoc* Committee submitted to the Conference in April a special report on its work since the Assembly's

²⁰ See Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 27*) (A/43/27), para. 77, sect. 1. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, including a list of documents before it and two appendices, is reproduced *in extenso* under paragraph 77. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee is also available under the symbol CD/874.

²¹ CD/795.

second special session on disarmament, in 1982.²² It, too, contained the rolling text in appendix I to its report. With the submission of its final report of the 1988 session, the *Ad Hoc* Committee updated the draft convention for the third time during the year.

In 1988, new documents were submitted by members and non-members of the Conference in the form either of documents to the Conference or of working papers to the *Ad Hoc* Committee, or of both. The Soviet Union, in a document submitted by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, disclosed the size of its chemical weapons stockpile.²³ In addition, the Soviet Union submitted a document transmitting information given in a presentation on 3 and 4 October 1987 at the Shikhany Military Facility on standard chemical munitions and on technology for the destruction of chemical weapons at a mobile unit.²⁴ The United States submitted information that had been presented to a visiting Soviet delegation at the Tooele Army Depot in Utah from 18 to 21 November 1987.²⁵ The Soviet Union proposed a multilateral data exchange in connection with the drafting of the convention,²⁶ and the Federal Republic of Germany suggested types of data relevant to the convention to be provided multilaterally prior to the signing of a convention.²⁷ The United Kingdom gave information on the past production of chemical warfare agents on its territory.²⁸ The German Democratic Republic provided data relevant to the convention.²⁹

The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy jointly suggested an approach to the order of destruction of chemical weapons.³⁰ The United States put forward some general concepts concerning the method of destruction of chemical weapons production facilities.³¹ In connection with provisions dealing with the non-production of chemical weapons in the future, the United States proposed threshold quantities for monitoring chemical activities not prohibited by a convention.³² In addition, the Federal Republic of Germany put forward a case for *ad hoc* checks on production facilities in the chemical industry.³³ It also presented a list of super-toxic lethal chemicals it felt were relevant to the convention.³⁴ The German Democratic Republic made suggestions concerning the composition, size and decision-making process of the executive council of the envisaged verification inspectorate.³⁵ Canada dealt with factors

²² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No.2 (A/S-15/2)*, sect. III.

²³ CD/790.

²⁴ CD/789.

²⁵ CD/830.

²⁶ CD/808.

²⁷ CD/828.

²⁸ CD/856.

²⁹ CD/871.

³⁰ CD/822.

³¹ CD/849.

³² CD/802.

³³ CD/791 and CD/869.

³⁴ CD/792.

³⁵ CD/812.

involved in determining that body's personnel and resource requirements.³⁶ Argentina suggested guidelines for assistance in relation to protection against chemical weapons.³⁷ Finland and Norway (both non-members) put forward additional documents in a series concerning verification procedures.³⁸ Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted documents dealing with the question of the use of chemical weapons.³⁹ Other ideas and proposals were put forward in working papers submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

At the first meeting of the 1988 session, the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons for 1987, Mr. Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, reported on work done during the inter-sessional period, including private consultations he had undertaken in November 1987 and open-ended consultations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee in November and December 1987. The Chairman felt that the negotiations on the draft convention had reached an advanced stage. During the inter-sessional period, time had been devoted to a number of issues, including: (a) verification of the destruction of chemical weapons and the actual order of destruction of those weapons; (b) future non-production of chemical weapons; (c) the international organization to be established for the implementation of the convention; (d) practical solutions to the question of inspection on challenge; (e) assistance for protection against chemical weapons; and (f) economic and technological development. In addition, work had been initiated on the two articles pertaining to the last two issues, which had not previously been the subject of negotiations.

The business-like atmosphere of the *Ad Hoc* Committee that had prevailed during the 1987 session and the inter-sessional period continued during the 1988 session. The Committee held 21 meetings and a considerable number of informal meetings and consultations; its working groups were likewise frequently convened. Exchanges of information—in the form of data on chemical weapons and other data relevant to the convention—took place among the members of the Conference during the session. This contributed to the positive atmosphere and increased confidence among participants. A meeting between chemical industry experts and the *Ad Hoc* Committee was held in July in connection with the consideration of questions pertaining to the monitoring of the chemical industry to ensure that chemical weapons would not be produced and especially to the need to protect the confidentiality of information gathered through inspection.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee continued the negotiation and further elaboration of the convention based on the appendices to its two latest reports⁴⁰ and other proposals submitted by its Chairman and by delegations. It agreed to deal with all the articles of the draft convention as follows:

³⁶ CD/823.

³⁷ CD/809.

³⁸ CD/843 and CD/873 (Finland); CD/857 and CD/861 (Norway).

³⁹ CD/854 and CD/872 (Australia); CD/826 (Federal Republic of Germany); CD/827 (Islamic Republic of Iran).

⁴⁰ See footnotes 20 and 21.

Cluster I

- Article I: General provisions on scope
- Article II: Definitions and criteria

Cluster II

- Article III: Declarations
- Article IV: Chemical weapons
- Article V: Chemical weapons production facilities
- Article X: Assistance

Cluster III

- Article VI: Activities not prohibited by the convention
- Article XI: Economic and technological development

Cluster IV

- Article VII: National implementation measures
- Article VIII: The Organization
- Article IX: Consultations, co-operation and fact-finding

Cluster V

- Article XII: Relation to other international agreements
- Article XIV: Duration, withdrawal
- Article XV: Signature, ratification, entry into force
- Article XVI: Languages
- Preamble

The *Ad Hoc* Committee dealt with the clusters in three working groups: Group A, under the chairmanship of Mr. Andrej Cima of Czechoslovakia, dealt with cluster III; Group B, under the chairmanship of Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico, dealt with clusters I and II; and Group C, under the chairmanship of Mr. Sadaaki Numata of Japan, dealt with cluster IV. The Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee conducted open-ended consultations on the elaboration of articles in cluster V and, at his request, Mr. Ekéus held informal, open-ended consultations to prepare the ground for multilateral trial inspections of the chemical industry in order to test the verification procedures envisaged in the draft convention.

In their assessments of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee towards the end of the 1988 session, most delegations stressed the need to accelerate the negotiations, especially in view of the recurring use of chemical weapons and the dangers of their proliferation. They also expressed the hope that the negotiations would be further facilitated by the recent confidence-building measures taken by a number of participating States, as well as by the envisaged trial inspections of the chemical industry.

In introducing the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on 15 September, the Chairman pointed out what he considered the most important achievements of the session, namely: (a) the agreement on the definition of chemical weapons production facilities in article II; (b) the fact that article V was now based on the destruction of the production facilities rather than on their conversion to peaceful uses; (c) the agreement on a new part of the guidelines on the international inspectorate concerning general rules governing inspections pro-

cedures; and (d) the development of article XI on economic and technological development. The Chairman stressed that despite the hard and intensive work that had been done by all delegations during the session, the results achieved, though important, were not fully satisfactory.

The Chairman further emphasized the importance of the inter-sessional work to be undertaken in December 1988 and January 1989. He felt that it was needed more than ever, as the *Ad Hoc* Committee was at a decisive stage in its negotiations. During the inter-sessional period the following questions would be taken up: confidentiality with regard to verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry; undiminished security during the destruction period; guidelines on the international inspectorate; and the article dealing with assistance for protection against chemical weapons.

On 20 September, the Conference adopted the *Ad Hoc* Committee's report, which is an integral part of the report of the Conference. The Conference thereby decided: (a) that appendix I to the report be used for further negotiation and drafting of the convention; (b) that other documents reflecting the results of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, as contained in appendix II to the report, together with other relevant present and future documents of the Conference, also be utilized in the further negotiation and elaboration of the convention; (c) that the Committee further examine in full the question of undiminished security during the destruction period, starting with the inter-sessional work in 1988; and (d) that work on the convention continue during the inter-sessional period. The *Ad Hoc* Committee further recommended that it be re-established at the outset of the 1989 session and that the decision on chairmanship and mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee be taken at the beginning of the reconvening of the Conference in 1989.

Action by the General Assembly, 1988

During the forty-third session of the General Assembly three draft resolutions were submitted in the First Committee under the agenda item "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons". Of the drafts, two concerned primarily chemical weapons, and one, biological weapons.

On 31 October, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United States and Zaire submitted a draft resolution entitled "Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention", which was later also sponsored by Ecuador, Liberia, Thailand, Turkey and Uruguay.

On 14 November, the same sponsors, joined by France, submitted a revised draft resolution, which was later also sponsored by Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Portugal and the Soviet Union. In

introducing the revision on 14 November, Australia noted that the new draft retained the essential elements of resolution 42/37 C of 1987 and reflected developments that had taken place since its adoption. In the draft, the Secretary-General was requested to continue to carry out promptly investigations in response to reports concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons. It mandated the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the group of qualified experts provided by interested Member States, to continue his efforts to develop further technical guidelines and procedures available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of such reports. In the view of the sponsors, operative paragraph 6 (see below) did not exclude any State from contributing in any way it deemed appropriate to the work of the Group of Experts.

On 31 October, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the Ukrainian SSR, the United Kingdom and Viet Nam submitted a draft resolution entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons", which was later also sponsored by Bulgaria, Hungary, Malaysia, Portugal, Samoa, Turkey and Uruguay.

In introducing the draft on 14 November, Poland called attention to the significance of the envisaged chemical weapons convention, expressing the view that there was no example so far of a multilateral disarmament treaty of its magnitude, importance and sensitivity. The draft was based on resolution 42/37 A of 1987, adopted by consensus. Among the modifications were some paragraphs of the preamble and of the operative part that reflected the support of Member States for the convening of a conference on the Geneva Protocol in January 1989, and their hope that the conference would give new political impetus to the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. There was also recognition of the importance of strengthening confidence-building measures through further international exchanges of data relevant to the drawing up of the convention. Poland stressed that, at the current stage, such exchanges were essential to the effective continuation of the negotiations. Member States were strongly urged to contribute to an early agreement on, and universal adherence to, the convention.

On 16 November, the First Committee adopted the two drafts introduced by Australia and Poland respectively without a vote. In that connection, some States gave explanations of their position.

Belgium, a sponsor of both draft resolutions, stated that it would view their adoption by consensus as a confirmation of the great importance the international community attached to all aspects of the question of chemical weapons.

The Islamic Republic of Iran regretted that no practical measures had been taken to stop the use of chemical weapons; such absence of action by the international community had, in its view, led to intensified use of those weapons. It held that the draft resolutions ought to have been revised to make

a stronger commitment to upholding the Geneva Protocol of 1925. It did not want to stand in the way of consensus, but stated that it could not participate in the decision on the draft introduced by Poland.

Jordan, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, indicated their conviction that stress must be placed on the 1978 Final Document, which gave the highest priority to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. Within that framework of disarmament priorities, emphasis should be placed on the preparation of a multilateral convention on chemical weapons. The Arab Group urged the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its negotiations on chemical weapons. It considered the initiative taken to hold a conference in Paris a constructive step. It was prepared to join any consensus aimed at achieving progress towards the elimination of chemical weapons as well as of nuclear weapons; in its view, both of those aims should be pursued with the same enthusiasm and vitality.

The United Kingdom expressed satisfaction at the consensus adoption of the draft introduced by Australia, which gave high priority to the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. Although a number of technical problems remained to be solved, especially on verification, it was committed to reaching a conclusion of the negotiations as soon as practicable. It strongly supported the measures taken by the United Nations to uphold the authority of the Geneva Protocol and considered Security Council resolutions 612 (1988) and 620 (1988) major steps forward.

The United States considered the draft introduced by Poland one of the most important draft resolutions on which the Committee was taking action at its 1988 session. It reaffirmed its strong support both for the conference in Paris and for the Geneva negotiations. It held that the recommendation in operative paragraph 3 of the draft (see below) should be placed in proper perspective. In its view, the question was not so much whether a given number of days or hours were set aside for negotiations, as whether the negotiating time was being used productively and efficiently by all members of the Conference on Disarmament.

On 7 December the General Assembly adopted without a vote the two draft resolutions. The one introduced by Australia was adopted as resolution 43/74 A and reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 42/37 C of 30 November 1987,

Recalling also the rules and principles of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict,

Reaffirming its dedication to protecting humanity from chemical and biological warfare,

Expressing deep dismay at the use of chemical weapons in violation of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of other rules of customary international law, at indications of their emergence in an increasing number of national arsenals and at the growing risk that they may be used again,

Recalling the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other relevant rules of customary international law,

Recalling also the necessity for adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,

Bearing in mind the resolutions of the Security Council on chemical weapons adopted during 1988,

Noting that prompt and impartial investigation of reports of possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons would further enhance the authority of the Geneva Protocol,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the meeting of the group of qualified experts established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 42/37 C to develop further the technical guidelines and procedures available to the Secretary-General for the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons,

Recalling that, in its resolution 620 (1988) of 26 August 1988, the Security Council decided to consider immediately, taking into account the investigations of the Secretary-General, appropriate and effective measures in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing its appreciation for the work of the Secretary-General, and noting the procedures available to him in support of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol,

1. *Renews its call* to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and condemns vigorously all actions that violate this obligation;

2. *Calls upon* all States that have not yet done so to accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol;

3. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to pursue as a matter of continuing urgency its negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

4. *Calls upon* all States to be guided in their national policies by the need to curb the spread of chemical weapons pending the conclusion of such a convention;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to carry out promptly investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the Geneva Protocol or other rules of customary international law in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member States, in accordance with the procedures established by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/37 C;

6. *Also requests* the Secretary-General, pursuant to resolution 42/37 C, with the assistance of the group of qualified experts provided by interested Member States, to continue his efforts to develop further technical guidelines and procedures available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of such reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons, and to report to Member States as soon as possible;

7. *Requests* Member States and the relevant international organizations to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the above-mentioned work;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons".

The draft resolution introduced by Poland was adopted as resolution 43/74 C and reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and to their destruction,

Reaffirming the urgent necessity, particularly following recent United Nations reports, of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition

of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and taking note with satisfaction of the proposal to convene a conference to that effect,

Reaffirming also the urgent necessity of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,

Taking note of the Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by consensus on 26 September 1986, and, in particular, of article IX of the Final Declaration of the Conference,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, which incorporates, *inter alia*, the report of its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, and noting that following the precedents set over the past four years, consultations are continuing during the inter-sessional period, thus increasing the time devoted to negotiations,

Convinced of the necessity that all efforts be exerted for the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

Expressing the hope that the conference referred to above will also give a strong impetus to that end,

Conscious of the need to share data relevant to the negotiations on a future convention banning all chemical weapons on a global basis and of the fact that the provision of such data would be an important confidence-building measure,

Noting the bilateral and other discussions, including the ongoing exchange of views between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the framework of the multilateral negotiations, on issues related to the prohibition of chemical weapons,

Noting also with appreciation the efforts made at all levels by States to facilitate the earliest conclusion of a convention and, in particular, the concrete steps designed to promote confidence and to contribute directly to that goal,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1988 session regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, and in particular appreciates the progress in the work of its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons on that question and the tangible results recorded in its report;

2. *Expresses again none the less its regret and concern* that, notwithstanding the progress made in 1988, a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated;

3. *Urges again* the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its 1989 session, the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce further its efforts by, *inter alia*, increasing the time during the year that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons for this purpose with the mandate to be agreed upon by the Conference at the beginning of its 1989 session;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session on the results of its negotiations;

5. *Encourages* Member States to take further initiatives to promote confidence and openness in the negotiations and to provide further information to facilitate prompt resolution of outstanding issues, thus contributing to an early agreement on, and universal adherence to, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

6. *Recognizes* the importance of declarations made by States on whether or not they possess chemical weapons and of further international exchanges of data in connection with the nego-

tiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction;

7. *Welcomes* the offer by the French Government to convene in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989 a conference of the States parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and of other interested States;

8. *Expresses* the hope that all States will contribute actively to the objectives of the conference.

On 31 October, 38 States⁴¹ submitted a draft resolution entitled “Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction”. In introducing the draft resolution on 4 November, Austria recalled that the *Ad Hoc* Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts of States Parties to the Convention, held in 1987, had finalized the modalities for the exchange of information and data between parties. By the draft, the General Assembly would call upon States that had not yet participated in the exchange to do so; it would also call upon all States that had not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay.

On 16 November the First Committee approved the draft without a vote. On 7 December the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 43/74 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, in which it commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Convention,

Recalling its resolution 39/65 D of 12 December 1984, in which it noted that, at the request of a majority of States parties to the Convention, a second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention would be held in 1986,

Recalling that the States parties to the Convention met at Geneva from 8 to 26 September 1986 to review the operation of the Convention with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble to and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, were being realized,

Recalling also its resolution 41/58 A of 3 December 1986, in which it, *inter alia*, noted with appreciation that on 26 September 1986, the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction adopted by consensus a Final Declaration,

Pursuing its resolution 42/37 B, and noting with satisfaction that at the time of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention there were more than a hundred States parties to the Convention, including all the permanent members of the Security Council,

1. *Notes with appreciation* that, in accordance with the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

⁴¹ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom, United States and Zaire.

Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, an *Ad Hoc* Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from States parties to the Convention was held at Geneva from 31 March to 15 April 1987, which adopted by consensus a report finalizing the modalities for the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration, thus enabling States parties to follow a standardized procedure;

2. *Notes* that the *Ad Hoc* Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from States parties to the Convention agreed in its report that the first exchange of information and data should take place not later than 15 October 1987 and that thereafter information to be given on an annual basis should be provided through the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat not later than 15 April;

3. *Notes with satisfaction* that the second such exchange of information and data has commenced, and calls upon States that have not yet exchanged information and data to do so;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the relevant parts of the Final Declaration;

5. *Calls upon* all States that have not ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention and to international confidence.

Conclusion

In the work of the Conference on Disarmament on the conclusion of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, steps forward were recorded in certain areas, such as the definition of a chemical weapons production facility, the destruction of such facilities, and some aspects of the issue of inspection on challenge. The need for States to provide the Conference with certain data prior to the signing of the convention began to assume greater urgency and there was increased willingness on the part of members to disclose such data. Towards the end of the 1988 session of the Conference, it was widely recognized that further work was needed on a number of difficult aspects of the convention.

The debates during the 1988 session of the Disarmament Commission and the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament highlighted the timeliness of the issue of chemical weapons. Stress was laid on the urgency of concluding a chemical weapons convention and the need to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

A great deal of attention was focused on the latter question during the forty-third session of the General Assembly. The United States put forward a proposal for the convening of a conference to consider actions to reverse the "erosion" of the Protocol. The proposal received wide support. France offered to host the conference, which was later scheduled to take place in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989.

The two consensus resolutions on chemical weapons that the General Assembly adopted at the end of its session reflected the widespread wish to come to grips with the problems of the use of those weapons and their general prohibition. A third consensus resolution, adopted on the subject of biological weapons, sought to intensify exchanges of information and data between the parties to the Convention on biological weapons.

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

Introduction

THE SPACE AGE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE BEGUN IN 1957, when for the first time a man-made object was lofted into orbit round the Earth. Since that date, the new problems of outer space have been discussed in the United Nations, particularly in the General Assembly, in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its subsidiary bodies and in the Conference on Disarmament. The discussions have contributed to the conclusion of a number of international agreements concerning both military and peaceful aspects of the use of outer space.

According to the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,¹ known as the outer space Treaty, "outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means" (article II), and the parties undertake "not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner" (article IV). Detailed norms for States' actions in this environment are included in the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies² to ensure that the Moon and other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than Earth, are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

By the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) of 1972,³ each Power has undertaken not to deploy ABM systems for a defence of the territory of its country (with, in practice, one exception only). It has also committed itself

¹ General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 3rd edition: 1987 (United Nations publication, Sales No.E.88.IX.5).

² General Assembly resolution 34/68, annex. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.

³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 944, No. 13446.

not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. Since its entry into force, the Treaty has played a major role in the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Preventing the militarization of outer space has become an increasingly significant objective for the United Nations, as reflected in particular in the 1978 Final Document, which called for international negotiations to be held on the issue.⁴ In 1981, the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.⁵ Subsequently, upon the initiative of socialist States, the Assembly requested the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva to embark on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of such a treaty (resolution 36/99 of 9 December 1981). At the same time, following a Western initiative, the Assembly requested the Geneva body to consider the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements for preventing an arms race in outer space and to give priority to an agreement prohibiting anti-satellite (ASAT) systems (resolution 36/97 C of 9 December 1981). Since 1982, the multilateral negotiating body has had on its agenda an item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, because of differing views over the formulation of a mandate, it was only in 1985 that it was able to set up an *ad hoc* committee to deal specifically with the item.

In 1983 the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly its "Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Space against the Earth",⁶ and the following year, in an address to the General Assembly, President Reagan indicated that his Government was prepared to discuss a wide range of issues of concern to both the United States and the Soviet Union, including the militarization of space. Every year since 1983, the major political groups have each submitted a draft resolution on outer space, but only the draft by non-aligned countries has been adopted—always by overwhelming majorities. By the resolution the Geneva negotiating body has been requested to establish (or re-establish) a subsidiary body with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space and, since 1984, the Soviet Union and the United States have been urged to initiate or pursue, as the case may be, negotiations aimed at preventing such an arms race.

In 1985, the question of preventing an arms race in outer space was, more than ever before, a major concern both within and outside the United Nations. At the bilateral level, the United States and the Soviet Union, at their Geneva summit meeting in November, agreed to accelerate negotiations on nuclear and space arms, namely "to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth". At the multilateral level, the main development was

⁴ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 80.

⁵ A/36/192, annex. The Soviet draft treaty is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 6: 1981, appendix VII.

⁶ A/38/194. The draft treaty was submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in 1984. The text is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, appendix VIII.

the setting up of an *ad hoc* committee in the Conference on Disarmament with a mandate to examine, as a first step, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the subject.

In 1986, although efforts in this area continued in the Conference on Disarmament and the question was a major topic in the summit meeting in Reykjavik, no substantial progress was made in ensuring the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. At the Washington summit, in December 1987, the leaders of the United States and the USSR adopted a joint statement,⁷ which, on the outer space question, stated, in part, the following:

Taking into account the preparation of the Treaty on strategic offensive arms, the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time.

General developments and trends, 1988

Within the multilateral framework, the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space continued to be pursued in the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly. In the course of its deliberations, the Conference was able to focus, even though only in a preliminary way, on some concrete aspects of the question.

In his message to the *Conference on Disarmament* at its 1988 session, the Secretary-General of the United Nations stressed that the prevention of an arms race in outer space remained an issue of great concern to the international community and urged that all the avenues open to the Conference be explored in order to deal with the problem in all its aspects.

The Conference on Disarmament considered its item on "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" in the relevant *Ad Hoc* Committee, the mandate of which—namely to continue to examine, and to identify, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space—dictated the course of the Committee's work. In that connection, members of the Group of 21, socialist States and China were of the view that as a result of the work carried out in previous years, attention should be devoted at the 1988 session to proposals for concrete measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. They believed that the various ideas and suggestions that had been advanced provided sufficient points of convergence to enable them to move forward in that area. Accordingly, many delegations held that the *Ad Hoc* Committee should proceed with a more structured and goal-oriented examination of the subject. Western delegations considered that, while the work of the Committee since its establishment had contributed to a better understanding of the questions

⁷ The text of the statement is reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XI, No. 1 (Winter 1987/1988), p. 165.

involved, there were still some fundamental divergences with respect to all the subjects covered by the mandate. In their opinion, therefore, it was necessary to continue the examination and identification of relevant issues with a view to reaching a common understanding and definition of the scope and objectives of the work of the Committee.

In practice, delegations discussed or referred to a large number of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, such as the definition of the scope and objectives of multilateral work under the agenda item; the status of outer space as the common heritage of mankind, which should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; the need to prevent an arms race in outer space; the absence, at present, of weapons in space; the identification of the functions performed by space objects; the identification of the threats confronting space objects; the relationship between the prevention of an arms race in outer space and arms limitation and disarmament measures in other areas; the relationship between bilateral and multilateral efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space; and questions relating to verification and compliance and the need for information on how outer space was being used in national space programmes of military significance. In general, the Committee gave consideration to a number of proposals aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and ensuring that its exploration and use would be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes in the common interest and for the benefit of all mankind.

There was general recognition of the importance of the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States and it was stressed that bilateral and multilateral efforts were complementary. The Group of 21, socialist States and China emphasized that those negotiations did not diminish the urgency of multilateral negotiations and reaffirmed that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, had the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. They also stressed that the scope of the work of the Conference on Disarmament was global and larger than that of the bilateral negotiations. Western delegations, while recognizing the need for the Conference to play a role in these matters, stressed that nothing should be done that would hinder the success of the bilateral negotiations, and they believed that multilateral disarmament measures in this area could not be considered independently of developments at the bilateral level. The United States, in statements both in the Committee and in plenary meetings of the Conference, pointed out that it had not yet identified any practical measures that could be dealt with in an international context.

In its sessional report, the *Ad Hoc* Committee concluded that the legal régime applicable to outer space did not by itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in that environment. It thus believed that there was a need to consolidate and reinforce the present régime and to enhance its effectiveness.

In the *General Assembly at its fifteenth special session*, the consideration of the outer space question was rather restrained, even though speakers on

the subject, in particular from the non-aligned States, saw the prevention of an arms race in outer space as a problem the solution of which was to be sought urgently (see chapter II above). Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom spoke on the subject. China referred to it briefly, as did the Federal Republic of Germany, speaking on behalf of the European Community.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union held that preventing the introduction of weapons into outer space was the most important task in the area of disarmament. One of the ways to achieve that goal was to make space a sphere of expanding peaceful co-operation among States, the benefits of which could be enjoyed by all peoples on Earth. To that end, the Soviet Union advocated the establishment of a world space organization and suggested that, building on the idea put forward by France in 1978, a start could be made in establishing an international space monitoring agency.

France stressed that the international community could not remain indifferent to any legal régime that might apply to future military activities in space. For that reason, it must not be negotiated only by the two major Powers. In the short run, the international community could play a greater role in three directions: the reaffirmation and development of the principle of non-interference with non-aggressive space activities; the framing of a code of good conduct in space designed to prevent accidents and allay fears that might arise from certain manoeuvres by objects in space; and the strengthening of the system of notification laid down by the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (concluded in 1974), with a view to achieving greater disclosure. France believed that it would be desirable for the Conference on Disarmament to undertake a serious review of those questions without delay.

At the *forty-third session of the General Assembly*, there was considerable debate on the question of outer space, but only a few new elements emerged. It was clear, however, that Member States more than ever strongly supported the prevention of the militarization of outer space and the preservation of the ABM Treaty and strongly urged agreement between the two major Powers on a period of non-withdrawal from the Treaty. It was also generally and intensely felt that the outer space legal régime should be strengthened and that the subject should be discussed more substantively in multilateral bodies. Another aspect for which there was substantial support was the banning of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. There was also a positive response to the idea of establishing an international space monitoring agency.

As in past years, the General Assembly ultimately adopted one single resolution sponsored by non-aligned States, in which it stressed the need to consolidate and reinforce the legal régime applicable to outer space to make it really capable of preventing an arms race in that environment and reiterated its request to the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of outer space.

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1988

During its 1988 session, the Conference on Disarmament considered its agenda item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" at plenary meetings during the periods from 29 February to 4 March and from 1 to 5 August. It re-established an *ad hoc* committee under the agenda item and requested it to examine and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Conference also decided that the *Ad Hoc* Committee would take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives as well as developments which had taken place since it had first been established in 1985.

During the 1988 session, the Conference had before it a number of new documents on the agenda item. One was the Stockholm Declaration of the Six-Nation Initiative, adopted on 21 January 1988 by the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and by the First President of Tanzania,⁸ which called on the parties to the ABM Treaty to strictly abide by it. The Declaration also urged a complete banning of anti-satellite weapons and, as an interim measure, called for an agreement banning the testing of such weapons. The Soviet Union submitted a document relating to the establishment of an international system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space.⁹ Venezuela proposed an amendment¹⁰ to the outer space Treaty.

On 8 March the Conference appointed Mr. Adolfo Taylhardat of Venezuela as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, which held 17 meetings between 8 March and 7 September.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee adopted the same programme of work as for 1987: examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, existing agreements, and existing proposals and future initiatives relating to the subject. The *Ad Hoc* Committee agreed that it would give equal treatment to the subjects covered by its mandate and specified in its programme of work. Accordingly, it decided to allocate the same number of meetings to each of those subjects.

In addition to the official Conference documents on the agenda item (see above), the Committee received working papers submitted by Canada transmitting documents relating to it, among them a retrospective review (1982-1987) of arms control and outer space. Another working paper was submitted by Australia and Canada on the strengthening of State practice under the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.

⁸ CD/807.

⁹ CD/817.

¹⁰ CD/851.

Some delegations, mainly from socialist countries, stressing the urgency of banning the introduction of weapons into space, discussed comprehensive proposals for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, such as those calling for a treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space or from space against Earth, a treaty prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, and amendments to the 1967 outer space Treaty. In that context, some of those delegations considered that the various definitions of space weapons that had been put forward provided a good basis for working towards a comprehensive prohibition of weapons that were not yet outlawed under the existing legal régime. They also suggested that with the assistance of experts it should be possible to formulate a definition that would not only describe space weapons but also list their components.

Venezuela submitted a proposal¹⁰ calling for the amendment of article IV of the outer space Treaty to make the prohibition contained in it applicable to any kind of space weapon and to include a prohibition on the development, production, storage and use of space weapons. The proposal also provided for a definition of space weapons. It was envisaged that the amendments to the Treaty would be complemented by a protocol establishing appropriate verification machinery to ensure compliance with the complete prohibition of space weapons. Peru suggested an amendment to the outer space Treaty calling for the broadening of its scope to cover any type of weapon, and for the multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and a ban on ASAT systems other than space-based systems.

Western delegations were not in favour of such approaches on the grounds that they did not give an accurate picture of all the threats confronting space objects and overlooked other significant factors of the military and strategic situation relevant to outer space. They also held that the Conference should examine the proposals bearing in mind questions relating to compliance, verifiability, practicability and utility.

Members of the Group of 21 and socialist States, noting that existing legal restraints did not preclude the emergence of non-nuclear ASAT weapons, stressed the importance of a ban or limitations on them. A number of issues that would have to be addressed in the consideration of such a ban or limitations were identified, for example the scope of the ban, the definition of ASAT weapons, the problem of dual-purpose spacecraft, and means of verification. Various proposals and ideas were discussed, such as: a general treaty supplemented by specific protocols applicable to different categories of satellites; prohibition of systems capable of attacking satellites in high orbit; prohibition of dedicated ASAT systems; a treaty that would ban the use of force against any space object, prohibit the deliberate destruction, damage, or interference with the normal functioning of space objects, proscribe the development, production or deployment of ASAT weapons, provide for the destruction under international control of any existing ASAT weapons and prevent the utilization and modification of any space object as well as manned spacecraft for ASAT purposes; a ban on the testing and/or use of ASAT weapons, pending the achievement of a comprehensive ban on the develop-

ment, testing, deployment and use of such weapons, on Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space; the destruction of all existing ASAT weapons; and the prohibition of the development, testing and deployment of space-based ballistic missile defence systems.

Some delegations emphasized that a ban on ASAT weapons should protect only satellites performing peaceful functions and not those engaged in activities that threatened the security of other States or endangered the peaceful activities of other States in outer space. An ASAT ban, therefore, presupposed an agreed definition of peaceful functions and a verification system aimed at determining whether objects launched into space met that criterion. Some other delegations were of the view that the issue of defining peaceful functions would have to be resolved in the context of negotiations on an ASAT ban. Western delegations considered that there were inherent difficulties in proposals for a ban or limitations on ASAT weapons and referred, in particular, to the diversity and characteristics of potential threats to space objects, the existence of weapons systems that had an ASAT capability, the limitations of such notions as "intention" or "dedicated" for purposes of defining and prohibiting ASATs, problems of verifiability and the close link between questions relating to ASATs and matters under consideration in the bilateral negotiations.

Attention was also devoted to the question of the protection of satellites, and a number of proposals and ideas were examined. Various possible measures relating to the security of satellites were mentioned by Western countries, such as giving a multilateral scope to the immunity—provided for in certain bilateral agreements—of satellites that serve as national technical means of verification; a "rules-of-the-road" agreement; the reaffirmation and development of the principle of non-interference with peaceful space activities; and the elaboration of a code of conduct in outer space to prevent the risks and fears that could arise from certain manoeuvres of space objects.

Some delegations highlighted the contribution that confidence-building measures could make to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space and stressed in that regard the importance of transparency in the activities of States and of accurate information on how outer space was being used. Members of the Group of 21 and some Western States believed that the strengthening of the registration Convention would be a valuable confidence-building measure, and they discussed various ways and means of improving the system of notification established thereunder with a view to assuring the availability of timely and adequate information on the nature and purposes of space activities. Australia and Canada suggested that an understanding be reached among States parties to the Convention that in discharging their reporting responsibilities they would provide timely, accurate information on the functions of a satellite, including whether it fulfilled a civilian or a military mission or both. This same proposal included the suggestion that States that have launched space objects but are not party to the Convention should join the Convention or agree to submit the same information under the terms of General Assembly resolution 1721 B (XVI). The Soviet Union and the United

States considered that questions concerning the registration Convention fell within the competence of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

Members of the Group of 21, socialist States and China considered that the participation of experts would contribute to the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and they mentioned a number of areas where it would be desirable to have technical expertise and guidance, among them, problems of definition, questions relating to ASATs and the protection of space objects, verification and data exchanges. Some delegations favoured the establishment of a group of governmental experts, and various possible mandates for such a group were suggested. Western countries, sharing the view that experts made a valuable contribution to the work of the Committee, believed that such a contribution could be made through their inclusion in delegations. In their opinion, the work of the Committee had not yet reached the stage where the establishment of a group of experts would be useful. France made a detailed presentation at the expert level of the basic principles of operation of observation satellites and the fundamental techniques of interpretation of satellite data.

Delegations generally recognized the importance of verification in the context of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

A group of socialist States underlined that the non-deployment of weapons in space should be effectively verified. They supported the creation of a world space organization, which would, *inter alia*, perform verification functions. They were also convinced of the necessity of establishing, under the auspices of the United Nations, a mechanism such as an international verification agency which would co-ordinate and verify compliance with agreements and treaties on specific aspects of the limitation, reduction and elimination of armaments. With regard to space, the central element of a verification system would be an international space inspectorate upon which the States parties to the agreement would confer the right of access, for inspection purposes, to any objects intended to be launched into or stationed in outer space.

Western delegations maintained that issues relating to verification and compliance needed to be considered in greater depth. Noting that many elements of the existing legal régime applicable to outer space were relatively simple, they pointed out that the more complicated any arms control agreement for outer space was, the more difficult it would be to verify compliance with it. They believed that verification and compliance issues were particularly sensitive and complex in this area because, on the one hand, vital national security interests were at stake and, on the other hand, the vastness of space and the possibilities of concealment on Earth posed special problems. With respect to the proposal for the establishment of a world space organization, Western delegations were of the opinion that its consideration was beyond the competence of the Conference on Disarmament. They also foresaw substantial legal, technical, political and organizational difficulties associated with an international verification inspectorate. In this regard, they believed

that it should be kept in mind that virtually any space object, if controlled and manipulated appropriately, was capable of serving as a weapon.

The United States maintained that any type of international verification inspectorate was impractical because treaties already in place adequately regulated military activities in space, while also permitting the conduct of important national security and self-defence activities such as early warning of attack. It noted that the ABM Treaty, the outer space Treaty and the registration Convention constituted significant elements of this régime. The United States believed, moreover, that proposals such as that regarding an inspectorate could be more de-stabilizing than stabilizing because they could circumvent the development or compromise the effectiveness of strategic defence capabilities that threatened no one. It noted that greater reliance on effective defences against ballistic missiles might, in the future, provide a safer, more stable basis for deterrence of war than sole reliance on the threat of nuclear retaliation, and that, to provide a fully effective layered defence, some elements of a ballistic missile defence system might need to be based in space. For its part, the Soviet Union stated that the ABM Treaty explicitly prohibited the development, testing or deployment of ABM systems that were, *inter alia*, space-based or included space-based elements.

In its substantive conclusions, contained in its report to the Conference on Disarmament,¹¹ the *Ad Hoc* Committee noted that there had been general recognition of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and a readiness to contribute to that common objective. The Committee had advanced and further examined and identified various relevant issues and its discussions had fostered a better understanding of a number of problems and a clearer perception of the various positions. There had been recognition of the significant role that the legal régime applicable to outer space played in the prevention of an arms race in that environment and of the need to consolidate and reinforce that régime and enhance its effectiveness, and of the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral. In the course of the deliberations, members had acknowledged the common interest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes and the importance of paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which called for further measures and appropriate international negotiations in accordance with the spirit of the outer space Treaty.

It was agreed that no effort should be spared to ensure that substantive work on the agenda item would continue, and it was recommended that the Conference re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of the 1989 session.

¹¹ The report is reproduced in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/43/27)* under paragraph 80.

Action by the General Assembly, 1988

At the forty-third session of the General Assembly four draft resolutions, all of them entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", were submitted to the First Committee. Only one, however, was pressed to a vote and adopted. While considering the draft resolutions, the General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", which contained the views of 11 Member States on the question, conveyed to the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 42/33.¹²

Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe submitted the draft resolution that was adopted. The representative of Sri Lanka, who introduced the draft resolution on 8 November, stressed that it built upon the near consensus of General Assembly resolution 42/33 of 1987, but took into account and sought to reflect new developments, including the ongoing discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union and the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, established by the Conference on Disarmament. The draft, the representative noted, acknowledged the complementary nature of bilateral and multilateral negotiations. At the multilateral level, the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating forum, must have a primary role in the negotiations for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the sponsors held. That was not to deny in any way the special responsibility of the States with major space capabilities to pursue commonly held goals. Thus, in the draft resolution the United States and the Soviet Union were urged to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space. Taking into account the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, the Conference on Disarmament would be requested to intensify its consideration of the question in all its aspects and to re-establish, at the beginning of its 1989 session, an *ad hoc* committee with an adequate mandate to undertake negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space.

On 17 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution, which was later sponsored also by Bangladesh, Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Suriname, Uruguay and Viet Nam. The representative of Sri Lanka, who introduced the revision on 18 November, stated that changes had been made with a view to reflecting the concerns of other parties and to achieving the greatest possible support. Sri Lanka commended the chief sponsors (Italy, the Soviet Union, and China) of the other three draft resolutions on outer space for their cooperation, and those draft resolutions were withdrawn (see below).

¹² A/43/506 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2. Replies were received from: Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, the Byelorussian SSR, Ecuador, France, the German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Norway, the Philippines, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR.

The same day, the revised draft resolution introduced by Sri Lanka was put to the vote. Separate votes were requested on the eleventh and eighteenth paragraphs of the preamble and on operative paragraph 8. The eleventh paragraph of the preamble, in which grave concern was expressed at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space, was approved by a recorded vote of 121 to 1, with 13 abstentions. The eighteenth paragraph of the preamble, in which note was taken of the complementary nature of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on outer space, was approved by a recorded vote of 121 to 1, with 11 abstentions. Operative paragraph 8, concerning a request to the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an *ad hoc* committee, with an adequate negotiating mandate, at the beginning of its 1989 session, was approved by a recorded vote of 123 to 1, with 13 abstentions. Thereupon, the draft resolution as a whole was approved by a recorded vote of 137 to 1 (United States), with no abstentions.

In connection with the vote, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Belgium explained their respective positions. The United States made clear that, in spite of its commitment to arms control in the area of outer space, it had been unable to vote in favour of the draft resolution because the text contained elements that were deliberately aimed at, and increasingly critical of, fundamental elements of United States policy. The United Kingdom, which abstained on the three paragraphs put separately to the vote but voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, thought that the draft did not take sufficient account of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space issues. Basic understandings between those two Powers, it stated, were necessary in order to provide a foundation for significant progress in the multilateral domain. Belgium, which also cast an affirmative vote on the draft resolution as a whole after abstaining on the three paragraphs put separately to the vote, regretted that the draft resolution differed considerably from the text of resolution 42/33 of 1987, to an extent that changed its inner balance. It hoped that the sponsors of the draft resolution would take those considerations into account at the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly and would work to restore the widespread support enjoyed by resolution 42/33. Finally, Canada, which abstained on the eleventh paragraph of the preamble and on operative paragraph 8 and voted in favour of the eighteenth paragraph and of the draft resolution as a whole, felt that the text addressed neither the fact that there was a lack of common understanding of what was forbidden and what was permitted under the legal régime applicable to outer space nor the genuine complexity of the problems involved. It believed that portions of the draft could have been improved with a view to strengthening the effective role and responsibility of the multilateral element in preventing an arms race in outer space.

On 7 December, the General Assembly voted on the draft resolution, again taking separate votes on the eleventh and eighteenth paragraphs of the preamble and on operative paragraph 8. The eleventh paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 138 votes to 1, with 13 abstentions, and the eighteenth by 139 votes to 1, with 11 abstentions. Operative paragraph 8 was adopted

by 139 votes to 1, with 13 abstentions. The draft resolution as a whole was then adopted by a vote of 154 to 1, with no abstentions, as resolution 43/70. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,

Reaffirming also the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes,

Recalling the obligation of all States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from the threat or use of force, including in their space activities,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, have undertaken, in article III, to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding,

Reaffirming, in particular, article IV of the above-mentioned Treaty, which stipulates that States parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner,

Reaffirming also paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that in order to prevent an arms race in outer space further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Noting its resolutions 36/97C and 36/99 of 9 December 1981, as well as resolutions 37/83 of 9 December 1982, 37/99D of 13 December 1982, 38/70 of 15 December 1983, 39/59 of 12 December 1984, 40/87 of 12 December 1985, 41/53 of 3 December 1986 and 42/33 of 30 November 1987 and the relevant paragraphs of the Political Declaration adopted by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986,

Recognizing the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and the readiness of all States to contribute to that common objective,

Gravely concerned at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space and, in particular, by the impending threat of the exacerbation of the current state of insecurity by developments that could further undermine international peace and security and retard the pursuit of general and complete disarmament,

Encouraged by the widespread interest expressed by Member States in the course of negotiations on and following the adoption of the above-mentioned Treaty in ensuring that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes, and taking note of proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions and to the Conference on Disarmament,

Noting the grave concern expressed by the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at the extension of an arms race into outer space and the recommendations made to the competent organs of the United Nations, in particular the General Assembly, and also to the Committee on Disarmament,

Noting also that in 1988 the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, taking into account its previous efforts since its establishment, undertook the examination and identification of various issues, existing agreements and existing proposals, as well as future initiatives relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that this contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions,

Convinced that additional measures should be examined in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to prevent an arms race in outer space,

Emphasizing the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, and with the existing legal régime concerning the use of outer space,

Emphasizing also the necessity of maintaining the effectiveness of relevant existing treaties, and in this context reaffirming the vital importance of strict compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,

Recognizing that bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America could facilitate the multilateral negotiations for the prevention of an arms race in outer space in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Noting the importance in this context of bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America that have continued since 1985, including at their summit meetings in Washington and Moscow on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms,

Hopeful that concrete results would emerge from these negotiations as soon as possible,

Emphasizing the mutually complementary nature of bilateral and multilateral efforts in the field of preventing an arms race in outer space,

Taking note of that part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to this question,

Welcoming the re-establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space during the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament, in the exercise of the negotiating responsibilities of this sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, to continue to examine and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

1. *Reaffirms* that general and complete disarmament under effective international control warrants that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it shall not become an arena for an arms race;

2. *Recognizes*, as stated in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Conference on Disarmament, that the legal régime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, that this legal régime plays a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, the need to consolidate and reinforce that régime and enhance its effectiveness, and the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral;

3. *Emphasizes* that further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community;

4. *Calls upon* all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding;

5. *Reiterates* that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

6. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;

7. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals and initiatives, including those presented in the *Ad Hoc* Committee at the 1988 session of the Conference and at the forty-third session of the General Assembly;

8. *Further requests* the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an *ad hoc* committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1989 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

9. *Urges* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work;

10. *Calls upon* all States, especially those with major space capabilities, to refrain, in their activities relating to outer space, from actions contrary to the observance of the relevant existing treaties or to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space;

11. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space submitted in accordance with resolution 42/33 of 30 November 1987;

12. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this subject by the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

14. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"

As noted above, three additional draft resolutions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space were submitted to the First Committee, but at the request of the sponsors no action was taken on them.¹³

Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution, which was later also sponsored by Australia. The draft was introduced on 7 November by the representative of Italy, who stressed that the international community had an important role to play in the prevention of an arms race in outer space; that arms control issues concerning nuclear and space arms must be considered in their interrelationship in order to facilitate agreements that would enhance strategic stability; that placing a relative emphasis, as the draft did, on the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union did not detract from the essential role the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament could and must play. On 18 November, the representative of Italy indicated that the sponsors of the draft resolution would not press it to the vote, in view of the common wish of many delegations for a single draft resolution, and with the understanding that this did not imply renunciation of the sponsors' approach to the question.

Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR submitted a draft resolution. It was later also sponsored by Romania

¹³ See A/43/838, paras. 8 and 9 (Western draft), paras. 10 and 11 (socialist draft) and paras. 12 and 13 (Chinese draft).

and the German Democratic Republic. The draft resolution was never officially introduced by its sponsors. On 18 November, the representative of the USSR stated on behalf of the sponsors that, as the draft submitted by the non-aligned States (which was to become resolution 43/70) reflected the international community's recognition of the urgent need to prevent an arms race in outer space, the USSR and the other Eastern co-sponsors would not insist that their own draft resolution be put to the vote.

China submitted a draft resolution, which was never officially introduced. On 18 November, China indicated that, in order to achieve the largest possible majority in favour of a draft resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, it had decided to support the draft submitted by the non-aligned States and would not insist on having its own draft resolution put to the vote.

Conclusion

In 1988 the prevention of an arms race in outer space continued to receive major attention, both within and outside the United Nations. There was no breakthrough, however, during the year, in efforts to consolidate and reinforce the legal régime applicable to outer space, to negotiate a multilateral outer space agreement (or agreements) in the interest of international peace and security, to adopt effective provisions for verification with a view to preventing an arms race in outer space, and to promote international co-operation in the peaceful use of outer space.

The relevant *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Conference on Disarmament was re-established in 1988 and its consideration of legal and technical matters, though still preliminary, was more concrete than in previous years. At the forty-third session of the General Assembly, a single resolution, 43/70, was adopted. By it, the Assembly again urged the Soviet Union and the United States to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations and requested the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of preventing an arms race in outer space and to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1989 session.

New weapons of mass destruction; radiological weapons

Introduction

THE POSSIBILITY THAT NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION might emerge was taken into account by the Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1948, when it defined such weapons as including "atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above".¹ At that time, "radioactive material weapons", now known as radiological weapons (devices containing radioactive substances, which are dispersed by conventional explosives), did not exist, and they are still not known to be produced.

Upon an initiative of Malta, made in 1969, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) considered certain implications of radiological warfare as well as the possible military application of laser technology, but concluded that it was difficult, at that time, to see the practical usefulness of discussing measures related to radiological warfare.²

In 1976, following the Soviet Union's submission, the previous year, of a draft international agreement entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons" to the General Assembly,³ the CCD began to work on the text of such an agreement. In 1977 the Soviet Union submitted a revision,⁴ suggesting that, parallel to a general agreement, a special agreement could be concluded on each particular type of weapon. A list of types and systems of weapons to be prohibited would be annexed to the general agreement and could be expanded as new developments occurred. The socialist States also

¹ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 2.

² See *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, chap. XV.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 31, 34-38, 120, 122 and 126, document A/10243. The draft agreement is annexed to General Assembly resolution 3479 (XXX).

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27)*, document CCD/511/Rev.1. See also *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, appendix X.

proposed the establishment, in the CCD, of an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts to consider possible areas of development of new types of weapons, which would be included in the initial list of types of weapons to be prohibited.⁵ In connection with discussions in the Geneva negotiating body, the Soviet Union and Hungary submitted various documents.⁶ In 1985, the Soviet Union put forward a proposal calling for negotiations on the prohibition of any new kind of weapon of mass destruction immediately after it had been identified and the simultaneous introduction of a moratorium on its development.

The issue of new weapons of mass destruction has been debated annually by the General Assembly and the Geneva negotiating body, and the need to prevent the emergence of new types of such weapons was expressed in the 1978 Final Document.⁷ From 1985 to 1987, Assembly resolutions calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to keep the matter constantly under review, with the assistance of a periodically convened group of experts (1985 and 1986), or with appropriate expert assistance (1987), were adopted by wide majorities, with mainly Western States abstaining. While socialist States and many non-aligned States believe that the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction would result in a sharp destabilization of the military strategic situation and that the Conference should take urgent action, most Western States believe that there are no indications that the emergence of such types of weapons is imminent. They see no need for the Conference on Disarmament to keep the matter under constant review, although they do favour its holding periodic informal meetings in order to follow the subject adequately. They would prefer to see new scientific developments dealt with individually as they arise and appear to have a weapons potential. Moreover, they feel that some potential new weapons of mass destruction that have been envisaged fall within categories that have already been identified and should be covered in that context.

In 1976 the United States raised the question of radiological weapons anew in the General Assembly as a separate topic. It was concerned about the rapid accumulation of nuclear materials as a by-product of reactor operations. In 1978 the General Assembly affirmed that "a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".⁸ In 1979, the United States and the Soviet Union, which had begun bilateral negotiations in 1977, submitted a joint proposal

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, document CCD/564.

⁶ Draft convention on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon (*ibid.*, document CCD/559), and reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix VIII (USSR); and papers on infrasound weapons (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, document CCD/575) (Hungary), and potential types of weapons of mass destruction (*ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), document CD/35) (USSR).

⁷ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 77.

⁸ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 76.

on major elements of such a convention⁹ to the Committee on Disarmament. Later that year, the General Assembly decided by consensus to call on the Geneva body to expedite negotiations on the text of a convention and to report the results to it at its next session. The following year, in order to finalize a draft treaty, the Committee established an *ad hoc* subsidiary body on radiological weapons, which it has re-established each year since then.

In 1981 Sweden introduced a new element into the discussion by proposing that any convention banning radiological weapons should also prohibit military attacks on civilian nuclear facilities, since the resulting dissemination of radioactive substances could cause mass destruction. While members of the Group of 21 widely supported that proposal, members of other political groups objected to such a linkage on the grounds that it would both broaden the scope of the envisaged convention beyond the original mandate and introduce new implications to be addressed, thus prolonging and complicating the negotiating process.

Finding an acceptable way to cover both a ban on radiological weapons in the traditional sense and the prohibition of attacks against civilian nuclear facilities has since been the main problem in efforts to negotiate a radiological weapons convention. In addition to the absence of consensus on the proposed linkage, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons has faced difficulties on such issues as defining the appropriate criteria for determining the scope of a prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities; defining radiological weapons; formulating treaty provisions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and verification and compliance. Many delegations hold that Sweden's proposal for parts of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons and the release or dissemination of radioactive material for hostile purposes¹⁰ provides the best negotiating framework for addressing all outstanding problems. Others continue to maintain that proposals aimed at resolving the question of prohibiting attacks in the context of prohibiting radiological weapons can only bring about a stalemate in both areas.

General developments and trends, 1988

With regard to the general question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, no developments occurred in the *Conference on Disarmament*. The Conference continued to deal with the question in its plenary and informal meetings, during which it became evident that the positions of Member States remained divided as regards, in particular, the need to initiate negotiations on specific types of new weapons of mass destruction, once such weapons had been identified.

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), documents CD/31 and CD/32.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/39/27)*, appendix II (CD/540), document CD/530. See also *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, chap. XVI.

As in previous years the subject of radiological weapons was considered by an *ad hoc* committee in the Conference on Disarmament. The considerations of the two main issues, i.e. prohibition of radiological weapons in the traditional sense and prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, were again conducted in two contact groups, which concentrated on draft elements that had not yet been worked out, in particular those concerning verification and compliance. The texts drafted the previous year were reviewed and new proposals were made that helped to clarify the positions of delegations. However, a wide divergence of views on both of the main issues persisted, which makes the possibility of progress in the Conference rather limited at present.

In the deliberations in the *First Committee*, the subject of new weapons of mass destruction was not dealt with in depth. The need for business-like negotiations with regard to means of preventing the development and production of such weapons was however noted. New compromise formulations were incorporated into the draft resolution submitted, enabling it to receive the support of almost all States.

The Member States that addressed the question of radiological weapons in all its aspects emphasized the need for the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on the subject with a view to the early completion of its work. They considered that the work done so far provided an appropriate basis for an agreement. At the same time, some stressed the importance of achieving a separate agreement on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities.

A new item that attracted much attention concerned the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa. It was included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its forty-third session in response to a request made by the Group of African States.¹¹ Two draft resolutions on the subject were submitted, by Nigeria and the Group of African States respectively, reflecting the concern of African States and others on the issue, and both of the texts were adopted (see "Action by the General Assembly, 1988", below). Nigeria had already brought up the subject in a working paper on the danger of radiation arising from clandestine dumping of nuclear wastes, submitted to the Assembly at its fifteenth special session,¹² as well as during the negotiations in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons in the Conference on Disarmament.

Many Member States, mainly from developing countries, addressed the issue, emphasizing that it was of general concern to all regions, not only Africa. They called on the international community to take strict measures to prohibit actions that could endanger the security and infringe the sovereignty of States. Accordingly, many of them welcomed the efforts of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to draft a convention on the control of the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and the fact that IAEA

¹¹ A/S-15/AC.1/17.

¹² A/43/142.

would establish a technical working group with the objective of elaborating an agreed code of practice for international transactions involving nuclear wastes (GC(XXXII)/RES/490). Some States, however, called for an international régime to prohibit the transfer of nuclear and industrial toxic waste to developing countries and rejected any dumping of wastes on the territory of other States. With the growing international awareness of the problem, there was a general feeling that the Conference on Disarmament should consider the question of nuclear waste in its ongoing negotiations on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. Czechoslovakia shared the widespread concern regarding the storage and elimination of toxic waste. It was of the view that effective solutions to those problems would have to ensure the ecological security of all States and be in keeping with the interests of the economic and social development of each country. Some other delegations, mostly from Western States, felt that the question of the dumping of radioactive wastes, as formulated by the Group of African States, did not fall within the purview of the First Committee, although they appreciated the concerns raised. They believed the matter should be discussed in other forums, and referred in this regard to IAEA, UNEP and the Second Committee of the General Assembly.

Action by the Conference on Disarmament, 1988

During the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament, the item entitled “New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons” was considered in plenary meetings during the periods from 28 March to 1 April and from 22 to 26 August.

On 2 February the Conference re-established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of such weapons. Under the chairmanship of Miss Tessa Solesby of the United Kingdom, the *Ad Hoc* Committee held six meetings from 29 February to 26 August. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations. At their request, the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland (a non-member of the United Nations), Turkey and Zimbabwe.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee decided to re-establish its two contact groups: Contact Group A to consider issues relevant to the prohibition of radiological weapons in the traditional sense and Contact Group B to consider issues relevant to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, each to be chaired by a co-ordinator. Subsequently, Mr. Hadi Wayarabi of Indonesia and Mr. Csaba Györfly of Hungary agreed to assist the Chair by serving as Co-ordinators of Contact Groups A and B, respectively.

After a general exchange of views, the *Ad Hoc* Committee gave the Co-ordinators certain guidelines regarding the issues to be considered in their respective Groups and regarding a possible order of consideration. The Contact Groups were directed to concentrate on issues pertaining to verification and compliance as well as other main elements.

On the basis of the work conducted within the Groups, both formally and informally, the two Co-ordinators presented to the *Ad Hoc* Committee their reports, which were reproduced as annexes I and II to the *Ad Hoc* Committee's special report to the Conference, for inclusion in the report of the Conference to the General Assembly at its special session.¹³ That report of the Conference also reflected the state of consideration of the issue on new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons since 1982.¹⁴

During the second part of the session of the Conference, the *Ad Hoc* Committee took note of a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament by the IAEA secretariat, conveying the Agency's readiness to provide technical assistance to the Conference in its work relating to the prohibition of armed attacks against nuclear installations, and the Committee agreed to keep the matter under review in its future work. It maintained the method of working in the two Contact Groups that it had decided upon in the first part of its session.

On 6 September the Conference adopted the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, to which were annexed the reports of the two Contact Groups. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee was then incorporated into the 1988 report of the Conference to the General Assembly.¹⁵ In its report, the *Ad Hoc* Committee concluded that its work had contributed to the clarification of different approaches which persisted with regard to both the issues under consideration. The Committee recommended that it be re-established at the beginning of the 1989 session of the Conference and that it draw upon the annexes to its report as a basis for its future work.

In introducing the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, the Chairman stressed that the reports of the Contact Groups showed that the Committee had made progress. In concentrating their attention on verification and compliance as well as on other main elements and in reviewing the texts, they had been able to fill existing gaps and to further clarify and elaborate the positions of delegations. However, considerable differences on substance remained, which showed no sign of being resolved. It had also been clear that year that the procedure of setting up separate contact groups had been a step in the right direction. The report would provide valuable help to the *Ad Hoc* Committee as it continued its task of reaching agreement on the substance of its work.

¹³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-15/2)*, para. 93.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, paras. 94 to 96.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Forty-third session, Supplement No. 27 (A/43/27)*, para. 86.

Action by the General Assembly, 1988

The question of new weapons of mass destruction and radiological weapons was addressed by several States in the general debate in the First Committee. Pursuant to resolution 42/38 F of 1987, the Secretary-General submitted a report on the progress made on the question of the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons,¹⁶ in which he referred Member States to the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament.

Angola, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and Viet Nam submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons", which was later sponsored also by Cuba and Democratic Yemen. In introducing it on 9 November, the Byelorussian SSR pointed out that the progress of science and technology, the emergence of new scientific principles and the possibility of their military application had created the danger that new forms of weapons of mass destruction would emerge having characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the weapons identified by the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1948. Furthermore, the problem of preventing the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction would become more urgent as progress was made towards eliminating existing types. The Byelorussian SSR believed it was necessary to work towards agreement on procedures which could be implemented immediately in order to co-ordinate international action as and when specific types of such weapons were identified.

On 14 November, the original sponsors and Afghanistan submitted a revision of the draft resolution in which substantial changes had been incorporated. Among others things, references to the use of scientific and technological achievements solely for peaceful purposes were deleted and the call to States to "commence negotiations" on the prohibition of any new type of weapon of mass destruction after it had been identified was changed to a call to "give favourable consideration" to recommendations of the Conference on Disarmament on the undertaking of specific negotiations on identified types. In introducing the revised text, the Byelorussian SSR expressed its hope that those revisions would make it possible for the draft to enjoy the broadest possible support. A further change of a similar nature was made orally by the Byelorussian SSR on 16 November.

On 18 November the First Committee approved the revised draft by a recorded vote of 134 to none, with 2 abstentions (Israel and United States). On 7 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a

¹⁶ A/43/622.

recorded vote of 152 to none, with 2 abstentions, as resolution 43/72. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Noting paragraph 77 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Determined to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction that have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of weapons of mass destruction identified in the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted by the United Nations in 1948,

Noting that in the course of its 1988 session the Conference on Disarmament considered the item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons",

Taking into account the section of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to this question,

1. *Reaffirms* that effective measures should be undertaken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to keep under review, with expert assistance, as appropriate, the questions of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on the identified types of such weapons;

3. *Calls upon* all States, immediately following the recommendation of the Conference on Disarmament, to give favourable consideration to these recommendations;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

5. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its forty-fourth session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament".

Hungary, Indonesia, Sweden and the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons". In introducing the draft, the United Kingdom stated that the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons had continued its established method of working in two separate groups in order to further assemble possible elements for a convention. The Contact Groups had been able to compile a full and honest record of views expressed, which would be a useful basis for the continuing work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. It felt that in spite of the progress made, considerable gaps remained between the positions of States.

On 14 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote, and on 7 December the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 43/75 C. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 42/38B of 30 November 1987,

1. *Takes note* of the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1988 session and that of the special report of the Conference on Disarmament, that deal with the question of radiological weapons, in particular the reports of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons;

2. *Recognizes* that the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1988 made a further contribution to the clarification and better understanding of different approaches that continue to exist with regard to both of the important subjects under consideration;

3. *Takes note* of the recommendation of the Conference on Disarmament that the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons should be re-established at the beginning of its 1989 session;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on the subject with a view to a prompt conclusion of its work, taking into account all proposals presented to the Conference to this end and drawing upon the annexes to its report as a basis of its future work, the result of which should be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

5. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all relevant documents relating to the discussion of all aspects of the issue by the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"

Iraq and Jordan submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons". In introducing the draft, Iraq noted that the fact that it was bringing the matter once again before the Committee demonstrated Iraq's concern about the lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament towards prohibiting armed attacks against nuclear facilities. By the draft resolution, the General Assembly would reaffirm that armed attacks of any kind against nuclear facilities were tantamount to the use of radiological weapons and would request the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts to reach an agreement prohibiting such attacks.

On 14 November the First Committee took action on the draft, which was adopted by a recorded vote of 99 to 2 (Israel and United States), with 30 abstentions. At the time of the vote, four States explained their positions.

With reference to its positive vote, the Islamic Republic of Iran expressed its firm belief that attacks on nuclear facilities would have dangerous consequences for the whole international community and that, therefore, all States must commit themselves to refrain from resorting to such acts.

Venezuela stated that it was abstaining, as it had done on earlier texts on the subject, on the grounds that the preparation of an international agreement to prohibit military attacks against nuclear facilities was not a disarmament matter but rather one related to the conduct of warring States. It should therefore be discussed in a diplomatic conference, rather than in the Conference on Disarmament.

Israel said that it had voted against the draft resolution because of the unjustified reference to Israel in the penultimate paragraph of the preamble (see below). It stressed, however, that its negative vote did not indicate a change in its long-held view that all States should refrain from attacking or threatening to attack nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes.

The United States explained that it had not concluded that additional legal measures, as called for in the draft, were appropriate and it believed the text prejudged the outcome of the discussion in the Conference on Disarmament. Moreover, it considered technically inaccurate the statement in operative paragraph 1 that an armed attack against a nuclear facility would necessarily lead to the release of dangerous radioactive forces. For those reasons it voted against the draft resolution.

On 7 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 116 to 2, with 29 abstentions, as resolution 43/75 J. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 37/99C of 13 December 1982, 38/188D of 20 December 1983, 39/151J of 17 December 1984, 40/94 D of 12 December 1985, 41/59A and I of 3 December 1986 and 42/38F of 30 November 1987 on, *inter alia*, the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting military attacks against nuclear facilities,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on this subject submitted pursuant to resolution 42/38F,

Gravely concerned that armed attacks against nuclear facilities, though carried out with conventional weapons, could be tantamount to the use of radiological weapons,

Recalling also that Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 prohibits attacks on nuclear electricity-generating stations,

Deeply concerned that the destruction of nuclear facilities by conventional weapons causes the release into the environment of huge amounts of dangerous radioactive material, which results in serious radioactive contamination,

Firmly convinced that the Israeli attack against the safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iraq constitutes an unprecedented danger to international peace and security,

Recalling further resolutions GC(XXVII)/RES/407 and GC(XXVII)/RES/409, adopted in 1983 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which the Conference urged all member States to support actions in international forums to reach an international agreement that prohibits armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes,

1. *Reaffirms* that armed attacks of any kind against nuclear facilities are tantamount to the use of radiological weapons, owing to the dangerous radioactive forces that such attacks cause to be released;

2. *Requests once again* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its efforts to reach, as early as possible, an agreement prohibiting armed attacks against nuclear facilities;

3. *Requests again* the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide the Conference on Disarmament with the technical studies that could facilitate the conclusion of such an agreement;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution.

Two draft resolutions concerning the new item on the dumping of nuclear waste were introduced in the First Committee.

Brazil, Nigeria and Pakistan submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes", which was later sponsored also by Argentina, Indonesia, Romania, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic and Thailand. In introducing it on 9 November, Nigeria emphasized that the text addressed a disarmament matter and complemented

other measures with regard to dangerous wastes that were being undertaken by the international community in other forums. The draft resolution concerned action by the Conference on Disarmament in its continuing negotiations on a convention to prohibit radiological weapons. Nigeria believed that the banning of the dumping of nuclear wastes for hostile purposes would constitute a step towards the achievement of such a convention, and would serve as a confidence-building measure in view of the legitimate apprehensions of the developing countries that had been roused by the dumping of nuclear waste. The call for the prohibition of such dumping for hostile purposes was timely and consistent with the provision of paragraph 77 of the 1978 Final Document.¹⁷

The United Republic of Tanzania, on behalf of the Group of African States, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa", which was later sponsored also by Romania. In introducing the draft in the First Committee, Zaire emphasized that the new item had been placed on the agenda of the General Assembly in response to the concerns expressed during their meeting in May by the heads of State or Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with regard to the dumping of wastes in African countries by transnational corporations and other enterprises of industrialized countries—a practice that was spreading. It also stressed that OAU had decided to undertake vigorous action to ban the dumping of wastes in Africa.

Intensive consultations were held on both draft resolutions, which resulted in a number of substantive changes in the texts. In introducing the revised draft submitted by the Group of African States, which was now entitled "Dumping of radioactive wastes", Zaire stated that the sponsors had made a concerted effort to merge the drafts so that a single text on the subject could be adopted. In Zaire's view, the draft resolution as revised no longer applied just to African States, but to all Members of the United Nations which were themselves affected by those practices.

Nigeria and Zaire made further statements at the meeting at which action was taken on the two draft resolutions. Nigeria felt that the draft submitted by the Group of African States had been considerably transformed, and later supported both draft texts. It stated that the draft text on the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes focused on an aspect of a multidimensional problem that fell within the purview of the First Committee; other aspects of the problem would be dealt with in the Second Committee. Nigeria hoped that the draft resolution would be adopted by consensus. Zaire deplored the fact that efforts to merge both proposals had failed. It could not support the draft initiated by Nigeria because it constituted an ambiguous answer to the concern of the African States, which was simply to ban the dumping of wastes in Africa. It felt that the title of the draft would suggest that wastes could be dumped for purposes other than hostile ones.

¹⁷ General Assembly resolution S-10/2.

The African States were categorically opposed to having industrial and radioactive wastes dumped and saw no need for a code of conduct, as the draft suggested in operative paragraph 2, to govern such practices.

On 18 November the First Committee took action on both draft resolutions as revised. The proposal initiated by Nigeria was adopted by a recorded vote of 103 to 3 (Congo, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo), with 11 abstentions. The proposal by the Group of African States was adopted by a recorded vote of 125 to none, with 13 abstentions. At the time of the voting in the First Committee, several Member States gave explanations of their positions.

Four States that supported the draft resolution submitted by the Group of African States made statements. Mali abstained on the draft text introduced by Nigeria because it did not believe that radioactive wastes could be dumped for non-hostile purposes. Mali objected to several of the operative paragraphs because it was convinced that dumping must be banned once and for all, given the fact that most Member States did not have the technical capabilities necessary to deal fully with such wastes. It cited sections of a resolution adopted in June by the heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States by which they condemned any dumping of industrial wastes. A similar position was held by Burundi, which also abstained on the draft initiated by Nigeria. Côte d'Ivoire voted against the proposal of Nigeria because the draft text did not take into account the relevant provisions of the resolution mentioned by the representative of Mali. Cameroon regretted that efforts to reach consensus on a single draft resolution had failed. It voted in favour of the draft presented by the Group of African States because it reflected the concerns of most delegations on the subject; it did not participate in the vote on the proposal initiated by Nigeria.

Among those Member States that abstained on the draft resolution initiated by the Group of African States, four—Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United States—gave similar reasons for their votes. In general, they believed that a clear distinction must be made between the dumping of industrial wastes—radioactive, toxic or otherwise—and the possible hostile use of radioactive materials. In their view, the first issue, on which the text submitted by the Group of African States focused, was not germane to the work of the First Committee, and should be discussed in other forums. The second issue, however, fell within the purview of the Committee and should be considered by the Conference on Disarmament under its agenda item on radiological weapons. Although the draft resolution initiated by Nigeria covered both issues, it did so in a non-controversial way. The United States had an additional difficulty with respect to the draft initiated by the African States: several passages of the text appeared to link all nuclear-waste dumping practices with security questions. The Netherlands pointed out that, to the best of its knowledge, no radioactive material was being dumped in Africa nor was there, at that time, any proof of the hostile use of such wastes. In speaking of the draft introduced by Nigeria, the Federal Republic of Germany stated that it did not believe that radioactive wastes could be used for military purposes. The four States stressed their readiness

to address in the appropriate forums the concerns raised by the sponsors of both draft resolutions.

Although both Australia and New Zealand had some reservations with regard to certain paragraphs in the proposal submitted by the Group of African States and would have preferred a greater distinction to be made between waste dumped in accordance with internationally approved standards and that dumped without proper regard to safety and environmental concerns, they supported both drafts. New Zealand noted that its own region had been used as a dumping ground for toxic waste. It called upon the sponsors of both draft resolutions to bring forward in 1989 a single text, one which would be directly relevant to the work of the Committee and would attract the support of all delegations.

On 7 December the General Assembly adopted both draft resolutions. The proposal initiated by Nigeria was adopted by a recorded vote of 129 to 1 (Togo), with 10 abstentions, as resolution 43/75 Q. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind resolution CM/RES.1153(XLVIII) concerning the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa, adopted on 25 May 1988 by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its forty-eighth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 19 to 23 May 1988,

Recalling resolution GC(XXXII)/RES/490 on the dumping of nuclear wastes, adopted on 23 September 1988 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its thirty-second regular session,

Considering its resolution 2602C(XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which it requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, *inter alia*, to consider effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of warfare,

Determined to prevent all nuclear-waste dumping practices that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Aware of the in-depth consideration of the question of the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes in the Conference on Disarmament during its 1988 session,

1. *Calls upon* all States to ensure that no nuclear-waste dumping practices occur that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States;

2. *Welcomes* the decision of the International Atomic Energy Agency to establish a representative technical working group of experts with the objective of establishing an internationally agreed code of practice for international transactions involving nuclear wastes;

3. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to take into account, in the ongoing negotiation for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, the deliberate employment of nuclear wastes to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of radiation produced by the decay of such material;

4. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

5. *Further requests* the Conference on Disarmament to include in its report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session the developments on the ongoing negotiations on this subject.

The proposal initiated by the African Group of States was adopted by a recorded vote of 141 to none, with 13 abstentions, as resolution 43/75 T. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind resolution CM/RES.1153(XLVIII), concerning the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa, adopted on 25 May 1988 by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its forty-eighth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 19 to 23 May 1988,

Mindful of the serious concerns raised by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its forty-eighth session concerning the grave implications that the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes could have on the national security of African countries,

Recalling resolution GC(XXXII)/RES/490 on the dumping of nuclear wastes, adopted on 23 September 1988 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its thirty-second regular session,

Considering its resolution 2602C(XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which it requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, *inter alia*, to consider effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of warfare,

Aware of the potential hazards underlying the dumping of nuclear wastes and also the transboundary radiological consequences, which could have adverse implications on regional and international security, and in particular on the security of the developing countries,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Aware also of the consideration by the Conference on Disarmament during its 1988 session of the question of the dumping of radioactive wastes, which cause destruction, damage or injury by means of radiation produced by decay of such material,

1. *Condemns* all nuclear-waste dumping practices that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States;

2. *Expresses profound concern* regarding practices of dumping nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa, which have grave implications on the national security of African countries;

3. *Calls upon* all States to ensure that no radioactive waste is dumped in the territory of other States in infringement of their sovereignty;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to take into account, in the ongoing negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, the dumping of radioactive wastes in the territory of other States;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of the present item by the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

6. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to include in its report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session the developments on the ongoing negotiations on this subject;

7. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a report, in consultation with relevant international organizations, on the dumping of radioactive wastes in all its aspects in Africa, including all steps taken or envisaged to monitor, control and put a halt to such activities, and to submit his report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session an item entitled "Dumping of radioactive wastes".

Conclusion

There was no development in the Conference on Disarmament in 1988 regarding the general question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. However, resolution 43/72, adopted on the subject in the General Assembly, was supported by almost all States because of its compromise language on the issues that are still being debated.

Issues relevant to the prohibition of radiological weapons in the traditional sense and to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities were again addressed in the Conference on Disarmament, which re-established the relevant *Ad Hoc* Committee. The Committee decided to continue its work in two separate contact groups. Although the work conducted in 1988 contributed further to the clarification of the differing approaches of delegations, considerable differences on substance persisted with regard to both subjects. At its forty-third session, the General Assembly adopted two pertinent resolutions: by resolution 43/75 C it requested the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on the prohibition of radiological weapons with a view to promptly concluding its work, and by resolution 43/75 J it requested the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its efforts to reach, as early as possible, an agreement prohibiting armed attacks against nuclear facilities.

A new item on the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1988 and two resolutions, 43/75 Q and 43/75 T, were adopted on the subject. By both resolutions the Conference on Disarmament was requested to take the matter into account in its ongoing negotiation for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons. In addition, by resolution 43/75 T, the Secretary-General was requested to prepare a report, in consultation with relevant international organizations, on the dumping of radioactive wastes in all its aspects, in Africa. Thus, Member States will continue to discuss this subject at the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

PART FOUR

Consideration of conventional disarmament and other approaches

Conventional weapons

Introduction

THE ISSUE OF THE REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS and armed forces was first addressed by the General Assembly in the course of its earliest sessions, yet the question of nuclear disarmament has traditionally dominated international disarmament efforts, inasmuch as it is nuclear weapons that pose the threat of the annihilation of civilization. All armed conflicts since 1945—almost all of them in developing countries—have been fought with conventional weapons¹ and they have caused over 20 million deaths. Conventional weapons and armed forces account for some four fifths of global military expenditures. (This proportion is almost the same in the nuclear-weapon States.) Moreover, in the course of the past two decades there has been a steady increase in the accuracy and destructive potential of conventional weapons, owing to modern technological advances, and, more recently, sophisticated—and costly—conventional weapons have been transferred into the arsenals of countries in developing regions. Some developing countries are also building their own armaments industries, and even exporting weapons at the simpler end of the technology spectrum to other developing countries.²

Since the mid-1980s, the need to address nuclear and conventional disarmament concurrently has been increasingly acknowledged. The escalating accumulation of conventional weapons, particularly in the two major military alliances, and the apparent nuclear parity between those alliances have led to a reassessment of certain of their military strategies. The close relationship between nuclear and conventional armaments was recognized by General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan at their summit meeting in 1985. Acknowledging that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought, they also underlined the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. With the conclusion of the INF Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States and the prospect of further

¹ A recent exception has been the documented use in conflict of chemical weapons, which are classed as a weapon of mass destruction (see chapter XII).

² See *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No.E.89.IX.2), paras. 33-55.

reductions in their nuclear arsenals, hopes for cuts in conventional arms, particularly in Europe, have increased. These factors and those mentioned in the preceding paragraph—the frequency of the use of conventional weapons and their destructive and destabilizing effects, especially in developing regions, the economic burden their acquisition imposes, their increasing lethality, and the growth in arms transfers—have all contributed to a willingness on the part of States from all geographical and political groupings to address the question of controlling the conventional arms race.

At the United Nations, discussion of the issue of conventional disarmament has focused on four elements, namely: (a) conventional weapons *per se* and efforts to limit them, (b) international arms transfers, (c) the so-called regional approach, and (d) an agreement on the prohibition of certain kinds of conventional weapons. In 1984 the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly a study by a group of experts on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces.³ This was significant in that it represented the first effort at a comprehensive consideration of the subject. The General Assembly decided by consensus in 1985 to include an item entitled “Conventional disarmament” in its agenda and decided by consensus in 1986 to request the Disarmament Commission to consider the question of conventional disarmament on the basis of the recommendations and conclusions of the 1984 study, a task in which it is still engaged.

There is as yet no agreement on how conventional disarmament might be brought about. Western States and others, including China, point to overarmament and to the clear and present tragedy of conventional armed conflict and continuing tensions and instabilities that carry the threat of further conflict. They advocate restraints on, and reductions of, conventional arms simultaneously with a process of nuclear disarmament. A number of countries, however, continue to hold that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority in disarmament negotiations, citing in particular paragraph 20 of the 1978 Final Document.⁴

It is recognized that arms transfers have considerable implications for conventional disarmament, but the subject is complex and arouses many concerns, particularly among States that do not have indigenous arms production facilities and therefore feel the need to import arms for self-defence. There has been a growing feeling, however, that the international community must address this issue and there have been calls for consultations between major suppliers and recipients to explore possible approaches.

Although the reduction of conventional armaments on a global scale is seen as a desirable goal and has been the favoured approach of some, for instance India, it is generally recognized that global and regional disarmament

³ A/39/348. The study was subsequently issued as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.1, under the title *Study on Conventional Disarmament*. It is summarized in *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, chapter XXV.

⁴ General Assembly resolution S-10/2. The Final Document is also reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol.3: 1978, appendix I.

efforts cannot be isolated from each other, and it is felt by many that agreements to restrain and reduce conventional armaments may be more easily arrived at among States in a given geographical area. A 1980 United Nations study on the regional approach⁵ suggested that the possibilities for regional initiatives were virtually unlimited. In discussions regarding such measures of conventional disarmament, it is widely agreed that States and blocs with the largest arsenals have a special responsibility in carrying out reductions. The successful conclusion in 1986 of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe,⁶ which established certain procedures for notification of the exercises and troop movements of each side and for exchanges of observers at such activities, was regarded by many Governments as the possible beginning of a process of arms reduction in Europe, the world's most heavily armed region. These Governments were further encouraged by the Soviet Union's announcement, late in 1988, that it would unilaterally reduce its troops and withdraw a large number of men and armaments from Eastern Europe.

As a result of efforts to ban or curb the use of certain categories of weapons, an agreement on the subject was concluded in 1980: the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the three Protocols annexed to it.⁷ The Convention and its Protocols provide for the protection of civilians and civilian objects from attacks by means of incendiary weapons, land-mines and booby traps, and prohibit entirely the use of fragments that cannot readily be detected in the human body. The Convention is kept under review in two contexts: that of wider adherence and that of broader scope, the latter either through the amendment of its existing Protocols to make them more stringent, or through the elaboration of additional protocols. For the status of the agreement, see appendix I to this volume.

General developments and trends, 1988

Noteworthy developments took place in the conventional disarmament field in 1988 in the context of the European region, where the two sides continued their work towards establishing a new forum for negotiations to supersede

⁵ *Study on All the Aspects of Regional Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No.E.81.IX.2).

⁶ The Stockholm Document is reproduced in SIPRI, ed., *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1987* (Oxford University Press, 1987), appendix 10 A.

⁷ *Final Report of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects* (A/CONF.95/15 and Corr.2, annex). For the text of the Convention and its Protocols, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, appendix VII, or *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 3rd edition: 1987 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.88.IX.5).

the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe. Those talks were allowed to wind down inconclusively in the course of the year, with the understanding that they would be terminated upon the conclusion of the CSCE follow-up Conference at Vienna. It had been agreed already in 1987 that the new talks would take place in the CSCE context, with 23 participants, the 16 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) parties and the 7 Warsaw Treaty parties.

In the course of 1988 the "Group of 23" discussed primarily the mandate for the new negotiations, with the discussion focusing on such questions as the inclusion of dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) weapons systems and tactical aircraft, and on the scope of the mandate and the precise zone to be encompassed. It was eventually agreed that neither tactical aircraft nor dual-capable weapons systems would be singled out, and that the negotiating process would proceed on a step-by-step basis. By the end of the year it was agreed that the new forum would be known as "Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe", and only a few details, including some relating to the limits of the zone of application, remained outstanding.⁸

In the United Nations and in other forums, both the Soviet Union and the United States made clear their intention not only to move stage by stage towards greatly reduced armed forces, but also to ensure that the armed forces of both sides would be given a largely defensive character.

On 7 December, at the United Nations, General-Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev underlined the emergence of a new reality—a turning away from the principle of super-armament to the principle of reasonable defence sufficiency. He announced plans for the reduction of the Soviet armed forces by 500,000 men within the next two years and the withdrawal of 50,000 Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. This would include, in agreement with the other Warsaw Treaty States, the withdrawal of six tank divisions from Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Hungary, and their disbandment. The total reduction in the European part of the USSR and in the territory of its allies would comprise 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft. By these actions, Mr. Gorbachev stressed, the Soviet Union was addressing the problem of transition from an economy of armaments to an economy of disarmament.

In a statement issued in Brussels at the Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council, held on 8 and 9 December, the NATO foreign ministers expressed their concern about weapons systems capable of mounting large-scale offensive operations, observing that the East had a preponderance of such systems, and termed the reductions announced by the Soviet Union "a positive contribution". They suggested overall limitations on holdings of armaments in Europe at levels substantially lower than the existing ones, and exchanges of information on military organization, manpower, equipment and

⁸ The agreed mandate was initialled by both sides on 14 January 1989, and attached to the Concluding Document of the Vienna follow-up meeting of the CSCE, which was approved on 15 January 1989.

major weapon deployment programmes, the accuracy of which would be assured by a random evaluation system.

The *Disarmament Commission*, for the second year, had on its agenda an item on conventional disarmament. Although the importance of both the topic itself and the Commission's achieving further agreement on it on the basis of the previous year's work was widely acknowledged, the Commission was not able to conclude its task. The relevant documents and actions are noted in "Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1988", below.

The spokesman for the States members of the European Community emphasized not only the grave suffering caused by conventional weapons, but also the fact that it was the expenditures on conventional armaments and armed forces that absorbed the overwhelming part of the world's military budgets. Therefore the Twelve regarded conventional disarmament as essential for all States and advocated that it be sought at both the regional and the global level.

Eastern European States stressed the importance of taking the specific conditions of different regions into account. As to Europe, they drew attention to the programme drawn up by the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Parties to the Warsaw Treaty,⁹ which called for early agreement on the mandate for negotiations on reducing armed forces and conventional weapons on the continent, and they stated their readiness, in the course of those negotiations, to identify and eliminate, on a reciprocal basis, existing asymmetries and imbalances in the region. The USSR observed that such reductions must not deflect attention from nuclear disarmament.

Various non-aligned States expressed the view that, while the highest priority must be given to nuclear disarmament, conventional disarmament also merited attention, especially in the light of the costs of the conventional arms race in terms of the world's resources—human, financial, natural and technological. Like States from other groupings, they emphasized the need for undiminished security at the lowest possible levels of forces. India emphasized its feeling that conventional disarmament should be dealt with in the global context, while Pakistan and Venezuela spoke in support of the regional approach. Some delegations warned that attempts to reduce armed forces and military expenditures were futile without the reduction or elimination of security concerns and political mistrust.

Other developing States expressed particular concern at the further refinement of conventional weapons, for instance in the area of precision-guidance. Such advances gave rise to a constant demand for, and the supply of, new conventional weapons systems. It was also suggested that developing countries were being used as a proving-ground for new weapons.

⁹ A/43/276. The text, containing a communiqué and appeal, was issued in March following the session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers; it was also circulated in the Conference on Disarmament as document CD/824.

In the *Conference on Disarmament* there was no item relating to conventional disarmament on the agenda, although the item entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" (see chapter IV) embraces the consideration of conventional measures in the context of the overall programme. There was no development on that aspect in 1988.

With the ongoing CSCE Conference in Vienna and the associated work of 23 NATO and Warsaw Treaty States on a new mandate for negotiations on conventional armed forces, attention tended to focus heavily on the European region. In referring to the preparations for those negotiations, Hungary noted that not only the members of the two alliances but all European countries were intensely interested in large cuts in armed forces and armaments on the continent. It felt that the prospects for elaborating regional arms reduction measures were good, and held that reductions to a level of defensive sufficiency would, in the light of the current concentration of forces, inspire similar efforts far beyond Europe.

Bulgaria emphasized the stated intention of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty parties to seek substantive reductions in armaments and armed forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. In the negotiations, particular attention should be paid to offensive weapons systems, and historical asymmetries and imbalances should be eliminated. In exploring ideas, the foreign ministers had proposed early exchanges of data between the two sides. The Warsaw Treaty parties were prepared for greater openness and new approaches to verification and to the comparison of military doctrines. The Federal Republic of Germany observed that equilibrium alone was not sufficient to prevent conflict, and called for a situation wherein the armed forces of both sides would be geared for defence; thus the first focus should be on tanks and artillery. The aim of NATO in the conventional field was "the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe".¹⁰ As disarmament and security were two sides of the same coin, the objective was mutual security at lower levels of armaments.

France stated that the complete denuclearization of Europe would bring about a situation wherein conventional conflict would again be possible; accordingly, the urgent need in Europe was to proceed to conventional disarmament in the context of the well-established CSCE process. The proper framework was twofold negotiations: on confidence-building measures following upon the 1986 Stockholm achievements, and on conventional stability through the reduction and redeployment of arms suitable for surprise attack.

A few non-members and States belonging to the Group of 21 expressed similar views regarding the emerging situation with respect to negotiations on conventional arms and armed forces in Europe.

¹⁰ Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 2-3 March 1988. The Declaration is reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XI, No. 2 (Summer 1988) (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.88.IX.4).

While continuing to stress the absolute priority of nuclear disarmament, some members of the Group of 21 referred to conventional disarmament on a global scale and in general terms. India pointed out that its plan for a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world¹¹ covered not only nuclear disarmament, but also other aspects, among them conventional arms reductions, leading by way of a time-bound process to a comprehensive global security system. India stressed that its support of a comprehensive approach to disarmament had its roots in Article 11 of the Charter, the mandate of the Conference on Disarmament to work out a comprehensive programme, and the 1978 Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. Another member from the Group of 21, Argentina, expressed the hope that the General Assembly would adopt a resolution in which it would request the Conference to tackle the question of conventional disarmament as an agenda item with a view to negotiating agreements.

In the *General Assembly at its fifteenth special session* the question of conventional arms and disarmament was, as already mentioned, discussed in great depth, covering as it did a full range of possibilities for global and regional application. Views and positions were offered on such subject areas as arms production and transfers, inhumane weapons, the military use of new technologies, disarmament and security, disarmament and development, military expenditures and their effects, and priorities for nuclear and conventional disarmament. A sampling of the views which individual States put forward in the general debate is provided in chapter II (pages 54 to 58). The papers submitted on conventional disarmament are discussed briefly in chapter II as well (see page 70).

The improved political climate throughout 1988, arising in part from the undeniable achievements of the two major Powers in the nuclear field, led States to express their views on conventional disarmament in terms of early parallel action, rather than as issues to be dealt with only in the shadow of nuclear disarmament. China noted that while nuclear disarmament was in progress, conventional arms reduction should not be neglected. It pointed out that conventional weapons had been invariably used since the Second World War, and that in Europe, where the two major military blocs confronted each other, the weapons they possessed were mainly conventional ones. Jamaica elaborated statistically on the tragedy of conventional armed conflict and on the continuing arms trade, and advocated both concerted efforts to overcome deeply rooted mistrust and regional measures to permit progress in restricting conventional weapons. Singapore found it puzzling that the Assembly continued to stress that priority should be given to nuclear disarmament when so many millions of people had been killed by conventional weapons since 1945. Accordingly, it believed that "restraint" was more feasible than "general and complete disarmament" and, in its view, disarmament problems could be resolved only through small, realistic steps.

¹¹ CD/859. The proposal was originally submitted to the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session (A/S-15/12).

Also contributing to an action-oriented outlook, particularly among the European countries, was the fact that the region was already benefiting from the confidence- and security-building measures in operation between the two major military alliances as a result of the agreements for the mutual inspection of military activities reached at the 1986 Stockholm Conference. Finally, the fact that the 23 members of the two alliances were actually preparing for new negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe lent realism to ideas that were being put forward, because they could still be taken into account in the preparations.

The role of the developing States in the arms race was the subject of some comments. Bhutan and Nigeria acknowledged a degree of justification in the accusation that those countries devoted scarce resources to the accumulation of conventional weapons in excess of security needs, and by their actions benefited the weapons industries of supplier countries. Nigeria hoped that the Assembly would agree that the disarmament process required the major exporters to reduce arms exports to the third world. Developing States stressed that they would prefer to spend their resources on social and economic advancement, but were obliged to react to the easy supply of weapons to favoured countries and to rebel groups in areas of tension.

At the *forty-third session of the General Assembly*, the various aspects of conventional disarmament and the relationship between nuclear and conventional arms reductions and global and regional efforts were considered. Denmark held that the complex issue of conventional disarmament should be kept at the forefront of the multilateral disarmament debate, which would stimulate regional efforts, while New Zealand believed that reductions and balances in the conventional field were central to the search for nuclear disarmament: the two processes must take place in parallel.

With the CSCE follow-up Conference making good progress at Vienna, many speakers, virtually all those from European countries and some others, hoped for and expected early agreement on a mandate for the new negotiations and an early start to the negotiations themselves. Many delegations, particularly Western but also some Eastern European ones, pointed to the importance of eliminating existing asymmetries and offensive capabilities. Some delegations from outside the region attached considerable importance to such negotiations, pertaining as they did to Europe, which was so heavily armed.

Concern was expressed by both industrialized and developing States at the continuing technological advances and the ever-increasing destructive capability of conventional weapons. Some called for the prohibition, for example, of the development of lasers for battlefield use; others called for restrictions on particular types of conventional arms and urged enhancement of the Convention on inhumane weapons.

In addition, restraints on conventional arms transfers, particularly from industrialized to developing countries, and the need for transparency, legality, and registration by the United Nations in order to make such restraint work were considered. Indonesia emphasized that the conventional arms race in-

volved both supplier and recipient countries, which should undertake the task of halting and reversing it in an integrated process.

All in all, the intense exchange of views in the Assembly brought out some provocative thoughts on many issues relating to conventional armaments and their regulation and reduction.

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1988

The Disarmament Commission established its Working Group III to deal with the agenda item entitled "Substantive consideration of issues related to conventional disarmament, including the recommendations and conclusions contained in the study on conventional disarmament". The Working Group was chaired, as it had been in 1987, by Mr. Skjold G. Mellbin of Denmark. The Group held seven meetings as well as informal consultations between 4 and 17 May.

In the course of the Group's work, the Chairman reported that, taking the progress achieved the previous year as its point of departure, the Group had identified the problems still requiring solution for completion of its mandate. It had found agreed answers for some of these, but other difficulties had arisen, and it was problematical whether it could reach agreement on a comprehensive report. In the end, the Group could only submit, by consensus, a procedural report listing the documents under consideration and recommending to the Assembly, through the Commission, that it should continue its work on conventional disarmament in 1989.

In presenting the report to the Commission,¹² the Chairman commented on the difficulty of the subject. Unlike nuclear weapons, conventional weapons were possessed by nearly all countries, which needed them for their security. This increased the sensitivity of the issues involved and inevitably made progress slow. The Chairman particularly regretted for two reasons that there had been a falling back in 1988: first, it was conventional weapons that were killing people and, secondly, this regression had taken place while in other respects the international climate had improved, a fact which had led or was leading to valuable progress in arms control and disarmament.

Action by the General Assembly, 1988

Five of the six draft resolutions pertaining to conventional disarmament on which the General Assembly took action in 1988 were submitted under sub-items of the collective agenda item "General and complete disarmament". Four of these are discussed below, in the present chapter. The fifth, introduced

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3)*; the report of the Working Group is reproduced under paragraph 57.

by Colombia and entitled "International arms transfers", concerned primarily the preparation for and carrying out of a study on the question. It is discussed in chapter XVII; the proposal was adopted as resolution 43/75 I.

The sixth draft resolution was submitted under the recurrent agenda item pertaining to the Convention on the prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons; it is discussed in this chapter. Finally, the General Assembly, under a new agenda item, added at the request of Trinidad and Tobago, adopted a draft decision pertaining to liability for the illegal transfer and/or use of certain weapons or substances; it too is discussed in this chapter.

Of the many documents before the Assembly under the collective agenda item, the two most closely related to the sub-item on conventional disarmament were those conveying: first, a statement issued in July by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty on the negotiations on reductions in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe;¹³ and, secondly, a communiqué and statement issued by the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty in October.¹⁴ The latter proposed additional confidence- and security-building measures to be negotiated in the CSCE-Stockholm context at an early date with the aim of reducing the military confrontation and danger of surprise attack in Europe, and giving a more defensive character to military activities in an atmosphere of increased openness.

Denmark submitted a draft resolution entitled "Conventional disarmament", which it later revised and introduced in its revised form on 15 November. It noted the increasing emphasis on the need to control the conventional arms race without diverting priority attention from nuclear disarmament and welcomed that development. As the question involved all States, the United Nations had a unique opportunity to generate awareness of its urgency. In the light of the history of progress on the subject, including the 1984 study, the 1986 addition of the item to the Assembly's agenda, the 1987 addition of the item to the Disarmament Commission's agenda, and the widespread concern expressed on it in 1988 at the Assembly's fifteenth special session, Denmark was confident of resumed progress towards an agreed substantive report at the Commission's next session. Denmark also welcomed the additional new proposals before the Committee on the arms transfers aspect of the question, a complex issue which had not so far been addressed in a comprehensive way. By the proposal, the Assembly would request the Commission to continue its substantive consideration of conventional disarmament issues in 1989 and report to the Assembly with a view to facilitating measures of conventional arms reduction and disarmament.

The Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote the same day.

¹³ A/43/486-S/20061.

¹⁴ A/C.1/43/7.

Some States and groups explained their positions. Mongolia expressed the view that conventional weapons posed a particular threat to peace and security because of recent technological developments which were being used to create ever more sophisticated weapons, thus increasingly blurring the conventional/nuclear boundary. Mongolia also singled out the need for the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces, particularly in Europe, but also in Asia and other regions. The United States welcomed the revised text presented by Denmark because it avoided any prejudgement of the effects of quantitative and qualitative improvements in armaments. In the United States view, the effect of such improvement could only be assessed in the light of certain factors, such as needs of legitimate self-defence, impact on regional and world stability, and manpower versus technical capacity of the States concerned. To view qualitative characteristics in isolation from such factors was unrealistic. Finally, Belgium added to its endorsement the point that, together with many other delegations, it had reaffirmed at the special session the need to proceed to a substantial reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces throughout the world, taking account of each regional situation. It also welcomed the convergence of views on the need to limit offensive and surprise-attack capacities in Europe.

In making a general comment on behalf of the Group of Arab States with regard to conventional disarmament, Jordan emphasized that efforts with a view to conventional disarmament should focus first on the States with vast arsenals and on halting the supply of weapons to racist régimes, which pursued policies contrary to the will of the international community. The Arab States also emphasized the importance of non-belligerence, the end of all occupation and the right of all colonized peoples to self-determination. In explaining its position on the draft at a later meeting, Cuba stated that it interpreted the second paragraph of the preamble to mean that greater attention to conventional disarmament should be given in the framework of general and complete disarmament and in the light of the priorities established for disarmament, under which nuclear disarmament had absolute priority.

China submitted a draft resolution, also entitled "Conventional disarmament", which it introduced on 8 November. In the introduction it too noted the increasing attention being given to conventional disarmament, and the fact that it was a concern of all. The text it proposed not only pointed out that nuclear disarmament had the highest priority, but also stressed the danger to world peace and security brought about by conventional conflicts. It stated that armed forces should be used only for self-defence and that all States should promote conventional disarmament; at the same time it drew attention to the special responsibility of those with the largest arsenals and urged the two major military alliances to conduct serious negotiations pertaining to Europe, not only because it had the heaviest concentration of armaments and armed forces, but also because that region's efforts might generate a new momentum in the field of conventional disarmament.

On 15 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution introduced by China without a vote.

Mongolia explained that it also regarded the Chinese initiative as an important one, and drew particular attention to operative paragraph 2 (see below), which set out the belief that military forces should be used only for self-defence. Mongolia, along with many other countries, fully endorsed that position, regarding a focus on self-defence as a step forward in confidence-building and security. Cuba, for its part, observed that the text called attention to: the priority attached to nuclear disarmament; the fact that technological advances made weapons more destructive; the special responsibility of States with the largest arsenals and other militarily significant ones; and the belief that resources released through disarmament could be used for development. It pointed out that the States with the largest arsenals and other militarily significant ones accounted for more than 80 per cent of world military spending. It also appreciated the fact that the text acknowledged the need for States to protect their security and maintain their defensive capacities.

Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey submitted a draft resolution entitled "Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament", which was later revised twice.

In the first revision, Turkey withdrew its sponsorship. The phrase "in Europe" was added to the title and the preamble of the text was amended to better reflect the continuing need for efforts to build confidence and enhance security and for increased security and stability in Europe at lower levels of forces. In addition, the wording was revised to express the need to lessen "the risk of" military confrontation rather than just to "lessen military confrontation". The operative part of the text was amended to avoid prejudging the outcome of the follow-up Conference at Vienna and to invite other States to consider "appropriate measures" for reducing the risk of confrontation and strengthening security, rather than to "consider the possibility of negotiating agreements" for that purpose.

In the second revision, the sponsorship became Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden. The preamble was further amended so that the third paragraph would refer to "the great importance of increasing security and stability in Europe through the establishment of a stable . . . balance", rather than "the need for increased security and stability in Europe through a stable . . . balance", and so that the fourth paragraph would make it clear that the expected new negotiations, both on confidence- and security-building and on conventional disarmament, would be within the CSCE framework. The operative part of the text was amended so that the General Assembly would "welcome the progress achieved" at Vienna rather than "welcome the indications of progress" (see the text of the resolution, operative paragraph 1, on p. 340) and would urge the participants in the new negotiations to contribute to the attainment of "their objectives as agreed", rather than to "these objectives" (paragraph 2).

In introducing the twice-revised text on 18 November, France stated that the sponsors, in their efforts to arrive at the final wording, had opted to adhere

to broad, known trends and not to specify ways and means in order to avoid any interference with the ongoing Conference at Vienna and to meet the preferences of non-European countries. Thus the text in the main would enable the United Nations to give appropriate approval to the impetus generated at Vienna, making it possible to reduce, gradually, the military confrontation that had dominated Europe and East-West relations for over 40 years. In addition, the text would invite other countries and regions to take account of European developments without any attempt to impose any particular model. The text emphasized the decisive nature of specific regional conditions (paragraph 3), thus providing it with a universal character.

The revised draft resolution was approved by the First Committee without a vote the same day.

Three States amplified their views. Cuba, referring to operative paragraph 3, expressed the belief that any measures adopted should be accomplished not only by taking into account regional conditions, but also with the participation of all States directly interested, a point in keeping with the 1978 Final Document. Similarly, India, acknowledging its constant emphasis on nuclear disarmament, stated that it also acknowledged the importance of conventional disarmament, particularly in Europe. Referring to the invitation to all States in paragraph 3, it stated that the minimum conditions for taking measures were recognition of differing regional conditions and of the principle of progress only on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. Paragraph 3 referred to the first consideration, but not the second. It felt that that interpretation was universally acceptable and was embodied in the 1978 Final Document, and it joined in the consensus adoption of the text in the belief that paragraph 3 was to be interpreted accordingly. Yugoslavia pointed to its participation in the CSCE process and felt that in the main the text reflected the current state of affairs in that regard. However, it found that the text also reflected certain positions that were in line with the bloc approach, which it did not share. Specifically, it felt that the third paragraph of the preamble should be strengthened by a clear reference to conventional disarmament as the way to increase security and stability in Europe; in other words, what was needed first of all was concrete measures of conventional disarmament. The CSCE process should stress the complementary nature of confidence, security and stability efforts on the one hand and disarmament on the other in order to lessen the military confrontation and enhance the security of all.

Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Romania, Sri Lanka and Uruguay were the final sponsors of a draft resolution entitled "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale", which was introduced by Peru on 8 November. In introducing the text, Peru stated that the proposal brought up to date resolutions 40/94 A, 41/59 M and 42/38 N, all of which had been adopted with no opposing vote. The current draft expressed support for regional, subregional and unilateral efforts to reduce armaments and military expenditures. While the sponsors

felt that measures at any level in keeping with the Charter warranted support, the preamble reaffirmed the complementarity of regional and subregional efforts on the one hand and global endeavours on the other. By the operative part of the text, the Assembly would express satisfaction at conventional disarmament measures adopted and would appeal to all countries, especially arms producers and suppliers, not to interfere with countries seeking regional peace agreements and promoting development and the well-being of their peoples. Before the vote in the First Committee, the sponsors submitted a revised text with a number of drafting improvements to both the preamble and the operative paragraphs and an additional paragraph in the preamble recognizing that disarmament measures must be balanced so as to ensure that no State or group of States would obtain advantage over others at any stage.

The First Committee approved the revised text by a recorded vote of 110 to none, with 18 abstentions (non-aligned States, Israel and United States), on 17 November.

Five of the States that abstained explained their positions. Afghanistan was in favour of conventional disarmament on a regional scale as an integral part of global disarmament, and it believed that regional conflict should be resolved by respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States concerned. Accordingly, it had proposed an international conference to consider its particular situation, including the question of its demilitarization, at which the international community would guarantee the principle of non-interference and non-intervention in its internal affairs. Thus, its abstention was due to the absence of a direct reference to the principles of non-interference and non-intervention. Cuba, while appreciating the efforts made to have the text reflect all views, still found that it lacked some important elements. Especially, it did not mention the principles of non-use of force, non-intervention, non-interference, self-determination and the right of self-defence reaffirmed in paragraph 26 of the 1978 Final Document. Mention of such elements was necessary in the light of numerous examples, including recent ones, of threats to small countries. Also, the text did not stress the need to take into account the characteristics and situation of each region. Cuba found other elements to be missing which, in the light of history, required mention.

Democratic Yemen, noting the dramatic increase in proposals pertaining to conventional disarmament, could support sincere efforts in that field if they were in keeping with the unanimously adopted strategy reflected in the 1978 Final Document, which gave absolute priority to nuclear disarmament. It recognized and was concerned that the political objective in some quarters placed emphasis on conventional disarmament and diverted attention from the spiralling nuclear-arms race, and also that some texts did not take into account characteristics of regions which were confronted by racist régimes. It found it paradoxical that some States with a keen interest in conventional disarmament were voting against or abstaining on proposals pertinent to nuclear armaments, and wondered what their priorities were. As in the case in point, it would abstain in the voting on all draft resolutions on conventional

disarmament that did not take into account the right to self-determination, or the right to liberate Palestinian territories under Israeli occupation or to liberate Namibia; that did not refer to the arms embargoes imposed on exports to racist régimes; and that did not take into account Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on a comprehensive embargo on the export of arms to South Africa; the text introduced by Peru was one of these. India noted the priorities established in 1978, the first of which related to nuclear weapons. Those priorities were as valid now as they had been a decade ago, inasmuch as nuclear war threatened the survival of mankind. Therefore, progress in conventional disarmament had to be within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. Referring statistically to the dominance of the major Powers and military alliances, India expressed the opinion that isolated measures offered little hope of meaningful progress: what was required was a global approach.

The United States, while it had supported similar resolutions in the past, regretted that it could not vote in favour on this occasion because of the particular formulation of the text. It would, on any future occasion, continue to co-operate in efforts aimed at achieving consensus language.

The draft resolution entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects" was sponsored by 19 States¹⁵ and was introduced by Sweden on 8 November. Sweden pointed out that the text noted the provisions in article 8 of the Convention for reviewing its scope and operation and for setting standards for additional categories of excessively injurious conventional weapons. The text also contained an appeal to States that had not yet become parties to the Convention and its Protocols to exert their best efforts to do so, so that those instruments might ultimately enjoy universal adherence. The sponsors hoped that the text would be adopted by consensus.

Sweden added, on its own behalf, the view that some categories of weapons, such as incendiaries, should be objects of further restrictions. The use of sea-mines could possibly be restricted by a new protocol, a draft of which Sweden had prepared. Finally, Sweden felt that laser technology should be followed closely at the international level, since there could be a risk of its anti-personnel use, which could cause permanent blindness. Sweden understood that the International Committee of the Red Cross was planning a meeting on the laser question in the course of 1989.

On 10 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. There was no elaboration of position.

On the new agenda item added at the request of Trinidad and Tobago, which was entitled "Liability for the illegal transfer and/or use of prohibited

¹⁵ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, USSR, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia.

weapons and weapons or substances which cause unnecessary human suffering”, Guyana, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago and Vanuatu submitted a draft resolution with the same title. In introducing the draft on 8 November, Trinidad and Tobago emphasized recent concern about conventional weapons of increasing sophistication and destructive capacity. While the use of some such weapons was prohibited by various conventions, that was insufficient, as there was also the question of their illegal transfer across national borders. The initiative looked upon consideration of appropriate steps to prevent such transfers and the use of prohibited weapons or substances as an integral part of the disarmament process. As a first step, the sponsors felt that the Secretary-General should prepare a report on the feasibility of ascribing liability for these activities, which were causing unnecessary suffering, and perhaps on the possibility of establishing procedures for investigations to determine liability and ensure due process. In this exercise, the Secretary-General might obtain views of Member States, United Nations organs and intergovernmental organizations, among others, and he should take into account that at some stage there might arise a requirement for appropriate sanctions.

On 16 November, the four original sponsors plus Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines submitted a revised proposal, a draft decision designed to retain the item on the provisional agenda of the Assembly at its forty-fourth session, in 1989.

The First Committee adopted the revised text, in the form of a draft decision, without a vote. There were no explanations of position on the draft decision.

All of the draft resolutions and the draft decision discussed above were adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December.

The first draft resolution, introduced by Denmark, was adopted without a vote, as resolution 43/75 D, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 42/38 E of 30 November 1987,

Welcoming the wide support expressed by Member States for greater attention to be given to conventional disarmament,

Also welcoming the increased awareness of the implications of many aspects of the conventional arms buildup, both in its qualitative and its quantitative aspect,

Taking into account that conventional disarmament is a necessary part of the disarmament process,

Recalling the central role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament,

Having examined the reports of the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session and at its forty-third session,

1. *Maintains* that the United Nations should continue to encourage and facilitate disarmament efforts in all fields;

2. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue at its 1989 session the substantive consideration of issues related to conventional disarmament and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session with a view to facilitating possible measures in the fields of conventional arms reduction and disarmament;

3. *Also requests* the Disarmament Commission for this purpose to include in the agenda for its 1989 session an item entitled "Substantive consideration of issues related to conventional disarmament";

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Conventional disarmament"

The draft resolution introduced by China was also adopted without a vote, as resolution 43/75 F. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war as expressed in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and particularly its paragraph 81, which provides that together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, and which stresses that States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions,

Also recalling that in the same document it is stated, *inter alia*, that priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces, and that it stresses that nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently,

Further recalling that in the same document it is stated that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority, and that real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament on a world-wide basis,

Aware of the dangers to world peace and security originating from, and the loss in human life and property caused by, wars and conflicts fought with conventional weapons, as well as of their possible escalation into a nuclear war in regions with a high concentration of conventional and nuclear weapons,

Also aware that with the advance in science and technology, conventional weapons tend to become increasingly lethal and destructive and that conventional armaments consume large amounts of resources,

Believing that resources released through disarmament, including conventional disarmament, can be used for the social and economic development of people of all countries, particularly the developing countries,

Noting that the ongoing conventional disarmament negotiations in Europe have gained increasing importance,

Bearing in mind its resolution 36/97 A of 9 December 1981 and the *Study on Conventional Disarmament* conducted in accordance with that resolution, as well as its resolutions 41/59 C and 41/59 G of 3 December 1986, and 42/38 E and 42/38 G of 30 November 1987, and the consideration by the Disarmament Commission at its 1988 session of the question of conventional disarmament,

Bearing in mind also the efforts made to promote conventional disarmament and the related proposals and suggestions, as well as the initiatives taken by various countries in this regard,

1. *Reaffirms* the importance of the efforts aimed at resolutely pursuing the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament;

2. *Believes* that the military forces of all countries should not be used other than for the purpose of self-defence;

3. *Urges* the countries with the largest military arsenals, which bear a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions, and the member States of the

two major military alliances to conduct negotiations on conventional disarmament in earnest through appropriate forums, with a view to reaching early agreement on the limitation and gradual and balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons under effective international control in their respective regions, particularly in Europe, which has the largest concentration of arms and forces in the world;

4. *Encourages* all States, while taking into account the need to protect security and maintain necessary defensive capabilities, to intensify their efforts and take, either on their own or in a regional context, appropriate steps to promote progress in conventional disarmament and enhance peace and security;

5. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to consider further, at its 1989 substantive session, issues related to conventional disarmament;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Conventional disarmament"

The twice-revised draft resolution introduced by France was also adopted without a vote, as resolution 43/75 P, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Determined to achieve progress in disarmament,

Reaffirming the need for continued efforts to build confidence, to lessen the risk of military confrontation and to enhance mutual security,

Reaffirming also the great importance of increasing security and stability in Europe through the establishment of a stable, secure and verifiable balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels, as well as through increased openness and predictability of military activities,

Considering that further negotiations in the field of confidence- and security-building measures, as well as a new negotiation on conventional armaments and forces, both within the framework of the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, should promote the process of strengthening confidence, improving security and developing co-operation in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security,

1. *Welcomes* the progress achieved so far in the deliberations at Vienna on issues concerning the above-mentioned negotiations;

2. *Urges* Member States that will participate in the above-mentioned negotiations to contribute actively to the attainment of their objectives as agreed;

3. *Invites* all States to consider the possibility of taking appropriate measures with a view to reducing the risk of confrontation and strengthening security, taking due account of their specific regional conditions.

The draft resolution introduced by Peru and later revised was adopted by a recorded vote of 125 to none, with 23 abstentions. The resolution, 43/75 S, reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/94 A of 12 December 1985, 41/59 M of 3 December 1986 and 42/38 N of 30 November 1987,

Taking note of the final documents of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Nicosia from 5 to 10 September 1988,

Reiterating the primary responsibility of the militarily significant States, especially nuclear-weapon States, for halting and reversing the arms race, and the priority assigned to nuclear disarmament in the context of the advances towards general and complete disarmament,

Drawing attention to the fact that together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, conventional disarmament measures should be resolutely pursued, in the context of which conventional disarmament on a regional scale acquires urgency and renewed importance,

Affirming that regional or subregional arms limitation and disarmament processes complement and enhance global disarmament efforts,

Expressing its firm support for all regional and subregional peace and disarmament endeavours that take into account the characteristics of each region, as well as for unilateral measures to strengthen mutual confidence and assure the security of all States involved, making possible regional agreements on arms limitation in the future,

Emphasizing that the adoption of such disarmament measures should take place in an equitable and balanced manner in order to ensure the right of each State to security and that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage of this process,

Noting with satisfaction the positive trend towards the peaceful settlement of various regional and subregional conflicts and the important role played in that regard by the United Nations,

1. *Expresses its satisfaction* at the initiatives towards arms limitation and disarmament adopted jointly or unilaterally by some countries at the regional and subregional levels, as well as at the systematic implementation of confidence-building measures, limitation of the acquisition of conventional weapons and the reduction of military spending, with a view to allocating the resources thus released to the socio-economic development of their peoples;

2. *Expresses its keen satisfaction* at efforts to bring about the peaceful solution of conflict situations and regional and subregional crises, which would facilitate setting in motion specific measures for conventional disarmament on a regional scale through negotiated agreements under strict and effective international control;

3. *Again expresses firm support* for the United Nations system, and for the Secretary-General in particular, in the efforts to find solutions to conflict situations, thereby reaffirming the primary role of the United Nations in promoting peace and disarmament, and for the strict observance of the principles and norms embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;

4. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to persevere in his current peace efforts in various areas of tension in the world;

5. *Requests* the United Nations to provide assistance to States and regional institutions that might request it with a view to establishing disarmament measures on a regional scale;

6. *Appeals* to all States to facilitate the progress of regional disarmament, refraining from any action, including the threat or use of force, that might impede the achievement of this objective;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale"

The draft resolution concerning the Convention on certain categories of conventional weapons, which was introduced by Sweden, was adopted without a vote as resolution 43/67. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 32/152 of 19 December 1977, 35/153 of 12 December 1980, 36/93 of 9 December 1981, 37/79 of 9 December 1982, 38/66 of 15 December 1983, 39/56 of 12 December 1984, 40/84 of 12 December 1985, 41/50 of 3 December 1986 and 42/30 of 30 November 1987,

Recalling with satisfaction the adoption, on 10 October 1980, of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, together with the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III),

Reaffirming its conviction that general agreement on the prohibition or restriction of use of specific conventional weapons would significantly reduce the suffering of civilian populations and of combatants,

Taking note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* that an increasing number of States have either signed, ratified, accepted or acceded to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which was opened for signature in New York on 10 April 1981;

2. *Also notes with satisfaction* that, consequent upon the fulfilment of the conditions set out in article 5 of the Convention, the Convention and the three Protocols annexed thereto entered into force on 2 December 1983;

3. *Urges* all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence;

4. *Notes* that, under article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to consider amendments to the Convention or any of the annexed Protocols, to consider additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols, or to review the scope and operation of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments to the Convention or to the existing Protocols and any proposals for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing Protocols;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General as depositary of the Convention and its three annexed Protocols to inform the General Assembly from time to time of the state of adherence to the Convention and its Protocols;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects"

The draft decision introduced by Trinidad and Tobago was adopted without a vote as decision 43/423. It reads as follows:

At its 73rd plenary meeting, on 7 December 1988, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, decided to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Liability for the illegal transfer and/or use of prohibited weapons and weapons or substances which cause unnecessary human suffering"

Conclusion

In 1988 the traditional priority accorded to nuclear disarmament continued and nuclear-related issues remained dominant in the debates in the various international forums. At the same time, the trend of the 1980s towards devoting both increased and more immediate attention to conventional armaments and their regulation not only continued but gained momentum.

This may be attributed in good measure to the encouraging East-West atmosphere in Europe. In that region, the conclusion of the INF Treaty (a success in the nuclear field) followed upon the confidence-building results of the 1986 Stockholm Conference, and throughout the year substantive preparatory work was being carried on by the two major military alliances with a view to new negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, to take place in the CSCE context, commencing early in 1989. Those regional developments alone were referred to generously in the international forums, and

were frequently regarded as indicators of the potential viability of the regional approach for other parts of the world.

Another strong catalyst to the increased consideration of the conventional side of the arms race was the experience of conventional armed conflict fought with sophisticated weapons, which have become plentiful and easily obtainable. As to the question of costs, it was again brought to the fore, in the United Nations study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race, that the conventional side of the arms race consumes some 80 per cent of global military expenditures and, equally important, it was shown that social costs and the other international effects of excessive military spending are almost always negative.

The discussion at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly on the conventional aspects of the arms race indicated that the time was ripe for the international community to take measures to progress towards its objectives in the disarmament, development and security fields. In the event, at its regular session, the Assembly adopted six resolutions and one decision on conventional disarmament and closely related matters. Five of the resolutions and the decision are discussed above, while the sixth resolution, on a study on international arms transfers, is covered in chapter XVII. No negative votes were cast on any of the five resolutions or on the decision considered above, and of these six actions, five were adopted by consensus.

Reduction of military budgets

Introduction

PROPOSALS FOR THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS, based on the conviction that such measures would facilitate the disarmament process and help release resources for economic and social development, were made in the General Assembly during the 1950s and 1960s.¹ In 1973, a proposal submitted by the Soviet Union led to the adoption of resolution 3093 A (XXVIII), by which the Assembly called upon the permanent members of the Security Council to reduce their military budgets by 10 per cent and to designate a portion of the funds thus saved for the provision of development assistance to developing countries. The other permanent members of the Security Council opposed the proposal for various reasons.

In pursuance of resolution 3093 B (XXVIII), initiated by Mexico, the Secretary-General appointed a group of qualified experts to prepare a report on questions concerning the Soviet proposal.² While recognizing the benefits of reducing military expenditures, the experts dealt with the problems of arriving at a generally acceptable conceptual definition of military budgets and of developing a standardized system of measuring and reporting the military expenditures of States. By initiating other studies and surveys on the subject in the following years, the General Assembly sought to develop such a standardized system.

In 1978, the Assembly established the *Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting. In 1980, the Panel submitted a report³ in which it found the proposed instrument for the standardized international reporting of military expenditures feasible and recommended a further study of the problems of comparing military budgets as well as of those likely to arise with respect to verification.

¹ The proposals are discussed in *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chapter 6.

² *Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and Utilization of Part of the Funds Thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.I.10).

³ *Reduction of Military Budgets: International Reporting of Military Expenditures* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.81.I.9).

In 1979, on a Romanian proposal, the General Assembly adopted resolution 34/83 F, in pursuance of which the Disarmament Commission initiated a lengthy process of examining the possibility of concluding agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures. The following year, the Assembly adopted resolution 35/142 A, by which it requested the Commission to continue its deliberations and to identify and elaborate on the principles that should govern further actions of States in that respect, keeping in mind the possibility of incorporating them into a suitable document at an appropriate stage. This is one element in a dual approach which the United Nations has followed in the matter since then.

The other element is based on a Swedish initiative, resolution 35/142 B, by which the General Assembly sought to broaden the participation of Member States in the standardized reporting system by recommending that they all use the instrument⁴ to report their military expenditures each year to the Secretary-General. It also requested the Secretary-General to carry out another study with a view to refining the reporting instrument in the light of suggestions received and proposing solutions to problems of comparing and verifying military expenditures; that study was completed in 1982.⁵ Pursuant to one of its recommendations, a further expert study, on the feasibility of constructing price indexes and purchasing-power parities for the military expenditures of States in order to facilitate valid comparisons among them, was undertaken in 1983. It was completed in 1985.⁶

The dual approach derived from the Romanian and Swedish initiatives has thus consisted, on the one hand, of an attempt on the part of the Disarmament Commission to identify and elaborate principles for freezing and reducing military budgets and, on the other, of an effort on the part of the General Assembly to broaden participation in the standardized reporting system.

In 1986, the Disarmament Commission, for the first time in six years, reached agreement on a set of principles to govern the actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets, with the exception of a principle concerning transparency, for which a number of options were proposed both in 1986 and again in 1987. That principle has since been the centre of discussion in which differing opinions have been expressed. The Western States have maintained that the reporting exercise would increase transparency and openness in military affairs and thereby lessen mistrust and make agreement on the reduction of military expenditures more likely. However, the socialist and non-aligned States, while acknowledging the value of providing such

⁴ The "Instrument for standardized international reporting of military expenditures", which is in the form of a matrix, is discussed and reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chapter XX and annex III thereto; it has remained essentially similar since that time.

⁵ *Reduction of Military Budgets: Refinement of International Reporting and Comparison of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.4).

⁶ *Reduction of Military Budgets: Construction of Military Price Indexes and Purchasing-Power Parities for Comparison of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.2).

information, have tended to see the emphasis on reporting as a diversion from the real task of reducing military budgets. In 1987 it seemed that there was some *rapprochement* in the positions of States and that there was a growing acceptance of the principle of transparency, although several delegations cautioned that there should be no pre-conditions for commencing negotiations on reductions.

General developments and trends, 1988

The question of the reduction of military budgets was examined by the Disarmament Commission and by the General Assembly at both its special and its regular session. It was also referred to in discussions on such issues as the need for conventional disarmament, the allocation of resources released for socio-economic development, and the achievement of greater openness and transparency in military matters in general, which are dealt with in other chapters.⁷

Growing military expenditures, it was widely agreed, constitute a heavy burden on the economies of all countries and have extremely harmful effects on world peace and security. As noted in a new United Nations study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race,⁸ global military expenditures, estimated at constant prices, have continued to increase. The world gross domestic product increased from 1980 to 1985 at an annual rate of 2.4 per cent, while the corresponding annual increase in military expenditure was 3.2 per cent. This indicates that the arms race during the 1980s has absorbed a higher relative share of the world's limited resources than ever before. Since the Second World War, world-wide military expenditures have increased, in real terms, between four and five times. They consume some 6 per cent of total world output. A necessary condition for public accountability of the socio-economic burden of the arms race, the study emphasized, is full openness of information about the magnitude of military spending. The experts supported efforts to enhance the scope, reliability and comparability of military expenditure data, and encouraged the use of the United Nations international system for the standardized reporting of military budgets, introduced in 1980, stating that it should make use of national accounting systems. Considering the availability of reliable figures on military expenditures as necessary for an analysis of the real military burden, they regarded progress in this area as an important element in the negotiation and conclusion of verifiable agreements on reducing military budgets.

⁷ For an account of the adoption of resolutions on these subjects, refer to: chapter XV (resolutions 43/75 D and 43/75 F, on "Conventional disarmament"); and chapter IV (resolution 43/75 B, on "Relationship between disarmament and development", and resolution 43/75 G, on "Objective information on military matters").

⁸ *Study on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.89.IX.2). For a description of the study, see chapter XVII.

In the *Disarmament Commission*, the need for reducing military budgets was emphasized. Non-aligned countries, while pointing out that both developed and developing countries needed to reduce military spending, emphasized the major responsibility of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States in this regard. They stressed that the reduction of military expenditures would make it possible to allocate additional resources to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. Many delegations were of the view that pending agreement on the text of principles regarding the freezing and reduction of military budgets, all Member States should exercise restraint in military expenditures. The non-aligned countries felt that measures in this area would help guarantee international peace and security, and would facilitate disarmament. They also stressed the need to address the security concerns of States when considering reductions in military expenditures. Zambia, for instance, pointed out that, given the situation in southern Africa, countries of that region might find it difficult to do their share in reducing military budgets.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty emphasized the need for negotiations in respect of the reduction of military budgets. It was necessary, they considered, to reduce military budgets to a level of reasonable sufficiency, and in that context reiterated their proposal of March 1988⁹ for a moratorium of one or two years on any increase in military expenditures by the two major military alliances, with a view to their further effective reduction.

The fact that only one paragraph of the Commission's text entitled "Principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets" remained outstanding had raised the hopes of many delegations that it would be possible to complete the work on the issue and to conclude the consideration of the item. Those hopes were also nourished by the increasing *rapprochement* with regard to the issue of transparency and comparability of military information—the element of the principles that had so far prevented the Commission from successfully concluding its work. The belief was expressed that conditions now existed for finding an acceptable formula for the paragraph.

Although there was acceptance of the need to elaborate agreed methods of measurement and comparison, there were still differences in emphasis. Western delegations, regarded the United Nations standardized reporting instrument as a universal framework whereby States with different social and economic systems could supply information about their military spending in a comparable and non-prejudicial form and they called upon all States to participate in this exercise. Willingness to publish data about force levels and expenditure was a sure test of a country's commitment to increased openness and transparency in military matters. They considered the elaboration of an agreed method of measuring and comparing military budgets a prerequisite for meaningful negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets.

⁹ See A/43/276, annex II.

Socialist States were of the view that, in order to achieve and successfully implement agreements in the area of reducing military expenditures, a higher degree of predictability, an exchange of information, and the establishment of a stringent and effective system of monitoring and verification of the commitments would be of particular importance. The Soviet Union again affirmed its readiness in the next two or three years to approach a realistic comparison of military expenditures.

At the *fifteenth special session of the General Assembly*, several States addressed the question of the reduction of military expenditures and put forward a number of concrete proposals in statements and documents. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty emphasized that reductions of armaments and armed forces should be accompanied by corresponding reductions in the military expenditures of States; that the resulting savings should not be used for military purposes; and that principles should be adopted governing further actions of States in the field of freezing and reducing military budgets, which could be used for encouraging concrete negotiations in this field.¹⁰ Romania favoured the inclusion in each disarmament agreement of provisions for an appropriate reduction in military expenditures. It also reiterated that it had unilaterally cut its troops, armaments and military expenditures by 5 per cent.¹¹ France called for all countries to communicate to the Secretary-General quantified data relating to their military budgets and to supply an evaluation of the impact of their military expenditures on their economies; it also called for a United Nations facility to be set up to evaluate the military expenditures and to review those data. Cyprus proposed that a considerable proportion of savings arising from reductions in military expenditures by countries whose banks were owed substantial debts by developing countries should be paid into a fund established by each country, the fund to be used to buy part of the debt owed to its banks.¹²

Outlining its approach to the issues before the special session, the United Kingdom stated that transparency in military matters (including the provision of accurate data on military capabilities) reduced the scope for misunderstanding and promoted progress in negotiations. Undue secrecy, on the other hand, bred suspicion and inhibited progress in negotiations. The United Kingdom called upon all States to support the United Nations instrument for the standardized annual reporting of military budgets.¹³

In the course of the debate during the *forty-third session of the General Assembly*, Member States addressing the subject reiterated positions already expressed in the Disarmament Commission and during the special session. A number of States again underlined the fact that military budgets were absorbing a high proportion of the world's natural, human, financial and technological resources thereby hindering the economic and social development of all countries, in particular the developing countries. Many delegations, especially of

¹⁰ A/S-15/26, annex.

¹¹ A/S-15/30.

¹² A/S-15/42.

¹³ A/S-15/11, annex, para. 3.

non-aligned and socialist States, called for measures with a view to freezing and reducing military budgets, with the subsequent allocation of the resources released to development purposes.

China believed that the third-world countries should devote their limited resources to social and economic development and resolve their disputes with other countries through peaceful means rather than force. It felt however that they were very often not in a position to make a free choice, as their security was still threatened by armed aggression from outside. In fact, in terms of both military expenditure and armaments, by any measure the developing countries could not compare with the two super-Powers or the military blocs. Member States of the European Community pointed out that while all States needed to protect their national interests, including the right to undiminished security, there should be a strong common interest in achieving that purpose at lower levels of armaments, thereby reducing the high military spending in order to increase the allocation of national financial resources to a number of urgent humanitarian needs.

With respect to openness and comparability of data, the Western delegations felt that, by supplying the Secretary-General with relevant information, Member States would support the Organization in carrying out its role in that field. The Philippines noted that it had for the first time participated in the United Nations standardized reporting system, and it urged those States that had not yet done so to participate. The Soviet Union stated that it would announce that it would begin using the United Nations standardized military expenditure accounting system and it expressed its willingness to begin work immediately on methods for symmetrically comparing military expenditures within the framework of the United Nations.

Thus, during the year, Member States reaffirmed the need to reduce military spending and they were able to move closer towards an understanding of the steps required to achieve that goal.

Action by the Disarmament Commission, 1988

As in previous years, the question of the reduction of military budgets was an item on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission (for the full title, see chapter I).

As requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/36 of 1987, the Commission was to continue consideration of the question and to conclude its work on the last outstanding paragraph of the principles that should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets. In that context, the Commission had before it the text of those principles as elaborated in 1986 and further considered in 1987, as well as a number of other suggested formulations for the outstanding paragraph dealing with the exchange of data on, and the comparability of, military budgets.¹⁴

¹⁴ For the full text of the principles, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42, para.41)*. See also *The Yearbook*, vol.11: 1986, chap. XVIII.

While welcoming the progress made in 1987, a number of States expressed the hope that the outstanding issue could be solved and that the work of the Commission on the subject could be concluded.

After a general exchange of views, the item was taken up in a subsidiary body. The Consultation Group, which met under the chairmanship of Mr. Teodor Melescanu of Romania, held seven meetings and a number of informal consultations between 4 and 18 May. It continued the consideration of paragraph 7, the last outstanding paragraph of the principles, on the basis of a formulation proposed by its Chairman. That proposal was subsequently amended in the course of deliberations, taking into account concrete suggestions by various delegations. While a general agreement was reached on most of the elements of the paragraph, it was not possible to achieve a consensus formulation for the entire paragraph. Nevertheless, the Consultation Group agreed that the text for paragraph 7, with the bracketed wording in the last sentence, should be incorporated into its document of principles.¹³ Paragraph 7 reads as follows:

Meaningful negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets would require that all parties to such negotiations have accepted and implemented transparency and comparability. The elaboration of agreed methods of measuring and comparing military expenditures between specified periods of time and between countries with different budgeting systems would be required. To this end it [is essential] [should be encouraged] that [the participating] States utilize the reporting system adopted by the General Assembly in 1980.

It was generally felt that further consideration of paragraph 7 should focus, *inter alia*, on the last sentence, taking into account the content of the paragraph as a whole. In this connection the Consultation Group noted that in the absence of agreement on principle 7, there was no final agreement on all the principles. On the recommendation of the Consultation Group, the Disarmament Commission transmitted the draft text of the principles to the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session for its consideration, as part of the special report of the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly at that session.¹⁵

In a concluding statement in plenary, India stressed that although the question of the outstanding paragraph had not perhaps been fully resolved, a major step forward had been taken. The Federal Republic of Germany, on behalf of the member States of the European Community, was of the view that certain progress had been made in finding language on openness and transparency in military matters as well as on the standardized United Nations reporting instrument. Even in the absence of final agreement on the principles, a promising basis for a solution was created. The Soviet Union emphasized the flexibility that had been demonstrated by many delegations. It regretted that a number of members had insisted on putting forward prior conditions for beginning negotiations on reducing military budgets; that had prevented

¹⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3)*. The report of the Consultation Group is reproduced under paragraph 30.

final agreement on the document. It hoped that greater openness in military activities and military expenditures and the realistic and symmetrical comparison of such expenditures would become an integral part of efforts to reduce the military budgets of States to levels of reasonable sufficiency.

Action by the General Assembly, 1988

In accordance with resolution 42/36 of 1987, the General Assembly had an item on the reduction of military budgets on its agenda in 1988. During its consideration of the subject, the Assembly had before it the report of the Disarmament Commission, discussed above, and a report of the Secretary-General containing data on military expenditures of Member States. Of the 30 countries that had provided information, 28 had used the international standardized reporting instrument.¹⁶

Bangladesh, Indonesia, Ireland, Peru, Romania, Senegal, Sweden and the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution entitled "Reduction of military budgets", which was later also sponsored by Nigeria. On 11 November the sponsors submitted a slightly revised draft. In introducing the original text, Romania explained that the work of identifying and elaborating a set of principles to govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets had reached an advanced stage in the Disarmament Commission. Given recent developments and encouraging prospects in the area of transparency and comparability, Romania had, during the current session of the General Assembly, engaged in consultations with interested delegations in the hope of arriving at a compromise text on the outstanding principle. It had found, however, that for various reasons there was a preference for continuing that exercise in the Disarmament Commission in 1989.

On 14 November the First Committee approved the revised draft resolution without a vote, and on 7 December the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 43/73.

At the time the Committee took action on the revised draft resolution, the United States welcomed the progress made on the issue during the Commission's 1988 session and expressed pleasure that discussions clearly indicated that differences were not as great as they had once been. It pointed out however that although the deliberations had focused on the outstanding paragraph, nothing was agreed until all was agreed, and that even when there was agreement on that paragraph, the Working Group would need to review the principles in their entirety to ensure that the whole text reflected the consensus of all States. The United Kingdom expressed the hope that the

¹⁶ A/43/567 and Add.1 and 2. The following countries reported data: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Saint Lucia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Commission would take time at its 1989 session to look over other parts of the draft principles.

Resolution 43/73 reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the ever-spiralling arms race and growing military expenditures, which constitute a heavy burden for the economies of all nations and have extremely harmful effects on world peace and security,

Reaffirming once again the provisions of paragraph 89 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, according to which the gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would contribute to curbing the arms race and would increase the possibilities for the reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Convinced that the freezing and reduction of military budgets would have favourable consequences on the world economic and financial situation and might facilitate efforts made to increase international assistance for the developing countries,

Recalling that at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, all Member States unanimously and categorically reaffirmed the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, as well as their solemn commitment to it,

Recalling also that in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second United Nations Disarmament Decade, it is provided that during this period renewed efforts should be made to reach agreement on the reduction of military expenditures and the reallocation of resources thus saved to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of developing countries,

Recalling further the provisions of its relevant resolutions, in which it considered that a new impetus should be given to the endeavours to achieve agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned,

Aware of the various proposals submitted by Member States and of the activities carried out so far within the framework of the United Nations in the field of the reduction of military budgets,

Considering that the identification and elaboration of the principles that should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets and the other current activities within the framework of the United Nations related to the question of the reduction of military budgets should be regarded as having the fundamental objective of reaching international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures,

Noting that the Disarmament Commission, at its 1986 substantive session, agreed upon the above-mentioned principles with the exception of one outstanding paragraph on which it was generally felt that further consideration was needed,

1. *Declares again its conviction* that it is possible to achieve international agreements on the reduction of military budgets without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security, self-defence and sovereignty;

2. *Appeals* to all States, in particular to the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries;

3. *Reaffirms* that the human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures could be reallocated for economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries;

4. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue consideration of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets" and, in this context, to conclude, at its 1989 substantive session, its work on the last outstanding paragraph of the principles that should govern further actions

of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets, and to submit its report and recommendations to the General Assembly not later than at its forty-fourth session;

5. *Draws anew the attention* of Member States to the fact that the identification and elaboration of the principles that should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets could contribute to harmonizing the views of States and creating confidence among them conducive to achieving international agreements on the reduction of military budgets;

6. *Urges* all Member States, in particular the most heavily armed States, to reinforce their readiness to co-operate in a constructive manner with a view to reaching agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets"

Conclusion

As in previous years, delegations in various disarmament bodies considered the question of the reduction of military budgets, often relating the issue to reductions in conventional armed forces and armaments; the reallocation of resources released through reduced military spending to development; and the building of confidence through transparency and openness in military matters. Although the Disarmament Commission was unable to complete its work on the outstanding paragraph of the draft principles and conclude the deliberations on the question, Member States generally felt that some progress had been achieved, in particular as regards positions on the transparency and comparability of military data, which would facilitate the Commission's work on the issue at its 1989 session. The General Assembly, in its resolution 43/73, requested the Disarmament Commission to continue consideration of the reduction of military budgets and to conclude its work on the last outstanding paragraph of the principles that should govern further actions of States in moving towards that goal.

PART FIVE

Information and studies

United Nations disarmament studies programme

Introduction

SINCE THE EARLY 1960s, UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT STUDIES, authorized by General Assembly resolutions, have been carried out by the Secretary-General with the assistance of experts and consultants appointed by him. They have been prepared with the intention of, among other things, assisting the disarmament negotiating process through analysis and by providing information. Following a decision taken at the tenth special session, a board of eminent persons was established to advise the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies to be carried out under the United Nations.

In general, there is wide support among Member States for the studies, as it is felt that they contribute to greater public awareness of the problems of the arms race and disarmament. Some delegations, however, have expressed concern regarding the selection of topics, stressing that selection should be the subject of prior consultation, and have asked for restraint in commissioning new studies because of their increasing cost and the continuing financial difficulties of the Organization.

In 1987, the Advisory Board submitted to the General Assembly a comprehensive report¹ on the subject of studies. The Board considered that the studies had successfully served one or more of the three purposes identified in 1978, namely: (a) to assist in ongoing negotiations; (b) to identify possible new areas of negotiation; and (c) to promote public awareness of the problems involved in the arms race and disarmament. The Board believed that the published reports had made important contributions to a broader understanding of the complexities involved and differing points of view held on a series of important issues but, at the same time, it recognized that studies could not be substitutes for formal negotiations. It felt that in the conduct of the studies, valuable experience has been gained and a number of useful principles established, for instance with regard to the composition of study groups and the practice of seeking consensus while permitting the expression of differing opinions. The Board believed that the question of careful selection of subjects for study and the matter of costs were of special importance.

¹ A/42/300, annex.

Two studies, one on the climatic and other global effects of nuclear war and the other on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures, were completed during the course of the year. Both studies had been requested in 1985, but had been deferred because of financial stringencies. At its forty-third session, the General Assembly requested five new studies (see below).

Studies concluded in 1988 and action by the General Assembly

Study on the climatic and other global effects of nuclear war

By resolution 40/152 G of 1985, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of consultant experts, to carry out a study on the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter. However, because of financial difficulties experienced by the United Nations, work on the study was deferred. By resolution 41/86 H of 1986, the Secretary-General was requested to submit the study in due time for consideration at the forty-third session, in 1988. Subsequently, 11 consultant experts, reflecting wide geographical representation and a broad range of scientific qualifications, were appointed. The list of experts appears in the annex to this chapter.

The Group of Consultant Experts held two sessions during 1987 and one further session from 28 March to 1 April 1988 in New York under the chairmanship of Mr. Henry A. Nix of Australia. At its last session, the Group adopted its report by consensus and transmitted it to the Secretary-General, to be conveyed to the General Assembly at its forty-third session.² It was also made available to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament in order to contribute to the consideration of the relevant agenda items.

In its findings and conclusions, the Group of Experts states that its examination of the evolution of scientific thought on the global environmental consequences of a nuclear war reveals a clear convergence towards consensus. In the opinion of the Group, the criticisms and objections that have been raised from time to time—mostly concerned with the uncertainty and limitations of early models—do not invalidate the conclusion that a large-scale nuclear war could have a significant effect on global climate.

The study notes that the scientific evidence is now conclusive that a major nuclear war would entail the high risk of a global environmental disruption. The risk would be greatest if large cities and industrial centres in the

² Transmitted to the General Assembly under the symbol A/43/351. The report was subsequently issued as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.89.IX.1.

northern hemisphere were to be targeted in the summer months. This is largely because a severe cooling in the summer months would have a much greater effect on growing crops than in the winter, when plants would be either dormant or perhaps not even sown. During the first month, solar energy reaching the surface in mid-latitudes of the northern hemisphere could be reduced by 80 per cent or more. This would result in a decrease of continental averaged temperatures in mid-latitudes of between 5° and 20° C below normal within two weeks after the injection of smoke during summer months. In central continental areas, individual temperature decreases could be substantially greater. Three-dimensional atmospheric circulation models with detailed representations of physical processes indicate regional episodes of sub-freezing temperatures, even in summer. Recent work suggests that these effects might be compounded by a decrease in rainfall of as much as 80 per cent over land in temperate and tropical latitudes. The evidence assessed to date is persuasive that residual scientific uncertainties are unlikely to invalidate these general conclusions.

Beyond one month, agricultural production and the survival of natural ecosystems would be threatened by a considerable reduction in sunlight, temperature depressions of several degrees below normal, and suppression of precipitation and of summer monsoons. These effects would be aggravated by chemical pollutants, an increase in ultraviolet radiation associated with depletion of ozone and the likely persistence of radioactive "hot spots".

The sensitivity of agricultural systems and natural ecosystems to variations in temperature, precipitation and light leads to the conclusion that the widespread impact of a nuclear exchange on climate would constitute a severe threat to world food production. The prospect of widespread starvation as a consequence of a nuclear war would confront both targeted and non-targeted nations. This would be aggravated by the increasing dependence of food production on inputs of energy and fertilizers and the dependence of food distribution and availability on a smoothly functioning societal system of communications, transportation, trade and commerce. The human impact would be exacerbated by an almost complete breakdown of health care in targeted countries and the likelihood of an increase in damaging ultraviolet radiation. The direct effects of a major nuclear exchange could kill hundreds of millions: the indirect effects could kill billions.

The socio-economic consequences in a world intimately interconnected economically, socially and environmentally would be grave. The functions of production, distribution and consumption in existing socio-economic systems would be completely disrupted. The severe physical damage from blast, fire and radiation in the targeted countries would preclude the type of support that made recovery possible following the Second World War. The breakdown of life support systems, communications, transportation, and the world financial and other systems would compound the difficulties caused by food shortages in non-targeted countries. Recovery, even in the long term, would be uncertain.

7 December, the General Assembly adopted it, by a recorded vote of 145 to none, with 9 abstentions, as resolution 43/78 D. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, after referring specifically to the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons, it declared, in paragraph 18, that removing the threat of world war—a nuclear war—is the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

Recalling also its resolutions 40/152 G of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 H of 4 December 1986, by which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of consultant experts chosen by him, bearing in mind the advisability of wide geographical representation and of their qualifications in a broad range of scientific fields, to carry out a study on the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter, which would examine, *inter alia*, its socio-economic consequences,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General entitled “Study on the climatic and other global effects of nuclear war”,

Gravely concerned by the conclusions of that study,

1. *Takes note* of the “Study on the climatic and other global effects of nuclear war”;
2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General and the group of consultant experts that assisted him in the preparation of the Study;
3. *Commends* the Study and its conclusions to the attention of all Member States;
4. *Invites* all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the Study before 1 September 1989;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the reproduction of the Study as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible distribution.

Study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditures

By resolution 40/150 of 1985, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to bring up to date, with the assistance of a group of consultant experts and making appropriate use of the capabilities of UNIDIR in a consultant capacity, the report entitled *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures*,³ taking into account the significant developments that had occurred since it was completed, in 1982. However, because of the financial difficulties of the United Nations, the work of updating the report was not begun until 1987, when the Secretary-General appointed 13 consultant experts, reflecting all major geographical regions and political trends. The list of experts appears in the annex to this chapter.

The Group held two sessions in 1987 and one further session in 1988, from 11 to 22 April in New York, under the chairmanship of Mr. Constantin Ene of Romania. At its last session, the Group adopted its report by consensus and transmitted it to the Secretary-General, to be conveyed to the General Assembly at its forty-third session.⁴ The report was also made available to

³ United Nations publication, Sales No.E.83.IX.2.

⁴ Transmitted to the General Assembly under the symbol A/43/368. The report was subsequently issued as a United Nations publication, Sales No. 89.IX.2.

the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament as a contribution to the consideration of the relevant agenda items.

In its conclusions and recommendations, the Group of Experts notes that during the 1980s the arms race has continued unabated, in particular in its qualitative aspect. This is most conspicuous in the area of nuclear weapons, a fact which calls for their reduction and elimination. Over all, the arms race accounts for some 6 per cent of world output and, in some critical areas, much more. As a general global phenomenon, the arms race has a bearing on the security and development of every nation, and has a negative impact on international relations and their stability. The study shows that military expenditures have extensive social and economic consequences. The negative long-term consequences of such expenditures overshadow any positive short-term effects. There is a genuine trade-off between the allocation of national resources to military purposes and the ability to solve global social problems. As conventional weapons consume the bulk of the world's military expenditures and cause widespread suffering, their reduction has become increasingly relevant. In the view of the experts, efforts to stop the arms race, in particular in its nuclear aspects, are a sign of the widespread desire for a more secure world. They recommend concrete actions aimed at stopping the applications of technological innovations that sustain the arms race. To help prevent nuclear war, States should settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means. If the INF Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States were followed by the limitation and reduction of other nuclear weapons and of conventional weapons, the security of all countries could be enhanced.

As disarmament, development and security are comprehensive phenomena, the relationships between them are often complex. A comprehensive notion of security includes many development issues as relevant components of safety from threats to the survival, integrity and well-being of mankind. Disarmament could strengthen the basis of both security and development by facilitating the reallocation, by decision-makers, of resources to development efforts. Distortions in international economic relations call for co-operation between developed and developing countries. Progress in arms limitation and conflict settlement would permit more effective treatment by the international community of problems of underdevelopment, insecurity and ecological deterioration.

In their study the experts lay emphasis on the fact that promotion of international action for disarmament and development calls for a more effective United Nations and the improved functioning of international institutions in general. These aims could be achieved through co-operation, permitting the United Nations family of organizations to assume an improved role in harmonizing the views and interests of States and in implementing action-oriented policies, including contributions to the verification of, and compliance with, arms limitation agreements and to the peaceful settlement of disputes. The total effects of such actions would be improved understanding, the solution of disputes and conflicts, and the reduction of the military use

of scarce resources. Even in the event of hostilities, the United Nations and regional organizations could assist in the processes of reconstruction and rehabilitation. Peace-keeping forces could provide, as they have done in some cases, health care and assistance in the rebuilding of local communities.

The wide-ranging knowledge and experience of the United Nations system could be more effectively utilized in the study of complex linkages between disarmament and development. As concrete steps in this direction, the specialized agencies could carry out practical studies, within their respective fields of competence, on how disarmament could contribute to development. There is also a need for enhanced co-operation to protect the global commons, including oceans, polar regions and space. Finally, the socio-economic impact of arms cuts should be systematically evaluated, and plans for conversion should be prepared. Research in the last-mentioned area should be expanded in both the academic and the policy-making communities, as conversion is a critical factor in the implementation of political decisions to reduce weapons and to dismantle their production facilities. The United Nations, with a group of experts, could lend an international dimension to the study of conversion and explore this issue in depth.

The public perception of the arms race and its consequences is seen to be of critical importance in the efforts to eliminate the danger of war. In this area, the United Nations, within the framework of its World Disarmament Campaign, should consider an information programme focusing on young people to ensure their better understanding of the phenomena of the arms race and the potential consequences of nuclear war.

Noting existing recommendations on the examination and analysis of the impact of military expenditures on the global economy, and attributing budgetary deficits in many countries to extensive military spending, the experts consider that more research is required in this area. The Group found a lack of reliable data on the interrelationship of military allocations and international economic processes. The experts therefore recommend that the United Nations support studies on the effects of military expenditures on international trade and finance, and the impact of arms reductions on the economies concerned as well as their indirect effects on those of other countries.

Openness of information about the magnitude of military spending is, in their view, a necessary condition for public accountability of the socio-economic burden of the arms race. Having found it impossible at the time of writing to give a reliable figure for the global military expenditures or even for those of some major participants in the arms race, the experts support efforts to enhance the scope, reliability and comparability of such data, and encourage the use of the international system for the standardized reporting of military budgets, introduced in 1980. This system should make use of national accounting systems. Considering the availability of figures on military expenditure as necessary for an analysis of the real military burden, they regard progress in this area as an important element in the negotiation and conclusion of verifiable agreements on its reduction.

As its final point, the Group of Experts notes that the arms race continues to have a divisive effect on the world, furnishing the means for transgression of the fundamental provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and undermining international security and conditions for the international co-operation that is urgently required in all the relevant fields underlined by the report. Joint efforts in those fields are indispensable for reinforcing and consolidating collective security, the principles of which the experts consider as fundamental and irreplaceable instruments for the preservation of international peace and security.

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Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden, Tunisia, the USSR, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zaire submitted to the First Committee a draft resolution entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security". The draft was later sponsored also by Malaysia. In introducing the text on 9 November, Romania stated that, on account of its depth of analysis, the report would become an important reference document in working with Governments and international public opinion. By the draft, the General Assembly would express its deep concern at the scale of the arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race, and military expenditures and would stress the negative consequences for the economic and social development of States of the use of substantial material and human resources for military purposes. The Assembly would also reaffirm its decision to keep the item under constant review.

On 14 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 125 to 1 (United States), with 9 abstentions (Western and associated States). Two States explained their positions on the draft.

The United States explained that its negative vote was not a reflection on the study itself, in which it had participated, but rather on the draft. The United States believed, among other things, that the references in the draft to the "alarming" speed at which military expenditures were increasing and the linkage of increased armaments to decreased security were not justified by the study itself.

The Netherlands abstained in the vote because, while welcoming the updating of the report, it was unable to concur with the proposal in the draft concerning further inclusion of the item on the agenda.

On 7 December, the draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly, by a recorded vote of 143 to 1, with 9 abstentions, as resolution 43/78 J. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security",

Recalling its resolutions 2667 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2831 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 3075 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 32/75 of 12 December 1977, 35/141 of 12 December 1980, 40/150 of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 I of 4 December 1986,

Deeply concerned that the arms race, particularly in nuclear armaments and military expenditures, continues to increase at an alarming speed, representing a heavy burden for the economies of all States and constituting a grave danger for world peace and security,

Recalling also the numerous statements made by the representatives of Governments during the disarmament negotiations and particularly at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament, to the effect that the vastly increased military budgets have also contributed to current economic problems in certain States and that existing and planned military programmes constitute a huge waste of precious resources which might otherwise be used to elevate living standards of all peoples and solve the problems confronting developing countries in achieving economic and social development,

Reaffirming the need for all Governments and peoples to be informed about and to understand the situation prevailing in the field of the arms race and disarmament,

Bearing in mind the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign, solemnly launched at the twelfth special session, which is intended to promote public interest in and support for the reaching of agreements on measures of arms limitation and disarmament,

Recalling further paragraph 93 (c) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it is provided that the Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security,

Considering that the elaboration of such reports should be viewed as a measure aimed at building confidence among States,

1. *Welcomes with satisfaction* the updated report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditures;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Secretary-General and the consultant experts as well as to the Governments and international organizations that have rendered assistance in the updating of the report;

3. *Recommends* that the report be brought to the attention of public opinion and also taken into account in future actions by the United Nations in the field of disarmament;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the reproduction of the report as a United Nations publication and to give it broad publicity in the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign;

5. *Recommends also* that all Governments ensure the widest possible distribution of the report, including its translation into the respective national languages;

6. *Invites* the specialized agencies as well as intergovernmental, national and non-governmental organizations to use their facilities to make the report widely known;

7. *Reaffirms* its decision to keep the item entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security" under constant review, and decides to include it in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session.

Studies initiated in 1988

Study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification

At its forty-third session, the General Assembly considered the item "Verification in all aspects", which, pursuant to resolution 42/42 F of 1987, was on its agenda as a separate item for the first time. Three of the draft resolutions

submitted under the item concerned a study on the role that the United Nations could play in the field of verification. In the end, the three draft resolutions were merged into a single text, and two of them were withdrawn.

On 24 October, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Romania and Spain submitted a draft resolution entitled "Verification in all its aspects". It was later sponsored also by Costa Rica, the German Democratic Republic, Portugal, Samoa, Thailand, Uruguay and Zaire.

In introducing the draft resolution on 3 November, Canada pointed out that, by the draft, the General Assembly would note with satisfaction the 1988 report of the Disarmament Commission on verification and endorse the 16 principles of verification that the Commission had agreed upon. According to the draft, the Assembly would also request the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of experts, a study on the role of the United Nations in verification. In Canada's view, an international consensus existed concerning the need for adequate and appropriate verification provisions in arms control and disarmament agreements. There was also a growing awareness within the international community of the significance of the role that multilateral verification was likely to play in arms control and disarmament, even though the form in which that role would unfold remained unclear. The sponsors believed that there was an important practical role for the United Nations in arms control and disarmament verification. Care would be needed in identifying such a role—one that would be capable of generating and maintaining broad international political support in the long term. Any role for the United Nations must develop step by step, on the basis of what was realistically feasible in terms of current political and financial realities. The next logical stage in that step-by-step process was to undertake an expert study of the role of the United Nations in verification.

Subsequently, at the request of the sponsors, no action was taken on the draft resolution.⁵

On 25 October, Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania submitted a draft resolution entitled "Verification within the United Nations". In introducing the draft on 7 November, Sweden pointed out that in accordance with it, the Assembly would endorse the principle of establishing a multilateral verification system within the United Nations as an integral part of a strengthened multilateral framework to ensure peace and security during the process of disarmament and in a nuclear-free world. It would also request the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements, including preparations for an outline of a multilateral verification system within the United Nations. A comprehensive report

⁵ See A/43/894, paras. 5 and 6.

on the subject was to be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session, in 1990.

One of the reasons for the proposal, Sweden made clear, was the fact that countries had quite different capabilities in terms of national technical means of verification, and that international verification arrangements were one way to even out such differences. International verification was not meant to replace bilateral or other verification measures already agreed upon, but to complement them. Keeping in mind that the United Nations had a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament, it stood to reason that it should be entrusted with a corresponding role and responsibility in the field of verification.

Subsequently, Sweden announced that the draft resolution would not be put to the vote.⁶

On 16 November, a third draft resolution was submitted. It was entitled "Study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification" and was co-sponsored by 35 countries,⁷ including the 6 sponsors of the draft introduced by Sweden and almost all sponsors of the draft introduced by Canada.

Sweden also introduced the third draft, on 17 November. It indicated that the new text was the result of long negotiations between Canada, France and the Netherlands on the one hand and Sweden on the other. The new draft stressed that the issue of verification of, and compliance with, arms limitation and disarmament agreements was a matter of concern to all nations. It further noted that the United Nations could make a significant contribution in the field of verification, particularly with respect to multilateral agreements. In the draft the Secretary-General was requested to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, which would, *inter alia*, provide specific recommendations for future action by the United Nations in that context.

On 18 November, the First Committee approved the third draft resolution by a recorded vote of 130 to 1 (United States), with no abstentions. Six States explained their votes.

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom explained their affirmative votes. Bulgaria explained that its vote was given on the understanding that the reference in the final paragraph of the preamble to the proposals regarding verification put forward by Member States included also those introduced by itself, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet

⁶ See A/43/894, paras. 7 and 8.

⁷ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Zaire.

Union at the fifteenth special session.⁸ The Soviet Union also regretted that the sponsors had not agreed to include in the final paragraph of the preamble a reference to specific socialist initiatives, but it commended the generally positive tone of the draft. Similar views were expressed by Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The United Kingdom thought that an in-depth study on the various aspects of verification would be useful. It considered, however, that in accordance with principle 13 of the Disarmament Commission's draft principles, verification was a matter for States directly concerned and was most effective when it was treaty-specific. Outside organizations might be involved in verification agreements only at the request, and with the explicit approval, of all parties to the agreement concerned.

In explaining its negative vote, the United States made clear that any verification arrangements, including those that might provide for a United Nations role, must be developed and agreed upon by the negotiating parties. It did not see how the Secretary-General could undertake an in-depth study on the role of the United Nations in verification in the abstract, in the absence of any parameters that specific agreements might provide for such a role in individual cases, and how, in the circumstances, the participants in the study could provide specific recommendations for future action by the United Nations in that field.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 150 to 1, with no abstentions, as resolution 43/81 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/152 O of 16 December 1985, 41/86 Q of 4 December 1986 and 42/42 F of 30 November 1987,

Underlining the important role that the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, has to play in the sphere of disarmament,

Recalling that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that, consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament,

Noting that the critical importance of verification of and compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements is universally recognized,

Stressing that the issue of verification of and compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements is a matter of concern to all nations,

Reiterating its view that:

(a) Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate and effective measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and to ensure that they are being observed by all parties;

(b) The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement;

(c) Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through United Nations organs in the verification process;

(d) Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed,

⁸ See A/S-15/AC.1/15.

Recalling that:

(a) In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field should be considered;

(b) Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures that are non-discriminatory and that do not interfere unduly with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development,

Conscious of the fact that the United Nations is already playing a useful role in the field of verification,

Taking note of all proposals that have been put forward in the field of verification by Member States, including those by Canada and the Netherlands, France and the countries of the Six-Nation Initiative,

1. *Recognizes* that the United Nations, in accordance with its role and responsibilities established under the Charter, can make a significant contribution in the field of verification, in particular of multilateral agreements;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* the completion by the Disarmament Commission of its work on the subject of verification in all its aspects;

3. *Endorses* the general principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission and contained in its report;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification that would:

(a) Identify and review existing activities of the United Nations in the field of verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements;

(b) Assess the need for improvements in existing activities as well as explore and identify possible additional activities, taking into account organizational, technical, operational, legal and financial aspects;

(c) Provide specific recommendations for future action by the United Nations in this context;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Verification in all its aspects"

Comprehensive United Nations study on nuclear weapons

Australia, Austria, the German Democratic Republic, India, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Comprehensive United Nations study on nuclear weapons", which was later sponsored also by Argentina, Hungary, Indonesia and Samoa. In introducing the draft on 3 November, Sweden noted that, by it, the Secretary-General was requested to carry out, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts and taking into account recent relevant studies, an update of the 1980 *Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons*.⁹ The study should be completed well in advance of the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly. It should be as comprehensive as possible and be based on open material and such further information as Member States

⁹ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.11.

might wish to make available for the purpose of the study. Sweden believed that the 1980 study had provided a common frame of reference and an authoritative information base on nuclear weapons for the 1980s. On the threshold of the 1990s, the time had come to prepare a corresponding standard reference work to serve as a guide for nuclear-disarmament efforts in the next decade.

On 17 November, the First Committee approved the draft by a recorded vote of 122 to 1 (United States), with 9 abstentions (Western and associated States). Three States explained their votes.

The United States pointed out that its negative vote was consistent with its previously expressed concern about the proliferation of projects which placed additional financial pressure on the budget of the United Nations. In its view, the proposed update was exceedingly broad in scope and would duplicate information already available in open literature.

The Netherlands and the United Kingdom explained their abstentions. The Netherlands believed that the developments that had taken place in the area of nuclear arms since the publication of the 1980 study did not sufficiently warrant an update, and that the exercise therefore did not deserve priority status as compared with some other proposed studies, which would cover new ground. The United Kingdom felt that the proposal was premature for two reasons: (a) the basic technical facts about nuclear weapons had not been changed by technical developments since 1980; and (b) it did not seem appropriate to launch a new study in the middle of the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which, if brought to a successful conclusion, could have a dramatic effect on nuclear arsenals. The United Kingdom added that it did not share some of the conclusions about the possession of nuclear weapons and the principle of nuclear deterrence drawn in the 1980 study.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 141 to 1, with 9 abstentions, as resolution 43/75 N. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Conscious of the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, in accordance with the Charter,

Recognizing that nuclear disarmament and arms limitation remain a priority objective and represent a central task of the international community,

Recalling the report of the Secretary-General entitled *Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons*, which was submitted to the General Assembly in 1980,

Recognizing also that since then many important developments have taken place in the area of nuclear arms, including the continued qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems,

Noting the importance attached by the international community to the complete cessation of nuclear testing within the framework of an effective disarmament process,

Noting also the full-scale stage-by-stage talks on nuclear testing between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America,

Bearing in mind the critical importance of an early and significant reduction of nuclear arms and recent progress in this field,

Noting further the reports of the Secretary-General entitled *Study on the Climatic and Other Global Effects of Nuclear War*, *Concepts of Security* and *Study on Deterrence*,

Convinced that a comprehensive United Nations study on new developments concerning different aspects of nuclear weapons would make a valuable contribution to the dissemination of factual information and to international understanding of the issues involved,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to carry out, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts and taking into account recent relevant studies, a comprehensive update of the *Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons* that provides factual and up-to-date information on and pays regard to the political, legal and security aspects of:

- (a) Nuclear arsenals and pertinent technological developments;
- (b) Doctrines concerning nuclear weapons;
- (c) Efforts to reduce nuclear weapons;
- (d) Physical, environmental, medical and other effects of use of nuclear weapons and of nuclear testing;
- (e) Efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban;
- (f) Efforts to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and their horizontal and vertical proliferation;
- (g) The question of verification of compliance with nuclear-arms limitation agreements;

2. *Recommends* that the study, while aiming at being as comprehensive as possible, should be based on open material and such further information as Member States may wish to make available for the purpose of the study;

3. *Invites* all Governments to co-operate with the Secretary-General so that the objectives of the study may be achieved;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit the final report to the General Assembly well in advance of its forty-fifth session.

Study on international arms transfers

Two draft resolutions on international arms transfers, which were later merged into a single text, were submitted during the session.

On 31 October, Australia, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Sweden submitted a draft resolution entitled "International arms transfers", which was later also sponsored by Honduras, the Philippines and Samoa. In introducing it on 7 November, Colombia emphasized the magnitude of the problem and the need to tackle it as soon as possible. This had been borne out by statements of heads of State and foreign ministers of various countries during the general debate at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. By the draft, the Assembly would request Member States to consider the possibility of taking action on the national, regional and international levels to control international arms transfers and to counter their harmful effects. Among other things, Member States would be requested to consider agreement regarding the establishment, within the United Nations, of a system of information on arms transfers on a universal and non-discriminatory basis. The Secretary-General would be requested to seek the views of Member States on the implementation of such measures and to explore, with the assistance of governmental experts, the nature of mechanisms which might assist in their implementation.

On the same day, Italy also submitted a draft resolution on the subject, entitled "International transfer of conventional armaments" In introducing it on 7 November, Italy stated that it was holding consultations with Colombia concerning the text, noting that its draft favoured a more gradual approach than did the other. Italy was convinced that the time had come for concerted international action to curb the arms race and to restrict the flow of arms to areas beset by tensions, as well as to halt and prevent clandestine and illicit international arms trafficking. It believed that greater transparency in the matter was necessary in order to establish a solid basis for action and that the United Nations could provide the framework for such transparency. In its operative part, this draft, too, envisaged a study by the Secretary-General on the subject, taking into account information provided by Member States.

Italy also indicated that it intended to continue to consult with interested delegations to reach a consensus on the matter. As a result of those consultations, Italy later requested that no action be taken on the draft resolution it had introduced.

On 14 November, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, the Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, the Netherlands, Peru, the Philippines, Samoa and Sweden submitted a revised draft resolution, which was later also sponsored by Bolivia, Luxembourg, Norway, Paraguay and the United Kingdom. On 17 November, the same sponsors submitted a further revised draft resolution. In introducing the latter on 18 November, Colombia thanked all the sponsors, in particular Australia, Cameroon and Italy, for their co-operation in drafting the final version. It believed that the draft embodied many of the concerns expressed over the years, as reflected and developed by the sponsors, who hoped that the study requested of the Secretary-General in paragraph 5 (see below) could be financed under the 1990-1991 programme budget.

On 18 November, the First Committee approved the second revision of the draft resolution introduced by Colombia by a recorded vote of 93 to none, with 36 abstentions (non-aligned States, China and United States). Six States explained their votes.

Cuba and the United States explained their abstentions. Cuba believed that the draft did not place sufficient emphasis on aspects relating to nuclear weapons, but seemed to draw attention away from them. In its view, the draft also made international transfers of conventional arms appear to be a regional problem when they were in fact a global matter. The United States recognized that the draft raised a number of serious concerns that it shared with the key sponsors. It felt, however, that the text blurred the distinction between legitimate and illicit arms transfers; that, at a time of financial restraint, it was inappropriate to call for costly efforts to collect and monitor information on arms transfers and to conduct an expert study; and that the text ignored the fact that arms transfers resulted from political tensions.

Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela all voted in favour of the draft, but had some reservations regarding it. In Mexico's view, it should

have been made clear that the text should not be interpreted as affecting priorities on disarmament negotiations as set forth in the 1978 Final Document. Nicaragua shared that reservation and also expressed the view that negotiated peaceful solutions to regional conflicts were a prerequisite for restraining arms transfers. Panama would have liked the draft to reflect its concerns over the right of States to self-determination. Venezuela found the draft, among other things, too ambitious in its stated aims and, as a result, not very realistic.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 110 to 1, with 38 abstentions, as resolution 43/75 I. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the central role of the United Nations in strengthening international peace and security and promoting disarmament,

Bearing in mind that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Member States have undertaken to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Also bearing in mind the inherent right to self-defence embodied in Article 51 of the Charter,

Taking into account the general principles outlined in paragraph 22 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Also taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations studies entitled *Study on Conventional Disarmament*, *Study on all the Aspects of Regional Disarmament*, *Study on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms race and Military Expenditures*, *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development*, *Reduction of Military Budgets*, *Relationship between Disarmament and International Security*, and *Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures*,

Further taking into account the action programme set forth in the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development,

1. *Expresses its conviction* that arms transfers in all their aspects deserve serious consideration by the international community, *inter alia*, because of:

(a) Their potential effects in areas where tension and regional conflict threaten international peace and security and national security;

(b) Their known and potential negative effects on the process of the peaceful social and economic development of all peoples;

(c) Increasing illicit and covert arms trafficking;

2. *Requests* Member States to consider, *inter alia*, the following measures relating to these concerns:

(a) Reinforcement of their national systems of control and vigilance concerning production and transport of arms;

(b) Examination of ways and means of refraining from acquiring arms additional to those needed for legitimate national security requirements, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region;

(c) Examination of the ways and means of providing for more openness and transparency with regard to world-wide arms transfers;

3. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to take into account the above-mentioned matters in its deliberations on the issue of conventional disarmament;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to seek the views and proposals of Member States on the matters contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 above and to collect all other relevant information for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

5. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to carry out thereafter, with the assistance of governmental experts, a study on ways and means of promoting transparency in international

transfers of conventional arms on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, also taking into consideration the views of Member States as well as other relevant information, including that on the problem of illicit arms trade, for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session;

6. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to make available, within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign, information concerning the question of arms transfers and their consequences for international peace and security;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session an item entitled "International arms transfers"

Study on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

Egypt submitted a draft resolution entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", by which the General Assembly would have, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study on the practical measures capable of creating the necessary conditions to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, taking into account the circumstances and characteristics of the region, and to submit the study to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session.¹⁰

On 9 November, Egypt submitted a revised draft resolution, to which new operative paragraphs 1 to 5 had been added (see below). Also in the operative part, the Secretary-General was requested to undertake a study on effective and verifiable measures that would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, taking into account, among other things, views and suggestions of the parties of the region.

In introducing the revised draft resolution on 10 November, Egypt expressed the view that the turbulence in the Middle East could not sustain further aggravation, particularly the introduction of nuclear weapons. Strongly committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Egypt had warned repeatedly that it would not allow a nuclear-arms race in the Middle East, in which one State would become superior to others. It believed that a nuclear-weapon-free zone would provide a framework for keeping the region free from nuclear weapons through equal, legally binding commitments by all States of the region. Egypt explained that the draft followed closely the text of the corresponding resolution of 1987, the only new element being the request to the Secretary-General to undertake a study on the question. In formulating the proposal, an effort had been made to limit the expenses that would be incurred.

On 15 November, the First Committee approved the revised draft resolution without a vote. Four States explained their positions on the draft.

¹⁰ At the time that the General Assembly considered this proposal, it had before it a report of the Secretary-General (A/43/484), prepared pursuant to resolution 42/28 of 1987, containing the views of Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt and Oman on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

The Islamic Republic of Iran affirmed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world was a positive step towards nuclear disarmament. Israel favoured the new initiative for a study. The modalities it considered fundamental to the establishment of a credible zone were free and direct negotiations between the States of the region and mutual reassurances. It pointed out that its view was consistent with those of several authoritative international bodies. Israel further insisted that a nuclear-weapon-free zone must be seen in a broad security context in order to be credible.

The Netherlands believed that some necessary conditions for the establishment of a zone had not been brought into focus in the draft, but was pleased with the request for a study. The United States noted, with regard to the fifth paragraph of the preamble (see below), that the issue of appropriate measures for the protection of nuclear facilities was currently under consideration in the Conference on Disarmament. The United States had not determined that additional measures were required.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the revised draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 43/65. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 of 9 December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983, 39/54 of 12 December 1984, 40/82 of 12 December 1985, 41/48 of 3 December 1986 and 42/28 of 30 November 1987 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, and in particular paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Emphasizing the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing also the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

Bearing in mind the consensus reached by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

Desirous of building on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Emphasizing the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Urges* all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Calls upon* all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. *Invites* those countries, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

4. *Also invites* those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

5. *Invites* the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the present resolution;

6. *Extends its thanks* to the Secretary-General for his report containing the views of parties concerned regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

7. *Takes note* of the above-mentioned report;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to undertake a study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, taking into account the circumstances and characteristics of the Middle East, as well as the views and the suggestions of the parties of the region, and to submit this study to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;

9. *Requests* parties of the region to submit to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions with respect to the measures called for in paragraph 8 above;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session a progress report on the implementation of the present resolution;

11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"

Study on scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security

On 31 October, the Byelorussian SSR, Hungary, India, Poland, Sri Lanka and Venezuela submitted a draft resolution entitled "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security". In introducing it on 8 November, India recalled that increasing amounts of resources were being devoted to developing new weapons systems, which caused uncertainty and insecurity. Developments such as the graduated use of nuclear explosive power, miniaturization and large-scale computing capabilities using micro-electronics, and fuel and laser technology were, in India's view, transforming the security environment for the worse. Therefore work should be initiated to develop a shared perception of the problems involved and to make possible concerted efforts to resolve them.

On 9 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution, which was later also sponsored by Indonesia and Romania. By it, the Secretary-General was requested to follow future scientific and technological developments, especially those which had potential military applications, and to evaluate their impact on international security, and to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session. Member States were invited to establish panels at the national level to monitor and evaluate such developments and disseminate the assessments provided by the Secretary-General's experts.

On 17 November, the Committee approved the revised draft resolution by a recorded vote of 109 to 7 (Western and associated States), with 14 abstentions. Eight States explained their positions on it.

The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States explained their negative votes. The Federal Republic agreed with the sponsors that the qualitative aspect of developments and trends relevant to the disarmament process was increasingly a matter for international concern, but held that it was not possible to distinguish clearly between weapon-related technologies and those developed primarily for peaceful non-military purposes. It did not share the thesis that the arms race was determined by technology. The United States considered it both inappropriate and impractical to single out technological developments for international monitoring. In particular, it had serious reservations about paragraph 1 (see below).

The Netherlands and New Zealand explained their abstentions. The Netherlands considered that the draft expressed an unbalanced and negative judgement of technological developments that might have a military application, the underlying premise being that certain technological progress might result in a set-back in disarmament efforts. Although this might be true in certain cases, it could also be said that some technological advances with military applications had a stabilizing influence. New Zealand had similar difficulty with the draft. At the same time, it supported the view that research for peaceful purposes had to be given the highest priority, and therefore it had some sympathy with that objective of the draft.

Australia, Brazil, the German Democratic Republic and Hungary, all of which voted in favour, elaborated on their positions.

Australia supported the central thrust of the draft, but did not agree with the implication that scientific and technological developments applied to military purposes must necessarily have a negative impact on security. Brazil stressed that any attempt to monitor the military application of new scientific and technological developments must not contribute to converting the structural imbalance created by the technological superiority of some countries into a permanent feature.

The German Democratic Republic held that it was necessary to prevent scientific and technological achievements from being used to create new types and systems of weapons and to ensure that scientific and technological progress was applied exclusively for peaceful purposes. In its view, the draft was a

timely initiative. Hungary considered that the inherent threat of an accelerating growth of nuclear war-fighting capabilities, deriving from the nearly automatic use of scientific and technological advances for military purposes, sufficed to prove the timeliness of evaluating scientific and technological developments with potential military applications.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the revised draft resolution, by a recorded vote of 129 to 7, with 14 abstentions, as resolution 43/77 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it unanimously stressed the importance of both qualitative and quantitative measures in the process of disarmament,

Observing that at no stage since the first special session devoted to disarmament has the qualitative aspect of the arms race been seriously addressed by the international community,

Noting with concern the existing potential in technological advances for application to military purposes, thus escalating the level and sophistication of armaments,

Recognizing that such a development will have a negative impact on the security environment while causing a major setback to disarmament efforts,

Stressing, in this context, the importance of effectively addressing this problem and ensuring that scientific and technological developments are not exploited for military purposes but harnessed for the common benefit of mankind,

Emphasizing that the proposal contained in the present resolution is without prejudice to research and development efforts being undertaken for peaceful purposes,

Recognizing the interests of the international community in the subject and the need to follow closely such developments,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow future scientific and technological developments, especially those which have potential military applications, and to evaluate their impact on international security, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, as appropriate, and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;

2. *Invites* Member States to establish panels at the national level to monitor and evaluate such developments and disseminate the assessments provided by the Secretary-General;

3. *Also invites* all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and proposals as well as the evaluations of the national panels;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session an item entitled "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security"

Conclusion

In 1988, two studies, one on the climatic and other global effects of nuclear war and the other on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures, were completed. During the year, five new studies were called for, on the following subjects: the role of the United Nations in the field of verification; nuclear weapons (a comprehensive update of a study completed in 1980); international arms transfers; the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East; and scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security.

ANNEX

*Composition of study groups**

Group of Consultant Experts to Carry Out a Study on the Climatic and Potential Physical Effects of Nuclear War, including Nuclear Winter

Sune Bergström, Sweden
Gyula Bora, Hungary
Messan K. L. Gnininvi, Togo
G. S. Golitsyn, USSR
Rafael Herrera, Venezuela
Mohammed Kassas, Egypt
Thomas F. Malone, United States
Henry A. Nix, Australia
D.V. Seshu, Philippines
Yasumasa Tanaka, Japan
Ye Duzheng, China

Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures

Lazhar Bou Ouni, Tunisia
Ján Chandoga, Czechoslovakia
Hendrik de Haan, Netherlands
Dragomir Djokic, Yugoslavia
Constantin Ene, Romania
Juan E. Fischer, Uruguay
Ladislav Matejka, Czechoslovakia
Adrianus Mooy, Indonesia
Semen N. Nadel, USSR
Waliur Rahman, Bangladesh
Christian Schmidt, France
Amada Segarra, Ecuador
Darold W. Silkwood, United States
Margaret Vogt, Nigeria

* Inclusion of a name does not necessarily indicate that the expert served for the duration of the Group's mandate.

World Disarmament Campaign and observance of Disarmament Week

Introduction

THE IMPORTANT ROLE THAT WORLD PUBLIC OPINION CAN PLAY IN efforts to promote the cause of disarmament was underlined by the General Assembly in the 1978 Final Document.¹ It was declared that in order for an international conscience to develop and for world public opinion to exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States. The week beginning on 24 October, the date of the founding of the United Nations, was proclaimed Disarmament Week, a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament.

A study on the organization and financing of a world disarmament campaign under the auspices of the United Nations, prepared by the Secretary-General in 1981 at the request of the General Assembly,² emphasized the importance of increasing public awareness of disarmament issues and stressed the need to involve as many segments of the world's population as possible in support of disarmament.

At its second special session devoted to disarmament, in 1982, the General Assembly took a formal decision to launch the World Disarmament Campaign and agreed upon a text defining its objectives. In that text, which was annexed to the Concluding Document of the special session,³ the Assembly recognized the need for additional human, financial and material resources to carry out an effective campaign, and it urged the Secretary-General to explore the possibilities of redeploying existing resources. Furthermore, it recommended the establishment of a trust fund for the Campaign through voluntary contributions from Member States, non-governmental organizations, foundations, trusts and private sources.

¹ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, sect. III, paras. 15, 99-107 and 123.

² A/36/458.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes*, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32, annex V; the Concluding Document is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, appendix 1.

At the regular session of the General Assembly held later in the same year, the Secretary-General submitted a report⁴ concerning the general framework of the Campaign, based on the text adopted by the Assembly at the special session, and the programme of activities for 1983. The report set out the primary purposes of the Campaign as follows: to inform, to educate, and to generate public understanding of and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. It further stated that the Campaign would focus primarily on five major constituencies—elected representatives, the media, non-governmental organizations, educational communities, and research institutes—and that it should be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner. The Assembly approved the general framework and programme of activities outlined in the report and decided that during its following session there should be a pledging conference for contributions from Member States. Accordingly, the First United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign was held in 1983; similar conferences have been held each year since then.

Since the launching of the World Disarmament Campaign, the General Assembly has established three regional centres to provide support for peace and disarmament initiatives in the regions concerned and to co-ordinate the implementation of regional activities under the World Disarmament Campaign. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, located in Togo, was established in 1986; the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America, located in Peru, was established in 1987; and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia, located in Nepal, was established in 1988.

General developments and trends, 1988

The World Disarmament Campaign, which has firmly established its place on the international disarmament scene over the past six years, continued to be a focal point for contact between organizations, research and educational institutes, individuals and the Department for Disarmament Affairs. In spite of persistent financial difficulties, which made it necessary to scale down somewhat the implementation of its programme, the Campaign translated the objectives given to it by the General Assembly and carried out activities that it considered appropriate and useful in furthering its goals.⁵

The Campaign continued to receive firm support from Member States and non-governmental organizations. There was a consensus among delegations at both sessions of the General Assembly that it should continue its

⁴ A/37/548.

⁵ See the report of the Secretary-General on the World Disarmament Campaign, submitted to the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session (A/S-15/9).

positive contribution by informing, educating and generating public understanding of and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament in a balanced, factual and objective manner.

As a part of the efforts to pursue those goals, several conferences were convened during the year within the framework of the Campaign. The United Nations Meeting of Experts on Verification, organized by the Department for Disarmament Affairs in co-operation with the Soviet Peace Committee and financed from the contribution of the USSR to the World Disarmament Campaign Trust Fund, was held at Dagomys, USSR, from 12 to 16 April. The Meeting brought together some 35 high-level experts from more than 20 countries to discuss the conceptual issues and the technical aspects of verification. The Regional Centre in Togo sponsored conferences focusing on disarmament efforts in Africa. From 15 to 19 February, a conference on security, development and confidence-building, within the framework of the Economic Community of Central African States, was convened to begin consideration of a proposed programme of measures aimed at enhancing security, confidence and development among the 10 countries concerned. From 22 August to 2 September, the programme of training on conflict-resolution, crisis prevention and management, and confidence-building among States members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was convened within the framework of the ECOWAS protocols on non-aggression and mutual defence assistance; the meeting was attended by senior military and civilian officials of the States members of ECOWAS. At the end of the year, from 6 to 9 December, the Regional Centre in Peru hosted the Conference of Experts on the Strengthening of Political Co-operation in Latin America and the Caribbean. Some 27 experts from the region, including diplomats, university professors and researchers, participated in the Conference, which addressed multilateral disarmament; co-operation and confidence-building; regional disarmament; disarmament, development and security; and international arms transfers.

The level of contributions pledged by Member States to the Campaign Trust Fund at the Sixth United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign, which was held during Disarmament Week, was significantly higher than that of the previous year. When a final list of pledges for 1988 (updated to March 1989) was issued, \$638,738 had been pledged (of which \$412,406 was earmarked for UNIDIR),⁶ compared with \$234,745 for 1987 (updated to March 1988). For details concerning the Pledging Conference, see "Action by the General Assembly, 1988", below.

In June 1988, the Permanent Representative of Nepal to the United Nations and the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs signed an agreement and a memorandum of understanding that established the United

⁶ The dollar equivalent of contributions pledged in national currencies has been calculated at the United Nations operational rate of exchange in effect as at 31 March 1989, except that contributions paid are recorded at the rate of exchange in effect on the date of the payment or at actual United States dollar amounts, if paid in US dollars.

Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia at Kathmandu. The Centre was officially inaugurated in January 1989.

Action by the General Assembly, 1988

In the course of the forty-third session of the General Assembly, a detailed discussion of the World Disarmament Campaign, the Regional Centres and Disarmament Week took place in the First Committee, and the Sixth Pledging Conference was held. Five draft resolutions were submitted to the Committee, all of which were subsequently adopted by the General Assembly.

World Disarmament Campaign

In response to resolution 42/39 G of 1987, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly a report⁷ on the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign in 1988 and on the programme contemplated for 1989. In the report, the Secretary-General drew particular attention to activities carried out in connection with the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly: for instance, the compilation and world-wide distribution of a disarmament information kit relating to the special session, and daily briefings, information and liaison services, a petition ceremony and a reception hosted by the Secretary-General, which had been organized at Headquarters in connection with the participation of some 1,900 representatives of non-governmental organizations. Other activities noted in the report concerned the Meeting of Experts on Verification, held at Dagomys, USSR (see "General developments and trends, 1988", above), production and dissemination of disarmament information materials, interpersonal communication, special events, and the contribution of the Department of Public Information and United Nations field offices to the goals of the World Disarmament Campaign.

Pursuant to resolution 42/39 G, the Sixth Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign was convened on 27 October, with 66 delegations participating. The Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, speaking on behalf of the Secretary-General, stated that the World Disarmament Campaign was an essential means of reaching out to the public at large and fostering a continuous and growing interest in disarmament matters. He noted, however, that given its limited resources, the Campaign could respond only partially to the numerous requests from the public for balanced and factual information. He therefore expressed the hope that Member States would help to assure the financial viability and thereby the effectiveness of the Campaign.

The President of the Pledging Conference, Mr. Peter Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, observed that the Conference was taking place at

⁷ A/43/642.

a time of significant developments in international relations. Noting that the importance of avoiding any hiatus in the disarmament process and of guiding the process towards concrete results was increasingly recognized, he expressed the hope that Member States would strengthen the World Disarmament Campaign.

In its Final Act, the Conference stated that the Secretary-General would keep a list of pledges made until 31 March 1989, after which the list would be issued. The pledges made at the Sixth Pledging Conference and subsequently until 31 March 1989 were earmarked as follows among the Campaign, UNIDIR and the Regional Centres:⁸

Australia	30,000 Australian dollars
	20,000 Australian dollars ⁹
Austria	10,000 United States dollars
Canada . . .	25,000 Canadian dollars
	25,000 Canadian dollars ⁹
China .	10,000 United States dollars ⁹
Colombia .	1,000 United States dollars ¹⁰
Cyprus .	1,000 United States dollars
Finland .	50,000 Finnish markkaa
German Democratic Republic .	100,000 marks
	50,000 marks ⁹
Germany, Federal Republic of . . .	12,000 United States dollars ^{10, 11}
Greece	5,000 United States dollars
Indonesia .	5,000 United States dollars
Mexico	5,000 United States dollars
Nepal	7,000 United States dollars ¹²
New Zealand .	5,000 New Zealand dollars
	5,000 New Zealand dollars ¹²
Norway .	15,000 United States dollars
	10,000 United States dollars ¹²
Peru .	15,000 United States dollars ¹⁰
Philippines	10,000 Philippine pesos
	5,000 United States dollars
Sweden	150,000 Swedish kronor
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.	20,000 United States dollars ⁹
	200,000 roubles ⁹
Uruguay .	1,000 United States dollars ¹⁰
Zaire	1,000 United States dollars

A draft resolution entitled "World Disarmament Campaign" was submitted to the First Committee by Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. It was later sponsored also by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, the German Democratic Republic, the Philippines and Romania. In introducing it on 7 November,

⁸ See A/CONF.146/2.

⁹ Earmarked for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

¹⁰ Earmarked for the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America.

¹¹ Contribution made in May 1988.

¹² Earmarked for the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia.

Mexico noted that, by the draft, the General Assembly would reiterate its commendation of the manner in which the Campaign had been geared by the Secretary-General in order to guarantee the widest possible dissemination of information; recall that it was essential for the universality of the Campaign to receive the co-operation and participation of all States; and reiterate its regret that most of the States with the largest military expenditures had not so far made any financial contribution to the Campaign. According to the draft, the General Assembly would hold a seventh pledging conference during its forty-fourth session.

On 14 November, the draft was approved by the First Committee by a recorded vote of 128 to none, with 10 abstentions. Three States explained their positions in connection with the vote.

The United States abstained because although it felt that the tone of the draft resolution was more temperate and businesslike than that of previous drafts, it regarded operative paragraph 4 (see below) as inaccurate and inappropriate. The United States considered that most of the States with the largest military expenditures did indeed make financial contributions to the World Disarmament Campaign through their United Nations assessed contributions, and it emphasized that a substantial part of the funding of the Campaign came from those contributions, even though under a decision taken at the second special session on disarmament the Campaign was to be financed solely from voluntary contributions. The United States also believed that voluntary contributions could not, by definition, be made under duress and that language applying such pressure should not appear in a United Nations resolution.

France and the United Kingdom also abstained because they objected to operative paragraph 4 of the draft. The United Kingdom pointed out that it paid just under 5 per cent of the United Nations regular budget, part of which was used to fund United Nations services in support of the World Disarmament Campaign. In the financial years 1988 and 1989, the United Kingdom had contributed about \$76,000 to the World Disarmament Campaign budget. In addition, it had devoted a substantial sum of money to disarmament information activities of its own, which were consistent with the aims of the Campaign. France stressed that it had contributed over \$2 million to UNIDIR since the establishment of the Institute. It had therefore participated in the international community's efforts in the area of scientific research, which was one of the fundamental aspects of the World Disarmament Campaign.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 144 to none, with 10 abstentions, as resolution 43/76 C. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in paragraph 15 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it declared that it was essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation and stressed the importance of mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament,

Recalling also its resolution 42/39 G of 30 November 1987,

Having examined the reports of the Secretary-General of 19 May 1988 and 4 October 1988 on the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign by the United Nations system,

Having also examined the part of the report of the Secretary-General of 10 October 1988 dealing with the activities of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies relating to the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign, as well as the Final Act of the Sixth United Nations Pledging Conference for the Campaign, held on 27 October 1988,

1. *Reiterates its commendation* of the manner in which, as described in the above-mentioned reports, the World Disarmament Campaign has been geared by the Secretary-General in order to guarantee "the widest possible dissemination of information and unimpeded access for all sectors of the public to a broad range of information and opinions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament and the dangers relating to all aspects of the arms race and war, in particular nuclear war";

2. *Recalls* that, as was also agreed by consensus in the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, it is likewise an essential requisite for the universality of the Campaign that it receive "the co-operation and participation of all States";

3. *Endorses once more* the statement made by the Secretary-General on the occasion of the Third United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign to the effect that such co-operation implies that adequate funds be made available and that consequently the criterion of universality also applies to pledges, since a campaign without world-wide participation and funding will have difficulty in reflecting this principle in its implementation;

4. *Reiterates its regret* that most of the States that have the largest military expenditures have not so far made any financial contribution to the Campaign;

5. *Decides* that at its forty-fourth session there should be a seventh United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign, and expresses the hope that on that occasion all those Member States that have not yet announced any voluntary contribution may do so;

6. *Reiterates its recommendation* that the voluntary contributions made by Member States to the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund should not be earmarked for specific activities inasmuch as it is most desirable that the Secretary-General enjoy full freedom to take the decisions he deems fit within the framework of the Campaign previously approved by the General Assembly and in exercise of the powers vested in him in connection with the Campaign;

7. *Notes with appreciation* that the Secretary-General has given permanent character to his instructions to the United Nations information centres and regional commissions to give wide publicity to the Campaign and, whenever necessary, to adapt, as far as possible, United Nations information materials to local languages;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session a report covering both the implementation of the programme of activities of the Campaign by the United Nations system during 1989 and the programme of activities contemplated by the system for 1990;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "World Disarmament Campaign"

Three draft resolutions concerning the Regional Centres were submitted to the First Committee and subsequently adopted without a vote by the General Assembly. While considering these drafts, the First Committee had before it reports of the Secretary-General on the functioning of the established Centres in Africa and Latin America and on the establishment and functioning of the new Centre in Asia.

In his report on the Regional Centre in Africa,¹³ the Secretary-General recalled that the Centre had been set up in 1986 to provide substantive support for initiatives and other efforts of African States towards the realization of measures of peace, arms limitation and disarmament in the region, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), as well as to co-ordinate the implementation of activities in Africa under the World Disarmament Campaign. The Secretary-General stated that the scope and activities of the Centre had evolved from that overall mandate and included the organization of training programmes on the peaceful settlement of disputes, the prevention and management of crises and the building of confidence among African States, seminars and conferences, research and study, advisory services to Member States, and the dissemination of information and documentation.

The members of the African Group submitted a draft resolution entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa". In introducing the draft on 7 November, Zaire stated that the Centre had been implementing the programme of action contained in the Lomé Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa, which had been adopted at a colloquium organized jointly by the Department for Disarmament Affairs and OAU in 1985. If the Centre were to continue its activities, Zaire stressed, it would have to have sufficient resources from voluntary contributions by Member States and international, governmental and non-governmental organizations. The draft resolution contained an appeal for contributions to be used to strengthen the functioning of the Centre.

On 14 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. In explaining its position, France stated that it associated itself with the consensus on the item, to which it attached special importance. It had decided to make a voluntary contribution of 20,000 francs to the Centre in 1989, which it wished to be used to carry out a study, in collaboration with UNIDIR, on information sources concerning confidence-building measures and disarmament, security, and in particular military expenditures in Africa.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 43/76 D. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/151 G of 16 December 1985, 41/60 D of 3 December 1986 and 42/39 J of 30 November 1987,

Taking note of the Political Declaration adopted by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, in which the Heads of State or Government, *inter alia*, reaffirmed the need to strengthen the role of the regional bodies in mobilizing support for the World Disarmament Campaign and, in this regard, welcomed the establishment of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa at Lomé,

¹³ A/43/689.

Bearing in mind resolution AHG/Res.164 (XXIII), adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its twenty-third ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 27 to 29 July 1987, by which it, *inter alia*, endorsed the Lomé Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa and the Programme of Action for Peace, Security and Co-operation in Africa,

Taking into account the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Expresses its satisfaction* that the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, inaugurated on 24 October 1986, has become operational;
2. *Commends* the Secretary-General for his efforts in taking the necessary measures to ensure the effective functioning of the Centre, and requests him to continue to lend all the necessary support to the Centre;
3. *Expresses its gratitude* to the Member States and the international, governmental and non-governmental organizations that have already made contributions to ensure the functioning of the Centre;
4. *Appeals once again* to Member States, as well as to international, governmental and non-governmental organizations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen the effective functioning of the Centre;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session on the implementation of the present resolution.

In his report to the General Assembly on the functioning of the Regional Centre in Latin America,¹⁴ the Secretary-General stated that the initial activities of the Centre had focused on disseminating information and on establishing contacts with relevant institutions and organizations, as well as responding to written and oral queries received from the public, with a view to generating wider support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. The Centre was also making efforts to set up a reference and documentation service that could be used by organizations and individuals concerned with issues of peace, security, disarmament and development.

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nepal, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela submitted a draft resolution entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America", which was later also sponsored by Ecuador and Togo. In introducing it on 8 November, Peru expressed its support for the three Regional Centres and stated that their establishment was testimony to the desire of the peoples of those regions to support the cause of peace. Peru explained that in order to make very clear what the field of action of the Regional Centre in Lima should be, the sponsors were proposing that the words "and the Caribbean" be added to the name of the Centre. The sponsors of the draft resolution were aware that, given the financial difficulties of the United Nations, voluntary contributions of Member States to the Regional Centre would be absolutely necessary.

On 14 November, after the sponsors had orally made several minor revisions, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

¹⁴ A/43/614.

Although it joined in the consensus because it supported the past work of the Regional Centre and its plans for the future and agreed with the initiative to rename it, Chile had difficulties with the third and sixth paragraphs of the preamble, which cited documents in whose formulation it had not participated and which made broad reference to economic, political and social concepts with which it did not fully agree. Cuba stressed that, operating in the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign, the Regional Centres were mandated to disseminate information on disarmament in order to promote public awareness of the subject, and it reminded Members that, in the priorities established with regard to disarmament, emphasis should be placed on the achievement of nuclear disarmament and on the adoption of practical measures to prevent the outbreak of a world war, which would be a nuclear war.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 43/76 H. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 41/60 J of 3 December 1986 and 42/39 K of 30 November 1987,

Welcoming the inauguration of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America on 9 October 1987,

Recalling also the Acapulco Commitment to Peace, Development and Democracy signed by the heads of State of States members of the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Concerted Political Action on 29 November 1987, as well as the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Permanent Mechanism held at Cartagena, Colombia, in February 1988,

Taking into account that the scope of action of the Centre includes Latin America and the Caribbean,

Also welcoming the holding by the Centre of the Workshop-Seminar of Experts on Disarmament from 4 to 6 May 1988,

Taking note of the final documents of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Nicosia from 5 to 10 September 1988,

Expressing its gratitude to the Member States that have made valuable contributions to the functioning of the Centre,

Convinced that in carrying out its activities the Centre will seek to promote relationships based upon mutual confidence and security among countries of the region in a spirit of harmony, solidarity and co-operation aimed at the implementation of measures that foster peace, disarmament and social and economic development in Latin America and the Caribbean,

1. *Reaffirms* that the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America, in conformity with its mandate contained in resolution 41/60 J, is called upon to explore new avenues for concerted political action among the countries of the region and to strengthen further the intra-Latin American and Caribbean links in a framework of harmony, solidarity and co-operation that will enable the region to become an effective area of peace;

2. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the holding of the Conference of Experts on the Strengthening of Political Co-operation in Latin America and the Caribbean in the fields of peace, disarmament, development and security, within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign, at Lima from 6 to 9 December 1988, which will also examine various conceptual and organizational aspects of the Centre to enable it to fulfil its objectives;

3. *Recommends* that the Centre hold two meetings during 1989 with a view to reaffirming its role as a centre for documentary collection, diffusion and dissemination, as a forum for the promotion of peace, disarmament and development measures in the context of the World Disarmament Campaign and as an organ for the co-ordination of studies, research and programmes in the fields of its competence;

4. *Invites once again* Member States and international, governmental and non-governmental organizations to make voluntary contributions to the Centre;

5. *Decides* to rename the Centre "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean";

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit that appeal to all Member States in order to ensure the effective functioning of the Centre;

7. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session on the implementation of the present resolution.

The Secretary-General reported¹⁵ to the General Assembly at its forty-third session that the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia had been established in June 1988 on the basis of existing resources and of voluntary contributions by Member States. As of July 1988, the Government of Nepal had pledged a contribution of \$14,000 to the Centre. Rissho Kosei-Kai, a Japanese non-governmental organization, had contributed \$15,750. The Secretary-General emphasized in his report that in view of the continuing financial crisis of the Organization, it would not be possible to realize any savings from the regular budget for the financing of the Centre. The Centre would therefore need voluntary contributions from Member States and interested organizations and individuals in order to meet basic administrative costs and staffing needs and in order to be able to carry out substantive activities.

Nepal submitted a draft resolution entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia". In introducing it on 8 November, Nepal expressed its appreciation of the fact that it had been designated as the headquarters of the Centre. It stated that the inauguration of the Centre would take place early in 1989 and would coincide with a meeting of representatives of some fifteen countries to discuss the future work and priorities of the Centre. It felt that the Centre had great potential in enhancing public awareness in Asia of complex matters related to arms control and disarmament, and could play a useful role in co-ordinating the efforts of the Asian countries in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to an atmosphere of mutual trust and co-operation.

On 14 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote.

Australia joined in the adoption of the draft by consensus because it believed that the Centre could contribute to a serious examination of disarmament issues in Asia. However, it expressed concern that the proliferation of such regional centres could duplicate the work of other organizations, create pressure on the United Nations regular budget at a time of stringency, and drain the capacity of the World Disarmament Campaign.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote as resolution 43/76 G. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 42/39 D of 30 November 1987, by which it decided to establish the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia with headquarters at Kathmandu,

¹⁵ A/43/568.

Taking into account its decision that the Centre should provide, on request, substantive support for the initiatives and other activities mutually agreed upon by Member States of the Asian region for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament through appropriate utilization of available resources, and should co-ordinate the implementation of regional activities in Asia under the World Disarmament Campaign,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the report of the Secretary-General of 19 October 1988;
2. *Welcomes* the signing of an agreement and a memorandum of understanding between the Government of Nepal and the United Nations regarding the establishing of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia;
3. *Commends* the administrative measures taken by the Secretary-General to ensure the establishment and functioning of the Centre, and requests him to continue lending all possible support;
4. *Invites* Member States and interested organizations to make voluntary contributions for the effective functioning of the Centre;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session on the implementation of the present resolution.

Disarmament Week

Pursuant to resolution 42/42 H, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-third session a report¹⁶ containing replies received from 9 Governments, as well as relevant units of the Secretariat, United Nations information centres and international non-governmental organizations, on their activities designed to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week.

On 28 October, the First Committee convened a special meeting to observe Disarmament Week, during which statements were made by the Chairman of the First Committee, the Vice-President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and representatives of the five regional groups.

The Chairman noted the improvement in East-West relations, the alleviation of regional conflicts and the renewal of confidence in the United Nations. He stated that members of the First Committee should reflect this improved atmosphere by striving with more confidence than ever before to build the conditions for peace through more pragmatic and realistic approaches to disarmament. The First Committee must show its determination to seek possibilities for the settlement of major issues in a number of areas, such as radical reductions in nuclear weapons, conventional force reductions, a chemical weapons convention, protection of the non-proliferation régime, limitation of testing, and verification and compliance.

The Vice-President stated that the United Nations was and should remain the centre-piece of internationalism, wherein bilateralism, regionalism and multilateralism could be complementary and mutually supportive in promoting the primary purpose of the Organization: the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security. The United Nations was an indispensable

¹⁶ A/43/508 and Add.1.

tool in the work for disarmament and its role should be constantly supported and strengthened. Prestige was no longer based on the force of arms, but rather—and increasingly so—on readiness to meet the rightful expectations and needs of the entire international community.

The Secretary-General believed that the conclusion and implementation of the INF Treaty and the opening up of prospects for a reduction in strategic nuclear weapons had been accompanied by progress in another sphere: the United Nations had been successful in setting in motion processes and diplomatic activities for bringing peace to troubled regions of the world. He stressed that the momentum towards peace needed to be maintained and carried forward. Credible progress in disarmament, more than anything else, would demonstrate movement towards a new phase of international affairs, promising a better and safer world for all.

The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, speaking on behalf of the Group of African States, observed that regional approaches to disarmament were important elements in the global effort to achieve general and complete disarmament, and that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and regional centres for disarmament were vital to the disarmament process. The African States demanded the denuclearization of Africa and expressed their concern in that connection over the nuclear-weapon capability of South Africa. In addition, they called for the condemnation of, and an immediate end to, the illegal dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa.

Speaking on behalf of the Group of Asian States, the representative of Kuwait said that members of the international community had a major role to play in educating world public opinion concerning disarmament. He went on to urge the First Committee to take advantage of the favourable international climate in order to reach agreements on disarmament which would work in favour of development, peace and security. For the United Nations and other international forums, this was an opportunity to make full use of their great potential and to realize the noble purposes and principles of the Charter.

The representative of the Ukrainian SSR, speaking on behalf of the Group of Eastern European States, affirmed that the role of the United Nations in the disarmament process was invaluable, as security through disarmament could be reached only through joint action and close co-operation among all nations. The members of the Group called upon the United Nations to play its role—which was unique—in identifying basic objectives leading to a nuclear-weapon-free world and in creating an appropriate political atmosphere characterized by confidence and mutual understanding, *glasnost*, and predictability in international affairs.

Speaking on behalf of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, the representative of the Dominican Republic said that the developed countries should understand that development and security were two intimately related objectives for the international community. Just as there could be no real

security based on fear, there could be no security with hunger, destitution, disease and illiteracy. A more just, balanced and symmetrical economic order in international trade and financial relations was a prerequisite for security, which would render the arms race much less necessary throughout the world.

The representative of Austria, speaking on behalf of the Group of Western European and Other States, noted that the observance of Disarmament Week offered an opportunity to reflect not only on the basic aspirations of mankind—freedom, justice and peace—but also on questions such as security. The improvement in East-West relations had produced significant results, creating favourable conditions for the achievement of further progress in disarmament. The members of the Group were ready to continue to contribute to disarmament efforts, which should enhance confidence, strengthen security and lead to lasting international peace.

On 27 October, the Department for Disarmament Affairs and the NGO Committee on Disarmament co-sponsored the annual NGO Forum at Headquarters. The Forum addressed the issue of chemical weapons, focusing on what could be done to prevent their further use and what remained to be done to complete a convention that would ban them totally. The Forum was attended by representatives of non-governmental organizations and of the media, and by members of delegations, United Nations staff and other interested individuals. The panellists were Ambassador Max Friedersdorf of the United States, Mr. Ruediger Luedeking of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin of the USSR, Ambassador Chusei Yamada of Japan and two NGO representatives, Mr. Kyle Olson (Chemical Manufacturers Association) and Mr. Gordon Burck (Federation of American Scientists).

A draft resolution entitled “Disarmament Week” was submitted to the First Committee by Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Japan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mongolia, New Zealand, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam, later joined by Afghanistan, Cuba, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines and Samoa. In introducing it on 8 November, Mongolia stated that Member States continued to view Disarmament Week as an excellent opportunity to reaffirm their commitment to strengthen international peace and security, pursue disarmament and alert world public opinion about that cause. Although the draft resolution was similar to corresponding texts of previous years, the sponsors had, in a spirit of compromise and co-operation and in the light of the positions of a number of delegations, made serious efforts to achieve new formulations by deleting or modifying several passages that appeared in the text of the 1987 resolution. In its preamble, the draft referred to new important developments in arms limitation and disarmament efforts and stressed the vital importance of eliminating the threat of a nuclear and conventional war, ending the nuclear and conventional arms race and bringing about disarmament.

On 14 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote.

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 43/78 G. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Noting that there have been important developments of late in the areas of arms limitation and disarmament efforts which provide a sense of strong encouragement and hope for a more secure world,

Noting at the same time that, despite the positive developments, the arms race still poses a grave threat to world peace and security,

Stressing the vital importance of eliminating the threat of a nuclear and conventional war, ending the nuclear and conventional arms race and bringing about disarmament,

Emphasizing anew the need for and the importance of world public opinion in support of halting and reversing the global arms race in all its aspects,

Taking into account the aspirations of the world public to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth,

Noting with satisfaction the broad and active support by Governments and international and national organizations of the decision taken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, regarding the proclamation of the week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament,

Recalling the recommendations concerning the World Disarmament Campaign contained in annex V to the Concluding Document of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in particular the recommendation that Disarmament Week should continue to be widely observed,

Noting the support for the further observance of Disarmament Week expressed by Member States at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the report of the Secretary-General on the follow-up measures undertaken by States and governmental and non-governmental organizations in holding Disarmament Week;

2. *Commends* all States and international and national governmental and non-governmental organizations for their energetic support of and active participation in Disarmament Week since its first observance ten years ago;

3. *Invites* all States that so desire, in carrying out appropriate measures at the local level on the occasion of Disarmament Week, to take into account the elements of the model programme for Disarmament Week prepared by the Secretary-General;

4. *Invites* Governments to continue, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/71 D of 14 December 1978, to inform the Secretary-General of activities undertaken to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week;

5. *Also invites* international and national non-governmental organizations to take an active part in Disarmament Week and to inform the Secretary-General of the activities undertaken;

6. *Further invites* the Secretary-General to use the United Nations information organs as widely as possible to promote better understanding among the world public of disarmament problems and the objectives of Disarmament Week;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 33/71 D, to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution.

Conclusion

Disarmament Week, an annual event fostering the objectives of disarmament, was again widely observed throughout the world in 1988. The World Disarmament Campaign continued its activities, including the production and dissemination of disarmament information materials and the convening of technical and regional meetings. Many Campaign activities in 1988 revolved round the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. At the Sixth United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign, held during Disarmament Week, Member States expressed their political and financial support for the Campaign. The level of contributions to the Campaign Trust Fund rose significantly in comparison with that of 1987.

The General Assembly adopted five resolutions in connection with the World Disarmament Campaign and Disarmament Week, four of them by consensus and one without any negative votes.

Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

Introduction

AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION, in 1978, the General Assembly decided to establish an advisory board of eminent persons to advise the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies to be carried out under the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation.¹ At its twelfth special session, in 1982, the Assembly discussed possible activities of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, and at its regular session later that year, by resolution 37/99 K, section III, it requested the Secretary-General to revive the Advisory Board (which had not met in 1982) and to entrust it with the following functions:

(a) To advise the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies and research in the area of arms limitation and disarmament carried out under the auspices of the United Nations or institutions within the United Nations system, in particular on the integration of a programme of such studies with a comprehensive programme of disarmament, once this had been established;

(b) To serve as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR);

(c) To advise the Secretary-General on the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign;

(d) At the specific invitation of the Secretary-General, to provide him with advice on other matters within the area of disarmament and arms limitation.²

In 1983 the Secretary-General appointed 22 members to the revived Board, and in 1984, two more. At the two sessions that the Board has held each year since then, it has mainly dealt with disarmament studies in general, the statute and the activities of UNIDIR,³ the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign and the situation in the area of disarmament.

The Advisory Board, in its capacity as Board of Trustees of UNIDIR, prepared a draft statute for the Institute in 1983. The draft was later adopted in revised form by the General Assembly and annexed to resolution 39/148 H.

¹ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. XXV.

² A/38/467; the Secretary-General's 1983 report contained certain reformulations of the language of his note of the previous year.

³ For details concerning the statute, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 8: 1983, chapter XXII, and vol. 9: 1984, chapter XXIV.

In 1987 the Advisory Board submitted to the General Assembly a comprehensive report on United Nations studies on disarmament⁴ containing views that it had expressed at previous sessions. In that report, which was well received by Member States, the Board reaffirmed the significance of studies and research in the field of disarmament and the value of establishing a co-ordinated approach to make the most effective use of the facilities and resources available. The Board noted that, in the course of its work, it had made or prompted proposals for studies. The most recent example was the study on the implications of deterrence for disarmament, which had been submitted to the General Assembly in 1986. In 1985, the Board had discussed the hypothesis of nuclear winter; subsequently a request had been made by the General Assembly for a study to be carried out on the subject of the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter. In discharging its function of advising the Secretary-General regarding the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign, the Board held a thorough exchange of views and noted the improvement and enrichment of the Campaign's activities. At the same time, it expressed concern over the Campaign's shortage of funds and the hope that innovative ways and means could be found to attract new resources. With respect to the Board's own role and methods of work, members felt that there would be merit in the Secretary-General's giving consideration to enlarging the role of the Board so as to permit it to provide advice on any aspect of disarmament to him and through him to the General Assembly.

Sessions of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1988

In 1988, the Advisory Board held its eighteenth and nineteenth sessions, from 26 to 29 April and from 26 to 30 September, in New York under the chairmanship of Ambassador Alfonso García Robles of Mexico. The members of the Advisory Board are listed in annex I to this chapter. At those sessions the following items were on the Board's agenda: (a) situation in the area of disarmament; (b) role of the Board; (c) United Nations studies on disarmament; and (d) implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign. In its capacity as Board of Trustees of UNIDIR, it discussed the activities of the Institute. A comprehensive account of the work of the Advisory Board is contained in the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-third session.⁵

Situation in the area of disarmament

Since the Board's sessions in 1988 were held before and after the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the discussions were mainly influenced by that event.

⁴ For a detailed discussion of that report, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 12: 1987, chap. XIX.

⁵ A/43/685.

In considering the prospects and possibilities of the special session, the Board focused on the relationship between bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations and on methods by which multilateral progress could be reinforced. The Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs invited the independent views of the Board on that matter. In the discussion, members of the Board recognized that there had been significant improvements in the multilateral arena as well as the emergence of new attitudes in Soviet-United States relations, as evidenced by the conclusion of the INF Treaty and the prospects for further disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, between the two major Powers. At the same time, it was noted that armed conflict and dangerous situations persisted in certain parts of the world that did not permit the establishment of conditions conducive to disarmament. The view was expressed that in the past 10 years there had been a marked shift from multilateralism to bilateralism and that multilateralism was in crisis in the social and economic fields as well as in respect of disarmament. There was, however, general agreement that bilateral and multilateral approaches were not in contradiction—on the contrary, they were complementary. It was suggested that perhaps a period of transition was beginning, from which the international community would move into a period of promising developments in the field of multilateral disarmament: multilateral agreements could promote nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, achieve an effective ban on chemical weapons, in due course address outer space issues, and also achieve effective limitations on conventional arms and the transfer of such weapons.

In September, when considering the results of the fifteenth special session, members of the Board expressed their disappointment at the fact that no final document had been adopted. Some members regarded the absence of a final document as a set-back to the cause of multilateral disarmament, feeling that the outcome of the special session was out of step with the broader course of international events. Questioning the value of holding similar special sessions in the future, several members voiced the opinion that it would be better to search for alternative approaches, such as sessions devoted to specific issues appropriately prepared within the framework of the United Nations. Other members, however, were encouraged by the atmosphere that had prevailed at the session and considered that many proposals and suggestions made at it could provide launching points for further actions by the General Assembly.

Role of the Board

The September session of the Board was not the first occasion on which the Board considered the question of its functioning, but new developments in the international situation provided an appropriate opportunity to discuss the matter in greater depth. There was general agreement that the Board should assist the Secretary-General—and thereby the United Nations—more fully in

his efforts to enhance progress in disarmament. Furthermore, the Board felt that it would be appropriate to amend its title to "Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters", as suggested by many delegations during the special session, so as to make it correspond more accurately to the functions set out in its mandate. These as well as other ideas for further improving the Board's work were subsequently brought to the attention of the Secretary-General in a letter from the Chairman of the Board.

United Nations studies on disarmament

At both its sessions, the Board continued to consider the matter of United Nations studies on disarmament and took note of the conclusion of two new studies concerning, respectively, the climatic and other global effects of nuclear war⁶ and the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditures⁷ (see chapter XVII). As the Board had a particular interest in the subject of the latter study, it invited Dr. Mark Harwell of the Global Environmental Program, Center for Environmental Research, Cornell University, United States, to make a presentation on the most recent research on the subject. Responding to questions, Dr. Harwell acknowledged the persistence of many scientific uncertainties. However, he stressed that they did not undermine the validity of conclusions that a major nuclear exchange would seriously affect the global environment and that there would be more casualties from the indirect effects of nuclear war than from the direct effects.

The Board also discussed the question of verification, using as a basis a background paper prepared by UNIDIR. Members of the Board emphasized the significance of the verification issue as well as the difficulties involved. In stressing the complexity of the problem, they underlined the relationship between verification, security and confidence-building.

The Board was informed of a number of proposals submitted at the third special session which might lead to subjects for United Nations study: multilateral verification, developments in nuclear weapons, and certain aspects of conventional arms transfers.

Implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign

In its consideration of the Campaign, the Board took into account the special report of the Secretary-General to the fifteenth special session⁸ as well as his report on the activities of the Campaign carried out in 1988.⁹ During the

⁶ A/43/351, annex. The study was later issued as a United Nations publication (Sales No. E.89.IX.1).

⁷ A/43/368, annex. The study was later issued as a United Nations publication (Sales No. E.89.IX.2).

⁸ A/S-15/9.

⁹ A/43/642.

exchange of views, members expressed their satisfaction with the activities carried out in pursuit of the Campaign's primary purposes of informing, educating, and generating public support and understanding for the objectives of the United Nations in arms limitation and disarmament. They emphasized the value of regional conferences, seminars and meetings of experts as well as the need for greater involvement on the part of educational communities and elected representatives. Noting that the level of contributions from Member States to the Campaign Trust Fund had declined markedly from 1985 on, the Board expressed concern lest the shortage of funds should have serious implications for future activities and hoped for further support from Member States to assure the viability of the Campaign. Members expressed particular interest in the work of the United Nations Regional Centres in Africa, Asia and Latin America and recommended that the Department for Disarmament Affairs, with the assistance of Member States, should enhance the role and promote the work of those Centres in accordance with their mandates.

Following established practice, the Board invited representatives from the co-ordinating bodies of non-governmental organizations to address it at its September session. In their remarks, the representatives stated that the outcome of the special session had underlined the need for broader public support for United Nations disarmament activities and they noted with appreciation the co-operation extended to them before, during and after the special session by the Department for Disarmament Affairs. They also expressed general satisfaction with material prepared by the Campaign, although their organizations would favour more visual material and a more imaginative style of presentation. They welcomed the fact that the Campaign had facilitated the establishment of a communication network among non-governmental organizations in the field of disarmament. Members of the Board expressed appreciation to the representatives for the contributions and constructive efforts of their organizations and to the Department for Disarmament Affairs for its part in the conduct of the Campaign.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

In its capacity as Board of Trustees of UNIDIR, the Board considered and approved the report of the Director on the activities of the Institute in 1988 for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-third session.¹⁰ (For an outline of the programme of work of UNIDIR, see annex II.) It also considered and approved the proposed programme of work and draft budget for 1989¹¹ in the light of the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. The Board expressed its satisfaction at the growing ability of the Institute to conduct independent research on disarmament-related problems and its belief that the potential of UNIDIR for

¹⁰ A/43/687, annex.

¹¹ A/43/685, paras. 44-51.

carrying out research of a specialized or highly expert nature should be further encouraged. While noting the significant increase in the number of donors, which it believed reflected the international community's increasing recognition of the value of the Institute's work, the Board stressed the need for appropriate financial support in order to ensure the continued viability and development of the Institute. In accordance with the respective provisions of the Institute's statute, the Board recommended a subvention from the regular budget of the United Nations amounting to \$221,100 for 1989. On 21 December, the General Assembly adopted resolution 43/218 A on revised budget appropriations for the biennium 1988-1989, thereby approving the subvention.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1988

In the discussions on the issue of United Nations disarmament machinery during the special and regular sessions of the General Assembly, several Member States expressed their views regarding the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies. The twelve Member States of the European Community emphasized, in a document submitted to the Assembly at its special session,¹² that the Board, besides serving as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR, had an important role to play in co-ordinating studies so as to avoid overlapping between those carried out by experts appointed by the Secretary-General and those of a more academic nature. In their opinion, that role as well as the function of considering and recommending guidelines for disarmament studies should be strengthened. In a working paper,¹³ some socialist States expressed the view that greater use should be made of the potential of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board, which brought together well-known disarmament specialists from many Member States. They also pointed out that proposals to enhance the Board's effectiveness and expand its authority, involving it more actively in the consideration of disarmament questions and the strengthening of international security, deserved support. It was felt that it would be appropriate for the Board, in considering certain questions, to call upon noted scholars and leading specialists from various countries.

Conclusion

In discharging its functions in 1988, the Advisory Board continued its deliberations on the main issues on its agenda. As it met shortly before and after the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, its work was strongly influenced by that event. The Board discussed in depth the situation in the area of disarmament as well as its own role and functioning. With regard to the latter, a number of proposals were put forward for consideration by the Secretary-General with a view to enhancing the effectiveness

¹² A/S-15/43, annex.

¹³ A/S-15/AC.1/2.

of the Board's work. In considering the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign, the Board noted with appreciation the manner in which Campaign activities were being carried out. As Board of Trustees of UNIDIR, it expressed its satisfaction at the growing ability of the Institute to conduct independent research on disarmament-related problems and its belief that this potential should be further expanded. Recognizing the need for appropriate financial support for the Institute, the Board recommended a subvention of \$221,100 from the regular budget of the United Nations, which was later approved by the General Assembly.

ANNEX I

Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

Oluyemi Adeniji, Ambassador of Nigeria to France

Hadj Benabdelkader Azzout, Ambassador of Algeria to the United Kingdom

Rolf Björnerstedt, Chairman, Governing Board of the Alva and Gunnar Myrdal Foundation, Stockholm, Sweden

James E. Dougherty, Professor of Politics, Saint Joseph's University, Philadelphia, United States

Omran El-Shafei, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt

Constantin Ene, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania

Alfonso García Robles, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

Ignac Golob, Ambassador of Yugoslavia to Austria

A. C. S. Hameed, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sri Lanka

Ryukichi Imai, Ambassador of Japan to Mexico

Boris P. Krasutin, First Deputy Director, International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR

Björn Inge Kristvik, Director General, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway

Carlos Lechuga Hevia, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Liang Yufan, Ambassador, Bureau of Foreign Affairs, Shanghai, China

Ronald Mason, School of Molecular Science, University of Sussex, United Kingdom

William Eteki Mboumoua, formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cameroon

Manfred Mueller, Professor, Institute for International Relations of the Academy of Political Science and Legal Studies, Potsdam, German Democratic Republic

Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, Ambassador of Argentina to France

Edgard Pisani, Chargé de mission auprès du Président de la République française

Maharajakrishna Rasgotra, High Commissioner of India, London, United Kingdom

Friedrich Ruth, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Italy

Amada Segarra, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ecuador

Agha Shahi, Professor Emeritus of International Relations to Universities in Pakistan; Chairman, Islamabad Council on World Affairs, Pakistan

Tadeusz Strulak, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations Office and other international organizations, Vienna

Roland Timerbaev, Ambassador, First Deputy Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations

Jayantha Dhanapala, Director of UNIDIR, is an *ex officio* member of the Advisory Board when it is acting in its capacity as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR.

ANNEX II

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research*

Introduction

The proposal to establish an international institute for disarmament research was put forward by the President of France at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, in 1978. UNIDIR was established at Geneva in 1980 within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). In 1982, the General Assembly, by resolution 37/99 K, decided that UNIDIR should function as an autonomous institution working in close relationship with the Department for Disarmament Affairs and that the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies should function as its Board of Trustees and draft the statute of UNIDIR on the basis of its existing mandate. The Assembly also invited Governments to make contributions to UNIDIR. The statute of UNIDIR was approved by the General Assembly by resolution 39/148 H of December 1984, and it became effective on 1 January 1985.^a

Disarmament research is an integral part of disarmament efforts. The purpose of UNIDIR is to undertake independent research on disarmament and related problems, particularly international security issues. According to article II of its statute, the Institute aims at:

- (a) Providing the international community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the armaments race and disarmament in all fields, particularly in the nuclear field, so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations, towards greater security for all States and towards the economic and social development of all peoples;
- (b) Promoting informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts;
- (c) Assisting ongoing negotiations on disarmament and continuing efforts to ensure greater international security at a progressively lower level of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, by means of objective and factual studies and analyses;
- (d) Carrying out more in-depth, forward-looking and long-term research on disarmament, so as to provide a general insight into the problems involved, and stimulating new initiatives for new negotiations.

UNIDIR takes into account relevant recommendations of the General Assembly and works on the basis of the provisions of the 1978 Final Document. It carries out its research projects within the Institute or commissions individual experts or research organizations. The Director of UNIDIR reports annually to the General Assembly on the Institute's activities.

UNIDIR has a fellowship programme to enable scholars from developing countries to do research on disarmament and related international security issues at the Institute. In 1988 UNIDIR had visiting fellows from Algeria, Brazil and Pakistan. In addition, interns from Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland (a non-member of the United Nations) and the United States worked in UNIDIR during the year.

Voluntary contributions from States and public and private organizations constitute the principal source of financing of the Institute's activities. A subvention towards meeting the costs of the Director and the staff of the Institute is provided from the regular budget of the United Nations, in conformity with the provisions of the Institute's statute.

During the period under review, the following countries made contributions to the Institute's Trust Fund, which were used to finance the 1988 work programme of the Institute: Australia, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Switzerland and the Soviet Union. In addition, under an agreement with the Government of Japan, a three-year project (1986-1989) for the establishment of a data base on disarmament is being financed from the Trust Fund for interest on the Contributions to the United Nations Special Account.

* Text contributed by UNIDIR.

^a For further details on the origin of UNIDIR, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 6: 1981, chapter XX and annex II, and vol. 7: 1982, chapter XXIII and annex II.

Programme of work, 1988

Conference of Disarmament Research Institutes on the topic “Disarmament research: agenda for the 1990s”

The Conference, organized by UNIDIR with the assistance of the Institute for World Economics and International Relations of the USSR, was held from 22 to 24 March at Sochi, Soviet Union.

Over 50 participants, representing 46 institutes and organizations from different regions of the world, met to strengthen the co-operative links within the international disarmament research community and to hold a productive exchange of views on the conceptual framework for the disarmament process in the next decade. The proceedings of the Conference were published in a research report, which was distributed to all delegations attending the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly.

UNIDIR Newsletter

As a means of maintaining and developing co-operation among research institutes in the field of disarmament, international security and other related fields, UNIDIR commenced the publication, in English and French, of a quarterly *Newsletter* in 1988. Four issues were published. Each issue focuses on a specific topic (see “Publications”, below) and also contains a number of regular items, such as announcements of conferences and news from institutes.

Conventional disarmament in Europe

As part of the preparation for a conference on conventional disarmament in Europe, scheduled for January 1989, research reports reflecting different perspectives were prepared, one of which was published in 1988.

National security concepts

The project on national concepts of security of States has been a standard element in the Institute's work programme for several years. A series of monographs on a number of countries was undertaken in a revised format.

Pilot project on a computerized data base on disarmament

Under the action programme elaborated in 1987, the project continued its work of expanding, updating and maintaining the computerized sample files on the experience and evaluation of the Final Act of Helsinki, with particular attention to confidence- and security-building measures, and on verification questions.

In connection with the UNIDIR research project on “Medium-term perspectives in disarmament and arms limitation”, a file was created to store data extracted from the official records of the General Assembly on questions relating to the fifteenth special session and to compile statements of government representatives.

Information on the project and its sample outputs was sent to research institutes working in the field of disarmament and international security. By the end of August a large number of institutes had responded positively, providing information on their own data bases and/or other activities and expressing a wish to establish arrangements for a reciprocal flow of information. Work has commenced on these arrangements.

Medium-term perspectives in disarmament and arms limitation

A survey of medium-term perspectives in the field of disarmament and arms limitation was conducted with a view to addressing the major problems, the required measures and the ways and means of defining the agenda for future research. The survey was conducted among two

different groups: Governments and research institutes working in the field of disarmament and arms control. The responses are being collated and analysed, and the results will be published some time in 1989.

Verification

A research project was initiated on the topic "National concepts of verification", which analyses in detail the views on the problem of verification held by States participating in multilateral disarmament negotiations.

A separate project on the technical aspects of verification, under the title "Verification by airborne systems", was undertaken in 1988. It seeks to provide a comprehensive guide to the potential of remote-sensing techniques in airborne systems, examining the technical, legal and operational considerations involved.

Outer space

Following the successful conclusion of the first research project on outer space, which resulted in the UNIDIR publication *Disarmament: Problems related to Outer Space*, a second project was undertaken in 1988. It deals with problems of definition and demarcation in the prevention of an arms race in outer space and entails the pooling, through UNIDIR, of the knowledge of an international group of scientific and legal experts with a view to providing a variety of approaches that the international community could adopt in that regard. The group held its first meeting in October.

Publications

Several publications were issued in 1988 and are on sale through the regular channels for the distribution of United Nations publications. The publications are the following:

Research reports

Interrelationship of Bilateral and Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations/Les relations entre les négociations bilatérales et multilatérales sur le désarmement, Proceedings of the Baku Conference, 2-4 June 1987/Actes de la Conférence de Bakou, 2-4 juin 1987, Geneva, UNIDIR, 1988 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E/F.88.0.1), 258 p.

Disarmament Research: Agenda for the 1990's/Le désarmement: Programme pour les années 90, Proceedings of the Sochi Conference, 22-24 March 1988/Actes de la Conférence de Sochi, 22-24 mars 1988, Geneva, UNIDIR, 1988 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E/F.88.0.3), 164 p.

Conventional Disarmament in Europe, by André Brie, Manfred Müller, Helga Schirmeister and Andrezj Karkoszka, Geneva, UNIDIR, 1988 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.88.0.6), 55 p. (also available in French).

Arms Transfers and Dependence, by Christian Catrina, published for UNIDIR by Taylor and Francis (New York, London), 1988, 409 p.

Research papers

A Legal Approach to Verification in Disarmament or Arms Limitation, Geneva, UNIDIR, Research Paper No. 1, September 1988 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.88.0.2), 70 p. (also available in French).

Verification Problems of the Washington Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles, Geneva, UNIDIR, Research Paper No. 2, October 1988 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.88.0.7), 62 p. (also available in French).

UNIDIR Newsletter

First issue, March 1988 "Disarmament Development/Désarmement Développement", 16 p.

Second issue, June 1988, "Research in Africa/La recherche en Afrique", 28 p.

Third issue, September 1988, "Confidence-building Measures and Limitation of Conventional Disarmament in Europe/Mesures de confiance et Limitation des armements classiques en Europe", 32 p.

Fourth issue, December 1988: "Research in Asia and the Pacific/La recherche en Asie et dans le Pacifique", 40 p.

Programme of work, 1989

The programme of work for 1989 includes the final phase of a three-year project to establish a *computerized data base on disarmament* derived from United Nations documents, government statements, parliamentary records and scientific literature on selected security and disarmament issues; and the publication of monographs in the continuing series on *national concepts of security*, including national approaches to disarmament.

Under its *fellowship programme* for research scholars from developing countries, UNIDIR envisages four fellowships for work at the Institute in 1989.

A conference on "*Conventional disarmament in Europe: options and perspectives*", originally envisaged for 1988, was postponed to January 1989. It will bring together diplomats, government officials, scholars and researchers, and experts from non-aligned countries and regions other than Europe.

Research guides to the proceedings of the Conference on Disarmament will be written on specific items on the agenda of the Conference, identifying the issues involved and tracing the evolution of the discussion, the principal proposals made and the positions of delegations.

UNIDIR will continue the publication of the quarterly UNIDIR *Newsletter* to enhance contacts with and among research institutes and individual experts in various parts of the world.

The programme on *verification in disarmament* will involve completion of an existing research project to establish a comprehensive guide to the potential of remote-sensing techniques in airborne systems for verification of arms control agreements; and a research project to elaborate a repertory of methods, procedures and techniques concerning verification of the treaties and agreements currently in force.

The programme on *disarmament and development* will involve three activities: (a) preparation of a report defining the interrelationship of disarmament and development; (b) the preparation of a report setting out possible strategies for converting resources from military to civilian uses; and (c) in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs, specific tasks in monitoring military expenditures throughout the world by means of an examination of existing publications.

A research project involving a comprehensive analysis of the *security of third-world countries* will be conducted by a group of scholars representative of the political and geographical diversity of the third world. The project, which will be approached both from a regional perspective and in its totality, will examine the military-strategic aspects of security and the economic or non-military aspects.

Over the period 1988-1989, some 15 experts from a wide range of regions and countries with space capabilities are analysing the problems of definition and demarcation in the prevention of an arms race in *outer space*.

A symposium on *defensive strategies, defensive postures and disarmament*, arranged by UNIDIR in New York, together with the United Nations Association of the United States and the Max Planck Society of the Federal Republic of Germany, will examine the concept of non-provocative defence with a view to investigating its feasibility as a disarmament measure designed to achieve security at lower levels of armaments and its impact on strategic concepts and approaches. The participants will include academics, diplomats and military specialists from diverse countries.

A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX I

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

The data contained in this appendix have been furnished by the Secretary-General in cases where he is the depositary of the treaties or agreements concerned and by those Governments that are depositaries in the other cases.

The Secretary-General is the depositary of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques; the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; and the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

France is the depositary of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

Mexico is the depositary of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America are depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

The United States of America is the depositary of the Antarctic Treaty.

The Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation is the depositary for the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga).

Inclusion of information concerning the treaties and agreements of which the Secretary-General is not the depositary is as reported by the respective depositaries and implies no position on the part of the United Nations with respect to the data reported.

The total number of parties has been calculated on the basis of information received from the depositary Governments.

Actions reported in the period 1 January to 31 December 1988

The following list shows actions reported,^a if any, during the period 1 January to 31 December 1988 with regard to the arms regulation and disarmament agreements for which full information

^a Accession is indicated by (a), acceptance by (A) and succession by (s). In the case of multi-depositary clauses which make the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America depositaries, depositary action may be completed with one or more of the several depositaries. The letters "M", "L" and "W" indicate where the reported action was completed: "M" for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Moscow), "L" for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (London), and "W" for the United States of America (Washington).

is provided in the third edition of *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.^b

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

SIGNED AT GENEVA: 17 June 1925

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions take effect on the date of the notification of the depositary Government

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: France

NEW PARTIES: Bahrain — 9 December 1988 (a)^c
Saint Lucia—21 December 1988 (s)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 112

The Antarctic Treaty

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON: 1 December 1959

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 23 June 1961

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: United States of America

NEW PARTIES:^d Canada—4 May 1988 (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 38

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

SIGNED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN MOSCOW: 5 August 1963

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 8 August 1963

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1963

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Pakistan — 3 March 1988 (L)
Antigua and Barbuda—16 November 1988 (W) (s)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 117

^b *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 3rd edition: 1987 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.88.IX.5).

^c With the following reservations:

“The said Protocol is only binding on the Government of the State of Bahrain as regards those States which have signed and ratified the Protocol or have acceded thereto;

“The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the Government of the State of Bahrain in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose Allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol;

“The accession by the State of Bahrain to the said Protocol, signed on June 17, 1925, shall in no way constitute recognition of Israel or be a cause for the establishment of any relations of any kind therewith.”

^d Spain and Sweden became consultative parties in September 1988. In addition to the 12 original signatories (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), the following 10 treaty parties have been accorded consultative status: Brazil, China, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay.

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 27 January 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1967

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Afghanistan —17 March 1988 (M) (L)

—21 March 1988 (W)

Antigua and Barbuda—16 November 1988 (W) (s)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 89

**Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
(Treaty of Tlatelolco)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY: 14 February 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each Government individually

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Mexico

TREATY—NEW SIGNATORIES: none

NEW PARTIES: none

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I—NEW PARTIES: none

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II—NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 31^e

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 1 July 1968

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Saudi Arabia—3 October 1988 (W) (a)

Bahrain —3 November 1988 (W) (a)^f

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 139

^e Total includes Brazil and Chile, which have not waived the requirements set out in article 28, and the five nuclear-weapon States and the Netherlands, which have ratified one or both of the Additional Protocols.

^f With the following reservation:

“The accession by the State of Bahrain to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968, shall in no way constitute recognition of Israel or be a cause for the establishment of any relations of any kind therewith.”

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 11 February 1971

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 18 May 1972

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES:	Brazil	— 4 April 1988 (M) ^a
		—10 May 1988 (L)
		—12 May 1988 (W) ^a
	Antigua and Barbuda	—16 November 1988 (W) (s)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 81

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 10 April 1972

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 26 March 1975

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Bahrain—28 October 1988 (L)^b

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 110

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA: 18 May 1977

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 October 1978

^a With the following statement and understanding:

“The Brazilian Government wishes to state that nothing in the present treaty shall be interpreted as in any way prejudicing the sovereign rights of Brazil in the area of the sea, the seabed and its subsoil adjacent to the Brazilian coast, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is the understanding of the Brazilian Government that the word “observation” in Article III, Paragraph 1, of the Treaty refers only to observation that is incidental in the normal course of navigation, in accordance with international law.”

^b With the following reservation:

“The accession by the State of Bahrain to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 1972, shall in no way constitute recognition of Israel or be a cause for the establishment of any relations of any kind therewith.”

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations
NEW PARTIES: Guatemala —21 March 1988 (a)ⁱ
Switzerland — 5 August 1988 (a)^j
Antigua and Barbuda—25 October 1988 (s)^k
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 55

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 18 December 1979
ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 July 1984
DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations
NEW PARTIES: none
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 7

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 10 April 1981
ENTERED INTO FORCE: 2 December 1983
DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations
NEW PARTIES:^l France— 4 March 1988
Cyprus—12 December 1988 (a)^m
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 30

ⁱ Guatemala accepts the text of article III, on condition that the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes does not adversely affect its territory or the use of its natural resources.

^j With the following reservation:

“Because of the obligation incumbent upon it by virtue of its status of perpetual neutrality, Switzerland must make a general reservation specifying that its co-operation in the framework of this Convention cannot go beyond the limits imposed by this status. This reservation refers, in particular, to article V, paragraph 5, of the Convention, and to any similar clause which may replace or supplement this provision in the Convention (or in any other arrangement).”

^k With effect from 1 November 1981, the date on which Antigua and Barbuda assumed responsibility for its international relations.

^l Article 5, subparagraph 2, of the Convention states:

“For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”

^m With the following declaration:

“The Provisions of Article 7, paragraph 3(b), and Article 8 of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) will be interpreted in such a way that neither the status of peace-keeping forces or missions of the United Nations in Cyprus will be affected nor will additional rights be, *ipso jure*, granted to them.”

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT RAROTONGA: 6 August 1985

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 December 1986

DEPOSITARY: The Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation

TREATY—NEW PARTIES: none

PROTOCOL 1—SIGNATORIES: none

PROTOCOL 2—NEW PARTIES: USSR—21 April 1988 (without reservation)

China—21 October 1988

PROTOCOL 3—NEW PARTIES: USSR—21 April 1988 (without reservation)

China—21 October 1988

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 11^a

^a Total includes the two nuclear-weapon States, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which have ratified Protocols 2 and 3.

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1988, as reported by depositaries
(s) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions, acceptances and successions)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Non-proliferation	Sea-Bed	BW Convention	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	Conventional weapons	Treaty of Rarotonga
Afghanistan	r		s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	r		s	
Albania												
Algeria							s					
Angola												
Antigua and Barbuda			r	r	s r	r	r	r	r			
Argentina	r	s r	s r	s r	s		s r	s r	r		s	
Australia	r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	r	s r	s r
Austria	s r	r	s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Bahamas			r	r	s r	r	r	r				
Bahrain	r											
Bangladesh			r	r		r	r	r	r			
Barbados	r		r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r				
Belgium	s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r		s	
Belize						r	r	r				
Benin	r		s r	r		s r	s r	s r	s r			
Bhutan	r		r	r		r	r	r				
Bolivia	r		s r	s	s r	s r	s	s r	s			
Botswana			r	s		s r	s r	s				
Brazil	s r	r	s r	s r	s r†		s r	s r	s r			
Brunei Darussalam						r						
Bulgaria	s r	r	s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	
Burkina Faso	r		s	s r		s r						

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1988, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Non-proliferation	Sea-Bed	BW Convention	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	Conventional weapons§	Treaty of Rarotonga
Burma			S I	S I			S	S				
Burundi			S	S		I	S	S				
Byelussian Soviet Socialist Republic			S I	S I			S I	S I	S I		S I	
Cameroon			S	S		S I	S					
Canada	S I	I	S I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I		S	
Cape Verde			I			I	I	I				
Central African Republic	I		I	S		I	S I	S				
Chad			S I			S I						
Chile	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I†			S I		S I		
China	I	I	I	I	S I			I			S I	S I (P.2&3)*
Colombia			S I	S	S I	S I	S	S I				
Comoros												
Congo						I	I	I				
Cook Islands												S I
Costa Rica			S I		S I	S I	S	S I				
Côte d'Ivoire	I		S I			S I	I	S				
Cuba	I	I		I			I	S I	S I		S I	
Cyprus	I		S I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I		I	
Czechoslovakia	S I	I	S I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I		S I	
Democratic Kampuchea	I					I	S	S I				
Democratic People's Republic of Korea		I				I		I				
Democratic Yemen	I		I	I		S I	S I	S I	S I			

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1988, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Non-proliferation	Sea-Bed	BW Convention	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	Conventional weapons	Treaty of Rarotonga
Haiti			S	S	S I	S I		S				
Holy See	I			S		I			S			
Honduras			S I	S	S I	S I	S	S I				
Hungary	I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I		S I	
Iceland	I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S		S	
India	S I	I	S I	S I			I	S I	S I	S	S I	
Indonesia	I		S I	S		S I		S				
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	I		S I	S		S I	S I	S I	S			
Iraq	I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S	S			
Ireland	I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I		S	
Israel	I		S I	S I								
Italy	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I		S	
Jamaica	I		S	S I	S I	S I	S I	I				
Japan	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	I		S I	
Jordan	I		S I	S	S I	S I	S I	S I				
Kenya	I		I		S I	S I	I					
Kiribati						I						S I
Kuwait	I		S I	I		S	S I	S I	I			
Lao People's Democratic Republic			S I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I		I	
Lebanon	I		S I	S I		S I	S	S I	S			
Lesotho	I			S		S I	S I	S I				
Liberia	I		S I			S I	S	S	S			
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	I		S I	I		S I		I				

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1988, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Aniarcic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Non-proliferation	Sea-Bed	BW Convention	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	Conventional weapons	Treaty of Rarotonga
Pakistan	I	S I	S I	S I				S I	I	I	S I	
Panama	I	S I	S I	S	S I	S I	S I	S I				
Papua New Guinea	I	I	I	I	I	I		I	I			S
Paraguay	I	S	S	S I	S I	S I	S	I				
People's Republic of Kampuchea ^o						I						
Peru	I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I		S I		S		
Philippines	I	S I	S I	S	S I	S I		S I		S I	S	
Poland	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I		S I	
Portugal	S I	S	S			I	I	S I	S		S	
Qatar	I						I	S I				
Republic of Korea	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	I			
Romania	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S	S	
Rwanda	I	S I	S I	S		I	I	S I				
Saint Kitts and Nevis												
Saint Lucia	I						I					
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines												
Samoa		S I										S I
San Marino		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I				
Sao Tome and Principe							I	I	I			
Saudi Arabia	I			I		I	S I	S I				
Senegal	I	S I				S I	S	S I				
Seychelles							I	I				
Sierra Leone	I	S I	S I	S I		I	S	S I	S		S	

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1988, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Non-proliferation	Sea-Bed Convention	BW Convention	EMMOD	Celestial bodies	Conventional weapons [§]	Treaty of Rarotonga
United Republic of Tanzania	I		S I				S	S				
United States of America	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I			S
Uruguay	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S	I		S I		
Vanuatu					(A.P. I&II)							
Venezuela	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I		S I				
Viet Nam	I			I		I	I	I				S
Yemen	I		S			S I	S	S	S I			
Yugoslavia	S I		S I	S	S I	S I	S I	S I				S I
Zaire			S I	S	S I	S I		S I				S
Zambia			I	I								I
Zimbabwe												

NOTE: This table updates, to 31 December 1988, information contained in the Secretary-General's report "Status of multilateral disarmament agreements" (A/43/686) of 25 October 1988. The report is prepared for each regular session of the General Assembly pursuant to resolution 36/92 H of 9 December 1981.

* P. means Protocol to the Treaty of Rarotonga.

† Party has not waived the requirements under article 28 of the Treaty.

‡ A.P. means Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

§ Protocols I, II and III have been accepted except where noted otherwise.

° The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has informed the United Nations that the People's Republic of Kampuchea deposited in Moscow on 25 September 1987 an instrument of accession to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. The total number of accessions to the Treaty (140) includes the accession of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Contribution of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament

Excerpts from the report of the Secretary-General*

...

II. CONTRIBUTION OF THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

A. International Atomic Energy Agency

[For an account of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, see chapter XI above.]

B. International Labour Organisation

In 1988-1989, it has been proposed that ILO research should focus on an analogous study [concerning conversion of industries from military to civilian production] examining the lessons to be drawn from adjustment to structural change in heavy industrial (non-military) branches for the reduction in armament production. Five country-industry cases are to be examined, with particular reference to the adjustment strategies that have been followed by enterprise managements in the restructuring industries, as well as to trade union policies and to various government measures that have been adopted. Their critical evaluation should throw a useful light on the policies to be followed in the case of defence production cuts.

C. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

[FAO referred to its contribution to the 1987 edition of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* and said that it had no additional information to provide on this subject.]

D. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

In 1988, UNESCO, in close co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), reproduced and disseminated widely the comprehensive survey of research in the social and human sciences

* A/43/650. The report was submitted pursuant to resolution 41/59 D of 3 December 1986. By decision 43/422 of 7 December 1988, the General Assembly decided to defer until a later date, to be agreed upon in consultation among Member States, the consideration of the item "Contribution of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament".

in UNESCO's fields of competence on all activities in the field of disarmament, including the causes and consequences of the arms race and the relationship between peace, security, development and disarmament. This study was prepared in 1987.

Furthermore, an informal consultation of researchers in the field of disarmament will be organized at UNESCO headquarters to consider ways of increasing research capacities in the social and human sciences and exchanges of knowledge on these questions.

Finally, in 1989 and in close co-operation with the above-named institutions of the United Nations, an interdisciplinary study group of researchers and experts will be convened with a view to promoting a study of the relationship between peace, security and disarmament, and the possible links between disarmament and educational, scientific and cultural development.

E. *World Health Organization*

[WHO referred to its contribution to the 1987 edition of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*.]

III. CONTRIBUTION OF OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMMES WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

D. *United Nations Environment Programme*

UNEP activities in relation to arms limitation and disarmament fall under the programme area "Peace, security and the environment". The overall goal of this programme is to promote environmental security as a basis for sustainable development. UNEP objectives in this regard are: (a) to increase governmental and public awareness of the environmental impacts of military activities and the arms race; and (b) to increase knowledge and awareness of the impact of environmental deterioration on regional and global security.

In the current biennium, 1988-1989, UNEP is collaborating with the Peace Research Institute, Oslo, to develop widespread understanding of: (a) the concept of international environmental security; and (b) the security dimension of sustainable development. The concept of environmental security has begun to receive attention in recent years, and is addressed in the United Nations document *Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond* (resolution 42/186, annex), and in *Our Common Future*, report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987).

E. *United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research*

[For an account of the work of the Institute, see chapter XIX, annex II.]

List of resolutions and decisions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-third session, held from 20 September to 22 December 1988 (including voting)

*Reference
in text*

Resolutions on disarmament questions

- 43/62 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/25 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 240

Adopted by an unrecorded vote of 149 to none, with 5 abstentions

- 43/63 Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions
Resolution A 218

Adopted by a recorded vote of 136 to 4, with 13 abstentions,^a as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of So-

^a The delegation of Yemen subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

43/63 viet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania,
(cont.) Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yemen

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey

Resolution B

219

Adopted by a recorded vote of 127 to 3, with 21 abstentions,^b as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey

43/64 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

220

Adopted by a recorded vote of 146 to 2, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,

^b The delegation of Samoa subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

43/64
(cont.) Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Israel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

43/65 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 375

Adopted without a vote

43/66 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 251

Adopted by a recorded vote of 116 to 3, with 34 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Kampuchea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Lao Peo-

43/66 ple's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Norway,
(cont.) Poland, Seychelles, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia

43/67 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects

341

Adopted without a vote

43/68 Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the
security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons

231

Adopted by a recorded vote of 117 to 17, with 16 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Greece, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Malta, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Sweden, Uruguay

43/69 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

229

Adopted by a recorded vote of 152 to none, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana,

43/69
(cont.) Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Brazil, India, United States of America

43/70 Prevention of an arms race in outer space

302

Adopted by a recorded vote of 154 to 1, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

43/71 Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa

244

Resolution A—Implementation of the Declaration

Adopted by a recorded vote of 151 to none, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,

43/71
(cont.) Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: France, Israel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution B—Nuclear capability of South Africa

245

Adopted by a recorded vote of 138 to 4, with 12 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

43/71 United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Ven-
(cont.) ezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, Israel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain

43/72 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of
mass destruction and new systems of such weapons 313

Adopted by a recorded vote of 152 to none, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Israel, United States of America

43/73 Reduction of military budgets 352

Adopted without a vote

43/74 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons 285

Resolution A—Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention

43/74 *Adopted without a vote*
(cont.)

Resolution B—Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 288

Adopted without a vote

Resolution C—Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons 286

Adopted without a vote

43/75 General and complete disarmament 174

Resolution A—Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

Adopted by a recorded vote of 141 votes to none, with 12 abstentions,^c as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

^c The delegation of Greece subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

43/75 (cont.)	Resolution B—Relationship between disarmament and development	114
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
	Resolution C—Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	313
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
	Resolution D—Conventional disarmament	338
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
	Resolution E—Nuclear disarmament	177
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
	Resolution F—Conventional disarmament	339
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
	Resolution G—Objective information on military matters	115
	<i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 130 to none, with 10 abstentions,⁴ as follows:</i>	
	<i>In favour:</i> Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe	
	<i>Against:</i> None	
	<i>Abstaining:</i> Algeria, Bahrain, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates	

⁴ The delegation of India subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

43/75 Resolution H—Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field
(cont.) of disarmament

29

Adopted by a recorded vote of 131 to 2, with 20 abstentions,^e as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Israel, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Resolution I—International arms transfers

373

Adopted by a recorded vote of 110 to 1, with 38 abstentions,^f as follows:

In favour: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ger-

^e The delegation of India subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour; the delegations of Chile, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Portugal, Qatar and Somalia had intended to abstain.

^f The delegations of Djibouti and Jordan subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to abstain; the delegations of Chile and Sao Tome and Principe had intended to vote in favour.

43/75
(cont.) many, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire

Against: Djibouti

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, India, Iraq, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Resolution J—Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons

315

Adopted by a recorded vote of 116 votes to 2, with 29 abstentions,⁸ as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Israel, United States of America

⁸ The delegations of Luxembourg and Qatar subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to abstain.

43/75 *Abstaining:* Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela

Resolution K—Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

180

Adopted by a recorded vote of 144 votes to 1, with 7 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France

Abstaining: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Luxembourg, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution L—Naval armaments and disarmament

117

Adopted by a recorded vote of 152 votes to 1, with 1 abstention,^h as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Den-

^h The delegation of Israel subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

43/75 mark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, (cont.) Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Israel

Resolution M—Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

118

Adopted without a vote

Resolution N—Comprehensive United Nations study on nuclear weapons

370

Adopted by a recorded vote of 141 to 1, with 9 abstentions,¹ as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nic-

¹ The delegation of Zaire subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

43/75 (cont.) aragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Resolution O—Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

176

Adopted by a recorded vote of 103 to none, with 46 abstentions,¹ as follows:

In favour: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Zaire

Against: None

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

¹ The delegations of Bhutan, Burundi, the Central African Republic and Swaziland subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to abstain.

- 43/75 Resolution P—Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional
(cont.) disarmament in Europe 340

Adopted without a vote

- Resolution Q—Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile
purposes 318

Adopted by a recorded vote of 129 to 1, with 10 abstentions,^k as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe

Against: Togo

Abstaining: Angola, Bahamas, Barbados, Burkina Faso, Congo, Mali, Niger, United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia

- Resolution R—Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of dis-
armament 23

Adopted without a vote

- Resolution S—Conventional disarmament on a regional scale 340

Adopted by a recorded vote of 125 votes to none, with 23 abstentions,^l as follows:

^k The delegations of Burundi and the Central African Republic subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to abstain; the delegation of Kenya had intended not to participate in the vote.

^l The delegation of Sao Tome and Principe subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour; the delegation of Qatar had intended to abstain.

43/75
(cont.) *In favour:* Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire

Against: None

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Angola, Bahrain, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Resolution T—Dumping of radioactive wastes

318

Adopted by a recorded vote of 141 votes to none, with 13 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the

43/75 Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

43/76 Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly

Resolution A—Disarmament and international security

92

Adopted by a recorded vote of 129 to 1, with 21 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

43/76 Resolution B—Nuclear-arms freeze

182

(cont.)

Adopted by a recorded vote of 135 to 12, with 3 abstentions,^m as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: China, Iceland, Spain

Resolution C—World Disarmament Campaign

385

Adopted by a recorded vote of 144 to none, with 10 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal,

^m The delegation of Portugal subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote against.

43/76 (cont.) New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution D—United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

387

Adopted without a vote

Resolution E—Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

198

Adopted by a recorded vote of 133 to 17, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Greece, Ireland, Israel, Japan

- 43/76 Resolution F—United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory
(cont.) services programme 94

Adopted without a vote

- Resolution G—United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament
in Asia 390

Adopted without a vote

- Resolution H—United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and
Development in Latin America 389

- 43/77 Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted
by the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session

- Resolution A—Scientific and technological developments and their impact on
international security 378

Adopted by a recorded vote of 129 to 7, with 14 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Turkey

- Resolution B—Third special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament 81

Adopted by a recorded vote of 152 to none, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

43/77 *In favour:* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

43/78 Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

Resolution A—Report of the Disarmament Commission

2

Adopted without a vote

Resolution B—Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

19

Adopted by a recorded vote of 127 to 17, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia,

43/78 Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Chile, Colombia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel

Resolution C—International co-operation for disarmament

95

Adopted by a recorded vote of 136 to 1, with 13 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Resolution D—Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter: report of the Secretary-General

361

43/78 *Adopted by a recorded vote of 145 to none, with 9 abstentions, as follows:*

(cont.)

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution E—Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament

178

Adopted by a recorded vote of 135 votes to 13, with 5 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka,

43/78 Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, (cont.) Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Japan

Resolution F—Prevention of nuclear war

196

Adopted by a recorded vote of 136 votes to 3, with 14 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey

Resolution G—Disarmament Week

393

Adopted without a vote

Resolution H—Guidelines for confidence-building measures

96

Adopted without a vote

Resolution I—Report of the Conference on Disarmament

27

43/78 *Adopted by a recorded vote of 96 to none, with 53 abstentions,^a as follows:*
(cont.)

In favour: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zaire

Against: None

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritania, Mexico, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Resolution J—Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security

364

Adopted by a recorded vote of 143 to 1, with 9 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New

^a The delegations of Qatar and Sri Lanka subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to abstain.

43/78
(cont.) Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Resolution K—Comprehensive programme of disarmament 113

Adopted without a vote

Resolution L—Consideration of the declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade 98

Adopted without a vote

Resolution M—Report of the Conference on Disarmament 26

Adopted by a recorded vote of 136 to 3, with 14 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

- 43/78 *Abstaining:* Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, (cont.) Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey
- 43/79 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace 32
Adopted without a vote
- 43/80 Israeli nuclear armament 249
Adopted by a recorded vote of 99 to 2, with 51 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Against: Israel, United States of America
Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Zaire
- 43/81 Verification in all its aspects
- Resolution A—Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements 136
Adopted without a vote
- Resolution B—Study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification 368
Adopted by a recorded vote of 150 votes to 1, as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam,

43/81 Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

43/82 Implementation of the conclusions of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Conference

183

Adopted by a recorded vote of 137 to none, with 11 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire

43/82 *Against:* None
(*cont.*)

Abstaining: Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Guyana, India, Israel, Lesotho, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Decisions

43/422 Contribution of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament 119

Adopted without a vote

43/423 Liability for the illegal transfer and/or use of prohibited weapons and weapons or substances which cause unnecessary human suffering 342

Adopted without a vote

Resolutions on related questions

43/16 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 261

Adopted without a vote

43/50 Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa

Resolution B—Military collaboration with South Africa —

Adopted by a recorded vote of 123 to 2, with 29 abstentions,^o as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

^o The delegation of Vanuatu subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

43/50 *Against:* Israel, United States of America
(cont.)

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Resolution C—Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist régime of South Africa

Adopted by a recorded vote of 123 to 12, with 19 abstentions,^p as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Bhutan, Botswana, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Lesotho, Malawi, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden

Resolution D—Imposition, co-ordination and strict monitoring of measures against racist South Africa

Adopted by a recorded vote of 136 to 4, with 14 abstentions,^q as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize,

^p The delegation of Vanuatu subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

^q The delegation of Vanuatu subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

43/50 (cont.) Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Germany, Federal Republic of, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Austria, Belgium, Equatorial Guinea, France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, Spain

Resolution E—Relations between South Africa and Israel

Adopted by a recorded vote of 106 to 23, with 26 abstentions,^r as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

^r The delegation of Vanuatu subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

43/50 (cont.) *Against:* Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Grenada, Honduras, Japan, Lesotho, Malawi, Malta, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Uruguay, Zaire

Resolution K—Concerted international action for the elimination of *apartheid* —

Adopted by a recorded vote of 149 to 2, with 2 abstentions,⁴ as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Germany, Federal Republic of, Portugal

43/83 Question of Antarctica

⁴ The delegation of Vanuatu subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

43/83 Resolution A
(cont.)

Adopted by a roll-call vote of 100 to none, with 6 abstentions,^{t, u} as follows:

In favour: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: China, Fiji, Ireland, Portugal, Turkey, Venezuela

Resolution B

Adopted by a roll-call vote of 111 to none, with 10 abstentions,^{t, v} as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic

^t See statement by the President of the General Assembly at the 76th plenary meeting (A/43/PV.76, p.72).

^u During the course of the roll-call vote the following members announced that they were not participating: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Uruguay and Viet Nam.

^v During the course of the roll-call vote the following members announced that they were not participating: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay.

43/83 of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, (cont.) Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Ireland, Lesotho, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Paraguay, Portugal, Swaziland

43/84 Strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region —

Adopted without a vote

43/85 Strengthening of regional and international peace and security —

Adopted without a vote

43/86 Need for a result-oriented political dialogue to improve the international situation —

Adopted by a recorded vote of 127 to 1, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,

43/86 Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
(cont.) Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

43/87 Tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration on the Preparation of
Societies for Life in Peace

Adopted by a recorded vote of 128 to none, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

43/88 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of
International Security

119

Adopted by a recorded vote of 128 to 1, with 22 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania,

Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

43/89 Comprehensive approach to strengthening international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations

Adopted by a recorded vote of 97 to 3, with 45 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Israel, Japan, United States of America

Abstaining: Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay

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